STUDIES IN

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Journal of the Inter-University Centre
for Humanities and Social Sciences

VOL. XX, NUMBER 1, 2013

Editor
RAHUL GOVIND

INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY
RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ASCERTAINING CERTAINTY: SELF AND COSMOS

This special issue takes as its theme the problematic "Ascertaining Certainty: Self and Cosmos". It does so, in a way explicitly indebted to Krishnachandra Bhattacharayya, by thinking through and of the passage and ground within and between kinds of certitude that cannot but be forms of ascertaining. While aiding in thinking through, the organization of the disciplines of Philosophy and the Human sciences, this problematic simultaneously signals the difficulty involved in making knowledge claims that are both univocal and differentiated across such faculties.

And so, one cannot but ask, how the nature of knowledge-claiming is to be understood across the academic spectrum and in what is articulated in their relations. That there is no singular or self-evident way of meaningfully relating forms of certainty and necessity across subjects and methods forces one to examine questions regarding subject and method. Hegel had argued in his *Phenomenology* that reflection is that which makes the true a *result* while simultaneously never able to abstract itself or merely hover over that which comes to be so qualified; this speaks to the impossibility of distinguishing *a priori* — in authoritarian frozenness – the suppleness of internal and external, proof and proposition, subject and method. The ascertainment of certainty requires thinking through self as the certainty of that which cannot be denied and cosmos as that by which certainty is ascertained: the two enjoying a relation without parts. Self — rather than indexing a particular psychic receptacle or apparatus – might be taken as that unity and unifying aspect which orients an assertion in language and/or the world. While cosmos invokes in its etymological sense of "order or arrangement" that speaks of a universality which many philosophical traditions and ways of living have found necessary to postulate so as to salvage – not subsume – the particular from evanescent evanescence. One has etymological sanction for such crossings because "certainty" is in its origins as much "surety and pledge" as it is "determined and fixed".

Any knowledge claim will have to confront the paralyzing potential of the "hermeneutic circle"; but one may wish to recall that its original Platonic formulation – that is of conceptual and not historical interest – had to do with recollection and the nature of the self and soul. The successful repression of this problem in all its guises allows for the neat division within the social sciences between structure, and time and change. This division is without ratio in so far as neither the nature of time nor structure are themselves simultaneously probed. History and Philosophy, unlike sociology and political science, retain the delicate joining of subject and method, urging in their very existence and every day use, the impossibility of treating subject as indifferent to the method to which it is subject. The nature of time certainly does not appear to be sufficiently known so as to make grand divisions between that of the contemporary and the past – axiomatic for disciplinary organization – and this will have equally significant implications for thinking the human subject subject to such disciplining. Simultaneously, predicates which characterize words and terms such as society or history or philosophy – bringing into being subjects such as Indian History or German Philosophy – need to be rigorously reflected upon. This point is no doubt commonplace, except that in an ironic turn of the tide, it is not uncommon to witness the greatest critiques of the very nature of the political appropriation of culture and vice versa – whether in racism, nationalism or fascism – themselves rehabilitating sans reflection forms of cultural determination with unceasing insistence. And so with little probing into words and categories such as self, the human subject, society or belief, that have existential dimensions proportionate to their philosophical iterations, these are merely asserted to be unique to their fundamental determinant which is culture; whatever shape this arbitrarily takes on, civilizational, national or regional.

A rigorous working through of such words and terms cannot afford to either 1) merely find a 'native' equivalent thereby abdicating work on the subject word at hand or 2) outright rejection which is the other side of a mere empty assertion without justifying or working through that which is asserted. The difficult attempt of analytically carrying through one subject is falsely resolved by the mere adding of a predicate without realizing that the latter too is subject to simultaneous working-through i.e. for instance, the problem of 'modernity' or 'politics' or 'Indian' is not to be solved by resort to an 'Indian modernity' or 'Indian politics'.

Such strategies are effective distraction and ultimate complicity

– rather than effective antidote – to the collusion of Philosophy and the human sciences that have aimed at trapping the world history in the world of phantom norms. This undeniable fact of the 'discrete charm' — and open violence — of the Western cannon lies not but in itself but in its employment by the sly stratagem long ago detected by Marx: of proclaiming history only to insist that it is over, thereby disguising the making of the world in its image as naturalistic inevitability; paradox no more than droplets on a lotus leaf. The inflation of history so as to distinguish, only to then immediately repress the possibility of succumbing to history, is the prize contradiction that any politics of culture hankers for. Yet this misstep is even less graceful when haranguing or rejecting self induced phantoms of dominant frameworks in forsaking universality through self-inflicted petrifaction. For universality rather than a thing-content to be resisted – resistance would prove that it never was in the first place – might be taken as felt horizon. From here might it not be possible to work with terms and words as the undeniable felt problems at hand — brimming in life lived as much as words spoken whether philosophy grief possession politics or silence — in their itinerant reflection as much as chronic expression. These matters – partaking across diverse traditions and life-worlds – might be understood as forms of resonance and rhythm not amenable to be analyzed as objects with histories (of discrete parts arbitrarily summed) or identifiable culture (qualities repressing the rationale of qualifying).

If philosophy probes the nature of language, words and forms of necessity and freedom in being and non-being, and their multiplying vertiginous implications, how can this not touch, let along inflect the human sciences? Equally can the latter ever afford to cease asking of philosophy if it can ever transcend the question as to whether it is not indeed an essentially human endeavour? Are death and dying, the pained and deprived, and the modes whereby they are experienced describable in the neutralizing language of the calculable so as to be evaluatively cooked (up) in the hospice of balance sheets, statistical trajectories, and minimal thresholds? How do familiar words and categories such as philosophy, grief and possession, or politics, silence and acting bear witness to rites of passage within, between and among the concatenation, if not catachresis, of certainties? Does this not have implications in the practice of the human sciences and Philosophy? Might not one meaningfully and rigorously examine and follow through the implications and expressions of such familiar ideas that enliven,

traverse and formulate – without just assuming *a priori* – the distinction and distinction-making between the 'natural' and the 'moral'? Do not the interplay and movement of self and cosmos, passage and ground cleave across cultures(s)? Or are they hostage to culture – and therefore available for documentation – rather than a freely rigorous thought across and within cultures faithful as much to the certainty of feeling as to its ascertainment in thought. For thought will indeed be hostage – and may even suffer from a Stockholm syndrome – to culture if the latter is unthinkingly taken as final authority; abandoned by the time of reflection it is left as arrested idol.

The above was some of the muddled thinking that went into the concept note circulated for this special issue of *Studies in Humanities and the Social Sciences*. My colleagues have kindly contributed, in ways very much their own, and done justice, rendered amplitude, to issues that were initially, all too inadequately broached.

IS THERE 'PHILOSOPHY' IN INDIA? AN EXERCISE IN META-PHILOSOPHY

Ankur Barua

Philosophers rarely agree among themselves, and especially so when it is a matter of delineating the domain of enquiry that can be viewed, discussed and taught at institutes of higher education as 'philosophy'. Speaking of western *philosophia*, the shifting lines demarcating this form of enquiry from others can be seen partly as a product of wider historical forces: for instance, Socrates would view 'philosophy' as the practice of self-enquiry that can be performed anywhere, even in a tavern, while contemporary Universities would regard that opinion as far too dissolute and provide a more regimented course of topics, themes and, of course, semester examinations. In other words, as we move from a leisurely class, undergirded by a slave society, that ponders on self-knowledge in the Greek *agora* to the world of late modernity where individuals are assessed, evaluated and readied for their contribution to the national income, *philosophia* becomes classified as one more specialisation that offers a University degree. Another instance that highlights how changes in political economy can lead to divergent visions of the location of *philosophia* on the intellectual landscape is the question of medieval Scholasticism. In the tradition of British empiricism, thinkers such as St Thomas Aquinas are often brushed aside as 'mere' theologians, implying that there is no serious logical, rational enquiry in their texts. The Schoolmen are not 'philosophers' because they are Churchmen whose point of departure is a specific Christian world-view, and hence their learned treatises are to be consigned, as David Hume famously put it, to the withering flames of logical analysis. From roughly 1920s onwards, the antagonism between *philosophia* and enquiry based on faith-commitments was rigidified through Logical Positivism – any form of enquiry that smacks of faith in transcendental entities, not amenable to empirical verification, is to be banished from the scientific Academy and dispatched to the charming pieties of poetry club meetings. Analytical empiricists such as Bertrand Russell would broadly agree

with the Positivists – ancient and early modern *philosophia* had been ensnared by the siren calls of speculative system-building, and their monstrous edifices had to be painstakingly dismantled through logic, mathematics, and the empirical sciences. The Russellian truth, to put it bluntly, lies not in the grandiloquence of a Hegelian narrative but in the clarity of a logical atom. (Bostock 2012).

Our survey of *philosophia* from Socrates to Russell shows that the western intellectual tradition continues to struggle with the question of whether *philosophia* is antagonistic to a faith-stance (as Anglophone analytic philosophy in the line of Russell has often argued) or compatible with such a stance (as Catholic Thomism, hermeneutic interpretivism and so on have contended)? The intellectual, cultural and political ramifications of this question are not limited to European conceptual spaces; indeed, they have often impinged on a question at the margins, 'Is there *philosophia* in India?' Often an argument of the following form has been employed to deny the presence of *philosophia* on the Indian intellectual horizons.

Premise 1: *Philosophia* is the 'tough-minded' project of pure enquiry, based on autonomous thinking (*theoria*) and the rejection of *mythos*, defined as the negation of *logos*, and not shackled to any faith-commitments (Halbfass 1990: 145-159).

Premise 2: All enquiry in Indian thought is rooted in Vedic speculation, based on authoritative testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) or practically orientated towards the goal of liberation (*mokṣa/nirvāṇa*) from phenomenal existence. *Philosophia* is diametrically opposed to any of the former types of 'tender-minded' thinking.

Conclusion: The Indian conceptual spaces are clustered with mythology, poesy, history, dogma, theology, and the like, but are singularly lacking in *philosophia*.

In this essay, we shall interrogate this argument by analysing the two premises. Such an investigation is also an exercise in meta-philosophy, that is, an enquiry into where the boundaries, if at all, of the distinctively 'philosophical' enterprise lie, in any cultural context (Williamson 2007). To begin with, it would be useful to note that the questions 'Is there 'philosophy' in India?' and 'Is there water, gold or fire in India?', despite their similar logical structure, are conceptually distinct, for unlike these elements 'philosophy' is not a 'natural kind' whose presence or absence can be verified

through standardised means of empirical investigation. As Russell argued: 'We may note one peculiar feature of philosophy. If someone asks the question what is mathematics, we can give him a dictionary definition, let us say the science of number, for the sake of argument ... But philosophy cannot be so defined. Any definition is controversial and already embodies a philosophic attitude' (Russell 1975: 7). To Russell's observation, we may add that the boundary lines of the discourse of 'philosophy' are policed by philosophical presuppositions which are themselves often structured by various socio-historical, cultural and institutional forces, as we will see in our discussion of how western *philosophia* has been viewed, received and reconfigured in contemporary India. Further, we will see that 'faith', which has often been positioned as the intellectual Other of *philosophia* in recent centuries, is in fact closely entwined with reason in some other conceptualisations of *philosophia*, and this fact should alert us to the meta-philosophical nature of our quest for resonances of *philosophia* in the Indian intellectual horizons. Such an interweaving, as we will note, characterizes some influential strands of classical Indian enquiry into the nature of reality, the metaphysical status of personhood, and so on, which were often keyed into technologies of the self, geared towards a cognitive, moral and spiritual transformation of the self and its relation with the other, whether human or transcendent.

A

Before we proceed to inspect the two premises, we need to engage with a methodological criticism that could be raised against the very project of cross-cultural enquiry, which claims, roughly, that the attempt to look for Indian parallels to western *philosophia* is misguided from the start. Any such cross-cultural 'translation' would be superficial, so runs the argument, for (English) terms such as 'philosophy' are so densely localised in European structures of assumptions that their meanings will forever elude those looking into them from the margins. To put the argument more picturesquely, anyone who has not lived through the *Indian* rainy season cannot truly savour the poetic beauty of the Sanskrit poet Kalidasa's *Meghadutam*, just as Indian readers of John Keats' 'Ode to Autumn' will miss the point that he is writing about an *English* autumn. To this pattern of criticism, which often draws upon Kuhn's notion of 'incommensurability', sociological applications of Wittgenstein's idea of 'forms of life', anti-foundationalism in

epistemology, ethical relativism, (Winch 1958) and so on, we shall point towards two possible lines of response, keeping in mind our specific inquiry about the nature of 'philosophy' in India. Firstly, the notion of 'incommensurability' between conceptual schemes is self-referentially incoherent if it is taken to deny the possibility of *any* translation across them since this very judgement *presupposes* that one is first able to isolate, identify and somehow compare at least some elements of the two (Markham 1998: 34-5). This takes us to the related question of whether it is possible to neatly 'individuate' distinct life-worlds that are curved inwards into themselves such that trans-cultural interactions or commonalities can never create a context for mutual understanding. Underlying this assumption of 'west' and 'east', fixed in mutual static otherness, is the 'essentialist' view that every cultural system has an inviolable core embodying incommensurable conceptual schemes through which experience is filtered, organized and classified. In this context, we need to distinguish between the relatively straightforward epistemic view that descriptive statements about the world are dependent on conceptual frameworks to the more problematic ontological statement that these frameworks constitute hermetically sealed universes which revolve around some immutable principles or values (Scharfstein 1998: 84-97). In response, it has been pointed out that we must rather emphasise the dynamic and multi-stranded character of cultures and their capacities to adapt themselves to changing circumstances (Matilal 1989: 339-62). For example, it is possible to discover ideas or lines of thought in a system of meaning that are roughly more analogous to those in *another* system than to those *within* itself. Thus, noting that it is a mistake to identify Indian philosophy with 'monism', F.C. Coppleston writes that 'there is more affinity between materialism in India and western materialism than there is between Indian materialism and the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta' (Coppleston 1980: 169). Therefore, although many cultural contacts, as for instance the British colonial encounters with Indic religions, are characterised by violence and relations of power-asymmetry, the complex processes that are thereby set in motion are better described not in terms of destruction of their putative 'essences' but of mutations in which some of the dominant peculiarities of each culture may become suppressed and the hitherto latent ones brought to the fore (Tanji 1991: 161-173).

The wider point for our discussion is that provided we do not view 'India' and 'Europe', in Orientalist fashion, as two monolithic wholes, which are structured by essentialist values and do not admit

any translations across their boundaries, we can better appreciate the historical fact that such translations have, in fact, been attempted several times in the last one hundred years. The question, 'Is there 'philosophy' in India?', emerged through a dynamic transactional process characterised by multiple alliances, intersections, oppositions and adjustments between domestic Indian perspectives and a range of European self-understandings on these matters. Wilhelm Halbfass has demonstrated that an almost unbroken tradition of European writing, starting from the early nineteenth century down to Edmund Husserl in the last, equated the concept of 'philosophy' with the spirit of 'pure theory', 'rejection of *mythos*' and 'autonomous thinking' which were believed to be *distinctively* Greek and hence lacking in the Indian and the Oriental traditions (Halbfass 1990: 145-159). In contrast to this exclusion of 'philosophy' from India, pivotal figures of neo-Hinduism such as Swami Vivekananda and S. Radhakrishnan often presented Indian *darśana* in oppositional terms to European 'philosophy' such that while the latter was evaluated as merely rational, analytic and located on the empirical plane, the former was put forward as essentially spiritual, based on 'intuitive experience' and providing an overarching framework synthesising the European manifold of 'economics', 'socio-political existence' and 'religion' (Halbfass 1990: 287-309). In other words, the question, 'Is there 'philosophy' in India?', was to some extent forced upon the Indian intelligentsia located at the 'contact zones' where certain indigenous notions were proposed through a statement of cultural self-affirmation as not only roughly equivalent to the European notions of 'philosophy' but also subsuming the latter within their more comprehensive reach. Nevertheless, the criticism of such cross-cultural movements does provide a salutary reminder of the formidable problems associated with translating terms, or finding their equivalents, across rival or competing traditions, and warns against constructing too easily 'family resemblances' or a Procrustean bed of a 'common core' into which these can be compressed. For example, the semantic range that has been developed in Sanskrit and modern Indian languages such as Hindi to translate western *philosophia* encompasses *darśana, tattvadarśana, tattvajñāna,* and *tattvavidyā* (Halbfass 1990: 287-309), but whether or not these latter are assessed as accurate, or at least adequate, will rely significantly on one's judgement of how satisfactorily they are able to capture the range of meanings associated with the former within its European contexts. Therefore, a cross-cultural inquiry into the question, 'Is there 'philosophy' in

India?', must be grounded in an awareness of the various European self-definitions of the nature of *philosophia* and the manifold indigenous responses through the horizons of *darśana* in contexts marked by the presence of Europe.

B

When we examine the European self-images of *philosophia*, we are greeted with a bewildering range of responses: for Socrates it could mean the instrument through which people are roused from their unreflective lives, for Aristotle it might be an enquiry instigated by a sense of wonder, for some of the Stoics it was a preparation for death, for many of the medievals it was the handmaiden of theology, for empiricists such as Hume it was often an antidote to religious superstition, for Kant it was a transcendental enquiry into the possibility of sensory experience, for Marx it was a mere interpretation of the world which the workers had to transcend by creatively changing the world, for most of the Logical Positivists it was the end of metaphysics, for the existentialists it was a call to accept the absurdity of existence, for Wittgenstein it was a spiritual struggle to dissolve the pseudo-problems produced by language, and for Rorty it was a resource for poetically re-imagining a world without foundations. Further, for almost a century now, the western philosophical landscape has been riven by a notorious 'Analytic philosophy' versus 'Continental philosophy' divide, in which the former allegedly deals with neatly delineated problems by dismantling them to their parts and studying their internal relations with conceptual rigour, while the latter is supposed to address larger questions in an integrative manner with close connections to art, literature and politics (Prado 2003). This survey of western self-understandings of *philosophia* again highlights the meta-philosophical nature of our enquiry into the question, 'Is there 'philosophy' in India?', and it is not surprising that philosophers sharply disagree over how to understand meta-philosophy itself: whether the *meta* in meta-philosophy is to be read as 'after', which would imply that it is a second-order discipline investigating first-order domains such as ontology, epistemology and ethics, or as 'about' which would suggest that it is simply a way of speaking about philosophers (Moser 1999: 561-2). For our purposes, we take meta-philosophy as the specific field of enquiry that raises questions such as the conditions under which a claim should be viewed as philosophical rather than non-philosophical, the autonomy of

philosophy from disciplines such as science, and, most crucially for our purposes, the distinction between philosophy and religion.

From such a meta-philosophical angle, we can see that the descriptions of *philosophia* outlined in Premise 1, namely, 'pure enquiry', 'autonomous thinking' and 'rejection of myth', are three highly specific, and historically located, self-representations in a wide range of competing views. They express the confidence that reason can reveal the deep structure of reality by dispelling the obfuscations of *mythos*, a confidence one can also note in Russell's monumental *History of Western Philosophy*: 'All this [religious dogma and metaphysics] is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy ... For this renunciation they have been rewarded by the discovery that many questions, formerly obscured by the fog of metaphysics, can be answered with precision'.(Russell 1945: 835) While many philosophers till around the middle of the last century carved the intellectual cake in such a manner that *philosophia* received the largest share by virtue of its following the broadly Enlightenment project of Reason, contemporary philosophers are usually less receptive to the idea that *philosophia* is the 'first science', or generates knowledge through a special faculty called intuition, or provides an *a priori* standpoint from which the world can be critiqued, classified and categorised. Rather, by rejecting such 'philosophical exceptionalism' they tend to see it as more or less continuous with other empirical fields such as psychology, linguistics, jurisprudence, evolutionary biology, and so on (Williamson 2007: 4). An even more strident interrogation of the claims of universal Reason in the second half of the last century has been associated with a revitalised Christian philosophical theology which has produced not only revamped versions of the cosmological and teleological arguments, but also reconfigurations of the classical doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement and the Trinity (Insole and Harris 2005). The defenders of such a 'Christian philosophy' often reject the idea that the structure of Christian revelation must be tailored to the requirements of secular Reason or the putatively universal canons of Enlightenment rationality, arguing that finite, perspectival reason must operate with the guidance of revelational control. For instance, Paul J. Griffiths, a Professor of Catholic thought as well as a scholar of Buddhism, argues that reason should be put to work theologically, and this is possible only when, from the vantage point of Christian faith, the limitations of reason, due to volitional depravity and catechetical inadequacy, are recognised. That is, while Christians will be confident of reason's ability to disclose the structure

of reality, since they believe that they participate in the *ratio* of Jesus Christ, the eternal Logos, they will however be keenly aware of reason's corruption by sin (Griffiths 2005: 145-59).

C

Griffiths is here touching on the enormously complex issue of Christianity's engagement with 'reason': as a broad generalization, the Roman Catholic tradition has viewed the relation between 'faith' and 'reason' not as antagonistic but as dialectically interconnected in a hermeneutic circle, that is, reason needs to be empowered by revelation to discern reality truly, correctly and adequately. The Catholic view that reason must be located within a salvific context also resonates with some contemporary attempts, not specifically religious, to place the work of reason within a therapeutic network in which philosophical argumentation and human flourishing are closely entwined. The therapeutic paradigm is not a modern reading of *philosophia* but is rooted in certain classical Greek technologies of the self. For instance, Epicurus brings out an important aspect of Hellenistic philosophy when he says: 'Empty are the words of the philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul' (Long and Sedley 1987: 157). This therapeutic impulse, as Pierre Hadot emphasised, is central in much of *philosophia* in Greek antiquity where philosophical discourse was structured not as a set of abstract problems to be rationally excogitated but as the practice of spiritual exercises through which the student, as auditor or interlocutor, could undergo a spiritual transformation (Hadot 1995). Aquinas too highlights this therapeutic *telos* of reason in a Christian context when he starts his *Summa Theologiae* with a discussion of sacred teaching (*sacra doctrina*) which he argues is necessary *ad humanam salutem*, a phrase that should be translated, according to one commentator, as 'for human flourishing' (Ganeri 2010: 54).

The therapeutic structure of Christian theological discourse can be traced back to St Augustine for whom human beings need the infusion of divine grace for the cure of the soul. We shall highlight this structure by pointing out how St Augustine's famous philosophical ruminations on the nature of time are not merely an exercise in idle speculation (*curiositas*) but are closely related to his exegetical struggles with the Biblical text. As W.B. Green has pointed

out, St Augustine's attempts to understand the nature must be understood against the background of his exegeses of the text of Genesis: 'Had he not been driven to make explicit the biblical view of creation in opposition to that of the Manichees and the Neo-Platonists, St Augustine might never have put in writing his reflection on time' (Green 1965: 148). Against both these groups, St Augustine argued that we are born into this world with a wounded nature which we have derived not, of course, from God who is blameless but from Adam, and because we are unable to disentangle ourselves from our attachment to physical objects, we are all in need of a healing Physician (*De Natura et Gratia* 3, 3: *jam medico indigent, quia sana non est*). As long as *caritas*, the love of God, does not reign in us, we are bonded to the 'necessity' of sinning, and we cannot attain the true freedom (*libertas*) which is the performance of good works under God's grace. At the heart of this therapy of desire stands St Augustine's *philosophia* of divine eternity which is sharply contrasted with the vacillations caused by human temporality. St Augustine argues that because the timeless God does not move through any temporal successiveness, the divine mode of existence is categorically distinct from that of the mind (*mens*). In order to appreciate this distinction, let us examine how the mind, which, in contrast to God, is immersed in the flux of time, measures temporal durations. Our perception can be only of things that exist in the present moment and not in either the past, which does not exist now, or the future, which does not exist yet. According to St Augustine, we should therefore talk not of three different times, past, present and future but of three modes of one *present* time: a present remembrance of things past with the memory, a present immediate awareness of things present, and a present expectation of things that are in the future. He concludes that time is an extension (*distentio*) of the mind: 'In you, my mind, I measure times' (*In te, anime meus, tempora metior*). (St Augustine 1841a: XI, 27, 36). The present attention of the mind is 'stretched out' in remembering and in anticipating, such that a 'long' past is a 'long' memory of the past and a 'long' future is a 'long' expectation of the future. In other words, whereas the mind's vital activity is symbolised in *linear* terms which points to the fact that it is distended in the two (opposite) directions of the future through anticipation and the past through memory, no such (linear) symbolism can be applied to the 'inner life' of God. Because in this world of ceaseless fluctuations, the mind cannot fix its unchanging attention (*attentio*) on everything simultaneously, its life is one of dispersion whereas in

the divine life there is no such extension (*distentio*). In its experience of transience the mind also learns that it is distinct from the immortal God, for a thing that is no longer what it earlier was can be said to have suffered a kind of death (*si non est quod erat, mors quaedam ibi facta est*) (St Augustine 1841b: 38, 10). Consequently, temporality is experienced by human beings as a process of disintegration for they are scattered in time (*in tempora dissilui*), and the storms of temporal distractions will continue to afflict them until they are purified by the fire of God's love and flow into eternity. (St Augustine. 1841a: XI, 29, 39). St Augustine writes that our earthly loves are ephemeral for time snatches them away from us sooner or later, and we are left behind making futile attempts to hold on to what has passed away with the consequence that we are distracted from seeking God with simplicity of heart. This is why, according to St Augustine, we are in need of Christ's grace which draws us out from the earlier state of bondage into the Church, infuses *caritas* into our hearts and by strengthening our delight (*delectatio*) in God sustains us in the new life, full of grace (Holtzen 1990: 115).

D

Our survey of self-images of *philosophia* reveals that the relation between reason, logical enquiry and philosophical argumentation, on the one hand, and faith-standpoints, hermeneutic horizons or overarching metaphysical commitments, on the other hand, has been conceptualised in more diverse ways in the western tradition than the descriptions in Premise 1 would indicate. This diversity needs to be kept in mind as we examine the often-heard criticism that classical Indian thought cannot be characterised as an intellectually acceptable branch of 'academic philosophy' because it is entangled with 'religion', for such rejections can usually be traced to the standpoint of positivistic empiricism, for which all metaphysical commitments were meaningless, unintelligible or nonsensical in a post-Kantian post-Humean world. Especially from Anglophone analytic philosophical perspectives, Indian *darśana* has often been associated with woolly-headed mysticism or irrational leaps to the authority of scriptural texts, and charged with being deficient in rigorous and methodical analysis (Krishna 1991). In the light of our preceding discussion, we can perhaps argue that Anglophone philosophy's rejection of its internal other, medieval Scholasticism, is paralleled by its suspicion of its external other, Indian

darśana – both are supposed to be fatally implicated in Metaphysics, Authority and Tradition, and hence unpalatable for philosophical consumption. At the same, however, the professional divides in contemporary philosophy have in recent decades become significantly blurred – for instance, now that the boundaries between analytic and continental philosophy have been softened, and the 'method of analysis' is regarded more as one possible style of philosophizing and not exhausting the content of 'philosophy' itself, the sense of an intrinsic antagonism between analytic philosophy and Indian thought has gradually subsided. Significant work on aspects of Indian intellectual concerns with reality, mind and language has emerged in recent decades even in western academic circles, highlighting the presence of issues, debates and enquiries that parallel those which have come to be accepted as 'philosophical' in western contexts (Matilal and Shaw 1985). Further, several commentators on Indian religions have pointed out that the question of liberation, in turn related to the question of the Self, which with some exceptions was always in the background, did not act as an impediment to inquiries into logic, ontology, hermeneutics, and so on. Even the Vedāntic traditions, where the transcendental Self looms larger than elsewhere, are a rich product of the interplay of revelation, human experience, reason and scriptural exegesis. They are characterised both by the dominant soteriological concern of moving out of the cycles of re-embodiment (*saṇsāra*) and by a high level of systematic reflection in order to clarify the character of human response to the structure of reality and to confront the alternative viewpoints of the rival schools of Vedāntic interpretation. In the remaining sections of this essay, we shall highlight precisely this dense interweaving between, on the one hand, rational argumentation to establish the coherence, systematicity and adequacy of one's doctrinal position, and, on the other hand, acceptance of a revelational horizon which guides such reasoning'.

We shall do so by picking up a question that is central to many influential strands of classical Indian thought: if the ultimate goal is liberation from the cycles of the phenomenal world, what is the correct description of the goal and what is the proper method to arrive there? By highlighting some aspects of Indian thought, namely, the traditions of Sāṇkhya–Yoga, classical Buddhism and Nyāya, we will indicate that some of their debates are centred round these two questions: *Which* liberation? and *Whose* method?

E

To signal at the outset, the cruciality of the 'work of reason' in classical Indian *darśana*, we may start with one of the requirements for discipleship according to the tradition of Advaita Vedānta. In addition to possessing certain ethical virtues such as self-control, purity and austerity, the disciple should be able to distinguish between what is eternal and what is not-eternal (*nitya-anitya-vastu-viveka*) (Grimes 1996: 261). Some of the sharpest disagreements between the Sāṁkhya–Yoga, the schools of the Vedānta and Buddhism revolve precisely over the metaphysical question of what is, in fact, eternal, for only the eternal, so runs the argument, can provide true lasting satisfaction for *saṁsāra*-bound humanity. To rephrase this question in terms of human personhood: is personal identity ultimately a conceptual fiction that is generated through psychological connectedness among non-eternal moments (the Buddhist view) or is personal identity grounded in a substantial, eternal self (as Rāmānuja and some others argue)? What is crucial for our purposes is that these arguments over the substantial self, or the lack thereof, are not based simply on Vedic revelation: often, they appeal to what is believed to be the most plausible explanation for the phenomenology of memory.

At first glance, Sāṁkhya–Yoga and Buddhism seem to overwhelm us, as it were, with detailed descriptions of our lives as mired in pain, suffering and misery; however, this exhortation to view the world *as* permeated with dissatisfaction is propaedeutic to the resolution of the ills that beset us. These traditions offer highly specific diagnostic approaches to the human condition: only *after* we have realized the true depths of our misery shall we also wish to put an end to it, and reach out for the remedy that has been offered to us. That is, this sort of an *experience-as*, in which one learns to *experience* suffering *as* omnipresent, plays a therapeutic role: to put it bluntly, a physician may not be able to heal a patient who does not grasp the true extent of her *dis*ease.

The set of beliefs and practices that are sometimes clubbed together as Sāṁkhya-Yoga puts forward the thesis that there is a preponderance of suffering over happiness in this world, and that even moments of happiness are, in fact, mixed with pain or tend to change into pain (Warrier 1981: 55). According to its metaphysical picture, outlined in the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (350–450 CE) and the earlier *Yoga Sūtra* of Patañjali, the world has evolved from the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of two independent principles, *puruṣa* – or pure, inactive, contentless consciousness – and *prakṛti* –

or primordial matter which is made of three strands (*guṇas*). The essential self (*puruṣa*), which is non-agential witness (*sākṣin*), forgets that it is metaphysically distinct from the mind-body complex which is a product of dynamic *prakṛti,* and this misidentification leads to a succession of lives which are steeped in suffering. The remedy lies in learning to discriminate or distinguish (*viveka*) between oneself as translucent witness and the ever-changing states of the psycho-physiological complex, so as to reach the final destination of isolation, detachment or dissociation (*kaivalya*) from all insentient *prākṛtic* evolutes. This therapeutic structure is announced at the very beginning of the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* which states that because of the torment of the three types of suffering (psycho-physical, natural and cosmic) there arises the desire to know (*jijñāsa*) the means to terminate them. As one gains a deeper insight into the way that things really are, one sees all phenomenal-*prākṛtic* existence as suffused with suffering, as stated by Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra* (II. 15): to the one who discerns correctly, all indeed is suffering (*duḥkhameva sarvaṁ vivekinaḥ*). To facilitate the attainment and deepening of this 'healing' insight, the *Yoga Sūtra* lays down an eight-fold path through which the diseased individual is led back to full health. Some scholars have highlighted the parallels between this Sāṃkhya–Yoga technique of the self and the structure of classical Indian medicine. A.G. Krishna Warrier, for instance, points out that 'the entire Sāṃkhya–Yoga Philosophy assumes a four-fold character like the medical science. Corresponding to the four main sections of the latter, the Sāṃkhya–Yoga also deals with suffering, its cause, liberation from it, and the means thereof'. (Warrier 1981: 56-7). A similar diagnostic structure, founded again on the thesis of the ubiquity of suffering, is present in classical Buddhism which holds that all conditioned phenomena can only lead to a deep dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). Indeed the first noble truth declares that 'all is suffering' (*sarvam duḥkham*), and hammers home the point in the following clear terms: 'Birth is painful [*duḥkha*], old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful' (Radhakrishnan and More 1957: 274). Once again, however, when this statement from the Buddha's first sermon is placed within the overall structure of the three other noble truths, its therapeutic thrust becomes clear. Having urged us to see suffering as structuring the very fabric of phenomenal existence, the Buddha goes on to identify the *cause* of suffering as craving (the second noble truth), specify that a *remedy*

is available through the cessation of this craving in *nirvāṇa* (the third noble truth) and lay down a *path* towards the restoration of health comprising of the eight-fold path (the fourth noble truth). In fact, the depiction of the Buddha as a physician is a vital aspect of both Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist self-understandings: while the Pali Canon speaks of the Buddha as the Great Physician and his *Dhamma* as the therapeutic training for his disciples, the Mahāyāna text *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* speaks of the Buddha as a benevolent doctor who seeks to dispense the proper medicine to his sons (Burton 2010: 187). More specifically, the Mahāyāna thinker Śāntideva argues that the Buddha's teaching is 'the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness' (Śāntideva 1995: 143); and points out that just as medicine tastes unpleasant to the ill, likewise Buddhist practice, which is in fact directed to the health of enlightenment, often turns out initially to be unpleasant or difficult (Śāntideva 1995: 69,101).

F

While Buddhism claims that absolutely every form of phenomenal existence is suffused by suffering (*duḥkha*), it is possible for a critic to complain that 'happiness' and 'sadness' both constitute the fabric of our fragile existence, and by being prudent we can learn to increase the former and decrease the latter. Such indeed would have been the response of the Cārvākas (or the Lokāyatas) who held a fully materialist position and rejected all supra-empirical entities such as the soul, God and the law of *karma*, instead endorsing a hedonistic ethic of attaining the greatest amount of pleasure in this life. More to the point, they held that it was 'wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasures as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which invariably accompanies it; ... just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists' (Radhakrishnan and More 1957: 229). The Cārvāka mocks the individual aspiring for liberation as a fool who would refuse to eat rice because it comes encased in husks or consume fish because they contain bones or grow crops because animals might destroy them. Now we may be urged, in response to the Cārvāka, to perceive the pervasiveness of suffering by counting the number of our happy hours free from anguish, and consider how they constitute a small fraction of our misery-laden lives. Such a hedonistic calculus would not, however, unambiguously yield the conclusion required by Buddhism, for different individuals would add up the pluses and

the minuses in their own ways and place different weights on the entries in the two columns, depending on the circumstances of their lives. Therefore, the first noble truth of Buddhism needs to be disentangled from its hedonist associations, and 'pleasure' and 'pain' should be regarded primarily not as descriptive hedonic terms but as objective evaluative terms, grounded in a certain metaphysics. That is, one should read the therapeutic structure of Buddhism as based not on quasi-numerical considerations of the predominance of pains over pleasures, but in a metaphysical claim about the very nature of *all* phenomenal existence – namely, that it is characterized by impermanence (*anitya*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and not-self (*anātman*). According to Buddhism, people who claim to have found some amount of happiness (though not entirely unmixed with pain) and view the whole as positively good are in a state of spiritual ignorance. The metaphysical assumption that lies at the basis of this evaluative thesis can be phrased in this manner: that which is impermanent or subject to transmutation is deficient in worth, and the supreme end is, therefore, conceived of in terms of an incomparably valuable state that can neither be lost nor superseded. As Keith Yandell has pointed out: 'There is a tendency in Indian metaphysics (as well as elsewhere) to think in terms of what exists permanently or everlastingly as really existing and of what exists only for a time as existing defectively or not at all' (Yandell 2001: 171-190). It is this 'tendency' that operates in the Buddhist attempts at describing *nirvāṇa* with a string of negations such as unborn, stopping (*nirodha*), unconditioned and deathless.

In common with strands of early Buddhism, Sāṃkhya–Yoga too speaks of ultimate, disembodied liberation in a negative character in terms of absence of pain as well as pleasure. While admitting that the term *ānanda* (bliss) does occur in scriptural texts, it argues that it must not be accepted in its positive significance but must, in fact, be read in a figurative way to denote the absence of pain in the state of liberation (Feuerstein 1980: 56). The Nyāya school agrees with the *Sāṃkhya–Yoga* on two counts: first, it locates the overcoming of ignorance in a therapeutic context, and second, it visualizes liberation in purely negative terms as the complete absence of pain. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* argues that the 'science of the self' (*ātmavidyā*) has a fourfold structure: what needs to be abandoned is suffering (*duḥkha*), whose cause is erroneous beliefs (*mithyājñāna*), after the overcoming of which there arises liberation (*apavarga*) and the method of attaining which is knowledge of the self (*ātmajñāna*) (Thakur 1997: 2, 14-16). Further,

the Nyāya tradition offers what has been termed the No Joy (NJ) understanding of liberation, according to which the liberated self does not enjoy any positive bliss (or possess any cognitive or affective faculties) over and above the absence of pain (Chakrabarti 1983: 167-82). The Nyāya holds that consciousness is not an essential but an adventitious attribute of the self; it is only when the self comes into contact, through the mind and the sense-organs, with the external objects that it is conscious. Consequently, in the state of liberation, when the self is freed from its body (through which it undergoes distress through contact with sense-objects), it is at once emptied of consciousness and freed from all experiences whatsoever–pleasurable or painful.

However, in contrast to both Sāṃkhya–Yoga and Nyāya, the Advaitic tradition has by and large characterized the state of liberation as one of supra-sensuous bliss (*ānanda*), arguing that an individual could not feel motivated to strive towards a state characterized solely by lack of pain. Vācaspati Miśra records this sense of bafflement in the form of an inference: '*Mokśa* must be a state of happiness, because it is *aimed at (iṣṭa)* and nothing but a state of happiness can be aimed at' (Cited in Chakrabarti 1983: 176)· At the heart of these debates over the conceptualizations of *mokṣa* lie, once again, certain metaphysical considerations regarding the constitution of the human person and the type of ethical practices required to recover one's transcendent purity. The Advaita tradition, as interpreted by G.C. Pande, holds that non-dual Brahman is not only foundational being (*sat*) and foundational consciousness (*cit*), but also self-sufficient bliss (*ānanda*) which is distinct from the *saṇsāric* forms of happiness (*laukikānanda*, *viṣayānanda*) that arise from subject-object interaction. There has been a scholarly dispute regarding the importance given by Śaṁkara to the Upaniṣadic notion of *ānanda* (because it would seem to be associated with duality and desire), but Pande argues that *ānanda* must be understood not in terms of hedonic experiences but as the supreme supra-sensible felicity which is the essence of Brahman (Pande 1994: 204). In contrast to Sāṃkhya–Yoga and Nyāya, the Advaitin, then, could view *mokṣa* a positive fulfilment and 'not the mere absence of *duḥkha* but also the presence of *ānanda* as the nature of Brahman' (Myers 1998: 557).

G

A predominant note that Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Buddhism, Vedānta and

Nyāya strike is that human beings must be trained to perceive everything around them as incapable of providing them with genuine contentment, and that this training involves careful reflection and discriminative understanding of the nature of reality, the structure of human personhood, the shape of the meditative praxis. These traditions seem to agree on these points: the phenomenal world is not a locus of lasting value but neither is it a purely illusory domain, and through ethical-meditative praxis, underpinned by the moral order constituted by the operation of *karma*, human beings can be gradually extricated from the mesh of rebirth and sorrow. However, once we move beyond the formal structure of the therapeutic paradigm (*diagnosis–cause–remedy–praxis*) the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Buddhism and Nyāya sharply disagree over the substantive content of each of the links in the process that leads to the cessation of suffering. To use Śaṁkara's words, what according to the Sāṃkhya–Yoga and Nyāya are real (*nitya*), namely, some form of substantial self, is precisely what according to most strands of Buddhism is unreal (*anitya*), and the Buddhist scholastic centuries were devoted partly to the task of dismantling, de-centring and deconstructing the belief in substantial enduring entities. In other words, from a Buddhist perspective, it is precisely this belief in a substantial self that holds together one's cognitions and volitions that is the misconception that needs to be overcome. The 'I conceit' that unifies the different impermanent aggregates into a self is the source of attachment not only to 'myself' but also to physical objects in the world which are regarded as 'mine'. The world is correctly viewed, according to Buddhism, not as composed of permanent substrata with their fleeting qualities, but as a collection of interdependent processes, none of which bears the mark of substance, but which are related to one another through dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Therefore, in place of a substantial self that is ontologically distinct from its properties such as thoughts and feelings, there are simply interrelated processes of cognitions and feelings, and no 'I' that possesses or comprehends these events as 'mine'.

One of the classical opponents of the Buddhist view that the person is to be deconstructed into a causally related series of cognitions and volitions is the Nyāya school which accepted a plurality of substantial selves, and viewed consciousness as a property of each substantial self. The Nyāya argues that the Buddhists cannot explain the phenomenon of recognitive perception of a cogniser who states: 'I who perceived X earlier am the same I who perceive it now'. The

Nyāya thinker Uddyotakara opposed the Buddhist explanation of psychological continuity in terms of mental states which condition each other, on the grounds that since cognitions are momentary, succeeding cognitions cannot be causally related to the preceding cognition which has vanished. In other words, for the Buddhist, the earlier temporal slice with the impression of say a cow is causally related to the present temporal slice where the impression is revived; but the Nyāya counters that unless both these slices belong to the self same cognizer, the subsequent temporal slice cannot know that the object of its cognition is the same object of cognition as that of the previous temporal slice (Chakrabarti 1999: 60-65). On the basis of certain theses about memory such as 'one can only remember what one has seen before', the Nyāya tries to establish that the memory criterion of personal identity, in fact, presupposes the existence of a permanent substantial self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in other words, joins contemporary critics of the analysis of personal identity in terms of the memory criterion: since a mental state can be a genuine memory of an experience only if the person in the state is the same person who had the experience, psychological continuity theories cannot explain personal identity without presupposing it (Beebee and Dodd 2007: 36-54). The Nyāya critique of Buddhist reductionism is carried on by Rāmānuja, whose world-view is fully realist and who argues that the finite self is an enduring unitary entity that underlies its conscious states. Rāmānuja says that the various states of consciousness such as joy and grief which originate, persist for some time and then pass away are attributes of the *same* self which endures through them. This permanence of the self underlying all its conscious acts is established by the fact that a certain object could not have been re-cognised as the same object over a stretch of time unless the subject of knowledge had continued to exist for that duration. Also, the distinction of the knowing subject from its conscious acts becomes the more evident when statements such as 'I, the knower, do not at present have the knowledge which I once had' are considered, for what they show is that conscious acts do not have the same permanence as the knowing self (Lipner 1986: 52-3). If such transient acts of consciousness were to be identified with their substrate, the knowing self, it would not be able to recognise a thing seen on one day as the very same thing which it had seen on the previous day. This is because, as Rāmānuja says, what has been cognised by one cannot be re-cognised by another.

In short, our discussion of some classical Indian thinkers reveals

that while, on the one hand, they see the process of reasoned discourse as ultimately framed by a horizon of liberation, they also raise, on the other hand, fundamental questions which are recognizable from a western perspective as instances of *philosophia*: the questions of persistence through change, personal identity, nature of consciousness and virtue ethics. For instance, in the Buddhist tradition, desires are viewed not as brute forces but as responsive to our beliefs, and the reason that desire produces suffering is because they are in fact rooted in false views about the nature of reality (Burton 2010: 191). Therefore, Buddhist philosophical therapy has a strong cognitive dimension: we need to overcome our ignorant ways of viewing the world as a domain of substantial things, and such transcendence involves both the logical refutation of Vedāntic arguments and the practice of meditation, mindfulness, restraint and self-analysis.

H

Let us now turn to the Premise 2 of our argument, after having noted in the preceding sections that the classical Indian 'care of the self' did not prevent the flourishing of argumentative settings within which the competing doctrines of rival schools were analyzed, debated and critiqued. The view that rational discourse was lacking in classical India because all thinking was Vedic-based is a sweeping generalization, for not only did Buddhism explicitly reject Vedic authority but also traditions such as Sāṃkhya–Yoga, while traditionally within the Vedic fold, are usually silent on the Vedas. While some strands of the material, such as Advaita Vedānta, are indeed scripturally grounded in the Vedas, this authoritative control needs to be carefully understood in terms not of a 'farewell to reason' but of a division of cognitive labour. Advaita claims that sense-perception, inference, and other means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) apply to the empirical domain, while the existence of Brahman is known only through scriptural authority. Therefore, Śaṃkara argues in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* 18.66 that '[e]ven if a hundred scriptural utterances were to say that fire is cold or that it is not bright they would have no cognitive authority. If scripture were to say such things we would have to assume that it intended some other sense, else we would be understanding its cognitive authority amiss' (Lipner 1994: 146). While Śaṃkara himself employed reason (*tarka*) to dismantle the positions of his opponents, he could also inveigh against what he called the 'dry reasoning'

(*śuṣkatarka*) of the 'dialecticians' who having rejected Vedic authority were entangled in fictions of their own unaided intellect (Halbfass: 280). Śaṃkara was not the only classical theologian who put scripture, as it were, in its proper place, for his own doctrine that the phenomenal world is an insubstantial illusion was criticised by Mādhva who argued: 'Self-evident experience establishes the difference between the individual soul and God. Everyone knows that they cannot do everything. Scripture is not an authority if it contradicts this sort of self-evidence'. (Cited in Bartley 2011: 188)

Another explanation that is sometimes offered for the alleged lack of rational argumentation in the Indian traditions is that the phenomenal world is believed to be an illusion. However, even this view is an over-generalization: not only the Jaina, the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, and the Sāṃkhya–Yoga traditions but also the followers of the Rāmānuja and the Mādhva school of Vedānta clearly affirm the ontological reality of the material world. Even the Advaita tradition, which did hold that the phenomenal world is ultimately an illusion, and is grounded in the unchanging, timeless Brahman, sometimes employed sophisticated dialectical tools to dismantle rival standpoints and suggest the way to this Brahman. The Advaitic transcendence of secular (*laukika*) reason should therefore be understood not as instance of reason being cast to the winds but of reason being employed to explore its own limits – and in this specific respect Advaita is in quite good European company, whether Zeno of Elea, medieval Roman Catholicism and arguably Wittgenstein. On the other hand, the Indian schools that were opposed to the Advaitic theory that the temporal world is ultimately a cosmic illusion (*māyāvāda*) often debated, not surprisingly, the nature of time itself: for instance, the realist and pluralist Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika school regarded time as one of the categories of existence (*padārtha*); in the Sāṃkhya tradition, again realist, time was regarded as an aspect of the world of becoming which emerged from the dynamic interplay between the principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*; and the Buddhist schools were involved in controversies over notions such as momentariness (Balslev 1983). The often-heard claim that Indian *darśana* is 'spiritual' should therefore not obscure the crucial point that the classical intellectual traditions developed through mutual debate, argument and enquiry, sometimes borrowing one another's argumentative strategies and presenting refutations of their opponent's views. For one instance of the sophisticated level of this cross-border traffic, we may turn to a Śaiva–Siddhānta thinker called Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (c.1000 CE) who, according to Alex Watson, 'creatively assimilated certain

features of Buddhism, thereby strengthening his own armoury, and then used these to overcome those other features of Buddhism that conflicted with his own tradition' (Watson 2006: 388). More generally, classical Indian debate and enquiry often proceeded through an examination, interrogation and critique of the view of the doctrinal opponent (*pūrva-pakṣin*), and established the final conclusion only through this dialectical negotiation.

On the other hand, one can point to certain strands in the classical material which emphasized patterns of critical enquiry which are not directly connected to spiritual practice. For instance, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya (c.300 CE) mentions a certain cognitive discipline called *ānvīkṣikī*, of which the three branches of *sāṃkhya, yoga* and *lokāyata* are mentioned. Kautilya rejects the view that *ānvīkṣikī* is only a special branch of the Vedas, that economics (*vārtta*) and politics (*daṇḍanīti*) are the only sciences (*vidyā*), and that politics is the only science, and records that *ānvīkṣikī* is an independent science (I.2.1–12). Further, he cites a traditional couplet which states that *ānvīkṣikī* is the source of light for all branches of knowledge, a means for all activities and a foundation for all social and religious duties. While it would be mistaken to read into these remarks a fully–systematized tradition exemplifying the 'pure theoretical attitude' of Husserl, it has also been argued that they do indicate a concern for a practice of reason which can be applied to matters such as the distinction between good and evil, the goals of political institutions and so on (Ganeri 2001: 9). Further, while the Nyāya tradition does hold that the overcoming of erroneous beliefs is geared to final liberation, it also argues that the highest good is to be attained through the knowledge of sixteen categories, six of which are means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the object of right knowledge (*prameya*), the parts of a demonstration (*avayava*), truth-directed debate (*vāda*), victory-directed debate (*jalpa*), and destructive debate (*vitaṇḍā*). (*Nyāya–Sūtra* 1.1.1). More specifically, truth-directed debate (*vāda, kathā*) has the following characteristics: (a) the debate is initiated by the fact that mutually incompatible attributes have been ascribed to the same subject; (b) the proof of either the thesis or the refutation should be based on evidence (*pramāṇa*) and argument (*tarka*); (c) both sides should mention the five steps in demonstration (*avayava*); and (d) the reasoning should not involve contradictions with any accepted doctrine (Matilal 1986: 83-84). The five limbs mentioned in (c) are as follows: (a) the thesis to be established; (b) evidence; (c) the general principle, with an example; (d) subsumption of the present instance under

the general principle; and (e) statement of the position thus proved. Thus a standard instance of this pattern of argumentation goes as follows: (a) there is fire on that hill; (b) for, there is smoke there; (c) wherever there is smoke there is fire, for instance, in the kitchen; (d) there is smoke on that hill 'accordingly' (*tathā*); and (e) therefore there is fire on that hill (Matilal 1986: 78). Given the strong emphasis that the Nyāya tradition places on providing material instances for this inference, it should not be surprising that it often appealed to ordinary experience and ordinary language (*lokānubhava* and *lokavyavahāra*) when trying to establish a conclusion in epistemology. For instance, in response to a sceptic who enquires into why one should accept that all occurrences of smoke are also occurrences of fire, one Nyāya answer is that the assumption that there can be an instance of smoke in the absence of an instance of fire would upset the prestige of ordinary experience (*loka-maryādā*) (Mohanty 1992: 172). The Nyāya tradition was attacked on this very point from two different directions by its doctrinal opponents, the Mādhyamika Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntins, who argued, for somewhat different reasons, that ordinary language and experience should not, in fact, be taken as authoritative – and proceeded to provide rational reconstructions of the ordinary sphere of discourse.

I

Our discussion in the preceding sections shows that the location of classical Indian thought in dense networks of text, tradition and therapy should not obscure the presence of numerous types of practices of reason in these networks. Thus, in his work on classical Indian philosophy, Jonardon Ganeri speaks of 'rescuing a story suppressed by Orientalism – the story of reason in a land too often defined as reason's Other' (Ganeri 2001: 4). Further, in this anti-Orientalist context where the image of the 'mystical, irrational Orient' has been shown to be a 'western' construction, and scholars are exploring the possibilities of 'alternative modernities' in non-European civilizations, we can see that it is difficult to locate a precise equivalent for *philosophia* in the Indic traditions, whether *darśana* or *ānvīkṣikī*, partly because of the semantic fluidity and the extremely wide range of self-images of *philosophia* itself. For instance, in a book published in 1971, Antony Flew argued in this manner to explain the exclusion of Indian 'philosophy' from the discussion: 'philosophy as the word is understood here, is concerned first, last and all the

time with argument. It is, incidentally, because most of what is labelled *Eastern Philosophy* is not so concerned ... that this book draws no materials from any source east of Suez' (Flew 1971: 36). Twenty years later, Robert Solomon presented a very different view of the relation between 'argument' and 'passion' in philosophical discourse: 'My own allegiances tend toward the more emotionally extravagant existentialists – Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus and Sartre ... But even a brief look at our definitive philosophical heroes should be enough to tell us that philosophy is something more than detached analysis and argument. Socrates, our ultimate model, entered into philosophy with wit, passion and a mission almost unimaginable in most professionalized philosophy today. Even Hume and Kant, hardly Kierkegaardian existentialists, display a passion and a mission ... in their works and in their lives that one would be hard pressed to find in the Journal of Philosophy' (Solomon 1992: 44).

Therefore, the question is 'Is there 'philosophy' in India?' turns out, after all, to be a subset of the wider set of translation projects of the type, 'Is there *X* in India?' And as it often happens with the translation of terms which are richly woven into one specific cultural universe into those of another cultural universe, we may argue that terms such as *darśana* and *ānvīkṣikī* are 'not the same, and yet not another' from *philosophia*. That is, the problems that western philosophers have raised, analysed and debated do not always have precise analogues in the Indian traditions: for instance, Advaita Vedānta or Buddhism do not discuss the sense-reference distinction or the analytic truth versus synthetic truth distinction, nor do they speak of the ontological argument, supervenience, or the Kantian *a priori*. On the other hand, the Fregean view that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence is indeed paralleled in classical Indian thought by the theory of related designation (*anvitābhidhāna*) which states that isolated words are not meaningful in themselves and only a sentence expresses a complete meaning, which was opposed by the theory of relation of the designata (*abhihitānvaya*) which states that sentential meaning is composed of the meaning of individual words (Mohanty 1992: 70). Thinkers in the classical Indian traditions also raised questions which correspond to western philosophical disputes over whether consciousness is a substance, quality or act; whether logic is concerned with formal validity or material truth; whether 'being' is a real predicate or a linguistic artefact, and so on. As for western philosophers themselves, in the wake of Kuhn and other thinkers

who have developed various forms of social epistemology, they have become less shy of speaking of authoritative testimony: a recent introduction to epistemology points out that many testimony-based beliefs are justified beliefs, and that such beliefs play an extremely important role in building up our stock of knowledge (Audi 2011: 150-172). However, whether or not we are able to find detailed parallels to the standard problems of *philosophia* in the Indian traditions is perhaps not the point. Contemporary western philosophers themselves tend to understand their enterprise in terms not of a fixed body of doctrines, debates or systems but of ongoing, tentative essays in rational enquiry. Tyler Burge argues that philosophy 'lies in the detailed posing of questions, the clarification of meaning, the development and criticism of argument, the working out of ideas and points of view' (Burge 1992: 51). The sort of generic rationality – reason at work in elucidating meaning, connecting concepts, and developing arguments – that Burge is indicating can be quite readily located in the Indian traditions, as we have seen on many instances in the previous sections.

And yet, as often, something is indeed lost in translation as we move from some of the present self-images of *philosophia* to *darśana*. Contemporary western philosophers who deal with the problem of personal identity, for instance, tend to keep their discussions clear from arguments in moral philosophy. Whereas for classical Indian thought this was not simply an 'academic' dispute, for the conceptualization of the self as a substantial entity or as a nexus of interconnected process had crucial ethical implications. For instance, some of the Vedāntic thinkers would argue that the education of the emotions requires as a presupposition a temporally extended self which can act as the substantial locus for this self-cultivation, while the Buddhists would respond, with critical argumentation, that the acceptance of such a locus is precisely the misconception which must be overcome for eradicating emotional turmoil. Whatever their views on the ontological status of the world – as an insubstantial mirage or a real adjectival attribute of the Lord – most Vedāntic schools agree that the way beyond *saṁsāra* lies in uncovering the deeper substantial self and ridding it of its empirical impurities. They would concur with the Buddhists on the relation between suffering and impermanence, but would retort that the cure lies in becoming more centred in the heart of being, whether the absolute of Śaṁkara which has no fleeting, and hence sorrowful, attributes or the Lord who shall take away the empirical misery of the dependent self. As we have seen, however, we should perhaps

speak of this shift from 'pure reason' that has often been projected as the hallmark of *philosophia* to 'therapeutic reason' in terms not of the 'overcoming of reason' but, in fact, of the 'surplus of reason' – reason, it would seem, has so much more work to do in these Vedāntic versus Buddhist controversies. At the same time, *philosophia* itself has sometimes been characterized as a progression from the Cartesian turn to the linguistic turn and finally to the ethical turn, and this narrative highlights a point that we have emphasized at several places in this essay – the work of reason and the quest for self-transformation have often entered into complex stances of opposition, engagement and reinforcement in both the western and the Indian intellectual traditions.

WORKS CITED

Audi, R. 2011. *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. London and New York: Routledge.

St Augustine 1841a. *Confessiones*. In J.-P. Migne. ed. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini: Opera Omnia*. Vol. 32. Paris.

St Augustine 1841b. *Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis*. In J.-P. Migne. ed. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini: Opera Omnia*. Vol.35. Paris.

Balslev, A. 1983. *Study of Time in Indian Philosophy*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz.

Bartley, C. 2011. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. New York: Continuum.

Beebee, Helen and Julian Dodd. ed. 2007. *Reading Metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bostock, David. 2012. *Russell's Logical Atomism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burge, T. 1992. 'Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950–1990', *The Philosophical Review* 101, 3–51.

Burton, David. 2010. 'Curing Diseases of Belief and Desire: Buddhist Philosophical Therapy'. In *Philosophy as Therapeia*. ed. C. Carlisle and J. Ganeri. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chakrabarti, A. 1983. 'Is Liberation (*mokśa*) pleasant?', *Philosophy East and West* 33, 167–82.

Chakrabarti, K.K. 1999. *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind*. Albany, N.Y.: New York.

Coppleston, F.C. 1980. *Philosophers and Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Feuerstein, G. 1980. *The philosophy of Classical Yoga*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Flew, A. 1971. *A History of Western Philosophy*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Ganeri, Jonardon. 2001. *Philosophy in Classical India: the proper work of reason*. Routledge: London and New York.

Ganeri, Martin. 2010. 'Two Pedagogies for Happiness: Healing Goals and Healing Methods in the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas and The *Śrī Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja'. In *Philosophy as Therapeia*, ed. C. Carlisle and J. Ganeri. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Green, W.B. 1965. 'St. Augustine on Time'. *Scottish Journal of Theology*. 18, 148–163.

Griffiths, P.J. 2005. 'How Reasoning Goes Wrong: A Quasi-Augustinian Account of Error and Its Implications'. In *Reason and the Reasons of Faith*, ed. P.J. Griffiths and R. Hutter. New York: T & T Clark International.

Grimes, John. 1996. *A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Hadot, P. 1995. *Philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. trs. By Michael Chase. Oxford: Blackwell.

Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1990. *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.

Holtzen, T.L. 1990. 'The Therapeutic Nature of Grace in St Augustine's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*', *Augustinian Studies*. 21, 93–115

Insole, C.J. and H. Harris. ed. 2005. *Faith and Philosophical Analysis: the Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion*. Farnborough: Ashgate.

Lipner, J. 1986. *Face of Truth: a study of meaning and metaphysics in the Vedāntic theology of Rāmānuja*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Lipner, J. 1994. *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*. London and New York: Routledge.

Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley. ed. 1987. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Markham, Ian. 1998. *Truth and the Reality of God: An Essay in Natural Theology*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Matilal, B.K. and J.L. Shaw. ed. 1985. *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Matilal, B.K. 1986. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1989. 'Ethical Relativism and Confrontation of Cultures'. In *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*, ed.

Michael Krausz. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mohanty, J.N. 1992. *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Moser, Paul. 1999. 'Metaphilosophy'. In *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Robert Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Myers, M.W. 1998. 'Śaṇkarācārya and ānanda', *Philosophy East and West* 48, pp. 553–67.

Nyāya–Sūtra. 1997. Anantalal Thakur critical ed. *Gautamiya nyāya darśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Pande, G.C. 1994. *Life and Thought of Śaṇkarācārya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Prado, C.G. ed. 2003. *A House Divided: comparing analytic and continental philosophy*. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.

Radhakrishnan, S. and C.A. Moore. ed. 1957. *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Russell, Bertrand. 1945. *The History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Russell, Bertrand. 1975. *Wisdom of the West*. London: Macdonald and Co.

Śāntideva. 1995. *The Bodhicāryāvatara*. trs. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1988. 'The Contextual Fallacy'. In *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, ed. G.J. Larson and E. Deutsch. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Solomon, R.C. 1992. 'Beyond Reason: The Importance of Emotion in Philosophy'. In *Revisioning Philosophy*. ed. James Ogilvy. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Thakur, Anantalal. ed. 1997. *Gautamiyanyāyadaraśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Tanji, J. 1991. 'The Problem of Relativism'. In *Culture and Modernity: East–West Philosophic Perspectives*, ed. E. Deutsch. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Warrier, A.G. 1981. *The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta*. Madras: University of Madras.

Watson, A. 2006. *The self's awareness of itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments against the Buddhist doctrine of no-self*. Wien:

Sammlung de Nobili Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien.

Williamson, Timothy. 2007.T̃he Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden MA and Oxford: Blackwell.

Winch, Peter. 1958. *The Idea of a Social Science*. London: Routledge & Kegan.

Yandell, K. 2001. 'Some reflections on Indian metaphysics', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 50, 171–190.

GRIEF AND DHARMA: SUFFERING, EMPATHY AND MORAL IMAGINATIVE INTUITION

Purushottama Bilimoria

INTRODUCTION[1]

Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson once claimed that the philosophical literature of India, with its world-denying proclivity, professes a cultural version of "psychic fainting", a flight from emotions and from emotional entanglement. Great value was placed in ancient India, alleges Masson, on the ability to withdraw oneself from all but minimal involvement with the external world of human relations (Masson 1981:3). Masson compares this to the trend towards *affectlessness* that psychiatry terms the "schizoid stance". This masochistic tendency to detach oneself from others and to exalt the detachment into a philosophical principle of sublime proportions was pushed to its limits in ancient Hindu, Buddhist and Jain thought, Masson argues. Nevertheless, we can expect to find evidence, albeit veiled, of an original impulse which was so strong that it required this panicked flight (Masson 1981: 5; cited in Bilimoria 1995).

What might have been the "original impulse" from which the ancients sought to escape? Masson does not pause to answer this question directly. He hastily moves on to examine the presumed antecedent tradition of the solitary wanderer (*parivrâjaka)*, the person who renounces everything on account of the pervasiveness of pain or suffering *(duḥkha*). For example, Masson does grant in half-scathing tone, that the Buddha's life reveals something about his concerns with emotions, insofar as the Buddha made *duḥkha* the cornerstone of his metaphysical and moral teaching. This is echoed in the *Mahābhārata* as well: 'All living beings – be they superior, inferior or mediocre on account of their worldly deeds – are completely enmeshed in suffering. You must see this' (*Mahābhārata* (MhB) XII – Peace [Śāntīparvan] or 'The Book of Liberation', 174.14). But it took a severe depression, or melancholia, for this distorted recognition to arise; in other words, the 'Buddha was able to perceive a basic fact of human experience correctly,

even if he erred in seeking a direction for its provenance'. Hence the sharp diagnosis: Much within Buddhism is 'a manic defence against depression' (Masson 1981:7).

Whether Masson's evaluation can be generalised for much within the Indian tradition at large is a debatable issue, for it is not uncommon to find Indian texts making depression, in the form of despondency, *viṣāda*, a starting point for a protracted analysis of emotions and aligned human sensibilities. We can put Masson's analytic judgment to the test in the battlefield scenario in the book of the *Bhagavadgītā* (BhG), and elsewhere too in the MBh, moments before the unseemly war erupts and in its aftermath. But I shall argue here, within these enframing narratives, that we loose sight of the conceptual autonomy of emotions and a warrant for their philosophical and psychological sublime status inasmuch as emotions tend to be foregrounded if not in reason then certainly in a discourse of ethics, or concerns with moral turpitude, attachments, and the larger provenance of *dharma*. Could the bewildered blubbering *viṣāda*-stricken Arjuna have ended up on Freud's couch instead of being saddled in the chariot of the *dharma*-juggler Krishna? Or for that matter, the self-doubting, ever-grieving Yudhiṣṭhira, especially as the carnage of war hits him as it were in the guts. While the BhG approves of *bhaktibhāva* (devotional love) and the more commonplace affects (feelings of confusion, fear or joy) in making moral decisions, it appears to be dismissive of the harder emotions in the detached pursuit of duty. However, from a certain reading in the broader context of the epic, one might still argue that the epic MBh seeks to understand the phenomenological intricacies of emotion, its entanglement with propositional attitudes or judgments of the intellect, and its impact upon the person's action *or* inaction. The texts exhorts that moral judgments be appropriately grounded in the visceral aspect of emotions. But in whose moral judgment? There is much at stake here. In other words, when Arjuna trembles from fear and is sicken with dread at the approaching battle, his charioteer does not discredit Arjuna's affects or judgments but, instead, appeals to Arjuna's imagination to invoke the fear of an even more painful sense of shame should he decide not to take up arms and engage in the ensuing battle. Not only in the opening scene of the BhG book, but also in the larger MhB, especially after Arjuna returns with Krishna from a victorious day elsewhere in the battlefield only to discover that his only beloved son, Abhimanyu, prompted by Yudhiṣṭhira to break through the circular quay, *chakra-vyuha*, stood slaughtered by the scion of his

opposing cousin-brothers, Jayadaratha. One might surmise that the BhG's resolution is more sanguine, culturally-sensitive, and philosophically circumspect than appears from the traditional perspective of absolutist moralism on the one side and stoic asceticism on the other side.

Arjuna's viṣāda(despondency)

The text informs us that Arjuna is 'dejected, filled with strange pity' (1.28). Here a despondent Arjuna is wheeled up as the interlocutor, more like a patient, and seen to be presenting a first-hand account of his relative state of mind on the battlefield as he encounters the prospect of the impending death of his kith and kin: his body is overwhelmed with sensations of feelings, described as quivering, shivering, giddiness, nervousness, heaviness of breathing, weakness of limbs, hair standing on end, and swallowing. The 'physiology of affect' (Stolorow 2011) is striking. Arjuna relies on his physiological "affects" to determine what is right and what is wrong; his reference for the moral intuition he was come up with at this point in the narrative is his own body, thus:

> *My limbs sink,*
> my mouth is parched,
> my body trembles,
> the hair bristles on my flesh.
> the magic bow slips
> from my hand, my skin burns,
> I cannot stand still,
> my mind reels.
> I see omens of chaos,
> *Krishna; I see no good* [*emphasis added]. . . (1.29-31b)

This colloquy suggests that certain basic reactive emotions could be involuntary.

However, when Krishna takes the stand as it were, it is apparent that the didactic counsel given to Arjuna is predicated on the "emotional" values of dispassion and detachment as the only appropriate guide for moral decisions. But the reference frame for that moral judgment rests elsewhere in the normative memory. Krishna admonishes the warrior-hero for lamenting what is unlamentable, since the living will die in time while the *ātman* is

freed and remains undying. Elsewhere, I have related this to a voice in a dream sequence: 'It is natural (for one) in the physical state to mourn; but grief (*śocya*, grieving, lamentation) is for oneself not for the departed' (Bilimoria 2012a).Thus, Krishna counsels Arjuna, 'Great Warrior, kill the enemy menacing you in the form of desire!'(BhG3.43b). But why does Krishna deny Arjuna's own feelings about the menaces of war, when Arjuna might just have hit the moral target? Is there a necessary isomorphism between 'war'/ 'warrior' and 'desire', 'righteous kingdom' (on earth or, if failed, in heaven) and 'dharma'? Why does Krishna urge Arjuna by appealing to his sense of shame, and then argue for dispassion? Why, after decrying desire and arguing for dispassion and detachment, Krishna encourages the powerful emotions of devotion and *desire* for Krishna, while fighting for the kingdom (either) to the very end?

Arjuna has consulted his emotions, evaluated the situation according to his physiological affects and found the answer to his moral dilemma in these telling judgment:'there is *no good* [to be had] in this battle: I shall not fight' (BhG 2.9). Furthermore, he asks how he can ever be happy if he kills his own cousins and kin for 'honour forbids it' (1.37). He is so overwhelmed by the powerful emotional state that he begins to weep (2.1). Arjuna has evaluated his situation according to his physiological affects and made his moral decision. But that is also the rhetorical move on which the text tricks the reader: if only Arjuna could be distracted from and be disabused of the instructive power of his own physiological response, his *in situ* subjective moral intuition - what I call 'situational imagination'-, if he could imagine victory ahead, he could be persuaded towards seeing the virtue of a normatively-informed transcendental argument. Hence Krishna responds with a smirk, a biting smile, in prosaic terms; '*...by golly you're good at vexing eloquence, dis fine rhetoric and sombre polemics; well, let me be telling you somethin': ye ain't gotta clue what's comin' for yu, mate.*' This same veiled though muted cloud-like rebuke I did hear also from my own beloved when I read out my second paper on emotions in Indian philosophy by her hospital bedside, graciously acknowledging that I was drawing on her work on empathy in psychotherapy (Bilimoria 2003; 2012a; Sharma1993, 2014).[2]

That politics and polemical diatribe on dharma, yoga, freedom, death, and the transcendental discourse that follow in the dialogue is not my concern here; what I wish to get a handle on is how do we understand Arjuna's over-wrought melancholy? I turn elsewhere

for a moment, to Freud (who of course is not commenting on our text, but has a general theory of some interest in this context).

General Theories of Grief and Melancholy

In his essay on 'Mourning and Melancholia', Freud begins by talking about the "affect of mourning" : 'In the face of a death, the work of mourning brings with it a certain affective state... grief that accompanies it' (1917; 1986: 239-260). Freud is really interested in melancholy for which grief serves as a contrasting foil for his theory, and much philosophical and psychoanalytic literature has been around on melancholy as a depressive syndrome – from Aristotle to Kristeva (Kristeva 1989; Radden 2000).

As Hamlet's father's ghost pointed out, it is unbecoming for someone to feel empathy and grieving for another to be a mere obligatory act, though obligation might apply to certain forms of public or political mourning. But the women at the unending end of the MBh war did not wander across to the corpse-strewn river of the bloodied battlefield out of any sense of obligation; they were there looking for their arraigned lovers who had left home that morning avowing to bring back slain heads of the enemy cousin-brothers (on both sides) and kings' men as "trophies for *dharma's* avenge" that they had each pledged in fulfilling their calling. The evidence from the ground, as it were, discloses a process much more impromptu, and even to an extent spontaneous, in its response, unself-consciously proceeding without much awareness or sign of it being a cognitive act, or even that it is as clearly intentional. I veer towards alternative theories that underscore "unthinking energetics" of feeling-states, that accord a minimalist intellectual content and allow the analogues from experiences of the aesthetic and erotic sublimes to find commonalities here. In constructing this argument to the best explanation I found myself drawing liberally from psychoanalysis, feminist continental thinkers, and Indian philosophy of aesthetics. And this kind of theorising I've found it difficult to locate in our own Indic tradition (as I will argue and demonstrate), while there is a rich descriptive content, we are short and poorer for that in terms of deeper theorising as has been the mainstay in certain Western disciplines, notably, psychology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, feminist thought.

Grief is not something that can be easily "talked through" and resolved intellectually in a matter of moments, as when parties come to understand that the anger and rage, or a flurry of accusations

based on jealousy, were actually a result of some gross misreading of signs or cues – displaced object-relations – or earlier interactions between them. There is no "ready-at-hand" tool or '*prāmāṇic-upāya'* for it. And Krishna, I believe, gives a short shrift to Arjuna in this puzzling inner state he (the grief-stricken warrior) is overwhelmed by: 'It's unmanly, unbecoming of a warrior to feel so. Stand up to misery with an unvanquished heart (*hṛdayena aparājitaḥ*, MhB, Śāntīparvan,174.39); sorrow is there only in the states between the extreme limits of consciousness (elliptically: *duḥkham madhyeṣu remire..sukham antyeṣu remire)*(MhB174.35).

Śocaty eva yathā bhavān: 'Get over it, you shouldn't be grieving for your lost sons, husbands, grandsons, brothers, fathers... because they died fighting to the end for the righteous kingdom while standing firmly in dharma' (Sautpatika-parvan 11:12, & 18). 'Our hero sons have been slain following the *kṣatriya dharma'*. As if this counsel could be of some consolation or solace, the interlocutor continues:

'Draupadī: Fair lady, your sons and daughters have met their fair deaths, virtuously, in pursuit of dharma,

You, who understands dharma, should not grieve for them.'

One can hear the fading echo of dharma beseizing the entire terrains of Kurukṣetra reduced to a carnage of rubbles and river of blood, stench and tears; or, in another or contemporary context, hear Derrida (2001) sermonising at the news of the death of his colleague and friend, Jean-François Lyotard: *'There shall be no mourning*.'

Robert C. Solomon is right in emphasising that grief is not a fleeting emotion, and that therefore the phenomenological structure common to cognitive acts is not expansive enough to capture the protracted space in which grief "happens" and demands its process. Thus 'the process of grieving is the process of coping with that impossible desire and intolerable loss' (2004:85). And to that end there is an inexorable reflective, dedicatory, contemplative, introspective, introjective and even deeply meditative structure (if we have to continue to use cognitive language)to the process. But as I have been arguing, there is a deeply 'affective' element – the language of the body and the soul – that cannot be reductively captured within the bounds of the cognitive (mental) process – no more than love can be (for love is rooted in and predicated upon, as the saying go, in the language of the heart). The pathologically dissociative 'cognitive' theory of emotion for long excluded affect as an essential element of emotional experience which much more

satisfies grief's conditions of reciprocity, reparation, empathy, compassion, and *Sorge* [care] and is not limited merely to rational or intellectual movement (*e*-motion).

Importantly, as just noted, there is in this expression of grief a moral *reciprocity*, if not also the moral responsibility or blame (hence guilt)one is overcome with, the sense that somehow one is oneself implicated in the cause of the death, which in turn compounds the sentimentality of loss. Reciprocity entails that the onus is now on the part of the survivors to make good the loss, not theirs (as might be selfishly believed) but the short-circuited opportunities and eudemonic life-project of the other, the deceased, in which project the survivors failed by dint of their ignorance or helplessness in the face of the other's imminent or sudden passing. A kind of virtual trusteeship or covenant is established whereby the survivors (or mourners) each pledge in their own way within their capabilities to take care of the affairs as well as more vulnerable surviving kins (or animals), bring to completion unfinished work, and perpetuate the memory of the beloved deceased – for "s/he meant so much to me also". They offer their selflessly unstinted attention: in regular prayers, meditation, visits to the gravesite, fasting, undertaking pilgrimage, and other vow-based observances, such as celibacy (in the case of the widow/er), a more spiritually-aligned life-style, and so on. These are intentionally directed toward the well-being of the faithfully departed's 'soul', whichever 'other-worldly' realm s/he may have gone onto, and beg for pardon, for *forgiveness*, for their shortcomings (hence the other side to the 'river of tears'). Thus, a mortified Dhṛtrāshtra, overwrought with grief, rambles, confessing in his lamentation, or condescends to his grief saying: 'Such insufferable loss... I did not heed to Bhīṣma's counsel, his warning so full of truth... against my better judgment; I did not act; now I am eaten away by crippling remorse, now I am broken: *'tasya lāpa-pya-mānasya, bahu-śokam.*'.(Śāntīparvan177).To have the courage amidst this turmoil to be able to face the issue and stare deeply without even as much as a blink at the fathomless reach of death that has brought about this loss through the imagined(or real at the moment of the death) eyes of the beloved—not unlike the ceaseless gaze into a beloved's living eyes – this courage is considered to be a quasi-virtue (like valour in the face of tragic assault or aggression, as in the pursuit of the eloped Urvāśī).

And yet this is an improbable imagination: not being able to think the other's pain may be as improbable an imagination as trying to think one's own death; or even more: *knowing one's death*; you

may and, I believe, you can know when you are dying (the dying say so, or show it), but can you know *nomologically* that and the moment upon which you are dead? In other words, is a first-person account possible of the "moment of death", for then this via *reductio* would yield the contradiction of the person not having died, and what else is death but *that* (claims to NDE aside)? A putative paradox that seems without an easy solution.

The Phases of Grief

This divergence aside, I wish to take up each of the stages I discern in the welling up of this emotion, drawing from the Indian tradition. I have shown this with the BhG's opening scene, despite Krishna's clever attempt to, as it were, hijack the sentimentality expressed into a well-crafted normative discourse of the possibilities awaiting him were Arjuna to drop his emotional outrage and engage in the impending battle.

So consider, for example:

Vālmīki's empathy for the sorrow (*śoka*) he felt in the mournful shriek of the female krauñca bird [egret] upon the sudden death, from a grievous hunter's arrow, of its male partner-in-the-embrace-of-love. This emotional intensity which transforms Vālmīki, a mere by-stander at that point, evokes pathos in the melting mind of the "first poet" (*ādikavi*), who then writes the "first poem" (*ādikāvya'),* which ensues in the epic *Rāmāyaṇa*; from *śoka* to *śloka* (the verse form of Sanskrit poetical creations) (Gerow 1984 :56).[3]

Somānanda, an exponent of Pratyābhijña philosophy, comments in his *Śivadṛṣṭi* that, in grief also there is the same wondrous experience of delight, joy, *ānanda* (to those who have *khecarī-sāmya*). Whatever pleasure is derived from one's wife and son, the pleasure which is animated by seminal energy, and which abides in the heart (*antarvyāvasthitam*), when contrary to all anticipation (*bhāva-asadṛśa*) there is an apprehension of the loss of the loved one aroused by tears and shrieks, that very pleasure becomes the cause of grief (*kṣobhātmakaṃ*). When that grief reaches its climax (*vikāsam āpannaṃ*) and one thinks that that pleasure will not be experienced any longer, then owing to despair (*nairapekṣya-vaśa*) the nature of that grief is suddenly turned into distinct joy (*camatkriyātma*) (owing to the expansion of the essential nature or *khecarī-sāmya*). So it has been said:

> 'Even in grief, by the expansion of the essential nature etc.' (Ś.D. V.9. Vijñābhairava, stanza 118: 43-44).

Thus the news about the death of a beloved person that evokes grief (*śoka*), like the great joy of an aesthetic experience, may give access to a wondrous, at least momentarily, contact with the divinely sublime consciousness underlying these experiences. This is, of course, Abhinavagupta's thinking as well, that all the *sthāyībhāvas* (basic durable emotions) and their corresponding *rasa*-s (aesthetic relishes) ultimately lead to or culminate in *śāntarasa,* literally, "peace-mood", 'the imaginative experience of tranquillity', that one experiences when the realisation dawns about the futility (*nirveda*) of contingent existence, which then arouses the full-blown consciousness of *ātman* (authenticity of Da-Sein) in the zoon of liberation (*mokṣa)* (Masson and Patwardhan, 1969: 35).Whether this occurs with each *sthāyībhāva* in turn, or via a convergence of all the *sthāyībhāva* into one dominant (prima-donna) *bhāva*, or in differential relations, or in sublation *or* cancellation of each in an ascending leap, etc., has been a matter of much scholastic dispute since Abhinavagupta elevated *śāntarasa* as the crowing aesthetic sentiment - something we cannot go into here (See Masson &Patwardhana 1969; Gerow; Gerow and Aklujkar 1972).

But I must confess that this *ānanda* or ultimate bliss-state fully escaped me in my own moment of extreme *viṣāda*; it seems, I missed that boat somewhere. Only in the deeper metaphysical intuition of the possibility of the ultimate state being none other than *Nothing-ness*, as when one looks over at the never-ending expanse of the Venus Bay ocean receding into the borderless horizon, have I found myself overwhelmed with a sense of joy (Bilimoria 2012b). But Abhinavagupta may want to retort that there is indeed a formal isomorphism between the aesthetic and the philosophical, even as 'he proceeds to treat dramatic aesthetics as a prolegomenon to the true conquest of the nature of things (*saṃsāra)*' (Gerow 1984 :57). The only difference from philosophy is that the universality is still emotional – grounded in the diversity of the human realm rather than in the unity [or emptiness] of the cosmic. [I]t is the capacity to feel that distinguishes us from the universe and gives us hope of salvation' (ibid). Abhinava's metaphysical commitment was to *advaita* (non-dualist ontology) of Brahmanism, so the preeminent *rasa* tied to the realisation of its truth would understandably be *ānanda*; but if counterfactually the best metaphysical explanation turns out to be its rival, equally non-dualist but empty of all ontology, or to use

Heidegger's term, *onto-theo-logos*, i.e. Nothingness, barring traces of suffering as specks scattered over the Void, then the universality of *śāntarasa* is not at all compelling. Rather, one could argue, it might just be the case (as indeed Buddhist aestheticians like Bhāmaha, Digṅāna elsewhere, have maintained) the affect-filled sublime of *karuṇa,* pathos, empathy, or the universality of compassion, is the proper candidate for the climax of all aesthetic experiences. In the *Naṭyaśāstra* too *karuṇa* is said to be the *sthāyībhāva* properly of grief, brought about by the loss of a dear one, or by calamity, killing, misery, pain and tragic frustration; the shock ensues in tears, dejection, or a 'total' (collapse) and so on. *Karuṇarasa* as compassion or empathy is evoked when one experiences someone dear to them die (or is killed) and by hearing unpleasant things. There may indeed be a tinge of "delight" (*rasoi)* in this introjective transference, for after all this is not a *bhāva* as such, maybe a *bhāvana* (sentiment), but clearly a *rasa*, with the same measured distance that Abhivanagupta noted between the bereft, wailing lovebird and the poet Vālmīki. Philosophers are after all transcendental or metaphysical poets, and that is why they are drawn to prosaic poets (Yudhiṣṭhira to Krishna; Heidegger to Hölderlin, Rielke; Gandhi to Tagore.)

Jumping to the contemporary representation, I am told that Gajendranath Tagore, a nephew of Rabindranath Tagore, and a poet and critic in his own right, interpreted many of the heart-wrenching poems and later experimental (quasi-impressionist) paintings of the Noble Laureate precisely in this light: that through his suffering, as the four walls collapsed around him, there was still a *rasa* or delight or *jouissance* being enjoyed by someone in the transcendental planes, namely, an otherwise benevolent God.

I am not so sure; one so afflicted may have to stretch their credulity to a limit to invite the possibly non-existent supernatural – at a moment when oneself along with the one lost is in the jaws of Yāma, and doubt and disbelief overpowers his/her intellectual faculty – to indeed think of partaking of any joy, even the curious compounding in the aesthetic of *karuṇa*, compassion, empathy, (even in self-pity) and *rasa*, that might be believed by all but the sufferer to present itself.

There are further suggestive material in literary and aesthetic works, and particularly in the *Mahābhārata* and Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṃśa* that open up certain vistas and hermeneutical possibilities at least. And that I have found in the wide-ranging dilation on the *bhāvas,* states of emotion. These, and especially the corresponding sentiments (*rasa,* aesthetic relish, metaphor for the

literal sense of "flavour") in the audience, are triggered by *vibhāvas,* causes or stimulants and their consequent inner experience (*anubhāvas)*, e.g., the actual shedding of tears, pallor, facial grimace, drooping limps, sighing, absent-mindedness; accompanied by the *vyabhicārībhāvas* of disgust, exhaustion, anxiety, impatience, delusion, confusion, fear, regret, helplessness, forgetfulness, languor, stunned, breaking down, collapse, etc (NS:59). This aesthetic view is originally articulated in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (NS), where the term *rasa* is first used in a properly theoretical sense. (Gerow 1984:36). This is an affect conveyed through language, and use of kinaesthetics (performatives) to enact empathetic modes of responses (in drama) to events witnessed on the stage (theatre), as if in real life. Drama is a metaphor for creation of diversity from an unstable base of unity; and lyrical poetry a metaphor for the cosmos striving for unity that would survive ruptures in the currents of life. As we noted earlier, Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa* is said to have been born in such a moment of emotional transference triggered by the moral improbity being witnessed, and 'the manifest form of language is here an inspiration that is emotional yet already reflective, to which it uniquely gives voice'(Gerow, 1984: 57). It is, as Edwin Gerow continues, 'no accident that in later *rasa* theory, *śoka* is counted as the emotional ground of one of the eight *rasas,* the pathetic (*karuṇa),* now understood as the message of Vālmīki's grief' (ibid).

What I understand as 'grief ' as a felt-state and 'mourning' as an act, appear under the *sthāyībhavas* or 'basic durable emotions', some people call 'permanent' or'dominant emotions'; the *Naṭyaśāstra* lists eight *bhāvas* with eight corresponding *rasas*:

- *rati* (love); śṛingāra (erotic love)
- *hāsya* (mirth); laughter
- *śoka* (sorrow); grief
- *krodha*(anger); indignation
- *utsaha* (energy); excitement
- *bhaya* (dread); fear
- *jugupsā* (disgust); bībhatsa
- *vismaya* (astonishment); arresting.

And these may be accentuated by accessory elements, sensibilities, *vyabhicārībhāvas*, or *sañcārībhāvas* such as anxiety, affliction, delusion *(moha), viṣāda* (dejection), *amarṣa* (the insufferable), even *unmāda* (insanity). These are further accompanied by changes in physical (read also, physiological, physiogenic) symptoms, *anubhāvas,*

feelings, such as *aśru*, shrieking with tears, confusion, trembling, hair-standing on its ends, weakness of the knees, other gestures such as loosing grip on things in one's hands, collapsing, and so on – verily these are Arjuna's symptoms in the beginning chapter of the BhG. And very little, I might add, one gets out of theorising on *rasa,* except in a counterfactual way of what aesthetic sense one might have after melting deeply into the state that would be the other's *antarbhāva* (1st-person feelings)*;* thus, *karuṇarasa* (compassion or empathy) corresponding to the *bāhirabhāva* (external, transference) in all its visceral modality of *śoka* (sorrow), *vilāpa;* the former is in the *rasika*, aesthete or spectator, the latter is not. In fact, *antarbhāvas* (that are internal to the feeler; subjectively experienced)cannot be re-enacted as such, but for certain constitutive elements expressed in *bāhirabhāva.*

While there can be 10 or more states of *kāma* (desire's love, cupit's arrows), there aren't variations given in the case of *sthāyībhāva* of *śoka/ lāpa.* Curiously, what is interesting is that the ensuing reactive emotions, *duḥkhas*, from the frustration or petrification of states of *kāma* (desire), border very much on the *vibhāvas* of *śoka*, particularly, *abhilāṣā* (longing), *arthacintā* (anxiety of loosing), *anusmṛti* (recollections), *udvega* (distress), *vilāpa* (lamentation), *krodha* (indignation), *vyādhi* (fever), and many more such constituents are covered. In fact, the loss of the loved object or the beloved in death is permanent and irrecoverable, irreparable, while the loss, say, in romantic split-ups, mis-firings, or travels to distant lands by the beloved is seen as being transient, recoverable, reconcilable: Sītā's separation from Rāma begins as the hopeful latter but ends up as the former; their re-union in the heavens after death counts for naught (*nirapekṣa)*: there never is a possibility of return to the innocence of the shared love-state *(vipralambha-śṛṅgāra* as in *rati*); the deeper the love, the deeper the grief; and that is what is underscored in empathic sorrow that registers grief. But the *hṛdaya-samvāda* (empathy) as in Vālmīki's *rasapratīti*, even though it is marked with a profound sense of sorrow, is really not the *bhāva*, originary *duḥkha*, that the surviving krauñca-bird bereft of it's beloved partner, might feel and goes on feeling thereon: the motif for the plot in the finalé of the epic...hence the mortalising sorrow of Sītā at her total chastisement and banishment by Rāma. A poem pegged on grief, from beginning to the end, symbolised in the separation of the lovebird from its mate.

Not all *śoka* or state of grief, of course, are felt as a result of departure, death or loss of the beloved or close ones; other events

could bring these about as well, such as abduction, injury, abandonment, separation, the other falling into untoward habits/ disposition (such as addiction to liquor, drugs, infidelity, and so on.) As the legendary Bhīgu narratives in the MBh's 'Book of Peace': People are overwhelmed by the mental sorrow caused by the destruction of their kinsmen and wealth, or else the separation from them, as well as by other sufferings caused by decrepitude and death (190.13). The symptoms could be the same though: tears, weeping, drying of the palate, change of colour and contour of the face, even throughout the body, lethargy, loss of memory, numbness, perturbations, modulation in the voice, even muteness, loss of confidence or sense of forbearance, ...the extremes of anxiety and panic attack, as we might call it in modern parlance. Associated with the gloom of grief is a series of unsettling sensations and feelings: not least, an arresting sense of hopelessness, loss, fear, anxiety, wrath, if not indignant anger, a 'collapsing of the house of cards', a throbbing of the heart in deep pain, swallowing, tightness in the chest, and perhaps also in the stomach that has all but lost its usual appetite, and insomnia. Because of the intensity and insufferable 'jabofred-hot memory' whence all this "common-sense" vanishes like an ant in the mouth of a furnace (C.S. Lewis, 1976), there follows doubts about what one is actually feeling, sometimes denying the obvious only to be hit with wave upon wave of discomfiture, tears and inexplicable sensations in various parts and organs of the body; thus it is that grief is often said to be the most negative of 'negative' or 'hard' emotions.

The Mahābhārata's Grief Writ Large

In light of the foregoing ruminations, let me turn now to some representative passages from the narrative ethics of the epic MBh to examine how theoretically deep the thinking there is in respect of the 'hard emotions' in question.

Grief had struck the Pāṇḍavas whence – tricked into the game of dice by the arch-rival Duryodhana, which they lost by a certain sleight-of-hand – they were robbed of their share of the kingdom, their possessions, and technically even the wife of the five heir-brothers – Draupudī. The entire kingdom (City of Elephants) is said to have been smitten by inconsolable grief. (MBh, 'The Forest Teachings', Book III (29) 1.15-18: 221). A wise Brahmin, Śaunaka, steeped in the ontology of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, wishing to help Yudhiṣṭhira understand this moment of grief in the post-partum, self-exile,

condition, spoke thus, with a tinge of object-relation psychotherapy thrown in as well: 'Thousands of occasions of sorrow and hundreds of occasions of fear beset day after day the foolish, but not the wise... (2.15) This world is tyrannized by two kinds of sorrows that arise either in the body or in the mind... disease, labour, meeting with the unloved, and parting with the loved – these are four causes from which bodily grief arises. The pain of the body and the pain of the mind, is relieved by rapid counter measures and by steadily ignoring it: these are two courses of action. For sensible physicians first relieve a man's mental anguish by pleasing talk and delightful presents; *for mental ills affect the body,* as a hot iron ball affects the water in a pitcher. Thus one should appease the ailment of the mind with insight, as one appeases fire with water; when the mental ailment is achieved the body calms down. Love, it is known, is the root of mental pain, for love makes a man attached, and thus he comes to grief. Grief roots in love and fear springs from love. From love is born the motivating passion that seeks out its object. Both passion and its object run counter to well-being, but the former is held to be the graver wrong. Just as fire in the hollow of a tree will burn down the tree to its roots, so even a small fault of passion destroys a man who wishes for Law [Dharma]' (2.20-34). Śaunaka then links passion with desire, the longing from which springs thirst, which 'deranges man, fearsome, pregnant of Unlaw [adharma], and giving rise to evil' (2.35). It is interesting to note that bodily (read, physiological) perturbations are linked directly to mental anguish as the basis of grief, and that relief from grief involves calming the body through 'talk' therapy in tandem with healing of the body, care of self. It is for this reason that some mental health and neurosciences institutions in India have begun to (re-)introduce Āyruveda treatment and a regime of yoga, meditation with regular chanting (at an adjacent shrine to Gaṅeśa), *in situ*. However illuminating as this brief discourse on grief is, there is still no follow-up or attempt at a more rigorous treatment of the malaise in the passages and Books that follow, until we get some moving episodic snippets towards the end of epic – to which I now turn.

The suggestive passages I choose are from the Strīparvan: 'The Book of Women' (after the carnage in the 'Dead of Night'), at the start of the eleventh canto of the *Mahābhārata*. There is definitely here an account of a deeply moving mood of grief, the grief of failure, of lost status and of the dire loss of loved ones. The grief that the women have been overcome with is so palpable that it is

difficult to express except through imagining the grief of others and grieving on another's account. The moving instance of this is Gāndhārī's expression of grief to Krishna, in which she surveys the blighted battlefield with divinely given-sight or extra-ordinary intuition (*divyena cakṣuṣā)*. 'The description she paints of the innocent wives of the deceased warriors confronted by the mangled corpses of their men is a masterpiece of horror and pathos'. (Clay Edition, 2009a: 281) *Amor fati!* The warrior's former invincibility is juxtaposed with the women, Pañchala and Kuru alike, reminiscing the virtues (*smarantyo bhartṛjān guṇān*), and the joys they had with their now lifeless husbands, being mauled by the hungry vultures, hyenas, dogs and goblins in an act of total annihilation of the hitherto virility, macho-manliness and identity : *'That was my man!'* Grief robbed them of their demeanour (*śoka karśita dṛṣṭvā*) at the sight of the draped corpses of Karṇa, Abhimanyu, Droṇa, Drupada, Jayadaratha, Duhshāsana, Bāhlīka, Duryodhana, among other; tigers of men snuffed out like fading flames, most by Bhīma's missiles, lie with maces still in their hands, as if raised boastfully toward their beloved women (16.38).[4] Gāndhārī bewails, beginning with a much-telling directive: *kṛpaṇaṃ eti śokārtā vilalāp|ākulendriyā, sugūḍha jatru vipulum, siñcantī śoka tapitā* (17.4; 18.5-9): 'Look at the array of widows, bewildered daughters-in-law, newly-betrothed brides running hither and thither, with their braided hair down, soaking in the blood of their loved ones, some also looking for the heads severed from their now wooded bodies of their fallen husbands. The jackals are out in daylight indifferent to this human noise, gnawing at every limb which only a few moon-nights before in deep conjugal embrace triggered many a pleasurable sensation to their beloved now distraught wives, screeching to the winds: How could this be – this pitiful slaughter? *Whose dharma, whose justice?*'[5] So there are, as Solomon rightly observed, deeply reflective and dedicatory qualities of grief, meaning that the surge of feelings (sensations, emoting) is marked by a deep sense of care, gratitude, reverence, honouring, dedicating, commemorating, reciprocating, celebrating; but there still remains an unrequited longing, a resilient desire for it to be otherwise than the loss so deeply felt.

So, while I do find some very interesting accounts – and, the theorising on the *bhāvas* more generally and grief as a *bhāva* more particularly – instructive, that in some ways also reinforces my fight with the reductive cognitivist accounts (emotions as evaluative judgments or beliefs), my own philosophical lament here (*vilāpa)* is that one has to go through the aesthetic, abstract and *alaukika*

(other-worldly) texts rather than be given direct analysis, as it were from the side of the crypt – my own abstractions that evolved over nine years notwithstanding.

Concluding Remarks

I will conclude here with some remarks from my reflective insights on the comparative front. Two years back I published a paper, now also a chapter in a collection on the late modern-day philosopher of passions and emotions, Robert C Solomon (Higgins and Sherman 2012), that was written in the aftermath of a deeply personal experience of loss; I had not then delved much into primary literature outside of the Western contexts, except for passing references to the inclusion of grief as a 'basic, albeit negative emotion' in the epics and before that in Buddhist literature as well. I will consider some instances and contemplate on what exactly is the understanding given beyond a descriptive contour that any career-psychologist might offer to her bereaved patient as well.

A Buddhist monk and Indian sadhu might well identify grief with sentiment or *vedanā*; but grief is not all about sentimentality either (de Silva, 2012). It is more a *moral episteme* entangled with a deeper emotional response than might be thought (this is borne out to some extent in the lamentations of the women in the moving passages in the Strīparvan of the *Mahābhārata* we've just looked at). It may even be more, as one moves to consider variations to this theme cross-culturally (e.g. Keinman, 1985), and in psychoanalytic wisdom.

The Sanskrit term *dukḥka* and Pali *dukka* are not specific enough to cover the deep sense of loss, *kampāva* and pain of mind (*sanvegāya),* and sorrow, *kālakīrima* – from *kāla* and *kriyā* ('terminal agency of time') (Obeyesekere 1985).Or, in Mbh's words, *so'yam pacati kālo mām*: Time has cooked me (227.85). Time and suffering are inextricably connected; which resonates with Heidegger reminder us that *being* and *time* are intimately and metaphysically intertwined. Dhṛstrāṣṭra did not act in time; Duryodhana did not heed the far-sighted Bhīma (himself the arch-patron of the Kuru brothers) and the reconciler Krishna (favourably disposed to the rival group) to make peace with his cousin-brothers instead of taking recourse to war, and ended up walking with the entire clan into the jaws of time. When it is all too late, *being* has been metamorphosed into *non-being* (non-existence, which may well be its observe side) *time* delivers nothing but loss, carnage, suffering, a

decrepit end, and the consequent *bhāva* of grief. The ethical project is thwarted.

But there is a certain degree of universalism and essentialism presupposed in much of the discussion about grief; and if I am seen to be questioning this in the context of Western theorising I cannot by the same token afford to be mute or aridly complacent in the context of Indic theorising. What seems missing is a proper attention to the *sui generis* substantive nature, *apekṣatva,* of the affective state, the unconscious processes, and the bodily impact before and without predicating the feelings to some loss of moral balance or quest for ethical guidance in one's decision making, to rid oneself of desire and thirst, or even embrace a certain peculiar sense of joy (*rasa,* as in *karunarasa,* let alone a trace of divine bliss *śāntarasa, ātmāsneha*). Are Arjuna and Yudhiṣṭhira really asking 'What should I do?' 'How should I think?' – or is it more of, 'How should I be *feeling* if this is what I am feeling, indeed?' This is a common error in all theories that tie emotions too closely to the cognitive or intellectual, albeit pre-linguistic, phenomenological structure which in turn is spelt out in meta-ethical analysis as a response treating of an inherent moral dilemma or a challenge to the normative given in the situation, i.e. to the norms the individual and the larger social group are privileged to: thus, anger is seen as a response to the sense of my being morally slighted by another or treated unjustly in respect of my dues, or lament is said to arise owing to the petrification of desire, and separation from an object one is attached to, etc.

Some have tended to analyse emotion as an 'evaluative (or normative) judgment, a judgment about my situation and/or about all other people' (Solomon 1976: 186; Nussbaum 1997). If one interprets cognitive content of emotion as being evaluative, as Solomon did in his early views, then this is what marks the emotion of grief as well. The intense evaluative judgment or 'appraisal' element here would include increasing references to an agent's desires and goals—or rather their frustration, petrification. Other researchers have insisted on the bodily disturbances—"unthinking energies"—and perturbations of non-intellectual mentation processes in the agent so that experiences such as trembling, blushing, perspiring, pangs, throbs, tingles, burning and other sensations, adrenalin secretions, increase in heart and respiratory rates, alterations of blood flow, changes in blood pressure, digestive processes and other neurological symptoms are significant constituents; indeed, these would be fundamental structural

registers of emotional response. And this is evidenced not just in human beings with their quaint sentimentality, but also in animals. This gives warrant to the idea that grief involves a much larger metaphysical tapestry than, say, the more short-fused emotions such as anger or even moral indignation do.

I liken Gandhi, especially as he faces the near-collapse of the Indian subcontinent as it is being rent apart with communal violence on the eve of its Independence, to the doyen of morality in the *Mahābhārata*– Yudhiṣṭhira – particularly the disenchantments of the entire clan that he bore witness to along with the carnage of the war as it drew to an unending end, and the constant rebuke he faced from Draupadī for wandering the earth with his dog without finding a stable foundation for *Dharma* or grounding it in firm absolutes. Gandhi's theory of morality called for scant theorising, but rather much sensitivity toward social variations and alterations and reliance on sheer inner moral strength and 'conscience', as he put it. Thus he appealed to situational imagination; as he remarked, truth in moral matters has no absolutes; rather, it is left to the individual by virtue of her character and imaginative engagement to resolve upon a decision and act accordingly. Non-violence for him is one such truth *(satya),* it is the mainstay of his entire pragmatic and political ethics (*Satyāgraha*); however, it would be far from being set in creeds or absolutes of any kind. Instead, there are numerous modal possibilities and outcomes that one can anticipate (or perhaps not anticipate given the gravity and hidden vectors in any conflict encounter). He confessed to Martin Buber in their correspondence that he didn't know how he could deal with Hitler and the Holocaust visited upon them by the Nazis; with the British at least one could appeal to their innate conscience; perhaps with the Americans too as he counselled visiting African American delegates. However, one chooses the best course on a par with the argument to the best explanation, from among these, and since nonviolence (*ahiṃsā)* is a law on a par with natural and scientific laws (again not in any absolutist but indeed in tolerably relativist or contingent sense), it works its way through the universe. The best course to the best cause. This small insightful, one might say, imaginative moral vignette, has had a positively shattering effect in world politics and transformed us from mere subservient or argumentative colonials (colonial subjects) to postcolonial beneficiaries and theorists.

This is illustrated with an ecological canvas portraying nature's grief on the faces of the six species of animals surviving the ruthless, irrational act of burning down the Khāṇḍava forest by some playful

instinct that overcame Krishna and Arjuna while frolicking the outskirts of the forest in what seemed like a pass-time ('The Burning of the Khāṇḍava Forest', Book I, 216: 25-30). Perhaps this cavalier act is indicative of the non-absoluteness of nonviolence vis-à-vis Jain and Buddhist ethics by the time of the epics; *ahiṃsā* or non-injury as a virtue is catalogued but only as a prudential imperative, i.e. if it serves a purpose. Sacrifice is condemned where animals are used, but animals are used as vehicles and killed by the thousands, close to a million, in the battlefield; the *aśvamedha* (horse-sacrifice) is performed when installing Yudhiṣṭhira to the royal crown, and as just mentioned the Khāṇḍava forest with all its inhabiting animals are smitten. It wasn't until Gandhi, and to an extent Tagore, that *ahiṃsā* as non injury is transformed into the positive virtue of nonviolence and put back on the ethical high-ground, i.e. given a moral ontological prerogative all its own. But even Gandhi did not rule out an implicative element of coercion in the powerful resistant act; indeed, when it came to defending oneself and one's family, he did not rule out recourse to some form of violence, self-sacrifice aside. An ailing animal that may have no chance to recover its health could be put to sleep out of mercy for its undignified existence.

WORKS CITED

The Bhagavad-Gītā (BhG).1985. In the *Mahābhārata*, trans. and (ed.), J. A. B. van Buitenen. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Bilimoria, Purushottama. 1995. 'Ethics of Emotion: Some Indian Reflections', in, *Emotions in Asian Thought A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy,* Roger Ames and Joel Marks (eds). Albany: SUNY Press, 65-84.

———. 2003. Perturbations of Desire: Emotions Disarming Morality in the 'Great Song' of the *Mahābhārata.* In, *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions,* Robert C. Solomon (ed). New York: Oxford University Press, 214–232.

———. 2012a. 'Of Grief and Mourning, Thinking a Feeling Back to Robert Solomon'. In, *Passion, Death and Spirituality, The Philosophy of Robert C Solomon,* Kathleen Higgins and David Sherman (eds), Sophia Studies in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures. Dordrecht: Springer, 149-174.

———. 2012b.'Why is there Nothing rather than Something? Special 50th Anniversary Issue Tribute to Max Charlesworth. *Sophia* (Philosophy &Traditions), 51(4), December, 509-30.

Derrida, Jacques. 2001. Letter to Francine Loreau. In *The Work of Mourning,* ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 94-104.

Freud, Sigmund. 1986 [of 1917]. Mourning and Melancholia. In *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. James Strachey, Vol. 14. London: The Hogarth Press, 239-260.

Gerow, Edwin. 1994 .'Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm'. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114(2) (Jan-March): 186-208.

———. 1984. 'Sanskrit Dramatic Theories and Kālidāsa's Plays'. In, *Theater of memory : the plays of Kālidāsa*, Barbara StolerStoler (ed), translated by Edwin Gerow, David Gitomer, Barbara Stoler Miller. New York: Columbia University Press, 42-62.

Gerow, Edwin and Aklujkar, Ashok. 1972. 'On Śānta Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics', Review of J. M. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, 1969. *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics. Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92(1): 80-87.

Kleinman, Arthur and Byron Good (eds). 1985. *Culture and depression: Studies in anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry of affect and disorder.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kristeva, Julia. 1989. *Blacksun: Depression and Melancholy,*. trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press.

Higgins, Kathleen and Sherman, David, 2012. *Passion, Death and Spirituality, The Philosophy of Robert C Solomon,* Sophia Studies in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hiltebeitel, Alf. 2011. *Dharma: Its Early History in Law, Religion, and Narrative.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, C. S. 1976. *A grief observed.* London: Faber & Faber; Greenwich, CT: SeaburyPress/BantamBooks.

The *Mahābhārata* (MhB).1933-1970. Critical Edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

———. 1973. Book Vol I I. The Book of the Beginning. trans. J. A. B. van Buitenen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

———.1972-1978 (1981 Phoenix Edition). Vol II. Books 2 and 3.trans. J. A. B. van Buitenen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

———. 2004. (Strīparvan) Vol 7. Book XII. The Book of Women. Trans. James L. Fitzgerald. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

———. 2009a. Books X & II. Dead of Night/Women. Trans. Kate Cosby. . Clay Sanskrit Edition. New York: New York University Press : JJC Foundation.

———. 2009b. (Śāntīparvan) Book XII. Peace: The Book of Liberation. trans. Alexandra Wynne. Clay Sanskrit Edition. New York: New York University Press.

Masson, J. Moussaief. 1981. *The Oceanic Feeling: The Origins of Religious Sentiment in India.* Dordrecht: D. Reidel (Kluwer/Springer).

Masson, J. Moussaieff, and Patwardhan, M. V. 1969. *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics.* Bhandarkar Oriental Series, no. 9. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

The Nāṭyaśāstra (NS) [ascribed to Bharatmuùi] English translation with critical notes by AdyaRangacharya. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.

Nussbaum, Martha.1997. 'Emotions as judgments of value and importance'. In, *Relativism, suffering, and beyond : Essays in memory of Bimal K. Matilal,* P. Bilimoria and J.N. Mohanty (eds.), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 231-251.

Ganantha Obeyesekere, 1985. 'Depression, Buddhism and the work of culture in Sri Lanka'. In, *Culture and Depression Studies in Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder (Culture & Depression),* Arthur Kleinman and B. Good (eds). Berkeley: University of California Press, 134-151.

Radden, Jennifer (ed). (2000) *The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva.* New York: Oxford University Press.

The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. The University of California Rùmùyaùa Translation Project Collection (Goldman and Goldman-Sutherland), Department of South and South East Asian Studies and South Asia Library, UC-Berkeley.

Shakespeare, William. 1992. *Hamlet,* Cedric Watts. ed. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth.

Sharma, Renuka M. 1993. *Understanding the concept of empathy and its foundations in psychonanalysis.* Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press.

———. 2014 *Empathy Theory and Application in Psychotherapy.* New Delhi: DK PrintWorld. (Revised edition of 1993; new Preface by P. Bilimoria.)

de Silva, Padmasiri, 2012, 'The Lost Art of Sadness', in Higgins and Sherman, 312-340.

Somānanda. 1934. *Śivadṛṣṭi* (Ś.D.) *with Vṛtti of* Utpaladeva, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no 54. Pune : Aryabhushan Press.

Solomon, Robert C.1976. *The Passions.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

———. (ed.). 2003. *Thinking about Feeling: Philosophers on the Emotions.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2004. On grief and gratitude. *In Defense of Sentimentality.* New York: Oxford University Press, 75–107.

———. 2007. *True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Stolorow, Robert D, 2011, *Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis.* New York: Routledge.

NOTES

1. Two distinct sequential versions, or parts derived from a larger work-in-progress, were presented respectively at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, during my short visiting scholar tenure in 2012, at a symposium on Emotions in Indian Thought convened by Dr Aleksandra Wenta, and for the EPOCH seminar, at the kind invitation of Prof Arindam Chakrabarti, in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, May 2014. I am grateful to many who attended and for their helpful and critical comments, while pointing me also to further sources which this version begins to do justice to. Some theoretical contours of this paper are based on my earlier studies on emotions and grief (1995, 2003, 2012a), inspired by (the late) Renuka Sharma (1993, re-issued with a new Preface, 2014; and an unpublished thesis outline: 'Philosophy of emotions'). The present paper is reciprocally dedicated to her memory, to cousin-brother Shantilal, Australian mentor Max Charlesworth, and to the canine kinds, Devi, more recently, Rasa.
2. It only dawned on me months later, that the coveted message was that I showed no empathy or any of the 'hard emotions' towards her terminal plight, or what was coming, that I in my scholastic stupor was so determined to deny and escape from. And indeed I had frequently escaped overseas attending conferences and collecting research resources seeing family, but never once sharing the condition of the beloved. It took some years of therapy in New York and San Francisco to work through this unconsciousness emotional narcissism.
3. Abhinavagupta reverses the gender status of the birds from Vālmīki 's narrative, with a streak of candid scepticism of the inherent symbolism at stake – wasn't it Sītā the *satī* who really is pushed to her death; while Rāma, the supposed sternly un-feeling paragon of epic morality, is immortalised in the text? Besides, the grief reported on happens to be Vālmīki's, but can he really speak for another's immense and irreparable *duḥkha*? Abhinava contends that even if a by-stander is able to feel via the 'melting of the mind' another's grief, a certain distance is necessary for the artist to be able to produce a literary work on that traumatising experience. *Locana* 1.5L (See Gerow 1984, 1994.)
4. cf. Alf Hiltebeitel, 2011.
5. I am citing from the Clay Sanskrit Edition here (Strīparvan: 281).

THE DEADLY "*MAMA*", THE PERILS OF POSSESSION

Arindam Chakrabarti

"Even this body/self is not mine, or else, the entire world is mine"
(Uttered by King Senajit, in MBh XII, 25.19
and by Janaka the philosopher-king, in MBh XIV.32.11)

Must analyze the idea of *belonging*... Must examine, more closely than I have done as yet, the nature of the relative dependency of being and having: our possessions swallow us up."

Gabriel Marcel

Introduction: Mining "Mine"

The word "sva" in Sanskrit stands both for self and wealth, for what I am as well as for what one possesses. Can we have a sense of self without a sense of possession, an *aham* without a *mama*? If nothing is mine, can I be myself? Can I even be a self if I do not own at least my body? Can I both be and have the body? If the meanings that my words possess are not private—as meanings are rules and no semantic rules, qua rules, can be privately followed—– how can I claim my thoughts to be mine, as long as thoughts are essentially meanings of sentences made up of words? Can I never have a private thought then? Karl Popper and others have written on the logic of scientific discovery, but there is no discourse which could be called "the political economy of scientific ideas and theories", except some Applied Ethics discussions of patenting practices and copyright laws. Can anyone claim ownership of the Pythagorian theorem (which Baudhayana also formulated but did not give a proof of) or of Quantum Theory? These are some of the questions this essay wishes to be about. Starting from my name—which seems to belong to me though not uniquely, for, I am aware that numerous others are called "Arindam"—all the way to my face, my DNA, my memories, my *belongings* seem to make me who I am. Yet even as a spiritual vice

"I'(Ego)-ism (*ahamkāra)* does not seem to be quite the same as "Mine"-ism (*mamakāra*). If a homeless destitute who has sold out his own body to someone else arrogantly claims "I am the only person in this area who owns nothing, not even his own body" he would be *nirmama* but not *nirahamkaara* (perhaps this is why *Bhagavadgitā* II.71 mentions these as two distinct features of a person of firm wisdom) for his *ahamkāra* will be of having nothing he can call "*mama*".

"Having" or "possessing", marked by the genitive or possessive 6th case-ending in Sanskrit, can stand for an enormous variety of ties. Almost any relation can be expressed through the use of the "x has y" schema, as long as one adds a further specifying clause of the form "as F" when "F" is a relational predicate. Thus, we could state that Aristotle has Plato *as his teacher*, Anscombe has Geach *as her husband*, Calcutta has Darjeeling *as its nearest hill-resort*, and Gautama has "Siddhārtha" *as his name* and Modi had Kejriwal *as his major adversary*. Yet some relations seem to be more directly and naturally expressed through the "has"-formulation than others. A whole *has* parts. A word *has* a meaning. A surface *has* a color. A person *has* knowledge of biochemistry. And most crucially, a certain businessman *has* a million dollars, and I *have* a body.

Possession of property in the sense of wealth, money or land seems to be so central that even the widest metaphysical use of the term 'property' as a feature or quality that something has seems to be derivative of the legal-economic sense of belongings or possession. No wonder Draupadi's pointed question: "If Yudhisthira lost himself, how could he stake me in a gamble as a 'wife belonging to him' since a slave cannot own any property?" had no "clear answer" from the experts. For, even the notion of staking oneself in a betting game presupposes "I am a property belonging to myself", which Janaka says, does not make sense: "even the self is not mine".

Upon a quick survey, I can think of twelve sorts of "mine" each of which deserves a separate treatment before we try to find either a common or family resemblance kind of thread running through all these occurrences: "my shirt/house/money", "my body", "my words/ writings", "my thoughts", "my parents", "my labor", "my needs", "my child/children", "my food", "my actions (including their consequences?), "my time", "my country".

In this paper I examine three fundamental possession relations from these different types of having: [a] the relation between a person and her mental states (of which cognitive states would be a proper subset); [b] the relation between a word of a particular

language and its meaning in that language; [c] the relation between a person and the property or money that she or he owns. Now, I do not need to belabor the obvious centrality of these three relations to human life in general. Indeed much of classical Indian as well as contemporary Western philosophy of mind, philosophical semantics and social and political philosophy have centered round these three varieties of possession. And I am not trying to discuss all the issues that have come up in those three major branches of philosophy between these two equally virile and equally disputatious traditions of thought.

What I wish to attempt is an *interlinking* of these three problem areas: *mind, meaning* and *money*. It is not only the two uses of the English word 'property' –for an attribute and an estate—which suggests this interconnection. Sanskrit, though it does not use '*dharma*', the word for property-as-feature, for property-as-wealth, does use the same word '*artha*' for both meaning and money. And more tantalizingly, it uses the same word '*sva*' for property-as-wealth as well as for the self. Yet, when the scripture dictates "*parasvam na ādadīta*" it is not prohibiting identity theft, do not take another's self, it merely tells us not to steal other's property.

Besides these lexical associations, even in philosophical writing, their explicit interlinking is not new. Ownership of a mental state has been polemically compared and contrasted by Vasubandhu to possession of goods or cattle. And the meaning of a word has been thought of as a speaker's mental content (property?) at the time of using the word (by Bhartūhari as well as by Locke). But I would like to argue that an insight need not be mine alone or in me for the first time in order to be genuinely mine. Indeed no insight can belong exclusively to one person because unless it is communicable that is sharable, hence not privately owned, it does not even count as an insight or thought.

In spite of the fact that both Buddhist and Vedic social ethics endorsed the idea of private property, the attitude towards ownership of wealth as well as authorship or proprietorship of knowledge was very different from the standard Western liberal attitude of exclusive personal right. Both traditions regarded an exaggerated sense of "mine" as the root of all evil and suffering. Thus, at the end of the *Mahābhārata* (in a part called "Post-Gītā", i.e. *Anugītā*) Kṛṣṇa admonishes: "Two letters: 'mama' (mine) spell death and three letters: "na-mama"(not mine) spell everlasting Brahman". On behalf of the Buddhist side, Dharmakīrti says:

One who sees an ego, would have permanent attachment to

this 'I', his thirst would make him see attractive qualities of commodities which he would then try to make 'mine' by all means... Given such self, there would be the title 'other', and from such separation of ego and the other... all the other evils would ensue (Pramanavarttika Of Dharmakirti, 1989, verses 219-221: Pramāṇasiddhi, 219-221).

Either through the doctrine of no-self which renders private ownership of even one's self a matter of convenient designation and linguistic fiction or through the doctrine of obligatory gift-making reminding one of the owed character of all that one owns, the Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers, in spite of widely divergent ontologies, have both given us conceptions of ownership from which we might learn important lessons in these days of shameless unbridled privatization.

We have tended, hitherto, to set aside Sanskrit Dharmashastra discussions of inheritance law and division of property right (dayabhaga) as pre-modern religious jurisprudence, of little interest to philosophers of the logico-metaphysical stripe. But it has come recently to the notice even of Western scholars that a whole bunch of 16th and 17th century New Logicians paid very keen attention to what Kant called, more than a century later, "the metaphysical elements of justice". And this philosophy of rights begins with the question of defining ownership and owned/propertyhood (svaamitva and svatva)



1. Who owns mental states?

One rather weak argument against the physicalist Cārvāka used by dualists was the argument from the possessive case: "John could not be the same as the body of John because the owner and the possession could not be the same." The general premise of this argument is, of course, easily challenged because the locution "x of y" is often used without implying any real difference between x and y, as in "the city of London" or "the head of Rahu" (when Rahu is a demon

with nothing but a head), or "the body of a doll". That premise also backfires on the dualist, as the ancient physicalists have been quick to point out, when one hears uses like "the soul of John". However, the possessive case in locutions like "My desire", "Her pain", "Your pleasure" seems to be ontologically deeper. I seem to be able to distinguish myself from my desire or my pain. The distinction seems to be lost in extreme pain because the feeling and I seem to fuse. But two clues of the distinction are available to reflection, even if such reflection is impossible, for most unenlightened feelers, until the pain abates. The first clue is that the more intense the pain is, the more acutely I am aware of my past and future existence minus that pain, because my desire for the pain to stop consists in my believing in the possibility of my staying myself in the absence of this pain, and my sense of this pain having started at some point comes with the unmistakable memory of my having once been without it. The second clue to this complex felt content "my pain" being divisible into I and the pain is that the pain can get more intense or fade away but it makes little sense for me to feel that there is more or less of myself, since the idea of degrees of I is unintelligible. As for desires, the possession relation is clearly an indicator of difference between the desirer and the desire, both because I seem to have, one after another, many distinct desires, and because I am able to find myself simply without the desire when it is fulfilled. Indeed, what I desire could be described as the state of cessation of the desire, in almost all standard cases. Thus, my states, pains, wishes, decisions, memories seem to belong to me by the close relationship of *inherence* – a kind of asymmetric inseparability in distinction. That particular wish or anguish cannot exist without being in me. But I could easily be without that wish or anguish.

The most general argument for a substantial self other than the body as well as other than passing mental states in Indian Philosophy was given by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilaswāmin in his commentary to *Nyāyasūtra1.1.3 and 3.1.4*: (Gautamiyanyayadarsana With Bhasya Of Vatsyayana)

i. Wishes, anguishes, decisions and cognitions, etc. are tropes (unrepeatable qualities).
ii. Tropes cannot exist without a substance to which they belong (qualities are never self-standing).
iii. The body, the inner sense or any other external substance cannot be the substratum of introspectible mental qualities (qualities

of the body being either externally perceptible like colors or imperceptible (even if material, such as magnetic field) like weight).

Therefore there is a special non-material permanent substance to which all these co-personal mental states belong, which re-identifies itself across different sensory modalities (with unifying judgments like "I touch this thing which I saw before") as well as connects its own remembered past states with the present owner of those memories.

Although Buddhists are not physicalists like the Cārvāka-s, they reject the conclusion of the above argument because they reject any permanent substance in either the inner or the outer world. They rebut the above argument by rejecting premise ii. Without needing any permanent substance to run through or under them, a causally connected series of qualities can 'own (=include as a member) a particular quality. That series or stream of conscious states can be "conveniently talked about" as a separate entity to which an individual mental state belongs just as a soldier is said to belong to an army or a chariot-part can be said to belong to a chariot. We cannot here go into the elaborate debate between the Buddhist reductionist and the Vaiśeṣika realist about the intelligibility of the concept of inherence as a mind-independent relation between properties and property-possessors. The Buddhist strategy seems to be a two-step process: first reduce inherence into some causally tightened mereological (part-whole) relation, and then expose the mereological whole to be a merely titular entity no different than its components. The Buddhist point is not that tropes such as a particular sensation of blue or a particular twinge of desire *can* just exist or happen on their own without being owned by or ascribed to something that calls the sensation or the desire "mine". For one thing, the Buddhist rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assumption that the introspectively available mental state is at all a trope or *guṇa* (distinct from a trope-possessing substance). So even the first premise of the argument would be rejected by the Buddhist. As is well-known, the so-called self of a person is reduced by the Buddhist to a flowing stream of five psycho-physical factors (*skandhas*). The particular ephemeral entities that fall under the *nāma-skandhas* (psychological factors) are most generally called "*dharmas*". But the Buddhist's *dharmas* do not cry out for a *dharmin*! They are like David Hume's impressions and ideas that are not even causally connected in any ontologically deep sense. They bunch together like a bundle but are not held together like a Kantian "synthesis", let alone requiring

any synthetic or transcendental unity of apperception. Some of these are more basic *cittas* while the others are derivative *caittas*. Thus I am, at any point of time, a bundle of bodily events causally (merely through succession) connected with some sensations, feelings, tendencies and judgements. None of these passing *citta*-states are independent. For nothing that arises is independent. Indeed, an intentional cognitive state depends upon many kinds of causal conditions: a (posited) object, an immediately preceding state, a sense-organ (which, in Yogācāra, is itself a mental entity) and the right environmental conditions. But what it does not depend upon is a self or immaterial substance of the kind that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulates, because first, it is ontologically redundant, second, it is empirically unverifiable, and third, in being allegedly uncaused and permanent it is impossible under the scheme of dependent arising of all positive things.

In Yogācāra psychology, there is also a diagnostic story told as to why the undivided self-grasping cognitive state first bifurcates itself into the grasper part and the grasped object part, and then as the objective grasped part appears to be outside the mental state, the subjective grasper part finds a "house" in an erroneously imagined ego which seems to own the cognitive state. This is a no-ownership theory of mental properties insofar as the only owner here is a linguistic fiction called "the fluid conglomeration of emerging mental and physical factors".

In spite of this general reductionist account of persons that takes our sense of "possessing" our own mental states to be nothing but an entrenched error, a mask of make-believe unity, Vasubandhu felt the need to take the idea of personal possession of mental states seriously. To translate the relevant section of his *Pudgalaviniścaya* which is added onto the last chapter of his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:

"If there is no self, who is it that remembers? What does 'remembers' mean? It means: grasps the object of recall... Who then does the recalling? Who does it has been already said: the specific antecedent psychic event (*citta*) that causes the recall... When it is said "Caitra remembers", given that there is no self, *whose* is this remembrance? What is the meaning of this sixth/possessive case? Well, it means the owner. Who is the owner of who, for instance? Just as Caitra is the owner of his cow. How does he become her owner? Since her employment as a beast of burden or for milking is under Caitra's control. But here, where is the memory to be employed such that we are looking for its owner? It has to be employed towards what is remembered. Why does it have to be employed? So that it is remembered.

Oh well said indeed! That recalling has to be used towards itself! How exactly is the *employment* done here? By production or by sending it from one place to another (the cow-owner does not produce the cow, but controls its movements)? Since a memory cannot move from place to place, it must be simply by production. Thus it can be concluded that whatever is the cause or producer is the owner (*svāmin*) and whatever is its effect or product is the owned property (*svam*). Indeed there is no one single entity called "Caitra" and not even a cow. Thus even in the example case, *there is no owner-owned relationship besides cause-effect relationship.*

Whether this Buddhist critique of a substantial self is cogent or not is not my concern here. It is the clever way Vasubandhu unpacks the ordinary language meaning of "owning" and then reduces *all cases of possession* to cases of "producing", which interests me. Suppose my grandfather owned a coal-mine. When he dies, neither the coal-mine nor me undergoes anything but what is called a "Cambridge-change" (as when a line becomes shorter because another longer line is drawn next to it). Yet, I may, by the legal force of his will, come to inherit that coal mine. Vasubandhu's account tells us that the mine can become mine only if I have produced it. What we acquire by means of inheritance or surplus value of a product that nobody produced or somebody else produced or spent their labors on, by this criterion, should not be ours, unless we believe that just the death of a parent or grand-parent causes a new "ownership" property in me. Of course, if I cause the death of the father which in turn produces my ownership property then I might be said to have indirectly produced the inheritance. Though not at all rare in the history of royal and not so royal families, this kind of causal agency or credit is not usually claimed by the claimants of ancestral wealth. Besides, both the owner and the owned, under Vasubandhu's analysis, are nominal or titular reals. All owners are themselves impersonators of identity and personhood. "Having" thus gets all its power from an ego-rigging and thing-making *language*! Our *entitlement* to wealth is very much a matter of the *titles* we give to ourselves and to those collections and their possible uses we call wealth. Thus, this error-theory of possession naturally leads us from the question of owning of mental states to the question of words' possession of their "own" meanings.

2. From Mind to Money, to Meanings: How does a word have *Meaning.*

I cannot make my words mean whatever I wish them to mean. In *Alice in Wonderland*, Humpty Dumpty was rather concerned that he

should be the master of his own words' meanings rather than the other way around. This led him to a private language where the word 'impenetrability' meant "a nice knockdown argument". He was (and looked) so literally full of himself that he did not care that with such fiats of individual semantic decisions what he was creating was not a language at all because it could not manage to be a rule-bound social practice.

Unfortunately, Bhartṛhari, the greatest philosopher of language from (4th century) India, comes very close to regarding individual word meanings as mental entities existing in the intellects of the speaker rather than in the external world. Of course, he strikes a Buddhist note by speaking of two levels of the meaning's being: being in the speaker-hearer's intellect (buddhi) and being externally, bauddha and bāhya sātta. Somewhat like the two truths of Nāgārjuna, his philosophy of meaning operates at two levels. At the level of ultimate reality there are no words separable from the sentence and no sentences separable from the entire language, and language and the world are also one and the same. Similarly in the world out there, the distinction between one thing and another is also a fiction created by semantic analysis which is a useful fiction of the grammarians. At this level Bhartṛhari is a supreme holist, and eventually a non-dualist who believes that speech and reality are two aspects of the same self-expressive reality which he characterizes as "language-stuff" or "word-Brahman".

At the level of convenient abstraction he argues that each word must be eternally and naturally connected with its most intimate meaning, although this meaning is primarily the form of the word (or the type-word?) itself along with the meaning in the mind of the speaker (which speaker would that be, given that the idea of a speaker-in-general is itself very much a word dependent abstract idea?). In spite of my difficulty with the notion of this internal (subjective) intellectual meaning as the first meaning, I want to draw attention to one valuable insight that Bhartṛhari shares with Śabara the Mīmāmsaka. This is the anti-Humpty Dumpty insight that an individual speaker cannot make her own language by means of arbitrary noise-object correlations without presupposing an already given language which is not of his own making. Even the act of correlating or association presumes a set of pre-established word-world relationships. The very establishment of the initial conventions would require a language, since outside the context of a language even ostentions (finger-pointings) cannot be interpreted, let alone general features being recognized. When this insight is packaged as the doctrine of eternal pre-conventional semantic rules, modern

students of Bhartṛhari find it hard to swallow. But even Donald Davidson (in "Communication and Convention" *Synthese* 1984) tells us that some presumed semantic relations have to be there for even the first conventions to work as a social contract. Language cannot be a result of a contract since the very idea of contract presupposes language. The lesson I learn from this idea of authorlessness of basic semantic rules is that even an innovative speaker or writer (like e.e.Cummings or James Joyce) cannot claim semantic private ownership over a language, since the basic purpose of using words is to be understood by others. And one can do all sorts of creative things with language only thanks to one's immersion in one or more traditions of shared and handed down lexical and syntactic rules.

Bhartṛhari starts his long and complex chapter on relations by arguing that neither inherence (*samavāya*) nor contact (*saṃyoga*) nor any logical product of those relations can ever be the relation which is expressed by that sixth, possessive case-ending in phrases like "this is the significandum *of* that signifier". Needless to say, the semantic relation could not be contact, for otherwise the word "water" would always be wet. He gets into a paradox by confessing that this word-meaning ownership relation is unsignifiable. But he extricates himself deftly out of the paradox by drawing an object-versus-meta-language distinction. Eventually he gives that argument which I summarized above that no individual (and this should include a personal God!) can claim to have established this basic word-meaning relationship. But I think he mars it all by his idealism or mentalism about the word-meanings existing in the intellects of the speakers, which makes the world of discourse exist only secondarily or metaphorically but not objectively or absolutely!

In spite of this idealistic excess, Bhartṛhari believes, like most Brahminical thinkers, that tradition (especially the Vedic corpus) is the source of our most important knowledge and he explicitly says that our original insight and cognitive abilities flower only when we learn from many traditions and many teachers. The resulting knowledge is very much our own, but we owe it to these teachers and traditions and perhaps also to the fact that they disagree and make us reflect and decide on our own!

In its theory of knowledge, Buddhism does not rely on testimony. But the need for a loving teacher is recognized in that tradition too. The hubris of intellectual property rights is counteracted at a more basic level by recognizing the fictional nature of the so called owner of knowledge in the first place.

3. Technical Definitions and Raghunātha's Plea for Possessedness as a Basic Category

We saw earlier how Vasubandhu helps himself to a working definition of ownership in course of the imaginary dialogue with a soul-theorist: "X is owned by Y iff the employment of X is under the control of Y." Even Śākyamuni Buddha himself lived in a largely agricultural society where Vedic Dharmaśāstra laws permitted private ownership of property "established by inheritance, purchase, partition, acceptance as a gift and discovery (e.g. of hidden unclaimed treasure) for everybody and by conquest for the warrior-caste and by way of wages for merchants and workers." (Dharmasutras 10.36-40) The enlightened one along with his monastic disciples depended on wealthy patrons like Anāthapindika (whose name itself suggests generosity towards the destitute). As long as the wealth was earned through initiative, strength of the arms, and sweat of the brow, and through righteous means – it was part of right livelihood to own it, consume part of it and donate it at will. (Kalupahana 1995:122) It was greed and possessiveness that was decried, not possessions themselves.

Many centuries after this period, with the advent of the precise language of the New Logic in thirteenth century India, even legal philosophers started using the logicians' defining techniques in trying to capture the concept of private property. An interesting result of this trend is found in Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's notoriously untraditional text "A Demonstration of the True Nature of Things to Which Words Refer" (*padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇam*). Among other innovations suggested in this text on metaphysics and epistemology is the idea that possessedness is a category of being in its own right.

The argument for this starts by finding fault with the traditional ways of defining the difference made to something by its being owned by someone. It was realized long ago that possession is not an occurrent or active relation holding between the possessor and the article owned. Between the act of acquisition (if any) and the act of consumption, there may elapse the an entirely idle or passive period of non-use (or even not yet knowing that one owns that bit of property), of having without using when no "employment" is happening. During this period, it is quite conceivable that someone else consumes, uses, or even changes the piece of land or commodity without the consent or against the will of the person who actually and legally happens to own it. Hence by the simple definition "to be owned by X is to be employed according to the will of X", the article would fail to be owned by the real owner and could count as

being owned by a squatter or a thief. To avoid such under-coverage and over-coverage, Raghunātha first tries out the modally strengthened definition: "(Possessedness is) fitness (*yogyatva)* for use as one wishes." (*yatheṣṭa-viniyoga-yogyatvam Raghunatha Śiromanī* 1957). It is worth noticing that the term for 'use' is '*viniyoga*' which is what, roughly a thousand years back, Vasubandhu had used in defining ownership in the passage discussed earlier. The additional sophistication is the introduction of the possibility-term 'fitness' (*yogyatva*) to take care of what Kant has called "rational" as against empirical possession. Ted Turner possesses the vast ranches in Montana even when for months he neither uses it nor directs others how to use it, since the ranch still has the fitness to be used just as Ted Turner wishes. At this point Raghunātha raises an objection by way of clarifying the actual force of the "fitness" clause: If by "use" is meant consumption or eating, it is quite possible for me to eat the fruits of my neighbor's garden, or an illegal hunter to eat the elk that belongs to Ted Turner. Such food and property has the fitness to be consumed and used by many people other than the owner. Hence the definition suffers from overcoverage. It applies to unpossessed objects as well. In answer, Raghunātha clarifies: "Such uses, without the wish or permission of the owner, though possible, are prohibited by Scriptural Law." So the emended definition should be: "Y is possessed by X iff Y is fit for being used just as X wishes in the sense that uses of Y against X's use are prohibited by specific scriptural injunctions."

But Raghunātha probes the matter further by asking "What specific scriptural injunctions are these?" In trying to answer this, the defender of the traditional definition has to refer to an injunction which uses the very concept of possessedness, for instance, the rule: "Do not take what is another person's possession." Since such a rule uses the concept of the definiendum (other's *sva*=possession) its inescapable introduction into the definiens renders the definition of *svatva* (possessionhood) viciously circular! Even if we take away the tradtional Hindu concern for scriptural injunctions, the logical worry behind Raghunātha's position that any reductive definition of possession would be circular can be understood in the following way. No commodity becomes or remains anyone's property by their exclusive natural *capacity* to consume or control the consumption of that commodity. Others often have as much capability (and need) to use my property as I have. The additional exclusive right which society, state or law gives to an individual over the use of a possession is conferred upon it by an

explicit deployment of that very concept of right to *possession* which the reductive definition of possession was trying to explicate in terms of *other* notions like, fitness, employment, permission, control and wish.

The lesson that Raghunātha learns from this is that the possessedness that is produced in things when one receives those things as gifts or buys them or inherits them by the death of one's parents, and that which is destroyed by giving those things away is a basic category not definable in terms of things and features belonging to other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories (See Kroll 2007; Kroll 2007a). This sounds like giving ownedness an ontological status of its own. But actually what Raghunātha has succeeded to show is that there is no noncircular way of *deriving* the concept of ownership from other natural categories. Thus Raghunātha unwittingly undercuts Locke's attempt to demonstrate that right to private property is as natural (or god-given) as the relation of ownership that we have to our own bodies. Locke gave the first metaphysical push to the liberal theory of private ownership by the following argument:

i. Every man owns his own body, because it is nobody else's body.
ii. The labor of his body is part of the body, hence owned by him.
iii. Whatever he has mixed his labor with (e.g. the grain produced by the mixture of his labor with the seeds and the soil) he has made his own property.
iv. He therefore has as inalienable a right to his property as his right to his own body. (Laslett 1988: 287-288)

Of course, Locke does add the qualifier "as long as there is enough and as good left in common for others"; both his third premise and his qualifier has been the subject of endless criticism. The fundamental mistake in such attempts at a "naturalized" justification of private property is that they claim to discover possessedness as a feature of commodities, especially when they are results of some human work, and then defend the need of a social, political, religious or legal authority to protect and honor that feature of things within human practice. As Raghunātha shows, the truth is quite the reverse: it is the social or legal or religious authority that invents mine; I don't need any scripture to tell me what is mine. But without the permissions and prohibitions of a set of other possible possessors of those very commodities, no land or tree or

gold or silver can be mine. Thus without a speech-community (viz. one capable of appealing to a set of rules: scripture or the constitution) there is no possession. As Levinas puts it:

> "A thing does not resist acquisition; the other possessors – those whom one cannot possess – contest and therefore can sanction possession itself. *Thus the possession of things issues in a discourse.*" (Levinas 1961: 162)

Nyāya and other orthodox systems of Indian thought do admit a special kind of intimate relation between a person and her own body. Indeed this relation gives the Indian dualist as much trouble as pineal gland gave to Descartes. But perhaps because of a pan-Indian shared belief in the possibility of reincarnation, none of the classical Indian philosophers take embodiment as what makes one person uniquely and exclusively special. The indexicality of "I" which rubs off to the trouble-making "mine" is the root of all selfish and competitive greed and envy. It is due to this ineliminable token-reflexivity of "I" and "mine" that two children both saying "this toy is mine" are not agreeing with one another, nor saying the same thing. A shallow peacemaker's statement "You are both right, for it belongs to both of you" does not solve either the practical or the theoretical problem of private ownership. What is in a body that makes me unique? How can I use the concept of "my body" as the individuator of a lump of matter, without first sorting out what makes Arindam's "mine" distinct from Rahul's "mine"?

Indeed one of the most ancient Vedic bases for ethical duties comes from the idea that it is our birth in a body that makes us dependent and indebted creatures. The very basis of all my ownerships is my body which we get from parents. What we own, therefore, is what we first have to acknowledge as owed. We depend upon natural forces (the gods) to nourish the body with rain and sunshine and air to breathe, we depend upon fellow creatures to maintain a social and economic support system and we are indebted to the long chain of teachers and wise people for bequeathing to us a language and a storehouse of skills and sciences without which we could not even begin to speak to each other or begin to learn other things on our own. Thus, what the Vedic moralist derives out of our natural embodiment is our *duty to share* whatever wealth we produce with our own toil or we acquire otherwise as a mark of our congenital indebtedness, rather than the right to exclusive control or possible consumption all by myself. This is enshrined in the doctrine of obligatory gift-making that I discuss in the next section.

The Paradox of Obligatory Giving

What kind of ownership do we find in the Vedas? We find the following paradox in the Upaniṣads and Ṛgveda:

1. It is obligatory that I give some P to X (when P is some material substance – not love, compassion or verbal reassurance – and X is any other person who has much less P than I have and can use a little more of it).
2. If I ought to give P, it must be possible and permissible for me to give P.
3. I can give P only if I own P.
4. I own P if and only if I am permitted and have the right to use P in any socially harmless way I like including keeping P for my own or my progeny's consumption.
5. If I am permitted to keep all of P for myself, then I cannot , at the same time be obliged to give P away to X, because if it is obligatory that I give a certain part of P then it cannot be permissible that I keep, that is, not give away that part of P. I cannot have the right to keep and the duty to give away the same thing at the same time.
6. Therefore, from 1 to 5, by closing our conditional proof, it follows that if it is obligatory that I give P then it is not obligatory that I give P.

This sounds like a paradox, but since P implies not-P simply boils down to not-P, all it shows is that if the liberal definition of ownership (premise 4, above) is correct then giving can never be obligatory. Since I have shown that some amount of giving, with awareness, with consent, with faith, with fear and with shame is obligatory in the Vedic scheme, that scheme must be based upon some alternative definition of ownership. Hunger has been called death. But the Vedic hymn in praise of giving (ṚgVeda: X.117) starts dramatically by remarking that hunger is not the only way to die: "Deaths catch up with the over-fed too." This line can be interpreted in two ways. First it could be the message of universal mortality being used to warn the miserly amasser of wealth. But more pointed explanation of the plural "*mṛtyavāh*" here would be that the inhospitable scrooge, however well-fed he may be, dies many deaths before his physical demise. Death here stands for loneliness and ignorance. The unhospitable eater is friendless because he cannot be a friend

himself: *na sa sakhā yo na dadāti sakhye*. He is short-sighted because had he looked at the "longer path" (*drāghīamsam anupaśyet panthām)* he would have realized that riches are like chariot wheels (up and down as well as going around from person to person) such that he might find himself at the receiving end and have to beg from the very person he is refusing today. That this second interpretation taking unsharing consumption itself to be a kind of spiritual death is more plausible is confirmed by the 6th verse (quoted above) which uses the word '*mogha*'. "I am telling you the truth" the verse goes, "it is death for this unknowing ungiving person. By his act of eating he nourishes neither the sun nor his friends. The lonely eater only incurs sin." What is this allusion towards nourishing the sun?

This takes us back to the mystical/poetic/moral/metaphysical idea of the relation between sacrifice and the cosmic order. The universal Self or Brahman made or became the world by means of sacrifice. So we maintain the world by our acts of sacrifice. It is because we are ready to nurture the needy, pass on our knowledge to our posterity, preserve our environment and support our friends and above all to give before we consume that the sun rises and sheds light on our plants and the cloud-god showers rain. This may sound absurd to us because we make a sharp distinction between the causal-natural laws and the moral-spiritual laws. But for the Vedic vision, both of these are two aspects of the same *ṛtam satyam*. One who violates the moral order of eating also fails to do his share for maintaining the natural order of food-production. That is the sense in which the lonely eater "does not nourish the sun".

In the second verse of this hymn there is a description of over-eating *in front of* the hungry which deserves special attention: "He who possessing food, hardens his heart towards the dependent poor asking for food, and *eats in front of him* can never make himself happy." This very sense of visual oppression is used by Śaṅkara in his commentary to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage about the seven kinds of food: one (the first) part of this food is "common" says the mantra-text. "Of this" here means of all the eaters. How is that? That which is eaten by all living beings every day was meant for everyone's consumption. Why is there a possibility of unavoidable sin in eating that common food? It is a mixed property of all. Because it is everyone's share, the handful of food as it is being thrown into the mouth is seen as tormenting others. Since every creature's yearning is fixed on that food in the form of the desire "That morsel could have been mine", it is not possible to even swallow without causing pain to others. The text after this goes on to prescribe obligatory

offerings to insects, birds and dogs etc. as a daily duty of the householder so that he is rescued from this sin. The same idea is expressed by the early Christian Saints Basil and Ambrose. The former comments:

> The bread you are hoarding belongs to the hungry, the clothes you keep in your wardrobe belongs to the naked, the shoes you hide away belong to the poor. In other words, you are committing as many injustices as there are things you could give away. (Aquinas 1947: 1769-1771).

Ambrose almost echoes the Upaniṣads by his remark "Let no one say that what is common is his own." We must remember that Śaṅkara's interpretation of "*kasya svid dhanam*" (Iśopanisad 2005) that it is a rhetorical question challenging the idea of individual ownership of wealth: Whose, after all, is wealth? Nobody's! Marcel Mauss does discuss Classical Hindu Ethics of donation, the endless discourses on the act of gift-making which start from the Ṛgveda and run into those one hundred and sixty six chapters of the 13th part of the *Mahābhārata* called "Dānadharmaparva". Yet even after quoting the most eloquent passages about the categorical imperative of hospitality, charity and sharing of wealth and the vice of hoarding from the ancient Indian sources, strangely enough, he calls this the Brahminical interplay of *exchange*. But if giving or sharing is morally obligatory, how can it be supposed to be done with the expectation of reciprocation, in the spirit of barter? Barter seems to be inherently hypothetical in character: if you want to get riches from the fire-god give him some ritual offering first (literally butter Him up!). If you want merit in heaven or the after-life then give alms to the monk or donations to the church. But one kind of *dāna* I think is not like this. It is not a utilitarian or benefit-motivated , optional or super-arrogatory, *kāmyakarma*, but a bounden duty, a *nityakarma* of a house-holder. Whoever owns property has a duty to give a portion of it. Whoever eats must share her food. Such giving brings no merit, no moral gain. *Not*-giving brings moral loss. A *nityakarma* is defined as that of which the omission is sinful but the commission is not beneficial to the doer. There is no merit in paying back your debts, though there is demerit in failing to give back what one owes. Dana should be thankless also because it is always inadequate compared to how much one owes. Hence shame in the giver is a fine but rare virtue. I have tried to expose some logical and ethical difficulties in the very concept of obligatory giving from which a new concept of ownership or possession follows.

This is the conception of owning while owing, possession as based

on a series of congenital debts. Without abolishing private property, this conception can keep our moral struggle against greed and avarice alive by constantly urging us to reflect that money and meaning are possible because there are others who co-create them with us. If we forget our duties towards our class-others, gender-others, cultural-others, species-others and even temporal-others – past and future generations – then our possessions swallow us up. We become the food of our own food.

5. Concluding ideas I shall owe to whoever will read this essay, for my idea becomes mine only when someone else "listens" to them as "authored" by me:

One of the first words that my two-year-old daughter learned to lisp, proudly on occasions but plaintively more often, was "*mine*". I can almost remember the resolute pursing together and then expansive opening up of her tiny pair of lips as they would vocalize the "m" and the "ā" sound that she mastered much earlier in saying "Mā". "That is māi mother", "This tricycle is māyine", "That Barbie doll is mmāyine!!". This was neither a remarkable linguistic achievement nor an embarrassing character flaw in her. All children her age, long before they can pronounce "tricycle", pick up that momentous word "mine", or its equivalent in whichever language they are born in. Usually it coincides with the first experience of playing with other kids and having to stake a claim of proprietorship. Just as triangulation (a la Donald Davidson in (Thompson 2011)[1] starts to make an objective world of objects appear with myself and another person looking at the same common object, a triangulation between self, other and an object in the world is required for the possessive "mine" to gain meaning, for besides the owner and the owned, it requires the actual or potential "other"-claimant. This partitioned triangulation is like a bisected triangle, which underscores the left-out third corner as the non-owner. Right there, the other conscious body of a little person very similar to oneself, is ushered into the child's play-room only to be thwarted: "Come, look at these objects I possess, you can admire them, even play with them a little, giving me company, but you cannot have them or take them away". I claim a commodity as freely accessible by myself for my use, but viewed by another as belonging to me but not to her, such that the other needs my permission for access to it. This sort of interrupted triangulation starts with learning a possession-relation which has primarily an exclusionary purpose. "Mine" means, "not yours". T̃he pride expressed by that expression, I would like to

imagine, starts off more as warmth of feeling and protective fondness for the object and less, at least at that early stage, as a competitive glory and showing off. But the envy-generating conspicuousness of consumption, the fear and complain, the aggressive avarice soon come tumbling after, when juvenile social pressure requires taking turns on the tricycle or letting other girls play with that Barbie doll. So, my daughter's strong feeling of entitlement to snatch an object away from the hands of a covetous or even curious little colleague would come out almost like an interjection "Its mine". It would have been unfair and pointless to ask her, then, "But what do you mean by "mine"? What is most frustrating is that it seems equally unfair and pointless to ask her even now as she is a college graduate or even to ask her if she becomes the proprietor or CEO of a large company or remains relatively poor owning very few things: "What do you mean by "mine"? It is entirely possible that Justin Timberlake who owned "MySpace" had a precise legal definition at his disposal to support his claims of which businesses are his own, but those who really acted as if that electronic social networking site deliberately misleadingly called "MySpace" was really their private space, would not bother to think what it is that make a space or a home or even a gadget his or her own.

As I think back, I realize that as a parent, it was "my" implicit expectation that my child learns, as she learns to talk, at least two uses of that possessive word, even before she could speak full sentences using that word. One is the use we made when I or her mother would say "You are *my* baby". In some sense she was mine, but surely not either in the sense in which my back or leg was mine, or in the sense in which my shirt or watch was mine. Apart from the fact that my watch was replaceable but my daughter was not, one big difference between my owning my watch and my owning my daughter was that I could not belong to my watch, but I belonged to my daughter. I was hers, so she could say "my father" when referring to me. This is the second use of "my" I wanted her to learn. But of course that must have been confusing. The first sense, I expected, will show her why she must obey me and not necessarily any other man. But the second sense, did not carry the implication that I should obey her because I was hers. Surely possession cannot be a reversible relation. If the little chair belongs to me, I cannot belong to the little chair. Yet, human inter-personal belongings often aspire to be mutual. Could my child ever understand that we could both point at each other and say "mine"? Does that make sense? One could try to demystify it by saying, as a child and young adult,

she was ours, because we were responsible for her life and wellbeing. In her adulthood, especially when we grow too old to take care of ourselves we belong to her, because we become her responsibility. But that kind of taking turns in one-sided ownership is not what this mutual belonging is all about.

Eventually my child should know me as her father and in that sense I was hers. The other is the use of "mine" for her body or body parts. I would not just teach "that is a hand" this is a foot" those are eyes, but would also teach the distinction between "my hand" and Your hand, or mother's face and my face.

So, actually four kind's of private ownerships came under that little genitive (possessive) predicate: the symmetric relation between father and daughter, the asymmetric relation between a person and his or her body parts, the asymmetric relation between a person and her material possessions, and finally the asymmetric relation between a author/thinker/artist and her own original ideas or writings or artistic creations. Each of these relations, at different levels, could be constitutive of who my daughter took herself to be. It seems, then, that she could not first figure out what "I" meant and then, learning the general function of deriving "Belongs to X" from "X", derived 'mine' from it. It was the other way around. Mine was primary, and I was derived from it. There would be no I without my possessions. No '*aham*', without '*mama*'. Indeed, there is a clue to this left in the Sanskrit word "sva" which means two things: oneself, and wealth or possessions. To illustrate, self-awareness is called "sva-samvedana", self-rule is called "sva-rAj". But one who does not have any wealth, any possession is called "nih-sva", other's property is called "para-sva". In a mysterious verse (XIV, Asvamedhika Parvan, 13.3, we have referred to in the very opening essay), the Mahabharata tells us that two syllables spell death, They are actually one and the same syllable "ma" repeated twice. "*mama*" (not "Mama" as the English word for mother is pronounced with two long aa-s), in Sanskrit, means *mine*. This hardly makes sense to us in these ego-centric times. Life, the opposite of death, seems to require a sense of mine.. of ownership—possessing something I can call my own, at least a body I have some right and control over. Mama should be the spelling of life, we feel like protesting, not of death.

But we do not have to blindly take it from scripture or a religious epic like the Mahabharata that the word "mine" signifies death. W̃e can investigate within our own reason and intuition what exactly is deadly about death? Why are we afraid of our own death? Because it is utterly and logically unknown. It is not just unknown like a

country one has never visited, but could visit and come back to tell us reliably about. Death is something I see happening to other people but cannot imagine myself quite succumbing to such complete wipe-off, an existence-deletion as it were. So, conceptually "my death" is a whirlpool of errors and contradictions. There is no one in that imagined scenario who can claim it to be happening to "me" because it is precisely the elimination of that claimant, Yet, that does not mean that it is just any old death who cares whose. My death, however mind-boggling (and body-boggling), is the ultimate concern of mine.

So, to call something "death" is primarily to identify it as a dark abyss of impossible errors, errors that do not loosen their grip on us even when they are exposed intellectually to be errors.

Now, very simply put, my deeply troubling hunch is this. "Mine" is a mine of such errors, errors which give us endless grief, but which we cannot help committing as long as we live. It is like a sickness we secretly love because we have become so used to it that it is unimaginable how we can live without it. Perhaps all other existential plights and blights are quarried out of this horrid hollow of "mine". Why? Because it is a product of two notions: the notion "I" which stands for the ego, or as it is called in Sanskrit "ahamkāra", and the notion ownership. We have seen earlier in this essay how from different points of view—the Buddhist perspective or the Vedic perspective —this Mind-Body complex which we call the first person is an error-breeding error. At every level, I regard myself as standing outside, beyond comparison with all other individuals who are objects of my thought, whereas I am the thinker. I stay just outside my visual field as the viewer. Yet, I also put myself inside the field as one of the items or players on the field. Even as, "knower of the field", I make that self-exemption, that "I-am-special"-claim, I also happily objectify myself because I recognize that I am no different than every other self, and I am one among many. I am one of those self-exempting uniqueness-claimants. I AM a You because I am YOU to you, but I can never be YOU because you are a second person whereas I remain the first person. This subject object confusion is the root of the notion of Individual ego. Ahamkara is this "cit-jadra granthi" (knot of physicality and consciousness). So the ego is a clot of conflations. But why is ownership, independently, an error? "X owns Y" is also, at bottom, an inconsistent notion, especially when it means private ownership, which, like "subjective justification" claims to be, at the same time, subject to yet free from public rule-following strictures. So the possessive case is another clot of confusions. Now

putting these two sets of incurable errors of the "I"-usage and property-possession we obtain the notion MINE. Hence it is an abyss of errors: not just a "*tāmisra*" darkness, but "*andha- tāmisra*", blinding darkness. And this is one meaning we can attach to the claim that "mine"-saying is dying.

Works Cited

Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. 1967. Prahlad Pradhan (ed.) Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologica*. trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bross.

Buck, Wayne F. 1987. "Kant's Justification of Private Property." In den Ouden and Bernard den (ed.) *New Essays on Kant*. pp. 227-244. New York: Peter Lang.

Dharmakirti, *Pramanavarttika Of Dharmakirti (With Dharmakirti's Own Commentary On The Third Chapter And Manorathanandin's Commentary)*. 1989. R. C. Pandeya (ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Gautamiyanyayadarsana With Bhasya Of Vatsyayana (Nyayacatungranthika Vol. I). 1997. Anantalal Thakur (ed.). New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Iśopanisad. 2005. Goswami, Sitanath (ed.) Kolkata: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.

Kalupahana. 1995 *Ethics in Early Buddhism* Honolulu: University of Hawaiùi Press.

Kroll, Ethan. 2007. 'The Triumph of Reason: Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Sanskrit Discourse and the Application of Logic to Law'. Chicago IIAS Newsletter #43.

Kroll, Ethan. 2007a. 'Early modern Sanskrit thought and the quest for a perfect understanding of property'. Chicago IIAS Newsletter #43.

Laslett, Peter. 1988. (ed.) *Locke: Two Treatises of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinas , Emmanuel. 1961. *Totality and Infinity*. trans. by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Pennsylvania: Duquesns University Press.

The*Mahābhārata*. 1933-1970. Critical Edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Raghunatha S'iromani Padarthathatattva—*Yatheṣṭa-viniyoga-yogyatvam—Raghunatha Shiromani PadarthaTattva Nirupanam*. 1957. Karl Potter (ed.) and trans. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.

Thompson, Jessie A., 2011. *Donald Davidson: Meaning, Triangulation and Convention*. M A thesis. Colorado: Colorado State University.

NOTES

1. I would have liked to include two more sections on Immanuel Kant's discussion of Private Property and Proudhon's 10 arguments against the cogency of the very idea of private property. But time did not permit to actually include them in this paper with proper referencing. Some of the Kant references, and critical work on him will be available from the internet, in (Buck 1987)

AMBEDKAR CONTRA ARISTOTLE: ON A POSSIBLE CONTENTION ABOUT WHO IS CAPABLE OF POLITICS

Soumyabrata Choudhury

For Ghanshyambhai

I

At the outset, I would like to place side by side, two documents, greatly removed from each other with regard to their time and location of origin. The first: upon India's independence from British rule in 1947, the Constituent Assembly debated anew the question of constitutional safeguards for minorities. The section of opinion arguing for such safeguards expressed itself thus, "The reservation of seats has benefited us in many ways ...it has created an awakening among the Scheduled Castes; it has brought among them a spirit of self-progress; it has made others realize that the members of Scheduled Castes are citizens, equal to them, and they too should be entitled to all the rights that a citizen should have. It has also developed amongst us a habit to sit together and decide the future of the country and to discuss the important and grave problems of the country mutually..." (Sen 2007: 107)

The second text now : Aristotle in 4th century B.C Athens, devotes the Book Eight of his *Politics* to the role of such activities as music, painting, gymnastics etc in the education of the young such that they can become good citizens. With particular reference to music Aristotle says:

Since we accept the division of melodies proposed by certain philosophers into (i) ethical, (ii) practical and (iii) enthusiastic, with distinct modes corresponding to each and [since] we maintain that music should be used not for the sake of one benefit only but for several (for it should be used for education and for *katharsis* as well – what I mean by *katharsis* I will indicate generally now but more clearly in the work of poetics – and thirdly for employment for cultivated leisure [*diagoge*] both for amusement and relaxation from toiling, it is clear that one must make use of all the musical

modes but not use them all in the same way: for education the most ethical modes are to be employed; but for listening to others perform we must also use the practical and the enthusiastic. For any affection that occurs strongly in some souls occurs in a lesser or greater degree in all such as pity, fear or again religious ecstasy [*enthusiasmos*]. There are some people who are particularly susceptible to this later form of excitement and we see them once they have availed themselves of melodies that thoroughly excite the soul, put back on their feet again as a result of the sacred melodies just as if they had obtained medical treatment and *katharsis*... In a similar way [to the sacred melodies], the kathartic melodies offer a harmless pleasure to all. Hence the use of such modes and melodies must be permitted for those whose business is providing music for the theatre; the audience after all is double, partly free and educated but partly vulgar too, composed of laborers and farmers and other such, and these people too must be granted their spectacle as a relaxation...it is appropriate thus to permit those who perform publicly to make use of this sort of music but for education, as has been said, one must employ ethical melodies and modes. (Ford 1995: 118-119)

Without making any vain, ill-advised attempt to make commensurate the vast difference of provenance between the two documents, let us pick out an apparent point of contact, which is also a point of repulsion, between them: which could be identified as the evaluation of something like "habit" in the two texts. Though Aristotle doesn't use the word it seems he is saying that kathartic modes and melodies correspond to a low level pleasurable *habit* of the soul, its most degraded, if harmless, potentiality. While the citation from the Constituent Assembly Debates puts a positive value on habit which is a *new* and *relational* possibility with the coming of the Scheduled Castes, with reservation, up to the level of a general citizenship. But this point of contact – and repulsion – must be immediately qualified. It is not as if Aristotle does not recommend the positive uses of habit. Quite the contrary. In *Politics*, Aristotle urges the ethical habituation of the youth in their conduct towards virtue and citizenship. Such habituation, with specific modalizations, pertains as much to the body as to the soul (*psyche*). In fact without habituation and practice, it is impossible to mould conduct in the requisite form(s) of virtue (*arÍte*). Then is it that in the above texts from *Politics*, Aristotle is concerned only with the habits of those who are a priori excluded from the rights – and obligations – of citizenship? Just as in inverted symmetry, the Constituent Assembly pro-minority view seems to foreground the emancipated habits of

the hither-to excluded Scheduled Castes. I think it will be useful at this point to take a second look at the tabled documents – and it is possible that they will reveal a symmetry, an inverted one at that, but answer the question "whose habits are at stake here?" somewhat differently in the light of this second symmetry.

Clearly the Constituent Assembly view says, "it has developed amongst *us* [emphasis mine] a habit to sit together and decide...". In fact throughout the passage the pronominative subject travels between "them" and "us" – and "us" in two compositions, one *without* them and one *with* "them" such that the habit of participating in citizen-politics, of deciding the future of the country is mutually conducted by a re-*composed* "us". Now read the Aristotle passage again: Without equivocation it is said that the kathartic pleasure is meant "for all". Everyone is susceptible to this pleasure, to a greater or lesser degree. The kathartic modes and melodies appeal and have access to the simpler and least composed (or organized, if you will, but the musical term for both sides, the melody and part of the soul, is more illustrative) part of the soul, which is an essential component of the universal constitution of the soul as such. At this level, everything is automatism, a cycle of equilibrium and disequilibrium – and Aristotle's medicinal analogy to the incidence of kathartic music emphasizes that by the introduction of the melodic medicine in the system, *nothing is fundamentally transformed.* The automatism is restored, the universal animalism of the soul is put back on its feet – nothing, in other words, is composed or re-composed at the level...at the level of what, or who?

I think Aristotle provides the answer in the first book of *Politics* much before he has questioned the effects of music on the souls of potential citizens. The answer lies in his definition of the *zoon politikon*, "the political animal" and the relation of that definition with what he calls the "outcast"[1] (Aristotle 1995: 250). This nexus of definition and exception, postulate (or prescription) and intransigence provides the fundamental grid of judgment on political constitution and capacity that from its ancient Greek provenance travels afar and seems to arrive at the doorstep of the new Indian Republic whose 'melodic line', as it were, was being created by the Constituent Assembly before 1950. The grid in Book One of *Politics*, lays out the following parameters: when Aristotle says that "Man is, by nature, a *zoon politikon*, a political animal" this utterance starts off as a postulate or axiomatic declaration. At one level, everything either follows from this axiom or everything henceforth is mobilized to save this axiom. At another level, Aristotle does provide a defining parameter for

the declaration – by which parameter and others, he will distinguish the political animal from the "outcast". The parameter by which the 'being-political' of man – which further coincides with man's 'being-human' — is decided is the capacity of *logos* that is not only more than but is also an *overcoming* of the voice (*phone*) of the animal which expresses mere pleasure and pain.(Aristotle 1995: 250) Thus the definition of 'being-political' of the animal that is man involves not only a predicate or positive capacity of reasoned speech (*logos*) but is the grid of the overcoming, a cross-over and transformation vis-ë-vis a *threshold* of animalism. Which means according to Aristotle, the generic capacity for politics is both existent and in-existent for man, an actual capacity and constitutive possibility as well as a hazard and *exposure* to the risk of failing to overcome the defining threshold, falling back into animal automatism of pleasure and pain. Interestingly, Aristotle's distinction between the *zoon politikon* and the "outcast" maintains the first parameter but articulates it with the second one which gives it a paradoxical evaluation.

According to Aristotle, the outcast is the negative of the political animal. The outcast, *beast or god*, lives outside the State and by that virtue, is a kind of 'fundamental being', an un-composed or non-constituted entity who is marked by a paradoxical *sovereignty without capacity*. The strangeness, or should one say, grotesquerie, intensifies when we see that outside of divine entities, the consistent examples of outcasts, these sovereigns without capacity, in Aristotle's text, are women, slaves, laborers, children, foreigners, in short, every category which is excluded from the full capacities of the political animal and yet *is ruled by them*[2]. How is this unsavory paradox to be explained? By going back to Book Eight and its kathartic expedient: which is that the fundamental, non-constituted, factical outcast-nature which is a cold sovereign indifferent to joys of political constitution(s) is a *universal nature*. Fundamentally – and musically – according to Aristotle, we are all outcastes and we are all sovereigns and even for such cold sovereigns there is the musical stimulation of the de-graded, kathartic type. Upon this kathartic incidence, arrives the threshold or moment of political differentiation that must differentiate the universal nature or substance from its outcast(e) sovereignty into a divided structure of inclusion and exclusion. Which is to say a structure self-divided into the 'natural' and 'political' animal where the trace of one beast is always carried by the other. So every further expedient of ethical habituation of the bodies and souls of citizens – whether through forms of music other than kathartic or not – will always carry the trace of the fundamental

automatism and the sovereign animal habit. Aristotle is keenly aware of the presence of the trace of difference in the paradigmatic dyad of inclusion and exclusion that constitutes the grid of the political animal in its graded distribution of sovereignties and capacities, governments and freedoms. Before relating this structure to Ambedkar's thesis on 'graded sovereignties' of the caste-system, a parenthesis:

At the threshold where man is sovereign and subject to the pure automatism of *katharsis,* sovereignty is the same as absolute incapacity. How to explain this? By the speculation that this threshold in Aristotle is abysally split between the greater schema across of genus and differentia, potentiality and actuality etc., and the 'fundamental' non constituted hither side which is sovereign by dint of being non constituted and factical. It's the hither side of a split threshold whose kathartic facticity – this is how some classes *are*! – is projected into the greater side of the schema of soul and its parts, the hierarchy of potentiality and actuality, etc as the possibility of a kind of constitutive entropy of all constitution. Which is the same thing as saying that all 'definition' of man as a political animal is a theoretical effort to attenuate this entropic return to a fundamental state which is factical through and through. However despite this effort, to the factical givenness of outcast(e) sovereignty there will always correspond the entropic potential of constituted humanity – this is what we might all become, mere kathartic animals!

Now by the above *speculative* construction, it can be readily admitted that the use of terms/concepts such as "sovereignty", "soul", and "habit" is not strictly aristotelian. But this use is only a reflection of a 'repressed' presupposition of Aristotle's system and is of the nature of an untimely *trace* of this presupposition. Hence for instance there is such a trace of this automatic-animal sense of habit in the *formal* cultivation of habit (*hexis*) as the proper infrastructure of potentiality supporting all actual conduct of virtue (*arête*). One might summarize the clarification by introducing a term for this 'trace' betwixt potentiality and actuality: im-potentiality. As impotential, 'entropic' vitality, habit secretly persists in the formal structure and pedagogy of Aristotelian habit as virtue. Life haunts form in the history and destiny of western constitutional politics from its Aristotelian beginnings. And this spectrality veils and separates Aristotle's political-philosophical concepts from themselves and from each other. That is the point of this long parenthesis. Now to return to the main comparison.

Is the above Aristotle's Ambedkar moment, the homologue of

an Ambedkar-threshold of graded sovereignties of the caste-system in India?[3] I will postpone the theoretical comparison for the moment but indicate the stakes of such a comparison. The stakes lie in the constitution of a congregation or assembly which both articulates as well as mobilizes the dyadic structure of society with its spaces of inclusion and exclusion. When Aristotle points out the simple fact that the theatre-audience, which listens to musical performances, is always two, the laboring classes, women, slaves etc and the educated elite, he is already setting up the task of both overcoming and articulating this doubleness in the constitution of the political assembly by carrying the trace of difference in every actual politically and socially differentiated formation. A certain *ontological* inclusion of the fundamental degradation of the universal sovereign 'animal' and 'kathartic' nature must carry on in every higher ethical and political habituation – and the habituation of every higher level of congregational existence is a kind of *rule* or *government* of the outcast-habit rather than its total exclusion. For Ambedkar, the primary, irreducible question is that, does the caste-system in India, historically petrified over two thousand years and with a claim to immemorial existence beyond historical time present a *trace* of its systematic, structural or relational reality? Is there any space of mobility and mobilization of structural difference and historical contingency, in the political constitution of a congregation that includes in its formation traces of its own exclusions? Indeed B.R. Ambedkar will ask this question explicitly in his comparative discussion of Brahminical caste-system with the treatment of plebeians under the provisions of Roman Law. But that elaboration for later...

I would like to summarize the sequence that follows from Aristotle's equivocal or di-aporetic axiom that man is, a *zoon politikon* – equivocal because it contains and presupposes the opposite axiom that man's nature remains subject to ecstasies that are cold to politics: first, exclusion is not separation; the subject of politics includes its exclusions, its incapacities, and its inexistences. In that sense the subject of politics is always also im-political. The second link of the sequence is that by the im-political logic of political capacity, *everyone* is political; or rather everything can be – and must be – *politicized*. The third link is that in its operational economy, every-one, instead of living the life of a multiplicity, is always reducible and divisible into the figure of the *two*: Included and Excluded, Master and Slave, Human and Animal. Thus the sequence closes in on itself and forms a circular chain or grid that Aristotle onwards distributes the classical principles of western political philosophy.

II

It is a reasonable supposition that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar belonged to the opinion that praised in the Constituent Assembly the new "habit" of participation in collective decision on the nation's future, a habit made possible by reservations. Indeed this admirable opinion addressed a subject which, as I pointed out earlier, was re-composed from the initial separation of "them" and "us" and yielded a new and egalitarian indiscernibility of erstwhile hierarchies of society. Yet we also know that Ambedkar in his day, was a critic of any 'natural' constitutional reflex or habit that flowed smoothly from 'liberal' constitutionalism of the West. In his "A Plea to the Foreigner", Ambedkar was at pains to point out that all constitutional projects, indeed, all sovereignism, must take into account the irreducibility of "circumstances" and the demands of contingency (Ambedkar 1991a: 199-238). According to this critique, the theory of constitutional habit – which, following Aristotle's grid, leads to constitutional morality as a habituation – promotes the *form,*not the actuality of the constitution of self-government.(Ambedkar 1991a: 202-203)

Though I will not attempt a historical analysis here, the context of "A Plea to the Foreigner" which was the tremulous eve of Indian self-government, demanded that the stakes be clearly expressed as to *who* would rule whom in the actuality of self-government, not only in its constitutional form. This was a demand placed vis-à-vis the imminent ruling party of an imminently independent India, that is, Congress. But Ambedkar addressed this demand to the so-called generic "foreigner" to campaign for a kind of cosmopolitan rallying around the exigency of this demand. There was an effort to penetrate the general bloc of sympathy for Congress in Britain – including liberals and socialists – but it was as much an attempt to draw out liberal-constitutional political philosophy, with its subjective infrastructure of habits and reflexes considered "democratic", on the exigency of social separation, irreducible in its structure and topology, that was a point of *resistance* to, and not a threshold of a transformation into the constitution of the 'political' subject. The entire criticism of Congress rested on its majoritarian as well as Gandhian covering over of the separative structure by an *appearance* of social totality or *one* society whose Hindu and secular modes of existence were fused together in this majoritarian-Gandhian logic of mass organization and mass-ideology that Congress represented.

Ambedkar's criticism in "A Plea to the Foreigner" unfolded on two levels. The criticism of the potential ally in the cosmopolitical

'foreign' partisan was that he or she was a partisan of what was considered to be a 'natural-political' totality continuous with an emancipation from the fundamental animal life of universal humanity. According to Ambedkar, the liberal – as well as the socialist – democratic partisan must become aware of the actuality of the 'Hindu exception', an exception which didn't admit of the index of intelligibility of the 'animal', who is generically asocial in habit, pleasure, suffering and is the generalized equivalent of all life-processes that is automatic and kathartic. The 'Hindu' outcaste, the Untouchable, is intensely socialized, thus dense with the human habits of following rules, prescriptions, proscriptions and commands as no animal is – and exactly by virtue of this total human-social habituation is entirely *separate* such that no *notion* of caste and outcastes exists, no *trace* of the Untouchable exists in thought.4

The second level of criticism is directed toward the Congress party and particularly Gandhi. Here the accusation, not merely exhortation, is the following: the Congress maintains the separation of the lower castes by excluding them from the logic and technique of mass – and militant – organization, of which Mahatma Gandhi is the undisputed master. Ambedkar had been the first to admit that it was the Mahatma's arrival on the scene from South Africa that was singularly responsible for the conversion of Congress from a campaign for political reform to an organization which henceforth would impose militant sanctions which the 'masses' would enforce. (Ambedkar 1991: 20) And this extraordinary act of 'conversion' was carried out by Gandhi through a singular intervention into Hindu society, which was not a society, with no real stakes in 'totality', which was a non-totality of corporations hanging together through shared negative injunctions against who and what was impure, unseeable, unspeakable within that system. Indeed Hindu society was separate from itself which lived out a collective life as sheer *habit* that erased all traces of its systematicity and 'mad' rationality.[5] Now Gandhi didn't, atleast to begin with, when he wasn't pushing for social reforms and Congress wasn't from the end of the 19th century either, intervene in Hindu society as such. What he did was give a militant and mass programme to the 'Hindu' so as to convert the Hindu corporatism and separatism not *into* but *as* secular and political congregation. Now this quizzical formulation requires a parenthesis before one goes on to Ambedkar's critique of Gandhi:

"Conversion *as*..." instead of "conversion *into*..." is a clear case of linguistic infelicity. Strangely, it is a meaningful – and productive– infelicity when understood in the light of a Gandhian strategy of

individual-to-national *debt*. The function of this strategy of debt is to induce the conversion of a multitude into a congregation *in its own place*. Instead of converting 'into' another form or denomination, a scatter or multiplicity of individuals become a homogenous collective without any conscious movement of such homogenization when they fulfill a *minimal* obligation as individuals as if it were a 'pure' (and 'free') exercise of self discipline. In his or her own place, each individual, *selfishly* practices 'Gandhian' selflessness in such acts as that of spinning cloth and paying the minimal four anna fee to Congress as token of 'selfish' participation. Gandhi's genius of inducing the minimal selfish debt/obligation in the 'Hindu' individual *converted* Hindu individuality into secular-political discipline without the slightest disorientation of that individual status or being towards 'another' form of life, whether political or religious. Interestingly, in perfecting this technology of 'conversion *as*...', Gandhi proved himself as one of the greatest exponents of the same Christian technology of inducing a modern, 'free' debt that so marks the constitution of the Western individual as a political being. So there is no contradiction, seen from this angle of debt induction, between modern, secular-western Congressist individualism and the 'Hindu' Gandhian practices of the self.

The above is the crux of Ambedkar's accusation, nay, indictment. According to Ambedkar, the lower caste in general, the Untouchable in particular, are exempted from the superb Gandhian technique and logic of inducing in the individual Hindu, who leads essentially always a fragmented existence, a *minority* existence (in the true sense of existential weight and not number), a unified *national debt*. This debt is expressed in the 'minor' subscription of a few annas which every individual pays to become a member of one political party so as to be totalized into a mass action of repayment of national debt. Now Gandhi will eventually go further and offer the alternative mode of individualized as well as totalized debt-payment by paying with the labor of two thousand yards of hand spun cloth. (Ambedkar 1991b: 246) Ambedkar accuses this extraordinarily sophisticated technique that it exempts the Untouchable from this debt of the new congregation. How so, when Gandhi was eventually campaigning for the abolition of Untouchability and urged non-Hindus as well to join this 'Hindu' secular process? By the diagnosis that the Mahatma didn't apply himself his personal authority and his strategic genius to the task of organizing the Hindus in support of the cause of Untouchables *as* Untouchables[6] — for who could doubt the need to convert the

'problem' Untouchability was into a *locus* of political transformation and congregation? The Untouchable could never simply *be* the generalized Hindu in the process of Gandhian and Congressist conversion to nationalist debt until the excluded castes' debt to itself *as* excluded was expressed as a congregation and political assembly. And until then the Untouchable was only *abandoned* to Hinduism and in Ambedkar's criticisms of Harijan Sevak Sangh, such an abandonment, in the midst of all the exaltation into divinity of the Untouchable and the penance of the Hindu, was vividly felt, accused, denounced[7].

In "Annihilation of Caste", meant to be a speech in the cause of social reform which was cancelled because of its *decision* on Hinduism so as to *annihilate its habit* from Ambedkar's own life, the author takes issue with Mahatma Gandhi (in the letters following the publication of the address) on the very principle of equality. For Ambedkar against Gandhi as well as against Arya Samajists, the concern was equality, not in God's eyes but in the real unequal world. (Ambedkar 1989 b: 87-88). Equality in the here and now of inequality! Forced by the actuality of different kinds of inequalities – socio-historical and physical – will we treat unequals unequally? – this is Ambedkar's founding question to any egalitarian thought (Ambedkar 1989 b: 58). But if Ambedkar enunciates a founding principle from his side of equality, which bases itself neither on God's sanction and grace nor on the Aristotelian *threshold* of potential equality which is the threshold of overcoming *and* politicization of animal life – a later generation of biologistic and economistic philosophies will speak of "animal spirits" – then doesn't such 'axiomatic' equality go against the insistence on thinking the caste system as a trace of its differentiated structure, against the separation of the Untouchable in thought as much as in the electorate? In such essays as "Are the Untouchables a Separate Element?" and "A Plea to the Foreigner", we find an urgent campaign for reservations and separation of electorates which is somewhat impatient with the expected 'reasonable' justification of capacity – and opportunity – correction of historical wrong. In Ambedkar's view, if one works with the axiom of equality – he says that thought is nobody's monopoly – and under British rule, some form of civil rights are available to the Scheduled Castes, then the urgent issue is not capacity-equalization through reservations. In the legislative as well as administrative spaces, protection and reservation are the *direct* legal-constitutional propulsion to *exercise* of right and capacity given the absolute obstruction of Hindu (non)society to such exercise[8]. It

is, even more fundamentally, the *demonstration* of the Untouchable's separation in a vivid alienation of the truth that not only is the Untouchable excluded, abandoned but also that Hindu society is separated from itself, is anathema to itself, is, hence, not a society at all. For Ambedkar, what Gandhi could never take upon himself was the *thought* of caste as Hinduism's self-anathematization even while he deployed a complex logic of debt and love vis-a vis the reformist conduct towards the Untouchable's hereditary function of scavenging (Ambedkar 1991 c: 297).[9] Ambedkar wants to show that in this comprehensive regimen and prescriptions of reformist, nay, loving conduct, the Mahatma is still not *thinking* as far as caste is concerned (Ambedkar 1991 b: 19).

But what is Ambedkar's analysis of Gandhi's logic of conduct in the social reform programme for the abolition of Untouchability, which was a programme, after all, in great advance of the days of Annie Besant's prognosis of social integration as doomed on the grounds that the lower classes/castes are incorrigible for which they are not to be blamed since they carry in their unclean, inassimilable habits no trace of reflection of their degradation?[10] The analysis yields the following features, which, taken together, reveal a masterful, if secret and perverse, Gandhian logic of conservation of the hereditary caste-system. In the piece "Gandhism", Ambedkar extracts a simple model of sociability underlying Gandhism which could be almost called "animal". Maybe not in the sense of Aristotle's kathartic homeostasis but in the sense of a repetitive and self-sufficient locus of *work*. Even with the expansion of the model to make intelligible wider networks of human community, the locus of productive self-sufficiency remains the same – and the simple repetitive principle is the basis for all further strivings towards spiritual self-sufficiency, which surely is creative and not repetitive or habitual merely. In fact, in the early *Hind Swaraj* and several contexts, Gandhi will repudiate and not cease launching tirades against what he sees as a 'culture of leisure' that comes with modern technological civilization and breaks open and infiltrates the principle of self-sufficiency. According to Ambedkar's analysis, this repudiation of leisure and love of labor is precisely the *affection of the leisured classes* (Ambedkar 1991 c: 291). Or, maybe the precise formulation should be that Gandhi's love of labor – as true as that of a Ruskin's why not – is an affection that serves the interests of the leisured classes. In caste propelled Hindu (non) society, Gandhi's transvaluation of labor as virtue re-induces labor and work, the limit manifestation of which is scavenging, as a 'privilege' in society. This

general re-induction is accompanied, simultaneously with social reforms and the campaign to abolish Untouchability by a prescription and tactic to re-induce the 'privilege' of labor, including scavenging, in the same functional distribution (*varna*) that the caste-system articulates. And in the existent functional distribution, it is then the Shudra's and the Untouchable's 'privilege' whose fruits the leisured classes enjoy.

But we must understand this tortured logic that ends up as a Shudra's curse being her privilege, is not a 'Hindu' logic; it is formal and if one may call it that Aristotelian. Gandhi prescribes the privilege to be so because it is an act of repaying a general debt of humanity (the debt of *all* to scavenge). Or, even better, the prescription of debt is inflated into a *love of debt* ("I love scavenging*",* says Gandhi) (Ambedkar 1991 c: 292). These prescriptions and inflations – Gandhian, whether or not 'Hindu' – lead to the logical deduction of scavenging as the Shudra's 'privilege'. This is because the Shudra can legitimately and habitually do as a matter of *birth-right* what general humanity is indebted to do and loves being so indebted...in the essay mentioned above and in the letter of reply to Gandhi's objections, objections to *Annihilation of Caste* in *Harijan,* Ambedkar carries out a kind of scientific polemic against Gandhism which is as much an axiomatic struggle, a struggle to depose the axiom of eternal and virtuous scavenging that determines Gandhian reformist conduct. Does Ambedkar lay the groundwork for a 'dalit' theory of future sociability which will be a theory of universal, unconditional and fundamental *leisure*? Does he obliquely prophesize a *dalit snobbism* as a catachrestic riposte that the future will provide to the laceration and love of hereditary occupation, and its deep, monotonous "ancestral calling"?[11] A theory of leisure that is non-Aristotelian and does not require to be itself produced by slaves, women, laborers – and of course professional musicians who the citizens must enjoy and judge but never emulate? (Ford 1995: 117) I will not even begin to check subtle prophecy against hard historical reality Ambedkar onwards and after early 1950s. Only this might be proposed, at the risk of over-generalization, that the 'real' of Ambedkar's historical threshold was one when all past habits must be broken and revoked and new habits must start to be formed. Not just habits as habituation but habits as experiments with a new *purposiveness*[12].

III

It is true that the opinion from the Constituent Assembly Debates cited at the beginning signals a re-composed horizon of political and collective participation, nay, decision, which is already, within a limited space, 'impurifying' the subject of politics of its pure caste-bound separations. Such an ongoing impurification was indeed the main constitutional task, the new experiment with a republican purposiveness. And B.R. Ambedkar couldn't but be galvanized by this emergent republican horizon of unity and indiscernibility of erstwhile separate and hierarchical categories. At the same time, it seems to me, Ambedkar's singular preoccupation with creating the trace of separation as separation in thought that would be the key critical step towards solving the "mystery of caste" was not fully exhausted. And given the incompletion of the task, all projects of constituting political self-government would be subject to a social and ontological blind spot which erases all traces of the systematicity of the caste-system and is itself never quite erased. How could a political (and juridical) constitution be actualized, which is an eminently rational and purposive orientation, when the social space was saturated by the living *absurdity* of the caste-system! This was the basis for Ambedkar's foreboding that independent, republican India was entering a life of contradiction in which the egalitarian constitutional principles and inegalitarian social structure would contradict each other to catastrophe[13]. It was also the source of his wry advice to the dominant interests to be grateful that the minorities in India, unlike in Ireland, had accepted the constitutional compromise of reservations and not indulged in direct action (Ambedkar 1989 b: 40-43). So within the constitutional horizon we do see an ambivalent subjective figure emerge who is both certain and uncertain, reassuringly certain about the truth of liberty, equality, fraternity as the generic ideals and values to be accomplished; almost tragically uncertain as to the possibility of realizing these values faced with the immemorial impasse of the caste-system.

Indeed if Ambedkar is always writing with both hands, with one the draft of the constitution with a kind of patient, almost ironic energy, with the other, the critique of immemorial habit with a nearly tragic lucidity and urgency, I would like, at the end, to imagine a third organ in action; an incorporeal organ of thought with which Ambedkar intellectually chooses to *default* on both the

debt of Hindu shastras and of liberal political knowledge, though never with the same intensity and amplitude. But since his repudiation of and conversion from Hinduism is well known, I will make a statement about his intellectual resistance to, if not default of, the *givenness* of the political subject in western liberal democracy and its donative condescension, which is to say, its *sovereignty*.

I tried to show earlier the equivocal axiomatic core of Aristotelian constitutions of the political subject formed of a certain complicity and vacillation between generic sovereignty and predicative capacity – constitutions of which liberal democracy is one. I also specified the Aristotelian sequence to be an equivocation, utilization and recuperation of a fundamental dyad – which is also a continuum – whose constitutive terms are "human" and "animal". In that unfolding in Aristotle, the becoming-human of man and being-political of the animal are the same. Though he was a physiological researcher and not a political philosopher, Xavier Bichat, during the time of the French Revolution, drew up a 'modern' cognitive physiology of human consciousness that roughly replicated Aristotle's criterion of possession of *logos* for the political animal; only this time *logos* encompassed an expressive and cognitive consciousness emancipated from the habitual life of "assimilation and excretion". To such a habitual monotony was opposed the differentiated and emancipated "life of relation". In fact, Bichat writes of an *organic* life which is "vegetal", an *animal* life of relation which feels, perceives, reflects on its sensations and "...is frequently enabled to communicate by its voice its desires and its fears, its pleasures and its pains." (Starobinski 2003: 129-130) The gradation of vitalist transformation – which as much as a political schema of transformation, I have proposed – leads to the properly cerebral life of human *will* but it is still in differentiated continuity with *passion,* whose roots lie in organic life (Starobinski 2003: 130). Thus roughly to the measure everything and everyone is politicized, every exclusion is included the trace of which lingers, appeals and dismays, everything including the highest cerebral will is physiologized even while every physiological stage is vitalized by a kind of infinite virtuality.

The above homology between a 'science' of life and the 'life' of politics is formally subtended by two dyads or couples: 'limitation-transformation', 'externality-subjectivation'. The couples separate and intertwine such that every transformation takes place under a constellation of external limitations and every limit is transformed into a *force* of 'becoming' : This is the 'becoming-human' of life, the 'becoming-political' of the living individual such that the limitation

or externality of life becomes or transforms into a *subject* of a capacity or a sovereignty with infinitely graded potentialities. With this schema the consistency of classical Aristotelianism with modern biopolitics is demonstrated and it seems that the political field is totally saturated with this 'western' logic[14].

Despite the obvious parallel between the differential model above and Ambedkar's thesis on graded sovereignty of the Hindu caste-system, the thesis itself insists on the exceptional status of the Hindu system. So, in conclusion, what might be the nature of this exception and what universal, generic stakes might be involved in that separation? In the text "Who Were the Shudras?" – a title obscurely resonant with Emmanuel Sieyes' 1789 text, *What is the Third Estate?*[15] – Ambedkar develops the Greek axiom on man's nature as political animal and shows its differential and potentializing truth in Roman Law. He shows how the codes of Roman Law retain the principle of mobility within the hierarchy of patrician-plebians such that there can be a differentiation of the hierarchy of legal and social personae. Roman Law allows degrees of legal capacity – *juris sui* and *juris alieni* among other categories – to subjectivate the *personae* of society to the extent that the plebeians and slaves with hardly a *persona* through the contingency of acts, have a chance of crossing the threshold Aristotle called "*kathartic*"[16]. Analogously, through the chance of reprehensible public acts, the full, patrician *persona* of law and society was liable to be struck with sanctions and fall below the threshold of subjectivation[17]. Then for Ambedkar as for the history after him, was a *plebianization of lower castes* possible within the caste-system in India?[18] According to Ambedkar, it was *not* within the rigors of Brahmanical law. These were rigors – like the *akribeia* of iconoclast Christians[19] – that were fabricated to foreclose the chance of actions and events, foreclose anything from *happening*. The technique of this rigidification/ rigour is the law of hereditary, immemorial transmission of caste-status unlike the severely limited but strikingly effective *topology* of legal personality in ancient Rome. But it is at this point that an observation from Ambedkar's work "The Untouchables" reveals an extraordinary modality of the rigid Brahmanical hierarchy.

In this work, Ambedkar cites the list of Scheduled Castes in all the provinces from a 1935 survey by the Government of India and calls it a "terrifying" list (Ambedkar 1990 b: 265).[20] Why? Because below the immobile, rigid threshold – hence not a threshold but a hellish abyss – according to the survey, there exist four hundred and twenty nine communities! This "terrifying" number *is* the real

of an utterly exposed mass of existences and at the same time it is a number as if in pure play *of* numericality conveying no more even the corporeal simplicity or degradation of 'being-animal' as opposed to 'becoming-human'. Rather, it is the decisive count of *existence itself* which doesn't add up to or express a total sum because this is an existence dispossessed of what Ambedkar calls "the title-deeds to humanity" (Ambedkar 1991 b: 269).[21]. Which means, this is a state of 'being-human' and nothing but 'being-human' – yet without a *trace* of any *consistent, formal* humanity, thus, 'being-human' inconsistently. So instead of the simple bi- or tri-partite division of vegetal, animal and human differentials of 'life' that is the framework of a 'western' typology, the case of 'immemorial' Brahmanical Law sits rigid and massive, though also articulated in a distilled economy of three high *dvija* (twice-born) castes, sits over the nether and according to Ambedkar's prophecy, potentially tectonic play-ground of the lower castes' *existence* – this play of difference of castes, sub-castes and out-cast(e), is a play of stratification *in one place* (and in apparently one immemorial time). While this 'play' is not the natural material for 'western' politics' programme of limitation, transformation and constitution, every constitution must, according to Ambedkar, reflect the actual play of forces of a given society[22]. So, "reservation for backward classes/ castes" will be the general name for the brief reflection of society in a constitution, which even if, *to all appearance* liberal-western, is also an *index of resistance* to that very constitutional philosophy and habit.

But at that late stage in Ambedkar's life and work, things had assumed an ambivalence which was in turn, and together sometimes, delicate and discordant. However in his earliest presentation at Columbia University, "Castes in India", Ambedkar had a firm diagnostic thesis: The caste-system, with its massive and immemorial saturation of the social field, being a system, *was also a historical contingency*[23]. It was an act, plot – and chance – of such enormous proportions that it became axiom, law and habit fused into one. From that early stage onwards, Ambedkar, based on his pioneering thesis, never ceased to make the most open and unqualified appeal (which also had the insistence of a demand). Which was that the caste-system being a historical contingency must be recognized, analyzed and overcome; its annihilation must become the stakes of not only Indian history, in search of independence and equality – that is, the stakes of the political consciousness of that exigent time when Ambedkar was thinking and writing – but the concern and stakes of *any* definition, model and prescription of politics. The

historical contingency of the caste-system in India, which has, for whichever reasons, assumed this shape of an immemorial mystery and monster, appeals to and demands the attention of *any* politics that while never ceasing to pay – and default on – the debts of sovereignty and capacity, is also ready this time, in Marx's imagery, "to weave its intrigue with the world" with *thought* and *chance*[24].

WORKS CITED

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1989a. "Caste in India" in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 1*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1989b. "Annihilation of Caste" in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 1*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1990a. "Who Were the Shudras?" in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 7*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1990 b. "Who Were the Untouchables?" in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 7*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb .1991a. "A Plea to the Foreigner", in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 9*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb .1991b. "What do the Untouchables Say?" in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 9*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1991 c. "Gandhism", in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 9*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Ambedkar, Babasaheb. 1991 d. "A Strange Event", in Vasant Moon (ed.) *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 9*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Aristotle. 'Politics' in Loomis, Louise Ropes (ed.). 1995. *Aristotle: On Man in the Universe*, (ed.) New York: Walter J. Black.

Besant, Annie. February 1909. "The Uplift of the Depressed Classes", *Indian Review*.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1991. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ford, Andrew. 1995. "*Katharsis*: The Ancient Problem" in Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky (ed.) *Performativity and Performance*, London & New York: Routledge.

Moon, Vasant. (ed.) 1989. *Writings and Speeches: Vol. 1*, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2010. *Religion, Caste and Politics in India*. Delhi: Primus Books.

Loomis, Louise Ropes (ed.). 1995. *Aristotle: On Man in the Universe*, New York: Walter J. Black.

Mondzain, Marie-JosÈ. 2005. *Images, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*, trans. Rico Frances. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Parker, Andrew and Eve Kosofsky (ed.) 1995. *Performativity and Performance*, London & New York: Routledge.

Sen, Sarbani. 2007. *The Constitution of India: Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Transformation*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Starobinski, Jean. 2004. *Action and Reaction: The Life and Adventures of a Couple*, trans. Sophie Hawkes. New York: Zone Books.

NOTES

1. Here Aristotle quotes Homer on the "outcast" as the one who is "tribeless, lawless, heartless".
2. In Aristotle's scenario the outcast is a figure of *separation* and *injustice* – hence both for the exigency of the principle of justice and that of the administration of this principle, "rule" or "government" is necessary. See (Aristotle 1995 : 251)
3. This is a reference to Ambedkar's comprehensive thesis on the structure of caste system in India, its static multiplicity of parts and its totally 'habituated' and invisible articulation in time. See, for the entire construction of the thesis (Moon 1989: 5-96).
4. This is the crucial point of contention between Ambedkar's understanding of caste and the Western tendency at the time to make what Ambedkar consistently considered a question of *notion, structure* and *relations of multiple elements*, into a 'substance', whether rendered impure, animalized and degraded in the putting down of lower castes or redeemed through social reform. For Ambedkar, as for someone like Frantz Fanon on race, caste was a question of *thinking* against its habit. Thus the Untouchable, *once thought*, was not defined by 'being impure' but by a structure of separation between the categories of "purity" and "impurity".
5. The characterization of the caste-system as a case of madness is found many times in Ambedkar. The defenders of the system are indeed mad, its greatest upholder, Manu, must have been overcome with madness to have enunciated the law he did; Ambedkar doesn't exempt Gandhi of a certain madness for explaining injunctions against inter-dining on the ground that eating was as disgusting as defecating and thus best done alone. Again, it seems to me, the issue of madness is really an issue of the erasure of all marks or signs of a system so pervasive as caste, from the objects and dispositions (habits?) of a society's thinking. The *real* madness of caste, its absurdity, was that it was *not thought to be mad*.
6. (Ambedkar 1991b: 246) This support, in Ambedkar's projection of Gandhi's method of debt-induction, could be expressed by the Hindu's employing in his

household at least one Untouchable – and defaulting on this would exclude the Hindu from the franchise and membership of a nationalist party and 'congregation' such as Congress.

7. This criticism also involves Gandhi's campaign for the Untouchables' right to temple entry. Given Gandhi's vacillations with regard to such a Bill – and the same regarding his decision to fast or not on that question – Ambedkar's statement is that the real stakes are not in the permission to enter a Hindu temple or not but in 'Untouchables' experience of Gandhi's actions, their judgment based on that experience about Gandhi and the consequent *decision* to separate or not from Gandhism.
8. There is enough evidence for this insistence on Ambedkar's part on "exercise". Yet we mustn't limit such exercise to that of constitutional and juridical rights that vindicate a fundamental 'human' capacity thus giving the lower castes their legitimate dignity. I think, Ambedkar's arrow pierces deeper into the real of *existence*, however excluded and disabled, and the exercise of dignity is sought even in that *weakest real* of existence – a kind of generic dignity. It is probably with post-Ambedkar history that the 'symbolic turn' comes and dignity becomes the affect of a *symbolized* Dalit existence, whether through reservations or through other iconized, even idolatrous means.
9. For Gandhi, caste evil is *anachronism*, not *anathema*.
10. See the long and appalling quote (Besant 1909) in (Ambedkar 1991 d: 3-7).
11. This phrase in Gandhi's reply to "Annihilation of Caste" is used by Ambedkar in his riposte repeatedly – and reversed in tone and value, refuting and mocking against affirming and obligating.
12. For an extraordinary reading of David Hume which puts into assemblage habits, custom, imagination and truth, an assemblage whose purposive orientation doesn't contradict habit, in fact needs it, but also vigilantly regulates it according to a criteria of consonance of imagination (which builds on habit) with truth, see (Deleuze 1991)
13. See this prophetic remark as cited by Perry Anderson in his recent essays in the *London Review of Books* launched in the cause of blowing up the contemporary triumphalist (nuclear?) establishment of an 'ideology of India' masking itself as the (ancestral?) "idea of India". See Perry Anderson, *After Nehru*, http://www.irb.uk/v34/n15/perry.anderson/after.nehru, p. 5. Right after quoting Ambedkar, Anderson says the champion of unconditional equality was wrong; caste inequality, among others, became a resource of the democracy to come in India since Ambedkar.
14. This is not to deny the tremendous value of a thesis like Giorgio Agamben's that the field of 'western' political logic is inaugurated by a fundamental *abandonment* of all logic of sovereignty and capacity and that moment of *re-vocation* must forever accompany every stage of the political vocation of 'empowerment' and 'constitution' of sovereignty. One could say that in a historically and socially 'alien' case of caste in India such a revocation and an abandonment is utterly exposed – a kind of bewildering 'play' of sovereign abandonment is exposed to the eyes of 'others' (other than Hindus, who according to Ambedkar, see, hear, feel, *think* nothing).
15. I will not develop this speculation – which, to me, is a compelling one – here. But I do think this is another direction to take from the one which likens Ambedkar to a Tocqueville of Indian history.
16. For reasons of brevity, I will not expand Ambedkar's comparison of Roman Law

and Brahmanical Law. The details are crucial though – the reader is advised to go to Ambedkar's full text – but this much can be said, that the author brings out the differentiator as "contingency" which Roman Law takes account of. But this contingency, precisely because it is *law*, Roman Law must constitute as a flexible but firm *code*. Is this then the ideal for Ambedkar's vision of politics? I suggest that it is not and for Ambedkar, the chance of history must be understood as a *challenge* to any constitution. See (Ambedkar 1990 a: 57-64)

17. This is called the fall from *existimatio*, or reputation in the eyes of law. This could be lost by committing certain proscribed acts – one of which was for the *persona* with *existiamatio* to appear on the public stage! See (Ambedkar 1990 a: 61)
18. I will not – I can't – conduct any serious investigation into such so-called "plebianization" in the post-independence India, particularly in electoral terms. But for an expert analysis on "plebianization" (and "ethnicization") of the lower-castes and related studies, see (Jaffrelot 2010).
19. For the contrast between *akribeia* and *oikonomia* (a kind of flexible "economy" of power) in the war of doctrines of the icon between the iconoclasts and iconophiles in Christian Middle Ages, see (Mondzain: 2005).
20. What terrifies Dr. Ambedkar in this list prepared by the Government of India in 1935 is its *teeming isolation*. The imagination of the slave against the master, the animal against human, foreigner against citizen retains a classical economy – and dramaturgy– of the Two. This is a "terrifying" *play* of human isolation.
21. Again in the context of Gandhi's efforts of social reform, what is at stake, in Ambedkar's view, is not just an abstract right but the *habit* of *not feeling grateful* which must be practiced. I will call this the project of a new conduct of *defaulting* rather than induction into the old Brahmanical habit of 'being-in-debt'.
22. For the Lasalle quotation on constitution of social forces, see (Ambedkar 1989 b: 42)
23. For the argument of castes in the caste system being a "parceling-out" from a single caste and its consequences for the *appearance* of an immemorial hierarchy of 'bits' of caste which must actually be historical in its genesis, see (Ambedkar 1989 a: 22)
24. I will not elaborate a theory of chance or events here. But such a task is essential for understanding the *consequences* of contingency that convert the latter into forms of *necessity* and *destiny*. It is as much essential for the *opening* to historically unprogrammable *acts*. I think there is sufficient cue to think these possibilities in Ambedkar's example of the railways in India as a contingent moment of decision on the immemorial caste-segregation. Which is also when Hinduism will try to pre-empt true decision by a theory of *prayaschitta*, which 'pays back' the 'debt' of the crisis or contingency through expiation (or *Katharsis*, in the sense of purgation?) of the decision on the event. See (Ambedkar 1989 b: 73).

HEARING SILENCE, SPEAKING *ANIRVACANIYA*[1*]

Sharad Deshpande

"*Silence is impossible. That is why we desire it*"
Maurice Blanchot (Blanchot 1986:11)

We all know that oxymorons like the ones in the title of this essay are a literary device to enter into the realm of the "non-literal" by juxtaposing contradictory terms. But we hardly realize that what is taken to be just a literary devise could actually be an invitation to "see through" the union of contradictory terms and to engage with the enigma or the mystery that the alleged union generates. Instead of a reasoned resolution of the enigmatic experience using the tools of logic, one may as well try to engage with an enigma by way of preserving and respecting its beauty. There is indeed something beautiful about what the enigmatic experience generates. Therefore, we will try to respond to the oxymora in the title of this essay i.e., "*hearing silence*" and "*speaking anirvacaniya*", ("speaking the unspeakable") not by theorizing on oxymorons, i.e., figures of speech but by engaging phenomenologically with the spaces they open up.

Let us ask: How do we encounter silence; given that it is not experienced the way we normally experience colours, sounds, tastes, and touch with our sense organs? Silence is neither imagined nor inferred using our faculties of imagination and reason and yet we 'experience' it directly, authentically and genuinely. We 'hear' the silence. This paradox, or better, a mystery; an enigma, calls for creative engagement with paradox rather than its dissolution. Living with a paradox or an enigma or a mystery need not be all that uncomfortable. In fact, the mystery of silence is due precisely because we take silence[2] as just the *absence*[3] of sound[4] a kind of void, a sheer passivity and then wonder how we experience it.[5] Using Nyāya terminology of *abhāva* (non-existence) we may describe the absence of sound as *dhvnyabhāva* (i.e. *abhāva* of *dhvani*). To the question "what is silence?' the natural answer seems to be that "silence is absence of sound". Put in this way, the problem of experiencing

silence is a philosophical problem of accounting for non-existence or absence; and in this case, of accounting for the non-existence or absence of sound. In Indian tradition *Naiyāyika*-s have dealt with the problem of *abhāva*, i.e. the problem of non-existence or of non-existing state, or the absence, by recognizing four types of absences, i.e. prior non-existence (*prāgbhāva*), posterior non-existence or destruction, (*dhvaṇsābhāva*), constant or absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) and non-existence through difference (*anyonyābhāva*). If silence is absence (non-existence) of sound then it makes sense to say that silence is *prior* or *posterior*, before or after the presence of sound. This can be schematized as [s^1 S s^2]. It is not difficult to evoke different images of this flow of absence *and* presence of sound *and* silence with the assumption of time. So at time t^1 there is prior silence which is absence of sound (in Nyāya terminology this will be *prāg-dhvnyabhāva*), at time t^2 there is sound (*dhvani*) which comes into existence by destroying (replacing, filling) the existing prior silence and at time t^3 again there is silence which comes into existence by destroying the existing sound (in Nyāya terminology this will be *dhvaṇsa-dhvnyabhāva*). The twin issue involved here is to capture the nature of silence as absence of sound, the sound that comes into existence, and the relation between the two.

It will be interesting to know whether the presence of sound makes any difference to the preceding silence (*prāg-dhvnyābhāva*) except saying that the preceding silence is filled with sound, or is overcome or even destroyed. What one would like to know is whether there is any *qualitative* difference between two silences; i.e., two *abhāva*-s, i.e., s^1 and s^2 ruptured by the intermediate sound 'S'. In what relevant features s^2 is or could be different from s^1? This is not to suggest that s^1 and s^2 are two *types* of silences, or that there are two types of *abhāva*-s but to suggest that they are or could be two *aspects* of the same silence or the two aspects of the same *abhāva*. We might verbalize this insight by saying that we are exposed to the same silence under two aspects i.e. the silence *before* and silence *after* the sound. We do talk about silence *before* the storm and silence *after* the storm and we do not mean the same when we say so. We believe that there is a *qualitative* difference between the two silences and this difference is expressed variously by invoking different images. For example, the silence before the storm could be full of anxiety, fear of the unknown, breath-holding, and the moment of everything coming to a standstill, while the silence after the storm may be full of relief, exhaustion, consolidation, frustration,

and so on. As compared to the first two types of *abhāva*-s, i.e., prior non-existence (*prāgbhāva*) and posterior non-existence (*dhvaṇsābhāva*), understanding the phenomenon of silence as absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) and absence through difference (*anyonyābhāva*) are much more complex cases. Though in ordinary language we talk of absolute silence, it is not clear as to what would be the absolute silence as the absolute non-existence; the *atyantābhāva*. This is not to suggest that we do not have expressions in ordinary language to express the idea of absolute silence (i.e., absolute non-existence of sound) but the question is how to articulate the philosophical notion of absolute silence given the kind of beings that we are.

Can we say that the same silence resumes when the sound stops? This gives an impression that the silence is all-pervading and sound is intermittent; that the Universe is 'filled' with the all-pervading silence (which is not a mere absence of sound) which is interrupted by the recurrent bits of sound at the regular intervals of time rhythmically. To conceptualize and to visualize this form of all pervading silence is indeed difficult. What goes nearest to this visualization is what science fiction movies show: the space-crafts travelling through the darkness in the infinity of the outer space. The whole series of science fiction movies dealing with the theme of the *Aliens* or the TV serials like *The Star Trek* depicting a voyage to unknown planets away from the Earth in terms of light years show that there is no sound up there, the darkness and the cold of the inter terrestrial space is filled with dead silence. For this the scientific explanation is that since there is no air in the outer space, there is nothing that sound can travel through. No one can hear your scream!

As a counter to the idea that the Universe is filled with the all pervading silence, Indian metaphysicians offer the whole philosophy of sound by employing the notions of the *āhata-nāda* (*āhata* = struck, beaten, and hence the sound (*nāda*) produced by striking a chord or by beating a drum etc.) and the *anāhata-nāda* (*anāhata* = unbeaten, unwounded, intact, and hence the sound (*nāda*) which is continuous, intact, eternal). Within this framework, the further distinction is drawn between four manifestations of sound, i.e., *parā*, *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikharī*. Of these, the first, i.e. *parā* is transcendental, inaudible to the outer senses, and is *avyakta*, the unmanifest, and is a continuous flow of consciousness. The remaining three, i.e. *paśyanti* (seen but not heard) *madhyamā* (the middle, a stage before the actual articulation of the word), and *vaikharī* (the

fourth and the final stage of sound, the articulation of the word) are more and more available to the external sense organs. Based on these notions the whole system of Nāda-Yoga creatively engages with the phenomenon of sound (*nāda*) and offers the metaphysical notion of the *Nāda-Brahma* around which the Indian tradition of music has evolved.

In ordinary language we say somewhat circularly that silence is absence of sound and sound is absence of silence. Beneath this circularity we seem to imply that the presence of one *causes* the absence of the other and vice versa. But we can as well say that the presence of one *explains* the absence of the other and vice versa. So we seem to be talking about two different things, i.e. causation and explanation and wondering whether the relationship between silence and sound is that of causation or of explanation. But these two are different types of relations and we need to distinguish them clearly. Consider the sentence: (A) "A constant exposure to maximum volume was responsible for his hearing loss." The sentence does not tell us whether the relation between (i) "A constant exposure to maximum volume" and (ii) "was responsible for his hearing loss" is the relation of causality or of explanation. But consider these two sentences: (B) "His sudden exposure to maximum volume was responsible for his hearing loss" AND (C) "That his sudden exposure to maximum volume was responsible for his hearing loss." In (B) "His sudden exposure to maximum volume" is an event in nature but in (C) it is not. In (C) it is the *fact* that a certain event (of his 'sudden exposure') has occurred at a certain point of time. In ordinary language we do not draw this distinction since there is no need to do so. But in philosophy this distinction should matter.

Causality is a natural relation that obtains between events, states of affairs, or things which are natural, extra-linguistic and extensional. So the relation that holds between these is also natural, extra-linguistic and extensional. We may say that silence being a state of affair and sound being an event the relation between them is natural, non-linguistic and extensional. But the relation of explanation on the other hand is linguistic, non-natural, and intentional. It holds between facts, truths, or propositions. So when it is said that "That his sudden exposure to maximum volume was responsible for his hearing loss" the relation that is asserted is between two facts and hence intentional. The same point can be made by distinguishing between two kinds of causes, i.e. *productive causes* and *explanatory causes*. (Mackie 1974: 265) The question then

is: whether we take silence/sound as productive or explanatory causes?

An interesting (and troublesome) way to imagine the relationship between silence and sound would be on the analogy of Newtonian space which was considered to be absolute. For a long time it was thought that space is like a container in which objects are placed at various distances. Similarly, one can imagine that silence is absolute; it is like a backdrop against which sounds come into being. But the analogy breaks down the moment we realize that space is the function of relative positions at which objects are placed. Likewise we might say that there is no absolute silence, it is relative to sounds with time intervals.

Not-hearing the sound is different from hearing silence. Not-hearing *simpliciter* like *not-doing* simpliciter is inaction, a failure, or even an inability as in the case of a deaf person, whereas hearing silence is a successful and positive experience of silence. This is analogous to the difference between 'forbearance' and 'not-doing *simpliciter*.' One forbears doing something intentionally whereas 'not-hearing simpliciter' is not intentional. A deaf person does not intentionally choose or decide "not-hear". But to forebear doing something, e.g. forbear to hear the high decibel sound is an intentional act with a purpose of safety in mind. Hearing silence is analogous to 'seeing darkness'- "A blind man cannot see the darkness of a cave. His sighted companions can." (Sorensen 2010)[6]

We are exposed to silence in many different ways - philosophically, psychologically, normatively, or in the setting of the everyday and the pop-culture. Poets and wordsmiths constantly try giving captive images of silence trying to go beyond the limitations of language. One such image is that of hearing the 'sound of silence' in a song sung by Simon and Garfunkel. This is a 1964 song in the realm of popular culture of the folk-rock or protest music. It is written by a song-writer and a singer Paul Simon in1964 and was sung by Simon and Garfunkel duo. It was assigned an unstated political context by stating that it was written soon after the 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy and that it was taken to be an anti-war song, a statement on the Vietnam War. The latter myth became popular because the Vietnam War was on when the song was gaining popularity. But as Simon himself clarified that the song was an expression of a "youthful alienation", "a post-adolescent angst" - a cry that "nobody is listening to me, nobody is listening to anybody".[7] Though the phrase "sound of silence" is an oxymoron, a figure of speech, the imagery that the song invokes has multiple layers of

meaning. The central theme of the song, if the notion of "the central theme" makes any sense, is sound, speech, and communication (i.e. conversation). The song does not pretend to give any message. In fact, Paul Simon has no message to give, but he wants to *talk* to you. The song is about the world in which people are talking without speaking, people are hearing without listening, and people are singing songs which their voices never share. Clearly this is a powerful evocation of metropolitan city-world which, despite sophisticated communication technology, is strangely devoid of communication and through it the conversation. The more and more technology pushes people towards each other more and more they withdraw into silence, into their own worlds which are marked by the boundaries of privacy. The citizens of the metropolitan city-world are wrapped in protective silence, the silence of "not-getting involved" in anything other than privacy of one's own individual world. With the erasure of *Speaking* and *Hearing*; discourse or conversation, the vital force of living, is killed. The words in the song "*Hear* my words that I might teach you, ...take my arms that I might reach you" is a plea for conversation and not the protest against its failure. (Williams 2002: 11-2) Silence marks the absence of sound, a failure of conversation, a failure of reaching out to the other. This failure is the failing not of yours or mine, his or hers, but of the community to overcome the collapse of conversation and hence "No one dare disturb the sound of silence". "Silence like a cancer grows" when no one dares it.

Silence enters in our consciousness in many different ways. The experience of silence has qualitative aspect. Silence is often associated with stillness, quietude, tranquility, and calm with which we often characterize silence but these are also supposed to be the qualities of mind. Silence is also a forbearance of or self-control over speech-a *Mauna*. That almost all religious traditions of the world accord sanctity and normative status to silence is evident when silence is 'observed' as a *vow*, (*a retreat*, or a *mauna-vṛata*). Silence can be subjected to *norms* of obligation in special contexts like court room deliberations, examination or seminar halls which are spaces of "hearing' the "other". Silence can also be a norm to be observed as a mark of respect to the dead.[8] Silence can be *used* as a convenient devise, an escape route, a mark of disapproval or a dislike. Silence can be a virtue, a strength of mind, the mark of mature mind in the setting of "being together" or "being with the other". Silence can be a matter of preference, a matter of value. Silence can be an expression of respect to the elders. One may prefer being silent

than speak and doing so in a certain situation could even be considered as appropriate (*uchit*). But silence can have an existential dimension, for example, a sense of utter helplessness, a sense of repentance, shame, and despair as in the case of the *mauna* of Pāndava-s in a situation like the one wherein the *Pāndava*-s, after losing all their fortunes in the game of dice sat quietly and witnessed helplessly the disrobing of Draupadi in the royal court of the *Kaurava*-s. (*Paancho pati baithe maun, kaun gat hoiee*)

We take silence as a state of affair when we describe it as 'pin-drop silence'. Silence is often associated with the two opposite faces of night i.e. darkness and the moonlight, both equally mysterious, in which we encounter the night. 'The dead silence', 'the absolute calm'-the *nirava shāntatā* of the night is an invitation to turn the senses inward. Silence is essentially inward looking. Metaphorically though, we attribute *agency* to silence; we say 'silence speaks for itself', 'silence *speaks* in volume', 'this silence is *killing* me', 'this silence *frightens* me', 'I am *humbled* by this silence', and "this silence is *engulfing*'. There are many other ways in which silence exerts its agency. Attributing agency would be the first step towards the positive and creative encounter with silence, making *it* encounter with *us*.

Sound and silence as phenomena are available to technological manipulation in film making and television. But there is a difference between the way they are manipulated in both these media. Whereas the television as audio-visual medium requires that every visual on the TV screen is to be filled with sound; silence is of critical importance in film making both for the directors and music composers. We are so conditioned to see an image on TV with sound that one gets disturbed if one finds TV suddenly going mute even for a minute. But as opposed to TV, a film making can afford to completely sever sound from the visual. Film making is perhaps the best example of how technology creatively engages with silence. Hitchcock's famous nerve-wrecking scenes in almost all his suspense thrillers derive their chill from thoughtfully and creatively structured silence and sound (i.e. music score sequence).[9] Hitchcock is the master of withholding sound from the viewer to arouse curiosity and creating tension through both ambient noises and silence. By manipulation of the soundtrack he pushes silence forward. Silence in a Hitchcock film represents the realism of traumatic events, as well as their secrecy from the public world. Contrary to convention, he uses silence without music to heighten moments of tension.[10] Silent murder scenes are a hallmark of Hitchcock's manipulation

of auditory participation of viewers' involvement in a movie. In *The Rope* (1948) two persons strangle to death a former classmate, in *Strangers on a Train* (1951) a girl is strangled in an amusement park; in *Psycho* (1960) a woman is murdered while taking shower in bathroom, and in *Torn Curtain* (1966) a man is burned in an oven; in all these we find murders taking place in silence without music score. Silence renders the viewers through the characters in the scene helpless and the mute witnesses of the murder. It is so ironical that a desperate scream loudly signals the murder but those who are nearby the murder scene still fail to 'hear' it. Hitchcock dramatizes, intensifies, and accentuates this irony through silence. Through silence Hitchcock gives a paralyzing shock to the viewers by creating the feeling that the time has stopped. In *The Birds* (1963) there is no murder scene but there is horrifying terror all through. There is no killer in singular, killers are in thousands, and they are birds, they are crows, unprovoked, but suddenly they attack humans and kill them. Unlike the other crime stories, *The Birds* problematizes theories of explanation of crime e.g. murder, since unlike humans, we cannot attribute emotions or intentionality to birds. All that we have is the curious or the mysterious behavior of thousands of birds which unsettles the sense of security of the characters forcing them to be in the state of horror and utter helplessness. The occult is also at play here since no familiar explanations are available. The last scene of the movie, i.e., attack of birds arouses suspense in the blackness of silence until the sudden attack takes place. Silence is the most powerful device in such scenes which epitomize Hitchcock's handling of suspense crime and horror.

Philosophers' engagement with silence is through explicating the relationship between language, thought, and reality. In this engagement the idea of transgression, of crossing the boundary becomes important. In their own ways, Buddha and Wittgenstein stress this idea. The idea of silence also figures very prominently in Heidegger's reflection on discourse in which the notions of 'hearing' and 'silence' are pivotal. Kant reads silence as the "universal quiet of nature" in which one grasps the knowledge of the immortal soul without describing it. It seems that philosophers' reflections stress the organic relation between speech and silence.

In an important sense silence is cognate of the 'ineffable'. As in the case of silence, it is not rewarding to characterize the 'ineffable' negatively just because one falls short of adequate or proper expressions to express what one wants to express in language. One needs to dwell upon the *mode* of the ineffable. Poets often struggle

to find out words and expressions which would adequately, effectively, or even powerfully express what they want to express. The "ineffability" of thoughts or emotions in poetry is based on the non-availability of adequate words and expressions and hence this ineffability is empirical and contingent. It points to the limitation or the partiality of words which can be overcome. Sometimes poets coin new words altogether to express their feelings and moods. But the 'ineffable' as understood by philosophers is not restricted to the empirical limitation of language. Suppose we overcome the empirical limitations of language, suppose the language becomes absolutely perfect in the sense that it leaves nothing unexpressed, or that it covers everything that is expressible in to the words of that language, then should we think that the category of 'ineffable' would disappear? The idea of perfect language, more precisely, the idea of logically perfect language was once toyed by Russell which was made up of only the syntax or the syntactical structures but did not have vocabulary. (Russell 1972: 25) To the extent that language had no vocabulary it was free from the problem of the ineffable. But only when one has the notion of the 'expressible' or 'speakable' does one have the notion of the 'unspeakable' or 'ineffable'. Here we may wonder whether the *anirvacaniya* (the 'ineffable') and silence collapse into one another. Is silence metaphysic of sound and of speech? What is the ontology of silence? How do we engage with silence and the 'ineffable'? These questions, philosophical as they are, should free us from characterizing silence and the 'ineffable' negatively as the mere *absences* though in day-to-day life we do characterize silence and the 'ineffable' in this way. But when one is doing philosophy, what matters are concepts more than the words used in everyday language. Thus, 'silence' and 'ineffable' present themselves as philosophical concepts to ponder over.

In Indian tradition Advaita Vedāntins employ two fertile notions i.e., the *sat-asat-vilakṣana* ('is' and 'is not' mode of being taken together is unusual, extraordinary) and therefore *anirvacaniya* (unspeakable). In Advaita metaphysics *māyā* (the world of veridical experience, the *prapanca*, which is treated as cosmic illusion) is declared to be neither *sat* ('is' or being) nor *asat* ('is not' or non-being). This is explained by rope-serpent (*rajjusarpa*) analogy. The snake (which is seen in place of rope) and the rope (appearing as serpent) are neither real nor unreal. We cannot take the serpent to be real, nor can we take it as unreal. Without being either we take the serpent to be both real and unreal. This in effect means that there is no definition possible of *sat* (being of the serpent);

there is no definition possible of *asat* (non-being of the serpent). There is also no definition possible of *sat* and *asat* taken together (being and non-being of the serpent) because that will involve contradiction. So on every count there is no definition, or a definite knowledge possible of the experience of the *sat* (being of the serpent) and *asat* (non-being of the serpent). This is *vilakṣana*, i.e., a peculiarly distinctive situation, something unusual, something extra ordinary because it limits the speech. Going further, the Advaitin's argue that even the reality of the rope as assumed by the common sense in contrast to the illusionaryness or the unreality of the snake in its place is also an illusion due to *adhyāsa* (superimposition). Just as the snake is superimposed on rope, the rope (the not-self, an object) itself is a superimposition on the self. This is what *māya* does. Therefore, for an Advaitin, *māya* i.e., superimposition, an illusion; whether cosmic or ordinary, is *vilakṣana* (distinct from everything that can be defined or described cogently) and hence *anirvacaniya*, the 'ineffable' i.e., beyond the realm of describable and speakable. Illusion is uncanny and limits the speech; this limit is transcendental and not empirical. When we encounter an illusion we are caught up in an endless cancellation of unreal by the real and vice versa. The phenomenon characterized by this eternal and mutual cancellation of its simultaneous existence and non-existence is *vilakṣana*, i.e. uncanny, mysterious, uncomfortably strange, and wired. Because it is *vilakṣana*, because it is uncanny, it is *anirvacaniya* (the ineffable, un-speakable, the limit of speech). This *anirvacaniyatā* (ineffability) is the horizon of silence.

As the Advaitin's talk about *prapanca* (the phenomenal reality) they also talk about *Brahman* (the transcendental reality). As the illusion (*māya*) is *anirvacaniya* (ineffable) Brahman too is said to be *anirvacaniya*. The question therefore is in what sense both the phenomenal and the transcendental reality is *anirvacaniya*? Advaitin's believe that Brahman is *anirvacaniya* for it is the presupposition of speech. Brahman is prior to speech. And this is why, speech 'falls short' of giving any description of Brahman. Brahman is the foundation of everything that is nameable and speakable but is itself beyond all naming and description. The *anirvacaniyatva* of Brahman is foundational, whereas the *anirvacaniyatva* of māya is linguistic.

Wittgenstein too talks about silence when he says, "*Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.*"[11] (Wittgenstein 1922) However, there is a difference between Advaitin's and Wittgenstein's take on

silence though both of them are talking about it through the category of the ineffable. Whereas the Advaitin is talking about silence through the ineffability of the world of veridical experience which they take to be an illusion due to ignorance or false knowledge, i.e. *adhyāsa* or *avidyā*, Wittgenstein is talking about silence through the ineffability of *propositions*[12] made within a particular structure of language which is used for a certain purpose, i.e. the purpose of *description* of *facts*[13] and nothing else. Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* employs certain pivotal concepts (i.e. 'simple', 'complex', 'name', 'proposition', and 'fact') in terms of which he engages with the logic of language and the structure of the world. By logic of language what is meant are the preconditions of determining the legitimacy of propositions, i.e., whether a given proposition can be *expressed* in the particular *structure* of language that Wittgenstein is outlining. The logic of language sets the *limit* of language internally and hence the limit of language is not its *contingent limitation* but the limit of language is its transcendental possibility of expressing propositions having sense. The limit of language is the limit of expressibility, i.e. *what can be said* (i.e. a legitimate expression, a proposition with sense) and *what cannot be said* (an illegitimate expression, a proposition without sense, or a *non*-sensical proposition). But the notion of 'expressible' (i.e. what can be expressed) is internally related to the notion of what is "thinkable" (i.e. what can be thought). Therefore, the limits of language, one might argue, are also the limits of what *can* and what *cannot* be *thought*.[14] In fact this is one of the standard readings of Wittgenstein. But as has been argued (Golay 2007: 41) Wittgenstein is not attempting to do this, i.e. he is not attempting to draw a line between what can be thought *per se* and what cannot be thought *per se*. Because to draw the line between the *per se* 'thinkable' and *per se* 'unthinkable' one will have to first think the unthinkable and this is impossible. What Wittgenstein is attempting is to "draw the boundary or the *limit* within the domain of what can be thought *alone*." (Golay 2007: 41) Thus, what is expressible and what is inexpressible (through a proposition) are both *within* the domain of thought or thinkable. The Wittgensteinian limit does not demarcate what is expressible and what is not expressible *as such* but between what is legitimate (i.e. logically permissible) and what is illegitimate (i.e. logically not permissible) *within* the domain of thought. Wittgensteinian precept "*Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent*" locates silence not in the thick-black region of unthinkable, the non-thought, or in the twilight zone of the

inexpressible *as such* but locates it in the region of thinkable, in the region of thought itself. Wittgenstein's precept cannot be read as "whereof one cannot *think* per se or whereof one cannot *express* per se thereof one must remain silent. The '*whereof*' and the '*thereof*' in Wittgensteinian injunction is the domain of illegitimate thoughts or the domain of inexpressible *within* the domain of the thinkable or within the domain of language itself. We encounter or "pass over into" silence (*mauna*) if we transgress the limit which is implicit in the structure of language.

Heidegger's engagement with silence is manifest through three of his profoundest insights, i.e. "Authentic silence is possible only in genuine discourse" (Heidegger 1996: 154), "Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence" (Heidegger 1996: 252) and "The call speaks in the uncanny mode of *silence*." (Heidegger 1996: 252) These three profound statements sum up how discourse through silence is ontological or existential for Heidegger. Clearly Heidegger is making silence as integral to discourse from the point of view of Da-sein's authentic life. If the standardized, informative, descriptive language-game constitutes the authentic life of Da-sein then Da-sein has to be existentially or ontologically engaged with it. The 'talk' (i.e. discourse) cannot be a "talk for talk's sake" or a talk at cross-purposes, or the *Gerede* which are all the inauthentic modes of discourse.

Although the profound statements cited above bear on discourse and the Being, (i.e. Da-sein), the former stresses the notion of 'discourse' in the context of Da-sein's 'being with the other', whereas the latter two statements stress the notion of 'the call' (of conscience) in the context of Da-sein's potentiality-of-being-a-self.[15] What Heidegger is saying is that Da-sein's being-with-others could very well be inauthentic if Da-sein is merely a member of the crowd for which discourse is no more than information or curiosity or *Gerede*. For Da-sein this discourse is alienating, i.e. it alienates Da-sein from itself or from what is its own. This inauthenticity can be overcome leading to the authenticity of Discourse via a search for something that belongs to Da-sein. Invocation of this belongingness to Da-sein is what conscience tries to achieve through silence. Thus, an authentic being-with others is possible through the voicing of Being through conscience. But what if the call is the call of Da-sein's Being which is in principle public and sharable but only in the authentic mode? But Da-sein's capacity towards being-a-self or self-hood is one of acknowledging its relationship to Being hence the silence is

also an act of listening to the voice of Being or the existential or ontological dimension.

Da-sein's 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-with-one-another' becomes intelligible only in and through Discourse. In this double constitution, i.e. in the constitution of Da-sein and in the constitution of discourse, '*hearing*' and '*keeping silent'* are the only possibilities in which the "existentiality of existence first becomes completely clear." (Heidegger 1996: 252)To make sense of '*hearing*' and '*keeping silent'* we must know 'what is spoken' as such, or 'what is said as such', through which discourse communicates. But one should also note that the 'what' here is not totally determinate. The call does not refer to anything specific- it is nothing! Its not just one kind of meaning but rather the possibility of many meanings which is opened up by understanding. The elements or the building blocks of this communication are "sharing of being attuned together" and of the "understanding of being-with". The attunement and understanding stress precisely that communication for Heidegger is not from the 'inside' of one subject to the 'inside' of another subject but through the Being-with-others (*mitda-sein*) which is manifest in 'attunement-with' and 'understanding-with'. The connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility is through "hearing". Hearing is constitutive of discourse. Hearing transcends the primary and authentic 'being-open' of Da-sein (the form of "listening to...") to 'being-with' the other. Heidegger stresses that Da-sein hears *because* it understands. Since understanding is receptivity Heidegger emphasizes on listening. The question here is that of primacy of speaking or of listening. Heidegger wishes to de-emphasize the speaking part as primary. The Da-sein is not a Cartesian subject who begins to speak from scratch. Rather as a being-in-the-world or being-there, Da-sein's existence is inextricably linked to that of the mode of Being that surrounds and constitutes. Intrinsic to the notion to 'hearing', i.e. Da-sein's 'being-with-others' is the notion of 'keeping silent'. Silence is the possibility of understanding. Heidegger says that "In talking with one another the person who is silent can "let something be understood," that is, he can develop understanding more authentically..." (Heidegger, 1996, 154) But silence, i.e. keeping silent is not dumbness or inability to speak and understand. These are inauthentic silences possible only in pseudo discourse. A silence is genuine when in a discourse it is the ground of authentic and rich disclosedness of Da-sein, i.e. the disclosedness of Da-sein in the form of 'saying something' in the midst of 'being-with-one-another'.

But in being-with-one-another the Da-sein is lost in the 'they' from which the authentic potentiality-of-being of Da-sein has to be recovered and attested by Da-sein itself. This attestation has to be grounded in Da-sein itself. This attestation comes from the 'voice of conscience'. This voice of conscience has to be thematized existentially and not psychologically, biologically, or even theologically. Thus delineated, conscience is pure "call". It discloses 'something' to understand. This formal characteristic of conscience reveals that conscience as a call is a mode of discourse. In fact, Heidegger explicitly states that "Calling is a mode of *discourse.*" (Heidegger 1996: 249)The call of conscience *summons* Da-sein to its "ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self" and to this summons corresponds a possible *hearing* of conscience. This hearing is actually a recovery of Da-sein's failure to hear itself, a recovery of the loss of Da-sein into the publicness of the 'they'. Listening to the 'they-self' must be interrupted by the hearing to itself. But what does the Da-sein, the one who is summoned, hears when the call is issued? Nothing! Because the call (of conscience) does not *say* anything, nor does it make Da-sein to converse with itself. The call of conscience is un-uttered and yet it is not obscure and indefinite. Conscience "*speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence.*"

WORKS CITED

Bays, Michael Jeffery. *Sound: Hitchcock's Third Dimension* info@borgus.com

Blanchot, Maurice. 1986. *The Writing of the Disaster* (tr) Anne Smock. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Golay, Pravesh Jung. 2007. *The Concept of Limit in Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, PhD Thesis, (Unpublished) University of Pune.

Heidegger, Martin. 1996. *Being and Time* Trans. Joan Stambaug. New York: State University of New York Press.

Kant, Immanual. 1981. *Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens* Trans. Jackie, Stanley, L. 198.1 Edinburgh: Scottish Academy Press.

Mackie, J.L. 1974. *The Cement of the Universe.* Oxford: Clarendon Press

Russell, Bertrand. 1972. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.* London: Routledge

Sorensen, Roy. 2010. 'Hearing Silence: The Perception and Introspection of Absences' in Matthew Nudds and Casey O' Callaghan (ed.) *Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays* Ed., Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Williams, Paul. 2002. 'Sounds of Silence' in Paul Williams (ed.), *The Crawdady! Book, Writings and Images from the Magazine of Rock*. Milwaukee: Hal Leonard

Warnock, Geoffrey. 1953. *Berkeley*. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge

NOTES

1. I am grateful to Professors Nirmalya Chakravarti and Kanchana Mahadevan for helping me formulate some of the ideas pertaining to Advaita Vedānta and Heidegger in a clearer manner.
2. The Sanskrit equivalents of 'silence' are '*nihśabda*', '*mauna*', '*tūshnin*', '*śabdaprayogarāhityam*', '*stabdh*' each one having specific context of its use.
3. The Sanskrit equivalent of 'absence' is '*abhāva*'.
4. The Sanskrit equivalents of 'sound' are '*dhvani*', '*nāda*', '*ninād*', '*rava*', '*ārava*', '*saṇrava*'.
5. The enigma of 'hearing silence' is also due to the universally accepted inseparable relation between 'hearing' and 'sound' implying that only sounds can be heard. Sound is taken as tautological accusative of the verb "to hear". (Warnock 1953: 36)
6. On the other hand Plato's Cave men are not blind; they 'see' the shadows but without realizing that what they see are only shadows. If we substitute darkness for shadows then Plato's cave men are "seeing darkness" without realizing that it is darkness. Confusing shadows for reality and confusing darkness for light would both be the forms of ignorance and Plato will be the 'sighted' companion!
7. (http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php)
8. The gesture of silence towards the dead can become profound by associating silence with darkness. In Poland the death of Pope John II was commemorated on the evening of April 8, 2005 by switching off the lights in homes throughout the nation to reinforce five minutes of silence. (Sorensen 2010: 15)
9. Alfred Hitchcock: *The Rope* (1948) *Strangers on a Train* (1951), *Psycho* (1960), *The Birds* (1963) *Torn Curtain* (1966)
10. (Bays: *Sound)*
11. This translation is by Ogden and Ramsey but D.F. Pears and B.F. M. McGuinness translate the sentence as "What we cannot speak about we must pass over into silence."
12. A proposition is a combination of names. A simple (atomic) proposition is a combination of simple names. A complex proposition is a truth function of simple propositions.
13. An atomic fact is a combination of simple objects.
14. But these limits of thought are not epistemological the way Kant has thought about them.
15. Kant expresses this idea differently. He reads 'call' as "the immortal spirit's hidden faculty" and says "In the universal silence of nature and in the calm of the senses the immortal spirit's hidden faculty of knowledge speaks an ineffable language and gives undeveloped concepts which are indeed felt but do not let themselves be described." (Kant 1981:196)

IMAGINATION AND FREEDOM: BHATTACHARAYYA, HEIDEGGER AND THE KANTIAN INHERITANCE[1]

Rahul Govind

(I)

Introduction

The relationship between thought and history is a difficult one. To use thought as a marker of (historical) change is precarious, fraught with self-contradictory possibilities, suicidal. If thought has to be so thought it would be sequestered – to mark – in a time of discrete parts. Such self –induced necrosis will be unable to distinguish itself from what it purportedly refers to, and in thinking thus, or otherwise, it cannot be captured by a time of discrete parts, just as the latter cannot as such capture change. One cannot know the particular part in its particularity without assuming to know the whole that cannot be *given* in the same way. That which marks out particularity cannot — in a peculiar death-drive — be really distinguished from the character of the whole. Such an inherent defect is politico-historical and epistemological in equal measure. To say that an idea has an (empirical) provenance – for instance, "human liberty was first truly conceived in the Enlightenment" – damages idea and site by congealing them in an abstraction that is bent upon abstracting itself.[2]

This sleight of hand is freely available in philosophical literature today. Among many, Immanuel Kant has a privileged place in the characterizing of modernity as a historical marker. The recent work of Charles Taylor speaks of the Kantian intervention as characteristic of modernity in its contribution to an "exclusive" humanism. As distinct from humanisms that preceded the modern era where being-human spoke of a flourishing within the world as well as beyond it, exclusive humanism is to have marked the making of modernity as found in and founded by Kant. Taylor argues that "In spite of the continuing place of God and immortality in his scheme, he is a crucial figure also in the development of exclusive humanism, just

because he articulates so strongly the *inner* (my emphasis) sources of morality"[3] (Taylor 2007: 312).

There is little attempt to explicate the nature of reason, will, humanity or freedom in its specific Kantian elaboration. There is no clarification of the fact that the moral cannot merely be taken as the source of, or apply to, the phenomenal word, just as *that* we live in the phenomenal world — such as when we are hungry and eat or behave in a particular way — is not an action for which *we* can provide or verify absolute laws. Neither is there anything, in Taylor, on the relations and interrelations between reason, understanding and the will as they criss-cross the critiques. In what earthly sense can we speak of "exclusive humanism" in the context of Kant's discussion of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the "empirical ego" and autonomous will, the sensible and intelligible nature(s) of man?[4] Since for Kant the moral law and will are "noumenal" and therefore the question of "application" – especially in the world of unending appearance – is fraught[5]. If "theoretical" reason reveals to us nothing but phenomena and the will is 'noumenal' the characterization of man or "exclusive humanism" becomes an arduous task.

In this context, in attempting the task of understanding what appear as the human and knowledge, the following essay studies Kant and his inheritance in the work of Martin Heidegger and Krishnachandra Bhattacharayya[6]. The primary guiding thread of the following effort would be to weave pure reason, practical reason and, to a much lesser extent, aesthetic judgement. More specifically, in the thesis to be elaborated below, the contention is that, imagination in the construal of knowledge, including sense perception, allows for a congruency with the problematic of freedom and autonomous will. Imagination in knowing and freedom in acting is grounded in a more fundamental way of approaching the subject-world. In this sense it is hoped that the perennial difficulties of thinking though knowledge and action may be approached yet once more.

In this light we turn to the famous "Davos Dispute" that staged the encounter between the venerable and established Ernst Cassirer and a young and by all accounts charismatic Martin Heidegger in 1928. An important thread in their discussion is the acute recognition of the uneasy congruence between Kant's practical and theoretic reason and the conceptual difficulties this implies; a point scarcely broached by Taylor. Cassirer argues, that practical reason breaks away from the limits posited by the critique of pure reason; " in the

ethical a point is reached which is no longer limited to the finitude of the knowing creature"[7] (Heidegger 1997: 195). In response, Heidegger argues, that such transcendence "shows an inner reference to the finite creature..this transcendence too still remains within the [sphere of] creatureliness and finitude" (Heidegger 1997: 196). That there could be beings that are rational and yet finite i.e. angels implies the 'inner' relationship between rationality and finitude. For Heidegger, transcendence lay in a "certain infinitude" — which can itself only be grounded in the ontological — even while it is always robustly distinguished from divine infinitude that plays the role of a 'orientating horizon' in the Kantian investigation.

Both Cassirer and Heidegger, unlike Taylor, stay clear of an anthropocentric – "exclusively humanist" — position in their interpretation of Kant[8]. Their discussion and dispute lie in the nature of conceptualizing that – "objective form" for Cassirer and "Being" for Heidegger — with reference to which the human being is thinkable. For Heidegger's detailed studies on Kant, this involved a persistent critique of an "epistemological" reading that analyzes the Kantian project as laying the ground work for scientific truth i.e. Kant is not one who lays down the rules by which scientific truth or mere experience are to be measured since this unjustifiably presumed a picture of nature as the site of rule governed objects. Rather, in Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's fundamental endeavour is to probe the very nature of being, time and the subjectivity of the subject. In this approach Heidegger finds an ally in his much lesser known elder contemporary, Bhattacharayya. While Heidegger's interpretations of Kant saw the latter's corpus as whole, he refrains from a unified and univocal interpretation of the corpus; with much less attention to the aesthetic judgement[9]. On the other hand, Bhattacharayya's studies in Kant seamlessly wove the three critiques together in the power of their constructive interpretation.

There are obvious and strong affinities between Bhattacharayya and Heidegger in their concerted departure from an 'epistemological' reading of Kant's works that dwell on the status of knowledge and validity without an investigation into the nature of being or the being for whom such validity in fact is. For both Heidegger and Bhattacharayya, imagination, time and the schematism together are given a central place in the interpretation of pure reason and understanding[10] and the horizon of the divine (intellectual intuition) is underlined and exploitatively explored; concepts such as rationality and universality are themselves

scrutinized differentially; and the importance of action – across the grades of bodily mental and moral – are emphasized. The transcendental and experience remain important reference points. While Heidegger emphasizes moving beyond the proposition/ assertion-judgement as the paradigm for truth and falsity, being and non-being, Bhattacharayya begins his one published study of Kant, wondering about certainties beyond that of knowledge, where an object is other than the consciousness of it i.e. what is conventionally treated as judgement or "theoretical" knowledge. In this sense the practical and the aesthetic are interpreted with a rigour and seriousness that reconfigure our understanding of the paradigmatic form of judgement or what we may more easily recognize as propositional knowledge. Both employ a reading – a constructive interpretation[11] – such that the identification of categories and words exhibit and defend in themselves the indentificatory procedures and interpretative protocols of their coming into being; a process that is as concretely rich as it is abstractly rigorous (Bhattacharayya 2008: 5; Heidegger 1997:141).

In relation to the different interpretations of the practical and theoretical reason as articulated in the Davos Dispute, Bhattacharayya interprets practical reason as a certitude that has no object distinct from itself. Therefore the self that wills – and practical knowledge as a form of knowledge is also a form of certitude – does not refer to an object and itself cannot be one. This characterization of practical reason forms the guiding thread for an understanding of the phenomenal nature of the object as it appears to — and as it is construed by — the human faculties. The *a priori* nature of thinking and the pure concepts would not be comprehensible if the very nature of the object was not (already) suspect; and not merely the object that is encountered (appears) in sense-perception (Bhattacharayya 2008: 664-5). Bhattacharayya argues that the Kantian distinction between the phenomena and the noumena refers not to the distinction between what is sensorially apprehended and its condition, the mentally comprehended, but rather to the fact that the latter itself is also as object (content) – in its construction and reception of objects – phenomenal (Bhattacharayya 2008: 666)[12]. This 'phenomenology' he argues would be "mere metaphor" without the idea of free causality as willing i.e. practical or moral certainty. The latter is congruent with and redemptive of the detailed arguments of the first critique. That is to say, for Bhattacharayya, Kant's works have to be understood as a coherent – even while differentially elaborated – whole.

It is in such an exposition that Bhattacharayya's arguments in relation to imagination, concepts, intuition and practical reason traverse Heidegger's interpretative work. To anticipate a line of argumentation that which will be detailed below on the relationship between practical and theoretical reason: Bhattacharayya defines an object as a content that is distinct from the consciousness of it (self), whereas the transcendental is defined as that which is not distinct from the consciousness of it (self)[13] (Bhattacharayya 2008: 663-4). The role of the concepts, intuition and objects as sketched out in the first critique are characterized by the difficulty of 1) distinguishing objects and knowledge of objects and 2) the distinction between knowing something and knowing it as distinct from such knowing. This 'external' world – of and as object(s) — is itself not so much given in space but rather might be seen as a "determination of space". These space-figures themselves are determined through time, the imagination and apperception (and understanding) in what is called the work of the "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 671). The appearing world is therefore itself in the process of being constructed just as it is simultaneously in its phenomenology that which does not determine the self-as-freedom (practical reason). Heidegger's diagnosis of phenomena is not without analogy to this line of inquiry. For him, appearance [object] is two-fold being, both what shows itself as object of empirical intuition and "appearance" as "an emanation of something that hides itself in that appearance" (Heidegger 1962: 51). Yet, in this instance, he does not appeal to practical reason as a way to resolve the impending difficulties of such conceptualizing[14], choosing to critique Kant in favour of a more radical interpretation of being and *Dasien*.

We now attempt a more detailed study of Heidegger and Bhattacharayya's respective interpretations.

(II)

Intuition and Concept

The fundamental distinguishing between intuition and concept is tethered to an interpretation of *judgement*, with Heidegger wanting to cut it down to size, as it were, and Bhattacharayya identifying it as one among other – and ultimately dependent – certainties. In the analysis of the first critique in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, understanding (concepts) rather than being a sign of human sovereignty is a characteristic mark of its finitude – the "humanness

of reason" — because thinking is essentially "relative to intuition". By its very nature it is neither absolutely distinct nor distinguishable from intuition[15]. Both intuition and concepts are representations but while intuition relates itself immediately to the object and is singular, the concept refers to it [the object] "mediately by means of a feature which several things have in common" (Heidegger 1997: 16). An expression of this unity of the two lies in the fact that the Apophantic and Predicative syntheses are grounded in the Veritative syntheses i.e. the classical form of judgement as the joining of subject and predicate (Apophantic synthesis) is based on the unity and synthesizing of the predicate itself as concept (predicative synthesis) which is itself based on the unity and synthesis of thinking-intuition that is given in advance so that the 'object' may appear as "given" and "known" in the first place (Veritative synthesis). For Heidegger, the superiority of intuition lies in the fact that divine knowledge is characterizable as (originary) intuition because of the singular and whole representation that is responsible for the coming into being of being; it *creates* being, unlike finite intuition that assumes "givenness"[16] (Heidegger 1997: 17-21). Thinking always assumes something at hand, in the context of which it can articulate itself as judgment in the conventional sense (apophantic: joining of subject and predicate). Thus the finitude of thinking is infra-structural and only for such finitude is something like an object – appearance – possible.

The understanding is itself not an object like the object of sense-perception, and so its intelligibility cannot but be grounded in the imagination, that presents what is not present. Analogously the "pure forms" of intuition – space and time – are not (given) objects but are (imaginatively) represented in advance for knowledge to occur. Space is not one space among others but neither does the unity of spaces lie in space as if the latter were a concept and not a pure intuition. Rather space lies in all spaces as singular and is not the "common" feature of a multiplicity as would an (empirical) concept[17] (Heidegger 1997: 32). Time as "inner sense", on the other hand, Heidegger argues, has no reference to spatial objects but still determines space in that it determines what is represented in the representation of spatial objects. As opposed to pure intuitions, the concept in/as judging requires a unifying; the bringing of the many under the one. The oneness of the concept as anticipatively given is, all the same, necessarily expressed in the particular (intuition).

Bhattacharayya, for whom too, the light of the "divine" gives shape to the Kantian endeavour, arrives at similar conclusions on

the "superiority" of intuition. For in his reading too a distinction has to be made between the knowledge of intuition and the knowledge of the concept. Pure forms of intuition are characterized as "form" and concepts as "qualifiers", with the former "grasping" and the latter allowing for "relation" or judging. In characterizing the relationship between the two Bhattacharayya writes, "knowledge of a conceptual qualifier presupposes knowledge of this type of (non conceptual) qualifier, but not vice versa" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 68). And later, "Judgement is knowledge of grasped objects, and so it has to be said that it presupposes grasping. Grasping does not presuppose judgement" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 70). Grasping is 'ordered relation', and 'arrangement' by which the whole is constituted by its parts, whereas judgement (relation) is the "formless unification of two formed objects". "Space is experienced as essentially an act of grasping", and not an object received by the senses (Bhattacharayya 2011: 101). Judgment as subsumption is therein distinguished from grasping, and this distinction has an affinity with Heidegger's distinguishing between the immediate/singular and the subsuming/mediate[18].

The "subservience" of the concept to the intuition in Kant radically transforms the very nature of the concept as judgement in the Heideggerian reading. However this subservience is only to be appreciated if it is located within the two-fold nature of both cognition (intuition and concept) and object (particular/immediate and universal/universalized). The concept as representation in its referral to the object (intuition) in Kant is to be comprehended in distinction from traditional metaphysics that identified the assertion with the judgement *within* the element of the concept (Heidegger 1967: 153-165). In contrast, for Heidegger's Kant, the crucial unity required by the judgement is provided by apperception i.e. the I-relation. It is to be emphasized that the I-relation is a requirement for an object but not itself an object, which Heidegger characterizes in almost Bhattacharayyesque way as "that which is aware of that which encounters" (Heidegger 1967: 158).

The break with "traditional metaphysics" is further elucidated by the Kantian analytic and synthetic judgements whereby the former is merely a clarification of the (subjective) concept while the latter returns via the object (as x i.e. not determined or really determinable in itself). The fact that Kant's analytic judgement in its negative conditional – the principle of non-contradiction – does not take into account temporal determination illustrates the analytic to be merely conceptual. The move to the question of how "synthetic

judgements *a priori* are possible" then will have to move beyond mere logic – or the domain of the concept conceived according to the laws of identity and contradiction – into transcendental logic. That is to say the Kantian concept performs an altered function; it is now necessary that thought participates as thought referred to intuition, i.e. as synthetic judgement" (Heidegger 1967: 176). The necessity of the synthetic *a priori* is thus expressive of the fact that the object is determined-in-advance (synthetic and *a priori*) in order for it to become an object of a judgement. This would also require that the "object" is not known in itself but rather as that which is "altogether different" from the concept i.e. synthesis that allows judgement (concept/assertion). Heidegger cites Kant, "But in synthetic judgements I have to advance beyond the given concept, viewing as in relation with the concept something altogether different from what was thought in it" (Heidegger 1967: 192). That is to say the "mode of objectivity" has to be presupposed for the (individual) object to appear as object and object of knowledge and thought. It is this that requires the move from mere logic to Transcendental Logic.

In other studies Heidegger returns to this problematic by carefully interpreting the Kantian critique of the Ontological Proof, summed up in the line "being is not a real predicate" (Heidegger 1988: 27-49). He expounds the meaning of "real" as it operates here, which, rather than designating an object of sense perception – as contemporary philosophy or everyday language might have it – would have to be understood as characterizing, predicating the thingness of a thing. Reality is to be contrasted with existence (actuality and necessity) in that it (further) determines something, speaking to the essence of a particular thing. This is what makes Kant's argument – that a 100 real thalers adds no more coin than a hundred possible thalers – meaningful. That is to say, the conceptual determination (100) is unaffected by existence. Thus the real is a positing in relation to another positing, a determination of a determination. Existence on the other hand is an "absolute positing" – does not determine in the sense that the real does – that has only reference to the "cognitive faculty". Therefore it [being/existence] might well be a predicate – a determination – but not a real predicate[19]. The relation between the "absolute positing" and the "cognitive faculty" Heidegger names perception, or more accurately, as perceivedness. Existence or actuality is thus equivalent to perceivedness in the sense that it is neither the (act) of perception nor the perceived object but rather *that* in the latter which is

perceived. The objectivity of the object i.e. actuality or existence is the perceivedness indicating the 'unity' of conceptualization, the act of (sense) perception and the 'object'.

In distinguishing and relating intuition and understanding, both Bhattacharayya and Heidegger underline the role of the imagination in Kant, distinguishing it from mere imagination as conventionally understood. Bhattacharayya almost identifies thinking and imagination, arguing "from imagination (thinking) of form [intuition] and qualifier [concept] in the object received by the sensibility, knowledge of form and of qualifiers arise" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 72).[20] In a not dissimilar manner for Heidegger, the synthesis that brings the intuition and the concept together in their structural unity is due to the "power of the imagination"[21]. The manifoldness of intuition and the unity of the concept are therein synthesized. As Heidegger argues, in the first edition of the first critique, the imagination is rendered as the faculty of synthesis. Such a synthesis is included in transcendental apperception which is the pure unity of the "I think" that accompanies all applications of the concept (judging)[22]. Imagination is characterized as productive and pure (transcendental) in that it does not represent what is already given (an object/appearance). And so *that* which it synthesizes must in its turn be pure i.e. pure intuition which is time. Time in advance connects what is given in sense while transcendental apperception ensures the immutability required for the formation of unites (concepts). Heidegger, all the same, contends that Kant did not follow through radically enough this relation between time, imagination and apperception.

(III)

Transcendental Imagination: Concept and Intuition

And yet, one needs to move more slowly to follow the role of imagination in the production and reproduction of objects (appearances), though an examination of the chapter on schematism. Heidegger argues that the crucial function of the imagination and schematism lies in the fact that the latter "makes sensible" concepts. In his interpretation of imagination he elucidates the nature of images: The image is the "look" given in advance – the horizon – in which something can be encountered and then characterized (judged). As an image it refers, simultaneously, to the immediate sensed, the image-sign of what is no longer there (as 'after image') or yet to come (premonition), or the general

feature. The role of schematism — the "making sensible" — functions in the following way: What is sense-perceived as a particular house is in fact the application of the rule of the concept house neither of which – sensed object or rule — can be abstracted from one another. Schema is the regulative rule whereby the concept takes sensory-perceptual expression. Therefore a rule is made manifest in its regulation, in its "picking out" or sketching, of that, which is the particular house. The how, of the image appearance, being regulated by the rule is the schema that is linked to, but not reducible to, the image. Such an operation is not the enumeration of a concept already formed beforehand — that can itself be apprehended as an object — but a concept whose unity can only lie in its "regulation" by the schema. (Heidegger 1997: 63-71). What Heidegger names "regulation", might in another idiom be called "implication" or not complete image but what is "intended to be completed in an image" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 696). Analogous to the argument about "making sensible", here too the image-concept nexus is expressed, and not assertable (judged), in the face of experienced fact; it is the "self becoming flesh" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 697).

While in relation to sensibility what is received is called matter, Bhattacharayya, in his emphasis on the importance of time writes, "the direct matter for understanding is the object grasped by inner sense, which has time as its form". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 79). Qualifiers or categories can only be applied in something temporally formed and not directly on the "manifold intuition" that is received by the sensibility. Now categorical relation is not to be found in the object but rather the latter is found to correspond to the "categorical relation imagined as ultimate form". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 85). The thought of the ultimate limit is described as "imagining, which is and is not with image, or is schematic imagination" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 86). A distinction between space as form [intuition] and the idea of the universal lies in the fact that though "universals have limits, a limit of universals is not experienced as a part of a universal with unknown limits". That is to say, the perception of a (spatial) object is simultaneous with the perception of the latter's connection with (other) spatial objects, while this is not the case with color for instance, that is perceived individually and not in connection with other colors. In this sense space as form is not perceived though it encodes a *belief* in its existence as an unlimited and yet total series. While its limits are not perceived it cannot be perceived as limitless. In this sense space appears as a relation, and not a property; like a

color or that which can be "understood" by concepts/qualifiers. Time, for Bhattacharayya too, has the same features of order and relation, and cannot be known apart from space.

Judgement, on the other hand, is "sentential knowledge", in the form, *this* object has *this* qualifier. A qualifier is constituted as a relation of predication, the latter, is identified as "objecthood, qualifierhood or knownness". In sentential knowledge, qualifying means that "the individual appears as part of the relation and not as its substratum". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 107). While spatial and temporal forms too are designated as "implicit judgements" they are all the same distinguished from explicit judgments as a kind "of knowledge of an object which is not distinct from knowledge" (Bhattacharayya 2011:110); resonating with Heidegger's distinguishing of space as in all spaces in the singular and therein unlike a concept that is the designation of a common feature among many. The latter, concept-judgement, cannot take place without distinguishing knowledge from the object of knowledge. Within the structure of (such) judgement a distinction is thereby made between knownness and knowledge of an object, the latter present in the former.

Such an explicative orientation has parallels with Heidegger's effort to turn the question of knowledge away from judgement as assertion towards thinking ontology and transcendental questions. This is not unlike the certitudes other than judging – that are in a sense more fundamental — that Bhattacharayya speaks of. The priority of time for the latter is recognized in its (near) identification with the "mental object" although space is all the same required as symbol. Heidegger draws an inner thread between time and concepts by treating time as a "pure image", a schema-image enjoying a privileged relation to concepts. In this endeavour, he gives Kant's example of substance, explaining that the latter can only be understood in terms of time. Schematism is thus about concept formation, concept formation that is linked to a making sensible that is not determined by – or directly determining of — empirical representations (appearances). In fact it is only through time that concepts can be related to objects, because concepts are themselves "non homogenous to objects" being unlike objects in their being non-intuitable. Neither causality not substance is (empirically) intuited as an object; they require time to mediate between them and objects (appearances). Similarly for Bhattacharayya the fact that

causality can neither be perceived nor inferred but is an implication of what is experienced has to be taken as (self) evident indexing of the function that is transcendental subjectivity.

In such a context apperception remains crucial – as relation – in relation to the imagination and the categories. While form and grasping are presupposed by qualifying (concept/judgment), imagination-schema as "active forms" — "knowledge by implication" — are implicit in perceptual knowledge where the form is taken as complete or completed (Bhattacharayya 2011: 76-7). Congruently universality itself requires differentiation; empirical universality is the common property instantiated in the individuals, while Kantian categories as "fundamental universals" do not find instantiation i.e. cannot be apprehended as objects of sense-perception. Relation is one such universal, for there is no such thing as a particular relation. This fundamental significance of "relation" as primary universal underlies the crucial category of recognition[23]. In such a context it is transcendental apperception and imagination that secure the 'knowabilty' of/as experience which lies in experiencing and not in "that which" is experienced. This means that what is known or experienced is a something that cannot 'itself' be (simultaneously) known. Rather it is known only as the correlate of the transcendental apperception and the imaginative faculty which forms the *nomos* by which the horizon is delimited, a judgement formed. For Bhattacharayya recognition is identifiable with transcendental apperception as the awareness of the "manifestation of the unmanifest" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 89). The imaginary component of knowledge is both active *and* a manifestation, the latter in its possibility has to lie in transcendental apperception and objecthood or knownness or what Kant calls the transcendental object.

(IV)

Transcendental Apperception and Moral Ascertainment

While Bhattacharayya moves on to link transcendental apperception with practical reason, Heidegger does so in more tentative fashion[24]. For the former since transcendental apperception "cannot be called an act of knowing an object, it has to be called knowing present in itself, as essentially willing" (Bhattacharayya 2011: 90). Only the act that (makes) manifest(s) i.e. recognition, enables specification (qualifiers: understanding/categories and form: time but also space). "Reason is primarily practical or imperative, and theoretic reason may be taken to presuppose it not as constitutive of objective

knownness, but as constitutive of the *fact of knowing*" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 709). It is this exigency that explains Kant's "formalism" of the moral. No object i.e. meant content as indefinite can confirm, deny or verify moral willing. The latter can no more than be described as a "spiritual attitude" since it cannot be applied in terms of consequences with both terms – application and consequence – implied as indefinite. Since they cannot be known what is to be known is whether an exception is being made in the act of willing i.e. the spiritual attitude itself. The conscious repudiation of inclination is the universalization of (good) willing that harmonizes with others in the Kingdom of Ends. This is to simultaneously correspond with the "purposive system of nature" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 711).

Without moving directly into a characterization of practical reason in an interpretation of Kant's first critique, Heidegger nevertheless explicates in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, a synthesis of a "higher" level between intuition and understanding. Ultimately the transcendental power of the imagination synthesizes the pure thinking I and the inner sense (time). This is so because it is peculiarly characterized as a faculty of intuition that doesn't represent an immediate object (at hand). It forms an image – though not "creative" in the divine sense — and partakes of both spontaneity (as active) as well as sensibility. Pure intuition (time) and (transcendental) imagination are joined by the fact that what is intuited in intuition does not have the unity of a concept but is "caught sight of in advance" and is not the mechanical application of a rule.

Bhattacharayya would say that "imaginative anticipation" is a requirement for the concept to apply to the percept (Bhattacharayya 2008: 697-98). Space and time are not "categories" in the logical (abstractly conceptual) sense a la the Marburg School and judgement is not the mere propositional joining of subject and object. Rather, Kant's linking of the understanding (concepts) to transcendental apperception, and the elucidation of a transcendental logic, show judgement to require the 'self' that gives the horizon/ground in advance. Thought — rather than being reduced to judging — is associated with the free forming and projecting faculty of the imagination. Finally the unity of the understanding is also derived from ideas and reason, which by its very nature is "architectonic" and therein given in advance.

In such an interpretative effort Heidegger takes a slight detour to practical reason and the idea of the person. The idea of the

person is the moral law and the respect [for it] with which it is in-dis-associable is characterized as a *feeling*, though a "pure" feeling unlike that of sensorialy induced pleasures and pains (Heidegger 1997: 109-112). Analogies for even conventional pleasures contain a double dimension: pleasures for and in something but also pleasure in oneself (enjoyment) that finds pleasure in something (else). In a similar way the feeling of respect for the law is a feeling in which I show myself as a free and rational being; therein respect is for persons and not things. Not the basis for the judgement of actions already accomplished but rather that which is presumed in advance so that one can act freely and rationally. In respecting the law – that I give myself as the moral law – I show myself to be who I really am. Yet this detour does not sufficiently 'join' the critiques. And Heidegger's accusation that Kant does not fundamentally follow through the promise of a "subjective deduction" could well be countered by Bhattacharayya's explorations of the interrelations between practical reason and the reflective judgement.

A few years after *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* Heidegger takes up the relation between the first two critiques more fully in his lecture course, *The Essence of Human Freedom.* Beginning with the problem of freedom as formulated in the Antinomies, Heidegger identifies it as related to as well as distinguished from nature and causality (in nature) by its features: it is spontaneous and transcendental. Characteristic of this way of framing the problematic is the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the intelligible/transcendental and the empirical, freedom (spontaneity as causality) and nature (natural causality) (Heidegger 2005: 148-156). Freedom is posed from within the "cosmological" and speaks of the possible unification of nature and freedom. While the Antinomies point to the false contradiction necessarily entailed in the ascription of characteristics to appearances that are taken for things-in-themselves, for Heidegger, Kant's second Critique strikes out a distinctly different path. This way of tethering the two critiques is authorized by a philosophical momentum of its own that is all the same not the abandonment of textual fidelity. The citation from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* serves as motto: "speculative philosophy clears the way for practical philosophy".

Pointing to the "actuality" of freedom in the second critique, Heidegger argues that for Kant freedom is not an empirical concept and therefore cannot be found in experience. Even though a "fact", it is not to be encountered or found in nature as a datum but rather is that which gives itself its own law. The will therefore is not directed

towards an object but realizes itself in its knowledge in praxis. This is not to say that is it opposed to reason. Rather insofar as it is an action that acts according to a concept, it is autonomous and not heteronomous; as it would be if determined by sensible nature. The will's identity and conformity with pure reason – as representation and willing – lies in its regulative, not constitutive, nature. Neither referring to — nor reflecting — an object of knowledge (experience), it is a special form of knowing itself. Universality, in such knowing, thus conceived, is not caught in the false opposition of (empty) rule and circumstance but is rather that which forms itself and itself forms. This grounds the idea of law as the 'original' law giving itself. And hence the otherwise incomprehensible combination of the hypothetical if-then and categorical in the "ought" (Heidegger 2005: 181-202). The *Critique of Judgement* provides for Heidegger a crucial clue to this elucidation of practical freedom by naming the latter as "fact", but is otherwise not central to the unfolding of the general problematic, as is in the case of Bhattacharayya[25].

For in Bhattacharayya's meditative reflections on Kant there is a dense rigorously calibrated clarity to the distinctions and folding across the critiques : "It may be stated in advance that the moral judgement takes the subject as a *symbo*l (typic) of the predicate (ought, 'final purpose', good), the theoretic judgement understands the predicate (concept) as *approximation* to (or schematically figured by) the subject, and the reflective judgement regards the subject as the *expression* (self-specification) of the predicate (reason, 'purposiveness')" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 695). In theoretical judgement the known phenomena is an "always unsatisfying necessary and not self evident...a mixture of concept and percept", not "self- subsistent like the phenomena of the reflective judgment or the judgment of value". Phenomena is thus for reflective judgement a "living nature" a "spatialized mind that specificates itself". No knowledge, as it were, exists in the aesthetic judgement because here phenomena is "no longer apperceived", already made up, as it is, of an "external percept inter-penetrated with the concept". As an "accomplished presentation of expression", this is distinguishable from a theoretical judgment where the object is (imaginatively) anticipated by principles even while its specificity cannot be (Bhattacharraya 2008: 699). However we can never theoretically explain the fact that what is given by and in nature corresponds to our *a priori* principles. That even what we could never anticipate 'fits' in with our 'cognitive' apparatus while

unknowable, is felt and it is this "felt content" that we can "reflectively interpret as the purposiveness of nature". "Felt content" links the reflective judgement to the judgement of the ought, which is an expression of a "felt immanence of the concept of the good in the perceivable object" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 700). However as in (theoretical) cognition practical reason is determinative and amounts to knowledge, though of a different kind. In Bhattacharayya's subtle parsing, in practical reason:

"The predicate as in theoretic judgement is fully formulated and transcends the subject, determining only the apprehension or the internal perception of it. Its immanence in external nature is indeed felt: nature is the felt as the body of the holy law, though a mystic and not manifest body, not as informed by the law of freedom but as its distant symbolism (typic). In the theoretical judgement the transcendence of the concept is expressed by its indefinite approximation to the percept in the *schema*"[26] (Bhattacharayya 2008: 701).

(V)

Implications

In the light of the above the great attraction of large historical theses such as those of Taylor's become evident. Kant himself has become a feature characteristic of an object — historical development and ultimate uniqueness of the West – in a form of knowledge that he would be the first one to suspect. For (theoretical) judgement is always but approximate while ideas are to be "regulatively employed". Current trends that speak of the history of ideas can no longer distinguish ideas and things, and thought as predicating a historical epoch can no longer meaningfully be differentiated in its structure from the judgment that has a color characterizing an object; with time reduced to the latter as a given whole formed of discrete parts. What Bergson might laugh off as trying to capture motion through an arbitrary conjoining of immobile parts. But while things are objects of perception/experience arguments that identify ideas with things may well be called a la pataphysicians the "imaginary solution [that which characterizes a historical epoch: content characterizing time (change)] to a non-existent problem [which geographical location – West,[27] East, Country A or Country B – has a history that is unique and *produces* modernity [a meaning-value: what has territoriality]?]".

On the other hand, for Kant himself an idea is to be to be pictured as a "*focus imaginarius*"; it does not itself characterize since it doesn't directly apply to intuitions. Rather it is to unify (order) the understanding just as the latter unifies in the object the manifold intuition. Kant writes, "Thus the idea of reason is an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this difference, that the application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself (as is the case in the application of categories to their sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now since every principle which prescribe *a priori* to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds, although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason must also have objective reality in respect of that object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it, but only in order to indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself" (Kant 1965: 547). Reason as an analogon of a schema may be compared to the distinction between symbol and schema made in the Third Critique. Unlike schemas which contain "direct exhibitions of the concept", "symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuitions as well), in which judgement performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the firmer object is only the symbol. [Here] the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but contains merely the symbol for our reflection" (Kant 1987: 227).

Humanity as idea or ideal cannot, in the light of the above, be taken as an indivisible (semantic) part that the totalizing endeavour of history can engender; a prized trophy on the celebratory showcase of the West. For it is ultimately aporeatic as to whether the distinguishing of parts in the whole is a feature of the whole or the parts in their indefinite individuality: this is why such an endeavour hurts itself. The fundamental flaw of a history of ideas would be to treat the latter as ultimately irreducible parts of the totalitarian will of History to which is ascribed value and direction. Both Bhattacharayya and Heidegger read and renew Kant with the imagination and will and faith to the text at hand. We now conclude this essay by reflecting on the nature of sensibility and reason, in the context of the importance of the imagination and will.

Heidegger's investigations into *Dasien* are undertaken through readings of Kant that reflect on a finitude that is seen to mark rationality by the fact that, for Kant, there are kinds of (purely) rational finite creatures such as angels. Rationality is marked by a 'primitive' sensibility, the latter symbolized by sense-perception. The finitude of rationality is detached from the issue of whether it is or isn't mediated by the bodily sense organs. In humans pure reason is sensible in itself and not "because" it is embodied or has a body [28]. I can experience my body as my body only because of the "sensibility" of reason (Heidegger 1997: 121)[29]. In his interpretation of the Greek elaboration of truth Heidegger speaks to its attempt at fusing two distinct notions: seeing and knowing-one's-way-about[30]. What appears as sensory is thus an essential constituent of what will 'result' as knowledge, since the image-schema of (sensory) certainty codes knowing or might we say ascertainment[31]. What we take to be (mere) sensing is already pervaded by understanding just as that we 'see' a book assumes we know what a book is. Knowing is revealed as the resonance of the continuous folding of concepts and intuitions. We might add that since reason stands in for the totality (unconditioned) not given in intuition (which is 'understood'), analogous to sensibility in its most basic sense, it is that by which objects (appearances) are given to us. By recognizing practical reason as reason-will in the self enables the constitution of – and freedom from – that which appears.

Speculatively one might conjoin this insight of the body with Bhattacharayya's elaborated "felt content" or "felt body"[32]. Freedom is not to be inferred or perceived and is in fact arguably the prototype of causality — as category of understanding/in nature — in its realizing itself and differentiating itself from sensory inclination. Enjoying freedom from that which 'it' has— in turn — construed. Here, the phenomenon of the world is ultimately supported – not merely voided – by the self in practical knowing and reflective judgement. Knowledge cannot know an object in itself but the fact that it takes place with reference to and in inextricable involvement with the world — as transcendental object — is its characteristic feature. It presupposes the self leaving us with a wonder that is expressible in aesthetic and teleological judgement. Apperception, good will and aesthetic judgement in turn resist the reduction of the human – like any meant content – to mere object or appearance. This apparent loss of knowledge is in fact the gain that is dignity: that the person is an end and not a means[33]. This does not mean that human beings cannot themselves be – and not be merely treated

as — "merely empirical" as and when they are sensorially determined. One of the most succinct and disturbing results in Kant's politics is the formulation and defence of the category "rights to a person akin to the rights to a things"[34]. (Kant 1991: 61). Akin, analogy, here too must be cross-referenced with reason and symbol. Yet in this way Kant endows actual experience with a valence that later philosophy and human science could scarce live up to.

The general problem of experience and science has been linked to the differential reception of Kant's three critiques by Georg Lukacs's *Young Hegel*. Lukacs locates the controversies within German Idealism and their far reaching implications here; with Fichte's I-positing and Schelling's "objective dialectics" but a philosophical elaboration of practical and aesthetic reason respectively[35] (Lukacs 1976: 241-259). Gillian Rose's more recent, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, continues to speculate on the inheritance of Kant in "neo-Kantianism" that, according to her, forms the conceptual infrastructure of contemporary sociology[36]. She argues that the neo-Kantian paradigm severs the logical (validity) from cognition, perception and consciousness[37] (Rose 2009: 7). Whereas for Kant the transcendental had an "empirical employment" and experience was in a sense not distinguished from the objects of experience[38] — with the phenomenal noumenal distinction doing crucial work – for the neo-Kantians the transcendental now referred to a set of objects that did not take form in — or even have meaningful reference to — actual experience (Rose 2009: 6-23).[39]

If experience and the objects of experience cannot be really distinguished, that which is experienced as experience needs to be taken seriously.[40] Rose interestingly remarks that while for Kant the transcendental was to be understood with reference to actual experience and the figurations of space and time, the Neo-Kantian interning of validity and value as transcendental (in a non Kantian sense) cut it off from the world of sense-experience. Ironically, from such a perspective, the human sciences have exchanged the problem of 'actual experience' for an oscillation between the verities (of validity and value) and facts (data); both of which turn out to be ultimately inexplicable. While Rose goes on to speculatively salvage Hegel, her work does not ask whether the specifically Kantian, as opposed to the Neo-Kantian, formulation of the problem might at all be fruitful for a future human science. In a sense Lukacs already answered this question, giving it primacy of place in a genealogy of Marx through Hegel. The importance of practical reason and aesthetic judgement for Fichte and Schelling and their critique in

the hands of Hegel who converted a primary social and historical problematic into a philosophic-epistemological one is the story of *Young Hegel*; of how labour and recognition epistemologically and historico-politically account for and re-imagine the world and change in a way impossible with the will (practical) and art (aesthetic). However in the light of Heidegger and Bhattacharayya another attempt – howsoever provisional – at a rehabilitation of the original Kantian formulation may well be made.

This would mean that the human would not become simultaneously an empty placeholder (axiom) and a dead object (datum). Rather than the seeker of phantom treasures – when and where did liberty, man, freedom etc. first come about — history might find meaning as a speculative art finding gravity in experience. The facts of brutal murder or systemic hunger would have to be taken as "facts" in the sense of the Aesthetic Judgment, the 'imaginary points' of pure reason, the "feeling" that is primitive fact for practical reason; points requiring interpretative elaboration rather than either deriving meaning from an abstract system absolutely outside the ambit of intuition (e.g.: the economy, the political) or becoming an object of consumption (the newspapers appetizing breakfast). Remaining complacent with the irresolvable contradiction between axiom (human are free and good) and that which is experienced (humans are unfree and commit acts that are inexplicable from the foregoing axioms) reproduces the contradiction of knowing an object that leaves (such) knowing itself unknown. By virtue of its very nature, no amount or kind of experience – in the Kantian sense – can disturb such complacence, awaken such slumber. In the interest of recognizing and acting through experience it would be necessary to move from *knowing* contradiction[41] to *feeling* it. This would allow for an action that as free can begin (a change) rather than change in the terms of which change is already known, eviscerating the distinction between action and process. This is congruent with the need for the imagination which is the presentation of that which is not present.

For this, a 'fact' is to be taken in a primitive sense; the "moral feeling" that is as central for will as is imagination for knowing. The senses that pervade might guide so that the interpretative effort is not merely consumed in its object — knowing disappearing without trace in the known – but transcends itself. To return to sensibility as guide; the flavour suffuses the whole in a way that poverty or violence does not suffuse the knowledge of which they are subject and object. Would it be possible to sketch, for instance, a history of hunger that

would be a history that is touched and touches the hungry rather that write a history of hunger that locks out its very subject? Rather than being consumed in itself it would be a provocation, an effort for its eradication in fact. Experience – as much as the act of writing — would have to be taken not as mere datum but as itself a form of knowledge to be acted upon in the imaginative-theoretical and free-willing sense. Imagination and time in their construal of the object that is fundamentally given would thereby be true – do justice — to the kernel of affective experience that affirms the object while resisting the tranquilizing effect of cumulative processes of objectification. Knowing thus powered is free to change – self-world – in a way that would not be possible if the known is always but a case of the already known and therein infallible in its infinitely dense inertness (Objective laws/Nature). Reason is practical in the recognition that what appears as known awaits a realization in which it is voided as particular.

Justice would therein propel the theoretical judgement as its telos and not remain confined to mechanically applying a ready-made rule. To take the imagination and freedom seriously is to call the bluff that the application of a rule is without content[42]. Claims towards the formal application of rules mask this entrenchment of particular content. This is indistinguishable from existing contingency and what could be growing inequities[43]. That it is the same criminal act – whether done by poor or rich, deprived or endowed – and so requires the same judgement evades the fact that no amount of scrutiny of the act can ascertain beyond doubt the nature of the action i.e. its cause whether in the nature of 'humanity' or the world in which the act occurred. That the individual act is expressive of the whole is what flavouring in taste might teach us; for knowing the criminal act cannot simply be a case of folding the act back into the criminal as though discrete ingredient. The formulae – all are equal — that shield and are impervious to growing content or discontent is something Marx will have picked up from Kant. Even if the latter poses the problem differently: How is the self concerned with such – as well as its own – unknowable 'content' is paradoxically the univocal site of the moral and conceptual.

Here, one may recognize the wisdom that Kant has in common with traditions that have their faith in the 'self', but all the while resist definitions and axioms, remaining content with guiding principles and the facts of finitude. Kant would be more on the side of the Mahabharata, which says, "Do not inflict upon others

what is intolerable to yourself"[44], and less on the side of those perhaps most well received lines of the Bible, "As you wish that men would do to you, do so to them" when yanked out of their context. We can be certain of pain (and ignorance) in a way that is perhaps not possible with pleasure (and knowledge). And so there is great risk of self deception — violence and injustice — in deceiving ourselves that we are treating others like ourselves; a risk that is not present in the negative – but by no means paralyzing – dictum of the Mahabharata. Our abstract identification with others in terms of laws – all are equal and free – is necessarily indifferent to differentiations in content. Humility and faith, on the other hand, that yoke the moral and the epistemological – via freedom and imagination — may also well have been the lesson of Socrates who was the wisest man, because, perhaps, "I am wiser than this man, it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know" (Plato 1997: 21)[45]. And the rest, is unceasing imagination as much as courageous will, for, rather than paralysis, in the caesura, the twilight of certain death that is the *Phaedo*, Socrates tells us that he has begun the art of story-telling and verse, gets into the game of most stringent arguments with friends and the greatest friend death in wait, only to end with a fable, the imagination of what awaits, with the will powerfully reposed in itself as practiced virtue.

WORKS CITED

Arendt, Hannah. 1989. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1978. *Life of the Mind*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

————————. 2006. *Between Past and Future*. New York: Penguin Books.

Bergson, Henri. 2011. *Creative Evolution*. Trans. Arthur Mitchell. Digireads.com Publishing.

Bhattacharayya, Krishnachandra. 2008. *Studies in Philosophy* (ed.) Gopinath Bhattacharayya. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.

———. 2011. *Implications of Kant's Philosophy*. Trans. By J.N. Mohanty and T. Chatterjea. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Billimoria, Purushottama. 2008. *Sabdapramana*. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld.

Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1997. "Rationality in Indian Philosophy" in

Deutsch and Bontekoe (ed.) *Companion to World Philosophies*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chandoke, Neera. 2014. "Manifesto for the Moderate Indian" in *Economic and Political Weekly*. Vol. - XLIX No. 21 Mumbai: Sameeksha Trust.

Govind, Rahul. 2008. *Antinomies of Political-Economy*. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, New York.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, Martin. 1988. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Pres

———. 1997. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

———. 1967. *What is a Thing?*. Trans. W.B. Barton, Jr./Vera Deutsch. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.

———. 2005. *The Essence of Human Freedom*. Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Continuum London.

———. 2002. *The Essence of Truth*. Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Bloomsbury

———. 1962. *Being and Time*. Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson New York: Harper San Fransisco.

Kant, Immanual. 1965. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. N.K. Smith. St. Martin's: Bedford.

———. 2006. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. and Ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1987. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.

———. 1982. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*. Trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.

———. 1960. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Trans. T.M. Greene and H. H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row.

———. 1991. *Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. and (ed.) Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lukacs, Georg. 1976. *Young Hegel*. Trans. R. Livingstone. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

———. 1971. *History and Class Consciousness*. Trans. R. Livingstone. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Mohanty, Jitendranath.1992 *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought* Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Plato, 2007. *Plato: Complete Works* (ed.) John M. Copper. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.

Rose, Gillan. 2009. *Hegel Contra Sociology*. London: Verso.
Rossi, Paolo. 2006. *Logic and the Art of Memory*. New York: Continuum.
Taber, John. A. 2005. *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology*. New York: Routledge Curzon.
Taylor, Charles. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
———. 1989. *Sources of The Self*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1985. *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NOTES

1. I thank Sanghamitra Misra for this as well as that.
2. So Charles Taylor can claim, "The great *invention* of the West was that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and explained in its own terms, leaving open the question whether this whole order had a deeper significance, and whether, if , if did, we should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it. This notion of the "immanent" involved denying – or at least isolating and problematizing – any form of interpenetration between the things of Nature, on the one hand, and "the supernatural" on the other, be this understood in terms of one transcendent God, or of Gods or spirits, or of magic forces *or whatever*". (my emphasis). So defining religion in terms of the distinction immanent/transcendent is a move tailor made for "our civilization". (Taylor 2007: 15-16) Truly Taylor made, the clear lack of intelligibility of the above "characteristic" is germane to the hubris of a text that simultaneously claims to know the totality [the globe] by (even) knowing the individual – exemplary and orienting? – (western) part. Taylor doesn't shy away from writing a few lines on Taoism and Buddhism – traditions and life-worlds as complex as these – to shore up his argument without bothering to reference even the rich secondary literature, let along the primary. Of course even this sideways glace is more than mainstream philosophers of the Western world whether Habermas or Rawls do when speaking of the modern. It is such a cavalier attitude to complex traditions, in general, that allows in turn for as respected a political philosopher in India, Neera Chandoke, who has nowhere demonstrated any expertise in Indic traditions notwithstanding her important contributions otherwise, to claim, with little argument, that "The Shanti Parva anticipates not only Locke but Hobbes" (Chandoke 2014: 11). That the latter has not been known for such kinds of pronouncements might indicate that the current political harvest has begun.
3. Earlier Taylor had argued that in Kant, "We have the power as rational agency to make the laws by which we live...the place of fullness is where we manage finally to give this power full reign and so to live by it". In Taylor's earlier work on the sources of the self, he had argued that, "[Kant] He insists on seeing the moral law as one which emanates from our will. Our awe before it reflects the status of rational agency, its author, and whose being it expresses". That is, "The law of morality, in other words, is not imposed from outside. It is dictated by the very nature of reason itself. To be a rational agent is to act for reasons. By their very nature, reasons are of a general application". And later, in a way that will anticipate

the arguments of *The Secular Age*, "Kant explicitly insists that morality can't be found in nature or anything outside the human rational will" (Taylor 1989). We will below deal with the problem of the unconditioned/totality (reason) and understanding (intuition/givenness). Taylor is of course not alone in singling out Kant for a characterizing of modernity; Jurgen Habermas's crucial argument on the emergence of the public sphere also gives Kant an important role and this argument has enjoyed enormous importance in the study of both Europe as well as colonial and post-colonial societies. One could also name thinkers as different as Foucault (in Kant's "critical attitude" to the contemporary) and Kosselleck (on time). Our essay through Kant, Bhattacharayya and Heidegger hopes to re-think much of the above especially in claims about modernity, its theologico-religious deductions and its relation to human rationality.

4. Man is 'itself' conceptualized though different predispositions; animal (living) and human (living and rational), and personality (rational and accountable) as clearly elucidated in (Kant 1960). Freedom as practical has to be located on the 'noumenal' register. "On the other hand, the moral law, even though it gives no such prospect, nevertheless provides a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world and from the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact that points to a pure world of the understanding indeed, even determines it positively and lets us cognize something of it, namely a law. This law is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible nature (in what concerns rational beings), with the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a *supersenisible* nature though without infringing on the mechanism of the former. Now nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational being in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws and is thus, for reason, heteronomy". This difficulty is elucidated in many ways: "In the moral principle we have presented a law of causality which puts the determining ground of the latter above all conditions of the sensible world; and as for the will and hence the subject of this will (the human being), we have not merely thought it, as it is determinable in as much as it belongs to an intelligible world, as belonging to a world of pure understanding though in this relation unknown to us (as can happen according to the *Critique of Speculative Reason*) we have also determined it with respect to its causality by means of a law that cannot be counted as any natural law of the sensible world; and in this we have extended our cognition beyond the boundaries of the latter, a claim that the *Critique of Pure Reason* declared void in speculation. How then is the practical use of pure reason here to be united with its theoretical use with respect to determining the boundaries of its competence" (Kant 2006: 38, 44).
5. "Now, in order, in the case at hand, to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action, one must recall what was said in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or follows from it: that the natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting subject as appearance, and that, accordingly the determining grounds of every action of the subject in so far lies in what belongs to past time and is no longer within his control (in which must be contended his past deeds and the character as a phenomena thereby determinable for him in his own eyes). But the very same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable for him through

law that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his action – in general every determination of his existence changing conformable with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being – is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon". And later, "But a difficulty still awaits freedom insofar as it is to be united with the mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the sensible world, a difficulty which, even after all, the foregoing has been agreed to, still threatens freedom with complete destruction...That is to say: if it is granted us that the intelligible subject can still be free with respect to a given action, although as subject also belonging to the sensible world, he is mechanically conditioned with respect to the same action, it nevertheless seems that, as soon as one admits that God as universal original being is the cause also of the existence of substance (a proposition that can never be given up without also giving up the concept of God as the being of all beings and with it his all-sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends), one must admit that a human beings' actions have their determining ground in something altogether beyond his control namely in the causality of a supreme being which is distinct from him and upon which his own existence and the entire determination of his causality absolutely depend. In fact, if a human being's actions insofar as they belong to his determinations in time were merely determinations of him as appearance but a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved". (Kant 2006: 84-5).

6. We will be largely referring to (Heidegger 1967); (Heidegger1988); (Heidegger 1997); (Heidegger 2005); confining ourselves largely to the writings of the 1920s and early 30s; and (Bhattacharayya 2008) and (Bhattacharayya 2011).

7. In passing one may note that well before this dispute Lukacs had already written, that "Kant's ethical analysis leads us back the unsolved methodological problem of the thing-in-itself". Lukacs argued that Kant had in fact an insight into true praxis that is not followed through, which is directly linked to the elaboration of the critique of pure reason. "But the very moment when this situation, i.e. when the indissoluble links that bind the contemplative attitude of the subject to the purely formal character of the object of knowledge become conscious, it is inevitable that the attempt to find a solution to the problem of irrationality (the question of content, of the given, etc.) should be abandoned or that it should be sought in praxis". And later he credits Kant with this very insight into praxis through his critique of the ontological proof, "..he is compelled to propose the dialectics of concepts in movement as the only alternative to his own theory of the structure of concepts..it has escaped Kant and the critics of his ontological argument that here..Kant has hit upon the structure of true praxis as a way of overcoming the antinomies of the concept of existence". See (Lukacs 1971: 126-7). However a careful attention to the Kantian elaboration of imagination and schematism in conjunction with the autonomous will – as analyzed below — may credit the Kantian enterprise with greater intention that Lukacs would have it.
8. An "exclusive humanism" would be a necessary ground for any anthropocentric position. On the other hand, Bergson has spoken eloquently on the place of humanity in Kant. "True when he [Kant] speaks of human intellect, he means neither yours nor mine: the unity of nature comes indeed from the human understanding that unifies, but the unifying function that operates here is impersonal. It imparts itself to our individual consciousness, but it transcends

them. It is much less than a substantial God; it is however, a little more than the isolated work of a man or even than the collective work of humanity. It does not exactly lie within man; rather, man, lies within it, as in an atmosphere of intellectuality which his consciousness breathes. It is, if we will, a formal God, something that in Kant is not yet divine, but which tends to become so". (Bergson 2011: 178).

9. May well be factually in error since I have been only able to consult – non-exhaustively —English translations of Heidegger's work.
10. On reason and understanding Kant writes, understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Accordingly, "reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give the manifold knowledge of the latter an *a priori* unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason" (Kant 1965: 303). And later, "For pure reason leaves everything to the understanding – the understanding [alone] applying immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavors to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned..reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such a manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole". (Kant 1965: 318). Such a description would also have to include Kant's discussion of the "natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason" which is "inseparable from human reason". (Kant 1965: 300) and the Antinomies. In this context, we can understand the central place of the "moral" that is directly broached in the above section.
11. Bhattacharyya describing his own interpretation of Vedanta, writes, "exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophical construction and this need not involve any intellectual dishonesty". And later, "The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too". (Bhattacharayya 2008: 4-5). Heidegger writes, "Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able to through this place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech". (Heidegger 1997: 141)
12. It is this fundamental point that recent studies, including those of Taylor's, that distinguish between (Kantian) "motivations" and (utilitarian) "consequences"/ "outcomes", seem to ignore. Such arguments on motivations — whether as qualified through "moral instinct" or as "purely formal" (Taylor 1985: 322) — scarce does justice to either the arguments regarding the concept-intuition nexus, the inevitability of 'illusion' and/or the broader Kantian problematic of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the analogies, the paralogisms or the antinomies. On this issue one could compare Bhattacharayya's insight with (Heidegger 1962: 50). Lukacs would call this "irrational" or the "content" [matter] that allows for

the infinite scope of freedom and knowing. See his critique of Engels in this regard. In this relation we might recall that Kant defines matter as "that in appearance which corresponds to sensations" (Kant 1965: 64). But more importantly in defense on Lukacs's line of argument we can cite from the Paralogisms, "For matter, the communion of which with the soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. There may well be something outside us to which this appearance, which we call matter, corresponds; in its character of appearance it is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us, although this thought, through the above mentioned outer sense, represents it as existing outside us. Matter, therefore does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct and heterogeneous from the object of the inner sense (the soul), but only the distinctive nature of those appearances of objects – in themselves unknown to us – the representations of which we call outer as compared with those which we count as belonging to inner sense, although like all outer thoughts these outer representations belong only to the thinking subject" (Kant 1965: 355).

13. The manner of the formulation – and perhaps more – might well be reminiscent of Hegel's opening gambit in the chapter on Self-Consciousness "In the previous modes of certainty what is true of consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it". (Hegel 1977: 104).
14. We might say, in a manner we hope will be justified as the essay progresses, that such an endeavor – the 'nexus' tying concept, action and language — is congruent with many lines of inquiry within the Indic philosophical corpus. Different philosophical traditions might view "resulting action" as a criteria for truth. The early Mimamsa debate on interpretation was directly linked to action and purpose, and the equally sophisticated and intricate debate between Kumarila Bhatta and the Buddhists lay precisely on the means of knowledge with regard to Dharma, involving the issue of whether perception was conceptualized. For detailed and intricate discussion on these related issues see (Billimoria 2008) and (Taber 2005; 1-44). The introduction, by Tara Chatterjee, in (Bhattacharayya 2011), attempts to sketch out the Indic philosophical background to Bhattacharayya's essay; an effort we are by no means competent to evaluate.
15. The following sections could be seen as interpretations of Kant's well known statement regarding concepts without intuitions being empty and intuitions without concepts being blind.
16. See (Heidegger 1988: 77-99), on the shift from the problematic of creation (Aquinas) to "nominalism".
17. See also (Bhattacharayya 2011: 97), Bhattacharaya calls this the double nature of space as "relation present in object and also [a] self-located relation" or "reflexive relations of space".
18. However, Bhattacharayya does argue that grasping can be known only through relation and judging and so ordered relation will have had a "shadow of a relation" like Heidegger's argument that the concept finds expression in the particular.
19. In Lukacs's reading this predicate that is not a real predicate would indicate the rational and be the register that allows praxis.
20. "Understanding receives completed form of time or mental form as matter and then appears as schema or rule present in it". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 93). The "superiority" of form is maintained in the light of the imagination too for Bhattacharayya argues that, "In knowledge of object imagining (thinking) of

qualifiers presupposes imagining (thinking) of form, the imagination (thinking) of form does not presuppose that of qualifiers, but presupposes thought of qualifierhood or objecthood". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 72). Heidegger also links what he calls "pure thinking" to the imagination and the "self"; "This original "thinking" is pure imagining. The imaginative character of pure thinking becomes even clearer if we attempt, based on the essential determination of the understanding, which has now been achieved, to come nearer to pure self-consciousness, to its essence in order to grasp it as reason" (Heidegger 1997: 106). Hannah Arendt also given analytic importance to the distinction between Thinking and Knowing in Kant that she reads as the distinction between Truth and Meaning. See (Arendt 1978: 53-65).

21. The role of the imagination in Kant would not be completely surprising if for instance one studied Kant in the context of the arts of memory and the "imaginative logic of Bruno". On the latter Paolo Rosssi writes that, "In Bruno's art it [*subiectum*] is given a 'convenient meaning which is technical or artificial'. It is not the 'subject' of a formal predicate which , in logic, is the counterpart of the predicate, neither is it the 'subject' of substantial, accidental or artificial forms as in Aristotelian physics. Bruno's *subiectum* is the subject of imaginative operator, which can be attached or detached, which shifts and changes according to the wishes of the cognitive or imaginative operator". (Rossi 2006: 87). This line and direction is scarce attended to in the standard scholarship.
22. "Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has unity in apperception" (Kant 1965: 365). It must also be noted that Heidegger makes it clear that he is against the prevalent interpretation of Kant that saw him moving from a "psychological" first edition to the "logical" second edition; rather both have questions of the transcendental and being as their pole star. (Heidegger 1997: 119-20)
23. One might refer to Heidegger's rendering of the transcendental and transcendence; "Transcendental reflection is not directed upon objects themselves nor upon thought as the mere representation of the subject-predicate relationship but upon the passing over and the relation to the object *as this relation*" (Heidegger 1967: 176)
24. See (Heidegger 2005: 172-74), where there is a linking of apperception with the ought.. "Pure apperception is an action which is non-receptive i.e. it involves a different relation between cause and effect. It is a determination from itself rather from something else...In these actions of the 'I think' which we ourselves enact (in this kind of effecting), we provide rules for the 'acting forces'. This provision of rules is a kind of determining. What we stipulate for our action has in each case an 'ought' character". (Heidegger 2005: 173). See (Heidegger 2002: 124-5) where different kinds of knowing are emphasized. "If one wants to translate the Greek ... by the German 'Wissen" [knowledge], then one must also take this German word in its corresponding primordial meaning and hold fast to this. As a matter of fact our language recognizes a meaning of 'know' which corresponds to the original meaning .. we say that someone knows how to behave, knows how to succeed, "knows how to make himself liked". The affinity with Bhattacharayya is evident. This problematic may be illuminated by the statement in the film, *Dewaar* where, in reference to a near impossible task, the hero is asked whether he thinks he would be able to do it, and the hero replies by saying that he doesn't think he can do it he *knows* that he *can* do it.

25. Arendt has in the context of the Aesthetic Judgment drawn to our attention the two operations present in judgment: imagination and reflection. Giving a central place to imagination, she argues, that the "operation of imagination prepares the object for the 'operation of reflection'. And this second operation – the operation of reflection is this actual activity of judging something. This two-fold operation establishes the most important condition for all judgments, the condition of impartiality, of "disinterested delight". We cannot go into the larger argument that drives this text i.e. Kant's 'politics' that is studied through a reflection on spectatorship, action, the "common sense" and the imagination. (Arendt 1989: 68)
26. This is not the first time that "feeling" has been used to exhibit an inner experience that has critical 'epistemological' status and as primordial cuts though theoretical judgement via the imagination. For instance, elsewhere Bhattacharayya has written that the form of space can only be imagined i.e. it can be imagined as detachable from objects which is "to be aware of its being their pervasive location and to organically feel oneself pervading them". Pure perceiving or form thus cannot be disassociated from feeling oneself pervading. While space is thereby picturable time can only be "felt duration or self-feeling". It is important to remember that "feeling" is used in Kant too in reference to respect and therefore has to in this instance be differentiated from the sensorially induced (pathology).
27. See endnote 2, with Taylor arguing for the Western "invention" of "immanence". This kind of argument is the apogee of a series of transferences. Initially confined to technology, technology was to stand for superior culture; such an argument then migrated taking as its subject less tangible 'objects' such as "markets" and institutions [Douglas North etc]; and now it has vitiated the realm of ideas. This alchemy that converts ideas to culture itself has a market in places that are happy to either 1) vehemently differentiate themselves from what they perceived as Western culture to a kind of nativism that can nether in reality deny the presence of the 'West' whether as norm (which sets the terms for differentiations) or history (colonization and the transformation of institutions) (2) Claim superiority by having reached there first: whatever is claimed elsewhere is already present. What is subsequently lost is a rigorous elaboration or understanding of the nature of the claim and its content itself.
28. Arendt in her reading of Kant distinguishes the "objective senses" [seeing, hearing and touching] from the sensed sensations [taste and smell]. She argues that Kant's identifies aesthetic judgment with taste to indicate the "internalization" that judgment stands for which is therein not an object [of sense perception such as is the case with seeing, hearing and touching]. She links this form of representation with the imagination where too there is a representation of an "absent" object. See (Arendt 1989)
29. We might remind ourselves that for Kant sensibility is that through which objects are given to us The inter-linking and 'overlap' between sensibility and knowledge is elaborated in Heidegger's reading of Plato, where he argues, "It is for this reason that the sense of seeing provides the guideline for the meaning of knowledge i.e. knowledge does not correspond to smelling and hearing but seeing". [Although earlier Heidegger had etymologically linked hearing and seeing, by linking "brightness", reverberation and echo]. And later, "just as sensory seeing is not the yoke, the light, the light source itself, just as little in the field of non-sensory seeing is the faculty of knowledge, thus the understanding of being, or on the other side the manifestness of being, the highest and genuine source of the possibility of

knowledge". (Heidegger 2002: 83, 45). The sun to the visible is the like the good to ideas that not only enables the latter but are also responsible for their existence (growth, nourishment and the like).

30. The importance of "seeing" and light and the unity of the two as a form of truth-certainty has been described in a different context, elsewhere by Bhattacharayya. "A light sphere in circumnambient darkness: it is the indeterminate infinite Brahman. At the circumference, however, it reaches its limit (not resistance) and retires into itself, the limiting darkness falling outside of it; the sphere, as viewed from circumference onwards is the determinate Infinite or the closed in Absolute, Isvara. The limit, however, determines its quality, not as darkness but as darkness lighted up, which again defines the darkness". (Bhattacharayya 2008: 49). The consistent cross referencing with the Western philosophical tradition in a discussion of Vedantic metaphysics cannot be followed here.
31. Hannah Arendt elsewhere argues for the diagnostic importance of the loss of sense-certainty (and "nature") with the intervention of modern science. See "Concept of History" in (Arendt 2006)
32. Two other essays by Bhattacharayya that would rigorously illuminate this problematic would be, "The Concept of Rasa" and "The Concept of Value" in (Bhattacharayya 2008)
33. This fundamental distinction is as much between kinds of reasoning as it is about the subject/object i.e. Mechanical and Teleological.
34. I have elaborated the possible implications of this and the silence with which it has been received by recent scholarship, such as that of Habermas's public-sphere argument, in my doctoral work at Columbia University (2008).
35. This line of argument is found even in (Lukacs 1971)
36. In (Rose 2009) Lukacs himself is ultimately domiciled within the neo-Kantian framework.
37. According to Rose, for neo-Kantians, logic and validity have to refer to propositions and not concepts (as with Kant). Such an analysis of Kant and the neo-Kantian position could well be used to critique attempts to differtiate Indian and Western understandings of philosophy. For instance the claim that in Indic traditions where "cognition that is expressed is not sense, but an event (property, act, or substantial modification, depending upon which system one happens to be talking about) belonging to someone's self. Consequently, Indian logic is a logic of cognitions – in spite of its preoccupation with sentences and sentential contexts"; See (Mohanty 1992: 19-20). On the other hand, for a less rigid characterization of the Indic and Western corpus that reads rationality across them i.e. allowing for the rigorous reading together of as diverse figures as Kumarila Bhatta and Gadamer, Dummet and the Nyaya philosophers see (Chakrabarti 1997). Our attempt at a reading of Kant perhaps allows for a rehabilitation of such import philosophically as well as 'historically' (or the consequences of characterizing traditions of thought).
38. "We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have prospective validity in a synthetic *a priori* judgement" (Kant 1965: 194)
39. The moral (named value) and logic (named validity) are analyzed separately by distinct traditions that ultimately find their way into Durkheim (validity/social) and Weber (value/culture)
40. "Accordingly, since experience, as empirical synthesis, is, in so far as such

experience is possible, the only species of knowledge which is capable of imparting reality to any non empirical synthesis, this latter [type of synthesis], as knowledge *a priori*, can possess truth, that is agreement with the object, only in so far as it contains nothing save what is necessary to synthetic unity of experience in general" (Kant 1965: 194). And elsewhere, "If by merely intelligible objects we mean those things which are thought through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective employment of all our concepts of understanding is merely the mode of our sensible intuition, but which objects are given to us; if we abstract from these objects, the concepts have no relation to any object...We cannot, therefore positively extend the sphere of objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and assume besides appearances objects of pure thought, that is, noumena, since such objects have no assignable meaning", (Kant 1965: 292-3).

41. Knowing contradiction would be knowing that contradiction appears only by the ascription of meaning to an object-content treating the latter as though it were a thing in itself. The Antinomies in the first critique thus play a different role in the third critique.
42. As Kant says, "Between theory and practice, no matter how complete the theory may be, a middle term that provides a connection and transition is necessary. For to the concept of the understanding that contains the rule must be added an act of judgment by means of which the practitioner decides whether or not something is an instance of the rule"(Kant 1982 : 61).
43. Kant recognized that this may well be a historical accumulation and so may be said to have given a clue to Hegel and Marx. He argues, "For we are here concerned with the cannon of reason (in practical matters), where the worth of practice rests entirely on its appropriateness to its underlying theory. All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the application of law are made conditions for the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self-sufficient theory". (Kant 1982: 62). .
44. The next line one could argue is even more 'Kantian'; "This in short is dharma and it is other than what one naturally desires". (Cited in Chakrabarti 1997)
45. In this regard, Arendt's has been one of the most persistent and subtle efforts to salvage the original ground of the moral and the logical through a reading of Plato.

CONTRIBUTORS

ANKUR BARUA is Lecturer in Hindu Studies at the University of Cambridge. He researches the classical and the modern traditions of Vedantic thought. His book *Debating 'Conversion' in Hinduism and Christianity* is being published by Routledge, London in 2015.

PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA is presently Visiting Professor-cum-Lecturer at University of California, Berkeley, where he teaches in the Religious Studies, Philosophy and African American Studies departments. He is known for his work on Testimony (*Śabdapramṇa)* in Indian Philosophy, Indian Ethics and Justice, Mīmās and Nyāya metaphysics and epistemology, and is presently working on volumes on Indian Ethics II, Routledge History of Indian Philosophy, Spivak and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Personal Law Debates in India, and Self & Its Horizon in Indian Philosophy.

ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, where he is the director of the EPOCH (Eastern Philosophy of Consciousness and the Humanities) Project. His current research interests include: Moral Psychology, Normative and Epistemic dimensions of Emotions and Feelings, Reality of the Future, The Name of God and the Speech Act of Prayer and Possession.

SOUMYABRATA CHOUDHURY currently teaches at the School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously taught at CSSSC, Kolkata, and has been a fellow at CSDS, Delhi and IIAS, Shimla. His book *Theatre, Number, Event: Three Studies on the Relationship of Sovereignty, Power and Truth* was published by Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla in 2013.

SHARAD DESHPANDE is currently Tagore Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. He was formerly Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pune. Analytic philosophy, Aesthetics, Fictionalizing philosophy and philosophizing fiction are some of his areas of interest. ˜

RAHUL GOVIND teaches at the History Department in the University of Delhi, Delhi. He has published on issues of political-economy and metaphysics with the *Economic and Political Weekly*, *Telos*, *Indian Economic and Social History Review* and *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research.*

STUDIES IN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOL. XX, NUMBER 1, 2013

Editor
RAHUL GOVIND

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY
RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA

SHS

STUDIES IN
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Annual Subscriptions:
INSTITUTIONS: Rs. 300 (Inland); US $ 30 (foreign)
INDIVIDUALS: Rs. 200 (Inland); US $ 25 (foreign)
STUDENTS: Rs. 160(Inland); US $ 20(foreign)

Cheques/drafts should be drawn in favour of
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla-171005
Enquiries concerning manuscripts, advertisements
and subscription may be addressed to:

Sales and Public Relations Officer
Indian Institute of Advanced Study
Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla-171005
email: proiias@gmail.com

ISSN: 0972-1401