


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WAR-TIME IN THE S



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By F. A. EDWARDS, F.R.G.S.

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The present article is, we believe, the first that has appeared upon this subject as a whole. The light that it throws on subsequent events in adjoining countries of the Near East will no doubt commend it to our readers' special attention.]

THE European War broke out at an unfortunate time for the Sudan. In 1912 and 1913 the country had suffered from low flood and poor rains; during the first half of 1914 a shortage of dhurra, the staple food of the bulk of the native population, caused considerable distress, and in some districts of Dongola, Khartoum, and the White and Blue Nile Provinces famine conditions prevailed for a time. But the Government imported millet from India, and thus tided over the period till the harvest of the crops. After the failure of the crops caused by the low Nile in 1913, the Dongola Province was visited by a murrain of cattle and a plague of locusts. Rinderpest was very bad in Mongalla Province to the south, and in the Nuba Mountains Province the cattle-owning Arabs lost severely from pleuro-pneumonia among their herds. Various measures were taken by the Government to contend with these troubles; poison gas was supplied by the Wellcome Research Laboratories to destroy the locusts; action was taken to stamp out the cattle disease. One good result of this and the supply of Indian grain by the Government was that it impressed upon the natives the interest which their present rulers took in their welfare, and this was not without its effect during the critical time of the war.

The country was not free from occasional troubles with some or other of the many different tribes. Though it was fifteen years since the Sudan had been reconquered from the Mahdists, some of the more distant parts had not

yet been brought under immediate Government control, and the natives had not yet everywhere become accustomed to English rule. During 1913 and the early part of 1914 there had been a number of disturbances in different parts. An outlaw and his followers had given trouble on the Atbara River, and in a conflict with a patrol had killed Major J. L. J. Conry and three of his men; the Bedaiat Arabs of Dar Fur had raided the Hawawir and Kababish tribes of Kordofan; there was trouble with the insubordinate Nuba mountaineers; in the Bahr el Ghazal Province a party of Banda negroes attacked pilgrims and carried off women and children and property, Mandala Arabs committed highway robberies, Baggara Arabs raided the Dinkas, and there was sedition among the Niam-Niams or Zandeh in the far south; and the lawless Nuers on the Bahr el Zeraf, Sobat, and Pibor Rivers attacked the Anuaks and Dinkas.

In an enormous country of nearly a million square miles, with a population of about four millions belonging to a number of different tribes, speaking different languages and in various stages of civilization, only gradually being brought under regular government, such outbreaks were, perhaps, only to be expected. To preserve order in this vast area the total regular force available was a little over 14,000 men of the Egyptian army, composed of Egyptian, Arab, and negro regular units, distributed in forty-six garrison and military posts, with a small British force at Khartoum, consisting of a battalion of infantry and a detachment of garrison artillery. The administration was carried on by 110 British officers and officials (excluding technical staff), distributed over fourteen provinces.

The inhabitants of the northern portion of the Sudan—some two-thirds of the whole in number—were Arabs or Arabized tribes, professing the Muhammadan religion, and these might have been considered as most amenable to outside influences. The Germans hoped by dragging Turkey into the war to bring about a great Muslim

uprising in North Africa against the Italians in Tripolitana or Lybia, the French in the Central Sudan, and the British in the Eastern Sudan, relying upon the fanatical Senussi in the Northern Sahara to take a leading part in this crusade. This, if successful, would have rendered it practically impossible to hold the southern portion of the Sudan, above Khartoum, which is inhabited by negro (mainly non-Muslim) tribes. Fortunately, the general loyalty to the Government was never in doubt, a testimony to the pre-war record of the Government. At the commencement of hostilities an active propaganda, directed against Germany and her allies, was instituted, and means were taken to inform the more intelligent sections of native opinion, through their leaders and the local press, of the facts of the military and political situation and of the ascendancy of German influence at Constantinople. In consequence, the rupture with Turkey, which came as an unpleasant surprise to the Sudanese, found native opinion to some extent prepared for the shock to their religious susceptibilities, and there was a remarkable outburst of expressions of loyalty to the British Government by the Muslim notables and other native leaders in the Sudan.

Rains and floods in the autumn of 1914 were excellent, and the people generally, busy with the prospects of a good season, paid little heed to the outbreak of the war. A censorship was established, garrisons were strengthened where needed, and a more frequent and effective system of patrols instituted, particularly on the Red Sea coast and the Abyssinian frontier. Martial law was declared, and legislation was introduced to strengthen the hands of the Administration in dealing with emergencies and to prevent trading with the enemy. In October and November, 1914, the Governor-General (Sir Reginald Wingate), who was also Sirdar of the Egyptian army, held a series of huge public receptions at Omdurman, where he explained to the sheikhs and notables the origin and causes of the war with Germany; he afterwards made a tour of the Sudan, and

held similar receptions at Wad Medani, Sennar, El Obeid, and Port Sudan. Returning to Khartoum, he addressed the principal regimental officers there and the principal religious sheikhs and ulema. The ulema enthusiastically declared their loyalty; many of the principal Arab sheikhs, including some who had fought against us in the Mahdist cause, wrote to the Governor-General expressing their goodwill.

Whilst things were thus satisfactorily shaping in the Sudan, the Khedive of Egypt was plotting at Constantinople for a Turkish invasion of Egypt. The British Government promptly met this by deposing him and declaring a British Protectorate over Egypt on December 17; and next day Hussein Rushdi Pasha, who was known to be friendly to England, was proclaimed Sultan. There was, of course, some danger from the Muslim population and the Arabs, whose fanaticism and slave-trading interests had in the past been aroused by the Mahdi against the Egyptian Government, and whom Germany and Turkey now hoped to raise against us. Sympathizers with Mahdism were not extinguished in the conquest of 1898-99, and now and again there had been attempted risings by Arab fanatics, who coloured their political aspirations with religious propaganda. In 1903 a new "Mahdi" appeared at El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, but was quickly put down.

The German objective in Africa was the establishment of a great central African empire, comprising the English, French, and Belgian possessions, so as to connect the German colonies of the Cameroons, East Africa, and South-West Africa in one enormous block—"Mittelafrika" they fondly named it. The capture of the German colonies by the Entente Powers in the early period of the war was regarded with equanimity by the Germans, who consoled themselves that the fate of the African possessions would be settled on the battlefields of Europe. Maps were printed at the Colonial Office at Berlin showing this great German "Mittelafrika," which was to swallow up the French Congo

possessions, the Belgian Congo, and British East Africa, and to extend practically from the Egyptian frontier to the boundary of British South Africa. It was a grandiose scheme, based on the writings of great German publicists, professors, and high colonial authorities. With an inflammable Muslim population in the Sudan there was a real danger in such a policy. But "the best-laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley." Almaz Effendi, Enver Pasha's aide-de-camp, was sent from Turkey to stir up the Muhammadan element to rebellion. He landed at Port Sudan in December, 1914, and called upon the Egyptian officers to revolt. Their reply was to arrest him; he was tried by court-martial and sentenced to be shot.

The vulnerable point of the Sudan was on the extreme west. Dar Fur (the country of the Fors, or Furs), one of the old Muhammadan empires of the Central Sudan, which had only been conquered by the Egyptians in 1874, had not been brought under direct Government jurisdiction since the suppression of Mahdist rule. After the battle of Omdurman in 1898, Ali Dinar, one of the Emirs of the Khalifa and a descendant from a former Sultan of Dar Fur, deserted the Dervish forces and escaped to El Fasher. Here, with the sanction of the Sirdar (Lord Kitchener), he proclaimed himself Sultan, and in 1901, when he had beaten down the considerable opposition which he encountered, he was officially recognized as agent of the Sudan Government on condition of paying an annual tribute of £500. This tribute was paid yearly till the outbreak of the war, and the Sultan continued nominally to maintain friendly relations with the Sudan Government, though he would not allow Europeans to enter his territory. Dar Fur was not, therefore, under the immediate control and authority of the Sudan Government, and, apart from the tribute, Ali Dinar had been left to his own devices. The condition of the people under his rule was not satisfactory. He ruined the people to embellish his capital—where he had a fine palace built, two stories high—and reduced half the popula-

tion to a state of serfdom, filling his harem with concubines, and distributing his subjects' cattle among his favourites and the Arab merchants who brought him precious merchandise and weapons and ammunition sent by the Senussists. He had to meet conspiracies, retaliating by the execution of members of the royal house involved, and generally acted as a despot who could only maintain his position by force of arms and fear. He harassed the adjoining countries to the west and south, and more than once raided into Kordofan. He repeatedly invaded Dar Tama, adjoining Dar Fur on the west, and caused the Sultan of that country to be dethroned and a creature of his own (Othman) installed in his place. This action not only caused the assassination of Lieutenant Boyd-Alexander (April 2, 1910), which was instigated by Othman, but brought him into conflict with the French. The French had, in 1909, occupied Wadai, the defeated Sultan of which, Doud Marrah, fled to the Dar Fur borderland, and thence gained help which enabled him to continue the war and to inflict more than one serious reverse upon the French army. The French claimed Dar Tama as a dependency of Wadai, and shortly after Boyd-Alexander's death Captain Chauvelot attacked the Forian army in Dar Tama at Gereda and utterly routed it. The wretched Othman fled to El Fasher, where he was put to death by Ali Dinar for losing the battle.

A common religion naturally brought Ali Dinar into touch with the Senussi of the Eastern Sahara; from his first becoming Sultan he had had communications with the Sheikh As-Senussi, who died in 1902, and he continued the relations with his successor, Ahmed Sherif. The Senussi, a semi-religious, semi-political Muhammadan fraternity in North-East Africa, had attained a considerable influence over a wide area, and, like the Mahdists, were credited with aiming at a world empire, or, as they no doubt would term it, the submission of the world to Islam. At the outbreak of the war a Germano-Turkish Mission, headed by Nuri Bey, a brother of Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of

War, landed in Cyrenaica to organize with the Senussists an outbreak in Central Africa against the protectorates of France and Great Britain. The Grand Senussi, Ahmed Sherif, lent a willing ear to the suggestions of Nuri Bey, and sent emissary after emissary to preach revolt to the different Sultans responsible to the French and British authorities. Their exhortations were well received in Dar Fur and in the south of Wadai.

Ali Dinar was persuaded that the Sudan Government was not strong enough to deal with him, and that his chance of cutting himself free from British suzerainty had arrived. Perhaps he had been encouraged in this belief by the delay, inevitable as it was, in arriving at a settlement with the French of the questions concerning the western boundary of Dar Fur. At the instigation of the Turkish Mission, he planned an invasion of the Sudan, which was to be carried out in connection with the Senussist advance upon Egypt. Copies of his Jihad against the British Government were despatched to the Sudanese and other tribesmen, urging them to cast off their allegiance to the Christians, and threatening condign punishment to all who refused to obey. Egypt was for a long time in danger from the Senussi menace. Germany urged Sidi Ahmed to invade Egypt, and the Kaiser sent him an autograph letter, written in Arabic, in which he styled himself "Allah's Envoy."

After several defiant letters, Ali Dinar, in April, 1915, formally renounced his allegiance to the Sudan Government and started a plan of invasion of the Sudan, to be carried out simultaneously with the Senussist attack on Egypt. In view of more insistent demands elsewhere, it was not convenient to take action against him immediately, but a cordon of native irregulars was established to prevent communication with the Senussi country and to intercept any caravans of arms that might attempt to pass along the Arbain road to Dar Fur. Towards the end of 1915 a Senussi army 30,000 strong, with a leaven of Turkish

troops and controlled by Turkish and German officers, swarmed across the western borders of Egypt; and it was not till February, 1917, that they were finally defeated and driven off. In December, 1915, Ali Dinar's attitude became so threatening that a small force of camel corps was hastily despatched to Nahud, an important trading centre in Western Kordofan. But this did not discourage the Sultan, who, in February, 1916, commenced concentrating a force on the Kordofan frontier at Jebel el Hilla. The Sirdar therefore ordered the concentration at Nahud of a force of all arms, about 2,000 of all ranks. The troops left Nahud, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel P. V. Kelly, on March 16, and occupied Um Shanga, where a Forian observation post was dispersed, on the 20th. Two days later Jebel el Hilla was occupied, after preventing a movement by some 800 For horsemen. The movements of the force were facilitated by the railway from Khartoum to El Obeid, a distance of 428 miles, which had been completed on December 30, 1911. Beyond this the expeditionary force, with its stores, guns, aeroplanes, and other bulky equipment, had to proceed across a desolate tract of roadless country for nearly 400 miles farther. A makeshift motor road was prepared, over which aeroplanes and their repair shops could be taken, as well as the other supplies of the force. When this motor road was ready the camel transport was supplemented by a mechanical transport service from railhead to Nahud, by which means the rapid convoy of supplies was ensured.

The advance was made in the square formation familiar in former Sudan campaigns, over broken sandhills with much hidden ground. Large parties of enemy horsemen and camelry hovered round as the force approached the position where the Sultan's forces were entrenched, in a strong position near the village of Beringia, twelve miles north of the capital. On the morning of May 22 Kelly's force here came in contact with Ali Dinar's army, estimated at 3,600 men armed with rifles, besides a large number

armed with spears. The effective part of the Sudanese force, about 2,000, was therefore greatly outnumbered. The Sultan's troops attacked with great desperation, many of the attackers falling within ten yards of our firing-line; but in a short time the For army was broken and fled in disorder, after sustaining some thousand casualties; our casualties were five killed and twenty-three wounded. Next day Colonel Kelly's troops occupied El Fasher without opposition, and as the Sultan's troops were marching away from the south side of the capital, Lieutenant J. C. Slessor, of the Royal Flying Corps, circled over and bombed them.

Ali Dinar, with a greatly reduced following, fled to Jebel Marra, a tangled mass of mountains seventy miles southwest of El Fasher, which had in old times been the home of the rulers of Dar Fur. On Jebel Marra (we are told by Captain H. F. C. Hobbs, who explored the mountain a few months later) there is a crater lake, which is regarded with much superstition and fear by the inhabitants. The Fors of the mountain say that it is haunted, regard it as an oracle, and ask it questions, the answers to which they deduce from the various colours which the water of the lake assumes in the early morning or late afternoon, when there is a considerable reflection, or when the surface of the water is troubled by the wind. To this lake Ali Dinar sent two of his officers to consult the waters as to his movements. It is said that the waters refused to let the envoys approach, and even retired before them. However this may be, the invading forces gradually closed in on the fugitives. Two posts, one to the north and the other to the south of Jebel Marra, at Kebkebia and Dibbis respectively, were formed. At the latter place, in October, Major (now Brigadier-General) H. J. Huddleston dispersed a force under Ali Dinar's eldest son, Zachariah. Ali Dinar's followers suffered from smallpox and starvation, and at last they were surprised and attacked by Huddleston's force at Guiba, near the western boundary of Dar Fur, on November 6, 1916. The attack was a complete surprise,


our forces getting within 500 yards of the camp before being discovered. On the capture of the camp a vigorous pursuit was started, and Ali Dinar's body, with those of some of his principal adherents, was found a mile off.

The occupation of El Fasher and the death of Ali Dinar brought to a conclusion organized resistance in Dar Fur, and left only local disturbances to be put down, and the reducing to order of the population and the protection of the country from the Senussi raiders in the north. The establishment of administration was taken in hand at once. Dar Fur was constituted a province of the Sudan, Lieut.-Colonel R. V. Savile being appointed Governor. Armed bands of escaped slaves roved about marauding the country, under two former adherents of Ali Dinar, who took refuge in the little-known country to the south-west. One later crossed the Bahr el Arab and surrendered to the Bahr el Ghazal authorities, and the other found a home in French territory. The inhabitants generally readily accepted the new Government, and good progress was made with the settlement. Efforts were made to obtain the confidence of the natives and, with a very inadequate staff, to lay down the framework of government. The administration was started on the principle of maintaining and supporting the authority of the native headmen rather than of close administration. The principle worked well generally speaking, but the magisterial powers given to headmen were in some instances abused.

To the north-west of Dar Fur the mountainous regions of Ennedi and Erdi were the resort of robber bands, who from time to time made marauding excursions into Dar Fur, and even extended their raids at times to Kordofan and the banks of the Nile, hundreds of miles across the desert. Though in the French sphere, they owed no allegiance to the French, and recognized only the authority of the Senussi. The most redoubtable of these brigand chiefs was Mohammed Erbeimi, head of the Teika section of the Guraan tribe. The Guraans live chiefly in French

territory, and subsist almost entirely by raiding. In 1916 Erbeimi's band raided into Dar Fur and carried off some thousand camels. The French had in 1913 captured Borku (north-east of Lake Chad), and were operating in Ennedi against him; to co-operate with them a camel-corps force under Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) T. B. Vandeleur proceeded to Furawia in January, 1917, but failed to get into touch with the French troops, which had already chased the robbers away to the north-west and recovered the prisoners and camels taken by them. Erbeimi, after two years of varying fortune, during which he was continually harassed by the French, finally surrendered to the Sudan Government at Furawia in December, 1918.

In Southern Dar Fur the refusal of the Beni Helba tribe to obey Government orders compelled the despatch of a small patrol into their country in January, 1918. In May some unrest was noticeable in Dar Masalit, one of the old Arab sultanates to the west of Dar Fur, which had been conquered by the Sultan of the latter country. The Sultan of Dar Masalit had been some years before captured and hanged by Ali Dinar, and the new Sultan, Mohammed Bahr el Din (commonly called Endoka), who had been installed by the French, proposed to attack the French and Sudan posts which by mutual agreement had been placed at Adre and Kereinik, on the borders of Dar Masalit; but he soon submitted to a display of force. During these operations with the French communications were facilitated by the establishment of wireless telegraphy between El Fasher and Abeshr. In September, 1921, a fanatic named Abdullahi el Soghayer, of the Masalit tribe, collected a following and attacked the Government post at Nyala, in Southern Dar Fur, which, with another post at Zalinga, had been established in February, 1917. The handful of police and native troops made a magnificent stand against the onrush of thousands, and the attack was repulsed, with the loss of 600 tribesmen killed; but Captain H. Chown and Mr. T. McNeill and three other civil servants were



killed, and the Sudan casualties were sixty-one. Abdullahi was afterwards captured, tried, and hanged at Nyala on October 28.

But the new province generally was settling down under the new administration, and was now safer for traders and travellers. Greek and Syrian traders had soon found their way to El Fasher from Khartoum, and pushed their operations forward to Abeshr, where they supplied the French with their stores at exorbitant prices. Travellers, too, began to find their way across the country, which the traditional policy of the Sultans had so long closed to them. In 1917 Commandant Jean Tilho crossed Dar Fur on his way home from Borku *viâ* the Nile and Egypt; in 1919 Mr. Palmer, British Resident in Bornu, travelled across Wadai and Dar Fur to railhead at El Obeid in a dog-cart, and Sir Philip Brocklehurst, Commandant of the post at Kereinik, journeyed in the reverse direction across Wadai to Lake Chad; and in 1920 Commandant Audoin passed through little-known districts south of Dar Fur in a journey from Cameroons to the Nile. These regions, he reported, had been so harassed by the raids of the Sultans of Dar Fur, Dar Kuti, and Dar Sila as to be in great part depopulated.

It was not only on the western confines of Dar Fur that French and British forces co-operated. Far away to the south, near the point where the boundaries of the French, Belgian, and British spheres meet to the south of the Bahr el Ghazal Province, a Sudan force was able to render good service to the French. When the watershed between the Nile and the Congo was fixed on as a dividing-line between the French and British spheres by the agreement of March 21, 1899, it did not correspond with tribal divisions; one large tribe, the famous Niam-Niams, or Zandeh, was divided. Some sections of it extended into the country which is drained by the upper streams of the Bahr el Ghazal, some sections were included in the Belgian Congo, and others in the French sphere to the north of the

Mbomu River. The various sections are split up under a number of petty chiefs, or "Sultans," and one of these Zandeh chiefs, Bangazagene, in the far corner of the French sphere not far from the boundaries of the Bahr el Ghazal Province and the Belgian Congo, revolted in February, 1916, and attacked the French post at Mopoi. In the following month Major R. F. White, with a detachment of the Sudanese Equatorial Battalion, crossed the frontier, occupied the post from which the French had been driven, and with the Belgians aided the French in defeating Bangazagene. And in 1917 the authorities in the French Congo asked the Governor of the Bahr el Ghazal to cooperate against an outlaw named Krikri who had raided loyal chiefs; a patrol under Captain V. H. Fergusson patrolled the frontier, and Krikri was shortly after arrested.

There was also much fighting with the negro tribes in the Nuba Mountains and farther to the south—the Nuers, Dinkas, and Lotuko, and the far-away and untamed Turkana on the western shore of Lake Rudolf; and there were conflicts on the Abyssinian border; but exigencies of space do not allow of describing them.

INDIANS OVERSEAS

BY HENRY S. L. POLAK

IT will probably be agreed that there is no single subject upon which there is such unanimity of agreement among Indians and between them and the Government of India as the question of the status of Indians overseas. For many years it has caused the gravest anxiety to His Majesty's Government, for it contains within itself the seeds of imperial disruption unless handled with greater skill and honesty than have been used for some time past.

At the present time there are two principal danger spots—Kenya and South Africa; but there are a number of minor causes of disturbance and ill-feeling on the part of the people of India, for example, Ceylon, British Guiana, and Fiji. It is, however, necessary to distinguish between those parts of the British confederation where the British Government exercises no jurisdiction, owing to the extension of self-government and Dominion responsibility to them, and those parts which are under the direct jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. The problem and its solution differ according to the category in which the particular territory is placed. If we take, by way of illustration, the disabilities and grievances of which Indians in South Africa complain and have for long complained, we find the Colonial Office protecting itself behind the plea that it is no longer responsible, and that it cannot directly interfere with the conduct of a self-governing Dominion. This, though an unpalatable truth, is, doubtless, the correct constitutional position. But it does not satisfy India, especially when the Colonial Office appears

to take up the less strong ground that it is undesirable for it to make even a diplomatic representation to the Union Government. If that attitude be correct, it implies that His Majesty's Government can less effectively secure the protection and the welfare of His Majesty's Indian subjects in an integral part of the British Commonwealth than in a foreign country. But however valid these reasons may be in the case of self-governing Dominions, they do not operate at all in the case of territories which are under complete control from the Colonial Office. It is because this distinction is clearly realized in India that we hear so much of British hypocrisy in this matter, and it makes it easier to understand the bitter criticism of Mr. Churchill's action regarding Kenya immediately after the Imperial Conference last year.

It will be remembered that at that Conference the Right Hon. Mr. Sastri, on behalf of India, brought forward a resolution designed to establish once and for all the position of Indians already established in the overseas Dominions, Colonies, or Protectorates. After a great deal of diplomatic negotiation a formula was agreed upon, which, after reciting the right of the self-governing Dominions and India to regulate the conditions of immigration as between themselves, admitted at the Conference of 1918, and a reference to the reforms in operation in India having as their eventual object the conferment of responsible government upon India, recommended that the status of equal citizenship should be granted to Indian settlers overseas. To this resolution all parties to the Conference, including Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government, but excluding South Africa, gave their assent. It was with a view to carry out the recommendation of the Conference in detail that, at the pressing invitation of the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, Mr. Sastri, at the request of the Government of India,

subsequently proceeded upon his tour of those Dominions, which has recently been successfully concluded. But scarcely had the ink dried upon the document than Mr. Churchill addressed a series of proposals to the then Governor of Kenya, nullifying the very principle embodied in the resolution. No public information of the nature of these proposals was for some time forthcoming, until, in a moment of after-dinner enthusiasm, Mr. Churchill announced particulars of the policy that he proposed to introduce and enforce. Mr. Montagu, who was then in office, promptly, it will be recollected, repudiated the Colonial Office policy, which, he made clear, had never received Cabinet sanction. The Kenya question is still unsettled, and the Colonial Office remains under a cloud, so far as Indian opinion is concerned. It is to be hoped that the new régime will enable Ministers to discuss the matter afresh, without preconception, and with the sole object of giving effect, in the spirit as well as in the letter, to the principle of equal citizenship adopted at the last Imperial Conference. Nothing less will solve this complex problem and restore Indian confidence, so rudely shaken during Mr. Churchill's tenure of office.

It is equally true to say that, until the test question of Kenya is settled, it will not be possible to settle any of the other problems associated with Indian emigration. It is useless to speak, as Sir Frederick Lugard did recently, in a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute, of diverting Indian attention to the prospects of Indian settlement in British Guiana and away from Kenya. In the first place, Kenya is much closer to India and is one of the oldest settlements from India, and a proper solution of the Kenya question is regarded as a matter of honour. In the second place, even with the bait of transferring British Guiana to the control of the Government of India, no one in India will seriously advocate Indian emigration to any overseas territory

so long as the doctrine of equal citizenship is not loyally enforced in every Crown Colony and Protectorate. As Lord Meston pointed out in his address to the British Association, it is a real and not a paper equality upon which India will insist. Besides, the Government of India has not yet been able adequately to protect the interests of Indians who have emigrated as labourers to such near countries as Ceylon and the Federated Malay States, of which evidence was recently brought to the notice of the Select Committee on Emigration appointed from among members of the Indian Legislature. In addition, nothing whatever can or will be done until the Assembly has had time to read and digest the Report of the Indian delegation that has recently returned from British Guiana. I am very doubtful whether the Assembly, after having done so, will be prepared to recommend the reopening of Indian emigration to British Guiana, and if not, it is one of the few certain things to be predicated of the Government of India that it will not act in opposition to the views of the Assembly. Much the same thing applies to the case of Fiji, regarding which a similar report is awaiting consideration. In discussing these matters, it is essential to remember that India will never again consent to any scheme of purely labour-emigration. She has no intention of being regarded as an inexhaustible reservoir of cheap and docile labour for the enrichment of European capitalists, often absentees. She is much more interested in developing her own industries than in supplying a labour force for others who cannot be relied upon to treat it well.

South Africa was not a party to the Imperial Conference resolution, and Mr. Sastri let fall a few significant sentences on the subject at the complimentary luncheon given to him on October 26 last. He said: "I was not prepared to go to South Africa, and if I may quote high authority, without mentioning names in this room, I was assured that for a

good long time yet South Africa may not be in a state of moral and material preparedness to receive a deputation of this kind from India. In the light of that information, the Government of India magnanimously resolved not to take the Government of the Union of South Africa by surprise, for we hope to play the game." Now the situation in the Union is very unsatisfactory. The storm-centre, which was formerly in the Transvaal, has lately been transferred to Natal, where the anti-Asiatic elements have been organizing themselves for a great demonstration. Their former argument, that the Indians were a danger to the Province because they so considerably outnumbered the European population, has been greatly weakened by the latest census figures, which show that, whilst the Indian population has been stationary, the European has rapidly increased, so that, in a short time, the Europeans will have begun to outnumber the Indians. Moreover, as each year passes, the proportion of Indians born in the Province and who know no other home, who are, indeed, South Africans, increases, the majority of them already being of South African birth. Nevertheless, the anti-Indian agitation proceeds from bitterness to bitterness. Last year three Ordinances were passed by the Natal Provincial Council depriving Indians of certain rights of ordinary citizenship. One of these was subsequently assented to by the Governor-General, upon the advice of the Union Government, one has been suspended pending further inquiry, whilst the third has been definitely disallowed, on the ground of incompatibility with the Union Government's policy. A prominent member of the Council has notified General Smuts that he intends to reintroduce the two Ordinances not yet assented to, and that, upon their being passed, as there seems little reason to doubt they will be, he and his Natal colleagues who are members of the South African Party will challenge the Union Government to disallow

them. It seems probable, therefore, that General Smuts may be obliged to choose between keeping his party intact and assenting to measures of which he and his Government do not approve.

There is, however, a possible way out, and it raises a constitutional issue of the first magnitude. The Provincial Councils and the Union Government exercise their powers only with the authority derived from the South Africa Act, 1909, an enactment of the Imperial Parliament. Section 147 of that Act provides that the control of matters specially or differentially affecting Asiatics shall vest in the Governor-General-in-Council. I have excellent grounds for asserting that this provision was inserted in the Act in order to defeat the possibility of just such legislation as that complained of, for it was realized at the time that Asiatic affairs were of far too difficult and delicate a nature to be entrusted to the Provincial Legislatures. It is now argued, on behalf of the Indian community, that the meaning of this section of the Act is to confine the control and handling of Asiatic affairs, from beginning to end, and at every stage, to the Union Government, responsible to Parliament, to the exclusion of any lesser jurisdiction, and that the Union Government is not empowered to delegate any portion of this control to any subordinate or other authority. If that contention be correct—and there is a good deal of support given to this interpretation in influential quarters—then the Ordinance recently passed and assented to is *ultra vires* the South Africa Act, the Natal Provincial Council is incompetent to legislate in matters specially or differentially affecting Indians, and the Union Government ought to prohibit the Provincial Councils from considering or in any other way dealing with such matters. If the above interpretation were adopted by the Union Government, General Smuts could honourably extricate himself from a very difficult and possibly dangerous

political *impasse*. If not, then there is nothing to prevent the Provincial Legislatures constantly hampering and embarrassing the Union Government in the administration of Indian affairs, and it would be quite useless for the Government of India to make any representations on behalf of South African Indians to the Union Government. The latter would be faced with the unpalatable alternatives of having either to suppress the Provincial Legislatures, or to secure an amendment of the South Africa Act, or eventually to assent to the handling of Indian affairs by the Provincial politicians, mostly ignorant of the Imperial issues involved and unaccustomed to Imperial responsibility.

