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THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

JAMES A. C. BROWN was born in Edinburgh in 1911. After taking a degree in medicine at Edinburgh University he travelled in Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, and the Balkan countries, and became specially interested in Psychiatry. On the outbreak of war he joined the R.A.M.C. and became a Specialist in Psychiatry in the Middle East, where he had experience ranging from the treatment of battle casualties to work in prisons and the psychological selection of recruits for the Palestinian Forces. In the Army he learned the importance of social factors and morale in the prevention of mental illness, and the significance of the social aspects of medicine. At present he is engaged in Industrial Medicine in London. The present volume is the author's second book ; in 1946 *The Distressed Mind* was published in the Thinker's Library.


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CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE GROUP MIND

THERE is nothing new about our present interest in social life and its problems. At all times there have been thinkers who have concerned themselves with the question of the origins of society and its relations, actual and ideal, to the individuals composing it. Yet it is only in comparatively recent times that the scientist, as opposed to the mystic and the philosopher, has attempted to answer the precise questions: How *in fact* do people behave towards each other? and, How *in fact* are societies built up and their institutions developed? The answer to the first question forms the subject-matter of social psychology, while sociology attempts to answer the second. For us, the importance of these sciences lies in our realization that until such problems are better understood we cannot hope to make the best use of modern knowledge and technical achievements. Not only may we fail to utilize them adequately, but we may actually destroy civilization altogether by a positive misuse of our powers. Science, says Bertrand Russell, has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die.

Social psychology and sociology are, of course, not the only social sciences. Knowledge may be gained from the study of man's past in prehistoric

archæology and history; from the study of his customs in ethnology; in the study of man himself, or anthropology; and the study of how he deals with the wealth produced by the resources of the earth, or economics. In this book, however, we shall not keep rigidly to any one of these sciences, but will pass from one to the other when necessary in order to get as comprehensive a picture as possible of what is so far known about man in relation to society.

Early writers on social problems were more often engaged in theoretical discussions about the nature of the State and with the devising of ideal societies or Utopias than with matters of fact. But their observations supply an interesting sidelight on modern studies and show that the philosophers were long ago asking questions which we are, in many cases, still trying to answer. There are, it must be remembered, two differences in method between the social philosopher and the scientist. In the first place, the philosopher works by sitting in his study and thinking, while the scientist goes out to observe; and secondly, the philosopher thinks in terms of values—that is, of good and evil—which are not the concern of the scientist as such. Thus if the scientist were asked how to build a good society, he would have to ask, "Good for what?" Good for training its members for the Kingdom of Heaven, or for giving the greatest happiness to the greatest number, or for its capacity to produce an intellectual or a warrior *élite*? The first of these forms was held to be the ideal of the good State by St. Augustine in his *De Civitate Dei*; the second by that practical English utilitarian Jeremy Bentham. Plato believed in an intellectual *élite*, and

Nietzsche in an *élite* of supermen. When he is told what kind of society is desired, the scientist may then have some ideas as to how to attain it, provided that it is really capable of achievement. Some Utopias contain inner contradictions, and are therefore impossible to achieve at any time, while others are merely impossible to achieve at a particular time in history. For example, the City of God of St. Augustine, with its ideal of priestly supremacy, would be an impossible ideal for the twentieth century, but it was very nearly realized in the centuries preceding the Renaissance while the Church still held considerable temporal power. Bearing this in mind, we shall not expect to find philosophers in agreement as to the form of the ideal society—a concept which, in any case, has little meaning if regarded as an absolute. One can conceive of a society which is ideal only for a certain people, at a certain level of culture, and during a particular period in history.

The ancient Greeks were much preoccupied with discussing the, to us, very topical question of whether States or the individuals composing them are more important. One school of philosophers, the Pythagoreans, taught that the individual should subordinate himself to the whole and invariably act for the general good. They argued that, since the welfare of all depended on the State, it was only reasonable to make it of primary importance. The argument, therefore, was that supporting the State would in the end benefit the individual—the Greeks, being reasonable men, never deified the State as an end in itself, as did the nineteenth-century German philosophers under the influence of Hegel. In opposition to the Pythagoreans, the Sophist school believed that society was

unimportant in comparison with the individual man. They disapproved of State control, and thought, as do many modern Liberals, that government and laws were used by the weaker members of society in order to protect themselves from the stronger and more successful. These, at any rate, were the views attributed to a Sophist philosopher by Plato in one of his dialogues. But Plato himself believed that, since the problem was to create a State in which all men could lead good and useful lives, the function of law was to ensure, by force if necessary, the co-operation of the minority who would not help of their own free will. The "Good Life," described in his book the *Republic*, did not include the slaves on whose labours the economy of the Greek city-State was based.

The greatest of Plato's pupils, Aristotle, had somewhat similar ideas to his teacher, but he restricted the rights of the individual to a much greater degree. Since men were manifestly unequal in ability, wealth, and status at birth, Aristotle considered that they should be given only rights proportional to these natural inequalities. Like most Greeks, he had a poor opinion of democracy, and held that monarchy and aristocracy were the best forms of government.

Later Greek schools showed a similar divergence of opinion. One of them—the Stoic school—held, like the Pythagoreans, that social life was a duty before which the individual should subordinate himself. Nevertheless, they took a broad view of civilization, and declared their goal to be the good of all mankind. Hence they did not believe that one State should be supported against another, but that all States should live at peace in accord with the "Natural Law" of the

Universe. The Epicureans, another philosophical school, agreed with the Sophists that the rights of man should be considered first. Since, they said, society was founded for mutual protection and the benefit of all, a government could be called good only when it supplied these requirements. When it failed in this men had the right, and even the duty, to alter it, by changing the laws and deposing those who were responsible for misrule.

With the beginning of the Christian era the same opposing theories persisted, but with a slightly different background. Those who upheld the power of the State did so, in the Middle Ages, in the name of God, and, after the Renaissance, in the name of the nation and the king. Generally speaking, the tendency was towards absolutism, and the contrary thesis of the importance of the individual was not popular until the time of Locke, at the end of the seventeenth century. The mediæval Schoolmen developed the idea that the State was founded by God, who had delegated his authority to the Church and the king. This being the case, disobedience to the royal authority was equivalent to disobedience to God and was therefore sinful. St. Thomas Aquinas considered, on these grounds, that although the State ought to concern itself with the happiness of the people, a bad government should be changed only by legal means. Revolution, however bad the administration might be, was never justifiable. Identical views on revolution were held, in post-Renaissance times, by the English philosopher Hobbes, whose book the *Leviathan* was a defence of the divine right of kings. Hobbes, in an attempt to make absolutism reasonable, said that the natural state of man was one of constant fear of attack

from his enemies, to escape from which he created society. In this act individuals gave up many of their rights in exchange for security, and delegated power to a ruler, who, however tyrannical he might be, was a lesser evil than the terror and cruelty of their original condition. We can see that, while the mediæval view of the State had been modified by the essentially universal attitude of the Catholic Church, by the time of Hobbes the State had become an end in itself.

In opposition to these views, the English philosopher Locke and the French writer J. J. Rousseau believed men to be naturally free and equal. Nobody had the right to take away the life or property of another, or to interfere with his liberty. Society, they said, had been set up as a contract agreed on by the group in their common interest, but even prior to this men had been naturally good and peace-loving. Rousseau went further than Locke, since he was prepared to put his theory of the goodness of the "natural man" into practice.

Government, he stated, should not be merely by the representatives of the people, but by the people themselves. That is to say, he believed in direct government such as obtained among the citizens of Athens in its Golden Age, and, in his own time, in some of the Swiss cantons. There must be no ruling or privileged class, and there should be a "return to nature," since war, tyranny, and poverty are diseases of civilization.

These two writers, whatever the defects of their theories, realized the important truth that man is largely what society makes him. Man without a social background is inconceivable, because all

adult behaviour is learned from the environment. People are not born "bad" or "criminal," because badness and criminality are forms of social behaviour meaningless apart from group life. We shall discuss this problem more fully in a later chapter, but in the meantime it is sufficient to note that, although a man may be born more impulsive or of lower intelligence than normal, and thus, perhaps, more liable to steal, he cannot be born a thief. Stealing is a man-created concept dependent on the institution of private ownership of property. In a society without this institution (and a number of such societies exist) it is meaningless.

The French Revolution, of which these two writers were the forerunners, gave a new impetus to social studies. As the initial idealism wore off and gave place once more to reaction, the question arose as to how liberty and equality could be attained, and whether, in fact, it was possible to attain them at all. So, for the first time, it was suggested, mainly by the writers Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, that scientific method might be used in the study of society. Saint-Simon did little beyond making this suggestion, but the idea was taken up seriously by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who can thus claim to be the founder of Sociology as it is now understood. In his writings Comte gave up the idea of a social contract to account for the origins of society and showed that the social impulse is innate in human nature. He described the development of civilization as taking place in three stages: a military stage, in which force was the main sanction; a revolutionary stage of transition; and a "positive" stage, in which scientific experts would guide the life of the people. In

England, about the same time, John Stuart Mill (1806-73) was also interested in the scientific approach. He thought that a careful study of history would show how one form of society followed another and that from this it might be possible, by observing trends in present-day life, to predict future possibilities. He looked forward to greater equality of opportunity and distribution of wealth, and, although he repudiated what he considered to be the tyranny of Socialism, he believed that some degree of State control was a necessary evil. The utilitarian philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), influenced by Darwin's theory of Natural Selection, attributed the formation of social groups to their survival value. He thought that State interference should be as little as possible in order to give full play to the law of the survival of the fittest. Only by competition, he considered, could the best and most efficient members of society be preserved rather than the weaker and less adequate.

Throughout history, then, there have tended to be two schools of thought on the nature of society, the one claiming that the State is simply a group of individuals living together for their own mutual benefit, and the other that the State is something more than the individuals constituting it. In its extremest form the latter theory claims that the State is the only reality, and that its members, men and women, have no true significance by themselves. Finally, this path leads to Hegel's Prussian absolutism and the Nazi and Fascist State.

At the present day there is, in social psychology, a belief somewhat similar to this, concerning what is called the group mind. It is maintained that when

individuals form a group another entity arises which has, in some sense, a real existence apart from the individuals constituting the group. Thus Durkheim and McDougall refer to the group or social mind, and Jung to the collective or racial unconscious. Maeterlinck, in a somewhat different sphere, maintained that a nest of ants or termites has a collective soul, and we have all heard *ad nauseam* about the soul of Germany or Italy. Even so intelligent a writer as Herbert Spencer likened the community to an organism, thereby implying that each individual has a relationship to the group resembling that of a cell in the body to the whole creature. This, of course, is sheer nonsense, based on a misuse of words. A cell cannot exist by itself, but a man can, though perhaps not very comfortably. A number of people from a society can set up a smaller community and live quite happily, controlling their own affairs, but who ever heard of a piece of muscle or liver tissue setting up on its own except in a laboratory? Furthermore (and this is the main point), a body is aware of itself in however lowly a degree, but a group has no ideas or feelings or emotions as such. All that one finds on examination are the feelings, emotions, and thoughts of John Smith, Tom Jones, and others, which, although they may spread to the rest of the group, remain essentially the feelings and thoughts of individuals.

Society is a system of relationships which does not exist apart from the persons composing it, and although men behave differently in a crowd from their behaviour as individuals there is not, in fact, any new quality produced which was not already there. For instance, a quiet, respectable man may, in a crowd, shout for a negro to be lynched, but

only because aggressive desires are present (although usually latent) in everyone. Ordinarily these desires are kept under control, and even out of awareness, by the realization that they are not socially approved. But when placed in a group where this type of behaviour is condoned, the individual can let his aggression come to the surface and can act on it. No idea, whether noble or base, comes from a crowd unless it was, to begin with, in the mind of at least one member. Crowds do not as a rule indulge in very noble behaviour, because, for an emotion to be communicable to a group, it must be capable of appealing to even the most stupid person present. Take, for example, the Crusades as a mass-movement in which religious fervour was apparently displayed by many thousands of people. What were the actual facts behind this movement?

In Europe at that time an increase in population had led to increasing feuds between the nobles, owing to lack of land for their offspring. These feuds led to great hardships and suffering among the peasants, and the destruction of crops, due to the continual fighting, was producing a threat of famine. At the Council of Clermont, in 1095, the Pope Urban II, who appears to have been a realist, called for a Crusade, and gave the following reasons, which probably give a fairly good idea of just why the ordinary man went on the Crusades. To the practical individuals he pointed out that the constant fighting in Europe was producing desolation, and that it would be better if they directed their energies elsewhere; to the dull and greedy he said that in the East there was plunder to be had for the taking; and to the religious, that the Holy Land must be rescued from Moslem rule. This

example gives a fairly clear picture of the motives of a crowd; the people wanting to work off excess energy, the lustful, and the idealistic minority of leaders who really believe in the "rightness" of their cause. The religious tone of the Crusades came from the last group, and was gladly accepted by the others to furnish an excuse for doing the less creditable things they had already the desire to do. When discreditable things are being done, the fact that others are indulging in usually forbidden pleasures is a sort of tacit permission to the more scrupulous to carry out acts they would never have done on their own initiative. It is as if Society said to them: "All right, carry on and do as you please to-day." Crowd psychology is not really so mysterious, and is certainly not explained any more readily by reference to a group mind.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that we must distinguish between a group of people living together for their mutual benefit, though not necessarily in actual physical contact, and a "crowd," which implies a number of people, with or without a common aim, actually present together at a particular place and time. "Social" is not the same as "sociable." The distinction is important, because a scientist may be a useful member of society although he keeps almost entirely to himself, whereas a criminal may be surrounded by friends and yet be a liability to society. The partly isolated individual, acting on his own initiative, is aware that he will be held responsible for his actions, and behaves accordingly. It is for this reason that a man sitting quietly in his home will usually talk fairly sensibly on political matters, while in a public meeting he may be a menace. Totalitarian States do not like men to be too much

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alone, since solitude leads to thought, and thought is dangerous to any social body founded on the negation of reason. Rallies, parades, and meetings have been part of the stock-in-trade of the purveyor of political or religious humbug since the State began.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION

AUGUSTE COMTE was right: no matter how far back into the past one goes, there is no sign that man ever existed except in groups. From the start we are dealing, not with individuals, but with "society." Unfortunately, since specifically human life began at least half a million years ago, it is difficult, from the few bones and the rough stone implements which are all that remain, to picture what these early societies were like. It is certain that for four-fifths of this time there was no attempt to use anything but crude stone and wooden tools. Then, about 20,000 years ago, there seems to have been a sudden flood of inventiveness, which produced the use of metals, the discovery of the wheel, boats, pottery, weaving, and, in some places, the use of stone for building purposes. This series of discoveries followed some time after the end of the last Ice Age, and is connected with the appearance, 30,000 or more years ago, of the first true men.

It is reasonable to assume, by analogy, that the earlier types of sub-men went about, as do some of the higher apes, in small family groups consisting of a male leader and his "wives," together with a number of younger males. At this stage there was no permanent association with other families—the group simply wandered from place to place, living in caves or rough shelters, and gathering fruit and roots or

hunting small animals, which were killed with stones or sticks. Later, these family groups tended to coalesce and form clans. Peoples at the clan level of culture can be found at the present day among the Eskimos, the Australian aborigines, the Bushmen of Africa, and the Veddahs of Ceylon. In the nineteenth century there lived, in Tasmania, a people who were perhaps even closer in culture to the earliest human types. They are now extinct, but a certain amount of information has been left by the original European settlers telling of their customs. Neither men nor women wore clothes, except in winter-time, when they sometimes covered themselves with kangaroo skins, and houses or huts were unknown. When the weather was bad, they simply sheltered behind a rough screen of wooden sticks on which was spread the bark of trees. The only weapons used were spears and clubs, both of wood, and their tools, identical with those of the Old Stone Age savages, were made of stone chipped roughly into shape. They did not know how to fish, but lived on eggs, snakes, lizards, grubs, shellfish, and occasionally birds when they were able to kill them.

Unlike the Tasmanians, the Veddahs of Ceylon are still in existence. Among this people two or three families live together in a cave, but they seem to have little interest in other family groups living near by. There are no social classes and no warfare, and marriages are monogamous (mainly because of the small number of women). Brothers frequently marry their sisters because it is difficult to find anyone outside the family group. They have no religion and do not believe in gods, although they believe, as do all primitive people, in the spirits of the dead.

At a further stage of development there arose among some peoples a more closely knit clan system, characterized by the formation of sub-groups based on the family and its relatives which, in some areas, were symbolized by the totem, an animal or plant which was a sort of emblem representing the sub-group. The totem animal was sacred to the families it represented, and they were not allowed to kill it. Members had to marry outside their sub-group, since marriage with a member of the same totem was regarded as incest. This institution, known as exogamy, will be more fully described later. It is still found among the natives of Australia and elsewhere.

Primitive people did not usually remain for long in a particular area. Since they did not know how to plant seeds and live by agriculture, any one place was sooner or later exhausted of food, and they had to move on. This nomadic type of life was the usual way of living all over the inhabited world until about 1200 B.C., when, probably in North Africa and Western Asia, men began to discover the arts of cultivation and the domestication of animals. They began to use implements of polished stone instead of the crude chipped ones used hitherto, and, with these discoveries, the archaeological period known as the Neolithic, or New Stone, Age commenced.

Agricultural civilization led to a series of important discoveries. In the first place, the farmer, by the nature of his work, becomes keenly aware of the passing of time—the grain sprouts from the ground at a certain season, ripens, and must be harvested at another season. So calculations were necessary in order to know when seed-time was due, and this was especially important in areas like the Nile valley,

where seasonal floods made the soil fertile and ready for sowing. It was essential to know when the floods would occur and just how high they would be in the coming year. For this reason farmers invented methods to tell the time and to measure the rising of the waters. The stars were studied too, since they were a means of telling the seasons and reckoning direction. In the course of centuries this knowledge began to accumulate, and the people who possessed it, together with the mass of superstition and magic inseparable from primitive science, became a privileged class—the priests. Religion at this stage was naturally founded in the soil, and reflected the interests of the agricultural community. The priests dramatized the life-history of the grain, which, buried in the earth, rises again, as it were, from the dead, and thus arose the oldest religious myth of the god who dies and is resurrected, a myth found in many lands all over the world. In Egypt, this god was called Osiris, in Babylonia, Tammuz, and from Greece came the legend of Ceres, the goddess of grain, whose daughter Proserpine went into the underworld to live with Pluto on the condition that once a year she would be allowed to return to earth. On her return, the grain and vegetation, it was said, could ripen once more.

A far older custom of primitive people, which became associated with the fertility beliefs, was the custom of blood sacrifice. Early man attached great importance to blood, which seemed to contain the secret of life and strength. They noted that when a man was wounded and bled, his strength left him and he was in danger of death. What, then, could be more natural than to use this lifegiving fluid to obtain

strength for oneself or give it to others? In this way originated such customs as cannibalism—the savage ate his dead foe, or even a loved one, to obtain their strength. When a man died, he was sometimes painted with red earth, apparently on the theory that anything looking like blood might have the same effect in strengthening the weak. Finally, human sacrifice became connected with fertility rites in a double way; blood helped to make the earth strong and fertile, and the individual who was sacrificed was re-enacting the story of the god who died. Osiris, incidentally, was also the god of the dead, and the preoccupation of the Egyptians with the life after death no doubt arose from their early religious system. From these primitive origins came many of the elements of the principal Mediterranean religions—the worship of Attis, Osiris, Mithra, and, at a later date, of Christ. Similar myths are found all over the world, as far away as Peru and Mexico, but it is still undecided whether these South American folk-tales have arisen spontaneously or whether they arrived by a process of diffusion from a common source in Egypt.

It was in the river-valley civilizations of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Indus that the first national States were founded. In Egypt the clans began to coalesce, since it takes larger groups of people to farm efficiently, and the chieftains of the local kingdoms, at a later date, united to form the two States of upper and lower Egypt. Finally, upper and lower Egypt were united into a single kingdom by the Pharaoh Menes in 3400 B.C.

In the valley of the Nile the retreating floods leave behind masses of mud, which, drying in the sun, break up into roughly square-shaped blocks. These

were possibly the first bricks, until the idea was developed of making them by hand and using straw to make the mud hold together more firmly. Although, as we have seen, stone was used later for building, its use was generally reserved for temples and public buildings, and the ordinary people continued to live in mud-brick houses as they do to-day. Before 4000 B.C., copper had been discovered, and, with this, the age of metals began, while about a thousand years later, in 3000 B.C. or thereabouts, an alphabet of twenty-four letters was being used and writing was already highly developed.

Since the annual floods washed away all boundaries, a system of land-measurements had to be devised, so that, when the floods had passed, the boundaries could be marked out again. It was also necessary to build systems of canals both to control the waters and to take them to the further parts of the valley. From these necessities geometry (the name means earth-measurement) and mathematics are derived. The Egyptian peasant, however, never thought of the land on which he worked as his own property. It was the property of the god, and part of his crops were given to Pharaoh, who was the representative of god on earth. This was the earliest form of taxation. Money was not used in Egypt until its use was learned from the Greeks, in the fourth century B.C.

In Mesopotamia, in the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates, another civilization arose about the same time as that of Egypt and was in many ways similar to it. As in Egypt, the wealth of the Babylonians depended on adequate irrigation of the land, but unlike Egypt, which is comparatively narrow between its limestone hills, Mesopotamia is a

broad valley, and the fields were often a long way from the river. Therefore, a much more elaborate system of dams and reservoirs had to be built, and since these were common property and the product of collective effort, rules had to be made regarding the fair distribution of water. In this way the inhabitants of the country became law-conscious, and, about 2000 B.C., the first written legal code, devised by King Hammurabi, was engraved on a stone column and set up in the temple in Babylon.

There were two other differences between this civilization and that of Egypt. One was the warlike character of the people, and the other their pre-occupation with trading. Both traits arose from the same geographical cause—that, whereas in Egypt the land was surrounded by desert which acted as a protective barrier, in Mesopotamia the surrounding mountains were inhabited by fierce tribes ready to raid and plunder the country whenever possible. With these tribes the peoples of the valley engaged both in trade and in defensive warfare. The Egyptians were, by contrast, a peaceful people—at least, until the inhabitants of the surrounding countries developed means of transport which enabled them to cross the desert. After the Hyksos invasions from Palestine, which were carried out by means of horses and war chariots, hitherto unknown to the Egyptians, the Pharaohs had to become warriors or perish. Thus a military caste arose.

Two important observations are suggested by these facts. The first is that war is, in general, due to land-hunger, or, to be more exact, to the desire of the “have nots” to obtain the natural wealth of the land from the “haves.” The wars of religion in Europe


may seem an exception to this rule, but, as we saw in the first chapter in relation to the Crusades, and will see later in connection with the Reformation, the religious motive has usually an economic one behind it. The second point to note is that no people is "naturally" warlike, and this trait, in common with other characteristics, whether of nations or individuals, is purely a response to a certain sort of environment. These remarks will, however, be elaborated in a later chapter.

About the year 2000 B.C. the Semitic peoples were spreading all over the known world—that is, all over the Mediterranean and Near East areas, where they dispossessed the old races. They were ruling in Mesopotamia, had conquered Egypt (the Hyksos invasion, which we have already mentioned), and a group of them, the Phœnicians, had become seafarers and occupied Crete and some parts of Southern Greece. The Phœnicians built the cities of Tyre and Sidon in what is now Syria, and, later, Carthage in North Africa. In Crete a wonderful civilization flourished which has only comparatively recently been brought to light—a civilization where the arts reached a high level, where the buildings had running water and drainage installations, and where the women wore corsets and crinolines resembling those of nineteenth-century England. It has been suggested by Sir G. Elliot Smith that the Phœnicians were trading with India about 800 B.C., and in this way began a spread of Egyptian culture to Asia. From India the ideas spread to Burma, the Malay Archipelago, the Pacific islands, and ultimately to America, where they planted the seeds of the elaborate civilizations existing there up till the time of the Spanish

conquests. Among the ideas thus spread (according to this so-called diffusionist theory of culture) were the practice of mummification, the building of huge stone monuments and pyramids, the worship of the sun, the weaving of linen, and the practice of circumcision. The culture which was characterized by these practices has been called the Heliolithic (sun-stone) culture, and as it spread, with the help of the Phœnician sailors, it displaced in many parts of the world the older and more primitive civilization of the vegetation- and fertility-gods. But at last, after many centuries of the sun-culture, a race of wild barbarians from Central Asia began to enter into Eastern Europe and to spread to the South and West. In Britain they displaced the Heliolithic people, who had built Stonehenge (the Phœnicians had visited England too), and began the Bronze Age. In Italy they began to displace the Asiatic Etruscans, and a number of them invaded Greece.

To the cultured Phœnicians the first Greeks who came down from the North must have seemed ignorant savages. Living in small villages, they neither knew how to write nor how to use metals. But they were apt pupils, and in a few hundred years produced a civilization unique in the history of the world. The Greeks had three qualities in particular: they were intensely curious, had complete faith in reason, and were unhampered by any respect for customs and conventions.* The great cultures which had existed

* "The nationalistic outlook of the Greeks was largely due to the accident that, coming into the Aegean as conquerors, they absorbed the technology of Egypt and Sumer, diffused over the Eastern Mediterranean, without at the same time succumbing to the animistic over-beliefs of the indigenous inhabitants." (John Katz, *The Will to Civilization*)



up till this time had shown a totally different attitude to life. They had generally been ruled by a priest-king, the head of a priestly caste who were the sole possessors of such knowledge as there was. The priests were not curious beyond their purely practical needs, and were even antagonistic to the innovator. So, although geometry and arithmetic were discovered in Egypt, it was left to the Greeks to go beyond mere land-measurement and begin the science of mathematics. The Babylonians had studied the stars, partly for religious and partly for more practical reasons (the first solar eclipse to be recorded was in 763 B.C.). They had studied the anatomy of animals in an attempt to foretell the future, and begun the science of physics to enable themselves to build irrigation systems. But the Greeks separated science from religion and studied in order to find out what the universe was like. Through their efforts the scientific study of biology, physics, and medicine began, the first history-books were written, and literature became something more than a mere collection of religious instructions or tribal tales. With characteristic audacity they took the rituals, in which events in the lives of the gods were depicted, from religion, and turned them into the drama for a purely secular theatre. Perhaps, indeed, the main achievement of Greece was this secularization of science, law, and art.

But, although they had carried out their researches in a spirit of free inquiry which abhorred nothing more than intellectual tyranny, the knowledge acquired by the Greeks was to lie on Europe with a heavy hand for centuries to come. The Roman Empire arose and was destroyed, having added to

civilization the concept of a unified law in Southern and Western Europe, and an excellent system of roads. The law was largely destroyed by the barbarian invasions of the fourth century A.D., but the concept of a universal empire was converted into a religious and political ideal, the Holy Roman Empire, which, like the Roman roads, survived. Throughout the Dark Ages and mediæval times, science, law, and religion were mainly based on the distorted relics of Greek and Roman culture. This was probably due to two causes—the destruction carried out by the barbarians, which resulted in the intellectual impoverishment of Europe, and the influence of the Catholic Church, which did not then, any more than it does now, believe in progress. So the Church took its official philosophy from St. Thomas Aquinas, who had modified the philosophy of Aristotle. The doctor studied Hippocrates and his Roman successor Galen, and when one wanted to know the answer to any problem, all that was thought necessary was to look up the classical writers (or what was left of them, for much had been lost), and if the answer could not be found, the search simply had to be continued. All knowledge was believed to be in the ancient books, if only it could be found. The experimental approach had been forgotten. To men with this mental attitude it came with the shock of blasphemy when science at last revolted—when Galileo dared to put Archimedes to the test, and Paracelsus burned the books of Hippocrates and Galen before beginning his lectures on medicine at Prague.

We must now digress briefly to discuss the origin of the social classes, which become an important phenomenon in history about this time. It was noted

earlier that the first classes to arise were the priestly and military castes in the old river-valley civilizations. The other classes, however, arose in a somewhat different way, their origins being largely due to the institutions of slavery and private property. Primitive peoples were at first accustomed to kill the prisoners taken in war, but when they settled down to an agricultural life it became more profitable to keep their prisoners as slaves, who thus began to form a social class. The agricultural way of life caused a gradual breakdown in primitive communism in another way, since, when a government was stabilized, and therefore less strict, men working on a piece of land finally came to consider it as their own. Sometimes they got it as a reward for military or other services, and those who worked harder acquired more land at the expense of others. In these ways there arose a division into those who owned more and those who owned less. The latter tended ultimately to join the slave class or to become serfs, who, although not actually slaves, had very few rights. This was the state of affairs in Greece, where a group of freemen and their ruler lived at the expense of slaves who had no civic rights and who did all the work. Under the Roman Empire the gulf between those who owned land and those who did not widened, and the landless individuals flocked to the cities to take part in trade. Many of them were successful, and thus three social classes developed: the hereditary landowners become aristocrats (patricians), the men who had become wealthy by trade—a sort of capitalist class (equestrians), and the landless and moneyless proletariat (plebeians). As for slavery, as opposed to serfdom (a slave is unpaid and has no rights; a serf is paid but is bound to, and transferred

with, the land on which he works), it gradually died out with the custom of buying freedom, which became more and more widespread, and died out in the Middle Ages, until the discovery of the New World, when the slave trade in Negroes began. Serfdom did not end till much later, for it existed in Russia until 1861, and in Scotland there were still a few serfs in 1799.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire there was a short period of peace which ended with the death of Charlemagne in 814. With this event began the era of Feudalism, which was characterized by almost constant warfare between petty principalities with indefinite frontiers. Under the feudal system men were divided into three social groups (nobles, priests, and workers), and the unit of the State was the small village grouped around the castle of the nobleman. The roads in Europe at this time were very bad, and the countryside was dangerous on account of the many roving bands of robbers and outlaws, so most men never left the village in which they were born. As we saw in Chapter I, the theory of the feudal State was that the land was held by the king from God, and the nobles in turn held their land from the king and subdivided it to other men. Each man owed various services to the one above him, principally military service. On the soil, or working at a craft, were the serfs who rendered service to their overlord in the form of labour in return for protection, law, and order.

It will be remembered that the Pope diverted the fighting in Europe into the Crusades, which, beginning in 1095, lasted for two centuries. As a result of these campaigns the face of Europe was profoundly changed and the feudal system began to come to an end. The

Crusaders had been transported to Palestine by the ships of the Italian cities of Genoa, Venice, and Pisa, and on the return voyages the ships came laden with sugar, spices, silks, glassware, and perfumes. The great influx of these luxury goods, and the general economic activity due to the provisioning of the armies engaged, stimulated commerce. People travelled about more, markets were set up, and on the outskirts of the feudal walled town began to appear the booths of the new merchant class. Little did the lords of the manor know that one day the hereditary aristocracy would have to give way before the despised merchants!

The skilled craftsmen of the towns began to band themselves together in guilds which determined prices and hours of labour, and the system of barter, which had been the usual method of trade, gave way to the use of money. The creation of finance, in the modern sense, began. A much more important change, however, due to the necessity for large-scale commerce to have considerable areas free from petty frontier barriers, and with uniform laws, was the rise of national consciousness, which led to the founding of sovereign States. The old Europe where wars were between dynasties began to die, and gave way to the modern Europe of separate warring States.

The Renaissance, beginning in the fifteenth century, marked the end of the mediæval period. Characterized as it was by the return of Europe to the secular spirit, the Renaissance was thus in many ways similar to the period which had followed the rise of Greek civilization when it displaced the priestly cultures of the Near East. The historical background leading up

to this change in attitude was the gradual discovery of, and contact with, the wider world, begun in the time of the Crusades and continued in the voyages of discovery of Columbus (1492) and Vasco da Gama (1498), among others. Of great importance, too, was the conquest of Constantinople, in 1453, by the Turks, which caused Greek scholars, fleeing from the city, to bring their books and learning into Europe. It was the spread of this knowledge, both from ancient Greek writers and later Arab sources, that increased the spirit of rationalism, but the increased awareness of national solidarity, which made people resentful of the authority and temporal power of the Church, was an earlier factor. This resentment was the fundamental cause of the Reformation. Thus the revolt under Hus, in Czechoslovakia (Bohemia in those days), was directed against the German bishops, who owned much of the land. In Germany, Luther's revolt was even more clearly based on national and economic motives. It must be remembered that there had been many previous reformers—for example, Wyclif in England—who, sincere though they were, had not caused a vast conflagration. In fact, Luther himself, who had no intention other than the remedy of certain purely ecclesiastical abuses, was deeply shocked at the result of his agitations, for the proposed reform of the Church developed into a battle against its economic and political domination. The German nobles were not slow to use the religious excuse as a reason for confiscating ecclesiastical land, and we may note that, Henry VIII, although a staunch Catholic, did not hesitate to repudiate Papal authority and suppress the monasteries after confiscating their property for the same economic motives.

The power of the merchant class continued to increase. While the towns grew and trade flourished, it began to take over the common-lands which had previously been used by the whole community, in order to use them for new methods in farming. As in the days of the late Roman Empire, a new class of dispossessed peasantry, who had nothing to offer but their labour, came to be added to the old serf class. A group of merchant adventurers formed companies for trading overseas and began to found colonies. In 1688 they gained political control in England from the Stuarts, the representatives of the old hereditary aristocracy, and the way to the Industrial Revolution was open. In France the revolution of 1789 was of a similar origin. Although the merchant class was joined by the common people against the hereditary aristocrats, it was nevertheless essentially a movement of the bourgeoisie.

The Industrial Revolution, which followed, was led by Britain. It involved the displacement of the handworker by the machine, and the increasing migration of displaced peasants to the towns. The era of large-scale capitalism started, and in place of the antagonism between aristocrat and merchant came the new antagonism between capitalist (the former merchant) and proletariat.

The purpose of this brief outline of European civilization is to show that progress is made in response to a stimulating environment; in other words, that necessity is the mother of invention. Further, that historical movements, whether in the spheres of war, art, or religion, are often based on economic and technological factors. Our own battles, like those of primitive men, are essentially over the possession of

hunting-grounds, or, in modern terms, land, markets, and wealth (which are nothing if not the means to obtain food).

In spite of the great advances of European culture, there is no reason to think that the African Negro or the Eskimo are less intelligent than dwellers in more temperate lands. The Eskimo remains uncivilized because he lacks the materials for making tools, without which civilized life is impossible. As regards the Negro, we may guess that, living in a land where natural produce was usually abundant, he had less need to fight or invent, since the fruits of the earth were there to hand. The only ways in which such peoples can develop further are by a change in environment or by the invasion of another people at a higher level of culture. Europe was especially favourable to the growth of civilization: it has a relatively large coastline, which urged men to travel and master the sea, and there are many rivers to make it fertile, as compared with, say, Central Asia, while the soil, although rich, will not produce crops without a good deal of attention.

It is to such facts as these, and not to any inherent racial superiority, that we must attribute the flowering of Western culture.

CHAPTER III

PRIMITIVE THOUGHT

THE mental equipment of the primitive savage is in no way inherently different from that of the civilized man, nor have we any reason to suppose that there is a particular type of thought or behaviour in primitive races which differs fundamentally from our own. Savage people behave and think as they do simply because they have been given certain traditions and beliefs by their culture, which have proved to work more or less efficiently in daily life, and because they have insufficient information to criticize ideas which do not fit in with reality. Children in our own country, for example, are told fairy-tales about childbirth which they accept because they receive the information from sources considered to be authoritative, because the tales explain the facts as they are so far known to them, and, finally, because they have not enough knowledge to contradict what they have been told. Yet a child may be as intelligent as an adult, and differs only in the amount of knowledge it possesses and the lack of certain habits of thinking which are acquired later.

When we see a film it appears to be perfectly comprehensible because we are unaware of the habits we have developed through a life of cinema-going. We have learned to accept the conventions of the screen. But looked at in a naïvely realistic way,

a film is far from easy to understand. In a play on the stage one sees a group of people behaving more or less as they do in real life. But imagine a playgoer (say of Shakespeare's day) seeing a film for the first time. He would ask himself: "Are these people real? If so, why do they suddenly change in size? Why do they suddenly disappear, and in a flash reappear in an entirely different scene? If they are not real, how do they move?" All these questions are perfectly logical, but are based on ignorance of the fact that it is possible to make pictures which move. If one does not know this, and if one has no experience of the rules of the cinema, a film becomes incomprehensible. Similarly, if the savage does not know the conventions for finding out about reality, he has to take the experiences naively as he finds them. It is a natural tendency to take all experiences at first as equally real. To a child, Mickey Mouse, a pantomime, and life at home, are all real experiences, and so are his own imaginations. For this reason children in the first five years or so of life are incapable of lying, because they have not yet become able to distinguish between truth and fantasy. Furthermore, children can think only in terms of their own feelings, and they attribute the same feelings to all other objects, whether alive or not. A child is distressed when his toy dog is accidentally stood on, since he assumes that it has the same sensations as he himself would have in a similar situation. It is only as a result of learning, both from later experiences and from the stored-up knowledge of thousands of years possessed by his parents, that he begins to think differently when he grows older.

These attitudes are found in primitive savages,

along with other traits connected with insufficient grasp of reality. One such trait is the belief that like events produce like results, which is really a primitive form of scientific thinking. For instance, if there is no rain and the fields are suffering from drought, a savage may argue that if he imitates rain by pouring water ceremoniously on the ground he may in this way produce a shower. Or, if he wishes to harm someone, he may argue that he can do so by making an image of his enemy and sticking pins in it, or burning it. Another belief, closely related to this, is the use of ritual—the idea that performing an act in a certain way will make the desired result follow. For example, that a particular way of taking an oath is more effective than another.

It is interesting to note that, in the mental diseases of civilized people, one frequently finds a regression or reversion to primitive modes of thought. This is especially the case in the form of neurosis known as an obsessional state, in which the ritual type of thinking is common. A patient with this type of illness may behave in the most extraordinary way although, psychologically speaking, he is perfectly sane and realizes how foolish his behaviour may appear. He may feel impelled to stand in a certain position for a definite period of time, or to stop at every third step, or to wash in a particular way every few minutes. A relic of this type of thinking is found even in normal people when they feel mild compulsions to walk on the cracks between the paving-stones or to touch each lamp-post as they pass. In neurotics the unconscious motive behind this behaviour is an idea that these acts will in some way atone for, or relieve, the vague feelings of guilt which are present in most

cases of neurosis, and, to a lesser degree, in normal people.

We will summarize by enumerating these four types of thought characteristic of primitive people, and giving them their technical names:—

(1) Difficulty in distinguishing between reality and imagination (Fantasy-thinking).

(2) The attributing of souls to animals and inanimate objects (Animistic-thinking).

(3) The belief that like produces like (Magical-thinking).

(4) The belief that performing an act in a particular way will lead to a desired result (Ritual-thinking).

Let us now consider how these modes of thought affect the savage's attitude to life, and, further, how they have resulted in the building up of social institutions which affect us even at the present day.

An important consequence of fantasy-thinking is that to primitive people dreams are as real as the events of everyday life. When he goes to sleep, the savage is aware of some part of himself moving about, hunting, or fighting and carrying out all the actions to which he is accustomed during the day. Yet when he awakes he realizes that he has been in the same place all the time. From these apparent facts a perfectly natural deduction is that there is another self within him which can at times leave the body and go on its own errands. A seeming proof is that both his shadow and his reflection in the water suggest another self.

Primitive people are often very careful about their shadow—the Basutos, for instance, believe that if they

walk carelessly by the river-side, their shadow may be seized by a crocodile. In many languages the word for "spirit" and "shadow" are the same. Now, when early man first began to think about death, it must have seemed to him that the dead man had gone to sleep and for some reason would not awake. Probably it was assumed that the other self, the soul, had got lost, and sooner or later would come back to occupy the body. So he left food and drink beside the body and protected it from wild animals by placing it under a heap of stones, or, at a later date, inside a chamber in a burial-mound. A less charitable intention of the burial-mound or tombstone was to keep the spirit from "walking" and disturbing the living.

In this way arose the belief in spirits of the dead which is found in primitive races all over the world. The belief is not related to institutional religion, although it has contributed to the origin of religious beliefs. There are many savages who are totally without religious ideas, but who nevertheless believe in spirits which are attributed not only to men, but equally to animals, to plants, and even to stones. Some tribesmen, when out hunting, talk to the animals they are about to kill, apologizing to them, since they fear the spirits returning to haunt or harm the hunters, and in Australia certain stones supposed to contain the souls of children are visited by sterile women who want to become pregnant. This type of thought which attributes spirits to inanimate as well as living objects is called animism, and is almost universally found in early cultures.

We have seen that primitive people tend to believe that "like produces like," and that if one event is succeeded by another on one occasion, it will

inevitably be so on the next. Sir James Frazer has pointed out that this is essentially the beginning of scientific thought, since the beliefs later divide into the true sequences of cause and effect which are based on reality, and the false which continue as magic. But it is not always easy for primitive man to distinguish between the two, and magical ideas are tenacious in their hold. If, for example, a priest, at the appropriate time of year, puts on a green robe and finds that the trees are soon covered with green leaves, or if he lights a candle in the morning and the sun rises soon after, he will not easily be convinced that the events are not related. Similarly, to the savage it seems self-evident that if one harms something belonging to an enemy, the man himself will suffer thereby. Therefore natives of the countries where these beliefs are common hide their clothes, their hair after it has been cut, or scraps of food left over from meals, if they think that an enemy is wishing them harm.

Magic is thus an unscientific attempt to influence the course of events, while ritual is the correct way in which to make the magical event happen. But although we use the word "magical," it should be understood that to the savage such an event is not at all magical in our sense of the word. On the contrary, it seems to him no more remarkable that the desired effect should follow the ritual than it does to us when we press a switch and the electric light goes on. His belief in magic has no direct connection with the supernatural, although he may use it to influence spirits or, at a later stage, gods, who are, like any other entities, compelled to behave in the desired way if the ritual is done correctly. In religion, gods are

generally treated deferentially and propitiated, but even in the most highly developed religions the idea remains that ritual is a means of forcing their hand. In ancient Egypt, magicians claimed the power to compel the gods to act, and even threatened them if they disobeyed; in present-day Hinduism the same attitude is found, and Sir James Frazer states that "in France the majority of the peasants still believe that the priest possesses a secret and irresistible power over the elements." In a later passage the same writer, having noted that belief in magic precedes the origin of religion all over the world, continues: "This universal faith, this truly Catholic creed, is a belief in the efficacy of magic. While religious systems differ not only in different countries, but in the same country in different ages, the system of sympathetic magic remains everywhere and at all times substantially alike in its principles and practice. Among the ignorant and superstitious classes of modern Europe it is very much what it was thousands of years ago in Egypt and India, and what it now is among the lowest savages surviving in the remotest corners of the world."

When, among the more intelligent members of a culture, the belief in magic begins to fail, it is succeeded by a realization of their own helplessness in the face of Nature. From this state of disillusion comes the idea that if the world is not capable of being controlled by man, it must then be controlled by beings like man but far more powerful. These beings are gods, and the rest of the hierarchy of good and evil spirits.

We saw that in ancient Egypt the cycle of life and death, seed-time and harvest, was represented by the myth of Osiris, the god of grain and of the dead.

The story tells how Osiris was killed by his brother Set, and his body broken up and scattered over different parts of Egypt (representing the scattering of seed). In the Near East the vegetation- and fertility-gods of this type were succeeded by sun-gods, and later by gods of war. Thus, in Babylonia, Tammuz, who was, like Osiris, a vegetation-god, was followed by Shamash, a sun-god, and after this came Ashur, a war-god. In Egypt, Osiris was succeeded by Ammon-Ra, a sun-god who, although he did not give way to a specific god of war, became progressively more warlike in his qualities. These changes in the nature of the gods correspond to different stages of historical development, marked first by the peaceful life of the early inhabitants, followed by the sun-stone culture, and finally by an increase in warlike spirit as the nation-states arose. In these lands, as in many others, the king, who represented the god, was considered to be semi-divine—a quality of kingship which persisted for many centuries in the form of the divine right of kings, and only died out in England with the last of the Stuarts, in 1688.

A considerable advance in religious ideas was the origin of monotheism—the belief in one universal God—which dates from the revolution of Amenhotep IV, or Ikhnaton, about the year 1500 B.C. Ikhnaton instituted the worship of the sun as the one God, and although his religion was deposed by indignant priests after his death and the old religion brought back, it is probable that Jewish monotheism is derived from this source. The religion of the Jews gave rise to Christianity and influenced Islam at a much later date. It appears, however, that the Jehovah of the Jews was too austere to appeal to the early Christians, who, in

the beginning of the Christian era, brought back many of the rituals and sacraments of the old Mediterranean religions, including the worship of the virgin mother (Isis in Egypt), the sacramental meal, the idea of the Last Judgment, and, some would say, the whole story of the Christ.*

Before we leave the subject of primitive religion we must refer briefly to the question of rules of conduct and the origin of law, since these are usually thought to be, in their moral aspect at least, related to religion. In fact, however, there is nothing to support this belief. Primitive religion is concerned purely with placating the powers that rule the universe and with using ritual to influence their attitude towards mankind. Codes of moral behaviour have no place in this scheme; for there is no need of a definite code when the authority of custom is as yet unquestioned. The connection of morality with religion probably arose when the splitting of society into social classes necessitated laws applied by the ruling authority, which gave them supernatural sanction in order to ensure obedience.

At primitive levels the god is purely a tribal one, and morality applies only within the tribe. To an outsider the savage feels no moral obligations whatever, and every individual outside the tribe is regarded as an enemy (note, for instance, the attitude of the Israelites towards a conquered people). The rule of law comes much later; for law, as opposed to mere rules of behaviour, refers solely to conduct

* In the earliest days we see how man placates the powers of nature (animism). Later, with the class division of society, the real problem is man and his isolation from the community. Hence the religions of the man-god "cast out and rejected of men," of wounded and maimed gods.

which will be enforced in a court. It therefore cannot be said to exist until there are courts and a written code of laws, by which a man may know beforehand what will be the result of his breaking a given rule. The first laws in this sense arose in Babylonia, under the rule of Hammurabi. Such codes were at first under the control of a priestly caste, but they came later to contain more and more legislation concerning property and the relations between individuals. After the French Revolution laws tended to become purely secular, although in England and certain other countries there still remain laws against blasphemy and other relics of a more religious age.

The structure of the family in primitive peoples depends on two further peculiarities of their mentality. The first is that the earliest savages had no idea of the relationship between sexual intercourse and the subsequent birth of children. Indeed, strange as it may seem, there are, even at the present day, people in the Trobriand Islands in the Pacific, who lack this knowledge, where the children are looked after by the mother's brother, and the father is merely the man in whose house the mother lives. This being the case, early society is matrilineal; that is to say, descent is reckoned through the mother, instead of through the father, as is the rule in most modern civilizations. The other fact is that the savage does not think in terms of individuals, but of groups.

At this level of development the individual is of little consequence save as a member of the community, and is even strongly discouraged if he acquires any distinctive personal characteristics. Levy-Bruhl, an authority on primitive psychology, pointed out that in the Belgian Congo every individual seemed to know

the same sort of things as another, and they all gave the same replies to questions and showed the same mentality. One chief in the Congo had his own son killed for changing a legal decision which was the customary one of the tribe. In this type of society, tribes are divided into clans or totem groups, and the member of a clan is compelled to marry outside it, because the members of his own group are considered to be his blood-relations. He does not distinguish between his real father and mother and other elderly people in the clan, all of whom he accepts, to some extent at least, as his parents. All the younger women of his own age are his sisters, or, if belonging to another clan, his potential wives. In the more primitive societies a form of sexual communism prevails, and although a man may have a particular wife, he is entitled to live with any other woman outside his own group. This type of institution, in which marriage within the clan is forbidden, is known as exogamy. When each clan is represented by a totem—an animal or plant symbolizing it and supposed to protect it—the state of affairs is known as totemism. Totemism is found among both North and South American Indians, in the Pacific Islands, in Africa, and in the primitive tribes of Australia. With the advance of civilization the practice has tended to die out, but relics of sexual communism are still found all over the world. A modified form, found in lands where the matrilineal system of descent has given way to the patrilineal, is that in which the husband of a woman is considered to have sexual rights over her sisters. This custom persists even at the present day in Tahiti, which has been under European influence for many years, and was at one time common among

the Maoris. In the Aleutian Islands a woman may take the brother of her husband to live with her. A related custom, which also reveals something of primitive mentality, is that of giving one's wife to a guest for the night, the implication being that, in this way, the guest becomes a blood-brother. However hospitable this custom may appear, the intention is entirely practical, since the savage considers nobody outside his clan to be safe, and the only way to make him so is to accept him as one's own clansman, when it is hoped that he will feel bound to behave as such. Among some tribes the refusal of this privilege might be followed by the killing of the guest who had thus indicated his intention to be an enemy. It has been suggested by some writers that the ancient custom of temple prostitution, in the early days of Greece, whereby a woman had to prostitute herself to a stranger before marriage, was a relic of the original state of polygamy. In this act the woman was atoning for her "anti-social" behaviour in becoming the wife of one man.

The sexual communism of early man is paralleled by his communistic attitude to property. Although in all human races each individual is the owner of certain property which belongs to him alone, such assets as land and the wealth it produces are always regarded as the common property of the tribe. A native will refer to "my" bow and arrow, but never to "my" land. The other objects which come under common ownership vary from one culture to another. In the Pacific Islands the canoe is considered to belong to the community, and Rivers describes how, in Fiji, traders were liable to lose all their goods owing to a custom whereby persons in need could take the

property of others. In Africa many natives cannot even understand the selling of land, although their attitude varies from place to place. In some areas it is allowed to sell land only after consultation with one's kinsman, while in other places, such as the Gold Coast, the concept of private property is in no way different from that found in Europe.

Sexual communism and group marriage are usual in the early stages of human development, and are characteristics of a matrilineal society. When the role of the father in childbirth comes to be realized, the tendency is for descent to be reckoned through the male side of the family. In the older stages of culture all that could be said of a child was that the mother was So-and-so, while the father was usually unknown; but in a patrilineal society group marriage becomes displaced by individual marriage, and the children, being born of one father, form the more limited family in the modern sense.

The early Christian view about marriage, inferred in the New Testament, is that it is an attempt to legitimize the sexual instinct, thereby making it slightly less disgusting—"it is better to marry than to burn," in the words of the Apostle Paul. Nothing could be further from the truth. For, as we have seen, in the earlier stages of society, women, and especially unmarried women outside the prohibited group, were accessible to all males. The primary motive behind individual marriage was, in fact, an economic one. In an agricultural society it is an advantage for the man to have a helper over whom he has complete control—a control which he does not have in a state of group marriage, in which women are comparatively free. With the introduction of mono-

gamy the wife became a personal chattel, who was made to do some, or perhaps all, of the hard work in the fields. When, at a still later stage, the accumulation of personal property became possible, when the old communistic habits began to die out and some individuals appropriated more land, while others became reduced to the level of serfs, the economic need from which individual marriage had grown began to disappear. Having personal wealth, the landowner could pay for service, or enforce it from those he had dispossessed. When this stage was reached women became unproductive and dependent and had to rely on sexual attraction and feminine charm to keep their position. Thus, once again, the sexual motive in marriage became the important one.

In all the study of human customs nothing is more strange than their persistence. Customs and laws may go on long after their usefulness has disappeared. When a man finds a new and better way of making a stone instrument, he adopts it right away. If he finds a machine that does the work required better than the old one, he immediately gives up the old machine. But he keeps up a form of society based on matrilineal assumptions long after his group has become patrilineal; he burns offerings to gods long after his scientists have shown the customs to be ridiculous; he makes machines which increase wealth, and nevertheless retains a method of distribution which results in their increasing poverty.

The reason, of course, is that customs and laws become entangled with the personal desires of the individual to such an extent that they are sometimes even attributed to gods. It is not enough to say, "These laws are made for the following reasons";

they must be engraved on tablets of stone and given the authority of Jehovah. Therefore, as we know to our cost, laws and customs always lag far behind scientific discoveries, with the result that revolutionary outbursts take place from time to time in order to bring the old social system up to date with that created in the meantime by science.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

IN the first chapter we saw that varying ideas have been held about the origin and function of society, and that, briefly, these could be divided into the belief that society has some suprahuman significance or, alternatively, that it is a purely human organization. In support of the first belief it has been held that society in general, and the form of society known as the State in particular, is created by God, or the "Spirit of Universal Reason," or some other supernatural agency; while, in support of the second belief, other thinkers have held that the State was founded by man for his own ends. The upholders of the latter theory then differed as to whether society arose by a deliberate contract or by virtue of an inborn social instinct.

We came to the conclusion that society is simply a group of individuals arranged in a particular type of organization for their own mutual benefit, and suggested that the theory held by some psychologists concerning a "group mind" was related to belief in the suprahuman significance of society. We gave reasons for rejecting this concept of the group mind and showed that there is no reason to believe that any behaviour or idea comes from a group which is not already present in some form, even if only latent, in the minds of one or more of the individuals compos-

ing it. Any reader who wishes to consult a fuller discussion of the group mind will find a summary of the various theories which have been held in Prof. Ginsberg's *The Psychology of Society*. Prof. Ginsberg concludes that although the State and other forms of community show a kind of unity, this unity is simply a relation between individuals, based on community of purpose and ideals, and need not be referred to as a person or will: "Men do indeed share in a common life and contribute to a collective achievement, yet nothing but confusion can result from hypostatizing this life and ascribing to it a reality over and above the reality of the lives which individuals live in relation with one another."

In the second and third chapters an outline of the development of civilization was given, stressing the importance of environment and basing the origin of the institutions of society on this and the attitudes of the primitive mind. We are not here concerned so much with the later developments of religion, law, and customs, as with their early beginnings. For what is intended in this book is to give an account, in common-sense terms, of man's social origins, and to remove, so far as possible, all unnecessary mystery. When, for instance, we learn that ritual, so far from being an extremely complex thing, as it appears in the Catholic Church, is simply a way of thinking found in a primitive form in even the simplest savages, or that the belief in a God who died and rose again existed more than three thousand years before the Christian era, we have already learned a great deal about modern religion. This knowledge does not, of course, contradict religious belief in general; nor, indeed, can any scientific fact

disprove the truth of a belief unless it is one relating to the sphere of scientific knowledge. To the believer in an omnipotent God, the scientist can only reply, in the words of Laplace, that he has "no need of that hypothesis." But there can be no "scientific" proof that a benevolent, all-powerful God does not exist; one can only say that, from observation of the world, it seems extremely unlikely. The psycho-analyst's statement that God is a projection of the idea of the human father is quite readily accepted by the modernist theologian and interpreted in the form that this is the way in which God chooses to reveal himself. In other words, that God chooses to work through natural causes. The same argument can be applied to any rational account of religious development from primitive origins. To explain a process does not necessarily explain it away. On the other hand, if a theologian claims that the story of Adam and Eve is literal truth, or that the world was founded in 4004 B.C., he can be definitely contradicted by the scientist into whose sphere of knowledge he has trespassed.

We have already made some attempt to explain the course of social development in terms of environment, and many attempts have been made in the past to explain it in terms of specific factors, such as climate, geography, economics, and so on. At this point we shall examine these factors with a view to finding how much, if any, influence can be attributed to each, and whether they can be reduced to a single common explanation. We shall then try to show how the more complex cultural, scientific, and artistic achievements of a period are related to the social structure of the time.

Perhaps the earliest attempt to explain history in terms of logical development was that of the Italian Giambattista Vico, who in his *Scienza nuova*, published in 1725, claimed that all cultures passed through the three stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization. The first stage he described as one of unthinking, almost animal-like, existence. In the second stage chieftains arose who, in the course of time, developed into aristocrats and tyrants. Tyranny led to revolution and the establishment of democracy, which, in its turn, led to mob rule and a return to barbarism. Montesquieu, in his *L'Esprit des Lois*, was the first to suggest the theory, subsequently developed by Karl Marx, that great men are of little importance in history compared with the movements which produce them. He also believed that peoples in northern climates tend to be more vigorous and active than those in southern areas, who, he stated, had throughout history been conquered by men from the North—a dubious observation. Buckle, the English writer of a *History of Civilization in England*, claimed that the main influence in progress was the increase of knowledge, and its transmission from one generation to another. Here Buckle hit upon an explanation of progress which, while not absolutely fundamental in the sense that it still remains to be explained what led to knowledge being acquired and by what means it was transmitted, is nevertheless of the greatest importance. The savage differs from modern man mainly in the amount of knowledge he possesses. Without the accumulated knowledge of centuries handed on by such means as tradition and books, each one of us would have to begin anew and discover for himself the use of speech, fire, tools, and weapons.

An individual born totally deaf, however great his brain capacity, will develop into an imbecile, or, one might say, into one of the earliest Stone Age men, unless the difficult business of teaching him is undertaken. Without the transmission of knowledge, civilization would be impossible. But knowledge does not come by natural instinct alone, and Buckle failed to state what factors stimulate people to learn more than those things required for the mere necessities of living. Yet it is extremely doubtful if the Egyptians would have learned the elements of geometry without the stimulus of the Nile floods, or if the Babylonians would have paid much attention to the stars had they not required to find their way in the desert. Even the higher apes show curiosity; but curiosity or intelligence in themselves lead nowhere.

The importance of geographical and climatic factors has been stressed by various writers, mainly in Germany and America. They point out the undoubted fact that decline of rainfall or the drying-up of lakes has influenced many migrations, and that all the early cultures arose in river valleys. The Eastern Mediterranean, with its many islands, encouraged interchange of ideas between Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Crete, whereas in Africa and Asia the difficulties of overland travel limited these possibilities. Russia directed her attention to the East and South because her rivers flow in that direction, and when Peter the Great wished to open Russia to European influence, he built Petrograd, a port on the Baltic, at the mouths of the River Neva. All these are important facts, but the reason why decline of rainfall causes peoples to desert an area is because food will not grow without rain. River valleys are important because they are

fertile, and the Greeks certainly did not go to Persia for ideas in the first place, but for wealth. Nor would Russia have been interested in the South-East had that area been desert. We thus come to the economic explanation of history, which is largely, although by no means entirely, due to Karl Marx. As is well known, the theories of Marx were based on the philosophy of Hegel, with whom, however, he had otherwise little in common. For while Hegel supported the absolutist Prussian State, Marx repudiated it. Briefly, Hegel's philosophy was as follows: History is the development of the Universal Reason, which is God. At first the Spirit is unconscious, but in the process of history it becomes self-aware, and is in action from one society to another. As one society surpasses or defeats another, it becomes thereby the agent of God. War is therefore justifiable, as it is one of the instruments of progress. The actual mechanism of progress is by means of conflict within society—the so-called thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. That is to say, every society contains its own "negation" in the form of a class whose interests are opposed to that of the ruling class. In early eighteenth-century France, for example, we have a hereditary aristocracy in power (thesis) and a rising merchant class in subjection (antithesis). There is a revolution, and a system arises which is a synthesis of the others. The new ruling class, an aristocracy of the merchants, combines features of the two original classes. Thus begins Capitalism, which subsequently becomes thesis to the antithesis of the working class or proletariat—a state of affairs which in the theory of Marx, though not of Hegel, should give rise, after a revolution, to the classless society. Marx accepted Hegel's "dia-

lectic," as this process of development is called, but, being a Materialist, he denied its philosophical foundations, and called his theory Dialectical Materialism. He also elaborated considerably on the economic causes of historical movements which had, to a much lesser extent, been referred to by Hegel. This aspect of Marx's theory is full of interest, and appears to be the most fruitful concept so far advanced to enable us to understand history. To accept it as a useful working hypothesis does not mean that we must accept his theory as a whole, or its political implications, which, to say the least of it, have suffered severely in the last decade. For the general trend of modern society in Russia and elsewhere has been, as James Burnham's book *The Managerial Revolution* shows, towards bureaucracy rather than towards a classless society.

According to Marx, then, all the movements of history, from the greatest to the least, whether artistic, scientific, literary, or political, are basically due to the search for food or its equivalent, wealth, and the means of production adopted. That is to say, they are due to economic causes. Put in a more general and less specifically Marxian form, we may say, with Comte, that there is a "social consensus," that all the elements of social life at any given time are closely interrelated, or, with John Stuart Mill, that "not every variety of combination of these general social facts is possible, but only certain combinations; that, in short, there exist uniformities of co-existence between the states of the various social phenomena." We noted the importance of economic considerations in the development of Egypt and Babylonia and showed how these nations became warlike in response to the invasions of

barbarian tribes themselves in search of the wealth of the river valleys. Further, that a group of the Semitic peoples called the Phœnicians took to the sea in order to seek for riches, in this case mainly silver and tin, while the Greeks destroyed Crete for the same reason, and later fought the Persians to gain control of the sea route to Asia. Rome began to decline when the farmers who originally worked and cared for their own land were bought out by a rising class of capitalists who employed slaves as workers. The slaves cared little for the land, and this resulted in the soil being exhausted and dependence on food supplies which had to be imported. The decline was accelerated when the trade route to Asia, which had formerly been through Rome, was changed to a route through Constantinople. Similarly, we have seen economic causes at work in the Crusades and the Renaissance. The flowering of the Renaissance came first to North Italy, since it was through the North Italian ports that the trade route from the East ran. Later in history the Reformation came when rising nationalism, itself an expression of a new economic order, coveted the wealth and land of the Church, which owned two-thirds of the arable land of Europe. Later still, the age of Imperialism in Britain began when production outran consumption and manufacturers had to seek for new markets for their goods.

The implications of this theory are that all historical development is basically due to economic factors, and that therefore, as Montesquieu had suggested, great men are of little significance. It also implies that discoveries, whether in the field of science or technology, are significant only when they appear at an appropriate period in history. Alexander the Great,

Cæsar, or Napoleon, become merely the figure-heads of the movements they led. Hitler was merely the prototype of thousands of frustrated "little men"; Goering the prototype of the resentful demobilized officer of a defeated country. It is certain that great men do not always realize the role they are about to play in history, and are sometimes swept along in spite of themselves. Luther, had he not lived at the particular time when the German princes wished to throw off the economic yoke of the Church, might have been simply another of the many heretics who had preceded him. To begin with, he was not even a heretic, but only a priest who wished to reform certain abuses. But once he began, he was carried along by the movement at a speed which at first perplexed him deeply. It is doubtful, too, whether Luther's ideas would have spread so widely or so quickly had printing not been invented by that time.

It is apparent in history that inventions, like scientific theories, although they may potentially be discovered at any time, are acceptable only when the social structure is ripe for them. Rubber tyres, for example, were first invented to make an invalid chair belonging to a relative of the inventor run more smoothly. They had no social importance whatever until the discovery of the internal-combustion engine. In the second century A.D. Hero of Alexandria invented a steam engine, but his discovery had no significance till the nineteenth century since the economy of that time was based on slavery. In Egypt the steam engine was used merely to fool the worshippers in the temples by making the heavy brass doors open without visible force, and to produce mysterious organ music in the sanctuary.

In science it is probable that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection became famous only because it was published at a time when the struggle for existence due to the Industrial Revolution was particularly evident. Half a dozen biologists, from Lucretius in the time of Julius Cæsar to Buffon and Lamarck in the eighteenth century, had previously put forward theories of evolution which had been noted only by the curious. The principle of natural selection was discovered at the same time, independently, by Alfred Russel Wallace, and the idea of conflict was being stressed simultaneously by writers as widely apart as Malthus and Tennyson. In psychology, too, the static conceptions of the eighteenth-century Associationists had given way to the idea of mental conflict in the work of Herbart (1826), and culminating in Freud and the psycho-analytic school in the late nineteenth century. In literature the tone tended to be either romantic and as far removed as possible from the "dark Satanic mills," or, in the manner of Dickens, crudely realist. Note how this contrasts with the rationalism and classicism of the eighteenth century, when the Revolution was just beginning. Gibbon, Macaulay, Goldsmith, Pope, are calm, assured, and, to modern readers, even a little pompous. On the other hand, in the literature of the twentieth century, when it came to be felt that common sense and reason had failed, the writers of the early period were D. H. Lawrence, Joyce, and others, who placed the emphasis on instinct. In twentieth-century art we have the Surrealist school of painters and interest in the unconscious mind, in psychopaths and drug addicts, who are privileged to lead their life as instincts dictate. In science the "mystery" schools of

Emergent Evolution and the Vitalists in biology, and in physics the "mathematical God" and irrationalism of Jeans and Eddington, are prominent.

All these cultural changes, Marx would have said, are as related to the collapse of the economic system in Europe as are the two great wars. Contrast them with Russia. Here we have a country whose literature in the nineteenth century was gloomy, introspective, and great, corresponding to its backward economic development. Following the revolution of 1917, the literature became cheerful, full of faith in progress, and extremely dull.

An even better example of the relations between economic development and culture, because more fully studied, is the Renaissance in Italy, the economic and geographical causes of which have already been discussed. In the Middle Ages the architecture of Europe was anonymous. The great cathedrals were built by thousands of workers who took centuries to build them, because nobody cared who got the credit. The people of this period, in fact, seem to have lacked individuality much as do the savages described by Levy-Bruhl in Chapter III. Following the Renaissance and the rise of the merchant class, a new attitude became apparent. People regarded themselves as individuals, as they had not done since the days of Greece. Merchants commissioned buildings in their own name which had to be created in their lifetime, since it pleased them to be credited with magnanimity and good taste. A merchant must also pay attention to time more than, say, a farmer or a nobleman, so the whole culture of the Renaissance became time-conscious. In the Middle Ages life had been thought of as long, and time was little heeded, but,

in the new Italy, men, and not only merchants, began to feel that they must crush as much experience as possible into a lifetime that was running away all too rapidly (after the fourteenth century city clocks struck all the twenty-four hours of the day). The rise in individualism, due to private enterprise, led to an amazing variety in dress, and the same cause led to the amazing versatility of talented men. It was not uncommon to find a man who was a poet, an artist, a sculptor, and a physician, all in a supremely high degree. This again was in striking contrast to the Middle Ages, when, as the great Swiss historian Burckhardt says, "man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation—only through some general category."

A further result of the Renaissance was the method of accurate measurement, which was applied increasingly in science, and especially in physics and astronomy. This was based on the economic fact that money came into general use once more in this period, and the use of money suggests the use of exact numerical calculation. The employment of money also results in its circulation. People became rich or poor quickly in a way impossible in mediæval times, when wealth, being in land, was comparatively static. An element of uncertainty was introduced into life, and the entirely new concept of human existence as dynamic and changing. In addition, the use of money led to the feeling that any man could (at least theoretically) be as good as his neighbour. An interesting reflection of this, in art, was the appearance in painting of the naked figure, which had been objected to in the Middle Ages, not only on moral grounds, but also by the aristocracy, in that it emphasized the essential

similarity, and therefore equality, of all men. During the Renaissance the ban was removed, and pictures of the "Dance of Death" demonstrating the equality of humanity in the face of death became common.

There is no doubt that the economic explanation of history explains a great deal, and is, as we have already suggested, by far the most useful hypothesis which has, so far, been put forward. It is, after all, a commonplace that food is the most important of all considerations in the life of man. When there is plenty we can afford to look superior and pretend that eating is purely a secondary consideration, but without it nothing else is possible. Wealth, we are liable to forget, is simply a means of obtaining food and shelter, but later, when these are assured, wealth becomes something else. Not an end in itself, except to a madman, but a symbol of security, and, above all, of power. These are, however, later developments which do not invalidate the fact that money is primarily the means of living.

Does the economic theory explain everything? Perhaps not. When one thinks of the Greeks, for example, it is evident that what happened to produce their brilliant civilization was the combination of the knowledge of the Near East with the free minds of the Greeks. The Greeks were not limited in their inquiries by a priestly caste, and were free to seek for knowledge as they desired. But it may be asked whether this is an adequate explanation of their progress. Comparing the Greeks with the Egyptians, was there not an altogether more relentless drive to know and learn on the part of the Greeks? Looking back on history, do the Greeks not seem altogether different from the old, stable civilizations which hardly

changed in three thousand years as much as the Greeks in three hundred? This is what Sir Henry Maine meant when he observed that "nothing is more remarkable than the extreme fewness of progressive societies—the difference between them and the stationary races is one of the greatest secrets inquiry has yet to penetrate." It is worth noting, however, that Maine's distinction between progressive and stationary societies is open to criticism. Obviously, many societies which were progressive are now no longer so (*e.g.*, Spain and Italy), while others once stationary are now relatively progressive. There is nothing to suggest that either of these properties is inherent in any race.

In the following chapter we shall examine two further theories of history—one of which claims to explain this alleged difference—the Racial theory and the Psychological theory.

CHAPTER V

RACIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF HISTORY

So much has been heard of racial theory since the rise and fall of the Nazis in Europe that we are apt to forget that this theory was put forward originally in all seriousness and, by some writers at least, with no apparent political intentions. The first author to suggest that progress was due to the inherent superiority of one particular race was the French diplomat Count Gobineau (1816-82), who in a book called *The Inequality of the Races of Man* expressed the opinion that all human progress was largely due to the "Teutonic race." He believed that this race had had a separate origin from any other group of peoples and had dominated all the other races it had encountered in the course of history. Gobineau was followed by the less disinterested Englishman, Houston Chamberlain (1855-1927), son of an English general, who, after studying the history of art at Geneva and Dresden, became a naturalized German and married a daughter of Richard Wagner, the famous composer. Chamberlain wrote a book called *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* to prove, along with Gobineau, that the German race was superior to any other. He went much further than his predecessor, and even claimed that most of the world's great men (including Jesus Christ and the great Greek writers and philo-

sophers) had been of German blood regardless of their apparent nationality. Wagner was himself a supporter of this racial theory, which was gladly accepted by such German propagandists as Treitschke and Bernhardi. An opponent of Racism was found in Max Müller, a German professor of philology living in England, who, strangely enough, was the first to use the term "Aryan." Müller developed the theory of an "Aryan" language which had come from India and spread over Europe, basing his argument on a study of Sanskrit and its relationship with European languages, but he was careful to add: "When I say Aryans I mean neither blood nor bones nor hair nor skull; I mean simply those who spoke an Aryan language." In other words, there is no Aryan "race."

Grant Allen, whose *Evolution of the Idea of God* is a minor classic, was the author of another book, *The Passing of a Great Race*, in which he ascribed the rise of civilization to what he called the "Nordic" race. The Teutons he believed to be a mixture of many races, whereas the "Nordic" people were the blond, tall race now found mainly in North Germany, Scandinavia, and parts of England and America. Allen pointed out that the Nordics belonged to the race which first invaded India and, conquering the dark native Dravidian population, established the caste system and the use of Sanskrit. The intention of the system of caste was to keep their race pure from admixture with Dravidian blood. The Nordics then invaded Europe, founding the civilizations of Greece and, later, Rome, and, spreading West, established the Bronze Age in Britain and elsewhere. The portions of the race reaching Britain were the Goidelic and Brythonic Celts. As a result of these

invasions an advanced culture began to develop, always higher in the North, since the earlier peoples had been driven South to form a "backward fringe." Thus in Italy and Greece the fairer stock was in the Northern parts, and most of the great men came from this area. The Nordic peoples founded the ideals of chivalry, knighthood, and honour, in the Middle Ages, became the ruling classes in Russia and France as well as in the more specifically Nordic lands, and in the age of Imperialism their representatives conquered most of Asia, Africa, and America.

Allen further believed that, having depleted itself in the Crusades, the Thirty Years War, and other wars up to the war of 1914-18, the Nordic race was being replaced everywhere by non-Nordic types, and he considered that the result would be a return to barbarism and the irreparable loss of European civilization.

What is the truth concerning this theory of culture? We have seen, to our cost, that it can be very tenacious, and it has, even in our own time, been used to justify all kinds of barbaric treatment of so-called sub-human races. But there is not a shred of historical or scientific evidence to support such claims of racial superiority. It is of course true that, about 2000 B.C., there was a group of tribes in Central Asia and South-East Europe, some of whom were blond, tall, and blue-eyed, and who spoke a common language which is the basis of most modern European languages. They knew the use of the horse, of bronze, and, later, of iron, and they were the races who, at different stages of history, invaded Greece, Italy, and subsequently the rest of Europe. They invaded India, too, and over all these areas displaced the stone-monument

and sun-god culture which had probably originated in the Near East. But there the reality ends. These people were not all "Nordics," and they were not uniform in race. If one looks at the areas occupied by them—nearly all Europe—one finds that the areas of high culture were those in which the invaders came into contact with the old civilizations of the Mediterranean. This was the case with Greece and Rome. In the former the "Aryans" learned from the Phœnician settlements, and, further afield, from Egypt and Persia. In the latter they learned from the Etruscans, also an Eastern and "non-Aryan" race. For long after their arrival in Germany, France, and Britain they remained essentially barbarous. The most one might concede is that they had energy and relatively unprejudiced (because uncivilized) minds which, when confronted by great cultures which had become static, were able to make use of the new knowledge thus obtained.

All competent biologists assure us that racial superiority is a myth, although, for reasons not connected with inherent differences, at any given moment of history one or another race may become temporarily superior.* It has been pointed out many times that blond, tall, blue-eyed geniuses are almost unknown. Where, even in Germany, can one find such a man? Goethe, the greatest German writer, and Beethoven, the greatest composer, were not only both dark but neither had a very high opinion of his homeland. Both, in fact, looked to Napoleon—a small, dark,

* Some groups are, in fact, superior to others, because of economic or environmental selection—e.g., in the U.S.A. the average intelligence of farmers is higher in the fertile states of Ohio, Indiana, and Iowa, lower in the less fertile Nebraska. Intelligent people settled in the best land.

brown-eyed Italian—to save Germany from reaction. German culture would be much the poorer without Ehrlich, Heine, Mendelssohn, and Wassermann—all Jews—and it would not be far wrong to say that the most “Nordic” part of Europe—Scandinavia—is precisely that part which has produced fewest great men. It would be unfair to deny the greatness of Gustavus Adolphus, Christina, Ibsen, Strindberg, Grieg (incidentally of Scottish descent), Hans Andersen, and Swedenborg; but, having named these, could one name many more Scandinavian geniuses with a European reputation?

If there is one statement which could fairly be made regarding culture in Europe, it is that the greatest cultures have arisen where there has been a mixture of peoples; yet even this effect has been produced, not through mingling of blood, but of ideas. We may note the mingling of cultures in Mediterranean lands; the mixtures of Etruscan and barbarian, of barbarian and Phœnician, were fruitful, and it is doubtful if the Jews would have been heard of in history had they not obtained their God through association with the Egyptians. The mixture of Spaniard and Arab produced a great civilization in Spain, and in Britain we have the example of the mixture of Irish and English which produced Swift, Congreve, Sheridan, Goldsmith, and, in our own time, Yeats, Shaw, George Moore, Parnell, and many others. Pure races, of which there are fortunately not many in history, have achieved little or nothing, although this may be a coincidence; for one would have to look to the Australian aborigines, or the Andaman Islanders, to discover any races that were, even to a moderate degree, unmixed with others. Our own nation is as

mixed as any, and we are, no doubt, much the better for it. The only type of unity found at the present day in any nation is a cultural unity due to uniformity of tradition, teaching, and history, and this, too, is fast dying out as radio and the film open ever wider experiences to us. There is, perhaps, such a thing as the "British spirit of fair play," or "French rationalism," or "German Kultur," but it cannot be too often repeated that these are purely the result of upbringing in a particular environment and are not inherent in the individual. Take a baby from Berlin, or Paris, or Timbuctoo, and bring it up in an English family, and it will be as "English" as any child born in London. The same would be true of a Negro or a Chinese, but here the complicating factor of a different appearance comes in. He would not be treated exactly the same as other children, because his colour would differentiate him.

All so-called national character comes entirely from this cultural basis. It is easy to talk about "fair play" when one has lived in an island which has not been invaded for a thousand years and which has been in control of a large part of the world for a considerable time—it is easy, although fair play is still an excellent quality. It is not so easy if one has been born a Polish Jew with a tradition of centuries of persecution. If he takes up the customs of his adopted country, the Jew is "pretending to be English" (or German, or French), should he not, he is a part of the "Jewish problem." Should he be friendly, he is "ingratiating," if he keeps to himself, he is "arrogant." Little wonder, then, that this attitude also produces a type. The Germans are equally the product of a certain tradition and environment, and, while we may

hate them for the misery they have brought on the world, we must play the part of psychiatrist if we wish to prevent further trouble. A good psychiatrist may, in his own mind, hate the perpetrator of sexual crimes against small children, but, as a scientist, he must take the view that the criminal was, at one time, potentially sane, and that some influences in his lifetime distorted his attitude to sex and made his behaviour abnormal. The psychiatrist would be of little use to society if he merely struck his patient (which is what some people want to do to Germany). What he in fact does is to think out dispassionately how he can alter the patient's behaviour, and if striking him will really help—good and well. If not, it is an emotional luxury in which the practical man cannot afford to indulge when he is trying to improve the state of international relations.

We now pass to the psychological interpretations of history, which, it should be noted, are intended to be supplementary to other interpretations rather than exclusive of them. In a sense, of course, psychology is more fundamental than economics, for in the latter science, we have already assumed the psychological facts that man is acquisitive and aggressive. The theories to which we are now about to refer are, however, not simply concerned with these fundamental traits on which economics is based, but are rather elaborations on them which help further in explaining human behaviour.

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psycho-analysis, has been one of the chief writers on the psychological aspects of culture, and his theories on this subject are found mainly in three books, *Civilization and its Discontents*, *Totem and Taboo*, and *The Future of an*

Illusion, which are by no means always easy to understand. Before beginning, therefore, it will be necessary to state briefly Freud's concept of the mind.

Freud conceives of the mind as consisting of a conscious layer, which is that part of which we are aware in everyday life, and an unconscious layer, which represents the more primitive instincts. The important point is that all mental energy, being derived from the instincts, is contained in the unconscious, and is changed into suitable forms (that is to say, more or less socially acceptable forms) before reaching the conscious mind. This process of transformation is itself unconscious. Instinctual energy can be utilized in three ways: expression, sublimation, and repression. The first word is self-explanatory, the second means that the instinct is altered into a similar, but socially accepted, form, and the third means that the instinct is not allowed expression, but is dammed up within the mind, in which case it may later produce pathological behaviour. Thus, aggression may be expressed in hitting everyone who annoys us, or sublimated into a drive to reform society. Finally, it may be repressed and lead to neurotic or criminal tendencies. Since in any one individual the amount of mental energy is constant, the energy which is sublimated takes away from that available for crude expression, and vice versa.

We have seen that in primitive society the original state of man was one of sexual communism, in which there was little need to sublimate the sexual instincts except in relation to women belonging to the same clan. As culture develops, however, restrictions on the sexual life increase—first by the custom of monogamy, and later by many other taboos and laws

as the form of descent is changed from matrilineal to patrilineal. The sexual energy diverted from its more primitive form of expression has to be sublimated, and the result is increasing cultural development, which still further increases the taboos on crude sexual expression. This applies equally to the other instincts. Aggression against one's neighbour is increasingly frowned on as society becomes more highly developed, and the accumulated aggression is turned against the "out-group"—that is, against neighbouring people belonging to different tribes. With this, the stage of intertribal war begins. When the tribes, owing to economic and other demands, have to coalesce into nations, aggression is forbidden towards an increasingly large number of people, since fighting within a nation would lay it open to its enemies. At this stage we reach the modern development of international war. So, paradoxically, increase of civilization leads to bigger wars. Hitler used the mechanism of redirecting the aggression of warring sections within Germany against common "enemies" invented for the purpose—the Jews, the Communists, and the nations alleged to be encircling Germany. In this redirection lies the reverse of the paradox to which we have just referred: when a nation is at war, people become more helpful and tolerant to each other within the national frontiers. When the war is over, the aggression which has been aroused, and which has now no external object, returns within the nation to cause unrest, strikes, and crime.

So far, all is fairly plain sailing. After all, both saints and prize-fighters have known for centuries that if they suppress their instincts they will have more energy left for mystical visions or fighting. But

Freud developed a much more complex theory of culture, which attempts to explain a great deal more than the foregoing concepts, which any psychologist might readily accept as true. In his book *Totem and Taboo*, Freud began by examining the institution of totemism, to which we have already referred in an earlier chapter. He found the following features worthy of note: the totem-animal represents the clan and is supposed to be an ancestor; women in some tribes are supposed to become pregnant by the totem-animal; the animal is sacred and ordinarily must not be killed, but at certain times it is killed and eaten with great ceremony; lastly, totemism implies exogamy—that a man shall not marry a woman of the same clan.

These facts were interpreted by Freud in a theory which states that, in early times, man lived in family groups consisting of a dominant old man, his sons, and some women. The sex rights over the women were monopolized by the dominant male, who imposed restrictions on his sons in this and other respects. As a result, the sons both revered the father for his wisdom and power, and hated him for his restrictions. Finally, they banded together and killed the old man, and, according to the custom of the times, they ate the body in order to acquire his powers. After the act they were tormented with guilt, and to expiate their sin they agreed to abstain from sex relations with the women who had been the reason for the crime. In addition, it became a sin to kill any member of the group, and in this way the family developed into the larger clan, the members of which were forbidden to kill each other.

The totem of the clan therefore represents the father,

and the periodic sacrifice of the totem-animal is a commemoration of the original event. Freud then deduced that the rule forbidding the killing of clan members, and the other forbidding marriage within the group, had led to the beginnings of morality and social life. The fear of the father who had been killed is the beginning of primitive religion, in which God becomes the projected image of the father, and, as such, has to be propitiated. Finally, he believed that the ritual sacrifice of the totem-animal led to the beginnings of the drama, in particular the Greek drama. (Compare, for example, this account of the "primeval murder" with Sophocles' play *Œdipus Rex*, in which Œdipus kills his father and marries his mother.) Elsewhere, Freud concludes that in the Christian religion Christ represents one of mankind, the "Son of Man," who has come to take the guilt of the original crime on his own shoulders, and dies to propitiate the avenging God the Father, thus redeeming all men.

This theory will, no doubt, appear to many readers to be somewhat far-fetched, and indeed it is not accepted by most anthropologists. On the other hand, the theory can be understood only in relation to psycho-analytic knowledge. It is not necessary to assume that the primal murder happened at a particular time and place—it may have happened many times, or not at all. The psycho-analyst would say that all men have committed this act in fantasy in their own lives, since all have, in their unconscious, concealed jealousy of their father, who usurped their mother's love when they were young (the so-called Œdipus complex). The replacing of a hated individual by an animal is an everyday fact both in mental

diseases, which we have seen to consist in a reversion to primitive ways of thinking when the mind is under stress, and in the life of children. For example, a child who is afraid of his father at times, and cannot reconcile this fear with the tender feelings he also has, may develop a fear of horses or some other animal which, on investigation, turns out to represent the feared aspect of the father. Freud's theory also helps to explain the extraordinary absorption of early literature and folk-lore with patricide. In these tales the plot may be openly and directly concerned with the son killing his father, or it may take the concealed form of the hero killing the wicked king, who is, in dreams, often a father-symbol. Another fact which is made more understandable is the universal belief that woman is guilty of causing man to sin and making him aware of good and evil—in the story of Adam and Eve, the eating of the fruit makes Adam aware of sin, of which he was previously innocent. It is surprising how many of these concepts from ancient myths continually appear in the disordered thoughts of the insane.

That men derive their idea of God mainly from their father is certain. This does not mean to say that the concept of a God is derived from the fact of having a father (although this is quite possible), but merely that the qualities which people attribute to God depend largely on their relationship with their own father in early childhood. Since ideas come only from experience, and not out of thin air, there is nothing very surprising in this. It is apparent, for example, that in a country like Scotland in the nineteenth century, the strict attitude of parents was reflected in a similar attitude attributed to God.

Even at the present day mental diseases due to exaggerated sense of guilt produced by over-strict parents are more common in the North of Scotland than in the South of England.

That the drama was founded on the elaboration and secularization of early religious rituals in ancient Greece is a more or less accepted fact. In the early ritual of the god Dionysus (a god of fertility) a man was selected to play the part of the god, and in accordance with the story, similar to that of Osiris, he was killed and his body eaten, thus serving the dual purpose of re-enacting the story of the death of Dionysus and giving his strength to the worshippers. Meanwhile the high priest chanted the praise of the god, and the worshippers lamented his death by chanting. As the Greeks grew more civilized the man to be sacrificed was replaced by a goat—the animal sacred to Dionysus—and a second priest engaged in a dialogue with the high priest concerning the exploits of their hero, while the worshippers, now become the chorus, chanted at intervals. When the ritual began to be taken less seriously and lost its religious character, the Greek dramatists, beginning with Æschylus, introduced further actors. Scenery was first used by Sophocles, and, later still, Euripides took the chorus (the original worshippers) out of the play and made the main interest centre on the actors. The new plays introduced stories from the old folk-tales or from the lives of the gods. Some trace of the "special" nature of the play has been preserved up to the present day, and nobody seeing a first-night performance could doubt that the participants feel the occasion to be somewhat different from, say, a cinema show.

We may conclude that culture is aided in its development by the compulsory sublimation of instincts. As we shall see in a later chapter, it is the failure of this sublimation that leads to the opposite of culture—namely, crime, war, and insanity. Freud's later theory, described in *Totem and Taboo*, certainly contains a great deal of truth, but it is not generally accepted in its entirety, least of all by anthropologists. The economic theory of history remains by far the most satisfying theory so far advanced, and psychological explanations, while perfectly valid, largely record the subjective aspect of changes due, in the main, to environmental pressure.

With this proviso it is possible to regard history, from the psychological point of view, as a process of emancipation of the mind, taking place in four stages :—

- (1) A stage in which the mind did not regard itself as separate from the universe as a whole (i.e., the stage of animism).
- (2) A stage in which the mind had separated from the universe but not from society.
- (3) The rise of the isolated individual.
- (4) In the future: the reintegration of the individual with society by conscious effort in an order which combines the benefits of individualism with those of a healthy group-life.

CHAPTER VI

THE HUMAN BRAIN

ONLY a little over a hundred years ago the majority of knowledgeable men in Europe were more or less agreed that man had been created in the year 4004 B.C. (on the 23rd of March, to be precise). This was the date given by the learned Bishop Ussher for the creation of Adam, and it was not seriously doubted by anyone, although it was generally known that pieces of stone chipped roughly into the shape of tools had frequently been found in situations which suggested that they were older than this by many thousands of years. Such stones were sometimes thought to be the result of lightning on the earth, and for this reason they were given the name of "thunder stones." A few individuals had thought otherwise, from Lucretius, the Roman naturalist and poet (in whose poem *Concerning the Nature of Things* comes the first suggestion that civilization had developed in three stages—a stone age, followed by a bronze and iron age), to the great Renaissance artist and scientist Leonardo da Vinci, who believed that the tools were the work of very early man. The oldest of such implements are in deposits between half a million and a million years old, and they have therefore been called eoliths, or dawn-stones. In 1899 a French writer, Boucher de Perthes, published a book on the stone tools found near Abbeville, in the Somme Valley.

He showed that they were undoubtedly made by man and were frequently associated with the bones of animals long since extinct. The great naturalist Cuvier contradicted these findings. He believed that there had been a universal flood before the one recorded in the Bible, and that this flood had been followed by the appearance of man. Since man, on this theory, had not existed before the Flood, Cuvier thought it impossible that the "antediluvian" gravels should contain any human traces. Therefore, although the statements of de Perthes had been founded on excellent evidence, the learned world of the time laughed at his ideas. "Contradictions, jeers, scorn, were unsparingly heaped upon the author," wrote an observer. Nevertheless, Cuvier was to be proved wrong; for about this time, at Trinil, in Java, there was found one of the first of a series of remains of very early man. The bones are those of a sort of ape-man which must have lived half a million or more years ago.

This find led to an increased searching for man's early ancestors, with the result that remains of numerous other types were discovered, which are usually named after the sites where they were found—Heidelberg, Piltdown, and Rhodesian man. In 1929, was discovered the Peking skull, which is believed to be possibly upwards of a million years old. If this estimate is correct, the Peking skull may be the oldest human fossil so far known. None of these submen has any close resemblance to modern man, nor are they even directly related to him. At the most, they are in a parallel line of succession.

The bones of the most primitive men are few and far between, and in each case almost all that has been

found of their skeletons are the upper part of the skull, and the jaw, or thigh-bones. But the next type of man to appear in history, called Neanderthal man, is represented by quite a number of nearly complete skeletons found scattered in various sites throughout Western Europe. Neanderthal man was almost human, and lived probably fifty thousand years ago. Unlike the earlier types, whose only skill was to make rough stone tools, he knew the use of fire, and probably used skins to keep himself warm, since he lived during the last Ice Age. At that time all of Northern Europe, including Britain, was covered with ice, so Neanderthal man lived mainly in what is now France and South-West Germany. The chief differences in appearance between this type and modern man are the heavy eyebrow ridges, the lack of a chin, and the inability to oppose the thumb—that is, to hold it at right angles to the other fingers.

Then, thirty thousand years ago, a new race came to Europe who were the first true men. They ousted the Neanderthalers from the land, and the older race soon died out. From the beginning, the newcomers seem to have been divided into two groups—the Cro-Magnon and the Grimaldi peoples. The former somewhat resembled the North American Indians in physical type, while the latter were similar to the African Bushman, being thus a negroid type. H. G. Wells, in his *Outline of History*, suggests that the Cro-Magnon men may have come from the East and the North, and the Grimaldis from Africa and the South. The way of life of these savages was probably very similar to that of the nineteenth-century Tasmanians.

Since the study of man's primitive ancestors is a

comparatively new science, little detailed knowledge is available as to his origins. All that can be said with certainty is that, as one goes farther back into the past, there is an increasing resemblance between man and the apes, which is generally taken to indicate that the two have a common ancestry. But the record is still so incomplete that at present anthropologists are only able to make what seems a reasonable assumption from the known facts. Concrete evidence of the "missing link" between apes and men has, so far, not been discovered, but it must be remembered that comparatively few skeletons of early man have been found, because they are too fragile and easily destroyed. The relationship is certainly close, and there are many traits which the two species share in common which are either not found at all or found only in a very rudimentary form in other animals. Of these traits, perhaps the most important is the mother-child relationship—the long period during which the child has to be protected and nursed by the mother, owing to its complete inability to fend for itself. This fact has two very important implications. The first is that immaturity, and therefore the time of learning, is long-drawn-out. While the young of most animals are capable of being independent soon after birth, the young of human beings and apes are not mature for a considerable time, which varies from months to years, according to the species. In the human child in particular, the time of immaturity is far longer than in any other animal, and the child is initially much slower in developing than even the young of apes. In an experiment carried out in America, a newly born chimpanzee was brought up in such a way as to

be given as nearly as possible the same training as a newborn baby. It was found that the young chimpanzee quickly outstripped the human child in learning in the first few months, but afterwards it soon became settled in its habits and did not acquire any new behaviour. The child progressed slowly at first, but went on progressing, and its individual characteristics did not begin to become fixed till the fourth or fifth year.

The other implication of the long parent-child relationship is that it implies family life, or at least the beginnings of it, and with family life, social life also begins. It has, in fact, been suggested that the social instincts in man are really derived from the relationship between mother and child in the early years. Sir P. Chalmers Mitchell, the zoologist, has observed, in connection with taming animals, that it is the animals which remain longest with their mother in which the capacity to be tamed (or become socialized) is greatest. They are simply transferring to human beings the affection they give naturally to their mothers. In another sphere, psychiatrists have noted that when an attempt is made to reform delinquents who have antisocial tendencies, the most hopeless cases are those who lack love for their mother, but when this affection is present there is always some hope. Among the mammals the period of infantile dependence becomes steadily longer as one reaches the higher animals. For instance, it takes a human baby a year to accomplish the development that takes a young ape a month and a lion-cub a week.

Mother-love is the only form of tender emotion found in the most primitive people, who almost universally show their mothers life-long devotion.

Towards their wives they show little or no affection. A writer with long experience of Africa wrote that in all his experience he had never seen a Negro showing tenderness to his wife, and the same has been said of the Maoris (prior to contact with European civilization) and the North American Indians. A Catholic missionary writing of the Déné tribe of Indians, says: "If you wish to excite laughter, speak to the Déné of conjugal affection." It would appear, therefore, that the mother-child relationship is one of the earliest socializing and civilizing impulses.

The physical immaturity of the young child, in comparison with other animals, is most pronounced in the brain and nervous system, which at birth is quite surprisingly undeveloped. Since the structure of the brain has direct bearing on the nature of man, and is at the root of most misunderstandings concerning his mind, we will now digress briefly into anatomy to see how this complex instrument has developed.

The human nervous system is actually composed of three nervous systems superimposed on each other and fused into one; a nervous system resembling that of worms; another resembling that of the lower vertebrates, such as reptiles and birds; and, over both, the cerebral hemispheres, the typically human brain. Let us examine each of these in turn. In the worm the nervous system is simply a means of communication between one part of the body and another. It consists of a nerve-chain on either side of the body, with clumps of nerve-cells or ganglia at intervals, and, at the head end, two larger ganglia which are all the brain that a worm possesses. The nerve-chains are joined across the middle by fibres here and there. The large ganglia at the head are the controlling

power, but their predominance is a feeble one, so that, if the worm is cut in half, each half can go on living owing to the capacity of the other ganglia to take over. At the worm-level of development there is no consciousness as we know it. In man, this system is represented by the so-called vegetative nervous system, which is composed of two chains, with ganglia at intervals, lying on either side of the backbone and having their "brain" in the hypothalamus at the base of the true brain. The function of the vegetative nervous system is to control the internal organs. It makes the heart beat fast or slow, makes the intestines and bladder active or otherwise, and, in addition, it dilates or contracts the pupil of the eye and makes the hair stand on end. These changes are all connected with visceral control and the primitive emotions, but it is only at the next level that the emotions can become conscious. This higher level, corresponding to the nervous system of a reptile or bird, is, in man, simply the lower part of the central, or true, nervous system. It is formed by the ordinary sensory nerves, which take sensations from the skin and muscles into the spinal cord, up which they run to a "brain" just above the hypothalamus, called the thalamus. Here sensations from all over the body becomes conscious, and, in the reptile, would overflow almost at once into messages down the spinal cord, through the motor nerves to the muscles, producing suitable actions. This is a purely emotional level of behaviour characterized by feeling and acting, without thought or premeditation. Hence animals at this stage of development, when they are stimulated, tend to act right away.

At the human level of the cerebral hemispheres—

the brain as ordinarily understood—messages are received through the same sensory nerves and relayed through the thalamus to the surface of the brain. But here action does not necessarily follow immediately. This part of the nervous system can “hesitate and ponder.” In the vast number of brain-cells a message can be received from the sensory nerves, and action may not take place for many days, or it may be suppressed and never take place at all. If, for example, a hungry rabbit sees food it will certainly eat it at once. A hungry man may not eat, but keep the food for someone else, or for himself on a later occasion. Man’s capacity to visualize future possibilities distinguishes him from even the highest apes, who can only behave in terms of what is present in their field of vision at a given moment. Dr. Köhler, who studied the mentality of apes and their capacity to learn, found that a chimpanzee, when confronted by the sight of fruit outside his cage, would use a stick to reach it only if the stick were in the same field of vision—that is, if both the stick and the fruit were visible at the same time. If the fruit were in front and the stick behind, the animal could not connect the two together in his mind.

The superiority of man in this respect is not due to the possession of a larger brain, although his brain is, in fact, larger than that of any ape. But the brain of Neanderthal man was bigger than that of a present-day European, so size does not count in itself. Nor does the number of brain-cells. A baby is born with all his brain-cells already present, and, unlike any other type of cell in the body, nerve-cells do not increase in number. The human brain is only half developed at birth because the arborizations of the

cells—that is, the connections they make with one another—are not fully developed, and it is these connections which enable mental associations to take place. As learning proceeds, they increase in number, unless the child is born blind and deaf, when this increase does not occur, because it requires the stimulation of messages coming in through the sense-organs. Conversely, if a baby is born prematurely, the cells ramify more quickly, and therefore brain growth is speeded up. Learning, from the subjective point of view, is the increase of mental associations, and, from the objective side, is the increase of connections between the brain cells.

We have seen in the example of Köhler's chimpanzee that it could associate "stick" as a means of getting "food" only when both were present in the same field of vision. Why should this be? It is apparent that a man in the same situation would immediately think of a stick, even although none were anywhere near. Not only would he think of a stick, but he could also devise alternative means of reaching the food. This fundamental difference between men and animals is due to the invention of language. By the use of language a certain sound is made to represent an object or a process, so that virtually tens of thousands of possibilities are constantly present in the human mind. There may not be a stick in the field of vision, but there is the sound "stick" before the mind's eye, and associations can take place through the counters of words. This new discovery of man is the use of what is called conceptual thought. Animals, of course, can, and do, form associations. As Pavlov showed, a dog will begin to salivate when it hears a bell which has on previous occasions been

associated with the giving of food, and it is common knowledge that a dog will have pleasant associations with those who have been kind to it in the past, and will behave in a different way when it sees them from when it sees someone by whom it has previously been beaten. The distinction lies in the fact that the dog does not know why it feels different on each occasion. It cannot think, "Here is So-and-so, who gave me a bone last week—isn't that grand?" All the dog, or even a chimpanzee, can do is to feel good in the presence of a certain individual, and unhappy or afraid in the presence of another, without knowing why. One can only think, as opposed to mere feeling, when one has words to think with, for thinking begins with speaking "under one's breath." Many people have the greatest difficulty in thinking without talking aloud, and people who are not used to reading usually speak the words as they read.

Human beings, as well as animals, may have associations which are purely emotional and cannot be thought about, since they are not "verbalized" or put into subvocal speech. A neurotic soldier, for example, may feel a nameless dread whenever he hears an explosion, no matter how faint or far away it may be, and he does not know why. Under hypnosis, or with some hypnotic drug which produces drowsiness, he may visualize an incident in battle in which a comrade was blown up before his eyes. Subsequent explosions produce the emotion of dread by simple association, but they do not produce the experience itself because the man has repressed it, as psycho-analysts say. In the terms we are using at present the explanation is that the experience was so painful or so sudden that the soldier allowed it to

happen only at the emotional level—the level of the thalamus. He did not put it into the counters of words or thoughts—the business of the cerebral hemispheres—and therefore it could not be recollected except as a feeling. When he is able to say either aloud or to himself, “On such and such a day I saw a man blown up by a hand grenade and his blood was splashed over my face—then I began to vomit, and collapsed,” he has gained control over the events and over his emotions. *Words mean control over reality.* When next he hears an explosion he will start, and it will bring back the memory—not a nameless dread, but a definite incident which his mind has absorbed—and the emotion will each time grow less, because useless associations soon become dormant. One of the reasons why we remember so little of early childhood is simply because, being unable to speak at that time, we can only store feelings, and not verbal memories. Another reason, of course, is that, since children are amoral, our grown-up self, controlled by the super-ego, prefers to turn a blind eye to our infantile period of barbarism. The process of psycho-analysis largely consists in making these early feelings verbal and conscious so that useless associations can be cast aside.

Even the most normal person is full of such primitive and wasteful associations. He hates the Conservative party, perhaps because his father belonged to it, and may join the Fascist or Communist party because, unknown to himself, he wants to shock people. He joins an anti-vivisection league to keep down his own latent aggressiveness for which he was punished as a child, and is a vegetarian for perhaps the same reason. Now all these rationalizations, as they are

called, are a sheer waste of energy, and, still more important, they ignore reality and, in the long run, lead to trouble. The young Communist of this type will equally readily become a Fascist, since he is not interested in the political aspect of these beliefs, their merits and demerits, but only in their capacity to shock, to be "revolutionary." The anti-cruelty crank may try to suppress his own cruelty by joining a society for that end, but his overweening aggressiveness, which he refuses to recognize, is often painfully apparent to his family and to those who dare to contradict him. Therefore, in the last resort, the only useful associations are those based on reality.

More than any other influence, the misinterpretation of Freud's work has tended to make people incredulous of the value of reasoning. Critics have based their arguments on the fact that psychoanalysis has demonstrated the existence of a process known as rationalization, whereby the individual (in the words of Bradley) "gives bad reasons for what he does, or says, on instinct." For example, the Scottish Presbyterians who objected to J. Y. Simpson's use of chloroform in childbirth quoted the Biblical statement "in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" to justify their attitude. In fact, their behaviour was motivated by their resentment towards women as the cause of sexual temptation. The anti-Semitic business-man, jealous of Jewish competition, invents theories about racial purity or fantastic stories of plots against the Aryan race to justify his persecution of a minority. We have already quoted the examples of the man who is brought up in such a way that he is resentful of all authority and is consequently always "agin' the Government," whatever its political

outlook, and the man afraid of his own aggressiveness who feels compelled to fight it in others. Now, whatever the unconscious motives behind these beliefs, all of them must ultimately be tested at the bar of reality, and if they fail to pass this test they must be discarded. One is reminded of the intellectual who airily remarked, "On the whole, I accept the universe," and Carlyle's grim retort, "Gad, you'd better!" Even a true belief, if based on a wrong attitude, is liable to fail. Gentleness based on fear of one's own aggressiveness will be shown up, but gentleness based on the normal emotion of sympathy is true because, as we shall see later, it is the basic rule of society—not a commandment sent from Heaven, but merely that rule without which society cannot exist.

The critics of reason fail to note that Freud also described two other psychological mechanisms which are equally important in determining judgments—the process of identification and the reality principle. Identification means the capacity to identify oneself with a particular object or process as an ideal, and in such a way that its advancement becomes synonymous with one's own satisfaction and well-being. Many scientists have identified themselves with the service of truth, and the discovery of truth becomes necessary for their complete satisfaction in life. For this ideal they are prepared to admit error in a theory which has cost them much labour and thought, or to give credit gladly to another worker who has made a discovery that eclipses their own. Identification has altered man from a pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding animal, not, indeed, to something other than an animal (he will always bear the traces of his evolu-

tionary development), but to a new development in animal life. Man still seeks pleasure and avoids pain, but his pleasure may be identified with something very different from its original object. Valuing social feeling, he finds pleasure in behaviour originally unpleasant and is prepared to sacrifice his life for others. Valuing truth, he is prepared to admit himself in the wrong, and to find, in these actions, satisfaction. As Spinoza showed, men are moral because, in the long run, moral behaviour gives more lasting satisfaction—and this is even more true of the search for truth. It is a fact that, as H. G. Wells remarked, man's mind is no more intended for discovering truth than is a pig's snout. Probably the function of both mind and snout was to seek the pleasant things in life and avoid the bad. But man has developed the capacity to identify pleasure with truth, with unselfishness, with beauty. What was originally painful may give joy. In a lesser degree this is found even in the dog and other animals. A dog can be conditioned to salivate and show pleasure at the sound of a bell which has previously been associated with the giving of food. But if every time the dog is fed it is given a painful electric shock, it may also, if the shock is not too strong, learn in this way to find pleasure in pain, which has become associated with another satisfaction. The good scientist therefore says, "Truth is my happiness," and the moral man finds pleasure even in self-sacrifice, when it becomes necessary or appropriate.

Freud also emphasized the distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. The very fact that we note the fantasy of the man who rationalizes implies that we know something which is not

fantasy, which is reality. If all life were nothing but instinct it would be impossible to contrast the real with the not-real. Mental life is, indeed, based on instinct, but the instincts express themselves at different levels, and, as we have pointed out elsewhere, to explain a process does not necessarily explain it away. The love of Heloise and Abélard was not identical with the sexual activities of dogs, even although it died when Abélard was castrated by his enemies. Nor is a plant the same as a seed, even although it dies when the roots are destroyed. There is no ground whatever for believing that because the process of reasoning has developed from primitive sources it is therefore invalid, or that it is therefore identical with its primitive origins.

But supposing, for the sake of argument, that reason is, at times, a fallible guide. What remains? Well, says the non-Rationalist, there is intuition—the intuition of the mystic, which goes ahead of what is known by reason. But does it? Is there any evidence of the existence of a faculty called intuition? In a strictly limited sense there is. Intuition is simply deduction from data received on the borders of consciousness. For example, the nurse who daily sees patient after patient admitted into her ward will acquire what she calls a “feeling” for the different diseases. She will often say, “So-and-so is a case of cancer—I *feel* that he is.” The young doctor in the same ward, having seen relatively few cases, has to reach his diagnosis by a more laborious process of logic, even although he has far greater knowledge than the nurse. But there is no mystery here. The nurse has noted subconsciously the faint yellowish tinge of the skin, the signs of loss of weight, the

hollows under the eyes, and, comparing these with signs seen in other cases, has, without thinking, put two and two together. But note this: even if the nurse is correct, her diagnosis is of little value, because she cannot give reasons for it. The laborious diagnosis can be acted on, and, even if the doctor is wrong, one knows that, on going back through the chain of reasoning, one will find out where the false step was made. With intuition there is nothing to criticize—if the intuition is correct it cannot be shown to be so by the same process, but only by cold logic. In other words, both intuition and reasoning may be wrong, but one can demonstrate error only by the use of logic.

Furthermore, intuition often *is* wrong. Which one of us has not several times a day thought: "I feel that such-and-such a thing will happen"—and it has failed to happen? But we tell everyone about it when our prediction is successful. How many people have wondered at the astrologer in the Sunday papers when, once in a while, he happens to be correct in his forecast? Yet the same people have read week by week all the forecasts which have proved to be wildly incorrect without making any comment whatever. The fact is that, within ourselves, we are secretly surprised when the expert on intuition turns out to be right, just as we are secretly surprised when the unorthodox practitioner of medicine succeeds. We go to a doctor expecting, inwardly even *demanding*, to be cured, and if he is successful—well, that is just as it should be. But if he fails and the osteopath makes us normal, we tell the world.

So it is with reason. Its most severe critic *expects* it to work, and even uses logic to show that logic is

worthless; but when intuition works he praises it to the skies. This attitude is foolish. We may doubt the capacity of reason to know all reality, but of this we can be quite sure: there is no other way of knowing. Christians have intuitions of everlasting life, Buddhists of everlasting nothingness; Christians have intuitions of a God, Buddhists not. Which is the truth? Perhaps reason is inadequate to the task of answering, but it is the only possible criterion—even if we end up by saying, “I don’t know.”

Space does not permit a discussion of the relations between brain and mind—a subject which has exercised philosophers for centuries. Here we can only state dogmatically the modern view that the problem in its original form does not exist. Mind and body cannot be separated. Mind is not a separate entity, but simply a process going on in the body, just as digestion is a process going on in the stomach. It does not even happen solely in the part of the body known as the nervous system; the nerves merely correlate messages originating elsewhere and the brain makes them conscious. There is no manikin or spirit concealed in the pineal gland, or hovering around the head like a halo, nor, so far as we know, is there any ground for believing in a psychic or ethereal body duplicating the material one, although it is worth while pointing out that Materialism need not necessarily imply that such things are impossible. It is conceivable, although we have no reason to think it true, that something in the nature of what is generally called “spirit” may have arisen in the course of evolution. Materialism merely claims that matter is the fundamental stuff of the universe, and that anything else is secondary. In any case, surely the

modern concept of matter is mysterious enough for anyone who wants mystery!

We come to the conclusion, then, that mind is the subjective aspect of bodily events. Fear, for example, when regarded in its objective aspect, is a state of stimulation of the vegetative nervous system which produces a substance in the blood known as adrenaline. This process is so clear-cut that one can go to a chemist's, buy a bottle of adrenaline, and by injecting it produce fear in any individual or animal—only this fear, since there is no external cause for it, is nameless, like the terror of the neurotic soldier we have just described. The emotion of fear is simply this process regarded subjectively, and there is no need to bring in any other factors to explain the relationship. The fact of consciousness is, of course, a mystery, and probably cannot be reduced to any simpler terms. But it is in no way further clarified by reference to a "mind" in the sense of an intangible entity apart from the body.

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

It would be of little use if we discussed the development of society without referring to the development of the basic unit of society, man himself. So in this chapter we shall be concerned with the psychological growth of the individual in so far as it is related to his social environment. That psychological growth is related to the surroundings in which a man lives would be agreed by everyone, but although the fact is fairly obvious, many people do not realize that the individual is purely and solely the result of two factors—heredity and environment. Perhaps the relation may best be expressed in the form that man is a reflection of his total environment, past and present, seen in the mirror of his hereditary nature, which distorts the image to a greater or less extent.

Heredity is generally thought of as relating to two different types of character, physical and mental, the first being the actual structure of the body, and the second the personality. Now there can be no doubt that physical structure is inherited according to the quite definite rules discovered by Mendel, but the environment is also important, since it is only in the presence of a suitable environment that hereditary factors can develop fully. This obviously applies to some traits more than to others. For example, eye

and hair colour and probably certain diseases, such as hæmophilia (a blood disease characterized by excessive bleeding), will occur almost inevitably if the inheritance so decides. But a person will grow to his full potential height only if he is given adequate food and the necessaries of life. Similarly with intelligence, which is decided at the moment of conception, but requires a certain amount of stimulus by the presentation of knowledge before it can develop fully. Nobody can be more intelligent than his heredity allows, but without a good environment he may not develop to the highest degree of which he is capable. Generally speaking, therefore, physical structure is decided at the time of conception, but an unfavourable environment may retard its unfolding.

In the case of personality and mental traits the emphasis lies still more on the environment. It is not known with certainty what mental qualities, if any, are inherited, but what seems fairly certain is that only the tendency to behave in a particular way is inborn. As we noted earlier, a child may be born with a low intelligence or with inadequate capacity for emotional control, but it remains for society to transform these traits, which are perfectly compatible with a good life, into criminal tendencies. Liability to moods of elation and depression is possibly a hereditary trait, and so is the solitary self-absorbed temperament, for these are probably due to the preponderance or otherwise of certain endocrine glands. But it is doubtful whether these differences in temperament, found in many normal people, could develop into insanity or other mental diseases without social stress. Nearly all mental disorder is traceable to bad influences in early childhood—not, as a rule, bad in the

sense of intentionally wrong, but simply stupid. A child who is born oversensitive will react unfavourably to the difficulties which would be got over easily by another child more favourably endowed, but, on the other hand, in a good environment the child need never become neurotic at all. We may therefore conclude that character depends largely on upbringing, but is limited in its possibilities by inherited qualities.

It is only fair to say that a few writers have held a different view. In Lange's *Crime as Destiny* the writer described an investigation on identical twins (that is, twins developing from the same original cell, and therefore with identical hereditary qualities). He looked for twins of this type, one of whom was known to have a criminal record, and who had been separated in early life, so that both had been brought up in different environments. The idea was, of course, to exclude the effect of bad upbringing. In a large number of cases it was found that the other twin, in a totally different environment, had also shown criminal tendencies. This experiment would therefore appear to show that criminal traits can be inherited. However, these results are not generally accepted, and can be explained in other ways. Nobody doubts that some children are born with such an unstable temperament that they tend to get into difficulties in life, and being brought up (even for a short time) in a home which has made one child a criminal is not a promising background. Further, what type of person or institution would, generally speaking, take a child from a criminal household? Perhaps a government poor-law institution, which is not a good background, or an individual taking the child

on payment, or a relative of the criminal family—none of them very hopeful beginnings. The intelligent person wishing to adopt a child for his own home would hardly be likely to take the type of child who has had a bad home and stupid or criminal parents. So, all in all, Lange's thesis is far from invulnerable.

Heredity, we must realize, is not something definite that will inevitably produce a certain type of individual. It can develop only under the influence of particular experiences and in a particular environment. "The child of Gentile parents possesses hereditary potentialities that would make it possible for him to become either a Jew or a Gentile with equal facility, and in the same way an individual's heredity lends itself to either normality or abnormality," says an American writer, Dr. L. I. Brown. But the study of heredity is not, unfortunately, always undertaken nowadays with an unprejudiced outlook. German "scientists" have striven to prove that heredity is all-important, to bolster up their theory of a "master-race," while Russians have tried equally to show that it is of no importance whatever, and that every man has equal potentialities. The truth, so far as it is known, seems to be between the two extremes, with a strong bias towards the latter view.

When a child is born it has naturally no moral ideas nor any desires other than to avoid discomfort and obtain pleasure regardless of anything else. Yet it has to begin straight away to learn that everything cannot be obtained at once and some things cannot be obtained at all, and its first response to this state of affairs is anger and helpless rage. When

it wants to be fed, and is not at once satisfied, it cries and yells with fury. The first lesson of childhood is, therefore, that life involves frustration, and frustration leads to anger, or, in more technical language, aggression.

Aggression is thus not an instinct in itself, but is a response to the universal situation of being frustrated. It would not be profitable to discuss the question of what are the fundamental instincts, for this is largely a matter of definition—some psychologists refer to a dozen or more instincts, while others collect all of them into a single life-force, or lust for life—the libido. Any thwarting of this life-force leads to aggression, as we have already seen. This is an important fact, because the aggressiveness of any individual depends largely on the degree to which he has been thwarted in childhood, and aggression is obviously one of the primary problems in modern civilization. We shall therefore refer to the social side of the problem more fully in a later chapter.

As the child becomes gradually more aware of reality, he begins to realize that certain behaviour is approved of and other types of behaviour are not. The tendency to respond to the thwarting of desires by anger and yelling is usually one of the first acts to be disapproved by the parents, and later there are other forbidden acts, such as "dirty" behaviour, exposing one's body, and so on. When the child does something that is forbidden he incurs the parents' disapproval. Now disapproval, although a serious matter even to an adult, is much more serious to a child, because it means the withdrawal of love and affection, and since the child is totally dependent on his parents this is the most terrible thing that could

happen to him. In this way is set up the association, bad behaviour = loss of love, and there arises a division in the mind between the primitive, amoral, "old Adam," which is more and more ignored, and the everyday, respectable, "good little boy" who develops under the threat of parental disapproval. The first part, the "old Adam," becomes the unconscious mind, and the second, the individual as he presents himself to society, becomes the conscious mind. When the child grows older he may find that many of the parental prohibitions were unreasonable and he devises his own moral code, but there still remains the relic of the old strict parental code in the form of the super-ego.

Having got so far, we must now pause to enlarge somewhat on the last paragraph, especially the part relating to the unconscious. It should be understood that "unconscious" simply means "not attended to," and there is not really any logical difficulty in conceiving such a state of affairs, although much mystery has been made of it. The mind is, at any moment, aware only of a very small part of its actual contents—it is like a searchlight on a dark night, which can be turned on various objects in different directions, but only on a few objects in any given time. For instance, at the present moment I am not thinking of what I had for breakfast this morning, but with a redirection of attention I can easily do so. It could be said that this memory was temporarily "unconscious" until I thought of it. If, now, one imagines that the searchlight is fixed so that it can turn only a quarter of a circle, then one has a picture of the true unconscious mind, containing memories which cannot be brought into attention at all except

by a special technique. These memories are kept purposively and permanently out of attention because they do not fit in with the character which the individual has built up for himself. For instance, if a man has been brought up to repress his anger by being punished by his father every time he loses his temper, he may in time become quiet and inoffensive, since all his aggression is relegated to the unconscious mind. The reason is obvious; he has developed the association anger = punishment, so that any rising feelings of rage produce anxiety and are at once controlled. The unconscious mind, therefore, consists of all the traits which do not fit in with the individual's personality. It is too often believed that the unconscious is only obscene or primitive, but this is far from being true—the desire to be ambitious may quite well be repressed in an individual brought up with the ideal of being humble, and fear of violence is often repressed in those who like to feel themselves brave.

The type of parent who causes children to become neurotic is not necessarily loud and bullying or violent. On the contrary, the worst type is often the gentle, quiet parent who looks grieved when the child is dirty or angry, because the inference that the father or mother has been hurt by the child's actions causes far more guilt and shame than a mere thrashing followed by a return to normal friendliness. It is loss of love, not punishment in itself, that children fear.

The super-ego is what, in the language of ethics, is called the "conscience," and we have seen that it gradually develops by the acceptance of the parent's moral code under the fear of disapproval. This

acceptance takes place in two stages: in the first stage the moral code is felt to be imposed from without, but later it is "introjected"—that is, taken within the child, so that it becomes an internal compulsion, the "still small voice," which unfortunately is not that of God, but of the father. It is always more strict than the individual himself, because experience usually modifies the moral code of childhood, but many people who act in a way that they consider perfectly justifiable in terms of reason, suffer agonies of conscience afterwards because of a super-ego which is more alive than they realize. The super-ego is not logical, and is not as a rule a safe guide to morals, since it is simply the result of the old association between the acts that the parents consider wrong for children and parental disapproval. This explains why people may feel guilty when they merely think of a wrong act, whereas, if the process were a reasonable one, they would be concerned only if they had actually done wrong. But mental associations take place automatically, and are not dependent on whether an event takes place in reality or is only thought of. Hence guilt follows thought just as readily as it follows action. The feeling of guilt is itself nothing more than the dread of loss of love and approval, either from the parents or later, from society in general. This becomes apparent in religious literature, with its continual insistence on being "cast out" from the love of God. It is notable that guilt feelings are generally found in a society with a patriarchal type of family life, in which there is strict control by the father. In other societies they are almost unknown, and, although there are many forbidden acts and behaviour which is "taboo," the reason given for obeying

is that danger or harm will follow the breaking of the rule in a purely automatic and natural way. The idea of "sin" and shame does not enter into this type of moral attitude, and these concepts are largely the product of a certain sort of culture.

The moral code which the father impresses on the child is, of course, ultimately derived from the society in which he lives. But too often the parent imposes only the most childish and archaic elements of the social code, partly because, forgetting his own childhood, he is rather shocked at the child's primitive behaviour, and partly because he wants to make the child better than himself. A revealing association in ethical belief is that between sin and dirt, which is based on the fact that dirty behaviour in connection with bowel-training is disapproved in childhood. Thus comes the further association, dirt = loss of love = sin. Hence the ritual washings in religion and the many phrases such as "dirty scoundrel," "dirty stories," "unclean behaviour," applied in adult life to acts or objects which are not dirty in the literal sense.

The most important fact about the repression of "immoral" desires and thoughts is that it is usually unsuccessful. Emotions dealt with in this way find expression sooner or later by devious paths which are often worse socially than the original desire. It is common knowledge that repressed sexual desires often find expression in a prurient interest in other people's affairs and in absurd attitudes towards "indecent behaviour" which other people do not find at all indecent. In the next chapter we shall give examples of the various ways in which such repressed impulses find pathological expression, but the reader should

note that repression is not the same as suppression. Repression is the unconscious concealing of impulses to which the individual does not admit. The person who represses sexual desires is not aware of doing so, nor is he even aware that the desires exist, since they conflict with the false ideals of his super-ego. Suppression, on the contrary, is the deliberate and conscious control of behaviour realized to be inappropriate at a particular moment, by an individual who is fully aware of the desire to behave in this way. This later type of behaviour is not abnormal, and is in fact ethical in the best sense of the word.

We have already discussed repression and suppression as two means of dealing with instinctual drives. There remain two further methods—sublimation and expression.

Expression refers to the ordinary straightforward expression of an instinct in the original form. If it is one permitted by society, there will be no mental conflict about giving in to it, and no further problems arise. But if it is not permitted, the individual will usually feel a certain amount of guilt at having committed a forbidden act. In the adult the disapproval of society plays a similar part to parental disapproval in childhood, and, conversely, when an act is approved by society the doing of it leads to a feeling of well-being. So when, in certain circumstances such as crowd or mob behaviour, a generally forbidden act is commenced by some members of the crowd, the result is a spread to the rest. The spread is caused not only by suggestion and imitation, but principally by the fact that social condemnation of the act had been removed, and therefore loss of approval will not follow giving in to it. On the contrary, the

crowd may, and usually does, disapprove strongly of any individual who does not join them.

A good example of this interaction between the individual and the group is seen in what is known as "group psychotherapy"—a means of treating neuroses developed during the war, when there were too many cases to be dealt with singly. Neuroses, in general, are due to mental conflict between primitive desires and the ego, or, roughly speaking, between the "natural man" and social prohibitions. In this form of psychotherapy the patients sit together in a group under the control of a psychiatrist and are encouraged to discuss their sexual and other problems openly. As they gradually begin to realize that other people feel the same, and have the same difficulties, the feelings of guilt begin to lessen and the conflicts are thereby relieved. They have shown themselves as they really are, and society in the form of the group has not cast them out, but has even accepted them and shown that others, too, suffer. The confession of antisocial desires (or desires believed to be antisocial by the patient) has not led to loss of approval, and the association begins to break down.

The desire of the individual to be at one with the group, to be socially approved, is very striking. It is almost impossible for anyone to be happy unless he feels that at least some people approve of him and his work. A few giants in the past have been able to achieve a considerable degree of indifference to the opinions of others, but they are exceptions to the rule. One might almost say that the quickest way to make a man happy is to put him in the position of realizing that many people share his views and have

the same likes and dislikes as himself. The pleasure of being at a football match is largely due to this sensation, and the appeal of religious or political meetings is similar. Hence the fatal appeal of totalitarian methods, which have the added attraction of being able to supply an object for hatred. This mechanism will be described later, but it is sufficient to note here that the more hate an individual directs outwards, the less he has to spare against himself. So, at the expense of the Jews, the Communists, and the Catholic Church, Fascism offers every man an increased self-regard.

The joy of losing oneself indiscriminately in a group is the most deadly enemy of freedom. If a cause is just and reasonable people do not require to shout themselves hoarse over it. But the plain fact is that most men do not want to be free. They are afraid that freedom may mean standing alone, and to escape loneliness they are prepared to accept even the most absurd and obscene creeds. Army drill, with its rhythmic timing and simultaneous movements, is designed to inculcate this habit of compliance and a readiness to respond to commands by unquestioning obedience. Anyone who has been drilled will admit that it sometimes produces a strange feeling of elation—due again to a feeling of social solidarity and the loss of the burden of individuality. Evolutionally speaking, individuality is of recent origin, and it is a principle of the human brain that the most recently acquired habits are the easiest to lose. The fear of freedom is, with the problem of aggression, one of the greatest difficulties facing the world to-day, and, social solidarity, though a necessity, should not destroy reasonable individualism.

Sublimation, as the name implies, is the "making sublime" of primitive instincts by a process of transformation, and it differs from repression in that the instinct is, to some extent, satisfied in a manner which is socially useful. Sexual curiosity in the early years may be punished and therefore repressed, with the result that all consciousness of such normal curiosity is lost until it becomes later revealed in such pathological behaviour as an unhealthy interest in sex (even if only in the old maid's comparatively harmless interest in births and marriages), the behaviour of "peeping Toms," and, in the severest cases, in the form of insanity in which elderly people, noted for their blameless lives, are tormented by imaginary voices talking obscenely all day long. The "voices," needless to say, along with the obscenity, come from their own unconscious minds, where they have long been latent. In the form of sublimation, on the other hand, sexual curiosity, instead of being punished, is gradually transformed into general curiosity and the desire to know, in the fields of science or philosophy. Similarly, a child who is "dirty" (as all children are), in showing interest in its bowel-motions and fæces, should be encouraged to get dirty in the more socially approved way of playing with mud and sand. Playing with modelling material such as plasticine and clay is a sublimation of this childish interest, which may develop into various artistic tendencies. Cruel behaviour is another form of primitive behaviour in children, but differs from adult cruelty in that a child, to begin with, at any rate, is unaware of causing pain to another creature. The motive is really a desire for the feeling of power over others, and it has no other purpose whatever. When this is sublimated it may

become an interest in surgery or medicine, or, at a lower level, in bull-fighting or boxing.

Sublimation is one of the chief forces in civilization, and, as was suggested earlier, it may be that the increasing tempo of progress following on the settled agricultural way of life was at least partially due to the increased necessity for sublimation when people began to live in larger groups. Since repression is the failure of sublimation, it goes without saying that the increase of civilization has also led to an increase of repression and unhappiness. This is why civilization is always accompanied by an increase in mental disease and maladaptation, as well as an increase of artistic creation.

To recapitulate: civilization is like a reservoir on a hillside (the primitive instincts) from which flows a system of canals (sublimations) which direct the instincts into recognized channels—art, science, home-life, sport, work, etc. But the sublimations are never adequate to lead away all the increasing pressure in the reservoir, and the result is that muddy streams of water flow down the hillside and spoil the land. This overflow is caused by repression, and the streams that escape in this way are crime, mental illness, and social unrest. If instinctual pressure increases—due, for instance, to frustration produced by economic or other causes—the result is a corresponding increase in the overflow, which may end in war. The more the contents of the reservoir escape by the wrong channels of crime, social unrest, and so on, the greater is their tendency to continue doing so. The channels, as it were, become deeper and more easily utilized. So, after a war, when these modes of behaviour have become familiar, there is always an aftermath of

crime and psychopathic behaviour to add to the general chaos, although this phenomenon is also due to the fact that aggression, formerly directed against the enemy, becomes redirected inwardly against the 'society itself.

CHAPTER VIII

METHODS OF ESCAPE

THE story of a man's life is, in general, the story of how he meets and overcomes, or gives in to, his difficulties. When the difficulties are such as can be conquered, there is nothing further to be said, and the real problem arises only when he is confronted by a situation which seems insoluble and before which all his resources seem of no avail. Now one cannot remain indefinitely at a standstill—life must go on—and the human mind has devised a number of ways of behaving in the face of difficulty which are directed, not towards the constructive solution of the problem, or towards giving it up as a bad job (the only normal solutions), but towards evasion, which is an unpractical, and therefore abnormal, type of response.

Difficult situations may be classified under two headings: Objective and Subjective. The first consists of actual blockings of one's desires in the world of reality, as, for instance, when I wish to enter a room and find it locked, or if I wish to buy some article for which I am unable to pay. This form of difficulty does not concern us here, since it is an ordinary situation of everyday life, the solution to which varies with the problem. At present we are solely concerned with the problem of subjective or psychological difficulties which prevent the individual from responding normally towards his surroundings.

Subjective difficulties may be inborn, as when a youth has ambitions which exceed his inherent intelligence, or when a girl, who is born with some physical defect which makes her unattractive, finds that this interferes with her desire to get married. Such defects, or rather the individual's attitude towards them, may have a profound effect on the life of the person who suffers from them. An American film shown some time ago told the story of a girl, otherwise beautiful, who had received a facial injury as a child, which resulted in a severe scar, making her features distorted and ugly. In her resentment she became a criminal, and thus tried to get her own back on society for the slights it had shown her. When, after a plastic operation, her face became once more attractive, she gave up her criminal behaviour and led a normal and happy life. As in most film stories, this account is perhaps over-dramatized and sentimental, but the story itself is perfectly feasible, and such things happen again and again in real life.

The other cause for psychological difficulties is even more important, since it is much more common. It occurs when the desire to behave in a particular way is blocked by an opposite desire in the person's own mind—a desire to satisfy sexual urges may be blocked by the individual's ideal of chastity, or an ambitious man may be held back by his self-consciousness. In other words, this type of difficulty is due to mental conflict between instinct and ego, and the ego-ideals which block the satisfaction of the instinct are the result of upbringing rather than heredity. It is apparent that the only reasonable solution in this situation is to agree to satisfy either one side or the other. The first individual must either develop new

ideas on sex morality or relinquish his sexual desires, and the second must either give up his ambitions or his self-consciousness. When, as often occurs, he refuses to give up either, the result is a stalemate, which leads to neurosis. We therefore come to the conclusion that a neurosis is an unresolved conflict between two opposite desires, and usually, though not always, between a primitive desire and social ideals. In the case of sexual desires, it could be said that there is fundamentally such a conflict if the individual lives in a society which enjoins pre-marital chastity as an ideal. But the conflict between ambition and self-consciousness is a neurosis which is largely personal, although one could take the view that ambition is a quality useful to society and that this man is robbing others of the possible benefits that might arise if he gave up his self-conscious behaviour. These examples show the difference between the super-ego derived from the parental moral code and the moral code of society; for in this latter case the individual's fear of his ambitions is due to his parent's suppression of self-assertive behaviour in childhood, and the consequent guilt feelings which are now associated with such behaviour. A self-assertive child is perhaps a nuisance to the parent, but a self-assertive man, if his desires are kept within reasonable bounds, is often an asset to society. This is therefore another example of conscience going wrong. Conscience tells this man that it is wrong to assert himself, whereas society approves such behaviour. The self-consciousness, incidentally, arises from the shame produced by having such a "wrong" desire, and a psychologist would demonstrate in this case that both sides of the conflict spring from the same origin.

When an individual has a conflict of this type which he cannot solve in a satisfactory way, he may effect a temporary solution by denying the existence of the "wrong" desire in himself and attributing it to other people, thus gaining mental peace at the expense of normality. This behaviour is known as projection, and is extremely frequent both in individuals and nations. The man we have been referring to may find that everybody around him is aggressive and ambitious and believe that he himself has never had a chance. In this way he satisfies both sides of the conflict by explaining that ambition is useless in such a cut-throat atmosphere, and by attributing his self-consciousness to the unkind behaviour of others. The man, or, more often, woman with a sexual conflict may believe that other people's behaviour is disgusting, and that she, who hates such conduct, is morally bound to join a "watch committee" or other similar organization in order to keep society pure. Here again the sexual desires are satisfied by a prurient interest in the affairs of others, and the ideal of chastity (derived from parental punishment of sexual interests in childhood) satisfied by the picture of herself as a crusader against vice.

This mental attitude may lead ultimately to the mental illness of persecution-insanity, when the primitive impulses can no longer be held down. The final result, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the patient in an asylum, who hears obscene language "over the wireless" all day long. The voices, of course, are simply a projection of his own thoughts.

After the war of 1914-18, Germany, under the Weimar Republic, had to deal with the psychological problems of depression (which is inwardly directed

hate) and the breakdown of sexual morals. Hitler solved this problem, probably unconsciously, by the mechanism of projection. Low sexual morals were attributed to the Jews, and hatred to the Communists, resulting in the picture of the bestial and sensual Jew and the cruel and brutal Communist. In this way he solved at one stroke the conflicts which were leading to the unhappiness of the German people, at the expense of the lives of racial and political minorities.

That these psychological mechanisms are found not only among individuals but in large groups such as nations brings up the question of whether or not a nation can be said to be abnormal in its behaviour. We so often hear the terms "war psychosis," "depression," or "persecution mania," applied to racial groups and States that it is worth while considering briefly how far this is justifiable. In the first place, since we have discarded the idea of a group mind, we must also give up the idea that a whole group can be abnormal or insane in the sense of suffering from some specific mental disease. Also, since morals are not absolute, but vary from one society to another, it would seem equally unreasonable to believe that any individual who behaves according to the customs of his country can be mentally ill. There are, however, certain sorts of behaviour which must be held abnormal in whatever circumstances they occur, if only because they are unbiological and unrealistic. It is, for example, unbiological, and against the best interests of the individual, the nation, or the race, to commit suicide. Similarly, if one nation has a policy which injures all other peoples and leads to war, such a policy can be reasonably considered abnormal. In former days, if one nation were oppressed by another,

war might be thought justifiable, since it is a matter of opinion whether a minor war or oppression is worse. But in our own times, when such an act may lead to the suffering of many innocent people and may involve other nations, it is no longer justifiable or normal.

Abnormal behaviour is not an absolute any more than are moral codes,* but, generally speaking, we may say that no act which is harmless both to the individual and to society can be described as either abnormal or bad. Day-dreaming is abnormal if it leads to self-absorption and lack of contact with reality, and if the individual concerned does not carry out at least his minimum social obligations. If, on the other hand, it leads to the writing of literature which gives pleasure to many, it may be a social asset, and of geniuses we may sometimes have to say, as Pope Paul III did when asked to imprison Benvenuto Cellini: "You should know that men like Benvenuto, unique in their profession, stand above the law."

In our own day it is necessary to have an international outlook, not out of broad-mindedness, nor charity, nor humanity, but simply in order to save our own skins. Any person, therefore, who incites others to racial or group hatred should be punished, or at least segregated as a dangerous lunatic. Diseases of conduct are not like physical illness, where one can point out a particular structure in the body which is damaged or has a pathological appearance. The sole criterion of behaviour is the purely pragmatic

* Karen Horney (*Our Inner Conflicts*) points out that the possibilities of conflict are much fewer in a stable, tradition-bound society in which a clear-cut moral code exists, than in a society in transition with a relatively fluid code. In the latter there are more difficult decisions to make, more moral conflict, and therefore more neurosis.

one: Does it work, and is it in the best interests of society? Reality can never be ignored, for whatever conflicts with reality must, in the long run, be bad for society. A religion which inculcates views which are not, in fact, true, is not good, even if it apparently leads to the happiness of many people and their improved behaviour. If people are unhappy, the real cause of their misery should be attacked. To become contented by living in fantasy is only perpetuating bad social or psychological conditions, as a drunkard perpetuates his conflicts by concealing them with the use of alcohol. If a religion is false, it is indeed, as Marx said, "the opium of the people." Reality, of course, is never completely known, and one can only judge by the information available at any given time. Thus the world-picture of the Roman Catholic Church was not inconsistent with what was known of the universe in the Middle Ages, but it requires all the ingenuity of its apologists to produce at the present day even a semblance of consistency with modern knowledge. We may conclude, therefore, that, while an ordinarily satisfactory criterion of behaviour for everyday use is obtained by comparison of the individual with other members of the same culture, the only ultimately satisfactory criteria are (a) consistency with reality and (b) usefulness to the individual and to society as a whole.

A further point which requires to be answered in this connection is the following: when we say that the Germans had persecution mania, or when we make a similar judgment on another national or racial group, what does this really imply? We have seen that the behaviour of a nation may reasonably be described as abnormal under certain conditions, but we have denied that it possesses a group mind which

becomes diseased, or that every individual in the State is to be thought of as insane or neurotic. What, then, does this statement mean?

Taking the persecution of the Jews as an example, the individuals in a State may be divided into three groups, according to their attitude to this pathological behaviour. There is a minority of those who are grossly abnormal in that their behaviour is founded on the mechanism of projection and who really believe themselves to be victimized by the Jews. To this group belonged such men as Hitler, Himmler, and Streicher, who were obviously abnormal and perfectly sincere in their delusions. Then there is a large majority of people who are simply using the belief to suit their own convenience. Persecution makes them feel good because it distracts their attention from their own universal sense of frustration. Many of them, because of business competition or professional jealousy, are glad of the opportunity of getting rid of rivals, while some are simply camp-followers who like to be in the fashion. The main point about this group is that the individuals concerned, although they are ready to comply with, or aid, persecution when it is given social sanction by the crazy minority, would never have dared to initiate such a programme themselves. Yet there could never have been an active Nazi minority in power, had there not been this majority of passive Nazis supporting them. The desire to persecute others is latent in each one of us because nobody likes to believe that he is himself largely responsible for his failure in life. Ordinarily we are satisfied with attacking "the system," or "economic depression," to explain our failures, but a personal enemy who can be hurt is infinitely more satisfactory. The Jews supply such a target for aggression in

that they are a minority; they have a tradition of being scapegoats; they cannot fight back; and, unlike the Communists, they have no backing from any other land.

Finally, there is a small minority of men who retain their sense of reality and fair play and are against persecution. They are in a minority because comparatively few people are sufficiently well informed or determined to have strong convictions. Incidentally, being well informed has a great deal to do with being determined. The concept known as "will-power" simply means that the individual has oriented his life around one main ideal or group of ideals, so that everything else naturally falls into line in relation to this main driving-force. The belief that will-power can be developed by exercises is as foolish as the belief that intelligence can be similarly increased. The only sense in which the will can be developed is in having strong convictions, which depend, to some extent at least, on being well informed. This conclusion is not far from the belief of Socrates that goodness and intelligence are synonymous and that "bad" behaviour is only stupid behaviour based on inadequate knowledge. A man with a weak will is one who is continually drawn between many conflicting desires, whereas the determined man has one main desire to which all others are subsidiary. To give up smoking, for example, one would have to have (a) a belief that smoking is harmful and hinders the achievement of one's purpose, and (b) one desire in life that overrules all others. Without the first there would be no point in giving up the habit, and without the second there would be no emotional drive behind the belief. Thus it is evident that education is of supreme importance, since its function is to ensure

that personal convictions are based on reality, and are not simply the reflection of individual prejudices. In the terms we have used previously its function is to supply and develop suitable sublimations in order that people will not desire the wrong things.

Other mental mechanisms, although important in psychiatry, are less interesting socially except in so far as they lead to neurosis, and thus produce a social problem. Worry over mental conflicts may, for instance, produce either actual or hysterical disease of the body. In a chronic state of anxiety the continual secretion of the substance called adrenaline, which is the objective aspect of anxiety, may lead to high blood pressure, gastric ulcer, skin diseases, and so on. In a milder degree hysterical states result in which the organs merely function badly, but are not yet structurally altered, although, in time, abnormal changes may occur. It must be clearly understood that this is not a case of "mind over matter." Emotions are bodily states, and the only difference between nervous dyspepsia and stomach ulcer is one of degree. The first is a state of disordered function and may lead in time to the second state, which is one of disordered structure. Emotions are very potent processes, as the famous anatomist Hunter realized when, suffering from angina pectoris, a serious heart disease, he said: "My life is in the hands of every scoundrel who chooses to annoy me."

This problem of neurosis, whether in the form of physical illness due to anxiety, or simply anxiety in itself, is of great social significance, as will be realized from the fact that doctors estimate that up to seventy per cent of their patients have emotional conflict as an important factor in their illnesses. What is even

more significant is that the conflict is frequently due to dissatisfaction with the environment in which the individual has to live or the work he has to do. Thus it is common to find an industrial worker with neurotic symptoms who, on investigation, turns out to have a conflict between his distaste for an unpleasant or dull job and his need to remain at work in order to support his family. Unable either to leave his work or to reconcile himself to it, he develops a neurosis and evades the work by falling ill, while satisfying his conscience with the assurance that he "can't help it." This is obviously an important fact in industry, and it shows the importance of good surroundings and the selection of the right people for the right job. It has been found in the Army that, when men are selected for work by psychological tests, the incidence of neurosis in such selected persons is greatly reduced.

Desire for power is one of the drives most frequently manifested in political life, as well as in other situations, so we will conclude this chapter with a short account of the origins and development of this urge. Some psychologists, led by Alfred Adler, originally a disciple of Freud, have maintained that desire for power is the main driving force in life, and there can be little doubt that in modern European culture this over-simplification comes very near the truth. That it is universally valid is certainly untrue; for, as we have seen, the concept of individuality arose in Europe during the Renaissance, and has not arisen in most other cultures at all, and, without individuals, desire for power is hardly conceivable.* In Europe

* Karen Horney (*The Neurotic Personality of our Time*) lists craving for power and excessive desire for affection as two of the most characteristic neurotic features of modern life. Both, she considers, are due to social insecurity.

since the Renaissance, however, the power drive has made almost every other drive a secondary consideration. Even the sexual instincts, given first place by most psychologists, have been utilized in its support, and it would not be far wrong to say that more than half the sexual difficulties of modern times are due to the association of prestige with love. Most patients who come to a psychiatrist on account of what they believe to be excessive sexual desires are found to have a very moderate desire which has been put to the service of power in order to gain control over others. Conversely, many impotent patients are so because they associate the sexual act with power and aggression, which conflicts with their more tender sentiments. The Don Juan is a weakling who can satisfy his desire to be superior only by feeling that he is irresistible, and most disappointed lovers are more concerned with their hurt pride than with whether the girl they were to love through eternity is now happy with the rival.

Desire for power is derived from the feelings of inferiority and insignificance of childhood. Every child is bound to feel weak in comparison with adults, but parents and others often unwittingly tend to increase his sense of powerlessness. Perhaps the child is inferior in height or physique, or has weak eyesight, or is the youngest of several brothers and sisters. Or he may be teased about an imagined defect, such as red hair, or a racial trait, such as a Jewish nose. All these traits may produce a feeling of inferiority—the famous inferiority complex. In order to overcome this the individual has three possible courses open to him. He may overcome his defect by excelling others in the very thing in which he felt inferior, as

many stammerers have become great orators, or weaklings have developed into strong men, or men with poor eyesight into artists. Or, secondly, he may become powerful in another quite different sphere, even if it is only being the best dart-player at the local inn. Finally, he may adopt the neurotic type of response by failing to overcome his defect, but using it, or even exaggerating it, in order to avoid any difficult situation which he does not care to undertake. Hence the chronic invalid with dubious complaints, who has been "weak all his life" and satisfies his desire for power by being fussed over by shoals of admiring relatives, or the "efficient" business man who has migraine attacks whenever he is about to show up his inadequacy; the soldier who is unable to do guard duties because of "night blindness"; and the innumerable people who, having had an accident to their head many years ago, develop convenient headaches whenever asked to do something they dislike.

Unfortunately, the individual who has once felt inferior is liable to over-estimate power, and this may lead to over-compensation. Not satisfied with what he has attained, he must go on and on until his inflated ego is a social danger. It is worth noting that Mussolini, Hitler, and Napoleon were all small men with a poor social background, who aspired to something better. In other words, a superiority complex is essentially the same sort of behaviour as an inferiority complex, since both are found in people who think in terms of power—of "superior" and "inferior." The former has over-compensated and the latter has given up fighting. The tendency to think in power terms is not natural, although it is almost

universal in Europe. Nearly all of us tend to estimate every stranger we meet as more or less important, or clever, or good-looking, in comparison with ourselves. As we have already suggested, this is probably a result of the increased individuality and inner loneliness of European man particularly since the Renaissance. A child is made to feel very early in life that he must stand alone and accept his responsibilities, whereas in other races the whole tribe faces the dangerous situations of life together.

An unfortunate consequence of these psychological facts is that power is often given to the least suitable people. In politics, where men are required to be balanced, normal, intelligent, and concerned for the good of others, the sort of people who may be expected to put themselves forward are often unbalanced, cranky, and purely concerned with satisfying their own ego. The normal man does not want power *per se*. Worst of all, as we have seen, people are often attracted to the very positions for which they are least suited in their attempt to overcome feelings of inferiority. Thus we get the sort of politician who is, in turn, Liberal, Socialist, and Fascist, and obviously less interested in the virtues or otherwise of these creeds than in their capacity to allow him to assert himself, or the neurotic who is attracted to psychiatry, or the hypochondriac who becomes a P.T. instructor, or the timid man who wants to be a commando or parachutist. Finally, there is the man with the totalitarian mind, who wants people to be controlled because he cannot control himself.

All these facts emphasize that it is not always wise to let people choose their own position in life, and it is certainly unwise to permit those who are to rule to

put themselves forward without any further investigation of their motives, conscious or otherwise. The good of a statesman does not, unfortunately, always coincide with that of mankind, because, as Bertrand Russell points out: “. . . in a social system in which power is open to all, the posts which confer power will, as a rule, be occupied by men who differ from the average in being exceptionally power-loving.” (*Power: A New Social Analysis*).

CHAPTER IX

FRUSTRATION

WE have noted, in earlier chapters, that aggression is generally caused by frustration. If this is really true it is obviously a fact of the greatest importance; for any information which throws light on the problem of hatred and aggression is bound to be interesting, and perhaps helpful in the study of social problems. But unless frustration be very widely defined, it is difficult to describe *all* aggression as being due to this one cause. When a man gets up in the morning and stubs his bare foot against the bed, his action certainly generates anger, but it does not seem that he has been thwarted, unless in his desire to have a quiet and painless life. Yet, although all aggression may not be due to frustration, the reverse is certainly true: that all frustration leads to aggression, and that whenever a desire fails to be satisfied, in some form or another, anger is bound to result. In an ordinary case this hatred is turned against the individual object causing the blocking of satisfaction, and is relieved by violence against it. This is the sequence of events in early childhood, before the child has learned to control his behaviour, and when he can still be openly angry and violent. It is quite untrue that young children are naturally quiet and gentle—on the contrary, about the second year of life they delight in violence and destruction and take pleasure in fighting and pulling

things to pieces. This period of openly expressed violence corresponds to the time when the child is being brought under social control and, to that degree, is being thwarted. He is compelled to be good, to become regular in his bladder and bowel movements, and to stop being "dirty." Dr. Karl Menninger says: "We know, both from the observation of children and from the recollections of psycho-analytic patients, that these processes are accompanied by turbulent emotional reactions and that vestiges of the conflict between the child (as a representative of nature) and the parent (as a representative of society) persist throughout life."

In many primitive societies parents leave their children alone and do not suppress their desires, with the result that the child is later able to develop more grown-up substitutes for infantile behaviour without feeling that he has been thwarted by his father or mother. Any hurt the child receives in such societies comes from nature, whose thwarting is, in any case, a universal experience. In European and American culture, on the contrary, the child not only tends to be frustrated in his desires and his anger but he has to pretend to like it, or at any rate not to mind. He is expected to be polite and a "good little boy" at all times.

But when anger has once been aroused it must find some expression in some form or another, although the form of expression varies according to the individual and the situation. When outright violence is considered to be wrong or is not feasible there remain two possibilities: the aggression may be directed against another object, or, as a last resort, may be turned against the individual himself. We thus have

a situation which may be expressed schematically as follows:—

Frustration of desire: by individual, by nature, leads to aggression.	{	(1) Expression: attacking the cause. (2) Projection: "taking it out of" somebody, or something, else (3) Introjection (a form of repression). Bottling hatred up, self-hatred.
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Frustration by nature, by the environment, is experienced by everybody, and does not as a rule present the same problems as when the frustration comes from another individual. In the first place, it is more readily accepted as part of the natural course of events, and, secondly, it is usually possible to take direct action against it. Substitute reactions for direct aggression are generally due to personalities being involved in the situation. There are, however, some people who have such strong associations of guilt with any form of anger or self-assertion that they find it impossible to allow the least expression of such feelings even when animals or objects are concerned. In a minor form this attitude is found in the type of person who is an anti-vivisectionist, or a member of some similar society, and, in a grosser form, in the mystic who feels guilt about killing insects or even lice on his own body. These reactions occur only in people who have often been frustrated in childhood and then made to feel guilt about the resulting anger. It is important, of course, to distinguish between environmental thwarting, which is obviously impersonal—such as floods, storms, cold, and so on—and thwarting which, although it is really environmental, *appears* to proceed from individuals. Economic frustration has causes which are deep-rooted and certainly beyond the control of any one person, but it is felt by the individual

concerned to proceed from a person—perhaps his landlord, or his boss, or the government. It therefore appears as a blocking of desire by individuals, and economic thwarting leads, as is well known, to very deep and personal hatred.

Anger, therefore, may be projected against substitute objects either because of guilt or because of fear of social consequences. For example, a clerk in an office may turn against his wife the anger he has been unable to express when reprimanded by his employer, or a lover may be aggressive towards others when he is unable to express his feelings of frustration to his "coy mistress." These projections of anger may be turned in any direction, but usually follow the line of least resistance, either towards the person who is most convenient at the moment or towards someone who has been the object of aggression in the past. Hence the choice of their wives, or the Jews, by many men who are seeking a lightning-conductor for their rage. Intelligent and humane men go out and chop wood—an equally effective procedure. Perhaps Voltaire had this in mind as a solution to the world's problems when he concluded *Candide* by declaring: "We must cultivate our garden." It certainly was clear to Kipling when he advised us to "dig till we gently perspire," in order to cure "the hump that is black and blue."

Introjection (literally, throwing inwards) of resentment is a more difficult process to understand. It is, as can be seen, a form of repression, and usually occurs in the type of person described above, who associates guilt with any form of self-assertion. Therefore the character traits found in the depressed individual are over-conscientiousness and gentleness

to an exaggerated degree. He may be seething with hatred inwardly, but the hatred, being a forbidden impulse, is turned against himself. A very revealing example of this behaviour was seen in a young woman who came into hospital with severe depression after an attempt at suicide. In her conversation she referred to how wicked she had been, how she had failed as a wife, and how good her husband was to her in spite of her unworthiness. She considered herself to be unworthy to live, and felt that suicide was the only solution. But when given a drug to make her drowsy (the so-called "truth drug," the sole effect of which is to cause a relaxation of self-control, as alcohol does), the picture was very different. After a few minutes she said: "I feel I want to hit somebody, I want to tear the bedclothes to pieces"; and later: "It's that dirty rat of a husband of mine—I could kill him for going out with women and ignoring me." Having cursed her husband volubly for half an hour, she began to feel much better. This girl had been brought up by religious parents who had taught her that she should always be gentle and turn the other cheek. She had followed this advice to such effect that, when her husband became unfaithful, all the resentment produced was turned against herself and made her literally ill with self-hatred. Self-hatred and depression are identical, and the reader will note that, like all neurotic symptoms, depression serves a double purpose. The conscience is satisfied by doing what is "right," by turning the other cheek, and the impulse of hatred is satisfied by filling the husband with guilt. Her symptom says clearly to him: "If you had been faithful to me I wouldn't be like this." That this hurting of the other person while pretending

to be kind lies behind a great deal of so-called Christian charity was apparent to an old Scots farmer who said: "Aye, a soft answer turneth away wrath—and forbye (besides) it makes the other fellow damned angry!"

Most cases of suicide are examples of this mechanism. Theoretically, a man may kill himself out of sheer hopelessness, but in actual fact this is very rare, and most suicides are done with the dual motives of frustration and revenge. There is nearly always "another" in the picture whom the would-be suicide desires to hurt.

The sequence of outward- and inward-turned aggression is seen at a more primitive level in the following case quoted by Dollard, Doob, and others, in the book called *Frustration and Aggression*, published in the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction: A small boy was unusually aggressive towards adults, whom he invariably bit and pinched. When he was put in an institution the punishment given for this behaviour suppressed it, but the child then took to attacking other children of his own age. This behaviour, in turn, was suppressed, and the child then commenced to pinch himself and bang his head on the walls, until his body was covered with bruises. When sent elsewhere for treatment all possible sources of frustration were removed and the child was encouraged to express his anger. The result was that he first stopped harming himself, then became once more aggressive to adults, and finally gave up the abnormal behaviour altogether.

The importance of these observations for society is difficult to over-estimate. At present we are suffering from the aftermath of war, and the results

of a long period of frustration are coming home to roost. Rationing, the black-out, relatives separated from home, bombing, and so on, led to anger, which, during the war, could be conducted away by the existence of an enemy. Now it is turned by each individual against another individual or class. A situation like this is liable to lead to a vicious circle. People become afraid of their rising hatred and look to rigid control from without as a solution of their difficulties, and control leads to the acceptance of Fascist or totalitarian principles. Fascism is the solution of the man who is afraid of himself, and especially of his own primitive hatred of his neighbours. He does not realize that by imposing further controls Fascism only increases his aggression, which it then proceeds to re-direct against minorities or in renewed warfare. Fascism, in fact, is bound to lead to war, since in its psychological aspect it is a means of re-directing aggression, which, however, must sooner or later be satisfied.

At the level of societies nearly all thwarting is economic, a term which includes inadequate or bad food, dull work or unemployment, bad housing conditions, and bad education. Often the rivalries and hatreds which seem most personal, such as American or South African versus Negro, turn out to be largely economic, although the object of hatred may or may not be the real cause of the frustration. The Negro represents, to the American in the Southern States or to the South African, a source of cheaper labour which, at first useful, is now regarded as a rival. Having lower economic requirements, he can compete with the white man, who feels that his employment is endangered by one who can work for

lower wages. The same applies to the Japanese settlers in California. An important psychological factor, however, is that the group selected for persecution must be recognizable. People want an enemy they can distinguish from others, and they tend to choose a group different in colour, religion, language, or facial appearance.

Crime and neurosis are, generally speaking, products of frustration. We will deal with the former in a later chapter, but it is worth while noting that crime increases in times of economic depression. For example, the number of lynchings of Negroes in the Southern States of America corresponds closely to periods of depression in the cotton trade. Crime also increases after a war, and the increase is not, as one might expect, simply due to greater necessity for stealing owing to poverty. There are also more murders and sexual offences than in normal times. When thwarting occurs there is always a tendency for behaviour to revert to more primitive levels, or what psychologists call regression. Many men whose normal sexual desires are frustrated revert temporarily to homosexual behaviour—an earlier type of sexuality—although they are not in fact homosexual by nature. Other forms of sexual perversion are also prone to develop in times of economic or other stress, owing to the tendency to regress in the face of difficulties. The night-clubs of Berlin or London in 1919 and after are an example of this general rule.

How early training produces the adult character can be seen from the work of anthropologists who have studied the different types of upbringing in various races in relation to the adult personality of each race.

Thus the upbringing of the Mountain Arapesh is described as follows: the parents are indulgent and do not approve of rigid training, punishments are mild, and children are generally taught by imitation and example. When the child cries for food, it is fed right away, and docility is praised as a virtue. The result is an adult who typically is unaggressive and gentle, but who is liable to be un-self-reliant and worried when anyone disapproves of his actions. He is afraid of strangers and hates any form of violence or fighting. At the other extreme is a tribe known as the Mundugamor, in which the parents train the child severely, punish it fairly often, and feed it irregularly and not very much. The child is often beaten, and there are many taboos. These attitudes result in an adult who is aggressive even to his brothers, and who shows extreme hostility to his father. He indulges in head-hunting and cannibalism, and has little affection for anyone, including his own children.

In Germany children tend to be punished severely for breaking rules, and resentment against discipline is strongly suppressed, with the result that the aggression engendered is directed against groups outside the nation. In America and Britain, on the other hand, aggressive behaviour is less likely to be thwarted, and a certain amount of rough behaviour is expected in children. Excess aggression is sublimated into sport, and later into trade and business competition.

It appears, therefore, that the control of aggression depends on the following factors:—

- (1) Avoiding unnecessary frustration in childhood.
- (2) Allowing, within reason, controlled aggres-

sion to express itself openly and immediately when it arises.

(3) Redirecting the remaining aggression into suitable channels (i.e., sublimation).

Frustration in childhood, especially when imposed unnecessarily or without explaining to the child why it is done, is at the root of much adult neurotic behaviour. Children should be encouraged to express themselves as fully as possible, so long as they do not harm others, and when it is necessary to forbid certain behaviour the child should be told in a quiet and reasonable way exactly why this is necessary. Moral indignation is silly because, if the child is doing wrong unawares, it is out of place, and if the child is doing wrong deliberately, it defeats its own ends. Children deliberately do wrong only when they wish to draw attention to other grievances, or when they have not been properly dealt with. As the educationist A. S. Neill has shown, the people who require treatment are problem-parents rather than problem-children.

In the Trobriand Islands the anthropologist Malinowski found that no sexual frustrations were imposed on children, and in these islands crime and neurosis were unknown, whereas in a neighbouring group of islands, where taboos were strong, crime and neurotic behaviour were very common. It is not suggested that in European culture sexual taboos should be ended, but the lesson is clear that thwarting should be, so far as possible, reduced, and when it is unavoidable it should be kindly and reasonably applied. Readers will find in the books of A. S. Neill many excellent examples of the natural good

behaviour of children when they are treated as sensible beings.

When anger is stimulated it should be part of the function of education to enable us to control, but not to suppress it. There is no reason whatever why people should not quarrel when they feel like it, and "get it off their chests"—the best possible reaction so long as physical violence is kept within reasonable bounds. All over the world one finds the apparent paradox that people who are severely thwarted in childhood, and who are not allowed to be aggressive in their own circles or against authorities inside the group, are the most war-like and violent towards other groups. The continual healthy grumbling of the British and Americans (who have less to grumble about than most people) is largely the cause of their comparatively tolerant and peaceable natures, and the suppression of such healthy quarrelsomeness is a step towards war. Psychologists have often remarked that married couples who quarrel frequently and loudly with each other are precisely the ones who have no wish to be divorced. The two ways to make a nation peaceable are by avoiding frustration, especially economic frustration, and by allowing plenty of outlet for anger in healthy grumbling. The latter is the method of the great democracies, Britain and the U.S.A., and the former is exemplified in Brazil. Stefan Zweig, in his book *Brazil—Land of the Future*, has described how this country possesses immense natural wealth, and economic frustration has been little felt until recently. Many races, including the native Indians, Portuguese, Spanish, Negroes, French, and Jews, have intermarried and live together in perfect amity. There is no racial feeling whatever,

and the people are gentle, good-natured, and kind, if rather unassertive and over-sensitive. For example, a maid who has been working for a long time in a house may suddenly disappear and not come back again owing to a quite minor slight or unkindness, but she will make no complaint. This over-gentle attitude and fear of loss of approval, resulting in undue sensitiveness, is not particularly a feature of unaggressive societies, but, as in the case of the Arapesh tribe, is due to too much parental fussing. Parents who are too loving and easily hurt are liable to induce subdued behaviour on the part of children, who are afraid of hurting them.

The final factor in dealing with aggression is direction towards a suitable object. The U.S.S.R., which, before the war, was also a peaceable country, instead of projecting aggression against racial minorities, directed it against bad economic conditions (the Five-Year Plans), and, to a lesser extent, against political enemies within and without the State. The achievement of this attitude is a matter of education. If children were constantly taught that racial persecution and intolerance are contemptible, they would more readily accept other outlets for their anger. Generally speaking, however, except in enlightened communities such as Switzerland and Denmark, children are not specifically taught to despise such behaviour, and are simply indoctrinated with moral platitudes based on Christian morality which they can see being ignored and scorned in everyday life. There is no point in giving religious instruction which tells that one should love one's neighbour when even one's own father disobeys the rule with great frequency. It is not always, or even often, possible to

love one's neighbour, but it is possible to look on racial or any other form of persecution as disgusting and futile. We may detest Catholicism, but this is a different matter from interfering with the liberty and lives of Catholic people, who are entitled to their own beliefs so long as they, in turn, do not interfere with others. What helps persecution is that the authorities in most countries, although not perhaps anti-Catholic or anti-Semitic, are not fervently anti-intolerance, and perhaps are even inclined to welcome a little of it as a safety-valve to keep people quiet about other abuses.

To sum up: the mechanism of the production of aggression—one of the most serious problems in the world to-day—is clearly understood in its essentials, and the necessary conditions for a peaceful society are as follows:—

- (1) Enlightened upbringing of children, avoiding unnecessary frustration.

- (2) Good education, teaching specific duties rather than vague moral platitudes.

- (3) Attack the economic causes of social frustration.

- (4) Direct aggression towards suitable objects, such as programmes of reconstruction, poverty, intolerance, control of disease.

- (5) Allow controlled direct aggression within reason—that is, let individuals express their anger as it arises, provided no serious damage results.

- (6) The above are means of dealing with the motive forces of aggression. There still remains the question of legal control. For instance, the petty wars of the Feudal ages were stopped by for-

bidding private armies. The barons, no doubt, remained just as aggressive, but their power was removed. Similar action is necessary to take away the power of nations to wage international war,

CHAPTER X

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

CRIME is the breaking of a law, and therefore implies the existence of a legal code. Such codes, however, do not exist until society reaches a fairly complex economic level, although all people have customs and institutions the function of which is to regulate relations between individuals. Once society has developed beyond the mere family group it becomes an obvious necessity to ensure that members of the clan do not make a nuisance of themselves by continual quarrelling or fighting, and rules have to be devised to keep the peace for the benefit of everyone. These rules, to begin with, apply only within the clan, and other people are outside the law. So when a member of one clan injures a member of another, the result is a blood-feud, an attempt to exact vengeance, which, owing to the solidarity of primitive races, is liable to involve all the members of both clans. The blood-feud has always been common in Mediterranean races—we read about one in the beginning of *Romeo and Juliet*—and the custom still persists in some parts of the Near East. Usually, however, as civilization increases, an attempt is made to avoid so much unnecessary slaughter by applying the principle of retribution: “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” as it is expressed in the Bible. The Code of Hammurabi, to which we have referred in an earlier

chapter, is based on this principle, and quite literally decrees that if one man blinds another, whether by design or accident, he shall be blinded himself. Later, a system of compensations arose, and, instead of identical reparations being carried out in kind, it became possible to pay a fine in money according to a written law. The fines varied according to the social position, sex, and age of the individual who had been injured. In this way there arose the concept of Civil Law—that is, law regulating the relations between individuals, as opposed to Criminal Law, concerned with offences against the State.

Throughout the course of history Criminal Law has greatly increased its scope. Among primitive people only two forms of behaviour are held to be seriously antisocial: murder and incest. Crime is rather unusual in primitive communities. A. S. Diamond (*Primitive Law*) notes: “at the lowest grades of culture, communities may be found among whom no important offence of violence has been committed within living memory.” Murder, of course, is the killing of another individual of the same tribe, who is therefore “within the law,” while incest is the crime of having sexual relations with someone of the same clan or totem, who is therefore looked on as a brother or sister. For these crimes the penalty was invariably death, and with the development of religion the prohibition was given religious sanction. Incest, in particular, was held to bring the vengeance of the gods on the tribe which did not summarily execute the offender. As we noted earlier, there is no fundamental connection between religion and law, or even between religion and morality, but, as the story of Moses and the Ten Com-

mandments demonstrates, it suited the purpose of rulers to give their laws the authority of religion. The Jews were, indeed, as Cecil Roth points out in his *Short History of the Jewish People*, the first to associate religion and ethics: "Never before, so far as is known, had worship been associated with morals. Never before had rules for the government of relationships between man and man been presented or considered as divine ordinances."

The prohibition of murder seems a fairly obvious step, but it is not yet known why incest was held by all people in such abhorrence. Westermarck thought that this was due to a natural aversion to sexual relations between people who had been brought up together—a view which is certainly wrong, because, as Freud pointed out, there would be no need for laws against incest if the aversion were natural. People do not make laws against acts which nobody wants to commit, but, on the contrary, against those which many desire to do. Other anthropologists have thought that the taboo has the function of preventing the alleged, though imaginary, bad effects of inbreeding, but, since savages are not interested in eugenics, this seems a highly improbable assumption. Freud's explanation of the fear of incest has already been given in the account of his theories from *Totem and Taboo*, and those who are interested will find further accounts of the origin of the fear in Lord Raglan's book *Jocasta's Crime*.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the number of criminal offences had increased to such an extent that in England there were well over two hundred crimes for which the punishment was death. The effect of religion in adding to the number of

offences, and increasing the severity of punishment, was considerable. The Christian Church devised such new "crimes" as heresy and blasphemy, and was responsible for much of the irrational attitude towards offenders based on the theory that whoever committed a crime against the King or the State committed it also against God. This belief replaced the old common-sense concept of the offender as being a fairly ordinary individual who had to make redress to another individual for a wrong intentionally or inadvertently done, and the picture arose of the criminal as a monster of wickedness who had broken the laws of God and man. The typically Christian view of the law-breaker did not die out until the rationalist beliefs of the French Revolution began to spread and bring a return to older ways of thinking.

Various views have been held as to the purpose of punishment, at different stages of history, and generally these can be classified under the three headings of retribution, prevention, and reform. Retribution is, of course, the oldest of these, and is represented in the codes of primitive people, the code of Hammurabi, and the Old Testament. It is a notion based on magical thinking rather than on malice, deeply rooted in the human mind, not only in regard to wrong-doing but also in connection with other behaviour. Just as the wearing of a green robe is expected to make the spring come, so, in reverse, the effect of one act can be negated only by doing a similar act. The savage argues: "I do something here and something happens over there." Therefore, when he wants to undo an act he argues further: "Something happened over there, so now I must do something here." Naturally, the act done in retribution must be similar to the

original act, and when wrong is done by an individual the same wrong must be done to him. At a later stage, when settled social life has made people more humane, there arises the idea of the scape-goat—of visiting the retribution on a substitute-object when it is not considered fitting that the original wrongdoer should suffer. In the worship of the god Dionysus the human sacrifice was replaced by a goat which was killed instead, and the Old Testament story of Abraham and Isaac, in which a lamb was substituted for the son, tells the tale of a similar revolution in thought in the history of the Jews. It is only in terms of the primitive concepts of retribution and the scape-goat that the basic outline of the Christian religion can be understood; for there is little that appeals to the modern mind in the story of a God who was so angry with men that he wished to destroy them, and then gave his son instead to die for their sins as the "Lamb of God." Neither the relentless desire for vengeance, nor the idea that one man can wipe out the guilt of others by suffering in their place, has any meaning to the average modern European, and the ritual belief in retribution has dropped from penal codes, though not, apparently, from religious thought.

The belief that punishment is preventive is more enlightened and more recent, but has hardly justified itself in practice. In fact, crime has proved in the past to be related mainly to periods of economic stress, and there was more crime precisely at the times when punishment was most severe and ruthless. Before the war there were fewer murders in the countries where there was no death penalty, but this does not, of course, prove that the absence of capital punishment leads to less crime. It merely demonstrates

that peaceful and progressive countries tend to have less crime, and that absence of a death penalty does not lead to increase in murders. Few people would claim that a would-be murderer usually weighs up the chances of being caught and executed. Far from preventing crime, there is considerable evidence that a number of people commit crimes with the intention, unconscious or otherwise, of getting sent to prison. They are so afraid of their "bad" primitive impulses that they feel safe only when locked up in a cell. The final argument against this theory of punishment is that in most prisons a majority of the inmates are repeated offenders with two, three, or more sentences. It is evident that in these cases punishment has failed to prevent crime.

The theory that an attempt should be made to cure the criminal who is regarded as mentally abnormal is the most modern theory. The upholders of this theory maintain that crime is a disease which should be treated psychologically, and, as we shall see later, there is some truth in this belief. But there are also at least two fallacies involved: the first is that crime is a purely psychological problem, which is untrue, and the second is that it is possible to cure such offenders as are genuinely mentally unbalanced, which is not usually the case. Crime is certainly in a few cases an almost entirely personal eccentricity—a neurosis, in other words—but the vast majority of crimes are the product of social conditions, mainly economic frustration, and can therefore only be radically dealt with by treating the cause. When crime is a neurosis it is very difficult to treat, because the type of neurosis that shows itself in antisocial acts rather than in physical or mental suffering does not

cause the individual sufficient inconvenience to give him incentive to co-operate in treatment.

In order to understand criminal behaviour with a view to preventing it we must first discuss in more detail the various conditions which lead to crime. We must remember, however, that what constitutes an offence depends on the society concerned. Homosexual behaviour was accepted in Ancient Greece and is tolerated in many Western European countries, but is illegal in Britain—except, curiously enough, in the case of women. Holding opinions against religion is not now taken very seriously in any modern State, but holding opinions against the Government frequently is. Generally speaking, all States have passed laws against murder and assault, stealing, and other offences against property, and various acts which are held to be obscene or indecent. Bearing this in mind we may go on to describe the causes of crime under the two main headings of social and personal.

The social causes of crime are poverty and frustration generally. It is easy to understand that a man who is starving should want to steal food or money, and, so long as poverty remains, there will be people more or less compelled to steal in order to keep alive. Poverty is a form of frustration, but individuals are also frustrated in a more wide sense of the word. Dull and uninteresting work thwarts the desire for a purpose in life, and bad housing and lack of amenities make a man discontented and disposed to crime, quite apart from actual starvation. This type of thwarting increases after a war or in times of national unrest, and depends on many factors: conditions may actually be bad, or relatively worse, or a war may have increased the total amount of aggressiveness,

which, when peace "breaks out" (as the process has rightly been described), has to seek new objects; or a man may have developed a new outlook on life owing to better education. Frustration is always relative. A peasant in Egypt, for example, is far worse off than any European, but, so far, he accepts his social status, and hence is not frustrated to the same extent. In England men are no longer ready to accept as natural the attitude embodied in the old saying, "God bless the squire and his relations and keep us all in our proper stations." Knowing how things might be in a better society, their sense of frustration is all the greater. Because of this, education, unless there is parallel improvement in social conditions, may actually lead in some cases to increased discontent, although its more usual effect is to supply sublimations, and thereby keep the peace.

The personal motives for criminal behaviour are numerous, but may be described under the headings of antisocial, perverse, and neurotic. We may exclude the impulsive or accidental committing of a criminal act by an individual who is essentially normal and concentrate on the three forms of psychopathic behaviour, which are much more frequent. Most common among criminals is the antisocial psychopath—that is, an individual who is basically against society and who misbehaves in order to attack a society which he hates. Such an attitude is caused by childhood frustration rather than contemporary social conditions. Children require love and attention, and when they are born into a home where they are made to feel unwanted and uncared for, a natural response is to feel: "Well, if you won't give me attention when I try to be good, I'll see that you

give me some sort of attention even if you hate me for it." The child then becomes aggressive and truculent towards his parents and, retaining this attitude, is ultimately hostile towards all authority, although his behaviour is essentially directed towards getting love. Such cases as these form a large part of prison populations and return again and again, for punishment has no effect whatever on their behaviour. On the contrary, it confirms them in their belief that society is evil. Those who are discovered in adolescence may be helped by being sent to a Borstal institution, which can often do a great deal of good in reforming young offenders. This, then, is a group of criminals whose attitude, conditioned in the way we have described, is characterized by being definitely and consciously antisocial.

A second group, characterized by pathological sexual behaviour, are the sexual perverts. We need not describe here the various forms of perversion, of which the most important are homosexuality, sadism and masochism, and exhibitionism, but it must be noted that all these examples of abnormal behaviour are due to a failure to grow up. All children pass through stages when they show behaviour typical of adult perversions—for example, fondness for people of the same sex, pleasure in cruelty, and desire to show off their bodies—but they soon grow out of such tendencies and develop towards normal sexuality at the age of puberty. But individuals who are afraid of life and whose normal development is thwarted, perhaps by the anger or the teasing of adults, may remain indefinitely at a more primitive level. Such people are suffering from a lack of sexuality rather than an excess, as is commonly believed.

Their treatment is entirely a matter for a psychiatrist (who can usually do little to help), and legislation against such offences is futile, since perverts who break the law once usually continue to do so. There are, it need hardly be said, many perverts who never get into trouble with the law at all, and theoretically at least there is no distinction between controlling normal sexual desires and pathological ones. It appears, however, that a large number of perverts also lack adequate control and are psychopathic in other respects than purely sexual. Such cases are not deliberately antisocial, and view normal sexuality with the same abhorrence that others feel about perverse behaviour.

The final group of psychopathic criminals is a much smaller one. It consists of individuals who show, usually at quite a late stage of life, the sudden compulsion to steal or commit some other criminal act. Kleptomania is an example of this type of abnormality, and such people differ from the antisocial psychopath in that they have no antagonism against authority, and have no desire to get into trouble. Their crimes are usually quite pointless and are done with the intention of drawing attention to themselves. The commonest situation in which kleptomania occurs is in a middle-aged woman, usually with plenty of money, who feels that her husband is losing interest in her, and her sudden compulsions to steal have the dual effect of hurting the husband and making him show some interest in her. The term "kleptomania" does not mean habitual stealing, and should be applied only to pathological cases where stealing has an unconscious motive unknown to the offender. Crimes are also occasionally committed by people

who have serious diseases of the nervous system such as syphilis or chronic alcoholic dementia, but these cases are of no social significance whatever.

Taking all these types of criminal behaviour together, we can see that, with the exception of a small minority of cases, by far the greater number of crimes are due to frustration, firstly in the economic sphere and secondly in relation to home life, happiness, and work. In the many examinations of criminals which have been made, frustration in some sphere in life is found in nearly all cases. It was at one time believed, largely owing to the influence of the Italian criminologist Lombroso, that there was a definite criminal type which could be sorted out by physical examination from normal people. This type was supposed to be known by such "degenerative traits" as a low forehead, abnormally shaped head, or lack of lobes on the ears. Nobody nowadays believes in this theory, although it is an undoubted fact that criminals often show these traits.

The reason is that individuals born with deformities or odd appearance are more likely than others to develop pathological behaviour derived from an inferiority complex—the feeling of being looked on with scorn or contempt. There is a definite connection between criminality and ugliness, but the connection is due to the frustration and rebuffs received by ugly people in daily life. E. H. Sutherland, in his *Principles of Criminology*, noted that while the number of deformed people in certain American States was 39 per 10,000 of the general population, it was 150 per 10,000 among the criminal population. The number of deaf-and-dumb people in the general population was 19 per 10,000, and among criminals 31 per 10,000.

Criminals also tend to be of lower height than others; more often illegitimate; more often divorced; and more often of so-called inferior races. Biologically speaking, there is no such thing as an inferior race, but the stigma of being regarded as inferior is very real, and goes with a degrading environment and poor economic background. Five times as many American Negroes are sent to prison, and seventeen times as many Negresses, as white men and women. The same applies in a lesser degree to American Indians, and in still less degree to immigrants from Ireland and other predominantly peasant lands, who are regarded with a certain amount of contempt.

As regards economic conditions, W. A. Bonga noted that in Italy 60 per cent of the population classified as indigent supplied 88 per cent of the convicts, and this result, dating from the end of last century, is in agreement with more modern estimates. We have already seen that crime increases with periods of economic depression and decreases with periods of prosperity. Unskilled workers are more liable to get into trouble than skilled. On the other hand, the relationship between crime and low intelligence is not, generally speaking, close, although it may be important in individual cases. Education, however, as opposed to innate intelligence, is of great importance, as may be seen from the figures published by the Government of the U.S.A., which show that 27·3 per 10,000 of literate people were sent to prison, but 42·7 per 10,000 of illiterate. In England, at the end of last century, only 9·1 per cent of prison inmates had a good education.

The implications of these figures are clear. Apart from a small number of crimes due to more subtle

personal frustrations, criminal behaviour is due to fairly gross and obvious economic and social frustrations. Of these, the most important are poverty, unhappy home life, deformed or unhealthy bodies, bad education, and bad or dull working conditions. That punishment is not of much use, whatever its purpose, is apparent from the fact that 66·8 per cent of prisoners in Sing-Sing Gaol are recidivists or repeated offenders.

The cure is equally apparent, though perhaps easier to say than to put into action. We must remove unnecessary frustrations and improve education. Good social conditions are the only cure for crime, and a good education would further enable people to be more tolerant, more capable of making sublimations (the real function of education), and more capable of bringing up their children decently. Such people would be less likely to drive the unfortunate individual who is ugly, or deformed, or illegitimate, or intellectually dull, into a life of crime, and, by showing more humanity, would also reduce the number of cases of neurosis and other pathological behaviour.

Until this new attitude is adopted, all other actions will prove to be the patching up of a state of affairs which does not work satisfactorily. Prisons are, of course, necessary, but we may as well admit that their main function in our time is to keep people considered to be a nuisance to society out of the way.

CHAPTER XI

THE ORIGIN OF LOVE

WOULD-BE social reformers have directed so much attention to the importance of love in human relations that it will be worth while to examine the origins and development of this sentiment in order to discover whether it can be relied on to help society to a better adjustment. We should first, of course, define what we mean by love, but this is by no means as easy as might appear. Love has been thought of, on the one hand, as almost synonymous with sex, and, on the other hand, as a vague and delightful feeling that draws people, whether of the same or opposite sexes, towards each other. For the present, it will be safer to take the latter and wider view, including all the emotions that attract individuals to each other under the one name. It was in this sense that the earlier scientific writers used to refer to the attraction between atoms or between iron and magnet as love. Robert Burton in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*; for instance, asks: "How comes the lodestone to draw iron? the ground to covet showers, but for love?" and concludes: "No stock, no stone that has not some feeling of love."

The reason for defining love thus widely is that any definition depends to some extent on what one considers to be the origin of the sentiment, and while psycho-analytic writers have described love as derived from sex, most other writers have considered its

origin to be somewhat different. Certainly sex in animals and in primitive men has no connection whatever with feelings of love and tenderness as we understand them. On the contrary, it would be nearer the truth to say that sex is usually associated with cruelty. Animals, when under the influence of sexual excitement, have no interest in the pleasure or satisfaction of the other partner; to them it is a hunger, which demands satisfaction regardless of everything else. Robert Briffault has said: "With both the male and female, 'love,' or sexual attraction, is originally and pre-eminently 'sadic'; it is positively gratified by the infliction of pain; it is as cruel as hunger. That is the direct, fundamental, and longest established sentiment connected with the sexual impulse. The male animal captures, mauls, and bites the female, who in turn uses her teeth and claws freely, and the 'lovers' issue from the sexual combat bleeding and mangled."

Primitive men are equally lacking in feelings of tenderness for their wives. Generally speaking, the wife is almost completely ignored and love is reserved for children and the mother. Nobody living in Arab countries could doubt the great affection and regard in which fathers hold their children, but the wife is given little attention, and, when walking, must keep four or five paces behind her husband. If there is a horse or donkey available it is invariably used by the man, even if his wife is carrying a baby or a heavy load. Yet the woman may become very devoted to her husband regardless of how he treats her. Most of her attention, however, becomes directed towards her children, on whom she lavishes all the care and affection of which she is capable. Eskimos, who are

completely lacking in tender feelings towards the opposite sex, have expressed the opinion to Catholic missionaries that European parents are unfit to look after their children because they are in the habit of striking them. To the Eskimo such behaviour towards children is uncivilized and disgraceful. Similarly, the savage shows the utmost devotion to his mother. Towards his father he may be completely indifferent, or, in many cases, actively hostile, but the main object of his life, after he has done everything possible for his children, is to provide for his mother's old age. To insult his mother is, among many peoples, the most hurtful thing one could do to any man. Some tribes in Africa have a common saying, "Strike me, but do not curse my mother," and Lord Cromer, who had no special regard for the Egyptians; noted among them a similar attitude. They were constantly repeating, he said, the saying of the Koran: "Paradise lies at the feet of the mother."

These facts have led many writers to derive the sentiment of love from the mating instinct, the temporary period of mutual tenderness between the sexes which follows on the birth of offspring and has the function of aiding the mother to protect and nourish her child. The mating instinct, in turn, is developed from the maternal instinct. The mother extends the tenderness she feels for her child towards her mate in order to enlist his co-operation in protecting herself during a time when she is comparatively defenceless. It follows that love, and tender feelings generally, are the invention, as one might say, of women, and have subsequently been taken over by men. If this be the case, the association of sex with power drives, noted by Adler, and referred to in Chapter VIII, may

be a natural phenomenon rather than a product of modern civilization. Sex and aggression go together, while love and tenderness are something quite distinct in their origins. "Nothing is so far apart as lust from tenderness," says Lamartine, and it is well known to psychiatrists that many people have the greatest difficulty in resolving this natural conflict. Their gentler, more protective feelings are repelled by the idea of inducing submission, which is part of the sexual act. The psychologist Theodor Reik observes: "The sex aim is not identical with the love aim. Recently a patient said of her partner: 'He is not the person I love but the person who gives me sexual gratification.' Sex is a passionate interest in another body; love a passionate interest in another personality, or in his life. Sex does not feel pain if its object is injured, nor joy when it is happy. It is possible to possess another person in sex but not in love. In love you cannot possess another person, you can only belong to another person. You can force another person to sexual activity, but not to love."

The above refers to love between the opposite sexes. What, then, of the development of friendship, of love and regard between people of the same sex? It is obvious that this is as important, or perhaps even more important in its implication for society, as love between man and woman. Most psychologists have been content to ascribe the desire to have friends to a "social instinct," thus following the dictum of Aristotle that man is a social animal. Recently, however, there has been a tendency to be more cautious in the use of the term "social instinct" to explain all sorts of gregarious behaviour, and Robert Briffault, whom we have already quoted,

denies that there is any such instinct. He points out that animals are not, as a rule, gregarious, but, on the contrary, tend to scatter and spread abroad, if only because food supplies become short when many members of a group are together at the same time. Even the most gregarious animals, he says, tend to divide their large groups into smaller ones. Among human beings the love of company is of recent development, and is a result of prolonged maternal care and the development of the family. From family life, and, in particular, from mother love, all the "social instincts" have their origin. This feeling of friendliness and fellow-feeling for others begins within the family and spreads to the clan, the tribe, and later forms a large part of the sentiment of patriotism. There could be no clearer demonstration of the importance of upbringing in preventing crime and creating a happy society. Children who have been brought up in a good home atmosphere will prove in later life to be far less easily frustrated and less liable to unhappiness and discontent.

Romantic love is a much more recent development. Having its origins in the mediæval ideal of chivalry, it developed during the Renaissance, when woman first became a free personality capable of playing a part herself instead of merely being the object of love. In this way love became increasingly separated from its original form, and less and less a sentiment with significance for the group. Indeed, romantic love is even, in a mild degree, antisocial. The lover is proverbially disinclined for society, and such feelings can arise only when people have become strongly aware of themselves as individuals.

It is a strange fact that so modern a writer as

Theodor Reik had to take over a theory of the nature of love propounded by Socrates over two thousand years ago, in order to explain the psychological components of the sentiment derived from mother-love in the way we have seen. The theory, attributed to Socrates by Plato, is told in the form of a myth, and runs as follows: On the birthday of Aphrodite the gods were feasting, and the god Poros (plenty) was among the guests. While the banquet was going on, a beggar-girl, Penia (poverty), came begging to the door. Poros had become drunk with too much wine, and having gone into the garden, fell asleep, and Penia, finding him there, decided to have a child by him. She lay down beside him and conceived a child, who was called Love. Reik interprets this to mean that love seeks for his beloved as a poor man asks from one who has plenty; in other words, that love springs from discontent within oneself and envy of certain properties that one lacks which are possessed by the loved one.

It is therefore a *sine qua non* of falling in love that one should be dissatisfied, as Romeo was before he met Juliet, and for this melancholy or self-dislike there are only three solutions. The first is to fall in love, the second to hate, and the third to achieve something which gives back one's self-esteem. By falling in love one attempts to acquire the qualities which one lacks, from the beloved, firstly by union with her—the feeling of being, not two personalities, but one—and secondly by the increased self-confidence that love gives. The next solution, "falling in hate" as Reik calls it, is what we have previously called the mechanism of projection. By this mechanism we are enabled to regain self-respect by transferring the traits

we detest in ourselves to an external object. "So-and-so, not I, is lustful, or cruel, or ungenerous." Finally, self-esteem may be gained by projection into an inanimate object, in the form of work, which not only gives the confidence born of achievement, but also acts as a lightning conductor which directs the self-hatred or aggression outwards, away from the self.

Love, then, is a great solvent of hate, although it springs from unconscious envy. One might assume from this that the Christian solution of brotherly love is an ideal one, and that it has only to be applied in order to bring peace on earth and good will to all men. Whether this view is justified will be discussed later, but first we must complete the picture of love by discussing the completely different theory of its origin presented by Sigmund Freud.

Freud developed two theories about sex: one—the earlier theory—describing the growth of the instinct through various stages towards adult love, and the other, propounded in his later works, describing the origins of love and its relation to aggression. Since the later theory is more fundamental, and, in fact, almost amounts to a philosophy of life, it will be more convenient if we describe this theory first.

To begin with, Freud assumes a duality of instinctual life. Sex and aggression, he says, are two completely opposed and fundamental instincts, which are directed towards contrary ends. Aggression is the Death instinct, which strives to return to the inert matter from which the body came, while sex is the Life instinct, or Eros, which strives towards the continuation of living. The two instincts are in continual conflict, and it is part of each individual's life-problem

to reconcile them so far as possible. Thus a good solution of this psychological problem would be to love one's wife and children, one's nearest relations, and as many people as are worthy of love or friendship, and employ aggression in their defence, in work, and towards other appropriate objects. More specifically, the fate of aggressive instincts would be as follows: some completely repressed; some expressed directly towards people deserving of hate; some in sublimations such as work; and, incidentally, some in the form of self-hatred or self-reproach, known as conscience. In abnormal people the results are liable to be: turning against unsuitable objects (e.g., society, or in cruelty towards relatives); turning against oneself, resulting in depression or suicide; mixing aggression with sex, which produces sadism (sexual pleasure in inflicting pain) or masochism (sexual pleasure in being hurt).

The Life instinct, or Eros, is expressed in three forms. Firstly, it is used in neutralizing some of the instinct of aggression; that is, in sublimation, which involves a toning-down and redirection of destructive impulses by love. Secondly, it is expressed in outright exhibition of sexual desire towards the opposite sex. Finally, it is directed towards milder forms of love, such as love of friends, of pets, of inanimate objects—anything for which one feels tenderness or fondness.

Now it will be seen, from the description we have given of this theory, that Freud regards all friendship and tenderness as being derived from the sexual instinct. He considers that all these emotions are examples of "aim-inhibited sex," that is, of sexual feelings which, prevented from direct expression by

civilization and the prohibitions of society, have become transferred to other objects and diminished in their intensity in the process. This view is elaborated in Freud's theory of sexual development—the earlier theory to which we first referred. Believing that sexual impulses are present from the earliest years, Freud refused to accept the idea current at the time that they arose only at puberty. Puberty, he said, was simply the period of life when sexual desire turned towards the opposite sex, but prior to this there was a homosexual period (roughly between the ages of 12 and 14), and, earlier still, an auto-erotic period. That is to say, sex began by being self-love in the first years of life, then, turning towards an external object which still to some extent resembled the self, became directed towards a person of the same sex, and, finally, in the sexual stage, became fully adult. These stages do not, of course, refer to actual behaviour of the individual, but merely to mental attitudes. The so-called homosexual stage is quite definitely found in most children, as is also the auto-erotic—the former being the time of life when boys look reverently towards their seniors in school, and think girls “silly,” and when girls have passionate friendships with each other, and likewise rather despise boys. The latter stage, auto-erotism, is equally apparent in younger children who are obviously absorbed in their own bodies, from which come most of their satisfaction.

Freud's description of the three stages through which the sexual instinct passes is now generally accepted, and, indeed, is apparent to anyone who studies children. The account of Eros and the Death instinct is not yet generally accepted, and is too highly philosophical to appeal to most psychologists. Most

of the difficulty in reconciling Freud's with other views arises from a matter of definition. Freud finds sex at the root of friendship, appreciation of beauty, and all expressions of what is generally called love, because he himself put it there. His definition of sex to include all forms of the "lust for life," from the baby's pleasure in suckling (called by Freud oral erotism) to the elderly man's interest in stamp-collecting (called anal erotism), makes it inevitable that every action will show sexual components. In the first theory love and sex are defined in the more limited and more generally used sense.

Having now discussed the nature of love, we must consider whether it offers any hope for society in its present difficulties. Love is a great solvent of hate, but the question is, How is it to be applied? Certainly not by the Christian solution of loving one's enemy, for the following reasons: To begin with, love always implies hate. In normal love the hatred is directed against those who would harm the beloved, or even into the more sublimated form of working for the beloved, while, in the abnormal person, love may be mixed with hate and produce perversions. Secondly, love, in any meaningful use of the word, is strictly limited. It is simply not possible to love everyone, or even many people. If one is happy in one's own love, the result, as everyone knows, is a feeling of tolerance and kindness towards the world in general. But tolerance is not love. One feels tolerant partly out of moral conviction, and, far more important, through being happy and contented in oneself. (The discontented person *has* to look for other individuals and interfere in their affairs in order to gain a sense of power through controlling them.) As for loving one's

enemies, the idea is a supreme piece of hypocrisy based on the extraordinary oriental reasoning that to humiliate a person or break his spirit is not morally wrong, whereas breaking his head is wrong. What can one make of the passive resister who argues that putting another man in the wrong or shaming him is good, and morally superior to physical force? One can only note that it seems rather curious that he, who attaches so much importance to "spirit," should be so concerned with mere bodily hurt and remain unconcerned with "spiritual" hurt. The true motive behind loving one's enemy was explained in the Bible—"for in so doing you will heap coals of fire on his head." Very true—but why, then, call it love?

Another reason why it has been recommended to love all the world is a neurotic one. To the man who is afraid of life and, in particular, of people, one way of alleviating his anxiety is by assuring himself that he loves everybody, and therefore that all the world is his friend. His pathetic assurance will then save him from the ever-present fear of being disliked or disapproved of. This is one solution of the problem of social disapproval, but one may well consider that the individual who says he is disliked by nobody must be either singularly colourless or else deceiving himself. After all, Jesus Christ was probably hated and resented more than most religious leaders in history, and even St. Francis, the gentlest of men, was not regarded without a good deal of suspicion by the Catholic Church.

Love, in the ordinary sense of the word, comes into the social scheme of things in only one respect: that a normal love-life is necessary before any individual can be a really good member of society. If a man loves

and feels himself to be loved in return—not by the whole world, but simply by one particular person, and perhaps by a few friends, it will be easy for him to be a good citizen, provided he is also well informed. To be well informed means that one knows what are the appropriate objects of hatred, and one can get rid of a great deal of aggression without hating any person. Education can teach people to hate crime but to understand criminals. This is not done by “brotherly love” or “doing good to those who hate you,” but by common-sense and tolerance. It is futile to hate a criminal personally, because such an attitude will not alter his behaviour. Similarly, if a psychiatrist is attacked by a maniac he would have to defend himself by any means available, but when the maniac is subdued, the problem is to cure him. We have got to learn that it is an expensive luxury to allow ourselves to moralize on human affairs. Bad behaviour is, in a sense, abnormal behaviour, and we have got to look for its cause, which in some cases will be in the individual, but in most cases is the fault of society. There is much truth in the old Dutch proverb, “Happy people are good people.”

The first problem is to produce in the men in charge of affairs the scientific attitude, which instead of saying, “These men are criminals because they are Negroes,” or “These men are warmongers because they are Germans,” will ask: “What has made these men criminals or warmongers when they might have been tolerant, happy people?”

The second problem is the re-direction and control of aggression, which must be accepted as a normal but potentially dangerous instinct. Repression is quite the wrong way of dealing with destructive im-

pulses, and the sooner people give up the "Love your enemy" way of thinking, the better. We have seen that it is precisely those nations like the Germans, who suppress anger within their national boundaries, who are the most aggressive towards other people, whereas the Italians, who quarrel volubly and noisily with each other, are anything but warlike. The function of education in society, and government in general, is to reduce the frustration of individuals to a minimum, and, by humane teaching, to direct aggressive energy, which is the power-house of life, into the creation of what H. G. Wells has called the "work, wealth, and happiness of mankind."

CHAPTER XII

THE GOOD SOCIETY

It should be apparent that the economic, or indeed any other, explanation of history can be true only in a very general way. Marx's theory gives a reasonable account of such movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, but it cannot be claimed that it even begins to explain everything. Nor could this be expected, because so many other factors come into historical development that any theory can contain statistical truth only in the form of probabilities. It can never attain certainty. In other words, human behaviour, both in the social movements of history and in the psychological study of individuals, can be explained fully only *after* the events are completed. It cannot with certainty be predicted, except within very narrow limits. One can, for example, predict, with a considerable degree of accuracy, that a man of low intelligence will fail to pass a specific test of ability, or that a particular type of neurotic personality will be liable to break down in a specific way under stress. One can see in a general way in which direction history is moving, and can predict that some forms of social organization, although theoretically possible, are, practically speaking, highly improbable. Theoretically, it would be possible for a majority of people in Britain to vote for Anarchism at the next general election, but in

practice we can be sure that modern industrial society is not moving in that direction, but, on the contrary, towards increased control over the means of production—not for any theoretical “ Marxist ” reasons, but simply because increased complexity in the economic and technological spheres demands increased control. A rough analogy would be the greater need for traffic control in a city street than in a country lane. The only question at issue is whether control should be by “ boards ” in a Socialist State or by trusts in a capitalist State.

In history there are always surprises for the unwary. Who can doubt that the discovery of atomic energy will revolutionize our age, for better or worse? Yet this discovery might have been made five years later or earlier. If the latter, the war might either not have taken place at all or have had catastrophic results. It is difficult to believe that it was anything other than chance which led to the discovery being made first by British and American scientists rather than German, or that anyone could have predicted in which of these countries the discovery would first be made, since all were equally advanced in scientific development.

Had the Germans attacked Britain after the fall of France, the result of the war might have been very different, and this, too, seems to have depended on an error of judgment on the part of a few individuals in the German High Command. Of course, one can argue that, whether the war were won or lost, the economic result would, in the long run, have been the same, that the private ownership of the means of production is anyhow doomed, and that State control will come inevitably, regardless of wars won or lost.

At the most, the result of a war may speed up or delay an inevitable process. This is probably true, provided that atomic energy does not wreck civilization altogether. We may note, for instance, that all the Great Powers on both sides are, and have been for some time, moving towards increased State control, whatever one may think of its beneficent or bad results in particular cases. The fact remains that the details of history cannot be predicted by the historian with any degree of accuracy, any more than the psychiatrist, however complete his knowledge, can predict the behaviour of an individual on a particular day.

Some events in history seem quite inexplicable in purely economic terms. For example, what was there about the economic background of the Arabs that led them, a comparatively primitive people, to conquer all of North Africa, the Middle East, and part of Europe in the few centuries following the rise of Mohammed and the founding of Islam? Nearly all the economic phenomena of that period and culture have been repeated again and again without a similar sequel. If Mohammed had never been born, would there have been another warrior prophet, and would the course of history have been the same in its general outlines? Nobody knows the answer. All that we can say is that the economic interpretation of history forms a useful, and in fact the only, guide we have, but it is by no means infallible, and must not be uncritically applied.*

Marx's great contribution, although one foreshadowed by many other writers, has been the de-

* Engels, more moderate than Marx, conceded that sometimes ideas might react on economics instead of vice versa.

monstration of a "social consensus"—the fact that, given a particular stage of economic or technical development in a society, one may expect related changes in all the other fields of social life—in art, religion, literature, morals, and so on. And, just as Freud has shown that individually we may be compelled to act by motives of which we are not fully conscious, so Marx has shown that, socially, we are often in the same position; that the aspects of reality which happen to interest us at any given moment of history are to a large extent conditioned by the social and economic organization of the times. We need not quote any further examples of this process, which we have already noted at work in Chapter IV. Here we are merely concerned with its results and implications in the moral field.

So far from moral codes being absolute and unchangeable, we can see how they are, in fact, used to justify a state of affairs brought into being by largely non-ethical processes. It is evident, for example, that the technical discovery of contraceptive methods has revolutionized sex morals, and ideas have altered to fit the new situation. Extra-marital relations, at first forbidden, are later tolerated, and will finally be accepted. Individuals may object, Churches may threaten, but the result will be inevitable, and no amount of opposition will prevent it.

In a similar way it was "immoral" in mediæval days for craftsmen to compete with each other. Competition was forbidden by the Guilds, and to accept usury was a sin. When *laissez-faire* capitalism arose, competition was encouraged and the Churches conveniently found that profit was the just reward of thrift and hard work, commended by God.

Now, once more, it is fashionable to think in terms of "production for use, not profit," and the moralists will find it convenient to condemn profit-making.

There is, of course, nothing wrong in this. A procedure which is useful at one period of history may be bad at another, and the process appears silly only if professional moralists, as in the Church, claim that their moral demands are absolute and unchangeable. We have become familiar by now with the episcopal attitude to scientific advances, which first says, "Evolution (or psycho-analysis, or relativity) is a wicked lie." Later the claim is, "Well, whether it is true or not, it does not affect Christian truth." And, finally, "There's nothing new about *that*—we knew it all the time."

The implication, then, would appear to be this: We cannot create moral concepts in a vacuum; morals must be based on reality, and there is no point in making prohibitions which have no chance of being accepted. If, for example, we find in a society that there is a high percentage of venereal disease, it is in the long run quite useless to preach "sexual purity" without having regard to (a) the physiological problem of how far continence is possible for the majority of people, and (b) the sociological problem of what features—domestic, financial, bacteriological and political—lead to this social group being different from others.

There *are* certain moral concepts which are absolute, not in the Platonic sense of existing apart from individual actions, but in the sense that they are basic necessities of social life. The commandments "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you" and "Love thy neighbour as thyself" are

fundamental simply because one literally cannot conceive of a society in which they are not at least aimed at as an ideal. The phrase "Love thy neighbour as thyself" is, of course, a poetical exaggeration which only a complete humbug would suggest taking literally, but that one should have regard for one's neighbour's rights is a rule without which there *is* no society. All other ethical commandments are merely rules concerning particular situations at a particular period of history, and consequently may, at a later stage, be adequate or otherwise. They may once have been useful and have outlived their usefulness, or they may have been made to further the interests of a particular group without regard to the well-being of the whole society. In any case there is nothing unalterable about them. "Thou shalt not kill" is a particular form of not hurting one's neighbour. "Thou shalt not steal" depends on the existence of private property. "Thou shalt not commit adultery" depends on the existence of a particular type of social structure in which the wife is the property of her husband.

All these rules are particular cases of a general rule, and many are applicable only to a particular form of social organization. But loving one's neighbour—allowing, as we have said, for poetical exaggeration—is the rule of society. We need not think in terms of a solemn "social contract" made at a definite time in history, but it is easy to see that one cannot obtain the benefits of social life without foregoing the pleasures of taking the law into one's own hand. If I can kill my neighbour who has injured me, then I can never feel sure that my own life is safe from those who, rightly or wrongly, feel that I have injured them. Such, then, is a feasible account of ethical development,

and it might reasonably be said that history has shown a spread of neighbourly attitudes to larger and larger groups. The primitive tribesman regards all men outside his tribe as potential enemies towards whom he has no social duties whatever. These tribes coalesce into nations, and nations into empires, within which the individuals are more or less neighbourly. But at this point we have stopped. There is still the thought of "lesser breeds outside the law." But it is worth while considering that wars in our day are more terrible and devastating, not because men are more bloodthirsty, but for the dual reasons that (a) more people are involved than at the tribal stage of development, and (b) that technical advances have produced more deadly weapons of war. There is no substance in the belief, increasingly common since the recent war, that human beings are more cruel or barbaric than ever. The fact is that we have reached a high level of civilization, and only the two reasons we have already given make war more terrible. But civilization is always tenuous in its hold, and there is little cause for surprise in the observation that the weaker members of a culture (weak in intellect or emotional control) are liable to regress to primitive levels under the strain. If the demands of a culture are only moderate, there will be few failures to attain that level, but if they are high, there will be more "sinners" (and, of course, more "saints").

The demands of our own culture are already extremely high, and the capacity of individuals to meet them is not unlimited. The wonder is, not that many fail, but that so many succeed within reasonable limits. It is revealing, as demonstrating the material with which we are dealing, to read the results of the in-

telligence tests carried out during the 1914-18 war in the U.S.A. (intelligence, it should be noted, is an hereditary factor, and an individual's intelligence, as opposed to his knowledge, does not alter greatly during his lifetime). The figures show that about a third of the population are of a high intelligence, 25 per cent a good average, 20 per cent a low average, and 25 per cent very low. Of the last group there were 25,000,000 people in the U.S.A. who were "dull and backward," and 10,000,000 below even that low level. In England it is calculated that 10 per cent of the children of school age are sufficiently backward to require to be sent to special schools. The proportion of mentally dull people does not vary greatly from one country to another.

Now these figures have been used to support all sorts of reactionary theories. They have been held to indicate that democracy is useless,* that people of low average intelligence are a liability to a nation, that such people should be sterilized, and so on. But most of these ideas are baseless. It is true that only about a third of any population is likely to benefit from a university education, but no single social class has a monopoly of the bright minority. Only the lowest 10 per cent of a population has much difficulty in profiting from an ordinary education, and a low intellectual level does not mean that the individual may not be useful to society. Mental backwardness is not directly related to crime or delinquency, and there are many jobs which backward people can do as well as, or better than, those of higher

* "The problem of finding a collection of 'wise' men and leaving the government to them is an insoluble one. That is the ultimate reason for democracy." (Bertrand Russell.)

intelligence. If they do not add more than their manual labour to society, at least they do not necessarily hinder its progress—one might almost say that they tend to add to its stability. The real social menace comes far more frequently from men of higher intelligence with unbalanced ideas: the men with deficient emotional control. It is such people as these who commit crimes, who foster crank religions, and disturb the peace by spreading childish political propaganda. The man of lower intelligence, by his usual stolidity and conservatism, may help to compensate for the over-sensitive and unduly impressionable elements and in this way help to make society more stable than it would otherwise be.

Two methods have been described whereby the quality of society might be improved: the biological or genetic approach, and the economic or political approach. The first method suggests that a population may be improved by eugenics—that is, by controlling reproduction in various ways. Eugenic methods may be “negative,” and attempt to remove bad stock by such methods as “sterilization of the unfit,” or advising the use of birth control in the case of people with inheritable disease. Or they may be “positive,” and attempt to encourage the increase of the “better” stock in a culture. The dangers of this approach are apparent. In the first place there are not many physical diseases which are inheritable, and, consequently, eugenics could play little part in their prevention. When applied to mental disease its use is even more doubtful. In the case of schizophrenia (the most serious mental disease) the birth rate is naturally low because schizophrenia comes on in early life, and the individual, being subsequently in a mental

hospital, has no opportunity of begetting children. The other important mental disease, manic-depressive insanity, is perfectly consistent with high intelligence and social usefulness. It is periodic, and between attacks the individual is usually quite normal. The main criticism, however, is that, once the principle of the legal power to sterilize the mentally unfit is admitted, it is extremely difficult to say where it should end. There is an increasing tendency in totalitarian societies to begin by considering cranks and psychopaths abnormal (which is justifiable), and to end by diagnosing everyone with inconvenient political or religious beliefs as psychopathic or "subhuman." Such a society recalls the worst aspects of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*.

The position with regard to positive eugenics is no better. As regards physical health, this depends largely on upbringing, and not on inheritance. But in the case of character who is going to say who are the "best" people? "A" is a labourer of low intelligence, who reads with difficulty and has never heard of Picasso or Einstein, but he is a steady worker, a good-natured and kindly husband, and, within his limits, a useful member of society. "B" is above normal intelligence, almost brilliant, but he is a homosexual; he has written several excellent novels and has achieved a name in the literary world. Which is the better man (or the worse)? Should both be sterilized or only one, and, if the latter, which? On what grounds should "A" be sterilized or considered as a poor member of society? If "B" is "unfit," what about Clive, Baudelaire, Guy de Maupassant, Swift, Van Gogh, Nietzsche, all of whom were equally, or more, psychopathic? These questions are

unanswerable, and any such application of genetics would be an extremely dangerous precedent.

With the suggestions of the economic planners we are on safer ground. Their theory is that when everyone has complete economic security society will be naturally good. Now it is one thing to claim that, without economic security, society cannot obtain the full goodness of which it is capable. It is quite another thing to infer that economic security will automatically make a society good. One can conceive of a society in which each individual had complete financial security, and which, nevertheless, would be emotionally unsatisfying in the highest degree. Security is not everything when one feels one's talents to be wasted on a dull, routine job, or when one feels friendless and unloved. The most important type of security is emotional security—the realization that one has some significance for society as a whole. Every man and woman must be able to feel that his work is meaningful, and that he has a definite and useful function in the group in which he lives. Happiness, someone has said, is essentially a state of going somewhere. He must have his circle of friends who give him a more particular feeling of significance, and, finally, he must be of very special significance to one or more other individuals. That is to say, each one of us must be loved by someone else, each one must have friends, and feel that he is useful to humanity as a whole. Without these psychological needs economic security is worthless.

We have no need to despair of modern civilization: it has its faults but we are apt to forget that it also has its achievements. At no time in history has the average man had a higher material standard of living,

and even recurrent economic crises do not alter the fact that it has increased rapidly, and is continuing to do so. There are more educated people, more healthy people, and, apart from warfare, more humane and decent people than ever before. Even the cruelties of war are more due to technical advances in weapons of destruction than to moral defects.

But in spite of these great achievements the psychological defect of modern civilization is that social life is inadequate. Modern man is emotionally isolated and lonely. He even takes pride in being lonely, although he hardly likes it. In cities and towns one notes the rows of badly designed houses, each surrounded by a tiny plot politely called a "garden," each identical with the other, and eloquent of the pathetic desire to be individual, to have a house and garden of one's own, however wretched. People can live next door to each other for years in these circumstances and hardly ever speak a word outside the family circle. Yet most of them look with distaste on the suggestion of large, well-built, well-ventilated and heated blocks of flats, which would have all the possibilities of communal life together with the possibility of being alone when so desired. But the desire for indiscriminate individualism, however bad and at whatever cost, is passing, and we may hope to see in the modern city a healthy community life which will make it unnecessary for any citizen to be lonely or friendless, in which there will be no "only" children, because all children will spend much of their play-time, as well as their working hours, together, and where there will be no necessity for the old to steal the life of a daughter, who must remain unmarried and unhappy in order to look after them.

Such a society would satisfy psychological needs, but it is a mistake to believe that it will come inevitably as a result of economic change. Something similar will certainly develop, but a "similar" organization of society could be a very bad one if the basic rules of neighbourliness are forgotten. Above all, everything that is done is likely to go to waste unless the continual threat of international warfare is first removed.

We have already discussed this problem, but the best summary of the position comes from Dr. W. H. Sheldon (*Psychology and the Promethean Will*): "Whoever would abolish [warfare] must go deeper than the penetration of argument and conscious resolution. It is caused by hate, but it cannot be cured by resolving to love. It is caused by greed and the lust for temporal power, but it cannot be cured by inflating the dollar or by rationalizing economics. It is caused by group arrogance, but it cannot be cured by the League of Nations. It is caused by the pressure of overbreeding in the lower levels of all populations, but it cannot be cured by birth control. It is caused by the mutual intolerance of conflicting theologies, yet theologies like war itself are but expressions of the wish to escape from doubt and conflict."

The economic and environmental causes of conflict, whether at the individual, the social, or the international level, are abundantly clear, but the emotional aspect cannot be ignored, and emotionally unsatisfied people are the very ones who welcome war. It is a great mistake to believe that war is universally hated. It is not. If it were, we should have perpetual peace. But, as Dr. Sheldon has noted elsewhere: "Deep in the remoter layers of human consciousness, as every

observant psychologist knows, there remains for this reason a dear love of war. For in the passion of one intense purpose all of the conflicts of a life can be swept away like clouds before the wind.”

It is at this level, by removing social and personal discontents, that we must begin if we wish to produce a good society. In the words of another writer, this time an economist, Peter Drucker: “any society, regardless of the nature of its basic beliefs, can function only so long as it gives the individual a social status and function.”

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSIONS

WHEN, following the French Revolution, and the English Revolution of 1688, power was taken from the aristocracy and increasingly came to be vested in the common people the result was not, as might have been expected, a reduction in the absolutist tendencies of the nation. On the contrary, the fact that national policy was directed by the people themselves tended to give the State an even greater sense of the rightness of its actions in relation to other powers, and its citizens an increased awareness of devotion and loyalty to the government they had helped to elect. Nationalism, far from being curbed, was a greater force than ever throughout Europe.

In the Middle Ages the supra-national authority of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire had been real, and the small States were so often divided up by wars, or given over to other rulers by marriage of their princes, that there was little opportunity to feel any other loyalty than to one's own town or city and the Church which stood above all. It did not seem incongruous to the citizens that a French prince should rule over part of Italy, or an Austrian prince over part of Spain, and the quarrels which arose (they were very frequent) were essentially between various ruling families and dynasties. These petty States were absolutist in the sense that they demanded

loyalty to the ruling prince, but this was subject to the supreme authority of the Pope, which, as we know from the example of Henry IV at Canossa, was very real.

The national State, which developed after the Renaissance, was, on the other hand, completely absolutist and owed no allegiance to any power outside its own frontiers. The religious uniformity of Europe disappeared, and in its place many Churches and many religions arose. Henry VIII, Charles V, and Francis I were the first absolute rulers of sovereign independent States, and their claims were supported by the theories of such philosophers as Machiavelli and Hobbes. It was asserted that States of whatever size, small or large, were entitled to the absolute and unquestioned allegiance of all their subjects, whether laymen or clergy, and this attitude, though historically of comparatively short duration, has persisted to the present day, and has only been increased by the democratic extension of the franchise.

Although Liberal Democracy has failed to control nationalism, the intellectual movement of the eighteenth century known as the Enlightenment, or *Aufklärung*, which gave it birth, was essentially international and equalitarian. Represented in the ideas of Locke and Rousseau, it claimed that all men were equal, and naturally good, and inveighed against the older form of absolutism as tyrannical and unjust. The French Revolution, indeed, originally set out to spread these ideas throughout Europe, and, when war broke out with Austria, in 1792, the official declaration stated: "The National Convention declares in the name of the French people, that it will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who shall wish to receive their liberty." Yet the Revolution was

defeated, and the spirit of nationalism became stronger than ever, not only in the rest of Europe, but also in France. In 1914 many intellectuals believed, in the same way, that international Socialism would prevent the war, and a meeting for this purpose was held in Brussels; but again nationalism prevailed, and the idealists were disillusioned in the hope that their movement was of sufficient strength to produce international unity. Finally, in our own time we have seen international Communism broken up with the dissolution of the Comintern (the Third International), and the increased nationalism of Russia, which now is content to praise Ivan the Terrible and other oppressors of the people because of the part they played in building up the power of their country.

Since these great international movements have failed to decrease the power of national sovereignty, it could hardly be expected that the League of Nations would be successful, for the League never commanded loyalty from any considerable body of people. Yet, as we noted in Chapter VIII, there can be little hope for civilization until people realize that an international outlook is a necessity. In a world armed with atom bombs we cannot have many more chances, and it will be little consolation to think that European civilization, which has come so near perfection, may one day be recovered and developed by Dyaks or Koreans.

In spite of the failure of international movements some form of social unity has been a goal of man from the earliest days. In the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the French Revolution, and the Comintern it sought external expression and in the mystical idea of unity with the Deity subjective

expression. Legend and folk-lore testify to man's belief that this unity once existed but was lost. Hence the tales of Paradise Lost, of a Golden Age, and so on, not to mention the beliefs in Heaven, in a Millennium, and in a Brotherhood of Man, which assume a return to this blissful condition in the future. It is, indeed, true that man once existed in a state of unity with his society, before the rise of individuality began to disrupt it. Early man was in danger from his physical environment and safe within the group. Science has largely saved us from natural calamities—now we are no longer threatened by nature but by man. In those early days there were no isolated, inwardly lonely individuals, for everyone thought alike, and no God or religion, for unity existed within the tribe and did not need to be imposed from without. There was no law, for the desires of the tribe and the individual were the same, and in all probability there was no neurosis or crime, since these are based on conflict between social and personal desires. Aggression, instead of disrupting the society, was directed against the out-group, and since large-scale methods of destruction were unknown, its effects were comparatively harmless.

When separate classes of priests and warriors arose, consequent on the transition from nomadic to agricultural modes of life, there came to be a division of interests between the rulers and the ruled. The law, and morality in general, being that of the ruling class, had to be imposed from above, and religion was one of the means of compelling observance of a code which no longer derived its sanction from universal consent. Things were, of course, much more complex than these few notes suggest. Most religions

have been creations of the under-dog—attempts at compensation when an earthly Paradise has failed to materialize. The Roman Church takes over as the Roman Empire fails, Buddhism as Indian and Chinese dynasties fail. But they were invariably controlled in the interests of the rulers whenever they began to assume social significance. It is for this reason that the political attitude of the Church is usually reactionary, although from time to time smaller sects arise which attempt to return to the old theme of brotherhood.

In our own time the unity of man is fast becoming not only a necessity, but an actuality. Peace, we have been told, is indivisible, and it is already evident that no country can suffer economically without involving others. The world is an economic unity, although, unfortunately, individual nations are at very different levels of economic development. Within the State, or at least within those States which are most advanced economically, some form of collectivism appears to be inevitable. As has been suggested in Chapter XII, whether we accept Marx's theory in its entirety or not, it seems certain that trends in economic life are, to a large extent, outside our control. We may disapprove of mass-production or aeroplanes or nationalization, but they must be accepted nevertheless. All our knowledge suggests that at any given time in history there is only a comparatively small range of possibilities between which we can choose—we cannot, for example, choose at the present moment between old-fashioned Liberalism, Anarchism, and the Catholic State. The only choice we can reasonably be said to have is between the various forms of collectivism which, whether we like them or not, are "in the air." We can choose between Fascism,

Communism, Socialism, or the more limited type of policy represented by the New Deal in America, and, if we do not, one or other will come in spite of us. It is certainly of the greatest significance for our future which form of government we choose, but this should not blind us to the fact that our choice is limited.

All this should be apparent to even the most reactionary individual. The only difficulty is that he refuses to apply his knowledge. Having been brought up in an era of national sovereignty and individualism, he cannot, or will not, adapt himself to another outlook even although he knows it to be inevitable. The man who looks back sadly to the days of the small trader—the “horse-and-buggy” days, as the Americans call them—knows full well that they cannot be brought back. He is faced with a choice, not between free enterprise and control, but between control by cartels and industrial magnates or control by the State. Faced with two somewhat unpleasant alternatives, he behaves like a neurotic and retreats into fantasy and nostalgia for the past. Whether this nostalgia takes the form of retreat into an old-world village, playing cricket, and having afternoon tea with the vicar and the local squire, or the more ferocious Nazi form, which reverted still further back, to paganism and the old Teutonic gods, it remains a pathetic and childish form of behaviour in an individual who is afraid to grow up. The Nazis were unpleasant schoolboys, but they were schoolboys none the less, whose doings remind us of the characters in a story-book for teen-age boys—their camaraderie, their backslapping heartiness, their bullying, and their infantile pride and confidence in physical violence, not to mention their schoolboyish dislike of culture and intelligence, are all typical.

There is good reason, as we now know, to believe that the psychological attitudes in any society are closely related to its economic level as well as to geographical and other factors. Societies alter because of changes induced either by a changing environment or by the impact of another society from outside. All so-called racial differences are essentially due to these conditions, and nothing else. The transition of the Egyptians from a peace-loving to a warlike nation under the Hyksos kings, the similar transition of the Japanese (who had previously fought only one war in many centuries) in our own times, the difference between the Jew working on the land in Palestine and the Ghetto Jew from Poland, all show the importance of environment and the folly of racial doctrines.

Racial theorists were delighted to find, from psychological tests done on American recruits in the 1914-18 war, that the average mental age of Negroes fell far below that of white men. They were less pleased when later workers, dividing the results into those of Negroes who came from the Southern States and those from the Northern States, showed that the low average was due to the large numbers of Southern State Negroes, who, of course, live under bad social conditions, as compared with the Northerners.* In Los Angeles, where conditions are good and educational facilities excellent, Negroes rated an average intelligence quotient of 104.7, as compared with 75 in the South. The figure of 104.7 was, incidentally, "slightly above that of the whites with whom they were compared."

* See Chap. VII for the effect of environment on intelligence. A good environment may alter the apparent I.Q. by 5-7% by stimulating interest. But probably the more important factor here is that ambitious and intelligent Negroes tend to go to the North in search of adequate scope for their abilities.

The moral of this book is that the huge problems confronting the world can only be radically dealt with by equally huge changes of environment and social structure, which must, it need hardly be said, be along the lines in which society is already inevitably developing. Giving tablets of quinine to one man with malaria may be adequate in a single case, but when faced with millions of cases of malaria, as in India, this solution is absurd. For one thing, there is not enough quinine in the world to deal with all these cases, nor sufficient doctors and nurses to administer them, and if the quinine and doctors were available, the patients, if kept in the same environment, would still relapse. We have to consider why malaria is rampant. Because the areas where mosquitoes breed are not drained. Why are they not drained? Because of ignorance and poverty. Why ignorance and poverty? Again we come to the essential economic basis of the question. As Dr. Karl Mannheim has said: "With the present multiplication of the problems of society we have come to see that the mere cumulation of isolated reforms without co-ordination only creates additional disturbances, or shifts the difficulties from one sphere to another. For instance, raising the school-leaving age is only feasible if the consequences for industry are carefully thought out. Thus we have now reached the age of planning when purposeful reconstruction of society as a whole has to be envisaged."

Psycho-analysis may cure one individual's neurosis, but at the rate of three to four years of treatment for each case, the social benefit will be small. We must look deeper and from a wider viewpoint for the causes of social and personal distintegration. The brilliant geniuses of Ancient Greece appear to have been

eminently normal men because they lived in a culture in which internal conflict between man, and especially the sensitive man, and society was, as yet, slight. But in the last century, in Germany, the condition of the genius, and, in a lesser degree, of the ordinary man, was quite different. In *Fifteen German Poets*, Dr. S. H. Steinberg, gives short biographies of the outstanding German poets, which reveal the following facts: three died insane, two showed nervous instability, and six led unhappy lives. In the same period (the period of the Industrial Revolution) in England we have the unhappy lives of Shelley, Keats, and Byron, and, in France, of Baudelaire, De Musset, Lamartine, and Verlaine. Yet, in the eighteenth century, geniuses with minds less split by social turmoil were more balanced.

Writers who try, like Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard, and others, to change society by advocating a change of heart or philosophy are missing the point. A change of outlook is certainly necessary, but it will be ineffectual until the environment is altered fundamentally. For an altered outlook depends on a new environment, and not vice versa.

We have suggested that, economically, society is moving towards some form of collectivism. But there is no reason why this should be at the expense of individual freedom. The individualism of the past has too often been at the expense of others, particularly in the economic sphere, and it cannot be expected that, in the future, men will have the freedom to use *laissez-faire* methods in business or to build indiscriminately without regard to the well-being of society as a whole. Such acts are a disease of individualism—we have revolted too far from the uniformity of

early days—and our task is now to build a society which combines freedom of thought with a healthy communal life. When this is done there will be no need for people to become intoxicated by primitive mass-movements in a pathetic endeavour to escape loneliness and social isolation. Man will be able to be true to himself, and feel, at the same time, in the words of Donne, that “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine own were; any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind.”

To summarize:—

(1) History shows a spread of neighbourly attitudes to larger and larger groups. Thus clan becomes tribe, tribe becomes nation, and nation becomes empire.

(2) At the same time there has been an increasing isolation of the individual man from the community. On the one hand, this individualism has led to great progress in science and art, on the other hand to neurosis and criminality, both signs of separation from the group.

(3) At present, nations are seeking a means whereby social isolation may be ended. Fascism and Communism are both attempted solutions of this problem and show the desire of man to lose himself in the group. The question is whether a society can be built which will give the benefits of collectivism without loss of freedom.

