

USING the categories of objective intuition, subjective intuition, and organic intuition as a basis, Professor Bahm explores various types of intuition and their inter-relationships to one another and to various theories thereof.

The present study demonstrates how intuition is presupposed in all knowing, and thus all science, and how one becomes more deeply involved in it, rather than escaping it, by inferential reasoning. It introduces the theory of knowledge of Organicism, a new integrative type of philosophy interpreting all genuine general issues as polarities, thus laying a foundation for treating problems in every field of knowledge. The Organicist solution is presented to such problems as the nature of error and proof, test of truth, intuition of objects at a distance, subjectivity vs. objectivity, appearances vs. realities, dialectic, and aesthetic experience.

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*Types of Intuition*

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# Types of Intuition

*by Archie J. Bahm*



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


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## I. INTRODUCTION

SINCE MUCH MISINFORMATION, uncertainty and disagreement exists concerning intuition, one hesitates to discuss the subject lest he further disturb already-troubled waters. Yet the problem of the nature and function of intuition is so basic to all philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, religious and practical interpretation and action that understanding it is "a must."

Intuition is at once simple, extremely simple, and complex, infinitely complex. As simple, intuition is immediacy or directness of apprehension. When one intuits, he is aware of nothing between his awareness and that of which he is aware. He grasps directly what he apprehends, without requiring inference regarding what is beyond or belief in casual mediation of what appears. The fact that intuition is immediacy does not exclude the existence of mediating factors, but immediacy ends where mediation begins. Except for rare trance-like moments where one's awareness is wholly intuitive, experience includes both intuitive and inferential aspects. However, these are not divided by any obvious dichotomy but fade into each other imperceptibly. The boundary between immediacy and mediacy is not sharp, so unless one is skilled in critical observation, he may be unable to detect a difference. Naive, natural, or common sense realism,<sup>1</sup> which is the normal outlook of all of us most of the time, presupposes no difference between intuition and inference.

Western philosophies, by and large, ignore or deny a need for intuition, especially in its more mystical functions. Yet, according to one contemporary Hindu philosopher, "intuition is the foundation of intellect." This "does not mean that [intuition] is like a cornerstone on which the intellect, like the superstructure, is laid. Intellect is permeated by intuition. Both belong to conscious life. And our conscious life is a unity. Therefore we cannot treat intellect and intuition as two layers in the literal sense."<sup>2</sup> That intuition in the sense of immediacy is necessary to reason may be seen by a rational argument—for those who need it. If anything which is

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1. For a discussion of naive, natural, or common sense realism, see Ch. II of the writer's *Philosophy, An Introduction*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., N.Y., 1953.

2. P. T. Raju, *Thought and Reality*, p. 216. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1937.

mediated through a causal or an inferential series makes contact with experience somewhere, this contact is direct, and when it appears in awareness, is intuited. Whatever is indirectly apprehended must be apprehended through something directly or it is not apprehended at all. On the other hand, "No knowledge is ever merely immediate."<sup>3</sup> "The same experience is both immediate and mediated."<sup>4</sup>

If intuition is simple, consisting merely in immediacy of apprehension, how can intuition be also complex? And if all intuition is alike in being merely immediacy, how can there be "types" of intuition? Since, in apprehending each of the many different kinds of things, one must intuit each of them, he is involved in as many kinds of intuition as there are kinds of things apprehended. Thus, classifications of intuitions may be complex and various, even infinitely complex. However, it is the purpose of this study to select certain especially significant types which should throw light upon some of the positive, rather than merely neutral, values of intuition. For, in addition to the services which intuition performs as a universal and necessary, but indifferent, opening through which all that enters experience must come, there are some uses to which it may be put deliberately, with resulting values, and dangers, of various sorts. For convenience, the types selected will be grouped under three main headings: "Objective Intuition," "Subjective Intuition," and "Organic Intuition." These types, originating in the distinction between objects and subjects, will be interrelated with other types arising from distinctions between appearance and reality and between aesthetic and incomplete experience. Theories emphasizing each of these types of intuition, and difficulties encountered by them, will be explored and compared.

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3. John Dewey, *Intelligence in the Modern World*, p. 927. Joseph Ratner, Ed., Random House, N.Y., 1939.

4. Otis Lee, *Existence and Inquiry*, p. 98. University of Chicago Press, 1949.



## II. OBJECTIVE INTUITION

### *A*

The most commonly discussed type of intuition is that of objects. In fact, for some epistemologists, this is the only possible type of intuition. Involved here is a distinction between subjects and objects or, for present purposes, between an intuiter and what he intuits. In this section on "Objective Intuition," discussion will be limited to intuition of objects.

Although it is not a purpose of this study to make an exhaustive survey of all the types of objects which may be intuited, some illustrations may indicate the range of types. The object intuited may be a sense datum, a pattern, form, shape or essence, a relation, conjunction or connection, a sameness, difference or analogy, distinctness, indistinctness, fullness or void. What one intuits may be simple or complex, abstract or concrete, clear or vague, explicit or implicit, perceived or conceived, given or imagined. However, two ways of distinguishing objects, i.e., apparent versus real and complete versus incomplete, will constitute the foci of emphases in this section.

### *B*

Beginning with the distinction between apparent objects and real objects, we find ourselves confronted with at least two sets of problems: how to intuit apparent objects and how to intuit real objects. The two problems are, in part, quite different. Intuition of appearances poses no great problem, since most thinkers, oriental and occidental, accept the fact that appearances may be intuited. The significant issue, and the one which will receive most attention here, is whether real objects can be intuited. A third problem, involved in the first two, will be referred to again later, namely, is it possible to intuit at the same time an apparent object, a real object, and either identity or difference, or both, between them?

Since ordinary perception is naturally realistic, most of our interests and attention are devoted to apparently real objects. These, to be apprehended, must be intuited. For the naive realist, undis-

turbed by doubt, no problem arises. Intuition occurs without his being aware of it and, like a clear window, is noticeable only when attention is called to it specifically. The distinction between appearance and reality arises as a consequence of intuition of error, i.e., of an appearance which appears also to be other than it appears. Once the distinction arises, and is maintained by a subconscious fear of being hurt again by the consequences of erroneous judgment, then a tendency to question the reality of apparent objects persists, especially if reinforced by further apparent errors. Because of its practical consequences for survival and satisfaction, distinction between apparent and real objects is of special significance.

How the distinction arises may be seen by re-examining a familiar example of perceptual error: the straight stick which appears bent when partially submerged in water. One intuits the apparent bentness and intuits the apparent straightness and intuits the apparent contraction between the first two intuitions. Although one may then try to run away from the problem, surely normal human curiosity gives rise to something like the following. If it appears that one or the other or both of two intuitions involve error, then it is natural to infer (and to intuit the inference) that there is something which does not appear (called "real" by epistemologists). Then follows speculation as to the nature of this real. Such speculation can, at first, appeal only to other intuited appearances for explanation and can be only naively realistic about the speculative objects proposed as explanatory. When further critical insight reveals the possibility of further error, even of universal error, one may jump to the agnostic conclusion that certainty about the real is impossible. But phenomenalism (the view that knowledge is limited, at least primarily, to appearance), although resting upon fundamental and irrefutable foundations, is to a certain extent a philosophy of defeat. Excesses and inadequacies of various realistic epistemologies need not deter us from appreciating the positive evidences present in pragmatic realism. But all epistemological realisms presuppose inference and confront us with the problem of how much of what is inferred to be real can be intuited.

If intuition is direct and if inference about the real involves going beyond what is direct, how is it possible to intuit that which is beyond? Such inference involves 1) an intuition of that from which the inference starts, 2) an intuition of implicative or other relations presumed to hold between such start and that which is inferred to exist as real, and 3) an intuition of how what appears as real so appears. Thus, one never gets beyond intuition, but only involves himself in more, and more complex, intuitions. Can we ever know the real as it is apart from such intuition? No. The ego-

centric predicament<sup>5</sup> is ever-present. If, further, one inferentially constructs a complicated scientific system of explanation, he still does not escape intuition but merely entails himself in many more intuitions; for each premise, whether sense datum or axiom, each deductive step, each experience of conclusive satisfaction, must be intuited. By inferring, one does not escape intuition but rather involves himself in a series of intuitions. So, if there is any shortcoming in intuition, the shortcomings are multiplied rather than diminished by proceeding inferentially.

Does this mean that all knowledge of the real is impossible? If the real must be inferred and if all inference involves further intuition, does the real always elude our grasp, retreating from us each time we reach toward it? No. There is at least one way in which partial intuition of the real seems possible. This way presupposes recognition both of a distinction between and interdependence between wholes and parts. Not only are there obviously apparent wholes with their apparent parts, and apparently real wholes with their apparently real parts, but also there are apparent wholes with apparently real parts and apparent parts of apparently real wholes. Now when one intuits an apparent whole, but intuits it as having some of its essential parts missing, these parts may be inferred, intuitively, to be real. But such an inference is more of the nature of a gestalt than of a syllogism (chain of intuitions) or more a single apprehension—a grasping of an apparent whole, its apparent parts, and its missing parts all at once—than a deduction requiring distinguishable successive steps.

Here we must note that intuition has, if not a double meaning, at least an extension of its basic meaning. Intuition involves apprehending something both directly and all-at-once. Now this all-at-once-ness involves a directness or immediacy of togetherness or wholeness of *all* that is apprehended. So, when one grasps directly and all-at-once *both* a whole and its parts, including apparent parts and missing parts, these missing parts *are* thereby *intuited* as missing. To illustrate, observe perception of an object such as a ball. The ball is perceived, normally and naturally, as having size, shape, thickness (and perhaps solidity, resilience, endurance, color, etc.), and a single surface, only part of which is visible. Now apprehension of the shape of the ball as a sphere involves apprehension of both its visible surface and the fact that there is more to the surface than is visible. If one did not apprehend this "more surface than is visible," he could not apprehend the spherical shape as the shape of the concrete ball. So apprehension of the ball as a ball, i.e., as a

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5. See Bahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

whole with its many aspects (size, shape, thickness, surface—visible and invisible) as parts, entails apprehension of “more surface than is visible.” This “more surface than is visible” is thus also intuited.

Since “real” refers to “something which is regardless of whether it does or does not appear,” care should be taken to avoid confusing intuition of the real in the sense that it does appear with intuition of the real in the sense that it does not appear. When anything appears as, or as if, real, it both *appears* as real (as this *appearance* is intuited) and it appears *as real* (as this *as real* is intuited). But no genuine contradiction exists because that which is not apparent appears as *not* apparent. Now it is true that this circumstance involves a dialectical relationship which tends to be overlooked unless specifically attended to and which, thus, is overlooked most of the time. But this dialectical relationship must be made clear here in order to show how, and in what sense, intuition of the real is possible (and, indeed, natural, normal, and necessary). All perception of real objects presupposes a whole-part relationship in which “that which does not appear” appears as a part of the whole. (Analysis of the nature of perception as involving a thing or substance uniting its qualities or attributes which themselves are universals or classes uniting many members through identity of quality or attribute, is beyond the scope of this study. The parts played by memory, after-images, and attention-span in supporting intuitive gestalts will be neglected.) But enough has been said to indicate the way in which intuitive knowledge of the real is possible.

Of course, we are left with certain problems. Consider two. How can we intuit things at a distance? How can we be sure our intuitions of real things are true?

How can we intuit things at a distance? Or, more pointedly, how distant (in various senses) can a thing be and still be intuited? The principle for short distances and long distances is the same. To apprehend the space in an open box, where the angle of vision is such that only a portion of the interior is visible, for example, involves a perceptive inference presupposing the conception of a whole of empty space inside the box. Wherever a conceptual whole, or any other kind of whole, such as a felt whole, is present, intuition may apprehend the things united by it as together all-at-once. One may, for example, perceive the distant mountains as protuberances of the terrestrial globe, but only if he already has some unifying conception of the globular earth. Intuition is immediacy and how distant anything can be and yet be immediate depends upon how much unity between the apprehending and the distant thing actually exists and appears in the intuition. Hence intuition of a complex system with indirectly-related parts is possible, not in its entire

complexity, but generally, so long as the system exhibits some uniting principle which may be grasped as a whole.

How can we be sure that our intuitions of real things are true? After all, the invisible part of an apparent empty box may be occupied, the earth may not be a globe, and the theoretical construction of a complex system may be mistaken. The problem of error which gave rise to the distinction between appearance and reality still plagues us. Continuing doubt, with no clear hope of certainty, leads naturally to scepticism, even to agnosticism. Appeal to intuition is of dubious help, since we intuit error as well as truth and, some think, we may intuitively repeat the same errors again and again. Hence intuition, merely by itself, is not completely trustworthy. Yet, on the other hand, there is nothing apart from intuition to trust, for whatever we appeal to must be intuited. We have to intuit our distrust; so the problem of error can be solved, not by discarding intuition, but only by keeping it and recognizing that we are keeping it. Any doubt which is cast upon one intuition must be the work of other intuitions which either bring their own mark of trustworthiness with them or are themselves suspect. If we must suspect our suspicion, we have not solved but merely further complicated our problem.

What, then, is the test of the trustworthiness of any intuition? Is it not its seeming-to-be-so or its very appearing-to-be-the-way-it-appears? Any intuition is, and should be, taken at its face value unless challenged by some inherent contradiction or the evidence presented by other related intuitions. Those which appear unchallenged give rise to no doubt and present no problem of error and uncertainty. Only when doubt has been raised is a test called for, and the test, whatever it be, will, if it works, remove the challenge and result in some unchallenged, or no longer challenged, appearance. What appears as real must be taken as it appears unless some contradictory appearance appears, and the contradictory appearance must then be taken as it appears unless some still further contradictory evidence appears. The test of the trustworthiness of any intuition is to be found in its seeming so or seeming self-evident or in the self-evidence of other intuitions which themselves remain unchallenged or carry greater conviction (whether due to intensity of desire, repetition, memory, habit, *consensus gentium*, coherence, conformity to some preferred conceptual scheme, authority, or what not).<sup>6</sup>

Does this imply, then, that the otherwise untestable claims of the imaginative, the credulous, the mystical, or the insane should

6. See C. S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. V.

be accepted as true as well as those of the cautious scientist? In principle, the test used by each is the same. So, unless one has other grounds for doubting that the clairvoyant who claims to see through walls and years and complexities, the evidence intuited by him still appears as it appears. Other grounds there may be, but these other grounds are other intuitions that what appears is as it appears. The writer sees the pragmatic test, if this be broadly enough conceived, as the ultimate test. Now, of course, that pragmatism which presupposes some theory of biological evolution, and all of the inferred evidence supporting it, is a highly complex conceptual scheme with its own multifarious possibilities of error. Such a pragmatism is not in itself the ultimate pragmatism but rests upon certain feelings of satisfaction found in believing that what appears to be so is so. Ultimate pragmatism consists in an intuitive feeling that what appears to be so is so whenever (i.e., after) a desire or a doubt has been aroused. The final test of truth, the ultimate power for removing doubt, is to be found in the "aesthetic," the topic of the next section.

### C

By "aesthetic" here is meant apprehension of something as if complete in itself as apprehended.<sup>7</sup> For example, when distinguishing between experiencing value as intrinsic or instrumental, instrumental value appears as leading on to something else, as having a goal beyond, as unfinished in the sense that it has a further contribution to make. Value is experienced as intrinsic; on the other hand, when its value is experienced as all there or when any interest in it is wholly satisfied in it or by it. In some ways, aesthetic intuition is the most perfect, most complete, most ultimate kind of intuition, for in it nothing more is needed.

Careful examination of the contexts and intentions of many writers making startling claims for intuition will reveal an appeal to imagination which is aesthetically, not realistically, intended. To the extent that what is apprehended is aesthetic, there can be no error. The intuiter is infallible. All his claims are true. But they are made, not in defiance of, but with indifference to, the distinction between appearance and reality. The truth intended is not a realistic truth and those who, like literalists everywhere, mistake aesthetic imagination for realistic science must themselves be blamed for promoting exaggeration and error.

7. See A. J. Bahm, "Aesthetic Experience and Moral Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Sept. 25, 1958.

Is the distinction between appearance and reality the same as that between the aesthetic and the incomplete? No. Despite considerable overlapping, the differences are significant.

First of all, that which appears may appear as complete or it may appear as incomplete. What appears as complete, or is experienced as so complete in itself that it requires nothing else in order to be what it is, is aesthetic. In fact, such an experience is most aesthetic or most completely aesthetic, for it is intuited (directly and all-at-once) as an appearance (not requiring any not-given real to support it) and complete (needing no other appearances in order to be itself). Dynamic life may afford us few moments of completely aesthetic appearance, but some aestheticians testify that arrestingness, restfulness, and repose is the aesthetic goal and artists try to stop and hold attention to appearances by means of their works of art. On the other hand, one apparent object may appear to lead to and require another apparent object, or several other apparent objects, in order to complete it as an appearance. One may recognize what he experiences as only a dream, and yet as obviously incomplete. The Comtean philosophy of science claimed that positive science must be limited to appearances and that, on the basis of appearances alone, one could predict the laws of nature, i.e., of the reappearance of certain incomplete phenomena.

Secondly, that which appears as real may also appear as if really complete or as if really incomplete. Although what appears as real involves something more than is given, something more than appears, nevertheless what appears as real may appear as really complete in itself. The empty space only partly visible in the open box may appear as if completely contained within the walls of the box. Or real essences<sup>8</sup> may be believed to be entirely self-contained. Or the universe, when conceived as a closed system, may be imagined as involving nothing beyond it. Or God, conceived as eternally perfect, may be thought of as the ultimate in the way of the aesthetic; e.g., God alone is truly beautiful, according to Jonathan Edwards. Aesthetic realists are not uncommon. On the other hand, especially now that evolutionism has molded thought, one may perceive real things as inherently dynamic, changing, growing, and hence as incomplete. That which is experienced as both real and incomplete, or as incompletely apparent and really incomplete in itself, is the least aesthetic of the four alternatives.

We are now ready to consider how the test of truth is to be found in the aesthetic. We, as naive or natural realists, take appearances, or apparent realities, at their face value. What we intuit we take to

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8. See George Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*.

be true. After apparent error gives rise to doubt, we seek for that which will put our minds at rest again. If one wants complete certainty, the feeling that he has found the ultimate truth, he will be satisfied with nothing less than a full stop, a perfect rest, or that which is wholly self-evident. Now such a condition is to be found only in what is intuited as completely aesthetic.

Since few of our experiences are completely aesthetic, however, we must look further if we would understand the nature of "proof." When an experience is completely aesthetic, there is no awareness that what is intuited is a test of the truth, an answer to a question, a solution to a problem. For if, and to the extent that, the previous doubt, question or problem remains implicit in the present intuition, it is experienced, implicitly at least, as partly incomplete or as not wholly aesthetic. To recall the past or to anticipate the future, to feel caused or obligated, to feel either satisfied (involving past desire) or dissatisfied (involving future satisfaction) is to lack aesthetic completeness. Hence, most of our experiences, even those which are clearly aesthetic, are only partly so. However, partial aestheticness is partial aestheticness, and one's experience of it is all the more aesthetic when he accepts such partial aestheticness as all that he is going to get or as being as complete as it is going to be. Even though we may not be able to achieve what is completely aesthetic, we still strive for as much completeness as possible. What is experienced as "proof" is simply the feeling of achievement of that degree of the aesthetic which is desired, required, or expected.



### III. SUBJECTIVE INTUITION

#### *A*

Turning to the second major type of intuition, we must face the problem: can the self, the subject or intuiter intuit himself? Involved here is another distinction, namely, that between self-as-object and self-as-subject, which will serve to illustrate, even though it does not exhaust, the distinction between apparent self and real self.

#### *B*

Intuition of self-as-object may be dealt with in much the same way as other types of objective intuition except that self-as-object appears to be opposed to other types of objects by being also part of a whole self in which the self-as-subject is another part. Discussion of self-as-object need not detain us here except to note that the previously-examined distinctions apply to it. Is the self-as-object apparent or real or both? It is both. That it is apparent surely no one doubts. And that there is something real, something which escapes presenting itself wholly in appearance, is also commonly known and is discovered, like the discovery of other real objects, as a consequence of apparently erroneous inference regarding self. That its appearance may be experienced as aesthetic, as complete in itself, may be noted in those occasions when one enjoys self-satisfaction with himself as reflected in a mirror or in the eyes of others, and as unaesthetic or incomplete by the amount of time and effort spent before the mirror trying to improve his appearance or before others trying to increase his esteem. That one's apparent reality may be thought of, on the one hand, as aesthetic may be noted in the popularity of, and the satisfaction taken in, the belief that the self is an eternal, simple, indestructible soul, and on the other, as incomplete in itself by one's concern for his health, his uncertain future, and his fear of death.

#### *C*

Intuition of self-as-subject involves some especially difficult problems which may best be exposed by examining three types of theories regarding such intuition.

The first type of theory holds that it is impossible for an intuiter to intuit himself as intuiter. Intuition is directional, from intuiter to intuited, and this direction is irreversible. It is futile to try to turn around quickly and catch oneself as intuiter while he is still intuiting, for he as intuiter can and must move just as quickly in order to be on hand, so to speak, to do the intuiting of the just-escaped intuiter. One might generously, from this point of view, grant that one may catch himself just having intuited, but to intuit oneself precisely as intuiter of himself is impossible, for the intuiter is always behind his intuition, never in front of it. Hence, according to this theory, the self-as-subject is always real, never apparent, and is known by inference only. And although it may or may not be inferred to be something complete in itself, since it cannot be intuited, it cannot be experienced aesthetically.<sup>9</sup>

The second type of theory, illustrated by Advaita Vedanta, holds that the intuiter can, ultimately, intuit himself and do this completely, but not so long as his awareness is occupied with objects, even with the self-as-object. It is true, from this point of view, that the self-as-subject cannot be grasped as an object. Hence the direction of intuition, from intuiter to intuited, must be reversed or, rather, eliminated. Intuition of a self by itself can be complete only if the "of" and "by" disappear and the distinction, self-as-intuited and self-as-intuiter-of-self-as-intuited, fades away. Ultimately all distinctions are illusory, including any distinction between intuiter and intuited, so the ultimate goal of intuition is to eliminate all distinction. This goal is achieved when being (*sat*) and awareness (*chit*) are enjoyed (*ananda*) without even being distinguishable from each other. Now achievement of such a goal may appear difficult, requiring years of intellectual (*jnana*) devotion (*bhakti*) to yogic (*raja*) effort, but the reasonableness of this goal may be seen by an analogy.

Even as, when seeking to know (reproduce in mind) a real object, one's idea is believed truer as it becomes more like the object and is, or would be, completely true only if the real object were completely reproduced in the mind;<sup>10</sup> so when seeking complete apprehension of oneself as knower, one's apprehending must grow to be so complete as to identify one's apprehension and oneself as apprehended without any remaining difference. One who achieves such

9. See Immanuel Kant's "original synthetic unity of apperception," *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. by Norman Kemp Smith, pp. 152-158. Note also the "meta-selves" or "meta-intuiters" implied in the "theory of types."

10. See the opening sentence of Lao Tzu's *Tao Teh King*. Ed. A. J. Bahm, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., N.Y., 1958.

identity completely does not normally return to tell about it and if he did (as in *jivanmukti*) he would have to describe it as indescribable. Yet such a goal of intuition and such a theory of intuition of self-as-subject can be understood inferentially, and approached by degrees in practice, at least as easily as one can escape all intuition of self-as-intuiter as proposed by the first type of theory.

It should be noted that the goal of this second type of theory is conceived as completely aesthetic, more completely aesthetic, in fact, than by any other theory. For, not only does the immediacy become complete when identity without difference is achieved, but also its all-at-once-ness is conceived as so complete that reality is denied to everything else. In such an ideal, all distinctions, including those between subject and object, self-as-subject and self-as-object, appearance and reality, intuiter and his intuiting, and even between aesthetic and incomplete, disappear. Such intuition is so perfect, aesthetically, that nothing other than it can adequately describe it, for any "other than it" involves imperfection and incompleteness. Yet attempts to describe it do occur and proceed in two directions.

The first direction employs all of the common synonyms for perfection, such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and eternity. Such intuition is omniscient because its identity of intuition and intuited is complete (not because it knows multifarious details), omnipotent because all that could be desired has been accomplished, omnipresent and eternal because the illusory distinctions of space and time have disappeared (not because extending through all spaces and enduring through all times). Those ignorant realists who accuse Advaitins of claiming the impossible merely reveal their inability to understand the ultimacy of the aesthetic and how it is employed. If proof is ultimately aesthetic, then the Advaitans have idealized, at least, the most perfect kind of proof. But it cannot be found by searching among real objects nor by any external examination of one's apparent self-as-object. Rather it is to be sought in the self-as-subject, or *atman*, and can be found only in that ultimate intuition in which both the self-as-subject as distinct from other things and the seeking disappear.

The second direction, instead of describing the ultimate goal of intuition in terms of "all" or "omni," as in omniscient, omnipotent, etc., refers to it as indistinct or as beyond all distinctions, including such distinctions as "all" or "some" or "none." Is the goal to be found in either the objective or the subjective, in either appearance or reality, as aesthetic or incomplete? The reply given to each of these and all similar questions is that it is neither the one, nor the

other, nor both, nor neither.<sup>11</sup> It is so aesthetic, so self-sufficient, that not even any of these minimal distinctions apply to it.

The third type of theory opposes both of the first two types by rejecting both the impossibility, claimed by one, and the perfect ability, idealized by the other, of the intuer to intuit himself as intuer, and by accepting the two as dialectically related. It agrees with both theories in holding that, to the extent that intuition is directional such direction is irreversible, and that, to this extent and in this way, the intuer cannot intuit himself as intuer. But, in addition to being directional, intuition may be dialectical, i.e., may both retain its directionality and transcend such directionality in a more-inclusive dialectical gestalt.

Dialectic involves a whole self (synthesis) in which self-as-intuer and self-as-intuited are parts (antitheses). These two parts cannot be the same to the extent that they not only are distinct but exist at opposite ends of the direction of intuition. Yet, also, they are the same to the extent that they constitute complementary parts of this whole self. Now even though a self-as-intuer cannot move quickly enough to catch himself in the same act of intuition and even though he cannot eliminate the direction of intuition, he can perceive himself as an apparently real whole with certain parts missing as full appearances even though present nevertheless as implicit in the perceived whole. Such dialectical intuition may seem impossible to attain, especially to those whose beliefs have prevented them from ever trying to attain it. Yet it may be not as rare or difficult as supposed but rather an automatic aspect of all self-reflection which is commonly overlooked because, like intuition itself, it is transparent.

Now such dialectical difficulties as are involved in the third, or dialectical, type of theory of self-intuition seem to it to be not greater than but less than those encountered by the other types of theory of self-intuition. The phenomenalist must do violence to our naive view of self-knowledge because he first distinguishes between appearance and that (beyond appearance) which appears and then claims that only the *appearances* appear whereas *that which* appears does not appear; but, naively, that "appearances appear" and that "that which appears appears" are equally obvious. The realist, who also distinguishes between appearance and reality, and then claims that he can intuit reality, i.e., that which does not appear, involves himself in the predicament of asserting that that which does not appear appears (in intuition). The Advaitin must claim that the distinction, between self-as-intuer and self-as-in-

11. See P. T. Raju, "The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, June 1954, pp. 694-713.

tuted, or, more generally, between reality and appearance, upon which all discussion about intuition is based is ultimately illusory and hence Advaita itself as a theory is illusory, Advaita also claims that a self must destroy itself as a whole with parts in order to achieve itself as a whole without parts. These feats seem much more impossible to achieve than dialectical partial self-apprehension which occurs, in some way or other, in all self-reference.

Furthermore, all understanding of self presupposes that some dialectical intuition has been successful. We may illustrate this presupposition by extending our discussion to another of the many dialectical facets of self-intuition. Insofar as the self continues to be the same self (i.e., the self-as-intuiter continues to be the same self-as-intuiter) through several intuitions, then even if the self-as-intuiter did not, in any one intuition, intuit itself as intuiter but did intuit itself as intuiter in another previous intuition, it is still intuiting itself-as-intuiter in this one intuition to the extent that such sameness of self-as-intuiter continues. Through apprehending itself as a something which remains the same throughout many acts of intuition, a self intuits itself as a continuing whole which is properly inferred to be the same self-as-intuiter in the present act of intuition. If this dialectical theory were pursued further, it would be found that a self-as-intuiter intuits itself-as-intuiter not merely in one but in many different ways and that, even if it tried, it could not escape from intuiting itself-as-intuiter in many of those ways, even though such intuiting is never complete.

Finally, before leaving our discussion of the dialectical theory, we should note that it conceives the self-as-intuiter neither as completely beyond aesthetic experience nor as ever wholly within aesthetic experience but always as partly aesthetic and partly incomplete, with dynamic variations in the relative divisions of these parts. For, although a self-as-intuiter continues to be in some sense the same throughout several intuitions, it also changes and becomes somewhat different in each new intuition. Dialectical self-apprehension, although genuine, and complete in one sense, also fails to be complete self-apprehension in all senses. Further aspects of the aesthetic factors in dialectical experience will be developed in the next and final portions of this study.

## IV. ORGANIC INTUITION

## A

The third major type of intuition, here called "organic," includes characteristics of both the objective and subjective types. Recognition of organic intuition implies criticisms of those who claim intuition to be exclusively of objects as well as of those who claim intuition to be ultimately only subjective. Intuition is organic when both object and subject, intuited and intuiter, appear immediately together in apprehension. Although intuition is directional, hence asymmetrical, immediacy is symmetrical, the intuiter being as immediate to the intuited as the intuited is to the intuiter, the three, the intuiter, the intuited, and the intuiting, functioning in some way as a single whole. The tendency, which also may or may not be carried to extremes, of those who recognize intuition as organic is to claim that all intuition is organic and hence that organic intuition is the only type, the others being not so much distinct types of intuition as distinguishable types of emphases among organic intuitions which vary in the degree to which the objective and subjective aspects predominate.

Before proceeding to compare organic with objective and subjective types as discussed in the preceding sections, however, it seems advisable to examine further the general nature and range of meaning of the term "organic" as used here. Anything is "organic" when it is a concrete unity of opposites, not one in which the opposition collapses into the unity but one in which the unity is constituted by the opposites as its essential parts. Organic unity cannot exist without its opposing parts; organic plurality cannot exist without their uniting whole; the organic involves an interdependence of unity and plurality, whole and parts, opposition overcome and opposition continuing. The organic as conceived here is not, as is sometimes claimed,<sup>12</sup> an "identity-in-difference" or a "many-in-the-one" but is an identity-and-difference and one-and-the-many conception, where both of each pair of categorical opposites are given equally ultimate, though also relatively variable,

<sup>12</sup> E.g., S. C. Pepper, *World Hypotheses*; G. W. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*; W. H. Sheldon, *God and Polarity*; E. E. Harris, *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*.

status. As already indicated, wherever the opposites "subject and object" are concerned, both function together without either ever collapsing into the other or disappearing in some common haze—at least not completely. And where the opposites, symmetrical and asymmetrical, both characterize intuition, neither eliminates the other, each depends upon the other, and both cooperate, variably but essentially, in constituting intuition. In like fashion, what is experienced as organic is both simple and complex, apparent and real, aesthetic and incomplete, dialectical and non-dialectical. These pairs by no means exhaust the organic, but they must suffice for present purposes.

The view that all intuition is organic may be extended, then, by saying that all these opposites cooperate in constituting it. Hence intuition is never mere immediacy; for immediacy cannot exist by itself alone but always exists within and depends upon some context and embodies some texture,<sup>13</sup> even though the ways in which it so exists remain implicit rather than explicit. The opaqueness or transparency of implicit factors, lack of training in discernment and vocabulary for expressing these factors, the limitations of attention-span, difficulties involved in self-reflective thinking, and the normal devotion of attention to objects other than its own constitutive conditions, leave us largely unaware of such implicit conditions.

## B

Let us turn now to a comparison of the ways in which organic intuition differs from the objective and subjective types of intuition relative to these opposing pairs. Consider the appearance-reality polarity first. Not only are both subjective and objective aspects organically intuited, but appearance and reality (whether apparent objects versus real objects, apparent self versus real self, or the apparent organic subject-object versus the real organic subject-object is focused upon) are also organically intuited.

## I

The normalcy of organic intuition of objects as both apparent and real may be noted by recalling that as naive or natural realists we accept objects, such as a table, as wholes, even though only one side, for example, is visible, without much, if any concern about the distinction between appearance and reality. The other side, or

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13. See Lewis Hahn, *A Contextualist Theory of Perception*.

the inside, is there if you care to take the trouble to look. That the distinction, arising out of the problem of error, is disturbing to the naive realist may be seen by recalling the difficulty with which beginning students in philosophy are introduced to epistemological problems. These problems usually are faced with some distaste, not because they are believed to be perennially unsolvable (a later excuse for evading discomfort) but because we dislike to be convinced that we are unsure of what we prefer to believe we are sure about. Students become puzzled by their instructor's delight in "confusing" them, in demanding that they see a problem here so he can then proceed to make clear the significance of theories designed to solve the problem—but which never quite do so. Dismay, disgust, cynicism and pessimism are all born out of the discomforting attacks upon naive realism, and many students protest, perhaps rightly, that "we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see."<sup>14</sup>

If one succeeds in clarifying and accepting the distinction between apparent objects and real objects, he then tends to take sides, favoring either phenomenalism or realism or one of their many varieties. But, no matter which side we take, further problems arise.

If we favor the realistic side and undertake seriously to defend what is implied, we tend, sooner or later, to take, or mistake, the distinction for a separation and then we struggle valiantly and ingeniously, if somewhat futilely, to bring the two back together again.<sup>15</sup> The reason for such failures, as seen from the organic point of view, lies in the failure to recognize the relation between appearance and reality as organic in the first place. Appearance and reality, although distinguishable, are interdependent. Appearance is not self-sustaining; reality is unknowable except through appearance.

If we favor the phenomenalist side, we tend to believe that knowledge, and especially intuition, of the real is impossible. Sceptics, agnostics and positivists (among frustrated realists) and Advaitins and Buddhists (among avid subjectivists) all testify that knowledge of real objects is impossible. But, having forsaken part of their birthright, they struggle, also valiantly and ingeniously, if somewhat ineffectively, to explain why appearances appear as they do.

Many floundering philosophers, realists and phenomenals alike, have found hope of rescue from their disastrous dualism in Kant's complex synthesis, typified, perhaps, by the oft-quoted "concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are

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14. George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, Sec. 3.

15. See A. O. Lovejoy, *The Revolt Against Dualism*.



blind." Yet any rationalistic attempt to put and keep rationally dissected parts together by methods of "pure reason" is bound to fail to restore as much confidence as prevailed in predisturbed naive realism—a discontent noticeable in the rejection of much of Kant's intellectual architecture by his own German Idealistic followers. Hegel's synthetic dialectic constitutes one of the most profound, and monstrous, systems designed to deal with bifurcations, yet he too remained one-sided in favor of intellect ("Real is rational; rational real").

Early pragmatists and Whitehead approached restoration of faith in intuited organicity, but Urban, though temperamentally an idealist, sums up the situation as well as anyone: "As idealism . . . assimilates the object to the subject and tends ultimately to a solipsism of the subject, so realism . . . assimilates the subject to the object and tends to a solipsism of the object. Both are novel worlds—the one as remote from that of the plain man as the other."<sup>16</sup> "Both idealism and realism are ineradicable. . . . Both are equally indigenous to life; idealism is as natural as realism. Life, in fact, creates the opposition, but it also knows how to reconcile it. . . . Life does not say merely either or; it says both real and ideal."<sup>17</sup> Sooner or later, no matter how reluctantly, all are forced to admit that both objective and subjective aspects of experience are intuited as organic.<sup>18</sup>

The problem of error, which gave rise to the disturbing distinction between appearance and reality, demands its resolution by way of the problem of truth. Truth, experientially, is that which settles the doubts aroused by the appearance of error. Supporters of either side, i.e., realism and phenomenalism, and reconstructors of unity all must face similar difficulties. These difficulties may be exposed by reviewing each of the three types of theories involved in such side-taking and reconstructing.

1. Realists commonly conceive truth as conformity of appearance with reality, e.g., as in the correspondence of an idea with a real thing. But they all have to agree that there is no correspondence test of truth whereby one can compare such appearance and reality intuitively (i.e., either take the appearance and put it out beside the reality or bring the reality in and place it beside the appearance) for thereby either the appearance would become a reality or the

16. W. M. Urban, *Beyond Realism and Idealism*, p. 90. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1949.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

18. See also Lawrence Hyde, *An Introduction to Organic Philosophy*, the Omega Press, 1955, and Louis W. Norris, *Polarity*, Henry Regnery, 1956.

reality an appearance and hence the distinction out of which the problem arose in the first place would disappear. The dialectical difficulties involved in the problem of error (where something appears to be other than it appears) remain permanently. The doubt which has arisen can never be settled without destroying the very basis upon which realism rests. The embarrassing resort to other tests, such as the empirical, the pragmatic and the coherence tests, which realists do espouse in preference to admitting total defeat, implies at once support of these other theories and further doubt about the self-sufficiency of realism.

If proof is ultimately aesthetic, realism not only remains forever without direct proof of the real and of conformity of appearance to it, but also must admit that phenomenologists stand on firmer aesthetic ground when they insist that the real cannot be known without at least appearing to be real. Obviously dissatisfied with their short aesthetic rations, realists resort to enormous efforts in constructing inferential systems in order to seem to justify their claims. But each further effort, each additional inference, each added systemic structure, involves them in more complex, more abstract, more mediated, and more remote assumptions, each of which must itself be intuited, inferred to be real, and subject to its own possibilities of error both individually and in relation to the others in the system. Doubts multiply rather than subside. These efforts usually lead to a hopeless impasse, whence some realists are moved to make extravagant appeals, ranging from Descartes' faith in a non-deceiving God to irresponsible trust in arbitrarily postulated axioms which owe no essential debt to experience.

Thus realism bankrupts itself, first by squandering its initial loan of intuitions from the bank of common sense experience, then by overdrawing its account, refusing to pay interest on the loan, denying that the bank actually made the loan if it refuses to loan more unlimitedly, and finally either by appealing to the government (God), unaware that it too is supported by the bank, to insure its overdrawn account against insolvency or by declaring that each individual has unlimited right to establish his own unbacked banking system if and when he pleases.

2. Phenomenologists believe that truth lies wholly within appearance and, consequently, that the test of truth does also. Error itself had to appear and any truth which overcomes error must appear and appear to overcome it. Thus far, phenomenology seems to stand on unassailable ground. When one inquires how error is overcome, at least three theories of truth suggest themselves: a) the empirical, which faithfully traces conclusions back to intuited sense data, b) the pragmatic, which predicts that future appearances will be in-

tuitied as anticipated, and c) the coherence, which is satisfied so long as appearance itself hangs together without intuited inconsistency.

But each of these theories has its weaknesses also, partly because each also tends to presuppose, no matter how reluctantly, some system of explanation involving realistic assumptions, and partly because, without such assumptions, phenomenalism is left helpless and hopeless so far as explaining why appearances, including truth and error, appear the way they do. Empirical theories of truth often are bolstered by realistic supports, such as Locke's substances and primary qualities, Berkeley's God and ideas produced against our will, or the association psychologist's mechanical computer-like brains. Pragmatic theories of truth typically presuppose acceptance of biological evolution with its struggle-for-existence and survival-of-the-fit contexts for the workability of ideas or some "notion of a reality independent of either of us" which "lies at the basis of the pragmatist definition of truth."<sup>19</sup> Coherence theories of truth usually are tied to idealistic metaphysical schemes which demand an ideal real which, though interpreted to be wholly like or a logical extension of appearances, is nevertheless beyond ordinary experience.

The foregoing external criticisms regarding realistic supports are merely introductory, however, to more telling internal criticisms. Even if we grant that phenomenalism need require no external support, these theories of truth are still unsatisfactory.

Even if a phenomenalist empiricism followed Humean tendencies to a solipsistic extreme, it still would conceive itself as testing derived conclusions by tracing such derivation back, step by step, to an original sense-impression in some previous act of intuition which has long since ceased to be. If appeal is made to memory, then further realistic inference regarding reliability of memory is required, involving either a naive realistic faith that the real past can be directly intuited or the dubious inference that present intuitions of remembered appearances apprehend appearances which somehow must have remained stable, though unattended to, while awaiting re-observation. Thus even a solipsistic empiricism requires explanation presupposing that it is possible to intuit what is unintuitable.

If phenomenalist pragmatism follows Jamesian "radical empiricism"<sup>20</sup> to a solipsistic extreme, it would still conceive itself as testing predicted conclusions by following "from point to point of

19. William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 218. Longmans, Green and Co., N.Y., 1909.

20. Cf. William James, *Essays In Radical Empiricism*.

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one direction"<sup>21</sup> to some not-yet-existing future intuition of "satisfactory results." Yet here also explanation requires a double appeal to something real: first, to the real but not-yet-apparent future, and second, to faith both in the continuing workability of predictive mechanisms and again in memory so that what is now experienced will be remembered later as it appears now. In any case, a solipsistic pragmatism requires explanation distinguishing between apparent (present) intuition and future (not-yet-apparent) intuition which alone will then make present (and then-non-existent) intuition true.

If the phenomenalist conception of truth as coherence were followed to a solipsistic extreme, it would still conceive itself in terms of more appearances than can be intuited at one time. Although these other appearances are intended to be not independent of, but "coherent with," presently-intuited appearances, they are still real in the sense of being beyond present intuition. Hence phenomenalist coherence theories also presuppose impossible intuition—thus ending in "dilemma"<sup>22</sup> and "shipwreck."<sup>23</sup>

All of these phenomenalist theories of truth suffer from a common dialectical difficulty, in addition to their own more specific dialectical difficulties. That is that, if error, and hence truth which settles the doubt aroused by such error, is wholly within appearance, or is apparent only, it was impossible for the distinction between appearance and reality to have arisen in the first place. If error, and hence truth, involve the distinction between appearance and reality, then whenever error and truth appear, the need for belief in reality appears. Or if the phenomenalist persists in contending that error and truth are apparent only, then either error itself is an error or appearance is unreliable (and we, starting from appearance as reliable, end by concluding that it is unreliable). Further, in either case, the contention that error and truth are apparent only involves an "apparent only" which itself presupposes the distinction between appearance and reality and hence presupposes reality.

If proof is ultimately aesthetic, a view which is common to all three of the phenomenalist theories of truth considered, how far can one achieve such proof according to each theory? Empiricism idealizes the original sense datum as aesthetic, as perfectly and completely apprehended in intuition, and elimination of doubt as ac-

21. James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 106.

22. Francis Herbert Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 125, George Allen and Unwin, 1893, 1925.

23. See H. H. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 177, 178. Oxford, Clarendon Press, London, 1906.

completed when complex derived ideas are traced back to these original aesthetic intuitions. Pragmatism idealizes future satisfactory consequences, when intuited as anticipated, as solving one's problems or settling one's doubts. Coherence theory advocates idealize intuition of complete coherence but admit that, except as an ideal (e.g., Josiah Royce's God intuiting the total universe of appearances together in an "eternal now"), such is really beyond us. All three theories end by admitting appearance as incomplete: the original empirical sense data having ceased to be present, the pragmatic satisfaction being future until achieved at a time when the error motivating them is past, and the bulk of what is intuitable as coherent being mostly beyond us. All idealize completeness; yet all admit failures except for those present moments in which apparently complete satisfaction is temporarily achieved. But these moments, as moments, were already possessed by the naive, uncritical, common sense thinker before he was led, or misled, into trying to explain apparent error by believing that there is something other than or more ultimate than appearance in terms of which one may explain.

3. Would-be reconstructers or restorers of organic integrity to the appearance-reality polarity are of many kinds having varying degrees of success. And some of these are to be found among those with predominantly realistic (e.g., Aristotle, Whitehead, Neo-Realists), empiricistic (e.g., the Scottish Common Sense School), pragmatic (e.g., James himself conceived pragmatism not merely as radical empiricism but as a method adaptable to all varieties of hypotheses), and idealistic (e.g., Kant, Hegel, Bradley, Royce) leanings. But attention will be focused here upon an organic type of reconstruction.

Organic truth, relative to the distinction between apparent and real objects, has, as conceived here, many different aspects. Whenever a distinction between appearance and reality emerges in concrete experience, it is not, as such, abstract and offers no problem of error if one pays no further attention to it, accepting and leaving it, aesthetically, just as it is. But if one follows naturally the temptation to seek to explain the distinction, he risks, then and thereafter, forgetting the fertile soil from which it sprang.

Explaining, which consists in interpreting something in terms of something else, involves abstracting parts from a whole and relating them to other parts of this or other wholes. When appearance and reality are first distinguished and then separated in thought, what is first intuited as an apparent-real whole is interpreted by means of abstracting the apparent and the real as parts. This process

may involve not merely one but many types of error and, hence, of truth. For all of these types we need a common or general<sup>24</sup> term, and the term "fidelity"<sup>25</sup> is adopted here. All types of error due to abstracting in which concrete ancestry is forgotten or denied may be spoken of as "errant," and all types of truth in which awareness of indebtedness to such concrete soil is recognized as "faithful." If the real part is felt to be abstracted from the apparent-real whole, the problem of truth is seen as one of fidelity of the real part to the apparent-real whole. If the apparent part is felt as abstracted from the apparent-real whole, the problem of truth is seen as one of fidelity of the apparent part to the apparent-real whole. However, theorists usually over-simplify the problem as either one of fidelity of appearance to reality or of reality to appearance and, even when they recognize that there may be a problem of mutual fidelity of appearance and reality to each other, tend to forget that each, appearance and reality, owe fidelity to their common parentage and such mutual fidelity as they have is more like that of brothers and sisters sharing a common indebtedness to the same parents than of husband and wife in marriage.

Extreme abstractionists, especially those who slice appearance from reality by means of the law of excluded middle, are errant almost beyond recall. They try to force the couple unromantically into monastic separation without a window or even a peephole in the wall between them. Like prisoners in solitary confinement, appearance and reality are believed to be able to communicate only by sporadic tappings on their mutually-dividing cell wall through "one-to-one correspondence" between other still more abstracted real and apparent parts—though how even this much fidelity is believed possible and how the apparent end of such correspondence is intuited without at the same time, dialectically, creating a new problem of error all over again remains unexplained. Realistic extremists conceive the authority for truth to be external to appearance and so the truth-seeker should seek to submit all his appearances to such external reality. Truth, when it comes, comes from the outside as "in-form-ation." Phenomenalistic extremists conceive appearance alone as authoritative; and truth, whether fidelity of ideas to sense data, faith in one's will-to-believe in future consequences, or fidelities of little coherencies to a larger coherence, owes nothing to an external reality. The more abstractive a theory becomes, then, the less faithful it is to its concrete sources.

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24. See A. J. Bahm, "The Generic Theory of Truth, *The Personalist*, Autumn, 1947, pp. 370-375.

25. See H. B. Alexander, *Truth and The Faith*, Ch. I. Henry Holt and Co., N.Y., 1929.

Pointing out the mistakes of abstractionists does not, in itself, however, show how one can ever be faithful. If organic reconstruction is possible, how is it possible?

Longing for home does not bring you there; too, if you could return, as to your childhood neighborhood again, you may find yourself estranged. Only by recognizing that, in order to enjoy such familial assurance again, one must undertake the responsibilities of a home of his own, where he is willing to risk making intuitions and taking the consequences of his risks, can he achieve that measure of self-assurance which serves as a foundation for trusting the intuitions of others. In one's own intellectual home, with his own familiar intuitions, one tends to be unafraid. Here, when an error appears, it does not destroy his composure, his confidence in intuition, his faith that what he believes to be so is so. Here he is back to naive or common sense experience. Again "he goes from conviction to new conviction, confident in the reliability of each new view."<sup>26</sup>

Does the organic philosopher now advocate lulling his former incurious pupils, whom he aroused with such great difficulty, back to lethargic naiveté? This, critics will say, is not explanation; this is not reconstruction; this is surrender, flight, escapism. Once error appears it must be dealt with in terms other than its own, critics contend, otherwise one may be building error upon error to one's own eventual destruction. If appearance can be in error, we can no longer trust appearance and must go on to something other than mere appearance in order to achieve certainty, they say. But, the organic philosopher replies, where else can one go? One leaves home only for the purpose of establishing a better home, not to become homeless. It is the homeless man, one who cannot trust his own intuitions, who is lost. "Philosophical criticisms are simply common-sense criticisms of common sense."<sup>27</sup> To surrender the common sense with which one criticizes along with the common sense criticized is to be lost completely. Return to common sense is not escapism, but a return to sanity.

Yet, like one who has ventured forth from rural simplicity to cosmopolitan complexity, from naive intuitive convictions to maze-like systems of abstractions built into sky-scraping intellectual structures involving intricate aggregations of doubts (from which he has looked down with contempt at his former peasant absurdities), he cannot return home without bearing permanent scars of his adventure with him. Nor should he seek to root them all out, for neither can he nor is such eradication necessary. He cannot, for

26. Bahm, *Philosophy, An Introduction*, p. 41.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

if he tries he thereby magnifies their importance beyond their worth. He need not, for some will fade of their own accord, and some should be kept as reminders of the folly of explanatory over-ambitiousness. (Like one who has achieved Zen, he returns home, acting the same as before, yet with a difference which, though others may not be able to detect, is still present.) He is no less intuitive but he is less naive about the disturbance-value of apparent error. Since he had to develop great capacity for tolerance of multiple varieties of metropolitan errors in order to remain there at all, he now finds it much easier to tolerate the simple, more primitive, errors which, earlier, had naively prompted him to journey forth to save the world from such error. He is no longer overwhelmed by a burning curiosity which naively presupposes that errors appearing in his original intuitions can be conquered completely in another non-apparent ideal world if he could just step through Alice's looking-glass.

If he has profited by his observations in intellectual cosmopolis, he will have learned that each broad and glittering avenue, each style of architecture, or each more rapid mode of transportation promising to lead him to an ideal home, led him instead to department, apartment, and multi-storied buildings, each with its own specialized brand of doubts, errors, uncertain assumptions, without his escaping, anywhere along the way, from appearances of error. Unless he foolishly chooses to accept naively a section of these fractionated errors as somehow having superior intuitive palatability to those he originally found distasteful, he will, when he "comes to his senses," discover them to be even more unbearable than those little apparent errors troubling him in his original naive condition.

Should he then return home reluctantly, defeated, as many a sceptic, agnostic, cynic, and pessimist has done? Some will, and nothing much can be done for them; and some of these will become hard-bitten taunters of all others who are willing to venture in quest of their truthful fortune and of all who still have faith that truth may yet be found. Or should one retain some noetic resilience, some spark of fight in him, some desire to explain both his original errors and all the other more amazing errors he has seen along his way? Some, fortunately, become commuters, adapting themselves to both rural and urban errors, and developing even more tolerance than those whose choice of urban versus rural types of intuition depends only upon which is felt least repugnant. Although man can never abandon the building of bigger and better intellectual metropolises, he can and does also develop some intellectual suburbias and "rur-urbias" in which double-perspective, if not final solution, prevails.



But does the organic view have something positive to say for itself in the way of reconstruction? Yes. Its claims may be stated simply or complexly. The reader, undoubtedly, will prefer a more complex statement, here analyzed into several, somewhat reiterative, parts.

*a.* It claims both that one must return and that he cannot return to original naive intuitive assurance—a seeming paradox like that inherent in every view regarding ultimates.<sup>28</sup> One may return but only to the extent that he can, dialectically, both accept and not accept his return as both a return and not a return and the seeming paradox as both a paradox and not a paradox and, further, such dialectic as both dialectical and non-dialectical—all in different senses. Whoever adopts “the theory of types,”<sup>29</sup> thereby enslaving himself to permanent misuse of the principle of excluded middle, shuts himself off from ever returning. Life, however, has too strong a hold over all, except those who feel they must commit suicide in order to preserve the integrity of a false ideal. So life brings them back part way at least whether they wish or not, and tirelessly builds new bridges even for those who have tried to burn their bridges behind them.

*b.* The organic view claims that the goal of reconstruction is a return to a naïveté which is no longer completely naive, or to a common sense which has become wise—wise enough to know that its own wisdom must, at the same time, be both other than and yet never wholly other than common sense.

*c.* The organic view claims that apprehension ultimately is intuitive and that intuition is, at once, both enough (in the sense that one can never get beyond intuition) and not enough (for immediacy is never—with suicidal exceptions—mere immediacy but involves, intrinsically, automatically, generally, mediating factors of various kinds). It believes that intuition can neither be lured away, captured and killed by mediacy, no matter how much, or how complicated, or how persisting, nor can mediacy be reduced wholly to immediacy. Immediacy remains or recurs at each mediating step (for each such new step must either somehow carry some of the original immediacy with it—otherwise it cannot connect the one with the other with any assurance—or creates its own—otherwise it

28. E.g., those who see creation or ultimate causation as by God, Brahman, Tao, or Matter, require an uncaused cause to which each thing, in order to achieve its end, must somehow both return and yet never quite return; for unless he admits some “never quite return” he must suffer as unresolvable the paradox of how such a process could have started in the first place.

29. See Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. I, Ch. II.

will not itself be able to apprehend what it is doing—or both); and immediacy must surrender to being borne along and away to a gradual death, for otherwise it perishes immediately and completely as a timeless moment in a restless sea of time.

*d.* The organic view claims that error, apparent conflict among appearances, is both apparent and real: apparent because to be apprehended at all it must appear and any claim to its reality must suffer and survive all of the doubts which we have already raised against realism; and real, or at least apparently real, because its inherent self-conflict is intuited as denying self-satisfaction which alone can serve as proof of ultimacy and because it is perceived as a disturbance caused by something external, since no perfectly self-contained, self-satisfied, self-complete being could be so foolish as to disturb its own peace in this way.

This view claims both, 1) that whenever error appears it appears as a demand that we do something about it, a demand that we eliminate it, even completely, if possible, and yet also, 2) that error is something which we neither can eliminate completely, nor desire to eliminate completely when we have fully considered the matter.

That it cannot be eliminated may be seen by recalling both individual attempts and the long history of mankind in attempting to eliminate (explain away) error—attempts which seem to have led men only more deeply into error or into greater and more magnificent errors. (Perhaps man does not have sufficient sense of humor to recognize the history of philosophy and science and religion as a great drama, a comedy of errors, in which he, unwittingly, is the chief buffoon whether he likes his role or not. And when a Gotama or a Lao Tzu dare to call attention to man's foolish role, his pride condemns them as stupid anti-intellectuals. The organic view must share such ridicule for it too claims that man desires to know too much, i.e., more than he can know, and that his quest for complete understanding grows partly out of his misunderstanding of such understanding as he does have.)

That we not only do not really desire to eliminate error, but need it, depend upon it, are anxious to keep it, may be seen by recalling that error is the source and mainstay of our belief in reality, in something beyond and behind appearance. The distinction between appearance and reality, and our belief in reality, arose in the first place, remember, as a consequence of the appearance of error. Each of the varieties of apparently real things which enrich our lives and of the apparently real inferred things which our realistic reconstructers must use in building explanatory structures has its source in another error—another intuited appearance of conflict in appearances. Our faith in immediacy in general and in each

distinct kind of mediacy in particular arouses, and is sustained by, the continuing recurrence of apparent error. If error did not reappear, the source and abiding support for our faith in reality would disappear. We might, of course, bank upon our memories for a while, but as these fade, we would find ourselves without reconfirmation of trust in reality.

Error, then, though paradoxical in its origin, paradoxical in its nature, and paradoxical in its inherent demand that we desire to eliminate what we do not desire to eliminate, is our touchstone of reality. Let us, then, not be so foolish as to desire to, and try to, eliminate (explain away) error just because it seems paradoxical. Life itself, the organicist believes, is paradoxical, and any adequate theory of intuition must accept intuition itself as paradoxical and as able to grasp paradox without getting hurt by it. If life, intuition, and error are paradoxical, then one is more "realistic" (willing to be "objective" or to accept things as they are) if he also accepts such paradox as ultimate than those supposed realists who, also paradoxically, seek to eliminate the very foundations upon which they claim to build. Dialectic, like a self-pointed gun or dagger in unsteady hands, may, indeed, be a means to self-destruction; but, also, like a ladder, an internal and self-lifting ladder, may be used, by one who knows how to climb it, as a means to a more-acceptably-self-directed life; for life, or growth, is itself dialectical, the seed growing by pushing itself outside of itself and absorbing what is outside and integrating this with what is inside, preparatory to a next step in expanding beyond its former self by means of integrating more of what lies outside itself. All growth, biological and intellectual, is dialectical, and error, being also dialectical, may contribute to dialectical growth. He who would de-dialecticize error and intellect and growth, aims, really, at sterilizing life, at viticide, at suicide. Every perfectionist—whether he idealizes his ultimate perfection as a perfect God, perfect Brahman, perfect Idea or realm of "eternal objects," perfect Reason, perfect Absolute, or perfect "closed system"—dialectically demands his dynamic self to claim that stagnation is more ultimate than growth, the static more ultimate than the dynamic, death more ultimate than life.

Organic reconstruction presupposes dialectical integration of both rural and metropolitan types of errors, i.e., all evidences of reality which must be taken into account, as normal and to-be-expected-and-accepted parts of common sense experience. Organic reconstruction invites one to feel dynamically at home in a rhythmically varying middle way<sup>30</sup> between that error which believes

<sup>30</sup>. See A. J. Bahm, *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Ch. VI. Harper and Brothers, N.Y., and Rider and Co., London, 1958.

error can be wholly and permanently removed from experience and that error which believes that hopeless defeatism is the only alternative to complete conquest of error. Organic reconstruction accepts error as a universal ingredient in experience which serves as a reassuring challenge to the experiencer which proves that he is not alone in the universe and that his life is not merely at its end.

The healthy mind is not discouraged at a life-long prospect of battling with error. Rather, like the Taoist acceptance of complementary yangs and yins, he accepts the appearance and disappearance of error, the appearance and disappearance of doubt, much as he accepts the appearance of day followed by night and of night by day—especially if he habitually willingly puts in his day's work and then is satisfied with a restful night's sleep reward. Those who, instead of accepting daylight at daytime and darkness at night, want either daylight all of the time or darkness all of the time, are committed to the most fundamental types of error. Their efforts to invade intellectual darkness with artificial light do not eliminate their need for sleep; and in their prolonged hibernation in cavernous agnostic darkness they must occasionally stretch forth some other error-apprehending appendage, like a hand, to give assurance that the invisible walls are still there and to give courage to endure further their self-imposed blindness—for one will begin to doubt his doubting if he cannot feel that his doubting continues to be worthwhile.

Organicism's paradoxical proposal that one should willingly accept error as permanently desirable (as well as undesirable) seems not so paradoxical when the even-greater paradoxes of the alternative views are uncovered and exposed. Recurrent error is needed, like vitamins for the body, to maintain the life of the mind, for without its constant challenge mind would stop thinking, become useless, vegetate, stagnate, die.

*e.* Organicism claims that proof is ultimately grounded in the aesthetic, a feeling that the doubts and fears which gave rise to questions have been satisfactorily allayed. Both doubts and their allayment are products of many, and many kinds, of mediating conditions, but the attempt to settle all doubt by constructing an intellectual edifice of hypothetical reals which are then considered, somehow, more reliable, more indubious, more self-sufficient and self-evident than immediately intuitable satisfaction is doomed to failure. For the vital tendency to doubt, which provided impetus for explanatory structure-building in the first place, either cannot be quenched, in which case it will also normally attack every structure thus proposed, or, if it should happen to be frightened into closed-minded submission to any rigidly closed (lifeless) explana-

tory system, it will, so long as it is alive, writhe with anguish against the intellectual tyranny which that system imposes. A person can be convinced only by his own feelings of satisfaction, just as he can be aroused to doubt in the first place only by his own appearances of error.

Minds can, of course, be influenced, and it is a matter of common sense that you can fool some of the people some of the time but not all of the people all of the time—a slogan which applies in epistemology as well as in politics. It is true, even, that one can become accustomed to some of his errors, to amazing metropolitan explanations as well as to rural expectations that he can have a day or a night endure for just a little longer. In fact, if one has doubted something often and long enough to have come to accept his doubting as itself a normal state, he may then begin to fear what it would be like if his now-comfortably-uncomfortable state should disappear into some final and fully comfortable satisfaction. One who has doubted the possibility of proof for so long may even become afraid of proof. One who has been prevented from reaching the goal of life for so long may come to believe it to be a mere projection, something thrown out of life as another unattainable ideal, illusion, error. Intellectual extremists often know that, sooner or later, they must commit suicide, intellectual or vital, for surely they cannot continue, without at least some subconscious discomfort, their superficially unruffled conviction that agnosticism, cynicism, pessimism, if true, will fail to collect its own final payment.

If proof is grounded in the aesthetic, then it is to be found in some here and now, and if not in this here and now then in some other here and now, where satisfaction is complete. Complete? How complete? "If error, doubt, can never be wholly and permanently eliminated from experience, how can satisfaction ever be complete? Since complete satisfaction is impossible, he who looks for proof must look for it elsewhere than in complete satisfaction"—so will the critic argue.

The organic reply is that "complete" is a feeling present in life, not a termination of life and of feeling. "Complete" is a quality of the confidence with which one trusts life—the life which brought him into being without his asking, which sustains him whether he deserves such sustenance or not, and which will provide, in its own way, for his future. He who distrusts life, by doubting his intuitions, not momentarily but continuously, damning life for its uncertainties and brutishly demanding of life more certainty than it has to give, suffers from that "greed for views"<sup>31</sup> which makes him a ready victim for short-cut gambling schemes, from primitive black magic,

31. See *Ibid.*, Ch. IX.

through promises of eternal salvation, to contemporary "theory of games," which promise "all or none" results. Organic faith accepts its little loss (error unexplained) each day so long as it has sufficient profit (enjoyed satisfaction, proof that life is worth living even in the face of some evil and error) to sustain its confidence. Organic reconstruction proposes acceptance as sufficient unto each day the errors thereof, with enough exposure to those errors prevailing in the colleges of the intellect to share in the commonly-accepted comforts and discomforts of his time, with occasional sight-seeing trips into mankind's bigger cities and more distant countries (such travel is broadening) so he will not be completely intolerant of foreign faiths and fears. But the purpose of study and travel is to be able to live more comfortably, more confidently, in a home of his own; he who is homeless, who can trust no intuitions of his own, is a pitiful derelict.

Proof is aesthetic; the aesthetic is complete; the complete is a feeling of satisfaction. Organicism does not propose that minds should never become dissatisfied but that the goal of reconstruction is satisfaction only after dissatisfaction, a satisfaction which retains the conditioning and redirecting permanent scars of former dissatisfactions. The confidence it proposes is one disturbed by doubts which can never be wholly settled but which, nevertheless, remains steady in the face of continuing uncertainty. This attitude is one of tentativity, believing as well as doubting<sup>32</sup> and is accepted as basic to scientific method at least since the advent of pragmatism which has gone a long way toward satisfactory reconstruction in philosophy.<sup>33</sup> Although it must continue to doubt and fear the excesses of other reconstructionists, organicism is not dismayed by the prevalence of minds dominated by tyrannical temperaments, which demand completely closed systems, whether "scientific" or theological, for—unless they should happen upon some world-shattering suicidal intellectual atomic-bomb—it is confident that life itself will bring them back from time to time to intuitional sanity, to submission to common sense, to that naiveté which says "It's so just because it seems so."

But organicism is not so confident that its own hard way will find easy acceptance generally. The dialectical solution which it proposes promises that the seeming so in which we take complete-incomplete satisfaction is one which both seems so and seems not so and yields a satisfaction which is both satisfaction and dissatisfaction and proof

32. See A. J. Bahm, *Philosophy, An Introduction*, pp. 12-13, 154-156, 159-161, 165-166, 334-335.

33. See John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*.

which is both proof and not proof and demands a faith which is both warranted and yet not wholly warranted by results.

This solution requires re-examination of the so-called "law of excluded middle" which a long line of Western logicians has led Westerners to believe they must accept with complete confidence as a basic, realistic, unfailingly-reliable instrument for destruction and reconstruction. But the organic view is that the law of excluded middle both holds and does not hold, depending upon whether the middle excluded is a non-existent abstraction or is that concrete whole of existence within which the concrete opposites (yang and yin), which serve as the originating basis for opposed abstractions, have their actual being. The "law of excluded middle" is a very useful instrument, smoothed to razor-edge sharpness, for clarifying thought; but it is one thing to clarify thought and quite another to be able suddenly to slice the concrete universe into two completely different and never-to-be-reunited parts (now become, by this very act of thought, two utterly independent self-sufficient wholes). He whose allegiance to the "law of excluded middle" stems from a mania to demand more than he will get, whose tyrannical temperament wills that the concrete world conform itself to his demand for "all or none," is led naturally, whether unwittingly or willfully, to commit the simplest of logical fallacies. He automatically feels he must transform every pair of opposites into contradictories (appearance-reality, subject-object, aesthetic-incomplete, dialectical-non-dialectical, etc.); and thereby he cuts himself off from any intelligible means for reconciling or reintegrating what he believes he has thus cut asunder. His then feeble attempts to reconstruct by means of match-stick external relations bereft of glue offer him little reward; he can find no real reason why they should stay together at all, and if they do, he is left with a huge unmanageable ultimate mystery which, compared with the little doubts which originally provoked his search, should overwhelm and crush his hope completely. But the life-stuff which so ably adapts itself to daily doses of little errors is tough enough to sustain the stubborn tyrant even under the strain of almost self-destructive extremities.

Abstractly conceived, contradictories, completely excluding each other, can have nothing in common. But two contradictories, so conceived, cannot both exist; for if two things exist, they have all of the categories, i.e., the universal and necessary conditions of existence, embodied in common within them, and thus cannot be complete contradictories. Life is filled with opposition; but it finds its complete contradiction only in complete death. Those who

would make complete contradiction a basic law of life, as they seem to themselves to do of thought, would, contradictorily, and dialectically, make all life into death.

The organic view, resulting in part from sufficient realistic<sup>34</sup> curiosity to examine sympathetically oriental types of confidence, joins some of them in claiming, dialectically, that only to the extent that one can desire desirelessly can he hope for anything like complete fulfillment of his desires. Proof which is aesthetic is available only to those who demand no more than they are going to get and this means, for an organic view which sees experience forever both complete and incomplete, a willingness to be satisfied with some measure of continuing dissatisfaction. What will be required for satisfaction, or for an acceptable amount of dissatisfaction, relative to any doubt will depend, of course, upon many factors over which the truth-seeker has no control. The depth to which he has been disturbed, the intensity of his desire to quiet his disturbances, and the complexity and amount of effort required to pursue his problem, all enter into the picture. His conception of proof will be conditioned by such factors as fear, pride, his personal reputation in dealing with the problem, and the standards established by his colleagues or culture regarding what shall be accepted as proof. The standards proposed and accepted, either from others or set up by the quester himself, may be quite different, and themselves more erroneous, if conceived and formulated in the fever of his search, under terrifying fear of failure, or when ambitiously over-zealous for finality, than in terms of either the more modest original doubt or of a more quiescent perspective in which the average amount of satisfaction generally obtainable can be more sensitively appraised.

Full understanding of the nature of proof can come only from a re-examination of the nature of nirvana which, itself, is variously conceived. Yet the ideal of perfect proof as an ultimately attainable intuition of complete vacuity of both desire and satisfaction (as in Advaita, Samkhya, Yoga, Theravada, Madhyamika, and Jain *mukti*) is as impossible of attainment (in this life, with alleged rare and unreportable exceptions of *jivanmukti*) as is becoming the Christian God conceived as eternally apprehending all potential detail without confusion. But nirvana as conceived by Gotama<sup>35</sup> and Zen consists in willingness to accept life with its desires and satisfactions and dissatisfactions as what is to be expected and to expect proof as aesthetic to be found, if at all, in such a life as it lives commonsensically from day to day. Nirvana as middle-wayedness, desiring

34. See A. J. Bahm, "The Organicist Argument Regarding Inference Beyond Experience," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Dec. 1957, pp. 337-341.

35. See A. J. Bahm, *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Ch. VII.



neither more certainty nor less certainty than one is going to get, is itself an ideal not completely realizable except for moments. Life does not permit one to remain long in nirvana (hence "all is suffering"); yet the opposite extreme, denial that nirvana is possible at all, that proof is possible at all, is itself dialectically demonstrated to be absurd by the degree of assurance with which the denier asserts his denial.

Organicism advocates acceptance of proof as aesthetic, as nirvanic, and recognition that such an ideal as it advocates is not completely attainable; and it claims that such double acceptance brings one closer to the maximum possible proof, or settlement of doubt, than any other view which aims at more (as other reconstructers do) or less (as agnostics do) proof than one is going to attain. This is not surrender to blind faith (though some critics will be unable to comprehend this difference) but requires alertness or continuing watchfulness concerning how far appearances (both mere appearances and apparent realities) continue to function with pragmatic satisfaction, and this watchfulness requires sensitive attention to both objective<sup>36</sup> and subjective<sup>37</sup> factors. The intelligent man has to know (intuit and be satisfied with such intuitive proof as he has) whether he is awake or dreaming and depend upon similar common sense intuitions to decide whether proposals presenting themselves for belief or doubt are products of wild imagination or practical experience.

f. Intuition itself, organically conceived, involves both immediacy and mediacy, both aesthetic perfection and dynamic incompleteness, and hence is always a matter of variable degree, requiring dynamic alertness which, although never itself coming to rest completely, puts doubts to rest to the extent that their demands can be modulated somewhat proportionately to common sense expectancy.

## 2

Thus far, discussion of the organic view of intuition has focused upon problems involved in intuiting apparent and real or, organically, apparent-real objects. The other side of the subject-object polarity, in the meantime, has been neglected. It is time now to turn to the subject side and to inquire concerning problems involved in intuiting the apparent and real or, organically, apparent-real self or subject. In doing so, we shall inquire likewise into the roles played by aesthetic-incomplete and dialectical-nondialectical factors.

36. Such as the persisting visual bentness of the half-submerged stick.

37. Such as the willingness to accept the stick as appearing both visually bent and tactually straight at the same time.

We have already adopted the term "self-as-object" to represent the apparent self and "self-as-subject" to represent the supposed real self, although what these terms denote-connote may not exhaust what is meant by apparent and real subject.

Self, too, is discovered by trial and error, so that without some intuition of the appearance of error one would never discover himself. The life force within him, like that in a seed pushing itself above the surface of the soil, acts and such acting functions as desiring, doing and demanding, which, when rebuffed, frustrated, exhausted or pained, is dialectically forced to take account of itself as a doer and as an overdoer. It is in overdoing, and in the consequent dissatisfaction with the results of such self-assertion, that self-awareness is born. The shape in which the question, "What am I?" appears to each person may be in part peculiar to himself and due to the circumstances in which he first finds himself as an overdoer; yet also, apparently, there are sufficiently common types of excesses to yield fairly common conceptions of self-hood.

A child or naive adult, when questioned about himself, will feel that he should rise to the challenge of the question and be able to give an answer, even though he realizes that he is fumbling and failing to explicate what he believes, and be dismayed when he realizes that he has never thought much about himself or be disgusted that one should ask such a question when the answer, even though he cannot give it, should be so obvious as not to need asking. If the question is put to a more learned person, who has been indoctrinated by interpretations provided him from the various sciences, theology, literature, etc., he more or less inevitably resorts to one or another of these which happen to have impressed him most, or most favorably, or which he happens, at the moment, to recall. He remembers, for example, the physicist's claim that he consists of a body having so much mass, energy, weight and occupying so much space, or the chemist's that he is composed of varying proportions of some ninety-nine or more kinds of chemical elements and their varying compounds. Or he recalls the biologist's views about his being a product of heredity and the physiologist's about the growth and maturation of his cells and organs in response to balanced or imbalanced supplies of vitamins, hormones, and other dietary ingredients properly digested, and escape from disease or injury. If he has been exposed to psychology, he may conceive himself in terms of a complex nervous system which senses, feels, emotes, remembers, learns, all in accordance with certain principles of stimulus-response, or gestalt, or libidinous tendencies, depending upon which schools of psychology have influenced his beliefs.

His social science studies may have caused him to think of him-

self as a product of his culture,<sup>38</sup> or of his social roles<sup>39</sup> as child, sibling, male, citizen, leader, producer, taxpayer, etc. His theological instruction may have emphasized such conceptions as being a created or an eternal soul, dependent or independent of its body, sinful or pure, worthless or most worthy, free or determined, lonely or integrated into the divine nature of the universe. If he is an appreciative devotee of literature, drama, music, or the other arts, he may have been inspired to see himself as an actor on life's stage or as an artist creating and enjoying beauty, or as a music maker expressing himself in the universal language. He may have been led by the mathematician to think of himself as a deducer or as a deduction, by the logician as a definer or a definition ("essence"), or by the engineer as a machinist or a machine or, in an age of increasing specialization, as illustrative of any one of a number of more specialized structural-functional schemes, to say nothing of science fiction. The foregoing is not an exhaustive list but only suggestive of the growing myriads of explanations available for interpreting self.

But all such explanations involve the problem of whether the self so interpreted is merely another object among objects, a member of a class of objects which somehow includes itself and other selves, or whether there is also some self-as-subject which cannot be objectified and classified and interpreted. If one can recall his own visualizing of himself in terms of each of the reviewed explanations, he will note that the distinction between self-as-subject and self-as-object was largely missing and that he felt that he was intuiting himself as identical with the items enumerated in the explanation. Common-sensically, and organically, identity of self-as-subject and self-as-object, real self and apparent self, is intuitively presupposed. Thus, in a way, the problem raised here is usually no problem. Yet once it has been raised, once doubts about possible erroneous interpretation of self have arisen, the problem of the true nature of the self cannot easily be settled.

Nothing, surely, is of more central importance to a person than having a true conception of himself. Yet, and this is a major point being made here, the task of achieving such a true conception is fraught with all of the difficulties reviewed in seeking truth about apparent-real objects where the source of such quest was seen in the disturbing appearance and satisfactory disappearance of apparent error.

The organic solution conceives self as intuiting itself both imme-

38. See Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* or *Introductory Sociology*, Chs. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13.

39. See George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*.

diately and by means of mediating concepts, as intuiting itself as a complex subject-object integer which both acts as knower and yet (dialectically) captures itself within its own apprehensive scope, and as both somewhat self-satisfied with, and yet never wholly satisfied by, its own descriptive explanation of itself. This solution implies that other solutions are incomplete and hence false when stated as complete.

The other types of solution to be re-examined here are, again, realism and phenomenism.

1. Realists, who infer the existence of a real, non-apparent self behind the self as it appears, have the problem of relating truthfully the appearances (however described, e.g., in terms of whatever sciences) to the supposed underlying reality. Having distinguished, and then separated, reality from appearance and then interpreted reality in terms of abstracted (hence partial) concepts, the realist becomes unable to reconstruct an ideal whole of such real self which is satisfactory even to himself. If, in his enthusiasm for some specialized branch of science or theology, he seems to himself to approximate a satisfying ideal, he still fails to provide an adequate test of correlation of this constructed ideal with the implied real self felt as functioning as the subject providing such reconstruction.

The history of appeals by realists to extraneous assurances for their artificial claims, ranging from divine revelation, through implied but unprovable premises (such as Ideas, essences, "eternal objects"), to irresponsibly arbitrary "primitive" postulates, has led not to certainty but only to further doubt. The current hope of constructing selfless mechanical computers to think better than men aims at "solving" the problem of dealing with the supposed real self by offering evidence that the human body never needed a self in the first place and that the distinction between appearance and reality (upon which the theory of machines itself depends) was a mistake from the beginning. If one can demonstrate, however indirectly, that no real self exists, he then saves himself from the task of providing a test of truth regarding it. The "theory of types," invented by certain logical realists, reflects the extreme realist's confession of defeat, as it necessitates a theory of metalogics and metalanguages involving a fantastically infinite series of meta-selves no one of which is capable of intuiting itself without violating the alleged "vicious circle fallacy." The history of realistic psychology, during which, as is sometimes facetiously said, man has progressively lost his soul, his mind, his self, and finally consciousness, does little to restore or sustain man's common sense faith in himself.

Let us turn to an opposite variety of realism which regards self-

as-subject, and which, instead of interpreting the inferred real self in terms of appearances dealt with conceptually by the various sciences, mis-solves the problem of healing the appearance-reality breach by taking the appearance to be illusory (a predicament in which the foregoing realists also are involved but which they somehow overlook). A reminder may be needed here to save some readers from confusion due to common language habits. Whereas the terms "realism" versus "subjectivism" often express focus of attention upon objects versus subjects, here where attention has already been turned from the objective end to the subjective end of the subject-object polarity, the terms "real" and "realism" refer to an inferred self or subject behind the appearances or to a self-as-subject versus self-as-object.

The present variety of realism, illustrated most extremely by Advaita Vedanta, is able to infer the existence, for example, of Atman, the real self possessing absolutely no real attributes (*nirguna*), by denying all but illusory reality (*maya*) to its appearances. The real self cannot be described, explained, or even known (hence, dialectically, the present description of it is not a description of it, Advaita Vedanta is an explanation which is not an explanation, and all knowledge of Atman is knowledge which is not knowledge). But, instead of expressing scepticism regarding belief in such a real self, Advaita prefers to rely upon its inferences as most certain while regarding the appearances from which the inferences start as themselves inherently untrustworthy. The supposed self-intuition whereby Atman's intuition (*chit*) is identical (pure immediacy) with its being (*sat*) is inferred to be the most perfect possible; but this kind of intuition is unavailable to any living being who, at best, must take such satisfaction as he can in inadequate yogic approximations.

Both varieties of realism, at least in their extreme forms, leave us in a hopeless predicament with regard to ever achieving a living intuition of self-as-subject. The first variety failed because it tried to grasp the real self (which is in some sense a concrete whole) by means of abstracted apparent parts, and the second because, by making all non-purely-immediate apprehension (and hence all attempt at interpretation) illusory, it put true self-intuition beyond the reach of any living being.

2. If we turn, next, to phenomenalist views of how to interpret or intuit the real self, we fare no better. Extreme phenomenals are, as is to be expected, at best sceptics, normally agnostic, and, when recklessly overzealous, deniers of the existence of a real self. Without reviewing here the realistic assumptions involved in empirical, pragmatic, or coherent varieties of attempts to interpret

truth about an apparently real self by phenomenologists, we shall merely cite the claims of Theravada Buddhism as illustrating the phenomenological predicament.

Instead of heeding the caution of Gotama who, when faced with the question, "Is there a self or is there not a self?" refused to answer, Theravadins, whether drawn unwittingly or plunging greedily into making realistic assumptions, first assert unequivocally that there is no soul (*anatta*) "because all is impermanent" and then, dialectically, are forced to support this claim by asserting the existence of several varieties of permanencies, such as the law of karma and re-incarnation, law of "dependent origination" (cause and effect), an ever-flowing source out of which the mistaken consciousness of self recurrently rears (re-arises) (*bhavanga*), laws somehow fixing the number and possible arrangements of elements (*cetasikas*) constituting such consciousness,<sup>40</sup> "the state of Nibbana which is the only unchanging reality,"<sup>41</sup> and the ever-lasting job ("all is suffering") of freeing such non-existent self from its normal illusions of selfhood.

3. All of the foregoing views, realistic and phenomenological alike, mistakenly reject the demands of common sense (the source of their quest and the ultimately-to-be-satisfied judge of their answers), that a self exists as a continuing real substratum of appearance which intuitively itself genuinely, even if not totally, through its manifestations of itself to itself in and through its experiences. But the self is never alone, except for moments, but interacts with other apparent-real objects (including other apparent-real selves) which genuinely appear, even if never totally, through their manifestations to it in its experience. And experience, or whatever is experienced, is both partly an appearance and partly real, though sometimes more apparent (as in dreams) and sometimes more real (as in awareness of an approaching speeding car).

Organicism claims to accept the common sense view, yet not in its pristine rural form (except, of course, for those whose self and self-awareness is still in fact quite primitive), but idealizes a spiraling growth through urbanizing, if disillusioning, intellectual processes, with further successive re-rurifying and re-urbanizing stages until one's common sense itself comes to feel more aesthetic satisfaction with its rur-urbanized perspective than with either narrower rural or urban types of interpretation alone. One who has, by following his common sense, become aware of erroneous views

40. See J. Kashyap, *The Abhidhamma Philosophy*, Buddha-Vihara, Nalanda, 1942, 1954.

41. U Thittila in *The Path of the Buddha*, p. 84. Kenneth Morgan, Ed., Ronald Press, N.Y., 1956.

about himself, views which nevertheless emerged naturally and which are therefore not entirely erroneous, can hardly reject them entirely without thereby risking still further error. Not only did apparent error about self and objects arise naturally in the first place but also do the attempts to settle doubts and the tendency to incur still further errors in the course of such attempts continue to occur naturally. It is as natural to become a realist or a phenomenalist, an Advaitin or a Theravadin, an abstractionist or an exclusivist, under the varying circumstances which cause one to do so, as to become anything else. To err is human.

But, so organicism contends, a further maturing also naturally occurs if not prevented by (though it may also be promoted by) premature fixation of conviction accepting some partial view. But hasty conviction is what common sense desires (unless its "fingers have been burned" too often by such haste)—the widespread prevalence of enjoyment of wishful thinking stands as evidence—so the first promising solution is naturally adopted with some degree of (at least anticipatory) satisfaction, which satisfaction itself subconsciously supports the settlement of doubt and serves as "proof." It is very difficult to decide whether the tentative settlement of one's doubts has been premature, for, even in the organic view, the most ultimate satisfaction which can work maturely is a satisfaction-dissatisfaction blend (involving, dialectically, some satisfaction with dissatisfaction). Hence the organic view can hardly expect to offer much appeal to those whose faith in their view, no matter how partial and inadequate from an organic perspective, already provides them with a degree of satisfaction (especially if this be buttressed by the additional comfort felt in belonging to a culturally approved community of believers). No matter how false the future may prove his explanation, one whose present view provides any success in settling his most painful doubts will have little incentive to hear the comparatively feeble, because flickering (between satisfaction and dissatisfaction), organic promises. So long as there are views which promise complete cessation of doubt, the organic promise of only partial satisfaction, intermingled permanently with some dissatisfaction, will go unheeded, if not ridiculed.

Acceptance of the organic view must wait, relying largely upon the "tongs of fate"<sup>42</sup> to reveal inherent inadequacy in every one-sided extreme. This kind of process takes its own time (and toll, for every extremism, pressed too far, is self-destructive). Many are lost, or are long on their way; for some trusters, no matter how reluctantly, prefer suicide to return to the painful discomforts of uncertainty if these appear fearful enough; while others, having

42. See Fritz Kunkel, *God Helps Those . . .*, p. 135.

been fooled and frustrated again and again by each interpretation trusted, frantically turn and distrust all trust, revolt against trust itself, reversing their direction completely—or so they seem to themselves. But, dialectically, the rejecter has again become, even if unwittingly, a truster, albeit a truster in distrust (already he is tasting one of the permanent ingredients promised by the organic view). If he has been hard-bitten, then (but this too takes its time and toll) the greater or more extreme his trust in distrust the greater the shock in store for him when he discovers that he cannot escape trust (and the additional error of thinking that he can be without trust) in this direction either. In such a state of shock, he may or may not realize that he is now back, and yet far from back, in his original predicament where he first felt uncomfortable in the face of apparent error, and doubt, which will not completely settle itself. How intelligently or unintelligently he responds, for variations range from violent tantrum to hopeless pessimistic resignation, will depend upon how willingly he is able to face and accept his situation. If he is no more willing now than originally, his quest for certainty must continue and he is due for more irritating anxieties. He is not ready for salvation, nirvana, surcease, or that peace which passeth all understanding. Panic will get him nowhere, nor will tranquilizers which (like opium, liquor, dazzling distractions, or craven submission to authority) do not solve his problem, but merely postpone its solution.

Teachers may help, but teachers themselves are commonly caught in the toils of explanatory doubts, and when the blind lead the blind little gain is to be expected. Teachers, psychiatrists, ministers may, because of their great faith in human nature and the self-healing power of its common sense, happen to be great healers (like Gotama; or Jesus: "thy faith hath made thee whole"; "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof"). But too many are upholders of some doctrine, some explanation, with its own greater, no matter how carefully hidden, errors, and may so uphold its truth that they are willing to subordinate, even crush, the human spirit into submissive assent to it. Too many have forgotten, or have never learned, that explanations are made for men, not men for explanations.

### C

Organicism, paradoxically, must claim itself to be an explanation which is not an explanation; and he who takes it merely as an explanation makes it, and would make it make of itself, merely another more egregious set of errors; but he who is willing to take



it as "not an explanation" but as an expression of man's willingness to err as much as he does err, and itself as much an error as it is in error, thereby both is and is not an organicist. He becomes, also paradoxically, more organic, and more an embodiment of organicism, as he comes more to care not whether he is or is not an organicist. The organic view is more completely embodied in one who knowingly cares not too much whether he is or is not an organicist than in one who is anxious to have it acclaimed as *the* truth; for the intensity of a would-be organicist's desire to assert its superiority as an explanation is a measure of his insistence upon departure from the spirit of common sense which, in its most wholesome form, is pervaded by a considerable degree of "come what may."

To remain true to rur-urbanized common sense, organicism must recognize itself as both a necessary (i.e., natural) consequence (of the common sense demand that one try to explain apparent error) and yet somewhat futile (since no explanation, not even organicism, can serve as an adequate substitute for, or reproduction of, life's living itself in its own way). Organicism claims that life itself naturally motivates search for self-understanding. This search also naturally sprouts the ideal that such understanding be complete. Life then frustrates attempts to achieve that ideal. Such frustration<sup>43</sup> may lead eventually<sup>44</sup> to a final<sup>45</sup> ideal<sup>46</sup> of being willing<sup>47</sup> to live with-or-without ideals and be happy<sup>48</sup> with the semi-satisfactory semi-unsatisfactory answers which he gets. Man should understand that he is both an understander and misunderstander and that he should both enjoy-and-not-enjoy his comfortable-uncomfortable predicament-which-is-also-not-a-predicament as the goal-which-is-also-not-a-goal (but a prospect for continuing) as what he actually wants. Man should discover himself as a mistake-maker who finally expects that it is a mistake to desire to be freed from all mistake-making. To accept some mistake-making as one's ultimate lot is not to be freed from all ideals but is to attain the ideal that not all ideals can or should be attained. Only when one has become satisfied with this kind of paradox will he have returned-and-yet-not-quite-returned to his original, naive, not-greatly-disturbed common sense.

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43. Which may first beget another also-to-be-frustrated ideal that one can live wholly without ideals.

44. With ease or difficulty, or varying degrees of ease-difficulty.

45. But also infinal, continuing, and often-needing-to-be-relearned.

46. Which, to the extent it is achieved, actualized, lived, is no longer an ideal, and to the extent that it cannot be achieved should be given up and not held as an ideal.

47. And yet not wholly willing.

48. Or happily unhappy.

## V. SUMMARY OF TYPES

WE MAY NOW summarize the types of intuition examined in this study, and the types of theory which emphasize, even to the point of exclusiveness, each of these types.

### A

The most general and most basic classification, and one which has served to outline this study, distinguishes "objective," "subjective," and "organic" types of intuition. The distinction is based upon the simple and widespread observation that experience involves both a knower and a known, or that intuition involves both intuiter and intuited, which have come to be called, in both common and technical literature, "subject" and "object."

To speak of an "objective" type of intuition is to refer, first of all, to the simple, obvious, and universally understood, even if not universally agreed upon, view that "objects" may be intuited. "Objectivists," those who focus their attention upon intuition of objects and interpret it, variously, as the most common or most important or most reliable or most ultimate kind of intuition, may become extremists and assert that objective intuition is the only kind of intuition or that all intuition is of objects.

To speak of a "subjective" type of intuition is to refer to the view that the "subject" or intuiter may be intuited, a reference involving considerable risk of confusing the subject as intuiter with the subject treated as another kind of object. Careful and persistent "subjectivists," those who focus their interest in the subtle and more-difficult-to-understand intuition of a subject by itself, tend rather strongly to idealize the extreme or perfect self-intuition where intuiter and intuited attain, or collapse into, pure immediacy. Subjective intuition is perfect only when the subject so immediately and completely grasps its own being that no distinction between it as grasper and as grasped exists. Completely perfect subjective intuition is the only (completely true) type of intuition for here alone can immediacy exist uninfected with mediacy, otherness, or differentiation; hence all (completely true) intuition is of and by subjects, or subjective intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition.

To speak of an "organic" type of intuition is to refer to "subject" and "object" or "intuiter" and "intuited" occurring together as "subject-object" or "intuiter-intuited" aspects of "an or any experience" or "an or any intuition," and to intuition as "organic" so long as "intuiter" and "intuited" are considered as partly different, or differentiated, and partly the same, or undifferentiated, aspects of the "intuition."<sup>40</sup> "Organicism" is that type of theory which claims that an adequate understanding of intuition requires keeping attention focused continuously upon both such difference and such sameness even though these vary in significance and attendability. It claims that intuition cannot be fully understood, or be, apart from what is intuited and cannot be understood, or be, apart from an intuiter, and thus that if either intuiter or intuited disappear, intuition ceases, or if either intuiter or intuited is neglected, understanding of intuition ceases to be adequate.

Does organicism also involve a tendency toward an extreme? (Non-organicists may be quick to point out, "yes," for the tendency to go to extremes is human, normal, and the organicist too naturally succumbs to this tendency and hence organicism too, even by organicistic standards, is no better than other theories which it condemns because they tend toward and go to extremes. But organicism claims for itself, as is to be expected, a difference which modulates, even though it does not completely destroy, this criticism.) First of all, organicism gives not an unequivocal "no," nor even an unequivocal "yes," but, typically, a "yes and no." It idealizes avoidance of extremes and, dialectically, accepts also the ideal of avoidance of extreme avoidance of extremes. Men naturally vary in their devotion to opposites (e.g., waking and sleeping, exertion and rest) both of which are essential to their natures. (One who always sleeps exactly as much as he is awake is, if he exists at all, a very odd character.) One who goes to extremes occasionally is, dialectically, less an extremist than one who extremely avoids extremes. In fact, one cannot, dialectically, extremely avoid extremes without thereby also being an extremist. Hence, organicism idealizes the tendency to avoid extremes and thereby admits that one who goes to extremes occasionally fulfils, dialectically, this ideal more than one who never goes to extremes. The organicist "no" is thus a dialectical "no," which means that it is also, in a sense, a "yes."

Not to be overlooked is a dialectical implication of its own criticism of objectivism and subjectivism; for organicism must admit

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49. "Both subjective and objective are given us as ultimate facts of experience, and it is only prudent to take the view that they will both have to be included in any synthesis to which we finally attain." Lawrence Hyde, *An Introduction to Organic Philosophy*, p. 59. The Omega Press, Reigate, Surrey, 1955.

that people at times do forget to attend to both objective and subjective aspects of intuition, otherwise the first two theories would never have occurred to anyone and, without them, its own reason for being, as a contentious theory trying to overcome their inadequacies, would never have emerged. Hence, for it to deny that people ever go to extremes would be to destroy, dialectically, the very foundations upon which it is built as a critical theory.

If the organic theory defines organic intuition in such a way that "if either intuiter or intuited disappears intuition itself ceases," it implies that organic intuition is the only kind of intuition or that all intuition is organic. So stated, it appears to be just as extreme (as much "all" and "only") as each of the first two extremes. If it should appear to seek to make excuses for itself for such apparent extremeness (which is not just occasional or dialectical but a definitional, hence universal, extremity), it is bound to fail. Its own evaluation of such criticism is again in terms of "both"; it is extreme in one sense ("all") but not in another sense ("only"). It sees its own failure to refrain from positive extremity as a universal (common to all theories) failure rather than one peculiarly its own, and sees itself as more successful in achieving its claims because it takes such expected lack of success into consideration in framing its aims. To the extent that it seeks to be a theory, i.e., to interpret, explain, define, it must admit that it is caught in trying to be universal, hence extreme. Since it frames itself by incorporating both of the previous extremes in their positive form, namely, that "all intuition is of objects" and "all intuition is of and by subjects" when it states that "apart from either . . . intuition disappears," its own extremity does not exceed their joint positive extremities.

But on the other hand the organic view avoids both extremes in their negative forms, namely, that "objective intuition is the only kind of intuition" and "subjective intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition," by denying both "onlys" through asserting that both "subject and object occur together as subject-object." Each of the two views is basically true in the sense that it is based on an intuition, or a commonly-repeated kind of intuition, and hence is at least partly self-evident. Now each view, by denying what is self-evident in the other, thereby denies something which is at least partly self-evident. The organic view, on the other hand, in addition to being based in its own (subject-object) intuition (which also is denied by each of the other views in their extreme forms), not only does not deny the basic intuitions of the other two but, by accepting both, denies only the inferences which extremists draw from them regarding inclusiveness requiring exclusiveness (i.e., if

"all intuition is of objects" then "none is of subjects" or if "all [completely true] intuition is of subjects" then "none is of objects").

If the organic view appears to be extreme in seeking to affirm only the positive assertions of other theories, one should recall 1) its typical partial acceptance of both of each pair of opposites including the positive-negative opposite, and 2) its partially resigned acceptance of negation as inescapable, e.g.: a) its recognition that any two (or more) positives involve, in their being, that each is not the other and, in any adequate description of them, some statement of such negation; b) its claim that intuition itself, consisting actually in both immediacy and mediacy, each of which is not the other, involves negation as self-evidently as affirmation; c) its conception of the subject-object or intuiter-intuited aspects of intuition as embodying both sameness and difference (negation) requires continuing presence of some minimal degree of negation in all intuition; d) its inability to differentiate between itself and the other two views, and these two views from each other, without presupposing (hence implicitly affirming) negation; e) its awareness that, dialectically, negation of negation is still negation and that any further attempt to escape, by denying (negating) its negation of negation, involves it in dialectically still deeper negative presupposition; and f) its expectation of failure (partial "success-failure" failure) in interpreting, explaining, defining (for itself as well as for other theories), in replacing other theories which did, do, and will prevail, and in achieving general acceptance (in making excuses for such apparent extremeness); all involve some degree of negation.

Organicism, finding itself involved in dialectic and noting that all other types of theories either deny dialectical involvement, i.e., in their extreme forms, or are embarrassed by dialectical involvement, i.e., in their modified or less extreme forms (which have not been elaborated here), both accepts dialectic as universal and the embarrassment of other theories as support for its own unembarrassed acceptance of dialectic. It seems worth while to summarize ways in which these three theories are involved in dialectic.

To say, as extreme objectivists do, that "objective intuition is the only kind of intuition," implying that there is no intuition of subjects (except as objects; and that intuition of a subject as an object in no way constitutes intuition of the subject as a subject), implies further that no knower can know that he is the knower of what he knows or, if "knowledge" be somehow different from intuition, at least that no intuiter can intuit himself as the intuiter of what is intuited. The extreme objectivist, then, is involved dialectically in the predicament that he as intuiter can never intuit who, if anyone,

or even whether no one, himself, someone else, or both himself and someone else, is doing his own intuiting.

If he resorts, as some do, to a "theory of types," which claims that he may intuit himself as an object which was the subject of a previous intuition but is not the subject of the present intuition, he then has to explain how his mysterious dialectic-like backwards jump takes place in such a way that the intuiter which is intuiting and the intuiter which has just intuited can have nothing in common; for if they have something in common, which is intuited in intuiting the self as object, then some, i.e., this much, of the intuiter as intuiter is intuited in intuiting the intuiter as intuited (!) and the theory of types is "violated" or refuted. Does not his claiming that he knows (intuits) that intuiter as intuiter and intuiter as intuited have nothing in common (or, less extremely, are not each other in every way) involve him in intuiting, even if only negatively, the intuiter as intuiter; for if his negative intuition is true, then he must grasp the intuiter as intuiter somewhat, i.e., enough to make his negative intuition true; and the "theory of types" again is refuted.

Modified objectivists, who admit the charges in the foregoing criticisms and the egocentric predicament, are embarrassed, then, not by the contradictions of extremists but by the necessity of admitting the presence of dialectic which, like a skeleton in the closet, they wish to keep out of sight as much as possible while organicists seek to expose it as much as possible. The organicist is convinced that, once the dialectical camel's head is admitted into the objectivist's tent (or closet), further patient, persistent penetration will reveal dialectic to be omnipresent and evident to all who are willing to look with common sense intuition, i.e., willing to do more than peep fearfully out from behind self (or culturally) imposed blindfolds.

Turning to extreme subjectivists, who say that "subjective intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition" because immediacy can be complete only if no distinction exists between intuiter and intuited, we find also a desire to avoid dialectic which plagues them, so they believe, all the way until they have eliminated the last glimmer of mediacy. To the extent that an intuiter is different from itself as intuited, that difference constitutes an element of mediacy and diminishes, dilutes, reduces, the self-containedness and self-evidentness constituting intuition. But if intuition were complete, it could not be known either to be or to be complete where "knowledge" involves as much differentiation between subject and object as was intuited at the beginning of our quest. Without some continuing distinction between subject and object,

dialectical critics claim, the foundational problem to which extreme subjectivism claims to be an answer disappears and, hence, the very foundation upon which extreme subjectivism was built collapses.

Extreme subjectivism recognizes that, even though it aims to realize its ideal perfectly, until that time comes (and it has not yet come so long as one is still worrying about the problem or is aware that there is a problem), one is actually involved in imperfect intuitions (involving mediacy and dialectic). Every common sense intuition is infected by mediacy, but the degree of its truth is determined by the degree to which the intuiter is intuiting himself as intuiter rather than as an object (or, worse, as merely an object among other objects). All actual evidence available to the extreme subjectivist is, then, not wholly self-evident, and for conceiving his ideal of perfect intuition he must depend upon inference or mediation. He is, and usually knows that he is, in a serious intellectual predicament: Since perfect intuition (pure immediacy) can tolerate no distinctions and since no theory can be stated without involving distinctions, his theory of perfect self-evidence cannot be perfectly self-evident and perfect self-evidence cannot be self-evidently expressed in any theory.

Furthermore, to the extent that extreme subjectivism implies opposition to objectivisms (all, extreme or otherwise), such opposition entails mediacy; and any achievement of pure immediacy would entail a collapse of all distinction, including the distinction between extreme subjectivism as a theory and all other (opposing) theories—a conclusion which appears absurd even to the extreme subjectivist himself so long as he continues to think about the problem or so long as common sense intuition has any serious hold upon him. His apparent uncomfortable (unwilling) willingness to accept such absurdity as somehow necessarily foundational to his proposed escape from it is interpreted, by organicists, to be a consequence of his prior and continuing unwillingness to accept dialectic as a natural aspect of intuition in the first place. But his original and continuing unwillingness to accept dialectic dialectically leads him into still greater absurdity which (even though he may seek deliberately to close his eyes to it) continues to entail the very dialectic which he wishes to reject, and the more intolerable his predicament becomes the more intensely he longs for his mistakenly idealized perfect freedom from tension.

Organicism (to conclude this summary of subjective-objective views) finds itself more comfortable accepting dialectic (if not "from the very beginning" at least as a conclusion involved in its desire and willingness to "return to the beginning to which it cannot wholly return") as acceptable to that common sense which persists

in being not wholly acceptable to itself. Intuition is immediacy, and consists in self-evidence; but actually intuition is never known to occur (intuited as intuition) without some mediacy, including some dialectic; for, minimally, intuition involves some distinction between intuer and what is intuited, and the intuer somehow intuiting himself as the intuer of what is intuited, and, hence, some dialectic. Organicism, advocating acceptance of actual, rather than ideal, intuition (thereby, dialectically, idealizing actual intuition), accepts such actual intuition as self-evidently not-wholly-self-evident (and, thus, self-evidently dialectical).

### B

The second set of types of intuition summarized here (the set which received most detailed treatment in the foregoing study) is based on the distinction between appearance and reality. The types of intuition have been called "apparent," "real," and "organic," and the types of theory emphasizing each of these types of intuition have been called "phenomenalism," "realism," and "organicism."

To speak of an "apparent" type of intuition is to refer to intuition of appearance or of what appears or is present in experience, awareness, consciousness, regardless of whether what appears appears as an object, as a subject, or as a subject-object, in the senses previously discussed. "Phenomenalists," those who focus their attention upon intuition of appearances as the most common, most important, or most ultimate kind of intuition, calling them "phenomena," may or may not become extremists who hold that intuition of appearances is the only kind of intuition (only appearance can be intuited) or that all intuition is of appearances.

To speak of a "real" type of intuition is to refer to intuition of what is "real," i.e., beyond appearance, regardless of whether what is real is regarded as an object, as a subject, or as a subject-object, in the senses discussed above. "Realists," those who focus their attention upon intuition of real beings as the most common, most important, or most ultimate kind of intuition, may or may not become extremists, holding that intuition of the real (subject, object, subject-object) is the only (completely true) kind of intuition (only the real can be truly intuited) or all (completely true) intuition is of the real.

To speak of an "organic" type of intuition, relative to the distinction between appearance and reality, is to refer to that grasping of the distinction which attends to both sides of the apparent-real distinction at once, grasping them as interdependent, i.e., both de-



pendent upon each other (for neither could be distinct from the other without depending upon the other as something to be distinct from) and independent of the other (for the distinction of each from the other presupposes a genuine difference). "Organicists," who focus attention upon organic apparent-real intuition (of objects, subjects, subject-objects in the senses discussed above) as the most common, most important, and most ultimate kind of intuition, may or may not become extremists, holding that organic apparent-real intuition is the only kind of intuition or that all intuition is organic apparent-real intuition.

Summary of the ways in which phenomenism, realism, and organicism are involved in dialectic seems worthwhile:

To say, as extreme phenomenists do, that "intuition of appearances is the only kind of intuition (only appearance can be intuited)," implying that there can be no intuition of what is real except apparent realities which are apparent only and not beyond appearance, implies further that intuition of the distinction between appearance and reality is impossible since such an intuition would involve the appearance of that which is beyond appearance. But to deny the possibility of intuiting this distinction is to deny the experiential foundation upon which phenomenism, as a theory designed to take sides in the appearance-reality (phenomenalism-realism) controversy, rests. If the distinction between appearance and reality is not a true or reliable distinction in the first place, then the truth or reliability of phenomenism, as resting upon such prior truth or reliability, must itself be called into question.

Hence phenomenists, by trying to escape from the dialectical paradox of intuiting apparent realities as both apparent and real, merely involve themselves more deeply in dialectical difficulties by going to extremes. Being dissatisfied with partial certainty (intuition that appearances appear) and partial certainty of uncertainty (intuition that appearances of realities, which are not wholly apparent, appear), they seek, and claim, to achieve complete certainty (intuition of appearances only, without intuition of any, except illusory, apparent realities). But this claim, dialectically, presupposes knowledge (either intuited or intuitively unfounded) about the rest of the world being unable to appear, thereby implying realistic assumptions of an even greater magnitude than those they wish to avoid. Furthermore, phenomenism, in claiming that "intuition of appearance is the only kind of intuition," either limits (condemns) itself, as a theory, to being an appearance only, and saying nothing about the real or about the relation of the real to

the apparent, or claims some other-than-intuitive knowledge of the real, which knowledge, being not intuitive, is uncertain, and hence again its quest for certainty ends in uncertainty.

To say, as extreme realists do, that "intuition of the real is the only (completely true) kind of intuition" is to imply that the intuited distinction between the apparent and the real which gave rise to the idea of the real, and then to realism, in the first place is not a (completely true) kind of intuition (because involving appearance) and is to imply further that realism itself is not a completely true theory to the extent that it rests upon an originating intuition which is not completely true. Hence realists, by trying to escape from the dialectical paradox of having to intuit the apparently real merely involve themselves more deeply in dialectical difficulties by going to extremes. Being dissatisfied with partial lack of truth<sup>50</sup> he seeks, and claims, to achieve completely true intuition only by eliminating illusory appearance completely, forgetting often that only appearance can be directly apprehended and that what is completely beyond appearance must be apprehended only indirectly and hence cannot be intuited at all. Such an extremely realistic theory of intuition dialectically implies elimination of intuition entirely (so far as using it to attain complete truth is concerned)—and, incidentally, it may be noted how pervasive and persistent is the Western faith in extreme realism by observing the very unpopularity of intuition in Western philosophies as well as of dialectic whose function it is to call attention to this shortcoming.

To say, as extreme organicists do, that "all organic apparent-real intuition is the only kind of intuition" also involves dialectic, e.g., that "organic apparent-real intuition" must itself be intuited (and more than merely intuited) as involving both the apparent and the real, i.e., that organic intuitions, and organicism as a theory, must both appear and appear to be true (involving the distinction between the apparent and the real and mutual fidelity to each other) without appearing to be completely true (for if either the apparent or the real appeared as completely faithful to the other, error, ever-recurring error, would disappear). Error does disappear, but only for moments—for long enough to instigate hope in those who would eliminate it forever, but not for long enough to eliminate all basis for those who are cynical of ever achieving any truth. Organicism "saves itself" from the discomfort of paradoxicalness in dialectic by accepting such paradoxicalness as part of what is to be expected. If one's expectations are truer when he expects both truth and

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50. Since the real is beyond appearance, the realist thinks he must go beyond appearance in order to intuit the real as it truly is or to get a completely true intuition of it.

error than when he hopes for either truth alone or error alone, or truer when he expects to experience both the apparent and the real than when he hopes to experience either only the apparent or only the real, then organicism seems to itself, even when extreme, to be truer than either extreme phenomenism or extreme realism. No theory can fail to be true somewhat, i.e., have some intuitive basis for itself, and no theory can be wholly without error (i.e., involve some doubts which cannot be settled finally) because, as a theory, it must go beyond what is intuited, and must make some realistic assumptions which will continue to be problematical.

### C

The third set of types of intuition summarized here is based on the distinction between what is experienced as complete in itself (called "aesthetic") and what is experienced as incomplete in itself and as insufficient without something more to complete it. No names, except "complete" or "aesthetic," "incomplete," and "organic" (here meaning both complete and incomplete or complete-incomplete), have been used to designate these three types of intuition and no technical terms commonly prevail to name the three corresponding types of theories of intuition emphasizing each of these three types of intuition.

To speak of an "aesthetic" type of intuition is to refer to intuition which is felt as complete in itself. Feelings of completeness may or may not be experienced as perfectly complete; that is, there are degrees of completeness and what is felt as complete may be felt as more or less complete, without such degree of completeness ceasing to be felt as complete in that degree. No discussion of the kinds of incompleteness (and hence of completeness) is included here, although it may be pointed out that there are many kinds. To illustrate, an experience may be felt as having left something behind, as being as yet unfulfilled, as being insufficiently inclusive, or as lacking in value or quality. Hence an experience may be "aesthetic" without being merely, or wholly, or perfectly aesthetic; i.e., the aesthetic may be an aspect of or an ingredient in an experience. Those who would focus attention upon aesthetic intuition as the most common, most important, or most ultimate kind of intuition may or may not become extremists who hold that aesthetic intuition is the only kind of intuition or that all intuition is aesthetic.

To speak of an "incomplete" type of intuition is to refer to intuition which is felt as incomplete in itself. Those who would focus attention upon incomplete intuition as the most common, most

important, or most ultimate kind of intuition may or may not become extremists who hold that incomplete intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition or that all (completely true) intuition is incomplete.

To speak of an "organic" type of intuition, relative to the distinction between aesthetic and incomplete types, is to refer to intuition which is felt as both complete and incomplete at the same time (but "at the same time" adds nothing, since intuition is already "all at once") or as having both aesthetic and incomplete aspects. Organacists, who focus attention upon intuition of such joint "aesthetic-incomplete" intuition as the most common, most important, and most ultimate kind of intuition, may or may not become extremists who hold that such complete-incomplete intuition is the only kind of intuition or that all intuition is complete-incomplete.

Each of these three types of theories of intuition as complete, incomplete, or both, involves dialectic:

To say that "aesthetic intuition is the only kind of intuition," although not said without some reason, nevertheless involves dialectical difficulties. Reason for the assertion may be found in the very "definition" of intuition in the first place. If intuition is "immediacy or directness of apprehension" (p. 1) and "all-at-once" (p. 5) and if "mediacy ends where mediation begins" (p. 1), then it is easy to associate immediacy with completeness and mediacy with incompleteness and to conclude that intuition is completeness of apprehension whereas incompleteness involves inference. But if "aesthetic intuition is the only kind of intuition" means that only completeness can be intuited and not incompleteness, then an intuition could not be aesthetic since the very meaning of "aesthetic" as complete inherently involves its distinctness from incompleteness and thus without intuition of the distinction, including at least some of the meaning of incompleteness, the meaning of completeness itself is incomplete.

If an intuition were so complete (i.e., dialectically, completely complete), not only would it be experienced 1) as perfect, with no hint of imperfection anywhere else, 2) as self-sufficient, with no suggestion of possible insufficiency in anything, 3) as eternal or timeless, but not timeless in the sense of being opposed to time for even a negative awareness of time would imply incompleteness of passage, past, and future, 4) as pure internality, without externality or beyondness or even any taint of dependence of internality upon externality, 5) as absolute, without such absoluteness being even slightly infected with relation to relativity, 6) as utterly self-evident, without tincture of uncertainty or shadow of doubt or even the faintest distinction between self-evidence and its opposite, and 7) as

peaceful, without trace of anxiety or uneasiness or even of a previous unsatisfied desire now being satisfied, but also "one would have to be dead in order to have such an experience."

One can describe such an ideal of perfect completeness, but only by projecting to its extreme by progressive abstraction<sup>51</sup> one side of the normally intuited double-aspect complete-incomplete distinction. Advaita, Yoga and Madhyamika descriptions of Nirvana correctly infer complete absence, not only of all awareness of incompleteness, but complete absence of all content, other than uncharacterized (*nirguna*) being, which might in any way involve it in implications which are, by their very nature, incomplete. Yet neither can one say of such purely aesthetic intuition that it apprehends pure actuality, if this implies as an opposite, either anything impure or unactual. Rather, the most one can say, using the method of progressive abstraction again, negatively, is that it neither is actual, nor is not actual, nor is both actual and not actual, nor is neither actual nor not actual.<sup>52</sup>

Nirvana, so conceived, is believed to be intuitable only beyond life, except, perhaps, in rare and dubious cases of *jivanmukti* (enjoying contentless Nirvana while still alive) and few of those (such as Mahavira, The Jaina, and Gotama, The Buddha) who have "returned" have wanted to or been able to describe the goal in any way approaching accuracy in other than merely negative terms. Furthermore, both Nirvana and *jivanmukti* have other, more understandable, more achievable, and more desirable, as well as intuitively more certain (i.e., evident in living institutions) descriptions—as in the philosophy of Gotama, the man, and in Zen. Extremists cannot allow a single element or degree of incompleteness into their aesthetic tent without thereby admitting the camel's head of organicism. Dialectically, extremists would have to be dead to achieve their goal, for life, by its very nature is incomplete, and to intuit life as it is being lived is to intuit such incompleteness. To live is to be, not unaesthetic, but never wholly or merely or purely aesthetic.

To say that "incomplete intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition," although not without some reason, nevertheless involves dialectical difficulties. Reason for the assertion has already been suggested. To live is to adjust, i.e., is both to change and to endure: to change is to be incomplete until all change is completed;

51. Cf. A. N. Whitehead on "extensive abstraction," *The Concept of Nature*, pp. 65, 79, and *Process and Reality*, pp. 454-459.

52. See P. T. Raju, "The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, June, 1954, pp. 694-713. See also my *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Ch. VIII.

to endure is to continue until all continuing has stopped. Life by its very nature is incomplete; only death completes life completely. All living intuition is itself incomplete and all intuition of what is living is intuition of incompleteness. So any intuition which grasps what is as it is, i.e., as dynamic, must both grasp it as dynamic, incomplete, and itself be a dynamic, incomplete, grasp. The truest intuitions are those in which a dynamic life most completely apprehends its own flow, growth, change, direction, tendency. Bergson, perhaps more outstandingly than any other philosopher, has expressed the contrast between living intuitions and static concepts<sup>53</sup> though various romanticists, existentialists and pragmatists have done likewise.

But all of these views, to the extent that they tend toward the extreme, "incomplete intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition," face dialectical dilemma. On the one hand, if to be "completely true" is to be complete in one sense, then incomplete intuition cannot be completely true without being complete in that sense, but it must be complete in one sense if it is to be as incomplete as it is in another sense. On the other hand, if such would-be extremists nevertheless admit that intuition is always incomplete in both of the foregoing senses, do they not thereby confess 1) that their theory as a theory cannot be intuited to be, and cannot be, completely true, and that 2) their attempt to escape completeness completely always ends in recapture by completeness in some other sense (since being "incomplete in both of the foregoing senses" is to be more completely incomplete than if not in both senses and, as was intended by the admission, being somewhat incomplete in all senses is to be complete, i.e., as "all," in still another sense)? (Also, for those who consider "complete" and "incomplete" as contradictories, their assertion that intuition is always incompletely incomplete involves them in the further predicament of saying that, to the extent that it is incompletely incomplete, it is not completely incomplete but partly complete.)

To say that "organic (complete-incomplete) intuition is the only kind of intuition," although not without some reason, also involves dialectical difficulties; but these become for it "difficulties which are not difficulties" or both difficulties and not difficulties because, on the one hand, to the extent that they are foreseen and accepted as part of what is to be expected and to the extent that desires are modulated in such a way as not to avoid such difficulties, they then become not difficulties in the way they are difficulties to those who seek to evade them, even though, on the other hand, they do not

53. See Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics, Creative Evolution, Time and Free Will*.

cease to be difficulties entirely, for to refuse to recognize a difficulty for what it is would itself be to desire something other than what will be and, thereby, to create further difficulty for oneself. Reason for this assertion is to be found partly in the reasons given as evidence supporting the two previous theories as positive assertions, i.e., "all intuition is aesthetic" and "all (completely true) intuition is incomplete," and partly (if not wholly) in direct awareness of intuition (involving, dialectically, intuition of intuition), either of the (now inferred) original intuition of the distinction between complete and incomplete upon which the controversy and each of the three theories is founded or of any intuition which the reader happens to examine.

Organicism accepts the positive claim of the aesthetic extremist, that "all intuition is aesthetic," but rejects his negative claim that "aesthetic intuition is the only kind of intuition," which implies that there can be no intuition of incompleteness. Organicism accepts the positive claim of the "incomplete" extremist, that "all (completely true) intuition is incomplete," but rejects his negative claim that "incomplete intuition is the only (completely true) kind of intuition," which implies that there can be no (completely true) aesthetic intuition. Organicism claims, positively, that "all intuition is both complete and incomplete" or has both complete and incomplete aspects, even though these aspects vary in significance in such a way that at times what is intuited is almost wholly aesthetic and at others it is almost wholly incomplete. That all intuition is complete may be either directly observed (intuited in each intuition) or inferred: what is intuited must at least be intuited as being what it is or in such a way that "it is what it is"<sup>54</sup> is true of it (for such experience of "is what it is" involves some sense of completeness). That all intuition is incomplete may be either directly observed (intuited in each intuition) or inferred: what is intuited either as happening (becoming or/and becoming not) or as continuing (as *being*) involves time which must be experienced as incomplete.

Extreme organicism claims, negatively, that "organic (complete-incomplete) intuition is the only kind of intuition," thereby appearing to be as extreme in its way as the other two extreme theories are in their way (even more so, i.e., doubly extreme, because it denies two other extremes). This is true, in a sense, for all extremists are alike in being extremists and there is no way of escaping such likeness. An extreme which denies two other extremes is, in a sense, more extreme in its denials than one which denies only one other extreme; but, of course, each of the other theories denies extreme

54. In any tense of "is" or of any verb.

organicism too, so each is also similarly doubly extreme, even though the ways in which they denied organicism have not been discussed.


However, in another sense, even extreme organicism is not as extreme as either of the first two theories as extremes, for although it does deny each of them as extremes, it does not deny them, but rather asserts them, in their non-extreme forms (i.e., affirms each as "all" but denies each only as "only"), whereas they, as extremes, deny organicism both in its extreme and non-extreme forms. Organicism, even extreme organicism, is both extreme and not extreme (or is extreme-not-extreme) for it affirms both of the other opposing theories in their affirmations and denies them only in their denials (of each other and of organicism) whereas they deny both what is affirmed (by both organicisms and each other) and what is denied (by both organicism and by each other); hence each of these other extremes is at least quadruply negative, and extreme, or is extremely extreme.

#### D

This summary, which has been limited to three sets of three types of intuition and theories of intuition (objective, subjective, organic; apparent, real, organic; aesthetic, incomplete, organic), must terminate with a mere mention of other sets of types of intuition, and of theories of intuition, suggested, but not developed, here: immediate, mediated, organic; uncertain, certain, organic; erroneous, true, organic; concrete, abstract, organic; naive (rural), sophisticated (urban), organic (rur-urban); simple, complex, organic; transparent, opaque, organic; self-evident, not-self-evident, organic; and dialectical, non-dialectical, organic. There are many other kinds of intuition, "as many as there are kinds of things which are apprehended," (p. 2), and, relative to each, one can discover-create a set of three types of theories of intuition.

Organicism, as will have become obvious from the repetitious recurrence of the term "organic" in the different classifications, is itself both a single theory and several different theories; each of the theories called "organic" is both like and different from every other theory here called "organic"—like in embodying certain common characteristics and different in being about a different set of opposing theories.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup>. Organicism is treated further in Bahm, *Philosophy, An Introduction*, Ch. XX and p. 439.





<b>Borrower's name (Block letters)</b>	<b>Signature &amp; date</b>
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