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
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TRADITIONAL CULTURAL VALUES, EAST AND WEST

ENTRETIENS:

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY

TRADITIONAL VALUES

Edited by

N. A. NIKAM

(Vice-Chancellor, Mysore University)

With the Co-operation of

G. SIMONDON

(University of Poiters, France)

and

RAJENDRA PRASAD

(Patna University, India)

MYSORE

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
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PREFACE

At the invitation of the Indian Philosophical Congress, The International Institute of Philosophy met for the first time in Asia, in India, under the auspices of the Mysore University. The Indian meeting was a joint-session between an Indian delegation selected by the Indian Preparatory Committee consisting of Members of the Indian Philosophical Congress. The meeting was held under UNESCO's Major Project: Mutual Appreciation of Cultural Values —East and West.

The Indian meeting was made possible with the co-operation of UNESCO, the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, the Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs of the Government of India, the French Government, the Mysore Government, the Swiss Government, the Indian National Commission for UNESCO, the British Council, the Indian Philosophical Congress, the Mysore University and other Universities in India, the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and the University Grants Commission in India. I hereby record my deep sense of gratitude to all of them.

I wish to record my thanks to Professor Humayun Kabir, Minister for Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs and President of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress in inviting the International Institute of Philosophy to India: Without his great help it would not have been possible to organise the meeting. The Indian Preparatory Committee and the Reception Committee of the Mysore University gave the Indian Philosophical Congress wholehearted co-operation.

His Highness Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadeyar, Governor of Mysore and Chancellor of the Mysore University, not only participated in the *Entretiens* but gave a very generous donation of five thousand rupees which made the publication of this volume possible. I hereby record our grateful appreciation of his generous gift.

We are grateful to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India, for having delivered the Presidential Address.

M. Simondon and Dr. Rajendra Prasad have helped the Editor in recording and preparing Notes of the discussion.

The Wesley Press, Mysore, has done excellent work.

N. A. NIKAM
General Secretary,
Indian Philosophical Congress

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STANZAS RECITED AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS, HELD IN MYSORE

On the 29th August 1959

ŚRĪḤ

Mysūru Mahāpaṭṭane sammilitānāṁ antārāṣṭra tattva-Śāstra-vidāṁ mahāsammelanasya udghāṭana-samaye Śrimad-bhārata-rāṣṭropādhyakṣāṇāṁ Doctor Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, M.A., D.Litt. F.B.A. Mahodayānāṁ Sannidhāne Paṭhitā

SVĀGATA PADYA MĀLIKĀ

Yasmin jñāte janeṣu prasavati vimalo bhrātṛ-bhavaḥ suhrtvam
pusṭis-tuṣṭis-samṛddhir-nirupama-vibhavaḥ-samskrterdiptimatvam |
Mānuṣyaṁ yena samyak jagati vijayate dharmamujjīvya satyam
pāyād-vaḥ śāśvataṁ tat prarucira sudhiyām darsanaṁ
bodhapūrṇam || (1).

Śrīmad-bhārata-bhūmi-bhāga-vilasan-mysūru-deśe mahān
Antārāṣṭra-sutatva-darśana-dhiyām sammelanodghāṭanaın |
kartuṁ bhāgya-vaśāt-samāgatavate jñānin pramodena te
Rādhākṛṣṇa budhāgragaṇya tanumaḥ premṇā ca susvāgataṁ || (2).

Susvāgataṁ bhavatu vaḥ sumahāmatīnām
Tattvāva-bodhana-vidhau pari-niṣṭhitānām |
Nānā vicāra-pari-śīlana-pāṭavānām
Deśantarād-api samāgata-paṇḍitānām || (3).

Pāścātya-paurastya-sudhīmaṇīnām
Tattva-prabhodhaika-vacāmsi samyak |
Dharmam ca satyam ca pravisārya nityam
Kurvantu sāhyaṁ jagataḥ praśāntyai || (4).

Sarve janāḥ sapadi tattva-viveka śīlāḥ
svātantrya-pālana-vidhau kṛtino bhavantu |
Śrī-bhāratasya suyaśaḥ pravibhātu loke
Rārājataṁ ca mahimā vibudhāgraṇinām || (5).

Jayatu vibudha-saṁsat-tāttvikānām nitāntam
Jayatu vimala-śāntis-sarva-datrī prajānām |
Jayatu Jayatu Rādhākṛṣṇa-vidvad-varo'yam
Jayatu Sujana-vṛndaḥ prāpta-sarvasva-sāraḥ || (6).

May the vision of enlightenment which, radiates true brotherliness, friendship, prosperity, contentment, plenty, and matchless splendour of culture and which causes the triumph of humanity and true Dharma, ever protect you, sweet-tempered learned men.

Welcome to you, learned Dr. Radhakrishnan, foremost among our Scholars. It is our good fortune that you have come to this City of Mysore, to inaugurate the great International Conference of Philosophers.

Welcome to you all eminent Scholars, devoted to the propagation of truth; you are efficient in the inquiries connected with various problems of Philosophy and you have come here from all parts of the World and India.

May the words of Truth spoken by the wise men of the East and West help to sustain and establish Peace in the World.

May people possess discrimination; and may the glory and fair name of India shine, making successful all her endeavours in achieving the freedom of the human spirit.

May this illustrious Conference of Philosophers be crowned with success.

MOṬAGĀNAPALLI ŚAṄKARA SUBRAHMAṆYA ŚĀSTRĪ,
Āsthāna Vidvān, *Bangalore*.

TVAM-ANTARATAMO'SI GURO!

Tvam-antaratamo'si guro,
he ātma-tamohārin!
Jaṭila-kuṭila tama-antaraṅga-bahu-
bhāva-vipina-sañcārin,
Tvam-antaratamo' si guro,
he ātma-tamohārin!

Janma-janma-satakoṭi-samskāra-
parama-carama-samskārin,
Tvam-antaratamo'si guro,
he ātma-tamohārin!

Pāpa-puṇya-nānā-lalita-rudra-līlā-
rūpa-arūpa-vihārin,
Tvam-antaratamo'si guro,
he ātma-tamoharin!

Kannada Original: *Kuvempu*

THE INMOST GUIDE

Thou art the inmost Guide of my Being,
Oh Dispeller of darkness!

Tangled and devious is the way within,
But thy foot-steps tread their way
through the myriad-mazed forest of mind.
Thou art the inmost Guide of my Being,
Oh Dispeller of darkness!

Thou hast moulded my soul towards a life abundant and ultimate
Through the labyrinth of a million lives.
Thou art the inmost Guide of my Being,
Oh Dispeller of darkness!

Thy sport is grim and gay, through good and evil,
And through the Form and the Formless thou playest hide and seek.
Thou art the inmost Guide of my Being,
Oh Dispeller of darkness!

—*A free rendering of the original.*

SPEECH OF HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA SRI JAYA CHAMARAJA WADIYAR

Governor of Mysore

DR RADHAKRISHNAN, M. BERGER, PROFESSOR KABIR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I extend a very cordial welcome to you all. It is a matter of great pleasure to me to welcome to Mysore M. Gaston Berger, the distinguished President of the International Institute of Philosophy and the Members and other Delegates who are participating in the Entretiens.

It was in Mysore that, forty years ago, Dr Radhakrishnan commenced his great career as an exponent of Indian Philosophy and the ambassador of our culture and thought in the countries of the West. We are very happy to have him here on this occasion as the President of this gathering of thinkers, from many nations.

We are grateful to Professor Humayun Kabir and the Indian Philosophical Congress for having invited the Institute to meet this year in our country. All of us are glad that on the first occasion on which the Institute is holding its Session outside Europe, it has chosen to come to this ancient land which has a long tradition of philosophic thought.

In recent years the International Institute of Philosophy has deliberated on subjects such as 'Dialogue and Dialectic', 'Responsibility' and 'Thought and Action'. The theme selected for this meeting is that of 'Traditional Cultural Values, East and West'. Do traditional values survive? Are there traditional values distinctively eastern or western? What values unite mankind in its aspirations and achievements? How are these values to be preserved and promoted? What is the way of reconciling Value and Reality, and Tradition and Progress? I am sure that you will throw valuable light on these problems during your discussions at this Mysore meeting. It is appropriate, if I may say so, that this meeting of philosophers is held in Mysore which has had close historical association with the faiths and philosophies of Sankara Ramanuja and Madhva as well as of those of Jainism andVeerasaivism.

For over three thousand years philosophy has been labouring to determine values clearly, to state them unequivocally and to demonstrate the case for their acceptance. The need for philosophy has never been so great as in the present age. Modern science has made tremendous conquests in the fields of knowledge. Physical nature is rapidly giving up its secrets and man's control over his environment is increasing day by day. The growth of knowledge, and of the power that

knowledge brings, has made it essential that wisdom should expand proportionately so as to comprehend all the widening spheres of human activity. It is philosophy that can teach this wisdom.

The fundamental values of a good life have to be restated and emphasised constantly in the present day world of materialistic pre-occupations. For the performance of this task few agencies could be so suitable as the International Institute of Philosophy which combines in itself the philosophical genius of a large number of nations.

The *Praśna Upaniṣad* speaks of the Sun who, on rising, first bathes, in his rays all life that is in the east, and then proceeds to illumine every other point as well, the south, the west, the north, below, above and in between, until all living beings share in his glory. It is the hope of us all that philosophic wisdom should similarly permeate every section of mankind.

In welcoming you all to this Session I wish you a happy sojourn in Mysore and fruitful deliberations.

WELCOME SPEECH

HUMAYUN KABIR

On behalf of the Government of India and the Indian Philosophical Congress and on my own behalf, I have great pleasure in welcoming the distinguished scholars and thinkers who have assembled here today from different regions of the world. It is a matter of personal gratification to me that the International Institute of Philosophy accepted our invitation to hold its Entretiens in India. This is the first time that one of the sessions is being held in Asia. We are happy that India should play the host for the occasion and in India, it is perhaps right and proper that we should select Mysore for its venue. The southern region of India has been the meeting place of many philosophical trends and some of the most outstanding philosophers of not only India but the world were born here. I need mention only the names of men like Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharya and Madhvacharya as cases in point.

We are very happy that Professor Radhakrishnan was able to accept our invitation and preside over this inaugural meeting of the Conference. We have invited him not as the Vice-President of India but as the outstanding living philosopher of modern India. He is eminently fitted to inaugurate this meeting of philosophers from East and West; for perhaps no one else has in recent times worked harder and more successfully for better understanding of eastern philosophy in the west and western philosophy in the east.

We were also hoping that Shri Jawaharlal Nehru would be able to come and speak to the assembled philosophers about traditional values in East and West. Though not a professional philosopher, he is a man of wide experience and deep insight and his observations would have been of the greatest interest and value to all of us. He was hoping to come, but at the last moment, pressing tasks in Delhi have held him back. He has however sent a message which I have pleasure in reading out to you:

> 'I have no doubt that philosophy is important, but mostly it seems to me to consist of learned disquisitions from easy chairs about ideals and cultural values and the like. Somehow all this seems to me quite unrelated to the world's problems and tensions today. It is far too academic to my liking or, at any rate, to suit me. I do not deny its importance. I merely say that my mind is thinking of other matters of the time and other approaches and I am getting a little tired of all of us addressing homilies at international and national conferences.
>
> So you see I am hardly a fit person to address this Philosophical Conference. What are Traditional values of East and West? I really do not know, although much could be said about them. Most of these values arose in a certain set of circumstance

when the world was completely different. How do they fit in today? What answer have they to today's problems? I am not attracted to the word "traditional" although undoubtedly it has uses'.

You will notice that Shri Nehru has raised a fundamental problem when he expresses his doubts about the function of philosophy in the modern world. Philosophers may not deal directly with the problems and tensions of today, but if philosophy were unrelated to them, Shri Nehru would be right in questioning its value for man. In fact, one of the major claims of philosophy is that it seeks to define values which alone can offer us a criterion to distinguish between the many claims that are made on our time, attention and energy. Man has survived in a cruel world and triumphed over all other orders of life, because he refused to surrender to the claims of the moment. This he could do only because he built for himself standards by which conflicting demands could be measured and met.

Shri Nehru raises another problem when he says that he does not really understand what traditional values of East and West mean. He has in fact questioned the concept of tradition in philosophical speculation. I am sure you will all agree that when we talk of traditional values, we are treading on dangerous ground. What is traditional today was perhaps revolutionary yesterday, and what is revolutionary today may become traditional tomorrow. The history of man is a history of constant change and one may say that the changes which later reveal themselves in institutions or material conditions of life almost invariably originate first in the realm of thought.

Everything in the world is subject to change, but in the case of physical objects or lower orders of life, the changes are generally initiated by outside forces. Man is perhaps the only animal who initiates changes in himself and his environment consciously. It is therefore not surprising that human traditions have been changing ever since the dawn of history. Most of these changes have been brought about by man's contemplation which precedes his action.

In past ages, such changes were generally gradual and took place in a particular geographical area and within the orbit of a particular tradition or culture. Today changes have become far more rapid for two major reasons. The first is that different civilisations and cultures impinge on one another in an unprecedented way. Changes in the past were generally occasioned by internal developments, but today, in addition to this continuing cause of change, a new factor has been added by the challenge of forces and influences from out side. Difficulties of transport and communication were in the past the main reason why societies were more or less closed systems. Today these barriers have been largely if not wholly overcome. Ideas and ideals of one society are today brought into immediate contact with ideas and ideals of all other societies. When values of one system are confronted by values of another system, it is inevitable that the former unshaking

faith in any one system of values will be shaken. Each society is therefore more willing to borrow from other societies than was ever the case in the past.

The second major reason for the quicker rate of change in traditions and institutions is the rapidity with which new ideas now take hold of the world. Formerly an idea travelled only as fast as man could move. Even a hundred years ago, no idea could travel perhaps more than a hundred miles a day. Today, a thought can be flashed from one corner of the globe to every other corner within an instant. New ideas therefore come with a suddenness and rapidity which leaps across all physical, social and mental barriers and compels the individual to re-orientate his traditional beliefs as best as he may without any previous warning. What is true of the individual is equally true of societies. No society can any longer be impervious to the impact of new ideas and new forces.

The result has been an invariable tendency to reduce barriers within and among societies. It is not an accident that ideas of equality and democracy have become pervasive all over the world and in every sphere of human life. Democracy however involves the acceptance of different points of view. The attempt to suppress an unwelcome type of opinion or belief may fit into an authoritarian concept of society but the moment we accept a democratic pattern, we must be prepared for an immense diversity of beliefs and faiths among individuals and communities. Scientific and technological progress has made this fact more patent by bringing into contact societies with different beliefs and at different stages of progress. One of the major problems which the world faces today is that created by the scientific and technological unity of the world without a corresponding emotional and intellectual unification of man.

We are happy to welcome here philosophers from many countries who will seek to find an answer to these problems which face man today. One of their major tasks will be to reconcile the different claims made on man's faith and reason. We feel that the history of Indian culture might make a special contribution in bringing about such a reconciliation. One of the most marked characteristics of the Indian way of life has been its attempt to reconcile divergent points of view. The Buddha insisted that there must be no slurring over of intellectual differences but there must at the same time be a friendly acceptance of divergences that cannot be reconciled. Indian society is not a unified system but a federal structure with many aspects and many levels. Indian religion and thought reveal the same multiplicity and yet Indian culture is informed by an underlying consciousness of unity in the midst of all this diversity.

It is our hope that this Conference of Philosophers from East and West will be moved by India's spirit of understanding and acceptance taught by the Buddha. This greatest son of India also taught that even understanding and acceptance are not enough. There must in addition be compassion, a sense of fellow-feeling with all life that transcends

all differences and all barriers and reaches to the unity that is at the heart of all things. May that spirit move the philosophers assembled here and through them the societies and cultures they represent.

Once again on behalf of the Indian Philosophical Congress and on my own behalf, I welcome the philosophers who have come to this Entretiens and have great pleasure in inviting Professor Radhakrishnan to inaugurate the Conference.

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, MYSORE

Saturday, the 29th August 1959

by

Dr M. S. Adiseshiah

My first task is a pleasant one. It is to bring you Unesco's greetings and good wishes. The Symposium which has assembled here in Mysore takes place as one of a series of conferences organized by the International Institute of Philosophy. Since its creation, in 1937, the Institute has promoted many debates—debates which have remained as models of deep-going, thorough investigation of fundamental philosophical problems by representative thinkers of various countries. To recall only the most recent meetings, it considered 'Dialogue and dialectics' in Athens in 1955, 'Responsibility' in Paris in 1956, 'Thought and action' in Warsaw in 1957.

The present Mysore Symposium is therefore the heir to what is now firmly established scholarly tradition. But, from another point of view, it also represents a new start, a meaningful development since, for the first time, a session is being held in Asia.

This session is invited to consider some of the essential problems raised by the renewed confrontation and intellectual exchange developing nowadays, between Oriental and Occidental thought. The choice of the location of this meeting, and the choice of the themes for this meeting, are indeed of special significance to Unesco, which launched, from this very country, at the session of its General Conference held in New Delhi in 1956, one of its priority activities, a 'major project for the mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values'.

This meeting has also a most direct, personal meaning to many of us assembled here and, permit me to say so, to me.

We feel today that, if the International Institute of Philosophy has painstakingly arranged this session in India, it was not merely in tribute to one of the earliest, uninterrupted traditions of philosophical inquiry and thought of this country. Of course, this *is* a land where some of the first metaphysical questions were formulated in technical language and form, where the first questions about the condition of man, his place in the universe and in society, the problem of his salvation, were expressed and meditated upon. But today—a day which embraces the International Institute and Unesco—this great country need not meditate and ponder alone on these great issues of life and existence. The presence here of so many distinguished

philosophers from abroad is a recognition of a present reality: that Indian, and Oriental thought in general, represents a continuity, that they have something actual and essential to contribute in the growingly rapid and closer exchanges between civilizations.

The purpose of this Symposium is not merely to make a historical survey. It is a living dialogue between living men. It is not only a recapturing of past achievements, but a creation, in common, by Eastern and Western men together, of new approaches, new evaluations, new understandings, of the present.

Nor is the voice of India by any means the only one to be heard here for the Orient. Distinguished persons from other Asian countries will demonstrate the many-sidedness of Oriental thought. As Asians, they are all united in the same hope to find new terms for a dialogue with their Western visitors. But they also bring the variety of view-points which testifies to the richness of Oriental culture.

This variety, not only between Eastern and Western thoughts, but even within individual cultures, will certainly find its expression during your debates, since the Symposium is to be characterized by absolute freedom. We know that it will never lead to any confusion or, which would perhaps be even worse, to any hasty compromise based upon superficial analogies. This free discussion remains a debate between technicians, between philosophers, trained to the full expression of thought and to the demands of utter lucidity in the formulation and analysis of problems.

The high level of your debates is one of the reasons why Unesco is expecting so much from the Mysore Symposium. I have just mentioned the East-West major project of the Organization. Many of you know that it is a many-sided activity, which involves co-operation between Member States, non-governmental organizations and the Unesco international Secretariat, in a variety of fields. In general outline, we may distinguish three main areas.

First education is a fundamental one, since action through schools is doubtless the most efficient way to rectify, at an early stage, prejudices and misunderstandings about foreign peoples and cultures.

Another line is the action upon the general public, especially through better use of the great possibilities offered by mass media of information, such as the press, film, radio and television.

These aspects of the East-West major project are perhaps the most spectacular. And they are most important too, since the main purpose is a practical one: to have a wide impact that will change attitudes towards the East in the climate of opinion in the West, and reciprocally. But dissemination, popularization, would be insufficient, and sometimes misleading, if action was not firmly grounded upon fundamental study and research in Oriental and Western cultures.

This is a necessary intellectual basis for the whole programme. There is, therefore, a special part in the project, dedicated to study and research. Since, thanks to the organizers, the Mysore Symposium has been placed within the framework of Unesco's East-West major

project, it comes within those research activities, the importance of which hardly needs to be stressed.

Such is the context in which the present Symposium appears to Unesco.

Under the general heading of 'Traditional cultural values in East and West', your conference is approaching a series of specific, challenging problems. After having considered the relationships of science and philosophy, you are to study another fundamental question: individual freedom and society. It may appear in the course of your discussions, that neither spiritual wisdom nor rational methods, neither freedom constructed as civic rights nor freedom achieved through an interior experience of liberation of the self, are to be geographically defined, are an exclusive privilege of Orient or Occident.

Equally the awareness of irreducible differences, resulting from various experiences, may make one's own position clearer and the other's position more understandable.

Thus, in a further stage of your discussions, after such analysis of selected individual problems, you are invited to recapitulate, and to suggest some values which each culture might best contribute or benefit from, in the common undertaking of the modern world. For the adventure is, indeed, common, the decisive challenge is now the same. It affords no alternative except one: that man to survive must live in peace and understanding, or else perish.

Is such understanding to be founded merely on opportunistic arrangements, on a temporary balance of political or economic interests, while mere lip-service is paid to different traditions, cultures, personality? Or is understanding to be rooted in the conscience, in permanent human values? This is a question left to you, philosophers, to answer. And this, I take it, is the meaning of the last stage of your conference, on 'values and universality'.

I said earlier that this debate was characterized by absolute freedom. This is, in fact, a principle which has always been strictly applied by the International Institute of Philosophy, and which also governs the whole complex of the international symposia programme of Unesco.

In fact, with a view to guaranteeing the widest possible exchange of ideas in cultural discussions, it is Unesco's general principle that participants speak in their individual capacity and not as official representatives of any country or institution, or of any doctrinal school. In the same sense, Unesco does not, as a rule, organize the symposium directly, but delegates the responsibilities, especially the invitations, to a generally recognized, competent body. In the present case, there could hardly have been a more competent body than the International Institute of Philosophy. Our thanks are therefore due to this organization. It is also true that, like any other important international activity, this Symposium is the result of co-operation and of a joint undertaking. It is, in fact, one of the best examples of common endeavour which we can recall, where various private initiatives, governmental support and international planning, have

been integrated, each in its own place. The International Institute of Philosophy has received full aid from the other scholarly organizations to which it is intimately related, namely the International Federation of Philosophical Societies and, through this Federation, the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, one of the main supports of Unesco in the cultural field. Special thanks are also due to the Indian Philosophical Congress, a national branch of the Institute, whose Secretariat has shown tireless energy and devotion, to the University of Mysore and its reverend and scholarly Chancellor H. H. Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, and, not least, to the precious support of the Indian National Commission and the Government of India who are represented by that great philosopher, humanist and Unescan Shri Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan and the scholar, thinker and writer who has such deep roots in Unesco, Shri Humayun Kabir.

To all of you, I am happy to extend sincere appreciation and greetings from Unesco. I wish you a very successful meeting and I look forward with great interest to the results of your deliberations.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

by

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

I

MAY I join His Highness the Chancellor and Professor Kabir in extending a hearty welcome to the foreign delegates who have taken the trouble to attend this Conference. This Conference is another indication of the increasing interdependence of nations and individuals. Human beings are everywhere the same and they hold the same deepest values. The differences among them which are, no doubt, significant, are related to external, temporary social conditions and are alterable with them. Modern methods of transport and communication are breaking down barriers and building bridges of co-operation. All societies are fast becoming industrialised and we are all speaking the same language in science. New sets of values are springing up everywhere. We are called upon to participate in the painful birth of a new world civilisation which is possible only with international co-operation and understanding. In spite of the sharpness of international conflicts, the world is getting to be one.

It is for the political leaders to determine the practical steps by which the sources of power and communication now available to us can be used for closer co-operation and friendliness among the peoples of the world. No political understanding can be made permanent without understanding at the cultural level. Apart from its intrinsic importance, such understanding contributes to the enrichment of human experience.

Facile generalisations are made by philosophers of history which are highly misleading. Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* says that 'Persia is the land of light, Greece the land of grace; India the land of dream; Rome the land of empire'[1].

East and West are relative terms. They are geographical expressions and not cultural types. The differences among countries like China, Japan and India are quite as significant as those among European or American countries. Specific cultural patterns with distinctive beliefs and habits developed in different regions in relative isolation from one another. There were periods when China and India were pre-eminent in cultural affairs; others when Western nations became dominant. For the last four centuries Western nations aided by scientific development have dominated the East.

[1] E. T. by Sibree (1861)

Recent developments have given rise to the erroneous impression that while the West is scientific in outlook, the East is spiritually minded. The one is rational while the other is religious. The one is dynamic and perpetually changing while the other is static and unchanging. If we take a long view we will find that China and India have made fundamental contributions to science and technology till three or four hundred years ago and there have been illustrious examples of religious idealism and sanctity in the West. The more we understand one another the more we feel that we are like one another. East and West do not represent two different types of consciousness or modes of thought.

Science and religion are aspects of every culture. The rational and the spiritual are two strands inextricably woven in human nature, though in varied patterns. One or the other may be more prominent in different periods of human history.

II

It will be useful to consider briefly the metaphysical presuppositions which are the formative forces of civilisation. Metaphysics is not an esoteric pursuit. It has an important place in the life of every reflecting person.

Philosophy is a wide term including logic, ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy and metaphysics. The last is concerned with the ultimate nature of things. The search for metaphysical certainty has been the source of much that is profound and significant in the history of thought. Metaphysics comprises two main fields, ontology derived from the Greek word for being. What is Reality which exists in its own right and is not dependent on anything else? The other is epistemology which is derived from the Greek word for knowledge. What can the human mind know with certainty? How does opinion differ from knowledge? What can be known? These are the problems with which metaphysics deals.

In the last fifty years there has been a revolt against traditional metaphysics. From Thales to Whitehead in the West, from the seers of the *Ṛg Veda* down to our own time in India, philosophy has been speculative. In the contemporary world, logical positivism and existentialism represent the revolt against metaphysics.

The so-called revolution in philosophy is not altogether new. We have had the positivist tendency in Greek thought, and British empiricism.

Comte inaugurated the idea of positivism with his law of three stages of cultural development. 1. The first stage of every culture is theological, theology being for Comte another name for superstition. 2. The second stage of metaphysics substitutes principles and forces for the ancient gods. 3. The third stage is positivism which deals with scientific knowledge.

It is argued that nothing can be true or even meaningful unless it can be understood in terms of sense-experience. In ancient Greek thought Protagoras held it and Plato criticised it. In modern European thought Hume holds that there can be no true or meaningful assertions about God, soul and immortality or objective moral standards. Hume discards beliefs about these as 'sophistry and illusion'. Kant rejected this view.

To Hume's doctrine of experience, we have added the technique of linguistic analysis. The meaningfulness of statements about God, soul and immortality are due to linguistic confusion. Religious beliefs are treated as 'nonsense' by which we allow ourselves to be deluded. All forms of metaphysics are discarded as unprofitable enterprises.

Logical positivism adopts the verification principle. Any sentence can have factual meaning only if it is capable of verification in sense experience. Religious propositions are not capable of empirical verification and so do not possess any factual meaning.

Universally accepted scientific principles are not capable of verification by sense experience. We do not deny laws of nature on that account. The principle of verification is not a self-evident statement; nor is it capable of verification by sense-experience.

Even those who claim to eliminate metaphysics by asserting that there is no transcendental reality are making metaphysical statements about the nature of the universe. Even though we may repudiate metaphysical systems from Plato's idealism to Marx's materialism, metaphysical thinking seems to be inescapable. Whenever thought grows conscious of itself there is philosophy. Even he who denies philosophy does so as the result of a philosophy which is not aware of being one. Whenever standards of value are used and criticism is applied there is philosophy. The logic of the analytical philosophers is itself based on a metaphysics, certain presuppositions about the universe. Whatever value logical analysis has can be defined only in terms of an attitude to life which logical analysis by itself cannot establish.

When the logical positivists proclaim that experience is the indispensable source of data for philosophical investigation they limit the word 'experience' to sense experience but we have moral, aesthetic and religious experience also. Our intense experiences, passion for knowledge, love of beauty, moral despair, the sense of the numinous cannot be excluded from the world of empiricism.

The dissociation of intellect from the other sides of human life is the prominent feature of logical positivism. When we speak of sciences we should include under it not only mathematics, physics and biological sciences but also social sciences and those which deal with spiritual values.

Professor C. D. Broad of Cambridge says in the Preface to his *Five Types of Ethical Theory:*

" 'It is perhaps fair to warn the reader that my range of experience, both practical and emotional, is rather exceptionally narrow

even for a don. Fellows of colleges, in Cambridge at any rate, have few temptations to heroic virtue or spectacular vice; and I could wish that the rest of mankind were as fortunately situated. Moreover, I find it difficult to excite myself very much over right and wrong in practice. I have e.g., no clear idea of what people have in mind when they say that they labour under a sense of sin; yet I do not doubt that, in some cases, this is a genuine experience, which seems vitally important to those who have it, and may really be of profound ethical and metaphysical significance. I realise that these practical and emotional limitations may make me blind to certain important aspects of moral experience. Still, people who feel very strongly about any subject are liable to over-estimate its importance in the scheme of things. A healthy appetite for righteousness, kept in due control by good manners, is an excellent thing, but to "hunger and thirst, after", is often merely a symptom of spiritual diabetes'."

Any serious attempt at philosophical interpretation will have to consider these data. Again, the concepts which modern mathematics and physics use are not directly verifiable in sense experience. They lead to deductions which can be related eventually to experimental situations. Metaphysical theories are interpretations of the nature of the world and are tested by their adequacy to the observed data, by their capacity to co-ordinate positive knowledge. They are not mere speculations but interpretations of experience. In the case of scientific theories, what we can verify is their consequences in so far as these can be calculated and observed. We do not observe electrical energy, gravitation or relativity but we calculate what will be observed, in carefully determined circumstances, if these are true, and then verify whether they are actually observed or not. This is indirect verification. Metaphysical theories are capable of such indirect verification.

There are metaphysicians who claim that they are also empiricists in so far as they deal with being *qua* being. They all start with the basic datum that somethig exists.

All the same, positivism helps to release the nature and purpose of religion from magic, superstition and folklore with which it has got confused.

III

While positivism is influenced by the scientific method, existentialism has for its motive power the religious quest.

Existentialism is one of the basic types of thought which appears in the history of philosophy whenever we stress the difference between the individual being of man and the being of objects in nature. There is a difference between the being of self and the being of things. Man not only is but he *knows* that he is. His being is open to himself. Knowledge is confined to the world of objects but the self is compre-

hended from within. There is objective knowledge as well as subjective comprehension. It is sometimes argued that the one thing that is given incontrovertibly is the knowledge of one's own self. We do not know in the same way objects of the world.

The existentialists ask us to start with immediate experience. They argue that anguish is man's central experience. The world in which we fall in love, commit crimes, utter prayers or lose heart is the most important world of experience. The existentialists like all religious prophets aim at the transformation of man. Kierkegaard said of his work: 'This is a literary work in which the whole thought is the task of becoming a Christian'. In Jaspers the emphasis is on becoming a different kind of man. Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of life, one authentic and the other unauthentic.

Existentialists contend that truth is subjectivity. It is to be felt from within, not argued from without. Speculative efforts at system-building are futile.

IV

Every great philosopher is both an analyst and an existentialist. He is a poet with an intellectual conscience. Analysis without vision is expense of spirit, waste of subtlety. Undisciplined vision, unexamined intuition, sheer passion are the sources of superstition, fanaticism, madness.

The analytic and the existential tendencies are found in Socrates and Plato. We find them again in the Middle Ages, in the philosophy of the Schools.

There is always a tension between logical analysis and existential experience. Any adequate philosophy should be sustained by the integrity of reason and the claims of inward experience.

I may take two illustrations from Western thought, Plato and Kant. Plato's theory of forms is based on logical argument. When he hypostasises the forms and affirms that absolute beauty and absolute justice are not mere concepts but have their existence in another world, when he subordinates the world of sense to that other world, he is under the influence of the Orphic and the Pythagorean views. What is given does not transcend nature but the aspiration it awakens does.

Plato had a deep sense of alienation and a vision of another world. Death is not the end. There is another world, where the soul has its being before birth and after death. It is not logic or epistemology that leads to this view but reflection on man and his conduct.

In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates exhorts man to 'become like a God as far as he is able to'. We feel a sense of lack, a privation. We have to grow beyond our present status. Man, as he is, is incomplete.

Kant confined knowledge and science to the world of phenomena. But reflection on the nature of the world led him to the conclusion that it did not constitute the whole of reality and there were supersensible entities, things in themselves. There were ideas of reason, of the soul, of the world in its entirety and of God. The realities corres-

ponding to these ideas could not be construed as objects. They have not a constitutive but only a regulative use. They enable us to organise our experience and estimate its worth. The pursuit of science rests on a faith, a hope and a trust, the faith of reason in its own supremacy or in the rationality of the world.

The examination of our nature as moral agents enables Kant to give a richer and deeper meaning to ideas. The fact of duty is a positive illustration of the kind of reality to which the ideas of reason point, a reality, which although having a definite content, is in no sense an object in the context of experience. For Kant the contemplation of the starry heaven above us should be accompanied by the recognition of the moral law within us.

V

In Indian thought we have both existentialist distress and rational reflection. The main concern of Indian thought is with the status of man, his ultimate goal. Nature and God are treated as aids to help man to attain security of being, peace of mind. The main interest of Indian thought is practical. Philosophy is a guide to life.

In Indian philosophical circles, a ferment is caused by the impact of Western thought on the traditional doctrines. Generally speaking, it has not resulted in any major changes of outlook though the methods of approach have been affected. There are a few who have abandoned the Indian tradition and adopted the ideas of some Western thinkers but unfortunately they have not made any deep impression either on Indian thought or on Western philosophy. The most effective development is in the presentation of India's fundamental thought in the idiom of our age and its development in new directions. One may indicate the Indian approach to the problem of religion by a reference to the first two aphorisms of the *Brahma Sūtra*, which is said to give the main purport of the Upanisads which are a part of the Vedas. The two *sutras* deal with (*i*) the need for the knowledge of ultimate Reality, and (*ii*) a rational approach to it.

VI

The theme of the first *sutra* is *brahmajijnāsā*. It indicates man's desire to know the Real. There is dissatisfaction with the world. History, astronomical, geological, pre-human and human appears to be an aimless process of creations and perishings, from which no meaning for the individual human existence can be derived. We do not seem to discern any principle in the whole chain of being which demands man's meaningful participation in the adventure of time. The world seems to be meaningless, vain and futile. It is *anitya*, transitory and *asukha*, painful. Animals are subject to disease and decay but are not capable of distress. The Buddha bases his way of life on the fact of suffering. Confucius writes:

The great mountain must crumble
The strong beam must break
And the wise man wither away like a plant.

'Remember, man, that dust thou art and unto dust shall thou return'. Jeremiah cries out: 'Cursed be the day when I was born; the day my mother bore me be unblessed. Accursed the man that brought glad tidings to my father ,saying "A son was born to you", and made him glad. That he slew me not from the womb! And that my mother were my grave. Wherefore came I forth out of the womb? To see suffering and grief, that my days are consumed with shame[1]'. St Augustine speaks of 'the ceaseless unrest which marks the temporal life of the individual'. The consciousness of death is the cause of anxiety. If man loses himself in the world and its diversions, his anxiety may be a brief fleeting fear. But man is a thinking being. When he reflects on the finite and limited character of his existence, he is overcome by fear which is, as Heidegger says, 'more primordial than himself'. When the fear becomes conscious of itself, it becomes anguish. The tragedy of the soul is added to the contemplation of the world as mortal. Modern man is rootless because he is unaware of his own real being. He is engrossed by the chances and changes of mere existence. His energy becomes a will to power or a mere striving for security. This is the nihilism which denies absolute value to anything. Man laments the felt absence of Being, of Reality, of God.

The consciousness of the finiteness and mortality of all our achievements makes us ask whether there is anything beyond and behind the world process. If there were not a Beyond, we should have been satisfied with the world process. The suffering individual cries out in the words of the Upaniṣad:

Lead me from the unreal to the real
Lead me from darkness to light
Lead me from death to eternal life

asato mā sad gamaya: tamaso mā jyotir gamaya: mrtyor mā amrtaṁ gamaya.

In *Genesis*, it is said, if man and woman will only eat the fruit of the one tree, 'ye shall be as God'. The meaning of it is that we are not what we should be. In *Leviticus* (XIX) the Lord demands: 'Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy'.

The word *Brahman* refers both to the aspiration in man's soul, the outgrowing of the spirit, prayer as well as the object sought, the Ultimate Reality. The seeking of man is inspired by the Eternal Spirit in man. It is the presence of the Infinite that makes us dissatisfied with the finite. This view reminds us of the word of God that Pascal believed he had heard: 'You would not seek me if you had not already found me'. Compare the confession in *Romans* 'We do

[1] XX, 14 ff.

not know how to pray as we ought but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deaf for words'. The suffering is the result of the conflict in us. Man belongs to two worlds, the spiritual and the natural. He is *sad-asad-ātmaka*, Being and non-Being.

Existence is essentially a process in time. It is perched on a razor's edge, as it were, which divides being from non-being. Human being is involved in non-being. We were not: we will not be. What is the nature of being? What is the mystery of non-being which surrounds and conditions existence as we know it? Being needs non-being for its manifestation. St Augustine in the first chapter of his *Confessions* asks what his longing for God means. Does it mean that he has found God or has not found God? If he had not found God, he would not know of God since it is God who gives him the yearning for God. If he had found God and knew him fully, he would be incapable of yearing since he would be fulfilled and so would not have to struggle and suffer.

Karl Barth in his *Epistle to the Romans* has a notable passage relating to the inner, invisible conflict: 'Men suffer, because bearing within them . . . an invisible world, they find this unobservable, inner world met by the tangible, foreign, other, outer world, desperately visible, dislocated, its fragments jostling one another, yet mightily powerful and strangely menacing and hostile'. Life is a perpetual drama between the visible and the invisible.

VII

The problem of meaninglessness cannot be solved by religious faith alone. We must gain assurance of the reality of God. The faith has to be sustained by metaphysical knowledge. The Real is to be known through discrimination, reflection, *vicāra*. The discipline of *manana* prescribed in the *Upaniṣads* requires us to reflect on what the Scriptures state. We have to think out the metaphysical presuppositions and attain personal experience of the religious *apriori* from which all living faith starts. We need intellectual effort and spiritual apprehension, metaphysics and religion. Only reasoned faith can give coherence to life and thought.

The idea suggested by the Scriptures requires to be clarified by the use of reason. The worlds of reason and religion do not turn in different orbits. Indian thought is firm in its conviction that religious propositions should be grounded in reason.

Though there are a few Christian theologians like Karl Barth who protest against the intrusion of reason into the realm of religious faith, the main tendency in Catholic and many Protestant forms of Christianity is, however, to use reason for the defence of faith. In his Epilogue to '*My Life and Thought*', Dr Schweitzer writes: 'Christianity cannot take the place of thinking, but it has to be founded on it. I know that I myself owe it to thinking that I was able to retain my faith in religion and Christianity'.



The second *sutra* makes out that God is the world ground, the source from which the world proceeds, by which it is maintained and ended. *janmādy asya yatah.* How does it happen that there is something rather than nothing? Being is already there without reason or justification. It is not exhausted by any or all of its manifestations, though it is there in each one of its manifestations. The world with its order, design and evidence of purpose cannot be traced to non-intelligent matter. Materialism is the theory which regards all the facts of the universe as explicable in terms of matter and motion. It explains all psychical processes by physical and chemical changes in the nervous system.

Scientific metaphysicians like Lloyd Morgan, Bergson, Alexander and Whitehead claim that they start with experience and their theories are meant to account for the facts observed. If they are empirical metaphysicians, so are the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads*.

The *Brahma Sūtra* (1.1.2) takes its stand on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which distinguishes matter, life, mind, intelligence and spirit in the world process. In the world, to use Leibniz's words, 'there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead'. There are no sharp cleavages. The gradation from one order of being to another is so imperceptible that it is impossible to draw the line that shall distinctly mark the boundaries of each. Everything in nature is linked together. All beings are connected together by a chain of which we perceive some parts as continuous and others escape our attention.

The Upaniṣad affirms that the long process of evolution, the terrestrial formation, the emergence of life, the struggle of mind to rise out of its ignorance, the growth of intellect and the intimations of something larger than intellect are not the result of chance. There is behind the development of this universe the Reality of a being, consciousness, bliss, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda.* It is the self of all things, one and eternal. All beings are united in that self but divided by a separatist consciousness.

The inexhaustibility of the source of the universe is the ground of our assurance that it will continue to grow in future till the Kingdom of Spirit is attained. The future of man should be conceived to be, if we use our freedom rightly, a gradual ascent to divine perfection. The cosmic process will not have finished its long journey until every soul has entered into the blissful realisation of its own divinity. To achieve a Kingdom of God on earth is the passion of the universe.

We cannot account for this cosmic process if we do not assume the Divine Reality which sustains and inspires the process.

Even as we admit a mystery behind the cosmic process, we recognise a mystery behind the flux of mental states. Metaphysical thinking which bases itself on experience holds that nature is grasped with the concept of necessity and the nature of self by that of freedom. The Real behind the cosmic process, *Brahman* and the Real behind the individual ego, *ātman* are the same.

Man's body is a perishable speck in the material universe; his mind is itself an instrument. The upward surge of nature cannot have body as its final product. There is something beyond, something that mankind shall be. The Eternal is in him but wrapped up in his constricted personality. Man's greatness is not in what he is but in what he can be. He has to grow consciously into it. His aspiration to participate in the divine creativity, his consecrated will to do so is the instrument of the evolutionary urge. We may call it the grace of the divine or the power of the human, *deva-prasāda* or *tapaḥ prabhāva*. Each individual has a specific role in the creative process.

There is no conflict between science and religion. Nothing that science can say can affect the religious view of the importance of human personality. The universe may contain other planets in which rational creatures may exist.

Religion should not maintain what is evidently in contradiction with ascertainable scientific fact. Science does not presume to deduce a moral code from its observation of natural phenomena.

The important question is whether human beings are to be regarded as the apex of a process of natural evolution not purposefully directed or are they to be regarded as made in the 'image of God', the children of God. The scientific humanists believe in the power of rational, though accidentally produced creatures to dominate the process of which they are the final result so far. But they exaggerate the extent to which human beings are free from subrational desires and the extent to which they can subordinte their behaviour to a plan of rational and universal benevolence. Religion holds that man exists on the level of supernature as well as nature. Kant refers to man's twofold nature. As belonging to the phenomenal or the sensible world, he is determined. as belonging to the noumenal or the supersensible world he is free. 'Greater is he that is in you than he that is in the world'.[1] Man is free to disobey the law of duty.

[1] John IV: 4.

SCIENCE AND WISDOM

by

J. N. CHUBB

THE title of the subject under discussion might be construed as a reflection on the worth of scientific knowledge. If science is to be contrasted with wisdom, the presumption is that science falls short of the highest ideal of knowledge and that we must look beyond science for the proper satisfaction of the demands of our rational nature. Or the statement that the scientist, as such, is not a wise man may imply that he is concerned with things which are of secondary importance, with phenomena which are mere shadows and appearances of an underlying or transcendent reality. Wisdom is traditionally associated with philosophy and is even regarded as its sole concern. But philosophy was exalted to the status of wisdom, (love of wisdom is but the beginning of wisdom), by those philosophers whose main pre-occupation was with the realm of the supersensible and the eternal, in aspiring after which man discovered the meaning of his existence and attained his immortal destiny. Wisdom was regarded as inseparable from metaphysics and the pursuit of values. A philosophy, inspired by an immortal longing and an instinctive commitment to an absolute and timelessly perfect reality as the sole and sufficient cause of all things, could not but exalt itself as wisdom over science, and relegate the latter to a dealing with an inferior order of existence.

In the present times, when metaphysics has lost its prestige and has been magically whisked out of existence, or reduced to a shadow of its former self, its facile pronouncements on the nature and limits of scientific knowledge, and its own vastly superior status as knowledge of the ultimately real are no longer regarded as the deliverances of a superior wisdom. The philosopher who sets himself the humbler task of clarifying the concepts of science and analysing the meanings of words, (often with no better result than to find out in how many different ways it is possible to say the same thing), may perhaps still be regarded as a wise man, but his wisdom has shed all its glory and has, in a sense, become inferior to the wisdom of science. With the eclipse of metaphysics wisdom becomes synonymous with knowledge. As a spokesman of science the task of the philosopher is largely the negative one of dissolving illusions arising from a misuse of language, of showing that philosophy has no subject matter and problems of its own, and thus clearing the way for the universal acceptance of science as the only respectable and well-established body of factual knowledge.

We have to understand the causes and motives of the recent anti-metaphysical upsurge and meet the objections which are the logical formulation of these underlying motives before we can hope to restore metaphysics to its former position of pre-eminence. If metaphysics cannot be summarily dismissed in a single sentence, as the positivists have tried to do, nor can it be briefly reinstated by the facile rejoinder that the positivists' criterion of meaning is, on its own showing, meaningless. Philosophical conflicts have deeper roots and are not resolved by dialectical clashes and verbal pyrotechnics.

The problem of the relationship between philosophy and science must ever remain a philosophical problem. This means that philosophy has in some sense a right to examine and evaluate science. A reciprocal right to examine and evaluate philosophy does not belong to science. There is, therefore, a philosophy of science, which, however, is not an independent intermediate discipline between physics and general philosophy, since our evaluation of science depends entirely on a wider philosophical standpoint.

The importance of recognizing this fact is that it will enable us to see the divergent and conflicting views of science held by philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists as so many corollaries following from divergent points of view in philosophy, which may themselves remain in the background. The interpretations of science, except as regards its concepts and methods, do not arise from within science or from an unbiased reflection on science, but are all of them philosophical interpolations, preconceived philosophical schemes into which science is conveniently made to fit. Thus the statement that science is an inferior knowledge, pointing, as a result of its own inadequacy, to a higher form of knowledge and to a supra-physical reality is the exhibition of a metaphysical bias. But the statement that there is no higher standpoint from which we can thus sit in judgement on science and that science is really its own philosophy is no less the result of a bias, this time an anti-metaphysical one. We may illustrate this with reference to the treatment of the problem of induction. The different accounts of the ground of induction are, I suggest, not different answers to the same question but formulations of different philosophical points of view, different attempts to fit science into a pre-conceived scheme of knowledge. The idealist says that the principle of uniformity presupposed by science is an imperfect formulation of the metaphysical principle of Ground and Consequence. But when he sets out to demonstrate that the scientific concept of cause is riddled with contradiction, the alleged demonstration already presupposes a faith in the metaphysical principle and therefore cannot be regarded as leading up to it. The same consideration applies to Kant's view that the law of causation is a part of the structure of thought and so a priori, but its application and validity are restricted to the world of phenomena. To one who eschews metaphysics, the statement that belief in causality is a priori means nothing more than that it is universally and instinctively accepted; and in denying the intelligibility of the distinction between

phenomena and noumena, the question of the limits of the applicability of the principle of causation does not arise.

At the other end tough-minded philosophers and positivists dissolve the metaphysical aura surrounding the problem of induction. Belief in the uniformity of nature is nothing more or less than a working assumption, justified, not on logical but on pragmatic grounds. One who has no stomach for metaphysics would resolutely limit himself to this statement and refuse to acknowledge any further mystery in the problem. Or if our belief in uniformity does not rest on logical grounds, it may well be regarded as itself an inductive generalization which is progressively confirmed by the discovery of specific uniformities in nature. The charge of circularity would apply to the view only if we held that belief in uniformity rests on a logical ground. Those empiricists who shrink even from the mystery enveloping general propositions go to the length of denying that there are general propositions—(who can stop them?)—and hold that inductive generalizations are not judgments but merely rules of procedure which enable one 'to find one's way about reality'.

It would seem then that there is no transition from science to philosophy. Science is monadic in the sense that it cannot look beyond itself or climb out of itself by a reflective self-awareness. It is, relatively speaking, autonomous and self-contained. It lends no support to a materialistic, mechanistic or deterministic interpretation of reality, nor does it contain intimations of occult powers and presences in the universe or prefigure a world-view which answers to our religious outlook and aspiration. In spite of the mystification introduced by modern science in upsetting common-sense notions and habits of thought, we have not the least ground for concluding that science carries within it the burden of an impenetrable mystery, which when regarded with proper humility and awe, appears as the manifestation in the material world of the Supreme Mystery, the Mysterium Tremendum. One may not hope to look out from science onto a wider and more edifying cosmic prospect. The well-meant but philosophically amateurish attempts of Jeans and Eddington to conjure an idealistic philosophy out of the methods and results of science have been sufficiently criticised and exposed. Science neither favours religion, nor is it anti-religious.

Each grade of knowledge is, from its own point of view, complete. Its incompleteness is internal to it, which it overcomes progressively by realizing its own nature more and more fully. We do scant justice to science when we dismiss it as an imperfect form of knowledge, an inadequate way of explaining what is explained more fully in some other intellectual discipline, or say, as Collingwood does, that a scientist not only thinks but also refuses to think. All thinking is a search for intelligibility or order, but the scientist uses one criterion of intelligibility and the philosopher another. Within the limits of his notion of intelligibility the scientist never refuses to think. It is peurile to suggest that his notion of intelligibility is limited precisely because he

refuses to think. Philosophy may claim to possess a more satisfactory ideal of explanation, and its claim may be justified. But the thinking mind has to seize and possess this higher ideal by a leap unaccountable in terms of logic. It is not carried to it by an upward thrust of a dialectic immanent in all thought. The philosophical point of view, with its criterion of intelligibility, 'emerges' in thought as mysteriously as life emerges in matter.

If then Philosophy, in comparison with science, represents a higher level of reflection the relation of science to philosophy illustrates the general law of what I have called a broken continuity. This law applies in all cases where there is a difference of levels and may be stated thus: There is no continuity from the lower to the higher. The higher standpoint somehow emerges and establishes its continuity with the lower. Between the lower and the higher there is a break, a gulf which can only be crossed by a leap wholly unaccountable in terms of the ground from which the leap is made, but on reaching the higher standpoint the continuity is re-established, for the higher includes the lower and comprehends and corrects its partiality and limitation.

Any interpretation of science presupposes a philosophy and the philosophy in turn rests on a standpoint which is extra-logical. In philosophy, conclusions do not follow from the process of reasoning but are implicitly contained in the starting point which is anterior to discursive thought. The acceptance of this view would alter the complexion and purpose of philosophical discussions. They would cease to be polemical and become, instead, persuasive. They would be, like religious discussions conducted in the spirit of mutual toleration and respect, a sharing of experiences, attitudes and beliefs. A philosophical argument is really a recommendation of an implicit standpoint whose cogency is merely exhibited by the argument, but not established by it.

Every philosophical system can, with sufficient ingenuity, be made logically coherent, for reason within us is an instrument and not the sovereign master. It need not be only the slave of passion, it could be the servant of a purely secular or *bahir mukha* outlook which finds security only within the bounds of sense-given realities; or it could be the handmaid of a metaphysical impulse that seeks to elevate man above the sphere of conflict, evil and suffering into the state of eternal beatitude in union with God.

Thus a neutral or impersonal definition of philosophy is in the very nature of things not possible. The definition of philosophy which I offer here may be regarded as a persuasive definition and no more than a *confessio fidei*.

Philosophy is the expression of the demand to think categorically, i.e., to think without assumptions, by cancelling all hypotheses. Such a demand presupposes a criterion or notion of intelligibility, which it is the business of philosophy to make explicit. But in making it explicit the mind gives to this notion a specific content or meaning. In this process the mind takes a surreptitious leap and makes an affirmation of faith. This act of faith does not cancel the demand to think without

assumptions since it is not a premiss in or part of the system which thought constructs. It stands behind the system as its guiding impulse, but is not external to it. The notion of intelligibility itself opens out into a coherent philosophical system. Now, according to me, thought which is autonomous and internally complete has for its object that which is self-existent and complete in itself, in other words God, the Infinite or the Perfect Being. It is in the Infinite that thought comes finally to rest, i.e., becomes categorical. This is not presented as a proof of God's existence, for the belief in God or the Infinite and the criterion of intelligibility suggested above are mutually dependent and the one does not follow from the other. The demand for thinking without assumptions is the response of the finite mind to the pressure on it of the Infinite. It expresses, at the level of reflection, the nisus of the part towards the whole. The act of faith which develops into a metaphysical system can be shown to be reasonable, but it is not grounded in reason. This, however, is not peculiar to metaphysics. There is no philosophical system whose starting point is grounded in reason. At its base is either a positive act of commitment to the Whole or a negative act of abstraction and exclusive concentration on a partial aspect of reality. In between there are grades of affirmation or denial representing the rigorous but truncated metaphysical systems of Western philosophy.

As Philosophy rests on an act of faith it is not, in the strict sense, knowledge, but only an aspiration for knowledge. Faith as such is not self-existent or self-explaining, but always carries within it a secret urge to transform itself into knowledge. The goal of the philosophical quest carries one beyond philosophy to a direct supra-rational experience of Reality. Philosophy articulates, that is, makes intelligible, a pre-existent faith, and in doing so, merely formulates a possible mode of realization. It is an incident in the life of religion, giving a rational form to the impulse of the ineffable in man to rise and meet the Ineffable in the totality of things. A metaphysical proposition thus implies a process of verification as a part of its meaning. It is simultaneously an injuction and an assertion. It is informative and carries a factual or cognitive, though perhaps not a literal meaning.

This view of Metaphysics answers the challenge posed by the positivist of today on the basis of their analysis of meaning. Metaphysical propositions are verifiable, but in an experience which is simultaneously the discovery of reality and the regeneration of the individual. The limitation of the positivist's point of view consists in restricting experience to sense-experience.

Metaphysics thus points the way to the highest wisdom. Wisdom is the direct knowledge of the supreme reality in which man finds fulfilment and salvation. Knowledge is the destruction of ignorance, but since the highest knowledge is supra-rational, there is a basic ignorance underlying thought itself, which is not disturbed or diminished by the process of reasoning. Philosophy represents a lower order of knowledge, if knowledge it can be called, within the shadow of

Ignorance. This Ignorance belongs to the self and has the self for its object. Knowledge of Reality is also self-knowledge, for in this higher knowledge the self is revealed as eternal, incorruptible and of the very nature of bliss. Through ignorance the self puts behind it its divine status and identifies itself with the forces of the lower nature, thus creating a temporary centre of consciousness with a wholly illusory sense of a separate existence and a separate will. The self does not change or lose the purity of its nature, but merely steeps itself in the order of mobile and corruptible things, thus generating a world in which suffering, struggle, collision and discord appear to be the inevitable concommitants of the individual and the collective life.

Wisdom is that knowledge in which 'the knots of the heart are cut', all conflicts are resolved and man, losing nisus and all connaturality with evil, is restored to wholeness.

How then, is Science related to Wisdom? In the first place we have to recognize that science through its understanding and control of the forces of material nature places at our disposal a tremendous store-house of power which can be used for good or for ill. It provides the means, but the means have to be subordinated to the right vision of ends. If power is placed under the yoke of wisdom it could be used to enrich life and change the face of the earth. But it is also important to recognise that since science is concerned with phenomena and the surface appearance of things, the power which it generates is of limited value and application. It is not a power which can transform human life and human society. That power resides in the spirit. But so far the spiritual quest of man has been for salvation and a wholly supernatural destiny in which there is a severance of the relation between Spirit and Matter, between the Divine and its manifestation as the phenomenal universe, and a failure to reveal the significance and direction of the laborious ascent of evolutionary Nature. The spirit casts its benign light and influence on the phenomenal order, sustains, beautifies and uplifts it, but recognising it to be incurably evil and intractible to the higher force forsakes it in the end and withdraws into the realm of transcendent light or a formless Nirvana. This world-negating attitude which is common to all religions finds its most logical expression in the theory of Maya. Science falls within the sphere of Maya and is concerned with the realm which is neither being nor non-being and which is finally to be negated or left behind in the upward flight of the spirit.

Science and Wisdom thus seem to fall apart and the separation of the two is the first and perhaps an inevitable step in man's search for the ultimate. But this dualism of Science and Wisdom, of the phenomenal and the noumenal, of Matter and Spirit can and must be overcome if the last word of Wisdom is to be revealed. We may distinguish between an essential wisdom and an all-wisdom. In the former, the self, shuffling off its external sheaths of body, life and mind, is content to abide within itself or its divine ground and closes its eyes on the sphere of manifestation, for it is in secure possession of that, knowing

which, all things are, in essence, known. An immobile and beatific transcendence is the culmination of the spiritual quest. Such a wisdom, though overwhelmingly satisfying, is still defective because it is confronted with a final inexplicability in the presence of the phenomenal world and thus contains an element of negation. There is still a need for an all-wisdom, an integral knowledge which is the final synthesis of all that is and appears and becomes. This knowledge completes the curve of the upward movement and descends again into the phenomenal world, not indeed to dally with it and savour its infinite variety, but to transform it into a true manifestation of the divine reality. The relative order is regarded as a manifestation, but certainly, as it exists today, it conceals and distorts rather than manifests divinity. If there is a hidden divinity awaiting manifestation in terms of matter, life and mind, it means that the story of evolution is not yet complete. There is possible a new stage in human consciousness which Sri Aurobindo has called the gnostic or the supramental consciousness, which, while reposing in the bliss of eternity, becomes dynamic for the reconstruction of individual and collective life here below, and instead of merely rejecting or transcending, perfects and transfigures the body, life and mind which are the instruments of the spirit, thus opening the way for the formation of a spiritual society and the existence of a divine life on earth.

In this integral vision of the self-revelation of divinity in the very stuff of matter and in all the intermediate ranges of existence between matter and spirit, the necessity for the make-shift hypothesis of Maya is finally overcome. It promises a fulfilment above in the transcendent and an even greater fulfilment below in the doing of divine works, thus harmonising the outer with the inner nature, the dynamic life impulse with the transcendent Calm, the lowest term of existence with the highest. In such a transfigured world science once again assumes its rightful place. In its theoretical aspect it satisfies, partly, man's omniverous desire for knowledge. In its pragmatic aspect it becomes the handmaid of a Wisdom-Power whose aim is to fulfil the divine intention in the heart of Time, to make earth open to divinity and house God's joy in the concourse of men, thus assuring their social no less than their individual salvation.

> 'This world shall be God's visible garden-house—
> And Truth shall be a sun on Nature's head—
> All things shall manifest the covert God'.[1]

[1] Sri Aurobindo, Savitri, Book XI, Canto I.

OBJECTIVITE EN SCIENCE ET EN PHILOSOPHIE

Confèrence pour les entretiens de Mysore

Par

LUDWIG LANDGREBE

DEPUIS l'époque de Kant on n'a jamais cessè de se plaindre du spectacle qu'offre la philosophie: systèmes contradictoires, se remplacant l'un l'autre, en opposition continuelle, ou l'on ne saurait trouver un quelconque progrés de la connaissance tout au contraire des sciences de la nature où depuis le début des temps modernes, en un processus régulier, chaque découverte s'échafaude sur une autre. Cette crise de la confiance de la philosophie en elle-même n'a fait que s'aggraver au cours du XIXé siécle et a finalement conduit à cette opinion résignée, qu'il était absolument impossible à la philosophie de parvenir, comme c'est le cas des sciences de la nature, à une connaissance objectivement valable, mais qu'elle n'etait simplement que l'expression d'une expérience subjective, que la peinture d'une vision du monde basée non pas sur une connaissance rationnelle mais sur le sentiment. Donc dit-on, il lui manque ce caractére scientifique qui garantit une connaissance objectivement valable; ses affirmations, (Sätze) n'auraient qu'une valeur subjective et relative et devraient étre considérèes comme une sorte de poésie conceptuelle. La conséquence ultime de cette résignation est la nègation sceptique par le positivisme logique de toute possibilité d'une quelconque métaphysique. Mais si la mètaphysique concidérée par Aristote comme la 'philosophie premiére' est vraiment au centre de toute philosophie, puisque toutes ses affirmations ne peuvent trouver leur fondement ultime que dans la métaphysique, cette négation alors entraîne celle de toute philosophie en général, car une philosophie sans métaphysique est, pour parler avec Hegel, un 'temple sans Saint des Saints'.

L'origine de cette crise de confiance en soi de la philosophie est d'ores et déjà donnée dans la maniére dont au commencement des temps modernes la philosophic fut inaugurèe par Descartes. Dèterminant, en effet, pour la naissance de cette crise est le concept de la raison, concept défini par la faculté de connaissance des vérités èternellles qui lui sont innées. D'aprés cela toute connaissance véritable ne pent reposer que sur le développement de cette possession qui est innéc à la raison. Il en résulte la conviction qu'il ne peut exister qu'*une* méthode pour parvenir à la connaissance de la vérite. Cette méthode se trouve déjà être développée de facon exemplaire dans l'algébre moderne et de

la même maniére elle doit être déterminante pour l'accés a la vérite philosophique. Par là-meme est affirmée l'identité de méthode de la philosophie et des sciences et mise en evidence cette comparaison entre le succés des sciences et l'insuccés de la philosophie.

Mais si cette comparaison ne doit pas conduire à la résignation sceptique il faut se demander, si la prèsupposition en fonction de laquelle elle a été établie est vraiment valable La raison humaine est-elle comprise de façon suffisante, quand son concept est défini aú sens ou l'entend le rationalisme? Ce concept de la raison exclut qu'il puisse exister encore une troisiéme chose à côté de l'alternative entre connaissance objectivement valable au sens des sciences de la nature et simples opinions subjectives et relatives. Mais l'essence de la raison est-elle vraiment dèveloppée dans toute son ampleur dans cette méthode de connaissance, qui est appliquée dans les sciences de la nature? L'objectivité des sciences de la nature est-elle la mesure qui doit également servir à l'appréciation de la connaissance philosophique; n'a t'elle pas plutôt sa propre et spécifique mesure de la vérité, de sorte que celle-ci n'est certes pas 'objective' au sens des sciences le la nature, mais pas non plus uniquement subjective, relative et irrationnelle c'est-à-dire telle qu'elle ne puisse ètre fondèe par la raison? Ce fut précisément cette suspicion d'irrationalité qui eut pour conséquence la negation sceptique de la possibilité d'une philosophie quelconque. Veut-on affaiblir cette suspicion, il faut donc montrer comment la philosophie contient sa propre espèce de rationalité et de logicité qui est différente de l'objectivité de la connaissance scientifique. Quelques premiers pas dans ce sens doivent être tentés dans les conssidérations qui suivent.

A cette fin il est d'abord nécessaire d'expliciter ce qu'il faut comprendre par objectivité des sciences de la nature et de la connaissance scientifique, differente de l'bjectivitè de la philosophic. Kant, le premier, a indiquè avec la plus grande netteté, sur quoi repose le fondement de la possibilité de l'objectivite de la méthode scientifique et de la progression continue de sa connaissance: a savoir dans la découverte de la capacité de la raison de se former une projection (Entwurf) de la nature sur la base des représentations à priori qui appartiennent à son inventaire. C'est la decouverte que la raison ne peut connaitre avec ses concepts **que** ce qu'elle a elle-même produit. Cette découverte a été, dit kant une 'révélation' pour les savants. Husserl a encore précisé ce concept d'objectivité et montré que la prètention des sciences à l'objectivité de leur connaissance n'est réalisable qu'à condition que la dètermination de ses objets ait lieu dans une relation fondamentale (Begründungszusammenhang) d'affirmations (sätze) qui puisse étre reutilisée par un sujet capable de pensée quelqu'il soit, par chaque homme en tant q 'être de raison—peu importe la facon dont est faite sa vie sur le plan des sensations et des sentiments, peu importe aussi sa situation tant historique que sociale, à quelle tradition et à quelle culturelle il appartient. En effet sur cette facon de déterminer les objets de la connaissance par la pensée repose le fait étonnant, que les sciences de

la nature issues de la tradition de la pensée occidentale puissent, de même que leur application dans la technique, être comprises et développées par ceux qui appartiennent à toutes les autres sphéres de culture. Cette façon de déterminer les objets de la pensée n'est rien d'autre que le développement d'une faculté de la raison appartenant à l'homme de façon absolument générale. L'on pourrait dire que grâce au fait que ce concept de la raison soit ainsi communicable, celui-ci a trouvé une première preuve, quoique trés limitée encore, de sa cohesion et de son appartenance absolument générale a l'homme en tant que tel, de même aussi que le concept d'une humanité en tant qu'humanité raisonnable. Effectivement jusqu'à aujourd'hui la raison développêe dans les sciences de la nature et la technique est le seul lien qui entoure l'humanité entiére en dépit de toutes ses oppositions et de tous ses conflits. Comme nous le savons ce lien cependant ne suffit nullement pour éviter précisément des conflits par lesquels l'humanité s'anéantit elle-méme, qui plus est, il semble plutôt, être propre à porter ces conflits à leurs derniéres extrémités.

C'est pourquoi il est urgent de savoir, si le développment de la raison humaine en général dans l'objectivité dé la connaissance des sciences de la nature et de la technique a vraiment rèvélé toute l'essence de la raison ou si bien plutot la raison comprise dans la plénitude de son essence, ne doive pas, *par delà*, *pouvoir* fonder une communion de l'humanité au sein de laquelle une solution raisonnable de ses conflits serait possible. Bref, c'est la question de savoir si le concept de la raison en tant que faculté de parvenir à une connaissance objectivement valable au sens des sciences de la nature recouvre vraiment l'essence même de la raison? Toute connaissance qui dés lors ne correspond pas à ce critére d'absolue rationalité, n'est-elle donc qu'une connaissance subjective et relative? N'est elle que la simple expression d'une expérience irrationnelle et la connaissance philosophique, si tous ses efforts pour parvenir a une connaissance objective *ont èchouè*, doit-on lui refuser, par là, d'être considérée comme une connaissance au vrai sens de ce terme?

Pour répondre à cette question il faut partir du fait que la possibilité de parvenir a une connaissance objective de cette espéce, repose sur une certaine présupposition ontologique quant aux objets de cette connaissance. Elle semble si évidente que la plupart du temps on ne la voit pas et on ne la mentionne pas. L'apparence de son évidence est issue de la constatation que toute pensée est nécessairement pensée de quelque chose, c'est-à-dire un rapport, oú le sujet pensant est en relation avec son objet intentionnel. Cette distinction entre le sujet pensant et son objet intentionnnel est certes une distinction fondamentale et évidente parce qu'elle définit l'essence de la conscience en général. Mais par delà cette évidence l'on méconnaît trop facilement, que dans le concept moderne d'objet et aussi de la connaissance objective, qui s'y rapporte et de sa vérité, l'on pense *toujours* implicitement, tacitement beaucoup plus que ce simple rapport formel général de la relation intentionnelle qui appartient de facon indissoluble à la conscience.

Dans ce concept d'objet est toujours tacitement impliqué par la pensée, que dans le connaître (Erkennen) cet objet n'est découvert qu'en tant que ce qu'il était déjà auparavant et qu'il reste, peu importe qu'il ait été ou non connu. C'est pourquoi la concordance d'une connaissance avec l'objet connu vaut en tant que critére formel de sa vérité. C'est là une définition de la vérité de jugement à propos de laquelle Kant remarque qu'elle est d'une telle évidence qu'elle se passe de commentaires. Mais si c'est l'adèquation à l'objet de connaissance lequel devient substrat de l'acte de jugement,'qui vaut en tant que *critère de la vèritè* du jugement, c'est alors que la connaissance est comprise comme le processus continu et progressif de l'approche (Annàherung) de l'objet, en tant que processus de la saisie (Erfassung) de cet objet. Dans cette saisie il se montre tel qu'il était avant qu'il ne fut connu (vor seiner Erkenntnis) et ce qui'l est et qu'il restera en tant que tel. Celù présuppose que l'objet de la connaissance dans son étre-en-soi reste hors d'atteinte (unberührt) tel qu'il est et était, qu'il soit connu ou non.

Voilà donc ce qui est présupposé quant au caractére ontologique de l'objet de connaissance. Cette présupposition seule permet de tendre vers l'objectivité de sa détermination en tant que but de connaissance. Elle est la connaissance d'un substrat compris comme quelque chose, qui est mis en face du sujet connaissant et qui demeure dans son indentité d'objet indépendamment du déroulement subjectif des processus de connaissance (du sujet). Le rapport du sujet connaissant avec l'objet de connaissance est par là méme celui de la distance théorique (theoretischer Abstand). Le sujet se comporte dans son acte de connaissance comme ouvert à l'objet et tourné vers lui, objet qui independent de lui demeure (beharrt) dans son identité. La science objective est ainsi caractérisée comme étant une science *thèorique* au sens du concept moderne de théorie et de 'théorique'. Elle repose sur la distinction entre le sujet pensant-connaissant, de ses processus subjectifs de connaissance, et de l'objet de connaissance qui subsiste par lui même et auquel dans son déroulement la connaissance devient plus ou moins adéquate.

Le développement de la logique formelle qui commence avec Aristote, avec ses principes de l'identité, de la contradiction et du tiers-exclu est l'Organon de cette connaissance essentiellement orientée vers les objets. Elle ne reçoit sa signification générale et formelle à condition seulement que le rapport de la connaissance, dont le déroulement est réglé par ces principes, ne soit exclusivement que celui de la distance théorique entre le sujet et l'objet de connaissance. Cette condition vaut également pour toutes les extensions de la logique formelle traditionelle vers l'analyse formelle universelle, la logistique et la semantique logique. Dans le principe d'identité de *l'objet du jugement* déja l'on implique toujours, tacitement, la temporalité de sa permanence[1]

[1] au sens latin de per-manere (n. d. t.)

(Beharren) dans l'identité. L'on peut exprimer ceci également endisant que l'objet d'une connaissance objective quelconque, dont les conditions formelles sont exprimées dans la logique formelle quelle que soit l'extension de celle-ci, est (dans cette connaissance) pensé avec la catégorie de la substance (ce dernier terme étant pris dans son sens kantien).

Si le concept de l'objectivité de la connaissance et les présuppositions qui permettent d'y accéder sont maintenant éclaircis, il reste à s'-interroger plus avant et à se demander, si la connaissance philosophique elle aussi peut se réclamer de ces présuppositions pour son objet intentionnel qu'elle vise dans la formulation de son jugement (auf den sie urteilend gerichtet ist), et si par là elle est en droit de se proposer pour but, a l'image de la connaissance scientifique, l'objectivité de sa connaissance ou bien si tout au contraire son substrat n'est pas d'une tout autre sorte. Si cela devait être le cas, il faudrait alors que ce qui peut à bon droit signifier 'objectivite' de la connaissance philosophique, reçoive un sens *fondamentalement, diffèrent que dans les sciences exactes.* Si la possibilite d'une connaissance objective repose sur la *distance thèorique du sujet par rapport à l'objet* et si ce rapport ne vaut pas pour la connaissance philosophique, il en résulterait cette nouvelle question de savoir, si elle est vraiment en ce sens une connaissance théorique. Il convient donc de savoir si la distinction entre une philosophie théorique et une philosophie pratique est vraiment conforme à son essence.

Or, Husserl a montré que ce but, que la connaissance se propose dans l'objectivation, but qui fut déterminant pour l'évolution des sciences de la nature de l'époque moderne, n'est qu'un but pratique parmi d'autres que l'homme s'est fixè dans son existence, Mais ce comportement scientifique—théorique à l'egard de la nature est précéde d'une relation pre-scientifique de l'homme avec les objets de son monde en général et de la nature en particulier. Même cette relation implique déjà une certaine connaissance, car ce n'est qu'en tant quil est un être pensant qu'il peut exister en tant qu'être agissant. Mais il s'agit là d'une relation oú l'on n'élimine pas, comme c'est le cas dans l'objectivation theorique, toutes les determinations des objets qu'il n'est pas possible à chaque être pensant de réeffectuer. Tout au contraire, elles sont considérées dans leur relation avec l'homme et dans leur signification pour lui dans le monde oú il vit. Et c'est précisément de ce rapport pré-scientifique, non théorique ('théorique' entendu au sens moderne) de l'homme avec les objets et avec les questions du monde qui l'entoure, que l'interrogation philosophique reçoit ses impulsions initiales—d'un rapport donc, qui *n'est pas* celui de la distance théorique entre le sujet et l'objet de connaissance. C'est ce que confirme un simple coup d'oeil sur la naissance de la philosophie occidentale chez les Grecs. On voit ainsi que la pensée philosophique a commencé a l'instant précis, ou l'interprètation du monde et de la situation de l'homme dans ce monde et de ses relations avec les puissances divines, oú cet homme lui-même furent mis en question à la lumiére du Mythe, oú, enfin, l'homme s'assigna pour mission de trouver une orientation nouvelle.

Et pourtant longtemps encore ce n'est pas l'homme lui-même qui est le thème de l'interrogation philosophique, mais en toute prèmiere ligne l'Etre (das Sein) et le Cosmos. Mais l'intérêt essentiel n'est pas dans cette interrogation celui d'une connaissance 'theorique', au sens des temps modernes, des objets pensés comme *existant* par aux-mêmes. Ce dont il s'agit essentiellement c'est de la situation de l'homme dans ce monde et de son rapport avec les raisons et les origines de son existence (Sein). Si dans l'interrogation philosophique alors les mêmes thémes apparaissent, qui deviendront plus tard objets de la connaissance scientifique, ils deviennent des thèmes d'interrogation d'une manière tout autre que dans cette connaissance scientifique. L'intérêt dominant de la connaissance philosophique de ces thèmes ne les concerne qu'-autant que l'homme dans leur connaissance reçoit une certitude nouvelle quant à sa propre situation dans le monde. L'hommeest donc tout d'abord implicitement, *et plus tard* (*depuis Platon*) *explicitement*, le *vèritable thème* de l'interrogation philosophique, laquelle vaut pour la tentative de s'entendre sur son rôle dans ce monde. C'est là un acte de compréhension (Verständnis) qui ne peut en dernier ressort porter que sur le fondement (Grund), c'est-à-dire sur les puissances qui déterminent la loi de son existence, telle est le thème de ce qu'Aristote a appelé la philosophie première dont l'ensemble de questions devient plus tard le centre même de la métaphysique.

Ainsi ce ne *sont pas des objets* dans le monde ou des régions d'objets, qui sont le véritable thème de toute connaissance philosophique. Son but n'est pas leur détermination objective dans une relation fondamentale (Begründungszusammenhang) d'affirmations vraies, c'est-à-dire telles que chaque sujet pensant puisse les réeffectuer. Le thème de la connaissance philosophique est bien plutôt *le monde lui-même*. Par monde il faut comprendre non pas la totalité de tout étant réel ou possible subsistant *en soi*, ni la *totalitè de tous les objets possibles de la connaissance* mais au contraire *l'horizon universel de la conscience humaine* (*Husserl*) et cela signifie la maniére dont l'homme se situe (sich befindet) au milieu des objects, comment ces objets sont orientés autour de lui et par rapport à lui et ce qu'ils signifient pour lui et pour sa situation au milieu de ces objets. S'il arrive donc qu'il soit *souvent* question dans la connaissance philosophique des mêmes objets, qui forment aussi le thème des sciences, il *n'en* est *pourtant nullement* question comme d'objets existant (bestehen) en soi et saisissables pour la connaissance dans leur en-soi; mais il est question d'eux tout au contraire dans leur *rapport à l'homme*, de l'homme dans sa relation avec eux et de leur signification quant à sa propre situation au milieu de ces objets et enfin de sa relation avec le fondement (Grund) de leur existence (Sein). En ce sens toute connaissance philosophique est dans sa fin derniére—même là oú cela n'est pas mentionné explicitement et demeure donc caché—connaissance de soi de l'homme. Elle est issue de la quête vers la certitude quant à la situation de l'homme dans le monde et quant à sa relation avec le fondement (grund) de son existence. L'homme a besoin de cette certitude non seulement en vue de satisfaire sa soif de connaissance, mais

il en a surtout besoin en tant qu'il est un être (Wesen) pratique pour l'acquisition des normes de son action. La connaissance philosophique n'est donc pas une connaissance portant directement sur les objets, lesquels sont sous-entendus comme existant en soi, mais elle est une connaissance réflexive concernant l'homme. Même *si* des affirmations isolées issues de sa forme linguistique paraissant encore être des affirmations à propos des objets, *leur vèritable* substrat cependant n'est pas l'objet dans son existence en soi, mais *l'homme pensant, mèditant* (sich besinnender Mensch) *lui-même.*

Mais il s'en suit que la présupposition qui rend *la connaissance objective possible dans les sciences* de la nature n'est pas donnée ici. C'était, comme nous l'avons montré, la présupposition que dans la connaissance l'objet est pris pour (hingenommen) et saisi pour ce quil' était déjà et qu'il reste en soi *indèpendamment* de la connaissance. C'était la présupposition qu'il n'est ni touché ni modifié par la connaissance qu'on en a. Or ce n'est pas le contenu (Inbegriff) des objets dans leur existence en soi, qui est le véritable substrat de la connaissance *philosophique,* mais ce sont ces objets dans leur *relation* avec l'homme et le contenu de ces relations, qui constituent sous le nom de 'Monde' en tant qu'horizon universel de toute expérience et de toute connaissance, le thème général de la connaissance philosophique. Même si ainsi l'homme réfléchissant sur lui-même et qui pense, est au moins implicitement le substrat dernier de toute affirmation philosophique, ce n'est pourtant nullement un substrat de la connaissance, tel que dans le jugement de connaissance il est constaté seulement dans son être en soi comme ce quil était déjà. C'est tout au contraire un substrat qui *se modifie lui-meme* a travers chaque acte de la connaissance. Ce qui donc différencie la connaissance philosophique de toute connaissance objective, c'est qu'elle n'est pas le simple fait de prendre un étant existant en soi pour ce qu'il est et de le déterminer, mais qu'elle est une connaissance telle qu'a travers elle, son substrat est d'ores et déjà changé. La connaissance philosophique en tant que connaissance de soi de l'homme ne signifie donc *pas une relation entre sujet et objet au* sens d'une *distance* théorique entre les deux. En tant que connaissance réflexive elle n'est pas une simple constatation d'un substrat du jugement qui demeurerait dans son identité (identique à lui-même), elle est tout au contraire une modification de ce substrat (de cet objet) lui-même. L'acte de cette connaissance signifie une modification du sujet pensant qui accomplit cet acte de connaissance. C'est *là ce qui fonde* l'importante découverte de Kant que le moi-sujet pensant ne peut être déterminé au moyen de la catégorie de la substance, comme catégorie de ce qui est identique à soi-méme (Beharrende) dans le changement de ses accidents. Mais les conséquences de cette découverte n'ont été tirées que dans l'idéalisme allemand. Ce fut surtout la grande découverte de Hegel que la prise de conscience (Bewusstwerden) signifie déjà par elle-même une modification du monde de l'homme et que les changements intervenant dans la situation de conscience (Bewusstseinstellung) de l'homme par rapport à lui-même et par rapport à son monde, sont le principe ultime de

toutes les modifications et de tous les bouleversements historiques. Cette découverte de l'espèce propre de la connaissance philosophique en tant que connaissance de soi de l'homme, espèce fondamentalement différente de toute connaissance des objécts, fut le prétexte au développement de la dialectique idéaliste. L'on reconnut à cette occasion le caractère limité de la logique traditionnelle comme simple organon de la connaissance de l'object et l'on tenta de développer la logique de la connaissance philosophique qui la réhausse (überhöht) comme une *logique de la rèflexion.* Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de montrer les raisons pour lesquelles cette tentative de l'idéalisme a échoué et devait échouer. Quoiqu'il en soit avec cette tentative a été vue pour la première fois la tâche, qui demeure entière après son èchec, de comprendre la différence *fondamentale* entre la connaissance philosophique et sa vérité et la connaissance scientifique en tant que connaissance des objets[1] Ce n'est que par là qu'il sera possible de fonder la logique de la connaissance philosophique par delà *l'alternative entre l'objectivisme et le subjectivisme;* qu'il sera possible face à l'impossibilité qu'il y a de réaliser en philosophie une connaissance objective au sens des sciences de ne pas tomber dans une attitude de simple résignation et cela en montrant que la philosophie elle aussi renferme son espèce propre de logicitè en tant que *connaissance rèflexive* en rapport avec l'homme et le transformant.

De quelle sorte doit être cette logicité et qu'est-ce qui résultera de ces considérations comme conséquences pour l'essence de la connaissance philosophique et pour la vérité valable de façon générale qu'elle peut atteindre, voilà a quoi il ne peut plus qu'être brièvement fait allusion.

Il en *rèsulte* tout d'abord qu'aucune relation fondamentale (Begrûdungszusam menhang) d'affirmations ne peut être simplement adoptée en tant que vérité au sens de vérité *objective-scientifique* et qu'on ne peut en tirer d'autres affirmations. Mais au contraire chacune de ces relations fondamentales doit être *ramenèe a l'horizon historique du monde oú elle a ètè ètablie.* Par cette voie une compréhension objective des affirmations philosophiques est possible de même que la description des théories (Lehren) philosophiques peut atteindre a l'objectivité. Cette compréhension, dans le sens de l'histoire des idees, des théories philosophiques à partir de l'horizon du monde oú elles furent conçues, n'est certes pas une compréhension qui implique purement et simplement l'accomplissement simultané de sa vérite pratique, essentielle pour la vie de l'homme. A prèmiere vue cela semble conduire au survol, plein de détachement, de toutes lesthéories philosophiques apparues dans l'histoire de la pensée. Mais cette comparaison entre les situations de l'homme par rapport à

[1] A cet égard l'essai de l'auteur sur 'Le Problême de la dialectique' dans le 3ème volume des 'Marxismus-Studien', Tübingen 1960, d'autre part *Gotthard Günther,* Idee und Grundriss einer nicht-Aristotelischen Legik, Hamburg 1959.

son monde, réalisées dans l'histoire et les situations possibles, lesquelles s'expriment dans les systèmes philosophiques, fait apparaitre (dans toutes ces situations) des structures et relations universelles qui fondent la possibilité de parler d'unité des hommes, *un a priori* indestructible qui n'est qu'indiqué (indiziert) formellement dans le contenu matériel des théories philosophiques. C'est une des tâches essentielles de l'avenir que d'éclaircir et de décrire ce rapport d'indication formelle comme au centre de la logique de la philosophie.

COMMENTS BY PROF. JOACHINS VON RINTELEN ON PROF. LANDGREBE'S PAPER

LANDGREBE develops the old and repeatedly new question whether the method of sciences, meaning natural sciences or as we say in Germany, exact sciences—with its quantitative and mathematical method is satisfactory for philosophy. The second question is: whether the method of natural science is conditional for all sciences. For science, objects are Facts and laws of Reality.

I would say, natural sciences are a 'presupposition' for Philosophy, because Philosophy is bound by their results, if the results are absolutely certain. But Philosophy has a more comprehensive problems. Its task is for Landgrebe the interpretation of the world and its realms. in relation to human beings. Here, it is not possible to transfer the categories of natural sciences to the content of human consciousness. Landgrebe quotes, for instance, the category of substance in the sense of Kant, a theme, about which also Nicolai Hartmann has written in detail.

I want to say, that Philosophy has to answer, in contrast with natural sciences, the problem of *sense*, of *meaning*, but not from a subjective point of view. I would like to define Philosophy as the understanding of meaning in relation to all objects, which are given, in German 'Sinnverständnis'; only then, is meaning always something which demands a qualitative insight and an essential understanding.

Landgrebe comes from the school of Edmund Husserl, who was a transcendental idealist. Therefore Philosophy is for him always a cognition in relation to the human being, in relation to the constitutive intentionality of human consciousness. If that is given, we have not a pure theoretical object, which exists *for itself*, but in relation to practical attitudes. In this way, we are able to overcome the subject-object bifurcation, which seems to me, is not possible in an absolute way and is not required.

But the structure of the human being is the same in fundamental principles, therefore it is possible for Landgrebe to achieve objective statements in the framework of human understanding of the world. Philosophy is, then, for Landgrebe a Science.

Therefore, it is not necessary to limit objective science to the natural sciences and their methods. Our universities have also another praxis. We have the philosophical faculties, faculties of humanities. In these faculties, for instance, the sciences of Languages, of History, of History of Ideas and Cultures, Anthropology, Psychology, Social Sciences etc., are not bound to mathematical and quantitative methods.

An important idea was added by Landgrebe. Philosophy can be an objective science but always in a special way: as a reflective know-

ledge of the relation of the human being to the world. This world is not a reality independent of us; it is always world in relation to us. Landgrebe means that we have given a relation to the ground of Being although the ground of Being is yet without a distinct interpretation. Landgrebe's view is obviously similar to the central question of Existentialism.

I understand Landgrebe in this way: We *are* because of our relation to the ground of Being,. *Seinsgrund*. Whether we are able to surpass the framework of human relations is a question very difficult to answer.

Perhaps the ultimate and most essential problem for us presented in the paper of Prof. Landgrebe is the question: How is a statement which is obligatory, in a general sense, for all mankind possible? We see that the human being is always in a flux, a process of becoming, and can be understood as Landgrebe says only from its *historical horizon*. If so, is not everything relative and historical, arbitrary and accidental? Landgrebe denies this; and he pre-supposes that we can have completely apriori cognitions, and these alone give for Landgrebe a foundation for the unity of mankind although in a formal way,—on old problem.

I would say the following for instance in relation to the problem of values, which is today one of the most important questions in contemporary Philosophy and a theme of our Congress. In comparing cultures of different historical horizons: Does not the contradictions and changeability of valuations force us to admit the relativity of all valuations? Is there an objective philosophical answer still possible? Has not each and every one of us the right to release himself from the inward obligation of certain value-demands, since such demands have a merely historical origin which established their validity only for our times? May they not be superseded tomorrow? As an individual, I myself stand accidentally in this or that situation—a situation determined perhaps by the community which today arbitrarily prescribes certain demands and tomorrow prescribes others. The disdain shown in our own days for humanitarian values making judgments in the light of humanitarian values impossible illustrates my point.

Now we are in a very difficult situation. I want to answer: The Relativism is both right and not right. We cannot deny the historical development and horizon. But is it a consequence an absolute Relativity? It seems to me, that this Relativity is only a relative Relativity? Let us think, for example, of differences in essential value of love as it was seen in the Greek Eros, in the brotherly love of Christianity, in humanitarian love or, at the present time, in social love. In spite of all this, however, I would still maintain that, in the last analysis, all these attitudes have as basis a common value tendency which historically manifests itself in a spectrum of variations (*Variationsbreite*). We are concerned with the selfsame value which has received in reality its historical character, because of diverse gradations and diverse emphasis of significations (*Rothackers Bedeutungscharakter*).

It is characteristic and important for contemporary thinkers to stress that which is more or less general and common to all, for we already know accurately enough the diversity which may enrich our historical outlook. But there another decisive fact appears in this problem. One and the same value tendency can attain various degrees of actual fulfilment because of the possibility of comparative and superlative graduation (*Steigerung*). For example, that which is meant by the value of a person, can be realized in completely different ways on different levels, all of which are embodied in individuals. I would therefore prefer to speak of the varying dimensions of profundity of value possibility (Tiefendimension).

But even that is one of the reasons, that we have the inclination to accept a Relativism and Historicism with the words of Landgrebe of the historical horizon and not to see the general and common attitudes in different expressions.

Now, let me give a summary about the paper of Professor Landgrebe. The task of Philosophy is not that of natural sciences to explain objective facts and their laws, but to demonstrate the world-understanding of human being. It stands always in an inner relation of theoretical and practical questions. We have the possibility in spite of changing historical horizon to admit general obligating ideas and to indicate them in a formal way. But they have always colour of the historical horizon and are given through a true phenomenological analysis of our outer and inner experiences. But I add that there are formal and material concepts which are always complementary. Therefore we have not a pure formalism and not a pure material concept as content. These general postulates and ideas gain—I want to say of course in the historical horizon an individual realisation of different fulfilments, of different variations and dimensions of depths. Nevertheless they are in the sense of Landgrebe expressions of valid objective relations and meanings, which are determining the background of human existence and its understanding of the world.

SCIENCE AND REALITY[1]

by

ANDRE MERCIER, Berne

TO MODERN common sense, Reality is all that surrounds us and with what we must reckon in each of our acts; it is also that which acts upon us and even that which results from accomplished acts.

To the metaphysician who is sophisticated by discussions about the mere appearance of things, about the abuse of our senses, about the necessity of things in themselves, Reality has little by little drawn back beyond the limits of a common apprehension and has been declared inaccessible except by a transcendental effort, the success of which has however always remained doubtful.

Has Science to do with either of these kinds of realities? My answer to this will be yes in both cases: Science has to do with both these realities.

Science never considers the things which it encounters without preconceived ideas about these things. But at the same time, these preconceived ideas are always drawn by it from an experience it has acquired about these very things. So this is the story of the hen and the egg: It is not possible to say, when talking about experience and theory, which is first and which is second.

In its consideration of the things it encounters, science regards them as exterior. Either they are readily found on the so-called objective plane, or they are thrown onto it. But they are not simply considered in their mere 'being-there'; they are envisaged in their actuality, in what they do spontaneously and by reaction towards the other things.

In contradiction to certain misleading declarations suggesting that science only seeks to establish 'what is', the reality with which science deals is a changing one and yet it is evidently submitted to certain

[1] Before entering the subject, let us make two remarks, one about a question of vocabulary, the other about the extension of the word Science.

First, we shall continuously use the phrase 'The brute reality of things'. This phrase is not quite alien to that other one used by Whitehead when he speaks of the 'brute facts'. Its role is to suggest an initial situation in which man is face to face with a reality without his having yet applied the mechanisms of any reason in order to establish a conscious understanding of that reality.

The second remark concerns the distinction that should be made between mathematics, which are here conceived as the intellectual power at the basis of all scientific activity elaborated at the utmost of its capacity, and the sciences proper which are positive knowledge about 'Reality'. Of course there arises an important problem of the relation between Mathematics and Reality; however we shall neglect it, firstly for want of time, secondly because it has been treated by several mathematicians, especially Swiss authors.

constants; on the one hand it is closely related to temporal flow, on the other hand it shows some kind of immutability which imposes itself to the human mind's curiosity as Form and Law.

The insistance with which Form and Law in the world surrounding us, the world of Nature which the Greek called Phusis, are imposed upon our minds, has led the Greek and more especially Plato to localise the Reality of that world in the idea of original Forms; this doctrine took away from reality all its being the 'reality of things', for the latter is merely conceived as the appearance of ideas. The intellectual operation thus performed is not reprehensible, quite on the contrary; but it operates a kind of short cut, which simply drops detailed explanations; it is a process of zero approximation which makes one to rush in one single jump above and away from the multiple difficulties, it amounts to an explanation 'avoiding explanation', to a science without the elaboration of science.

Kant, presumably reflecting on Newtonian mechanics, justly noticed that science is to establish a system to take the place of that one single *metaphysical jump*. In his days, however, one only knew of the example of Newtonian mechanics and he probably became its intellectual victim, for this mechanics had already had a success so tremendous that he possibly felt the need to look for *a priori* principles on which to ground mechanics as *the* only sort of possible explanation. In particular, he brought the study of Nature under the sign of causality.

Although we in our times cannot accept his doctrine in details since it does not resist a criticism based on contemporary scientific knowledge, I must acknowledge that the Kantian presentation helped to march a big step forward towards an adequate enunciation of the problem of Reality as it is put by science. We remember that he considered what we call Nature as the product of an activity of our cognitive power called Understanding working by virtue of *a priori* principles summed up as 'legality', among which one of the most important questions to be answered is: which is the form of the law of causality governing the physical world?

Kant believed to have discovered the *a priori* forms of understanding. Now if one considers with attention the contents of those principles known as the Axioms of intuition, the Anticipations of Perception and particularly the Analogies of Experience, he will notice that they have by Kant been given exactly the form which they should have in order to found Newtonian mechanics, and consequently the particular law of causality later known as Laplacian determinism. The physical world appeared thus in those days reduced to indisputable propositions; the changing and temporal nature of physical Reality in its brute appearance was thus replaced by an immutable legality discovered so to say by virtue of the first principles of pure reason.

Of course Newton had declared that he was forging no hypotheses, however he certainly was aware of the fact, that his theory was a construct.

Since those days, Newtonian mechanics has been found insufficient in many domains, of heat, of electricity, of light, of the microcosm and the macrocosm; therefore, it must nowadays be considered as an explanation restricted to phenomena involving motions altogether not very rapid of bodies spread in regions neither very big nor very small of space. As a consequence of this restricted role attributable to mechanics, scientists have understood that all science is but a progressing construct, and that the more it progresses, the more enlarged and complicated the field is separating the line of departure where Reality is the reality of things in their brute appearance, from the limiting line where Reality would be the kind of transcendental apprehension spoken of at the opening.

Moreover, we have learnt that every scientific undertaking aims at a reduction of temporal phenomenon to untemporal form, which is the only immutable sign of legality manifested with great insistance in all reality at any degree attained by such a reduction.

Let us argue on two kinds of examples: concrete examples of objects that obviously are very real to the eye of everybody, and an abstract one taken among the branches of science.

As a first instance of a very real object, let us, in this great country where we are assembled as honoured guests, take that of an elephant. Let us ask: Which is the reality of an elephant?

To that question, several answers can be given.

If we are talking of a wild elephant crushing with its big paw the high grass of the savannah, it is a brute reality we are talking of, made of persistent change where no order is established by human consciousness. Eventually an order appears as a consequence of elephant hunting.

If we mean by an elephant a tame one set on to work systematically, it appears to its tamer and master as endowed with a moral reality made of the orders of the work imposed on it, of the forms of a bargain where it gets housing and nourishment for the said work, just as in the case of a sheep-dog in the pastures of Scotland or a slave contributing to the erection of a pyramid in ancient Egypt. The elephant is reduced to an educational order which lets it appear as domesticated animal. In that order it is submitted to more or less elaborated techniques which show more or less details in its moral reality; consequently the more this operation is performed forward, the further the elephant is away from the brute reality of its state of wildness.

If we are talking about elephants as described in zoology textbooks, they are made of organs, they are pachydermatous, they have a trunk and tusks, a herbivorous stomach and so on; their reality becomes zoological. Then we submit these organs to more elaborate analyses, which lead us to physiology, to physicochemistry... and finally the elephant becomes an assemblage of particles according to orders manifested at several levels. The more these analyses are pushed forward, the more we get away from the brute reality of the elephant.

Europeans are not accustomed to see how elephants are trained. However they are more familiar with horse training for instance. In the latter case, from high training at the riding school one could let appear another reality of an aesthetical kind established by a well-defined bond between the trainer and the animal.

In the former case as in the latter case, orders, forms, laws, are established to which the object, arising from its brute reality is more or less adequately submitted. The temporal reality it possesses at the brute state makes room for an immutable reality which is located in the form of the laws and in the structure of their entanglement.

In Science, the entanglement of these forms and laws is called a scientific theory. A theory is what is durable and is written in the textbooks, hence it is what is detached from temporal reality, from the historical uniqueness of factual situations. The books in their turn serve as bases for prevision; prevision re-establishes temporal order from recognized constants, but it does it artificially.

The idea of prevision, which we owe to the Babylonians, and which has fascinated all generations of scientists as well as of other people, leads us to deal with the second concrete example which we intended to consider. It is the example of a locomotive.

A locomotive is in a certain sense an artificial elephant. It is in an elementary way already a teleguided machine, but it does in no way possess the kind of primitive free will which is noticeable at least in the case of the wild elephant. It is built according to the model established by mechanical, thermodynamical or electromagnetic theories. Inside the brute reality of things, a locomotive is nothing but one instance of a construction by the human mind, or reintroduced by human decision into the brute reality; however this construction by the human mind is itself no more the brute aspect, but a scientific aspect of the reality of things.

If an intelligent man, unaware of locomotives, should see for the first time a brand-new locomotive on its rails in the middle of a savannah, as if it were there in its wild state, and if this man should climb it to try out the handles of its engine, he might perhaps finally find out how it works and would classify it among thermo-mechanical engines; he would elaborate its theory, yet presumably not so complete as the whole physics known to the man who constructed it.

A locomotive, i.e. a work of technic (itself daughter of physical science,) is generally considered as more scientific than an elephant. The elephant is the work of Nature or of God as you please; the locomotive is never considered as the work of Nature or of God, but as the work of man, of the scientist who becomes a technician. A locomotive is artificial in the full meaning of this word. So the concrete works of science are artificial, and so is their reality. Scientific reality, if made concrete, is an artificial reality which only reminds of the brute reality of things. The simpler or more elementary the brute reality of a thing is, the more chance there is to achieve a faithful imitation of the reality of

this thing by building an artificial object, e.g. artificial satellites or still better chemical compounds obtained by synthesis.

Moving on now to an example of abstract nature, let us consider mechanics itself.

Mechanics had originally been invented by Newton only to give an account of the motion of celestial bodies; it was a formalism adapted to the phenomenon of gravitation only. As a mathematical formalism, it was, and still is today, an assemblage of non-contradictory constant relations; consequently it performed the reduction of a manifestly temporal phenomenon, of that one which had first of all drawn the attention of observators, to orders of immutability. From a certain brute reality of things, it operated the passage to a reality constructed by the mind, i.e. to a theory.

The success of his theory was great not only on the ground of the extraordinary precision with which it gave an account of the phenomenon of gravitation, but also because, by substituting in the same formal frame a new and reasonably chosen law of force instead of the law of gavitation, one was able to account for other phenomena. The way to a universal explanation of all known or unknown motions was, it seemed, open, and even, by an audacious though at the same time too easy to make extrapolation, the way seemed to open for the explanation of all changes, i.e. finally of everything that happens in Nature. Absolute determinism invaded thought, everybody became a mechanist. And Kant meant to save Free will by means of Practical reason, but tried at the same time to ground any reason whatever *a priori.*

Historically, this blindness in face of the provisionality and precariousness of the explanation given by mechanics is an appalling effect of its invention. A provisionality that lasted so long that though the insufficiency of this explanation had become manifest, one has up to the coming of Planck and Einstein tried to lead everything back to it without anybody acknowledging to himself, that this mechanical explanation was not the definitive and total identification of Reality. Although the theories of electromagnetism and heat were already distinct identifications, they resembled mechanics, for in making them, one had endeavoured to copy mechanics.

The theory of relativity is one of the directions in which one had recognized that mechanics is but an approximation valid under certain assumptions, assumptions of which Newton had not been aware of, and quantum theory is the other direction in which one has noticed that mechanics is again but an approximation valid under certain different assumptions. That has been enough for us to understand that physical science, and *a fortiori* all positive sciences, do not and will never amount to anything but to approximations of the anticipated identification of that Reality which escapes our grasp.

Quantum theory and Relativity theory are in their turn but approximations valid under certain quite restrictive assumptions.

Now the kind of reality which physical science has tried to identify has, even through the revolutions of quantum and relativity theories,

been by all scholars of this science assumed to be an achieved reality for all times. By this we do not mean to say that the physical world is submitted to no evolution. Now one of the most fundamental hypotheses practically tacitly made in today's physics is that the physical world is the fact of an evolution conformal with itself, in which there is no place for either spontaneous generation, or finality, or creative evolution, or existential will, or eschatological hope,—all things to which, 'tis true, there is for the time being indeed no reason to direct the attention of the physicist.

Nevertheless, even with the help of quantum theory and its conditional determinism, one is able to construct neither a biology nor a psychology, and furthermore one does not possess an acceptable cosmology even based on the most modern form of relativity theory.

Neither finality, nor any of the other categories or categorial notions in which one or the other specific behaviour of reality seems to have its root, has been up to this day decently submitted to the order of a mathematical formalism, with one exception. This exception is irreversibility, and the corresponding formalism is that of thermodynamics.

There follows from this that, apart from physics,—including such chapters as astronomy, chemistry or the sciences of the Earth,—positive sciences from biology to sociology or further more if there are proposed sciences beyond it, do not yet supply any truly satisfactory identification of Reality. In return, the increasing multiplicity of categorical notions according to which the various sciences and their chapters can be arranged show us how far we are from embracing Reality, even from the mere point of view of science.

This of course posits the problem of the One and the Multiple, for not only the metaphysical jump which we talked of at the opening, but also the very reduction from the order of brute and temporal reality to that of the immutability of constants as they are discovered at any level of the identification of reality are unifications. A scientific theory is a unity unifying the multiple, and if there is some sense in looking for a unitary theory that would unify everything, like an extrapolation of the hope formulated by Einstein in the restricted field of physics, then the universal unitary theory would be identical to the One, as opposed to the Multiple, and the metaphysical jump would be replaced by a pan-scientific visualization of the world.

But even this visualization leaves unanswered the question as to whether there are other modes of reality than the one apprehended in the scientific undertaking. We have suggested the answer while considering an example by which we let moral and aesthetical realities appear. Such a country as India or the United States undoubtedly has a reality, but a complex one. Its reality presents, beside a scientific one with mountains, rivers, crops, human races and the like, a moral aspect concerned with ethnic, interior or exterior political questions and so much more.

These remarks lead us to put the question of the reality possessed by any 'thing' which has a name in the vocabulary, but cannot be individually shown by the forefinger: God, Time, Space, the forces of Nature, geometrical figures, proletariate, aristocracy and so on. If there exists a scientific theory objectively verified to a certain degree of approximation about one or the other of these 'things', then it is an identification of the thing, but merely an identification of scientific order. There are such people as maintain that an identification along the scientific line is alone capable to confer authenticity upon the assumed reality of a thing. Yet they have no proof whatsoever of their statement. Indeed, if we revert to our previous examples, it appears clearly that there are orders of reality distinct from the scientific one and consequently from the objective one.

Besides, whatever the order under consideration may be, whenever one believes he has grasped Reality, he becomes aware sooner or later that he has not yet done so.

According to Abelard, who is said to have created the word, and to Duns Scotus who used it after him, Reality is that which is of the thing in opposition to that which is in the idea, in other words that which suffices to identify the thing. This definition is still the only possible today. Reality, alas, escapes our grasp and resists every effort made by man to apprehend it.

However *We are* ever and ever *grasped* by *It* and strongly indeed.

LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY

by

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THE nature of human relations is indefinable but we may begin with the very obvious fact that individuals are not all alike and no one is self-sufficing. If the origin of Community is therefore discoverable in functional division and if functional division is intrinsic to anything organic, then, does Community imply a 'natural' division of 'classes'? Does social evolution reveal the 'natural' division of 'classes' which the idea of Community logically presupposes?

When we say that individuals are not all alike and therefore they come together, we imply a kind of 'necessity' and in speaking about it we should avoid confusion of standpoints. Kant distinguished between the Realm of Nature and the Realm of Ends and he said that the characteristic mark of the Realm of Nature was 'empirical necessity' while the characteristic mark of the Realm of Ends is 'practical freedom'[1]. It is in terms of 'Practical freedom' that we analyse the Concept of Community and yet we have to light a candle, as Socrates would say, to see where Liberty is.

In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson analyses the sort of 'necessity' which brings entities together into communities, whether of ants or human beings, in terms of a conception of 'obligation' neutral between Biology and Ethics.

Indian thought conceives and interprets human relations at all levels in terms of *ṛṇa* or 'debt' which individuals owe one another and this conception postulates a social structure and relationship in terms of human obligations as prior to human rights and as arising out of them.

The idea of Community expresses the basic truth of human relations. Community is a more inclusive conception than the State and is not analysable in terms of Parties or Groups, political or otherwise. Community is or ought to be the embodiment of the ideals of Liberty and Fraternity, although no actual community has united them even partially in its institutions. We may distinguish between the positive Law of the State and the 'living law' of Community. To speak of Community

[1] What is 'Practical Freedom'? Is it 'formal' or 'real' freedom? How is 'practical freedom' to be interpreted in its application to Community? Is it a 'social contract' or 'Trust'? Is community a kind of 'joint stock company' or is it more like the Hindu Joint-Family? Sri Jawaharlal Nehru interpreting India's bond with the Commonwealth said: 'No bonds bind us to the Commonwealth, therefore, there are no bonds to be broken'.

and to speak of individuals is the same thing, for Community is the living order created by the actions of individuals. A Community is changed when the individuals are changed; neither individuals are prior to Community nor Community is prior to individuals. Community is united by the bond of 'neighbourliness' and is the *realised good, not of the greatest number, but of all.* This is what is meant by *Sarvodaya* in current Indian Social-Ethics. We may define community and its structure by saying that it is a unity of 'Manifestation' and not a ' Unity of Composition' i.e., a Whole present in its parts, although, historically and sociologically no actual Community exhibits the kind of structure implied in the conception of a 'Unity of Manifestation'.

The Concept of Community is the concept of order in human relations and questions of order and anarchy are ethical questions and so any theory of Community which explains it wholly in socio-economic or legal terms does not express the truth in human relations. Order is not created or wholly created by legislation for there is the paradox that in a well-ordered State or Community legislation, as Plato said, is superfluous, while in an illordered State it is useless. The increasing work of modern legislatures and Law Courts indicates that something is basically wrong with the individual and Community.

There is something in human experience which transforms human relations, relationships, actions, and attitudes into an ordered whole in a Community. Indian thought calls it *Dharma.* Dharma is action and the principle of action. Aṣoka established order in his kingdom through his Edicts on Dharma, *Dharma-lipi.* He said in Rock Edict *XI* thus: 'King Priyadarsi says: there is no gift that can equal the gift of Dharma, the establishment of human relations on Dharma, the distribution of wealth through Dharma, or kinship in Dharma, Dharma-Sambhandha'.

The concept of Community cannot now be conceived in terms of the City-State or the Nation-State. 'The hellenic world' says Jules Monnerot 'was handicapped by the very perfection of an historic past which it was unable to surpass'. What was true of the City-State is now true of the Nation-State. The concept of United Nations as an international Community is the consciousness of an obligation to surpass 'the very perfection of an historic past'. It is the creation of a World-Order in spite of ideological differences through what Aṣoka called *Dharma-Sambhandha,* kinship in Dharma.

There are misconceptions of Liberty which we ought to reject: (*a*) Liberty is misconceived as a centrifugal tendency in human affairs as opposed to Security in what is called the 'State of Nature'. The conceptions of 'State of Nature' and 'Social Contract' imply that there is one Law for the individual and another for the Community. The 'Social Contract' theory implies that Community is a kind of a 'Unity of Composition' arising and held together by a bond called 'Social Contract' which is not absolute but conditional, for it gives the individual the right to make a revolution if he is convinced that the sovereign authority

which coerces him into obedience is not really an expression of the *General Will.* (*b*) Secondly, there is the anarchist's misconception of Liberty as a convulsive force in Society analogous to physical force in Nature. There is the fallacy of interpreting the Realm of Ends in terms of the Realm of Nature.

Marxist philosophers distinguish between a 'reactionary force' and a 'revolutionary force' and identify the Movements of Liberty in History with revolutionary force and justify the use of force and violence in their encounter. What is the distinction between the two as both are forms of violence and appear barbarous to each other? Why does a 'revolutionary force' become a 'reactionary force' in History? Why does a revolution which rises against absolutism make the State absolute even as a transition? Is it good that everything in the life of the individual should be governed by State-action? If it is a dialectical Law for a thing to contain its own negation and if this is also the Law of History, then, Liberty is this dialectical principle itself by which a thing surpasses its own perfection of form, passes into its opposite and includes them both and not the partial Thesis or the partial Antithesis of the Movement. If this is the 'truth' of History, then, it ought to affect human action and the struggle for liberty ought to become a 'non-violent' struggle. Here is a passage from Mahatma Gandhi which indicates the connection between 'Truth' and 'Non-violence':

QUESTION: 'However honestly a man may strive in his search for truth, his notion of truth may be different from others. Who then is to determine truth?'
GANDHIJI: 'The individual himself'.
QUESTION: 'Honest striving after truth is different in every case?'
GANDHIJI: 'That is why the non-violence part of it'.

In analysing the concept of Community we could make two broad distinctions and two broad generalisations and these reveal two aspects of Liberty co-existing in a Community. (*a*) Community exists in functional division which becomes in the social process more and more heterogenous and diversified. The idea of Community entails a basic, original difference between individuals in work, worth, skill, potency of talent and function. This basic difference is also a 'natural inequality'. The concept of social order means that someone who has the talent in him to be a musician, as Plato would say, who has the 'soul' of a musician, has the creative opportunity and liberty to be so; whereas, if he who can be a good potter abandons his art and becomes a politician, his art suffers and the public life of a Community will consist of politicians who cannot even be potters. The life of a Community is lived in its culture, which lives and breathes in an environment of 'doing as you like', for Culture is doing as you like in the pursuit of higher values. This aspect of Liberty is called 'Cultural Freedom'. It implies leisure and freedom from Authority. In this sense, Community is the ideal of a realised commonwealth of diversity of cultures and

faiths. The idea of a realised commonwealth was expressed by Aṣoka in Rock Edicts VII and XII as follows:

> 'King Priyadarsi wishes members of all faiths to live everywhere in his kingdom. The faiths of others deserve to be honoured for one reason or another. By honouring them, one exalts one's own faith and at the same time performs service to the faith of others. By acting otherwise, one injures one's own faith and also does disservice to that of others.'

Aṣoka's conception is the ideal of a Commonwealth where the State is not so much the source of the guarantee of liberty to the individual as the individual is to a fellow individual.

Liberty as 'Cultural freedom' is not merely fulfilling well, the socio-economic function by an individual of his duties in the social organism but the chance to reach his own, real self, 'enjoying, content in himself, the peace of his inner being'. Yoga is the culmination according to Indian thought of the experience of individual freedom and Community is the unity of individuals in whom that experience is made manifest.

(*b*) On the other hand, Community is the idea of a commonwealth where certain inequalities between individuals are progressively diminished or altogether removed: such inequalities as are based on wealth, social hierarchy, colour etc. This is another aspect of Liberty; it is a 'Mass Movement', a 'class-struggle', a 'Social Revolution' aiming at the establishment of an egalitarian social order. In this sense History, as Hegel said, is Freedom; it is freedom of the masses from bondage, for better socio-economic conditions and security, freedom from want and hunger. Evolutionary Democracy and Revolutionary Socialism is a major difference within this Movement.

> 'There is no necessary connection between social justice and a democratic form of government; a fact which is equally well demonstrated by certain examples from Egyptian and Chinese History. The inequality of wealth which is the mainspring of commercial republics is a stimulant, and the accumulation of capital by private initiative favours expansion and enterprise. So the Democratic Socialism of the 19th century linked together two aspirations which history shows to be antagonistic if not incompatible. Though in men's hearts there may be a necessary connection between justice and democracy, history does not confirm it. History shows that justice in the sense of equality has been imposed rather by universal absolutism than by universal duffrage'.
>
> (p. 313—*Sociology of Communism* by Jules Monnerot)

The Realm of Ends is the realm of 'practical Freedom'; the analysis of Community attempted in this paper reveals two aspects; Liberty as 'Cultural Freedom' and Liberty as a Movement towards Equality, as a 'Class-Struggle'. The philosophical problem of Liberty is not merely the problem of resistance to Tyranny, or freedom from authority,

or the question whether the Individual has Rights against the State etc., but the 'internal contradiction', if we may say so, in the nature of Practical Freedom. This contradiction *appears as an opposition between Liberty and Equality*. The Revolutionary is inspired alternately by these ideals but no social revolution has yet united them in its institutions. Are these ideals incompatible? What is the type of Community in which these ideals are realised in institutions? How is the ethical difference between these two to be reconciled? Is equality to be imposed from without? Is classlessness possible *en masse* or is it a result of individual development?

Hegel said in his *Philosophy of History:* 'The History of the World is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom'. He distinguished between the Idea and its 'realisation in the concrete' through the complex of human passions. The concrete mean and union of the two, the idea and the complex of human passions, he said, is Liberty. I think Hegel used the terms 'Mean' and 'Union' in a 'Pickwickian' sense. What Hegel really means is that Liberty under the conditions of morality in a State is a 'mixture', to use a word from Greek Philosophy and not a Mean or a Union. It is a 'mixture' of Reason and Unreason, for the Means which Reason uses in History belong to the sphere of unreason, the complex of human passions. Hegel's analysis of the Idea of Freedom in History involves the 'naturalistic' fallacy. How is History a progress 'of consciousness of freedom' when, human action determined by Unreason, the complex of human passions, *Kāma*, and *rāga* as Indian ethics calls them, does not consciously choose the right Means for realisation of freedom? When human action does not consciously choose the right Means for its realisation, then, human action is involved in a fatality, a 'vicious regress' *Karma-bandha*, and the nature of such action is not free. The 'consciousness of freedom' is therefore a consciousness which unites the right Means with the right End in action, and the nature of such free action is *Satyāgraha* as Gandhi called it. When an individual sets this force in motion in Society, he sets in motion a truly 'revolutionary force', for it acts for the good of the Agent as well as his Opponent, for the Victor and the Vanquished. *Satyāgraha* is revolutionary force but a delicate one. It has no place in it for unreason, obstinacy, self-interest, or hatred or ill-will. There is a corrupt form of it which Gandhi called *durāgraha*.

'If a man however popular and great he may be, takes up an improper cause and fasts in defence of the impropriety, it is the duty of his friends, fellow-workers and relatives to let him die rather than that an improper cause should triumph so that he may live. Fairest means cease to be fair when the end sought is unfair'. (p. 46, *Non-violence in Peace and War. Vol. II—Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad*, 1949).

Between a speculative philosopher like Hegel interpreting the phenomena of History and a man of action like Gandhi, setting in motion a social revolution through change of the individual, is there a difference in the concept of Liberty as a norm of human action?

FORMAL FREEDOM AND REAL FREEDOM

by

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I

In this title which has been assigned to me it seems to be assumed that 'formal freedom' and 'real freedom' are to be contrasted as less adequate and more adequate versions of the same kind of thing. If that is so, I want to begin by questioning my terms of reference. Why I find this necessary will appear from a few preliminary definitions.

By 'formal freedom' I understand 'being in a position effectively to exercise one's 'real freedom'. It is not therefore a *kind* of freedom, even an inferior kind, but a *condition* of freedom, and in practice a necessary condition. It is contrasted with 'real freedom' as means to end and not as copy to original. Examples of 'formal freedom' in this sense are a minimum wage, religious toleration, property rights and, above all, effective protection against arbitrary interference, either by other private persons or by public authority, of one's ordinary way of living, subject only to our own observance of the corresponding obligations. These political arrangements are not 'the end for man', but they provide the basis for the exercise of the 'real freedoms', to which we now turn.

'Real freedom', both in India and in the West, has commonly been supposed to have something to do with spiritual mastery. It may consist in sinking oneself in a reality (or perhaps a non-reality) beyond oneself. Or again, it may consist in the expansion of the moral personality through adherence to a rule or through the indwelling of conscience. There is no point here in stressing the difference between these two ways of life; there have been saints in either style. What we are here concerned with is their similarity. There are neither of them devices for achieving goods other than themselves, They are not preconditions, prolegomena or means to ends: they are just good in themselves.

Formal freedom, then, is formal in the sense that it has no explicit content and can lend itself to any content. It is as moral beings that we contribute that content. It is the use we make of formal freedom which justifies it. And the trouble is that we may make the wrong use of it. The defence of it is that it is in making the right use of it that we achieve our good, and that this is so important that we must run the very considerable risk of making the wrong use of it.

All the illustrations we have given of 'formal freedom' can be brought under the heading of 'rights'. Rights are the elbow-room within which moral development is possible. They are containers for moral decisions. In Europe and European-derived cultures the emphasis on rights has had the effect of eliciting personal initiative and widening the sphere in which moral decisions are possible. In British countries, at least, it has underpinned what has commonly been called *laisser-faire*, which is not and never has been merely a balance of forces, but an organized system under which what in a welfare state is effected administratively is effected none the less in the absence of administrative interference by the rigid enforcement of the law of contract. In none of these cases does the machinery of rights bring about single-handed the expansion of the moral will; it merely guards it against the conditions which make such expansion impossible.

Rights have to be secured by political action. It is true that custom and public opinion can play their part, and if they are strong enough political action may not often be necessary. But it must be in reserve, because in any civilized society there can be only one repository of force. Now political action is obviously well placed to break up the unofficial power of some persons over others, and political action may therefore at some time be the best conserver of rights. But when rights are threatened by political action itself, it can hardly be by political action that rights will be best sustained. As a matter of history, both things have happened, and are happening; and if attention is here drawn to the case in which the state is the aggressor, it is only because that case is the more paradoxical; for whether or not there are natural rights, there can be civic rights only when there is a state to enforce them. There is only one way of breaking out of the paradox, and that is to say that a well-constituted society must provide constitutional safeguards for rights; whether written, as in U.S.A. and Australia, or unwritten but operative, as in the U.K. will depend on historical factors not here to be considered. Either way, political action is limited by axioms which the state respects as much as anyone.

So far, then, we identify formal freedom with the system of rights enforced in a constitutional society: in short, with political freedom: and we agree that there is a moral and spiritual freedom (whether of communion or detachment) which is most worth having and cannot be expressed merely in political terms. Formal or political freedom, on this scale of values, takes second place, but it cannot be superseded. The relation is not dialectical but hierarchical. No amount of spiritual freedom does away with the necessity for formal freedom. Even if everyone wanted to give his rights away, he would have to have them first. And, as a matter of hard fact, where formal freedom is at a discount, spiritual freedom is difficult to sustain and transmit. If one's rights are not protected the finer edges of moral insight are blunted in the ensuing struggle and finally submerged in an inevitable despotism.

Having outlined a position to defend, largely in terms of Western experience, I wish first and principally to contrast it with another posi-

tion, also of Western provenance, and to suggest, secondly, that the contrast may be important for the traditionally Indian as well as for the traditionally Western type of spirituality.

II

The Western position I wish to contrast with the position we have outlined may be stated as follows. What matters is not that rights should be upheld, but that there should be no distinction between rulers and ruled. Once obliterate that distinction, and the question of rights will not arise, because people will not need to be protected against themselves. The crux of the matter is not the limitation of power but its distribution. If government is truly self-government, it does not need to be limited at all. In fact, the limitation embodied in what we have called 'formal freedom' is transmuted into the 'real freedom' of popular sovereignty. Because we are apt to think of one thing at a time, and because its most alarming consequences were not originally intended, we do not always realize what we are committed to by this now traditional but once revolutionary move in political philosophy. It finds 'real freedom not in personal decision or religious abnegation, but in the decisions and structures of a Community, standing to formal freedom not simply as end to means, but as an all-embracing genus to a subordinate species.

The damage began with Rousseau, not a practical politician, but an idealist with an unlimited capacity for self-deception, who envisaged the impossible and evolved a formula for achieving it. 'Each man, in uniting himself to all, nevertheless obeys only himself'. The ideal is politically impossible, for in any considerable society, in order to achieve a common purpose, let alone to unify different purposes, some people have to obey others. To say this is not to criticize democracy; it is to criticize a bad theory about democracy. It is certainly all to the good that those who are governed should have some hold over those who govern, and that those who govern and those who are governed should jointly recognize a system of explicit or implicit understandings. But this does not mean that people govern themselves; it means that they are willing to be governed by others on constitutionally defined terms.

Self-government, then, is something which cannot happen; and what cannot happen, it may be held, cannot be dangerous. But nothing can be more dangerous than the belief that what cannot happen can happen: impossible theory, packed into slogans, powerfully reacts on practice, and, just because it is impossible, diverts practice from its proper channel.

The belief that self-government is a practical proposition has led to many preposterous conclusions, such as that rulers are merely commissaries charged with carrying out policies devised by assemblies, and that, in the name of some mystical general will, a man may be 'forced to be free'. But the most preposterous conclusion of all is that 'real freedom' can absorb formal freedom; for without the protection of a

'formal freedom' other than itself 'real freedom' is constantly in jeopardy. 'Real freedom' conceived in political terms is no more than absolute power exercised by majorities, and, as J. S. Mill quite properly pointed out, this is in principle no different from absolute power exercised by minorities. If there is no 'formal freedom' there is no protection for the stimulating variety of thoughts and habits which to many of us are the marks of a free society, and every encouragement to those self-accredited demagogues who, because the people cannot speak for itself, presume to speak on its behalf. When 'real freedom' is identified with self-government, an impossible ideal is soon impersonated by a sinister possibility.

None the less, the desire not to be governed has a certain magic lure about it, especially for those who are badly governed, and it is supported up to a point by the experience of groups small and cohesive enough to settle matters by agreement. Here one feels, nobody governs anybody; discussions just issue from reasonable discussion with a common signature. That this may happen in a well-knit family, or a small sectarian religious congregation, or a policy session of the association for the advancement of science, or even a University committee if and when its members are genuinely anxious to reach agreement, is not to be denied: and it may even have happened in the more under-populated cantons of Switzerland in the 18th century, though certainly not in Rousseau's Geneva. Rousseau's partiality for small communities shows that he had such models in mind: as Mr Peter Laslett has pointed out, he was a 'face-to-face' man, and his mistake lay not in his preference for the 'face-to-face' society, in which, as a matter of fact, 'real freedom' in our sense of the word has been cradled, but in his assumption that the face-to-face society can ever be a model for government. It is just a matter of empirical fact that government emerges whenever a society is complex or heterogeneous; as every society must be if it is to realize any but the simplest or most specialized interests of its members. And, the moment that happens, the face-to-face society passes over into a political society. It is because Rousseau failed to notice the transition that he endowed political society with the virtues of a face-to-face society, and so neglected to safeguard the real face-to-face societies against the pressures of an absolutist democracy.

Let us assemble the conclusions of this section of the paper. According to a widespread western interpretation of democracy 'real freedom' is to be found in the field of politics, and in that field renders 'formal freedom' unnecessary. J. S. Mill, who noted this tendency in the continental democratic theory of his time, and deeply suspected it, summed it up for its sponsors in a nutshell; 'the nation did not need to be protected against its own will'. If this is so, moral freedom, the freedom of personal initiative, is freedom only in an imperfect and approximative sense; and as for the freedom of the monk or the yogi, who looks for liberation by contracting out, there is just no place for it at all. Real freedom lies in the subjugation of personal purposes to all-absorb-

ing social purposes. On our interpretation, political or formal freedom is essential to real freedom; but the transactions of real freedom rest upon it and rise beyond it. These are to be found in personal decisions and personal affections, or, alternatively, in those intensely personal acts in which personal identity advances out of society to its own negation. And what makes the confusion possible is the transferring of the 'face-to-face' model from private to political society.

III

I have considered what I have called the main Western error in the relating of formal and real freedom. It might however be held that the problem arises because of the outward and aggressive bent of the Western form of spirituality. If real freedom is to be found in the sort of personal decision which influences the overt course of events, it enters the field of formal freedom, and confusion becomes inevitable; but the real freedom which consists of self-mastery directed towards negation, while it enters the material world in its preliminary phases, is directed not towards it but away from it, and does not depend on a formal freedom obtaining within it. Hence the whole notion of formal freedom, and in particular of rights, belongs to Western-style spirituality, and is a prerequisite for real freedom only in that context.

There is no doubt that inward liberation is far less dependent on political elbow-room than are overt and expansive personal decisions. Indeed, the whole point of Stoic morality (about which, as it was Western, I can speak with more authority) was that it made a man master of his soul no matter what his circumstances might be. Nevertheless, in modern times, it is well to consider the social pressures which might suffocate interior discipline, just as the administrative encroachment of the Stuart monarchy, if it had been allowed to, would have suffocated the traditional rights of Englishmen. The practice of interior discipline rests on a long tradition, on a pervasive religious atmosphere persisting even into a secularized ethic, and above all (seeing that it is both rare and difficult) on the willingness of the less enlightened to acknowledge in the few a superior discernment in which they know themselves to be deficient. All this can survive the thunder of the legions or a top-storey foreign occupation; but it could be cut at the root by the intentional bias of a secular education, or even by the unintentional bias of a preoccupation with technology. To maintain itself it may need the protection of an organized system of rights, and particularly the right of the family, as the basic social institution, to demand its own type of education. That is as may be: I am merely concerned to suggest that Eastern-type spirituality may come to need the hard shell of formal freedom in the shape of personal rights which Western-type spirituality, with its more definite worldly commitments, had had to develop and must continue to maintain.

This, however, is an extension from our main theme. What we have tried to suggest is: (*i*) that formal freedom and real freedom as defined, are both ingredients of a good life (*ii*) that they are distinct and irreducible (*iii*) that real freedom is axiologically higher and formal freedom structurally basic. When it is allowed that real freedom is the truth of formal freedom, or that formal freedom is freely absorbed in real freedom, this delicately poised double tension between the necessities of organization and the spontaneity of the spirit is distroyed. It is through that tension, which holds them each in its proper place and does not allow them to encroach on each other, that formal freedom and real freedom, the system of rights and the adventures of the spirit, may each yield us what they have to give us.

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND SOCIETY

(Experiment in Individual Liberation—Yoga)

by

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THE Yoga is the union with the Highest, the Ultimate; it is the attainment of the status of the Absolute, the Unconditioned. But it is also the way that leads to that union and that status. But the normal life is a conditioned existence and its growth is the growth of new conditionings. These conditionings are the whole stuff of life, they constitute it, they regulate it. And they pertain to the three principal steps of evolution, Matter, Life and Mind and their corresponding elements in personality, the physical, the vital and the mental. Our conditionings are, so to say, the associations or bondages created between our individual physical, vital and mental parts and the environmental or universal Matter, Life and Mind. These associations or bondages are evidently multitudinous and involve great variety and variability in the force of intensity and compulsiveness of relationship. As life grows, the complexity of these conditionings too increases and the predictability of behaviour becomes difficult. The choice or preference of the individual for one conditioning or the other becomes a more evident phenomenon. That is what is normally called freedom. Freedom is the freedom of choice among possible alternatives in a situation. These possibilities are normally the various lines of conditionings formed or in the process of formation in an individual. And such freedom is more definitely characterised for our experience by the absence of a pronounced external coercion or determination. Undoubtedly the exercise of choice is some freedom and it involves some real experience of freedom.

But this choice as a psychological fact involves a play of varied forces of character with relations of harmony as well as opposition among themselves. Thus compulsiveness is not altogether an external fact, it is internal too. In other words, restriction of freedom can also be internal. This happens when a higher impulsion, with which we have acquired a fair degree of self-identification, is stoutly resisted and overpowered by a lower impulsion, with which our self-identification is yet strong. This is essentially an experience of slavery to the lower, the more egoistic, the more impetuous, the more violent. It is a complete experience of coercion and absence of freedom. There is, however, one ray of hope present here and it is that of persistently increasing our identification with the higher and decreasing with the

lower and thus ultimately achieving a free unhindered play of the higher, which then affords a hearty experience of freedom.

The Yoga is profoundly psychological. It is, in fact, in the Indian scheme of knowledge, the equivalent of modern psychology. But Yoga is psychology with a soul and which does not admit of any limiting assumptions in the pursuit of the knowledge of human personality. To its reading, all coercion is at the last instance internal. External facts coerce, because of our inner slavery to them. When we become inwardly free, truly liberated, then our whole being can declare, not as a poetic fancy but as real experience, 'stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage'. We can experience resistance by external conditions, but we will not feel coerced by them. We will have no fear of being overpowered by them, on the other hand, have complete confidence of overcoming them. This yogic truth has an interesting parallel in modern psycho-analysis, which says that the symptoms of the disease are willed by the patient. That is to say, even the undesirable external symptoms of disease too have their basis in the inner will.

Freedom is an in-itself enjoyable experience and, therefore, its appeal to man is profound and great. But obviously freedom is not a matter of external circumstances, it is a fact of experience and it has to be achieved and enjoyed through a process of inner growth. And this process is the discipline of yoga. The Yoga is, we have said above, the union with the Highest, the Ultimate, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Free. It is also the way that leads to that status. A choice between two or more alternative lines of conditionings externally determined is to yoga no freedom. Freedom really means living and acting out of the unifying centre of our being, the Centre which commands all the diverse energies of our life. To act under one or the other of these energies in opposition to some other or others under external conditioning is obviously a different thing. It does not have the spontaneity which is the essence of freedom and its deep satisfaction. In order to enjoy spontaneity, to be and feel free, it is necessary that man must first develop a proper perception and feeling for the essential and the self-existent fact of his life and then live it.

The yogic orientation of life declares all life as bondage, because our normal way is that of creating involvements in the environment. We build up thus a vast system of self-identifications in the world of matter, life and mind around us. These self-identifications tie up our selfhood externally and, in fact, create a selfhood which being thus superficially thrown abroad, feels essentially insecure and much divided. This is our normal ego-personality, always set against another, a non-ego, divided in itself and superficially fixated on diverse facts of environment. Our problem, therefore, is to discover our Self, our self-existent Self, the Self which lives in its own right, securely, confidently and spontaneously. All these outward identifications, says Yoga, have to be laboriously dissolved and the right

inner identification with one's central Self aspired after and formed. Thus has the individual liberation to be worked out, the external conditionings annulled and the self-existent and spontaneous status found. This status is a wonderful status of life. As lived within, it affords a fine experience of self-being, spontaneity and freedom. One's outer members, the body, the life and the mind and the world do offer resistance, because they are governed by certain necessities of their own, but they then no longer tend to overwhelm the individual. The individual, in fact, lives with a masterly feeling, whether acting or not acting on the flux of events. And the events do not perforce drag the person along nor ever cause him hurt or injury.

Such is the status of individual liberation which Yoga has traditionally upheld. It may surely clarify our concept of freedom and that would be some contribution to the much-vexed contemporary question of individual freedom and society. Undoubtedly freedom is a fact of inner experience, it must be felt as such, and that would require a harmonisation and tranquillisation of the inner discords, disharmonies, violences and oppressions, whether of the nature of psychological repressions or suppressions.

But the Yoga is a large tradition in India. Perhaps nothing has enjoyed more research and exploration here as this field. And, therefore, many have been the techniques and procedures and many the orientations of life supporting them. Sri Aurobindo's integral Yoga gives an interesting fresh extension of meaning to the concept of individual liberation. The individual is, it says, of a piece with the universal. It is a particular representation of it. In fact, three terms together, the individual, the universal and the transcendent, give the full meaning of existence, whether at the individual or social or cosmic plane. The individual is the unique particularity, the universal the wide field of applicability and the transcendent the yet-uncovered reach of evolution, the future possibilities in both, the individual and the universal.

The concept of individual liberation, under this orientation, gets bound up with that of the liberation of society. The individual gets liberated in his universal aspect, when the society gets liberated. If this does not happen, the individual is not fully liberated. Thus arises the concept of integral freedom. The individual acts as a spearhead of a movement of freedom, but the individual liberated as an individual has further to liberate himself as the universal which means that freedom must spread itself to society. And then the transcendent should increasingly become the immanent, the higher the present status. This involves a perfectibility of the unenlightened parts of our personality and the world. The freedom of the soul is hampered in its exercise if the Matter, Life and Mind of the world and personality continue to be governed by their old mechanisms. It is the possibility of a higher perfectibility in them that makes the cause of freedom for the individual and society a hopeful prospect. And Sri Aurobindo affirms that the liberation of the soul must be followed up with the perfection of Nature. Then alone does freedom become a real issue

for the world. Otherwise, individual liberation will always look upon this world as resistant and uncongenial and another world alone as the proper home for the full exercise of freedom.[1]

Such is the most modern yogic contribution of India to the cause of freedom and society.

This would certainly appear to be extremely idealistic. But is freedom not an ideal, an ultimate value, which we seek to realise, but which seems ever to evade us? And yet being in itself satisfying, we cannot give it up. It, therefore, demands great patience and great discrimination. So great a prize as freedom naturally could not be had easily and particularly when our normal life is largely a thing of necessities, of wants and pressures, external and internal.

Contemporary history affords an interesting experiment in freedom. The democratic urge had strongly affirmed individual freedom, the freedom of the individual to form and hold opinions, to express them, to follow a religious faith, to choose one's vocation and otherwise determine one's life, but conceding to others in society the same freedoms. Now what is the conception of society and what is the conception of the relation of the individual and the group involved here? The individual is evidently the more important fact here. Society is more or less a grouping of individuals. And what is the concept of the individual? It is a separative personality, seeking to live its own life primarily by itself. But are these facts of nature? Even at the present level of evolution, with man as an ego, there are in man simultaneously individualistic impulses as also those demanding collective life and experience. And within the egoistic range of life itself, there are levels more egoistic and less collective and those more collective and in certain respects less egoistic. And, in connection with the democratic urge, it is also worth recalling that it arose as a reaction against an authoritarian system of life. It is therefore quite understandable that there should have been an over-emphasis on the individual in it. This extra emphasis accompanied by an essentially negative conception of freedom as absence of external authoritarian coercion and interference seems to have encouraged the individual to take an attitude of 'wanting to do things as it liked'. Law was taken as a necessity of the situation, but the attitude was the essential right. The result was the growth of erratic egoism. The freedom to form and hold opinion is all right, but does it not involve a duty to seek and accept the truth? If a relatively greater general emphasis on the place of truth in life be maintained then the democratic urge would not encourage mere personal opinion; but otherwise it would. Freedom, therefore, should

[1] Cf. 'it (liberation) implies two things, a rejection and an assumption, a negative and a positive side; the negative movement of freedom, a liberation from the principal bonds...the positive side an opening or growth into the higher spiritual existence...the positive sense of freedom is to be universal in soul, transcendently one in spirit with God, possessed of the highest divine nature. ...' On Yoga, Sri Aurobindo, pp. 770-71, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry).

be the opportunity to live, act and grow to fullness and perfection of life out of and under the conditions of one's being and personality, unhampered and in fact with the sympathetic regard of others. Without a teleological reference as to the goal of life and evolution, Truth Perfection etc., freedom could not have its full meaning. And how could the meaning of a moment in a process be determined without reference to what the process is tending to?

Democracy was a reaction, the universal and social aspect was not duly recognised in it and freedom was in attitude primarily negative. The consequence of it was that it soon began to show its limitations. These limitations, in their turn, engendered a new reaction, that of socialism, which laid an equally strong over-emphasis on the collective aspect. And the historical process then appeared to demonstrate the complementary truth of life.

We stated above that whether of the individual or society or existence as a whole, the full sense and meaning is of threefold determination, viz., the individual, the universal and the transcendent. Democracy recognised the truth of the individual. But the individual it recognised and sanctified was the competitive individual. The true individuality must be different. The universal in the individual as a part of its individuality, it failed to see. Socialism recognised the universal in the individual but made it the whole stuff even of the individuality. The truth of individuality, the uniqueness of being, expression and possible enrichment in a particular, it failed to see. And the transcendent was not recognised by either. And without it, freedom loses its reference to the reality of the evolutionary process and its dynamic goals of the future.

We might now revert to our subject of Yoga and ask ourselves, what may possibly be its contribution to the issue of individual freedom and society? Yoga as a thorough-going psychological discipline and essentially an experimental attack upon the subject of individual's freedom is able to demonstrate the detailed circumstances attending it. Any procedure of Yoga clearly shows what self-deceptions, illusions and hallucinations can beset our pursuit of liberation. The Buddha had advised that the unliberated should not try to liberate others. That would perhaps worsen the bonds. Today the unpsychoanalysed is not allowed to attempt a psycho-analysis of others. He will not be able to help the resolution of conflicts and the elimination of repressions, being himself subject to them.

This is possibly the most important contribution of Yoga to the subject of freedom. This is its gift of expert knowledge. But it can be easily objected that what Yoga aims at is absolute freedom, the freedom of the Soul, whereas in society we are concerned with relative freedom only. Here another fundamental issue of philosophy impinges on our attention. Can the relative be known without our knowing the absolute? Or alternatively, will our knowledge of the relative at all have any certitude and command any reliance without the knowledge of the absolute? Our entire modern search for knowledge

in the West has here a question to ponder over and also to reflect whether the see-saw movement of our 'isms' and revolutions and counter-revolutions has anything to do with our deliberately limiting ourselves to the relative or not. In the progressive growth of freedom in society, for example, can we not admit the truths and the partialities of democracy and socialism and positively march forward to a more integral concept of freedom? This should become easily possible if the vision of absolute freedom were there before us.

The contemporary Integral Yoga has further some ideas to offer. Individual liberation is essentially bound up with social liberation. But the more important is that liberation opens up the possibility of the perfectibility of nature through the transforming action of the liberated soul on the unconscious mechanisms of nature. That raises the prospect of the world and society becoming a congenial home for the exercise and enjoyment of freedom. This is of the utmost significance to the cause of freedom in the world. Freedom in an egoistic world must always be a precarious thing. Unless the world could get something of freedom into its stuff and making, how could it become a stage for the play of freedom in it and on it?

Integral Yoga affirms that a liberated individual must extend his liberation horizontally and thus liberate his cosmic consciousness too and then advance vertically so as to achieve the higher integrations of future evolution for the perfection of his own life and that of the society.

Integral Yoga combines in itself the highest idealism and the completest realism. For idealism, it aims at an actual life of the Absolute in the relative field of human society and the world. And on the realistic side it has a complete appreciation of the physical, the vital and mental in personality and society and of their laws of operation and the conditions of their progress and evoluation. In relation to freedom, it admits of stages of growth and even the necessity of coercion in the progressive unfoldment of freedom. Among the stages we must, at first, recognise that of the helplessness of the child when a complete good-willed guidance and aid are necessary. Then comes that of the rise and play of the ego, which demands recognition of the will for self-assertion and independence. But the egoism of the ego tends to widen and moderate itself and thus its competitiveness develops co-operativeness. But the co-operativeness becomes a full reality at a further stage in the growth of selfhood, where the individual spontaneously feels itself as one with the society and the rest of existence. This is when the ego becomes the soul. Each one of these stages have their own operations of freedom. Freedom acquires its full meaning only at the last stage when the individual is able to live out of a self-existent soul. This determines the teleology of the entire process and, therefore, is indispensable to the understanding and regulation of freedom at each previous stage. Now if freedom is growth to such status of self-existence, then relative coercion to check the lower rebellious impulses with a view later to bring them into a condition to guide themselves

rightly would be quite justifiable. But this can only be done in a disinterested way under good will.

Liberty in a community will have to be adjusted to its stage of evolution. But such adjustment should always have a sufficient margin for making mistakes relative to its growth. And it is the actual freedom that matters, that helps personality and society. Formal freedom too, when an honest profession of faith, helps. But, when otherwise, it is a verbal illusion.

We might in the end ask, how can freedom be actually promoted in the world? The Yoga, in consequence of its own characteristic psychological insights, can possibly make some suggestions. First, it would demand that individuals seeking to promote freedom do realise it themselves from more to more and truly breathe the spirit of freedom. They will thus be able to generate an atmosphere of freedom, which will be of capital importance to the cause of freedom in the world. Second, if we remember that the true ideal of freedom is an absolute inner experience, then we will be able to appraise each relative formulation of its duly in the light of it and not get unnecessarily entangled in it and make its natural disposal more difficult. Third, to go about the task of promoting freedom in the true spirit of freedom i.e., in a free, confident and masterly way and not out of fear, as involved, harassed and worried or with violence and in reaction. That way we create just the spirit that possesses us.

OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND IN PHILOSOPHY

by

PRAVAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY

GENERALLY speaking verifiability and objectivity, are the two principles characteristic of a scientific statement which is demarcated from other kinds of statements by being both verifiable in (or reducible to) immediate sense-experience and universally acceptable. But, strictly speaking these two characteristics are mutually incompatible, for something to be sense-verified must be directly and conclusively certified by some individual mind and we cannot get the *same* thing verified by another mind, our sense-experiences being private and fleeting. So that verifiability, in the strict sense, implies subjectivity and inter-subjective verifiability is a contradiction in terms. This situation in scientific method is recognised by the modern thinkers (e.g., Einstein, Carnap, Wisdom, Hempel, Braithwaite and Ayer) who have liberalised the notion of verifiability in this context. A statement to be scientific now needs only be such as,—in conjunction with some other statements, some of which may be just nominal definitions of the primitive terms of the system used in the statement concerned while others, called reduction statements, are partial and conditional physical interpretations either of the new terms to which the primitives have been reduced by the nominal definitions or of the primitives themselves (in which case the latter definitions are not needed),—yield as conclusions some physical-object statements which describe ordinary observable things and are inter-subjectively verifiable, in the ordinary sense, in which we speak of this red pencil or that hard surface verifiable. We gather from this definition of a scientific statement two things. *First*, the data of science are recognised to be what, in the strict sense, are but indirectly, and partially verifiable objects, the directly and completely verifiable objects being those encountered in introspection and immediate sense-experience. The basic language of science is physicallistic or ordinary thing-language and not sense-data or phenomenalistic one. The latter has not been and, perhaps, cannot be developed and, then, this would be a language with a vocabulary too variable with individual observers, and so, too vague for science, which must have some determinacy and uniformity of meanings of terms to start with. Anyhow we note that the materials of science (excluding, of course, introspective psychology and including only the behaviouristic one) which it correlates and explains, are already one stage removed from direct verifiability and one stage towards inter-subjective acceptability or universality. The *Second* thing we note in the definition of a scientific statement is that

any such statement is only partially and indirectly confirmed by, not directly and completely verified by or reducible to, physical-object statements which means that the products or results of science, in the form of theoretical constructs or devices introduced to correlate and explain the observable data of science, are above these data. We shall presently see that the distance of the constructs from the date increases by stages as science advances, effecting synthesis of increasingly wider regions of observational data and the constructs gain in scope, theoretical *import* and empirical confirmation.

The first step that science implicitly takes in its search for unification of experience is, we should say, construction of physical objects out of individual sense-experiences and positing them as data to work upon for further unification. The principle that operates from behind this procedure of science is that whatever may be constructed out of and explanatory of a very large number of experiences belonging to many persons will be more real than a fewer number of separate individual experience which may be judged for truth or falsity in terms of this construct. Thus the otherwise isolated sense-experiences of myself and others are correlated and explained by the physical object like a piece of rope which serves to test these experiences when presented in isolation. Thus if I see a snake where I am lead by the experiences of others that it is a rope, I must consider myself having an illusion of a snake. So that though in one sense the rope is less real for me, for it is not given to me but merely constructed, it is more real and scientifically valid in the sense that it is more inter-subjectively acceptable. Now we see that reality of an object may be equated with its objectivity and that this has two meanings. *First* immediacy and givenness of the object in knowledge and the directness and conclusiveness of verifiability in private experience; *second*, indirect and constructive manner of reaching the object from more direct data by thinking on them and the indirectness and inconclusiveness of verifiability and validity in collective experience. Our sense data and inrespective objects are most objective in the first sense and least objective in the second sense while the abstract theoretical constructs of most advanced parts of science are just the opposite of these in this respect. We shall now see how the principle that is implicitly operative in this procedure of science,—while it passes from the sense-data to the physical objects and admits the latter to be the more objective entities than the former and, so, starts from them rather than the sense-data,—is also operative explicitly therein as it passes from these physical objects to more abstract constructs in its search for greater and greater synthesis of experience. We shall see, in short, how as science advances it gains in objectivity in the sense of Universality and loses in proportionate manner objectivity in the sense of givenness and directness of the object known.

The first step of scientific enquiry is its implicit passage from sense-experience to physical objects. Its second step is an explicit passage from physical objects to certain laws of their coexistence and succession

that they seem to follow. What science really observes is, of course, regularity or constant conjunction of these objects in our limited experience and never any necessity holding between the objects, for this cannot be observed and to establish it as a relation holding between them one has to observe all the infinite number of objects concerned which is absurd. Nevertheless, when science speaks of a law it means not merely that a regularity has been so far observed and may be expected in future, but asserts a necessary connection between all the instances of the objects concerned. This connection is postulated to explain the observed regularity and, so, the law belongs to a different order of things from the regularity of the physical objects. The law is a construct arrived at indirectly from the observation of regularity and it is indirectly and partially (or finitely) verified by the agreement of its consequences with observation in a number of cases. Thus a law is established which states much more than a regularity actually observed. Of course, there may be an error in the process, it may very well be that it is not Q with which P is connected but with some other thing R, but, then, P and R are necessarily connected. Admission of error does not require us to give up the postulate of causal or necessary relation obtaining in nature demanded to explain striking regularities therein. It may only affect our knowledge of specific instances of this relation. Now we believe science, that is to say, the attitude of the scientists as expressed by their practice, does not subscribe to a radical empiricism that treats all laws as in principle but statements of regularity, it believes rather in the necessary connections, though it certainly grants the principle of fallibility or of permanent control against dogmatism and obscurantism that holds some scientific laws to be above doubt and correction. Science believes in a very well-ordered world and it is its business to find this order. It does not conceive a Heraclitean world which would lead science to treat all observed regularities as accidental and dissuade it from studying them. Now the implication of this belief in necessary laws of connection of things, which are postulated to explain their observed regularities, is a belief in the classes of things each with infinite members and this implies a belief in their universal essences or permanent natures which may be said to be instanstiated in the actual things. For otherwise one cannot easily imagine how all the infinite number of things of one kind can be necessarily connected with a similar infinity of things of another kind. That the scientist must be led logically to posit such essences is further seen from the circumstance of his considering the laws and the entities involved therein to be more real or objective in the sense of universality than the actually observed individual objects which collectively constitute the evidence for them. If we think something to be copper from its general appearance and other superficial properties but find values for its electrical and thermal conductivity and also its spectrum different from those of copper we would certainly consider the metal to be not copper. Similarly we would confirm our initial idea that it is copper if we find the experimental results

supporting it. This means that by copper we mean that ideal thing which follows the laws we have previously established by repeated observation and experimentation, the laws which define the essential nature of copper. This essential copper is thus a theoretical construct and though it is less real or objective in the sense of immediate givenness it is more so in another sense, viz., in that of universality or inter-personal validity. We can easily see that this construct is arrived at from, and confirmed by, physical objects in an indirect manner more or less similar to the procedure by which the physical object is implicitly arrived at and confirmed in terms of sense-data. The same principle of objectivism that is operative in the latter is operative in the former also, viz., the principle that what involves a greater number of experiences as its basis and evidence is more universally acceptable than what does not. It is a paradoxical situation in scientific method no doubt that what is a theoretical construct and not a given object and what is but partially and conditionally defined in terms of more directly observable data, the physical objects, are considered to be more objective in the sense of greater inter-personal validity than the data themselves. We shall seek to resolve this Paradox in the sequel.

Now there are laws that correlate and explain laws of smaller scope, and, so, of validity. Science searches after such more inclusive laws and, so, for universal essences of greater scope, validity and theoretical import. In fact, a law of lower scope that describes a necessary connection between two classes of objects, like, say, the positions of the moon and the rise of tides, may in one sense be regarded as not so much explanatory as descriptive, while a law, such as that of universal gravitation,—of which the former law relating to the moon and tides and many other laws besides, such as those relating to a falling body, two closely suspended and attracting balls, are but specific modes or consequences under particular situations,—seems to be more explanatory. This explanatory value is acquired by virtue of the greater theoretical import of the law or of the theoretical constructs involved therein, for now it is like a master-key for many locks that were known to have particular keys only. Thus with the progressive search of science for more inclusive laws and its success we have again a moving away from objectivity in the sense of directness and givenness of the object and a moving towards objectivity in the sense of universal acceptability. The more general law has for its immediate data and evidence,—which indirectly and partially confirm it,—the less general laws that fall under it.

The highest reach of science in this striving after integration of experience is marked by some theoretical constructs like electrons, quanta, or waves as defined in wavemechanics. These entities have remote analogies in our commonsense objects and are only very partially interpreted through chains of definitions and reduction sentences that connect them to observational data. They are floated in the air, so to speak, and moored to the ground by these chains. Yet they claim and enjoy an universality, by virtue of their greater scope and theoretical

import, much superior to that reached by the laws and their physical objects which are comparatively more directly known or proximate to our immediate experience. The explanatory value of these abstract constructs is also of the highest degree and each explains and connects a number of laws of various grades of generality which may be said to be their proximate data and evidence. An abstract construct may also be more inclusive than and explanatory of some other lower-order constructs; wave-mechanical theory explains and interprets in its own terms the atomic model of Bohr's theory.

Now we have thus broadly speaking, three stages by which science reaches towards integration of experience passing from sense-experience to the abstract constructs successively through the physical object and the laws. The first-stage is implicit while the last two are explicit and there are sub-stages in them, one law explaining lower-order laws and one theory explaining some lower order theories. This picture of science is certainly a little idealised still it depicts the broad features to be noted in science from the methodological point of view. And the most important point for us to note is that in each stage of this scientific comprehension a kind of entities are posited that are neither analytically related to nor completely confirmed by the kind of entities that form the basis of such positing. This basis not strictly logical, there being no deductive necessity by which the higher-order entities may be said to follow form the lower one, it is only a supporting ground in the ordinary sense and not in a logical one. This means science constructs or invents greater and greater abstractions as it advances and yet, as we noted earlier, these abstractions are progressively more objective in the sense of universality. Our problem is now to answer two questions that naturally arise from this situation. *First*, how can an entity arrived from some other entities be more objective or valid than the latter ? *Second*, how can the constructive or inventive operation of the mind yield universally acceptable results or, in other words, how can freedom in scientific theorisation be compatible with the apparent inter-subjective validity of the theories?

In answer to the first question we observe that a higher-order entity that is held to be more universal or valid than a lower-order one and to be a standard by means of which we can test the latter, is not on a par with the lower entities but transcendent of them in a logical sense. It is not logically inferred from the latter but posited as the ground of the latter which follow from it and only partially confirm it. A physical object is more than a complex of actual sense-experiences and a law is more than a summary of the conjunctions of physical objects actually observable. In justification of this manner of constructing higher-order objects and treating them as possessing a higher kind, and not merely a degree, of universality, the scientist may say that when we meet some regularity of an overwhelming sort we must explain it in terms of something more pervasive and essential in nature than these regularities and must treat any individual deviations from these regularities, or apparent foils to the explanatory construct,

as illusory and, so, revise them. Now we may be mistaken in our construction and may have to revise a construct if we encounter many such conflicting situations, but this cannot jeopardise our faith in such higher-order entities in general and drive us to a phenomenalistic method in science. We may have to suspend judgment in individual cases where we do not know for certain, whether, say, a particular law is to be modified or particular observations that challenge it to be discarded, but such situations must be treated as exceptional and such dead-locks as temporary. Objectivity or universality of a higher-order entity flows from the number of the lower-order entities that it correlates and explains but usually this number is so overwhelming in comparison to that of the conflicting ones that we cannot but consider this universality as of a different order altogether from that of the individual lower-order entities and we reject the few counter-evidences as mistaken and seek to revise them if possible. When the weight of the counter-evidence seems to be comparable to that of the supporting ones, a state of doubt and indecision results but this only shows that our original construct is mistaken and a fresh one needed rather than that no such construct is possible or that no explanatory grounds, more pervasive than the data to be explained, can be there in nature. Thus the postulate of and belief in such higher-order entities in general is warranted by the extreme majority of cases where we succeed in establishing some uniformity in the phenomena of nature at different stages.

In answer to the second question, viz., how can freedom in construction give us universally valid constructs, we reply summarily that, this element of freedom is, in practice so far, not very great in magnitude though there is always the logical possibility of our over-hauling the system of present theories. In regard to the first part of this reply we observe the following. Though there is indeed a speculative leap involved in the finding of a suitable theoretical construct and there is no logic of discovery, yet there is much check on any arbitrariness in the procedure by the requirement that a construct must have wide verificatory consequences or empirical confirmation and import, simplicity as well as some systematic relationship with other constructs in the field of enquiry. There is always the possibility of, and there actually are some, cases of alternative theories in a field when it is not easy to decide amongst them by the criteria of simplicity, scope and deductive fertility or theoretical import, but such cases can be and are in practice, settled by fresh observations which may, and do, favour one theory against its rival. Some element of aesthetic appreciation is required in judging the over-all simplicity and elegance of a theory in deciding such difficult cases but this appreciation too, is more or less objective in practice. Though it is not a rational process controlled by any rule and computation, it is not as arbitrary or fickle as value-judgments are considered in some quarters and this ought not lead one to conventionalism as it has done some like Poincare and Eddington. The criteria of simplicity and comprehensiveness have been sought to be defined in rational terms to eliminate this element of freedom and choice in theory-construction

but such attempts have not so far succeeded and we have to be satisfied with as much objectivity as is obtained in practice with the non-logical concepts of these criteria. We must observe, however, that though we have in practice a very satisfactory degree of objectivity in or agreement over scientific theories there is always the logical possibility of finding alternative theories, and,—as we have said above in the second part of our summary reply to the question of objectivity,—of overhauling the whole theoretical system of the present moment. This possibility of revision we are speaking of is not one that arises from fallibility which, as we noted above, must be admitted as a permanent feature in science that can never be cocksure about anything. But it arises from another situation in science, viz., the element of freedom and choice existing, in howsoever small degree, in scientific theorisation. We can, in principle, always differ on the comparative validity of a particular theory in regard to another, even though we may agree on the factual evidences or the datal plane. This is because validity is a matter of fruitfulness, simplicity and scope of the theory concerned and these are matters not so much of rational finding as of aesthetic valuation. So far as we can ordinarily see, it is an accidental fact that we do mostly agree in such valuation also, but we might as well be denied this fortunate circumstance in our cultural life and, so, delivered to subjectivity and chaos in our scientific enterprise. This possibility can only be denied by a faith in some underground metaphysical connection between our collective mind and nature such that what one apparently creates in freedom must agree with what other minds so create and what is out there in nature as its secret inner mechanism. Einstein, who believed in the freedom of the mind in scientific theorisation as much as he did in the possibility of our following the 'right way' to 'unique' truths of nature, held such a metaphysical faith in the 'pre-established harmony' between the mind and nature and, as he admitted, felt religious over this situation. We, for the moment, do not like to be as metaphysical about this question which, therefore, we have answered in a rather equivocal and philistinic manner, admitting objectivity of scientific theories in practice as a piece of good luck and denying this in principles.

We have thus seen what kind and degree of objectivity is attained by science as it advances in its search for synthesis of experience. We can very well see now that whatever objectivity in the sense of universal acceptability is attained by science, by virtue of the greater scope, simplicity and theoretical import of the theoretical constructs it offers, is due to our common acceptance of certain basic methodological principles operative in science. We all admit the criteria for a good scientific theory though we may actually come to differ over the question whether a particular theory does or does not fulfil the criteria better than another. Moreover, the question of ultimate or unconditional validity of any part of scientific theory does not arise in science which does not answer any metaphysical question. Whether atoms exist or are real, are questions, as Carnap has shown, treated in science in a

conditional and internal manner in the sense whether these entities do or do not succeed as fruitful constructs in the context of our present experience and other fruitful constructs. Thus concerned, these questions are sensible and answerable. The question, on the other hand, whether atoms do *really* exist or are ultimately real, is quite external to science and incapable of sensible formulation and answer, for we do not know how to judge whether anything is absolutely existing or real. The terms existence or reality in the metaphysical sense has not been uniquely defined in terms of inter-subjectively given experience. Generally we mean by it absolute givenness or undeniable presentation, but this definition cannot help us in deciding in any actual case whether something exist or not, for what may appear to one person to be absolutely given may not so appear to another. Thus philosophers differ very much over the question of ultimate reality. Sense-experience, physical substance, super-sensible essences, some spiritual stuff with its modification and some undifferentiated spiritual stuff are some of the various entities believed to be ultimately real by different schools of philosophy. So that science, which starts with an acceptance of some basic principles and definitions, cannot find any sense in such metaphysical questions which intend to deal with matters of ultimate or unconditional validity.

This leads us to observe about philosophy that, so far as it is not a pseudo-philosophy allied to some branch of science following the scientific method, such as scientific philosophy, scientific logic, ethics and aesthetics, that is to say, so far as it is pure metaphysics, it must be subjective. It cannot aspire to attain that kind and degree of objectivity as science attains to a large extent. If it seeks universality for its results by indirectly reaching them through and confirming them by observable phenomena, then it will be essentially an unitary science correlating and explaining all our experience by means of a single system of theoretical constructs as representing. But this scientific or inductive metaphysics cannot speak of these theoretical constructs as representing ultimate reality because, *first*, they are but postulated entities more or less fruitful in organising the perceptual data and we cannot equate this fruitfulness which has degrees with ultimate existence or relating which cannot have degrees, *secondly*, they are, as shown before, always open to revision because of an element of freedom involved in the construction of and acceptance of them rather than others, and *thirdly*, the ultimate existence of the perceptual data that they organise and rest on for validity may be challenged in philosophy instead of being implicitly granted as in science. So if philosophy is to be taken in the sense of giving us positive knowledge of ultimate existence, that is, of what there really is, then it cannot follow an inductive method, and scientific philosophy is a contradiction in terms. But if on the other hand philosophy takes recourse to immediate experience as its source of knowledge and, so, adopts an intuitive method, then it cannot attain universality, for our intuitions are patently subjective and fleeting objects and we have so far very diverse kinds of intuitive philosophies.

We thus broadly see that philosophy, in order to mean business, must offer results that can be claimed to be objective in both the senses we defined the concept in the essay, viz., in the sense of givenness in immediate experience and in that of inter-subjective acceptability. We have already found that science sacrifices the first kind of objectivity to attain the second kind, and we now find that philosophy can claim either one kind or the other, depending on whether it is scientific or intuitive, but not both at once and, so, it cannot succeed as an intellectual discipline. This certainly sounds dismal but we cannot help this conclusion. And we for our part are not very much damped by it for we believe, that philosophy should be done and taken as a personal enterprise in thinking and experiencing, as a free venture, in search after ultimate principles of this world and our life. Every principle or method in philosophy claims finality and self-evidential truth and is not like science, satisfied with provisionality and with a kind of truth that rests on partial and shifting evidence. Therefore, philosophy must necessarily be a matter of personal vision and consequently open to questioning by other persons who may have their own visions. We must make peace with this circumstance in our cultural life and, so, must philosophise accordingly in a free manner, enjoying our own as well as others' freedom of thought and experience. We must not do philosophy in a scientific, argumentive or speculative manner for this cannot offer any conviction about any ultimate matter even to the philosopher himself, what to speak of others ! We must not for that reason treat any idea or vision that gets hold of our mind to be the ultimate truth but, while resting on it, must be prepared to change it for another if that seizes our mind with greater beauty and power. We must keep our vision to ourselves nor inflict them on others but seek as much corroboration of it as is possible through friendly discussion, enjoying both its acceptance by others and its non-acceptance, for it springs from freedom and every person has his own point of view, as a mark of this freedom and also of self-distinction from others. Philosophy, in our sense, does not seek objectivity of either of the two kinds defined in this essay for it believes in freedom and individuality of our thoughts and experiences regarding ultimate matters. Reality, the object of philosophy, is, not some antecedent thing out there to be passively known, but something in here to be actively *realised* or made real by the free creativity of the mind.

SCIENCE AND REALITY

by

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THE distinction between appearance and reality is as vital to science as to philosophy in general. The *search* for reality assumes that what appears is not really so that the reality is that which is behind the appearance and which makes the appearance appear. Appearance *qua* appearance is not true or false; it is just pleasant or unpleasant, significant or insignificant. Kant's use of the term 'aesthetic' for sensation is significant in that respect. Appearance, however, is not only pleasant or unpleasant, significant or insignificant but also a *clue* to action.

As clues to action, they may mislead and thus come to be taken as false. The Real, then, comes to be conceived as that which leads to successful action. But action's success depends on what we want to achieve and the success of the achievement is judged once again in terms of that which 'appears'. 'Appearance' is, then, the clue to 'reality' either as that which is 'significantly experienced' or as that which when disregarded obstructs the realisation of what is sought to be achieved through action.

Science is exclusively concerned with the second aspect. But as obstruction to action makes sense only in the context of the goals desired to be achieved, science generally tends to make a further restriction on the types of goals it generally seeks to help to achieve. The goals that it habitually prefers are those which are realisable through a manipulation of external factors and which are measurable through external criteria.

However, science, in the ultimate analysis, is interested in knowing what things are and how they come to be as they are found to be. Only, as Hegel saw long ago, a series of atomic statements describing matters of fact such as 'the grass is green' and 'the rose is red' never constitutes science. Description is, therefore, only a preliminary phase in the understanding of the phenomena as a process. The real crux lies in the interrelations between facts and, at a deeper level, in seeing them as the end-result of processes which make them what they are. The ultimate interest is in producing the end-result by re-creating the process which was supposed to result in its production. The end-result is mostly confined to that which is perceptual and public and value-neutral, though there is nothing in the logic of science which need necessarily confine it to these only.

The value-neutral character of the end-results in which science is interested and from which it takes its start needs a closer examination as it may reveal a clue to the idea of Reality science fosters and strengthens by its work. First: on a purely generalised level, science is not in the strict sense completely value-neutral. It is committed to the value of truth and to the rejection of error, whatever may be ultimately meant by these terms. Second: in terms of the end-results it generally *wishes* to produce, it is not value-neutral either. It generally conceives of the end-results it prefers in terms of the needs and desires of people mostly at the grossest level of their physical, vital, mental or social existence.

Still, science is supposed to be interested in all facts equally. As facts, some are not more important than others. Only in the context of a generalized theory, some facts assume crucial importance for purposes of verification. Similarly, in the context of certain desired results some relations between facts assume outstanding importance. But *qua* facts (whatever this term may mean) none is more important than the other: a Leonardo is no more important than an idiot or a Christ than some insane person in an asylum. Science, in a sense, reduces everything to the equal status of a fact. The world is emptied of values and values themselves are seen as interesting socio-cultural facts. As facts, all values are of equal status and science is interested in all of them equally. The *gleichschaltung* of all values is a destroying influence for the non-scientist just as, in another context, the gleichschaltung proceeding from a certain ultimate type of spiritual approach is destructive for the non-spiritual person in general.

The search for objectivity makes values subjective or only socio-culturally objective; the primacy of perception in whose terms alone verification is sought reduces non-perceptual experience to an absolute nullity; the search for theoretic concepts in terms of whose coherent interrelationships the whole world of experience is sought to be made intelligible turns the world of experience itself into a mere *Schein*, an *appearance* which is only remotely and indirectly related to what is 'really real' or 'real-in-itself'.

The idea of reality that science fosters at different levels may, then, be summarized as follows:

1. At the unsophisticated level of cognition, it suggests the sole reality of that which is given through perception and, ultimately, through sensation, primarily of the visual type. At a more sophisticated level, it suggests the sole reality of the postulated conceptual entities in their inter-relationships—postulated in order to account for and understand the complex web of experience in its facticity, i.e., apart from its value-aspects in general.
2. At the level of feeling, it suggests the sole reality of pleasure and pain as organic sensations conceived as reflex responses to stimuli outside oneself.
3. At the level of action, it suggests cause as more real than the effect and the more external and material the cause the more real it is

taken to be. In terms of effects, only those are taken to be real which are organic in nature, i.e., concerned with the fulfilment of life's needs.

In contrast to the reality-perspective and reality-attitudes which science fosters, there is the whole life as lived and explored by the artist, the mystic, the lover and, to a certain extent, by each and all of us who live our lives. Here, to be surcharged with significance is to be real. Perception and sensation, by themselves, are on the lowest rung of the ladder; the theoretic world of the concepts is practically non-existent. The 'abstract' is another name for the 'unreal' and—strange to say—that which is sensed or perceived apart from its significance is felt as abstract by everybody.

For the mystic, the lover and the artist every bush is a burning bush. And even for the common man, the bush is a bush only when it burns; otherwise, it is only just a sort of bush. Whatever sings, to that the heart dances and whatever dances, to that the heart sings. And only where there is song and dance, reality gushes forth as the stream that bursts from the stone. Otherwise, all is somnolent and dead—at least, seemingly so.

To the living man—and each one of us is that—the world of the mind, the so-called world of the subjective, alone is real. The external world is only marginally so. In that world, the esse is always the *percipi*. It is a world of meaning and significance and value. Pleasure and pain as organic sensations are only marginally significant. A tickle, by itself, is nothing. Pain has only a negative significance except in contexts which give it a meaning and purpose. It is the deep and abiding emotions arising from objects at once actual and ideal, complex and enduring over periods of time, creations of memory and imagination that give abiding form to the feeling in man. It is the shade the nuance, the touch, the flavour that is the soul of the life of feeling and not just sensation as many seem to think. Pleasure and pain, by themselves, never constitute the life of feeling just as sensations never constitute knowledge. In the field of action, to man as living, causes are always subsidiary. The real thing is effects and the effects get more real as they are concerned with ideal ends realizable only partially over a period of time and, even then, never completely so. Science itself is the example of such a pursuit and yet the attitude it fosters, wittingly or unwittingly, about pursuits in general is the exact opposite of what it does.

Such contrasting ideas of reality produce a schism in the soul of man. Philosophy has done little to heal this breach. Rather, it has helped in the widening of the fissuce. The so-called philosophy of science has merely underwritten the prejudices of an age. The provisional limitations of science have been erected into imprisoning walls which one may not cross. Instead of releasing science from its own limitations, it has proclaimed them as the sole truth. Instead of releasing man from the illusory ideas that science fosters, it has declared them as the sole reality. The therapeutic function of modern philosophy consists in sterilizing all that is meaningful and significant and valuable

in the name of clarity. But the seekers after clarity have forgotten, not merely that 'clarity is not enough', but also that 'clarity' itself needs to be clarified. The two pillars of modern philosophy, 'experience' and 'verification', are sufficiently broad-based to support a far larger structure than any has cared to build. The childish clutching to the dragging folds of science and the elevation of physics into the paradigm of knowledge are, I suggest, responsible for them.

There is nothing in the procedure of science to confine it to sense-experience only. 'Verification' is too complex a thing, as even those philosophers have discovered who confined themselves to the physical sciences only. Science itself is an activity seeking ideal values of the highest sort. The satisfaction it seeks has little to do with organic sensations of pleasure and pain. A reflection on the nature of this very activity would reveal more about the reality of man than most philosophers of science have cared to do. The vast, unfathomed realms of introspective experience explored by the artist and the spiritual seeker may be a closed book to the scientist working in a narrow and specialised field. But that it should be so to the philosopher who is supposed to be open to all fields of human seeking and knowledge, is tragic in the extreme.

Science fosters certain ideas about what is real in the realm of knowing, feeling and willing. Many of these are purely accidental, particularly those that pertain to feeling and willing. Others, especially in the field of cognition, are just rigid universalizations of parochial truths or, sometimes, even of parochial prejudices. It should be the task of philosophy to expose these continuously and in the clearest manner possible.

The scientific enterprise of the last four centuries has intensely concerned itself with a few domains. A heavy price for this has been the utter neglect of realms previously cultivated by man. Attention and talent being limited, this was almost inevitable but there is little doubt that it has been greatly helped by the illusion that it had refuted what, in fact, it had only ignored. Science has yet to ask itself seriously the questions: (1) if facts of a certain sort are fairly well-established, does it necessarily preclude certain other sorts of facts?; (2) what is a fact?; (3) what is exactly meant by the presupposition that whatever be the nature of reality, it must be a coherent whole?

It is not so much the practising scientists as those who have reflected on it or tried to popularise it or crusaded on its behalf who have been grossly guilty in the matter. The philosopher, like the common man, is so dazzled by the achievements of science that he seems to have grown blind to his own function. Science is the modern counterpart of magic and miracle which convinces not by what it is but by what it does.

But even if science were to be freed of its parochial prejudices and passing limitations, it would still not be witness to the whole of reality. It is committed to the seeking of only one value; others it may understand, but only through its own perspective. Even in the field of knowledge, science never seeks vision but only understanding. It should

be the task of philosophy to overcome these limitations and provide the integral perspective that human experience, in all its multi-facetedness, so richly deserves and which the human heart so insistently demands. That, instead of this, philosophy should increasingly reduce itself to an almost ultra-myopic specialization, is the intellectual tragedy of our times. To give oneself to the illusion that 'sensation alone is knowledge', that 'the tickle of pleasure alone matters', that 'the biological ends are the only ends man ever pursues', is, and has been, the constant temptation of man. But it is only in modern times that philosophy has lent its massive support, in such a continuous manner, to the strengthening of such an illusion. It is time that the illusion be combated and much will be found in the *practice* of science to help in combating the illusion.

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST IN THE PAST

by

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The Origin of Philosophy:

Diogenes Laertius opens his scrap-book *On the lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers* (early 3rd century A.D.) with the report: 'Some say that the task of philosophising began with the barbarians —among the Persians with the Magi, among the Babylonians or Assyrians with the Chaldaeans, among the Indians with the Gymnosophists, among the Celts with the men called Druids'. He dismisses these claims with the boast that 'philosophy, and indeed the human race itself' began with the Greeks. In this matter he was exceptional among the Hellenistic writers: when the classical age of Greece had passed, scholars of various schools who looked back on it from Alexandria and other academic centres refer one after another to an indebtedness of the early Greek Philosophers (especially Thales and pythagoras) to the Egyptians and the Chaldaeans.

These Hellenistic scholars are late witnesses, writing between 250 and 700 years after the death of Thales. Some of them were not of Greek stock, and may have been prejudiced; but it is fairly evident that the conflux of Oriental ideas into Alexandria and elsewhere had left even the Greeks among them with an astonished and admiring sense of the antiquity of the culture of the lands east of Syria, as well as the culture of Egypt (which had long been known). 'This antiquity was needlessly exaggerated: for example, Diogenes Laertius quotes writers who placed Zoroaster some 6,000 years before the Christian era'.

When we press backwards from the Hellenistic period to the Greek philosophers of the classical age, we find among these very little sense of indebtedness to foreign thought. All that Aristotle has to say is that the art of mathematics began in Egypt (*Meta* A I, 981 b 23). Plato praises the Egyptians for teaching their children how to calculate and measure everyday things (*Leges*, VII, 819 A); but in the same work he disparages them as 'illiberal' (747C), i.e., bound to practical interests; and in the *Republica* (IV, 435 E) he contrasts them as 'lovers of money' with the Greeks as 'lovers of study'. He says nothing of any higher wisdom among the Egyptians and Persians, and nowhere even mentions, so far as I know, the Chaldaeans. Neither from Aristotle nor from Plato, then, would we infer that Greek *philosophy* had been borrowed from abroad. Passing further back to the Pre-Socratics, the fragments we have of their writings do not hint at their being such a thing as

non-Greek philosophy; but the argument from silence has here no value whatever, since the fragments are scanty and disconnected.

It seems as though the tradition of a primordial eastern philosophical wisdom partly known to and used by the Greeks originated in the Hellenistic period, when eastern thought first came openly and massively into the Greek-speaking centres of learning.

This conclusion does not, of course, settle the question whether philosophy made its first appearance among the Greeks or in the East, or whether the earliest Greek philosophers were indebted in any important respect to eastern thought. The problem requires an independent analysis, which may be outlined in some such way as the following.

(*a*) What kind of thinking about the world and man was there in fact among the eastern nations before the beginning of the Greek philosophy? The insertion of 'in fact' is intended to emphasise the need for a critical dating of the documentary material. The question is one of purely historical scholarship.

(*b*) What similarities, if any, are there between the most disciplined thought of the East and that of the early Greek philosophers? This question also seems to be one of entirely disinterested scholarship, but differences of evaluation would quickly come into operation. Western scholars would regard form as more relevant than matter. All of them would take science to mean pure science, i.e., observation and logical construction pursued for their own sake, as having an intrinsic value. They would therefore ask whether Egyptian mensuration went beyond practice to mathematics, and whether Chaldaean astrology rose to astronomy. On the marks that constitute philosophy they would not entirely agree, for some would firmly exclude practical concern even in its moral and religious sense; but all would exclude thinking in myths, and would demand, as against even illuminating intellectual intuitions, some care for logical detail.

(*c*) What communications of intellectual ideas between the East and early Greece are well attested, and what were in practice possible? The answer to the first part of the question would probably have to be negative. The second part calls for a knowledge of the historico-geographical conditions. Two bald indications of these must suffice.

(*i*) The distinction of East and West as commonly drawn is scarcely applicable to the 6th century B.C. The effectively known world consisted of the Mediterranean coast, the Nile valley, the land of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the large expanse now known as Persia, and Northwest India, with China as a dimly known land beyond. Within this area there had been for long centuries, and there continued to be for centuries to come, so much movement of peoples, armies, political envoys and traders that historians have come to regard it as a unity, for which the name Eurasia has been proposed. In racial terms also it had a considerable degree of unity, for its eastern and western extremities were dominated by peoples of a common northern origin, with a wide wedge of Semites from the South thrust in between them.

In what is usually called the first great clash of East and West, the war of Persia with Greece, Aryan was meeting Aryan, and so too when Persia marched against India.

(*ii*) The Ionian Greek cities (on the western coast of Asia Minor), of which the earliest Greek philosophers were citizens, had reached an advanced stage of material development by the 7th century B.C. They had regular maritime connections with Egypt, with which they had a large trade, and to which they supplied mercenaries for the Pharaoh's army for at least a century and a half. Their land-neighbours were the Lydians, of unknown stock, who mingled the culture of the Greeks on their West and of the Persians on their East. Through the territory of the Lydians ran a trade-route between the East and the Aegean Sea. Towards the middle of the 6th century the Ionian cities were annexed by Lydia, and with this were absorbed in the Persian empire in 546, not recovering their independence until 479.

What exchanges of ideas occurred between the Ionians, Lydians, Persians and the more eastern peoples remains a matter of conjecture. It is enough to have shown that such exchanges were possible. Doubt has been expressed about the ability in those old days of peoples of different languages to converse about anything other than very practical matters, but this doubt is probably unjustified, for in the 5th century B.C. Herodotus found in Egypt interpreters who conveyed to him a surprisingly wide range of ideas, and when Alexander led his armies into India one of his officials, Onesicritus, a Cynic philosopher, had philosophical conversation with the sect of ascetics (Gymnosophists) there. Of this conversation, unfortunately, only a bare mention has survived (Strabo V).

The Open Mingling of East and West—the Hellenistic Age:

Greek and eastern culture were pulled together for centuries when Alexander of Macedon conquered Egypt (331 B.C.), overran Persia, and pressed on into the Punjab (326). His successors in Egypt, the Ptolemies made the new city of Alexandria the cultural capital of Eurasia. His successors in Asia, the Seleucids, tried to Hellenise their huge territory, founding scores of cities in the Greek style and under a Greek-speaking ēlite, the largest of these new cities, Antioch in Syria and Seleucia on the Tigris, ranking next to Alexandria and old Athens in cultural importance. The Seleucids failed, however, to retain the Punjab, which the Indian king Chandragupta recovered in 304.[1] In the middle of the 3rd century their easternmost province, Bactria, bordering on India, became independent, but its line of Greek-speaking kings maintained the area as an outpost of Hellenistic civilisation, and extended their rule to the Punjab soon after 200 B.C., until Bactria was overrun by Mongol tribes about 130 B.C., under whom, after a century of consolidation, it became a centre of Buddhism.

[1] A Seleucid envoy to Chandragupta's court, Megasthenes, wrote an account of India and its customs, which has not survived (it is mentioned by Strabo and other authors).

The Bactrian city of Gandhara is known among archaeologists for a distinctive type of Buddha-statue, held to be clearly Greek in form.

Thus Asia as far as the Indian border, and at times beyond it, became largely Hellenistic in the ruling culture of its cities. When the Roman power supervened, extending to the upper reaches of the Tigris, it supported within its area the established Hellenistic cultural ways and standards; and east of the Roman imperial border the Parthians, who had become masters of Babylonia and western Persia round about 100 B.C., pretended to favour the Hellenistic elements there, and seem in fact to have done so in a superficial way.

As for trade-connections, the ancient land-route from China and India to Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea was still used. In addition, the Indians in this period opened up a sea-route through the Persian Gulf to the mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Ptolemies of Egypt traded by sea with India, and so too, from the 1st century A.D., did the Romans, who had received an envoy from a king of Pandya in India in A.D. 13.

The general conclusion is that, from the point of view of inter-communication, there was, far more than in the cradle-days of Greek philosophy, a single Eurasian world.

When, however, we face the question of what intellectual ideas passed from Greece to the East, we are baffled. Archaeological exploration of the vast area, still very incomplete, has shown little more than artistic influence. Literary documents seem to have perished. It is claimed that there are Greek traces in the Indian mathematics and astronomy of the period, but allegations of philosophical influence are bound up with the controversial dating and exegesis of the Upanishads.

The movement of ideas and attitudes from the reverse direction, from East to West, is far better known. It was carried partly by returning Greeks or Macedonians, but chiefly, it seems, by immigrants of all sorts, including slaves. In Antioch, Asia Minor, Alexandria, and later in Rome, East and West jostled one another in street and temple. Alexandria was the leading centre of the new international or cosmopolitan intellectual activity not only because it was a great trading centre but also because such activity enjoyed there a most generous patronage from the State, in the form of an incomparable library attached to an institution for teaching and research (the 'Museum'), in which scholars from all parts resided, maintained by the royal bounty. It held this leading position until the early years of the 4th century A.D.—at least a full five hundred years—when Christian theological and ecclesiastical interests began to reduce the opportunities of the unconverted scholars. Christian theology was itself a very Hellenistic phenomenon, being the shaping of an eastern religion into a Greek intellectual form. Theology and philosophy alike ended in Alexandria when the Arabs captured it in A.D. 640.

The dominating eastern currents were religious, and it was this reference, not new strictly philosophical ideas or techniques, that gave an eastern colouring to some of the philosophising of the West. The

older Greek systems were freely accommodated by the most orientalised of the teachers to a demand for personal salvation and to claims to divine revelations. Throughout the Hellenistic period, however, the old Greek type of thought persisted, with two changes—first, natural science was separated from philosophy and was fruitfully pursued, secondly philosophising lost its creative force and took the form of respectfully editing and commenting on the works of the earlier period. To this second generalisation there is the exception of Plotinus, whose system is remarkable for its sheer intellectual power. His mysticism, and his way of mounting to it, have some similarity with the metaphysics of the Upanishads, and have been thought by some modern writers to be orientally inspired; but they seem to me to be authentically Platonic. It was his followers who loosened its logical texture.

The Role of Islam:

When the barbarians swept down from the North in the 5th century A.D., overwhelming Rome, an intellectual night fell over what had been the western part of the Roman empire, and lasted for many centuries. Such philosophy as the Christian Church in this part managed to preserve was some of the logic of Aristotle and a distorted form of Neo-Platonism; and few of the Christian scholars were competent until the 11th century to handle even that remnant. The primary historical facts for us are that during the latter part of this dark period philosophical activity of the Greek kind was kept alive (outside the rather isolated Byzantine empire) only in the new empire of the Moslems, and that it was chiefly from this empire that it came to mediaeval western Europe.

The spread of Islamic power from the Arabian peninsula was spectacular. Between 635 and 642 Syria, Iraq, western Persia and Egypt were occupied; in 680 the occupation extended from the Indus in the East to Tunisia in the West; and in 711 the armies crossed the Straits of Gibraltar to subdue Spain, from which the Moslems were not completely expelled until 1492 (though confined to a small region in the South from 1248).

How did the Moslems, fresh from the desert and the congenial business of fighting, come to be the patrons and practitioners of philosophy?

When Justinian closed the philosophical schools of Athens in 529, some of the ejected philosophers went to Persia, whose king was reputed to be an admirer of all things Greek. But since only seven went, and all returned after little more than a year, we cannot suppose that they left a lasting mark. It is more plausible to give some weight to the Hellenism left in Asia by the Seleucids, even though it was probably not philosophical and by the 7th century was doubtless much orientalised. It is recorded that when the first Umayyad Caliph settled his court in Damascus in 661, he retained some of the Greek-speaking officials of the displaced Roman régime.

But the most recent and traceably direct channel of Hellenism to the new conquerors was the heretical Syrian branch of the Christian Church. Its religious language was Greek, and so too was the form

of its theology. It had spread into Mesopotamia and Persia, and when the Moslems came it was allowed to remain because it paid tribute. It had several centres of theological and other learning, notably at Edessa and Nisibis in northern Mesopotamia, and Jundi-Shapur, very close to what was to become in 762 the new Moslem capital of Baghdad. These schools had long been using Syriac translations of some of Aristotle's writings, Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and a few Neo-Platonist commentaries on this.

The Syriac scholars were first called on by the Moslems because of their medical knowledge, and then for their mathematical and astronomical learning. The Moslem interest was thus originally practical. In this way curiosity about Galen, Euclid and Ptolemy was aroused. Later, Moslem theologians began to debate among themselves the kind of problems which the Greek philosophical way of thinking had forced on the Christian theologians—e.g., whether God and the Koran could both be eternal, whether the omnipotence of God could leave any room for human freedom, and whether the Koranic attributes of God could be applicable literally. Presumably they had had conversations with Syriac scholars. Before the end of the 8th century we find the famous Caliph Harun-ar-Rashid encouraging the study of Greek thought, even sending agents into the Roman empire to buy manuscripts;[1] but not until after his death did the interest pass evidently beyond the Baghdad court. The change of climate was due largely to a shift of power. In 750 a new dynasty of Caliphs was established by a Persian revolt, and thereafter it was not the Arab but the Persian Moslems, with more than a thousand years of high civilisation behind them, that shaped public life and taste.

In the 9th century a frankly philosophical movement began, based on the direct study of the works of Aristotle, with a bias derived from the use of some of his Neo-Platonist commentators. It was in this movement, and not among the later Christian Thomists, that Aristotle was first regarded as the philosopher *par excellence*, the man in whom unaided human reason had reached the limit of its achievement and powers. The outstanding figures were Al Kindi (d. after 873), who laid the foundation by translating a number of Aristotle's works into Arabic and expounding them; Al Farabi (d. c. 950); Avicenna (d. 1037); and Algazel (d. 1111), who voiced the interest of Moslem orthodoxy, making a sceptical protest against the pretensions of reason. The next distinguished figure, Averroes (d. 1198), lived not in the East but in Islamic Spain: long in favour at the western Caliph's court there, he was at length disgraced for teaching that the truth expressed popularly in the Koran can only be grasped and rightly formulated by reason. With him the flowering in Islam of philosophy of the Greek sort ended. Chiefly through the authority, in the East as in Spain, of the orthodox theologians. Not having arisen spontaneously, but under Hellenistic contacts, philosophy apparently never acquired a natural rootage.

[1] In his reign an Indian astronomical manual of the 7th century, by a certain Brahmagupta, was known.

What had made the philosophers socially acceptable seems to have been primarily their skill in the practical art of medicine.

Although in the history of Islam those able thinkers form only a short and untypical episode, in the history of western philosophy they have the important position of being the chief link between the ancient and the mediaeval schools. What they did was to make known to the Christian Schoolmen the rounded Aristotle whom we know, and in so doing gave a powerful stimulus to philosophical thinking in the West. The transmission had two aspects.

(*a*) Some of Aristotle's works became available for the first time to western Europe. In the middle of the 12th century the philosophical material at the disposal of the Schoolmen was meagre. Of Aristotle these scholars had only the *Organon* in a Latin translation. It was by Latin translations (made by Christians in Spain) from the Arabic versions that they first came to have the text of some of Aristotle's writings on physics and zoology. This happened in the second half of the 12th century. About the same time translations were made into Latin directly from the Greek, nearly completing the Aristotelian corpus by soon after the middle of the 13th century.[1] In respect of Aristotle's own writings, then, the debt to the Arabs does not seem to be of the first importance; but it is hard to resist the impression that the rumour of Arabic texts, and then the first Latin versions of these, either provoked or strengthened the demand for translations from the Greek.

(*b*) It is unlikely that Aristotle's own writings alone, unaccompanied by any interpretation, would have produced the effect which they did produce on the Schoolmen. These were made aware of the long Moslem pondering over Aristotle by the translation into Latin, from about 1150 to about 1260, of the Arabic commentaries and expositions written by the Moslem philosophers mentioned earlier. These helped the Schoolmen not only to understand Aristotle's thought but also to see the kind of problems which it set for theology. The works were much read and much discussed, contributing greatly to the rapid enlargement and maturing of philosophical thought that occurred during the 13th century, especially in the schools of France. It was the coming of Aristotle so largely in the Moslem vehicles, with interpretations at some points inconsistent with Christian theology, that led the ecclesiastical authorities to ban for a while the teaching of Aristotelianism in the University of Paris; but the ban had little effect, the new territory of speculation having shown itself too exciting to be foreclosed.

The Jewish philosophers of the period lived and worked in Moslem lands, reading Aristotle in Arabic. They took some part in the transmission of Aristotelianism to the West by translating from Arabic into Latin, and through two of their on Aristotelianising thinkers, namely, Avicebron (or Avencebrol; d. 1070), who lived wholly in

[1] The *Metaphysica* and the *De Anima* were available from both the Greek and the Arabic; the ethical writings (including the *Politica*) only from the Greek.

Spain, and Maimonides (d. 1204), born in Spain but moving later to Egypt. The works of both these became well known to the Schoolmen. They were written in Arabic.

Later links between West and Far East:

From the European Middle Ages onwards, West and East have maintained some sort of contact. Vasco da Game did not, of course, discover India, but only the sea-route to it. Before him the Roman Church had sent missionaries, at the end of the 12th century and in the early part of the next. One of these—Jordanus, Bishop of Columbum in Travancore—wrote an account (*Mirabilia*, which has survived) of Hindu India and of his travels in Persia. When Marco Polo arrived in China in 1275, he was not the first European to be seen there, for his father and uncle were there when Marco was born in Venice. Within a few decades a Franciscan friar established several mission stations in China, the Jesuits following in the 16th century (some of whose successors were among Leibniz's vast range of correspondents). India then became the fields of the commercial ambitions and rivalries of the Portuguese, Dutch, French and British. So far the contacts and exchanges were almost entirely religious and commercial, the exceptions being that Europe welcomed early in the 18th century the lovely art of China, and that a few of its cosmological ideas filtered through.

Accurate and fairly full acquaintance with the philosophies of the East, had to wait until the relevant languages had been mastered. Several dictionaries of the Chinese language were compiled in the West in the first two decades of the 19th century, and the writings of Lao-tse and Meng-tse (Mencius) were translated before 1850. No western philosopher, however, seems to have been influenced from China. As for India, Sanskrit came to be well understood towards the end of the 18th century, and in 1819 the first dictionary of it was published. Its unique importance for comparative philology being at once recognised, it was regarded primarily in this reference. The study of its philosophical literature came later. As early as 1802, however, there appeared a Latin translation of a Persian version of the Upanishads, which was read by Schopenhauer and influenced him greatly. This was the first notable modern impact of Hindu philosophy on the West. In the third quarter of the 19th century the direct translation and scholarly exposition of the Upanishads seriously began, and one of the most distinguished leaders of this work (which is still unfinished) was a follower of Schopenhauer's philosophy, Paul Deussen. About the same time the Pali texts of Buddhism were being competently translated and expounded, but they do not appear as yet to have left a mark on any western philosopher.

During the past hundred years so many Indians and Chinese have had a western education that a knowledge of the western philosophical tradition has become common among them. Many of them have handled its techniques with complete competence, but seem to have remained basically loyal to their own ancient systems. The most

honoured living name in the philosophical bridge-building between India and the West, in the double task of interpreting each to the other, is Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, large in both scholarship and sympathy. Collectively the Americans, geographically situated between East and West, have taken the lead in bringing together, sometimes face to face in conference and sometimes through published symposia, philosophers of the two deeply diverse traditions. With the present conversations in Mysore this quest for mutual understanding has been fittingly brought under the aegis of UNESCO.

TRADITIONAL VALUES IN THE BACKGROUND OF A THEORY OF VALUES

by

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I

THE concept of value is the pivot on which the subject under discussion obviously rests. So the fruitfulness of the investigation of this subject may be said to be primarily dependent upon the determination of the meaning of this concept. But there arises an initial difficulty owing to the fact that the concept of value is not amenable to satisfactory definition. And the situation is made more difficult by the addition of the adjective 'traditional' to value, in the formulation of the subject. A traditional value relates to a certain age, a certain society, community or people, and varies from one age to another and from one society, community or people to another, whereas value, if it is, as it should be, taken to mean something of worth in itself or on its own account, should obviously preclude reference to the peculiarities of age, society, community and people so as not to admit of characterisation as traditional. Besides, social dynamism being a fact beyond dispute, any element in the life of a society or a people has had a history and so is not to be found as a self-same identity.

The difficulties mentioned above are not, however, absolutely dissuasive of the investigation of the traditional values in the life of a people. They only point to the limitations to which such an investigation is naturally open. Despite the indefinability of the concept of value, certain things are recognisable and indeed are actually recognised as values. Of course, it may be that a thing that is regarded as a value in one age or by one people is not so regarded in another age or by another people. And even forms of conduct such as 'speaking the truth', 'loving one's neighbour', which are ordinarily regarded as universal and unconditional values, may not really be values of this kind. But these are difficulties relating to detail which perhaps can never be finally resolved, but which, it is necessary to realise, may leave the status of the generic values unaffected.

II

The generic values are those values which embody the fulfilment of the primary needs of man. Some of these needs are, of course, such that man shares them with animals. But even then, the fulfilment of these needs in the case of man naturally takes a shape divergent from

that which it takes in the case of animals. Further, man, in virtue of his peculiarity which differentiates him from animals, has certain other primary needs which, perhaps, are not to be found in the case of the latter. Generally speaking, the *human* values corresponding to the first category of primary needs are *wealth* (artha) and happiness (*kāma*). In consideration of the peculiarity of the primary needs to which they correspond, these values may, however, be called *mundane*, it being understood that, on this account, they are not to be regarded as 'lower' or 'instrumental' in contrast with certain other values regarded as 'higher' or 'intrinsic'. In fact, the distinction usually drawn between higher and lower, intrinsic and instrumental, values presupposes a misunderstanding of the concept of man and, consequently, of the nature of the things that are of value to him. Nevertheless, wealth and happiness, not being ex-hypothesis the only values, are in need of adjustment to, and co-ordination with, other values that there may be. In the absence of such adjustment and co-ordination, wealth and happiness lose their character as values and man devoted to their pursuit ceases to remain strictly human.

What, then, are the other *generic* values? This question is naturally bound up with the question: What are the primary needs coming under the second of the two categories distinguished above? Since these needs, as previously observed, are those which differentiate man from animals, they may appropriately be called *social*. Be it noted, however, that sociality, in spite of the verdict that sociologists may pronounce to the contrary, seems to be peculiar to man and is conspicuous by its absence in the animal world. That this is so is evident from the fact that the values corresponding to these needs, unlike the values corresponding to the needs coming under the first category, are of the nature of *form* as distinguished from content or *matter* and are intended to serve as *regulative principles*. This fact is only vaguely and inadequately expressed by the usual conception of man as a *rational* animal. In any case, it is obvious that just as there are values of the nature of content or matter so there are values of another kind which are of a formal and regulative character. And from the nature of the case, the former, if unregulated by the latter, necessarily cease to be human values, and the latter, in the absence of the former, are completely ineffective.

Among philosophers in the West, Plato was perhaps the first to have envisaged the problem of social value. But it seems that he was far from conceiving it with sufficient generality. He occupied himself primarily with the investigation of *justice* which, notwithstanding its unquestionable social character and its importance as a major social value, relates to the maintenance of *right* and so seems to bear a predominantly juridical and political sense. This indicates that justice is only a specific value of the social kind, and as such is characterised by a limited measure of the sociality of social value understood in a generic sense. In this sense social value is obviously not identifiable with any one of the specific values characterisable as social. It is rather a corporation of all such values, but charged with a definite task as

signified by the Indian concept of 'dharma'—the task of regulating the human pursuit of wealth and happiness, and thereby guiding men towards a way of life which demands that they live as *human* individuals, as individuals to whom individuality is only another name for mutuality.

But a demand made is not a demand fulfilled. Social value as such contains hardly any suggestion about the way to the fulfilment of the demand which is essential to it—the demand for the transvaluation of individuality in the form of mutuality in the life of man. This is precisely the reason why a demand of social value such as 'love thy neighbour' is not fulfilled of itself. The fact is that man, seized with ignorance of his intrinsic dimensions consequent upon his unavoidable biological birth, delusively shrinks into an insular unit, a non-human ego without capacity for self-expression, for entering into the lives of others. Thus does man stray into bondage, emancipation from which, conceived of as moksa, mukti or liberation, is the *sine qua non* of the transvaluation in demand. Of course, moksa, from its very nature, is itself a demand—obviously, the demand for a kind of education and discipline. But even in this respect it is something more, being the fundamental principle on which the education and discipline in demand need to be based. Yet it is, also, not a mere principle or, in other words, is not purely formal and regulative. That this is so many be realised from the fact that, while it is *negative* in form, being conceived of as the elimination of egoity or the insularity of man as biologically determined, it is definitely *positive* in intention.

The fulfilment of the demand of social value, as it seems obvious from what has already been observed, consists, in the final analysis, in the assimilation of the mundane values to moksa. Thus assimilated, these values are not mere things happening *to* life, but are transvalued so as to constitute the joy *of* living otherwise called ānanda. Moksa, which, positively, is but another name for men's living in one another, then, has an essential value aspect in which it is ānanda. As such, it is not merely a value, but that which lends value to whatever is regarded as valuable, that is, the value of all values or rather the most human of all human values. It is precisely in this sense that moksa is spiritual value *par excellence* as distinguished from the values that are respectively designated as mundane and social. But since the mundane values cannot be strictly so called except in so far as they are regulated by social values, and since moksa is the inevitable condition of the fulfilment of the demand of social values, all values *qua* values are spiritual—of course, without prejudice to the peculiarity of the values that are mundane or social.

III

The above is a sketch of a theory of values made in the light of the relevant suggestions conveyed by early Indian thought. In presenting it before coming to discuss the problem of traditional values as we are at present required to do, it is, however, far from us to assume that these values are somehow to be extracted out of the

theory in question or any other of its kind. It would be a sheer absurdity indeed to suppose that a theory of values *invents* the things that may be of value in human life, say, the traditional elements such as the Family and the State and the laws about life and property. These are things which a theory of values can only *find* in a concrete world of individual and social life. But then, no traditional element can be said to be necessarily of value merely on account of its being traditional. This, of course, does not matter in the case of sociology, which, curiously enough, does not care to enquire whether an institution, a belief or a custom really is of value or not, and to which all traditional elements in human life are of equal interest. But in the investigation of traditional values the valuation of such elements is obviously imperative. Hence the importance of a theory of values for our present purpose.

IV

Now, as regards the traditional elements in the life of a society or a people, it is of foremost importance to notice that they have a history and have not always existed in the same form or contained the same details. In any case, they are not eternal and inviolable. But that does not necessarily mean that they are of no significance in human life. On the contrary some of them at least have played a significant role in the conduct of human affairs.

But then, one should not be so indifferent as to ignore the fact that among the traditional elements there have been some which are not only of no value, but are positive disvalues and yet have masqueraded as genuine values until their false appearance has been removed by the benign hand of a reformer. In fact, the history of the human race is full of instances of such traditional elements. The customs of Sati, infanticide, untouchability and child marriage are instances of this kind. Even as regards the institution of marriage, the significance of which in human life seems to be beyond question, one may well hold that its value cannot bear examination and this, not for the reason which Plato may have had, but from the point of view of the theory of values outlined above, which insists on the assimilation of happiness to moksa regarded as joy of living. And what is thus true about the institution of marriage may be equally true about many other widely recognised institutions such as the Family and the State.

The fact of the matter seems to be this. The institutions, customs, ideas and beliefs of a people, which constitute its traditions and are potent factors in the conduct of its affairs, owe their origin, form and detail to the physical, social, economic and psychological conditions of the life of the people concerned. Yet it is true at the same time that the traditional factors in their turn exercise their influence on the very conditions by which they are determined. And on the mutual causal relation between the two depends the course of the life of a people except for the fact that some brilliant thought, idea or action of a person or persons of exceptional genius may on occasion break the barrier of traditions and bring about unpredicted changes in the process of human

history. This does not, however, mean that traditions and their determining conditions are unconcerned with the ideas of wealth and happiness and of love, justice or any other social value. What is meant is that they contain little provision for the fulfilment of the demand of the social values, and, consequently, do not have the proper means of regulating the human pursuit of wealth and happiness. This speaks of a fact amenable to verification and at the same time reveals the truth that traditions are not called into existence by the demand of the ultimate values but are by and large governed by the law of natural selection. Herein lies the explanation of why the ideas and the principles of conduct of the highest value, which, if they had power and strength, could produce unprecedented salutary effects upon the history of mankind, were not woven into the traditional texture of human life so as to become potent factors in the conduct of human affairs. An outstanding example of such an idea is the idea of moksa or nirvana envisaged by early Indian thought and in the crucifixion of Jesus the principle of conduct in question finds its most glorious illustration. The former has remained at best a subject for academic investigation, while the evils of all manner of social inequity have eaten into the vitals of Hindu Society. The latter has been handed down as a symbol conspicuous for its holiness, which may stir religious sentiment, but has been unable to resist the visitation of fraticidal wars in Christendom.

V

As the situation stands and as is evident from the above discussion, the ultimate values have authority and right but are lacking in power and strength. The traditional elements—institutions, customs, ideas and beliefs on the other hand, are without authority and right, but wield power and strength. So it is natural that they should, and actually they do, come to bind a people together and to knit its members into a social organism with as much stability as is permissible under the circumstances. But for them human beings would be hopeless and helpless and stand each alone, doomed to extinction. Judged from this point of view, the traditional elements in the life of a people may be said to constitute a sphere of values in distinction from the pyramid of ultimate values with wealth and happiness as the base and moksa as the apex. And their value is to be judged in terms of the power and strength they come to exercise in the conduct of human affairs; so that the stronger and more powerful is the influence of a traditional element upon the life of a society or a people the more valuable that element should be. For the measure of the power and strength that falls to its share a traditional element should, however, be thankful to the law of natural selection more than anything else. This, perhaps, reveals the secret of the ascendency in the scale of value of traditional elements, early and recent—of the Indian hierarchical system of social organization based on casteism, of Western industrialism and the Western institution of the nation-state with its attendant nationalism comprising a certain complex of ideas, attitudes and sentiments.

The situation described above is, however, seriously affected by the question of the health of a social organism. Being constituted by none but human beings, a social organism cannot remain in a state of health except in so far as the ultimate values are brought to bear upon its affairs. But, since it owes its existence and its relative stability mainly to the traditional elements, and since these elements, as already seen, play their part regardless of the ultimate values, its health is never guaranteed. That even a good custom corrupts the world is no mere poetic fancy, but a true statement of fact indeed.

As regards the stability of a social organism, there is no gainsaying the fact that it is adversely affected when the social organism concerned is not healthy. But, then, partly owing to the fact that an effective sense of ultimate values is rare rather than common among mankind, and partly owing to indifference to suffering more prevalent in the orient than in the occident—an unhealthy social organism generally has a longer life than is its due. In any case, the fact remains that social organism as such, from its very origin and nature, is, in a sense, inherently unhealthy; and at the same time, being constituted by none but human beings, it bears a demand for the ultimate values to come to its rescue. But since the ultimate values, with all their authority and right, lack power and strength, and since traditions die hard, all that may normally happen later rather than sooner in answer to its demand is the modification of the prevailing traditions or at best their replacement by new ones. Thus it seems that in the name of progress human society proceeds from one state of ill health to another with the goal of perfect health receding further and further.

VI

In so far as its foundation lies in traditions governed by the law of natural selection, human society does not lend itself to a better portrayal than what has been presented above. Yet this is not all that one can say about the human beings of whom society is made up. While a member of society, man, in a sense, is apart from it. In any case his status as a *human* being is not co-extensive with his status as a *social* being. It is on this account that he finds himself in a position to recognise, and to be impressed by, the authority and right of ultimate values. To understand what the result of this circumstance may be it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the ultimate values, unlike traditions, are unable to exercise direct influence upon man or, in other words, to become immanent powers to govern human life and conduct except in rare cases of personality such as a Buddha, a Socrates and a Jesus who are, strictly speaking, *human* rather than *social*. The result in question then seems to be this, that the ultimate values are reproduced in human life and thus they come to stay representatively as part of its furniture in the shape of an attitude or a disposition as the case may be.

The attitude in question is most prominently illustrated in a deeper aspect of Indian life which is independent of traditions and, further, bears a protest against traditionalism.

It is more passive than active and more negative than positive. This is the attitude of renunciation (sanyaśa)—renunciation of the Family and the State, indeed, of all that is of tradition. To construe it as the attitude of world-negation is, however, to misconstrue its real significance. It is not so much a denial of the world as it is a call for the restraint of the excess of this-worldliness caused by the power of traditions; and at the same time it is a warning against the evils proceeding therefrom. Of course, indifferentism in worldly matters is a distinctive feature of the attitude of renunciation—indifferentism which, as the social, economic and political history of India amply testifies, demands a heavy sacrifice of the people imbued with it. But the loss thus suffered by a people could be the greatest gain for mankind if life were regenerated in the crucible of the human qualities—rigorous, but of the highest value—which are the spiritual offspring of the attitude of renunciation. Of such qualities the most fundamental is tolerance (ahimsā). Tolerance is freedom from hate, jealousy, anger, anxiety and fear. Its motto is not merely ' live and let live ', but 'let all share in one another's life'. Its demand is not for the mere *co-existence* of peoples, but for their *inter-existence*. And thus does it envisage the possibility of *one human* society unaffected by the limitations of parochial traditions, of community, race and nation.

But, it would be natural to reply, in a world such as ours, where even co-existence of peoples seems to be an unrealisable goal, the ideal of their inter-existence is far too utopian to admit of realisation. The goal in demand, it would be pointed out, should really be less ethereal and more substantial than that which is envisaged in tolerance. This raises the question of the basis of the goal and at the same time suggests the answer. The basis is to be found in an aspect of human life which, like tolerance, should be related to the ultimate values and thus have authority and right. On the other hand, it should, unlike tolerance, be invested with some measure of power and strength —which it could be if it were such that its strong point lay not in its independence of traditions nor in its conveying a protest against traditionalism, but in its being the presupposition of some traditional element or other occupying a respectable place in the life of a people. This really brings us to the disposition which was earlier spoken of as a reproduction of the ultimate values and a part of the furniture of human life, and was distinguished from an attitude such as the one considered above.

This disposition, unlike the attitude of renunciation and its foremost offspring tolerance, is more active than passive and more positive than negative. It is none other than social conscience, admittedly the ultimate basis of a legacy of Roman civilization, the idea of Law, which has formed a dominant part of the traditional foundation of Western society. The West in particular has promoted the cause of science, medicine and other applied sciences, and has thereby and otherwise too made most valuable contributions of human welfare. And, although it may not easily be seen, yet it is a fact that all this is ultimately

due to the significant role that social conscience allied with a developed civic sense has played in life in the West. It is no less on this account than on account of the wealth and power that have been at its disposal that the West has enjoyed and is still enjoying supremacy over the rest of the world. So, it may well be argued, when so much human welfare goes to the credit of a tangible element in human life such as social conscience, this element should be regarded as the mainstay of the human race and there should be no need of groping in the dark in search of further support or looking up to the unearthly attitude of renunciation and the amorphous human quality of tolerance for the salvation of mankind.

This argument is, of course, irrefutable in itself. But it cannot withstand the inner contradiction in which Western social life, in a deeper analysis, is found to be involved. The idea of Law as a bequest of Rome to the Western world is not an independent and isolated element but, as a matter of historical fact, is inseparably bound up with the idea of institutions headed by the State. And since there is no gainsaying the fact that the State is the citadel of Power or at least that Power is essential to the State, social conscience as the unquestionable ultimate presupposition of the idea of Law cannot, and, in fact, does not, have absolutely free play in Western social life, but is rather in constant danger of being lost to Power. That the danger is real and not imaginary is verifiable among other things by the progressive employment of science in the service of power and, in particular, by the crisis of western civilization which perhaps has reached its greatest height in our day, threatening the human race with extinction. Hence the demand, not for the liquidation of Power—because the world cannot do without State and government—but for the safety of social conscience. Since the demand itself is called for by the supervention of Power upon social conscience, its fulfilment cannot come out of the State which is inseparable from power. Traditional religion, the religion of God, as will be admitted on all hands, has proved ineffective in this respect, not because it is religion, but because in the Christian world it turned out to be an institution with Power at its command and so became a replica of the State.

The fact is that the position of social conscience cannot be safeguarded except in so far as it is extricated from the over-bearing influence of Power, and that this cannot happen except on condition that social conscience itself is wedded to an attitude which denies power, and to a human quality which can withstand the onslaught of the evils produced by Power such as hate, jealousy, anger, anxiety and fear. This obviously brings us back to the attitude of renunciation (sanyāsa) and the human quality of tolerance (ahimsā). These two not only are the inevitable conditions of the safety of social conscience, but—this may be too difficult for statesmen and politicians to realise—provide treatment of the inherent disease of the State so as to make it possible for it to be restored to perfect health.

VII

Although we have found it necessary to recognise such a thing as traditional value, the sense in which we have been led to understand it is not likely to meet with the approval of those who not only are interested in the detailed study of the so-called traditional values, but who believe that in the preservation of the traditional values embodied in the lives of different peoples lies the safety of the future of mankind. But the point is that no traditional value can remain in a preserved condition. Owing to the changing character of the social, economic, political and psychological conditions which are apt to determine its nature and detail, a traditional value may be destroyed, modified, maimed or replaced by something which is a value of a different kind or else does not deserve to be called a value at all. But even granted that traditional values strictly so-called can be maintained in a preserved condition, that should be no guarantee of the safety of the future of mankind, because there is no getting away from the fact that they owe there nature, form and detail mainly to natural selection, and because man is after all more than what natural selection can bring within its perview.

What is suggested is not, however, that traditions need to be abolished or given up. Perhaps, no people can give up its traditions any more than one can give up one's desire for food and shelter. But, then, a tradition strictly speaking, is not *of* man; it is something *to* which he can only conform—which means that man, in a sense, is not himself or, in other words, is heteronomous, not autonomous, in so far as he is a mere participant in traditional life. Hence, the human need that traditions conform to man as he is himself, instead of his conforming to them. A tradition that fails in this task deserves to die, and that which succeeds is of interest to us, because it is *of* man. This refers us to social conscience which, as already seen, is a dominant part of the traditional foundation of western society.

As previously indicated, it is in social conscience as extricated from power and regenerated in the crucible of tolerance that man is himself or, in other words, is autonomous. But what else can autonomy be but the inevitable condition of what is meant by moksa or liberation? And liberation is not of the East or the West; not of this people or of that. It is universally human and envisages inter-existence of all peoples in one human society. This is perhaps the final result that may accrue from a fruitful study of traditional values. But the result obviously is not of the nature of an accomplished fact, but is the bearer of a problem which is no other than the problem of education and discipline. The solution of this problem is urgent, because on it would depend the birth of a new world in place of the world where mankind is on the verge of losing its future.

'CAN PHILOSOPHY HOPE TO HAVE A HIERARCHY OF VALUES?'

(*AN INDIAN VIEW*)

by

HIS HIGHNESS SRI JAYA CHAMARAJA WODEYAR

INDIAN thinkers have always believed in a hierarchy of values. The concept of 'caturvidha purusārtha' or the four-fold aims of human endeavour, viz., Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Moksa, is an expression of this hierarchy. In this conception the ultimate value is 'Moksa' or final emancipation. The Moksa that these thinkers speak of is the goal to which their lives were directed. The attainment of Moksa is the fullest unfoldment of the potentialities that lie in the human soul. It is the complete flowering of human personality which is described in the Upanisads as the state of becoming Brahman.

Moksa is also called apavarga or the final beatitude. It is upeya, and end in itself. It can never be conceived of as upaya, a means to an end. In other words, it is the ultimate value of man's quest, real intrinsic value. The three other values in the purusārtha hierarchy are the 'trivarga' or three-fold ones of Dharma, Artha and Kāma. Dharma[1] is virtue, Artha is wealth, Kāma is desire. As among these three values also there is a gradation in the descending order of Dharma, Artha, Kāma. The wise man tries to secure all the three values; if he cannot do so, he will always concentrate on dharma first and last.

The Dharma Sāśtras, which are treatises on law and morality, recognise Kāma also as a value and as a motive force of human action. Certain impulses and desires are common to man and the lower animals, but they are of a lesser level and their satisfaction is of inferior value compared to the realisation of the moral and spiritual aspirations of a properly developed human personality. In the hierarchy of values, therefore Kāma occupies the lowest place. The distinction of hita (the beneficial) and hitatama (the most beneficial) made in the Upanisads may well be applied to the relative values of Kāma and Moksa. Professor P. V. Kane sums up the axiological teaching of the Hindu Dharma Sāśtras in the following words: 'This teaching shows that there are proximate ends or motives and ultimate ends or motives, that the ultimate ends are really the most valuable and that the whole teaching of Dharma Sāśtra points to this that all higher life demands discipline both of body and mind and requires the subjection of lower aims to aims of higher value'.

While recognising this gradation among Dharma, Artha and Kāma it must be remembered that all these three are only instrumental

[1] Dhriyate iti dharmah—That which sustains is Dharma.

values and means to an end. Even the ethical end known as dharma is not ultimate. It is a means for achieving a spiritual end, viz., Moksa. Though the ethical is an essential ingredient of a spiritual life, it is not the whole of spiritual life. Any attempt to reduce spiritual life to the merely ethical would not be true to Indian thought. The content of Moksa is of greater magnitude than that of dharma. To miss the hierarchy among values is to miss their meaning.

At the same time Indian thought gives the fullest recognition to the limited sphere within which the three instrumental values have their sway. None of these values should be suppressed altogether. The Āśrama ideal of Hinduism does not advocate renunciation or ascetism prematurely except in very rare cases. One has first to go through the life of a householder (grhasthāśrama) in which the values of artha and kāma are given the fullest scope for expression. Even in that stage there should be no deviation from the pursuit of ethical and spiritual values. A fixation for ever at any one of these levels of value without progressive attempts to transcend them would spell disaster. The Dharma Śāstras recognize that unless each one of these values is conceded its legitimate claim for satisfaction, life would suffer from a feeling of frustration that would affect its whole outlook. Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, for example declares that 'a man should enjoy all such pleasures as are not opposed to dharma. In this way one secures both worlds.' In the Bhagavad-gita, Kṛṣna gives a place to the legitimate type of Kāma that is not opposed to dharma. (Dharmāviruddho bhutesu kāmosmi bharatar-sabha: Gīta: VII-11) Kautilya, author of the Artha Śāstra, says: 'One may have kāma provided there is no conflict with dharma and artha; one need not lead a life devoid of pleasures'. Kautilya recognizes the economic basis of life (Artha) as very important even for dharma.

The striving towards the ultimate value called moksa is unique to the human estate. This supreme and of human life (paramapuruṣārtha) is attained by few. So far as the vast majority of mankind is concerned it is a distant end. In any case no one should lose sight of it. Moksa is self-realization, the realization of what one is in his true being (svasvarūpajñāna).

Not mere hedonism, whether egoistic or altruistic, nor mere eudaemonism with the vague goal of happiness, nor even the ideal of duty for duty's sake divested of all desire implied by the Kantian categorical imperative, not certainly the principle of utilitarianism, will be of any avail for reaching the fulness of life envisaged by the Indian thinkers. They have always held that the three instrumental values of life must get themselves transmuted and transformed in the crucible of one's own soul. This view does not advocate eradication of desires but sublimation of these in the interests of a fuller and a more satisfying life. Salvation is to be attained through 'samsāra', the cycle of existence. One has to go through samsāra or worldly life to be able to transcend it. The world is God's workshop for the moulding of souls, says the Kannada saint Basavesvara. It is in the world that the values have to be realized. Heaven lies here about you when you know how to live,

says Kṛṣṇa in the Gita. The Īsāvasyā Upanisad exhorts us to aspire to live a life of a hundred summers filled with the performance of our duties in this world—kurvannevēha karmāni jijīviset satam samāh (I-2).

I have briefly indicated some aspects of Indian thought on the hierarchy of values. I trust that the philosophers of many nations who are gathered here will consider these views in relation to their own traditional systems of philosophy and patterns of culture and help to arrive at a synthesis of world thought on the hierarchy of values.

In this task of determining the proper scale of values I am certain that we can derive guidance of the most beneficial character from the traditions enshrined in the cultures of the various nations of the world. Indian thought on this question is well set forth in the declaration of Manu Dharma Sāśtra that 'the Veda, tradition, conduct of good men and the satisfaction of one's own conscience are the fourfold authorities for the determination of dharma'.

Vedaḥ smṛtih sadācārah svasya ca
priyamātmanaḥ,
Etat-caturvidham prāhuḥ sāksat-
dharmasya lakṣaṇam.

(Manu: 11-12.)

SCIENCE AND REALITY

by

S. V. RAMAMURTY

IN DEALING with Science and Reality, let me first state what is understood by Science and Reality. Science is taken to be systematized knowledge which 1. is metrical, 2. relates specially to the objective world and 3. is formulated with reference to general laws. Reality is taken to mean 1. that which has objective existence or 2. that which is absolute or self-existent as opposed to what is derivative or dependent or 3. that which is ultimate. In Science, the emphasis is on the interest in the objective world and on measurability. Physics is the dominant Science developed in the West in the present age which may be called the Age of Physics. Physics is the science of matter and recognizes three fundamental entities, namely time and space besides matter. The space of Physics is three-dimensional. Einstein has replaced it by a four-dimensional space-time in which time adds a dimension to the three dimensions of physical space. Knowledge is derived by observation through the senses delivering messages to consciousness for its interpretation. In Newton's physics, knowledge relates to a universal consciousness. In Einstein's physics, knowledge is related to an individual observer who is not however recognized as introducing mind in his scheme. Thus Science under the influence of its dominant form, Physics is based on matter, quantity, measurability, three dimensionality and observation. It seems to me that all these notions are connected. In measurability which is said to be the distinguishing characteristic of science, there are three factors namely, a unit, a number of units and their integration.

Let me now consider what is set aside as not Science. In the Eastern tradition of religion and philosophy, the ultimate reality is not matter but spirit. Mind too is held to be real. Philosophy is systematized knowledge dealing with mind and quality instead of quantity. Its two fundamental entities mind and spirit yield a two dimensional world, while with matter, a three-dimensional world. Religion deals either with the one entity of spirit into which man merges or an entity of spirit which has a dual expression as God and man—Paramatma and Jivatma. In its final form, Hindu philosophy presents religion as dealing with one fundamental entity, spirit, yielding a one-dimensional world. Matter is characterized by quantity, mind by quality and spirit by reality. These three characteristics merge one into the other. Philosophy as in Bergson regards quantity as incipient quality. Quality may be viewed as incipient reality.

The objective then is not wholly separated from the subjective. The subjective is the seer, the objective is the seen and they are integrated in seeing. In a small book called 'Drik Drisya Viveka' (Discrimination of seer and seen) with a commentary by Sankara, the great Philosopher, the seen material world is shown to be integrated by mind as the seer and is said therefore to be of the nature of mind. Then the various states of mind namely, the waking state, the dreaming state, the dreamless sleeping state and finally Samadhi or super conscious state are described as seen and thence integrated by the inner seer, spirit. Matter is thus the seen and mind the seer. Mind is the seen and spirit is the seer. Finally, spirit is seen and seer through the seeing that integrates them. It is therefore a limited view to consider that matter alone is the objective world. So is mind too. So indeed is spirit too as seen by itself as seer. Science thus can be a science of mind and spirit even as of matter.

If quantity is the basis of systematisation of matter, quality too which is a transfinite quantity and reality too which is a transfite quality and therefore quantity, can furnish a similar systematisation of the knowledge of mind and spirit and there is scope therefore for a science of mind and spirit. Measurement then can characterize both spirit and mind even as it does matter. I have arrived at the view that spirit has a mathematical measure in pure or absolute number. When spirit the seer sees spirit the seen, the relation of the two is a pure number. Spirit has thus in a pure or absolute form the quantitative value which matter has. I have therefore found it possible to introduce change of spirit as a variable in a differential equation connecting spirit with other entities of the universe.

What then about the dimensions of matter? I believe that the number of dimensions of a set up is the number of fundamental entities contained in it. In the science of nature, matter has three dimensions furnished by its three fundamental entities—time, space and matter. Man who is a compound of matter, mind and spirit has also three dimensions. Nature and man seem to meet in matter. If we deal with a world of mind and matter, space and time, it is a world of 4 dimensions. I believe that the fourth dimension of Einstein is provided not by time which is already included in the three dimensions of a material space but by mind which the observer brings in. The Cosmos consisting of nature and man, of the five fundamental entities spirit, mind, matter, space and time has five dimensions.

Indeed the idea that spirit which is the absolute reality expresses itself at various levels which are relatively absolute has been expressed in Vedanta. In Taittiriyaka Upanishad, the student asks his teacher to teach him Brahman. The teacher defines Brahman as that 'from whence all beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death' and asks the student to think. The student meditates and says *anna* or matter is Brahman. The teacher asks him to think again. And so on successively through the various forms of Brahman as *prana* or life; *chitta* or mind; *vignana* or

understanding and *ananda* or bliss. Elsewhere in the Vedanta, *akasa* or space and *kala* or time also come into the scene. Thus the various fundamental entities which we may now list come into the picture with spirit as the ultimtae and time, space, matter and mind as relatively ultimate.

The definition of Brahman in the Vedanta has been recast by Pandit Nehru as 'the inner base of every thing that exists'. In mathematical language, I have expressed it as 'the one variable of which everything in the world is a function'. I have refered to the connection that seems to exist between matter, quantity, measurability, three dimensionality and observation. The same mode of connection exists between spirit, reality which is absolute quantity as well as value, measurability, five dimensions and an integration of observation with reasoning and intuition. In the science of matter, the systematisation of knowledge is not merely by observation but also by reasoning and intuition. Starting from observation, by a process of induction and reasoning and final flash of intuition leading to a hypothesis and therefrom by reasoning and deduction, the science of matter is built up. So can the science of spirit and also of mind which stands between.

I have ventured to give the name of Cosmics to the science of spirit, as Physics is the name for the science of matter. I have laid down three propositions in Cosmics, namely.

1. Spirit is real
2. Spirit is measurable by pure number
3. Spirit has a general law of relation with any entity given by

   $\frac{\delta\theta}{\theta} = \delta\sigma$ where σ is spirit and θ is any entity.

The ultimate reality of spirit is that from which all other reality, all other knowledge is derived. The two great three-dimensional worlds of Nature and man coalesce into the Cosmos and there emerges an integrated world of five dimensions, knit together by the basic reality of spirit and developing in more and more variegated forms. From the unit 1, successive integers 2, 3 and so on develop. Is the form embodying 1 greater than that embodying 2 or 3? Or is it the reverse? Is Science embodying three entities spirit, mind and matter greater or less than philosophy embodying two entities or religion embodying one? The ultimate reality is spirit. The ultimate values are spiritual. Is the spiritual value of the one greater of less than the spiritual value of the many?

This is a question that underlies the differences in ideology of the East and the West. Men recognize science to be good because of the many good things it has provided for man. Science therefore is in many ways an avenue for progress and not retrogressive from religion and philosophy on which pre-scientific civilizations have been built. But if as Science emphasizes its differentiated quality, it also neglects at the same time its bases of religion, and philosophy, the moral and social values of man, it leads to a sense of anxiety and frustration.

What is needed therefore is that the new values of science should not swamp the old. When science produces good as well as evil, what is needed is not to throw away science but recover its progenitors religion and philosophy, so that the three-fold character of science is not accompanied by loss of the integrated value of spirit which underlies it. The spiritual value of 1 is the same as that of 3. Pure number is the class of all finite integers. Cantor, the Italian Mathematician, has found a mathematical symbol for it. He called it Aleph-zero. Aleph-zero multiplied by any integer has the same value. The spiritual value of religion, philosophy and science each in an integrated form is the same. It is the integration of all three that keeps the good of all and avoids the evil of neglecting any. Science inlaid with religion and philosophy has greater variety and harmony than any one or two of them.

There is scope therefore for expanding the jurisdiction of science from matter to mind and spirit. Thereby we can build through philosophy a science of religion and a religion of science. Philosophy as the middle way between religion and science has both the capacity and responsibility of integrating them.

There are two values which man seeks—freedom and community. The former is of the nature of the One self which is in him. The latter is of the nature of the One world in every part of which the One self is implicit. Philosophy seeks the goal of man's individual self and also the values of his universal self. The former yields man's right to freedom and the latter his duties to the community. The reconciliation of these two aspects forms the basis of ethical and social life. Why is man free? Because in him is the immanent spirit which is subject to none. Why has man duty to the community? Because, the community is a form of the transcendent spirit which contains man and the universe. Dr A. N. Whitehead in his 'Adventures of ideas' states that the fundamental schism in humanity is between the Aryan and the Semitic and that to the Aryan, Law is immanent and to the Semitic, Law is transcendent. The reconciliation between freedom and community is to be found in the relation between immanent spirit and transcendent spirit. If spirit is the one ultimate reality, it is an integration both of immanent and transcendent spirit. A philosophy of reality is thus a healing force for the Science of life, both individual and universal. In the famous verse of Bhagavad Gita which enjoins on man to perform action which is his *Dharma* without desire for the fruits thereof, a reconciliation is made between right as individual and duty to the universal. The appreciation of Reality in relation to Science has thus significance in man's practical life as well as his philosophy.

FORMAL AND ACTUAL FREEDOM

by

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THE problem 'Formal *vs* Actual Freedom' is usually understood as the question whether certain definitions of freedom, started with as postulates, can hold to the last in actual situations, whether, in other words, these definitions are not *merely ideal*, never completely workable in given actual situations, and whether, therefore, a freedom that is workable—actual freedom—is not different from freedom that is ideal.

The usual problem 'Formal *vs* Actual Freedom' is thus based on the assumption that ideal freedom, otherwise called formal freedom, is a mere postulate. In the present essay we have challenged this assumption: we have claimed that formal freedom is a living over-natural process. Naturally, therefore, we have looked to the main problem from a different point of view, and, more interested in the point of view itself than in many of the empirical details, we have had to be satisfied with a general analysis only.

Freedom is the fact that man sometimes stands aside nature and resists all pressure—physical, biological, psychic, social, etc. Free man, just so far as he is free, is thus outside nature, 'nature' meaning the field where every event is completely determined by, i.e., predictable in principle, from, other events that either precede it or happen after it determining it teleologically. If man is thus, as a matter of fact, sometimes outside nature, it means that he has a capacity to remain so, for it is not by accident that he has slipped form nature; through sustained effort he can acquire a more or less permanent attitude of so standing aside, and whenever he stands aside he feels, rightly or wrongly that he is more in himself.

Freedom is thus over-natural. But this does not mean that it is antagonistic or even indifferent to all that is nature. We are speaking here of freedom of *will*, and will, we shall show later in detail, is nothing if it does not manipulate things of nature. Over-natural freedom must, therefore, be represented in nature also. At the level of nature it is represented by what is called *decision* which, though an empirical event, is abrupt somewhere. Decision, be it noted, only represents freedom, it is not freedom itself. Its abruptness, another name of which is freedom, is only its adjective.

Every decision is abrupt, i.e., free, at some point. No complete account can be given as to why I decide for this particular act, and not that, at this particular time and place. Given all relevant conditions for an act, one may cooly decide for another. Complete empiricistic

determination is at best a postulate, a mere prescription that there be nothing over-natural, and its success depends on how far an abrupt decision is amenable to such treatment. The treatment fails in many cases, and where it appears to succeed there is always a smuggling somewhere of something which is not unambiguously an item of nature—a personality, an ought or value. Personality is a nucleus that grows, a centre round which character is formed, and it is doubtful if that nucleus is an item of nature. It is even more doubtful if value or the ought is an item of nature. The ought, another name of which is the desirable, is never merely that which is or can be desired under definable natural conditions: these conditions have themselves to be desirable. For the same reason it is not, also, what is desired rationally or consistently. 'Rational' or 'consistent' is no synonym of 'desirable.'

Personality or the ought does not also *determine* a decision in the way a natural phenomenon determines another. There is no personality or ought *first* and *then* the determination by it of our decision. Creative personality and operative moral values are relevant only in the context of decisions for particular acts, and so the word 'determination' has here a different connotation altogether. A pre-existent ought or personality has nothing in it to compel a particular decision for a particular act; one would always be at liberty to flout it. The very fact that it is not flouted speaks against it pre-existence. In will personality is always creative, and the ought always functional.

There is thus no empiricistic account of freedom. Freedom is an over-natural urge. The question now is whether this freedom is *formal* or *actual.*

The actual is that which exists, contrasted with which the formal should be that which does not exist. But as the formal is not zero we have to say that it is a *content* that does not exist. But even this does not make the meaning precise. A false content does not exist, but nobody calls it formal on that account. So we have to say that the formal is that which is not prevented altogether from existing, we have to say that somehow it both exists and does not exist—exists in one way and does not exist in another. More precisely we can say that by itself it does not exist but that it exists in association with some existent fact or facts. The formal, in other words, is that which, though always in some existent fact, is, as the form of that fact, somehow original, not wholly reducible to that existent; and as the existent, for us, is primarily an event in nature, the formal, as not reducible to it, is, therefore, overnatural. It is, again, the same over-natural form which, in another way, is said to exist, viz., when it viewed as *also in some existent fact.* As not existing it is *merely formal,* and as *also existing* it is to be called *actual.* Henceforward by 'formal' we shall mean what is merely formal.

Briefly, the relation between the formal and the actual is this:

The actual is that which we start with, and the formal is later distinguished in it. As distinguished in the actual, the formal has to be understood as what was already in the actual, though, till distinguish-

ment, as undistinguished. Once the formal is distinguished it is understood in two ways—as in itself, i.e., as now distinguished, and as undistinguished from the actual and, therefore, as itself actual. In plain language, the formal is an over-natural presupposition of the actual.

But if by itself the formal does not exist, why insist—one might ask—that it is over-natural, as though as not existent it has yet some original status? Why not de-ontologise it altogether and treat it as a mere postulate? The charge, we reply, can be met in two ways. First, even as a postulate the formal has to be called over-natural: the formal is postulated, even by modern empiricists, as a principle beyond nature, not co-ordinate with natural events. The only difference is that while they treat it as a cold dead postulate—a mere formula, so to say—for organising existent facts, we hold—and that is our second point—that all presuppositions are not of this type. Many of the presuppositions may be dead formulae, but not those which generate rules that are normally taken as permanent. Space, for example, is one such presupposition that generates geometrical rules, and freedom or spirit another generating basic moral rules.

Modern empiricists who insist on the postulate-character of presuppositions insist also that there is no rule which can be called permanent. They insist that every rule is a conceptual construct just necessary for certain situations and so liable to alteration as situations change. But this is not true of all rules. There are rules—those of Eucleadian Geometry, for example—which persist in claiming permanence. This claim has to be faced, it should not be lightly dismissed as an age-long prejudice born of our confinement to a 3-dimensional space. The multi-dimensional structure which modern scientists speak of is only a dead, though successful, postulate, but the 3-dimensional space with the Eucleadian rules is insistent. With this as the presupposition, and not with the multi-dimensional structure, we lead our life, and if there is any metaphysical interest other than life everything that is metaphysical is believed as existent, though at a higher level; but *ex hypothesi* the multi-dimensional structure is not to be taken as existent. No postulate is ever to be taken as an existent fact.

Freedom too is no dead postulate because, as we have said, it is the source of some basic moral rules that are abiding. That there are abiding moral rules is evident also from the fact that we often compare different empirical norms, even axiologically, with one another. Unless we had believed in abiding norm or norms there could be no such axiological comparison. These abiding norms may not be specifiable. Perhaps as merely functional they cannot be specified, and most probably as the guiding principles of actual will which operates in and through nature they remain ever fused with empirical social norms. But, decidedly, we cannot deny that there are abiding norms.

Over-natural freedom is a living presupposition of decisions and, through decisions, of our acts. By itself it is formal, but considered as a *presupposition of acts* it is actual freedom. It is always in the

context of acts, always present in these as the operative principle, but undeniably, it is also an *original* urge, not wholly reducible to acts. It is what we can neither deny nor yet assert as existent. We know nothing of it except that it is the source of basic moral rules, though we feel its presence whenever we act reflectively. By itself, therefore, it is of little importance to us.

An ethics or ontology that idolises this formal freedom and neglects our concrete acts is no more than a speculative luxury, unless, of course, one understands by its originality some demanded superior type of existence approachable in some religious or over-religious attitude. We are not concerned with this latter alternative. We only insist that it is not the freedom that we meet with in our daily life. The freedom which is our everyday concern is freedom of *will*. Free will, as will, must be dealing with existent facts of the world, only its dealings are not compelled by forces of nature. Free action is the manipulation of things of the world without any pressure from nature. As such actions are *first* events issuing forth from original (but non-existent) freedom (of course on the occasion of some natural events misconceived as the causes of those actions), and as this original freedom is the source of some permanent rules, the actions have to abide by these rules. Moral actions are cases of actual freedom that presupposes an original formal freedom which does not, however, exist.

In will, formal freedom always looks outside, and seizing upon things of the world and manipulating them it is actual freedom, will never turns inward. If there is any freedom claiming self-completeness and attainable through withdrawal, it is not freedom of will, and not also attainable through will.

But cannot a man will to *be* good, and is this not will in the inward direction? We reply, one cannot *be* good except by consciously *doing* good. Doing-good is more primary, and as this is effected being-good happens automatically. Over and above doing good there is no second will to be good. Doing-good and being-good are two inseparable aspects of one and the same moral situation, doing-good being only more primary. A moral situation is this: there is a functional original freedom which of its own nature manipulates things of the world according to rules that issue from itself. Doing-good is the manipulation side of this situation, and being-good is on the side of original freedom, and we have seen that original freedom is only a presupposition of free *acts*, tending always to realise itself as those acts. It follows that if being-good is a state of *realisation* it must be of the form 'doing good'. There is no self-contained inward realisation called being-good.

There are people who hold that every increase in being-good is either itself a greater realisation within or a clearer manifestation of some ideal perfect freedom. But this is impossible. If being-good is relevant only as doing-good every increase in the former is to be measured by a corresponding increase in the latter. There is no limit, however, to the increase of doing-good. It follows that equally there is no limit to the increase of being-good. For will, therefore—as

much in the aspect of being-good as in that of doing-good—there is no ideal perfect freedom.

The so-called ideal freedom is understood, by those who admit it, as either realisable through the rising stages of being-good or as already real and getting more and more manifest in those stages. The denial of this ideal freedom means, in effect, that formal freedom (of will) should not be idolised as self-contained and existent[1]. Freedom which is relevant to will is always operational, it always comes out and has its play on things of nature.

Actual freedom as the free manipulation of existent facts is thus inevitably in the context of nature. As freedom, it resists indeed all natural pressure, but, paradoxically enough, as manipulating nature it has to abide by the obduracy of natural facts and laws of nature. This, however, is no anomaly. The acceptance, here, of nature is not forced, but free, and —what is more important—the acceptance belongs to the very constitution of *actual freedom.*

To explain both the points. Free will accepts nature as only a means for something about which we are free. As such the acceptance has itself to be called free. If X is a means to Y we accept X not in the interest of X, but only as it conduces to Y. In other words, only that much of X is accepted which is of minimum necessity. Freedom would have been jeopardised if the whole of X were to be accepted. Here, on the other hand, there is conscious selection, and where there is selection there is freedom. One might ask here if, in will, even this selective acceptance of nature were not against freedom. We reply—and this is our second point—those who could ask this question have no clear idea of actual freedom. Doing good—good will—as actual freedom works *ex hypothesi* under this limitation. It is precisely as under this limitation that good will is actual freedom. Formal freedom may not have this limitation, but we have seen its fate. This limitation constitutes the very actuality of freedom. There is no *a priori* clash between will-freedom and this limitation. Were there a possibility of such clash actual will that operates in and through nature could not be felt as free. What is incompatible with such limitation is a freedom that is no freedom of *will.* In cases other than of will, pure freedom, if there is any, is a maturer stage to be reached through an effort of withdrawal from nature. But, in will, free manipulation of nature is maturer than formal freedom. The spiritual task in will is precisely to manipulate nature more and more according to basic moral rules, not to run after the functional formal freedom. As, therefore, in will the very manipulation of nature is the actual realisation of freedom the limitation we are speaking of is not merely no defect but positively an enrichment of freedom.

Some believe that through will-not-to-will (*vairagya*) we can, even in willing, realise the formal freedom as in itself. But it is doubtful

[1] Presupposed by actual will there is no over-natural which could be self-contained and yet non-existent. Formal freedom is neither existent nor self-contained.

if the so-called will-not-to-will is a form of will at all. It may well be a peculiar attitude to abjure will altogether and turn to knowledge or love. Or it may just be a preparation for knowledge or love, or this knowledge or love itself in an attitudinal form.

Nature that limits freedom is not merely physical, it covers also the obdurate facts and laws of the biological, psychic and social fields. This last field of nature offers an interesting limitation to freedom. Social facts and laws are infinitely more unstable than the physical, biological and psychic, and yet they limit freedom as necessarily as the latter. No man is born in a vacuum, everyone begins life with a social heritage and environment, and his freedom has initially to accept and operate in and through these. Limitation being a necessary constituent of actual freedom, and social heritage and environment being one of the determinants of this limitation, there is no getting rid of it from the beginning. This does not, however, mean that one has to remain committed to a particular social set-up as to physical, biological and psychic limitations. The latter are more or less permanent limitations, but particular social structures do, as a matter of act, change frequently and do not, therefore, permanently limit our actual freedom. Moreover, and that is the more important point, it is this very unstable character of particular social structures that precisely finds room for actual freedom. If social structures were as inflexible as physical, biological and psychic nature there could be no scope at all for actual freedom. Actual freedom, operating primarily according to moral rules that emanate from formal freedom and secondarily according to natural laws and amidst natural events, reorganises nature and builds newer situations. Human creations which though as accomplished are parts of nature are not due entirely to nature, and when these creations are moral they are precisely for social change. These social changes are often indeed secondary situations grafted on an existing over-all social structure, just as is the case with physical changes my will effects, but often again they are more fundamental infecting the over-all set-up itself. Such fundamental changes are possible only because every particular social system is, of its own nature, at least pliable, if not entirely a human creation. Social structures constitute limitation to actual freedom so far only as we have to start with them. We start with them as though with an inherited bank balance.

FREEDOM

Sir. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar.

In the thought-provoking paper by Prof. A. Bryce Gibson, he begins with the discussion as to whether a workable, actual freedom is not different from ideal freedom. Formal freedom, he understands to be a condition of freedom. Real freedom, he defines, as something akin to spiritual selfmastery as a freedom from oneself which consists in sinking one-self in a reality beyond one-self. Individual rights have to be secured by political action, but when such rights are threatened by political action, a new situation arises and that is why many Constitutions have enunciated fundamental rights. Spiritual freedom cannot, of course, be expressed in political terms. As the Professor points out, formal or political freedom, though it may take a second place, cannot be ignored or superseded. Western Constitutions have solved the problem by the distribution of power on the basis of explicit or implicit understanding. Actual freedom is declared to be the free manipulation of existent facts but it has to take account of the Laws of Nature. The conclusion which the Professor arrives at is that the Eastern type of spirituality may need the hard shell of formal freedom in the shape of personal rights.

Two factors enter into all discussions of freedom namely, the nature of responsibility and the significance attached to law either as a source of freedom or as an obstacle to freedom. A man is not responsible or accountable for what is done by another or appertains to another. In other words, a man is free only to the extent that he performs his own action or achieves that which is proper to himself. If a stress or strain develops between one's own self and another, then the law may play a part either alien to the self or when the self is able to make the law somehow its own, namely, the expression of its power. In the first case, the law is an obstruction to freedom; in the second, it is a source of freedom. Whilst political liberty is generally the resultant of positive law, the conception of collective freedom involves what may be called the law of Nature. In truth, a man is free who is able, under favourable circumstances, to act as he wishes for his own individual good as he sees it or through acquired virtue or wisdom to will or live as he ought to conformably to a moral law or ideal befiting human nature or by a power inherent in human nature to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he should do or become.

The above discussion deals with the ideas of freedom as outlined by Western thinkers. In Indian theory, the king or Ruler, whether in a Monarchy or Democracy, was always subject to the cosmic law which is styled either Rita or Dharma by reason of which the Ruler becomes subject to an obligation to protect person and property. Some of the Dharma Sastras go to the extent of making the Ruler criminally

liable for offences and most of the Sastras confer on the subject the right to resist the Ruler in appropriate junctures.

Side by side with the conception of Rita and Dharma, there was developed the idea of custom and convention as being the origin of law even although such customs and conventions may be heterodox and in variance with Vedic or later precepts. One by-product of these theories has been the doctrine adumbrated in Sukraneetisara and in Bhishma's discourses in the Mahabharata that taxes are paid by the subjects as the price of protection. The idea of freedom as indicated in the early Smritis was based on the existence of a Welfare State where the Ruler or the Rulers, as the case may be, had the fundamental duty to secure for people freedom from fear and want. These theories were carried to their logical conclusion. Vasishta and Boudhayana conferred rights on Brahmins and Vysyas to take up arms in defence of social order. The Vishun Smriti and Bhishma in the Mahabharata allowed passive resistance against the bad Ruler and the taking of arms against tyrants. In other words, the conception of freedom in ancient and medieval India involved the doctrine that temporal power was subject to certain over-riding spiritual laws.

CAN PHILOSOPHY ESTABLISH A HIERARCHY OF VALUES OF UNIVERSAL USE

by

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PHILOSOPHERS have always considered as one of their essential tasks the foundation of the right hierarchy of values, that is, the indication of what is the *summum bonum*, the highest Good, and of the ways in which it determines the various ends of life. However, the special character of the question, which I am supposed to answer, seems to be provided by the point that such a hierarchy of values should be 'of universal use', that is, acceptable to everybody whatever their situation.

This involves the problem of finding a philosophical foundation of the hierarchy of values, which would be independent, to the largest possible extent, of the differences distinguishing all existing and possible philosophies. And this seems to imply a contradictory claim, that is, the claim of finding a philosophy not subject to the historical conditions of existence, upon which any other philosophy appears to depend.

Now, I think it is clear that we cannot escape this dilemma just by choosing one of its horns. Suppose we were to say that there is a philosophy which provides the basis for the coexistence of all possible philosophies, and which is independent of any historical change. Such a philosophy might be, for instance, the theory of common and permanent human rights,—including the right of free thinking, and the corresponding duty of toleration,—as established by some western thinkers of the eighteenth century. In fact, this theory provides a basis for a hierarchy of values, which might be considered as being of universal use, in as much as it becomes more and more difficult to find somebody who openly rejects the idea of human rights as expressed or implied, say, in their definition by the United Nations, whatever his philosophy or his religion. But this does not exclude that this theory is also *one* theory, pertaining to a certain period of the historical development of mankind. It is bound, as everything else, to change and develop with history: it cannot pretend to stand immovably above history.

On the other hand, it is also impossible just to surrender, so to say, to history, and to find in its continuous change the only conceivable basis for a hierarchy of values, which might be considered of universal use. In history, indeed, we find every kind of value: hate and love, violence and meekness, the ideals of victory and power and those of kindness and coexistence. History never tells us if we have to fight for Gandhi or against Gandhi, for Hitler or against Hitler. History

can only tell us who, in any single situation, is more likely to win: which is, of course, a very essential piece of information, but does not exclude the responsibility of our choice. We are always choosing *in* history, even when we reconstruct the history of the ideas and the ideals which we approve, and we strengthen ourselves with the recollection of the past struggles and victories of these ideals, and with the hope that they will continue to win.

Each horn of the dilemma sends us back to the other. This uncomfortable situation becomes particularly evident in any attempt to further the acknowledgement of a common hierarchy of human values by simply stressing the one or the other of those opposite aspects of the problem. Take, for instance, the two alternative methods which have been followed by many cultural bodies, concerned with the serious desire to bring men to understand what they have in common as a basis for peaceful coexistence, rather than what they do not see from the same point of view, which may lead them to fight against each other. In some cases this has meant a search for a universal truth, common to everybody or deserving to be accepted by everybody. Now, this has led people to restrict more and more the extent of that truth, in order that it should not become an offence against anyone's freedom of thought: that is, in order that the limitation of that freedom might be the least possible. In other words, those who have followed this method have been confronted with the same problem, which worried the most tolerant theologians of the Reformation, when they tried to find a definition of the essential points of Christian faith, which might be acceptable to everybody. The more they tried to exclude controversial points, the narrower became the domain of their truth. And, at the very end, 'historicism' could smile at them, showing them that even that truth was, after all, nothing but their truth.

But those who follow the opposite path are by no means better off. This is the way which we might call the method of the crystallization of each culture, whatever the value which we ascribe to them. In his famous book *Christ stopped at Eboli*, the Italian writer Carlo Levi gave a picture of the conditions of life in Southern Italy, which strongly contributed to the social and political effort of all those who were anxious to see those conditions bettered. But, trying to show that in that kind of life there were also peculiar human values, which it would have been dangerous to destroy in the souls of those primitive people before they had become familiar with higher standards of civilization, he liked to speak of the *civiltà contadina*, the 'civilization of the peasants', which had lasted immovably for centuries and centuries, untouched by the Greeks and the Romans, unchanged by history . . . . Now, if this is the right approach to every 'civilization', then all 'cultural unities' become, in a sense, untouchable. We should not only refuse to learn, from the way of life in primitive Samoa, something which we possibly need to learn: we should also protect that civilization from any influence from outside. Defence of freedom and individuality becomes, here again, something like indifference. Instead of human

communication, we have an exhibition of folklore. 'East' and 'West', for instance, become cliches, according to which every Easterner should be essentially different from every Westerner, and should preserve that difference as a sacred heritage. Now, we have seen, in our discussions, how little those clichés work. For myself, I have noted again, with pleasure, that to be an Italian does not prevent me from sharing many of the views of Indian friends far more than other views of some of my countrymen; and I think the same is experienced by many people in India too, as it is, very probably, in every other country. Every presupposition of fixed and organic 'cultural unities' becomes indeed a hindrance for the free dialogue of anybody with anybody else, whatever the cultural environment to which each of them belongs.

Now, is there no other way of getting out of the dilemma? We cannot get out only by comparing doctrines, or by searching for what is more common and fundamental in the different theories, or by contemplating them indifferently in their infinite plurality, as they appear and disappear through the history of human thought. But I have just spoken of the free dialogue of men, as of something which goes beyond any cultural border, and which we should further as much as we can, against any tendency to establish cultural borders. May be this 'spirit of dialogue' is precisely what we need in order to have that solid foundation of hierarchy of universal values, which we are searching for.

Let us recall for a moment the greatest western master of this spirit of dialogue, Socrates. In his confession of faith, which he made in front of his judges and which caused him to be condemned to death, he said very clearly (we can read it in Plato's *Apology*) that he could renounce everything, but dialogue. He was not sure of anything else: he was prepared to discuss any other thing, and to accept the opinion of his interlocutor whenever there was a possibility of his being persuaded. But one thing he would never accept: renounciation of discussion. To 'ask and answer questions', to 'give and take reasons': that is, to try to understand others and to make oneself understandable to others: this constant 'duty of dialogue' was the only certainty of Socrates, his only permanent and unshakable rule of conduct, in this life and in any other thinkable world.

Now, is this faith really different from that, which inspires King Aśoka to preach his gospel of toleration? In one of his inscriptions he says to some Buddhist monks: If you wish other sects to respect your religion, respect the religion of other sects even more than your own. The essential point is the same. Religions may be discussed, doctrines may be superseded, truths may be submitted to examination and criticism: but the duty of understanding, of communicating, of admitting discussion is a permanent rule, it is something which goes beyond any subject of discussion, and remains untouched by any result of the discussion.

So the eastern master of toleration and the western champion of dialogue appear to agree as to a rule, which, if accepted, offers the

required basis for a universal hierarchy of values, and therefore for any development of civilization. If I accept, indeed, that everybody else has the same duty, and the same right, to understand and to discuss my point of view, which I have to understand and to discuss his, then this basic parity of rights demands in itself every other kind of equality, that is, every further development of civilization. If I make this fundamental decision, then there is no ideal of human freedom and social justice, which is not brought into play. This is the reason why we are more and more interested in finding the expressions of this spirit of dialogue and mutual understanding running through the most diverse cultures. We feel that that is their moral link, the basic condition of their coexistence and communication. Religions, philosophies, ideologies, theories may always change: the place of this change is history, the right to change is freedom. But the permanent cornerstone of this right, as well as of every other right, is the will to mutual understanding.

It is therefore essential—in the very nature of the situation—not to take for this principle any of the possible theories concerning it. Of course I cannot speak about the duty of dialogue, without speaking. Any discourse upon dialogue is a *logos* on *dialogos*, if I am allowed to recall the Greek antithesis of those terms. But the spirit of *dialogos* goes beyond any *logos* including all *logoi* concerning the *dialogos* itself. I don't imagine, for instance, that the book *Logo e dialogo*, in which I have tried to explain this state of affairs, can claim a special immunity from discussion. Of course it may be discussed, like any other book; and I can never be sure that I shall not be persuaded to correct or to rewrite or to discard it completely. But this has nothing to do with the fact that, so long I am willing to accept discussion, nothing else in the world can condition this will.

In other words: I always need others, in order to know what they think; but I only need myself, in order to decide that I have to know what they think. No opinion of others can, indeed, persuade me not to understand them: the request, not to be understood, is the most absurd request in the world, because the man, who asks not to be understood, is really asking for this request to be understood. And this situation applies not only to the relation with men, but also to the relation with any other kind of possible interlocutors in dialogue: angels or animals; devils or gods. Here is the reason why no god can tell me what is my moral duty, if I have not previously chosen, as my moral duty, the duty of listening to him, as to anybody else. The secular 'will of dialogue' is therefore, in this sense, the most absolute amongst the 'absolutes': any other possible religion rests upon this basic act of faith.

The enactment of this act is, of course, my responsibility: nobody else can do it for me. But this is the well known situation of moral responsibility. Before choosing according to a rule, I must choose that rule. And I am alone in front of this task: absolutely alone. But I know the terms of the choice. I know what they are; I know

that they cannot be different; I know that I cannot avoid choosing. I must always choose between good and bad, between altruism and egoism, between understanding and not understanding others. But so long as I could believe that goodness and altruism and values might be something different from the duty of understanding others, I could also hope to get, from the understanding of theirs, some truth, some philosophy, which might tell me what is the good, what is the rule which I have to follow. Now I know that no *logos* can produce my will of dialogue, if this is not already there. I am free from the old idea that the value of freedom is based upon the truth of knowledge, and I see why the development of civilization does not need to fear freedom of thought. Beyond the dilemma caused by the assumption that any hierarchy of values should be fonded upon a doctrine, I see now what is the real basis of any hierarchy of this kind.

The will of dialogue, the spirit of tolerant but warm interest in others, the liberal open-mindedness in which understanding is not scepticism and faith is not fanaticism, has been sometimes expressed in the formula: I will fight to the death against your views: but I will fight to the death for your right to express them. This is a fine formula: but the point, which I have tried to make here, may help us to see why it is also partly wrong. In fact, I can say that I will fight to the death for the freedom of discussion. But I cannot say the same concerning the views, which I shall defend in the discussion: because this would amount to a dogmatic certainty, that those views will never be changed by the discussion. Here we see, very clearly, the basic difference between the two kinds of certainty. The one is the certainty of dogmatism, the other is the certainty of openmindedness. We can have the second, without falling into the first, only if we understand the difference between *logos* and *dialogos*. But when we have understood this difference, we can also say that this philosophical reflection has shown us the way to found a hierarchy of values of universal use. Then, whether or not we precede along that way, is up to us.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY ENTRETIENS AT MYSORE

August 28 to September 1, 1959

August 28
9.45 to 11.15 *Section I:* First Meeting

SCIENCE AND WISDOM

President: M. JULIAN MARIAS (Spain)
Speaker: J. N. CHUBB (India)

Discussion

Ewing, A. C. (U.K.): I suggest that the lack of agreed logical cogency in philosophical thought may be due not to an inherent difference between its judgments and those of other branches of study but to the human difficulty of being clear as to its concepts so that in regard to the very difficult questions of this subject even great philosophers are in the same position as the school boy who is not clear enough about arithmetic to be able to be certain that he is right in saying $8 \times 9 = 72$. I want to raise the question by what criteria we can decide which of the two alternative explanations is the right one.

Prasad, Rajendra (India): I want to make a few comments on two of the main theses of Dr Chubb. In his paper at one place (p. 6) he maintains that philosophical conclusions 'do not follow from the process of reasoning but are implicitly contained in a starting point which is anterior to discursive thought'. Now, if the conclusions are implicitly contained in the starting point, they will follow from that starting point, whatever may be the nature of the starting point, and if they follow, then it can be demonstratively shown by a process of reasoning that they do. If P is implicitly contained in Q, then P will follow from Q. This is what we mean by the expressions 'implicitly contained in' and 'follows from'. Therefore, there is either inconsistency in Dr Chubb's thought, or he is using these expressions in some non-ordinary sense. In the latter case he should tell us what is that non-ordinary sense.

At another place (p. 7) Dr Chubb maintains that 'philosophy is the expression of the demand to think categorically, i.e., to think without assumptions', and, then, in the very next sentence, says that the demand 'presupposes a criterion or nation of intelligibility'. Here again I find him inconsistent. If philosophy has no assumptions, it cannot presuppose anything, and if it presupposes anything, even a notion of intelligibility, it is not without any assumption. Therefore, it is inconsistent for Dr Chubb to say that philosophy is without

assumptions when he is prepared to accept that it presupposes a notion of intelligibility.

Damle, P. R. (India): Dr Chubb, in his paper, has stated that unlike science the starting point of philosophy is a-logical and in philosophy reason never proves anything but only explicates the position initially taken. I ask him whether the same cannot also be said of science. Science also starts with the facts of sense-experience and ultimately offers laws which suit that experience.

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): I would like to make a remark pertaining to the saying of Dr Chubb that 'the act of faith which develops into a metaphysical system can be shown to be reasonable, but it is not grounded in reason'.

I completely agree with Dr Chubb that there is no demonstrative proof in metaphysics, but I do not think that reason is only expressed in demonstration. The reasonableness of the act of faith has also some relation to reason. What could that be? I suggest that an act is reasonable if it can be justified by reasons accepted by the people to whom I give the justification. A philosopher tries to justify himself for every rational being, at least ideally, and his reasons have to be addressed to such beings and accepted by them.

We cannot say then that philosophy is without presuppositions. If it wants to be reasonable, it has to be connected to the reasons that justify it and accepted by reasonable beings.

If philosophy has to be based on 'the self-revelation of divinity', why is it that 'the ultimate reality expresses itself in a manner that is historically common to the members of the same cultural tradition?' Could we not explain it by saying that what we call self-revelation, is nothing else than the manifestation of the cultural tradition in which we were educated?

Krishna, Daya (India): I should like to ask Prof. Chubb the following questions:

(1) Is Wisdom necessarily related to religion or the seeking for some transcendent reality such as God? Is it not possible to dissociate it from religion and conceive of it as a way of life?

(2) If 'appearance' is intrinsically and integrally related to 'reality', then, science which is concerned with the world of appearance should also be an integral and necessary part of religion.

(3) If the world of sense-experience can be understood only in terms of something other than sense-experience, does it necessarily follow that this something other must be God or some such spiritual Reality? Why is not Prof. Chubb satisfied with the theoratic constructs of science in terms of which sense-experience is sought to be understood?

11.45 to 13.15 *Section I:* Second Meeting

OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

President: S. V. RAMAMURTHY (India)
Speaker: VON RINTELEN (West Germany)

Discussion

Krishna, Daya (India): Objectivity in a field of study is a function of the subject matter it studies, the methods it employs, and the criteria of validity it uses. If there is a fair amount of agreement on these, the study can be said to be objective. I suggest that Philosophy has and has always had such an agreement in a large measure. Right from Zeno onwards, the philosophers have always spotted when another is doing philosophy, have always tried to show the weakness in the other's argument and have tried to build comprehensive systems which are consistent in character. There may be a range of varieties, but beyond a certain point everyone knows whether a problem is philosophical or not, or if the objection urged is relevent or otherwise.

Prasad, Rajendra (India): Almost all of the previous speakers have accepted as unquestionable, may be unknowingly, the age-old assumption that philosophy is a study of facts. If philosophy, like science, is a factual discipline, then certainly it would be worth while to enquire whether it possesses objectivity, and if it does, then, whether its objectivity is different from or the same as the scientific one. I do not wish either to suggest or deny that there is objectivity in philosophy, but only to emphasise that if we reject the above-mentioned assumption, the question whether there is or there is not any objectivity in philosophy will have to be dealt with in a way much different from that adopted by the previous speakers. It may also happen that then the question turns out to be a pseudo-question.

Sen, Indra (India): What is objectivity? Does it not contrast with ego-centricity? The child, to begin with, is all government by its wishfulness. Slowly this becomes less, and *pari passu* the objectivity of the physical things and of the inter-subjective reality begins to take shape. And at the adult level ego-centricity is still there; this is a play in the form of the personal predilections of the philosopher. Is not the progressive reduction of such 'predilections' a way to achieve objectivity in increasing degrees? The concept of the *Bewusstsein uberhampt* (consciousness as such). It is the consciousness free from the particularities of the individual predilections or ego-centricities, which is enlightening.

Obviously the objectivity of the philosopher is of different order from that of the empirical scientist.

The inter-subjective reality of social life is again a category by itself; while the objectivity of spiritual experience is altogether of a different class. It must be extremely interesting to find the mutual relationships among these different orders of objectivity.

Javadekar, A. G. (India): In science objectivity is achieved by means of abstraction of the object under investigation from other objects as well as abstraction of the knowing person from the object. It is a process of *de-personalization* of individual eccentricities, etc.

In philosophy, on the other hand, objectivity is arrived at by integration, perfection, or idealization, of personality. This is essentially a procedure of *sādhana.* The all-comprehensive character or philosophical investigation necessitates such a Yogic method.

The difference between the approach of Science and that of philosophy is thus fundamental.

18.00 to 19.30 *Section I:* Third Meeting

SCIENCE AND REALITY

President: ABRAHAM WAISMAN (Argentina)
Speaker: ANDRE MERCIER (Switzerland)

Discussion

Barzin, M. (Belgium): I agree with every part of the argument but not with the conclusion arrived at by Prof. Mercier. I am not sure that the revolution effected by the 19th century science is so great as he suggests it to be and I think that science still is very much like what Kant thought it to be.

Van Melsen, A. G. M. (Holland): There is one great difference between classical and modern physics. In the days of Kant physics was regarded to be a purely theoretical discipline, whereas today it has become eminently practical.

Marias, J. (Spain): I think Prof. Mercier is wrong in isolating absolutely what he calls 'brute reality'. We never find any such reality, a reality without any relation to mental operations and interpretations. I would also like to know whether he would include the self in his 'brute reality'.

Sen, Indra (India): According to Prof. Mercier there are three orders of reality: (1) brute reality, (2) scientific reality and (3) other levels of reality. Science is restricted to the contemporary world and life. The reality studied by science is not the whole of reality. The important question is: what is reality, reality in its wholeness?

Kalibansky, R. (Canada): I would like to raise a few questions: (1) Is the object of history not really temporal? (2) In what sense scientific reality is to be understood as active? (3) Was the term 'reality' introduced by Abelard for the first time?

August 30
9.45 to 11.30

SYNTHESIS OF SECTION I

(Round Table)

President: MARCEL BARZIN (Belgium)

Barzin, M. (Belgium): I want to summarize the main conclusions of Prof. Chubb and Prof. Mercier. According to Chubb there exists a great difference between science and philosophy. Philosophy cannot demonstrate its conclusions whereas science can; there is agreement in science but not in philosophy. The convictions of philosophy are not completely communicable. The questions raised by philosophy are much more important than those raised by science, even though the affirmations of philosophy produce more complications. Mercier, on the other hand, has maintained that the place of reality in science and in philosophy is the same. The reality of science approximates the reality of philosophy. Thus there would be an equation of the dignities of philosophy and science which I cannot accept, for philosophy seeks values which it is not the task of science to look for at all. Science has no other job than the description of Nature.

Mercier, A. (Switzerland): It is not true that science has no values to look for. Truth is a value as great as beauty or goodness. If it is evident that truth differs from other values, e.g., aesthetic and moral ones, still truth must be given the status of a value as is done in the case of beauty or goodness. Thus we get three forms of knowledge, i.e., science, art and morals. The three do not form a hierarchy but run parallel to one another, and they constitute a whole which is at least a major part of the subject-matter of philosophy. Therefore, if Mr Brazin is in a sense right in saying that I put science and philosophy on the same plane, he is not absolutely right. I also want to insist upon the creativeness of science. Mr Brazin defines science as a mere description, or let us say '*compte-rendu*' of natural happenings. This is a much too narrow conception. Science brings forth truth in a way similar to that which is characteristic of art with its own value of beauty, even if there remains the difference that science is objective and art is subjective. This makes extremes emerge out of these two activities. But, as we say in French, 'less extremes se touchent'.

The concept of reality in science has, in the last decade, changed a great deal, and the change has made it much closer to that of philosophy. It would be a catastrophe if the notion of reality in philosophy is not usable in science. Philosophical and scientific topics are on the same level.

Rintelen, Van (W. Germany): It is my wish to say a few words about idealistic phenomenology and about Professor Landgrebe who is not able to agree to our having correctly understood his philosophy. Mr Chairman, Prof. Barzin; it was you, I believe, who stated that in phenomenology we are dealing also with the difference between subject and object. That is true. This object, however, remains an inner intentional object, the ultimate aim of which is the bridging of the subject-object bifurcation; a conception common to the Romantics and to German Idealism (Schelling). Considered as a science, philosophy displays quite a different aspect of reality from that of the natural sciences; the aspect of object apriori quality, not quantitative determination. And this is active, creative construction, an objective derivation from consciousness as such. But is then a philosophy of natural sciences possible? Yes, possible in its dealings with the problems of sense and meaning, of Bedeutungscharakter (the character of meaning), but not in a handling of laws and facts. We see, as a result of this, then, modern Existentialism differentiating (Jaspers) between scientific orientation in the world (wissenschaftliche Weltorientierung) and philosophical problems.

You further remarked, Mr Chairman, that philosophy is left, therefore, whith the problem of values for its occupation, an opinion, however, which is by no means shared by either Phenomenology or Existentialism. Husserl, indeed, wrote the elucidation of a value theory —which is no longer published, however, Heidegger denies the value problem as philosophical momentum—it being too subjective! He attempts to postulate a 'Fundamentalontologie'—Fundamental Ontology.

I would say that Professor Landgrebe demands a different experience of being from that of the natural sciences. In philosophy we have our formal apriori experiences, and their objectivity is an objectivity of consciousness itself.

Barzin, M. (Belgium): Professor Chubb distinguished between values and things. This distinction is very helpful in differentiating the philosophic from the scientific activity. There are two important activities of the human mind. One of these two activities consists in describing the world objectivily, in presenting a true picture of things without involving any appreciation or evaluation. The scientific activity is of this type. A scientist describes what is a rattlesnake, he describes its teeth, venom, etc., but does not say that it should be killed. The other human activity consists in the appreciation of values. Values appear when there is a conscious approval or disapproval of certain parts of reality. The appreciation of values is a prefiguration of action, action in a wide sense of the term, as a contemplative creature is also active. Philosophy is concerned with values. East and West seem to differ on this point, but the difference is more apparent than real. Value is real in the sense that it is a moment of our life, shapes our destiny, and determines our attitudes. It is an element of our

consciousness and not of things. Value-judgments are expressions of aspiration, the will to live, and we give through them a deep meaning to our life. We should not ask for the same sort of reality for spirit and values as we do for things, otherwise the importance of spirit and values would be diminished.

Chaudhary, P. J. (India): Direct and conclusive verifiability is unknown in science. Scientific hypotheses are abstract. Scientific objectivity is very indirect, it has only corroborative validity. Objective entities in science are entities we shall agree upon if we follow a particular method of investigation and use a certain kind of logic and language. A good theory is simple, comprehensive, etc., and these are aesthetic criteria. Distance from the objective data leads us to suspect the value of scientific knowledge. Only by constructing freely we can know the world. In philosophy we cannot have even this kind of objectivity. Science also is valuational. There is objectivity in science because of certain conventions we have agreed to follow. There are no agreed conventions in philosophy. Reality in philosophy is that which is to be realised; philosophy is an expression of freedom, vision, etc., as it aims at having a vision of ultimate reality, of what the philosopher thinks and feels to be ultimate. To demand objectivity is to deny the dignity of philosophy.

Mercier, A. (Switzerland): Scientists do not see any difference between looking for truth and positing values. The scientific search for truth is also a kind of valuation and not a mere description. There are three kinds of values: rational (Truth-Untruth), aesthetic (Beauty-Ugliness) and moral (Good-Evil). The scientist, in his search for or description of truth, is also inspired by aesthetic, or even moral, considerations. Hence it is not correct to maintain a water-tight distinction between description and evaluation. As philosophy is also concerned with the three kinds of values, the philosophic and the scientific attempts are not very different.

Barzin, M. (Belgium): The scientific attitude towards the world is a attitude of objective description, and not one of evaluation. In making an evaluation we either cherish a thing or do the otherwise. To be sure whether there is an orange on the table we have to *see* whether it is there and recognize what is there to be an orange. Even if we agree that there is one on the table, we may have opposed attitudes towards it. I may like it and you may not. We shall be making, then, different valuations. Valuing is an action, but seeing or recognizing is not.

Van Melson, A. G. M. (Holland): Speaking of the developments science has made in recent times and of their impact on the theory of knowledge, it is important to point not only to the theoretical developments of science but also to the fact that science has increasingly become more experimental and more intimately connected with technical application. Modern technics cannot be thought of without

science, but at the same time science cannot exist without experimental technics. Modern physics can be rightly phrased as 'thinking with the hands'.

The science of Newton still had a strong theoretical prependerance. For that reason the epistemology of Kant is greatly dominated by this theoretical aspect of physical knowledge. Modern physics, that is, a physics in which rational thought, sense-experience and technical skill are strongly united, need, therefore, to be evaluated in a wider scope than that outlined by Kant. In physics the difference between theoretical and practical reason has to a certain extent been overcome.

Barzin, M. (Belgium): But when you make an experiment you do not wish to obtain certain results; if you do, you are a biased scientist.

Hallie, P. (U.S.A.): There are different aspects of science. In its creative aspect it is very much closer to the creative work of an artist. A scientific discovery is like a vision. Einstein emphasized this point when he paid that there was similarity between philosophy, science and religion.

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): The scientific problem is to ascertain whether what appears to be real is in fact real. There is agreement in science with regard to the criteria of reality, but there is no such agreement in philosophy. The search for the criteria is easier in science than in philosophy because scientific evaluations are much more restrictive and less complex than philosophic evaluations.

Barzin, M. (Belgium): Science is creative but in that respect it is not a search for truth. A scientist in building a science makes evaluations, but science does not consist of evaluations. Any science is the totality of results established by it.

Krishna, Daya (India): Creative operation in science is certainly creative, but what comes after is not creative.

Mazumdar, A. K. (India): Dr Chaudhury says that objectivity is attainable in Science but not in philosophy. His definition of philosophy is too restrictive when he defines it as a study of reality which is to be realized. If philosophy starts with a conviction and then offers arguments, no objectivity can be achieved, but in that case there will be sharability and communicability in philosophy. Further, if there is personal equation in both philosophy and science, then why should philosophy be different from science? There is selectivity in science but that does not make it valuational. Objectivity in science is different from that in philosophy, but we cannot say that there is no objectivity in philosophy.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): Both in science and philosophy there is an effort to get out of a purely personal and subjective point of view to something objective. In science it is easier than in philosophy to make the transition because there is an agreed set of postulates and conventions which we do not have in philosophy. But the struggle is

all the same in philosophy. Valuational facts occur in science, but they are restricted to the conventions within which scientists work; in philosophy they are not so restricted.

Sen, Indra (India): Philosophy too has objectivity but that is very hard to attain. We obtain physical objectivity by the elimination of the child's wishfulfilment. By extending the attempt further we gain objectivity in the realm of ideas. Wisdom is the integral guidance of life. It has many levels and every level has a norm. Science is a theoretic attempt; it has a place in wisdom and under wisdom. Philosophy is also theoretic but concerned with life and world in their entirety. It is nearer to wisdom than is science. There is complete amity between science, philosophy and religion. There is a need for re-orientation. Science is concerned with the physical part of reality and philosophy with the whole of it, even with God. Science is a study only of the manifest workings of God. If we view them in this way, we shall be able to effect a synthesis of philosophy and science.

Siddiqui, Z. A. (India): I believe that the confusion in this discussion arises because of ambiguous use of 'objectivity'.

When we say science is objective we mean that it deals with objects as we know them or as we perceive them. It does not and cannot venture any assertion regarding the ultimate nature of objects.

The other sense of objectivity is one upheld by Realism. It implies a metaphysical assertion that the object perceived is exactly like and corresponds to the object existing. It is in this sense that the realist claims objectivity for science and denies it in case of philosophy. But it remains a metaphysical hypothesis and can never be proved. We can never know the ultimate nature of objects of justify our belief in the correspondence of our knowledge with them.

There is, however, a sense in which we may claim objectivity for philosophy. We may say that an objective fact is one which is not my exclusive possession or my arbitrary way of looking at things. Take the value judgments, for instance. We cannot point out anything in the external world corresponding to them but we can show that other human beings also recognise these judgments and this is what is meant by their objectivity. So philosophy is objective in this sense and it is not much different from the objectivity of science as both depend on verification and corroboration by others.

Rintelen, Van (W. Germany): A philosophy of nature is possible. There are two aspects of reality—the aspect of being and the aspect of value. Philosophy is concerned with both.

Wadia, A. R. (India): The desire to synthesise the work of science and philosophy is natural. But it is not possible to ignore the fundamental difference between science and philosophy. Science perforce as a matter of convenience deals with isolated parts and hence it is abstract. On the other hand, philosophy deals with the whole and therefore it is essentially more concrete than science. Both indeed

deal with reality, but at different levels. From the standpoint of methodology science is perfectly justified in breaking up a whole and studying each part by itself, and the results that it produces are certainly fruitful, as evidenced by the whole history of science. Science is correct within its limits, and it becomes wrong only when it becomes fanatical and prefers the part to the whole, and thereby gives rise to a distorted view of reality. It is only when things are studied as a whole that we can view them in their proper perspective and that is essentially the task of philosophy. Therefore, whatever may be the importance of the contribution of science, it will have to be supplemented by philosophy with its vision of the whole and its determined effort to understand reality as a whole.

Shah, K. J. (India): Scientific intuition is different from the philosophic or artistic one. Even the scientific objectivity is different the philosophic one. Wisdom is a way of doing science and also philosophy.

Chubb, J. N. (India): The hall-mark of a philosopher is the full reflective awareness of what he is doing. From the philosophic standpoint we may deny that there is any relationship between philosophy and science. We do not arrive at our philosophic standpoint by a process of reasoning. There are different starting-points, and each has a logic of it own. This logic may be coherent from the point of view concerned and not from any other point of view. Hence there are bound to be alternative logics. There cannot be any uniformity of opinion as to what philosophy should be. The differences must not, however, be arbitrary. Philosophy is the expression of the urge in man to transcend his finitude. From this point of view the demarcation between science and philosophy is clear. The spiritual cannot be explained in purely logical terms. Philosophy does not prove anything and hence it is not right to say that its conclusions are uncertain. Its end is not knowledge but an aspiration for knowledge.

August 30
11.45 to 13.15 *Section II:* First Meeting

LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY

President: Chaim Perelman (Belgium)

Speaker: N. A. Nikam (India)

Discussion

Ramamurthy, S. V. (India): Man is free because he has an immanent spirit in him. Spirit, as the Vedanta says, is smaller than the smallest and greater than the greatest. Freedom of individual is related to community as immanent spirit to transcendent spirit.

Wadia, A. R. (India): In western culture the city state of the ancient Greeks was the first expression of human community. It gave rise to the state regarded as the highest body. It was not so in India; it is so now in India as a result of the influence of western political ideology. According to the Indian conception real freedom consists in self-realization, in full consciousness of the ultimate reality. The concept of Mukti expresses it well. It consists in spiritual, and not physical, power. The political philosophy of Gandhi is really Indian; not so is the one we are following at present. Today we have a growing tyranny of the state which is un-Indian.

Marias, J. (Spain): Liberalism came in Europe after the downfall of the 18th century rationalism as a result of the realization that everything could not be explored by reason. Freedom is not thinkable without a programme to be realised in society. Society is both a system of pressure as well as that of resources. A liberal is one who is not sure of what he can be.

Potter, K. H. (U.S.A.): If 'freedom from' (social institutions) is a necessary condition for 'freedom to' (spiritual freedom), then the problem is to distinguish those institutions which are necessary from those which are not. The Indian contribution is towards an *attitude* which anaesthetizes the *binding* aspect of social institutions and frees us for spiritual freedom.

Javadekar, A. G. (India): There is the concept of the withering away of the State which is originally Indian and not, as is presumed, a gift of the Western Communist political philosophy. Mahatma Gandhi also upheld the same idea of a state without a State.

The most comprehensive concept in the western political philosophy is that of the State. But in Indian philosophy more comprehensive still is the concept of Dharma. To this concept both the individual and the state are subordinated.

Again, while the concept of right has a priority in the Western political consciousness, in India the concept of duty or obligation has received priority. It is the spontaneous flow of righteousness which is more fundamental than the assertion of rights.

The prevalence of Dharma is the prevalence of spontaneous righteousness which makes the idea of external compulsion superfluous. Anarchy is thus the rule of Dharma, and as spontaneously flowing from the individual it is really the ideal autonomous state of the society of enlightened individuals. It transcends the duality of the ruler and the ruled and expresses itself in self-rule.

Sen, Indra (India): The opposition between liberty and community is resolvable. Man needs others for himself, and hence there is community. He seeks society and if he seeks acquisitively no compromise is possible. On the level of instinct acquisitiveness is certainly dominant. On the level of reason universality is spontaneous. It is on the level of universality that morality comes to be appreciated, and the conflict between the liberty of the individual and the demands of the community is eliminated. But we do not always live on the level of reason. On the level of reason there is respect for rules and principles. We have to make progress towards a co-operative society and even beyond that. There are three dimensions of an individual's life: individual, social and transcendental.

Calogero, G. (Italy): If I am interested in my freedom I am an egoist, and then there can be no compromise between the individual's liberty and community. But if I am interested in the freedom of others, there would be no opposition between socialistic and liberal positions.

Shah, K. J. (Indian): If we want to have liberty in a community we should have a clear picture of what a community is. The formation of a community always involves some sort of ideals. These ideals should be stated in practical terms. We should have liberty to live and make sacrifices for others. Ideals should be dynamic and not static. Difference should be resolved by the use of arguments.

LIBERTY FORMAL AND LIBERTY REAL

President: C. P. RAMASWAMY AIYER (India)

Speaker: A. BOYCE GIBSON (Australia)

Discussion

Hallie, P. (U.S.A.): The notion of conscience is very crucial in Rosseau and in Mill. Conscience symbolises real freedom.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): It may be true of Rosseau. But he called in the state because he could not see any other way to protect the individual.

Wadia, A. R. (India): I greatly appreciate the paper of Professor Boyce Gibson. He has dealt with the subject of liberty according to western tradition. I should like to bring out the contrast between the conception of liberty in the West and the conception of liberty in the East, particularly India. In the western tradition the State has played an extremely important part. It has been taken to be the highest form of society and ever since the days of the ancient Greeks, the life of man has been conceived only in terms of the State. As Plato taught, a perfect man can be found only in a perfect society. Except during the centuries when Christian theology dominated European thought and tried to subordinate the State to the Church, the European tradition of liberty has consistently taken the form of political liberty and this liberty of the individual has been identified with the democratic conception of the State where an individual is both a subject and a ruler. This conception of liberty has now come to be accepted all over the world even by the nascent democracies of Asia and Africa. But it is worth noting that in the original tradition of these countries the State has played a comparatively minor part. In India social organisation was rooted in the twin institutions of caste and joint-family. The primary loyality of a Hindu was to these institutions. The State existed only in a secondary way to safeguard the continuance of the caste, the joint family and other accepted ideas and customs of the people. The authority of the State was not omnipotent as in the West, but was definitely limited by the idea of Dharma so that if a King failed to maintain the Dharma of the people, the people had the right of changing the King. This did happen though on rare occasions, and even the powerful States that came into existence under the Muslims and the British were limited by the consciousness of the rulers that the religion of the people should not be disturbed and when a ruler like Aurangazeb forgot this limitation, the widespread revolt of the Marathas in the South and the Sikhs in the

North led to the ultimate downfall of the mighty Moghul Empire. The British were much more circumspect. But when the idea got about rightly or wrongly that they were trying to tamper with the religious customs of the people, there was a widespread revolt which has come to be described by the British as the Indian Mutiny and by the Indians as the first struggle for freedom from the British yoke. Thus the concept of political liberty of Europe and America was conspicuously absent in the East. But there was a concept of freedom as represented by the concept of Moksha or Mukthi which implied freedom from the cycle of births and deaths. In other words, the concept of liberty far from becoming political took up a metaphysical attitude. Mathew Arnold was not wrong when he wrote in his Obermann Once More:

> 'The East bow'd low before the blast,
> In patient deep disdain,
> She let the legions thunder past
> And plunged in thought again'.

There is a legendary story of the mighty Alexander standing abashed before the Indian Yogi who looked upon Alexander's conquest with disdain as being of no consequence. That represents the typical attitude of the Indians.

Today for good or for evil the East has fallen so completely under the sway of the West that along with its science and philosophy, we have also accepted the importance of the State, and the State has become a great leviathan with tremendous unlimited power, and the individual has to console himself with the thought that it represents himself.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): I am very much in agreement with Prof. Wadia. The rule of the constitution and a certain notion of equality are the hallmarks of a state government.

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): Because the rights of the community are forgotten the majority imposes its laws. There is a return to natural law in Western culture. The problem is to find out the relation between a natural and a positive law.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): My position is half-way between natural and positive laws. But it can be stated even without referring to natural laws.

Banerjee, N. V. (India): You have distinguished between formal and real freedom and said that formal freedom has no content, but the examples you have given show that it has some content. Wherefrom does this content come? Do you mean the same thing by 'freedom from oneself' and 'freedom to oneself' (in defining real freedom)? What room is there for moral efforts if the individual sinks in reality or non-reality?

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): Professor Banerjee has raised some very important points. Real and formal freedom have no content. Making decisions is no content. I use 'freedom to oneself' and 'freedom from

oneself' in the same sense. To sink in non-reality does not mean to be non-existent.

Purushotham, T. A. (India): Freedom of every organism consists in its relating itself to its situation. Man's real freedom is realised when he makes himself a centre for the expressions of spirit, the ultimate reality.

Sen, Indra (India): Formal and real freedom are not opposed to each other but different stages in the same process if freedom is correctly defined, keeping in view its relationship to development. Development has always an end or purpose. Freedom to grow in one's own way is this end. In such a scheme of things rights and duties are seen in a new light. Freedom gets some positive content. Freedom is definable only with reference to a norm.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): However self-sacrificing people are, they have to abide by some common understanding that they will not come into conflict with one another. Hence formal conditions will be always necessary.

Nikam, N. A. (India): What is freedom? Does freedom mean choice in an 'either—or', and only the choice in an 'either—or'? If so, then, it seems man is 'condemned' to be free, for he is not happy with his choice in the 'either—or'; otherwise, why should existentialist philosophers say, man is 'condemned' to be free? Freedom of this kind is a fatality. If this is not 'real freedom', then, real freedom ought to mean the rejection of even the 'either—or'. The rejection is, also, a 'choice'.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): This is a different conception of freedom, I am afraid.

Marias, J. (Spain): One has to choose as long as one is alive, but this does not mean that everything is to be chosen. In one's choices one may be faithful or not to his calling.

Jessop, T. E. (U. K.): It has been said that real freedom consists in self-mastery, in spiritual freedom. What does it mean? It is difficult to understand. Self-mastery is meaningful only in relation to other members of the community. Formal and real freedom mean the same thing.

Gibson, A. B. (Australia): To master oneself for oneself is not to be a moral agent. The morals sense is there only in a social situation. I want to contrast particular duties with general duties.

Sen, Indra (India): There is no difficulty in understanding the notion of self-mastery. One is the master of oneself as well as the servant of oneself, as human nature consists of heterogenous elements.

Potter, K. H. (U.S.A.): Does Prof. Gibson have any reasons for thinking that 'the willingness of the less enlightened to acknowledge in the few a superior discernment' is a necessary condition for the Eastern type of spirituality?

August 31, 1959
9.45 to 11.30 *Section II:* Third Meeting

YOGA AS EXPERIENCE OF (INDIVIDUAL) FREEDOM

President: A. C. EWING (U.K.)
Speaker: INDRA SEN (India)

Discussion

Potter, K. H. (U.S.A.): It seems to me that there is a paradox in Yoga. How can the same method which is used to gain individual liberty be used to gain 'universal' (social) liberty, if social institutions are the necessary conditions of freedom?

Sen, Indra (India): The individual liberty is conducive to universal liberty. The social institutions may have to transformed.

Kalibansky, R. (Canada): Dr Sen has said that Yoga is both a way to freedom and also an end, and that it involves a transcendance of emotions and reason. I have two questions to ask in this connection: (1) What would then be the nature and criterion of knowledge? (2) Does not one loose oneself in the higher reality when one attains freedom? How can then the two remain separate?

Sen, Indra (India): The central thing in Yoga is the union of the self with the Real. The self overcomes its (finite) individuality and becomes one with the Real. If the self is lost, it is lost for the discovery of 'what I am'. Knowledge does not really mean annihilation of emotions; Yoga is not always ascetic. Emotions impose limitations on our capacity for joy. The aim of Yoga is to eliminate these limitations.

Singh, Karan (Jammu and Kashmir, India): It has been said that there is an evolution of the Yogic process. Evolution may be cyclic and not necessarily linear. How can then there be a guarantee for progress?

Sen, Indra (India): If the ideal is conceived as something towards which we can move in steps, progress becomes easier. Evolution and progress are not irreconcilable with each other.

Shah, K. J. (India): Yoga is a means to a way of living. The end is a way of life. There may be other means also. Yoga may be used for good or evil just as any means can be so used. There is no absoluteness about Yoga. We should not overemphasize the means and forget the end.

Sen, Indra (India): Yoga as a technique or means is not the only way to truth and reality. There are even various Yogic systems, e.g.,

in the Upanisads, Vedanta, etc. There also can be Yogic aberrations in which Yoga is misused.

Damle, P. R. (India): Dr Sen has maintained that (*i*) self-knowledge is our best achievement in knowledge, (*ii*) freedom is essentially a matter of experience, and (*iii*) in the final stage Yoga enables one to transform the ignorant resistant material of body, etc., into instruments of spirituality.

I ask him: (*i*) Does not significant self-knowledge imply knowledge of objects and otherselves? (*ii*) Can one, on his definition of freedom, satisfactority distinguish between illusory and real freedom? (*iii*) Is it not true that to say that the material is capable of being transformed implies that it is potentially spiritual?

Sen, Indra (India): Freedom can be genuine as well as spurious, but its content is always experience. Self can be known only by looking within.

Berger, G. (France): Knowledge implies the duality of the knower and the known. How can there be knowledge in the absence of this duality?

Sen, Indra (India): Knowledge is the plenitude of awareness, the intensity of awareness in its final moment. When we transcend duality, we gain the real plenitude; unity comprehends all multiplicity.

Miesegaes, S. (Holland): What are the philosophical implications and foundations of this Yoga?

Sen, Indra (India): Different Yogic disciplines have different philosophical implications and foundations. In some the reality of the Absolute or Brahman is assumed.

Prasad, Rajendra (India): Dr Sen, in his speech, has used expressions like 'we become more and more real', 'we become more and more true', etc. He has, therefore, by implication, accepted that reality and truth both admit of degrees, that something which is not true (or is less true) can become true (or more true) and also that truth can be meaningfully predicated of human beings, human life, etc. I see no objection against saying that something which is not real now can become real at some other time, but I do not understand what it would mean to say that X is more (or less) real than Y or X can in future become more real than what it is at present. Either X is real or not real; there is no other possibility. It seems to me that Dr Sen is making the unjustifiable assumption that reality is identical with value. Values do admit of degrees, but reality does not. Reality is not a value-predicate nor it is a logical predicate. Like reality truth also does not admit of degrees. A proposition is either true or false; it cannot be more true or less true. Probability does admit of degrees and the reasons advanced to show the truth of a proposition may be more or less conclusive. When truth is said to admit of degrees it is usually the case that it is confused with probability or its meaning is confused

with its criteria. If a proposition p is false, it is false; it cannot become true at any time. It may happen that p which is false at time t *seems to become* true at time t_2. In such cases if we carefully analyse the propositions involved and make proper allowances for personal and temporal factors in rephrasing the sentences expressing them, we shall find that the proposition which is true at t_2 is not p but some other proposition. Further, truth, when predicated of persons, does not have the same meaning which it has when predicated of propositions, statements, views, theories, etc. 'Mysore is a small city' is true when Mysore is a small city. The word 'true' does not have this meaning when it figures in expressions like 'a true man', 'a true life', etc. In the latter cases 'true' means 'good', 'desirable', etc. Dr Sen does not seem to be conscious of these complications inherent in the various uses of the word 'true'.

Sen, Indra (India): Yoga is essentially a spiritual discipline. In spiritual experience there is an awareness of the degrees of reality and truth.

Perelmen, Ch. (Belgium): I do not agree. What you are saying amounts to this; when we become divine, all problems are solved. But, how to solve our problems when we are men?

Sen, Indra (India): Truth is a means for attaining more and more freedom. The final consumation is had only in spiritual experience.

11.45 to 13.15

SYNTHESIS OF SECTION II

(Round Table)

President: HUMAYUN KABIR (India)

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): In the history of western philosophy we find two mutually opposed traditions. The approach of the classical tradition, to which Plato, Aristotle, and some others belong, is not very much different from Dr Sen's. This approach consists in trying to get rid of opinions, prejudices, and personal meanings so that some sort of self-evident, absolute, and eternal truths may be attained. Those who belong to the other tradition, which is a fairly recent one, start with what is given (i.e., opinion, sense-experience, etc.) and then try to correct it in some sort of a trial-and-error manner. They accept that the given is imperfect, our existing stock of knowledge and its criteria are imperfect, but believe that by regular efforts we can make them, in a gradual manner, more and more perfect. If philosophy is concerned with the search for absolute truths, the second approach is not philosophical. It may be that the search for the absolute gives a felicity, but it offers no way for solving concrete human problems. However, the two approaches are there with their weak as well as strong points, and none of them should be lost sight of.

Ewing, A. C. (U.K.): For western thinkers philosophy is just one branch of study among others, more comprehensive indeed and very different indeed from the sciences, but still not one specialised subject of knowledge (or attempted knowledge). While eastern thinkers seem to regard it as the salvation of the whole man. The westerners realise the need of this salvation, but they do not connect it primarily with philosophers or regard the philosopher as the person to teach how to achieve it. If they are religious they leave this teaching rather to the clergyman or minister of religion, if they are secularist it is not clear for whom they should leave it, perhaps the owner eventually will be the psychologist. But at any rate there is a sharper separation in the west between philosophical understanding and liberation from the tyranny of our desires. The difficulty is that intellectual is very different from emotional realisation as in the case of the orthodox Christian who was asked what he thought would happen to him when he died and replied: 'I suppose I shall enter into a state of eternal bliss, but I wish you would not talk about such depressing topics'. It is easy to know very well that you ought not to be angry and that it is bad even for yourself to be angry, and yet give way to anger because you are carried away by strong emotion, but it is thought to be the business

not of the philosopher but (of anybody) of the preacher to deal with this situation, because it is not a matter of understanding but of letting your understanding properly influence your emotions.

Secondly, we cannot understand as somebody pointed out in the morning session today, what is meant by saying that in order to know reality the self must become 'more real'. The concept of degrees of reality has been by no means unknown in the west. It played a large part in scholastic philosophy and again in the philosophy of Decartes and in a somewhat different sense in that of Bradley, but we have lost touch so much with these types of philosophy that it is impossible for us adequately to recapture the meaning of the phrase. We think of a thing as either real (existing) or not real: to suggest that it is more or less real seems for us nonsense as a thing cannot exist more or less.

The Yoga Philosophy should have a special appeal to the west however, because more than most forms of mysticism it does make clear the claim that its conclusions can be verified by adopting a specific procedure (mode of life) and that if this is adopted then follows the intuitive apprehension of its truth. It should therefore be of interest to those philosophers who stress the varification principle and refuse to admit as meaningful any statements about the real which cannot be verified. It is however by no means a simple process to settle such claims by verification. For it still may be doubted whether such alleged intuitions are really insights into the truth, or only the effect of traditional teaching and of the expectations of those who have them, but it is at any rate an important and worth while subject of consideration whether such verification is not a possibility.

Ramaswami Aiyer, C. P. (India): Professor Gibson has maintained that formal freedom is a necessary condition of real freedom. In the Indian tradition the external conditions of freedom are not final, real freedom can be realised without formal freedom. All political and social institutions are subject to the moral law called *Rta.*

Bhattacharya, K. D. (India): Freedom is the capacity to resist pressure. Ideal or real freedom consists in the experience f complete detachment from nature. It is not realizable in this empirical world. Realization of freedom is contemplation, it is of the nature of knowledge and not action. In the empirical world we have to work under certain limitations imposed on us by nature-physical, biological, etc.,—and society. Real freedom is over-natural.

Raju, P. T. (India): The difficulty of western philosophers in understanding the Indian conception of knowledge is due to their failure to understand the distination between what the vedāntins call swarūpa jnāna (existential consciousness) and dharmabhūta jnāṇa (attribute consciousness). The latter depends upon an external object for its truth and it is this consciousness that the majority of western philosophers study. It is only recently that the existentialists have been studying existential consciousness. If existentialism is not understood

by one part of the west, then even in the west one part cannot understand another part with regard to freedom there are two questions: (1) Is there a metaphysical foundation for absolute freedom, and (2) can absolute freedom be ever experienced? Yoga does give an answer to each one of these two questions.

Kalibansky, R. (Canada): The best way of understanding freedom is to study how the term has been used in western and Indian traditions. Then we may find some family likenesses between them. Freedom presupposes three things, a being who chooses, some sort of relationship between him and his environment, and lastly, the absence of constraint.

Ramamurthy, S. V. (India): All dualities are reducible to the duality of self and non-self. Duality offers an opportunity for moral efforts. There are different ways to overcome duality, e.g., the ways of Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, etc.

Desmet, R. V. (India): In the West wisdom was first considered to be attainable by man. In Christianity it is not attainable without the help of God. Man is free but completely dependent upon the Absolute. Freedom consists in his submitting himself to a law or truth higher than himself. This position is nearer to the Indian view. Philosophical efforts should be inspired by aspiration for Dharma, i.e., values and higher truths.

Junankar, N. S. (India): In the Indian tradition all beings are equal and every one has the potentiality of realizing the values of life. The Jaina and Bauddha philosophies deserve special mention in this connection. The concept of Ahimsa (non-violence) is also very important. The elimination of desires is not recommended by all philosophical schools; Karma, or the life of action, is also preferred by some. Yoga is in itself a technique, its validity, metaphysical foundations, etc., are to be supplied by philosophy. The important question is not whether it is valid but whether it is effective.

Shah, K. (India): In Indian thought philosophy has not been kept separate from religion, though its methods and conclusions are different and they need to be separated from those of religion. In the west this confusion has not taken place. It is wrong to say that philosophy cannot be developed as a separate discipline as various alternative systems of logic have been in fact developed.

Kaul, R. N. (India): Truth is not a property of *propositions* only: it is also a property of *persons*. We speak of a true friend or a true coin. Truth here means authenticity, genuineness: the opposite of true is spurious, defective, false. Science has no use for this *personal truth:* hence its so-called *objectivity*. Reality is not spatio-temporal merely, nor what is apprehended through '*sense*' only. So experimental verification and statistical generalizations or quasimathematical measurements and exact statements are not possible *always* in philosophy. Philosophy is thus different from Science. In philosophy we evaluate qualitatively and not merely observe facts nor merely make quantitative and objective or purely 'impersonal' statements. It is deeply concerned

with *facts of life* and *death*, honour and insult, loyalty, commitment. Truth here is indeed subjective. History of Philosophy is not useless: it is a record of deep personal 'insights' of the past thinkers. Systems do break down, as they imply rigidity, mechanism and formalism. Nevertheless, philosophy shares with science, in the fullest measure, the disinterested 'curiosity', the doubting temperament, the methodology of a free, impartial enquiry. Hence, we have to incorporate science up to a point in our philosophical investigations, without being overwhelmed by the tentative conclusions of this or that science at any period of history. This is the essence of *Perennial Philosophy*, which is neither historically conditioned nor scientifically orientated. But it cannot reject the historical conditions with contempt, nor do away with modern scientific advances and the scientific temper of the present age.

Dufrenne, M. (France): The opposition between Indian and western philosophy with regard to the nature of freedom is more apparent than real. The difference between the two rather is that western philosophy is more inclined towards analysis and making distinctions than is Indian philosophy. There are three forms of self: (*a*) Practical subject whose aim is to live, (*b*) Transcendental subject whose aim is to know, and (*c*) the Ethical subject whose aim is to enjoy spiritual life. The main problem is to unite and relate the three. There are also different kinds of freedom: material, metaphysical, religious, etc. The problem of material freedom cannot be solved by discussion or by practising Yoga.

Kabir, Humayun (India): Physical, biological, social limitations are there, but man transcends them and gains freedom. We have trumphed over physical nature and controlled it much beyond the imagination of our forefathers. In supplying the formal conditions of freedom Democracy and Dictatorship are not much different. Man's freedom forces him to transcend his conditionings; there is an irreducible surd of individuality in every man which leads him, sometimes, even to react against the system in which he has been brought up. One who balances all factors, social and individual, is freer then those who do not. It is not that absolute bliss gives absolute freedom. Freedom does lie in experiencing freedom, but freedom of circumstances cannot be replaced by it. Dr Sen's thesis is, hence, only a half-truth. Acquisition of freedom is a gradual process. There are degrees of truth and reality. Fanaticism is not a virtue; adjustments have to be made. The opposition between eastern and western philosophy is the result of misunderstanding. Each school of Indian philosophy, from logical analysis to transcendentalism, is found in western philosophy. What is basic to freedom is toleration. Realisation of values in individual life will help the establishment of a harmonious community.

MEETING OF THE EAST AND WEST IN THE PAST

President: A. R. WADIA (India)

Speaker: T. E. JESSOP (U.K.)

Aiyer, C. P. Ramaswamy (India): There is a great deal of evidence of a very close contact between the east and west in ancient times. In the Chhandogya upanisad there is a reference to mumifying dead bodies. Mumifying the body is an Egyptian practice. There is also evidence of Egyptian scholars coming to India; there was also some contact between Pythagoras and Indians. The excavations of Mohen-jo-daro also show signs of contact between the East and West in very ancient times.

Kabir, Humayun (India): That there was some contact between the East and West in quite early times is supported by the excavations recently done in India, e.g., those in Rupar in the Sutleg valley, etc. Some excavations show that India had some contact with Egypt in 2000 B.C. There is also evidence of contact between India and Europe. The rise of Christianity was influenced, most probably, by Buddhism. The Arabs always accept their indebtedness to ancient India.

Filliozat, Jean (France): From the historical point of view, we are now not limited to the field of conjectures concerning the ancient intercourses between what is called East and West, namely in my present purpose, Greece and India.

Professor Jessop has said we are not sure if commercial relations, with great differences of language, were fit in ancient times for intellectual relations. Fortunately, we have some textual testimonies which are dicisive on the reality of exchanges of ideas.

Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer has just referred to Puranic texts which bear testimonies of a knowledge in India of ideas of Iran. Concerning the relations with Greece too we have texts.

The Hippocratic Collection several times refers not only to Indian drugs, like pepper, but also to Indian receipts for medical cures. So, notions have circulated, along with products, from Indian to Greek physicians. And we just observe great similarities between some scientific doctrines in Greece and India before the time of the expedition of Alexander to India.

Shri Aurobindo has written a small interesting book on similarities between the ideas of Heraclitus and some Indian ideas. On another side, the duration of the so called 'great year' according to Heraclitus is evaluated with the same figures as the duration of a similar period in

Ancient India. One treatise in the Hippocratic collection teaches a doctrine of the role of wind in the world and in the metabolism living beings, which is quite similar to an Āyurvedic theory. Another doctrine of the physiology and pathology of bodies expounded by Plato is different from what is generally taught by Greek physicians, but is quite similar to the *tridosa* system of the Āyurveda.

Intellectual exchanges before Alexander's time between Greece and India are quite natural. The part of India, the Indus valley, held by Persians, was, before Alexander and for about two centuries, incorporated into the same political unity which consisted of Babylonia, Egypt and several Greek countries under the sway of Persia. And we have direct evidence of intellectual relations between Indian and Persian scholars at that time: they have elaborated a special system of writing, the well known *kharosthi*.

Ramamurthy, S. V. (India): Ancient Egyptian temples are very much like south Indian temples. This shows close contact between India and Egypt as early as about 1500 B.C. The Europeans have not paid adequate attention to the Dravidian civilization of India, otherwise they must have discovered signs of contact between India and Europe in ancient times.

Siddiqui, Z. A. (India): Historical records show not only evidence of contact between ancient India and the West, but also a great similarity of ideas between the philosophies of the two cultures. Teachings of Al Gazali are very much similar to those of Descartes. The Muslim philosophy of Spain also shows signs of Indian influence.

Sen, Indra (India): The basic attitude of the ancient Indian mind, as exhibited in the Vedas and other works, was one of love towards all. It is very well embodied in the principle. 'Let all be happy'. An attitude of respect for the guest is also an important characteristic of the Indian mind. In all ancient contacts attempts were made to establish harmonious relations.

September 1, 1959
9.45 to 11.30 *Section III:* Second Meeting

WHAT THE EAST EXPECTS FROM THE WEST WHAT IT CAN OFFER TO THE WEST

President: GASTON BERGER (*President*, I.I.P. Paris)
Speaker: N. V. BANERJEE (India)

Siddiqui, Z. A. (India): I do not believe that there is a real difference between fundamental values and traditional values. Traditional values are nothing but the expression of fundamental values subject to the accidents of time, place and circumstances.

Traditional values derive their force and sanction from the fundamental values of life.

But since sometimes the translation of fundamental values into more concrete values relative to particular circumstances of the individual and society does not take place on a conscious and critical level, so they stand in need of constant examination and modification if necessary. The changing nature of society and its circumstances also calls for this examination. But it should be done in the light of those fundamental values which underlie them.

From this it follows that if we want an understanding between different cultures and different sets of traditional values we should try to discover their underlying bases the fundamental values and the philosophies on which they are based.

Banerjee, N. V. (India): Traditional values are not identical with fundamental values. Values conflict with one another. If traditional values are expressions of fundamental values, then why should we examine and modify them?

Potter, K. H. (U.S.A.): According to Professor Gibson social freedom is a necessary condition for spiritual freedom. According to Professor Banerjee spiritual freedom is a necessary condition for social freedom. The possibilities then are the following:

(*a*) Give up spiritual values; but then what significance can be attached to social values?
(*b*) Give up social values; but then we have irresponsible isolation of mysticism.
(*c*) Deny Prof. Gibson's view. But this will lead perhaps to (*d*) the denial of Prof. Banerjee's view, which will lead to (*a*)
(*e*) Must we not distinguish between those social institutions which breed evil habits and those which do not? This investigation is a proper task for philosophy, Eastern and Western.

Rintelen, Von W. (Germany): I wish merely to say a few words about your (Dr N. V. Banerjee) theory of values. You begin with the needs of human beings—a thought comparable with Aristotles' αγαζον ἐoτcυ oὐπίσ ἐΨὶτι (goodness is that after which all strive), or with the Middle Age dictum: *bonum est, quod omnia appetunt*. The terms' 'ἀγαόυ' 'bonum', have more or less the same meaning as our expressions value, valeur, Wert. For the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, however, this state of striving after, being a result of human needs, was far wider and more general, confined not only to human beings, but to nature as a whole. One can compare your opinion likewise with the more modern thesies of the German philosophers Ehrenfels and Moinong, for them value being *is Begehrbarkeit*, the object of our desires and needs.

My question is, however: Do we not pre-eminently have to overcome this departure from our needs,—we can need everything—the good and the bad, value and disvalue—a fact seen clearly by Plato? We often acknowledge values without necessarily striving after them, as can be seen, for instance, in sacrifice. This is a value which we do not need always. We must refer to a further criterion, a criterion appearing to me as depending upon the qualitative content of our needs, as for example, justice, love, loyalty to oneself, help, beauty, freedom and the life. Here, we are asking for the problem of value. Your speaking of ultimate values seems to reveal the same opinions. Do you find it possible to describe these ultimate values in—as we would say—a phenomenological analysis?

Banerjee, N. V. (India): The primary needs are social needs, and social needs are human. Social life is peculiarly human; animals do not have any social life.

Marias, J. (Spain): I share Dr Banerjee's point of view. But I want to point out that there are some fundamental differences between East and West. The West holds that reality is to be made, but the East thinks that it is what it is.

Prasad, Rajendra (India): Professor Banerjee's paper is really very interesting. I do not want to raise any objection to what he has said, but only to make a request for clarifying certain points. My first difficulty is with regard to his reference to the primary needs of man. He says that 'the generic values are those values which embody the fulfilment of the primary needs of man? Now if by 'primary needs' be means 'needs which man ought to have or experience', then what he says about generic values becomes obvious but tautological and therefore uninformative; if by 'primary needs' he means 'needs which are in fact basic because of man's psychological, biological and physiological nature', then what he says about generic values is not obvious because it is not a contradiction to say that the fulfilment a primary need (in this sense) does not lead to the realization of any value. My second difficulty is with regard to his use of the phrase 'instrumental value'. He says on page 2 (of his paper) that wealth and happiness, i.e., the

mundane values, are not instrumental values, but on page 5 he says that it is Mokṣa 'which lends value to whatever is regarded as valuable', including even wealth and happiness. Now if wealth and happiness *get their value from Mokṣa,* then they certainly do not have any intrinsic value and therefore if they have any value at all that must be instrumental value. Further, it would also mean that there is hierarchy of values with Mokṣa as the highest value. My third difficulty is about Professor Banerjee's notion of formal or regulative principles. He says that all social values are formal or regulative and have no content or matter. Then, Mokṣa should also be only formal because it also is, according to him, a social value. But he is not prepared to say that; rather, he says that it is not purely formal or regulative, which means that it has content also. But how can that be when it is a social value (in his sense)? Further, how can a formal principle be regulative? To be regulative a principle must have in it some directive force; it must have the power to be action-guiding. But it cannot have all this if it is formal. Therefore I fail to understand why Professor Banerjee says that social values are both formal and regulative.

Banerjee, N. V. (India): Dr Prasad has made some very important comments, but I do not agree with what he has said. I have not said that mundane values are instrumental. Values cannot be classified into intrinsic and instrumental ones. I do not accept even the existence of any hierarchy of values. I have spoken of co-ordination or assimilation, and not of any hierarchy of values. Further, when I say that a social value is formal or regulative, I only mean that it is an end without having any material content.

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): I must congratulate Dr Banerjee for his excellent paper. I agree with his conclusions but not with his methodology. The real problem is the problem of the hierarchy of values. By solving this problem alone we can solve the problem of the conflict of values.

Traditional values are not themselves values, they only give content to fundamental values. They are changed, and sometimes even rejected by man. A change in tradition is also an element of that tradition.

Shah, K. J. (India): In Indian philosophy, ethics and religion go together. Ethical and religious values Dharma and Mokṣa are separable in thought but not in life. Their separation might weaken the social conscience. There is no hierarchy of values; all values are necessary.

Gibson, A. Boyce (Australia): I want some linguistic clarifications. Is 'Mokṣa' to be translated in English by 'liberation'? The latter term carries with it a sense of 'getting out of the cave', and no sense of triumph. But mastery is also necessary, and not only getting out. Is Dharma, as defined in this paper, the same as Mokṣa? What is the right English equivalent of Ahimsa, non-violence or toleration?

Banerjee, N. V. (India): Non-violence is the literal translation of 'Ahimsa' but 'toleration' expresses its positive content in a more

satisfactory way. Mokṣa is not identical with Dharma. It is not merely formal, but it also has in it a joy of living, but I do not want to give it any mystical colour. Under Dharma I include values which hold a content. The word 'Dharma' means 'that which holds'. I have given new meanings to these terms, but, I think, I have not made a great departure from the classical usage.

Damle, P. R. (India): I suggest that while in the first part of his paper Dr Banerjee has taken the position that in our life mundane values take the form of social values and that they do so because of our capacity for Dharma and Mokṣa together, in the latter part of his paper he seems, without sufficient justification, to find fault with social organisations and to attach undue importance to renunciation which, if it is to result in active tolerance, must be based on social conscience. The defect of being too traditional again may belong to the individual as well as to groups, and those he considers great individuals, are so because they are truly social.

Banerjee N. V. (India): I have not said so.

Kabir, Humayun (India): Professor Banerjee has maintained that tolerance and renunciation are Eastern values and social conscience is a Western value. Social conscience, he holds, has failed because of its association with power. But power is not in itself evil, it becomes evil only when there is an excess of it. But even the excess of toleration and renunciation is also evil. Power is not violence, violence is an unreasonable and excessive use of power. Rather, power is essential for progress. West has to learn from East that the utilization of power should be done in a very cautious manner.

Desmet, R. V. (India): What do you mean by natural selection?

Banerjee, N. V. (India): I mean natural selection employed in the realm of values. Values are found in circumstances on which individuals have no control.

Sen, Indra (India): The Eastern countries are trying to reconstruct themselves, they are eager to utilize the industrial and scientific expertise of the West. What the East can offer to the West is of a great fundamental importance, it is the joy of wholeness, perception of the unique, the All, the Ultimate. These things have been very assiduously cultivated in Indian life.

HAS PHILOSOPHY DISCOVERED A HIERARCHY OF VALUES WITH A UNIVERSAL USE?

President: HIS HIGHNESS SRI JAYACHAMARAJA WODEYAR, MAHARAJA OF MYSORE (India)

Speaker: G. CALOGERO (Italy)

Chubb, J. N. (India): A materialist and a spiritualist cannot discuss anything profitably if each uses his own rule of understanding. Professor Calogero speaks of a common rule of understanding. What is it if not a rule of intelligibility? Philosophy is creative because it discovers a rule of intelligibility. He accepts tolerance as the highest value, but this will not solve the problem of the hierarchy of values because there are values, e.g., religious values, which are absolute values and which cannot be deduced from tolerance. It is better to keep the philosophical point of view outside if we want to tackle the problem of the hierarchy of values. Whether values are hierarchical or not depends upon the philosophical framework concerned.

Calogero, G. (Italy): I agree with you that if the common rule of understanding is a logical rule, understanding will become more difficult. I never said that all values are logically deducible from tolerance.

Javadekar, A. G. (India): The Upanisads have given us a conception of the hierarchy of values.

There is a recognition of the fact that all values result from the demands of human nature. Human nature is a complex of body (anna), life (prāṇa), mind (manas), intellect (vijnāna), intuitive bliss (anānda) and the spirit (ātman) transcending these coverings (kosa). Corresponding to these levels of human nature there are the variety of values. The lowest are the values of physical existence. They constitute all material goods. Higher is the biological, instinctive satisfaction resulting in values of health and hygiene. Next come the values of psychological, social and political institutions. Higher, again, are the values of intellectual pursuits of science and philosophy. Still higher are the aesthetic values of arts, music, dance, painting, sculpture and architecture. But highest in the scale are the values of spiritual experience, religion and mystical illumination which lead to the attainment of peace. Ātman is described as peace or silence (sāntam). The lower values are not to be sacrificed but are to be rendered instrumental to the next higher values. In a perfect life there is a realization of a harmony of all the values with the spiritual value of peace as the central regulative value. There should be realization of

peace within and peace without. Upanisads begin and end with the proclamation of the highest value of peace (sānti) three times.

Junankar, N. S. (India): The anekāntavāda and syādavadā of the Jaina thinkers present a very good intellectual framework of what Professor Calogero calls 'Co-existence of philosophies'. In all this the view that reality is manifold is presupposed.

Sen, Indra (India): There is no philosophy but there are several philosophical systems. Confusion will end if all aim at understanding life and existence. Philosophical systems result from man's seeking to understand life and existence. There are different systems because of differences in angles of vision. A scale of values is not available but is possible. Philosophy must be workable in life. The four parts of man, physical, biological, etc., indicate the possibility of a scale of values.

Calogero, G. (Italy): Philosophy is both an enquiry and a system. It always enquiries. The philosophy of co-existence is the history of philosophy. The historians of philosophy are in sympathy with this or that philosopher.

Ramamurthy, S. V. (India): I suggest that a hierarchy of universal values should relate not only to philosophy but also to religion and science. They should be not merely human values but also spiritual and material values.

Vedānta arrived at a list of values of spirit. Starting with a definition of spirit or Brahman, the Taitiriya Upanishad stated five values as satisfying that definition, namely, matter, life, mind, understanding and bliss. Elsewhere in the Upanishads, *Akasa* or space, and *Kala* or time are also mentioned as such values of spirit. Compare these seven values with the fundamental values in science.

Apart from the rock and roll of modern science, classical Physics as in Newton and Einstein has recognised three fundamental values: time, space and matter. These are included in the list of Vedanta values. Philosophy accepts mind and spirit as fundamental values. In the science of Relativity, mind has entered in the shape of the observer. Parapsychology from the side of observation has posited something beyond mind as well as matter, called the psi-function. The psi-function points towards spirit, if it may not be identified with it. Taking the common ground of values derived from religion, philosophy and science, from intuition, reasoning and observation, I suggest the recognition of a hierarchy of five entities of universal validity, namely, time, space, matter, mind and spirit.

Every fundamental entity adds a dimension to the world of existence· The view of the world is growing from the three dimensions of Newton to the four dimensions of Einstein and thence, as I venture to suggest, to five dimensions.

Calogero, G. (Italy): These problems are not about values.

Van Melsen, A. G. M. (Holland): In a sense, I completely agree with what you have said. There is only one question to be asked, an important one. It seems to me that the way of philosophising you proposed is a means and not an end. The necessity of understanding each other is of value. We also have always to be prepared to give up our opinion, and to accept others but not because it is another man's opinion, but because it is true or valid. Therefore, the coincidences of philosophers and philosophies is important but it is not the final problem. The final problem is that we want to know what is true or valid, we want to know what philosophy is right. It is clear that behind your own plea for understanding each other a certain philosophy is hidden, a certain evaluation of man.

Calogero, G. (Italy): In science we ask 'why' because we are in search for truth. But when we ask why we should seek truth, science cannot answer. For that we have to go to ethics. Hence there must be an hierarchy of values. We cannot go on asking 'why' for ever. Ultimately we have to exercise our choice. Moral life consists in continuous acts of choice.

Van Melsen, A. G. M. (Holland): It will be interesting to examine the ultimate situation.

Krishna, Daya (India): Values lead to action. The problem of values is really a problem of the guidance of human actions. Conflicting values produce conflicting actions or disallow any action. Even in a hierarchy the realisation of higher or primary values may conflict with that of lower ones. There is no guarantee of harmony among values.

Calogero, G. (Italy): I agree that values lead to action. Perhaps I did not emphasize this point. I have to choose the primary values because it would be dangerous if somebody else imposes his choice on me. Hierarchy is always there even if conflicts exist, conflicts are resolved by acts of choice.

Hallie, Philip (U.S.A.): Consistency as a characteristic of philosophical systems is as important as their completeness. But Professor Calogero has ignored the value of consistency.

15.00 to 17.00

SYNTHESIS OF SECTION III

(Round Table)

President: JEAN FILLIOZAT (France)

Filliozat, Jean (France): I am a Western indologist, not a philosopher. My role must be here to try to help in some way the construction of some bridge between Indian and Western philosophers. With my Indian colleagues my task is very simple: they have no need of any information from me. For the Indian thinkers who attend the meeting the synthesis between Indian and Western philosophies is already realised according to their respective ways. They know, of course, Indian philosophy as well as Western philosophy and they use a Western language. The situation is not the same for my Western colleagues and I have promised to many of them to present some observations from the point of view of one who is witnessing from outside both situations of Western and of Indian philosophies.

As they are all knowing French very well, I shall use for that purpose rather the French language than my poor English, and I shall try to summarize my points in English too.

(Translation into English of the speech delivered in French:)

There is no gross contrast between East and West.

Apart from the fact that there are many 'Easts', as different one from the other as with respect to the West and many positions very different in the West also, it is impossible to reduce to one unit the Indian traditions. Common and general features in them may be only recognized, and even that are often differentiated.

In Mysore only, as His Highness and Dr. Radhakrishnan have both recalled to, in the very opening session, five traditions are represented: traditions of Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Jains and Vīraśaiva. All of them, it is true, have in common the aspiration for Mokṣa, but not all for the same sort of Mokṣa.

What forms a common tradition is reduced to a most general position.

A first point to keep in sight is the variety of traditions, everywhere, in the East as well as in the West.

A second point to note is that the most of the possible philosophical attitudes are found, at some stage, in separate cultures, but simultaneous as the West and Indian cultures are.

By example, the scientific attitude of search after truth by observation, reason and criticism, exists perfectly in the Indian philosophical

tradition and played therein a part much more considerable that the proceedings which have been taking place here could not lead to believe it.

The notion of *pramāṇa*, criterion of judgements, dominates in fact the biggest part of the Indian science and philosophy.

Caraka, the physician of the first century, who exposes theories otherwise more ancient, sets up a whole system of means to arrive by observation and logic at correct diagnosis and to avoid erros of induction. His attitude is rational.

Under the form of *Nyāya*, and then of *Navyanyāya*, the logic finds a considerable place in the Indian philosophical research. The critic of opinions, very active among the brahmanical philosophy, the buddhism and the jainism, very active also even within the group of brahmanical philosophies, is lying on many systems of logic.

The religious doctrine of Śaivasiddhānta, is presented, in many of his works, in accordance with the logic thus established. The revelation is brought in them either to direct obviousness (*pratyakṣa*) to which belongs the intuition, or to testimony of recognized validity (*śabda*).

The knowledge, in such an instance, does not like to be mystic, but of course to be rational.

A third point I would raise concerns the notion of traditional values.

Values are to be appreciated in connection with the spheres to which they belong, and not in the absolute.

The validity of the solution of a problem exists only for that problem and not for any other.

A tradition that has a human value in some society, may not have the same in a society which has different customs and different ultimate purposes.

Each tradition has certainly its value for the conditions under which it has taken form, otherwise it would have been abandoned sometime or other.

But only solutions of big and general problems, common to the whole humanity, can be compared and appreciated, one in connection with the other.

Many philosophical problems are put in different ways in the various traditions and it is vain to like to know what are the respective value of solutions answering to different terms. Each one is right or wrong with respect to its own term.

Those which are adopted as traditional have, in this way, a recognized value of fact. They are good for those they satisfy, good in effect, if not legitimate in reason.

For the comprehension of traditions, we should replace them in the ideas of the producing sphere and not appreciate them in compliance with our ideas.

For knowing the Yoga, as leading to a mode of Mokṣa, we should understand at first how it agrees with the conceptions and preoccupations of the spheres where it was formed. Regarding the value, we have

only to note in what extent it is recognized and not to find out what is its absolute measure, which of course does not exist. And it is obvious that it has no value, as a mean to reach Mokṣa, to one who does not believe in Mokṣa and does not seek it after as an aim.

The appreciation of a culture through another culture is ligitimate only when the problems put on both sides are absolutely the same. More than the appreciation, are of importance the knowledge and comprehension. This is told by the device of the Mysore University न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशम् (na hi jñānena sadṛśam) 'nothing worthy to be compared with knowledge.' The closeness of cultures must be sought in the reciprocal comprehension and not in the mutual appreciation.

After these words, pronounced in French and summarized in English, the floor was given to the presidents of the two first meetings of the Third Section, Prof. A. R. Wadia and Prof. G. Berger.

Then the floor was given successively to:

Prof. F. Brunner, Prof. T. E. Jessop, Prof. J. Marias, Prof. C. Perelman, Prof. Indra Sen, Prof. N. A. Nikam.

Wadia, A. R. (India): The object of this Section relates to the meeting of the East and West. The purpose of this entretien may be said to be twofold. First that we should come together and know one another. This object has been fulfilled to a considerable extent. We of the East and West have come together to exchange our ideas and get to know one another. This object would have been better achieved if the western delegates and the Indian delegates had been housed under the same roof so that they could have had their meals together and could have had plenty of opportunities for informal discussions outside the regular meetings. The second object is to discuss the possibility of evolving a philosophy which could be a synthesis of the East and the West.

I myself in my earlier years used to think of this approachment as a possibility. But in the course of years I have now come to be conscious of a fundamental difference between India on the one hand and the West, a difference which cannot be overcome. In the West philosophy is looked upon essentially as thinking. It is essentially rational. In India philosophy is conceived not as mere thinking but as realisation, and as realisation it transcends mere thought. Philosophy in India is Darshana—direct vision or realisation. This difference is so fundamental that some European thinkers have doubted whether India has produced any philosophy, and this view is shared even by some Indian thinkers who have been nourished in the traditions of western philosophy. Forty years ago when I came to Mysore, I heard an eminent Indian saying, 'India has no philosophy'. And even today there is a professor of philosophy in Bombay who is never tired of repeating that Indian philosophy is no philosophy. Some years ago when an Indian thinker wrote a book on Indian philosophy and tried to bring out some similarity between the Indian and the western thought

a colleague of mine observed, 'It is not enough to show that Indian philosophy has what European philosophy has, but we should show that Indian philosophy has something which European philosophy has not got'. In this very Conference, there is an observer who came to me during the interval for coffee, and he asked me, 'Has any of you realised the ultimate reality?' I had to say 'No' so far as I was concerned, and then he asked me, 'But then how can you all talk about it?' So you will see how fundamental the gulf is between the Indian and the Western approach to philosophy.

It is usual to quote Ruddyard Kipling:

'Oh, East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet,
Till earth and sky stand presently at God's great judgement seat'.

We in India are not very fond of Kippling as he was an imperialist, but great injustice has been done to his memory by quoting only this complete for he goes on to say,

'But there is neither East nor West, Boarder nor Breed nor Birth.
When two strong men stand face to face though they come from the ends of the earth!'

Is there a chance of the two traditions ever meeting? There appears to be two possibilities. Philosophers of the West, true to their traditions, can study the mystic phenomena or 'realisation' as testified to by the great Indian seers. If they succeed in throwing light on the truth of realisation, it is possible that philosophy in the West will take in its stride even the obstruse phenomena of 'realisation'. The second possibility is that if the West ever decays—and Spengler has written on the 'Decline of West'—it may come to look upon this life as 'Maya' or illusion. This will be an escapist philosophy and no one who has drunk deep at the founts of western philosophy would ever wish it to develop this idea. This morning my friend, Mr Ramamurthy, voted in favour of Ramanuja against Sankara, and if philosophical controversies can be solved by voting, I myself would unhesitatingly support him and cast my vote for Ramanuja. Looking upon the world as Maya or Illusion is not a solution but an attempt to escape solution. My own feeling is that Sankara's Advaitism has done a lot of harm to India. I remember years ago, when I was much younger, at the time of the first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Calcutta, I was introduced to the distinguished Indian Scientist Dr P. C. Ray, and when I was introduced to him as a philosopher, he put his hand on my shoulder and said with a smile, 'India has had enough of philosophy. She now wants science'. I am inclined to agree with him, not that philosophy has become superfluous, but philosophy has to recognise the worth of science and especially its method. I myself have learnt a great deal from the philosophy of the West. It has taught me how to get out of the grooves of dogmatism and how to face the problems of thought and of life. If Indian thinkers conversant with the western tradition can introduce that spirit of free inquiry into

the study of Indian philosophy, they will have gone far to bridge the gulf that has divided India from the western tradition.

Berger, G. (France): The central word in Prof. Banerjee's paper is 'power'. Power is to be realised. Spiritual values have no power. The important problem is how to make power rightful and right powerful. If absolute values and power are separated, happiness and harmony in society will not be possible. For a happy and harmonious living every individual should have an aspiration towards the good, a desire for justice.

Brunner, F. (Switzerland): I should like to contribute to what many speakers have already referred, namely, an understanding between East and West, by making a brief summary of Western thought.

In the first period of it (i.e., in the time of Saint Augustine) intelligence has as its objects the ideas or reasons of things of the world as they are in divine intelligence. It does not follow at all, however, as one is often led to believe, that human intelligence proudly considered itself divine. On the contrary, human intelligence refused to think of the world on its own and to contain within itself the criterion of truth. In other words, human intelligence renounces itself in order that God could think of the world through it. In this first period, then, the object of intelligence was the object of faith. This is so because of the renunciation of intelligence to be the criterion of truth. So much for the first period.

In the second period, because of the appearance of Aristotelianism in the Latin world, the object of human intelligence became the essence of sensory things, which was to be searched for in sensory things and no longer in God. The reference to God was indirect, which means that God was now regarded as the cause of the world and not as the object of intelligence. At this time a certain distinction was introduced between the object of intelligence and the object of faith. Faith was concerned with the supernatural revelation and intelligence began to search for natural human knowledge. Theology and philosophy were not separated because they still had certain objects in common. But they were distinguished in such a way that from then onward in Western thought, there appeared a philosophical current of autonomous rational thought.

One could distinguish a third period, but I shall content myself by going on to the fourth, namely the period of nominatism. This time not only did intelligence no longer have God as its principal object, but also it no longer had any object in common with faith. It could no longer affirm that God is perfect, or even that He exists. We can see that under these conditions faith and reason were really separated.

Some people say that faith thus became pure, but it is also clear that this time reason acquired complete autonomy. A new intellectualism could thus be constituted independently of religion and even of such fundamental religious questions as those conversing the cause,

goal, etc., of the world. All this provided some of the factors which led to the origin of modern science and also to that of a certain part of modern Western philosophy.

Instead of showing the importance of all the four periods of thought (as Mr Perelman did the day before yesterday) I would prefer to speak of one tradition that has become now transformed but also has conserved certain features of the past.

We have seen how religion and faith were separated from philosophy: religion became less intellectual and Western mysticism assumed an affective form and not an intellectual form. In other words, religion withdrew into affectivity whereas science, art and other forms of Western thought lived their own autonomous lives.

This explains why we westerners have some difficulty in understanding certain fundamental aspects of Indian philosophy which have been presented in this conference, for instance, the union of faith and intelligence of which some of you have given us so many examples.

Many Indian thinkers seem to be engaged in bringing about an evolution of Indian philosophy on lines similar to those on which the evolution of Western philosophy has taken place. I wish to say that if India follows this path, it should do so with prudence. Many westerners are there indeed who realize the impoverishment into which a certain part of Western thought has been led.

The particular problems which modern science solves are not the only problems which confront human intelligence. In the West this can be noticed by the appearances, side by side science, of the philosophies of life, existence and values.

What is necessary today is that human intellect should seek the knowledge of the ultimate nature of our being and of the world and of its origin and goal.

Man, in the scientific age, suffers because of the limitations he has imposed on his intelligence. He cures of number a illnesses, but his psychological anguish has become more intense. He is the master of nature, but never at the same time, have the forces of nature been so perilous for him.

To renounce ultimate knowledge in favour of scientific truth is perhaps a capitulation of intelligence. One must hope that Indian philosophy will continue to bring to the world that precious example of integral thought which alone really satisfies human spirit.

Jessop, T. E. (U.K.): Western philosophers of differnt countries agree among themselves that their function is to clarify the ideas of their students and not to spiritually improve them or convert them to their own views. Western philosophy is mainly critical and logical. East can help West to understand spiritual values and West can help East to understand material values. A sympathetic study of the history of philosophy can also help mutual understanding.

Marias, J. (Spain): Life is meaningful and we have to account for it. We can do that by understanding the living situations. The

difference between East and West is not natural but historical. To understand East and West we have to understand their history.

Perelman, Ch. (Belgium): Western philosophy also aims at the realization of values, it also tries to offer guidance in life. The ideal man for is the wise man, and the model of the wise man is socrates. The wise man is one who seeks knowledge, who asks questions, and not one who claims to know the answer to all questions. Search for truth, and not the attainment of absolute knowledge, is the ideal of the wise man in the West. The Eastern ideal is quite different from this. Here the wise man does not ask questions, but answers the questions put to him by others.

Sen, Indra (India): Professor Wadia feels that no synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophies is possible. But the differences between the two show that the synthesis is needed. The Western ideal is knowledge, the Eastern ideal is realization. Knowledge and realization must go together. If they go together, constructive intellect will be the product and criticism will be then clarificatory and not destructive. The calm wisdom of realization will be welcome to the West. The ideal of realization does not discard reason. It is Sankara's doctrine of Maya which has led Western philosophers to misunderstand the Eastern ideal of realization. In Aurobindo's philosophy the world is also Brahman, and there is no place for Maya.

Nikam, N. A. (India): Professor Perelman said that the model of the wise man for the West is Socrates. Even the Socrate tradition is not restricted to the West. The *Kena* Upanisad is in some parts, a teaching of the Socratic Wise Man, who knows that he does not know. Says the *Kena: Yasya amatam, tasya matam; matam yasya, na Veda sah:* 'he who says he does not know, he knows; (but) he who says he knows, he knows not'.

Professor Perelman said: 'Search for truth, and not the attainment of absolute knowledge, is the ideal of the wise man in the West'. Even this is a part of the eastern tradition. In the same *Kena* Upanisad, the teacher warns the pupil against saying that there is complete and absolute knowledge of Brahman. The pupil replies to his teacher that he does not say that he has complete or absolute knowledge of Brahman, nor that he has no knowledge of Brahman whatever.

It is true that pupils go to a teacher in the east for instruction, but the 'search of truth' is an 'experiment in living', in which Truth is *verified* both by the teacher and the pupil by 'living together'. In the *Praśna* Upanisad (i.e. an Upanisad which is concerned with (Questions'): Six Questioners approach the teacher with questions; To them the teacher replies: '*Live with me* . . . with austerity, chastity, and faith. *Then ask questions* according to your desire and if we know, we shall, indeed, tell you all that'.

In the course of the discussion a contrast was made between the ideal of the wise man in the east and the West. It is said that the ideal of the wise man in the west is that of an 'active' man. But what is

the nature of 'activity' of the 'wise' man, anywhere in the east or the West? The Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy distinguishes between ceaseless 'activity' of *Prakrti* or Nature, which is really, a 'passivity', a ceaseless passive 'process'. Its activity is 'caused' by mere *presence* of the *purusha* or Person. Likewise, the activity of the good life in Society arises from the *presence* of the wise man and his living example, whereas, 'Activity' in History is an 'interference'.

Instead of distinguishing between the East and West we ought to distinguish between two aspirations or Values. Dr S. V. Ramamurthy adds Space and Time to other Values, and we may therefore distinguish between what may be called 'the Conquest of Space' at which the Sputnik Age, in which we live, aims. Whereas the East and the West were united in the Past in the pursuit of a common value viz., 'Conquest of Time'. This was attained and realised in Meditation and Peace through Yoga in Hinduism and Buddhism, through 'Life according to Nature' in Chinese Culture, and through a withdrawl to the 'Wilderness' in Semitic Cultures. Although neither the East nor the West has answered the question, 'What is Time?' both have sought to 'Conquer' Time, at least as it appears to us, as the succession of our mental states. 'Stop you moving spheres of Heaven that Time may cease and midnight nevercome'. This is impossible; but the attainment of Peace in the Forest as in India, in Nature as in China, in the Wilderness as in Semitic religions is a way of the Conquest of Time and experience of immortality, here and now.

The Crisis in our Age is now such that we are asking question whether Man and Civilization will survive Time? In this both the East and the West are, again, united.

17.30 to 18.30

CLOSING SESSION

BERGER, G. (France)

(Speech on behalf of I.I.P.)

There is nothing which is distinctively and uniquely Eastern philosophy or Western philosophy. In many cases Western philosophers differ among themselves much more than anyone of them differs from an Eastern philosopher. The same is true of the philosophers of any particular country. The problem of the nature of the self is not a purely Eastern problem, it is also a problem of Western philosophy. However, there may be some differences between the philosophical attitudes and dispositions of the East and West. Science has played a role even in Indian culture, but its role in Western culture has been far greater. Many important philosophers were also eminent scientists. The same is true of technology also. There has also been a greater separation of philosophy from religion in the West than in the East.

The ideal man in the West is the active man. For Plato the highest value is the Good and a philosopher who has realized it is not to shun all social life. Emphasis on action is also found in the East, e.g., in the Bhagavadgita. His highness has very well said that it is in this world that values, even spiritual values, have to be realized. As a result of this meeting of the I.I.P. in India. I have realized that we should learn to look at the world also through Indian eyes. Emphasis on spiritual life is found both in the East and West. All spiritual thinkers have realized that liberation is something positive and not negative. 'Love for all' should be the motto of every human being.

Ramachandra Rao, A. G. (India): The University of Mysore is deeply grateful to the International Philosophical Congress for agreeing to hold its Sessions, for the first time, in India, choosing Mysore, as its venue, and accepting the humble hospitality of our University.

The University is proud of its learned Chancellor Sri Jayachamaraja Wodeyar, under whose leadership you were welcomed. He is a noble scion of the distinguished Royal family of Mysore which has nurtured in the State the traditions of the great Indian Culture for several centuries.

I may also bring to your kind notice that of the world's great Philosophers, Sri Sankaracharya and Sri Ramanujacharya, the pre-eminent Philosophers of India,—lived in this State and spread their great message of Universal Peace, toleration and service from here. Their lives and messages, which are embodied in monumental works

is a living fountain of inspiration that has been moulding the lives of millions in India and abroad. The places where they lived and delivered their messages, Sringeri and Melkote, are in our State, and continue to be places of pilgrimage for all scholars and savants.

And I am grateful to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India—the distinguished modern Philosopher, who inaugurated this conference. He was Professor of Philosophy in this University when I was a student.

I hope, you have enjoyed your short sojourn amidst us, despite the lapses and shortcomings of our humble hospitality. I trust your contacts and discussions have been fruitful.

I pray that the International Philosophical Congress should hold its Sessions oftener in India and visit our State again, for strengthening the foundation of Universal Brotherhood and human solidarity.

On behalf on the University, I wish you all 'bonvoyage'—for the safe return of all of you—back to your happy homes. *Jai Hind.*

Wadia, A. R. (India): For the first time the International Institute of Philosophy has not outside Europe, and it is in the fitness of things that the first meeting outside Europe should be held in India, at the invitation of the Indian Philosophical Congress. It is equally in the fitness of things that this meeting in India should be in Mysore, for Mysore has great philosophical traditions. Madhwacharya had his home in Mysore State. Shankaracharya founded the great Sringeri Mutt in Mysore State, and Ramanuja found refuge in Mysore State from his persecutors. Moreover, Mysore City has great facilities for putting up delegates and has almost become a city of conferences. I wonder why Mr Mallaradhya was so apologistic for holding the session in Mysore. Where else could it have been held? Bangalore may be bigger and wealthier with its industries, but it has not the conveniences nor the beauty and the peaceful calm that are the charm of Mysore.

As a teacher of philosophy I have always emphasised the concreteness of philosophy and how a philosopher should not be lost in mere thought but should take an active interest in life and in shaping things for the better.

I am glad that the successful organisation of this Conference is the result of the efforts of Professor N. A. Nikam and Mr Mallaradhya, both of whom were my students and I am proud of them, that both have shown great ability. I cannot but hope that the delegates from the West have enjoyed their stay in Mysore and will carry back with them happy memories of their contacts with us and the East. I trust too that the Indian delegates will all remember their happy contacts with their western philosopher and carry with them the interest and earnestness of thought and high philosophic thinking. Special thanks are due to His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore for the great personal interest he has taken in the successful work of this conference and his Highness has given an additional proof of this by donating Rs 5,000

towards the cost of printing the proceedings of this conference. Lastly I should like to convey on behalf of the Indian delegates our great appreciation to Hons. Berger and his colleagues. East may remain East and West may remain West, but there can be neither East nor West where the love of philosophy is concerned and we philosophers from the East and West can meet for the mutual quest for truth.

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Delegates from the following Countries were invited but were not able to attend the meeting and expressed regrets and best wishes: BURMA, CEYLON, CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, INDONESIA, JAPAN, NORWAY, PAKISTAN, POLAND, SOUTH VIETNAM, SWEDEN, THAILAND, URUGUAY, U.S.S.R., YUGOSLAVIA.



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