STUDIES IN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

SARVCHETAN KATOCH

SHSS

Editor
SARVCHETAN KATOCH

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

This issue of the *SHSS* has contributions from six scholars from various fields in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. I would like to thank all of them for their contributions and for their patient revisions in the light of the reviewer's comments.

I am grateful to all the reviewers for their reviews. We acknowledge the fact that their consent to review these submissions is a clear manifestation of their commitment towards academia.

SARVCHETAN KATOCH

'ALL LITERATURE AS VULGAR': AMBEDKARITE POETICS OF THE PEOPLE*[1]

Claire Joubert

The reflection presented here stems from a concern in two intersecting questions. One is the recognised necessity to rethink the concept of 'the people'. Freighted as it is, from its origination in European political philosophy, with the built-in contradictory fact of colonialism in the framing of the modern nation-state form, the concept is now made shaky in the transnational, possibly 'post-national' push of postcolonial globalisation. What is the outlook for democracy as the forms of the political recompose, on a global scale? The other question is the history of knowledge which has led to the situation of division and often conflict between conceptualisations of the people, of peoples, and of the political dynamics that run through cultural difference: a still active split between social sciences and the humanities. Their common genealogy in Europe's colonial rationalism has been established, and the special function of the Indian sub-continent as laboratory for their articulation amply documented. The issue of caste, a cultural singularity and a theoretical problem for political philosophies based on liberal citizenship as well as on class-division, is notorious as motivation of European Indian sociology (and its genealogy in colonial demographic classification). It is also critical, *in absentia*, as blind spot in the brahminical bias of textual Indology from its inception. What does the question of caste problematise in the divisions of knowledge concerning human societies, and their implications for democracy?

In studying Ambedkar's work and its continuities in contemporary dalit debates on literature, I explore what can be illuminated in these issues by a poetics of the people. The link between poetics and politics has a long tradition of preoccupying, as well as questioning, literary study. Concerning South Asia, it has mostly taken the form of a critique of the textualist culturalism of Indology, and the emergence of a political sociology of India has been decisive in fashioning the necessary tools to capture the positivities of India's

political present and past. But the analytical power of poetics is not reducible to the theory of *mimesis*—supposedly Aristotelian despite much retouching since, and organised on the Platonic disjunction of form and reality—, which is indeed one of its traditional ideologies and which sustains the disciplinary separation of (social) experience and (humanist) discursivity. Rather, as the study of the historicity of meaning constitutive of the process of socialisation, it offers potentials for strong rehistoricisations of 'the people'. It trains attention to the critical people-effects that are forming and transforming, rearticulating and irrupting, within, below, or outside of the categories of social science and liberal philosophy, constantly shaping 'a missing people' (Deleuze, 1985) from the texture of the presumed peoples—whether ethnic, cultural, communal, democratic, national... The condition for this rests on an equally strong historicisation of 'literature' as category.

Ambedkar

B.R. Ambedkar, as political leader, constitutional lawyer and social scientist himself, is typically discussed in the idiom of political scientists in the context of the history of Independence, and of social scientists for the discussion of caste politics. His denunciation of Brahminism makes him a natural ally for methodologies concerned with maximising the distance from the formalism of text. Yet for a poetics of the people, we can take a starting point in the radicality of his enunciative stance as he engages his critique of the casteist order in an unrelenting textual polemics with the *Dharmashastras*—here in *Who Were the Shudras* (1946): 'It will be said that I have shown no respect for the sacred literature of the Hindus which every sacred literature deserves. [...] in my research I have been guided by the best tradition of the historian who treats all literature as vulgar—I am using the word in its original sense of belonging to the people' (Rodrigues, 2002: 392). In this philological perspective, the history and the present of literature is placed within the history of an *ethnos*. The philological discussion of this literature also opens up the strategic field of the politics of enunciation, which makes possible an analysis of the *demos* in the linguistic products and practices that build up as culture.

   This cultural, anthropological take on texts has a specific history in India, in the double-edged genealogy in the Orientalist project. 'Culturalising' India has also meant undifferentiating the diverse groups of enunciators, and providing arguments for those who saw

the advantages in the depoliticisation of the colonial relation. But it is also interesting to consider this anthropological perspective in its own formative moment within the genesis of Indology—for instance in the words of Eugène Burnouf inaugurating the discourse of Sanskrit Studies in Paris with a lecture 'On Sanskrit Language and Literature' (1833). In 1863 Burnouf would give his classic *Essay on the Veda* (1863) the subtitle 'Studies in the religions, the literature and the social constitution of India... A work which might serve as an introduction to the study of Western literatures', at a time when these had not yet formed as objects of scholarship. Equally significant is the historical simultaneity with an opposite movement shaping the Romantic notion of 'literature' which was rapidly superseding the earlier inclusive category of 'letters'. We know how in this new cartography of text and society, the artistic autonomy of literature was nevertheless welded with the equally new national, if not nationalist, frame of reference. The 'literarisation' of Orientalist canons and textual practices would follow, amplifying the civilizational logic (for instance in widening the gap between Great and Little traditions) against the historical and (self)historicising perspective.

But the question of the people which Ambedkar recaptures by equalising the field of letters, well beyond the folklorist reclaiming of popular and vernacular forms, to engage in a textual sociology that has the power of a radical social critique, constitutes a direct interpellation of 'literature' and of what Europe-inspired literary thinking makes of the political, both in the course of its formative history and in its practices in the present.

Ambedkar, born in the Mahar community in the Bombay Presidency and educated into the Westernised intellectual elite, is a complex figure: ambivalent in the perspective of national history for his part in the shifting alliances and divisions of the decolonising process, and profoundly controversial. His posterity is marked with seesawing ups and down: centrality (as reference for emergent dalit politics with the 1972 formation of the Dalit Panthers, and again as instrument for the appeal to popular masses in the nationalist politics which has developed in recent decades, with the mainstreaming operation of his 1991 centenary celebration), and marginalisation (in the long intervening episodes of historical silencing). The multiple valences of Ambedkar, past and present, have to do with the penetrating character of his speech acts in democracy (Joubert, 2015), which dissected and disrupted the social contracts of Brahminical—but also reformist and nationalist—ideological agendas for India as independent polity. A poetics of the people

is at work in the political creativity in his war of discourses, and in the textual terrain of engagement he established for the democratic struggle.

Ambedkar's logomachy, conducted in the tight-knit, highly-charged discursive texture of public and political debates in the decades leading up to Independence, illuminates the discursive process through which democracy is produced. His action as maker of the untouchable political subject *and* key enunciator—in his role as chair of the Constitution Drafting Committee—of Indian constitutional democracy is materialised in this invention of successive rupture points in the hegemonic assemblages of enunciation, in the context of the acceleration of social transitions in de-colonial India. From his first intervention, in the 1916 ethnographic study on 'Caste in India', he opened up the terrain for engagement at the heart of the Indian discursive order, from which he would successively carve out a series of discursive positions for political critique, or discursive modes of political-democratic struggle, which are also political performatives. Each performs an alternative people, and constitutes a political emergence of the untouchable democratic subject: precarious, produced in the inchoative temporality of strategy, situational and shifting, but also decisive in the construction of the Union's socio-political scene as it is constituted today. We know how this dimension of counter-hegemonic interpellation in his work, the political imagination and analytic penetration of it, has been crucial to the constitution of the untouchables as political force, which would be expressed later in the new self-designation as 'Dalits'.

In a previous work, I have studied three of the most notable forms of Ambekdar's speech-acts in democracy as conducted in his essays and speeches (Joubert, 2015): annihilation (of caste)[2], representation (of the people), and conversion (and the posterity of liberation). Indeed Ambedkar's scalpel-sharp analysis of the social articulations of domination, and the vigorous political imagination in his proposed re-assemblages of collective enunciation, which dis-articulate instituted language games and redistribute socio-political relations, are worth studying in themselves. My suggestion is that Ambedkar's textual intervention is also a theory of the fine historicity of the *demos* that courses through enunciation, working by radical re-historicisations of the discursive compacts that hold together a political order and the different political subject positions that it allows. Ambedkar's 'vulgar-isation' of literature for the work of democracy is first and foremost the act 'of the historian', and a trenchant political philosophy of history.

In the space of this study I concentrate, concerning the poetics of Ambedkar's own essays, on the specificity of his praxis of re-historicisation. As he works to establish an untouchable speech position, his major point of engagement is with the power of social articulation in Brahminical letters. It is in his re-readings of the *Vedas* and *Shastras*, *Brahmanas* and *Upanishads*, as well as the *Gita* and the echoes of the Smriti in Sanskrit drama, that he undertakes a systematic de-coupling of the yoking between ritual content and the social hierarchy of caste, in the speech act of consecration. His rigorous, acid and at times jubilant polemic energy too is well-known and has been feared across several generations. It has also given rise to a popular culture of celebration around an exultant metaphor that plays with the possibilities afforded by his name Bhimrao to mythologise associations with Pandava Bhim, and all the possible imaginings of a smashing, breaking, crushing, to counter the socio-religious treading-down of the dalits (Poitevin, 2009). The 'annihilation of caste' takes place in the denouncing, dis-enunciating of the violent pragmatics activated in Hinduism's founding texts. It is in the most attentive philological 'respect' of the texts (Rodrigues, 2002: 392) that it is conducted, following the operations of symbolic degradation in direct confrontation with its enunciative authorities: 'straight from the horse's mouth' (Rodrigues, 2002: 405), and down to the letter: 'chapter and verse' (Rodrigues, 2002: 391).

But the polemic is the form only of a speech act, which has its overall logic in the work of historicisation. Ambedkar reads 'the sacred literature of the Hindus' to retrace the positive operations of domination that have shaped Indian history, and reconstruct a history of the *formation of* Chaturvarnya—and of a fifth varna as outcaste. Reversing the argument of antiquity of the Hindu order, celebrated by Orientalist research and appropriated by a section of Indian society to bolster the nationalist project, it makes audible what Jotirao Phule had already called the 'fabrication' of caste (Deshpande, 2002). And yet, developing Phule's mode of refutation into an altogether new dimension of shudra and ati-shudra critique and giving shape to what would become the age of the dalit political voice, it pointedly diverges from Phule's rhetorical strategy and avoids 'treat[ing] the whole literature as a collection of fables and fictions to be thrown on the dung heap not worthy of serious study' (Rodrigues, 2002: 394). Reading less for content than for force, he recaptures the historical struggles generative of domination, and identifies the logomachic strokes of Brahminism: in the anti-Buddhist 'counter-revolution' propounded in the *Gita* (Rodrigues,

2002: 193-205) for example, or in the insults and threats in the letters that he was receiving from 'the mad dogs of orthodoxy' (391). In this he redirects the antiquitising perspective to bring to view a historical process of social '*degradation*' (Rodrigues, 2002: 393) that resulted from political defeat. The titles of his published studies are explicit: it is a matter of retrieving the formative history of *Who Were the Shudras? How They Came to be the Fourth Varna in Indo-Aryan Society* (1946), the history of *The Untouchables: Who They Were and Why They Became Untouchable?* (1948), and even the contemporary history of caste in the making, in *What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables* (1945).

In his luminous study *Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability*, Christophe Jaffrelot proposes to read as an 'ethnicisation of caste'[3] the critical revolution which Ambedkar effects in the analysis of Indian society (Jaffrelot, 2005). It is certainly true that his readings reconstruct the shudras, for example, as a 'population' of the Indo-Aryan past: 'as a distinct, separate, identifiable community' (Rodrigues, 2002: 386), of identifiable kshatriya status in an original three-fold division of Aryan society, engaged in a persistent war opposing king and brahmins, and ultimately broken by the brahmins' victory[4]. In this reconstructed history, the brahmins' refusal of ritual service generated the creation of the fourth varna, excluded from twice-born status, and gradually the significance of political defeat was transmuted into social degradation, while the community itself was diluted and 'absorbed' : 'The word Shudra lost its original meaning of being the name of a particular community and became a general name for a low-class people without civilization, without culture, without respect and without position' (Rodrigues, 2002: 397). Out of the ideology of the people imprinted in the casteist order, and consecrated by the organic myth of *Purusha Sukta* (Rodrigues, 2002: 390), Ambedkar's reversed archeology indeed carves out a space for an *ethnos*: a history of peoples and of conflict, which contradicts the temporality of Sanatanism (Rodrigues, 2002: 170) and karma. Jaffrelot describes the strategies of 'militant autochtony' which can be—have indeed been—formed from the notion of an original anthropological identity, and the empowerment that results from this 'inventing of a golden age' (Jaffrelot, 2005: 38) for the lower castes.

The political myth for the untouchables which Ambedkar builds from his remobilising of history constitutes a less ambiguous attempt to bring out the generative acts of exclusion—in this case the persecution suffered for the communities' Buddhist secession from

the Hindu order—, both in terms of historical method and political vision. Ambedkar here does more than claim anthropological dignity and historical pride. Opening a past 'when Untouchables were not Untouchable but were only Broken Men' (Rodrigues, 2002: 400), he offers a double hypothesis: the notion of a Buddhist origin of untouchables, and an interpretation of untouchability as brahminical construction of the Buddhist meat diet into a taboo, at the time of the 'counter-revolution'[5] unleashed at the ending of the Buddhist polity, when this group 'did not care to return to Brahminism when it became triumphant over Buddhism as easily as others did' (Rodrigues, 2002: 402). Reintroducing the historical knowledge of a *reciprocity* of impurity between brahmins and untouchables, and of untouchable communities' active refusal of brahmin ritual ministry, Ambedkar anticipates the 'great surprise' (Rodrigues, 2002: 399) which is as—or more—likely as the hypothesis concerning the shudras 'bound to act as atomic bombs on the dogmas of the Arya Samajists' (Rodrigues, 2002: 390).

This reactivating of history has had a remarkable power of political fabulation in the history of the 20th century, reworking the ethnic argument already developed by Phule and Iyotee Thassar in the last quarter of the 19th century. Ambedkar's injection of vast and multidimensional scholarship, both encyclopaedically historical and historically cutting-edge, into this broad project is a key part of his contribution. But the characteristic break—and what I understand as a major conceptual-political *essay*, or *poem*, of the people—consists in reshaping the already circulating concept of 'Broken Men', or 'dalit' in the original Marathi[6], into the pioneering political concept which the last forty years of Indian history have materialised and vindicated. In Ambedkar's enunciation, the phrase 'Broken Men' is made to operate as political identification: it is taken from the already strategic discursive terrain of *ethnos* to the plane of the *demos*, and calls into emergence the untouchable people as political subject. In so doing it also identifies the historical and present actors of the 'breaking' up of a community, and the ideological speech acts archived in the Hindu *Shastras* and *Veda Vyas Smriti*, as the performatives of degradation. The remarkable political invention encapsulated in Ambedkar's concept constructs social humiliation (the experience of the broken *man*, as effect of oppression) into a collective becoming, and a political history, of a dislocated *people*[7]. It displaces the affective, inter-individual plane—as well as Mahar particularism in this instance—to shape an interpellation addressed to, hence constitutive of, a political subject which is potentially trans-

communitarian and trans-regional. Where 'dalit' can come to signify what it does in the 1973 Dalit Panthers' manifesto.[8] A similar insight into the fragmented people will be developed in Partha Chatterjee's *The Nation and its Fragments* (Chatterjee, 1993), although this key Subalternist study has been criticised for proposing no specific treatment of Dalit exclusion. But certainly, Ambedkar's 'Broken People' and Gramsci's thought on the fragment—theorising the subaltern as resulting from the dislocation of previously established communities, surviving within a hegemonic order as dis-organic fragments of classes and peoples, 'falsified and mutilated' and deprived of historical initiative—are mutually illuminating concepts[9]. Both are attempts to rethink, beyond Marxist economism and beyond the liberal 'political school' (Rodrigues, 2002: 121), the interconnections of class with culture, and *ethnos* with *demos.*

This is also why a reference in Ambedkar's thinking can help retain the critical edge in the Gramscian concept of the subaltern, against its partial erosion in Subaltern Studies work over the decades since their launch in 1982, when it has inclined towards a culturalist, possibly essentialising celebration. In recovering a political past for the shudra and untouchable peoples, Ambedkar's historicisation generates a political future, for struggle and social change through democracy. Similarly, his apprehension of the caste system through the concept of 'graded inequality' (Rodrigues, 2002: 385) constitutes a political anatomy of domination, beyond the social analysis already articulated by anti-brahmin voices and the various religious and social reformist movements and active from the late 19th century on. 'Graded inequality' explains how the 'division of labour' is compounded in caste with '*a division of labourers*' (Rodrigues, 2002: 263, italics in the original) in a relayed, hierarchic system of oppression which generates a deep 'anti-social' logic, making 'public opinion impossible' and constituting a structural invalidation of the principle of 'Fraternity'. In this obstacle to the *demos*, and its mobile configurations of political solidarities or class alliances, Ambedkar also identifies the point of hegemonic articulation which needs to be broken for any possible political evolution towards democracy. The 'annihilation of caste' will be a demolishing, a fracturing 'back': a breaking of the solidarities which hold the brahmin order in place, even when it also means breaking the solidarity of the Independence movement, in the demand for separate electorates in 1932 to take one landmark example, or in the dissidence from the Quit India movement of 1942.

Ambedkar's poetics of the people develops in the intense political

creativity with which, many times over in the four decades of his political leadership, he re-fashioned the possibilities of the *demos* as strategic conditions, hegemonic coalitions and critical opportunities shifted and realigned in the turbulent evolution of decolonisation. In each of these counter-calls to the iterative interpellation of caste, he imagined the *password* of a people in the making, as he diagnosed and activated the possible fissures in casteism's *order-words* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980). A comprehensive review of the organisational forms he successively gave to his work in calling into political being a possible democratic subject and political constituency would show the power of this sustained re-invention, consolidating successive common causes and discursive footholds, and aggregating constituencies across caste stratifications and across systems of social divisions: from the separate electorate demanded for 'Depressed Classes'/Untouchables at the Round Table Conference for colonial legislative reform of 1931, to the common condition of workers with the creation of the Independent Labour Party (1936), the solidarity of caste inferiority (with the Scheduled Caste Federation in 1942), and again with the mass conversion to Buddhism as project of social egalitarianism (1956).

This praxis of the *demos* was always tentative, necessarily a gamble within the prevalent equilibriums of power, more or less successful and always precarious; and certainly always vigorously contested by the various dominant groups whose 'order-words' it attempted to de-totalise and disjoint. The sequence of Ambedkar's career as statesman—as Minister of Law and Justice in the first national government and chief enunciator of constitutional law for the Constitution of independent India—ended his hopes of inscribing the *demos* in the political terms of the innovating Indian *polis,* as his draft for a Hindu Code Bill was blocked in the Legislative Assembly and he made the decision to resign. After this failure in 1951, the new 'password' to break through the 'order-words' of caste that Ambedkar experimented with bifurcated away from the political idiom, to form a new collective assemblage across historical lines and across discursive spheres, trans-connecting with a long and multiform tradition in India of social movement and dissent in religious expression. This retreat from the constituted plane of politics is no retreat from the political work of giving shape to the constituting *demos*: it is still actively inventing modes of disaggregating the casteist hold in national politics.

In reorienting his movement towards neo-Buddhist conversion, Ambedkar was placing the enunciation of the untouchable *demos* in

confluence with the vast historical stream of an alternative discursive and literary history which ranges from Buddhism to bhakti. The speech-act of Ambedkarite conversion picks up historical echoes with hagiographic tradition and devotional forms; from the radical bhakti poet-Sants of medieval vernaculars; from the Buddhist disputations (including their language choice of popular Pali over brahmanical Sanskrit). It resonates with the historical figure of the gurus and bodhisattvas who founded sect congregations, creating communities that cut locally egalitarian, emancipatory perspectives through the dominant ideologies. The figure of Kabir, and his following in the Kabir Panth, opening a zone of passage in the cultural order at the jointly mobile point of poetry and conversion between Hindu Brahmanism and Islam in the Mughal 15th century, is an emblematic guru figure in all of Ambedkar's political thinking[10]. The 1956 conversion reconnects with a radical history which it helps in turn to reinterpret from a political angle, beyond religion and beyond poetry, in its full spectrum from local popular heterodoxies to civilizational revolution, for which the Buddhisation of the State in the 3rd century constitutes the historical model. It is important to note Ambedkar's denunciation of the social quietism generated by bhakti culture in the lower castes. His criticism of pilgrimage practices, his acid remarks on the Chokhamela cult's 'very unhealthy effect on the Depressed Classes' (Jaffrelot, 2005: 49), signal the exact point in his reactivation of the conflicting and protesting histories in the canons of Indian discourse: the appeal to traditions of discourses from below is made not in the name of the *popular*, which can always potentially be re-absorbed into the national project as folkloric Little Traditions; not in the name of *poetry* either, whose critical energy can be dispersed in aesthetics; but as radical and dissenting: a history of political resistance and revolutionary pressure, which can be reconstituted as critical capital for the political creations to come.

Ambedkar's poetics, 'treating all literature as vulgar', brings together an original assemblage of three issues: literature, people and, crucially, the critical activation of historicity. It is the specificity of this proposition which distinguishes his contribution from earlier historicist attempts, where history was indeed already reactivated to generate a usable past for 'the shudratishudras'—Phule's designation for the groups identified by caste oppression but now engaged in a process of mobilising, including under his own leadership, and building social pressure to claim popular agency and social inclusion (Deshpande, 2002: 191). The 'adi' [original natives] theme which operated as rallying term for the enunciation of an uprising social

identity in a number of social movements starting from the late 19th century—from Iyotee Thassar's Adi-Dravida interpellation in 1892 (Bergunder, 2004) to its political amplification by Periyar in the Tamil Nadu of the 1920s and 1930s, or in the Punjabi Chamars' defiant claim to Adi-Dharmi status in the early 1920s—had been a militant use of pre-Aryan history. It founded new militant untouchable identities on the historical reimagining of outcaste and lower caste communities as dignified by an antiquity superior to that of the Aryas; as primordial, indigenous claimants of the land. This strong, and historically effective political re-articulation of the structural oppression of caste must be read as a major political invention, applying anti-traditionalism to 'the fraudulent rigmarole of the caste system' (Phule, in Deshpande, 2002: 45). The vision of Phule's Satyashodhak Samaj (Society of seekers of truth, founded in 1873) directs the social demand towards a restoration of historic truth, and his *Gulamgiri* ([Slavery], 1873) opens out an ample rhetorical stage on which he conducts a relentless debunking of the 'deep cunning' of the 'Bhats' who, characteristically, 'wrote books' to enshrine their 'cruel and inhuman Laws': 'Their main object in fabricating these falsehoods was to dupe the minds of the ignorant and to rivet on them the chains of perpetual bondage and slavery which their selfishness and cunning had forged.' (Deshpande, 2002: 30) The rationalist demystification of the 'mass of specious fiction', working through the illogical and the contradictory in the speech-acts of caste, works on a truth/falsehood binary focused on a polemic correction of the past.

Ambedkar's first scholarly statement on *Castes in India* (1916), bears a subtitle which is an index of how much he inherits from Phule's historicist protest: it is indeed in the study of the 'Mechanism, Genesis and Development' of caste hierarchies that their oppression will be exposed. But Ambedkar's political imagination breaks further ground in the strategies of 'apply[ing] the dynamite' to the 'finality and fixity', the 'cramp[ing]' and 'crippl[ing]', of social immobility. Ambedkar presses historicity to a more radical capacity, by vigorously reframing origin, but also locating the political resource of historicity in the mobility, the creativity, of the *demos*: a constantly originating of the people, constantly 'missing' (Deleuze, 1985) from *instituted* forms—social order, ethnic identities, or majoritarian polities—because continuously *instituting* in the negotiation of irrupting, de-totalising minorities. His conception of the *demos* as *historicity of* the people reframes caste, beyond its redefinition as race or ethnicity, as political history: a history of wars, and of 'Revolution

and Counter-Revolution'. It reorients the fight for annihilating caste as the work of inventing political spaces for the *demos* in the past-heavy present, including making use of all possible eddies in the precipitation of history approaching Independence to 'stamp the dalit imprint on time', in Kalekuri Prasad's words[11] (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013: 621). Indeed this 'process by which congealed power is made to flow, and flow all the way down to the lowest levels, remains to be discovered', Prasad continues in a 1998 essay: however powerful the Ambedkarite proposition for the dalit democratic force, its development in a number of post-Ambedkar movements has passed through destructive crises of leadership and new internal congealings of power. It has always been a matter of the continuous reinvention of the *demos* in the evolving situation of the enunciation of power: originating a people in the immediate process of history, as 'sharp, fresh and alive' as the dalit poetry to which Prasad pays tribute (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013: 617).

It is interesting that Ambedkar refers to Bhavabhuti for a poetics of democratic becoming, declaring trust in the 'future generation' of Hindus who will, if the present generation will not, 'take notice of what I have to say', he writes: 'For I take consolation in the words of the poet Bhavabhuti who said, 'Time is infinite and earth is vast, some day there will be born a man who will appreciate what I have said'' (Rodrigues, 2002: 392). Poetry is evoked here as operation of futurity, opening a trans-enunciative process for a people in the making across the generations, and explicitly not as aesthetic concern. Amdebkar's dalit critique is scrupulously a 'historian''s treatment of all literature as vulgar, unapologetically carried out with no pretention of style, as he remarks regularly[12]. The concern here is to essay a *demos*, and transform the terms for the enunciation of the people in the idioms and the geographies of social imagination. A poetics of the vulgar, as belonging to the people, is a de-poeticisation, or de-literarisation, practiced in his own writing as well as effected in the re-politicised reading of Kabir's or Ramanuja's bhakti poetry.

I will not suggest that the radical democracy which Ambedkar projects has the quality of granular historicity which the anarchist conceptualisation of Deleuze and Guattari explores. His theorising of minority, and his involvement of literature 'as belonging to the people'—as space for the de-totalisation of political order by the people in the making—differs from the notions of literature as 'the affair of the people', of 'minor literature', and of literature as 'minoritising' force (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975). It is important to sense the distinctness of his praxis of history and the strategic

cutting-edge, in his situation of enunciation in the colonial and caste-structured Indian hegemony of the interwar years, of his statist, constitutionalist option, based on the liberal principle of the rule of law. Critical historicisations are themselves historical forms of the work of emancipation, determined by their conditions of enunciation in the diversity of hegemonic conjunctures. It is in fact in the comparative study of their historical singularities that the critical modes for the here and now can be imagined and forged. Ambedkar's choices in his strategic moment are made sufficiently clear in his contributions to the legislative debate on the shaping of the Union: *States and Minorities* (1947), and *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (1946). His radical *demos* is not based either on the 'sly civility' that Homi Bhabha has dissected in the subaltern social history of the Raj (Bhabha, 2004: 132). The irruption of caste in the political sphere of civility translates into precisely the explicit modernism which has made him suspicious for Gandhian nationalism, and into the militant deployment of the cause of progress (and education particularly). A long development in *Annihilation of Caste* is organised in the successive examination of potential or actual modes of reform (religious reform, social reform, revolution, in various combinations...), to settle in conclusion on the choice of the temporality of democracy, as inspired by Dewey (and recognised by even such a counter-revolutionary as Burke, quoted for stating that 'A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation'): democracy lies in 'the present act of living and growing', in opposition to the anti-historical, sanatan look 'upon the present as empty and upon the future as remote' (Rodrigues, 2002: 304). As much as '[a]n individual can live only in the present' (quoting Dewey here), an 'ideal society' for Ambedkar 'should be mobile, should be full of channels for conveying a change taking place in one part to other parts.' 'In an ideal society,' he continues, 'there should be many interests consciously communicated and shared. There should be varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. In other words there must be social endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another name for democracy. Democracy is not merely a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience' (Rodrigues, 2002: 276). And fundamentally, 'the idea of law is associated with the idea of change.' Such a view of democracy as social movement can have revolutionary consequences: 'I have decided to change', Ambedkar declares as he bids farewell to the 1936 Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal for social reforms, where he had been

invited to speak but where the thrust of his address, which he would publish as Annihilation of Caste, alarmed the audience. 'I am gone out of your fold' (Rodrigues, 2002: 304), he repeats, after his earlier statement that he 'would not die a Hindu', and after the resolution adopted at the Yeola conference of 1935 that the untouchables should leave the fold of Hinduism.

Ambedkar-talk

To explore further the constitutive identity between the *demos* so conceived as movement of historicity in the people and the creativity of enunciation which mobilises communities in and through language, I want to follow Ambedkar's praxis of history in his posterity in contemporary Ambedkarism. The futurity which Ambedkar opened for the dalit subject has been spectacularly 'imprinted' on the *de facto* course of Indian history. However unevenly successful his projections of untouchable politics were in the decades of his leadership, and however marginalised his own voice has been in his lifetime and beyond, it is as inventor of the untouchable voice that he has marked and reshaped Indian history. 'Ambedkar-talk' (Bama, 2005: 103) has developed into a trans-enunciative space of political subjectivation where dalit empowerment has taken and is taking place, relaying the movement of emancipation across generations, locations, and languages: 'You gave us the tongue', Namdeo Dhasal was writing in the 1970s (Zelliot, 1992: 313). It is Ambekdar's role as 'logothete', or '*créateur de langue*' (Barthes, 1971) for the Indian *demos* and 'vulgariser' of literature as question of the people, as his discourse is continued in dalit enunciation now, which will help delineate further the poetics of the people necessary for the reinvention of politics that globalisation requires of contemporary peoples, ever more critically.

The canonisations of Ambedkar, 'the Doctor and the Saint'[13], do belong to a socio-political expression of popular politics which has an identified history in India, but the poetic strand of this history also finds a decisive new instantiation in dalit expression. From the neo-Buddhist turn of Ambedkarism in 1956, dalit literature has been in close and constant association with dalit activism, starting with the immediate formation of an organised programme of Dalit Sahitya[14]. And the expression of devoted homage to Ambedkar as 'father of Dalit literature' (Dangle, 2009: xxii) has been so characteristic that it has formed into a subgenre or identificatory trope in dalit literature, across poetry, autobiography, short-story and novel forms, and across languages. Anna Bhau Sathe's poem 'Take a Hammer to Change

the World' ('so saying went Bhimrao! [...] To break the chains of class and caste/ Hold to the name of Bhim!', Dangle, 2009: 5), Baby Kamble's eulogy in her 1986 autobiography *The Prison We Broke*[15], or the popular *ovis* entreating 'Mothers and women, stop singing the songs of the old times/ Compose ballads on *Bhim*' (Poitevin, 2009: 242), may give a sufficient sense of the common expression of inheritance and militant re-enunciation across genres, generations and locations. How then is it that this close interlinking of politics and poetics has been so persistently and so bitterly debated, in successive generations of struggles and movements? How can we understand the literary praxis of dalit activists, in the variety of local and historical situations? 'If you were to live the life we live/ (then out of you would poems arise),' Arjun Kamble writes in 1973 (Zelliot, 1992: 286). What does this characteristic yoking illuminate of the discursive historicity of the *demos* and, symmetrically, of the political processes in the poetic?

Looking at the ways the poetics-politics nexus is constructed, contested and problematised in a number of interventions in recent dalit debates, it soon becomes evident how much depends on *which* literature or which conception of literature is discussed; ultimately, on *which* imagination of the people it makes possible. As it disarticulates 'literature', the practice of dalit discourse re-historicises the category of literature in its identifiable, localised cultural sequences, and doing so it re-politicises the poetic, as making-'vulgar': as people in emergence, re-mobilised from the peoples 'congealed' in the dominant poetics. It *is* possible to conceive of the infinitely diverse cultural practices of enunciation in categories that are not those of 'aesthetics', as articulated in 18th century Kantian terms for the purposes of finding a shared experiential space for the otherwise autonomous subject of pure reason. It is equally possible to account for the poetic outside the mimetic opposition of representational form and content or style and experiential emotion—or again outside the European Romantic notion of the autonomy of art, tied up with the strategies of social distinction which it makes possible and welded as it is historically with the political horizon of the nation-state, along with its colonial undertow. It is, also, possible to think of it outside of the Sanskriti values that generate untouchability. The dalit critique of 'literature', 'aesthetics', 'poetics', whether conducted in English or Bhasha, will still be a poetics, precisely if one is ready to allow 'poetics' to name the collective creativity of a people, in and through a transformative politics of literary value. There is a concern shared by dalit critics over the capture of dalit productions by the mainstream literary scene and academic discourse. Against

this literarisation of the dalit voice, a poetics of society can be developed, able to envisage the radical historicity of 'the people', in enunciations that are not 'literature' but the quality of the people in the movement of political invention. In his 'Suggestions to Dalit Writers', Kalekuri Prasad calls for authors who will 'function like the permanent opposition to seats of authority' and be 'the dissenter who offers constructive criticism of the dalit movements's political leadership' (Prasad, 2013: 621). For a poetics of democracy, 'self-respect', the political trope developed by Periyar, must also be a 'self-criticism' consistent enough to continually regenerate leadership: 'encourage everyone who can hold a pen'; and 'prepare to be led by' that everyone.

The dalit poetics of vulgarity and obscenity, which has so shocked and aimed to shock the Indian public, is a constitutive feature that has fuelled several decades of literary and social clashes. In the first generations, Daya Pawar poetically imagined himself, 'Gathering all strength' against the hands that 'raised the whip' and dismembering the body of 'the cultured world', wearing its pointed fingers like the legendary Angulimal 'in the garland around [his] neck' (Zelliot, 1992: 294-296). In 'Sanskriti', he would also picture the indecorous dalit voicing of pain:

> Generation after generation
> has arranged the plastic pastime
> of that Great Divine Culture.
> Now then they
> stuff balls of cotton in their ears.
> In huts after huts, whimpering,
> the weeping of a broken heart,
> *disturbs* their peaceful life. (Zelliot, 1992: 282, italics in the original)

Keshav Meshram was also writing at the time:

> One Day I Cursed That Mother-Fucker God:
> He just laughed shamelessly.
> My neighbour—a born-to-the-pen Brahman—was shocked.
> He looked at me with his castor-oil face and said,
> 'How can you say such things to the
> Source of the Indescribable,
> Quality-less, Formless Juggernaut?
> Shame on you for trying to catch his dharma-hood
> In a noose of words'.
> I cursed another good hot curse.
> The university buildings shuddered and sank waist-deep.
> All at once, scholars began doing research
> Into what makes people angry. (Zelliot, 1992: 300)

But the poetic overturn of *samskritika adhipatyam* [cultural hegemony] (Prasad, 2013: 611) is larger here than the shock value in a simple reversal of diction in anti-diction. Beyond the introduction in literary thematics of the brutality of slum life and the violence of degradation, beyond even the militant inscription of the uncouth, the rustic, and the obscene made taboo in brahmin poetics, it is not a representation of vulgarity which is at stake but an effectuation of the vulgar—'as belonging to the people'; as the transformative generation of the dalit political subject. 'My everything amber/sky alcohols in the glass', writes Namdeo Dhasal in 1975 (Zelliot, 1992: 307): the poetic process performed here doesn't only give offense to the politics of purification, but projects an 'alcoholing' of values as poetic-political programme. The poetic act here is a call, in the poem's own terms, to 'family-plan your vulgarity': which implies also the concerted call to vulgarise/democratise, pointedly against the State's demographic policy in the years of the Emergency. The poetic performative is a drama of the people, molding a futurity: 'From what generation to what generation/ is this journey?' asks Arun Kamble in 'Primal Bond' (Zelliot, 1992: 304). 'Turn your dust smeared face this way/ and salvage these lives,' he continues, calling to the Ahilya-like statue-girl to transfigure, in a renewed 'connection' with the 'primal bond of the universe'. The process of the poem concludes when the 'phenomenon of procreation' has circled back to its point of generation in the present: the primal bond 'is forming in you.'

Dalit writing is teeming with such processes which, in myriads of poetic ways, perform the unceasing invention of emancipation. The semantic reversals, especially those that turn 'death' and 'life' into one another, or 'burning' from evocation of dalit atrocities into the qualification of the rage and power of struggle and back again to caste terror, are omnipresent. The politics of naming is a structural feature of the socio-symbolic degradation of untouchables through the enunciation of slurs, and its reversal typically deployed in dalit pride or in dalit strategies of social upward mobility. Phule's etymological efforts are a recognisable precursor to these vigorous symmetries of 'corrupting' caste-inscribed names (Deshpande, 2002: 57-64). Naming, identifying, as subject of enunciation, is a protest in itself. In dalit poetry the work on pronouns—circulating identities across I, you, we, they, it—takes this exploration of the enunciation of subject and collectivity further again, to striking and powerful re-imaginations of the dalit people. Recounting the peak moment of the dalit literary movement in Andhra in 1993-1994, Prasad singles out the poetic and political power of such compilations of the

Nalgonda poets as *Bahuvachanam* [The Plural/Plurality] and *Meme* ['It's Us'] (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013: 616-617): poetic activations of a political 'us'. His own poem 'For a Fistful of Self-respect' (602-603) violently disowns the strategies of purification, and exhibits the forging of 'a beautiful future' in the 'raging flame' of dalit atrocities turned, by the 'upside-down' power of poetic 'pronoun-ing', into 'the people':

> Chunduru [locality of the dalit massacre of 1991] is not a noun any longer; it's a pronoun.
> Each heart is now a Chunduru, a fiery tumour.
> I'm the wound of the people, a communion of wounds. [...]
> My very existence in this nation, drunk on caste and wealth,
> is a protest.
> I am someone who dies, time and again, to remain alive.
> Don't call me a victim.
> I'm a martyr, I'm a martyr, I'm immortal. [...]
> I am the upside-down sunrise. [...]
> I'm the one forging slogans in the fire of my heart. [...]
> I will glow as a beautiful future in the pages of history.
> I will be a raging flame
> That glows in this very country, again and again. (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013:602-603)

Writing as protesting is 'again and again', in dalit poetry of successive generations, the staging of identifications in a process of empowerment reminiscent of Pawar's projection of a poetic 'I' as the bloodthirsty robber who was converted by the Buddha:

> Angulimal.
> I am Angulimal...
> I am Angulimal... (Zelliot, 1992: 296)

Again in 'I Have Become the Tide', by J.V. Pawar, an identification is forged out of a poetic reversal of identity, which is also an allegoric trans-figuration of the individual experience of social violence into a movement of the people—a tide, rising with the power of the multitude:

> As the sand soaks up the water at the shore,
> so my great sorrow.
> How long will it be like the sand?
> How long will it cry out because of it's [*sic*] obstinate wish to exist?
> As a matter of fact, it should have been in tide like the sea. [...]
> The wind that blows every day
> that day yelled in my ear

'women stripped'
'boycott in the village'
'man killed'
As it spoke, it told me a mantra: 'Make another Mahad'[16]
My hands now move toward the weapon on the wall.
I am now the sea, I soar, I surge. [...]
The winds, storms, sky, earth
Now are all mine.
In every inch of the rising struggle
I stand erect. (Zelliot, 1992: 306-307)

Prasad opens his poem 'The Road' with a similar allegorical process of conversion of identity: 'Like me, the road too is dalit./ Feeling the footprint in the heart,/ is winds into the past' (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013: 603). As the text proceeds, the first assimilation of road and 'dalit' in the common image of being trodden underfoot ('Under/ the macabre dance of rough feet'), which weaves in also the association of the road as traditionally forbidden space for untouchables, morphs into a different identification, from protest march to protest poem and back again to the space of violence perpetrated on dalits, as the reader is called upon and called onto the road. The road opens out as space of protest, witness, and direction, towards the possibilities of solidarity—a powerful poetic instantiation of the 'password':

Tell me,
have you ever heard the song
of the road lined with crucifixes?
Have you ever seen an assembly of
entangled roads marching in procession?
Have you ever joined in the protest song
when the corpse of a road, lynched,
fell right across, bringing
all traffic to halt?
Walk this road.
Once.
To my village. (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2013: 603-604)

Movement and Literature

When B.M. Puttaiah asks 'Does Dalit Literature Need Poetics?' (Puttaiah, 2013) therefore, what is at stake is a question of poetics—how one conceives of the politics of poetics, and of the formation of new political subjects—which has no formalist superficiality or middle-class high culture complacency. The context of Puttaiah's essay is

his critical disaffiliation with the basis for discussion while attending a conference on 'Kannada Literary Poetics' (n.d.). Reacting to the co-optation of 'Dalit [and Women's] Literature' within the frame of 'Kannada literature' in this setting, he identifies a dissenting and 'urgent academic requirement': 'if there's a 'Dalit Literary Poetics', it will not be a natural part of the category '*Indian* Poetics'; it can never be that. It is more accurately a dissension in 'Kannada Literary Poetics'.' His argument is that the reception of dalit literature, when it has not been a simple rejection in forms ranging from literary 'disdain [to] violence and brickbats'[17], has in fact given a spectacle of the assumptions characteristic of mainstream literary criticism and of what I would call, after Kuhn, the 'normal science' of literary studies. For those who have sung its praises—'Aha! Oho!', Puttaiah ironises—in appreciation of 'themes' and 'ideas of craftsmanship', it has been a classic matter of aestheticising commiseration ('For the rulers, the tears of the poor are after all, just rose water') and the 'normal science' of critical protocols, 'treat[ing] the words as 'a beautiful peacock that no hands can seize''[18]: police raids might indeed not be able to detach the painting on the walls of the dalit hut, but the romanticised view of literary creativity, held by 'the class that now delights in literature', and folklorism, will do nothing to question 'the traditional sense that the word 'literature' carries'. It is not only that, as 'expression of the collective pain of society', 'dalit literature carries with it the powerful, unbearable odour of burning chilli', but that dalit irruption on the literary scene questions 'existing notions of 'criticism' and 'research'': 'What is called 'dalit literature' is not simply literature that has an ideology.' '[C]lose reading', 'language and structure', 'the focus on canonical texts or accepted forms and definitions of literature is not adequate' (Puttaiah, 2013: 351-354).

'Poetics is a distant dream', in these terms. Or at least it raises the issue of knowing '[t]o whom [...] the question of dalit poetics [is] addressed'. 'Some traditional studies have made dalit literature their prey, others have made it a source [to affirm their theories', Puttaiah continues, and a dalit canon has already formed, 'a readymade list of dalit authors and works', which even within dalit communities has come to have validity in 'the eyes of dalit leaders, writers and politicians'. Literarised, dalit expression can become an attribute of the educated dalit middle-class: Puttaiah reluctantly gives the case of Devanoora himself as example (Puttaiah, 2013: 362). Here it forms indeed as 'dalit literature', characterised by its fetishising in language. Congealing in 'letters of the alphabet, it splits dalits'

experience from their existences'. This evolution has led to the division of 'two ways of looking' at dalit groups and dalit expression, for Puttaiah: 'the bottom-up model and the top-down', reflected in the opposition of two views of dalit productions. One line of this opposition for Puttaiah distinguishes between reading and speech: silent reading is the 'method ideologically projected by the State, while speech stems from the body of people', when Dalit literature 'begs to be read aloud in a full-throated voice'. This determines another opposition, between 'the way non-dalits [as well as the educated dalits] and non-academic dalits respond to dalit literature': 'for Study, for Discussion'. Literature 'popularly defined as writings of famous dalit writers' can easily be included in syllabi, and 'studied under different rubrics, like proliferating brands in a market'. If the current flavour is dalit poetics, 'the irony is that whatever the name of the brand, the content of these studies remains the same', and as 'exclusionary'. In contrast, literature conceived as voice conceives of response as co-enunciation. It is not only that such literature 'resist[s] silent reading and require[s] to be read aloud', as it keeps the close connection with 'the body of people' and the rawness of social experience: the voicing is a 'dialectic', and speech 'aims at and anticipates a listener, and demands an immediate response' (Puttaiah, 2013: 362-363).

Puttaiah's position is not exactly K.V. Narayana's caution, which he quotes: 'Either become burning coal yourself, or stand outside and watch it' (Puttaiah, 2013: 351). In Puttaiah's outlook, a process of becoming is indeed involved but precisely through the dialectic of response, where the *demos* is generated, in trans-subjectivation, in opposition to the individualist modes of social mobility or the (Romantic) notion of self-expression. 'In reality, dalit literature is not meant for such [literarising] studies. It requires overwhelmed responses that pour out like the predictions of a fellow in a trance, like Kurimayya [in the story]' (364). In *this* literature, what is alive and 'burning' is the collective futurity, which passes from voice to voice, to flame 'bottom-up' for dalit movements and democratic pressure. Literary criticism might declare Siddalingaiah's famous protest song '*Ikkrala Vadirla*' to be 'not poetry at all', on the ground that ''Bash them! Kick them!' is not legitimate in poetic diction' and constitutes a 'violat[tion] of the sanctity of Goddess Saraswati'. But the test is elsewhere: 'Despite this, that same poem inspired hundreds to write poetry'. The 'raving reviewers have expelled them from frames of poetry or literature and rendered them untouchable' in the critical order, but the democratic inspiration has multiplied.

'Is it possible to have a poetics for dalit literature?' Puttaiah's conclusion asks (Puttaiah, 2013: 367): only if 'poetics' is critiqued as strictly as Puttaiah has critiqued 'literature'. The question is to understand what it takes for poetics to attain the 'serious theoretical interest or real theoretical maturity in studies' of dalit poems and to 'work towards revealing the actual vested social interests of those accolades' that turn the enunciation of the *demos* into 'literature'. One direction is signalled in Puttaiah's critique: extending the category of literature maximally, to include the demotic forms of social mobilisation, from 'pamphlets, wall graffiti, banners, magazine articles', slogans and protest-songs sung in chorus to the sound of the dappu, to plays, research and study camps, 'heartfelt talk between dalit activists', and even stretching to 'the words that were cooked up in the hot belly of the oppressor as reaction to the dalit talk'—the outer reach of trans-enunciation. 'Political demands, slogans and songs too constitute literature and there is vision even in a statement'. The vulgarising of literature here is not exactly contained in the undoing of the exclusionary process of cultural distinction and its fearful symmetries; not a static of popular against cultured forms, but vectors of socialisation precisely located in the historicity of a people in the making.

B. Krishnappa, a founding member and president of the Dalit Sangharsha Samiti in Karnataka which Puttaiah would also work with up to 1990, had a blunter view of the politics of the people in dalit poetics: 'The purpose of dalit literature is to prepare people for revolution' (Krishnappa, 2013: 109). Criticising both the confusion of progressive 'literary texts about dalits' with dalit literature and the assumption that 'if a writer is a dalit by birth [...] his work [is] necessarily dalit literature, his essay 'Dalit Literature' made clear: 'Dalit literature has a different stand on creativity and literary excellence. It is inappropriate to look for refinement in a movement's revolutionary literature'. '[O]ld aesthetic pleasures or artistic creativity or, indeed, abstruse similes and metaphors' are the luxury of 'the satiated and the flabby', and their value as literature 'can only be regarded as boosa [cattle feed]'. The interest of his analysis lies, again, in the poetics that Krishnappa does delineate for 'a literature that is part of a revolution': a quality of address, tied to a fresh sense of history. 'As dalit literature is addressed more to the labourer, the farm hand toiling in the fields, the unfortunate living in hell [...] it has to be unadorned and fresh,' he writes. And despite the logomachic dismissal of all 'aesthetic luxury, *written to kill me*' (Krishnappa, 2013: 110, my emphasis), it is interesting to note that

the wholesale opposition of 'simply imaginative' (and 'irresponsible') and 'realistic', if strategically necessary, does leave room also for a more penetrating distinction: between 'the subjective mode' with its 'cynical quality' and an envisioned alternative, however disappointed so far, of 'commitment to' the dalit 'identity'. Even if he concludes: 'To my knowledge, no Kannada writer has dwelt on the real problems of this country'.

Social Science and Poetics

This invalidation of literature, reminiscent in the history of discourse about literature of the deep interdiction of poetry which Adorno identified 'after Auschwitz', poses again the exact question of the poetics of social 'barbarism', to use Adorno's term: the question of how one thinks through the relation between the political 'reality' of violent hierocratic experience (and the task of revolution/annihilation), and the power of enunciation in this reality.

This articulation of enunciation and socialisation touches at the heart of the politics of knowledge which plays out in the division of disciplines. With characteristic incisiveness, Gopal Guru has explored one of its contemporary theatres in his 2002 article 'How Egalitarian Are the Social Sciences in India?' The text denounced a pathological casteist division of academic labour between on the one hand 'empirical shudras' (Guru, 2002: 5003)—restricted to their perimeter as informants and censored beyond that as 'emotional, descriptive-empirical and polemic at best'—and 'theoretical Brahmins' or 'the high priests of theory' on the other, continuously taking over 'newer epistemological territories that belong to the dalit/adivasi intellectual universe'. The publication stimulated a heated, long-drawn, and seminal polemic, generating in particular a long conversation with philosopher Sundar Sarukkai which was eventually published in 2013 under the title *The Cracked Mirror*. In the context of the web of high-stake interlinked issues raised in this vast and highly informed discussion, I restrict my entry point in the debate to the symptomatic function given to poetry in Guru's original argument, as illustration in the diagnosis of an exclusionary hierarchy of 'experience and theory'—in the author's chosen terms.

This mention of poetry is an unusual presence in political or social science debates. It appears when, regretting the 'soft options' too many dalits are taking as they veer away from 'tough courses like philosophy and theory' and respond instead to 'the attraction of temporal power' and forms of 'practical reason' that will connect

to 'more glamorous and easy spheres of mobility' (careers in 'formal politics and networking with institutions that demand that intellectuals always be ready with data'), Guru identifies an individualistic trend which he also extends to poetry. 'Dalits try to compensate for theoretical deficiency by doing brilliant poetry,' he writes. This

> has led to the creation of brilliant poetry in Maharashtra from this class. [...] But poetry cannot be a substitute for theory. Most poetry, including dalit poetry, is based on aesthetics and metaphors and this no doubt makes things interesting. It is true that dalits have developed a good sense of aesthetics but it by definition belongs to the particular, though it is based on rich experience and therefore has the potential to become the guiding standard for the universal. Besides, it also generates inwardness and tends to keep some things hidden from the public imagination. But poetry has no conceptual capacity to universalise the particular and particularise the universal. It does not have that dialectic power. By contrast, theory demands clarity of concept and principles and the open examination of one's action to see whether it is justified. Poetry helps the dalit in making connections through metaphor, but not through concepts. It is theory that is supposed to do that. [...] However, Gadamer would ask the question 'is it right to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Must we not also admit that the work of art possesses truth?' This is a serious question. (Guru, 2002: 5007)

The argument is based clearly on a preconception of poetry, 'supposed to' rely on form and limited by its individualism. It is 'interesting' to recognise in it the Kantian framework for the rationalism of the autonomous subject ('one's action'), indeed tied philosophically to the reduction of art to aesthetics. Guru's argument for theory, and for the 'social necessity for the dalits' of embracing theory and thereby 'restore to themselves the agency to reflect organically on their own experience', is crucial. In its call for the 'double commitment both to scholarship and also to the social cause', it is also in line with the early perspectives of Phule's 'Satyashodhak' educational activism, and with Ambedkar's explicit insistence on the highest education possible for the untouchables, against any notion of limiting it to vocational training. Guru's dissociation from the dalit argument against doing theory (that 'it makes a person intellectually arrogant, egoistic and socially alienated if not irrelevant') is explicit, as is his rejection of the 'ontological blindness' in the claim of dalits' 'lived experience' as 'privileged access to reality' which they can capture 'with a full view without any theoretical representation'. But the call to 'bring together

reason and emotion' and to articulate 'ownership' of experience with 'authorship' of theory—in Sakkurai's encapsulation of Guru's challenge to 'the practice of social science in India' (Sakkurai, 2007) —requires a considerable shift in the understanding of 'theory'. It cannot hold with an ahistorical understanding theory, as identified by Horkheimer for instance under the designation of 'traditional theory'. Horkheimer's 'critical theory' in contrast requires a hold on the historicity which defuses the categorical binaries of individual-collective, particular-universal, and subject-object—experiencial reality and theoretical concept—, and picks up on the dialectic processes of subjectivation, socialisation, public-*ation*, and the trans-enunciative production of truth.

The discussion of poetry—that carried out in European languages at least—has generically been placed on this disciplinary faultline ever since the contemporaneous developments of 'literature' (and 'aesthetics') and the scientification of knowledge about Man. When Guru illustrates his argument on the limits of poetry for theoretical praxis by quoting as 'a particular ditty' P.I. Sonkamble's lines 'When we were tearing you were tearing us/ Now we tear you while you tear' (Guru, 2002: 5007), he is leaving ignored the cumulative, resonant discursive history of dalit poetry. The implication is that the play on polysemy is a local, individual, textual trick of no 'particular' perlocutionary consequence on the common cause. But the trope also connects eloquently with the poetics of semantic reversal so powerful in dalit literary and so tied in, across the decades of production, with the 'pronoun-ing' of collective subjects trans-enunciated as more than 'public imagination': the re-imagining of the people. Much of literature anywhere is indeed the simple reiterative *énoncé* of the stratified status quo in its particular cultural and social context of production, and the orthodox repetition of 'congealed' identities—and it is the case within 'dalit literature'. Prasad's critique is one lucid analysis of this. But there are also poems of the people, subjectively-socially transformative even when they offer no recognisably 'literary' form.

Guru allows for a moment of uncertainty when he brings in Gadamer to reflect on the relation of art to truth, which opens a possibility for the work of truth a little other than the traditional 'transcending emotions to rationality' (Guru, 2002: 5007). The horizon of his argument is delineated in conclusion, as he calls for a theory that will be practiced with the organic impeccability of a Gramscian theory of theory, in the public space, 'from the Red fort in Delhi': 'That would, by the way, resignify the fort by dispelling

the deceitful rhetoric of interested parties ritually on every 15th of August'. Resignifying national identity, with the 're-' here indicating the exact space for the work of egalitarianism, is indeed a process of semantic-political *transformation*, which contradicts the disciplinary separation of social realities and semiotic forms, or experience and concept, because it contradicts the equally 'traditional' account of their relation as one of *representation*: mirror, whether cracked or intact. The question of poetry, raised by Guru as one amongst the inorganic choices of dalit-bahujan scholars turning away from the task of theory, here also helps to locate a theoretical blockage in the conception of the *demos*, and helps to devise a way through the traditional theory of language as *mimesis*, which has for centuries generated variations on the anxious aporia of an unbreachable conceptual divide between language and world. Western philosophy has been the major beneficiary of this ancient move, establishing truth rather than social signification as the ultimate goal of knowledge, and its own tropes as the royal road there.[19] Like Gramsci's philological critique of Marxism, Ambedkarite poetics has practiced *and has theorised* enunciation as resignification: it has effected the conversion of 'tearing' hides, an allegory of untouchable hereditary occupation, not into the expression of individual pain but into 'tearing' ('ripp[ing] to shreds the caste system's obscurantism', writes Prasad) as political power of collective voice: in Guru's own words, 'dalits deploying knowledge to tear the TTB [Top of the Twice-Born] through social auditing and intellectual intervention at various levels'.

'It is no coincidence,' Kalekuri Prasad insists in his 1998 essay on 'The Dalit Movement and the Dalit Literary Movement', that every one of [the leaders of the struggles in Andhra] was a poet' (Prasad, 2013: 608). Tracing their predecessors in 1930s dalit journalism and amongst the leaders who were there to receive Ambedkar on his 1944 tour, he argues: 'ever since those early days, dalit leaders and writers have been indistinguishable from each other.' There has been 'movement-inspired poetry', but more specifically the generation of literature out of the historical episodes of atrocities tells us something about the organic link of politics and poetics involved here: focusing analysis on the transformative process of 'victim' into 'martyr', Prasad's poetics theorises the poetic through the concept of 'inspiration'. From the key event in 1968 when Kanchilacherla Kotesu was burnt alive, Prasad shows the generative collective posterity in poetry and in political empowerment—'the movement-generation sprint[ing] ahead': 'To this day, Kotesu is the subject of dalit poets' lines', Prasad writes. 'Kotesu, symbol of dalit

aspirations', was first enunciated as such in the dedication to him of the Digambara poets's third volume of poetry that same year; thirty years later, '[w]here Kotesu collapsed now stands an Ambedkar statue'. Dalit experience is theorised here as the flaming of 'social ferment', across everyone's literature: 'The incident inspired a great deal of literature. Every poet, writer and journalist who ever wielded a pen in support of the oppressed has written Kanchikacherla Kotesu's name. To this day, Kotesu inspires dalit poets and writers'. And even after the Dalit Mahasabha splintered and 'the synergy between writers and the movement had been lost', Prasad makes the point that the 'literary movement kept the dalit question alive at a time when the dalit movement itself was in retreat' (Prasad, 2013: 612-617).

When both receded altogether it was, in Prasad's analysis, through a common weakening of collective cohesion, and the parallel formation of 'disagreements between individuals' in 'political differences' and, in the dimension of poetics, the 'debilitating individualism' of authors who disconnected from 'oral forms' that thrive 'beyond the dalit movement's immediate sphere of influence', making way for the process of literarisation. 'Literary criticism was reduced to lavishing praise and passing prejudiced judgements', Prasad writes, and ''dalit' had become a static, abstract term, emptied of its usefulness and political charge' (Prasad, 2013: 617-618). With this clear negative of literature when it is the 'sharp, fresh and alive' projection of a political subject in becoming, Prasad redefines the location of poetic value and, as a consequence, the object of literary study: not so much the popular, 'from-below' or vulgar forms in a static hierarchy of cultural values as, more exactly, the forms 'forg[ed] in the fire' of the historicity of the people. Poetry alive is not the poetry of a caste—not in 'the marvellous literary expression of the dalit folk'; not even in the dalit 'reconstruction of their history and literary history' if it is to reiterate the 'focus on individuals' achievements'—, but of a movement. This also means the structural proximity of the roles of poet and leader: Prasad writes of the role of Katti Padma Rao's 'as the movement's legendary orator', who 'crafted public speaking into a fine art' and 'went from village to village, making speeches that touched the hearts of dalits'. The literary value here is in the collective quality of the speech circulating through individualities and inventing a people. It is inseparable from a political theory of leadership as collective emergence, and a diagnosis of the failures of dalit movements in the fragmentation of the collective by individualistic aspirations to power[20].

K. Satyanarayana, co-editor with Susie Tharu of the landmark anthologies of 'New Dalit Writing from South India' (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2011 and 2013), has also contributed an extremely illuminating take on the debate raised by Gopal Guru. Its subtlety comes, I will argue, from its perspective in a careful poetics of society, and the methodology of fine historicisation that this entails. In his 2013 essay responding to *The Cracked Mirror*, 'Experience and Dalit Theory', Sataynarayana quickly identifies the experience/theory opposition as 'inherited from the natural sciences' and the 'product of a particular intellectual history in which theory bifurcated from experience' (Satyanarayana, 2013: 398). The strain of wresting an organicity in a situation of epistemic divisions (experience *vs* theory, but equally social sciences *vs* humanities) and to produce emancipatory theory appears much less of an impossible task once experience is de-naturalised, and repositioned as fully as possible in the flux of the 'broader historical and social context'. Sataynarayana starts with a reminder of the pioneering role, in the 'Mandal moment' of the 1990s, of dalit theorists and critics who reopened the Ambedkarite argument on institutions of higher education and the politics of knowledge production. He in fact replaces Guru's own critique within this movement, which identified the intellectual domain as a key area of power, and faulted the country's social sciences for failing to engage with the reality of caste and with dalit politics.

As he explores the historicity which Guru's argument blocks by keeping the self-identical category of experience intact, Sataynarayana retrieves the historical sequence of the 1990s during which dalit movements made a strategic use of identity and the claim to authenticity, and powerfully challenged the national politics of representation by 'bringing caste identity and Dalit experience into the public discussion'. In particular he evokes the famous 1996 episode in which the dalit-bahujan critic Kancha Ilaiah made the 'shocking' suggestion that the (all upper caste) revolutionary writers, who had dominated the Telugu literary scene since the 1970s—strong in their claim to represent 'the people', in the congealed language of Marxist-Leninism—should take up scavenging while the dalits, with their quite concrete life experience as 'the people', should write literature. When in this context the dalit writers raised questions of authenticity, Satyanarayana suggests, 'the claim to identity and experience [was] not to discover authentic Dalit literature, but to construct a canon of Dalit literature. Experience as a political category offer[ed] a ground on which to

posit a new canon' (Satyanarayana, 2013: 401). His call on Sanal Mohan's historical study of dalit slaves in colonial India provides a telling illustration of the poignant poeticity of experience: showing the construction of 'suffering' in the public performances of slavery narratives, shared and collectively healed in a process of cathartic community building, Mohan's own analytic gesture makes possible the construction of this historical 'narrativising' (Mohan, 2006) of community as dalit literature—with considerable repercussions in a critique of the category of 'literature'.

   This poetic-political invention which forms as 'experience' in the present of political struggle is that of a dalit *critique* and a dalit *movement*; the dynamic reinvention of dalitness rather than the politicisation of a pre-existing dalit identity or a positive reality of experience, however brutal. Forged in the historical transition between a political alliance with the Left and the rise of an autonomous dalit movement, 'experience' was produced in the theoretical praxis of mobilising and organising. The fragility of the dalit hold on power, and the failure to hegemonise decisively, has not only been a result of splits in solidarities and divisions of leadership, or of the continued logic of casteist 'graded inequality', in Ambedkar's terms, within the social pressure exercised by the lower castes and classes. It is also a necessary consequence of the critical nature of the irrupting *demos*, coming from no pre-formed identity, and never insuring a final stabilisation of political identity that would put a stop to the regrouping of domination or the strategic inventions of new critical peoples. It is the common historicity of resignifying which movement and literature (and even literary history) share: 'Significantly, Dalit literature was not discovered but constructed in the wake of Dalit struggles,' Satyanarayana points out. 'The canon of modern Telugu literature, which appeared natural and fully complete, began to seem as exclusive, limited, and biased. Dalits' claim to authentic experience to write about their life was possible only after the shaping of experience as a category in the collective Dalit mobilization and struggle' (Satyanarayana, 2013: 401).

As they draw elements together of context in the introduction to their first volume *No Alphabet in Sight*, from the genealogy of the land question to dalit pasts and contemporary movements, Satyanarayana and Tharu elucidate their position on the linkage of poetics and politics, necessarily re-problematised by the history of dalit voices. Their 'Notes for an Aesthetics', which ultimately resolve in the eponymous allegory-slogan 'No Alphabet in Sight', put forward a

strong claim for a proposed canon of 'new dalit writing', as they make a deliberate choice to include creative literature as well as 'what we can broadly term 'critique''. It is interesting to note that their characterisation of the corpus they 'construct' coincides—as it must in a study in poetics[21]—with the overall thrust of the theoretical poetics which they come to formulate: both are 'a deliberate effort to pull away from' a poetics of realism (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2011: 59). Insisting on the contrast not only with pre-1970s periods when 'atrocity reporting, polemical statements and policy proposals, largely done by non-dalits, and addressed primarily to non-dalits, occupied the forefront of writing related to the untouchable/Scheduled Caste question', but equally with 'the clamourous staging of atrocity and the sociological idiom of caste that marks much pre-1990s writing about dalits', they propose to identify a new age of dalit literature in a distinct poetics of critique, and creativity. As much as poetic texts, the essays, investigative reporting and histories included in the 'dalit literature' which the anthologies compose are read as innovations in the forms of social and political thinking, and valued specifically for the critical effect they have for 'not follow[ing] the protocols of social science writing but tak[ing] their cue from literature's more direct and promiscuous involvement with life'.

The authors are careful to avoid any ambiguity: these writings do not achieve literary status because of the 'familiar valorization of literature as presenting a more concrete and sensitive picture than what non-literary writing is able to offer'. This indeed would be an *aesthetics* of writing. Nor is their singular status due to their particular access to 'realities that elude academic writing such as the social sciences'. Their common dynamics, neither in 'literary' form nor in 'social' truth-content, is in their cumulative politics of address: forming 'the idea of a dalit reader is a major artistic and political achievement. Even more significant is the new community that is being gathered through such an address' (Satyanarayana & Tharu, 2011: 56). In redistributing the positions of enunciation, these dalit poems of the people 'ope[n] up a deeper story—that of the rise of dalits as a modern community'. Their achievement in 'unsettling the boundaries, frames, figures and ideologies' constitutes, beyond the dalit imprint on time, a praxis of 'reformulating democracy' (65).

As such, the dalit critique inaugurated by Ambedkar has implications for an understanding of the *demos* that far exceed the context of the Indian democracy, the cultural specificity of the sub-continent's history of caste, and even the current aggressiveness of Hindu nationalism. It constitutes a world-historical contribution to

the critique of democracy, much needed in the new uncertainties of the mutating nation-state form, whether expressed in the neoliberal disarticulations of the States' perimeters or the flaring up of nationalisms.

For literary study and its politics, it stands in illuminating contrast with a phenomenon like World Literature, which concentrates so much of contemporary scholarly debate on the fate of literature in the processes of globalisation. Leaving 'literature' mostly untouched as it explores contemporary and historical transnational effects, the World Literature question interrogates the new vicissitudes of the nation. Dalit poetics goes straight to the question of democracy as, even in the face of monumental hegemony, the historical plasticity of political forms.

Notes

1. I must express my deep gratitude for the exceptional research conditions which I was offered as visiting professor at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies in October 2015, and to the particular part in this that is due to its director Chetan Singh. My warmest thanks go to the scholars that I was fortunate to meet for their invaluable and generous feedback, and particularly to Tadd Fernée, Asha S. Jacob, Uma Maheshwari, Sukumar Muralidharan, B. Ravichandran, K. Satchidanandan, Esha Shah, Albeena Shakil, Chandrasheel Tambe, and P.G. Jung for their luminous suggestions.

2. Ambedkar's key text *Annihilation of Caste* (1936) has recently been given new editorial life with the publication in 2014 of an 'annotated and critical edition', with an introduction by Arundathi Roy entitled 'The Doctor and the Saint' (Ambedkar, 2015). The essay's new political audibility and topicality in the national conversation was clear enough to warrant the need for a second edition, issued in 2015.

3. See also the entire section entitled 'Analysing and Ethnicising Caste to Eradicate it More Effectively' (Jaffrelot, 2005: 31-51).

4. Jaffrelot argues: 'Obviously Ambedkar had in mind the Brahmin's refusal to recognise Shivaji as a Kshatriya. His theory, which is based on scant historical evidence, doubtless echoed this episode in Maharashtra's history, whereas in fact Shivaji, a Maratha-Kunbi, was a Shudra. Nevertheless, he had won power and so expected the Brahmins to confirm his new status by writing for him an adequate genealogy.' This process of 'Kshatriyaisation', 'a variant of Sanskritisation', 'did not allow the Shudras to emancipate themselves from the caste system and its hierarchical structure' (Jaffrelot, 2005: 39). The Shivaji political myth was already active in Phule's *Gulamgiri* (1873).

5. Ambedkar's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India*, composed during the 1950s, was left uncompleted (Ambedkar, 1987: 360-371).

6. A belief commonly referred to in contemporary scholarship on dalit history and politics attributes the original Marathi enunciation of the term to Jotirao Phule, writing from the 1870s onwards.

7. 'In a tribal war it often happened that a tribe, instead of being completely

annihilated, was defeated and routed. In many cases, a defeated tribe became broken into bits. As a consequence of this, there always existed in Primitive times a floating population consisting of groups of Broken tribesmen roaming in all directions' (Ambedkar, 1990: 275.)

8. Asking 'Who is a Dalit?' the Panthers list, beyond 'Members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, neo-Buddhists, the working people, the landless and poor peasants, women', 'all those who are being exploited politically, economically and in the name of religion': 'the Dalits (oppressed) of the world' (Dalit Panther Manifesto, 2013: 61-62). The recognition of 'our two great leaders—Jotiba Phule and Babasaheb Ambedkar' is explicit and identificatory.

9. It is useful here to remember that Ambedkar and Gramsci are exact contemporaries and respond, in their singular situations respectively, to a common historical situation of global imperial capitalism and of Marxist thinking.

10. In an autobiographical sketch, Ambedkar evoked 'his three gurus: Buddha, Kabir and Phule' (Rodrigues, 2002: 19). One should bear in mind the fact that Ambedkar's father was a devotee of Kabir. The very divided and contested opinions which still now characterise the historical evaluation of Kabir's conversion to Islam and the value of his interreligious poetic theme maintain the shifting movement of an uncertainty which, I would argue, constitutes the very power of the corpus of Kabir poetry to act and be reactivated as strictly historicising effect, never to settle the mobility of conversion into a fixed position.

11. Prasad, a dalit organiser, poet, and intellectual based in Andhra, wrote in Telugu. He died in 2013. The plurality of languages which characterises the national phenomenon of dalit literature carries important issues, concentrated in particular around the question of translation and the special status of English, as academic language in particular. With no competence in any bhasha language, I must rely on translations into English and am restricted to the cases where these exist. Also, for the purpose of the present study, I will keep these issues to a minimum, giving linguistic information in references only. This is not without a keen awareness that I am setting aside a crucial dimension of the politics of enunciation which is my object, and I intend to devote future work to it.

12. 'I am sensible to the many faults in the presentation of the matter,' he writes in *Who Were the Shudras* for example. 'The book is loaded with quotations, too long and too many. The work is not a work of art and it is possible that readers will find it tedious to go through it. [...] But the book is written for the ignorant and the uninformed *Shudras*, who do not know how they came to be what they are. They do not care how artistically the theme is handled. All they desire is a full harvest of material—the bigger the better.' (Rodrigues, 2002: 395).

13. Arundhati Roy's title for her introduction to the new edition of *Annihilation of Caste* (Ambedkar, 2015).

14. 'The conversion of Dr Ambedkar along with innumerable followers [...] was an event not only of religious significance but also of social and cultural importance,' writes Arjun Dangle. 'The Dalits now found a way to a new cultural life. Arising out of this was the need to have a separate conference of Dalit writers. [...] The first conference of Dalit writers was the event organised in Bombay in 1958 by the Maharashtra Dalit Sahitya Sangha.' (Dangle, 2009: xxvii)

15. 'Dr. Babasaheb Ambdekar [...] was our Baliraja who gave away his kingdom for Truth. He was like Rawan who squandered away his kingdom for character. He was our Buddha who taught love, brotherhood and equality unto all. He was our Bhim, our king and our saviour, who blessed the blind with sight.' (Kamble, 2009: 104).

16. Mahad, a reference to Ambedkar's landmark satyagraha for access to public tanks in 1927, also evokes the public burning of the *Manusrmiti* which took place on the same occasion.

17. 'Do Dalit Writers Protest Too Much?' asked a headline of the *Times of India* of May 1976. 'It is inevitable for early Dalit literature to have given expression of the torments of an oppressed people. But the note of continued protest is beginning to pall,... and writers should give a new direction to the Dalit literature movement' (quoted in Zelliot, 1992: 290).

18. Puttaiah's reference here is to Devanoora Mahadeva's *Kusumbabale.*

19. I am too limited in my grasp on the traditions that structure the sub-continent's epistemological history to be able to recognise what should be attributed to them in this issue. My point is not to reduce the genealogy to this sole influence, however powerful its determinations clearly are.

20. 'No dalit took a shortcut to a position of leadership. Innumerable hardships, sacrifices and a great deal of effort went into the pursuit of dalit aspirations before a leader could emerge. [...] And yet, by ignoring this historical process, we have failed to arrive at a dalit methodology for reconstructing history. Or, for that matter, a method for creating leadership.' (Prasad, 2013: 605).

21. If I may substitute this term to their own choice of 'aesthetics', to defuse the contradictions that I have attempted to locate in it, and in the conviction that I am not detracting from their argument by doing so.

References

Ambedkar, B.R. [1936] 2015. *Annihilation of Caste. The Annotated Critical Edition*, with an introduction by Arundhati Roy. New Delhi: Navayana.

Ambedkar, B.R. 1941. *Pakistan or the Partition of India.* Bombay: Thacker.

Ambedkar, B.R. [1947] 1970. *States and Minorities. What Are Their Rights and How to Secure Them in the Constitution of Free India.* Hyderabad: Baba Saheb Amdebkar Memorial Society.

Ambedkar, Dr Babasaheb. 1987. *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, Bombay: Govt. of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Dr Babasaheb. 1990. *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 7, Bombay: Govt. of Maharashtra.

Bama. 2005. *Sangati.* Translated by Lakshmi Holmström. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Barthes, Barthes. 1971. *Sade, Fourier, Loyola.* Paris: Seuil.

Bergunder, Michael. 2004. 'Contested Past: Anti-brahmanical and Hindu Nationalist Reconstructions of Early Indian History.' *Historiographia Linguistica.* 31(1): 95-104.

Bhabha, Homi. [1994] 2004. *The Location of Culture.* London: Routledge.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dangle, Arjun (ed.). [1992] 2009. *Poisoned Bread. Translations from Modern Marathi Dalit Literature.* Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan.

Dalit Panthers' Manifesto. [1973] 2013. in *The Exercise of Freedom. An Introduction to Dalit Writing,* edited by K. Satyanarayana and Susie Tharu. New Delhi: Navayana. 55-64.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1985. *L'Image-temps.* Paris: Minuit.

Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix. 1975. *Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure.* Paris: Minuit.

Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix. 1980. *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2.* Paris: Minuit.

Deshpande, G.P. (ed.). 2002. *Selected Writings of Jotirao Phule.* Delhi: LeftWord.

Guru, Gopal. 2002. 'How Egalitarian Are the Social Sciences in India?' *Economic and Political Weekly.* 37(50): 5003-5009.

Guru, Gopal, Sarukkai, Sundar. 2013. *The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2005. *Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste.* Delhi: Permanent Black.

Joubert, Claire. 2015. 'B.R. Ambedkar: la lutte dans les lettres.' in *Problèmes d'histoire littérature indienne,* edited by Claire Joubert and Laetitia Zecchini, *Revue de littérature comparée* 89(356): 461-472.

Kamble, Baby. [1986] 2009. *The Prison We Broke.* Translated by Maya Pandit. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan.

Krishnappa, B. 2013. 'Dalit Literature.' in *The Exercise of Freedom. An Introduction to Dalit Writing,* edited by K. Satyanarayana and Susie Tharu. New Delhi: Navayana, 106-111.

Mohan, Sanal. 2006. 'Narrativizing Oppression and Suffering: Theorizing Slavery.' *South Asia Research.* 26: 5-40.

Poitevin, Guy, Rairkar, Hema. 2009. *Ambekar! Des intouchables chantent leur libérateur. Poétique d'une mémoire de soi.* Paris: Karthala.

Prasad, Kalekuri. 2013. 'The Dalit Movement and the Dalit Literature Movement.' in *Steel Nibs Are Sprouting. New Dalit Writing from South India. Dossier II: Kannada and Telugu,* edited by K. Satyanarayana and Susie Tharu. Noida: HarperCollins. 604-621.

Puttaiah, B.M. 2013. 'Does Dalit Literature Need Poetics?' in *Steel Nibs are Sprouting. New Dalit Writing from South India. Dossier II: Kannada and Telugu,* edited by K. Satyanarayana and Susie Tharu. Noida: HarperCollins. 350-366.

Rodrigues, Valerian (ed.). 2002. *The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sakkurai, Sundar. 2007. 'Dalit Experience and Theory.' *Economic and Political Weekly.* 42(40): 4043-4048.

Satyanarayana, K. 2013. 'Experience and Dalit Theory.' *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle-East.* 33(3): 398-402.

Satyanarayana, K., Tharu, Susie (eds.). 2011. *No Alphabet in Sight. New Dalit*

Writing from South India. Dossier I: Tamil and Malayalam. New Delhi: Penguin.

Satyanarayana, K., Tharu, Susie (eds.). 2013. *Steel Nibs Are Sprouting. New Dalit Writing from South India. Dossier II: Kannada and Telugu.* Noida: HarperCollins.

Zelliot, Eleanor. 1992. *From Untouchable to Dalit. Essays on the Ambedkar Movement.* New Delhi: Manohar.

SOCRATIC HOSPITALITY:
HEIDEGGER, DERRIDA
AND THE PRIMACY OF THE GUEST

Kirsten Jacobson

In the *Crito*, Socrates argues that we cannot simply elect to shed or cast off the laws by which we were raised.[1] These laws are constitutive of our very way of being—even of our ability to reach a point at which we disagree with them; thus, whatever our stance may be toward those laws—including a stance of protesting them—we owe our stance and our very selves to them in an important and binding way. Socrates' argument is an acknowledgment that we cannot escape our roots, our home; we cannot cast off that by which we have constituted ourselves. In view of this, the home demands a certain justice—a justice that acknowledges our character of owing to home our very way of being, of being entrenched in its supportive and constituting framework.

In his lecture course on *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*,[2] Heidegger argues, on the other hand, that we are fundamentally unhomely—i.e., that we ultimately lack a secure base on which we can rest or claim to rest our being. Since we are beings who always have our own being as a question, we can never finally fix in place what we are or even what other beings—human and non-human—are to or for us. As such, our home—our way of being—always has a non-settled core to it; beneath our being-at-home is forever our character of being ultimately unhomely. Thus, in what seems a contrary conclusion to Socrates' position, Heidegger insists that our being is never secured, and that in a very significant way we are rootless or homeless.

These two lines of thought are united, however, in the idea that we are forever not-at-home in our being-at-home, or, again, that it is only through engaging with what is alien that we can be at home. This is, in fact, the position that Heidegger develops, ultimately suggesting that it is only through the recognition of the other as both an unsettling and a constitutive force in our lives that we authentically embrace our being-in-the-world, and that we can, recalling Socrates' concern in the *Crito*, give justice to our traditions.

In this paper, I use Heidegger's *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'* and Derrida's *Of Hospitality*[3] and *Rogues*[4] to examine the argument that the foreigner-guest is essential for our ability to be-at-home, and I conclude with an argument that it is cosmopolitan political settings that provide us the politically healthiest home environment. Section I introduces Socrates' argument from the *Crito* that our experience of self-identical self-possession is not our given nature, but that our ability to be ourselves comes from making a home in the laws. Section II draws on Heidegger and Derrida to argue that this very effort to be ourselves, to be at home, requires nonetheless that we answer to the other: the alien is not something to which we can be indifferent. Section III cashes out the implications of these analyses in an argument for our irreducible ethnocentricity, and, drawing on Derrida's *Rogues*, considers how the political imperative of hospitality can be interpreted in this context. Section IV, finally, argues that it is cosmopolitan political settings that offer us the healthiest environment for cultivating the political habits of plasticity that are essential to our multicultural political world. I conclude that it is precisely such existentially healthy homemaking that ultimately captures the essential spirit of Socrates' own approach to making his home in the laws.

I. Socrates and Our Home in the Laws

Implicitly drawing upon the Greek language in which he was raised, and upon the literary traditions of Greek drama, Socrates, in the *Crito*, composes an imaginary dialogue between himself and the laws.[5] His friend Crito has encouraged him to escape from the jail in which he is awaiting the execution of his death sentence, and Socrates brings the legitimacy of this course of action under philosophical scrutiny. Through this rhetorical trope of conversing with the laws, Socrates argues that it is only on the basis of living under, and by means of, the laws that he is able to be who he is. It is the laws, he claims, that allowed his very existence by making possible the marriage of his parents, that allowed his development by requiring that his father have him educated in music and gymnastics, and that allowed the free development of his self-identity as an adult citizen by allowing him an equal share in the community life made available by the laws.[6] The laws are the very matrix of the self: it is only on the basis of the laws that he is able to be the choosing, 'self'-articulating person that he is.

Crito has encouraged Socrates to break the laws, to turn against the laws and abandon them. Socrates argues against this, maintaining

that our deliberate living under the laws and our enjoyment of what they offer is a tacit consent to their legitimacy that obliges us to accept their judgment upon us.[7] More deeply, his argument shows that to abandon the laws is ultimately impossible for him, since it is only on their basis that he is capable of making the gesture of 'abandoning.' We cannot cast off the laws for it is these laws that shaped us and secured who we are: they have supplied us with our very capacities for meaningful action and we would thus deploy them even as we attempt to reject them; casting them off—if it were even possible—would amount to casting ourselves off.[8]

Socrates' discussion with the laws acknowledges the debt we owe to the 'home' in which we were raised, and acknowledges this primarily by noting that it is our 'home' that makes us into the specific beings we are. Home in general—whether as the laws that shape us or simply as our familial home—is that which has supported us in becoming ourselves; it is that resource by which we build ourselves.[9] Even as we differentiate ourselves from our initial family home, we are doing so on the basis of the support of that home. Even in the case of that most unhappy rebellion from a home that is our rejection of it, this rebellion is given its 'legs' by means of this home. In situations of poor laws or poor upbringing, this original home may have given us paltry tools, and even 'tools' that forever inhibit us from finding a satisfactory home, but that original home is still that out of which we live and by means of which we define ourselves—even if in opposition. With this Socratic exploration into the essentiality of our political home in mind, let us now turn to Heidegger's philosophical reflection on the core nature of our 'being-at-home' in his study of Hölderlin's hymn 'Der Ister.'[10]

II. The Un-homely Character of Being-at-Home, and the Role of the Guest

In his 1942 lecture course, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, Heidegger translates the second chorus of Sophocles' *Antigone* as declaring that man is by far the most *unheimlich* (*deinon*)—the most uncanny—of beings. Heidegger writes:

> The uncanny [*unheimlich*] means that which is not 'at home,' not homely within whatever is homely.... Being unhomely is no mere deviance from the homely, but rather the converse: a seeking and searching out the homely, a seeking that at times does not know itself.[11]

Heidegger argues that this unhomeliness reflects our way of

always being amidst beings in such a way that we are outside of them insofar as we are the sort of being that has the question of being before us.[12] We are never settled, can never finally arrive at what we *are*, nor, for that matter, can we ever settle what other things *are* in light of our own indeterminacy and, thus, our indeterminate look on other things. Thus, Heidegger writes: 'In those beings they come to, and in which they think themselves at home, they come to nothing. Thinking they are homely, human beings are those who are unhomely.'[13] Heidegger pursues this theme in his study of Hölderlin's poem. Following Heidegger, let us dwell awhile with Hölderlin's own words. Hölderlin writes in the poem now titled 'The Ister':

> Not without pinions may
> Someone grasp at what is nearest
> Directly
> And reach the other side.
> Here, however, we wish to build.
> For rivers make arable
> The land. Whenever plants grow
> And there in summer
> The animals go to drink,
> So humans go there too.[14]
> . . . .
> The rock, however, has need of cuts
> And of furrows the earth,
> Inhospitable it would be, without while;
> Yet what that one does, that river,
> No one knows.[15]

In these two excerpts from Hölderlin's 'The Ister,' we are told of the virtually ungraspable character of the river. We are told that in spite of its nearness, it is inaccessible and uncrossable save with the aid of 'pinions'; that it possesses the ability to 'cut' and 'furrow' even the most solid ground; that its way of doing (or being) escapes any knowing. Yet, we are also told in these same passages of the attraction and need we and the world have for the river and what it definitively offers us. In other words, we are told of ways in which we and others very much do grasp what the river is and gives to us: the river makes the land able to bear plants and it gives animals water to drink, and because of this we also go to the river and 'wish to build' *here*; the river also answers to the 'need' of rock and earth to be cut and furrowed, for without these cuts and furrows both would be 'inhospitable' and incapable of 'while.' These passages, then, tell of

the river's double nature as that which forever unsettles and settles both the surrounding world and us. It is a source of fluctuation that can never be stopped or absolutely figured, but it is because of this that it can continue to offer us (and the animals and the earth) more.

When Hölderlin identifies the river as the 'here' where we wish to build, and elsewhere in 'The Ister' when he describes the Ister as dwelling beautifully and also as inviting Hercules as a guest, Hölderlin draws us to notice the unsettledness that underlies the seemingly quite settled character of home.[16] Perhaps it initially seems easiest to understand this character of the home in the experience of the guest: though we might expect a certain feeling of lack or unease insofar as the guest is one who is quite admittedly 'settling' in a territory that is not her own, Hölderlin, however, does not suggest in his example that the guest—Hercules in this case—feels first and foremost this unease. To the contrary, Hölderlin describes the need that even the 'spirits' would have to *travel*—pointedly away from the unchanging heights of Olympus—in search of the cooling shade and uncharted and roam-worthy depths of forest of the Ister. In other words, we might say that Hercules, a guest and, thus, a foreigner to the river, feels relief and rejuvenation rather than unease and unrest at the river's unsettled offerings. So, even the guest of this example is not one who first and foremost experiences the unsettled character of the river as unsettling, but rather is one who feels this very character of the river to be inviting and productive. Even more so is it the case that the residents of the river—those who do build there as well as the animals who drink there and the forest and land that grow there—are able to be at home at the river and to flourish at the river precisely because the river is not marked by stillness, stagnancy, or fathomability. Hölderlin seems to emphasize this point when he describes how one can hear the 'growth' in the resinous trees of the Ister directly following descriptions of the *river's* forest as having scent that wafts 'high above' (i.e., unreachable), as being 'black' (i.e., in-visible), and as having 'depths' in which one 'roam[s]' (i.e., resistant to definitive mapping or charting); here again, Hölderlin emphasizes the development that arises from and stands upon the always moving, always ungraspable character of the river and what it 'mysteriously' does and offers. Settling arises in the unsettled.

Further, it is the guest, the foreigner-guest, who actually allows us to 'embrace' *ourselves* as 'at home' precisely in being 'unhomely.' Heidegger argues that '[b]ecoming homely demands a going away into the foreign',[17] because *our* being-at-home is precisely a journey through beings that are *not like us* and to which we must give accommodation and to which we must accommodate ourselves. It is

through the foreigner and through this dynamism of accommodation that we are made to notice our comportment with respect to beings, to notice and feel what is 'ours,' to experience the way we have made a home.[18] The foreigner allows us to 'own' what is ours in a way we cannot do on our own: we are not our own on our own.

Reminding us of Socrates' own discussion of our home in the laws, Heidegger directs this analysis to the *polis*. The *polis*, like the river, is a site—a pole, as Heidegger describes it—around which we gather and define ourselves and experience ourselves *as this* definite being opposed to what is beyond us or different than us and our festivities, laws, practice, habits, etc.: '[W]hat is essential in the historical being of human beings resides in the pole-like relatedness of everything to this site of abode, that is, this site of being homely in the midst of beings as a whole.'[19] The *polis* is the established reality in which—as Socrates showed—we give ourselves an established and settled identity. Continuing his focus on the second chorus of Sophocles' *Antigone*, Heidegger, however, emphasizes the 'counter-turning' nature that Sophocles identifies as belonging to humans in his description of humans as belonging to the *polis*, but also as being capable of behaving against the *polis*:

> As venturing forth in all directions, human beings arrive everywhere and yet everywhere come to nothing, insofar as what they attain in venturing forth is never sufficient to fulfill and sustain their essence. Whatever human beings undertake turns in itself—and not in the first instance in any adverse consequences—counter to what humans are fundamentally seeking from it, namely, becoming homely in the midst of beings.[20]

Here too, Heidegger argues, the *polis* reveals itself—in its changes, its revolving history, its ability to be influenced—not to be settled, not the answer to what we are. Though the *polis* is precisely our 'own' place, as Socrates argued, it is not so easily 'owned.' Indeed, Heidegger asserts that 'what is properly one's own, and appropriating it, is what is most difficult.' He continues: '[L]earning what is foreign, as standing in the service of such appropriation is easier for precisely this reason.'[21] So, it is to this end that he calls for an outward journey or the creation of a guest-house, for a place that will support an encounter with the foreign.[22]

In *Of Hospitality*, Derrida develops further this argument that it is only in the having of a guest to one's home that one truly 'comes into one's own' in the home.[23] Derrida writes:

> In order to constitute the space of a habitable house and a home, you also need an opening, a door and windows, you have to give up a passage to

the outside world [*l'étranger*].... The monad of home has to be hospitable in order to be *ipse*, itself at home, habitable at-home in the relation of the self to itself.[24]

One truly begins to *have* a home through the guest, for the guest allows the home to become thematic for the host. The encounter with the guest necessarily involves a crossing of and, implied in this, a basic highlighting of a threshold. The illumination of this threshold brings to the fore the question of how 'we' do things versus how 'you' do things.[25] Thus, the guest allows the home to cohere as 'what is ours,' inciting the home's 'owner' to experience this own-ness for the first time. Derrida writes: 'We thus enter from the inside: the master of the house is at home, but nonetheless he comes to enter his home through the guest—who comes from outside. The master thus enters from the inside *as if* he came from the outside.'[26]

The guest forces the host to step outside of and, thus, notice her regular rhythm with her home insofar as the homeowner is called, as a host, to address the needs of the guest rather than her own. In order to accommodate the guest, the host's home must now operate to some extent according to the guest's home-rules. In making such an adjustment toward the 'objective' guest, the homeowner finds herself in the unusual situation of living in her home according to another person's ways of doing things, and, thus, becomes like a guest in her own home.

While initially this seems like a fundamental unsettling of the experience of home, it is, Derrida argues, the very activity by which the homeowner comes to be at home.[27] To begin, the encounter brings to the fore the question of whether there is (at this time as well as for all time) a proper place—a home—for the other established here. In the activity of attempting to make the home a homely place for someone and doing so precisely with the recognition of the utterly unaccomplishable nature of this task, one most fully grasps the character of *homemaking*. To make a home is forever an unsettled and unfinished activity, and the having of a guest allows one to grasp how this is so even for one's own self.[28]

Even after the guest departs, the home continues to be experienced differently: the homemaker may be proud of the home; may be relieved to be free of the situation of having attention drawn to her/ his own or another's way of being; may be ashamed of her- or himself or of her/his treatment of the other; may be longing for more contact with the other, etc. When the guest leaves and the host no longer needs (or gets) to address the guest's foreign ways, the host may encounter the feeling of 'returning to normal,' of 'getting back to

my way of doing things,' and in so doing has a further experience of what 'normal' and 'my way' actually are. The guest, in other words, enables the host to 'own' her home for the first time by forcing her first to depart from the home and, then, by offering her the ability to see her home for the first time upon her return to her home. The guest makes visible and palpable to her what is typically 'too close to home' to notice. It is precisely through the guest that one 'comes home.'

Socrates' analysis of the laws of the *polis* may have seemed like a conservative defense of established ways, but the analyses of Heidegger and Derrida now suggest that the nature of the *polis* is only fulfilled in its openness to the foreign—the very opposite of conservatism. Socrates showed that the resources for our determinate identities—our material existence, the formation of our specific identities, the specific resources for communal life that are available to us—come to us from the laws, and thus reveals that the individual identities we take for granted are identities that we in fact *receive* from the laws. Heidegger and Derrida add to this the recognition that our very experience of 'ownness' comes to us from without, and, specifically, comes to us from what is not our own—from the foreign. For this reason, then, the *polis* can only properly be a home for us in our distinctive 'unhomely' nature by being open to what is beyond it. Let us consider, now, the challenge of making our political homes hospitable to others.

III. Hospitality: Conditioned and Unconditional

Like the way we experience the body, we ultimately experience home as the constitutive structure of support in the *background* of our daily activities, as the comfort that we know is there when we need it and so needs no second thought.[29] This is true politically and culturally, as well as 'domestically.' Typically, becoming a successful, functioning adult involves integration into a wide range of cultural practices that come to establish our political home. It is precisely by embracing these shared ways of behaving that we accomplish a cultural form of 'joint attention,' an experiencing-together, that allows us to coordinate and integrate our experience with that of others, thereby overcoming the arbitrariness and idiosyncrasy of merely 'private opinion' and embracing a shared sense of reality.[30] Such cultural practices, however, are not universally shared, that is, different cultures develop different forms for practicing joint perception, and growing up to be a successful, 'normal' participant

in culture typically involves developing a rigid commitment to one's own cultural forms of behavior: an unquestioning presumption of its normalcy that, as we said, 'needs no second thought.' Though our political way of being-at-home is not given to us, but rather is a perspective *established* historically and contingently, the very contingent and perspectival character of this experience is repressed and experienced by us *as if* it were simply given, and is so because it is the level we live from.[31]

Our home is our platform for engaging with the world, our very ability to have an openness to what is outside us is.[32] But our political home is embodied in a prejudicial perspective, which is to say, a *closedness* to the outside. Because our cultural practices are not universally recognized, but because we nonetheless live them as 'natural,' our cultural ways of being-at-home are naturally oppressive of the ways of others: our typical rigidity of cultural presumption is naturally a closure to the ways of others. The price of our 'making ourselves at home' in the world is that we make the world that we inhabit inhospitable to others. This duplicity of our way of being-at-home—its simultaneously being open and closed to what is foreign to it—is not a condition that can be overcome or 'corrected,' but is intrinsic to our experience of establishing a functioning relationship with the inter-human world. Indeed, it is the permanent condition within which all our interactions with the outside must be developed.

The very processes of cultural development that make us 'healthy adults,' amount to various forms of political rigidity. Overcoming our political rigidity, though, cannot be a matter of a wholesale abandonment of our situation of inherent closedness, but must be a transformative way of operating within the determinate terms of our political home. Political progress, rather, will come through changing the way we relate to our political homes: we must find an openness to transformation within our political being-at-home. This need to find an openness *within* our closed situations is what Derrida defends under the idea of 'democracy to come.'

In *Rogues*, Derrida writes that '[o]nly an unconditional hospitality can give meaning and practical rationality to a concept of hospitality.'[33] Hospitality must be unconditionally open to the ultimate other if it is to honor the demand of leaving aside the self-same in favor of listening and responding genuinely to what is beyond. Derrida connects the practices of hospitality and democracy, arguing that both lack a proper meaning, in that there is no rule or law or even sense that is determined in advance without the participation of those who come together to ask the question of how things, how the

other, and how oneself is to count. Rather than being the enactment of a fixed rule, democracy is the collective practice of determining 'What is 'living together'?'[34]

> For what is lacking in democracy is proper meaning, the very [*même*] meaning of the selfsame [*même*] (*ipse, metipse, metipissimus, meisme*), the it-self [*soi-même*], the selfsame, the properly selfsame of the it-self. Democracy is defined, as is the very ideal of democracy, by this lack of the proper and the selfsame.[35]

This meaning of democracy, for it to be *meaningful*, must be open, not 'proper' to something in advance.

For this reason, the hospitality that defines democracy can never be simply the application of a fixed procedure: there is no fixed method that can be guaranteed in advance to succeed. 'Unconditional hospitality,' Derrida writes, 'exceeds juridical, political, or economic calculation ... just as justice exceeds law, the juridical, and the political.'[36] He writes:

> A calculable event, one that falls, like a case, like the object of some knowledge, under the generality of a law, norm, determinative judgment, or technoscience, and thus of a power-knowledge and a knowledge-power, is not *at least in this measure*, an event. Without the absolute singularity of the incalculable and the exceptional, no thing and no one, nothing *other* and thus *nothing*, arrives or happens.[37]

Without the incalculable, there is no happening of meaning, only captivation and instinct or a form of meaning that is already decided, and, thus, as Derrida argues, not an event of democracy, of cooperative, questioning engagement. The unconditional hospitality that defines democracy, then, must always be 'to come' insofar as it must forever be open to questioning what will count as law for its members and also who will count as its members, and, thus, ultimately, always be open to questioning itself.[38]

At the same time, however, there is no hospitality *unless* it is conditional: any political situation must be determinate and specific if it is to offer its guest something particular, if it is to provide anything but the self-same to the guest. There is no 'event' of hospitality except in the case of an encounter between a home and one who is excluded from that home.[39] That is to say, hospitality and democracy require and are marked by the dialogue of at least two 'others.' Each 'other' brings the particularity proper to him- or herself, brings the conditionality of being a specific person with specific demands and interests. It is only through these specificities and conditions, and their challenges to one another, that a dialogue

becomes possible: there must be otherness for a conversation to begin. If these conditions were to disappear, so too would the event of an unconditional, that is, a never-to-be-fully-finished conversation. I must never let go of myself entirely to become the other, or else I will fail to see that other, to be able to honor that other and his or her view, insofar as I will have lost the perspective that my own otherness had allowed me to have on the other. The only meaningful hospitality, then, is a conditioned hospitality, an invitation for you to meet me on my conditions—the irreducible conditions that make me a specific someone.

In sum, then, there is no escaping the command to *unconditional* hospitality; yet, at the same time, that command can only speak to a specific someone, to someone who makes a specific home in the world, and, therefore, to someone who could only ever enact that hospitality *conditionally*. Our political challenge, then, is not to eliminate the 'conditioned' or 'prejudicial' character of our being-at-home; it is, rather, to live our specificity *as* an openness to others, to replace an attitude of rigidity with an attitude of plasticity.

Ethnocentricity is a condition with which we must always contend. Because we are always politically perspectival, it is incumbent upon us to be self-critical with respect to our ways of being-at-home. Our political responsibility is to challenge our cultural rigidity, and develop in its place an attitude of plasticity in our inhabitation of our political homes. We must recognize, therefore, the need for a kind of political therapy.

IV. Cosmopolitan Living as Political Therapy

It is important to remember that the very *raison d'être* for the rigidity of one's political perspective is the need to coordinate one's perspective with that of others. As we saw above, the embrace of our festivities, laws, language, etc., is precisely our way of making our perspective answerable to the perspective of the other, and establishing a sharedness of vision. Just as it is the need to engage with others that initially motivates us to develop such a cultural home, so can *other people* provide us with alternative models of how to be and thereby motivate us to reform our cultural rigidities.[40] Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Derrida on the nature of the guest, let us consider cosmopolitan living as a politically therapeutic model of making a home with others.[41]

It is the guest who has the capacity to give me my true 'homecoming,' for the guest teaches me how to be a host. It is the exposure to the

other that enables my own transformative growth into an attitude of plasticity. I propose that, similarly, what facilitates our cultural growth is precisely exposure to others and their different ways of being-at-home. Such cultural growth, though, like psychological therapy, involves opening a person to a situation of vulnerability, a situation in which the way of being for which a person is aiming is not yet securely hers. Care is needed here, then, since it is precisely in moments of vulnerability that we often revert to ways of perceiving or acting that are most ingrained in us: simply being thrust blindly into an alien way of being is not likely for most people to allow for an immersion in that culture that will bring about an ability to sympathetically reflect that culture. Good, psychologically therapeutic situations typically involve a *careful* exposure to what is challenging. Dramatic play therapy, for example, allows one to develop an empowered relationship to what one finds difficult by allowing one to 'play' at inhabiting different situations within the context of a supportive environment.[42] In general, the therapist provides a protected environment in which the patient can learn to deal with a challenge that might otherwise be overwhelming. In light of this notion of 'careful exposure,' we can see now why a culturally and politically varied—a cosmopolitan—social world is itself the appropriate therapeutic environment for one's 'cultural' health.

To counter the clash of perspectives that often characterizes the rigidity and ignorance with which members of different cultures often encounter each other, cosmopolitan political settings, like a good therapist, offer non-confrontational settings of multicultural exposure. Cosmopolitan living can be therapeutic, precisely because it offers its participants a vision of different ways to be, and calls for one's own creative responsiveness in accommodating oneself to this variety. We might say that, in a cosmopolitan culture, 'how to live' is precisely 'at play.' Making a home in a cosmopolitan setting constantly requires one to treat others as legitimate 'guests' in one's own home and, indeed, requires that one experience oneself as an alien 'guest' in the legitimate home of others. This 'careful exposure' to different and perhaps alien *cultural* ways of taking up the world that comes with cosmopolitan or multicultural living is crucial to the full development of our 'existential health.'[43]

Our ways of being-at-home, both personally and politically, can suffer, as Aristotle might say, from two opposed vices. On the one hand, our way of being-at-home may emphasize too fiercely our need for security from the other; such a home will sink us into an attitude of prejudice, of seeing ourselves and our surroundings only

in light of our already established views and customs; such a home encourages us to live more akin to the laws of necessity. On the other hand, we may hail from a home that pushes us continuously into what is other, and that lacks a certain continuity and reliability of perspective; such a home can leave us without a firm enough sense of self, and can leave us feeling lost and unable or unwilling to respond to others and our situation with decisiveness, with a settled perspective; in such a home we can neither settle meaningfully nor engage effectively with others.[44] Both of these 'vices of inhabitation' are simultaneously debilitating for both the self and the other.

An existentially 'healthy' home—both personal and political—amounts, on the contrary, to living in a way that reflects the world in its diversity. The world must, in other words, be able to show itself through us. This does not amount to reducing the subject to a projector of an alien reality, but rather acknowledges that the very nature of subjectivity is *to be* insofar as it is engaged with what *is* beyond itself. Subjectivity, on this account, loses a sense of relativism that is often used to question the 'validity' of the subjective viewpoint, and instead stands as *the* exemplary site of reflecting reality as it is. This reflection is never going to exist as a one-to-one correspondence with reality. As subjects, we are essentially characterized by our freedom. No immediate one-to-one correspondence between subjectivity and the world could exist, for this would be a situation lacking any reflection; it would be a situation of necessity, of natural law. Correspondingly, the world does not have one and only one interpretation. The givens it offers will, according to the situation in which they are taken up, have different, equally 'valid' interpretations. That said, it is not any interpretation that gears onto the givens of reality: central to subjectivity is the possibility of misinterpreting the world and its demands. Existential health is characterized by a subject's ability to be able to reflect adequately the reality of his or her intersubjective situation. It is a matter, that is to say, of making oneself at home *in* the world in such a way that one is reciprocally making oneself a home *for* the world, making a home that is simultaneously the other's and my own. As Heidegger and Derrida suggest, then, to take up adequately our nature as beings who are forever at home in unhomeliness—i.e., who are *free*—we must learn to be hosts such that we can accommodate the other as well as ourselves. Successfully inhabiting such a reality requires habits of plasticity and, indeed, it is precisely through our careful engagement with this multicultural reality that these habits of plasticity can be cultivated and developed.

Conclusion: Socratic Homemaking

In the *Crito*, Socrates argues that while it would be wrong of him to run from the commands of the law after his condemnation to death by those laws, it would not have been wrong for him prior to this condemnation to protest the laws that led him to this condemnation if he believed that such laws were unjust. Further, in his call to give justice to the laws, justice here should not be seen as merely repeating or regurgitating that which the original home outwardly professes. In Socrates' understanding of the laws, the laws may demand of a citizen that she in fact challenge those laws, as his approach to honoring the oracle of Apollo took the form of his challenging the words of the oracle. The laws, in Socrates' understanding, do not speak univocally and unambiguously. Here, it is interesting to compare Socrates' lawful behavior with that of the prosecutors: all are arguably expressing their living engagements with the laws, but the 'style' of this living is quite different. The prosecutors take up their laws precisely as a call to conservative cultural rigidity, whereas Socrates hears the laws precisely as a demand for dialogue, and, thus, for the very plasticity we have been studying. Socrates shows his way of having made and found a home through the laws, and it is *his* way in spite of it *also* being a way that is shaped by the laws. This fact that homes can be made in different ways out of the 'same' fodder shows that our actions cannot simply be dictated to us according to 'the' rule book of the laws. Socrates' own practice of enacting the laws required him to experience himself as under the imperative to think and act critically and ethically, and, indeed, precisely to challenge prevailing views and challenging them to the point that it cost him his life. In dying for the laws, he is primarily dying in defense of the plasticity of the laws: he is dying for the openness of law to the inherent demands of critical self-consciousness.

Socrates lives the laws as the demand that they be answerable to the demands of rationality and self-conscious subjectivity, just as much as he requires that self-conscious subjectivity hold itself answerable to the laws.[45] In requiring the laws to be laws of free inquiry, Socrates, in other words, demands that the laws be welcoming of what they had not anticipated, that they be hospitable to a guest that might transform them. Indeed, Socrates himself is effectively the stranger in his own city. With Socrates, then, as with Heidegger and Derrida, we see both the need to establish ourselves in a specific home, and that the very vitality of this home requires that it be open to the foreign guest.

The Athens that Socrates defended was itself, for its time, a cosmopolitan center.[46] The *Republic* begins with Socrates returning from a festival to celebrate the introduction of a foreign religious rite.[47] Again, in Book VIII of the *Republic*, Socrates identifies the democratic constitution (which is the constitution of Athens) as that political regime that inherently contains within itself all political regimes.[48] Our own investigation of the theme of the guest has allowed us to see that such cosmopolitan settings precisely mark the health of a political home, in that they are political societies inherently defined by the need for the mutual accommodation of aliens, reciprocally playing host and guest to each other. It is in multicultural cosmopolitanism that we see Socratic homemaking properly enacted.

Notes

1. Plato, *Crito*, in *Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, 2nd edn, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), 50c–51c.
2. Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).
3. Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality: Anne Doufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*, trans. R. Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
4. Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, trans. P.-A. Brault and M. Nass (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005)
5. On the Greek language in which he was raised, see Plato, 'Alcibiades I,' in *Complete Works*, trans. J.M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 111a; my attention was drawn to this passage by Patricia Fagan, who studies its significance in detail in '*Alcibiades I* and Pederasty,' Chapter 1 of *Plato and Tradition* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012); on the *Crito* in particular, see 'Socrates and Achilles,' Chapter 6 of the same work. On Socrates' (and Plato's) indebtedness to the tradition of Greek tragic drama, see Patricia Fagan, 'Plato's Oedipus: Myth and Philosophy in the *Apology*,' John Russon, 'The (Childish) Nature of the Soul in Plato's *Apology*,' and James Crooks, 'Inventing Socrates: Truth, Jest, and Care in Plato's *Apology*,' Chapters 5, 9, and 6, respectively, in *Reexamining Socrates in the Apology*, eds Patricia Fagan and John Russon (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009).
6. Plato, *Crito*, 50d–51d.
7. Ibid., 51c–53a.
8. This is an interesting parallel to Descartes' '*cogito*' argument, in which the attempt to deny 'I think' enacts a performative self-contradiction. See René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*, 4th edn, trans. Donald Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 63–64. See also Kant's use of a performative self-contradiction in the formulation of the categorical imperative in Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31–34.
9. For a fuller discussion of the existential character of home, see Kirsten Jacobson, 'A Developed Nature: A Phenomenological Account of the Experience of Home,' *Continental Philosophy Review*, 42 (2009): 355–73.

10. Heidegger's *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'* is based on a lecture course delivered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg during the summer of 1942. In the lecture course, Heidegger speaks in defense of the Third Reich for its opposition to the 'technological menace' and 'calculative domination' taking hold most clearly in the United States, a political culture marked by the scientific pursuit of 'space' and 'time' in their generalizable qualities, and, thus, on the denial of the necessity of home (42–48, 85–87, 123–25, 131–37, 165–67). For further discussion of these themes, and of the controversy surrounding Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, see the chapter 'Textuality and the Question of Origin: Heidegger's Reading of 'Andenken' and 'Der Ister,'' in Veroniqui Foti, *Heidegger and the Poets* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1992); Otto Pöggeler, 'Heidegger's Political Self-Understanding' and Martin Heidegger, 'Overcoming Metaphysics' and 'Only a God Can Save Us: *Der Spiegel's* Interview with Martin Heidegger' in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 198–244, 67–90, and 91–116, respectively. The hermeneutical complexity of interpreting the relationship between Heidegger and Nazism is demonstrated throughout Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
11. Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, 74.
12. For a discussion of Heidegger's view of language in this experience of being not-at-home, see the chapter 'Revolutionary Poetics' in Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 202–36, esp. 228–36. For a discussion of the way in which Heidegger sees language as something that *can* return us to an experience of being-at-home, see the chapter 'The Saving Power of Art' in Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger* (New York: Continuum Books, 2005), 125–54.
13. Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, 76.
14. Ibid., 4.
15. Ibid., 6.
16. Ibid., 5.
17. Ibid., 142.
18. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas argues that Heidegger's recognition of dwelling and building as the site of our way of being-in-the-world does not go far enough in emphasizing that it is the Other who allows us to enter into the domain of the human sojourn. Levinas writes: 'Things are not, as in Heidegger, the foundation of the site, the quintessence of all the relations that constitute our presence on the earth (and 'under the heavens, in company with men, and in the expectation of the gods'). The relationship between the same and the other, my welcoming of the other, is the ultimate fact, and in it the things figure not as what one builds but as what one gives.' [Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991), 77]. According to Levinas' argument, the Other, like ourselves, is the sort of being that is free and has the power to give shape and meaning to the world, and thus can disturb our sense of being-at-home by her own claims. As such, the Other prompts us to come into a new reality: 'To recognize the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed things, but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality. Language is universal because it offers things which are mine to the Other. To speak is to make the

world common, to create commonplaces.... The world in discourse is no longer what it is in separation, in the being at home with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what I give: the communicable, the thought, the universal' (ibid., 76). While Levinas' points about the place of the Other are profound, I do not find his interpretation of Heidegger compelling. For a criticism of Levinas' interpretation of Heidegger, see Derrida's 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,' in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79–153.

19. Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, 82.
20. Ibid., 87.
21. Ibid., 124.
22. Ibid., 125.
23. There are surely stages to this. For instance, the child's sense of learning this is *my* home is different than the adult's, and the 'new' adult who is just now coming into her first 'personal' home has a different experience than that of an adult who has had a home throughout a marriage and the bearing and raising of children. In either case, though, engagement with the other is fundamentally at play.
24. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 61.
25. 'We' is importantly ambiguous: it can mean 'you and I' (opposed to 'them/ her/him') or it can mean 'they/she/he and I' (opposed to 'you'). See Émile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. M.E. Meek (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 252–54. For further discussion, see Joanne Scheibman, 'Exclusive and Inclusive Patterning of the English First Person Plural: Evidence from Conversation,' Chapter 26 of *Language, Culture, and Mind*, eds Michael Achard and Suzanne Kemmer (Stanford: CLSI Publications, 2004), 377–96.
26. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 125.
27. Heidegger makes a similar point when he writes about our venturing away from home: 'This venturing is no mere leaving something behind but is already the first and therefore decisive act of return to the home.' [Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, 133]
28. Heidegger's essay 'Building Dwelling Thinking' (in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, ed. and trans. A. Hofstadter [New York: Perennial Library, 1971]) takes up the character of our dwelling in a similar vein.
29. On the non-thematic experience of the 'lived' body, see Drew Leder, *The Absent Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 34–35; and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 81–89, 142–47.
30. On the notion of 'joint attention,' see Timothy P. Racine and Jeremy I.M. Carpendale, 'The Role of Shared Practice in Joint Attention,' *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 25 (2007): 3–25; and Shaun Gallagher and Daniel D. Hutto, 'Understanding Others through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice,' in *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity*, ed. Jordan Zlatev (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 2008), 17–38.
31. See Kirsten Jacobson, 'The Experience of Home and the Space of Citizenship,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 48(3) (2010): 219–44.
32. On the theme of 'platform,' see John Russon, *Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Persons, Things, and the Nature of Erotic Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), Chapters 1 and 5.

33. Derrida, *Rogues*, 149. For a discussion of Derrida's notion of 'unconditional hospitality,' see the chapter 'A More Sufficient Response?' in Leonard Lawlor, *This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
34. Derrida, *Rogues*, 11. Michael Naas connects this question to the practices of hospitality, political life, and the reading of philosophy in ''*Alors, qui êtes-vous?*' Jacques Derrida and the Question of Hospitality,' *SubStance*, 34(1) (2005): 6–17.
35. Derrida, *Rogues*, 37; see also *Rogues*, 87.
36. Ibid., 149.
37. Ibid., 148.
38. Ibid., 9–11, 84–86. On this point, see also Michael Naas, ''One Nation ... Indivisible': Jacques Derrida on the Autoimmunity of Democracy and the Sovereignty of God,' *Research in Phenomenology*, 36 (2006): 15–44.
39. Indeed, this becomes an aporetic problem revealed by Derrida's argument, since this demand for particularity means that a *democratic* call for cosmopolitanism will necessarily exclude certain other particularities—namely, governments and ideals that hold to exclusionary or fundamentally conservative views. Derrida argues in *Rogues* that 'democratic' *forces* such as the United States can end up becoming the most roguish states of all by demanding that other sovereignties give up their views and political commitments in order to become 'democratically enlightened' in the vein of the model *supplied by*—dictated by?—the U.S. Derrida, *Rogues*, 95–97, 102.
40. This argument is more fully developed in John Russon, 'Heidegger, Hegel, and Ethnicity: The Ritual Basis of Identity,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 33 (1995): 509–32; see also Réal Fillion, *Multicultural Dynamics and the Ends of History: Philosophical Explorations in Kant, Hegel, and Marx* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009).
41. For a related argument, see Gideon Baker, 'Cosmopolitanism as Hospitality: Revisiting Identity and Difference in Cosmopolitanism,' *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 34 (2009): 107–28.
42. On dramatic play therapy, see Susana Pendzik, 'On Dramatic Reality and Its Therapeutic Function in Drama Therapy,' *The Arts in Psychotherapy*, 33 (2006), 271–80; and Sue Jennings, *Introduction to Dramatherapy: Theatre and Healing—Ariadne's Ball of Thread* (London and Bristol, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1998).
43. See Sheldon Pollock's 'The Cosmopolitan Vernacular,' *Journal of Asian Studies*, 57(1) (1998): 6–37, for a discussion of the global–local interplay that can occur when a cosmopolitan 'setting' may urge a specific community to develop a vernacular language and 'sense of self' in opposition to the dominant universal. Pollock's essay also offers broader insights into the way in which certain models of cosmopolitanism can indeed tend toward leveling out the very differences that this essay's vision of cosmopolitanism (as incorporating otherness) is discussing. Pollock discusses, for example, the 'uniting' effects of a chosen trans-regional language—a move that can encourage a certain cosmopolitanism by bringing diverse people together through a shared discourse, but that equally can begin to wash out particularities in ways people think, create, and act owing to the consciousness-structuring impact of the language itself. In 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,' in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), Kant insists

that the ideal cosmopolitan society must indeed maintain antagonisms among people with differing views, for without that reason and discourse will not be able to continue developing. He also, however, sees a necessity for diverse peoples coming together through unifying powers. Pollock's and Derrida's arguments reveal some of the challenges of reaching this ideal end.

44. For an argument that this is the basic situation of the agoraphobic, see Kirsten Jacobson, 'Embodied Domestics, Embodied Politics: Women, Home, and Agoraphobia,' *Human Studies*, 34 (2011): 1–21.

45. See the chapter 'Citizen Socrates' in Gregory Recco, *Athens Victorious: Democracy in Plato's Republic* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 73–94.

46. It is significant to note that this cosmopolitan and democratic site was also one that supported slavery and prohibited women and non-citizens from participating in the political arena. That Athens can be considered the birthplace of democracy further urges us to heed Derrida's reminder that democracy is always yet to-come, and also to beware of the 'roguish' elements that are perhaps always present within any political situation.

47. *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd edn, trans. Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Bk. I, 327a.

48. Plato, *Republic*, Bk. VIII, 561e. Derrida discusses this passage in *Rogues*, 25–27.

THE LIMITS OF MONEY:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
ON SELFHOOD AND VALUE

John Russon

Our contemporary world is characterized by natural, political, and economic crises on a global scale, and these empirical problems must surely be our most pressing concerns in both practical and theoretical matters.[1] It is my contention, though, that addressing our empirical situation well requires of us in fact that we engage in ontological inquiry, and specifically an ontological investigation of our distinctive human condition. We are, I shall argue, definitively ontologically divided: we are constitutively split between two different experiences of ourselves in relationship to others, things, and values. Understanding our empirical situation depends, I will argue, on understanding the differences between these two types of experience. I will call these two experiences 'intimacy' and 'economics.' I will consider first the ontological intimacy that characterizes our inhabitation of our living bodies and of our lived situations. In this experience of intimacy, the differentiation that we typically presume of self from other and of fact from value is not operative; such intimacy is distinctive of the formative experience of children. It is precisely this formative experience, however, that gives rise to the experience of economics, the experience, that is, of discrete subjects who work upon an alien world. The experience of intimacy allows us to criticize the absoluteness of the terms presented by the experience of economics, and the critique of the economic model of human life will be the central point of my analysis here; at the same time, however, the experience of economics itself offers an important corrective to the experience of intimacy, and I shall argue that our true political challenge is to live in a way that acknowledges both forms of experience without resorting to the authoritative terms of either. After clarifying the conflict of these two forms of experience, I will consider the imperative our experience puts upon us to negotiate these two conflicting forms of experience. Along the

way, we will see that each of these forms of experience—intimacy, economics, and their negotiated reconciliation—manifests itself as an aspect of the distinctive functioning of the hand.

1. The Intimacy That Is Definitive of Our Formative Experience

By the time we conduct any explicit and systematic investigations into the nature of selfhood, we are already well-formed individuals, clearly able to distinguish self from not-self and fact from value. In fact, though, these terms in which we construe our relation to reality are not adequate to comprehend our experience in general. I will begin by looking at two ways in which these terms are insufficient: first, they are in principle inadequate to comprehend the very conditions of action; second, these terms are inadequate to comprehend the very experiences by which we *become* such independent individuals.

Let us imagine a simple situation of action: I pick up my teacup. Here, the apparently independent 'I' intentionally enacts a material change in the 'outside' world. Here, in my relation to the cup, we see the alienation of self and world we typically presume to be definitive of reality. The insufficiency of this model of action is evident, however, when we consider the missing 'link' in this process: the hand by which I grab the cup. While the relation 'I–cup' may have the form of alienation, the relation 'I–hand' *cannot* have this form: inasmuch as *I* pick up the cup, the hand must *be* me. Whereas I, as agent, am *alienated from* the *object*, I am necessarily *embodied in* the means: I *inhabit* my hand, am 'at home in' and not 'alienated from' it. Agency is indeed independent initiation of change in the 'outside'—the equally independent real—but all of our capacities to 'do'—our agency—rest on our being in the world in a way that does not have this form: our powers are given by a fundamental embeddedness, an ontological intimacy.[2]

Here we see that even at the level of the developed individual there necessarily is an ontological 'intimacy' that founds, and cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of, the alienation of self and world. The 'fully fledged' experience of being an independent human individual, furthermore, is not itself our immediately given form but is itself preceded by a process of growth. If we consider the earlier period of growth—the experience of childhood development—we can see further ways in which the experience of the alienation of self and world is itself necessarily contextualized by a relationship of self and world that does not take this form.

The inhabited hand is the founding reality from which the

independent object and independent subject 'emanate,' so to speak, as zones of detachment. For the child, these 'zones of detachment' have yet to develop, and her experience is fundamentally that of absorbed inhabitation. For the child, 'self,' world,' and, indeed, 'others' are not three separate domains of reality or experience, but are, instead, intertwined dimensions of all experience.[3] The development of her experience of the world is *simultaneously* the development of her experience of herself and the development of her experience of other people. As many have argued, the mother most typically provides the decisive context for this whole range of the child's experience, and consideration of the mother and child is a helpful way to see this intertwining of self, world, and others.[4]

The child does not begin with a presumption of her separate existence, but works from a presumption of sharedness, experiencing herself as part of a 'we,' as one side of a 'with.' The importance of this interpersonal intimacy for personality formation is especially documented in the study of children deprived of such intimate contact: deficiency in this sense of 'with' leads to deficiency in many important sectors of personality development.[5] This intersubjectivity, though (somewhat like the hand in our earlier example), is not the object of experience, but the platform for world-directed experience.[6] As the child ventures into a new room or engages with a new toy or article of furniture, her comfort can easily be dependent upon her confidence that she is doing this 'with' her mother's support. Should the mother leave, the child may well lose her sense of self-confidence, and the world as she perceives it may shift from welcoming to threatening. In other words, the child's engagement with the world comes *from* an *inhabiting* of an intimate intersubjective space in which her companion is not the object of her experience, but the medium for her experience.

Something analogous to this non-differentiation of self and not-self pertains as well to the opposition of 'fact' and 'value.' In the case of grabbing the teacup, again, there certainly are situations in which I very self-consciously ask myself, 'What would be a good way to capture that liquid?' and then light upon the cup as a good means to fulfill my explicit project. More commonly, though, I am sitting talking with a friend, and my grabbing the cup to drink is in response to *its* vague beckoning: typically, that is, I experience the thing as charged with a significance that I feel called upon to discharge.[7] Rather than imposing a self-chosen value upon a neutral, factual situation, I experience things as inherently charged with value, and my action is lived more as an answering to the imperatives of things

than as an imposition of will upon an indifferent matter. Again, the child, similarly, does not self-consciously formulate a desire to walk and then scout out viable materials with which to accomplish this, but instead experiences the space between the table and the couch as 'to be walked in,' a charge she plugs into (and plugs into in a way, as we saw, that is itself inseparably interwoven with her sense of being with her parents, and her lived sense of their hopes and their support).

For the child, then, her 'self' is not an already established, independent reality, which freely chooses the values according to which she will deploy her action upon an alien world. Such a free, individual self, rather, is more like a *telos*: it is the form of experience that will be definitive for her developed personhood, but that form must be established *from* and *through* a cooperative negotiation with the world and with others—a negotiation in which she experiences herself as intrinsically engaged and involved, rather than one in which she is alienated.[8] The world and others are not objects for her experience, but that *from which* she experiences, and values are not the forms she imposes upon the world, but the forms to which she finds herself answering.

These considerations of the ontological conditions of action in general and of the formative conditions of personal experience reveal, then, that, prior to alienation, our experience of world and of others is necessarily one of intimacy. The world and other people are 'in' us, in the sense that we cannot separate our own innermost reality from them. We are able to experience a detached individuality for which the world and others are alien only on the basis of experiential resources that are afforded us by that world and those others—a world and others *in which we are at home*.[9]

But, though this intimacy with the world and others is the 'first word,' so to speak, of our experience and our reality, it is not, for that reason, the last word. The experience of independent agency and the recognition of the otherness of the world and other people remains irreducibly essential to our experience of freedom, our experience of ourselves. Our freedom is not found in remaining in the immersion of childhood experience, but in the development of self-responsible adulthood, and we hold parents and social institutions answerable to this norm, this *telos*: it is precisely their responsibility to foster this development of self-responsible freedom. While it is true that the experience of being reflectively and self-enclosedly detached from things and from similarly self-enclosed others is not the whole of our experience, it—the domain of personality, belief, choice, and self-

defined perspective—is nonetheless definitive of our experience.

It is the essentiality of this individualized autonomy that Locke defends in his *Second Treatise of Government*.[10] Locke argues that it is only a political world founded on the recognition of the essentiality of *consent* that can properly do justice to the nature of human freedom.[11] A politics of consent recognizes the authority of the individual voice, the authority of the individually reflective self-consciousness that is the subject of alienated action. In addition to being the most powerful and compelling exponent of this political value of the recognition of individual consent—our authority as individuals to dispose of ourselves, 'liberty'—Locke is also the most powerful and compelling exponent of the *essentially economic* character of this politics. Locke shows, that is, that a world of free individuals cannot be realized except in a context of recognizing private property.[12] Let us consider this relation of freedom and property.

2. The Economy that is Definitive of Our Free Existence

We have seen that our agency demands an ontological intimacy: I must inhabit the hand *with which* I act if I am to be able to move the cup *upon which* I act. This very same intimacy, this inherently non-alienated relationship to the world, is also the foundation of private property, the site, that is, for an essential alienation from the world. Let us consider again the hand.

It is because the hand is itself a participant in the material world that it can come into contact with other things in the world. For the hand to thus be my way *into the world*, it must be *my* way into the world. My hand and the cup are both things in the world, but my hand is different from the cup because the cup is not inherently, but only externally, moved by my subjectivity. The hand, on the contrary, is inherently moved by me: it is the immediate realization of my will, that is, my will immediately governs it. My hand, in this context, is *inherently* dedicated to the fulfilling of my will, and *it must be undividedly so* if it is to function as my organ of action. What allows my hand to realize my will is equally what requires that it be mine and mine alone: in being intimate to me, it is necessarily withdrawn from you.[13]

I noted above that our freedom is accomplished only through our becoming free, individual agents, and if I *am* to act, if I am to be free as an individual, able to consent to the formation of my own way of being in the world, there must be a portion of the material world that is proper to me: this must be *my* body. There is no 'I,'

in other words, without 'mine,' no self without private property. Just as intimacy is an *ontological* condition of action, so is *property* an ontological condition of action.

Locke is therefore correct to insist that property is essential to freedom: we need to have recognized a domain within the world that is ours, privately. This is most obviously and familiarly true with our individual bodily organisms: our ability to act in them immediately makes it possible for us to 'own' them in a distinct way. This ontological 'property,' however, does not automatically command political weight, for a condition of the body's ability to mediate my worldly action is that it necessarily be *part of the world*, part, that is, of a reality that is inherently public, inherently *not* 'my own.' There is an intimacy ('*Innigkeit*' in German), a mutual innerness of ourselves and our bodies, but our bodies equally—and equally necessarily—have an outside, worldly face as well, and we cannot own that 'on our own.'[14]

My body does conform itself to my will immediately (once, that is, I have 'owned' my body through a process of bodily development, and before it has denied my ownership in illness or aging), but I am not the only 'master' of my body: my body, as an integrated part of the material world, also answers to all the worldly forces that have an impact upon bodies as such: my body can be trapped under rocks or knocked over by a car, quite against my will. It is indeed my 'own' body, but simply by virtue of being body, it is also in principle 'unownable': it is *inherently* public, and its reality, therefore, will always necessarily escape my grip.

My ability to own my body is thus afforded me from without. Specifically, I am exposed to the wills of others, that is, to the way that other bodies, 'owned' by other wills, can exert an influence upon my body. My body, in short, is an inherently *contested* site: it is *necessarily* the site where competing trajectories will collide. My *uncontested* ownership of my body, then, can never be a natural condition: it can *only* be a matter of agreement. *Ontologically*, ownership of my body is necessarily contested, but *empirically* or '*ontically*' that contest can be renounced by the other(s). My ownership of my own body, then, is necessarily dependent upon the *consent* of others.

Already as an infant, my inhabitation of my own body involved my engagement with a body beyond myself, namely (typically), my mother's body. In a fundamental way, I treated her body as mine, that is, I lived from the unreflective presumption of propriety over a body that was necessarily already inhabited by the will of another, and, necessarily, an adult other—a reflective individual—who allowed me to do so: without my mother's willingness to allow me to

treat her body as my own, I would not be. Even at the most intimate level, then—the level of my very living organism, my very means of entry into the world—I am *necessarily,* i.e., *ontologically,* embroiled in matters of property and consent. The condition of intimacy, of 'self-ness,' is exposure to the will(s) of the other(s), and my self-possession is thus always and necessarily a matter of intersubjective negotiation.

As a child, my embodiment depended upon my mother's body, and my ability to inhabit her body thus necessarily depended on her consent. Thus, before being discrete, reflective individuals, our essential embodiment necessarily goes beyond the limits of the organic body and is necessarily transgressive of the 'proper' domains of others. Once one becomes such a discrete, reflective individual, one's identity develops, one's embodiment—one's constitutive inhabitation of the world—grows correspondingly, and, inasmuch as one's embodiment is inherently a site of contestation for ownership, the growth of one's identity cannot be separated from a growing process of economic negotiation.

I am embodied in my organism, but, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, my embodiment extends well beyond my organic limits.[15] Indeed, simply inasmuch as action is transformative action in the world, I must always enact myself as an instilling in the world of my will, a laying claim to a domain beyond my organism: in my movement, I presume to use the land, in my breathing, I presume to use the air, in my eating and drinking, I presume to use the water and the living organisms who supply my food. My characteristic action is much more complex than this, though: as an adult, my identity cannot be separated from my writing, by long-distance communications, my public display of my creative fashion sense, or my comfortable relaxation around the family dinner table. My adult humanity is realized in the complex developments of action that are mediated by artifice—culture—and I am embodied not just in my organism but in my papers, my cellular phone, my clothes and my house.[16] These material parts of the world, like my hand, are not the objects of my experience, not what my experience is 'about,' but the inconspicuous platform *from which* I engage with the objects of my experience. As an adult and as a child, then, my embodiment extends beyond the limits of my natural organism.

Whereas with the mother's body, the 'economic' negotiation is a very personal matter of sharing, the broader developments of our embodiment involve us in matters of intersubjective negotiation that are necessarily impersonal. Whereas each of us can make a unique claim to our organisms in that it is ontologically the case that our organisms typically give themselves over solely to our own, single

will, the worldly domains in which we embody our reflective selves are *exclusively* public, that is, they are no one's organism but are sites for the realization of *anyone's* world, domains, in other words, in which I have no more (and no less) inherent right than you.

Because we must embody ourselves through laying claim to real dimensions of the inherently public world—of the world, that is, *qua* potential 'body,' that has exactly the same status for *anyone*—my inhabitation or 'occupation' of that domain necessarily brings me, in principle, into contact—and thus potential conflict—with everyone. In other words, though in fact we might only have contact with familiar others, our 'ownership' of the world can always be denied by others we have never imagined and who do not share our values, as was experienced, for example, by the inhabitants of 'North America' whose world was taken over by European colonists. Whether we like it or not, then, it is the very nature of our embodiment that we are impelled to negotiate universally and impersonally with all others over the apportioning amongst ourselves of the inherently public world. *We must* make claims to exclusive ownership, and these claims *in principle* are claims against all others (who are in principle equally legitimate claimants). We saw above that property—laying claim—depends upon the recognition of others. What we see now is that it is implicit in the very nature of property that this need for recognition extends universally, and this means that, in principle, all property relies upon a universally recognized system of terms for recognizing apportioning: if it is to be securely established, property depends upon shared terms for recognizing portions and these must be impersonal terms, i.e., terms that are compatible across different systems of valuing. This demand in principle that property depends upon universal recognition means, in short, that property always implicitly depends upon money, upon a universal and indifferent quantitative standard for evaluating worth.[17] The actual development of a money economy, in other words, is not an historical accident, but is a response to the possibility—a vulnerability—always intrinsic to our need to establish a domain of ownership within an inherently public world.

We are initiated into the world in a way that does not allow a clear separation of self, other, things, and values: these are the subsequently unwoven threads of what is originally a single concreteness, the single fabric of our existence. Value initially is qualitatively specific, non-transferable, concrete, dynamic, and inextricable from the experience of embodied, interpersonal intimacy. The self thus embodied, however, is a self destined to grow up into self-reliant, reflective individuality, and the experiences of

things, others, and values are destined to undergo a corresponding change. In particular, our experience of value is destined to become the demand that all of material reality be measurable according to a universally recognized, impersonal, quantitative standard of evaluation. Our originary intimacy precisely gestates our growth into self-reflective, adult individuals participating equally in the world of money.

3. The Personal and Political Problem that is Inherent to Our Developed Nature

There is a problem with these two sides of our identities. According to our economic identities, everything has a price. According to our immediate identities, what is proper to us is unexchangeable and of incalculable value. Though the development of our identities as economic individuals fulfills an intrinsic trajectory of our existence, the terms under which this identity operates are in principle inadequate to comprehend our existence. Our economic existence operates under terms that cannot recognize the very reality from which that existence derives and, correspondingly, if that economic existence is taken to be definitive of our existence *tout court*—as has largely happened in contemporary political discourse—its natural tendency is to undermine itself and obliterate the very (material) possibility of experience.

According to the definitive intimacy that is formative of our identities, we inhabit a determinate worldly environment that must be uniquely and exclusively our own: this is 'inalienable' property in the sense that removing it removes me. Our analysis of intimacy demonstrated the necessity of private property, but this is not property in the sense of material wealth hoarded by an independently existing individual; this 'private property,' on the contrary, is the living materiality that is the very condition for the existence of choosing individuals. This private property, in other words, precedes and is presupposed by individuals. A precondition for the very existence of 'economic individuals,' in other words, is that persons 'have'—in the intimate sense of 'inhabit'—the materials in which to embody their developed identity. 'There are' economic individuals only in a social system in which persons are recognized as having the right to the material conditions for independent individuality. In principle, then, those who are not granted such conditions cannot be held answerable to the norms of economic individuality, since they in principle cannot participate in that system.

This logical demand upon economic life, however, is precisely

not recognized within economic life. Economic life takes its own position to be original, for economic life is the domain in which I am 'anyone': I participate only as an indifferent representative of the possibility of possessing and exchanging materials that are *in principle* not assignable to anyone in particular, for their value is qualitatively indifferent—simply quantitative. Economic life in principle ignores the *particularity* of my involvements and considers only how the reality in question measures upon a *universal* scale of value where it is precisely detached from anyone in particular. Thus, whereas the intimate inhabitation of property fails to acknowledge the essential outside, the essential publicness of its property, the economic appropriation of goods fails to acknowledge the essential inside of property, fails to acknowledge the inhabitation that is the precondition of economic individuals.

This 'conceptual' limitation of the economic perspective translates as well into a practical problem. If we live as if the economic domain were the total domain of human experience, then we enact a perspective that fails to recognize the essential inhabitation upon which we depend. The economic domain denies that there is any intrinsic value, denies anything of inherent worth, and recognizes only the universality of quantitative exchange.[18] To build our lives on this interpretation is to abandon anything that *is* of inherent value, and instead to enshrine the money system itself as the absolute value (in short, to establish the rule of banks). But the essential intimacy that characterizes our existence entails that no one can, without self-contradiction, deny the reality of inherent value. While it is true that such values are relative to particular individuals or groups, and therefore are necessarily not *universalizable* (i.e., what is essential to me is not essential to you), those values are *for each of us* absolute. To approach our lives from the perspective of economics requires of each of us singly that we deny the worth of what is for us absolute, and systematically it means that the absolute needs of persons are not protected but are instead subjected to the economic powers for which their value is only their public price.[19]

4. Conclusion: The Imperative Definitive of Responsible Existence

What I have tried to show is that there is a constitutive tension—indeed, a contradiction—inherent to our nature. The tension is that we are equally committed to intimacy and economics, but these two ways of being-in-the-world operate on contradictory

principles, contradictory interpretations of self, other, thing, and value. Further, each on its own is unsatisfactory, for each on its own operates according to a norm that does not acknowledge the reality of the other domain. Intimacy operates with a sense of the world and others as inherently 'for me,' not acknowledging the alienness, the being-for-other inherent to all reality; living according to the norms of intimacy is insular and exclusionary. Economics operates with a sense of the world and others as inherently alien, not acknowledging the entanglement that always pertains between the self and the world; living according to the norms of economy involves the denial of all intrinsic worth and all relations of dependency. Each mode of existing, then, fails to acknowledge something fundamental about our existence. The contradiction, then, cannot be resolved simply by reverting to one or the other alternative. In other words, the problems caused by contemporary global capitalism are profound, and they will not be solved by a reassertion of the insular values of traditional society.

Indeed, there is no 'solution' to this tension. But, while there is no solution, there are certainly recognizably false responses to this: attempts to deny the necessity of economic relations are reactionary and demonstrably insufficient to address the needs inspired by our ontological character; unqualified embrace of the norms of economic life is dishonest in its assessment of worth, and is demonstrably insufficient to address the needs inspired by our ontological character. So, while this diagnosis of the contradiction in our life does not point to a 'solution,' it does have obvious political implications in that it identifies the character of human life to which our institutions must answer, and it gives us grounds for criticizing the principles behind inadequate policies. There is no solution, in the sense of a final removal of this tension, but there is the imperative to live—personally and politically—in a way that acknowledges both contradictory demands and exercises good judgment in limiting the claims of each and balancing the needs of each against the other.[20] The 'solution' is found in the practice of enacting a mutual accommodation of intimacy and economics.

What are the empirical terms of such a 'solution'? In the economic domain, it is a version of this principle that underlies, for example, 'Mahatma' Gandhi's advocacy of *swadeshi*, which he understood to be an economic and political movement oriented toward maintaining the independence and health of local communities in the face of the encroachments of a global (imperial) economy.[21] One can see a similar spirit in Malcolm X's 'economic philosophy' of 'Black

nationalism,' which emphasizes the crippling effects on Black communities of having their local economic boundaries erased in a national economy.[22] Both of these movements emphasize the necessity of protecting the integrity of the local environment as a site of resistance against the oppressive effects of operating exclusively in terms of the homogenizing perspective of the global economic system. (Indeed, it is precisely Adam Smith, often touted as the advocate of modern, global capitalism, who emphasized the destructive effects of a government that abandons its responsibility for maintaining the integrity of a domestic economy by subordinating its policies to the exploitative goals of global economic interests.[23])

Complementing this, the challenge to the rigidity and insularity of our intimate identities and the insistence on the need to be open to the inherently universal dimensions of our experience is evident in, for example, 'Babasaheb' Ambedkar's personal reliance on Western resources to escape the oppressive dimensions of caste-identity, and especially in his turning politically to the welcoming resources of Buddhism to defend the inherent worth of 'Dalit' individuals beyond the terms of their caste-identities within the Hindu context.[24] And, again, Malcolm X, while advocating for the need to attend to the distinctive concerns of black Americans, nonetheless contextualizes his whole analysis by the insistence on the essential notion of universal human rights.[25] Most prominently of all, it is the practices and policies of multicultural accommodation (the practices celebrated by the Aga Khan, but denounced by Angela Merkel, precisely in the name of the global capitalism) that bear witness to the need to resist the insularity of one's 'home,' and to enact our identities as sites of engagement with others.[26]

To grasp the philosophical meaning of this 'solution,' let us, finally, look once again at the hand. Specifically, let us consider the hand that makes a sign. When I wave, or when I point, I make my body an expression: my 'outside' is the appearance of my 'inside.'[27] When you recognize my greeting or look in the direction I indicate, you, similarly, take up my outside as the appearance of my inside. In the sign, the indifference of the outside to the inside that was the ontological foundation for economics is superseded. On the one hand, then, the body as sign marks a kind of victory for intimacy, in that my inhabitation of my body extends to my body as outside, my body in its publicness. On the other hand, though, the body as sign marks a kind of victory for economics, in that my effort to express myself reflects my acceptance of the essentiality of recognition by others, that is, I acknowledge that I must answer to an 'outside'

perspective. In the sign, then, the two sides of our experience that mark a contradiction in our way of being in the world are, far from a contradiction, the necessary conditions for its existence. In this sense, experiencing the body as a sign is a way of living that 'solves' the contradiction of intimacy and economy.

It is when we communicate that we precisely *live from* the imperative to reconcile the demands of intimacy and economics. I experience my ability to be myself, my ability to speak my own mind, *as* my ability to accommodate the perspective of others. I make my home, my intimacy, in the perspectives of others. In adopting a language, we accept the need to find our own way in a way that accommodates others. The hand that waves or the hand that points thus embraces an ontology of self, world, values, and others that, again, like the inhabited hand, experiences self and world as intrinsically united, but it does not presume identity; rather, like the agent hand, it recognizes the alienness of others. The hand of the communication is the hand that experiences itself as governed by *the imperative to* find a union with an other with whom one is initially not united. This is the value that must ultimately shape our personal and political life.[28] Instead of presuming either an *a priori* adequacy to my own particular values or a 'universalizability' of value in the abstract, we must posit universality as a goal, a goal to be accomplished between different particularities that cannot be removed, but that have horizons that can accommodate unanticipated others.

Notes

1. I am grateful to the Indian Institute for Advanced Study (Shimla) for the invitation to present this research during my tenure there as a Visiting Scholar. I am also grateful for the invitation to present an earlier version of this paper as a Keynote Address to the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy, and for the kind receptions of versions of this research at the Michigan Technological University, Concordia University, Northern Arizona University, Wilfrid Laurier University and Xavier University.

2. This is the orienting theme behind Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Psychology*, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989); and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); see especially the discussion of the 'lived body' in Part I, 'The Body,' Chapters 1–3 of the *Phenomenology of Perception*. See also *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 50–51. I have discussed this lived experience of the body in 'Haunted by History: Merleau-Ponty, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Pain,' *Journal of Contemporary Thought*, 37 (2013): 81–89, especially pp. 81–85, and in 'Self and Suffering in Buddhism

and Phenomenology: Existential Pain, Compassion and the Problems of Institutional Healthcare,' in S.K. George and P.G. Jung (eds), *Cultural Ontology of the Self in Pain* (Springer, 2014), pp. 181–95, especially pp. 182–89. I am not at all convinced by the attempt to differentiate the positions of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in Taylor Carman, 'The Lived Body in Merleau-Ponty and Husserl,' *Philosophical Topics*, 27 (1999): 205–26; for a subtler approach to Husserl's phenomenology, see Peter Costello, *Layers in Husserl's Phenomenology: On Meaning and Intersubjectivity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) and James Mensch, *Postfoundational Phenomenology: Husserlian Reflections on Presence and Embodiment* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). A rich analysis of the complex relations of self and other that constitute the mediating conditions of action is central to F.W.J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Michael Vater (University of Virginia Press, 1993).

3. For a rich discussion of these issues, see D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), and Edith Cobb, *The Ecology of Imagination in Children* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1977). See also Jessica Benjamin, 'Beyond Doer and Done To: An Intersubjective View of Thirdness,' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 73 (2004): 5–46.

4. See, for example, Eva-Maria Simms, 'Milk and Flesh: A Phenomenological Reflection on Infancy and Coexistence,' *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 32 (2001): 22–40; and Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, pp. 15–20. This idea that the inner life of the child is shaped through the experience of the mother runs throughout Melanie Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945* (New York: Free Press, 1975); see especially, 'Love, Guilt and Reparation,' 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,' and 'Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States.' Merleau-Ponty offers a rich phenomenological account of these issues in 'The Child's Relations with Others,' in *The Primacy of Perception*, trans. William Cobb (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). See also David Ciavatta, 'The Unreflective Bonds of Intimacy: Hegel on Family Ties and the Modern Person,' *Philosophical Forum*, 37 (2006): 153–81.

5. The classic study of the developmental problems children face due to lack of intimate physical contact is René A. Spitz, 'The Psychogenic Diseases in Infancy—An Attempt at Their Etiological Classification,' *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 6 (1951): 255–75. See also Simms, 'Milk and Flesh,' *passim*; in her research, Simms stresses also the importance of recognizing the unique abilities that infants do develop in situations of lack of intimacy—see especially 'Deprivation in Infancy: An Ontological Systems View,' in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* (forthcoming). Compare D.W. Winnicott, 'The Concept of a Healthy Individual,' in *Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), p. 23.

6. On the theme of the 'platform,' see John Russon, *Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Persons, Things and the Nature of Erotic Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), pp. 19–20, 113–20.

7. That perception is typically a non-explicit response to the 'call' of the object; see Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 106–9, 83–84. On these themes, see Anthony J. Steinbock, 'Affection and Attraction: On the Phenomenology of Becoming Aware,' *Continental Philosophy Review*, 37 (2004): 21–43.

8. On the 'teleological' sense of selfhood, see John Russon, 'Desiring-Production

and Spirit: On *Anti-Oedipus* and German Idealism,' in Karen Houle and Jim Vernon (eds), *Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for the First Time* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013), pp. 152–72.

9. See Kym Maclaren, 'Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood? Empirical and Phenomenological Considerations,' *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 15 (2008): 63–93. Compare also Kirsten Jacobson, 'The Interpersonal Expression of Human Spatiality: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Anorexia Nervosa,' *Chiasmi International*, 8 (2006): 157–73. See also Winnicott, *Home Is Where We Start From*, pp. 133–41.

10. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government,* in *Political Writings,* ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). For a rich interpretation of Locke's *Second Treatise*, see Shannon Hoff, 'Locke and the Nature of Political Authority,' *Review of Politics*, 77 (2015): 1–22.

11. Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, Chapter 2 and *passim.*

12. Ibid., Chapter 5.

13. On the intrinsic connection between embodiment and property, see G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), sections 34–71. For the development of these ideas, see David Ciavatta, 'Hegel on Owning One's Own Body,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 43 (2005): 1–23. Sometimes, of course, the body does not embrace our undivided sovereignty—i.e., in illness, etc. Correspondingly, our agency is crippled. On the experience of the body in illness, see Havi Carel, 'Can I Be Ill and Happy?' *Philosophia*, 35 (2007): 95–110; see also S. Kay Toombs, 'The Lived Experience of Disability,' *Human Studies*, 18 (1995): 9–23.

14. On these themes of property and embodiment, see Russon, *Bearing Witness to Epiphany*, Chapter 4, pp 95–109.

15. My embodiment, for example, includes the cane or the hat through which I navigate the spatial world; see Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 93, 144–45, 153–54.

16. See John Russon, *Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 94–121.

17. For the basic concept of money, see Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition*, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), Book I, Chapter IV, pp. 31–35.

18. On this theme, see Wendell Barry, *What Matters? Economics for a Renewed Commonwealth* (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2010). See also G.W.F. Hegel's critical analysis of the attitude that presumes 'utility' to be the highest value, in 'The Truth of Enlightenment,' in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraphs 574–81.

19. I have approached the critique of capitalist globalization from another angle in 'On Secrets and Sharing: Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida on the Economics of the Public Sphere,' in Divya Dwivedi and Sanil V. (eds), *Public Sphere from Outside the West* (London and New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 41–57.

20. For an analogous approach to the theme of a 'solution' to an inherent tension, see Kant's discussion of the 'solution' to the third antinomy of pure reason: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd edn, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), A538/B566–A557/B585.

21. Gandhi defined this notion in his speech at a Missionary Conference in Madras, 1916: 'After much thinking, I have arrived at a definition of *swadeshi* that perhaps best illustrates my meaning. *Swadeshi* is that spirit in us which

restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote.... In [the domain] of economics, I should use only things that are produced by my immediate neighbours and serve those industries by making them more efficient and complete where they might be found wanting.' M.K. Gandhi, *The Essential Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For the interpretation of Gandhi's economic thought, see, for example, Dilip M. Nachane, 'Gandhian Economic Thought and Its Influence on Economic Policymaking in India,' *ISAS Insights*, 25 (2008): 16–28; and Satish Kumar, 'Gandhi's Swadeshi: The Economics of Permanence,' in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds), *The Case Against the Global Economy and For a Turn toward Localization* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), pp. 418–24. See also A. Whitney Sanford, 'Gandhi's Agrarian Legacy: Practicing Food, Justice, and Sustainability in India,' *Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture*, 7 (2013): 5–87.

22. See especially Malcolm X, 'The Ballot or the Bullet,' in *Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements*, ed. George Breitman (New York: Grove Press, 1994), pp. 23–44.

23. See especially Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Chapter 7, Part Third, pp. 363–72; see also Book III, Chapters 3–4, pp. 246–73. Indeed, Smith's famous reference to 'the invisible hand' is precisely a reference to the salutary effects of self-interested investment *in a domestic economy*; see *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Chapter 2, p. 292.

24. See Christophe Jaffrelot, *Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2005).

25. Malcolm X, 'The Ballet or the Bullet,' pp. 34–35.

26. The philosophical, political and experiential dimensions of the concept of multiculturalism are richly explored in Réal Fillion, *Multicultural Dynamics and the Ends of History: Exploring Kant, Hegel, and Marx* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2008).

27. On the experience of gesture, see Merleau-Ponty, 'The Body as Expression and Speech,' in *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 179–204. On the rich sense of the hand in the context of our being-with-others, see Jacques Derrida, 'Heidegger's Hand,' trans. John P. Leavey, Jr, in John Sallis (ed.), *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), pp. 161–96; and throughout *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). This material is helpfully discussed in Leonard Lawlor, ''Animals Have No Hand': An Essay on Animality in Derrida,' *The New Centennial Review*, 7 (2007): 43–69, though I disagree with the strong attempt here to differentiate Heidegger's and Derrida's thinking (even, indeed, in the context of discussing a quotation from Derrida that expressly disavows such a differentiation).

28. Compare Gandhi, 'The Duty of Bread Labour' (1935): 'In the ideal State, doctors, lawyers and the like will work solely for the benefit of society, not for self.... Man's triumph will consist in substituting the struggle for existence by the struggle for mutual service.' Gandhi, *The Essential Writings*, p. 90.

THE QUESTION OF 'NOVELTY' IN 'INDIAN PHILOSOPHY' DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

P.G. Jung and Roshni B.

> ... we can neither formulate nor answer any philosophical question, however universal, without reference to the concrete social background.
>
> Dhirendra Mohan Datta[1]

Positioning the discourse

Indian Philosophy is usually treated in terms of the so-called six 'orthodox' and three 'non-orthodox' schools which are designated as Mīmāmsā, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika, on the one hand, and Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka, on the other. One may add a few more, but this is the usual way of presentation and it is taken as adequate by everybody. But, is it really so? Does this help us in understanding and grasping the philosophical scene in India as it unfolded over three millennia of its recorded existence?[2]

The above question raised by Daya Krishna reflects the acknowledgement of the belief that the mode in which we construe and present traditional Indian thought-schemas is immediately co-related with how we begin to understand them. Such a claim is grounded in the implicit assertion that the historical positioning of an 'Indian philosophy' can no longer be treated as being peripheral to an exploration that delves into the deep intricacies of the discourse that has come to be so marked. The available thought-schemas of the twentieth century have established a fairly respectable position to the claim that our everydayness can be construed as having its constitutive, as well as its regulative principles, or *arche,* firmly rooted in its own temporal trajectories within the complex structures of its history,[3] and specifically in the structures of power-negotiations.[4] In other words, the twentieth-century thought-schemas inform us that

not only does every discourse have a history that can be narrated, but also, and more importantly, that every discourse *is* historical. Hence, they move beyond the obvious claim that every philosophical position or concept has a trajectory that is traceable in terms of its history, towards a much more novel and perceptive claim that every philosophical position or a concept has its originary grounds in the *zeitgeist* or the spirit of the time, and that our evaluative structure of choice is grounded in this *zeitgeist.* It is in the horizon of this relationship between a discourse and its historical positioning that we see a resurgence of the question of philosophy in India in relation to its colonial past in the recent decades.[5] Daya Krishna's question is precisely rooted in this firm conviction regarding the relation that obtains between the discourse marked as 'Indian Philosophy' and its historical positioning. Daya Krishna, thus, legitimately raises the issue of the possibility of an alternative mode of construing the trajectory of 'Indian philosophy' from the vantage point of a post-colonial consciousness. His question can thus be reformulated as, 'How else can we construe the traditional Indian thought-schemas' apart from its dominant presentation as *darśana*?' Notwithstanding the gravity of this question, we can, however, also ask why such a construal of 'Indian philosophy' appeared as an adequate presentation then. Thus, in this mode of interrogating the construal of 'Indian Philosophy' as *darśana,* what is being addressed is not the interrogative 'how' as in Daya Krishna's question, but rather is an engagement with this construal in terms of the historical positioning of an interrogative 'why'. In other words, we ask, why was the past construed thus *then*?

   More often than not, engagement with questions pertaining to the past within the context of the colonized, following the discourse of nationalism, invokes the fact of colonization. The discipline of History has been effectively employed in the construction of the contours of the narrative of nationalism, and in the definitive securing of a historical positioning of such a narrative. This securing is evident from the simple fact that Gandhi, for instance, can now hardly be made sense of in isolation from the discourse of our freedom struggle. The role of the discourse on nationalism through the historical positioning of its entrenchment within the fact of colonialism cannot be over emphasized in the construal of a collective identity of the diversity called 'India' into a unitary 'we'. Our purpose here is not to evaluate the success or the failure of such a historical positioning, but rather to highlight the mode in which the fact of colonialism informs a variety of our discourses in

the securing of particular historical positioning of these discourses within the locus of our colonial past. In other words, the colonial past is invoked for a historical positioning of our present, and as a legitimate mode of understanding it. Thus, for instance, the crisis of the nature our discourses in present times often invoke the fact of colonial intervention as the site which grounds the moment of rupture in its trajectory. Although, such an invocation does often come close to appearing as a fetish for convenient explanations of the crisis encountered by the discourse in the present times, it nevertheless must be noted that it is the colonial intervention that forced us to recognize the need to reflect upon our own discourses. The denial of a discourse that could legitimately be called 'History' within the epistemological framework of the colonized, for instance, is a classic example in hand. It is in the quest to respond to this assertion that the trajectory of the discourse of History in India gets categorically shaped. The discourse of Philosophy carries a similar charge as well, but the distinctive mark that pertains to the responsive discourse that came to be branded as 'Indian philosophy', lay in the fact that it was undeniably, and was precisely, this colonial intervention that awakened the awareness of the colonized as the possessor of a discourse called 'Philosophy' as such. More importantly, it is this colonial intervention that opened up the avenue for the construal of a unified front of the various traditional inquiries into the nature of reality and the legitimate modes of acquiring knowledge about it, as *darśanas* under the singular banner of 'Indian Philosophy'. In other words, we must not confuse the historical positioning of 'Indian philosophy' with the history of the traditional thought-schemas in India *as such.* The history of 'Indian philosophy', as Kalidas Bhattacharyya emphasizes, begins only in the first decade of the twentieth century when 'the living continuity of... philosophical thinking with the old philosophical traditions was snapped' with the introduction of Western philosophical thoughts and with the emergence of the tendency among thinkers from within the philosophical fraternity in India to apply 'themselves seriously to the fundamentals of the Western and the old Indian philosophy to see if they could completely reconcile the two philosophies...'.[6] The distinction between the historical positioning of 'Indian philosophy' and the history of the traditional thought-schemas in India *as such* demands our attention because of the fact that what comes to be pursued under the label of 'Indian Philosophy' is undeniably, not merely a colonial product, but is precisely a product that has its locus in the intersecting point between the axis of the East with that of

the West in contrast to the history of the traditional Indian thought-schemas *as such,* which can be viewed in modes that are independent of the fact of colonization.

Of course, postcolonial consciousness has brought about a vocal questioning of the very nature of this naming of the traditional thought systems as 'Indian Philosophy' since it is implicitly suggestive of the mode in which these traditional thought systems are to be approached. As is the case with all acts of naming, this specific act of naming too, is not an innocent one. The term 'Indian Philosophy' betrays the politics of orientation in the mode in which it positions these traditional thought systems under the purview of the lens that is specifically moulded by the historical trajectories of the schemas of thought in the West, and informed by the notion of 'thinking' that emerge precisely in the unfolding of these schemas of thought within the historical context of the West. It thus, in no lesser terms, brings along with it the entire evaluative paradigm, through and against which, the traditional Indian thought-schemas could be measured. But also more importantly, it forced the early Anglophone thinkers in India to selectively construe its traditional thought-schemas within certain imposed paradigms. It is this imposed paradigm of construing what would eventually constitute 'Indian Philosophy' that enforces an erasure of the available multiple interpretative modes of classification of these traditional thought systems that are internal to its historical trajectory in a bid to provide it a monolithic unitary classification that could be recognized by the West *as* 'Philosophy'.[7] It is in this construal of a singular identity, under the colonial gaze, that the discourse called 'Indian Philosophy' delineates its own distinctive identity traits as *darśana.*[8] In other words, the term *darśana* is itself indicative of the selective narrowing of the available traditional thought-schemas to 'systems of thoughts', by which, what was essentially meant were those traditional thought-schemas that had a greater affinity towards epistemological and ontological concerns. The term *'darśana',* remaining within the intersecting locus of the East-West paradigm presented Indian thought-schemas as a counterpart of Western thought systems, while also allowing for the proclamation of the distinctiveness of the former in terms of its positioning of *mokṣa* as its *telos.* It is this emphasizing of the telos of *mokṣa,* which when translated as 'spiritual', allowed for the construal of 'Indian Philosophy' as *darśana* as being in continuity with the ancient traditional past of India. This critical project of tracing its own identity traits is what demands an engagement with the question of *telos* of the activity of philosophizing. By the first two

decades of the twentieth century, this had already taken a distinctive shape as is reflected in the emphatic projection of *mokṣa* within the Indian thought-schemas. In other words, the choice of our early Anglophone writers on the history of 'Indian Philosophy' in their positing of these traditional thought-schemas as *darśana* over the other available alternative of construing 'Indian Philosophy', as *anviksiki* for instance, is itself an act that reflects a certain mode of construing the available traditional thought-schemas.[9] It must be remembered that this reductive approach of narrowing down of traditional Indian thought-schemas into systems of thought was first adopted by Max Muller in his presentation of traditional Indian thought-schemas to the West, distinguishing the 'philosophical systems' from both their Vedic and Upanisadhic sources, as well as Indian Literature in general.[10] Though Muller presents merely the 'orthodox' systems in his work, what remains as a basic influence upon the early Anglophone writers on 'Indian philosophy' is his view of the linear evolutionary nature of Indian thought-schemas since, for Muller, it was in 'the six systems [that] the philosophical thought of India has found its full realization'.[11] In the light of such a characterization, we must pause here to reflect upon the choice exercised by our early Anglophone writers of the history of 'Indian Philosophy' like Radhakrishnan,[12] Hiriyana,[13] or D.M. Dutta,[14] to characterize these traditional Indian thought-schemas as *darśana* . It is a deliberate choice indicative of a subversive move that seeks to foreground those traditional thought-schemas that clearly emphasize the ontological and epistemological structure in the pursuit of *mokṣa* over other available thought-schemas that conceive the task of philosophy as constituted in a meta inquiry into the socio-political and economic conditions of the everydayness of our lived experiences, like that of Kautilya, for instance. Within the intersecting locus of the East and the West and lodged against the backdrop of colonization, the construal of 'Indian philosophy' as *darśana* managed to project the victory of the epistemological and the ontological over the alternative orientation as a critique of the everydayness within the historical trajectory of the traditional Indian thought-schemas. It thereby clearly resonated with the corresponding victory of Aristotle over Socrates that is manifest in the engulfing of the Socratic concerns within a thick forest of ontological and epistemological framework as highlighted in both Kant, as well as in Hegel, the two most dominant figures of the English world then.[15] Though it is also a fact that the revival of Vedāntic traditions during the early nineteenth century by the social reform movements places

darśana, with its emphasis on *mokṣa,* more favourably within the common consciousness (given its invocation of ancient conceptions of philosophy as either *'brahmodya'* following the Vedic literature, or as *'atma vidyā'* and *'parā vidyā* following the Upanishads).[16] It is the adoption of the evolutionary framework of Muller that enabled these Anglophone philosophers to place 'Indian philosophy' at par with 'Western philosophy' in the evolutionary trajectory of 'thinking'.

More importantly, in the following section we shall try to locate the historical position of the construal of 'Indian philosophy' as *darśana* within the locus of the East-West intersection. Through this, we would not merely show the legitimacy of such a construal as a historical choice, but also throw light on the role it played in the assertion for the superiority of, or at the least, in the claim for a distinct identity for the traditional Indian thought-schemas.

Origins of the question of 'novelty'

Though the reformative visions of the Christian missionaries in the wake of the colonial intervention did manage to ignite a fresh engagement of the colonized with the traditional thought-schema of the Vedantins in the early half of the nineteenth century itself, this engagement can be better characterized as a defence of the cultural sphere against the Evangelists' assertion of the indigenous culture as being 'backward' and 'primitive'. It is this engagement that grounds the birth of such indigenous reformative movements like the *Brahmo Samaj*, which though informed in its general spirit by the ideas of Western Enlightenment, was nevertheless a foregrounding of the indigenous thought-schemas in a novel interpretative manner.[17] In this sense, it must be noted that within the context of the Indian colonial landscape, the cultural preceded the political struggle. However, it is this early phase of engagement with traditional thought-schemas that informed and instigated the rise of the Orientalists' discourse. Though in contrast to the Evangelists, the Orientalists were largely responsible for the glorified and consolidated image of the thought-schemas of the colonized, it is in their hands that the traditional thought-schemas get enmeshed inseparably with religion. That the celebration of the Orientalists' discourse[18] is what directly informs the shaping of the distinctive *telos* of the traditional Indian thought-schemas as being *spiritual* in contrast to the trait of *rationality,* which was held to mark Western thought-schemas of the 'modern' period, requires no proof.[19] But apart from the grafting of the distinctive *telos* in an effort to secure the distinctive identity for the construed

unified front of 'Indian philosophy', the Orientalists' discourse attributed another problematic trait to 'Indian philosophy', namely, that of 'stagnancy'. The Orientalists' merging of 'Philosophy' with 'Religion' inevitably entailed that given the absolutist nature of religion, philosophy too would be averse to the notion of 'growth and progress' in the context of Indian thought-schemas. It is this uncritical refrain of 'stagnancy' as the defining mark of Indian traditional thought-schemas that was largely singled out for its rejection. Thus, the Orientalists' discourse subsequently foreclosed the traditional thought-schemas from the very possibility of 'novelty'.

We must recall that by the late nineteenth century the asserted 'stagnant nature' of the traditional thought-schemas of the colonized is what enabled the neat transformation of the Oriental *Other* from an object of threat into a realm of the exotic. This shift in attitude towards the Orient was largely facilitated by the position of political supremacy of the West, but it was also significantly grounded in the triumph of modern science and its mechanistic explanatory paradigm. It is the latter which had instilled in the West the idea of a linear process of evolution of human races opening up the avenue to conceive of Eastern civilisations to be stagnating in time.[20] This new conception of the temporality of civilization also provided the Western powers with the much needed moral justification that legitimately 'obligated' them to colonize. It allowed them to defend their self-entrusted project to spearhead the progress of these societies on an ethical plane, and thereby enabled them to embed their political and economic interests within the realm of the moral.[21] Thus, if the earlier construal of the Orient as a 'threat' demanded an attitude of 'caution' embedded in a form of *respect for the unknown*, its construal as 'primitive' objects stuck in the temporal trajectory of 'progress', eased the adoption of an alternative attitude of curiosity. The Orient thus came to be seen as an opportunity to move back in time to know about one's own past. It is this attitude of curiosity, steeped in a spirit of supremacy, which shapes the trajectory of the marking the traditional Indian thought-schemas as ultimately lacking in any novelty, either in form or in its content. This characterization is, perhaps, the most audible refrain within the academic philosophical fraternity in India till date.

The engagement with the question of novelty

The two correlated aspects of 'spirituality' and 'lacking in novelty' that came to mark the traditional Indian thought-schemas came to

be a matter of contentious concern for the Anglophone academic philosophers in India by the beginning of the twentieth century. This is amply highlighted in the works of these thinkers and in the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress (IPC).[22] It is this concern that shapes the broader contours of their philosophical engagements. But the question of 'novelty' must first be briefly explored in its historical position in order to better understand what precisely was being denied to the traditional Indian thought-schemas. It must first be noted that the notion of 'novelty' was never a seriously articulated value within the thought-schemas of the West itself. Ironically, the notion of 'novelty' in fact creeps into the discourse in the West with the rise of mechanistic science which construes the world in terms of mechanical structures of causation that is determined as a whole by the laws that govern Nature. Such a world denies the possibility of any authentic case of novelty thus making prominent, the question of its possibility. In this scenario, only a life that is not governed by any laws *as such* can offer us the possibility of novelty. Stace rightly highlights the fact that the insistence on novelty is in fact an 'emotional revulsion' against the dominance of the scientific world-view.[23] Thus, novelty comes to be closely associated with freedom, such that a threat poised to one would entail a threat to the other.[24] Both Bergson and William James fervently sought to protect the idea of novelty, not for the sake of novelty itself, but rather for the possibility of freedom. Thus, the rise in the natural mechanistic sciences in the West invariably entailed a deep conflict between the discourse of that sought to ensure a secure foundation to the notion of freedom and the impossibility of rejecting the picture of the mechanistic-world put forth by the natural sciences. This, for instance had already led to the call to reject the 'traditional' or 'dogmatic' mode of investigating the legitimacy and truths of our beliefs, as instantiated in the works of Bacon. However, philosophy in the West had also begun to see the rise of thought-schemas that aligned themselves within the phraseology of the mechanistic sciences by the seventeenth century as instantiated in the works of the so-called 'rationalists' of the modern period.[25] But it was in the works of the so-called 'empiricists' that philosophy adopted, not merely the phraseology of the positivistic sciences, but also its methodology. It is this alignment of philosophy with the natural sciences that saw the discourse on morality move precariously on the borderline of a deterministic system, barely managing to secure freedom. Bentham's Utilitarianism clearly manifests this tension. The Aristotelian idea of 'metaphysics' now takes a back

seat as the philosophical engagement with metaphysics gets to be indistinguishable from 'physics' under the banner of 'Natural Philosophy', and epistemological and moral inquiries get into the investigation of mechanical 'powers' and 'structures' of the mind leading to the development of a new domain of Psychology. It is in this moment of crisis that Kant explores the possibility of securing an independent domain for philosophy as a metaphysical inquiry. Kant's critical philosophy is an attempt to free the notion of 'autonomy' and 'freedom' from the realm of phenomena and to provide for it the securer grounds of the noumenal realm. This brief trajectory in the history of Ideas in the West is of cardinal importance to our concern here since this intervention of the Newtonian mechanistic world-view within the world of ideas posed a serious threat, and challenged the very nature and purpose of philosophy as the discourse to illuminate and provide ultimate truths. Thus, Kant's project of devising a scientific metaphysics, thereby securing an exclusive realm for the 'transcendental' that authenticates the purpose of philosophy, can be viewed as a response to this challenge, without in turn challenging the world-view presented by the Newtonian mechanistic vision of the world.

Looked at from this perspective, the acceptance of the marking of 'Indian philosophy' as 'spiritual' appears to be a well thought-out move since it provides the possibility of grounding philosophy elsewhere, as was perhaps seen by Radhakrishnan and Malkani, who were both well versed in the problems that plagued philosophy in the West.[26] Radhakrishnan's declaration in 1923 that 'Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual'[27] is thus not just an innocent characterization that follows Muller's emphasis of 'Indian Philosophy' as essentially grounded in the pursuit of 'mokṣa' as a product of leisure,[28] but is rather the opening up of the possibility of framing 'truth' within a discourse other than that of science within the complex epistemological and ontological structures of traditional Indian thought-schemas. The acceptance of the mark of 'spiritual' thus entailed that philosophy shared its ground with religion rather than with the natural sciences. Ewing, who attended the Silver Jubilee of IPC, perceptively remarks that he finds a ray of hope in philosophical thinking prevalent in India as it escapes the positivistic mode of thought that has plagued the West, since philosophers in India source their inspiration from Philosophy of Religion, rather than from the Philosophy of Science.[29] Further, one can now appreciate the mode in which the early Anglophone philosopher in India upheld the spiritual nature of the Indian thought-schemas in

the context of their engagement with the question of *novelty*. The discourse concerning the notion of 'novelty' in the West[30] understood it as a discovery that presented a new relation amongst shared elements of our understanding about the world of experience. In this sense, novelty consisted in an assertion of a relation between entities that was hitherto unnoticed and un-asserted, though the claimed relationship between the elements had *always been there*. Since 'novelty' in natural science was construed to be of this nature, and thus, if philosophy shared its grounds with science, then novelty in philosophy too would have to be of this nature. Further, 'rationality' in the West was beginning to be defined in terms of such discoveries that would in turn cater to the idea of the 'progress' of a discourse. But a claim asserting that the very ground of philosophy differs from that of science allowed for a legitimate response to the assertion of 'stagnancy' and 'lack of progress' of traditional Indian thought-schemas by simply pointing out that those notions of 'novelty' and 'progress' did not apply to the discourse that is philosophy. Akhilalanda's review article clearly highlights the awareness that the Anglophone thinkers had pertaining to the peculiarity of the question concerning 'novelty' that was brought in by the dominance of the Newtonian mechanistic science. The mechanistic paradigm heralded in the West confined the world of philosophical discourse to the realm of experience. Hence, traditional Indian thought-schemas, whose domain essentially engaged with a realm that transcended it, could never really be seen as progressive in that light. Thus, for asserting a legitimate claim of novelty and progress, early Anglophone Indian philosophers too made an attempt to secure an autonomous domain for philosophical discourse which would free it from the binding notions of scientific progress and novelty. Though one can, from the privileged position of the present, question the necessity of this responsive engagement of the Anglophone thinkers of the period with the question of science, yet within the colonial spirit of the time, this was seen as necessary for the defence of the legitimacy of the pre-eminent pursuit of 'ultimate truth' as propounded by the traditional Indian thought-schemas. Since 'reason' was held to be synonymous with the progress of science in the West, the Indian concern with *mokṣa,* which provided it its distinctive feature of spirituality, also placed it at odds with reason itself. Indian Philosophy, which by virtue of its orientation transcended the world that could be accessed through the tools of either 'reason' or experience, therefore called for the securing of a distinct domain and a distinct tool.[31] Towards this end, one can

better appreciate the efforts of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya whose philosophical engagement assumed the form of an investigation into the contrasting nature of science and philosophy to argue for a distinct *telos,* and therefore, a distinct domain for philosophy. Thus when seen within the larger context of the question of 'novelty' and 'progress', one gets a clearer picture of the perspective that lay beneath the unwavering efforts of the earlier Anglophone Indian thinkers to defend the spiritualistic nature of philosophy, as well as their upholding of 'introspection' as a distinct cognitive tool, over and above those of sense experience and reason.[32] A similar sentiment is reflected in the thoughts of Nawab Mehdi Yarin, a contemporary of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, in his Welcome Address to the 15th session of IPC held in Hyderabad in 1939.[33] It is in the light of this alternative mode of arguing for the possibility of 'novelty' within the traditional Indian thought-schemas that this enigmatic acclaiming of 'spirituality' as a distinctive mark of Indian Philosophy gathers appreciative force. We qualify this force as 'appreciative' since it subverts the very stigmatic mark within a power structure and turns it, with astute clarity, into a defensive tool.[34] It is also in this light that one can interpret the 'missionary spirit'[35] that shapes G.R. Malkani's Presidential Address delivered during the twenty-fourth IPC held at Patna in 1949, where he defends the persistence in the so-called traditional preoccupations of Indian philosophy with the pursuit of eternal truth within its *spiritual telos.* Overtaken by this missionary spirit for the cause of philosophy in India, Malkani addresses the contention regarding the stagnancy and un-progressive character of Indian philosophy, more directly. Reflecting upon the alleged stagnancy prevalent in the 'field of philosophic creativeness' in India, he admits the loss of an *ideal of truth* during the interim period of 'political subjection' that is necessarily presupposed by traditional Indian though-schemas as a guide in the pursuit of philosophical activity.[36] One cannot miss the soft but emphatic underlining by Malkani of the fact that this political subjection empowers, what is otherwise a superfluous and erroneous ideal of the West of 'pure scientific reason' to become an influence to reckon with. Malkani holds that within the prevalent structure of power, such is the influence of this Western ideal that it has managed to make us believe in the binary opposition between discourses related to religion as representing Indian scholarship, and the discourse on modern science as representing the scholarship of the West. Malkani finds this equation between religion and ancient Indian scholarship problematic not because this equation does not hold. His discomfort

rather lies in his positive conviction that the West fails to realize that it is precisely because 'Indian philosophy' is rooted in ancient Indian religion that it is more philosophical and grounded in the lived-experience than is science with its ideal of 'pure abstract reason'. However, the crux of his argument is that even if this transition in ideals is granted, and if we do dismiss the ideal inspired by ancient religious thoughts of India to be no more in vogue, the question about the ideal that philosophy as a discipline of inquiry should aim for, would still persist. Hence Malkani's stance is to probe further into this question of the ideals that *ought* to guide the *telos* of philosophical inquiry and whether they can be conflated with the ideal that guides science. For Malkani, the cardinal concern thus transforms into a question pertaining to the nature of truth that the philosophical inquiry *ought* to be in pursuit of, in contrast to the truths that natural sciences pursue. Malkani holds that scientific ideals mould themselves around a notion of truth that is held to be 'probable and practical'[37] in nature, while philosophical inquiries are invariably in search of absolute truths, notwithstanding their differences among themselves regarding the nature of these truths. Thus, he holds that philosophical and scientific truths serve different purposes and aspects of life. For Malkani, inherent in the hypothetical nature of scientific truths, is the fact that they can only serve the practical ends of life such as gaining control over the environment and nature. On the other hand, philosophical truths are meant to serve a higher end of the *spirit* that dwell in higher levels of life. In other words, Malkani's argument implies that whatever be the nature of truth that we attribute to philosophy, this truth will come to guide our lives, in the sense that philosophy and life inspire each other. In this respect, the full blown entailment of Malkani's position is that confusing the nature of scientific truth with the nature of philosophic truth, and the equating of the philosophic pursuit of truth with mere reasoning will ultimately result in a life that is in abject poverty in terms of its *telos.*

Malkani further argues that the idea of progress that is rooted in the scientific attitude is occasioned by its ideal of 'reason' that is disassociated from life.[38] In other words, Malkani asks, can philosophical truth appear progressive if it is rooted in the *telos* of life and is inspired by it? That is to ask, can life take radically new forms when the absolute truth remains constant? Malkani admits that though absolute truth as the orientation of philosophic life cannot give rise to radically new forms periodically, this does not imply that absolute truth always takes the form of religion such as in

Advaita Vedānta, which was the predominant philosophical thinking during his period. Rather, the ways in which we come to 'appreciate' and experience absolute truth vary with the change of times, so that it may come to acquire a form of dialogue with science, due to the predominant influence it has in the present age.[39] Nonetheless, Malkani maintains that this should not lead one to conflate the nature of philosophic truth with that of scientific truth.

Likewise, A.C. Mukerji's Presidential Address to the IPC in 1950, explicitly gestures towards a stance that is adopted in order to respond to the allegations prevalent about Indian scholarship in philosophy of its failure to contribute anything novel to the fields of epistemology and metaphysics due to stagnancy and redundancy prevalent in its domain of ideas.[40] Mukerji expresses a concern that the question of 'novelty' that has come to be forced upon the traditional fields of philosophical inquiry has had a devastating result in so far as the concern for 'truth' has been subjugated by the concern for novelty in a bid to acquire a 'modern form'.[41] Mukerji perceives this superficiality to be a debilitating influence upon Indian traditional scholarship and argues that we should, in contrast, encourage ourselves to 'resolutely and boldly' continue in the traditional mode of knowledge production in the respective fields of epistemology and metaphysics. Therefore, what follows is an appeal, as much as a justification for his 'allegiance to the old method' and perspectives that consisted of such engagement in Indian philosophical scholarship.[42] Thus, Mukerji chooses to analyse the 'new orientation'[43] in the field of epistemology and metaphysics that holds the dawn of a 'new insight' into the understanding of reality as being synonymous with 'progress' or a philosophical advancement. He deems such a construal of 'advancement' to be disastrous if this craze for novelty is taken to entail a complete discontinuity from the initiatives of the past inquiries. No novelty, Mukerji holds, could be detached from the old theories for

> ...paradoxical as it may appear, a total discontinuity between a new theory and the old would render its critical weapons totally ineffective against the latter. To put it from the other side, the underlying unity and continuity of views is the very reason why they come into clash...[44]

For Mukerji, if novelty is not seen in the light of this relation that the 'new' must bear with the past, then it comes to assume a form that is driven by a personal initiative to depart from the past. He avers that

> ... [the] assumption is disastrous for it promotes an unhealthy craze

for originality and encourages a sort of dilettantish attitude to the achievements of the past. Personal initiative is, no doubt, a great virtue in philosophy...but...when completely divorced from an intelligent appropriation of the heritage of the past...is ill-suited for furthering the cause of truth.[45]

Mukerji contends that the West has always conceived Philosophy as an activity that was presumed to operate with a natural predisposition towards the 'speculative impulse'[46] that hinges upon creating 'aberrations' from the preceding history of thought as is evident through Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel. Or, in other words, as Mukerji holds, the West has held the belief that to attribute the character of progress or novelty to the discourse of philosophy, one has to arrange the epochs of philosophical thought in historical order and establish that a specific philosophical activity has necessarily displaced the preceding tradition of thought and has departed from it considerably.

Mukerji's concern, it can be observed, is not with the criterion that can be deemed as a yardstick to measure novelty. Rather in tune with Malkani, it is about novelty's relation with truth itself. That is to say, the question about novelty could also have been addressed by seeking a redefinition of the yardstick to measure it. The path chosen by Malkani and Mukerji to forge a relationship between the questions of truth and novelty can be arguably seen as the crystallization of the perspectival approach of the early Anglophone Indian philosophers in a bid to demarcate a distinct identity for 'Indian Philosophy'. These early Anglophone Indian philosophers, who can be classified as the Traditionalists[47] choose, given the demand of the hour, to partake and own the emergent appellation called 'Indian Philosophy', by identifying the relation between truth and traditional Indian though-schemas within a distinctive realm of the 'spiritual'. In other words, they adopted an attitude that takes a step aside, a way of detour, in addressing the question about novelty that is identified as being absent from the Indian philosophical discourse, by instead probing into the equation between novelty and truth. In other words, these thinkers sought to present 'Indian philosophy' primarily as an activity in the pursuit of a 'distinct kind of truth' from that of science. This enabled them to recast the emergent perception regarding philosophy's relation to novelty in a way that made the scientific ideal of 'progress' as adopted by the thought-schemas of the West appear as misplaced.

However as anticipated by Malkani, this mode of addressing the question of 'novelty' by securing an independent realm for the

discourse that is philosophy, and thereby securing for it an exclusive relation to a notion of truth that is inaccessible to the insights of the discourse of natural sciences, faces a distinct problem. The problem can be formulated as follows. Suppose we do grant the securing of a domain that is distinct from the realm with which science is engaged, and thereby, also allow for a distinct and exclusive nature of truth disclosed by philosophy, then we would consequently have to grant a distinct notion of 'novelty' and 'progress' to the realm of philosophy. But then, a question pertaining to the nature of this novelty and progress within this distinctive realm of philosophy would arise. Since truth in this realm is held to be absolute and hence impervious to change, the relation of the discourse to that of truth within the realm of philosophy could only differ in terms of its disclosure and in the stylistic structures adopted for its rendition. This would make novelty a matter of method and style. Hermeneutical understanding, in that case, would have to confine itself to mere rhetoric.

It is in light of this challenge, that one sees the efforts of P.T. Raju's[48] whose works can be categorized as marking a transition from the strict Traditionalists' view to the non-Traditionalistic ones as seen in works of later thinkers like Matilal, Mohanty and Daya Krishna. Addressing the idea of progress in Indian philosophy, Raju carries over the concerns that the Traditionalists were occupied with, such as the perception that the ultimate goal of philosophy was the pursuit of ultimate truth and that this was synonymous with ultimate reality. Nonetheless, he develops a dual temporal structure of time, that underlines that the understanding and contemplation upon this timeless eternal truth has to relate 'time' itself to the 'life of the time', and can only be legitimately expressed as the 'life of the time reflecting upon itself'.[49] This perception of philosophy implies that while the ultimate reality to be uncovered remains the same for all *darśanas* of Indian traditions as well as for those who seek it through Western philosophy, the way we apprehend this reality may vary from tradition to tradition and from time to time. Hence to the question, whether there is progress in (Indian) philosophy Raju provides an ambivalent answer. He would thus affirm progress to the extent that we do not confuse progress in philosophy with the progress of truth itself, though our 'understanding'[50] of this same eternal truth can vary from age to age. Thus progress can be celebrated in terms of this variance in the understanding of the truth, where this variance will come to express itself through different concepts. Under the ambit of the postulate of a universal truth that is indifferent to the mundane division of the East and

the West, the significance of Raju's move lies in the mode in which he posits the flourishing of new concepts within our discourse-both eastern as well as western-scientific as well as religious, as nothing more than the mere expression of the variance in the understanding of the universal truth by virtue of the grounds through which one is attempting to grasp it. The adoption of such a spatio-temporal frame of understanding the eternal truth allows P.T. Raju to link his conceptual scheme with science. This allows him to easily blend it with the non-Traditionalists opposition to the fixity of tradition. Raju's perception about science is not that it is the predominant mode of conceptualising truth in the modern age; rather he makes the subversive assertion that 'scientific thought'[51] is the mode in which 'time' leaves its imprint upon thought *here and now*, in this historical epoch. Given the scientific spirit of contemporary times, philosophical thought invariably has to relate itself to the scientific one in order to assume the spirit of contemporaneity. Implicit in his advocacy of science as the mode of contemporaneity is his belief that scientific thought is representative of Western philosophical thinking as such. It is this conflating of the connotation of these two terms, that is 'science' and 'western philosophy', that allows him to declare the need of a comparative framework of doing philosophy, where Indian philosophical activity should feel obliged to compare and relate itself with the Western thought-schemas. He writes,

> The student of Indian philosophy is therefore under the special obligation of bringing Indian thought into line with the Western...We should see not only similarities but also differences between Western and Indian thinkers and should study these similarities and differences systematically.[52]

For Raju, this comparative framework is a way of revoking the Traditionalists' belief that the ultimate truth is a revelation unmediated by reason through either *nididhyāsana*, or *aparokṣānubhūti*, and amounts to 'empty speculation'.[53] He therefore rejects the possibility of treating it as a mode to assert the superiority of one discourse over the other.

This concern with revoking the *telos* of the philosophy-truth framework that insistently tried to re-define philosophy around this equation, had also another objective or task at hand. As opposed to the Traditionalists who were defensive of the 'spiritual' aspects of Indian philosophy, and thus stood in an uneasy relation with the discourse of science, the non-Traditionalist is confronted with a task of developing a counter-view that treats Indian philosophy to be of

'antiquarian interest',[54] which had quarantined Indian philosophy as the subject matter of Indologists, Orientalists, and Philologists. P.T. Raju observes, there was a similar tug-of-war going on between Indian history and archaeology on the question whether Indian historical material belongs to the legitimate concern of archaeologists, or if it is still of any contemporary value.[55] It is to counter this trend of classifying Indian thought systems to be of mere antiquarian interest, that Raju argues for the comparative framework in order to reconstruct Indian thought 'according to certain scientific methods borrowed from Western philosophy, so as to bring it into 'close contact with modern life'.[56] In other words, his effort consisted of affirming life to traditional Indian thought-schemas, which otherwise was deemed dead, precisely by revisiting the past, much in tune with Mukerji, from the historical position of the *now.*

In a similar vein, Matilal also writes, 'The age of my material seems to justify a philological treatment, whereas the content of the material pleads for use of philosophy'.[57] Defending Matilal's thesis, Mohanty overrules the view held by Western canonical thinkers such as Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger et al., who held that Indian thinking lacks theory and conceptual orientation.[58] Thus, the non-Traditionalists who attempt to resurrect Indian thinking from the realm of antiquarian interest find themselves to be endorsing 'comparative philosophy' as a counter step. Moreover, as opposed to the philologists' and the indologists', who mostly refer to this corpus in its original form in Sanskrit, the philosophers' interest in the same material, set them apart due to their articulation in English. Thus, the choice of the English language as the medium of expression cannot merely be seen as a mode of assuring a pseudo proximity to power, but is rather to be construed as a methodological tool of differentiation. This linguistic advantage of philosophising in English made them readily embrace the comparative framework as the sole platform that would set them apart from the antiquarian interest in the same. Hence for both Matilal and Mohanty, the comparative method of philosophy is unavoidable for a modern Indian philosopher who invests himself or herself in extending the trajectory of thought from ancient philosophical traditions of India. As Mohanty puts it, comparative philosophy is the only way to dissolve and 'cut across East-West dichotomy'.[59] Language, for Matilal as well, becomes both the bridge that could 'initiate a dialogue between the ancient Sanskrit classical philosophers and the modern [Indian] philosophers', while at the same time bridging the temporal gap of providing the dialogue with a spirit of talking to contemporaries, rather than to

the dead thoughts of dead people.[60] Thus for Matilal, the notion of 'contemporaneity' provides a mode of bridging the temporal gap between the past and the present and thereby, allows contemporary Indian philosophers to distance themselves from the concerns of the indologists and the philologists. It is crucial to note here, that the optimistic heralding of comparative philosophy is predicated on the underlying belief that comparisons can only take place between systems that are commensurable and thus theoretically at par. This belief, as we shall see later, acts as the originary grounds for the paradigm of a universal discourse.

The question of novelty in the context of post-colonialism

Murty very aptly portrays the post-colonial experience of the post-colonial philosopher when he writes:

> Contemporary Free India seems to present to many Western people a phenomenon difficult to comprehend. They have been taught to believe that the Indian genius is predominantly mystical, that traditions in India endure for centuries without change... Indian scholars themselves in their works often gave their readers the impression that India cared only for things spiritual, that renunciation, detachment, and moksa... were the themes which formed the core of the Indian Way of Life. The sub-conscious inferiority complex of the older generation of Indian scholars made them assert the superiority of Indian culture over Western at least in that respect... the almost exclusive emphasis which both European and Indian scholars placed on the *sastras* concerned only with nirvana and mokṣa were responsible for this. If Kautilya, Brahma Gupta, Varahamihiri, Caraka, and Vatsyayana had received as much attention as the writers of Upanisads, the Buddha and Sankara from competent European and Indian scholars, the picture of India in both modern Western and Eastern minds would have been different....[sic][61]

As stated in the very introductory paragraph of this article, the position of respectability that was secured for the claim that every philosophical position or concept has its originary grounds in the *zeitgeist* or the spirit of the time, has led to a much more radical and critical reading of the early Anglophone Indian philosophers' engagement with the question of novelty. The fact of the absence of the colonial *other,* in a sense, left a vacuum in the very structure of philosophical engagement that made it even more arduous to follow the trajectory that philosophical discourse had been given thus far. Further, by the second half of the twentieth century, the celebratory spirit of the natural sciences was on the wane resulting in

a general disenchantment with the very idea of 'progress' it offered, especially after the experiences of the two world wars. Though, this saw a rise in the projection of 'Indian philosophy' with its humanistic and spiritualistic approach as an alternative to the paradigm of progress as upheld by the West, it also saw a fresh move from other Anglophone Indian thinkers who found themselves in a fresh, and a distinct position of 'freedom' in the second half of the twentieth century. For the latter group, the availability of a fresh ground translated into a critical opposition towards the perspective that sought to protect and defend a set of perceptions that had come to be associated with the spirit of 'Indian philosophy'. The question regarding the nature of 'Indian philosophy', now positioned itself in independence of the demands of the nationalist movement. The Traditionalists' perception, which aligned itself with the views of the early Indologists', came to constitute the Orientalists' discourse which identified certain absences as characteristic of the stagnation of oriental civilisations. This new set of radical Anglophone Indian thinkers was no longer academically obliged to espouse the cause of the hallowed and consolidated notion of 'Indian Philosophy'. Since they appear on the academic scene of India post-independence, no such ideological requirement weighed them down, and this granted them the freedom to be highly critical of the position upheld by the Traditionalists. In the hands of these post-nationalist thinkers, philosophical discourse tried to wriggle away from the image that 'Indian philosophy' had come to be circumstantially associated with. This very demand to move away entailed that they also had to move away from all the discourses that were cardinally shaped by the acceptance of the mark of 'spirituality' as the differentiating feature of 'Indian philosophy'. In this group of post-colonial thinkers we could count Daya Krishna, J. N. Mohanty and Rajendra Prasad who brought about a shift in the very mode of construing the engagement with traditional thought-schemas.

As J.N. Mohanty puts it, those thinkers who emerged in the post-colonial Indian scenario of academic philosophy,

> ...were looking for some way of doing Indian philosophy that would steer us clear of the paths that lay before us and with which many of us had already become disenchanted.[62]

In Mohanty and Matilal, one can clearly discern the urgency to dissociate from the philosophical trajectory provided by the Traditionalists who upheld the view that the hallmark of Indian philosophy is its practical orientation towards *mokṣa* that makes its

spiritual search culminate in the 'mystic intuition of truth'.[63] Thinkers such as Matilal, Mohanty, and Daya Krishna wanted to exorcise Indian philosophising of traditionalism and affirm its legitimate presence through the 'theoretical', 'analytical', 'logical' and 'intellectual' character in a bid to place Indian philosophy on an equal footing with that of the West.[64] In the context of the changed scenario, the emphasis thus, was now upon the value of equality rather than that of differentiation. In other words the defining *arche* of their engagement was to enable the participation of traditional Indian thought-schemas in a 'universal discourse'. It is this demand that presses Rajendra Prasad to emphatically insist on the distinction between 'Indian culture' and 'Indian philosophy'.[65] Prasad's insistence upon this distinction rests on the fact that while the former can legitimately claim a unique identity of 'Indianness', the latter must move away from all such claims of distinction in order to legitimately raise itself to the level of a universal discourse. Thus, the first concern at hand was to address and to undo the legitimacy of the claims of *peculiarity* upheld by the Traditionalists prior to them. It is towards this end that Daya Krishna's highly critical stance towards thinkers of the colonial period, who associated the purpose of philosophical activity with the attainment of *mokṣa,* makes calculative sense. Daya Krishna's plot is to trace the concept of *mokṣa* and to engage with it in such a way so as to show that the idea of *mokṣa,* if upheld as the pivotal concept grounding the mark of a spiritual *telos,* would culminate in redundant forms.[66] Daya Krishna argues that if it be the case that philosophy's task is merely to show the possibility of *mokṣa,* then it fails to project itself as an evolving discourse that continues its activities across centuries and into the modern age, since philosophy can then only be construed as merely 'apprehending the same possibility'.[67] In other words, Daya Krishna argues that within the Traditionalists' construal of philosophy, the sameness of the object that philosophy *ought* to concern itself with and pursue, namely *mokṣa,* makes the conception of Indian philosophy 'redundant',[68] as it fails to give an account of a 'progressive and evolutionary character'[69] of the concept of *mokṣa.* Daya Krishna's argument implies that the concept of *mokṣa* upheld by these thinkers as the one on which philosophy is grounded, lacks a scientific character, and rather comes to present itself as one constituted of an artistic nature. Thus, Daya Krishna's central argument against the Traditionalists was that if the activity of philosophy is tailored to serve any rigid *telos,* such as *mokṣa* (as construed by the Traditionalists), then philosophy can only be construed as a subjective pursuit of individuals over the ages; and

that philosophy as such possesses no 'autonomous validity' as such.[70]

But the stiff resistance towards the Traditionalists' paradigm and the need to move away from it is also grounded in the slow but steady realization that after all, the very acceptance of the unified label of 'Indian philosophy' was not an easy category to uphold, unless one conflated the unified whole to be Vedānta. Rajendra Prasad's reflections upon the Traditionalists' resistance towards the idea of progress probes into the presuppositions implicit in the views of Malkani, J.N. Chubb, R.C. Varadachari, Narasingh Narain, T.M.P. Mahadevan et al. He highlights the fact that the Traditionalists' defence of the spiritualistic aspect of Indian tradition, consciously or unconsciously, referred solely to the philosophical tradition of Vedānta in the form in which it came to be embraced by the nationalist movement. This appropriation which had its reasons then,[71] was however, seen by the radical thinkers of the post-colonial period as being detrimental to the project of engaging with the rich traditional Indian thought-schemas in the context of an independent India. As Rajendra Prasad argues, if on the one hand, the overwhelming attention garnered by Vedānta that was projected as *the* thought-schema during the period of colonial intervention came to heavily overshadow the other existing philosophical traditions, it on the other hand, underplayed the variegated nature of traditions that subsist on the Indian sub-continent that resisted a single homogenous classification under a category called 'Indian'.[72] However, for Prasad, it is not merely such constricted picture of 'Indian philosophy' that is problematic for the furthering or 'progress' of 'Indian philosophy' in contemporary times. Rather, any move to restrict the scope of the term 'Indian philosophy' to connote classical Indian traditions is itself a problem since it inevitably draws one to accept the parameters of philosophizing that is set by the boundaries of the tradition. In other words, for Rajendra Prasad, such a move would subsume the 'contemporary' firmly within the 'tradition'. For him such an imposed essential 'return to the tradition' translates into a mode of control that consequently results in the impossibility of any 'originality' of thought in contemporary philosophical engagements. He contends,

> ...it is wrong, too, to mean by Indian philosophy only ancient Indian philosophy. But, if the traditionalist is liberal enough to include in the Indian tradition all that genuinely forms a part of it, then, by requiring future developments to conform to it, he cannot exercise on them the kind of control he wants to, because, in that case, it would not be impossible to establish the concordance of any new theory with it.

'Originality', for Prasad, can emerge only when the intellectual

respect for one's tradition is not 'allowed to degenerate into uncritical devotion'[73] and opens the tradition to a critical appraisal. He holds that it is such timely critical appraisals that open up the possibility of 'our deep-seated convictions [to get...] challenged and well established beliefs questioned in a reasoned way [such that] we are forced to think afresh and make new departures in our intellectual journey'.[74] Thus for Prasad, philosophy finds its 'creative expressions' of originality[75] not in a 'return to the tradition' or in 'one's groundedness in it' but rather in the 'intellectual challenges' that emerge when the tradition is looked upon with a critical gaze that is due. Thus, in the context of a politically free India and the disenchantment with science with its ideal of scientific progress under question, the question of novelty gets subsumed under the correlated notion of 'originality of thought'. However, since the concept of 'originality' is seen as the mark of 'creative thinking'[76] itself, it no longer becomes the dominant pillar in the scaffolding erected for the project of the re-construction of the traditional modes of Indian though-schemas in the latter half of the twentieth century. The primordial concern that vexes the Anglophone philosopher in India now is the question of raising the traditional Indian thought-schemas to a 'universal discourse'. It is this paradigm of 'universal discourse' that draws the critics of the Traditionalists towards the complete downplaying of the epithet 'Indian' that prefixes the term 'philosophy' in the context of philosophical discourse in India. Thus, if the Traditionalists were geared towards providing a meaning to such a characterization of the traditional Indian thought-schemas in terms of the mark of 'spirituality', their critics, in stark contrast, takes this to be nothing more than a 'geographical label' that denotes the country where philosophical 'creative expression' sees the light.[77] It is also this project of aligning itself towards the paradigm of a 'universal discourse' that the question of language becomes a matter of contentious concern. Following Matilal, English was conceived both by Mohanty and Prasad, as a choice that would ease the process of dissociating the philosophical discourse that emerged in India from its 'cultural milieu' to a universal platform.[78] Though Mohanty does not conceive anything intrinsic to the English language as such that renders it a suitable medium for, constructing and engaging with, a 'universal discourse'; he nevertheless takes the 'historical contingency' of the situation that raises English as the most suitable medium for such a universal discourse as an undeniable fact. Since the critics of the traditionalists' discourse sought to re-present a rectified picture of the traditional Indian though-schemas to

scholars, both at home and abroad, and given their aspiration to place them within a paradigm of 'universal discourse', their choice of English as the medium of this re-presentation was a carefully crafted decision. It was a decision that was made well within the awareness of the power structures of the politics of language. Their choice of language was thus a choice that was not merely incidental to the larger landscaping of 'Indian philosophy', but was rather cardinal to their very project of 'universalizing' the traditional Indian thought-schemas into a position of a 'universal discourse'.[79]

Towards a seeming conclusion

Let us return to the question of 'novelty'. The Anglophone Indian philosopher's engagement with the notion of novelty can be read as emerging during the colonial times, in a trajectory that sought to secure an autonomous domain for philosophy vis-à-vis the natural sciences. This being so, the early Anglophone Indian philosophers were tightly framed within their own historical position of colonialism. Thus, 'Indian philosophy' in their hands, seems to recede into the ideology of the nationalistic discourse, which was undeniably the overarching spirit of the times.[80] In contrast, the positioning of traditional Indian thought-schemas within the broader framework of 'universal discourse' in the hands of the critics of Traditionalism, is precisely an attempt to distance the traditional Indian thought-schemas from such an ideology of the nationalistic discourse and project it in terms of a more universal or/and 'secular' trajectory that is devoid of any constrictive 'cultural traits'. However, the absence of the ideology of the nationalistic discourse in the deliberations on the nature of traditional Indian thought-schemas in the writings of Daya Krishna, Mohanty and Prasad cannot be read as an ideological vacuity, for a closer reading of their critiques of the Traditionalists disclose that their proposed paradigm of philosophy as a 'universal discourse' itself emerges within the new global ideology of 'contemporaneity'. Daya Krishna contends that,

> Indian Philosophy will come alive only when it is seen to be a living stream of thinkers who have grappled with difficult problems that are, philosophically, as alive today as they were in the ancient past. Indian philosophy will become contemporarily relevant only when it is conceived as philosophy proper.[81]

It is evident that for Daya Krishna, the death of 'Indian philosophy' is inalienably related to its inability to portray itself within the

paradigm of contemporaneity. For him, this failure on the part of Indian philosophy is due to the fact that

> ...it hardly forms a part of the philosophical climate of today- not even in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle form a part-not even in India, where at least, it may legitimately be expected to be so.[82]

Daya Krishna asserts that,

> ...the fault for all this lies squarely on the shoulders of all those who have written on the subject and tried to create the impression that Indian philosophy is not philosophy proper, but something else- something they regard as more profound, but certainly not the sort of thing which goes under that name today.[83]

Mohanty and Prasad, who also align themselves with Daya Krishna's vehement rejection of the modality in which the Traditionalists projected 'Indian philosophy' under the rubric of 'spirituality', bring to light a fundamental belief that underlies this rejection: namely, that it is only when a tradition finds itself to be in dialogue with a thinker of the past, as a contemporary rather than a dead soul, that it comes to mark itself as being contemporary to the time. One can thus read Mohanty's effort to redefine the notion of tradition by subtly dissociating its meaning from the notion of 'orthodoxy' and aligning it with the notion of 'modernity', thereby side stepping the problem of novelty in Indian philosophical thought.[84] But we must realise that this side-stepping is only a move to replace the concept of 'novelty' with that of 'contemporaneity' as a cardinal notion that 'mediates' between tradition and modernity.[85] Thus, one can observe a shift in the post-colonial thinkers' mode of characterizing 'Indian philosophy' as equipped to engage with the concerns of 'contemporariness', in which the question of 'novelty' gets translated into a notion of 'relevance'. After all, notwithstanding the vagueness that surrounds the notion of 'contemporaneity', the notion, minimally speaking, is suggestive of a discourse as being present to the time in which it emerges. In that respect, so to speak, a discourse that is contemporary must have within its reach the concerns of the present time, whatever those concerns be. This belief is what comes to be foregrounded in the critiques of the Traditionalists' positioning of philosophy. While the Traditionalists resisted adopting the Western definition of philosophy by taking an introspective turn into the *telos* of philosophical pursuit and its equation with 'truth', their critics like Daya Krishna, Mohanty, and Prasad, adhered to the Western construal of 'secular' philosophy by trying to uncover

the non-spiritual dimensions of Indian philosophical corpus so that it can talk to a global and a contemporary *other*. Thus, while both the 'traditionalists', as well as their 20th century critics, aimed at positioning the philosophy as pursued in India as a relevant mode of philosophizing, their respective engagements prodded them into exploring two different modes of commitments. While the Traditionalists highlighted the aspect where the discourse itself seeks to interpretatively engage with the 'contemporary' through their engagement with the then concern of 'novelty' and the position of philosophy, the latter thinkers take the 'contemporary' as regulating the interpretative aspect of the discourse itself. After all, it must be foregrounded that the pivotal position secured by the notion of 'contemporaneity' is itself rooted in the loss of faith in framing philosophical pursuit as a quest for essential truths that transcends our experienced everydayness. The critics of Traditionalists have a viable philosophical engagement in the broader background of contemporaneity, precisely because the framing of philosophical engagement as the mode to uncover 'ultimate truths' dissolves within the broad philosophical scenario by the late twentieth century.

However, what we seek to emphasize is that, notwithstanding the differences, the critics of Traditionalists positioning of philosophy nevertheless share a common point of anchor, namely, the 'tradition'. That is to say both the Traditionalists, as well as their critics, are in agreement with the givenness of a 'tradition that could be legitimately called 'Indian'. The primary difference between the two can be said to revolve around the mode of presenting the tradition, and the ways in which interpretative measures come to play in the respective modes of presenting the tradition. We must not lose sight of the fact that what defines the 'contemporaneity' of a discourse within the framework of the critiques of traditionalism is precisely the mode in which we relate to our tradition. Thus, Daya Krishnan's efforts can be seen as mode of interpreting the tradition in fresher lights, where the quotient of 'freshness' is dependent upon the modality in which the tradition can be appropriated within the present times through dimensions of the traditions that were either supressed, or ignored, by the Traditionalists.

In other words, what we are suggesting is the urgency to reflect upon the historical positioning of the emergence of our obsession with being 'adequately contemporary' or what amounts to the same as being 'relevant'. The question, what is it to do 'Indian philosophy' in the twenty-first century, is not a question that either the Traditionalists or their critics like Daya Krishna, Mohanty, or

Prasad can provide a foundation for us to answer. After all, the critics
of the traditionalists' representation of 'Indian philosophy' merely
paves the way for us to reinterpret Indian philosophy or enables us to
rewrite its trajectory and the mode in which we understand them in
alternative and broader ways. Mohanty's *Classical Indian Philosophy*,[86]
for instance, is a case in point. But unless we take philosophy to be an
interpretative effort of rewriting the history of ideas, we would have
to face an even more pressing challenge, namely, what do we do
with these interpretations. By and large, philosophical engagements
carried out under the label of 'Indian philosophy', both at the
hands of the Traditionalists, as well as their critics, have nevertheless
been an engagement that seeks to either present or re-present
precisely what constitutes the traditional Indian thought-schemas,
in terms of the content as well as its form. Though the critics of the
Traditionalists position does provide us with a broader alternative,
or what Daya Krishna labels as the 'field theory', perspective of
the traditional Indian though-schemas, they do not, however, tell
us how this broader perspective is 'contemporary' or 'relevant' to
the times. That is a task that is left open and unaddressed, unless,
as we stressed before, we come to equate philosophical activity with
the penning down of the history of ideas or providing the sketches
of the conceptual contours of the traditional thought-schemas.
'Contemporaneity' in the critiques, at least explicitly in Daya
Krishna's critique of Traditionalism, is portrayed in terms of the
cleansing of the picture of 'Indian philosophy' from any 'theological
hangover',[87] which though makes us aware that the notion of
'contemporariety' is 'secular' but nevertheless fails to throw much
light on what we ought to do with such 'secular' philosophical
pictures. Of course, Daya Krishna would tell us that this engagement
with the tradition, is not exegetical as we seem to depict it here,
and that such an engagement with the tradition is inevitable since,
'...thinking is a process that...is not solitary, individual monadic
exercise but rather the joint undertaking of a community of
visible and invisible persons... [and is]...an unfinished process,
unfinishable in principle'.[88] This is, however, suggestive of the idea
that philosophical perplexities transcend the specificities of space
and time as well as the specificities of the individual who is engaged
with them, and thus are universal in their essential nature. Such a
suggestion is inevitable given the adherence to the paradigm of a
'universal discourse' and hence the unquestionable need to write
Indian philosophy in English. However, to uphold such a position
is to burden the intricate relationship between the questions 'what

is Indian philosophy?' and, 'what is it to *do* Indian philosophy in the present times?' by suggesting that an answer to one of them would dissolve the other question. It is precisely the non-demarcation between these two questions as demanding distinct justifications and orientations that allows the critics of Traditionalism to position their critiques as a mode of 'doing' Indian philosophy, when in fact they are more broadly engaged with *showing* what 'Indian philosophy' truly is when rescued from the Traditionalists' clutches.

However, that said, the critics of the traditionalists' positioning of history of Indian thought-schemas had, at the least, a legitimate concern, namely, to undo the singular and the imputed erroneous representation of 'Indian philosophy' in the hands of the Traditionalists. It is this reconfiguration of the contours of 'Indian philosophy' that still renders their philosophical endeavour as a meaningful contribution towards understanding the traditional Indian thought-schemas. On the other hand, we, who are now equipped with the broader horizon of the tradition as sketched in these critiques, must appropriately address the question of what this reinterpretation entails for us. It is for this reason that we must treat with due seriousness the questions as to, 'what is it to *do* Indian philosophy in the twenty-first century?' and 'to whom is Indian philosophy addressing itself to?' The latter is in fact a question that demands a conscious attention to the concerns towards which philosophical activity ought to gear itself. The notion of 'contemporaneity' after all is informed by the nature of concerns that a discourse attunes itself to. It is only against the horizon of these twin questions that we can seek to meaningfully engage with question of the trajectory of 'Indian philosophy' in the present times.

Notes

  * We are grateful for the reviewer's critical comments.
1. Dhirendra Mohan Datta. 'Modern Indian Philosophy: Its Needs and its Social Role', in *Indian Philosophy and History*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996. p. 221.
2. *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Rawat Publications. 2001. p. 13.
3. It is no wonder then that it is only within such a privileging of the *everydayness*, where the everydayness has within its own bounds the power and the structure to constitute, regulate and explain itself, that a discipline like Sociology emerges and flourishes from the late Nineteenth century. In this respect, both Marx and Weber, irrespective of the distinct thought-schemas with which they approach everydayness, agree nevertheless that the everydayness must be explored within its own boundaries. For instance, faced with the enigmatic contours of the everydayness of the modern age and the fundamental problems encountered

therein, both Marx and Weber sought to understand these experiences in terms of relations that were rooted in the *past*. They thus sought the historical positioning of the everydayness rather than seeking to locate it in relation to a realm that transcended it. They both exemplify, and in a significant mode, the faith upon the immanence of the explanatory structures of our lived-world by firmly positioning their explanatory models within the schema of a historical positioning of the everydayness itself. Thus, within Sociology, though Weber's approach towards everydayness is in terms of an interpretative historical positioning of the intellectual and religious structures in contrast to the materialistic approach of Marx, both nevertheless, in their approaches manifest a faith in the immanent explanatory powers found within the bounds of the everydayness itself.

4. The smothering of 'critical philosophy' to its death, notably in the mode in which Kant, and following him Husserl, ardently upheld, echoes the celebration of the triumph of immanent explanatory structures over those that transcend the *everydayness*.

5. The recent projects that re-investigate the philosophical activity of our colonial past have, at the least, taken two forms. The first is constituted by those that probe into the reasons for negligence that is prevalent in Indian scholarship of philosophy that was produced during the colonial period, which then paves the way to the recovery of the works that was produced in this era from its moth eaten form. For instance, Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield's attempt falls within this category; see Nalini Bhushan and Jay L.Garfield, (ed.) *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence,* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2011. The second mode engages with these works thus recovered by re-imagining and re-envisioning the universe of this academic discourse, so as to build the fabric for engaging in the philosophical activity during the colonial period, and relating it to the present. Raghuramaraju's works have nudged the current scholarship to critically engage with the philosophical discourse of the colonial past in order to more meaningfully engage with the present; see, A. Raghuramaraju, *Philosophy and India: Ancestors, Outsiders, and Predecessors,* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2013. Also see S. Deshpande, *Philosophy in Colonial India,* New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015.

6. *Recent Indian Philosophy: Papers Selected from the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925-1934,* Vol. I. (ed.) Kalidas Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers. 1963. p. viii.

7. The label 'Indian philosophy' enabled a large majority of Western scholars to treat the term 'Indian' not as a descriptive term, but rather as a term that qualifies a discourse as philosophy by measuring it against the 'Western' paradigm of what it is to 'philosophize'. For a detailed elaboration upon this distinction, see P. G. Jung, 'The Road Not Taken: Mathrani's Wittgensteinian Quest for Transformation of Philosophy' in *Philosophy in Colonial India.* (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. pp. 167-69 (pp. 165-193)

8. Satchidananda Murty, reminds us that '...in ancient India, at one time philosophy (ānvīkṣki) was conceived as the rational, critical and illuminating review of the contents of theology, economics and political science and also as the right instrument and foundation of all action and duty, which helped one to achieve intellectual balance and behavioural competence (*prajñāvākyakrīyāvaiśāradya*)...

But unfortunately over the centuries this conception receded due to the domination of the darśana-concept of philosophy as essentially ontology and metaphysics conducive to liberation.' See *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*. Delhi: ICPR. 1985. p. 173.

9. Troy Wilson Organ, was acutely aware of violence that the term 'Indian Philosophy' does to the traditional Indian thought-schemas precisely because it seeks to trap these thought-schemas as a counterpart to Western Philosophy. As a cautionary remark he lists eleven possible terms that could all be used to signify a discourse as philosophical within the Indian traditional thought-schemas, namely, 'dṛṣṭi, darśana, tattva-jñāna, viveka-jñāna, ānvīkṣakī, adhyātma-vidyā, prajñā , bodhā,, sādhana , anu-īkṣakī, mata.' (pp. 17-18). See *Western Approaches to Eastern Philosophy*. Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1975.

10. Max Muller. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Associated Publishing House. 1973. (First published, 1899). p. v.

11. Ibid. Further it is this linear evolutionary approach that is clearly carried forward by Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy,* though he grants a much larger space in his work to the period before the rise of the systems of Indian thought. Hiriyana and Dutta are much closer to Muller in so far as their minimalistic treatment of other Indian thought-schemas, apart from the 'systems of thought', is concerned. Hiriyana's chapter title 'Transition to the Systems' in his *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,* is a clear indicator of Muller's influence. But what is of importance is the fact that these books were readings prescribed for 'Indian Philosophy' both in the East as well as the West and 'Indian Philosophy' came to seen as synonymous with 'the Systems of thought' by the second half of the twentieth century.

12. *Indian Philosophy.* (Vol.I & II), London: George Allen & Unwin ltd. 1923.

13. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1993. (First Published, 1932); Also, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin ltd. 1949.

14. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Dutta. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. 1960.

15. It must be emphasized that the 'West' then largely meant the prevalent traditions and thinkers taught, or in vogue, in English speaking countries, in Oxford and Cambridge in particular.

16. K. Satchidananda Murthy provides a brief, but lucid and informed, account of these terms and the periods that they were in vogue in his, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, ICPR. In this regard, especially see pp. 3-9; 173, which informs the specific claim made by us here.

17. It is also a similar spirit of cultural defense that roots the birth of *Arya Samaj* in the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, it must be noted that though both the *Brahmo* as well as the *Arya Samaj* were deeply entrenched within the Hindu cultural folds, unlike the *Brahmo Samaj*, which remained a clear fortification against Evangelic forces, the latter, at least in U.P., Bengal and Punjab, was also appropriated as a defense against the Islamic faith with an explicit claim of the superiority of the Vedic religion.

18. Tilak, for instance, following Max Muller, clearly accepts the inseparability of philosophy and religion in the context of Indian thought-schemas. Further, Radhakrishnan's explicit spiritualistic rendition of 'Indian philosophy' had a profound impact upon this characterization since he was almost identified

as one of the most prominent faces of 'Indian philosophy'. Moreover, even a cursory glance at the articles and reviews that were written beginning in the late 19th and going up to the latter half of the 20th century, show the highlighting of this aspect in a celebratory tone to assert the relevance of 'Indian philosophy' to the West as such.

19. Of course, it could be added here that the grounding of the philosophical reflections as well as religious doctrines within the ambit of the same corpus of Texts might have further helped in blurring the distinction, but to conflate the two on the basis of a singular ground would be to confuse metaphysical reflections within the ambit of theology with religion itself.

20. William Jones, notwithstanding his contributions, is a clear fore-runner of this legacy. Though he did attach an intrinsic value to the study of Asiatic cultures given his 'universal philosophy' where Asiatic philosophy is deemed integral to its history, his motivating force was to explore the reasons behind the 'inferiority of the Asiatic nations'.

21. See, Michael Gottlob, (ed.) 'Introduction' in *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2008. pp.1-11. It is on similar moral grounds that the British Parliament presents its accord to take over charge of India as her colony from the East India Company. See, Metcalf, R. T. *Ideologies of the Raj.* United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 1995.

22. *Recent Indian Philosophy: Papers Selected from the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925-1934* (Vol. I). (ed.) Kalidas Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers. 1963. p. viii. The Indian Philosophical Congress [IPC] was established by Radhakrishnan, who was then the King George V Professor at the University of Calcutta in 1925 as an avenue for 'philosophers of the country to meet once a year to exchange ideas on the state of research in various branches of the subject'. See *The Metaphysics of Spirit.* (ed.) S.P Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. p. xi.

23. W. T. Stace. 'Novelty, Indeterminism, and Emergence', *The Philosophical Review,* 48: 3. 1939. p. 296.

24. The discourse on 'novelty' construes itself in terms of an opposition between freedom on the one hand and determinism on the other. It is no wonder then that William Jones conceives the backwardness of the Asiatic societies in relation to their lack of political freedom.

25. Descartes epistemological framework, for instance, clearly highlights this tendency.

26. That Radhakrishnan was more than familiar with other Western traditions of the continent and the problems that were cardinal to them is amply highlighted in his *Traditional Philosophy: A Need for Reinterpretation.* See, *Indian Philosophy and History.* (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996. pp. 148-159.

27. Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy.* Delhi: Oxford University Press (Vol. I). 2008. p. 4.

28. Muller writes, 'There was hardly any political life in ancient India, such as we know it from the Vedas, and in consequence neither political strife nor municipal ambition. Neither art nor science existed as yet, to call forth the energies of this highly gifted race. While we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and discussions, with new novels and time-killing social functions, have hardly any leisure left to dwell on metaphysical and religious problems, these problems formed almost the only

subject on which the old inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual energies... What was there to do for those who, in order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys, except to meditate on the world in which they found themselves placed, they did not know how or why?' - *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,* Delhi: Associated Publishing House. 1973. (First published, 1899) pp. vi-vii.

29. A.C. Ewing, 'Philosophy in India: Note on Visit to Indian Jubilee Philosophical Congress', in *Philosophy,* 26:98 (July 1951). p. 263.

30. See, for instance, Charles E. Whitmore. 'The Locus of Novelty', *The Journal of Philosophy,* 35: 6. 1938. pp.141-149; W. T. Stace provides a fairly extensive idea about the nature of concerns pertaining to the notion of 'novelty' in the discourse that would have informed Anglophone thinkers in India in the early half of the 20th century. See 'Novelty, Indeterminism, and Emergence', *The Philosophical Review,* 48: 3. 1939. pp. 296-310.

31. This concern of the early Anglophone writers is clearly evident in the nature of their engagements towards the first half of the twentieth century. By and large, these writings, apart from being an engagement with the 'traditional systems of thought of India' are essentially a positioning of 'Indian philosophy' by virtue of its 'spiritual' nature as distinct from science and scientific reason. The Presidential Addresses of the IPC, and the papers presented at the Silver Jubilee Session of the IPC would clearly highlight this fact. It is for this reason that the notion of 'spiritual' and its nature become a matter of significance and garnered a good deal of engagement from the Anglophone philosophers during the early periods of the twentieth century. See, *The Metaphysics of the Spirit.* (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. It must, however, be mentioned that a notable figure who did not particularly align himself with this tendency was Surendranath Dasgupta. He in fact held the notion that the spirit of abstract reason that the West celebrated in contemporary times was what the traditional thought-schemas of India celebrated centuries earlier; thus he asserts that the reinventing of 'Indian philosophy' would have to find other indigenous avenues. In this sense, Dasgupta presents before us a unique subversive move where the evolutionary nature of philosophical thought and reason is accepted precisely to show how the West was lagging behind. See, 'The Philosophy of Humanity' (1936), in *The Philosophy of Life.* (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1998. pp. 62-65.

32. It is this spirit that resonates later in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Presidential Address at the IPC in 1967 as well. He writes, '...the dominance of the present day sciences has confounded us all the more. Sciences, we are told, have covered the entire field of Knowledge, and they are more firmly established than ever before. Either, then, there is no cognitive field left for philosophy, it being concerned with certain dubious values and prescriptions only, or it is nothing more than linguistic analysis of propositions used by laymen, sciences and what has hitherto been called metaphysics... this is not a correct assessment.' 'The Concept of Philosophy' in *The Metaphysics of the Spirit.* (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. p. 1.

33. For instance, he writes 'There was a time when metaphysics dominated the field. With the growth of scientific technique and the development of Natural Sciences, modern man has become highly skeptical to Metaphysical truths... Experience and experiment are the two catch-words of modern science. But

the revival of Metaphysics is, I think, necessary'. Mahdi Yar Jung Bahadur 'The Fifteenth Session of the All-India Philosophical Congress, Held at Hyderabad, Deccan', *Philosophy*, Vol.15, No.58 (Apr.,1940), pp.199-200; In so far as his characterization of Indian Philosophy goes, he is no less clear when he declares that the traditional Indian thought systems is a synthesis of metaphysics and religion. His concerns over the rift occasioned by the clash of scientific and philosophical thinking assumes the form of challenge posed by science towards metaphysics. In general, the awareness of the uncomfortable relation between Science and Philosophy in the West was well understood by the early Anglophone philosophers in India. See for instance, A.R. Wadia, 'Synthesis of the Eastern and the Western Thought in Gandhi' (1930); D.M. Dutta. 'Modern Indian Philosophy: Its Needs and its Role' (1952); Rasvihary Das, 'What is Philosophy' (1956), in *Indian Philosophy and History*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996.

34. By the 1930s this seems to have been a fairly accepted position as is evident from Shishir Kumar Maitra's ('The March of History of Philosophy') and Mahandranath Sircar's (Unity of Philosophy and Life) Presidential Addresses to the IPC in 1928 and 1930 respectively. See, *The Philosophy of Life*. (ed.) S.P Dubey. Delhi: ICPR.

35. G.R. Malkani. 'Philosophical Truth' (1949), in *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*. (ed.) Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 555.

36. Ibid., p. 556.

37. Ibid., p. 557.

38. Ibid., p. 558.

39. Ibid. further, it has to be noted that for Malkani, religion and forms of its truth were much closer to life than in the case of scientific forms of truth. This is the reason why for him, in ancient India, when religious truth was equated with philosophic truth, it did not result in a clash between the nature of its truth forms.

40. A.C.Mukerji, 'The Realist's Conception of Idealism' (1927), in *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*. (ed.) Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2011. pp. 471-498.

41. Ibid., p. 587.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 586.

45. Ibid., p. 587.

46. Ibid.

47. Elsewhere, I (Jung) have classified the ambit of academic philosophical activity that took place in India during the colonial period that engages with the problematic of (absolute) truth pertaining to the nature of ultimate reality to be operating within the traditional apparatus predominant during the period that I have termed the 'East-West paradigm'. In this paraphrasing, 'East' represents those whose philosophical activity was looked upon by themselves as giving voice to a distinct philosophical tradition that Indian geographical-political boundary can claim as its own. And the 'West' designates those Western thinkers who happened to exert an influence in the registers of 'comparative philosophy' as the Western iconic counterparts with whose works Indian philosophy's coming of age during the colonial era had a profound

give and take. These predominant Western counterparts were the Idealists, as Idealism was the philosophy that carried an affinity with the nationalist philosophy of this period encapsulated by a popularized version of Advaita Vedānta. Those Indian philosophers whose activity of philosophizing operated within this East-West paradigm hinged on the conviction that the function of philosophy is to unravel the ultimate truth. That is to say, they operated on the premise that philosophy's ultimate preoccupation should be with truth, which is presupposed to be the true form that ultimate reality acquires or reveals itself in. In other words, their preoccupation with truth was shaped by their quest to know absolute reality, and thus for all practical purposes, 'truth' came to be held as synonymous with this quest. See, P. G. Jung, 'The Road Not Taken: Mathrani's Wittgensteinian Quest for Transformation of Philosophy' in *Philosophy in Colonial India.* (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. p. 173.

48. P.T.Raju. 'Progress and Indian Philosophy', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol.25, No.1/3 (1944). pp. 88-98.

49. Ibid., p. 89.

50. Ibid., p. 93.

51. Ibid., p. 95.

52. Ibid., p. 96.

53. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

54. J. N. Mohanty, 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West.* Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992), p. 400.

55. P. T. Raju. 'Progress and Indian Philosophy', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol.25, No.1/3 (1944). p. 97

56. Ibid.

57. Cited in J. N. Mohanty, 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West.* Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 398.

58. Ibid., p. 399

59. Ibid., p. 401

60. See J.N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West.* Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992) p. 402.

61. K. Satchidananda Murty. *The Indian Spirit,* Waltair: Andhra University Press. 1965. pp. 3-4.

62. J. N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West.* Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 397.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 398. Also see Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991; In this context especially see 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy'. pp. 3-15.

65. Rajendra Prasad. 'Tradition, Progress, and Contemporary Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No.3/4 (Jul.–Oct., 1965) p.258

66. Daya Krishna. 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1965). pp. 37-51. In the work, he accuses Karl H. Potter who in his work, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (1963), treated Indian philosophy as a 'therapeutic discipline', where its sole activity is deemed to consist of the removal of impediments or 'intellectual difficulties' in the 'path to *mokṣa* (p. 39). Daya Krishna dismisses this view held by Potter with a clause that unless it is also held that philosophers themselves are the creators of their diseases, it cannot be held that Indian philosophical systems are meant

as a 'cure' to the 'illnesses' that impedes the path to *mokṣa*, on the ground that this makes philosophy a futile activity: for once such impediments are removed philosophy loses hold of its purpose. Moreover, this view would necessarily entail that Sankara and Ramanuja were not doing philosophy nor were they philosophers, as it is generally held that they were already on the path of *mokṣa* or had attained *mokṣa* (p. 39). K. C. Bhattacharyya is similarly held responsible for propagating the view that Indian philosophy is ultimately tailored to attain *mokṣa*, but its attainment is split between philosophy and spiritual practice. That is, Daya Krishna holds that for Bhattacharyya, philosophy's task consists of showing the possibility of *mokṣa* methodologically whereas, it is then the task of spiritual practice to take over and actualize the experience of this possibility (p.45). But if this be so, Daya Krishna argues, philosophy loses any further role to play in its attainment. However, it must be noted that what Daya Krishna misses out in this reading is the role that the concept of 'truth' plays as the intermediary link between philosophical activity and *mokṣa*.

67. Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosphy: A Counter Perspective.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991. p. 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 47.
70. Ibid., p. 40.
71. See for instance, S. Deshpande, 'G.R. Malkani: Reinventing Classical Advaita Vedānta', in (ed.) S. Deshpande, *Philosophy in Colonial India,* New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2015.
72. Rajendra Prasad. 'Tradition, Progress, and Contemporary Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No. 3/4 . (Jul.–Oct., 1965) p. 255. In this context, it is also worth noting here that even today, the thought-schemas which is preserved through an oral tradition of the various tribal groups that populate India, have hardly made it to the annals of 'Indian philosophy'.
73. Ibid., p. 256.
74. Ibid., p. 258.
75. Ibid., p. 257.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 258.
78. J. N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 404.
79. But given that language is nourished by the conceptual vocabulary of the 'form of life' in which it is embedded, we must remember that this choice has also been held by some to have very well been responsible for the very state of 'Indian philosophy' as of today. For instance, Mullick argues that the choice of English as the medium of philosophizing in India, must shoulder the responsibility for the 'near total dependence' of philosophers in India upon the conceptual framework of the West. Mullick characterizes contemporary 'Indian philosophy' as 'straining to ensure that [it is] ... suffused with the latest theoretical language produced in the West'. See Mohini Mullick. 'Colonialism and Traditional Forms of Knowledge...' in *Philosophy in Colonial India.* (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. p. 242. (pp. 239-253). Perhaps the critics of the Traditionalists did not adequately fathom the aftermath of their choice.
80. The overwhelming nature of the spirit of the times, in maintaining the mark of spirituality as the unique characteristic of Indian traditional thought-schemas,

is particularly reflected in Mathrani's philosophical trajectory. Mathrani, who was trained in the Analytic tradition in Cambridge and perhaps the first Anglophone Indian thinker to have taken the linguistic turn, after his return to India, first vehemently opposed the Traditionalists, by propounding the Wittgenstenian spirit of skepticism towards traditional philosophical concern. However, within the span of a decade or so, Mathrani's position drastically changes and he reformulates his philosophy of language to accommodate metaphysical propositions of religious experience.

81. Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991. p. 15.
82. Ibid., p.16.
83. Ibid.
84. J.N. Mohanty. *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought,* New Delhi: Oxford, 2002. p. 11.
85. Ibid., p. 12.
86. J.N. Mohanty. *Classical Indian Philosophy.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
87. Daya Krishna. *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy.* New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2001. p. 258.
88. Ibid.

ASCENDANT *SADHUS* IN WOODLAND HABITATS IN CENTRAL INDIA (7TH-13TH CENTURY)

R.N. Misra

This paper attempts to offer a brief account of the genesis and the rise of the *Mattamayura* ('ecstatic peacock') ascetics of *Siddhanta Order,* in the deep woods amidst rocky terrains (*aṭavīs*) of Mid-Indian hinterland that were inhabited by the irrepressible 'forest-based' (*āṭavika*) communities. The relevant evidence about this entire phenomenon tends to accentuate the profile of these woodlands and the communities therein, such that they are construed as those who marginalised the city, the state-society and while valorising the ascetics who—mixing piety with political power—practiced spirituality of sorts, which on occasions did not rule out even militancy in exercise of their hegemonic intents. The ascetics who populated these woodlands disseminated their faith through a network of monasteries that also contained temples to exclusively serve their purpose. This account of the renunciants' predominance is also remarkable in art history for their temples and monasteries. Their temples introduced unconventional motifs and a pantheon that is bereft of canonical sanction; and the monasteries, which, with their vast resources grew into huge strongholds of their power, fully fortified with ramparts, towers, gates, walks and crenulations.

The *Ranod Stone Inscription* of Vyomaśiva (10th century) written roughly three centuries after the beginning of Siddhanta ascetics' lineage at Kadambaguha (Kadwaha), retrospectively describes the sect's progressively expanding space, with its multiple branches *(vipula vardhita bhūriśākhaḥ)*[1] in the woodlands of Central India. This expansion was rapid and it appropriated both the imagined as well as the material spaces including *guhā*[2] (cave), *vasati* (halting station for nights), *tapasthāna*[3] (locations for penance), *tapovana*[4] (penance forest), *tīrtha* (pilgrimage centres), and *aśrama*[5] (hermitage) in these forests of Central India. Other Inscriptions describe this expansion to have gone on to include even vast territorial and spatial tracts, such as *padra* (or *pada*, a forest-tract settlement), *viṣaya*

(district), *pradeśa* (region), the different *diśaḥ* (directions) and the entire *urvī* (earth) within its ubiquitous span.[6] In this expanse, the Siddhanta *muni*s aspired and managed to locate themselves away from populated settlements, and establish habitats (*sthana*) in the woodlands that came to be marked in some inscriptions as 'penance forests' (*tapovana*).

Thus, the term 'forest' in these references is generally suggestive of a place of penance that is secluded and solitary, and thereby fit for a self-mortifying individual living in meditation. Such an imagery projects the expanse along with the inhabiting ascetics as an exclusive sphere that is bereft of social, economic and other activities that characterized life in a village or a town. The forest, in the Siddhanta ascetics' case, thus stood as an antithesis of the villages and cities, and their withdrawal into it signified a state of renunciation, which over time seems to have worked also as a ploy to amass political power and hegemony. The other practices in their renunciation consisted of performing specific rituals, following yogic regimen, worship by fire, self-discipline, celibacy, vegetarianism and, above all, ritual initiation (*diksa*) of novices into the faith by the ascetics who were already so invested. That is how the Mattamayura *muni*s, pursuing a counter-culture of asceticism and denial, began their journey to prominence.

The ascetic movement began in the woodlands of Guna-Shivpuri region of Madhya Pradesh, its cradle, in the seventh century. Gaining strength through 8th to 10th century, it eventually came to have a pan-Indian presence, but got dissipated in central India by 13th century. It survives today as a living religion, served by its *muni*s and monasteries in the Tamil region.

The rise of Siddhantin ascetics and their movement, though spectacular in many ways, was not merely accidental. It appears to have been realized through an organized lineage of devoted ascetics and their well-ordered pursuits of benevolence, especially, charity, temple building, fairs, festival and celebrations, among other things. These activities promoted the ascetics in the Vindhyan woodlands thereby gradually rendering other forces subservient to it. These subservients included local chieftains, the intractable woodlands along with its fierce *atavika* communities, and the traders and their caravans that traversed through the region. The disorganised milieu of the Gopacala region could offer little resistance to the politico-religious upsurge of ascetics whose territorial control continued to expand unabated all the while.[7] The Siddhanta *muni*s' territorial ambition seems to have been insatiable as is evident in terms of their expanse. As spheres of their influence grew, thanks to the growing

network of their monasteries, the sages, even in their renunciation, did not flinch from assuming or exercising power and practising an acquisitive monasticism of sorts that garnered immense resources in terms of *dhana, dhanya, hiranya, ratna*, neighing horses and rutting elephants. In the process, their monasteries became fortified arsenals with emplacement of weaponry. The acquisitions allowed the powerful and pious Mattamayura *sadhu*s to adroitly use them according to the requirements on different occasions. The stone-built, and sometimes fortified,[8] strong and expansive monastic establishments with their temples and sculptures representing Siddhantin imageries apparently underscore the *muni*s' overarching presence in the woodlands and their clout. This is in addition to their supremacy which the contemporary epigraphs have explicitly articulated time and again.

In details, therefore, this entire account ramifies into interrogating the advent and empowerment of the Mattamayura *muni*s', their *maṭha*s and the *maṭha*-related exclusive temples and sculptures which proliferated in quick succession, first in Gopācala woodlands (7th to 13th century) and then concurrently in the forest tracts of Cedi-Ḍāhala region amidst the Vindhyas in Madhya Pradesh (10th to 13th century). The process apparently was not without its challenges. Perhaps, the most arduous of the ascetics' tasks was to have a firm foothold in the intractable *aṭavī* with its insuperable *āṭavika* folks— the *aṭavī*s which they called their *tapovana*s. The travails of those venturing into the *āṭavikas*' hinterland are in evidence time and again and even armies were not spared if they risked moving through their territory. For instance, during the time of the Kacchapaghāta ruler Kirtirāja (1015-1035) of Gopadri region, the arms of a Malava army were seized as they passed through the hinterland.[9] It happened again during the time of Kirti Singh Tomar (1459-1480) of Gwalior, when the army of Sultan Hussain Shah Sharqui was plundered relentlessly in the hinterlands of the region. The menace of robbers too was real and the rulers tried hard to emasculate them, but with little success.[10] Much before that, we have a queer epitaph on a hero stone of 903 CE from Terahi, a site of a Siddhanta *matha* and a fort—an epitaph that perceived battle as a reward of sorts whether one emerged victorious out of it, or lost his life in it. The Terahi Stone Inscription admonished grieving over the death of a valiant, proclaiming that he would have 'Lakshmi if he won and heavenly Apsaras if he lost; so why worry about death in a battle field: *jitena labhate Laksmim, mriten'api suramgana/kshana vidhvanmsini kaya, ka chimta marane rane.*[11] As we shall see below, the ascetics did overcome the *āṭavikas* with their

benevolent support towards the community, their non-intrusive spiritual pursuits, and a wilful integration of *āṭavikas*' pantheon into their fold. Furthermore, over time, they came to protect the *atavika*s in the woodlands more substantially than the rulers in the mainland would protect Brahmanas, cows and *varnasrama dharma*. The contemporary inscriptions, as we shall see, bear this facet out. We will return to this point later, but before that let us first have a glimpse of *aṭavī* and *āṭavikas* in some details to appreciate why, and how, it mattered for ascetics to have them by their side.

Aṭavi and Aṭavikas

The terms *aṭavī* and *āṭavika* have cultural connotations in respect of the *Vindhyāṭavī*'s landscape and demography, and juxtaposing them with *muni*s should help us here in appreciating what it could have been like for them to operate there. The *Mahabharata, Puranas, Malatimadhava, Arthasastra, Brihat Samhita, Meghaduta* and *Harsacarita* among other texts, offer a fairly graphic account of them; the details from some of these texts follow.

The same woodlands that Siddhanta ascetics described as *tapovana*s (penance forest) containing their retreats, are known in ancient inscriptions[12] and texts as *aṭavī*, inhabited by the fearsome āṭav*ika* communities of violent disposition, who were dreaded for their inhospitable, raw ambience. Their description of these woodlands as *ghora aṭavī*, (Vanaparva 61.18), *dāruṇa aṭavī* (Vanaparva, 61.10), *mahāraṇya* (Vanaparva, 61.24), and *mahāghora vana* (Vanaparva, 61.25) and as being dotted by high, rocky hills (61.38) and inhabited by the āṭavikas underscores the starkly fierce and undomesticated character of the *Vindhyāṭavī*[13] region.[14] The term āṭavika,[15] denotes 'inhabitants of forest', and is derived from the term *aṭavī* (forest). As for *Vindhyāṭavī*, it defines the 'forest tract of mid-India',[16] the undomesticated, wooded hinterland amidst the Vindhyan rolling hills with its valleys watered by numerous perennial rivers.[17] Bounded by Yamuna in the north and Narmada in the south and extending down to the *mahakantara* of Daksina Kosala which included the legendary Dandaka forests within its limits. Together, *aṭavī* and āṭavika signify a state of culture and a way of life which, in conjunction with the Vindhyas[18] of Central India, tends to assume materiality in the *Harṣacarita* (Parab 2005: 227-29), a text of seventh century. Much before that, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya extensively dwells upon *aṭavī*, its fortresses (*durgāṭavī*), its āṭavikas, and their chiefs, painting the latter generally as belligerent and rebellious masters of the woodland

people. Despite its apprehensions about āṭavikas, the *Arthaśāstra* nevertheless recognizes their value as combatant troopers and a militant force against enemies amongst others. In the *Harṣacarita*, *aṭavī* figures as a typical ecological zone with its starkly natural and predatory ambience, where life amidst savage surroundings was not secure. The 'great' Vindhyan forest (*mahāṭavī*) was supposed to be *vipadbāndhava* 'a companion of calamity' (Parab 2005: 247). These woodlands were conspicuous for their intractability and for hard life of its folks. A journey through its thorny paths in the wooded surroundings was full of hazards (*durupagama śyāmākprarūḍhibhiḥ alambuṣā bahulaiḥ*). There was always the fear of 'sudden attacks by wild animals' (*śvāpadopadravam*). Hunting and bird-catching was a common practice and fowlers (*śākunikas*) foraged out to catch birds, especially hawks and partridges (*grāhaka, krakara, kapiñjala*). Young men, assisted by dogs, hunted out small game. These were less dangerous of the hunting errands, for there were other fierce hunters too who traversed the woods with their nets (*mṛgatantutantrī jāla*) and snares (*bahir vyādhaiḥ vicaradbhiransāvasaktavītam savyāla lambamāna balāpāśikaiśca*) for a big catch, carrying the necessary contraptions for the purpose (*śvapada vyadhana vyavadhāna bahalī samāropita kuṭīkṛta kūṭapāśaiśca*).

   Amidst the āṭavika communities, the training to groom the young ones in preying on birds and going in for small game started early. We are told of children (*pāśaka śiśu*), holding their nets, frolicking around, and zestfully targeting creepers to prey on birds. Banabhatta refers to a 'huge banyan tree encircled with cowpens' in the forest settlement with 'granaries of wild grains'. These cowpens, made of dry sticks and built around banyan trees (*śuṣka-śākhā-sancaya-racita govaṭa-veṣṭhita vikaṭa-vaṭaiḥ*), were protected by tiger traps (*vyāghrayantraiḥ*) which, it is said, were 'constructed in fury at the slaughter of young calves' (*vyāpādita-vatsarupakaroṣa...*). Its settlers were so wary of intruders that they would violently seize the axes (*kāṣṭhika kuthāra*) of the trespassing woodcutters'. A section of the forest had an enclosure of goddess Cāmundā (*gahana-taru-khanda nirmita cāmundā-mandapaiḥ vanapradesaiḥ*). The āṭavikas practiced slash-and-burn cultivation (*jhum*), and used to burn the husk of the wild (*ṣaṣṭhī*) rice. Its cloud of smoke would fill the sky (*dahyamāna ṣaṣṭhika ...dhumena dhusarimānam ādadhānaiḥ*) and make the heat unbearable. The plough was unknown to them, the soil too was unfavourable and they used the hoe (*kuddala*) for their incipient agricultural pursuit instead.

   The people of āṭavika communities, such as Sabara, Pulinda,

Seka, Nara, Aparaseka, Bhadakana, Kacchapas, were no less fierce.[19] The *Harṣacarita* description of Nirghata, a Sabara youth in the *vindhyaṭavī*, profiling his bearing and outfit may be worthy of note here to indicate what ātavikas might have looked like or been perceived of typically.[20] It describes this strongly built Sabara, blooming in youth (*prathama yauvanollikhyaman...*), as one who was the very epitome of violence (*hrdayahimsayah*). Like a 'shining pillar made on a lathe' (*yantrollikhitam-asmasara-stambhamiva*), he moved as a 'black mountain' (*anjanasilacchedamiva calantam*), 'gushing out like molten iron out of a Vindhyan cauldron' (*ayahsaramiva girevindhasya galantam*). The awesome bearing of the Sabara youth, described as a 'moving *tamala* (date palm) tree', was not without substance for he appeared no less than a death trap to deer (*kalapasam kurangayuthanam*), fever to tuskers (*pakalam karikulanam*), fire to lions (*dhumaketu mrgarajacakranam*) and death to buffaloes (*mahanavamiham mahisamandalanam*). He looked every bit as if he was the 'retribution of sins' (*phalam iva papasya*) or, 'the very cause of the Kali age' (*karanam iva kalikalasya*) or, 'the consort of the Night of Destruction' (*kamukam iva kalaratreh*). His flat nose, big chin, strong jaws and high cheek bone (*avanata kina cibukam, nasikam, cipit adharam, utkata kapola...*) amply displayed his fierceness and strength. His lofty forehead was generously covered with black hair; his skin between the eyebrows folded like a trident (*trisakha*). His eyes with scant eye lashes were sticky and red. His neck was slightly bent on one side; arms were long and chest wide. In all that, his built and bearing were imposing and awe-inspiring. He wore a glass bead (*kacamani*) on the lobe and had a feather of parrot stuck on to his ear. His outfit included a dagger in a sheath of snake-skin, overlaid with a patch of tiger skin, even as its hilt stood out on a deer-skin. He also carried a poisoned arrow in one hand and a bear-skin sack covered with a tiger's dappled hide (*sabala sardula carmapata*), in which he carried his arrows. He wore tattoos on his strong solid arms, had a bow hung on his left shoulder and carried in style the dead birds and animals— parrot, partridge and rabbit.

The specificities of life in woodlands are bared forth further in the *Harsacarita* in the statement that woodland cultivators were constantly agitated about sustenance of their dependents. They untiringly contemplated the breaking of the earth with their hoes (*prakāśamānam ataviprāyaprāntatayā kutumbabharanākulaiḥ kuddālaprayakṛṣibhiḥ kṛṣibalaiḥ abalavadbhiḥ uccabhāgabhāṣitena*). The soil in the territory was hard to break (*kṛṣnamṛttikā kaṭhinaiḥ*). So, they would parcel out portions of land into small plots for working

on them. Once the plots were secured and seeded, surveillance platforms were built overlooking the growing crop on such plots. Notwithstanding such precautions the plots still remained exposed to dangers from wild animals. Likewise, their ponds in the Sal (*aṭavi sulabha sāla kusuma*) groves were fenced with thorny *nagaphani* growth.

The *Harsacarita* graphically describes life in the woods where habitation was sparse. *Vindhyatavi,* however, remained endowed with natural wealth that people could have for consumption or other use. The forest products included cotton, jute, honey, wax, peacock feathers, *khadira* tree bark, medicinal herbs like *kuṣṭha* and *rodhra.* The *Harsacarita* also indicates the presence of iron smiths of the Vindhyas who burnt wood and extracted coal to use it for smelting iron. (*kacit anyatra grahayantam iva angariya darusamgraha dahibhih vyokaraih*). This added to the already existing heat all around. The woodland householders (*atavikutumbin*) had their wattle and daub dwellings enclosed within wooden enclosures amidst the woods. Those dwellings were sparsely scattered (*ativiprakrsthantara*) and could be identified only by the crowing of their cocks. Large bones of wild buffaloes were stuck out in the fields to scare the less dangerous of animals. Almost every household had the extract or liquor of *madhuka* (*madhuka-asava-madya*).

The pervasive ambience of these forests is also stressed in terms of spiritual experience in the woodland hermitages of saints and sages. The Vindhyas evoked different kinds of response among Harsa's courtiers. So, when in contact with it, 'some assumed monks' robes, some studied the system of Kapila (i.e., Sankhya), some abandoned gratification of senses and lived on limited diet, others reached old age in the hermitages and yet others finally took vows and roamed as shaven monks'.

The descriptions of Vindhyatavi and its sylvan surroundings in the *Harsacarita* (Parab 2005: 234-35) have graphic details about its people, their life and also the flora and fauna in their naturalistic and raw ambience. The picture of *vindhyāṭavī* and the people in it integrates their perils as well as splendours.

In contrast, the *Arthaśāstra* which, being particularly apprehensive of the āṭavikas, is loaded with the fiats of controlling and deploying them to serve the State aggressive designs. The text explicitly regards forests as a coveted entity in an imperial ruler's hegemonic exercise (*dvividha vijigīśo samutthānam-āṭavyādikam eka grāmādikam ca*, 13.5.1). It was needed particularly to augment the state with resources that could be put to different use. The āṭavika highlanders in the woods

were particularly sought to serve a ruler's expansionistic adventures. In Kamandaka's *Nitisara*, a text of the Gupta times, the term implies 'army', and that usage must have resulted from *āṭavika*'s unceasing and violent involvement with battles, raids and skirmishes in and out of the woods.

As *Arthasastra* explicitly states, the *atavika*s with the sole intent of plunder, were a threat to the traders and their caravans passing through the woods. These traders ventured into the region looking for ivory which fetched a good price in the cities. The *atavika*s, however, were difficult to be contained. Even Yuan Chwang (7th century) hints at their fierceness in his account of the Pariyatra region. He says that 'the climate (of the region) is warm and fiery, the manners of its people are resolute and fierce...The chiefs of these people are of a brave and impetuous nature and very warlike.'[21]

Thus, it is not surprising that in the scheme of Kautiliyan polity, the forest tribes (āṭavikān) could be won over by offers of money and honour, and could then be used to destroy kingdoms (12.3.17, 12.4.1). Like mercenaries, they, if placated, could be used to storm the forts situated in forests: the operation served its ends of harassing the enemy before a final assault was made to capture it (13.4.50-51). The forest tribes constituted one of the six kinds of combatants during the Mauryan period (and later), to be employed 'when useful for showing the way; when suited for the terrain of the enemy; when countering the enemy's mode of fighting, when a small raid (was) to be repelled or when enemy was mostly forest troops ... These were the occasions for the use of forest troops'. Thus asserts the *Arthasastra* (9. 2. 8).

The *Arthasastra* recommends that the 'king should remunerate ... āṭavikas with forest produce and with booty' (9.2.10) since the āṭavikas have plunder as their primary objective. But for this very reason, it also states that the danger from āṭavikas were akin to the dangers of befriending a snake (*Arthasastra*, 9.2.18-19), and hence, it warns that it is necessary for the State to be wary of them. The *Arthasastra* regards āṭavikas more perilous than highway robbers, saying that the latter 'operate at night and lying in wait, attack men's bodies, are a constant danger, rob hundreds of thousands (in cash) ...' The āṭavikas in contrast were known to 'operate in the forests far away', they were 'openly known'; they 'moved before the eyes of all and harmed only a part of the country'. Kautilya further adds that 'the āṭavikas have 'the same characteristics as a king', 'are many in number and brave (and) might openly seize and ruin countries' and that they are found 'living in their own territory' (*Arthasastra*, 8.4.41).

Reference to āṭavikas having 'characteristics like kings' and having 'their own territory' accords them a significant authority in ancient polity *vis-à-vis* the imperial rulers. It also reminds us of the Parivrajaka Maharaja Samksobha (528-9 CE) who ruled over the 'kingdom of Dahala...together with the eighteen forest kingdoms (*aṣṭādasa āṭavika rajya*),'[22] which had apparently federated, notwithstanding the admonitions earlier by Asoka, the Mauryan emperor in the 3rd century BCE and still later in the 4th century CE after Samudragupta's attempt to make them 'servile' (*paricariki krita*).

These accounts help in offering a glimpse of *atavi* and *atavika*s and allow us to conclude that having the āṭavikas in alliance with them was immensely useful to the Siddhanta *muni*s in various ways. With āṭavikas on their side, the esteem for the *muni*s must have risen phenomenally among the rulers, traders and others at large. The proximity between the *muni*s and the *āṭavikas* privileged the former and their monasteries, materially and symbolically in various ways. The āṭavikas could be deployed for defensive or offensive operations, they could serve errands, help in negotiating intractable stretches in the forests, and in peace time they could even be engaged in agrarian or artisanal pursuits. The Siddhanta *muni*s seem to have succeeded in winning them over with acts of benevolence towards them. Epigraphs bear it out eminently excepting for the fact that they figure in the *muni*s' epigraphs not as *atavika*s but as *prani, praja, jana, loka, i.e.*, 'people'.

The ascetics' concern for these people, and the latter's allegiance in their favour, seems to consistently surface in epigraphs, in various ways. The Siddhanta *muni*s are found providing subsistence, support in adverse circumstances (*uddhvartum vipadi praja*), health care and ease of passage to them in the intractable areas of forests by building pathways through them. Thus, Purandara is described in the Kadwaha Fragmentary Inscription as one who 'alleviated peoples' suffering'.[23] Vyomaśiva of Aranipadra stood for liberating forest folks from calamities and 'received people's respect' (*sakala loka namasya mūrtiḥ*) for that.[24] Compassionate to the core, he was dedicated to the welfare of all others: *yasyodṛkta paropakāra karuṇā mātram pravṛtteḥ phalaḥ*.[25] No wonder, when he rebuilt the Aranipadra *aśrama* of the recluses (*yati*s) that had gone derelict in time (*andhatamase bhagnaṃ*), the participation of the woodland community of Aranipadra was not missing in its renovation.[26] Kavacaśiva of Aranipadra was *lokapriya*, 'loved by people', not being like those self-seeking beings prone to chase their *tṛṣṇā* (thirst) in 'filling their belly' (*svodarapūrtimātra*). One of the ascetics of Kadambaguha is mentioned as *bhuvanaśraya*

'the refuge to the (entire) world'.[27]

Likewise, Prabodhaśiva was an ascetic, who was revered by people: *nikhila jana vandyaḥ*.[28] The Chandrehe inscription describes his works in the woodlands, which included digging a 'sea-like lake' (*sindhuprakhyam tadāgam*, v. 16) and a 'well having copious water' (*pracura salilaṃ kūpa*). By the process of excavating, breaking and ramming large heaps of stones he constructed pathways through mountains and across the rivers and streams, and also through forests and thickets (v.13), grew medicinal plants around the monastery, with people wondering at the glowing phosphorescence of these plants (v. 14). An ascetic of Kadambaguha is described as succour to people (*...tāpaharaḥ prajānām*).[29] The Jabalpur Stone inscription of Jayasimha[30] describes Siddhanta ascetics' proclivities for public good. Thus, Vāstuśiva is described as one who 'caused great bliss' (*śreyaḥ prakarṣaṃ paramādadhānaḥ*, v. 10). Nādaśiva was known for his 'support to all creatures' (*sarvabhūta dayāparaḥ* and *jantūnām āśvāsabhūmiḥ*) even as he was 'intent upon showing kindness to all creatures' (*sarveṣāmvandijanānām ādhārabhūtaḥ*).[31]

The proximity of the woodland communities, who were dreaded as much as they were sought for alliance which helped the ascetics to gain prominence and they seem to have stolen a march over the potentates. This could be possible in a milieu where all else except the *muni*s were dis-organized and disarrayed. Such circumstances, afforded the ascetics to successfully acquire privileges and power that conventionally rested with potentates. As the roles reversed, they promptly assumed the role of offering protection to the potentates who figure imploring the ascetics to do that. We have the instance of Avantivarman who offered the essence of his kingdom to Purandara seeking his favour: *nivedya yasmai nija rajya saram svajanma sapalyam'avapa bhupah* (*E.I.* 1, p.355, v.13) which stands confirmed in other similar instances mentioned in the Malkapuram inscription (*yuvarajadeva nripatir bhiksham trilakshīn dadau*) and in Jayanaka's *Prithviraja Vijaya* which speaks of the ruler named Sahasika who offered his kingdom to his guru in *dakshina* (*nijarajyalakshmim gurudkshinayai dattva...*), before proceeding on a military expedition for further conquests.

Epigraphs consistently indicate rulers, one after the other, supplicating to the *muni*s, not *vice-versa*, which always seems to betray the ascetics' clout over them. This is borne out in no less than seven specific instances and then again in *muni*s' investiture as royal preceptors (*rajaguru*s) of Kalacuris for two centuries. Those seven instances besides those relating to the royal preceptors respectively

refer to:

1. Avantivarman Calukya and Purandara *guru* at Aranipadra (Ranod) and Mattamayurapura (Kadwaha) in *c.* 825 CE. Avantivarman gave away the 'essence of his kingdom' to the *guru.*

2. The local Caulukya prince, possibly the protégé of Dharmasiva at Mattamayurapura, in whose favour the *muni* in person engaged the invading prince Gobhata in a battle and died fighting (sometime in the last quarter of the ninth century).

3. The Later Pratihara chief (*nrpa cakravarti*) Hariraja, disciple of an ascetic at Kadwaha in the last quarter of 10th century. Hariraja sought and received diksa from the acarya and gifted villages to him for that.

4. Yuvarājadeva I (915-945), the Kalacuri king and Prabhavasiva at Gurgi near Rewa. Yuvarājadeva invited and settled the muni at Golagnika monastery, which became famous in central India, the Deccan and the South as Golaki *matha.*

5. Nohalā, the queen of Yuvarajādeva I who established Īśvaraśiva at Bilhari near Katni (M. P.) in early 10th century,

6. The Kalacuri Laksmanarāja II (946-970) who invited Hrdayaśiva from Madhumati, fetched and installed him at Maihar (Vaidyanātha monastery),

7. The Kalacuri Laksmanarāja II and Aghoraśiva at Bilhari. Only after installing these *muni*s in his region did Laksmanarāja II mount his military expedition.

And, then again, the subservience of the rulers to the ascetics is indicated in the relationship between consecutive *rajaguru*s and their successive royal disciples of the Kalacuri dynasty, for about two centuries beginning during the time of Yuvarajadeva I to that of Jayasimha.[32]

The Ascetics too do not seem to be discreet about subservience of contemporary rulers towards them and the epigraphs issued by them or by their protégés exultingly dwell upon it time and again. They tell us of Dharmaśiva whose 'feet were revered by the lustre of the crest jewels of many princes', (*bhūpālamaulimaṇikāntibhirar citāṅghṛha*); of Sadāśiva whose 'venerable feet were worshipped by princes with rays of their crowns' (*nṛpaiḥ/yatpādadvayaṃvandama rcitaṃsekharāṃśubhiḥ*); of Hṛdayaśiva, whose 'uniquely venerable feet were rendered beautiful by the multitudes of rubies set in the crown of princes'; or of Īśānaśiva, whose 'lotus-like feet were reddened by the rays of jewels on the rows of heads of all kings'. The

Chandrehe inscription has Purandara described as the 'preceptor of kings' (*gururbhūbhujām),* and Prabhāvaśiva as the one who was 'revered by many kings' (*anekanṛpavanditaḥ*).[33] Trailokyamalla is said to have been similarly 'devoted to the feet' (*pādārcanarata*) of Śāntaśiva.[34] The substantive reason for the potentates' act of bending their jewelled heads to the feet of the *muni*s comes out clearly in the instances of Dharmaśiva, Kirttiśiva and others, described here, later. But we do find *muni*s claiming to be *mahibhrt,* 'protector of the earth' like kings. Vyomaśiva is described as one 'that in glory, vied with the rulers' *kṣitibhṛt urubhara-spardhi*. The ascetics' ambitious predispositions, apart from their spiritual attainments, are discerned in their militarism, administrative function and their well-knit monastic organization. Their active role in such matters helped in perpetuating their supremacy over the potentates roughly for four centuries from *c.* 825 CE.

The Saiddhantika ascetics are found strengthening their hold in the hinterland of the Vindhyas with their network of *matha*s, which ensured their control over the remote stretches of woodlands, and helped the rulers who had their support. Epigraphic accounts often bring out the ascetics' belligerent and militaristic role which helped their royal disciples. The Gurgi inscription of Kokalladeva II refers to Īsānaśambhu's 'conquest' (*nirjitya*) and compares him with Paraśurāma, the legendary warrior.[35] Prabodhaśiva too is described as 'Paraśurāma' in the Chandrehe inscription. He is said to have 'conquered all his enemies' (*vijitaśatruvargaśca yaḥ*) and 'showed the effect of his power on mighty kings' (*samunnata mahībhṛti prakatitātmaśaktikramo*). He is compared to Kārttikeya, the divine commander, who was the destroyer of the demon Tāraka.[36] Vimalaśiva[37] is eulogized for his 'political wisdom' and might i.e., for his 'power against enemies'. Nādaśiva[38] is mentioned as 'adept in the knowledge of religious texts and weaponry' (*śastra-śāstra viśāradaḥ*). Śaktiśiva 'augmented' the royal power of Gayākarna.[39] Kīrtiśiva is said to have 'reduced to ashes, the city of enemies' and 'wrested' the enemies' 'glory'. He was seen as Tripurāntaka-Śiva in his exploits without having the kind of divine support that Śiva had. It is said of him that though he '... had not the earth for his chariot, nor the sun and moon for its wheels, nor Brahma for his charioteer, nor Visnu for his arrow, yet he reduced to ashes the cities of the enemies (as Siva did those of demons). Hence, he (was)... Kirtiśiva, Śiva in glory'. He is further said to have '... filled all regions with his glory which he wrested from the enemy...'[40]

The Kadwaha Fragmentary Inscription explicitly refers to

Dharmasiva, who like Tripurantaka-Siva, worsted the raid of prince
Gobhata, but died fighting in the process. The details about the
episode in the Kadwaha Fragmentary Inscription make an interesting
reading. The record speaks of prince Gobhata raiding a monastery
with his army of elephants (*tatrajagamonmada sindhuranam balena
bhupah kila Gobhatakhyah*). We are told that when the protégé of
Dharmasiva, the *acarya* of the Kadwaha monastery 'suddenly fell'
(*sahasa papata*: died in action), the *acarya* was much 'enraged'
(*tad anu kopavipatalakshah*). In retaliation, he 'miraculously
produced bow and arrows from the monastery', fought fiercely
like 'Tripurantaka on earth', but lost his life in action. His militant
action and his demise are firmly and categorically established in the
epigraphic descriptions of 'heavenly damsels showering flowers'
(*surapatiramaninam puspavrishtyavakirnah*) on him. That is the way
texts, such as the *Mahabharata* for instance, typically described the
demise of heroes in a battle of honour. The evidence leaves little
doubt about the *acarya* Dharmasiva falling like a hero in his armed
encounter with the forces of the *bhupa* Gobhata. It also brings
out the active role of Dharmasiva in a military action and also the
plausibility of such action by other *muni*s, whose similar 'exploits'
are described in the inscription quoted above. No wonder, that the
ascetics of the Mattamayūra lineage became indispensable to the
State in exercising power which included combative action too, if
the occasion so demanded.

Such oblique, as well as explicit references to their war-like
disposition suggest that the Siddhanta ascetics were in demand
because of their overall strength, and resourcefulness. They lent
their active support to the State's political and economic well being,
including its preparedness for wars. They probably augmented
the State's security by offering training, garrisoning the royal
forces—elephants and horses included—maintaining arsenals,
manufacturing weapons and taking care of the States' affairs. They
also offered support to rulers when the latter left their seat to mount
a military expedition.

Such well organized dispensations managed by ascetics stand
in utter contrast to the overall scenario in the region where other
institutions had a dismal presence. What comes out through it is a
picture of a disorganized milieu, marked by incipient levels of state
and social formations, and a lack of effective control either by the
distant imperial dynasties or by local chieftains.

In defining the Saiva Siddhanta as the product of the material
milieu of the *Vindhyāṭavī* (Vindhyan forests) region, one encounters

many unconventional features of socio-economic and political developments that are amenable to alternative premises of historical interpretation, and are not necessarily based on conventional mechanism of state-society. It also allows for the possibility of interpreting art and patronage in the region differently. But that is a different story to be recounted elsewhere.

Notes

1. *Epigraphia Indica* (hereafter *EI.*), 1, p. 7355, v. 7; v. 3. Patangasambhu's Gwalior Museum Inscription, in Mirashi, V. V. (1974) *Prachya Nibandhavali* (in Hindi), Bhopal, pp. 179-89.
2. For *guha* as in 'Kadamba-*guha*-dhivasi,' cf. *EI.* vol. 1, p. 355, v. 8.
3. Cf., Mirashi (1955) *Inscriptions of Kalachuri-Chedi Era,* (Ootuckmund), Vol 1, p. 228; 200, v.7.
4. *EI.* 31, p. 36, line 14; or *EI.* 1, p. 355, v. 15. For delimiting the boundary of *tapovana,* cf. R.A. Kangle (1986), *The Kautilya Arthasastra,* p. 109.
5. *EI.* p. 357, v. 29.
6. For *guha,* as in 'Kadambaguhadhivasi,' *EI.*, 1, p. 355, v. 8; for *tirtha, El.*1, v. 9; for *padra, ibid. p.* 357, v. 29. It is mentioned as *pada* in a Kadwaha inscr., cf. *EI.* 37, p. 122, v. 7. For *visaya, pradesa* and *disah,* cf. *EI.,* 1, p. 357, v. 31. For *urvi* as in *urvipati, ibid., v. 11;* for *asrama, ibid., v.* 29.
7. Cf. Misra, R.N. (1999) "Religion in a Disorganized Milieu", in Joseph T. O' Connell, (ed.), *Organizational and Institutional Aspects of Indian Religious Movements,* Simla: IIAS. The paper was presented at an IIAS seminar in 1993.
8. This is especially true of the monasteries at Ranod, Surwaya and Kadwaha. They are popularly known as *garhis* (fortresses), even today.
9. *Indian Antiquary,* Vol. XV, p. 36, v. 10; also. Trivedi, H.V (1989): 542, v. 20.
10. Trivedi, H.V. (1989): 'Inscriptions of Paramaras, Chandellas and Kacchapaghatas...', CII, vol, VII/iii, p.543, v. 20.
11. Keilhorn, F, (1988 rep.) 'Two Inscriptions from Terahi; [Vikrama-] Samvat 960', *Indian Antiquary,* Vol. XVII, p. 202.
12. Inscriptions refer to the forest communities and their kingdoms. See, for instance, Asoka's Rock Edict XIII; Samudragupta's Prayag *prasasti* (Fleet, J.F. 1963 rep. p. 13) and Samkshobha's Khoh Copper Plate Inscription of the year 209 (ibid, p. 116).
13. The term is used in the *Harṣacarita,* (Parab ed. 2005): *ucchvāsa* 8, p. 231.
14. Cf., Agrawala, Vasudeva Sharan (1964) *Harshacharita: Ek Sanskritik Adhyayan* (In Hindi), Patna, p. 181, where these references are quoted.
15. The term figures time and again in Buddhist texts, the epics, Puranas, Dharmasastric text like *Manava Dharmasutra* (IX. 257) and in the *Kamandakiya Nitisara*; in Kamandaka it is consorted with army. Cf., Monier Williams, M. (rep. 2006): 133. Kamandaka apparently followed āṭavikas' descriptions from the *Arthasastra* of Kautilya.
16. Raychaudhuri, H.C. (1953): *Political History of Ancient India*, Calcutta, p. 307.
17. These rivers included Chambal and its tributaries (Sindh, Parvati, Mej), besides Asan, Sankh, Kuwari, Mahuar (anc. Madhumati of inscriptions) and Betwa, (anc. Vetravati and its tributary Orr, anc. Urvasi) in the Gopacala region and

Son, Ken (anc. Suktimati) and Narmada in the Dahala region (eastern and central Madhya Pradesh).

18. In the Puranas, Vindhya is one of the seven mountain chains (*kulaparvata*) associated with many legends. Agastya kicked it down; Sunda and Upasunda, the fierce Asuras, preformed their intense penance here. It is also the eternal abode of Durga. Cf., Vettam Mani (2010 ed): *Puranic Index*, p. 857.

19. They figure in the *Mahabharata* in reference to Sahadeva's campaign, and in many texts and inscriptions. A valorous Sarabha chieftain Goparaja, son of Madhava was a fierce fighter who died fighting somewhere near Eran in eastern Malwa in 510-11 CE. His wife committed *sati*. See: Fleet, J.F., *Gupta Inscriptions* (1963 rep): 93.

20. Cf., *Harsacarita* (Parab 2005: 231-32).

21. Beal, Samuel (tr.) *Siyuki: Buddhist Record of the Western World*, Delhi (1969), p. 179.

22. Fleet (1963): 114,116. The ruler made a grant for the purpose of observing the *bali, charu* and *sattra* at the temple which he had caused to be built, of the divine (goddess) Pishtapuri...' The rulers of the region sometimes set up boundary pillars (*valaya yasti*) to demarcate the territory of their kingdoms. We have the instance of Parivrajaka Maharaja Hastin and Ucchakla *maharaja* Sarvanatha doing this in 508-9 CE. Fleet (1963): 111.

23. *EI.* 37, p.122, v.5: *yattanubhṛtām paritāpa śāntau...*

24. *EI.* 1, p. 356, v. 23.

25. Ibid. He was a storehouse of merits including self-restraint, humility, prudence in polity (*naya*), propitious intent (*punya*) and spotless character. Ibid, p. 357, v. 26.

26. *E.I.,* 1, v. 29: *...sarvānanddyudayena paurasahitaṃ nītaṃ punastāḥ śriyaḥ.* Vyomasiva's habitat made the people (*praninah*) 'blessed'. Ibid, v. 31.

27. *EI.* 37, p.123, v. 11. The term used is '*trilokavijayī*'.

28. Chandrehe Inscription, Mirashi, V.V. (1955): 201, v. 12.

29. *EI.* 37, p.124, v.28.

30. Mirashi (1955): 333-336; translation, pp. 336-339.

31. Mirashi (1955): 372: Dhureti Plates: lines 16-17.

32. Pathak (1960) *Saiva Cults in North India*, Varanasi, p. 50. Also, Pathak, (1958) 'Kalacuri rajaguruon ki parampara' (In Hindi), Madhya Bharati, *Saugor University Research Journal*, Vol. 1, (i) pp. 1-6.

33. Mirashi (1955) i, p. 200, v. 4 (for Purandara); v. 5, also p. 231, v. 6 (for Prabhavasiva); ibid p. 220, v. 50 (for Dharmasiva); ibid p.220, v. 51 (for Sadasiva), ibid, p. 221, v. 54 (for Hrdayasiva); Ibid, p. 232, v. 17 (for Isanasiva). In the colophonic verses of the *Prāyaścittasamuccaya* of Hrdayaśiva his *guru* Isvaraśiva is described as one whose 'lotus feet were worshipped by kings': āsittatsaṃtatau muni śriIśvaraśivaiti/ jagatīpatibhirnṛpaiḥpūjitapādapankajaḥ; cf., Sanderson (2009) *The Saiva Age*, in Einoo, Shingo (ed.) *Genesis and Development of Tantrism*, University of Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, p. 268, fn. 631.

34. Mirashi (1955): 372.

35 Mirashi (1955): 232, v. 17-18.

36. Ibid, pp.200, 203, vv. 9-10, 12; Vyomaśiva is similarly described. *EI.,*1, pp. 356, 357, 358, vv. 23, 31, 38.

37. Mirashi, (1955): 339, vv. 39, 40, 44.

38. Ibid., p. 372 (Insc. No. 72, line 17).

39. Ibid., p. 337, v. 18.

40. Ibid., p. 335, 337, vv. 23-24.

CONTRIBUTORS

Claire Joubert, is Professor of English Literature at Université Paris 8 (France), and her research is centered around the theoretical and political effects of the diversity of languages that seeks to explore the critical issues raised by linguistic difference in the history of discourses on language, literature and culture. She is the author of *Studies on the Epistemology of Comparativism* (*Comparer l'étranger. Enjeux du comparatisme en littérature*, co-edited with E. Baneth-Nouailhetas, 2006); *On the Poetics of Multilingualism* (*Samuel Beckett et le théâtre de l'etranger*, co-edited with A. Bernadet, 2008. Her recent work engages with three terrains that are rich with differentials within the English language itself; *Indian literary history* (*Problèmes d'histoire littéraire indienne*, co-edited with L. Zecchini, *Revue de littérature comparée*, special issue Oct-Dec. 2015), *The History of Black Globalities*, and *The Genealogy of Global Studies*. This has more recently developed towards a new project on Islamic Globalities (2017-2018). Her last publications include *Le Postcolonial comparé: anglophonie, francophonie* (ed., PUV, 2015) and *Critiques de l'anglais. Poétique et politique d'une langue mondialisée* (Lambert-Lucas, 2015). She was a Visiting Professor at IIAS Shimla in 2015.

Kirsten Jacobson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maine. She specializes in 19th and 20th century Continental philosophy, and her research interests include the phenomenology of spatiality, the nature of home and dwelling, and more generally, the philosophical significance and status of the phenomenological method. Her published work has focused significantly on using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to conduct novel analyses of psychological and physiological illnesses and more generally to consider issues of "existential health". She is co-editor with John Russon of a volume on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty titled *Perception and its Development in Merleau-Ponty°s Phenomenology* (University of Toronto Press, 2017).

John Russon is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph (Canada) and the Director of the Toronto Summer Seminar in Philosophy. He is the author of six books, including *Human*

Experience (2003), *Bearing Witness to Epiphany* (2009), and *Sites of Exposure* (2017). He has also published many scholarly articles on Phenomenology, Hegel, and Ancient Philosophy.

P.G. Jung is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay. In the context of his co-authored contribution to this particular volume of *SHSS*, he is the author of *The Road Not Taken: G.N. Mathrani's Wittgensteinian Transformation of Philosophy* (in 'Philosophy in Colonial India', edited by Sharad Deshpande, Springer/IIAS, 2015).

Dr. Roshni Babu completed her PhD in Philosophy from the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Bombay. Her worked titled, *Introspective Metaphysics in Colonial India: Transcendental Philosophy of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya* was a study on Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's appropriation of Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy, that seeks to contextualize this appropriation within the colonial milieu of its emergence.

Professor R.N. Misra is a historian who retired as a professor of History from the University of Allahabad. He has published several books and has over a hundred articles to his credit. He is the author of *Ancient Artist and Art Activity* (1975. IIAS, Shimla), *Sculptures of Dahala and Daksina Kosala* (1987. Agam, New Delhi), and *Shilpa in Indian Tradition* (2009. IIAS Shimla & Aryans, New Delhi) amongst others. In the context of his contribution to this particular volume of *SHSS,* he was a National Fellow of the Archaeological Survey of India under the Tagore National Fellowship programme, where he submitted his monograph titled *Ascetics Piety and Power* (2016).