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AESTHETICS

V.K. GOKAK

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Coleridge's transcendentalism has been a stumbling block in the way of his admirers as well as students of his poetry and criticism. Readers are in love with his subtle-souled psychology in poetry and delicate imagery. They also admire his brilliant and perceptive criticism seen in his remarks on the genius of Shakespeare or the poetic diction of Wordsworth. But the philosophical and psychological assumptions that underlie his criticism, especially with regard to the origin and composition of poetry, baffle and intrigue his readers. Several efforts have been made to elucidate them but without much success.

Professor Gokak, a well-known poet and perceptive critic and a celebrated professor of English language and literature, has, in these pages, brought to bear on Coleridge's aesthetics, not only his poetic sensibility and critical acumen and scholarship, but also his Indian cultural background and his study of Indian aesthetics. The result is that he is able to present a fascinating exposition of Coleridge's aesthetic principles: What seemed to be utter confusion mixed up with opium dreams, is now seen to be a profound psychological account of the genesis and evolution of poetry. Professor Gokak has succeeded in lighting up most of the obscure corners in Coleridge's theory.

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VINAYAK KRISHNA GOKAK



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PREFACE

Coleridge's writings on poetry and literary criticism have been touchest one of aesthetic apprehension ever since he wrote them. His *Biographia Literaria* is one of the great peaks of excellence that English literary criticism has produced. Twentieth century literary criticism has struck out quite a few new paths in trying to elucidate the meaning of some of the obscure passages in Coleridge.

I believe I have made at least a few new and significant points regarding Coleridge's aesthetics. My Indian background has, no doubt, stood me in good stead in this field. I am grateful to Baroda University for having invited me to deliver their Tagore lectures for 1972. This gave me the opportunity to concentrate on this topic which had been engaging my attention for quite a few years.

I am grateful to Abhinav Publications for publishing this book and to the printers for printing it neatly.

*Brindavan
Whitefield
Bangalore*

.VINAYAK KRISHNA GOKAK



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COLERIDGE : AN INTEGRALIST

The originality and profundity of the philosophic insights of Coleridge have begun to be understood and appreciated in recent years, more than a century after he passed away. A few critics have written about the impact of Indian philosophic thought, myth and legend on Coleridge through contemporary publications in Great Britain and through German romanticism.

I am not interested in inquiring into the possibility of any Indian influence on Coleridge's aesthetics. One cannot be sure that there was any such influence at all. But one can easily affirm that what is true of Plato and Plotinus is also true of Coleridge. Coleridge's aesthetic system, which is after all not so nebulous as it has been commonly imagined to be, is based on a philosophy and psychology that posit the sovereignty of the human soul *vis a vis* the human personality. The word 'soul' is not just another word for 'mind' in Coleridge's writings.

"My system", said Coleridge, "if I may venture to give it so fine a name, is the only attempt I know ever made to reduce all knowledges into harmony. It opposes no other system, but shows what was true in each; and how that which was true in the particular, in each of them became error,

because it was only half the truth. I have endeavoured to unite the insulated fragments of truth, and therewith to frame a perfect mirror. I show to each system that I fully understand and rightly appreciate what that system means; but then I lift up that system to a higher point of view, from which I enable it to see its former position, where it was, indeed, but under another light and with different relations; so that the fragment of truth is not only acknowledged, but explained." (*Table Talk* : September 12, 1831. Quoted by R.H. Fogle in the notes to Chapter 1 ICC.)

I regard this as a key passage in an interpretation of Coleridge's philosophy. The metaphor of a perfect mirror is, in a sense, unfortunate; for it is difficult to frame a perfect mirror with broken fragments without revealing the cracks. This can only be another mirror by placing the fragments on which it can be shown that they could have made a perfect whole. But the passage clearly reveals that Coleridge was, if anything, an integralist in philosophy. Even his transcendentalism was only a part of his integralism. His philosophy was no mere eclecticism, as Rene Welleck tends to believe, for there is a logic and consistency in his attempt to join the broken fragments into a perfect mirror. His endeavours won a deep response even from positivists like the early I.A. Richards who "reflecting his metaphysics as ancestral moonshine...wished perforce it had been truth, and succeeded in transforming it to a brand of moonshine rawer but more acceptable to their time, with the label of semantics." (p. IX : Preface. ICC Fogle.)

Cleanth Brooks and others have been attracted by the possibilities of the Coleridgean 'reconciliation of opposites' for contemporary doctrines of irony and paradox in poetic language. They have unconsciously tended to reduce his theories to their own absolute monism. But it is unfair to describe Coleridge's critical position as 'a tempered and complex monism' as Fogle does, let alone absolute monism. His criticism has to be viewed consistently in relation to his own integral philosophy.

For there is no doubt that Coleridge was an 'integralist'. Coleridge was, as Fogle says, "a genuinely organic thinker whose mind is a totality and who aims always at synthesis." (Ibid. P. XI. Preface.) He tried to reconcile 'empirical English

and 'empyreal German'. He gave a place in his critical theory to Plato's search of the One in the Many and to Aristotle's conception of symbol and character as a fusion of the particular and the general; to the autonomy of a work of art as well as to the significance of genres or literary forms. In his theory of Imagination, he reconciled faculty psychology with the concept of the mind as a single organism. He was prompted to do this because of his integral approach which accepted German transcendentalism as the keystone of his philosophic arch.

Mr. J.B. Beer in his book, *Coleridge the Visionary* (Collier Books N.Y. 1962) tells us that, towards the end of his life, Coleridge deleted from a copy of the *Biographia Literaria* the passage describing the Imagination as "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation", and wrote a bitter recantation of his once-held faith in the "Heaven-descended Know Thyself", in the poem later given the title of *Self-Knowledge*. Be this as it may, the later pessimistic attitude of Coleridge towards his own visionary powers and early speculations need not prejudice us against their permanent significance for any theory of art. As Beer himself says, Coleridge was one of the potential bridge-builders and moments of insight characterised him all his life,—moments in which inquiring reason and shaping imagination were fused together.

One of the reasons why Coleridge wavered in his central attitude is to be found in the fact that he had to write about the things he loved, in an unfavourable intellectual climate. "But it is time to tell the truth", says Coleridge, "though it requires some courage to avow it in an age and country in which disquisitions on all subjects, not privileged to adopt technical terms or scientific symbols, must be addressed to the public." (pp. 163-64 BL. Edited by J. Shawcross Vol. 1 OUP.) A friend of his prevented Coleridge from completing the thirteenth chapter (on the Imagination) in *Biographia Literaria* because Coleridge had thinned away substances into shadows and deepened shadows into substances. The friend complained that, as with Berkeley, an essay announced on tar-water, had begun with tar and ended with the Trinity. This supposed friend was Coleridge himself and the letter was his own draft. An unsympathetic

mental climate brought about this dichotomy in Coleridge's personality. Why should an essay, announced on tar-water, not begin with tar and not end with the Trinity ?

Because of Coleridge's intuition of absolute existence ("Not to be, then, is impossible; to be, incomprehensible"), Sir Herbert Read detects in Coleridge the beginnings of existentialism. But it is much more important to remember that Coleridge was an integralist. Whatever his indebtedness to Kant and Schelling, it is clear that Coleridge was himself a free spirit breathing the mountain air of heights native to him. Transcendentalism was an important part of his philosophy. We may now try to fix the meaning of this much abused word.

For one thing, the word 'transcendent' means 'transcending comprehension and hence obscure'. But Coleridge himself accepts Kant's distinction between 'transcendent' and 'transcendental' and condemns transcendent speculations which transgress the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties. Transcendent speculations are speculations which are unrealizable in human experience and which even go beyond those *a priori* conceptions that the understanding employs in ordering its own experience. On the other hand, the word 'transcendental' refers to what pertains to the general theory of knowledge or experience, *a priori*. It implies the recognition of an *a priori* element in experience and is concerned with the very presuppositions of experience.

The word 'transcendental' has also been loosely used in spite of the definite meaning that Coleridge assigned to it. In seventeenth century English, before Coleridge used the word, it was often synonymous with 'metaphysical'. After Coleridge, it continued to be used in the general sense 'super-rational, super-natural, abstract, metaphysical'. It even came to mean that which is extravagant or visionary in thought or language. It was also used generally to describe the idealistic religious-philosophical teachings of Emerson and his group.

In the first place, we call Coleridge a transcendentalist because he believed in the transcendence of the Principle of Being, not merely its immanence. The Principle is above and independent of the Universe, just as it is immanent in it.

Coleridge quotes with approval a sentence in Latin in the last chapter of *Biographia Literaria* and says that it expresses

the object and thereby the contents of metaphysics as a science : "KNOW THYSELF : and so shalt thou know God, as far as is permitted to a creature, and in God all things". A belief in transcendence can co-exist with a belief in immanence.

This leads directly to the second tenet of Coleridge's transcendentalism. It is that the artist or individual must master the essence, the *natura naturans* "which presupposes a bond between nature in the highest sense and the soul of man". "The theory of natural philosophy", says Coleridge, "would then be completed, when all nature was demonstrated to be identical in essence with that, which in its highest known power exists in man as intelligence and self-consciousness." (BL p. 176 Vol. I.) "The apparent contradiction", says Coleridge, "that the former position, namely, the existence of things without us, which from its nature cannot be immediately certain, should be received as blindly and as independently of all grounds as the existence of our own being, the transcendental philosopher can solve only by the supposition, that the former is unconsciously involved in the latter; that it is not only coherent but identical, and one and the same thing with our own immediate self-consciousness. To demonstrate this identity is the office and object of his philosophy." (BL p. 178 Vol. I.)

Coleridge says that this philosophy is not mere idealism. It is idealism and the most binding realism at the same time. As he himself explains, "This principle and so characterised manifests itself in the SUM or I AM; which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self, and self-consciousness. In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, each involving and supposing the other." (BL p. 183 Vol. I.)

Wordsworth was, for a time, influenced by this transcendentalism of Coleridge. He had his fits of idealism and realism. But he could write in the preface to the *Recluse* :

Paradise, and groves
Elysian, Fortunate Fields—like those of old
Sought in the Atlantic Main—why should they be
A history only of departed things,
Or a mere fiction of what never was ?
For the discerning intellect of man,

When wedded to this goodly universe
 In love and holy passion, shall find these
 A simple produce of the common day.
 I, long before the blissful hour arrives,
 Would chant in lonely peace the spousal verse
 Of this great consummation.

Wordsworth goes on to comment in that great passage how exquisitely the external world is fitted to the mind and the individual mind to the external world and he refers to the creation which they accomplish with their blended might.

Coleridge's third tenet is the unity of the practical and speculative meaning of the word 'Knowledge': "to know is in its very essence a verb active." (BL. p. 180 Vol. I.)

Knowledge and experience are the obverse and reverse of the same coin. There can be no true knowledge without corresponding experience: "The postulate of philosophy and at the same time the test of philosophic capacity, is no other than the heaven-descended 'KNOW THYSELF'...And this at once practically and speculatively. For as philosophy is neither a science of the reason or understanding only, nor merely a science of morals but the science of BEING altogether, its primary ground can be neither merely speculative nor merely practical, but both in one. All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a subject." (BL. pp. 173-74 Vol. I.)

Coleridge's thought comes very close to ancient Indian thought in all these particulars. "India", says Zimmer in his *Philosophies of India*, "has had, and still has, its own disciplines of psychology, ethics, physics, and metaphysical theory. But the primary concern—in striking contrast to the interests of the modern philosophers of the West—has always been not information but transformation, a radical changing of man's nature ...a transformation as complete as possible, such as will amount when successful to a total conversion or rebirth."

Now that I have defined Coleridge's position as an integralist, I may sum up my view of Coleridge's theory of Imagination as I see it. The view set forth in the course of these lectures is essentially my own but for occasional hints taken from recent critics. Above all, it is Coleridge's own statements that have helped me to restate Coleridge's views in this manner.

We have considered it best to regard Coleridge as an integra-

list who adopted transcendentalism as the keystone of his philosophic arch. It is impossible to give a satisfactory account of his views on aesthetics without coming to terms with the philosophic organ which he called the Inner Sense. The human soul is, as it were, the 'soul' of his aesthetic philosophy.

Coleridge's theory of psychology is also based on these assumptions. Though he regarded the mind as a single organism, he also made use of six faculties or aspects of mental activity in setting forth his account of the poetic process : Will, Reason, Imagination, Rapture, Imitative Power and Taste. These faculties fulfil different functions, singly and together, on three levels of consciousness. At the higher subjective level, they are transfigured into intuitive powers by their contact with the Inner Sense. At the rational level, they perform the usual empirical functions and are put to logical and practical use, as Choice, Understanding, Fancy, Feeling, Imitative Power and Taste. At the nascent level, they function in an unobtrusive manner and are touched obscurely by an intuitive gleam.

The substance of the moment of vision, which is an amalgam of being,—of knowing, feeling and doing,—has the increase of consciousness as its goal. All the faculties are elevated to a higher status as they partake of the substance of the moment of vision.

In the creative process all these faculties, and not Imagination alone, are active. The many fusions that Coleridge speaks of, which are generally believed to have been attributed by Coleridge to the Imagination, are really achieved by the Inner Sense and by some of these faculties. Imagination achieves only two of these fusions.

But an esemplastic role is assigned to Imagination in addition to the achievement of two fusions,—that of being the chief agent in bringing about the product of poetic genius, of presiding over the birth of a work of art. The Inner Sense employs the Imagination for this purpose under the general control of Will and Understanding. As an independent faculty along with the others, Imagination has already achieved two specific fusions. As the shaping and modifying power of the work of art or poem that is about to be born, it uses its synthetic and magical power mainly in two ways. It transforms the fusions achieved by the Inner Sense, the other faculties or by itself,

into reconcilements of opposite or discordant qualities seen in the work of art. This it does as the work of art is being born. And it plays its esemplastic role in an equally characteristic manner by subordinating art to nature, the manner to the matter and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry. On this plane of artistic creation, it is also aided by Taste and Fancy and by a peculiar emotion which accompanies the act of poetic composition and is voluntarily kept up.

THE SOUL, THE FACULTIES AND THE THREE PLANES OF THEIR FUNCTIONING

It should, I think, be clear that Coleridge's theory of Imagination makes no sense at all unless it is seen and acknowledged that it is firmly grounded in an acceptance of the 'soul' which is quite different from mind, understanding, memory and other faculties; and that it is the transfiguration of these faculties by their contact with the soul (or the awareness, which Coleridge calls the Inner Sense) that gives to aesthetic activity and to artistic production its essential magic and significance.

Coleridge remarks : "The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity." (BL p. 12. Vol. II.) But we may ask what it is that makes him bring the whole soul of man into activity in this way. He obviously needs some sort of a kindling or stimulus to do this. The stimulus comes to him from an 'object'—a thing, a situation, an occurrence, an idea,—some happening within himself or in the world without. It is when the constructing, forming activity of the poet's mind starts entering into an event or object in this way that the whole soul of man in the poet is brought into activity. As Dr. I.A. Richards remarks, "the subject is what it is through the objects it has

been." (*Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 57.)

What does Coleridge mean by the "whole soul" of man? It is the philosophic organ which Coleridge calls the Inner Sense. "The Inner Sense has its direction determined by the greater part only by an act of freedom. One man's consciousness extends only to the pleasant or unpleasant sensations caused in him by external impressions; another enlarges his inner sense to a consciousness of forms and quantity; a third in addition to the image is conscious of the conception or notion of the thing; a fourth attains to a notion of his notions—he reflects on his own reflections; and thus we may say without impropriety, that the one possesses more or less inner sense than the other. This more or less betrays already, that philosophy in its first principles must have a practical or moral as well as a theoretical or speculative side." (BL pp. 172-73. Vol. I.) To those who do not have this philosophic organ, philosophy is a mere play of words and notions, like a theory of music to the deaf, or like the geometry of light to the blind. "The connection of the parts and their logical dependencies may be seen and remembered; but the whole is groundless and hollow, unsustained by living contact, unaccompanied with any realizing intuition which exists by and in the act that affirms its existence which is known, because it is, and is, because it is known." (BL. p. 173. Vol. I.) Coleridge goes on to say that this Inner Sense is able to apprehend absolute truth, the Spirit which permeates both subject and object. Subject and object are but the perpetual self-duplication of one and the same power.

The fourth degree of consciousness referred to here may be further elucidated by reference to a paragraph in which Coleridge explains one of the 'orderly degrees' that exist between the 'consciousness of others' and the highest consciousness short of Deity: "Those who tho' not conscious of the whole of their continuousness, are yet both conscious of a continuousness and make that the object of a reflex consciousness...And of this third class the species are infinite; and the first or lowest, as far as we know, is Man, or the human Soul... Hence...I can define the human Soul to be that class of Being, as far as we are permitted to know, the first and lowest of that Class, which is endued with a reflex consciousness of its own continuousness, and the great end and purpose of all its

energies and sufferings is the growth of that reflex consciousness : that class of Being too, in which the Individual is capable of being itself contemplated as a Species of itself, namely, by its conscious continuousness moving on in an unbroken Line, while at the same time the whole Species is capable of being regarded as one Individual." (Collected Letters of S.T. Coleridge, edited by E.L. Griggs, 4 vols. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956 II, 1196-97. Quoted by Fogle in *The Idea of Coleridge's Criticism*. p. 26.)

This absolute spirit or self, the eternal I AM, is the principle of being as well as of knowledge. Coleridge believes in its transcendence as well as immanence. He says, with regard to this principle of spirit : "It is to be found therefore neither in object nor subject taken separately, and consequently, as no other third is conceivable, it must be found in that which is neither subject nor object exclusively, but which is the identity of both." "The intelligence in the object", says Coleridge, "tends to objectize itself, and in the other to *know* itself in the object. This principle, and so characterised, manifests itself in the Sum or I AM; which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self and self-consciousness."

The 'Intelligence' that Coleridge speaks of in this passage is a self-development, not a quality supervening to a substance. It is itself the 'whole soul of man' or the philosophic organ called the Inner Sense. It is necessary to emphasise the fact that this is what the phrase "the whole soul of man" means, for Coleridge; for it is popularly supposed to refer to man's body and mind, his heart and brain and solar plexus—indeed, anything but the soul. By the 'whole soul of man' Coleridge means nothing but his soul or spirit. All the other faculties are *its* faculties—faculties of the soul—subordinated to each other according to their relative worth and dignity. We may reject Coleridge as well as the soul he speaks of. But it is not open to us to accept Coleridge and distort the meaning of one of his keywords so as to suit our ideas.

The next question that arises is : What is the relation between the soul of man and the absolute self or the great eternal I AM ? As we have seen, this absolute self is, originally, the identity of both subject and object. But this identity must be dissolved if the human soul is to be conscious of the object.

And a severance of this kind implies an act and an act implies a will. Self-consciousness or the soul of man, as distinguished from the absolute self, is impossible except by and in a will. The self-conscious spirit is therefore a will,—the infinite spirit confined in a finite or instrumental personality. Similarly, though the 'intelligence' expressed or 'objectized' in an object is infinite, the objective form itself is necessarily finite. That is why the absolute self has to be thought of as both transcendent and immanent and man and nature as finite manifestations of what is infinite. Coleridge says : "In the existence, in the reconciling, and the recurrence of this contradiction consists the process and mystery of production and life." (BL. p. 185 Vol. I.)

The development of an individual's awareness begins when he becomes conscious of his own soul,—when the inner sense begins to function in him, when he begins to say : I KNOW MYSELF. He reaches the summit of knowledge when he has realised the spirit or intelligence in Nature or in the objects around him, when he loses and finds all self in God. (BL. p. 186 Vol. I.)

We may now ask what the inner sense does for the individual or poet, once it is awakened. "All things that surround us and all things that happen to us have but one common final cause; namely the increase of consciousness, in such wise that whatever part of the *terra incognita* of our nature the increased consciousness discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection under the sovereignty of reason". (Quoted by I.A. Richards. COI. p. 139.), Thus the inner sense brings us an increase of consciousness. It opens up in our own personality areas that were unknown to us. It makes more and more explicit and unmistakable to us the pre-existent harmony between subject and object in an ever-increasing number and variety of objects and events. It makes the external internal and the internal external in an ever-increasing measure. The will conquers these new areas and brings them into subjection to itself. That is to say, they become an active part of the individual's personality, assisting him in and enriching his response to the World intellectually, emotionally and imaginatively. As Coleridge says of the Abyssinian maid singing of Mount Abora :

Could I revive within me
Her symphony and song,

To such a deep delight it would win me,
That with music loud and long,
I would build that dome in air,
That sunny dome ! those caves of ice !

The poet's own contact with life will be deeper than before and the increase in consciousness will reveal itself in a richer sense of living and a more refined conduct. Or it will result in the 'making' of a nobler and more perceptive poetry. For the activity of the inner sense is one in which "Knowing and doing and making and being are least to be distinguished". (I.A. Richards : COI. p. 47.)

The will brings these areas into subjection to itself under the sovereignty of Reason. Reason, according to Coleridge, is the source of Ideas which he defined as those truths "the knowledge or acknowledgement of which require the whole man, the free will, no less than the intellect, and which are not therefore merely speculative nor yet practical, but both in one." Reason enables man to apprehend these truths which are there beyond the reach of the senses. "It is immediate in action and indemonstrable by discursive argument, since its grounds are in itself. Itself the starting point of thought, nothing can explain it. From the Reason comes our idea of God, our idea of spirit, our idea of unity." (Fogle : CIOC. p. 6.)

The Will works under the sovereignty of Reason because Reason regulates all this intuitive knowledge. It is the spearhead of the poetic personality which is out to enrich itself. The Will consolidates what Reason sees and conquers. That is why Coleridge speaks of the Will as "practical reason".

The Imagination acts as mediator between the poet's impressions and images of sense and the ideas perceived by Reason. It images to him the Ideas apprehended by Reason and enables him to grasp their significance. What Coleridge says Imagination does for the reader, it does for the poet also in the moment of vision, the moment of the increase of consciousness vouchsafed by the Inner Sense. It captures in perceivable form the ideas and suggestions that are beyond form.

A damsel with a dulcimer
In a vision once I saw.

Critics like Livingstone Lowes have traced the floating parti-

culars, from a vast mass of reading material, that came together and were condensed into this image in Coleridge's consciousness. But the image itself makes concrete an intangible Idea and gives it body and form in the figure of a goddess of inspiration, a Saraswati as it were.

The poet has his rapture too when the Inner Sense is awakened within him. His raptures are all 'air and fire' then. Coleridge does not seem to have mentioned this particularly in his prose writings. But we have it in *Kubla Khan* :

Weave a circle round him thrice
And close your eyes in holy dread,
For he on honey-dew hath fed
And drunk the milk of paradise.

This ecstasy or *ananda* is what the poet experiences in his moment of vision.

Another faculty also is quickened into activity at the time, —Good Sense. Coleridge calls it judgement now and then. Judgement is evaluation or discrimination arrived at on the basis of Understanding. There are two forms of Understanding. One regulates intuitive knowledge and the other one the products of Fancy and the notices of Experience, as for instance that such an object has a triangular figure. Both are really one faculty,—wakefulness of mind. Good Sense is understanding or judgement operating in the sphere of Ideas, of intuitive knowledge and of creative activity. It is judgement touched to finer issues by the Inner Sense,—by the 'vision and the faculty divine'. It helps the poet to protect himself against self-deception, against phantom shapes dressed as Ideas and to distinguish between intuition and pseudo-intuition. It also helps him, by a divine instinct as it were, to arrive at the right felicity of phrase and magic of rhythm. For example, Shelley had the Good Sense to realise, after his mistaken adoration of Emilia Viviani, that it was an error to seek in a mortal image what was perhaps eternal. Keats was enabled by his Good Sense to revise the line. "A thing of beauty is a constant joy" into the inspired version : "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever".

The imitative power is active at this highest level, experiencing that transforming touch which enables it to grasp the

essence of an object. It is illumined by the Inner Sense. Similarly, 'Taste' is transformed into 'intuitive taste' and it begins to sense the degrees of Rapture or of the higher beauty which the poetic consciousness is privileged to experience.

We may therefore say that the Inner Sense promotes the increase of consciousness by intensifying the process of fine living or of fine 'making', by making possible the apprehension of newer and deeper truths, by imaging them in symbols or forms of enduring beauty, by plunging the heart into ecstasies of holy rapture and delight and by discriminating between a will-o'-the-wisp and Jacob's shining ladder. It is an all-sided enrichment, an integral progress in awareness.

We should not be misled into thinking that the soul does all this singly and by itself. As Coleridge says, the poet brings the whole soul of man into activity. But he does this with the due "subordination of its faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity". We have seen in the preceding paragraphs how all the faculties of the soul—Will, Reason, Rapture, Good Sense, Imagination, the Imitative Power and Taste—are active in the moment of vision. We have already seen something of this process in our analysis of the working of the Inner Sense within the poet's consciousness. While Coleridge believed that the human mind was a single organism, he also accepted in considerable measure the formulations of faculty psychology. He combines both these approaches in a unique manner in his account of the poetic process.

Coleridge enumerates these faculties in a paragraph in the *Biographia Literaria*: "I would arrange under the different senses and powers as the eye, the ear, the touch, etc.; the imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating and realizing power; the speculative reason, *vis theoretica et scientifica*, or the power by which we produce or aim to produce unity, necessity and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles *a priori*; the will, or practical reason; the faculty of choice (*Germanice*, willkuhr) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice), the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch." (BL. pp. 193-94, Vol. I.)

Coleridge does not refer to Emotion in this list of faculties. But this is probably so because Emotion is there to infuse intensity into the whole process. In fact, the entire poetic process is begun and continued by Emotion. The origin of metre lies in the workings of passion and the spontaneous effort to check them. Later, the very act of poetic composition is accompanied by a peculiar emotion that is excited by the act itself. "Through the same process and by the same creative agency will the poet distinguish the degree and kind of the excitement produced by the very act of poetic composition." (BL. p. 64. Vol. II.) We have also seen how, at the moment of vision, the poet experiences an ecstasy of delight and rapture. Emotion informs every part of the poetic process and gives it a peculiar intensity.

The awakening of the Inner Sense develops the rational consciousness into a higher form of subjective consciousness. We have already seen how several 'powers' are quickened to participate in this development,—Will, Reason, Imagination, Good Sense and Rapture. But these powers are only heightened forms of the powers which the normal consciousness possesses in its rational state,—Choice, Understanding, Fancy and Emotion. Understanding is of two kinds,—Understanding (1) which regulates intuitive knowledge and Understanding (2) which regulates the products of Fancy and the notices of Experience. Good Sense is judgement operating in the sphere of intuitive knowledge or Understanding (1). Mere judgement, as such, works in the sphere of Understanding (2). The Inner Sense alchemises these average powers by its impact and raises them to their status of glory. Taste and the imitative power may also be seen here in their transformed role. They also undergo a structural change, as it were, in the process of impact. The individual thus comes to possess two sets of faculties,—one operating on the normal rational level and the other on the higher subjective level.

Let us go into some detail on this question. While speaking of imagination and fancy, Coleridge refers to the Inner Sense, soul or 'intelligence'. He then proceeds to say: "For my present purpose, I *assume* such a power as my principle, in order to deduce from it a faculty, the generation, agency, and application of which form the contents of the ensuing chapter." The ensuing chapter (Ch. XIII) deals with imagination or the

esemplastic power.

It would have been exciting to see how Coleridge deduced the Imagination from the 'intelligence', soul or spirit. But Coleridge, functioning as his own friend, wrote to Coleridge : "What I had supposed substances were thinned away into shadows, while everywhere shadows were deepened into substances". Coleridge publishes this letter in the 13th chapter. He states that it produced complete conviction on his mind : "I shall content myself for the present with stating the main result of the chapter."

This is how a matter of fact attitude succeeded in suppressing an intensely interesting piece of analytical work. Coleridge then closes the chapter with the two famous paragraphs on Imagination and Fancy.

I should like to offer a few comments on the points made in these paragraphs before I proceed to analyse their contents. Imagination is regarded as primary and secondary and the primary imagination is held to be the "living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM". This is clarified by the earlier reference to the assertion of Hobbes, Hartley and their masters in ancient Greece that "all real knowledge supposes a prior sensation. For sensation itself is but vision nascent, not the cause of intelligence, but intelligence itself revealed as an earlier power in the process of self-construction." (BL. pp. 187-188 Vol. I.)

Coleridge speaks of fancy as 'a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space', which is blended with and modified by choice. It is that aspect of mental activity which is interested in detecting resemblances between things apparently unlike. Such a detection is indeed a choice exercised among memories, the quest being conducted with an eye on resemblances. If the eye concentrates on the dissimilarities between things which apparently resemble each other, the aspect of mental activity, guided by choice and memory, is called judgement or understanding (2). Memory itself is that aspect of mental activity which registers the impressions made by objects or events.

Imagination, as a mode of mental perception, is the same as fancy. It is interested in detecting resemblances between

things that are apparently unlike each other. The only distinction lies in the fact that fancy plays with no other counters but fixities and definites. Imagination, on the other hand, dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate. It struggles to idealize and to unify.

Now we have seen that it is the 'intelligence' or the Inner Sense that dissolves objects and recreates them, penetrating the 'intelligence' innate in objects. We have therefore to admit that imagination is nothing other than fancy working in conjunction with the Inner Sense. Memory—the storehouse of registered impressions—is exploited both by imagination and fancy. But whereas fancy is guided in its activity by arbitrary choice, imagination chooses from the point of view of the Inner Sense. The Inner Sense makes imagination what it is. Otherwise it would be just fancy.

In spite of his desire to study Coleridge's criticism, accepting tentatively the metaphysical assumptions on which it is based, Fogle leaves out the Inner Sense which is basic to Coleridge's theory of Imagination. He regards Reason as the highest faculty. He thinks of Understanding (2) as our ordinary "reason". It is the discursive intelligence, the faculty by which we deal with phenomena. Understanding (2) organises the evidence of the senses for logical and practical use; it enables us to survive in and even to manage the material World...It sees things as dead..., and can conceive mechanical structures only (p. 6. ICC : Fogle). Reason is impossible. Reason in the higher subjective sense is impossible without the faculty of understanding, except in the mind of a madman. Coleridge describes Don Quixote as the personification of the reason and the moral sense, divested of the judgement and the understanding. Sancho Panza is the personification of the understanding or common sense.

Fogle admits that reason in the intuitive sense is a 'more comprehensive faculty which transcends the understanding'. He goes on to say that Imagination is a higher faculty than Fancy and that it is akin to Reason. It is clear that Reason and Imagination are both native powers and that Reason is related to the passivity of Understanding (2) in the same way as Imagination is related to the passivity of

Fancy. But we have not understood Coleridge's position clearly till we also realise the fact that it is the Inner Sense that makes all the difference. Reason is nothing but Understanding (2) transfigured by the Inner Sense and Imagination none other than Fancy so transfigured. In the one case, the Inner Sense functions conjointly with the Understanding and appears as Reason. With the aid of the Inner Sense, judgement operates in spheres like our idea of God and our idea of Spirit,—spheres that are not open to the Understanding as such and apprehends Platonic 'Ideas'. In the other case, the Inner Sense works conjointly with our capacity to detect resemblances between things that are unlike each other and appears as Imagination. With the aid of the Inner Sense, Fancy is able to see into the life of things and detect deep and hidden resemblances and form them into symbols. Left to itself, Fancy can only detect 'dead' resemblances.

Then there is the reference to the role of Imagination as mediator between Reason and Understanding (2). Fogle says that, unlike Reason, Imagination *images* the ideal. Unlike the understanding, it idealizes rather than abstracts from images. To the imagination nature is real and living. As copula and mediator between Reason and Understanding (2) Imagination partakes of both and yet is neither. "The end of Reason is spiritual truth, and the end of Understanding is the demonstrable truth of science; the end of imagination is the beauty of truth" (p. 9. ICC : Fogle).

When Coleridge spoke of Imagination as mediator, he was specifically thinking of its role in interpreting the perceptions of the Inner Sense and Reason to the understanding of the reader. Coleridge wanted to suggest that these perceptions of the Inner Sense could be properly interpreted to the reader's understanding with the aid, not of Fancy, but of the Inner Sense 'working with Fancy'. What Coleridge said on the subject was this : "One diagnostic or contradistinguishing mark appertaining to all Ideas is, that they are not adequately expressible by words. An Idea can only be expressed (more correctly suggested) by two contradictory positions; as, for example : the soul is all in every part; nature is a sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere, and the

like." (Notes on Jeremy Taylor, quoted by Fogle in ICC.) The point is that the Ideas, which Reason perceives, are not wholly reducible to rational expression. They can be grasped only in an imaginative insight,—through images discovered conjointly by Fancy and the Inner Sense,—for the Inner Sense has also co-operated with understanding (as the higher Reason) in detecting them. The two images "all" and "every part" are two contradictory positions. These two positions are blended together into a paradoxical image which suggests the Idea of a Soul. The Idea is perceived by Reason. But it can only be suggested by an image which is sensuous and is therefore made accessible to the Understanding. But the image has to be made unique. It has to be modified so as to enable it to suggest the Idea. This manifestation, says Coleridge, is possible only to the Inner Sense working with Fancy and not to Fancy alone. It is easy to see that Coleridge has a similar distinction in mind between will and choice. Coleridge calls will 'practical reason'. Will is the Inner Sense animating the faculty of choice which is but 'an empirical phenomenon of the will'. Fancy may be called an empirical phenomenon of the Imagination. The Understanding is an empirical phenomenon of Reason. Coleridge calls will "practical reason" because it is Choice guided by the Inner Sense when the Inner Sense co-exists with Understanding. He calls Will "the moral will" for Will is 'practical', just as Reason is speculative.

Choice, Understanding and Fancy deal with fixities and definites. But Reason apprehends the Ideas beyond the reach of the senses. Imagination images them and the Will realises them in action or in the 'making' of a poem.

Understanding, Fancy and Choice are elevated to a higher level of activity as Reason, Imagination and Will when they function conjointly with the Inner Sense.

Understanding regulates knowledge. It prepares the ground for distinction or discrimination. It organises the evidence of the senses for logical or practical use. Judgement uses this evidence for a logical purpose,—distinction or discrimination. Choice makes use of it for a practical purpose,—acceptance or rejection. Good sense is judgement operating in the sphere of Reason and Imagination.

The 'Motion' that Coleridge calls the 'Life' of poetic genius

is emotion. It figures in the normal activity of rational beings as an attitude or a system of sentiments. A sentiment is an emotion that has gained stability by being linked to an idea. A number of sentiments leaning in the same direction tend to form an attitude. Pity, Sorrow, Ardour, Despair, Repulsion, Peace and Delight are some of the emotional attitudes that colour the life of man. When Coleridge speaks of the workings of Passion, we may suppose that he refers to the tumult or tension caused in the consciousness of an individual by the play or interplay of one or more of these attitudes. Passion is checked by a spontaneous effort of the Will. It loses its raw or attitudinal edge under the impact of the Inner Sense awakened by the 'balance of antagonists' and develops into pure rapture. When the process of dynamic aesthesis begins, rapture softens down into a gentle emotion accompanying the act of poetic composition.

We have not taken into account another faculty mentioned by Coleridge,—the imitative power, voluntary and automatic. This is related to memory. In the moment of vision, the imitative power registers silently the impressions made by the Inner Sense through Reason or Imagination. These impressions would fade away but for the workings of the imitative power. In the normal mental life of an individual the imitative power is active both in its automatic and voluntary forms, as when he registers impressions silently or imitates deliberately the behaviour, gestures and intonations of others.

During the moment of vision, the imitative power penetrates the core of an object,—in order to reconcile the external impressions of Nature with its own apprehension of the essence of Nature.

Similarly Taste moves from what Wordsworth called a perception of congruity and proportion to an apprehension of pure rapture.

It should be clear by now that Coleridge's account of the poetic process cannot be exhausted by discussing his theory of fancy and imagination, however important these twin faculties may be. The process is much more complex and involves all the faculties. Above all, it assumes the Inner Sense as the pivotal power that galvanises all the faculties, elevates and transforms them into higher powers and brings about through

them a rich increase in consciousness. Poetic genius is not merely imagination and fancy. We should not forget that Passion is its life and Good Sense its body. Reason is the intuitive mind of poetic genius,—it opens up the untold riches of the Beyond for its delectation and enrichment. The Will conquers and brings all this *terra incognita* into subjection. It also establishes a new kingdom in the world of art by putting imagination in action and retaining it under its control as long as the act of poetic composition lasts.

A closer scrutiny of the passage about the poet described in ideal perfection should make this point clearer. It is the poet who brings "the whole soul of man into activity". He does this with the "subordination of the faculties of the soul to each other according to their relative worth and dignity". He (not the Imagination but he, the poet, with his Inner Sense awakened) diffuses a tone and spirit of unity. It is the tone and spirit of unity, which are the manifestation of his awakened Inner Sense. They blend and fuse the activity of one faculty with that of the other, as it were. (We have to note that it is this tone and spirit of unity that blend and fuse, not the imagination.) The tone and spirit of unity are able to achieve this fusion, however, "by that synthetic and magical power, to which I would exclusively appropriate the name of Imagination". This means that the Inner Sense, which is the tone and spirit of unity, uses the Imagination as its chief agent to help it achieve these reconcilements. It makes the Will and Understanding put Imagination in action and retain it under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, control. Thus, throughout the poetic process, the Imagination becomes the moving spirit or soul of the process. That is why, in the paragraph following this one about the poet, Coleridge calls the Imagination the Soul of poetic genius, "that is everywhere, and in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole". But the Inner Sense is the power behind the throne and Imagination only its accredited regent or representative. The Inner Sense achieves the reconcilements through the help of the Imagination, by placing it at the helm of affairs. That is why the Imagination "reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities". An analysis of the reconciliation of these qualities will show that the rich complexity or amalgam, occasioned by

the heightened activity of all the faculties in the moment of vision, is transferred, magically as it were, to the product of poetic genius. The Primary Imagination links Reason to Sense and generates symbols. The secondary imagination fulfils all the other functions mentioned above.

In Coleridge's account of the poetic process, there is a third plane on which the corresponding counterparts of these faculties operate. It may not be fair to describe it as the irrational or infrarational level. But it is certainly true to say that the activity of the rational consciousness is not very much in evidence on this plane. The significance of this plane is best described by Coleridge himself. "All real knowledge supposes a prior sensation. For sensation itself is but vision nascent, not the cause of intelligence, but intelligence itself revealed as an earlier power in the process of self-construction" (BL. pp. 187-88, Vol. I). 'Intelligence', here, means, of course, the soul or Inner Sense.

The Inner Sense is the heaven of the aesthetic world of Coleridge and sensuous perception, the knowledge that comes to us through the five ports of the senses, is its earth. In between is the atmosphere of common day, of rationalism. But this world of eye and ear holds within itself in a nascent form the Will, Reason, Imagination, Rapture and Good Sense. The automatic imitative power and nascent taste also belong here. The Inner Sense is secretly at work on this plane and touches off these faculties in their nascent form. They do not reveal the full impact of the Inner Sense. Nor have they developed in the light of rational day into Choice, Understanding, Fancy, Attitude and Judgement. An obscure intuitive gleam colours their activity.

One such power is the Primary Imagination that Coleridge speaks of,—“the living power and prime agent of all human perception” and “a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM”. As Coleridge puts it, sensation itself is vision nascent. The pre-existent harmony between subject and object is experienced, if only obscurely, at this stage. We have seen that Shawcross takes primary imagination to mean ‘ordinary perception’. But we would prefer to regard it as mediator between Reason and Sense. The nascent or lowest form of Imagination can then be taken to mean ‘ordi-

nary perception' or 'nascent vision'. Primary imagination and nascent vision are almost the same. The only difference that one may detect lies in the fact that the Inner Sense is more active in Primary Imagination, particularly when we think of the reader enjoying poetry.

Another is the 'sensation of volition' which Coleridge distinguishes from the moral will and the faculty of choice. Coleridge finds reason to include it under the head of single and double touch. It is obscurities of this kind that have exposed Coleridge to much ridicule. But an elucidation may be attempted here. The word 'sensation' shows that Coleridge is thinking here of the spontaneous or 'involuntary' movements of volition. When Coleridge speaks of the "spontaneous effort that strives to hold in check the workings of passion" in the passage on the origin of metre, he has in mind the 'sensation' of volition or the nascent will. This may be regarded as an example of the 'single touch'. This should be distinguished from the "supervening act of will and judgement" that follows, for the latter is a conscious act.

An instance of 'double touch' may be fancied in what Coleridge says of the Imagination: "first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, control". The fact that the control is gentle and unnoticed shows that the control is exercised by the 'will nascent' rather than by the will. It puts Imagination in action and then controls it in a gentle manner. The putting in action and the subsequent control may be taken as an instance of the 'double touch'.

Reason and Good Sense can be accounted for on this level in a similar way. Coleridge does not speak of them specifically. On the other hand, he tells us that Imagination is put in action by the will and understanding and retained under their control. Again, he says that the 'balance of antagonists' is organised into metre by 'a supervening act of the will and judgement'. Since a poem is to be made accessible to the understanding of the reader, it is but natural that the understanding of the poet should be active in presenting and interpreting the complex nexus of his experience to him. But nascent reason is sure to play its part here occasionally, like nascent vision and nascent will. Similarly, in the supervening act of the will and judge-

ment, which, as we shall see, is central, not merely to the origin of metre but of poetry itself, we shall not be untrue to the spirit of Coleridge's exposition if we suppose that nascent Good Sense is involved in the act. In fact, we think that, in a more guarded moment, Coleridge would have used the term 'Good Sense' here rather than 'judgement'. Judgement is concerned with distinctions in the world of empirical knowledge and Good Sense, as Coleridge himself used the term, deals with distinctions in the world of the higher subjective perceptions. Coleridge described Good Sense as the 'Body' of poetic genius. It is the supervening act of the Will and Good Sense that can be more appropriately imagined as giving a rhythmic and thematic body to the spirit of poetry.

As for emotion, the affectivity that colours all our life, Coleridge speaks of Passion which we have analysed as the emotional tension caused by an attitude or attitudes. He does not mention Rapture specifically. But we have identified it as the emotional experience that is the poet's in the moment of vision. It persists and accompanies the act of poetic composition as a gentle emotion. We have emotional attitudes present on the second plane. On the third plane which we are considering here, the nascent plane, Passion is absent for it requires an interplay of attitudes which have a system of ideas as their kernel. There are fleeting or fugitive emotions in the everyday life of the individual. But they will have aesthetic significance only when they emerge as nascent attitudes or nascent rapture. Indian aestheticians have called them 'moods' as distinguished from attitudes. Coleridge himself has not spoken of them. But we may, if we like, accept them here for the sake of the completeness of the psychological scheme which Coleridge evolved in order to account for the poetic process. Fugitive emotions or moods at the nascent level, emotional attitudes at the rational level and Rapture at the higher subjective level : these are the three forms that Passion assumes in the poetic process.

THE FUSIONS IN THE STATIC AND THE RECON- CILEMENTS IN THE DYNAMIC AESTHESIS

We are now in a position to consider the poetic process itself. Coleridge views it in two phases which may be called static and dynamic. Static aesthesis begins when, kindled by an object or event, the passion in the poet is set ablaze. There arises in the poet's consciousness a spontaneous effort to check the workings of this passion. It is the effort of his nascent will. This results in tension, in a salutary antagonism in the mind between these two antagonists. This 'balance of antagonists' is assisted by the very state it counteracts. That is to say, the poet's consciousness begins to boil at white heat.

Coleridge has given this piece of psychological analysis with regard to the origin of metre. But it is evident that the analysis is applicable to the origin of poetry as well. This is one of the many reconcilements that the Inner Sense achieves in poetry with the help of the Imagination.

There is one more step taken before this 'balance' is organised into poetry. The Inner Sense is awakened in this process of tension. Coleridge does not mention it in this particular context. But it can be gathered from statements that he makes elsewhere on the subject. Quickened by this tension, the consciousness takes a leap into unknown territory, into the sphere of Ideas.

Passion, checked by will, culminates in what Coleridge calls an act of the realizing intuition. We have seen how integral this act is and how all the faculties are illumined and elevated by it. No one can say when this will happen. As to when the "ascertaining vision, the intuitive knowledge may finally supervene", says Coleridge, "can be learnt only by the fact" (BL. p. 166. Vol. I). He quotes Plotinus to support his statement: 'We ought not to pursue it with a view of detecting its secret source, but to watch in quiet till it suddenly shines upon us; preparing ourselves for the blessed spectacle as the eye waits patiently for the rising sun' (BL 167, Vol. I). Coleridge explains this process when he speaks of Shakespeare. Shakespeare "studied patiently, meditated deeply, understood minutely, till knowledge, become habitual and intuitive, wedded itself to his habitual feelings, and at length gave birth to the stupendous power" (BL 19-20, Vol. II).

The second phase—or dynamic aesthesis—begins when the poet, not content with the vision of reality vouchsafed him, desires to be *creative*, to find a fitting aesthetic body for his vision. The realizing intuition has resulted in an increase of *knowing* and *being*. The poet now wants a similar increase in *making*,—not making himself, since he has already become that, but of making his vision the soul of a work of art for communicating a similar increase in consciousness to others. It may be remembered that, while discussing metre, Coleridge speaks of "how this balance of antagonists became organised into metre (in the usual acceptation of that term), by a supervening act of the will and judgement consciously and for the foreseen purpose of pleasure" (BL p. 50 Vol. II). The poet seeks this fulfilment for his own delight and, however subconsciously, for the delight of others. The poet has ascended towards it, aided by his passion and practical reason. The passion itself has been kindled by an object, event or thought. He is now preparing for the descent of this vision, on the other side of the triangle into another object or event,—a work of art.

The 'balance' gets organised into metre or poetry under the 'supervening act', of the Will and Good Sense. Coleridge says in another context that the Imagination is first put in action by the Will and Understanding and retained under their control.

We may therefore suppose that Imagination is made the chief agent in this process by the Inner Sense under the general supervision and control of Will and Good Sense. Good Sense or Understanding (1) guides the Imagination in its attempt to clothe itself with a prose meaning; for imagination mediates between the translunary contents of the poet's vision—the Ideas—and the understanding of the reader. We have already spoken of the role of gentle emotion and imitative power in this creative act.

Imagination has played its own role in achieving the act of the realizing intuition. It receives the experience as image or symbol. But in the process of dynamic aesthesis, imagination becomes the shaping and modifying power in transforming all that molten lava—the substance of the interanimation of passion and reason and the consequent release of the Inner Sense—into a product of poetic genius. The Will and Good Sense preside over this dynamic process and Understanding (1) guides the Imagination in fitting the vision into a suitable prose meaning.

Imagination uses all the synthetic and magical power which it has received from the Inner Sense, in fulfilling this creative task. It is able to transform this complex content of the fusions achieved by the Inner Sense and the higher subjective faculties (including itself) into balances or reconcilements of those qualities which should be present in a work of art, but which are opposite or discordant. We have to remember that the esemplastic role or power of Imagination "reveals itself in the balance or reconcilment". Imagination itself is not responsible for all the fusions. It is responsible for only two of them, as a higher subjective faculty. But as an esemplastic power, it is responsible for the transformation of all the fusions into reconcilements of the opposite or discordant qualities that will figure in the work of art that is being born.

The qualities in a work of art are : multitude; unity; sameness; difference; idea; image; emotion; order; judgement; enthusiasm; the sense of novelty and freshness; the sense of familiarity; the natural; the artificial; the general; the concrete; the individual and the representative. Coleridge himself calls them 'qualities'. Imagination, in its esemplastic role, achieves their balance or reconcilment. It is able to do this because the soul and the higher faculties have made available to it the 'fusions' or 'in-

sights' that were achieved or released by them in the moment of vision or in the state of static aesthesis.

The 'insights' or glimpses afforded by the Inner Sense are responsible for reconcilements like the reduction of multitude to unity and the infusion of the sense of novelty and freshness into old and familiar objects. The tone and spirit of unity and the revealing flash of the Inner Sense make these reconcilements possible.

Some fusions effected by the Inner Sense account for a few other reconcilements. As may be seen, the word 'fusion' is applicable to the phase of the static and 'reconcilement' or 'balance' to the phase of dynamic aesthesis. The reconcilement of profound thought with vehement feeling derives from the fusion of Passion with Reason effected by the Inner Sense. The fusion of Passion and Will by the Inner Sense is responsible for two reconcilements,—that of a "more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order" and of the natural with the artificial.

Some reconcilements are accounted for by the 'insights' released by some of the faculties because of their transfiguration by the Inner Sense. Reason is responsible for the reconcilement of the individual with the representative. The Imitative Power accounts for the reconcilement of sameness with difference. Imagination itself, as a higher subjective faculty, is responsible for the reconcilement of the general with the concrete and of the idea with the image.

We may now examine the fusions achieved by the soul and the higher subjective faculties and the 'insights' released by them. The tone and spirit of unity diffused by the poet account for the blending or fusion of "each into each". This unity is the unity of the realizing intuition which is a single and undivided act. Coleridge describes this elsewhere as the "original gift of spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and insight of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew-drops" (BL p. 59 Vol. I).

This gives us the clue to another reconcilement that can be ascribed to the act of the realizing intuition,—"the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects". The reali-

zing intuition brings 'wonder' with it,—shedding a celestial light on familiar objects. In fact, this is one of the two 'cardinal points of poetry' mentioned by Coleridge when he speaks of the plan of the Lyrical Ballads,—“the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of the Imagination” (BL p. 5, Vol. II). “The sudden charm, which accidents of light and shade, which moonlight or sunset diffused over a known and familiar landscape, appeared to represent the practicability of combining both” (BL p. 5, Vol. II). In this plan, Wordsworth was to choose subjects from ordinary life. His object would be “To give the charm of novelty to things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind's attention to the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand” (BL p. 6, Vol. II). It is obvious that Coleridge is here speaking of the revelatory power of Intuition. It sees through objects into the “dearest freshness deep down things” (*God's Grandeur*: G.M. Hopkins), even as Reason sees the ‘representative’ in the ‘individual’.

Another fusion—that of ever-awake judgement and steady self-possession with enthusiasm and profound or vehement feeling—is also traceable to the Inner Sense. ‘Judgement ever-awake and steady self-possession’ is a description of the consciousness induced by the activity of Reason. Calm and dispassionate discrimination, at the time when the creative process is on, is possible only when the consciousness moves in the sphere of Ideas and has been illumined by Reason. “Enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement” is, on the other hand, a description of the consciousness induced by the activity of passion,—Passion that has been, or is on the verge of Rapture. The fusion of Passion and Reason is effected by the Inner Sense. It is possible because contraries like Passion and Reason can be harmonised when the realizing intuition opens up a level of consciousness on which being, knowing, doing and feeling are least to be distinguished; on which there is an integral awareness.

Coleridge makes frequent references to this quality of

poetry. Speaking of the influence of Bowyer, his teacher at school, Coleridge says : "I learned from him that poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more and more fugitive causes" (BL p. 4, Vol. I). He speaks of Cowper and Bowles as poets who were the first to "reconcile the heart with the head" (BL p. 16, Vol. I). What drew him to Wordsworth's poetry for the first time was "the union of deep feeling with profound thought; the fine balance of truth in observing with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed" (BL p. 59, Vol. I). He singles out for praise Wordsworth's "union of deep and subtle thought with sensibility" (BL p. 122, Vol. II). While speaking of Shakespeare's poetic power, Coleridge says : "No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher. For poetry is the blossom and the fragrancy of all human knowledge, human thoughts, human passions, emotions, language. In Shakespeare's poems the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a war embrace" (BL p. 19, Vol. II). He proceeds to say that Shakespeare "studied patiently, meditated deeply, understood minutely, till knowledge, become habitual and intuitive, wedded itself to his habitual feelings and at length gave birth to that stupendous power..." (BL p. 19, Vol. II).

Another group of reconcilements is concerned with the fusion of Will and Passion by the Inner Sense. Coleridge speaks of the reconcilement of "a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order". In a sense, this reconcilement represents the heart of the creative substance as it begins to take shape,—the antagonism between Passion and Will. The Will checks the workings of Passion by its own spontaneous effort. It is this part of the process which gives rise to the sense of tension and intensity. Poetry will be tame without the wrestling, as it were, of these gigantic powers in a war embrace. A poem should always give this sense of containing in itself more energies than are released in it. Coleridge says elsewhere that the pleasurable emotion of poetry is felt in perfection under the "full play of those

powers of mind, which are spontaneous rather than voluntary, and in which the effort required bears no proportion to the activity enjoyed. This is the state which permits the production of a highly pleasurable whole, of which each part shall also communicate for itself a distinct and conscious pleasure." This balance of Will and Passion, with which the poetic process begins, is, then, necessary for preserving a uniform intensity throughout the product of poetic genius. The 'balance' develops into a fusion when it results in the opening up of the truths of Reason and the Inner Sense.

The balance of Will and Passion is responsible for another reconciliation in poetry. The latter part of Coleridge's enumerative sentence takes us to a consideration of the formal element in poetry: "And while it blends and harmonises the natural with the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry." (B.L. p. 12, Vol. II.) The word 'artificial' reminds us of his statement about metre. He tells us how the balance of antagonists (i.e. Passion and Will) becomes "organised into metre in the usual acceptance of that term, by a supervening act of the will and judgement consciously and for the foreseen purpose of pleasure." (B.L. p. 50 Vol. II.) He goes on to say: "As these elements are formed into metre artificially, by a voluntary act, with the design and for the purpose of blending delight with emotion, so the traces of present volition should throughout the metrical language be proportionately discernible." (B.L. p. 50 Vol. II.) The word 'artificially', used here, clearly harks back to the blending of 'the natural and the artificial'.

The reference to the 'voluntary act' and 'present volition' shows that it is the Will that, in Coleridge's opinion, figures prominently in the reconciliation of the artificial and the natural. In this instance, as in the other one of emotion and order, it is the balance of Will and Passion that is responsible for the fusion of the natural and the artificial. We may refer here to the passage from *The Winter's Tale* which Coleridge quotes while writing about metre: "We may in some measure apply to this union (i.e. of Passion and of Will) the answer of Polixenes in *The Winter's Tale*, to Perdita's neglect of the streaked gillyflowers, because she had heard it said:

There is an art which in their piedness shares with
great creating nature.

Polixenes : Say there be;
Yet nature is made better by no mean
But nature makes that mean; so, o'er that art,
Which, you say, adds to nature, is an art,
That nature makes. You see, sweet maid, we marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock;
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art,
Which does mend nature,—change it rather; but
The art itself is nature."

Streaked gillyflowers, metrical writing with its picturesque language, the marriage of a shepherdess with a prince,—all these are natural though they may be unusual. The fact that art shares with nature in the creation of gillyflowers makes them flowers of a special kind; but they are, nevertheless, natural, for the art itself is nature. The human brain is a product of nature and whatever proceeds from it is equally natural. Perdita, a 'bark of baser kind', is married to Prince Florizel, a 'bud of nobler race'. This is, no doubt, an unusual union. But there is nothing unnatural about it and it may even result in splendid progeny, because of its very unusualness. Again, we should not forget that Perdita herself is not a shepherdess, but a princess who does not know her royal birth. Similarly the union, in poetry, of the gentler scion or will (or voluntary purpose) with wildest stock or passion, is an unusual one. It is not seen in prose. But the royal birth or the 'gentility' of passion itself, like Perdita's, will be established as natural when passion is sublimated or purified in the course of this union. Poetry is seen as a natural mode of utterance. The union of passion and of will naturally results in the 'language of excitement'. Again, since the language of poetry is the offspring of the union of passion and of will, the traces of 'present volition' or of the will, which is father to this metrical language, should also be proportionately discerned in the language. The union results in a frequency of the forms and figures of speech in the language. These figures of speech are the offspring of passion, for passion gave them birth. But Will is their father, for it is the control of passion by will that results in the figurative language of poetry. The

will makes the figures of speech 'children of power',—uses them for conveying the inner meaning or the substance of the realizing intuition. This frequency of figures of speech will not be desired or endured in prose, because the emotion there is not 'voluntarily encouraged and kept up' as in poetry. The frequency will not be natural in prose because this union of passion and will which is natural though unusual, is not present there.

We shall now examine the fusions achieved by Reason. Imagination, in its esemplastic role, "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate." (B.L. Vol. I p. 202.) This 'process' resembles what is spoken of in Indian aesthetics as the *avaranabhangā* or disenvironing or unveiling the soul of an object. It means an elimination of the accidental aspects or inessentialities of the object, and an apprehension of the very core of its reality. Imagination derives this power to recreate and idealise an object through the fusion achieved by Reason with the essence of an object. Reason penetrates through things, events or thoughts to their Laws. It removes the inessentialities and transforms the object into a transparent image of its archetype.

The reconciliation of the individual with the representative is traceable to the activity of Reason. Coleridge quotes in this connection what Sir John Davies observes of the human soul :

Doubtless this could not be but that; he turns
 Bodies to *spirit* by sublimation strange,
 As fire converts to fire things it burns,
 As we our food into our nature change.
 From their gross matter she abstracts *their* forms,
 And draws a kind of quintessence from things :
 Which to her proper nature she transforms
 To bear them light on her celestial wings.
 Thus does she, when from *individual states*
 She doth abstract the universal kinds.

The process referred to in these lines is that of the generalizing and idealising power of reason.

Of the two 'cardinal' points of poetry included in the plan of the Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge does not refer in his famous paragraph to the second one in which he himself specialized. What Coleridge calls "the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature"

could have been included in the famous paragraph as "the sense of affinity and familiarity with new and unfamiliar objects". This is what Coleridge himself set out to achieve in the *Lyrical Ballads* : "It was agreed that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith." (B.L. p. 6, Vol. II.)

In these poems, says Coleridge, "the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, supernatural; and the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting of the affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real. And real in this sense they have been to every human being who, from whatever source of delusion, has at any time believed himself under supernatural agency." (B.L. p. 5, Vol. II.)

This second cardinal point of poetry is also an instance of the reconcilement of the 'individual with the representative'. The poet brings to the surface the truth of human nature that is implicit in a mysterious situation or object,—an individual image or apparition. An image or apparition, a visitation from the world of mystery, awakens the passion of the poet. The passion is sublimated by his Reason which abstracts a 'universal kind' from this 'individual state'. This is what Coleridge did in the *Ancient Mariner* and also in *Christabel* and *Kubla Khan*.

Coleridge's series of 'reconcilements' begins with the reconcilement of "sameness with difference". This may at first be thought to refer to the co-existence of fancy and judgement in poetry. Fancy is the aggregative and associative power and judgement the discriminating dissociative power. The activities of both these powers are reconciled in poetry. The one exists in some of its imagery and the other in its meaning.

But this 'reconcilement' is concerned in a more profound sense with the imitative power. We have not considered the transfigured role of the imitative power so far. We have referred to its automatic and 'voluntary' roles. But Coleridge's essay *On Poetry or Art* throws a flood of light on the role of the

imitative power at the higher subjective level. Art is the "union or reconciliation of that which is nature with that which is exclusively human. It is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished from nature by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea." (B.L. II p. 255.) Coleridge distinguishes between a copy and an imitation: "In all imitation two elements must co-exist, and not only co-exist, but must be perceived as co-existing. These two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates. The artist may take his point of view where he pleases, provided that the desirable effect be perceptibly produced,—that there be likeness in the difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilment of both in one" (ibid. p. 256). If there is likeness to nature without any check of difference, the result will be disgusting as in wax-work figures of men and women. In a work of genuine imitation, we begin with an acknowledged total difference, because the detailed and circumstantial resemblance may not be there. But we find there the motion and the life which abolish the distance from truth. "Every touch of nature gives you the pleasure of an approximation to truth" (ibid. p. 256). It is in this context that Coleridge makes the great statement: "Believe me, you must master the essence, the *natura naturans*, which presupposes a bond between nature in the highest sense and the soul of man" (ibid. p. 257).

Having said that there is a subtle identity between Nature and the human soul and that "body is but a striving to become mind"—that it is mind in its essence, Coleridge proceeds to point out that this reconcilment "of the external with the internal" is there in every work of art. The artist must first "eloin himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect...The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourse to us by symbols—the *Naturgeist*, or spirit of nature, as we unconsciously imitate those whom we love; for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect" (ibid. p. 259). This is how a good portrait is the abstract of the personal.

In analysing the specific symptoms of poetic genius with

reference to Shakespeare, Coleridge speaks of "the choice of subjects very remote from the private interests and circumstances of the writer himself" and of the "utter aloofness of the poet's own feelings from those of which he is at once the pointer and analyst" (B.L. II p. 16). He regards this as a promise of poetic genius precisely because it tests his capacity to penetrate to the very core of the subject which is remote from him. If he succeeds in producing, not a mere copy but an imitation of its essence, it means that his imitative power has, at some point, been in contact with the Inner Sense.

IMAGINATION, FANCY AND GOOD SENSE

Imagination is given the central place in the poetic process and made responsible for the transference of the fusions achieved by all the faculties and by the Inner Sense, to the work of art because imagination is the mediator between the Reason of the poet and the understanding of the reader. It is the poet's soul or Inner Sense that is responsible for the miracle. In another field, that of practical action, the soul would have made the Will its chief representative and put it in action by the Reason and Judgement and retained it under their control.

Thus Imagination has two functions to fulfil in the poetic process. It functions as a faculty in its own right and achieves the fusion of the concrete with the general and of the idea with the image. This is what the Primary Imagination does. But a second or 'esemplastic' role is assigned to it by the Inner Sense. In this capacity, it is made to preside over the birth of a work of art and is endowed with an additional shaping and modifying or "synthetic and magical" power. This is the role assigned to the Secondary Imagination by Coleridge. It succeeds in transferring as reconcilements of the qualities present in a work of art the various fusions achieved

by the other faculties and by itself and in fulfilling a few other subsidiary functions, in its esemplastic role.

It is in its 'esemplastic' role that Imagination transforms all the 'insights' or 'fusions' into 'reconcilements'. It also fulfils three other subsidiary tasks in this role.

Coleridge accepted Plato's belief that 'Ideas' are mysterious powers living, seminal, formative, and exempt from time. The subliminal or the superconscious was an obscure region of the human mind and very little was known about it. Coleridge knew it as the haunt of great power. He thought that the light and power that emanated from it was one of the modes of revelation used by God. Poetry is dependent on the Ideas derived from within the poet. Poetry uses the materials provided by observation. But this cannot be a determining factor for poetry. As Coleridge says, Nature is there to enable Art to convey the Ideas of philosophy as if they were mere effects derived from the outward watchings of life. The 'Idea' is the universal in the individual, the universal become active and formative. Coleridge believed with Plato and Plotinus that Ideas are constitutive, and not merely regulative as Aristotle and Kant thought they were. Coleridge thought of revelation in his scheme as revelation of God in Nature, revelation through the superconscious in man and Revelation recorded in the New Testament.

The Natural mode has its limitations. The terrestrial should not be elevated above the celestial. Faith should not be summoned to the bar of limited physical experience. But the study of physical laws may help us to understand the Revelations of God and what they mean through the evidence that the laws afford. But the sense impressions of Nature cannot be relied on as a basis for either philosophy or theology.

In his *Method and Imagination in Coleridge's Criticism*, Jackson speaks of Primary Imagination as Reason, which is the organ of the supersensuous and Secondary Imagination as the faculty used to exploit the God-given resources hidden in the Superconscious ('Unconscious' in Jackson's language).

W.J. Bate notes (P-158, *Perspectives of Criticism*, Harvard College, 1950) that Sarah Coleridge stated (B.L. 1847) that in his copy of the book Coleridge 'Stroked out' the sentence distinguishing the 'Primary' imagination. She decided to leave

it in as it had been often quoted.

If Jackson takes Primary Imagination to be 'Reason', Shawcross takes 'ordinary perception' to be its field. Bate thinks of it as less a faculty than a *process* of realization by which the products and insights of two distinct aspects of mind—Sense with its flux of images and Reason with its Ideas—become transmuted and funnelled into a single stream of awareness.

In calling Primary Imagination a process, rather than a faculty, Bate goes wide of the mark. It *is* the faculty which links Sense to Reason and produces symbols. If it is nothing but a duplicate of Reason, Primary Imagination would be a redundant faculty. The three levels on which Imagination shows itself may be identified as follows :

(a) The instinctive level; "ordinary perception" which is the meaning that Shawcross ascribes to primary imagination. But it would be nearer the mark to take Primary Imagination as the faculty that links Sense to Reason. In that case this is the stage of nascent perception.

(b) Fancy at the rational level.

(c) The faculty that links Sense to Reason at the super-conscious level : Primary Imagination.

It is the laboratory in which essence is elaborated into existence and is transmuted into a symbol.

What Coleridge calls the secondary imagination is the field of synthesis and process of unification which is extended to all the faculties. Primary imagination synthesises Sense with Reason and with Rapture. In its secondary form, it struggles to unify all the faculties as they manifest themselves at the superconscious or rational level. It tries to recreate—i.e., draw into a closer unity with Reason—the entire flux of images of Sense. It is an echo of the Primary Imagination, unlike which, it co-exists with the conscious will. Its agency is the same in kind as that of the Primary Imagination. But it differs in the degree and mode of its operation. The mode is one of a unification of the materials furnished by all the faculties and not merely at their highest level. The work of the 'Completing Power'—Imagination—in its secondary phase may not be marked by the same degree of completion that one experiences in the formation of symbols by the Primary Imagination. Part of the material here and there may remain

undigested or unassimilated. Lastly, it also supervises and effectuates the reconciliation of the number of discordant qualities in a work of art. It has already helped to fuse or unify them as elements of the artist's experience.

As seen already, Imagination completes its work under the control of the Will, Good Sense and Understanding. Though Coleridge does not specifically mention this, it can be gathered from his statements elsewhere that Taste, Fancy and a gentle emotion accompanying the act of poetic composition help Imagination in its work. The tense activity of the first or static phase has subsided. Imagination is busy realising the results in terms of a work of art. It brings together the fusions achieved by the Inner Sense, the other faculties and itself and reconciles, with their help, many opposite or discordant qualities in the work of art. The reconciliation of these qualities makes the work of art a complex whole. But these would never have been reconciled in the work of art had not the Inner Sense and the higher subjective faculties achieved the fusions referred to above. In the creation of a work of art, which takes place on a comparatively lower plane, Taste and Fancy co-operate with the Imagination. A gentle emotion also accompanies the act of composition.

Apart from the shaping and modifying function which Coleridge assigns to Imagination in the creative process, he makes it specially responsible for two particulars. The lines which he quotes from Davies show this. After abstracting universal kinds from individual states, Davies says that the human soul re-clothes them in diverse names and fates :

Which then re-clothed in diverse names and fates
Steal access through the senses to our minds.

This is how Imagination reconciles the general with the concrete and the Idea with the image. Its function is to image the Ideal.

In addition to the two specific reconcilements which it achieves, Coleridge ascribes to Imagination the fulfilment of three other subsidiary tasks. One of these is that, while it blends and harmonises the natural with the artificial, aided by the balance of passion and will, it still subordinates art to nature. There is a frequency of the figures of speech in poetry

because the emotion there is "voluntarily encouraged and kept up". These figures are the children of power,—of will. But passion is their mother, for passion gave them birth. However prominent the "traces of present volition" may be throughout the metrical language, Coleridge intends to suggest that this society of the figures of speech is matriarchal and not patriarchal. The mother is more important than the father, for passion is the moving force. The entire creative process begins with the workings of passion; the will comes in only as a brake on these workings. But for the continuous intensity of passion, poetry would be no poetry at all. The will may step on the scene and direct passion to greater ends. It may, in fact, transfigure the very nature of passion in this way. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Perdita is more interesting than Florizel and, in a sense, Florizel is there mainly to enhance her beauty. Let Coleridge speak for himself. He says that the pleasurable emotion of poetry is felt in perfection under the "full play of those powers of mind, which are spontaneous rather than voluntary, and in which the effort required bears no proportion to the activity enjoyed. This is the state which permits the production of a highly pleasurable whole, of which each part shall also communicate for itself a distinct and conscious pleasure."

Again, the passage from *The Winter's Tale* is brought in to prove that Art itself is Nature. Art is subordinated to Nature. It nevertheless succeeds in transforming the very nature of 'Nature' or passion by its impact. But this need not make us think that the product becomes 'artificial' on this account. The 'Art' itself is 'Nature' and subdued to the quality of 'Nature'. The soul or the Inner Sense harmonises them. As the chief agent instrumental in bringing about the dynamic aesthesis, Imagination favours 'Nature', passion or the spontaneous powers of mind more than Will, in the interest of the work of art which it is now its function to produce.

Coleridge deals with two other questions,—the subordination of the manner to the matter and of our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry. The subordination of the manner to the matter is easy to understand if we see that 'matter' means the substance of the realizing intuition and not the selected theme or subject-matter. The whole function of Imagination,

in its esemplastic role, is to find a fitting body for this substance. We come across critical theories which hold that form and substance, or matter and manner, are equally important. This is, in a sense, true. There can be no manifestation of the soul of poetry without a correspondent body. The substance will not even be noticed if it did not express itself in a concrete form. Some critics even think that the manner of saying a thing is more important than matter in poetry. But in statements of this kind 'matter' tends to be identified with 'theme' or 'subject-matter' and the 'synthetic and magical power' with the manner of poetic speech. While admitting the indispensability of both matter and manner in poetry, it should be possible to concede the primacy of matter, even as the transcendentalist or idealist accepts the primacy of spirit as compared with matter. The whole process of dynamic aesthesis arises simply because a realizing intuition has come into existence. This is what is to be expressed.

As for the subordination of our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry, which is also one of the achievements of the Imagination, Coleridge says that this is secured by its magical power. It is easy to be lost in our admiration of the poet and his intuitive insight and exclaim :

Weave a circle round him thrice
And close your eyes in holy dread
For he on honey-dew hath fed
And drunk the milk of paradise.

But this attitude does not help us much in our appreciation of poetry. Our concern is, after all, with the substance of the intuition and experience expressed by the poet. The poet recedes into the background and projects this substance into his poem. The manner in which the magical power functions in the poem ensures that we receive the details of the experience with sympathy. The poem is a self-contained work of art and we may think of the poet, if we wish to, only after assimilating the experience which the poet has organised into expression.

The role of judgement and fancy in a work of art deserves to be considered in some detail. Coleridge calls Good Sense the 'body' of poetic genius and Fancy its drapery. Fancy is the folds in which clothing is disposed. It has a decorative effect in a work of art because of its charming play with the resemblances

of fixities that are apparently unlike each other. The clothing is gathered skilfully into folds which give an unexpected pleasure. The poetic 'genius' whose life is Passion, whose soul is Imagination and whose body is Good Sense, wears this clothing. What does Coleridge mean by calling Good Sense its 'body'? As we have seen, it is the poet's understanding which fits the contents of his vision into suitable subject-matter,—a prose meaning. The subject-matter or prose meaning is the 'body' of a work of art. We have defined Good Sense as judgement transfigured by the Inner Sense. Understanding (I) is concerned with the Ideas perceived by Reason and its other insights as well. Good Sense is intuitive Judgement which deals with these materials. Rational Understanding is concerned with our routine experience with objects in this world. Rational Judgement deals with distinctions relating to these objects.

Now, Good Sense, under whose control Imagination functions to create a work of art, is there to see that the contents of the poet's vision are accommodated at every step by the subject-matter without any failure of propriety. The poet's vision fears to tread this ground. But his Good Sense tests it and invites the vision to tread the ground only after it has made sure of the appropriateness of each step. Thus the body of a product of poetic genius is the subject-matter or prose meaning that has been tested by Good Sense. Shall we say that this is what Coleridge had in mind when he called 'Good Sense' the 'body' of poetic genius? In any case, Good Sense is the prime power that has to see that the general is adequately matched with the concrete, the idea with the image and that the 'body' is exquisitely fitted to the vision which it is to contain.

We can put this in another way which may bring us nearer to Coleridge's meaning in the sentence. Coleridge's intention in the sentence is to describe poetic genius viewed in its dynamic or creative aspect. He calls Imagination its soul. This should not be misunderstood to mean that Imagination itself is the Soul or Inner Sense. The distinction has already been made clear by Coleridge in the paragraph preceding the sentence. It is in the process of dynamic aesthesis that Imagination becomes, metaphorically, the 'soul' of poetic genius. It is everywhere, and in each, because, in its role as the shaping and modifying power in this part of the process, it has to attend to each and every step

necessary in transforming the vision into a work of art. It has to "form all into one graceful and intelligent whole". Passion gives vitality to poetic genius,—being its very life-breath. No dynamic aesthesis would have been possible without passion. Good Sense is the 'body' of poetic genius in the sense that, but for its good offices, poetic genius would have to remain disembodied,—nothing better than the complex molten lava of consciousness. The materials of the body itself are provided by the poet's understanding. Fancy is nothing more than the folds of the drapery gathered around this body.

It will thus be seen that, in this sentence, Coleridge speaks of only one part of the poetic process,—its dynamic side. Moreover, he speaks only of some of the faculties involved in it, not all. He leaves out any reference to Will and Reason and to the Imitative Power. Passion, which he omits in his comprehensive list of faculties, is included here. It is also possible to interpret 'motion' as the balance of Passion and Will with which the creative process begins.

I am inclined to agree with Dr. I.A. Richards that the sentence : "Finally, Good Sense is the Body of poetic genius", etc. is "a peroration in an eighteenth-century manner, not designed to be taken too seriously" (p. 126. COI). Dr. Richards quotes Coleridge's famous statement on Taste, which Coleridge makes while discussing Wordsworth's views on poetic diction, in order to define the place of Good Sense. Coleridge says that the poet is to regulate his own style "by such a knowledge of the facts, material and spiritual, that most appertain to his art, as, if it has been governed and applied by *good-sense*, and rendered instinctive by habit, becomes the representative and reward of our past conscious reasonings, insights and conclusions and acquires the name of TASTE." (p. 126. COI.)

Good Sense is here mentioned as a controlling tendency. Coleridge speaks of the role of Good Sense in the poet's own consciousness, when he is involved in the act of composition, and not in criticism generally. We have seen how Imagination is put in action by Will, judgement (which we have here called Good Sense) and Understanding. Good Sense is judgement exercised in the sphere of Reason and of creative activity.

COLERIDGE'S VIEWS ON FORM AND METRE IN POETRY

Allied to the music of words is the structure of the verse that the poet employs for his poem. There are three large possibilities open to him in this regard,—the employment of traditional verse structures or forms which have come down to him from earlier practitioners; an adaptation of these forms, with certain modifications, for his own purposes; or a rejection of these forms altogether in favour of building up an intensely individual rhythmic body for the lyric impulse. Even when a poet uses traditional verse forms, he subdues them, if he is great enough to do so, and leaves the stamp of his own genius on them. Acceptance of a traditional verse form need not necessarily mean the sacrifice of all individuality or uniqueness in verse structure.

The traditional verse forms in English are many. There is the four-foot couplet, with its sub-varieties, which has persisted in English verse from the Early Middle English period; the five-foot couplet which Chaucer used for the first time, and with such distinction in *The Canterbury Tales*; and blank verse which began with Surrey and has attracted most of the great English poets ever since. These are the major verse-structures which have been used not only for lyric poetry but also for drama or

for sustained narrative. There are the iambic stanza-forms including the Rime Royal (ababbcc), the *Ottava Rima* (abababcc), the ballad stanza, the *In Memoriam* stanza, the *Rubaiyat* stanza (aaba) and the *terza rima* illustrated in Shelley's *Ode to the West Wind*. There are, besides, triplets of various types used by poets like Campion, Morris and Swinburne.

The sonnet and the ode are also forms that have attracted many great poets and they have led to considerable experimentation within a prescribed field.

The traditions in verse form are themselves the result of experimental activity and of an eager search for the right rhythmic body for the inspiration that seized the innovators. The creation of the Anusthub metre in Sanskrit, the couplet structure that has attracted the greatest Sanskrit poets down to the most negligible poetasters, illustrates the fact that, in its origin, even a traditional verse structure corresponds to the most spontaneous need of a poet. Incidentally, it is also a perfect illustration of Coleridge's theory of the origin of metre. In his *Biographia Literaria*, this is what Coleridge has to say on the subject: "This I would trace to the balance in the mind effected by that spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion. It might easily be explained likewise in what manner this salutary antagonism is assisted by the very state, which it counteracts; and how this balance of antagonists became organised into metre (in the usual acceptation of that term), by a supervening act of the will and judgement, consciously and for the foreseen purpose of pleasure... There must be not only a partnership but a union; an interpenetration of passion and of will, of spontaneous impulse and of voluntary purpose." (B.L. Vol. II pp. 49-50.)

The workings of passion and the spontaneous effort which strives to hold them in check are the two elements of metre. They are opposed to each other. Because of their opposition to each other, a balance of their antagonism is effected in the mind. This antagonism is 'salutary'. The 'balance' is assisted by the very state it counteracts,—i.e. the workings of passion, the state of increased excitement. It assists the incandescence of aesthetic lava in the consciousness of the poet. The two elements are formed into metre artificially, by a voluntary act,—by a supervening act of the will and judgement.

Coleridge says that these elements are organised into metre 'consciously and for the foreseen purpose of pleasure'.

But it is not so clear whether this purpose of pleasure is 'foreseen'. A balance of the two elements is, in a sense, the frustration of one of them,—the workings of passion. Passion, left to itself, would have resulted in *an act*. But this expenditure of energy is prevented by the spontaneous effort which holds the workings of passion in check. The urge for action, generated by the workings of passion, therefore, expresses itself in another way. It transforms the two elements—passion and its antagonist—into metre. The 'purpose' here cannot be strictly regarded as 'pleasure' unless 'pleasure' means the relief or satisfaction that the individual experiences because the energy generated by passion does not remain baffled but has attained a specific goal. The 'pleasure' of the listener or reader is a later result. It may or may not have been 'foreseen'. But it does not affect the process in the poet's consciousness and has to be distinguished from it.

What, exactly, is the spontaneous effort which holds in check the workings of passion? How is it different from the supervening act of the will and judgement which organise these two elements into metre?

It can be said that this spontaneous effort is really the index of an individual's culture. This is nascent will, or the sensation of volition touched by the Inner Sense. This is what distinguishes a Macbeth from an average murderer, a Hamlet from a Laertes. The emotional state should not generate action. One has to act out of sheer intuitive perception or at least cool and considered judgement. The emotional state can be legitimately experienced as emotion. The next step there is to raise the emotion to a loftier plane by purging it of its grosser elements. It has to be sublimated,—if, by sublimation, we mean the elevation of the emotion to the plane of *satwa*,—of purity and light. The emotion has to be generalised by taking away its raw, individual edge and by endowing it with depth and width. The poet impersonalises it. He experiences it as *vishwamanava*,—as representative man and not as an individual. This is the spontaneous effort that holds in check the workings of passion. It transforms passion into pure emotion,—into contemplative or aesthetic emotion, if you like the phrase, by this 'salutary antagonism'. This state of consciousness glows with a great intensity because it contains passion within it.

Because the passion is being purified every moment, it gains more and more in contemplative beauty without losing its emotional glow.

Coleridge says that this balance of the two elements is formed into metre artificially by a voluntary act, i.e. by an act of 'present volition' or the will and judgement. Instead of resulting in some raw physical or activistic expression, the emotion is elevated to a state where it can culminate in vision. The supervening act of the will and judgement organises this state of consciousness (called vision) into metre,—into artistic expression. The spontaneous effort which holds in check the workings of passion has denied to passion or emotion its direct expression in terms of physical action. By now giving expression to it as metre and thus affording relief or satisfaction to the energy generated in the poet by his passion, the will blends 'delight' with 'emotion',—the original emotion or passion of the artist. The reader, on his part, is now face to face with metre, with a poem which is a blend of this delight and emotion. Metre thus represents, not merely a partnership, but a union or an interpenetration of four factors: the original passion or emotion; the spontaneous effort of the poet which holds the workings of passion in check; and the will (or 'voluntary purpose') and judgement (or Good Sense) which canalise the radiant and molten substance, which is the 'balance' of will and passion, into metre.

From this organisation of the 'balanced antagonists' into metre, Coleridge thinks that "two results are bound to follow. Since metre owes its existence to a state of increased excitement in the poet's mind, metre will be accompanied by the natural language of excitement. This does not, of course, mean that poetry will always be hysterical like Shelley's "I die, I faint, I tremble, I expire!" in *Epipsychidion*. It can be as matter-of-fact as Hardy's

Yonder a maid and her wight
Come whispering by

or

When the tea is brought at five o'clock,
And all the neat curtains are drawn with care
(from Harold Monro's *Milk for the Cat*)

But the point is that the emotional colouring will be percepti-

ble in the poem as it proceeds, as in Hardy's

War's annals will cloud into night
 Ere their story die
 or in *Monro's* :
 A long dim ecstasy holds her life;
 Her world is an infinite, shapeless white.

If not so directly felt, the emotion will run like an under-current through the poem, animating it at every step.

Secondly, Coleridge thinks that the traces of 'present volition' should be proportionately discernible throughout the metrical language. It will not obviously be possible to trace the presence of 'present volition' in metrical language as it is to trace emotional colouring. The two results or conditions of this organisation, as Coleridge says, are "reconciled and co-present" in metrical language. Even in the lines quoted to illustrate the presence of increased excitement in metrical language, "A long, dim ecstasy holds her life, Her world is an infinite, shapeless white" etc., the Will and Good Sense are present, as it were, in the background, ordering the meaning, or the intellectual equivalence or substance of that excitement into a coherent design. The point to remember is that the 'supervening act' is not merely one of 'present volition' or will. It also involves the exercise of 'judgement' or Good Sense. One may say that, whereas the Will canalises the purified passion into metre, Good Sense uses the material afforded by the Understanding for presenting in an orderly design the intellectual significance of the passion or excitement,—the orderly succession of imagery which makes for coherence, so that the energy generated in the poet by his passion and held in check by his voluntary effort, gives him the maximum satisfaction when it is organised into metre. In other words, there is a frequency of forms and figures of speech, of a more picturesque and vivifying language in the language of metre, because metre is born of a state of increased excitement. At the same time, these forms and figures of speech have to spell out, step by step, the semantic substance of that emotional state. The Will makes the purified Passion flow into metre in its entirety,—including its meaning or semantic substance. These forms and figures of speech are, originally, the offspring of passion,—the natural language of excitement. But they have also gradually to

unfold the 'meaning' or substance of that passion; for they are the 'adopted children of power': the power of the poet's will has adopted them and uses them, not merely as the language of excitement, but for the purpose of unfolding the significance of the poet's vision. These forms and figures of speech have thus a dual significance in the language of metre. They indicate the emotional intensity of the poet's state of consciousness and they also express the significance of his vision. They thus reveal, not merely a partnership, but a 'union, an interpenetration' of his Passion and his Will, Good Sense and Understanding.

If this is what Coleridge meant by his statement on metre, another question would naturally arise. What, exactly, is the voluntary effort of the poet which holds in check the workings of his passion? This effort also has to be described as an act of the poet's Will and Good Sense. We have already described this as an effort of nascent Will and nascent Good Sense. The poet denies to his passion its easy physical expression because he feels that it is a sign of lack of culture to allow his passion to attain its crude fulfilment. His perception, trained by his reason, revolts against it. He would rather hold it in check and elevate it to the plane of light and purity. This moment of balance is a moment of salutary glow,—the poet's consciousness boils at white heat and is incandescent with this 'salutary' antagonism. This purified passion awakens the poet's intuitive insight which vouchsafes him a vision of Reality. The result of such a vision is peace or delight. The poet then exercises his will and judgement for *the second time* and organises his purified passion into metre. His Will and Good Sense act deliberately and translate the vision into a work of art.

What does Coleridge mean by the phrase, 'the foreseen purpose of pleasure'? Whose pleasure is it and by whom is it foreseen? I have hinted that Coleridge skipped over the poet's own pleasure or delight in his anxiety to speak of the reader's pleasure in the context in which he was writing this chapter of his *Biographia Literaria* (Ch. XVIII),—his eagerness to contradict Wordsworth's claim that there is no essential difference between the language of prose and of metrical composition. In fact, Coleridge even goes on to suggest that,

regarding the language of metre, "there is a previous and well understood, though tacit, compact between the poet and his reader, that the latter is entitled to expect, and the former bound to supply this species and degree of pleasurable excitement" (ibid. p. 50). The use of this kind of language—the language of salesmanship—is more an Augustan than a Romantic trait. Coleridge was a subtle-souled psychologist and the exponent of a theory of imagination which is one of the subtlest in the field of aesthetics. It is hardly possible that he should use this language while theorising about the origin and nature of poetry or metre. It is the immediate context of controversy that makes him stress the reader's point of view and refer to the language of poetry in this way.

If we still assert that Coleridge has only the reader's pleasure in mind while speaking of the 'foreseen purpose of pleasure', we shall have to find an explanation for the phrase 'blending delight with emotion' in the statement "as these elements are formed into metre artificially, by a voluntary act, with the design and for the purpose of blending delight with emotion..." (ibid. p. 50). For blending whose delight with whose emotion are these elements (which elements) formed into metre? Obviously, the 'emotion' that is spoken of is the poet's emotion,—his passion or spontaneous impulse. Is metre formed to blend the emotion of the poet with the delight of the reader? The reader of a metrical composition may be moved to delight by the expression of the poet's emotion in metre.

Whatever Coleridge may have to say about the 'pleasure' of the reader, it should be clear that 'delight' is a subtler word and that it refers to the experience of the poet himself. The emotion is, of course, the original emotion or passion. "The sense of musical delight", said Coleridge, "with the power of producing it, is a gift of imagination." It is this "delight" that is blended with the original emotion when the 'balance' is organised into metre. The two legitimate conditions which the critic is entitled to expect in every metrical work—the accompaniment of metre by the natural language of excitement and the discernibility of the traces of present volition proportionately throughout the metrical language—must be co-present in a close union in metre. This union

manifests itself in a frequent employment of picturesque and vivifying language. This frequency of forms and figures of speech is greater than would be desired or endured where the emotion concerned is an ordinary emotion. But the emotion of the poet is 'tempered and mastered by the will',—it has gone through a special process of elevation and purification. It is encouraged and kept up 'voluntarily'—i.e. by an act of the poet's will—for communicating to the reader that pleasure which, says Coleridge, this kind of special emotion is found capable of communicating. Not only does the union, in metre, of the two conditions mentioned above, dictate a more frequent employment of picturesque and vivifying language; it even produces picturesque language of its own accord.

This union which, according to Coleridge, accounts for the birth of metre, is also responsible for the creation of poetry as a whole. It is the nexus of the aesthetic process and the birth of metre is only one aspect of the process. The very language which Coleridge uses in both these contexts shows that the two processes are identical.

Dr. I.A. Richards thinks that Coleridge "wavers between the two conceptions; sometimes taking metre as a sensory pattern of the signs, sometimes making it the very motion of the meaning. And this is part of the explanation of the oddly disjointed conditions of his argument." (COI : p. iii.) Dr. Richards also comments on Coleridge's definition of a poem : "A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having this object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the *whole*, as is compatible with the distinct gratification from each component part." (p. 10 vol. II. B.L.) Dr. Richards shows how Coleridge himself was not satisfied with the use of the word 'pleasure' in this context. Coleridge refers to this 'pleasure' in another context as "the peace that passeth understanding" (COI : p. 113). This pleasure was not an experience which was opposed to *truth* but one which transcended both, which was the result of bringing "the whole soul of man into activity". He also points out how the phrase 'a distinct gratification from each component part' could only mean a fuller and more entire response to the words in

poetry than in any other reading.

The 'disjointed conditions' of Coleridge's argument arise from the fact that, in trying to refute Wordsworth's strictures on metre, he is writing on the subject *from the outside*; whereas when he accounts for the poetic process in his own right, he writes about it from the inside, giving us a glimpse of what happens in the poet's consciousness when he composes poetry. Coleridge remarks that metre is not merely a super-added charm. If metre is superadded, all other parts of the writing must be made consonant with it : "As far as metre acts in and for itself, it tends to increase the vivacity and susceptibility both of the general feelings and of the attention. This effect it produces by the continued excitement of surprise, and by the quick reciprocations of curiosity still gratified and still re-excited, which are too slight indeed to be at any moment objects of distinct consciousness, yet become considerable in their aggregate influence. As a medicated atmosphere, or as wine during animated conversation they act powerfully, though themselves unnoticed. Where, therefore, correspondent food and appropriate matter are not provided for the attention and feeling thus roused there must needs be a disappointment felt; like that of leaping in the dark from the last step of a staircase, when we had prepared our muscles for a leap of three or four." (B.L. Vol. II p. 51.)

This is an excellent analysis of the effects of metre from the reader's point of view. If there is no correspondent language of excitement, the reader, who is roused by metre in this way, is bound to experience a sense of disappointment. In fact, Coleridge is looking at poetry as an article of food. Metre is one of the ingredients that give it its flavour. But it must be combined in the right proportions with such other elements as language and subject-matter if it is to preserve its relishability. Poetry is even compared to a dinner implicitly, when he speaks of metre as wine during animated conversation calling for the provision of correspondent food and appropriate matter. Later, he compares poetry to wine and speaks of metre as one of its ingredients : "for any poetic purposes, metre resembles (if the aptness of the simile may excuse its meanness) yeast, worthless or disagreeable by itself, but giving vivacity and spirit to the liquor with which

it is proportionately combined." (Ibid. p. 52.)

When we think of poetry as a finished product, the natural thing to do is to compare it to food. Indian aesthetics, with its theory of the nine *rasas*, flavours or attitudes, is itself an elaboration parallel to that of the six *rasas* or flavours of food,—sweet, salt, pungent, bitter, sour and astringent. The Aristotelian theory of *catharsis* has similar implications, whether the intended meaning is a 'banquet' or a 'purge'. Coleridge speaks of the meanness of his simile when he compares metre to yeast. But he erred, if at all, in good company,—with Bharata and Aristotle.

The point to notice is that, even when he looks at poetry from the outside, he is concerned with the need for a proportional combination of metre with other elements of poetry. Even when he speaks of metre as a superadded charm, he insists that this superaddition should result in a consequent change in the presentation and arrangement of the other elements of poetry: "Metre, therefore, having been connected with poetry most often and by a peculiar fitness, whatever else is combined with metre must, though it be not itself essentially poetic, have nevertheless some property in common with poetry, as an *intermedium* of affinity, a sort (if I may dare borrow a well-known phrase from technical chemistry) of *mordant* between it and the superadded metre." (Ibid. p. 55.)

Coleridge then goes on to state: "I adduce the high spiritual instinct of the human being impelling us to seek unity by harmonious adjustment, and thus establishing the principle that *all* the parts of an organized whole must be assimilated to the more *important* and *essential* parts." (Ibid. p. 56.)

Thus even an external view of poetry shows that metre is no mere extrinsic ornament. But Coleridge, as he proceeds with the discussion, makes a smooth and natural transition to the intrinsic view of poetry. He shows that there is a great and fundamental difference between charms that are merely superadded and those that inhere in the very act of poetic composition: "Even as truth is its own light and evidence, discovering at once itself and falsehood, so is it the prerogative of poetic genius to distinguish by parental instinct its proper offspring from the changelings, which the gnomes of vanity or the fairies of fashion may have laid in its cradle or called by its names

... the rules of the Imagination are themselves the very powers of growth and production. The words to which they are reducible, present only the outlines and external appearance of the fruit. A deceptive counterfeit of the superficial form and colours may be elaborated; but the marble peach feels cold and heavy and *children* only put it to their mouths." (Ibid. pp. 64-65.)

Coleridge made his point more explicitly in the 15th chapter of his *Biographia Literaria*, while discussing the symptoms of poetic power in Shakespeare's early works: "The sense of musical delight, with the power of producing it, is a gift of imagination; and this together with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect, and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling, may be cultivated and improved, but can never be learned." (Ibid. p. 14.)

We are thus led to an intrinsic view of the origin and function of metre and its relation to the faculties of the poet which are responsible for the act of poetic composition. There are some loose ends in Coleridge's arguments about metre. One of them is the indefensible distinction between 'Pleasure' and 'truth' that Dr. Richards points out and which Coleridge himself was not satisfied with. But the extrinsic view that Coleridge took of metre was necessitated by the occasion of the argument,—his examination of Wordsworth's view that metre is a superadded charm. Even here he showed how there is bound to exist a unity by harmonious adjustment. And he finally merged this extrinsic view in the intrinsic by referring to the unity that the Inner Sense imposes on the material. The 'sense of musical delight' is said to be a gift of imagination. Actually, metre is born of the interpenetration of passion and will. They culminate in an act of the realizing intuition. When Imagination is put in action by the Will and Good Sense, it is active in transforming the fusions achieved by the Inner Sense and other faculties into reconcilements of opposite or discordant qualities. The Inner Sense reduces multitude to unity. It is also responsible for what Coleridge calls the modification of "a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling", for it diffuses the tone and spirit of unity. The 'sense of musical delight' is traceable to the union of Passion and Will at the point at which they culminate in the awakening of the Inner

Sense. Their union brings about "the balance of a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order" and the blending of the "natural and the artificial". When Passion becomes Rapture, being checked by the Will, sublimated by Reason and illumined by the Inner Sense, Rapture breaks into song. It lights upon the tune or rhythm that will manifest it in its subtle body of sound, just as it lights upon the picturesque or figurative language that will express the substance of the vision. Coleridge attributes this manifestation of rapture in rhythm to the Imagination only in the general sense in which all reconcilements are attributed to it, in its role as the supervisory and shaping power. Within the complex aesthesis itself, it is traceable to Rapture.

THE ESEMPLASTIC ROLE OF TASTE IN
COLERIDGE'S THEORY OF CRITICISM

Coleridge remarks, in a certain context that a poet has to regulate his own style "by such a knowledge of the facts, material and spiritual, that most appertain to his art, as, if it has been governed and applied by *good-sense*, and rendered instinctive by habit, becomes the representative and reward of our past conscious reasonings, insights and conclusions and acquires the name of TASTE" (p. 126. COI). This passage gives us a valuable clue to Coleridge's theory of criticism. Coleridge remarks elsewhere that Taste is the faculty by which we apprehend Beauty. Taste is the intermediate faculty which connects the active with the passive powers of our nature, the intellect with the senses; and its appointed function is to elevate the *images* of the latter, while it realizes the *ideas* of the former (p. 227, Vol. II, B.L.). Just as imagination is placed as the 'esemplastic' or shaping, modifying and integrating power by the Inner Sense under the control of will, good sense and understanding in the creative process, we can suppose that Coleridge thinks of Taste as the chief agent in the critical process, functioning under the control of will, imagination and good sense. Taste is regarded here as an intermediate faculty like imagination. Rapture, Reason and the Imitative Power, which have also

been awakened in the critic by his perusal of a work of art, are, like the other three faculties, responsible for effecting specific 'reconcilements' in the critical process. But the Inner Sense places Taste here at the centre and makes it 'esemplastic' and endows it with the 'synthetic and magical power' with which it endowed Imagination in the creative process. The supervisory role of Understanding enables the poet's imagination to find a fitting prose meaning for his vision. A similar role, exercised by Imagination, enables the critic's Taste to penetrate through the prose meaning to the vision, through the concrete to the general, through the image to the idea and through the individual to the representative.

Taste, in its esemplastic role, has the same synthetic and magical power as imagination has. In the first place, it contains implicitly within itself such knowledge of the material and spiritual facts, as appertain to the poet's art. This is how the critic's Taste has been enriched by his understanding. Secondly, Taste has been enriched by the critic's past conscious reasonings,—the exercise of the critic's judgement has helped to form his Taste. Thirdly, the critic's 'insights' have also helped to form it,—his intuitive perceptions which came to him when he meditated deeply over the significance of a work of art or responded to that significance with a deep emotion. In other words, the critic's Reason and Rapture led him to these insights. Shaped by these insights, his judgement has been raised to the level of Good Sense. Thus Taste is to the critic what Imagination is to the poet. Its power is 'magical' because it is touched by the Inner Sense. It is 'synthetic' because all the other higher faculties have contributed to its structure and rendered it complex. They either control it or co-operate with it in its 'esemplastic' role. It can function at the nascent level because, as Coleridge says, it has been rendered "instinctive by habit". It functions at the rational level only among fixities and definites; we can assume this on the basis of Coleridge's psychological scheme. It exercises its prejudices and preferences there on the basis of conscious reflective thought. It comes fully into its own on the higher subjective level.

Taste, viewed in relation to judgement and choice, reveals a

distinguishing quality. Judgement is concerned with logical and choice with practical issues. Taste is concerned with aesthetic or emotional issues. Taste works in the field of emotion as judgement works in the field of understanding. At the nascent level, it recognises what is pleasant or unpleasant, beautiful or ugly, with a dim awareness of the reasons for this experience. At the rational level, it is able to give reasons for its feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness in relation to an object, or work of art. At the higher subjective level, it passes beyond mere pleasantness or unpleasantness and is able to sense and feel the rapture that originates when the consciousness comes into contact with the Inner Sense. It experiences the pure and supreme delight of which our pleasure is an imperfect version and our sorrow a distortion. It senses and recognises *moods* and impulses at the nascent level, *attitudes* at the rational level and the degrees of *pure rapture* at the higher subjective level. As the palate recognises and distinguishes the flavours of food, taste enables the individual to recognise emotional states. This is how it functions in the individual and in the poet. Coleridge gave three different names to the detection of resemblances at three levels,—nascent imagination, fancy and primary imagination. He found two names for some of the other faculties at two of their levels,—Understanding and Reason, Choice and Will, Judgement and Good Sense and automatic and voluntary imitative power. As for emotion, he at least distinguished between 'Passion' and the 'emotion that is voluntarily kept up' during the act of composition. But he had only one name for Taste. Coleridge spoke of the sensation of volition. We may speak of 'nascent' Taste. At the third level, it can be named: 'intuitive Taste' (B.L. Vol. II, p. 239, Genial Criticism).

What is the role of Taste in the poet's consciousness when the creative process is active within him? At this stage the poet's Rapture changes into an emotion voluntarily kept up. Taste helps a poet to regulate his style,—to adjust the picturesqueness and emotional glow or the 'colours' of his language to the substance of his vision, guided by Good Sense. As Coleridge says, Taste 'elevates the images' of the senses. It does this by clothing them with appropriate picturesque expression. It 'realizes the ideas of the intellect at the same time. That is to say, for their body and form it devises the appropriate glow

and colour. Taste, fancy, the imitative power and gentle emotion are subordinated to Imagination and they help it to achieve its synthetic effect in the dynamic aesthesis.

In the critical process, however, Taste functions uniformly at the higher subjective level and assumes the *esemplastic* or 'synthetic and magical' role under the control of Will, Imagination and Good Sense.

Coleridge first distinguishes Taste from the palate by pointing out the difference between a taste *for* Milton and the taste *of* mutton, a taste *for* Virgil and the taste *of* venison. He says that this metaphorical use of the word, "borrowed from the *pregustatores* of the old Roman Banquets", is singularly happy and appropriate. "In the palate, the perception of the object and its qualities is involved in the *sensation*, in the mental taste it is involved in the *sense*. We have a *sensation* of sweetness, in a healthy palate, from honey; a *sense* of beauty in an uncorrupted taste, from the view of the rising, or setting sun." (p. 236. B.L. II.)

The 'sensation' here is different from the 'sensation' of volition or taste. The latter is the 'nascent' form of a regulative principle: "There exists in the constitution of the human soul a sense, and a regulative principle, which may indeed be stifled and latent in some, and be perverted and denaturalized in others, yet is nevertheless universal in a given state of intellectual and moral culture; which is independent of local and temporary circumstances and dependent only on the degree in which the faculties of the mind are developed; and which, consequently, it is our duty to cultivate and improve, as soon as the sense of its actual existence dawns upon us." (p. 227. B.L. II.)

But Taste is not merely intellectual perception. Coleridge distinguishes between the 'organic' senses of the eye and ear and the 'mixed' senses of palate, touch and smell. The eye and ear present objects as distinct from the perception. The three remaining senses appear in part passive, and combine with the perception of the outward object a distinct sense of our own life.

Taste and smell are further distinguished from vision and sound on the one hand and from the sense of touch on the other by the fact that they add "to this reference to our vital being some degree of enjoyment, or—the contrary—some per-

ceptible impulse from pleasure or pain to complacency or dislike" (p. 248. B.L. II). In the metaphorical use of the word 'taste' therefore, we must learn to expect both this reference and this 'enjoyment'. Consequently, Taste means "an intellectual perception of any object blended with a distinct reference to our own sensibility of pain or pleasure, or *vice versa*, a sense of enjoyment or dislike co-instantaneously combined with, and appearing to proceed from, some intellectual perception of the object." (Ibid. p. 248) The chief purpose of the Fine Arts is to gratify the Taste,—“that is, not merely to connect, but to combine and unite, a sense of immediate pleasure in ourselves with the perception of external arrangement” (Ibid. p. 248.)

The question whether Taste has any fixed principle or ideal can now be answered. There is the liability to error with regard to our feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness. “No person of common reflection demands even in feeling, that what tastes pleasant to him ought to produce the same effect on all living beings; but every man does and must expect and demand the universal acquiescence of all intelligent beings in every conviction of his understanding.” (Ibid. p. 249.)

Coleridge also stresses the disinterestedness of Taste. This disinterestedness is, as a matter of fact, at the root of all aesthetic activity.

Curiously enough, Wordsworth was not prepared to follow Coleridge in all his psychological speculations and he tended to regard Taste mainly as instinctive.

He was prepared to recognise it at the rational level grudgingly. But he thought that Taste had nothing to do with the higher subjective level. He wrote in the Essay Supplementary to the Preface (1815): “Proportion and congruity are subjects upon which Taste may be trusted; it is competent to this office; for in its intercourse with these the mind is passive and is affected painfully or pleasurably as by an instinct. But the profound and exquisite in feeling, the lofty and universal in thought, and imagination; or, in ordinary language, the pathetic and sublime: are neither of them, accurately speaking, objects of a faculty which could never, without a sinking in the spirit of Nations, have been designated by the metaphor—*Taste*. And why? Because without the exertion of a co-opera-

tive power in the mind of the Reader, there can be no adequate sympathy with either of these emotions; without this auxiliary impulse elevated or profound passion cannot exist." (p. 315. B.L. II.)

But Wordsworth did not obviously care to remember that Coleridge's scheme is too comprehensive to be dismissed in this way. It provides for this "Co-operative power in the mind" or "this auxiliary impulse". Taste plays an 'esemplastic' role in the critical process since all the other faculties are also involved in it. Moreover, Taste, like all the other faculties on the higher subjective level, is transfigured by the Inner Sense. It can thus be raised to the status of 'Intuitive Taste'.

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