

# STRUCTURING ADVAITA DIALECTIC

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A Study of Śrīharṣa's  
*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*  
and  
*Naiṣadhīyacaritam*



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FRANCIS A.P.



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RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA 171005

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## Preface

The present work is the outcome of my post-doctoral research at Indian Institute of Advanced Study (IIAS), Shimla, India. It deals with the contribution of Śrīharṣa, the philosopher-poet of 12<sup>th</sup> century CE to Vedāntic dialectic. A confluence of strong lineages of extra-Advaitic systems like Nyāya, Buddhism, Mīmāṃsā etc., entering most harmoniously, though negatively, into the mosaic of Advaitic theories is most discernibly exhibited in the works of Śrīharṣa. I attempt in this work to structure Śrīharṣa's Vedāntic dialectic.

During my sojourn at the IIAS, I inquired into the dialectic and technique of Śrīharṣa's structuring of Advaita against the background of these systems. In the process, I have been helped and supported by many a person and many an institution; their part has been indispensable in the shaping of this work, although mentioning them by name is beyond scope here.

I am deeply indebted to the former Chairmen of IIAS: D. P. Chattopadhyaya, G. C. Pande and Balchandra Mungekar; the former and present Directors of IIAS: Bhuvan Chandel, Peter Ronald D'Souza and Chetan Singh; and the former and present Vice Chancellors of Sri Sankara University, Kalady: K. N. Panikkar and J. Prasad. I would like to specially mention the blessings of my revered Guru in the works of Śrīharṣa and Doctoral Guide (Sanskrit-Vedānta), namely, Prof. B. Subbarayudu of Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Puri Campus; and of P. C. Muraleemadhavan

and M. M. Vasudevan Potty, who were the guides of my first doctoral work (Śaṅkara and Aquinas).

Enriched by the Advaita Dialectic of Śrīharṣa—the greatest negative dialectician and poet of the Advaita tradition—from within the Presidential Halls of Wisdom of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, I offer the fruit of my research to Indologists and Advaitins the world over.

FRANCIS A.P.  
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## Foreword

It is a matter of great pleasure to write a few words on this work entitled “Structuring Advaita Dialectic” of Francis A. P.

His is a study of Śrīharṣa’s two texts: *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* (KKK) and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (NC). The first is a philosophical text and the second is a *mahākāvya*, a piece of literary art. Both these texts are known, in the tradition, as highly intellectual compositions. The KKK is the composition of the genre of *viṭaṇḍā*. In *viṭaṇḍā*, it is said that the writer engages himself in mere refutation of opponent’s views without giving his own views (*svapakṣa-sthāpana-hīnā-para-pakṣa-doṣa-pradarśana-parā-viṭaṇḍā*); that is, ‘a *viṭaṇḍā* variety of argument is that which is interested in showing faults in the opponent’s arguments without any interest in establishing one’s own position’. The *viṭaṇḍā* form of dialectic is mentioned in the list of sixteen entities mentioned in the first *sūtra* of Gautama’s *Nyāyasūtras*.

Śrīharṣa has presented mainly the Naiyāyikas as his opponent and systematically refutes all basic positions of Nyāya variety of Realism in order to hint towards the acceptance of Advaitic Idealism indirectly. The *viṭaṇḍā* form of argument does not commit directly to any position, but one has to indirectly guess what the arguer is interested in. Śrīharṣa drives through this mode of discourse towards the position of Advaitic Idealism in which universal consciousness is accepted to be the Ultimate Reality.

This consciousness is of the nature of self-awareness, the very

Being. It is because of such Universal Being, there is illumination of everything (*yasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti*). It is like the Sun which does not require any lamp for its illumination (*sva-prakāśa*) unlike the Naiyāyikas who accept *anuvyavasāya* to illumine a *vyavasāya* or *jñāna*.

While the Naiyāyikas accept the locus of *jñāna*, that is, the substance as the *ātman*, the Advaitins accept *jñāna* (that is, *caitanya* or consciousness) itself as the *ātman*. All arguments of Śrīharṣa point towards that position.

The greatest problem for such a position is that it cannot be an object of discourse. Once it is accepted that the Reality is that unchanging Truth or Consciousness or Bliss (*sat* or *cit* or *ānanda*) which is without a second and which is beyond the reach of mind and language, how to talk about it? How to initiate any debate on it? How to prove it? To whom should it be proved? As a matter of fact, it does not require any proof. It is self-illuminating. Therefore it can simply be experienced. The expression for such an experience is the Upaniṣādic statements. Therefore, those Upaniṣādic statements alone can be presented as the proof. Since one cannot point out to anything as identical with the Brahman because there is nothing other than that, the only course left is to deny the identity of everything with That saying not this, not this and so on (*neti, neti...*). In such a Monistic presupposition, debate is forced to take the shape of *vitandā* which simply says 'what you say is not the Fact.' Then, what is the Fact?

The honest answer is 'It cannot be stated'.

It is this reason, I think, that has compelled Śrīharṣa to adopt this kind of dialectic form.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great Naiyāyika of Kashmir of ninth century has shown in his *Nyāyamañjari* the limitation of arguments with regard to the establishment of Absolute Monism. He says that if someone claims such a Reality one has to prove it by some *pramāṇa*. If it cannot be proved by *pratyakṣa*, let it be proved by *anumāna*. But how can *anumāna* even work because what could be the ground (*hetu*) to establish the *sādhya*? Because the *hetu* has to be different from the *sādhya* and it should also be real. But by



presupposition, there is nothing Real other than the Brahman. So how can Brahman be established by *anumāna* too?

This is the limitation of argument and hence Absolute Monism cannot be established by any direct method of argument. That is why, I think, Śrīharṣa has taken recourse to *vitandā*.

As regards the *NC*, this *mahākāvya* is known in the tradition as a medicine to imbibe scholarship in oneself (*naiṣadham-vidvad-auṣadham*). Śrīharṣa seems to float the same urge of philosophy in this text also.

Although I agree with the concluding observations of Francis A. P., I would like to suggest that the limitations pointed out by him are only due to the basic thesis that Brahman is the only Reality and It is beyond mind and language, and all the rest that appears is false. With such presuppositions, I think, that Reality is beyond the scope of any discourse.

I would like to congratulate Francis A. P. for bringing out such a comprehensive and excellent study of Śrīharṣa's *KKK* and *NC*. I hope the scholarly world of Sanskrit and philosophy in general, and of Advaita philosophy in particular, will welcome this work with whole heart and would like to have more such research works from him in the future too.

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## Abbreviations

(Where various editions of books are used, the editor's name will duly be mentioned therewith.)

<i>BhĀ</i>	<i>Bhāmatī</i>
<i>BhG</i>	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
<i>BhGŚB</i>	<i>Bhagavadgītā-Śāṅkarabhāṣya</i>
<i>BhS</i>	<i>Brahmasiddhi</i>
<i>BrhU</i>	<i>Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad</i>
<i>BrhUŚB</i>	<i>Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya</i>
<i>BrS</i>	<i>Brahmasūtra</i>
<i>BrSŚB</i>	<i>Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya</i>
<i>BrUpV</i>	<i>Brhadāranyaka-Upaniṣadbhāṣya-vārttika</i>
<i>ChāU</i>	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>GauK</i>	<i>Gauḍapāda-kārikā</i>
<i>IṣṬ</i>	<i>Iṣṭasiddhi</i>
<i>KaṭU</i>	<i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i>
<i>KKK</i>	<i>Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam</i>
<i>Kum</i>	<i>Kumārasambhava</i>
<i>Mbh</i>	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
<i>MuṇU</i>	<i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</i>
<i>NaS</i>	<i>Naiṣkarmyasiddhi</i>
<i>NC</i>	<i>Naiṣadhīyacaritam</i>
<i>NyāK</i>	<i>Nyāyakusumāñjali</i>
<i>PañP</i>	<i>Pañcapādika</i>

<i>Rag</i>	<i>Raghuvamśa</i>
<i>RV</i>	<i>Ṛg Veda</i>
<i>SarS</i>	<i>Sarvadarśana Sangraha</i>
<i>TaCM</i>	<i>Tattvacintāmaṇi</i>
<i>Tāra</i>	<i>Tārkikarakṣā</i>

## Introduction

Swami Vivekananda has said that India was saved twice from materialism—once by Lord Buddha and a second time by Śrī Śaṅkara through his philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. World teachers of Śrī Śaṅkara’s eminence never cease to be relevant in any period of human history; they go on influencing world thought. That is the reason why even today Śrī Śaṅkara and his doctrine, the Advaita, is being studied and written upon.

Dr. Francis is my friend and colleague who worked under my guidance for his doctoral degree at Sree Sankaracharya University, Kalady. He is an enthusiastic young scholar with large amount of curiosity in the field of his study. He has taken much pain when he has undergone the work of comparing Śrī Śaṅkara and St. Thomas Aquinas for his PhD thesis. In seminars and serious academic deliberations, he used to interfere by applying his dialectics on various philosophical systems.

As evidenced from the present work, the development of dialectics in Indian philosophy, especially in Advaita Vedānta, has been purely epistemological rather than ontological.

The development of dialectics in Indian philosophy is yet to be probed into. The most important question concerning dialectic in Advaita is this. Can dialectics be related to Advaita Vedānta? The answer is in the affirmative. Why? The most general reason in one

of the fundamental principles of dialectics itself, namely, that of universal connection. There is nothing unrelated to other things in this world. This rule is applicable to the world of ideas also. The usual practice followed in philosophy to brand one system as dialectical or metaphysical is to take into account the attitude of system to the constitution of fundamental ontological reality: a philosophy which accepts the dialectical reality of the fundamental ontological principle, whether it be idea or matter, it is called a dialectical system.

Beginning of the dialectical method in Indian philosophical literature can be described in the dialogues of the *Upaniṣads*, which form one major set of the basic texts of the system of Advaita.

The success of Śāṅkara in appealing to the minds of the so called great men was partly due to his employment of an appropriate dialectical method.

It is very interesting to note how Sri Francis has explored the entire literature of Śrīharṣa namely *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*, from the point of view of dialectics. Śrīharṣa differs epistemologically from Kumarilabhatta, the mīmāṃsaka, and Śrī Śāṅkara, the Advaitin. This knowledge is very important for critical understanding of Śrīharṣa's approach to the whole problem. Śrī Śāṅkara accepts three *pramāṇas* but the later advaitins accepted six *pramāṇas* that of Kumarilabhatta. But Śrīharṣa, the sceptic Advaitin, does not accept any of the *pramāṇas*. He accepts only the ultimate reality. Here the author states that Śrīharṣa has undertaken his distinction of knowledge and sources of knowledge. It is said that this is a less conscious aspect of Śrīharṣa's work.

The dictum which is the basis of the ontological and epistemological basis of Śrīharṣa's methodology, that is, "*Sarvāṇi lakṣaṇāṇi anupapannāni*"—it means "all definitions are untenable". Precisely things have to be in relation, but relations are impossible. Thus by presupposing fundamentally distinct things, pluralists run into a host of difficulties, such as indicated by the demonstration of incoherence by the author.

In this significant work Sri Francis has discussed very many

issues with respect to the works of Śrīharṣa. The purpose of the composition of *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*: whether it is simply to popularize the central theme of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*, that is, Advaita doctrine? What was his philosophic leaning? To which school of Indian philosophy he belonged? To what extent he defended that philosophy? Did he have a positive Advaita programme in authoring *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*? Whether all the questions were discussed with due seriousness in these work?

Dr. Francis has stated confidently that all the readers will surely understand the tough philosophical and literary content of Śrīharṣa's works, and the negative stance he took throughout, with respect to other systems of philosophy.

Starting with unique and sensible questions like, what is the difference between skepticism, dialectics and knowledge? What is the viewpoint of Śrīharṣa with regard to knowledge? What is the role of Śrīharṣa in the categorization of the mode of debate called *tarka*? How to locate *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* in the debate landscape of India? etc. The author marches ahead, explicitly explaining the crux of the work up to the end of the book.

The author explains effectively, that how far the works *Tattvapaplavasimha*, *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* influenced Śrīharṣa for authoring *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*.

The research dissertation "Structuring Advaita Dialectic" prepared by Dr. Francis A.P. is a scholarly attempt in the field of studies to restructure the Advaita dialectics. It is in the background of the ideal set forth by the triumvirate of Advaita dialectics Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, I present this excellent work in the hands of the curious students of Śāstrās, especially of Advaita Vedānta, with a confidence that, it will extend the frontiers of thought, in the intellectual world in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular.

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# General Introduction

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1. Locating Śrīharṣa in the Map of “Dialectic”
  2. The Theme
- 

Schools of thought and religious systems always interact, connubate and convive. They interact in ways varying from the purely dialogical to the merely polemical. The dialogical embodies the heights of realization in the parties of dialogue, which is the most ideal way of interaction; and the merely polemical represents the particularities and deficits of realization of the parties involved.

Both the aspects are indispensable in philosophical discourse and debate on religion, since the metaphysical and practical philosophy of religion is a way of movement from the particularized to the most realized shapes of expression of relationship between the human and the Divine, among humans, and between the human and other living beings. Therefore, the most ideal way of interaction between religions would demand an ideal synthesis of dialogue and polemic, which may be called dialectic.<sup>1</sup>

The present work is an earnest inquiry into one of the most interesting syntheses of that kind in the history of interaction of

<sup>1</sup> Dialectics is the study of dialectic, the art of *dia-légein*, which includes also elements of polemic. For a discussion of the term ‘dialectic’ see the sub-section “Locating Śrīharṣa in the Map of ‘Dialectic’,” which follows immediately.

various schools of thought and religion in Indian philosophy and Sanskrit literature. My attempt here is, thus, to study Śrīharṣa,<sup>2</sup> the philosopher, poet and mystic. The special thing about him is that he did Vedānta dialectically for the philosopher, scholar, the litterateur, connoisseur and the commoner alike. Herein consists the importance of Śrīharṣa, the greatest negative dialectician<sup>3</sup> or Advaitin or Deconstructive Absolutist of Advaita.<sup>4</sup>

## 1. LOCATING ŚRĪHARṢA IN THE MAP OF “DIALECTIC”

The term “dialectic”—which became the alternative Platonic and Stoic name for logic—is from the Greek *dia-*, “between” and *légein*, “collect,” “speak,” etc. ‘Dialectic’ in the present work generally refers to the art of philosophical disputation in ancient India, as this was obviously the Indian counterpart of the Greek art of discussion or logical controversy.<sup>5</sup> Philosophical thoughts in ancient times filtered through dialectic, and this was true of ancient Greece as it was of ancient India. In ancient Greece, the Eleatic Zeno, a follower of Parmenídēs, was the originator of “dialectic,” which was developed by the Sophists (negatively) into an art to win followers and to teach their students how to win men and (positively) to seek truth discursively. Later on, dialectic became

<sup>2</sup> There exists an alternative way of writing the name of this thinker, namely, ‘Śrī Harṣa’. We have no absolute certainty as to which was the actual form used in his time. Circumstantial evidences yield the spelling ‘Śrīharṣa’. “[T]he King Śrī Harṣa of the 17<sup>th</sup> century cannot be the author of the *NC*, as it was composed in the 12<sup>th</sup> century. Again the author of the *NC* was not a king but merely a protégé of the king of Kanauj and his name was not Śrī Harṣa but Śrīharṣa.” A. N. Jani, *A Critical Study of Śrīharṣa’s Naiṣadhīyacarita* (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1957), 85.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought* (New Delhi: South Asian, 1985), 383.

<sup>4</sup> See the General Conclusion of the present work for a justification of this term.

<sup>5</sup> See Esther Solomon, *Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion*, 2 vols. (Ahmedabad: B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, 1978), 1:1f.

part of the Medieval educational system. Thus, the *trivium* consisted of Grammar, Logic (*Dialectica*) and Rhetoric, all of which dealt with the use of words; and the *quadrivium* was comprised of Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy and Harmony (Music).<sup>6</sup> The three features of Zeno's dialectic may be attributed also to the dialectical arguments of Śrīharsa: "(1) it is directed at someone else; (2) it takes its start from features of premises accepted by that other party; (3) its goal is the refutation of a view of that other party."<sup>7</sup> The purportedly negative application of dialectic is called by Plato as "eristic," which is from the Greek *éris*, "strife."<sup>8</sup>

In India, dialectic has its parallels in the following terms: *samvāda*, *vāda*, *sambhāṣā*, *kathā*, *tarka*, and even, *śāstrārtha* (dialectical discussion about the precepts of the *śāstra*). During the Vedic and post-Vedic period, logic was *vākovākya*, "question and answer," "science of criticism," "argument," used to be studied along with *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*. With respect to its subject matter, it was also called *brahmodaya*.<sup>9</sup> The Indian counterparts of the Sophists were considered to be the post-Upaniṣadic Śramaṇas, who were contemporaries of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. Most prominent of them was Makkhali Gosāla. In Indian thought, "theories of truth and validity of knowledge were specifically formulated after the Mādhyamikas and sceptical thinkers challenged the validity of empirical cognition and the efficacy of the organs of knowledge to yield truth. They took the clue for this from Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta and others contemporaneous with the Buddha and Mahāvīra."<sup>10</sup>

In later years, the following four terms came to be used: *kathā*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitandā*. '*Kathā*', used once to denote debate, became obsolete due to its use in the practice of narrating episodes of lives

<sup>6</sup> See Dale Jacquette, ed., *A Companion to Philosophical Logic* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 24.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>8</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol.2, s.v. "Dialectic."

<sup>9</sup> *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XI.5.7, 5.9 (quoted in Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 1:10).

<sup>10</sup> Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 1:6.

of saints and warriors in public. ‘*Vāda*’ is from *vad-*, “to say.” ‘*Jalpa*’ is from *jalp-*, “to speak,” and ‘*Vitaṇḍā*’ is from *vi-* and *taṇḍ*, “to hit, smash.” Śrīharṣa the dialectician *par excellence* in the Advaitic tradition calls his method as *Vitaṇḍā*.

The present work is primarily concerned with the philosophical method (dialectic) of Śrīharṣa, namely, *Vitaṇḍā*.<sup>11</sup> But, it is to be mentioned here that ontological, sociological, psychological, economic and other nuances of ‘dialectic’ do not appear in this work.

## 2. THE THEME

The texts *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* (hereafter, referred to mostly as *KKK* unless otherwise noted, the version consulted mostly being the one published by Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1917) and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (hereafter, *NC*) of Śrīharṣa have had a prominent position in making Advaita Vedānta ever more acceptable to the thinker, the educated and the populace alike, during and after his time. The first millennium CE witnessed the origin of Prācīna-Nyāya in the philosophical arena of Indian thought, especially among the Advaitins, Mīmāṃsakas, Buddhists, Cārvākas, etc. To use modern terminology, they may be compared to the monists, dualists, nihilistic idealists and materialists—or, better, the realistic camp and the non-realistic.

The *KKK* is essentially a philosophical debate set to writing. The *pratiññā* or proposition is stated,<sup>12</sup> namely, that all definitions are illogical, and the bulk of the text up to page 750 is devoted

<sup>11</sup> The present work is not so much a work in the dialectics of or in Advaita Vedānta. For an elaborate work in the latter, see K. Maheswaran Nair, *Advaita Vedānta, Dialectics and Indian Philosophy* (Trivandrum: Svantam Books, 1997) and K. Maheswaran Nair, “Dialectics in Advaita Vedānta,” in *Contemporary Approaches in Indian Philosophy*, ed. C. Rajendran, 127–38 (Calicut: Department of Sanskrit, University of Calicut, 1999), and V. Shishupala Panikkar, *Dvaita-Advaita Polemics* (Trivandrum: Svantam Books, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa, ed. Navikanta Jha (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1970), 130.

to its proof. The pages preceding 130 thus fall outside the main framework of the text; however, they constitute a necessary introduction to it. There had long raged a controversy between the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Jains on the one hand, and the Buddhists and Vedāntins on the other. The first group maintained that the latter, in their refusal to admit the existence of means of valid knowledge, logical fallacies etc., involved themselves in an impossible situation and were no more than fools—because its proof, the means of proof, what is to be proved and the prover himself do not exist: who does what with what? Their very primary assumptions thus make them ineligible to enter any serious discussion. As Śrīharṣa will hereafter involve himself in a lengthy debate, he must first meet these objections. He does so by forcefully restating the contentions of the Mādhyamika Buddhist, with the conclusion that what is necessary for discussion is not so much the existence of the *pramāṇas*, etc. as a knowledge of their existence. This is a fact well recognized by the Naiyāyika himself.<sup>13</sup> Śrīharṣa's method throughout this section is to reduce his opponent's arguments to absurdity, and force him to admit that the very objections he raises indicate that he holds the opposite position.

To facilitate our discussions, it is here important to note how Śrīharṣa differs epistemologically from Kumāriḷa, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Advaitin Śaṅkara, and the later Advaitins. This knowledge is important for a critical understanding of how exactly it is possible for Śrīharṣa to bring down the whole edifice of philosophical ratiocination as such by unconsciously presupposing validity of the very means of knowledge which he attempts to destroy. Śaṅkara is said to have accepted (at least) three sources of inference (*pramāṇas*), but his followers accepted all the six accepted by Kumāriḷa the Mīmāṃsaka. But, Śrīharṣa, the sceptic Advaitin, does not accept any of the *pramāṇas*. Instead, he accepts (in conclusion of his arduous destruction of all sorts of philosophical knowledge, via proving the sources of knowledge

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<sup>13</sup> *Nyāyākusumāñjali* of Udayana, ed. Padmaprasādupādhyāya (Benares: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1950), 131.

as self-contradictory) “only the ultimate, indeterminate intuition of the Brahman, which is Being itself.”<sup>14</sup> All the same, the actual ground realities around his arguments show that he has undertaken his destruction of knowledge and the sources of knowledge by using some of the sources of knowledge. This is, therefore, the less conscious aspect of Śrīharṣa’s work.

To begin with the conscious aspects of the work of Śrīharṣa proper, let me state his famous dictum that is the epitome of the ontological and epistemological basis of Śrīharṣa’s methodology: *Sarvāṇi lakṣaṇāni anupapannāni*, “All definitions are untenable.” Subodh Kapoor explains:

The chief method of Śrīharṣa’s dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definition; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (*cakraka*), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an independent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories.<sup>15</sup>

That is, the methodical procedure of Śrīharṣa is characterized by the destruction of all possible definitions and their epistemological propositions.

To clarify it further, let me now put in gist here the whole argument of Śrīharṣa against all dualists, using the Nāgārjunian nihilist strategy (*prasāṅga*) of reducing all into absurdity (which became *vitāṇḍa* in Śrīharṣa). He sketches two arguments, both of which together result in the conclusion that all definitions of all dualists

<sup>14</sup> Raju, *Structural Depths*, 383–84.

<sup>15</sup> Subodh Kapoor, *Encyclopedia of Indian Heritage* (New Delhi: Cosmo, 2002), 1971.

are incoherent (which means they are “defining the indefinable”), and so, only monism would hold:

(1) a property, such as blue, is unrelated to its bearer, such as a pot; (2) if there is a relation that relates them, such as inherence, then there have to be further relations to relate the inherence to each of the terms, the blue and the pot, *ad infinitum* ( $aRb$ ,  $aR'R$ ,  $aR'R'R$ , *ad infinitum*), likewise with the second term); unless (3) it is the very nature of one of the terms to link with the other; such linkage would amount to nondistinctness. The third seems the only viable option. Nondistinctness, however, is at odds with Nyāyā pluralism, and thus the argument (along with others), Śrīharṣa concludes, shows that there is no coherent Nyāyā challenger to the monism of Brahman taught by the *Upaniṣads*.

In sum, distinct things have to be in relation, but relations are impossible. Thus by presupposing fundamentally distinct things, pluralists run into a host of difficulties, as indicated by this demonstration of incoherence (and others).

That is to say, the disease of defining the indefinable would be cured, according to Śrīharṣa, by consuming the *khaṇḍakhādyā* of *khaṇḍana*.<sup>16</sup>

The advent of Udayanācārya in the 10<sup>th</sup> century C.E. marks the dawn of a new era, with his magnificent masterpieces like *Nyāyakusumāñjalī*, *Lakṣanāvalī* etc., in the philosophic scene. Advaita was in a condition of decline in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries. It is against this background that Śrīharṣa emerges and defends Advaita against the dualists like Naiyāyikas and Buddhists. The *magnum opus* in the field of Advaita dialectic has thus been *KKK*

<sup>16</sup> *Khaṇḍakhādyā* is an Āyurvedic tonic (*avaleha*) for getting rid of very many diseases:

*Cākṣuṣyam bṛmhaṇam vṛṣyam māṅgalyam prītivardhanam |*  
*Śrīkaram lāghavakaram khaṇḍakhādyam prakīrtitam ||*

Hence, the *KKK* is also known as *Anirvacanīyatāsarvasvam*. See *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa, ed. Anandapurna Saraswati (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, 1992), v. Cf. also *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa, ed. L. S. Dravida Śāstrī (Benares: 1904–1914), 10.

of Śrīharṣa, whereas in the field of literature it was his *mahākāvya NC*.

Advaita Vedānta is not a monolithic movement. It develops lines of cosmological argument and anti-cosmological argument, epistemological (where there is less intra-camp disagreement) and exegetical strategies, and ethical theories and views about the way to liberation or *Brahma-vidyā*, along with arguments against other philosophies on any point of concern. Śrīharṣa directs many of these currents into his version of Advaita, which combines, in particular, previous epistemological thinking with dialectical arguments—some innovative, others inherited from Nāgārjuna and others—against what he sees as views incompatible with Upaniṣadic teachings about Brahman and the self.<sup>17</sup>

It is against this context that Śrīharṣa makes his own contribution through the *KKK*. The significance of the dialectic of *KKK* can be seen in the fact that it ignited the cause of Advaitic Dialectics. The significance of *NC* is that this *mahākāvya* was one of the last Sanskrit *mahākāvya*s after Kālidāsa, and it began the work of popularization of Advaita among the masses, especially through its adaptations by others.

In the present work, the author is preoccupied with very many cognate problems with respect to the works of Śrīharṣa. Did he have any intention other than popularization of the Advaita of *KKK* in writing the *mahākāvya*, namely, *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*? Did he have the aim of writing an introductory manual for popularizing his philosophy through *NC*? Scattered in the main body of this work, one finds that his other motives in the writing of the *NC* are not very important. What was his philosophic leaning? Which school of Indian philosophy did he represent and defend, and to what extent? Did he have a positive Advaitic programme in authoring the *KKK* and the *NC*? Did he succeed in achieving the goal of this work? The reader, I am sure, would realize Śrīharṣa's

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<sup>17</sup> Stephen H. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic"* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997), 35–36.



importance as an Advaitin, from the enormous success he had in the field, despite the tough philosophical and literary content of his works, and the negative stance he took with respect to other systems of philosophy.

Did the post-Śrīharṣan period record a strong lineage of adherents of Advaita Vedānta, as a result of his endeavours? What is the interconnection between scepticism, dialectics and knowledge? What is the viewpoint of Śrīharṣa with regard to knowledge? What is the role of Śrīharṣa in the categorization of the mode of debate called *tarka*? How to locate *KKK* in the debate landscape of India? What was the pre-Śrīharṣan intellectual, social, political, literary and religious atmosphere that caused the emergence of his literary, dialectical and philosophical activity? The following chapters take up an intensive search into these questions.

What is the place of *NC* among Sanskrit *mahākāvyas*? Which are the commentaries of *NC* that have really made it accessible? Which are the regional variations and translations of *NC*? How far is a philosophical reading of *NC* possible? What are the literary merits and demerits of *NC* compared to other *mahākāvyas* in Sanskrit? What are the characteristics of *NC* as a *mahākāvya*?

Did *KKK* act as a source book for later thinkers, especially for advancement of Advaita dialectic and epistemology? How far has *KKK* been instrumental in the emergence of Navya-Nyāya in later centuries, as a result of the works and activity of Gaṅgeṣopādhyāya and Gadādhara? What was the role of Śrīharṣa in the emergence of *vādaprasthāna* in Advaita Vedānta?

How did he refute the particularistic realistic schools of Indian philosophy? How far could he be the reason for development of the Advaita dialectic during the post-Śaṅkara epoch? To what extent was he a philosopher, poet and mystic, and how could he combine the three in his person?

What are the core problems of realism according to Śrīharṣa? How far has he succeeded in blending the concept of *saguṇa-Brahman* of *NC* and the concept of *nirguṇa-Brahman* of *KKK*? How may we account for Advaitic theism in *NC* and for Advaitic-monistic voluntarism in *KKK*? What are the previous models

before Śrīharṣa for the creation of the Advaita masterpiece, *KKK*?

How far have the works *Tattvopaplavasimha* of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa and *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna influenced Śrīharṣa for authoring *KKK*? How to contextualize the fact that there exist commentaries on *KKK* by the arch-enemies of the very system, together with those of his own and other Advaita followers?

Problems of the like have been discussed in the whole body of this work. The present work is a humble contribution to the line of attempts to structure Advaita dialectic as presented in *KKK* and *NC* of Śrīharṣa, against the background of the ideal set forth by the triumvirate of Advaita dialectics, namely, Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī—the authors of the triple texts: *KKK*, *Tattvapradīpikā* and *Advaitasiddhi*.

My work here is divided into seven chapters, with a view to structure Śrīharṣa's accomplishment in Advaita dialectic. Chapter 1 traces the philosophical lineage of Śrīharṣa. Chapter 2 is a preliminary study of Śrīharṣa's works and their commentaries, facilitating an entry into the recesses and ramifications of the questions we have posed for our study. Chapter 3 is a Śrīharṣan epistemological inquiry into the possibility of knowledge in general, in sceptic lines. Chapter 4 focuses on his reductive *viṭaṇḍā* methodology, which was an Advaitically perfected form of Nāgārjunian *prasaṅga* method. Chapter 5 studies the constructive Advaitic dimension enshrined in *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍyam*, the philosophical *magnum opus* of Śrīharṣa. Chapter 6 deals with the making of Advaita dialectic through the poetic means, through the medium of a *mahākāvya*, namely, *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*, the last of the five great *mahākāvyas* in Sanskrit. Chapter 7 is a conclusive study of post-Śrīharṣan contributions of Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in perfecting the Advaita dialectic, thus bringing out the importance of Śrīharṣa in the development of Advaita in the post-Śrīharṣan millennium. The Appendices add flavour to the text by providing ample material for reference.

## CHAPTER 1

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# The Philosophical Lineage of Śrīharṣa: An Outline

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- 1.1. Philosophical Doctrines of Pre-Śrīharṣa Advaitins
    - 1.1.1. Significance of the Term ‘Vedānta’
    - 1.1.2. The Chief Periods of Advaita Vedānta
      - 1.1.2.1. The Vedic Period
      - 1.1.2.2. The Upaniṣadic Period
      - 1.1.2.3. The Epic Period
      - 1.1.2.4. The Aphoristic Period
      - 1.1.2.5. The Commentatorial Period
        - 1.1.2.5.1. The Pre-Śaṅkara Period
          - 1.1.2.5.1.1. Gauḍapāda (*ca.* AD 520–620)
          - 1.1.2.5.1.2. Maṇḍana Miśra (*ca.* AD 750)
        - 1.1.2.5.2. The Period of Śaṅkara (*ca.* AD 780–820)
        - 1.1.2.5.3. The Post-Śaṅkara Period
          - 1.1.2.5.3.1. Sureśvara (AD 800)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.2. Padmapāda (AD 820)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.3. Hastāmalaka (*ca.* AD 820)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.4. Toṭaka (*ca.* AD 800)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.5. Vācaspati Miśra (AD 841–900)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.6. Vimuktātman (*ca.* AD 850–1050)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.7. Sarvajñātma Muni (AD 900)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.8. Prakāśātman (AD 1000)
          - 1.1.2.5.3.9. Ānandabodha Yati (*ca.* AD 1050–1150)
  - 1.2. Identity of Śrīharṣa, The Philosopher-Poet
    - 1.2.1. Harṣagupta (*ca.* 6<sup>th</sup> Century AD)

- 1.2.2. Harṣagupta (7<sup>th</sup> Century AD)
  - 1.2.3. Harṣagupta
  - 1.2.4. Harṣavarman (8<sup>th</sup> Century AD)
  - 1.2.5. Harṣarāja (9<sup>th</sup> Century AD)
  - 1.2.6. Śrīharṣa (AD 1089–1101)
  - 1.2.7. Harṣamitra
  - 1.2.8. Anaṅga Harṣa
  - 1.2.9. Śrīharṣa
  - 1.2.10. Vikramāditya Harṣa
  - 1.2.11. Śrīharṣa
  - 1.2.12. Harṣa
  - 1.2.13. Harṣa
  - 1.2.14. Śrīharṣa
  - 1.2.15. Śrīharṣa
  - 1.2.16. Harṣa
  - 1.2.17. Śrīharṣa
  - 1.3. A Life-Sketch of Śrīharṣa
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## 1.1. PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES OF PRE-ŚRĪHARṢA ADVAITINS

### 1.1.1. Significance of the Term ‘Vedānta’

The term ‘Vedānta’ generally means the *anta* or concluding portion of the Veda. ‘Veda’, according to the commentators, denotes the *Samhitas* and *Brāhmaṇas*,<sup>1</sup> including the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upa- niṣads* of the different recensions of the *Vedas*. But all the Vedānta texts do not come at the end of the *Brāhmaṇas*. Some, like the *Īśa*, form portions of the *Samhitas* themselves. Others like the *Aitareya* and the *Taittirīya* come in the middle of *Āraṇyakas* and do not form portion of the *Samhitas* at their end, as it is the case with the *Chāndogya* or the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

Another mode of interpreting the term Vedānta is at times resorted to, whereby *anta* is taken to imply the final or ultimate

<sup>1</sup> *Mantrabrāhmaṇayorvedanāmadhyeyam. Āpastamba, Yajñapari- bhāṣāsūtra* 1.34; *Mantrabrāhmaṇayorveda-śabdaḥ. Kauṣītakī- Grhyasūtra* III.12.23.

teaching of the *Vedas*. The portion of the Vedic texts that concern themselves with the details of rituals is the *karmakāṇḍa*. Vedānta is the final teaching of the Veda and stresses salvation through knowledge. Vedānta is often styled, in this sense, as the latter portion (“Uttara Mīmāṃsā” or the science of exegesis) as applied to the latter part of the *Veda*, thus to demarcate it from the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā which deals with the ritualistic part of the *Veda*. The term ‘vedānta’ signifies not one system. The different systems within it differ from each other essentially in points of metaphysical doctrines. The differences range from absolute idealism down to dualism, with some important features. These common features may be the reason of their being designated by a common name, Vedānta or *Upaniṣads*.

### 1.1.2. The Chief Periods of Advaita Vedānta

Advaita philosophy is a *philosophia perennis* in its meaning and scope, in its theory and practice, and in its ideology and methodology. Its tradition is oldest in the pristine days of the *Ṛg Veda*. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan classifies Advaita into four periods, namely, the Vedic, the Epic, Sūtra and Scholastic periods.<sup>2</sup> Sangamlal Pandey has classified the same into five periods: (1) the Vedic Period (2000 BC–500 BC); (2) the Upaniṣadic Period (700 BC–600 BC); (3) the Epic Period (600 BC–AD 200); (4) the Aphoristic Period (AD 200–AD 500); and (5) the Commentatorial Period (AD 500–AD 1400).<sup>3</sup>

The last period, that is, the Commentatorial Period, has further been classified into the three sub-periods:<sup>4</sup> (1) the Pre-Śaṅkara Period (AD 500–AD 700); (2) the Period of Śaṅkara (AD 780–AD 820); and (3) the Post-Śaṅkara Period (AD 800–AD 1400).

<sup>2</sup> Radhakrishnan S., *Indian Philosophy*, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 1:56–59.

<sup>3</sup> Sangamlal Pandey, *Pre-Sankara Advaita Philosophy* (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974), 1.

<sup>4</sup> T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita* (Madras: University of Madras, 1960), 13.

### 1.1.2.1. The Vedic Period

The *Ṛg Veda* marks the beginning of Vedānta in seminal form. It includes esoteric hymns such as *RV* X.29, X.90, I.164.46, I.115.1, X.172, X.171, X.121 and X.12. These hymns deal with both elementary and highly reflective speculations on the universe, about its creation, on the feasibility of a great pantheism-compatible universal soul conceived to be one with the universe, etc. The latter concept appears for the first time in the *Ṛg Veda*. It has since dominated the whole of Indian thought and reappeared in some form or other. Despite references to different deities like Indra, Varuṇa, Yama, Agni, Mātariśvān, etc., the underlying monistic filament is unambiguously philosophic. In these philosophical hymns, the underlying theme is that all specific natural realities and events that popular belief denotes as ‘god’, is an emanation of the theoretically one whole. All plurality is imaginary. This may be encountered in *RV* I.164.46:

*Indram mitram varuṇam agnimāhuratho divyah sa suparṇo  
garutmān |  
Ekam sadviprāḥ bahudhā vadantyagnim yamam  
mātariśvānamāhuḥ ||*

To translate it, “That one Divine Reality is called Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, Yama, Mātariśvān, etc. The wise appellate the same One Reality in many ways.”

In some *Ṛg Vedic* hymns, the conception of the unity of the world and gods is the seminal shape of the *Veda-anta*. Some *mantras* advocate the unity and uniqueness of the Real: That One (*tadekam*) is not personal or specific or manifold, but it is the Impersonal Principle of all that are perceived as many in their individuality and event-nature. In short, nothing exists, other than this Principle (*RV* X.129.1, 2). Later, after much time, theoretical reflection and mystical practice, this concept emerged into Monism, which perceives through the veil of the manifold, the unity that underlies it. Accordingly, we have the hymn X.121. It describes Hiranyagarbha, the sole lord of beings (a sort of Demi-

urge) consciously supporting heaven and earth, as existing in the beginning of creation. Another hymn, X.90, conceives Virāṭapuruṣa as the one being who pervades the earth from all sides, and still remains over and above the mundane universe.

### 1.1.2.2. The Upaniṣadic Period

The monism foreshadowed in some hymns of the *R̥g Veda* had not yet become *advaita* or *dvaita* or any other. It began to evolve into idealistic monism in the *Upaniṣads*. It views the infinite, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, purely spiritual Brahman as the Ultimate Reality. The temporal, spatial and causal world is the subjectively objective manifestation of this Ultimate. In contradistinction, Brahman is understood to be non-temporal, transcendental, indefinable, incomprehensible and unknowable. Note that the presupposition behind such a conclusion was the need to *absolutely* differentiate between the many and the One, although the trend is least to be encountered in the Vedas! Accordingly, Brahman is without before and after, and inside and outside. One then encounters a spark of Brahman in the human, namely, Ātman. The latter is, then, found to be the almost impersonal (of the Brahman-level realization) and trans-personal (beyond the *jīva*-level of realization) Ātman, which must have been such by reason of its own experience of connection and continuity with Brahman. Brahman is the one, undifferentiated, homogenous consciousness without inside and outside, and hence, its like is also such in fact. The reason for our experience otherwise had then to be found in some phenomenon, which was called *Māyā*.

As we have mentioned, the principal concept in the oldest *Upaniṣads*—the *Chāndogya* (VI.2.1), the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II.4.14, IV.4.19, II.5.13), the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Kaṭha*—have their zenith in the experiential equation, “Brahman = Ātman,” whereby the world is taken most literal sense, and from which it obtains by transposition that the Ātman is the only Reality (*BṛhU* I.4.10; II.5.1; II.5.14: *ChāU* III.4.1). It is the consciously experienced metaphysical unity manifested in all the empirical (read ‘experiential’) plurality. Hence, all (*ya-*, “that which”) finite, measuring

(*ma-*, “measure”) plurality, by implication, reduces itself to *Māyā*, which is the doctrine that the universe is illusory, as found in *Upaniṣads* like Śvetāśvatara 9-10.

### 1.1.2.3. *The Epic Period*

The epics *Mahābhārata* (hereafter, *Mbh*) and *Rāmāyaṇa* are the literary representatives of Hindu philosophy in its Upaniṣadic origin and its multifarious aspects of development. It being a voluminous collection of metaphorical and allegorical narratives and discourses, the *Mbh* may be considered to be a masterpiece of the art of popularizing the Vedic and Upaniṣadic ontologies and ethics within the framework of plots and sub-plots that ably instantiate in the contemporary moral and religious forms of life, within the diverse social strata. It would be apt here to point out the persuasive methodology of the epics of *Mbh* and *Rāmāyaṇa* as remote prototypes of *mahākāvyas* like the *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (*NC*) of Śrīharṣa. As the epics are compendia of several streams of schools of thought allegorically enshrined in historical and mythical items, so also, the *NC* has been a reservoir of several disciplines and philosophical discourses.

Out of the *Upaniṣads* arose, besides Vedānta, several other schools of thought. The Epics, in their own right, have also given rise to fresh developments and cogent trends in Vedāntic thought, through their methodical communication of the essence of the Vedāntic schools. Thus, for example, *brahmavidyā* is not unknown to the Epics. Pertinently, S. K. De observes about the *Mbh* thus: “Indeed the idealistic absolutism of the *Upaniṣads* underlies most of the Epic teaching in its theoretic aspect.”<sup>5</sup> So too, it should be mentioned in passing that Śrīharṣa attempted to teach and to popularize the rational insistence of such Vedānta, the aesthetic-moral persuasion of the Epics and the moral-religious philosophy of the *Bhagavadgītā* by hybridizing them with the Mahāyāna, Nyāya and Cārvāka dialectic! As we know, the main contribution of the

<sup>5</sup> Radhakrishnan S., *et al.*, eds., *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952–53), 86.



Epic to Advaita is the *Bhagavadgītā*. The path of persuasion that Śrīharṣa's *NC* follows is the *Naḷopākhyāna* of *Mbh* in the *BhG*, but in a more dramatic, theatric and dialectic style.

The *Bhagavadgītā*, which forms part of the Bhīṣmaparva of the *Mbh* (25–42), has been the most popular religious poem in Sanskrit literature. It conveys lessons of philosophy, religion and ethics in one of the most universally effective ways—an example that Śrīharṣa follows by staunch adherence. It transforms Upaniṣadic metaphysical doctrines into a life philosophy of universal ethics and religion, concealing within itself the deep metaphysical doctrines of the dutiful, just, active, loving and contemplative person and society through apt narratives of the likes of the person's own life. As is always in the case of literary encapsulations of philosophic and religious doctrines, what is conveyed in a literary way wields great persuasive power by the *chiaroscuro* (Italian, “clear-obscure”) dynamic, awaiting decipherment of the concealed pearls of doctrine and life by the discerning devotee and connoisseur from within pious and literary ways unto being holy.

The *BhG* contributes, among others, the following main ontological doctrines to Advaita. In the spirit of the *Upaniṣads*, the *BhG* identifies the two principles, that is, the Ātman in its so-called “identity” with Brahman. Behind the fleeting senses and physical body there transpires the Ātman; and behind the transitory objects of the world the Brahman transpires. Theoretically, they are transcended into the One Being with Its metaphysically identical nature (*BhG* XV.17; VIII.22; VIII.3). Hence, their practical diversity does not matter!

The unity of all pathways is explicitly maintained in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The *BhG* practically removes the conflicts of all pathways, that is, of *jñāna*, *yoga*, *karma*, and *bhakti*. It maintains their organic unity within the ontological structure of practice. In effect, the *BhG* shows their points of contact by first dividing these pathways into two connected classes: *sāmkhyamārga* (here, intellectual *theórial*/contemplation, by philosophical intent of the *Gītākāra*) and *yogamārga* (here, *praxis*, by moral-practical intent). The *BhG* establishes for practical consumption the Advaita

ontological view, “he who sees Sāmkhya and Yoga as one, really sees.” (*BhG* IV.2; VII, 21–23; IX.3, 5, 23).

The *Bhagavadgītā* develops the doctrine of *Māyā* (*BhG* IV.6; VII.14, 15, 25) when it solves the problem of the transformation of the impersonal Absolute into a personal God by the supposition that it is due to *māyā* or cosmic illusion that such a transformation takes place. In other words, the *BhG* states that this transformation is a mystery and explains it in the same way as it does the relation of the Absolute to the world as do the *Upaniṣads* too. Although Śrī Kṛṣṇa comes as a personalized God, the monistic principle is constantly kept in view in His utterances. The *Gītā* of Śrī Kṛṣṇa lights the way of the *Bhāgavatadharmā*, which assures all, irrespective of all differences, that they can achieve the liberation promised by the *Upaniṣads* by continuing their daily works and activities in a spirit of devotion and renunciation.

There is an allegorical interpretation<sup>6</sup> of the *BhG* in the light of the whole *Mbh*. The blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra represents ignorance. Arjuna is the individual soul. Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the charioteer, represents the universal soul, the indweller of the heart. Our body is the chariot, the sense–motor organs being the horses. Mind, egoism, senses, *samskāras*, desires, craving, anger, hatred, lust, jealousy, greed, pride and hypocrisy are our enemies. These battles within are being fought continuously in life. Almost the same pattern of allegorical representation may be witnessed in the *mahākāvya NC* in a vivid and dramatic manner.

#### 1.1.2.4. The Aphoristic Period

Bādarāyaṇa’s *Brahmasūtra* (also called *Vedāntasūtra*)—the exposition of the Upaniṣadic philosophy and backbone of the orthodox systems—is the main text representing the aphoristic period in Indian Philosophy. All *Brahmasūtra* commentators agree on its status as the quintessence of the Upaniṣadic teachings.

Bādarāyaṇa proclaims Brahman to be the distinctive but evo-

<sup>6</sup> Ravindra Kumar Panda, *Anandabodha Yati: Life and Philosophy* (Delhi: Eastern Books, 1997), 6–7.

lutionary cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world (*BrS* I.1.2)—cause both material and instrumental (*BrS* I.4.23). Unaided by any extraneous means, Brahman created the universe by the process of *pariṇāma* (progressive modification). The world so created is not a new object coming into existence out of an absolutely non-existent state, but exhibits qualities divergent from those of the cause. The *sūtrakāra* propounds that the individual soul is distinct from the intellect, mind, sense organs and life breaths (*BrS* II.3.15; II.3.30; II.3.32; II.4.1; II.4.17; IV.2.10), as also from both the gross physical body and the subtle transmigrating body, both conceived as a totality. Individual soul is subtle (*BrS* II.3.1). It has its abode in the heart (*BrS* II.3.24; I.3.14), where he dwells along with the Lord, the creator from whom he is a distinct entity but is nevertheless related to him like the drop to the ocean or the sparks to the fire. As the soul's essence is identical with that of Brahman, there is no creation of the soul as such. The soul is immortal and liable to transmigration from life (*BrS* II.3.19; III.1.1; III.1.13) until he is able to win its salvation through proper knowledge and discipline.

### 1.1.2.5. The Commentatorial Period

#### 1.1.2.5.1. The Pre-Śaṅkara Period

##### 1.1.2.5.1.1. GAUḌAPĀDA (ca. AD 520–620)<sup>7</sup>

Gauḍapāda occupies an important place in the history of Advaita Vedānta, as he is its first systematic exponent. In the traditional salutation formula repeated daily by the followers of Śaṅkara, he stands as the grand preceptor—*paramaguru*—of Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda's teaching provides the firm foundation for Vedānta on which Śaṅkara and his successors built the edifice of Advaita theory.<sup>8</sup> His name will ever remain as the great pioneer who com-

<sup>7</sup> In the "Introduction" of *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Mīśra, ed. S. Kuppaswami Sastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), lviii.

<sup>8</sup> In the "Introduction" of *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, ed. R.

bined in himself a deep mysticism with a penetrating philosophy. Gauḍapāda is known as the author of the following works:

1. *Gauḍapādakārikā* or *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣadkārikā*
2. *Bhāṣya* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa
3. *Uttaragīta*
4. *Subhagodayastuti*
5. *Śrīvidyāranyasūtra*

The Ultimate Reality, according to all these works of Gauḍapāda, is Brahman. Following the way of the *Upaniṣads*, he teaches the nature of Brahman both affirmatively and negatively. As related to, and inclusive of, the world, Brahman is Īśvara who is also called the lower (*apara*) Brahman, seated in the hearts of all, (*GauK* I.28) and is the all-pervasive lord, impelling all being to activity. It remains the same in the three states of experience, namely, waking, dreaming and sleeping. The higher Brahman (*Parambrahma*), that is, Brahman *per se*, however, is not related to the world. It is devoid of sleep and dream; and transcends the three states of experience, and hence is called the fourth (*turīya*) (*GauK* I.14). Gauḍapāda expounds the doctrine of non-duality (*GauK* I.10; I.16; I.14) of the Supreme Spirit by citing important scriptural passages and by reasoning. Creation texts, he says, should not be interpreted literally; they are to be understood in a figurative sense, and should be regarded as providing an introduction to the texts, which teach non-duality.

Gauḍapāda analyses the three states of experience, and concludes thereof that the real Self is not affected by the changing states and that the Self is the constant unvarying non-dual reality. Gauḍapāda sets forth the doctrine of *ajāti* (non-origination). The category of cause itself, which is the ground of the notion of origination, is unintelligible. Giving a critique of causality, Gauḍapāda says, “Nothing could come out of nothing; nor could anything

issue out of anything else. Thus, *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda* perish by mutual conflict, and point to the truth of no-origination, the truth that nothing whatsoever is born.”<sup>9</sup> Brahman, which is the eternal immutable reality, is neither an effect nor a cause. There is nothing other than it. Gauḍapāda holds the view that the world of plurality is an appearance (*māyāmātra*). The one Self seems to be many through its own *māyā* (*GauK* II.12). The world with its things is an illusory projection of *Ātma-māyā* (*GauK* III.10).

Gauḍapāda teaches the *vivartavāda* or, to use his terminology, the theory of the *vaitathya* of the world. *Māyā*, which is the principle of illusion, has no independent ontological status. It is not an entity or reality having a substance of its own. As there are no real distinctions in either, and as it is created by things and experiences like pots and pitchers, so also, according to Gauḍapāda, Brahman or the Self, which is pure consciousness, is undivided and indivisible.<sup>10</sup> The truth is that no *jīva* is ever born. There is neither destruction nor origination, neither the bound souls nor those who seek the means to realise, neither *mumukṣu* nor *mukta* (*GauK* II.32). According to Gauḍapāda, *mokṣa* is not that which is attained (*sādhya*). What is called *mokṣa* is really the attainment of what is really attained. The path thereto is *jñāna*. Gauḍapāda defines it as *ātmasatyānubodha* (realisation of truth of the self) (*GauK* III.32). It is through the unborn knowledge that the unborn self is realized.

#### 1.1.2.5.1.2. MAṄḌANA MIŚRA (ca. AD 750)

In ranking philosophical writers according to their contributions to the liberation of the human mind, Maṅḍana Miśra, a great authority on Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, occupies a prominent place after Gauḍapāda in the history of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta. He is the author of six works:<sup>11</sup> *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*, *Bhāvanāviveka*, *Vidhiviveka*, *Sphoṭasiddhi*, *Vibhramaviveka*, and

<sup>9</sup> Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, 235.

<sup>10</sup> Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Sastri, *Brahmasiddhi*, lviii.

*Brahmasiddhi*. Of these works, Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* occupies a unique place among the works on Advaita Vedānta not only because of its comparative antiquity, but also because of the comprehensive and elaborate treatment of the various aspects of the Advaita doctrine.

Maṇḍana maintains the *sphoṭavāda* and *śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari. He holds the view that the Upaniṣadic text “*Aum iti Brahma, Aum iti idamsarvam,*” should be understood as establishing the identity of *praṇava* with Brahman and as supporting the *śabdādvaita* doctrine.<sup>12</sup> Maṇḍana gives a prominent and honoured place to the Bhaṭṭa theory of *viparītakhyāti* or *anyathākhyāti* (*BhS* 143, 150), with a slight variation. He maintains that the theory of *anyathākhyāti* is sound and, when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory reduces inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from the *anirvacanīyakhyaāti* (error of the indefinable object).

Further, Maṇḍana recognises two kinds of *avidyā* (nescience), namely, non-apprehension (*agrahaṇa*) and misapprehension (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) (*BhS* 149–50). Maṇḍana also utilises this distinction in explaining the purpose of meditation in his scheme of the attainment of the final liberating realization of Brahman and considers meditation as necessary for completely removing the second variety, that is, *anyathāgrahaṇa* of nescience and for converting the first indirect knowledge of Brahman (*parokṣajñāna*) into direct Brahman-realisation (*aparokṣabrahman-sākṣātkāra*).

Maṇḍana further avers that *jīva* (the Individual soul) is the locus (*āśraya*) and Brahman is its object (*viśaya*) (*BhS* 50). According to Maṇḍana, experience of Upaniṣadic *mahāvākyas* like ‘*Tattvamasi*’ (*ChāU* XI.4; X.2.3) reveal the “identity” of Brahman with Ātman and give rise to the true knowledge of the one Absolute Real. The knowledge that arises from such texts, however, is indirect (*BhS* 99) and mediate (*parokṣa*) and necessarily involves relation in some manner (*samsr̥ṣṭavisa*) like any other cognition arising from a valid verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*). Maṇḍana

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvi.

advocates that direct realization, which springs from meditation based upon the indirect knowledge, which in turn arises from the Upaniṣadic texts, is capable of bringing about realization of *mokṣa* (final beatitude).

1.1.2.5.2. *The Period of Śaṅkara (ca. AD 780-820)*<sup>13</sup>

Śaṅkarācārya is one of the greatest systematic thinkers that India has ever produced. His Advaitism is a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety. From a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, Śaṅkara's doctrine is the most important and interesting one that has arisen on the Indian soil. In him, all lines of thought converge: idealism and realism, pragmatism and rationalism, naturalism and mysticism, agnosticism and faith-philosophy. His system is one of the most valuable products of genius of mankind in its search for the eternal truth, and won him a place among the immortals of the humanity. The works of Śaṅkara include eleven commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and prominent *Upaniṣads*, etc., as well as five *Prakaraṇagrāntas*, *Upadeśa sāhasri*, *Aparokṣānubhūti*, *Ātmabodha*, etc., and eight *stotras* like *Ānandalaharī*, *Daśaśloki*, *Dakṣiṇāmūrti*, *Ṣaṭpadī*, etc., making a net total of twenty-four.<sup>14</sup>

Śaṅkara's doctrine is commonly known as Kevalādvaitya (Absolute Monism), according to which the Supreme Reality, that is, Brahman, is the only transcendental, absolute, eminent power and everything else, including individual souls, being false, gets merged with it, after attaining the true knowledge, the Brahman, the Intelligence without form, without qualities, without any limitations of time, space or causality and underlying the unity of reality. Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, is the only absolute substratum of all that is ephemeral. Empirical plurality is itself without the slightest touch of plurality. Śaṅkara's doctrine has two

<sup>13</sup> Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969–73), 2:100.

<sup>14</sup> Shripad Krishna Belvalkar, *Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy* (Poona: Bilvakuṅja, 1929), 230.

aspects, esoteric and exoteric, be it with reference to theology, cosmology, or psychology. Esoterically, Brahman is knowledge or realisation itself, without qualification and without possibility of change; exoterically, it is qualified, possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes capable of producing this world from itself and reabsorbing it in itself. Esoteric cosmology, however, says that it is Īśvara and all that is, is a mere appearance of truth. The manifold world is only an illusion, *māyā*, a dream, and the reality is to be attained not by reasoning (*tarka*) but by introspective realization (*anubhava*). According to esoteric psychology, the *jīva* is Brahman itself in full and total possession of eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, etc., but these godly qualities lie concealed with it as the fire in the wood and appears only after the final deliverance of self-realisation.

The philosophical part of Śaṅkara's doctrine may therefore be summed up as follows:<sup>15</sup>

- 1) All plurality is false or unreal and superimposed upon one pure and eternal Brahman, which is all-pervading; it is the *Māyā* that makes us see plurality, where there is unity and which itself has not independent existence (*BrSŚB* I.3.5; II.2.2; IV.3.14; II.1.33; I.3.16; II.1.14).
- 2) The individual soul is really nothing but Brahman (*BrSŚB* I.3.46; I.1.1; I.2.20; *BrhUŚB* II.1.20).
- 3) Knowledge in the form of self-realisation—realization of the identity of Brahman and Jīvātman—is the only means to *mokṣa* (*BrSŚB* I.1.4; III.2.5; III.4.1; *BrhUŚB* IV.3.1, IV.4.7; *BhGŚB* XVIII.20).
- 4) The practical part of the doctrine amounts to this: Actions must be performed only to purify the mind, so as to make one fit to acquire the knowledge of this identity of Brahman and *Jīva*; but afterwards they must all be given up, since without complete renunciation (*sannyāsa*) of all actions, achievement of *mokṣa* is impossible because action (*karma*)

<sup>15</sup> Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 13–14.



and knowledge (*jñāna*) are opposed to each other like darkness and light.

### 1.1.2.5.3. The Post-Śaṅkara Period

#### 1.1.2.5.3.1. SUREŚVARA (AD 800)<sup>16</sup>

In the history of Advaita Vedānta, Sureśvara occupies an important place, as he has presented the philosophy of Śaṅkara in a clear and systematic manner. This eminent Mīmāṃsaka is renowned as an immediate disciple of Śaṅkara after the latter defeated him in a debate and converted him into an *advaitin*.

The works<sup>17</sup> of Sureśvara are the following:

1. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣadbhāṣya-vārttika*
3. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣadbhāṣya-vārttika*
4. *Mānasollāsa*
5. *Pañcīkaraṇavārttika*

Sureśvara propounds the theory of semblance (*ābhāsavāda*), according to which *Jīva* (Individual Self) is the semblance (*ābhāsa*) of Brahman (*NaS* II.51: *BrUpV* I.II.157; I.IV.1328; II.IV.4.24, 25; III.IV.105). Sureśvara does not recognize any kind of differentiation between the *āśraya* (locus) and the *viśaya* of *avidyā* (*NaS* III). According to Sureśvara, the immutable Brahman is the material cause of the world, while *Māyā* is its secondary or mediate cause. Sureśvara maintains that the Vedic texts are capable of producing immediate cognition of the Self as Brahman and repudiates necessity of meditation (as *dhyānābhāsa*) or of repetition (as *prasāṅkhyāna*) as a means of producing immediacy (*aparokṣatva*) (*NaS* III.89–93; III.123–26). This view of Sureśvara is called *śabdaparokṣavāda*. Sureśvara holds that *mokṣa* has nothing to do

<sup>16</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:98.

<sup>17</sup> In the “Introduction” of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara, ed. S. S. Raghavachar (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1965), iv.

with the performance of action (*karma*). *Mokṣa* is not acquired by a combination of knowledge and performance of duties (*BrUpV* 18, 28, 38, 39, 40, 73: *NaS* 154–79). When self-knowledge dawns, the experience of ego (*ahamkāra*) vanishes. Duality is caused by the effects of *antaḥkaraṇa*. Knowledge breaks the bond of objectivity and illusory appearance. Hence *jñāna* (pure knowledge) is the only means for attainment of self-realisation (*NaS* I.99).

#### 1.1.2.5.3.2. PADMAPĀDA (ca. AD 820)<sup>18</sup>

Amongst the immediate disciples of Śaṅkara, Padmapāda is universally reputed for his substantial contribution to the development of Śaṅkara's Advaita doctrine. The only work Padmapāda is reputed to have composed is a commentary on the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara called *Pañcapādika*<sup>19</sup> (as it relates to the first five *pādas* of the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa) and unfortunately that too is not available in its complete form but up to the first four *sūtras*. Padmapāda propounds that *māyā*, *avyākṛta*, *prakṛti*, *agrahaṇa*, *tama*, *kāraṇa*, *laya*, *śakti*, *mahāsupti*, *nidrā*, *kṣara*, and *ākāṣa* are the terms synonymous with *avidyā*.<sup>20</sup> It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman. Thus, standing as the painted canvas (*citra-bhitti*) of ignorance (*avidyā*), deeds (*karma*) and past impressions of knowledge (*pūrvaprajñāsamskāra*), *avidyā* produces individual selves.<sup>21</sup> Undergoing its peculiar transformations with Brahman as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (*vijñānakriyāśaktidvayāśraya*) and functions as doer of all actions and enjoyer of all experiences.<sup>22</sup> In association with the Pure and Unchangeable light of Brahman, it is the complex of

<sup>18</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:100.

<sup>19</sup> *Pañcapādika* of Padmapādācārya, ed. T. Chandrasekharan (Madras: Madras Government Oriental Series, 1958), (n.p.).

<sup>20</sup> *Pañcapādika* of Padmapāda, eds. S. Srirama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri (Madras: Madras Government Oriental Series, 1958), 98.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 98–99.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

this transformation, which appears as the immediate ego (*aham-kāra*).<sup>23</sup> Through association with this ego, the Pure Self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called *antaḥkaraṇa*, *manas*, *buddhi* and the ego or the ego-feeler (*aham-pratyayin*). On the vibratory side of its activity, it is called *prāṇa* (biomotor functions). The association of the ego with the pure Ātman, like the association with the redness of a *japa* flower with a crystal, is a complex (*granthi*) that manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the *avidyā* stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (*sambhinnobhayarūpatvāt*).<sup>24</sup> Padmapāda avers that *avidyā* manifests itself in the individual person by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the Brahman by its limitation (*avaccheda*) through beginningless *avidyā*, is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual selves.

#### 1.1.2.5.3.3. HASTĀMALAKA (ca. AD 820)<sup>25</sup>

Hastāmālaka is one of the immediate disciples of Śaṅkara. He is known as the author of *Dvādaśamañjarī vyākhyā* and *Hastāmālaka-śloka*. Hastāmālaka expounds the theory that the self is eternally pure and it goes through transmigration (*samsṛṣṭi*), which is only temporary. The cause of *samsṛṣṭi* is *avidyā* (nescience) residing in Ātman, its object.

*Īśvara* is the reflection of *cidābhāsa* in *Māyā*, consisting of three dualities of *guṇa* (quality), viz., *sattva* (“whiteness”/light and intelligence), *rajas* (“redness”/activity and passion) and *tamas* (“darkness”/inertia and biliousness), while *jīva* is a reflection of the *cidābhāsa* at the level of a consciousness that is in *sattvagūṇapradhānamāyā* (nescience characterized by the whiteness-quality). *Īśvara*, the cause of this world, is a reflection of the highest *Brahman* called the *kūṭastha nitya* while *jīva*, appears to be the further reflection of *Īśvara* in *jīvamāyā* (nescience limited by individuality), influenced by *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 100–02.

<sup>25</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:100.

1.1.2.5.3.4. TOṬAKA (ca. AD 800)<sup>26</sup>

Toṭaka alias Ānandagiri is not a major author. Still, he is reckoned among the *Śiṣyacatuṣṭayī* (four pupils) of Śaṅkara. He is credited with the authorship of two works, namely, *Toṭakaśloka* and *Kalānirṇaya*. Toṭaka propounds that the highest Reality is *dr̥ṣirūpa* (comprising intelligence), *ananta* (infinite), *ṛta* (highest reality), *viḡuṇa* (void of qualities) and *hr̥dyastha* (residing in the heart). The plurality in the world is like the several appearances of the sun due to distinction by water or like the differences of shapes of ether-in-jar according to the shape of the jar.

1.1.2.5.3.5. VĀCASPATI MIŚRA (ca. AD 841–900)<sup>27</sup>

After the four immediate disciples of Śaṅkara, Vācaspati Miśra, a great Advaitin of versatile genius and encyclopaedic learning, rose to fame. He is reputed to have propounded a new sub-school of Advaita called Bhāmatī School, derived from the name of his celebrated work, *Bhāmatī*, on the *Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, which is the first complete commentary in the entire history of post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta.

The following are the works of Vācaspati:

1. *Nyāyakaṇikā*, a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana;
2. *Tattvasamīkṣā*, a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*;
3. *Tattvabindu*, an independent treatise on *Vākyārtha*;
4. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, a commentary on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, it being an epistemological work that discusses in detail the nature of the *pramāṇas*. It reconstructs the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy on account of which Vācaspati had become famous as *tātparyācārya*;
5. *Nyāyasūci*, the Nyāya work written as a supplement to *Tātparya*;

<sup>26</sup> Nachane S.A., *A Survey of Post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta* (Delhi: Paramamitra Prakashan, 2000), 237.

<sup>27</sup> Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 18.

6. *Sāmkyatattvakaumudī*, a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāmkyakārikā*;
7. *Tattvavaiśārādī*, a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*;
8. *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*.

Besides these works, Vācaspati is supposed to have written other works like

9. *Nyāyatattvāloka*;
10. *Nyāyaratnaṭīkā*;
11. *Brahmatattvasamhitoddīpanī*;
12. *Yuktidīpikā*, a work on the Sāṅkhya;
13. *Vedānta-tattva-kaumudī*.

The *Bhāmatī*<sup>28</sup> upon the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* is known for its profundity of spirit and subtlety of thought. It expounds an uncompromising non-dualism, setting forth its basic principles in cogent terms. In spirit, his view of Advaita is marked by depth of insight. Vācaspati's other Vedāntic work, namely, *Brahmatattva-samīkṣā*, a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*, has not found the light of day. Vācaspati propounds that the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidyā* is the Individual Soul (*jīva*) and Brahman is its object (*viśaya*) (*BhĀ* I.4.3). *Avidyā* differs from individual to individual. It is positive (*bhāvarūpa*) and specific to each *jīva*. In fact, there are many *avidyās* as there are *jīvas*. Vācaspati thus believes in plurality of even *mūla-avidyās* and accepts that the *āvaraṇa-śakti* (veiling power) alone is dominant in the case of *avidyā*: *mūla-avidyā* or primal nescience (*kāraṇa-avidyā*); and *tūla-avidyā* or derivative nescience (*kārya-avidyā*).

Vācaspati propounds the theory of limitation (*avacchedavāda*) according to which the individual self (*jīva*) is the limitation (*avaccheda*) of Brahman (*BhĀ* II.3.17; II.3.28; II.3.30). Vācaspati

<sup>28</sup> *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra I, ed. Anantakrishna Sastri (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1917).

holds the view that *śabda* (verbal testimony) causes only mediate knowledge, which is to be made direct and immediate through constant practice of rational contemplation (*manana*) and constant meditation (*nididhyāsana*). This view is technically called “*prasamkhyāna*”. For Vācaspati, constant meditation becomes the primary means to *mokṣa* (salvation).

According to Vācaspati, what is veiled by nescience is the conditioned Brahman (*sopādhika Brahman*). Vācaspati advocates a distinct view as to the role of Karma in the scheme of Advaitic *sādhana*. Karma, says Vācaspati, only subserves the purpose of generating the desire to know Brahman (*vividiṣa sādhana*) not as a means to knowledge of Brahman.

#### 1.1.2.5.3.6. VIMUKTĀTMAN (ca. AD 850–1050)<sup>29</sup>

Another great writer who flourished after Vācaspati Miśra is Vimuktātman. He is earlier than Prakāśātman, the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*, wherein his view is referred to by the latter. His successors like Prakāśātman, Sarvajñātman, Ānandabodha and others profusely refer to his views in their distinguished works like *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*, *Samkṣepaśārīraka* and *Nyāyamaakaranda* respectively. Vimuktātman is known as the author of two works, viz, *Iṣṭasiddhi* and *Pramāṇavṛttinirṇaya*.

Vimuktātman holds the view that the ultimate reality is pure intuitive consciousness (*anubhūti*). Nothing can be beginningless and external except pure consciousness (*Iṣṭ* 1). *Māyā* is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*), not from both, that is, from being and non-being (*sat* and *asat*), but as involving the characters of being and non-being (*sat* and *asat*). It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (*avidyā-śakti*), which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (*sarvajadopādānabhūta*) (*Iṣṭ* 69). But, just as the fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even upto their very roots, so Brahman-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance, at last itself subsides and

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<sup>29</sup> In the “Introduction” of *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, ed. Mysore Hiriyanna (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933), xiii.

leaves Brahman to shine on its own radiance (*Iṣṭ* 69). The functions of the *pramāṇas*, which are all mere processes of ignorance (*ajñāna* or *avidyā*), consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that is obstructing the omnipresent *ākāśa* (space); the *pramāṇas* have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, but only of removal of the last remnants of *ajñāna*, after which Brahman-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of the *ajñāna*, also ceases. This cessation of *avidyā* is as unspeakable as *avidyā* itself (*Iṣṭ* 366–75). Vimuktātman does not consider *avidyā* to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but also all their mutual relations; and also regards it as related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations.

1.1.2.5.3.7. SARVAJÑĀTMA MUNI (ca. AD 900)<sup>30</sup>

Sarvajñātma Muni alias Sarvajñātman is the author of three works—*Samkṣepaśārīraka*,<sup>31</sup> *Pañcaprakriyā*, and *Pramāṇalākṣaṇa*. Of these three works, his *Samkṣepaśārīraka* is very famous, which contains the gist of the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya*. In his text, Sarvajñātman tries to describe the fundamental problems of Vedānta philosophy as explained by Śāṅkara.

Sarvajñātman maintains that the supreme self itself undergoes transmigration and attains release. There is the transmigration of the self, having the subtle body as the operating condition. He speaks of asceticism as the necessary condition for attaining direct experience of Brahman.

<sup>30</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:iii.

<sup>31</sup> *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman, ed. and trans. Veezhinathan N. (Madras: Madras University Philosophical Series, 1972).

1.1.2.5.3.8. PRAKĀŚĀTMAN (ca. AD 1000)<sup>32</sup>

Another great Vedāntin of post-Śaṅkara Vedānta period is Prakāśātman who had brought up Padmapāda's *Pañcapādika* to very great prominence. He is more famous as the *vivaraṇakāra*, after his work named *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*. Besides the *Vivaraṇa*, Prakāśātman is the author of another work entitled *Nyāyanirṇaya*. But his *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* is the nucleus for the development of Advaitic thought known as "*Vivaraṇa Prasthāna*."

According to the Vivaraṇa school of Prakāśātman, Brahman is both the locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viśaya*) of *avidyā*.<sup>33</sup> The Vivaraṇa school postulates only one *avidyā*, that is common to all *jīvas*, but has different modes or potencies (*śakti*) to bind *jīvas*. The Vivaraṇa school advocates *Pratibimbavāda* (theory of reflection), that is, *jīva* (individual self) is the reflection of the Brahman.

1.1.2.5.3.9. ĀNANDABODHA YATI (ca. AD 1050–1150)<sup>34</sup>

The post-Śaṅkara period witnessed another distinguished Vedāntin, most popularly known as Ānandabodha. He referred himself under various titles such as *Yati* (*Nyāyamakaranda*, 360; *Pramāṇamālā*, 24), *Bhaṭṭāraka* (*Nyāyamakaranda*, 360; *Nyāyadīpikā*, 15), *Parivrājakācārya* (*Pramāṇamālā*, 24), *Sudhi* (*Nyāyadīpikā*, 15), *Sukavi* (*Pramāṇamālā*, 360) and *Ācārya* (*Pramāṇamālā*, 24). The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* gives the titles of his main works: (1) *Nyāyadīpāvalī*, (2) *Nyāyamakaranda*, (3) *Pramāṇamālā* and (4) *Sabdanirṇayavyākhyā* or *Nyāyadīpikā*.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> P. K. Gode, *Studies in Indian Literary History* (Bombay: Singhi Jain Sāstra Śikshāpīth, 1953–56), 228; Mysore Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), 340.

<sup>33</sup> Bratindra Kumar Sengupta. *A Critique on the Vivaraṇa School: Studies in Some Fundamental Advaitist Theories* (Calcutta: Namita Sengupta, 1959), 249.

<sup>34</sup> V. Raghavan and K. Kunjuni Raja, eds., *New Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit and Allied Works and Authors*, Vol.2. (Madras: University of Madras, 1968), 108. See also Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 28.

<sup>35</sup> Quoted in Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 28.



Like Śāṅkara, he was a metaphysician and an Advaitin of encyclopaedic scholarship, a poet, an honest critic and a recondite dialectician, who contributed much to Advaita philosophy and dialectics. It is known from his works that he not only explained the subtle points of Advaita philosophy with sound logical reasoning, facile examples, and epistemologically valid arguments, but also prominent doctrines of other orthodox and heterodox schools like Jainism, Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, etc.

The dialectical method used for the philosophical analysis, is not his invention. The Buddhists had made use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nāgārjuna (AD 300).

“Śāṅkara has also applied dialectic method for refutation of *Pūrvapakṣa* views in his *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* and the *Upa- niṣads*. His aim in employing the dialectic method was,” as Sarma remarks, “to establish the individuality of the system on the foundations of the Śruti freeing it from the shackles of the dualistic Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā in which it had been caught up in its early phase.”<sup>36</sup>

The record of Dasgupta is pertinent in this context: “Śāṅkara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras* II.II *Tarkapāda*.”<sup>37</sup>

Karl H. Potter opines: “Śāṅkara is responsible for a group of dialecticians who conceive of the refutation of alternative views as the only function of philosophical analysis.”<sup>38</sup>

Ānandabodha adopted the method of dialectics, the technical intricacies and the style of argumentation from the Navya-Naiyāyikas since in those days, that is, ninth century onwards, dialectic method was prominently used by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (AD 984) and Udayanācārya (AD 1000). Nachane aptly remarks, “This age was

<sup>36</sup> Sarma V.A., *Citsukha's Contribution to Advaita* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1974), 17.

<sup>37</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:118.

<sup>38</sup> Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 165.

the age of big Naiyāyikas like Udayana, the Advaita was enhanced through the dialectical approach in order to defend Advaitic view points since they were seriously attacked by the Naiyāyikas.”<sup>39</sup>

He “has maintained throughout his works the principles of dialectic such as applying the skills and techniques for the refutation (*khaṇḍana*) of the opponent’s views. He employs the technical terms most probably used by the Naiyāyikas called *doṣas* (faults) relating to argumentation which is the prominent feature of dialectical writing like *anavasthā* (inconstant gress), *ativyāpti* (over-applicability), and *anaikāntika* (inconstant reason).”<sup>40</sup>

## 1.2. IDENTITY OF ŚRĪHARṢA, THE PHILOSOPHER-POET

In Sanskrit literature, one *mahākāvya*, entitled *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (NC), and one *Advaita* dialectical text, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* (KKK), have come down to us as ascribed to the authorship of Śrīharṣa. But there are a good number of Śrīharṣas known to us. We have seventeen persons of the name Harṣa<sup>41</sup> in the realm of Sanskrit literature.

### 1.2.1. Harṣagupta (ca. 6th Century AD)

There was a king by the name “Ādityavarman” in the Maukhari dynasty who took the name Harṣagupta. From the royal seals and inscriptions available today, the identity of the kings of this dynasty has been established. The original names, along with those names assumed later, are given hereby in their chronological order:

<sup>39</sup> Nachane, *Survey of Post-Śankara*, 100; see also Panda, *Anandabodha Yati*, 44.

<sup>40</sup> Potter, *Presuppositions*, 44–45.

<sup>41</sup> Dhyanesh Narayan Chakarvarty, “Identity of Śrīharṣa the Dramatist,” in *A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri*, ed. A. L. Basham, 295–303 (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980).

- |                          |            |
|--------------------------|------------|
| a) Mahārāja Harivarman   | Jayasvāmin |
| b) Mahārāja Ādityavarman | Harṣagupta |
| c) Mahārāja Īṣvaravarman | Upagupta   |

The Harṣagupta *alias* Ādityavarman lived in the first part of the 6<sup>th</sup> century AD. It is believed that he was a resident of what has been the modern Uttar Pradesh.<sup>42</sup>

### 1.2.2. Harṣagupta (ca. 7th Century AD)

We come across another king by the name Harṣagupta in the dynasty of Pāṇḍu. The name of his father was Candragupta, and Bālārjuna Śivagupta was his son. He married Basatā Devī, daughter of Sūryavarman. Basatā Devī was a great devotee of Viṣṇu and she built a temple at Śrīpura. Harṣagupta reigned in south Kosala in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>43</sup>

### 1.2.3. Harṣagupta

From an inscription found in Afsad, near Gaya, we come to know the existence of another Harṣagupta, son of Kṛṣṇagupta of a dynasty with the title Gupta. It has to be remembered in this connection that this Gupta dynasty and the famous Gupta dynasty of history are not identical. Most probably, this Harṣa reigned in Vaṅga, Mālava and Magadha.<sup>44</sup>

### 1.2.4. Harṣavarman (ca. 8th Century AD)

There was a king named Harṣa in the dynasty of Bhagadatta in the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD. He was known as Harṣavarman, and also, Harṣadeva. He is described in an inscription, found in Nepal as the

<sup>42</sup> R. C. Majumdar, ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People: The Classical Age*, Vol.3. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), 67.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 221–22.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

king of Gauḍa, Uḍra, Kaliṅga and Kosala. His daughter Rājyamati was married to the King Jayadeva of the Licchavi dynasty. Sufficient proof can be obtained for stating that he lived in AD 737. So we may draw the conclusion that this Harṣadeva reigned in the first-half of the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>45</sup>

### 1.2.5. Harṣarāja (ca. 9th Century AD)

The king named Harṣarāja reigned in Mevār in the dynasty of Guhilas in the earlier part of the 9<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>46</sup>

### 1.2.6. Śrīharṣa (ca. AD 1089–1101)

Śrīharṣa, a king of Kashmir, is described in detail by Kalhaṇa, a great historian, in his famous work *Rājataranṅiṇi*. King Kalaṣa and Queen Bappikā were his parents. In the first part of his life, Śrīharṣa was extremely bounteous. Bilhaṇa, the famous poet, regretted for his munificence; but in his later life, Śrīharṣa became a tyrant and bore a loose character. In the 11<sup>th</sup> century AD, he extirpates the city of Parihāsapura. He lived between AD 1089 and AD 1101.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.2.7. Harṣamitra

There was a commander-in-chief named Harṣamitra in the kingdom of Kashmir.<sup>48</sup> Harṣata, the son of Kapila, was a ruler of the province of Lohara in the Kingdom of Kashmir.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 138, 141.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>47</sup> Sunil Chandra Roy. *Early History and Culture of Kashmir* (New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970), 166; Jani, *Critical Study*, 84; *Rajataranṅini* of Kalhana, trans. Aurel Stein, 2 vols. (Delhi: Munshi Ram, 1960), 2:511, 7<sup>th</sup> Taranga, No. 319; 829; 1712.

<sup>48</sup> *Rajataranṅini*, 1:511, 8<sup>th</sup> Taranga, No. 960; 670; 998.

<sup>49</sup> Roy, *Early History*, 131.

### 1.2.8. Anaṅga Harṣa

Mātrarata Anaṅga Harṣa, son of Sri Narendra Vardhana, ascended the throne of Kashmir in the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD. Damodara Gupta mentions his name in the *Kuṭṭanīmatam*. He is the author of a drama titled *Tāpasavatsarājacaritam*.<sup>50</sup>

### 1.2.9. Śrīharṣa

Still another Śrīharṣa was the grandfather of Bhoja, king of Dhara, and the father of Muñja and Sindhula. Probably he was alive in the earlier part of the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>51</sup>

### 1.2.10. Vikramāditya Harṣa

There was a king named Vikramāditya Harṣa in Ujjayinī in the 6<sup>th</sup> century AD. The poet, Mātr̥gupta of Kashmir, went to his court. He was contemporary of Pravarasena II of AD 580.<sup>52</sup>

### 1.2.11. Śrīharṣa

K. M. Panikkar refers to one Śrīharṣa who composed a commentary on *Kāvyapradīpa*.<sup>53</sup> It is difficult to procure more references on this personage.

### 1.2.12. Harṣa

Comparatively in modern times we meet another Harṣa, a commentator of *Gītāgovindam*, the famous lyrical work of Jayadeva.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Tridib Nath Roy, *Kuttanimatam*, Sl. No. 801 (quoted in Chakarvarty, "Identity of Śrīharṣa").

<sup>51</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, 84.

<sup>52</sup> Roy, *Early History*, 67; Jani, *Critical Study*, 84.

<sup>53</sup> K. M. Panikkar, *Śrī Harṣa of Kanauj* (Allahabad: Gyan Prakashan, 1922), 65.

<sup>54</sup> Surendranath Dasgupta and S. K. De, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1946), 666.

### 1.2.13. Harṣa

There was a commentator of *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharatamuni, who too was known as Harṣa.<sup>55</sup>

### 1.2.14. Śrīharṣa

One Śrīharṣa, an inhabitant of Teleṅgāna, was the author of a poetical work named *Amarakhaṇḍanam*.<sup>56</sup>

### 1.2.15. Śrīharṣa

In Indian History we get another Śrīharṣa, who was the king of Sthāṇvīśvara. After the demise of Prabhākaravardhana, his eldest son, Rājyavardhana, succeeded the royal throne. But within a very short time, he was killed and Harṣavardhana Śīlāditya ascended the throne. He reigned from AD 606 to AD 647.

### 1.2.16. Harṣa

We have the name of yet another Harṣa, who was the author of three dramas, namely, *Ratnāvalī*, *Nāgānanda* and *Priyadarśikā*.

### 1.2.17. Śrīharṣa (Author of *KKK* and *NC*)

In the 12<sup>th</sup> century AD, one Śrīharṣa was the court poet of Jayachandra, king of Kanyākubja. He is the author of *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyam* and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*, works of great fame.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> M. Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Madras, 1937), para. 564, 948; Jani, *Critical Study*, 84.

<sup>56</sup> Raghavan V., ed., *Amaramaṇḍana* of Kṛṣṇasūri, 1, 5–12 (quoted in Jani, *Critical Study*, 85).

<sup>57</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, 84.

### 1.3. A LIFE-SKETCH OF ŚRĪHARṢA

Fortunately, we get good information regarding the poet both from internal and external sources. From the epilogue stanzas as well as the concluding stanzas (XXII.150–53), we get the following glimpses about his life:<sup>58</sup>

Śrīharṣa was the son of Śrī Hīra, the best poet of his times, and Māmalladevi (I.145) for whom he had very high regard (XII.113). He had perfectly mastered the science of logic and reasoning (X.138) and his arguments were powerful enough to silence his opponents (XXII.153). His speech was as pleasant as the autumnal moon (XV.193); and his poetry was as sweet as nectar (XV.153). He was self-controlled (I.145) and being an adept in the precepts of the *Yogaśāstra*, he realized the Absolute—the ocean of delight—in trance (XXII.153). His poem was an outcome of his meditation on the *Cintāmaṇimantra* (I.145). He thrashed out a new track in the field of poetry (VIII.109) and never allowed any chance of introducing novel ideas in his poem to escape (XIX.67); he, therefore, was proud of his poem and looked down upon the carping critics who did not appreciate his poem. He proudly admits that he had wantonly made his poem difficult and that it will give pleasure, like nectar, only after proper exertion on the part of the reader and that it is not easily intelligible without the help of a teacher (XXII.150–52). He was highly honoured by the king of Kanauj who personally offered him a seat and two betel-leaves (XXII.153). Over and above the *NC*, he wrote the following works: *Sthairyavicāraṇaprakaraṇa* (IV.128), *Śrīvijayaprasāsti* (V.138), *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (VI.113), *Gauḍorvīśakulaprasāsti* (VII.110), *Ārṇavavarṇana* (IX.160), and *Chindaprasāsti* (XVII.222), *Śivaśaktisiddhi* (XVII.154) and *Navasāhasāṅkacaritacampu* (XXII.149).<sup>59</sup>

This information, supplied by the poem itself, is corroborated by external sources such as (1) Caṇḍu Paṇḍita's Commentary on the *NC* (AD 1297), (2) Rājasekhara's *Prabandhakośa* (AD 1348),

<sup>58</sup> See A. N. Jani, *Śrīharṣa* (Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1996).

<sup>59</sup> Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 1; See also Jani, *Critical Study*, 84ff.

(3) Gadādhara's Commentary on the *NC* (not later than AD 1444), (4) Vidyāpati's *Puruṣaparīkṣā* (early part of the 15<sup>th</sup> century AD), and (5) a manuscript (dated AD 1711).

It is only Rājaśekhara, who gives a more detailed account of the poet than any other of his biographers, and hence it is reproduced below, with supplements from other sources.

In the court of Jayantacandra,<sup>60</sup> the king of Banaras, there was, among other pandits, a Brahmin called Hīra, whose son was Śrīharṣa. Once Hīra was defeated in a polemic discussion by another pandit<sup>61</sup> of the court. Hīra could not live long to bear the heavy grief of his severe defeat. When he was lying on his death-bed, he called his most brilliant son and exhorted him to take revenge upon his rival. Śrīharṣa agreed and, after the premature demise of his father, the young Śrīharṣa, entrusting his family to his relatives, set out for studies. Under various teachers he mastered the different branches of knowledge such as Logic, Rhetoric, Music, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Mantraśāstra, Grammar and so on. He meditated upon the Cintāmaṇimantra, acquired through the grace of some teacher, for a period of one year, on the sacred banks of the Ganges. The Goddess Tripura revealed Herself and conferred upon him a gift of unsurpassable eloquence. But Śrīharṣa's sharp intelligence proved a curse to him as his learned arguments were unintelligible to others. He propitiated the Goddess, once more, and at Her advice, blunted his sharp and all-grasping intelligence by taking curds in the mid-night. Now the people could follow him. He then composed hundreds of works headed by the *KKK*. After this, he returned to Banaras and informed the king of the same. The king, along with Hīra's rival and other pandits, came to receive the poet who praised the king as under:

<sup>60</sup> According to Gadādhara, Śrīharṣa was the court-poet of Govindacandra, the grandfather of Jayantacandra. See Jani, *Critical Study*, 87.

<sup>61</sup> Rājaśekhara does not give the name of his rival. But, Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita names him as Udayana, the author of *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, etc., whose views are refuted by Śrīharṣa in his philosophical treatise, *KKK*.



Oh, ladies! Do not mistake this king for Cupid, as he is the son of Govinda and possesses excellent physical charms, because Cupid makes ladies his weapon, to conquer the globe, while this one makes the armoured rivals as helpless as ladies.<sup>62</sup>

All were extremely pleased to hear such an extraordinary praise. Śrīharṣa now gazed at his father's rival and challenged him with these words:

The Goddess of Learning sports with me, whether it may be the rosy bed of poetry or the thorny bed of Logic. The ladies get the same enjoyment, provided the lover is agreeable to them, whether the bed is well-equipped or is simply a bare ground.<sup>63</sup>

The rival pandit, realizing the brilliant achievements of Śrīharṣa, admitted his defeat and began to flatter him with the following words: Among the many powerful animals in the forest, only the valour of a lion is praised—at his roaring fear-stricken animals give up their joy. On hearing this, Śrīharṣa was pacified. They became friends at the advice of the king who richly rewarded the poet.

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<sup>62</sup> *Govindanandanatayā ca vapuḥśriyā ca māsmin nrpe kuruta kāmādhīyam tarunyaḥ /*

*Astrīkaroti jagatām vijaye smarāḥ strīrastrī janaḥ punaranena vidhīyate strī //*

There is a pun here. 'Strī' and 'astrī' are used to refer to the king's excellence over Cupid by the figure *Vyatireka*. The word 'Nandana' meaning "delighter" in 'Govindanandana' refers to a grandson and not to the son as is done by Rājaśekhara, who describes Jayantacandra as the son of Govindacandra instead of Vijayacandra, as is suggested by a comparison of the king with Cupid (Aniruddha, an incarnation of Kama), who was the grandson of Govinda, (i.e., Kṛṣṇa). See Jani, *Critical Study*, 87–88.

<sup>63</sup> *Sāhitye sukumāravastuni drḍhanyāyagrahagrānthile / Tarke vā mayi samvidhātari samam līlāyate bhārātī //*  
*Śayyāvāstu mṛdūttaracchadavatī darbhāṅkurairāstrī / Bhūrmirvā hṛdayamgamo yadi patistulyā ratiryōṣitām //*  
 Jani, *Critical Study*, 88.

By virtue of this chapter we come to the conclusion that Śrīharṣa was a product of an intellectual age, which is evidenced from the centuries preceding his emergence. Though there were several poets, kings and scholars named Śrīharṣa, the one considered here is the author of philosophical text *KKK* and the last *mahākāvya* in Sanskrit, *NC*. He was the court poet of Gāhaḍavāla dynasty of Kanauj during the 12<sup>th</sup> century. The present chapter has served to identify the Śrīharṣa proper for the purpose of our research. Now we shall proceed to the literary and poetic background of Śrīharṣa for a better understanding, of assessing Śrīharṣa's works and their commentaries in their proper setting.

## CHAPTER 2

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# Śrīharṣa's Works and their Commentaries: A Bird's Eye View

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- 2.1. Literary and Poetic Background of Śrīharṣa
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## 2.1. LITERARY AND POETIC BACKGROUND OF ŚRĪHARṢA

Among the five *mahākāvya*s of Sanskrit literature the first two *mahākāvya*s of Kālidāsa, namely, *Raghuvamśa* and *Kumārasambhava*, stand on a different level as compared with the rest of the *mahākāvya*s. Kālidāsa's poems differ from the two great epics of India, namely, the *Mbh* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The latter is called an *ādikāvya* for its poetic merits. These epics are known as *ārṣa mahākāvya*s as contrasted with the five *mahākāvya*s, which are called *vidagdha mahākāvya*s or classical or ornate epics. The purpose of the epics was to record the popular and heroic stories in an attractive and pleasing manner. But these *ārṣa* stories were, however, like diamonds or jewels directly coming from the mines. *Mahākavis* like Kālidāsa turned them into chiselled diamonds or jewels by removing the unattractive features on the one hand and by introducing other fascinating features favourable to their poetic requirements.<sup>1</sup>

In Kālidāsa we find the best poetic talent as he is a real *rasakavi* and in his poems we see how the narrative and descriptions go hand in hand, or, in other words, the descriptions of Kālidāsa are intended to heighten the particular effect and are not introduced for the sake of descriptions or merely for the display of poetic talents. On account of the due proportion of the matter and the manner, his poems appeal to the heart. This is not so in the case of later poets who wrote under the hard and fast rules regarding the requirements of a *mahākavi*, which would have been probably deduced from the works of earlier poets like Aṣvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa. Consequently, in Bhāravi and Māgha we see how form predominates over matter. In their poems the matter is merely a peg to illustrate their poetic gifts of the descriptive powers, word-

<sup>1</sup> Ānandavardhana's advice to this effect runs thus: *Itivṛtte yadi rasānanuguṇam sthitim paśyēt tam bhaṅgtvāpī svatantratayā rasānuguṇam kathāntaramutpādayet. Na hi kaveritvṛttamātranirvahaṇe kiñcit prayojanam—Dhvanyāloka* III (quoted in Jani, *Critical Study*, 237).

play and verbal jugglery such as *bandhakāvya*s, or, to put in the words of Ravindranath Tagore as quoted in Jani, "The story is only an umbrella-bearer, the language is the king."<sup>2</sup> The poems of these poets, therefore, appeal more to the head than to the heart. This was, of course, due to the tastes of the 'literati' of these periods. They wrote their poems to satisfy the desires of the people of cultured tastes. Even Kālidāsa had to satisfy a group of people who indulged in this sort of word jugglery as is clear from the Canto IX of his *Raghuvamśa*. This tendency of putting the form over the matter, use of double entendre, verbal jugglery etc. became more powerful after Kālidāsa and the critics who were great pandits began to judge poetry from this point of view and tried to see whether all these rules and regulations as prescribed by the rhetoricians were fulfilled by a poet or not. We, therefore, find in Bhāravi, Māgha, and other poets elaborate descriptions of political councils, seasons, water sports and so on. If a poem is to be understood like a *śāstra*, with the help of a commentary, alas it is a pleasure to the erudite only while ordinary readers are undone.<sup>3</sup> But this warning of Bhāmaha was out of place and Bhaṭṭi threw an open challenge to this warning by making a poem.<sup>4</sup>

Over and above this current of the form becoming more prominent than matter, we find other currents also in Sanskrit poetry. With Subandhu, Bāṇa, Bhāravi, Māgha we find the works with *pratyakṣara śleṣa* (pun on every word). In Bhaṭṭi we find the role of grammar in poetry.

Rhetoric, *Kāmaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra* also played a great part in the development of *kāvya* literature in the erotic descriptions of female beauties.<sup>5</sup> The influence of the *vakrokti* is also seen in

2 Ibid.

3 *Kāvyaṅyapi yadīmāni vyākhyāgamyāni śāstravat |  
Utsavaḥ sudhiyāmeva hanta durmedhaso hatāḥ* || Ibid., 238.

4 *Dīpatulyaḥ prabandhofyam śabdalaḥṣaṇacakṣuṣām |  
Hatā durmedhasaścāsmiṇ vidvatprijatayā mayā* || *Bhaṭṭikāvya*  
XXII, 33–34 (quoted in Jani, *Critical Study*, 238).

5 A top-to-toe description of bride's physical charm is in the *Vikramāṅkadevacarita* of Bilhaṇa and Śrīharṣa devotes one full canto

the works of poets like Mañkhaka (1135–45 CE) who wrote the *Śrīkañṭhacarita* and on Śrīharṣa. *Campū* literature also influenced the Sanskrit poets.

A few facts from the works of Śrīharṣa will show how he was a product of the age of learning. A century or two before Śrīharṣa, a great controversy was going on regarding the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand were for doing away with God, while Naiyāyikas like Udayana were trying to establish His existence. Śrīharṣa seems to suggest this problem of the day in XI.64. His *KKK* is nothing but a destructive critique of Udayana's *Nyāyakuṣumāñjali*. *KKK* was refuted in its turn by Gaṅgeṣa Upādhyāya of Mithila. Great disputes and debates were held in royal courts to decide the superiority of the pandits.<sup>6</sup> Somadeva in his *Yaśastilaka Campu* (959 CE), says that the poetry was merely a by-product of his philosophical studies.<sup>7</sup> This is true in the case of the *NC* as well, whose author is well known also for his philosophical work *KKK* and who, like his predecessor Somadeva, is a classical example of the combination of *tarka* and poetry, *NC* being a by-product.<sup>8</sup> So it would be proper to call this age as an Age of Learning rather than an Age of Decadence of Sanskrit Poetry and Philosophy.

### 2.1.1. Śrīharṣa and His Predecessors

Unlike Bhāravi and Māgha, Śrīharṣa does not draw upon other Purāṇas over and above the main source, namely, the *Mbh* epi-

(VII) describing Damayanti's physical beauty, due to the influence of the this effect of the age.

6 Rajaśekhara, in his *Prabandhakośa*, informs us that Śrīharṣa's father was defeated in the court by his rival.

7 *Ājanmasamabhyastāc-chuṣkat-tarkāt-trṇādiva mamāsyah |*

*Matisurabherabhavad idam sūktipayaḥ:sukṛtinām punyaiḥ ||* Jani, *Critical Study*, 239.

8 Gaḍādhara, a commentator on the *NC*, informs us that it was written by Śrīharṣa, only to remove a charge against him that he was only a dry philosopher. See, the Appendix on Śrīharṣa's Biography.

sode. However, he introduces certain set pieces of description and narration from his predecessors to embellish his own poem.

### 2.1.1.1. *Kālidāsa and Śrīharṣa*

Kālidāsa's influence on Śrīharṣa is seen in many places. That the description of Damayantī's *svayamvara*, though briefly described in the *Mbh*, is inspired by that of Indumati's *svayamvara* (*Rag* VI.20–84), is clear by the similarities of organization in the text of the *Raghuvamśa* and the *NC*. Thus Śrīharṣa introduces Sarasvatī to describe the princess, as is done by Sunanda in the *Rag*. The description of the kings and its rounding off in a stanza is also Kalidasian. Similarly, the description of the ladies looking at handsome Naḷa passing along the road in the city (*NC* XV.73–91) seems to be influenced by similar passages in the *Rag* (VII.5–16) and the *Kum* (VII.56–69), probably by the former, as is clear from the over-all structure of the passage and even from verbal resemblances.<sup>9</sup> Again, the description of the marriage ceremony in *NC* (VI.35–45) has some likeness in detail with that in *Rag* (VII.18–28) and is probably based to some degree upon it, because both the texts have similes in which the smoke from the fire forms ornaments on the bride's face (*Rag* VII.26; *NC* XVI.41) and both mention the perspiration on the hands of the couple (*Rag* VII.22; *NC* XVI.42). The description of the *sambhogaśrṅgāra* of Damayantī has also some resemblance with that of Pārvati in the *Kumārasambhava*.<sup>10</sup> In the description of the morning by the bards, who came to awaken Naḷa, Śrīharṣa seems to be inspired by Kālidāsa's similar description in the *Rag* V.65–75.<sup>11</sup> Over and above these main resemblances, there are some minor

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9 Such descriptions are found in in the *Buddhacarita* (III.13–24). *Kādambartī*, *Śiśupālavadha*, etc. See Jani, *Critical Study*, 263.

10 Cf. especially *NC* XVIII.35 and 37 with *Kum* VIII.2 and 4 respectively. See *Ibid*.

11 Such reveilles by the minstrels are found in Kumāradāsa's *Jānakīharana* (III.76–81) and in Ratnākara's *Haravijaya* (XXIX). See *Ibid*.

resemblances also, which either coincide ideologically or phraseologically.<sup>12</sup>

However, both the poets differ as far as their style and method of representation are concerned. “We have grace of expression and melody of verse in abundance in Śrīharṣa, but we miss the charming simplicity of Kālidāsa. In spite of neatness of versification and beauty of diction, richness of imagery and parade of learning, it fails to touch the heart of the reader like Kālidāsa’s poems, where the words flow spontaneously from the pen of the poet even as the tiny *śefālikā* flowers drop down, of themselves, in the early autumn morn. Where we have *svabhāvokti* in Kālidāsa, we find *vakrokti* and *atiśayokti* in Śrīharṣa; where we have *upamā* in Kālidāsa, we find *utprekṣā*, in Śrīharṣa; where we have suggestiveness in Kālidāsa, we find double entendre in Śrīharṣa.”<sup>13</sup>

### 2.1.1.2. Bhāravi, Māgha and Śrīharṣa

Bhāravi is in many ways the beginner of mannerisms in the later poets. Māgha’s work is nothing but an imitation of that of Bhāravi<sup>14</sup> and according to an exaggerated opinion of Sanskrit pandits, Māgha has succeeded in eclipsing the personality of his predecessor.<sup>15</sup> The use of double entendre and the obsolete words,

12 Cf. NC III.100.129, XIII.39 and XX.157 which remind us respectively of following similar expressions in Kālidāsa: *Taptena taptamayasā ghaṭanāya योग्यम् (Vikramorvaśīyam II.16.) Satām hi sandehapadeṣuvastuṣu pramāṇamantaḥkaraṇa pravṛttayaḥ (Abhijñānaśākuntalam I.22), Bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntara sauhṛdāni (Abhijñānaśākuntalam V.2), Na yayau na tasthau (Kumārasambhavam V.85).* See Ibid.

13 K. C. Chatterji, “Some Notes on the *Naiṣadhacaritam* of Śrīharṣa,” *Calcutta Oriental Journal* 3, no. 6 (1936): 155.

14 This is quite clear from the treatment of the subject matter as well as the general form and similar conceits. For details, see Hermann Jacobi, “Bhāravi and Māgha,” *Vienna Oriental Journal*, 3 (1889): 121–45.

15 *Tāvadbhā bhāraverbhāti yāvanmāghasya nodayaḥ |*

*Udite tu punarmāghe bhāraverbhāraveriva ||*

*Kṛtsnaprabodhakṛdvānī bhāraverivabhāraveḥ |*



the fondness for exhibiting grammatical and metrical skill and extraordinary command over the Sanskrit language, as seen in the different *bandhas* are some salient features of Bhāravi's style which are further elaborated by Māgha whose special features are the use of rare and obsolete words—so highly praised in conventional manner by the Sanskrit pandits<sup>16</sup>—and the introduction of Śāstraic learning in the poem. But Śrīharṣa surpasses both of them in the skilled use of all the characteristics mentioned above. The proper use of the indeclinable 'hi,' for which Māgha is very popular is found in the *NC* (XIII.53) as well. The same pandits who have praised Māgha so much and have placed him over Bhāravi, confess with due justification, that Śrīharṣa surpasses both of them.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.1.1.3. Other Poets and Śrīharṣa

Śrīharṣa's description of the religious aspect of Naḷa as seen in his daily programme of ablution, god-worship, physical exercise, meals, etc., (*NC* XXI) is like that of Candrāpīḍa in the *Kādambarī*. The description of Nala's horse (*NC* I.57–63) reminds one of Candrāpīḍa's horse in the *Kādambarī*. Similarly the introduction of a parrot (XXI.122) and a male cuckoo (XXI.123) to amuse the king (XXI.130–140 and 142) after his meals, also seem to be inspired by similar diversion in the *Kādambarī*.

The description of the ten Incarnations in the *NC* (XXI.53–118), though slightly touched by Māgha in his poem (I.34–68) seems to be inspired by an independent poem on that subject, namely, *Daśāvatāracaritam*<sup>18</sup> composed in AD 1066 by Kṣemendra during the reign of the Kashmir king Kalasa.

The minute top-to-toe description of the physical charms of the

*Māgheneva ca māghena kampaḥ kasya na jāyate ||*

*Māghena vighnitotsāhā notsahante padakrame*

*Smaranto bhāravereva kavayaḥ kapayo yatha ||*

16 Cf. *Navasarge gate māghe nava śabdo na vidyate |*

*Murāripada cintācettadā māghe matim kuru || etc.*

17 Cf. *Udite naiśadhe kāvyē kva māghaḥ kva ca bhāraviḥ ||*

18 Cf. Jani, *Critical Study*, 264. See also *Kāvyamālā* No. 26.

heroine is found in Bilhaṇa's *Vikramāṅkadevacarita* and Śrīharṣa in a similar description of Damayantī (VII.20–107), may have been influenced by it.

It is difficult, however, to say emphatically how far Śrīharṣa has been influenced by his above-mentioned predecessors, but one thing should be clearly borne in mind that he should not be condemned as a plagiarist as, unlike Māgha, he never loses his originality in the descriptions of topics mentioned above. Again, a succeeding poet is naturally influenced by his predecessor—a fact which has been corroborated by Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyaṁimāmsā*, when he says that the 'poet is never a non-plagiarist'.<sup>19</sup>

## 2.2. WORKS OF ŚRĪHARṢA

Only two works of Śrīharṣa have come down to us: the *NC* and the *KKK*. All the same, Rājaśekhara (in *Prabandhakōśa*) informs that he was prolific, with more than a hundred in the list of works. Confirmation is had from the epilogue stanzas, which mention eight works of his; and from the *KKK*, which mentions another work, titled *Īsvarābhisandhi*. The several catalogues of manuscripts attribute several works to him. These are another, but partial reason why we may hold him to have written many more than the two works. Thus, we have two groups of such works: (1) authentic works by Śrīharṣa mentioned in his extant works, whose authorship would not be questioned; and (2) works attributed to Śrīharṣa by the catalogues of manuscripts, whose authorship is uncertain. In what follows, we discuss the nature, content and authorship of works of the earlier group.

“Śrīharṣa was the product of an age of learning in which the scholars and poets used to vie with one another to show their superiority over their rivals. Some profound pandits used to visit different parts of the country in the court of other kings. The victorious pandits collected from the patron king a certificate of their

19 *Nāstyacauraḥ kavijanaḥ* || *Kāvyaṁimāmsā* XI (quoted in *Ibid.*).

victory over their rival pandit. Such a certificate was called a *jayapatra*. In order to surpass the rivals, the pandits sometimes even resorted to the supernatural powers and there are many references to the propitiation of Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning, for such powers. The *NC* itself is an outcome of such a *cintāmaṇimantra* (I.145), the efficacy of which is extolled in XIV.88–92. Amaraçandra Sūri and Harihara (12<sup>th</sup> century) are described as *siddha-sārasvata* scholars by Rājaśekhara. Bālacandra (13<sup>th</sup> century) also received such *sārasvatamantra* from Udayasūri.

In this age scholarship was more honoured than poetry, which occupied secondary position. Somadeva (10<sup>th</sup> century) in his *Yaśastilaka Campu* says that his poetry was merely a by-product of his philosophical studies. Śrīharṣa was also primarily a scholar and wrote the *NC* as a by-product of his scholarship to prove that he is not a mere dry dialectician but also a connoisseur of poetry. The *NC* was written by him to silence his detractors by exhibiting his poetic genius.<sup>20</sup>

## 2.2.1. Works Mentioned in the *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* and the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*

### 2.2.1.1. *Arṇavarṇana*

It is mentioned in *NC* IX.160: “It is obviously a description of the beauties and traditions of the ocean,” says Krishnamachariar,<sup>21</sup> who follows Theodor Aufrecht.<sup>22</sup> But, D. R. Bhandarkar remarks: “*Arṇavarṇana* has been wrongly translated by ‘description of the sea’. This *Arṇava* is undoubtedly Arṇorāja, who belonged to Cahamān dynasty of Sambhar, who was a contemporary of the Cālūkya Kumārapāla, and for whom we have the date AD 1139.”<sup>23</sup> But this does not seem to be probable as generally *varṇana* does

20 Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 42.

21 Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical*, 181.

22 Theodor Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*, 3 Vols. (Leipzig: Wiesbaden Franz Steiner, 1891–1903), 1:31.

23 *Indian Antiquary*, XLII, 84; Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 27–28.

not mean a *carita* and Vidyādhara, the oldest commentator, also describes it as *samudrasya varṇanam*. This is further corroborated by a stanza which describes the sea and which is attributed to Śrīharṣa.<sup>24</sup>

### 2.2.1.2. *Chindapraśasti/Chandapraśasti*<sup>25</sup>

This work, which is referred to in *NC* XVII.222, is a poem according to commentator Narahari.

According to R. P. Chanda, this Chinda is “Lalla of Chinda family, whose ‘Dewal Praśasti’ is dated in AD 992.”<sup>26</sup> But Bhandarkar, who is followed by Krishnamachariar, identifies him with “the Chinda king of Gaya, referred to in an inscription dated 1813 after the Buddha’s *nirvāṇa*—AD 1176.”<sup>27</sup> Theodor Aufrecht calls it an “Encomium of the King Canda.”

### 2.2.1.3. *Gauḍorvīśakulapraśasti*

The name of the present work, which is mentioned in *NC* VII.110, shows that it is a poem eulogizing the family of the king of the Gauḍa (Bengal) country. Scholars, however, are not unanimous in identifying this Gauḍa king. Thus, according to R. P. Chanda, he “was Mahipāla-I.”<sup>28</sup> R. D. Sen<sup>29</sup> seems to identify him with Ādiṣūra of Bengal, who invited five Brahmins from Kanauj to Bengal and among them Śrīharṣa was one. N. D. Das Gupta opines

24 *Udgarja(ccha)jjalakuñjarendrarabhasasphālānubandhod-dhataḥ* |

*Sarvāḥ parvatakandarodarabhuvāḥ kurvan pratidhvāniniḥ* ||

*Uccairuccarati dhvanim śrutipatho (nmāthī) yathafyaṃ tathā* |

*Prāyaḥ preṅkhadasaṅkhyasaṅkhadhavalā velayamāgacchati* |

*Sūktimuktāvalī*, 367.2 (quoted in Jani, *Critical Study*, Appendix 12,

48).

25 *Chindapraśasti* is differently spelt as *Chandaḥ praśasti* or *Chandapraśasti* in some MSS. The oldest of them reads the latter. Cf. Jani, *Critical Study*, 111.

26 *Indian Antiquary*, LXII, 83.

27 Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 28.

28 *Ibid.*

29 *Indian Antiquary*, II, 240–41

that this is a work in honour of the Sen dynasty as “in the second half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century the dynasty that was reigning in Gauḍa was the Sen dynasty.”<sup>30</sup> D. R. Bhandarkar does not see, in this work, any reference “to any specific ruler of the Gauḍa country.”

#### 2.2.1.4. *Īśvarābhisandhi*

Śrīharṣa refers, five times, to this work, in his *KKK*. Like the *KKK*, this also seems to be a philosophical work discussing the concept of God. The nature and contents of this work are easy to imagine from the quotations given below. It seems to have been divided into several chapters such as *svaparakāśavāda* (God is self-luminous) *jñātātāvāda* (God is *Jñānaviṣaya*) and *vedaprāmānya* (the authority of the Vedas), etc.

However, it is curious to note that in one place the author refers to it in future tense meaning thereby that the book was not written yet, while all the other references are in the past tense. This difficulty can be solved by saying that the chapter on *Svaparakāśavāda* was not written when he referred to this work while other chapters were perhaps ready. It is not wise to say that he had written two independent works of this name. Thus it becomes clear that the *KKK* and the *Īśvarābhisandhi* were simultaneously written.<sup>31</sup>

#### 2.2.1.5. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*

This work, which is referred to in the *NC* VI.113, has, fortunately, come down to us. The title literally means, ‘A sweet eatable of refutation’. Just as *NC* occupies a very high place in the field of poetry, so does *KKK* in the field of philosophy. It is “the greatest work of Advaita dialectics in its inception.”<sup>32</sup> It is one long dissertation on the vanity of philosophy, setting forth the inability of the human mind to compass those exalted objects which its speculative ingenuity suggests as worthy of its pursuit.

30 *Indian Culture*, 578 (quoted in Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 28).

31 Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 28–29.

32 Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, 2:451. See also Dasgupta, *History of Indian*, 2:125–33.

*In the spirit of Nāgārjuna*, he analyses the common categories with minuteness and accuracy and takes the reader through a long and arduous process of dissection to establish the simple truth that nothing can be conclusively proved to be either true or false. Everything is doubtful except universal consciousness. His belief in the ultimate reality of spirit marks him off from Buddhist nihilism. He discusses at great length of *pramāṇas* of the *Nyāya*, its theory of causation, and argues that the *Nyāya* is busy with apparent existence, but not with reality. While the Absolute is, though never known, the *Naiyāyika* does not discuss the Absolute, nor does he even admit of such a possibility or an absolute consciousness which is itself the Absolute. Thus, Śrīharṣa refutes many definitions of Udayana, the author of *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and other works. The work is known for its abstruseness and as such there are many commentaries on it.

Śrīharṣa refers to this work in the epilogue stanza to the sixth canto of his poem, while the twenty-first canto of the poem is referred to in the *KKK*. This mutual reference has led some to think that both these works were simultaneously written by the poet. But it demands too much from credulity to believe that the two works, entirely different in character, were written simultaneously. Again, as seen above, *Īśvarābhisandhi* was simultaneously written with the *KKK*, and as such the three works—namely, the *NC*, the *KKK* and the *Īśvarābhisandhi*—cannot be the simultaneous productions of a person. Thus it will be safe to conclude that the other two philosophical works were written before the *KKK*. The epilogue stanza which refers to the *KKK*, thus, does not seem to be synchronous with the production of the *NC*. However, the tradition, recorded by Cāṇḍū Paṇḍita and Gadādhara, speaks of the priority of the *KKK*. It is probable that the tradition might have been based on the epilogue stanza, which refers to the *KKK* and that Cāṇḍū Paṇḍita and Gadādhara may not be aware of the reference to the *NC* in the *KKK* as none of them seems to have been a student of philosophy.

Śrīharṣa seems to be very proud of his philosophical work and, in the third verse, assures the students that even simple cramming

of his work will make them invincible in dialectic discussions.

This work is, however, challenged by the great logician Gaṅgeṣa Upādhyāya of Mithilā (12<sup>th</sup> century AD). His *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, where he refutes the *KKK*, is refuted in its turn by Vācaspati (AD 1350) who re-established the views of Śrīharṣa in his work, *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*.

### 2.2.1.6. Navasāhasāṅkacarita

This is referred to in the *NC* XXII.149, according to which it is a *campū*—a poem mixed with prose. Bühler informs, “The Jesalmer Bhandar contained only ninety years ago a copy of his (i.e., Śrīharṣa’s) *Sāhasāṅkacarita*, though it is not to be found there any longer.”<sup>33</sup>

It is difficult to say who this king was, as there are many kings bearing the title ‘Sāhasāṅka’. According to Vidyādhara, he was a Gauḍa king. Īśānadeva follows Vidyādhara. He identifies this Sāhasāṅka with Vikramāditya. Gopinātha identifies him with the king of Kāśī. Narahari, on the other hand, identifies him with Bhojarāja.

R. P. Chanda identifies Sāhasāṅka “with the Parmar king Sindhurāja of Mālwa, who, according to Padmagupta’s *Navasāhasāṅkacarita*, had the *biruda*, *Navasāhasāṅka* and succeeded Vākpati after AD 994.” But D. R. Bhandarkar conjectures that “perhaps *Navasahasanka* was an epithet of Jayacandra himself.”

P. N. Purnaiya<sup>34</sup> identifies him with the sovereign of Gādhipura (a part of the ancient Kanauj), who was the patron of Srīkrṣṇa, the grandfather of Maheṣvara, the author of *Viśvaprakāśanighaṇṭu* and *Sāhasāṅkacarita*.

Prof. Wilson thinks, “*Sāhasāṅka* may be a title of Srī Candradeva, who founded the ruling dynasty of Kanauj about the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> century, which he acquired by his own strength.”<sup>35</sup>

33 Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 30.

34 *Indian Antiquary*, III, 30.

35 *Ibid.*

Theodor Aufrecht<sup>36</sup> says that the work either praises Bhojarāja or Vikramārka. Vidyāpati in his *Puruṣaparīkṣā* calls Vikramāditya as *Sāhasānka*. Of all these views, the view of Vidyādhara may be considered as probable in view of the fact that he is the oldest authority on the subject.

#### 2.2.1.7. *Śivaśaktisiddhi*

This work, mentioned in *NC* XVIII.154, is also read as *Śivabhaktisiddhi*. The oldest manuscript, however, reads the first title.

It seems to be the work of *Tantraśāstra* describing Śiva and Śakti, as is evident from *NC* XIV.98 as well as the *mangala* stanza of the *KKK*, where, the poet's devotion for the *Ardhanārīśvara* of Lord Śiva is clearly visible.

#### 2.2.1.8. *Sthairyavicāraṇaprakaraṇa*

This is mentioned in *NC* IV.123. It seems to be “a disquisition on philosophy,” and according to Nārāyaṇa and other commentators, it is a work establishing the non-transitory character of the world by refuting the *kṣanabhanga* theory of the Buddhist philosophers, according to whom everything is transitory.

#### 2.2.1.9. *Vijayaprasāsti*

It is described as *Śrīvijayaprasāsti* in *NC* V.138. Bhandarkar, in his Report (1907), says that in an old catalogue of the Jesalmer Bhandar, a poem named *Vijayaprasāsti* is referred to. But it is not found in the published catalogue (*GOS* XXI). It is difficult to say who this king Vijaya was. The commentator Bhavadēva (and not Gopinātha as believed by some)<sup>37</sup> identifies him with Vijayasena of Bengal. The commentator Śrīvatsa, on the other hand, identifies him with Vijayendra and remarks that the word Śrī is prefixed to the work either because the king was then alive or out of the poet's respect for the king.

36 Theodor Aufrecht (quoted in Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 31).

37 S. K. De, “Sanskrit Literature under Pala Kings of Bengal,” *New Indian Antiquary* 2 (1939): 266.



R. P. Chanda identifies him with Vijayapāla of the Pratihāra dynasty of Kanauj, an inscription of whose time is dated in AD 960 and whose successor Rājyapāla was a contemporary of Sultan Muhammad of Gazni.

D. R. Bhandarkar is, however, of the opinion that “Vijaya of his (i.e., Śrīharṣa's) *Vijayaprasasti* can thus be none other than Jayacandra's father Vijayacandra (AD 1155–59)” and is followed by Krishnamachariar and Pt. Shivadatta. The line *prakhyātakīrtikavarnitavaibhavāni*, which qualifies the glories (*yaśāmsi*) of Vijayacandra, also corroborates this view.

De, however, rightly remarks about all these works, “We know nothing about the nature and content of these works and all historical speculations based upon them are idle.”<sup>38</sup>

### 2.3. KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYAM: ITS NATURE, CONTENT AND COMMENTARIES

#### 2.3.1. KKK in General

“The three stages in the history of Indian systems of thought, including Advaita, may be said to be the following: the creative stage, the commentary stage, and super-commentary stage.”<sup>39</sup> The beginning of a system is made in the creative stage, as in the case of *Brahmasūtras* of Vedānta. Commentaries of the work are written in the ensuing stage; for example, the *Bhāṣya* of Śāṅkara. The third stage represents the commentaries on commentaries, most often ending in setting up different schools, the last of which in the case of Advaita culminated in the Advaita dialectic pillars of KKK of Śrīharṣa, *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha and *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. For example, the Bhāmatī school on the *Bhāṣya* of Śāṅkara on *Brahmasūtras*.

To acquaint oneself with the dialectic of Śrīharṣa in KKK,

38 Dasgupta and De, *History of Sanskrit*, 326.

39 *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Madhava, ed. Umāśāṅkara Śarma (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, 1964), 2.

which is an oral debate set in writing, one has to be thorough with the commentatorial (*Bhāṣya*) and super-commentatorial (*Vārttika*, *Ṭīkā*, *Ṭippanī*, etc.) stages. We discuss elsewhere, with illustrations, the specific dialectic devices<sup>40</sup> that are resorted to by the commentatorial, super-commentatorial and scholastic masterpieces.

### 2.3.2. Nature of KKK

Two types of works have originated in the vast philosophical literature of India. One type is called *adhikaraṇaprasthāna* and the other *vādaprasthāna*. The former can be generally described as topical and the other polemical. An *adhikaraṇa* is that which treats one subject in all its respects. It is defined as follows:

*Viśayoviśayaścaiva pūrvapakṣatathottaram  
Nirṇayaśceti pañcāṅgam śāstref dhikaraṇam matam.*<sup>41</sup>

Besides these five limbs, namely, subject, doubt, view of the opponent, conclusions and relevance, some scholars add a sixth limb too, namely, *prayojana*, whereby explanation on the necessity of the view of the opponent and also of the conclusion is sought.

In Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, we see *Adhikaraṇa*-wise treatment of the subjects concerned. As a consequence, commentaries and sub-commentaries (e.g., *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, *vṛtti*, *vārttika* and *vivṛtti* with definitions) on Śāṅkara's commentary also have followed the same method. Commentaries of Śāṅkara, Vācaspati, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, etc., go by the name of *adhikaraṇaprasthāna*.

*Vāda* is polemical discussion proper. It is, in fact, syllogism adopted in the respective philosophy. It has also limbs. Proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion are the limbs.

40 See Appendix No. 13 for the dialectic devices and the super-commentatorial styles of the Advaita dialectic texts.

41 See Dasgupta and De, *History of Sanskrit*, 37.

Naiyāyikas<sup>42</sup> accept all the five limbs (*pratijñā, hetu, udāharāṇa, upanaya, nigamana*), while Vedāntins<sup>43</sup> (e.g., Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaitasiddhi*) and Mīmāṃsakas<sup>44</sup> accept only three, namely, either a set of proposition, reason and example; or a set of example, application and conclusion. The logic behind this is that proposition and conclusion on the one hand, and reason and application on the other, are, in effect, the same.<sup>45</sup>

*KKK* belongs to *vādaprasthāna*. Navya-Nyāya has contributed much to the growth of *vādaprasthāna* in Indian philosophy. As a result, the dialectical method of Navya-Nyāya came to be adopted by systems other than Nyāya. In Vedānta, Śrīharṣa, in his *KKK* and Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, ably used the Navya-Nyāya dialectical method. When Vyāsatīrtha employed the Navya-Nyāya method to criticise Advaita, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī came forward to reply to him in the same coin. *Advaitasiddhi* is one of the best specimens of the highly polemical texts of Indian philosophy. In the polemical literature of Advaita, the *KKK* stands on par with *Tattvapradīpikā* and *Advaitasiddhi*.

### 2.3.2. Content

After the preliminary introduction to Chapter I the arguments to refute other systems follow. It begins with the refutation of the Logician's explanation of 'Right Cognition'. Every one of the definitions proposed by several writers on Nyāya is taken up, examined and found defective. Similar refutations follow: Apprehension, Recognition, Remembrance, the several kinds

42 See *Tarkasamgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, ed. and trans. Virūpākṣānandaswāmi (Madras: 1980), 98.

43 See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarājadhvarīndra, ed. Tryambaka Śāstri (Benares: 1954), 92–93.

44 See *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa, eds. and trans. Kuñhan Rāja C. and Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śāstri S. S. (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933), 56–67.

45 K. Maheswaran Nair, *Advaitasiddhi: A Critical Study* (Delhi: Śrī Satguru Publication, 1990), 27.

of Negation Instrument in general and Instrument of Cognition in particular, Operation in general, Perception, Inference and its factors, Analogy, Verbal Cognition, Word, Presumption, Non-Apprehension as a means of cognition, and the different Fallacies of Inference. With this ends the first chapter. Chapter II contains similar refutations of some of the more important ‘Clinchers’ postulated by the Naiyāyikas. Chapter III shows the absurdity involved in the putting of any such questions as—‘what is the proof of the existence of God?’ Chapter IV continues the refutations of the Nyāya categories—of Existence, Non-existence, Qualification, Substance, Quality, Community, Eternality, Individuality, Relations, Substratum, the conceptions of ‘above’ and ‘below’, the relation of Subject and Object, Difference, the notion of Causality, Destruction and Prior Negation, Doubt, the notion of Contradiction between ‘Existence’ and ‘Non-existence’ and Hypothetical Reasoning.

### 2.3.3. Commentaries

Commentary <sup>46</sup>	Name of Commentator	Time
1. <i>Bhāvadīpikā</i>	Citsukhācārya	AD 1220
2. <i>Khaṇḍanaphakkikāvibhajana</i>	Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgar	14 <sup>th</sup> century
3. <i>Prakāśa</i>	Vardhamāna Upādhyāya	1350–1375
4. <i>Ānandavardhanī</i>	Śaṅkara Miśra	1450
5. <i>Bhūṣāmaṇi</i>	Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	1475–1550
6. <i>Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇi</i>	Padmanābha	1578
7. <i>Khaṇḍana-darpaṇa</i>	Pragalbha Miśra	15 <sup>th</sup> century
8. <i>Khaṇḍanamaṇḍana</i>	Varadapaṇḍita	
9. <i>Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā</i>	Padmanābhadata	
10. <i>Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā</i>	Śubhankar	
11. <i>Śārada</i>	Śaṅkaracaitanya Bhārati	20 <sup>th</sup> century
12. <i>English Translation</i>	Śrī Gangānāth Jhā	20 <sup>th</sup> century
13. <i>Khaṇḍanaratnamālikā</i>	Sūrya Nārayaṇa Śukla	20 <sup>th</sup> century

<sup>46</sup> In the “Introduction” of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa, ed. Swami Yogindrananda (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, 1992), 8.

Apart from these commentaries, there is another work titled *Khaṇḍanakuṭhāra* by Gokulnath Upadhyay and *Khaṇḍana-khādyoddhāra* by Abhinava Vācaspati. These two works are studies on *KKK*. In Hindi there are two commentaries. One is by Caṇḍī Prasād Sukul, and another, which is the translation of the commentary called *Śāṅkarī*, is by Swāmi Hanumān Dās Jī.<sup>47</sup> There exists an English translation of the Introduction to *KKK*, by Phyllis Granoff (see Bibliography).

Another list, by Surendranath Dasgupta, runs as follows:

*Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana* by Paramānanda, *Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana* by Bhavanatha, *Dīdhiti* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, *Prakāśa* by Vardhamāna, *Vidyābharanī* by Vidyābharana, *Vidyāsāgarī* by Vidyāsāgara, *Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā* by Padmanābha Paṇḍita, *Ānanda-varḍhana* by Śaṅkara Mīśra, *Śrī-darpaṇa* by Śubhāṅkara, *Khaṇḍana-mahā-tarka* by Caitrasimha, *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍana* by Pragalbha Mīśra, *Śiṣya-hitaiṣiṇī* by Padmanābha, *Khaṇḍana-kuṭhāra* by Gokula-nātha Upādhyāya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiyāyikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vācaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal, called *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*.<sup>48</sup>

*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* (*Navya-Nyāya*) scholars also have commented on Śrīharṣa's *KKK*. The foremost of them is Vardhamāna Upādhyāya. In the Mithilā tradition, Gaṅgeśa was succeeded by his son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, and kept alive the verve and vigour of the new science of *Navya-Nyāya* of his father. Very much contrary to the tradition, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya has also commented on *KKK*. "This work was utilized by Pragalbha in writing his own commentary on Śrīharṣa's treatise. Vācaspati II, in his *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, refers to Vardhamāna's *Khaṇḍanaphakkikoddhāra*, which may be identical with it."<sup>49</sup>

Śaṅkara Mīśra, apart from commentaries, has authored an important polemic, namely, *Bhedaratnaprakāśa*,

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, 2:126.

<sup>49</sup> Gopinath Kaviraj, *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. M., 1961), 35.

... to reclaim the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dualism from the attacks of the Vedānta. And as this could not possibly be accomplished without in the first instance overthrowing the position already gained by Śrīharṣa in the Schools, the work turns out practically to be a refutation of *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā* itself. Though Śaṅkara by commenting on the *Khaṇḍana*, appears to have been in sympathy with the Vedānta, his real attitude towards it was always hostile.<sup>50</sup>

Vācaspati Miśra II and Śaṅkara Miśra's younger contemporary were considered by Vardhamāna as his teachers. Vācaspati Miśra II, the court Paṇḍit of the Rājās Bhairavendra (*alias* Harinārāyaṇadeva) and his son Rūpanārāyaṇa (*alias* Rāmabhadradeva of Mithilā) lived about the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>51</sup> He wrote mainly on the Hindu law, but was also a Naiyāyika. Besides his philosophical works, Vācaspati Miśra II wrote a commentary on Śrīharṣa's *KKK*, under the title *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*. Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaviraj says:

This is a rejoinder to the objections brought forward by Śrīharṣa in his famous polemical treatise against the dualistic hypotheses of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. Though certainly the work does not rise up to the high level of Śrīharṣa's masterpiece, it is nevertheless an interesting study, as showing how clearly the Naiyāyika brushes aside the charges of his opponents.<sup>52</sup>

Kaviraj is of the opinion that by use of pun Vācaspati Miśra II, the author of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, attempts, in page 3 of its preface, to play down the anti-Nyāya effects of Śrīharṣa's *KKK*:

*Śaṅkaravācaspatyoh samānau śaṅkaravācaspatī bhavataḥ |*  
*Pakṣadharapratipakṣau lakṣībhūtau na ca kvāpi ||*<sup>53</sup>

Kaviraj continues to comment:

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

Most probably the first two names Śaṅkara and Vācaspati are to be understood as directly intended for Śaṅkarācārya and Vācaspati Miśra, the great champions of the Vedānta, and not merely for Śiva and Bṛhaspati, and the point of saying would then consist in the popular estimate that as Śaṅkarācārya and Vācaspati were masters of the Vedānta, in the same way Śaṅkara Miśra and Vācaspati II occupied a unique position in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.<sup>54</sup>

This goes to point out that through the attack on the Śrīharṣan tenets of Vedānta presented in the *KKK*, Vācaspati Miśra II seems to compare himself and Śaṅkara Miśra with the two stalwarts of Advaita, namely, Vācaspati Miśra (the *Bhāmatikāra*) and Śaṅkarācārya.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, author of the original treatise *Padārthattvanirūpaṇam* (otherwise called *Padārthakhaṇḍanam* or *Padārthattvavivecanam*), the greatest Nyāya philosopher of the Nadiā school of Bengal and variously styled as Śiromaṇi, Tārkika-Śiromaṇi, or Tārkika-Cūḍāmaṇi, has also written a commentary on Śrīharṣa's *KKK*, and it is called *Dīṭithi*.

Thus far in this chapter we were discussing the various commentaries on the *KKK* from the Advaita and the opposite camps. We have thus located Śrīharṣa with his works *KKK* and *NC* and their commentaries as a prelude to understanding Śrīharṣan scepticism and his Advaitic Absolutism. The chapter that follows is worked out against the background of the then-existing controversy between the Advaitins and the Dvaitins. Now the stage is set for the emergence of Śrīharṣan Advaitic dialectic in his monumental work *KKK* which we are going to see in the next chapter.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER 3

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# Śrīharṣa's Advaitic Scepticism: A Portrayal

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- 3.1. Controversy between Advaitins and Dvaitins
    - 3.1.1. Extent of the Controversy
  - 3.2. Śrīharṣa's Polemic
  - 3.3. Śrīharṣa the Advaitin
  - 3.4. Scepticism, Dialectic and Knowledge
    - 3.4.1. Possibility of Knowledge: A Śrīharṣan Query
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- 

### 3.1. Controversy Between Advaitins And Dvaitins

The history of philosophy may very generally be said to be the history of the struggle between the two trends of idealism and realism or materialism. In India the struggle took the form of that between *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda* or *āstikavāda* and *nāstikavāda*. Within the two streams themselves, there developed a number of sub-streams. However, throughout the course of their development, they may have remained true to their original inspirations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In T. R. V. Murti's *Cultural History of India* (quoted in Nair, *Advaitasiddhi*, 18).



Philosophical controversies in which hard hits were given and taken have been a continuous affair in India. As a result, philosophical literature grew in India enormously. In the history of philosophical controversies in India, the controversy between the Dvaitins and Advaitins occupies an important position.

This was quite natural, for, though both form sub-streams of one and the same system, their opposition is diametrical. Advaita represents theoretical idealism/illusionism (*māyāvāda*) and the Dvaita represents particularist realism.

### 3.1.1. Extent of the Controversy

The controversy between the Advaitins and the Dvaitins cannot be confined to that between the Śāṅkarites and the Madhvaites alone. It was there even before the origin of Madhva-Vedānta. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of *Vedāntasūtras*, refutes many of the arguments of the Sāṅkhyas and Naiyāyikas who were all Dvaitins in the sense that they advocated the theory of many souls.<sup>2</sup> Gauḍapāda and Śāṅkara also refuted the arguments of the Dvaitins so as to establish Advaita. The great *ācāryas* who followed them also maintained the tradition. Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Maṇḍana, and Vācaspati Miśra (all of 9<sup>th</sup> century AD) deserve special mention. Vimuktātman (10<sup>th</sup> century AD), for the first time, adopted the method of establishing the Advaita predominantly by refuting *dvaitavādins*. His work *Iṣṭasiddhi* bears testimony to this.<sup>3</sup> Sarvajñātman (10<sup>th</sup> century AD), in his *Vivarāṇa* on the *Pañcapādika* of Padmapāda, and Ānandabodha (11<sup>th</sup> century AD) in his works such as *Nyāyamakaranda*, *Nyāyadīpāvalī* and *Pramāṇamālā* also paid attention to refuting the Dvaitavādins.

Śrīharṣa's *KKK* opened a new era in the history of polemical writing of the Advaita Vedānta school. It was Śrīharṣa (12<sup>th</sup> century

<sup>2</sup> Bādarāyaṇa dedicated the whole of the second quarter of the second chapter of *Brahmasūtras* for refutation of rival views.

<sup>3</sup> In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarājadhvarīndra (quoted in Nair, *Advaitasiddhi*, 18–19).

AD) who first adopted the method of Naiyāyikas in refuting the Dvaitavādins, Citsukha (12<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> centuries) and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16<sup>th</sup> century AD) followed suit. Citsukha's *Tatvaprādīpikā*, popularly known as *Citsukhī*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaitasiddhi*, not only refute the arguments of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika but also establish the fundamental concepts of Advaita.

### 3.2. ŚRĪHARṢA'S POLEMIC

Śrīharṣa's main work is *KKK*, 'the sweets/dish/tonic of refutation'. The work aims at establishing the Self-shining Consciousness (Brahman) as the only reality by refuting all the arguments put forward by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas to support the reality of the *pramāṇas* (means of valid cognition) and the *prameyas* (objects of valid experience). Śrīharṣa attempts to prove that all empirical experiences and their objects are but conventional relative truths, having no ultimate reality in them. This negative method of destructive criticism (*khaṇḍana*), originally started by nihilist Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti and others, was first avowedly applied by Śrīharṣa in the field of Advaita Vedānta and was followed by Citsukha, Ānandagiri, and others. Though mainly occupied in refuting the definitions of logicians, Śrīharṣa has also criticized some views and definitions of the Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists. He admits the similarity of his philosophy to that of the nihilists (Śūnyavādins); but he promptly points out the difference too, saying that while the Buddhists hold everything to be determinable and false, the Brahmavādins (Vedāntins) hold knowledge (*viññāna*) to be self evident and real; that while the former hold that the world does not exist outside cognition, the latter assert that the world, though indeterminable as *sat* or *asat*, is different from cognition.

Śrīharṣa proceeds to refute the sixteen categories (*padārthas*) established by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies. They are *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *samśaya*, *prayojana*, *drṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *cchala*,

*jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. According to them, it is by testimony (*pramāṇa*, “means of right cognition”) and definition that the categories or things are established (*lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyām vastusiddhi*). Reality of *pramāṇa* is untenable, because *pramā* (right cognition) and its means (*kāraṇa*) are indeterminable. *Pramā* cannot be defined as knowledge of the real nature of an object, because the real nature is not determinable. Nor can right cognition be defined as correspondence of the cognition with its object, because such correspondence, which means similarity, is also impossible to be determined. Similarity in certain points may be found even in the case of errors. All other possible definitions of *pramā* like proper discernment, defectless experience, uncontradicted experience, etc., are all untenable. Instrumentality (*kāraṇatva*) is also indefinable, as is the operative function (*vyāpāra*), which is said to constitute the definition of the instrument (*kāraṇa*). Thus Śrīharṣa refutes being (*bhāvatva*) and nonbeing (*abhāvatva*), the general categories of the logicians, on the ground that *bhāva* cannot be defined as existent by itself, because then *abhāva* would also exist. If *abhāva* is defined as negation of *bhāva*, *bhāva* is no less a negation of *abhāva*. The Nyāya definition of *dravya* (substance) as *guṇāśraya* (the support of qualities) or *samavāyīkāraṇa* (inhering cause) is also untenable. Even a quality like colour is known to be support or inhering cause of qualities (viz., number) when we think of one colour or two colours. After refuting the definitions of quality (*guṇa*) and universals (*sāmānya*), Śrīharṣa refutes the Nyāya concepts of relation like *ādhāratva* (subsistence) and *viśaya-viśayi-bhāva* (subject-object relation). The definition of cause as immediate antecedent is also faulty, since no cause other than the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) is immediately antecedent. He refutes the definitions of perception, inference, invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), and other allied matters. The definitions of all different fallacies have also been refuted. It must be understood that by refuting the definitions, Śrīharṣa has only denied the ultimate reality of things or categories, but not their practical value. He does not deny the apparent difference of things, nor the practical validity of *pramāṇas*. Perceptions, being concerned

with and limited to present individual things, are not competent to negate the universal ultimate reality of oneness. Thus, Brahman alone is the reality; the world of difference and its entities all being indeterminable.

### **3.3. ŚRĪHARṢA THE ADVAITIN**

Śrīharṣa is recognized to be one of the greatest exponents of what is generally known as the Śāṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta. Śāṅkara's Advaita has been commented upon, explained, expounded and developed in its various ramifications by several generations of scholars, commentators and original thinkers for over a thousand years. Even today it is claimed to be one of the two traditional schools of Indian Philosophy which have survived and have modern adherents, while most other schools have died of old age on Indian soil.

The only other school that has survived is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or what is now called the Navya-Nyāya. Both Advaita Vedānta and Navya-Nyāya have attracted the attention of modern scholars and philosophers (both in India and abroad) acquainted with Western philosophy and whose interest in the study of Indian philosophy has not simply been limited to the history of Indian thought or Indology.

Modern exponents of Advaita Vedānta are numerous. With a few notable exceptions, however, most modern authors of Vedānta try to expound and modernize the Advaita system either from a speculative and personal point of view, or from a superficial viewpoint within the Kantian Transcendentalism or Hegelian Absolutism. Such a method has seldom achieved the sophistication and respectability that is normally expected in the context of modern (chiefly Western) philosophic activity. Besides this unfortunate turn of events, we have to note also that the term "Vedānta" has acquired a very cheap, popular connotation. Thus, any vague and enigmatic statement that even remotely suggests that this real, everyday world, is an illusion and that there is only a Universal Absolute Reality, is taken to be a "profound" writing on Vedānta.

There is a bewildering variety of such publications on Advaita, and ordinary men of both East and West seem to swallow work after work of this kind.

Standard Advaita texts, written in technical Sanskrit for over a thousand years, are, however, very different. Even a cursory glance at these texts will belie such distorted impressions as a modern academic philosopher may derive from the popular publications of Advaita. Even when one finds it hard to agree with the philosophic conviction of the Sanskrit Advaita writers, one nevertheless finds it difficult not to admire the intellectual honesty of these authors as well as the professional sophistication of their philosophic methodology. It is undeniable that these authors examined their own doctrines as well as those of rivals in the context of the Indian tradition of philosophic debate and abstruse logic. They intended their writings to be available for rational discussion. "They were writing for intelligent and critically minded readers, and are not pleading merely for the silence of mystic communion"<sup>4</sup> instead.

Śrīharṣa's contributions to the field of Indian philosophy may be summed up in two broad points. (1) He presented the Advaita school, with an independent philosophic method which uniquely suited the rational discussion of its monistic doctrine of the ineffable truth. (2) Through his incisive critique of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories of *pramāṇas* in general, and of the definitions of the logical and epistemological concepts of Udayana in particular, he paved the way for the rise of the Navya-Nyāya school of Saṣadhara, Maṇikaṅṭha and Gangeśa, who introduced abstruse and mind-boggling technicalities in the formulation of definitions of such logical and epistemological categories as reason (*hetu*), inference (*anumāna*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*). To take the second point first, Śrīharṣa's trenchant criticism of Nyāya categories had

<sup>4</sup> Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Logical Illumination in Indian Mysticism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 6. See also Phyllis Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta* (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1978), x.

a salutary effect on the Indian philosophic scene, and philosophic sophistication of later authors of both Nyāya and Vedānta deepened as a result. But for Śrīharṣa, an Advaitin might observe, who could have dreamt that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī would appear later in the Advaita tradition?<sup>5</sup>

Śrīharṣa's philosophic method was essentially that of what is known as *vitaṇḍā* in the Indian textual tradition. The tradition mentions three types of 'formal' philosophic debate; *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*.<sup>6</sup> The first was characterized by the philosopher's search for the truth, while the second was mainly dominated by the disputant's drive for victory. The third type of debate, called *vitaṇḍā*, or negative argumentation, occupied a unique position in philosophic parlance. According to *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.44, a *vitaṇḍā* is a *thesis or a position which is refuted but no counter thesis is established*. Vātsyāyana described it as a disreputable form of debate, for, he thought, it was unfair to let the debater get away simply with the refutation of a position and not allow the opponent to examine his position. Obviously, Vātsyāyana's disapproval stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamika writers sometimes used such a debate (termed by Nāgārjuna as the *prasaṅga* method) to refute any philosophic thesis or position. Emptiness, argued Nāgārjuna, is not a position to be defended.

It should be noted that, as the method of the sceptics, the Indian *vitaṇḍā/prasaṅga* and the Western *reductio ad absurdum* are in effect almost the same. Mystics and monistic philosophers in India used *vitaṇḍā* as a very fruitful philosophic activity. And in this regard they were joined by the Cārvāka sceptics and the agnostics. Monistic philosophers generally believed in an Ultimate Reality which is ineffable in principle. Thus, the ultimate reality cannot directly be the subject of any philosophic discourse (which is only *prapañca*). Faced with this problem, the monistic thinkers chose

<sup>5</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, x.

<sup>6</sup> See also Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India," in *Philosophical Essays: Professor Anantalal Thakur Felicitation Volume*, eds. Rama Ranjan Mukhopadhyaya *et al.* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1987).

*vitaṇḍā*, the respectable form of negative argumentation.

Śrīharṣa in the Advaita tradition was a worthy successor of Nāgārjuna in the use of the *vitaṇḍā/prasaṅga* method for his purpose. Śrīharṣa is an original Advaitin in his claim that, as far as philosophic method is concerned, there exists very little difference between a Mādhyamika and an Advaita Vedāntin, or even between a mystic and a Cārvāka nihilist.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.4. SCEPTICISM, DIALECTIC AND KNOWLEDGE

#### 3.4.1. Possibility of Knowledge: A Śrīharṣan Query

Acquisition of knowledge or approach to truth is the aim of all dialectical endeavours. But even before acquisition of knowledge, one is to theoretically fix with the question of the possibility of it. True, dialectical criticism would always be helpful in the complete rejection of an existing view or theory in favour of another suggestion which, if the inquiry has been properly conducted, ought to approach nearer the truth. Now, how Śrīharṣa faces up with the very possibility of knowledge is the problem we are here addressed with.<sup>8</sup>

The concepts of truth seem to vary in the different systems of thought; so we may say that dialectic helps thinkers to approach the problem of truth and reality with an open mind, with sympathy and due consideration for all possible views, especially when they are concerned with the ultimate reality of things. Most of the Indian philosophical systems (except the Lokāyata and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) are idealistic in the sense that they do not regard the world as real as it is perceived by the physical eye, unless it be related after deep inquiry to some higher reality (e.g., the *Prakṛti*

<sup>7</sup> Bimal Krishna Matilal, "The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism," in *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal: Mind, Language and World*, ed. Jonardon Ganeri (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50–51.

<sup>8</sup> Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 9ff. For the following discussions, I depend very much on this accomplished work.

of Sāṅkhya-Yoga) or the ultimate reality (God or the Absolute Principle). Consequently, perception and the other *pramāṇas* are not wholly trusted as giving full knowledge of things. But they are regarded as reliable in the sense that their knowledge is not found to be contradicted in empirical experience and they help us to co-ordinate our empirical experience without philosophical or metaphysical beliefs.

But excepting the extreme idealists (Vijñānavādins and Kevalādvaitins) and the skeptics and the Mādhyamikas, the different schools do accept the *pramāṇas* as giving knowledge which is never completely sublated, even though it may be coordinated with or merged in the knowledge of the Highest Reality to present the whole Reality as it is. The sceptics, the Vijñānavādins, the Kevalādvaitins, and the Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, regard knowledge derived from the different sources as valid only in empirical experience and deny any ultimate validity to it. Even among these, the skeptics and the Mādhyamikas and the (later) Kevalādvaitins (who, believing in the reality of Brahman alone, are interested in repudiating the reality of everything else on par with Brahman) are very insistent on the point that the different *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) can under no circumstances be relied upon as yielding the highest truth, because the very concept of *pramāṇas* and its object is an undefinable one. One cannot be sure of any knowledge.

We can think of Indian thinkers as divided into two main groups as far as their logical procedures are concerned: the *prāsaṅgika* (*viṭaṇḍin*) and the *pramāṇavādin*. The first group consists of those who use only the *reductio* and the negative form of debate, while the second group is comprised of those who would establish, in addition to the *reductio*, a system of *pramāṇas* or accredited means of knowledge on the basis of which they would construct a system. One of the platitudes of the *pramāṇavādins* is that a philosophical debate cannot properly begin unless both parties entering it first admit that *pramāṇas*—i.e., means of knowledge such as perception and inference—and the existence of logical fallacies are acceptable realities. For it is only with the help of such



concepts that a philosophic debate can properly proceed. This was the well-expressed view of Vātsyāyana and many *pramāṇavādins* against the negative form of debate.

It is at this juncture that Śrīharṣa begins his *KKK*, attacking the above platitude and, in order to reject it, he first resolves it into four possible alternative meanings:

... the platitude may mean

- 1) that debaters who do not admit a *pramāṇa* system are unable to start a debate, or,
- 2) that the *pramāṇas* are directly related to the debate as cause to its effect, or,
- 3) that it is the practice of all people and philosophers alike first to accept a system of *pramāṇas* and then to enter a philosophic debate, or,
- 4) that without the acceptance of *pramāṇas* and logical fallacies, the twin goal of a debate, viz., the establishment of truth and determination of victory, will never be achieved.<sup>9</sup>

Now, Śrīharṣa rejects all the four alternatives:

The first alternative is untenable, for such philosophers as Cārvāka and Mādhyamika do enter into serious philosophic debates despite their refusal to admit the existence of a *pramāṇa* system. Indeed, if such debates did not exist, your attempt (i.e., the attempt of a *prasaṅgavādin*) to refute such debates (viz., *vitaṇḍā*) would be the most unusual behaviour (on your part).<sup>10</sup>

If these alternatives are not valid, then what humans call as

<sup>9</sup> *Atha kathāyām vādino niyamametādṛśam manyante-  
'pramāṇādayaḥ sarvatantra-siddhāntatayā siddhaḥ padārthāḥ  
santīti kathakābhyām abhyupeyam', tadapare na kṣamante; tathā  
hi-pramāṇādīnām sattvam yad abhyupeyam kathakena, tatkasya  
hetoḥ? Kim tad anabhyupagaccad-bhyām vādi-prativādbhyām tad-  
abhyupagama-sāhitya-nityatasya vāg-vyavahārasya pravartayitum  
aśakytvāt? (1), uta kathakābhyām pravartanīya-vāgvyavahāram prati  
hetutvāt? (2), uta lokasiddhatvāt? (3), athavā tad-anabhyupagamasya  
tattvanirṇaya-vijayaphalātīprasaṅjakatvāt? KKK (NavJha), 5–6.*

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 5–7.

knowledge is also invalid. This is what Śrīharṣa attempts to drive home into the minds of all in *KKK*. But, he may not be classified as one like Nāgārjuna,<sup>11</sup> since the latter is happy with the resulting *śūnyatā* of all knowledge and constructs of consciousness.

Dialectic would ordinarily proceed on the assumption that true knowledge can be acquired. But some schools of philosophical thought do not at all admit the possibility of valid knowledge of things. Thus, dialectic, examining other cognisables, turned upon itself and ransacked its very fundamentals.

In India about the end of the Upaniṣadic period (though the skeptical tendency is evident even earlier) with the upsurge of philosophical and critical thought there arose thinkers who were sceptical—though not necessarily so in actual life—about virtue and vice (Pūraṇa Kassapa and others) and the attainment of knowledge or the possibility of the description of reality in words (Saṅgha Belaṭṭhaputta). Their own works are not extant, so we do not have a detailed idea of their line of argument or their sceptical views. Nevertheless, we find some of their views recorded in the Buddhist and Jaina canonical literature and we can say that they were thinkers whose parallels may be found in the sophists, cynics and sceptics of Greece.

The Buddha did not encourage this line of thinking as it was likely to prove morally futile. But the method of criticism and refutation continued to be adopted by the theorists of Buddhism, especially by the Mādhyamikas; and later dialectical philosophers developed what is known as the *prāsaṅgika* method—the method of examining all possible alternative interpretations of the opponent's proposition, showing its absurdity, showing the absurdity of its respective consequences and thus refuting it.

Some sceptical thinkers of India deny that they have any philosophical doctrine at all and hold that the function of philosophical

<sup>11</sup> Śrīharṣa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nāgārjuna: *Tathā hi yadi darśaneṣu śūnyavādānirvacanīya-pakṣayorāśrayaṇam; tadā tāvad amūṣām nirābādhaiva sārvaṇyathānātā*, *Ibid.*, 138.

reasoning is critical—solely to destroy false philosophies. It is strange that some others who believe in reaching truth by intuitive experience (*anubhava*) or realization (*sākṣātkāra*) are also critical of empirical knowledge and repudiate the validity of its sources. A thinker of the first type would say, in the words of Collingwood,

I do not know what the right answer to any philosophical question is; but I think there is work to be done in showing that the answers usually given are wrong. And I can prove that one answer is wrong without claiming to know that another is right, for my method is to examine the answers given by other people and to show that they are self-contradictory. What is self-contradictory is, properly speaking, meaningless; what is meaningless cannot mean the truth, and therefore by this method I can preserve a purely critical attitude towards the philosophy of others, without having any philosophy of my own. As to that, I neither assert nor deny its possibility; I merely for the present suspend judgment and continue my work of criticism.<sup>12</sup>

This is exactly the position of the Cārvāka thinker Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Tattvopaplavasimha*.

The second form of scepticism—which may better be called Absolutism—agrees with the first in holding that philosophical reasoning cannot establish any positive or constructive position; but it holds that we are not, on that account, necessarily cheated of truth. It comes to us directly from intuitive experience or the Supreme Intelligence (*prajñā*). The Mādhyamikas and the Kevalādvaitins belong to this category.

Among the Kevalādvaitins, Śrīharṣa (*ca.* 1150 CE) and Cit-sukha (*ca.* 1220 CE) resorted to a line of argument similar to that of Nāgārjuna. Like Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa also is not interested in giving any rational explanation of our world experience; they are agreed in disregarding the validity of world experience. Though Chandrakīrti explains that Nāgārjuna has faith in the efficacy of the super-intelligence to grasp the ultimate nature of Reality—*Tathatā*—Nāgārjuna has not in his own works established any

<sup>12</sup> Collingwood R. G., *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 138.

thesis of his own work in order to establish the reality of Brahman.<sup>13</sup> Śrīharṣa does not seem to have applied his dialectic to his own thesis. His description of Brahman also could not have stood the test of his rigorous dialectical examination. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, has shown the hollowness of even the concepts of *Tathāgata*, *Nirvāṇa*, and *Śūnyatā*. Again, while Nāgārjuna mainly attacks the accepted Buddhist categories and other relevant categories connected with them, Śrīharṣa attacks mainly the definitions of the Nyāya school and comes to the conclusion that as the Nyāya cannot define its categories, these are intrinsically indefinable and the world-appearance measured and scanned in terms of these categories is false.<sup>14</sup> But though his chief polemic is against the Nyāya, since his criticisms are of a destructive nature, they can with modifications be used effectively against any other system. Definitions other than those refuted by Śrīharṣa can be refuted by a judicious manipulation of the arguments found in different places in Śrīharṣa's work or by urging similar or other arguments. Thus an intelligent man can repudiate the categories recognized and expounded by others.<sup>15</sup> Those who criticise with the object of establishing positive definitions would object to certain definitions or theories of other schools; but the Mādhyamikas, the Tattvopaplavavādins and Kevalādvaitins like Śrīharṣa in particular are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such and so their dialectic would be effective against all definitions and theories of other schools of philosophical thought. Nāgārjuna's methods differ from those of Jayarāsi and Śrīharṣa in that the concepts which he criticises are mostly just shown by him

<sup>13</sup> *Tad evam bheda-prapañcofnirvacanīyaḥ, brahmaiva tu paramārtha-sad aditīyam iti sthitam— KKK (NavJha), 82.*

<sup>14</sup> *Lakṣaṇādhīnā tāval lakṣyavyavasthitir lakṣaṇāni cānupapannāni, jñātādhikaraṇādi-lakṣaṇa-nirūpaṇadvāreṇa cakrakādyāpatteḥ. Ibid., 141–42.*

<sup>15</sup> *Evamprakārāṇi tattallakṣaṇeṣu khaṇḍanāny ūhanīyāni| tad etāsu khaṇḍana-yuktiṣu kām api sthānāntarasthām kenāfpi prakārāntareṇāniya tat-sadṛśīm anyām vā svayam ūhitvā parair vivicyamānāni padārthāntarānyapi buddhimatā bādhanīyāni. Ibid., 730.*

to be intrinsically based on concepts with no essential nature of their own but are understood only in relation to others. No concept reveals any intrinsic nature of its own and we can understand a concept only through another and that again through the former or through another, and so on. Jayarāsi and Śrīharṣa employ other arguments also to refute the concepts by bringing out the absurdities involved.

The criteria of the truth of knowledge as recognized by the different schools of philosophy are *avyabhicārtiva* (absence of discrepancy), *abādhitatva* (absence of contradiction), *avisamvāda* (absence of incoherence), *yāthārthya* (correspondence) and *vyavasāyātmakatva* (certainty of definiteness).

Śrīharṣa also starts his dialectical inquiry by stating the principle that definite knowledge and consequently the reality of all categories depend upon definitions, and all definitions are improper and absurd inasmuch as they have the fault of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), or mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), or argument in a circle (*cakraka*) or vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*).<sup>16</sup>

*Pramā* is defined by Nyāya as apprehension which is non-deviating or non-discrepant.<sup>17</sup> But this is not true from the point of view of Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa proceeds here by asking: What does 'non-discrepant' signify? He wants to conclude that the knowledge gained through such means are limited, and does not reach its goal, the highest truth. So he wants to use these simplistic means to truth and show them to be useless for the attainment of the highest truth. This process we see in the long stretch of arguments that follows.

If 'non-discrepant' signifies invariable concomitance of knowledge with the object, does it mean that the knowledge exists, or that the cognition coexists in space with its object, or that valid cognition is similar to its object in all respects.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Lakṣaṇādhīnātāvalakṣyavyavasthitiḥ, lakṣaṇānicānupapannāni, jñātādhikaraṇādīlakṣaṇa-nirūpaṇadvāreṇa cakrakādyāpatteḥ*. Ibid., 141–42.

<sup>17</sup> *Avyabhicāryanubhavaḥ pramā*. Ibid., 248.

<sup>18</sup> *Avyabhicāritvam arthāvinābhūtatvam, tadā praṣṭavyam*

On the other hand, in the view of those who regard knowledge or consciousness and its object as non-different, the definition would apply to erroneous cognition also and the qualification ‘non-discrepant’ would become meaningless as it is not competent to distinguish right knowledge from an erroneous one.<sup>19</sup>

It is not also proper to define valid knowledge as apprehension which is not contradicted.<sup>20</sup> If the absence of contradiction refers only to the time of cognition, then even the erroneous cognition of silver in respect of nacre would be valid since it is not contradicted at least at the time when the illusion arises. It is urged that a valid cognition is that cognition which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the validity of any cognition, since it is not possible to say that any particular cognition will never be contradicted—cognitions of the waking state are contradicted in the dream state. Again, if by absence of contradiction is meant absence of contradiction in the case of the knower himself, then it is likely that a person who has had erroneous cognition would never come across contradiction of a former cognition and would never have an occasion to ascertain that the said cognition was wrong or “non-valid.” If absence of contradiction in the case of all persons in the world is meant, then this is something which can never be determined.<sup>21</sup>

Another definition of valid knowledge is ‘apprehension which corresponds to its object’.<sup>22</sup> This too is not true, correspondence (*yāthārthya*) can mean having the real nature of a thing as its object, or being similar to the object.<sup>23</sup> But the real nature of a thing is indeterminable.<sup>24</sup> If we accept the second interpretation,

*kofsyārthah? Kim yadārthas tadaiva jñānam, uta yatrāfrthas tatraiva deśe jñānam, atha yādrg arthas tādrgeva jñānam yat tat pramitir iti.* Ibid., 234, 248–49.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 248–49.

<sup>20</sup> *Abādhitānubhūtiḥ pramā.* Ibid., 254.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> *Yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā.* Ibid., 236.

<sup>23</sup> *Tattvaviṣayatvam vā arthasadrśatā vā syāt.* Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> This is shown while refuting ‘*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*’. Ibid., 143ff.

then even erroneous cognition (e.g., 'This is silver') is similar to the object in point of cognisability and the definition would thus apply to it. It may be urged that in respect of the aspect of knowability or cognisability, the cognition is certainly valid, but it is not valid in respect of the 'silver' aspect. But this stand is not justified.

It can be argued that this rule of its being a qualifier of the thing exactly as revealed in knowledge (i.e., by inference and the like) is with reference to the qualifier of the thing and not with reference to the cognition whose qualifier it can be only in virtue of its being the object of cognition.<sup>25</sup> The definition would then be: "That cognition whose qualifier (in virtue of the latter's being an object of cognition) is a qualifier of a thing exactly as revealed in cognition, is valid in respect of the thing."<sup>26</sup> But this definition would become too narrow and would be restricted to only a particular cognition on account of the use of 'yat-tat' (that-which). And if 'that' be taken to refer to all cognitions, then since in the cognition 'I know nacre as silver' silverness is a qualifier, the cognition 'This is silver' also would be valid, and the expression 'that-which' would become superfluous as it was introduced only to preclude the cognition 'This is silver' from the scope of the definition of valid knowledge, which purpose is nevertheless not served.<sup>27</sup>

Like Jayarāśi, Śrīharṣa refutes Dharmakīrti's definition of valid knowledge as non-incoherent apprehension'.<sup>28</sup> Does non-incoherence (*avisamvāditva*) signify that the object of this cognition is cognized in the same manner (i.e., with the same details) by another cognition, or that its object is not cognized in a reverse way (i.e., differently) by another cognition, or that a thing per-

<sup>25</sup> *Arthaviśeṣaṇatve 'yam niyamaḥ yat tojjñānaprakāśitena rūpeṇeti, na tu jñāne' pi.* Ibid., 242.

<sup>26</sup> Some Naiyāyikas do not admit definitions expressed in terms of 'that which' as they believe that such definitions refer to particular cases only and are thus devoid of the very requisite of a definition that it should apply to all things of the same class or to all similar cases.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 236–42.

<sup>28</sup> *Avisamvādy anubhavaḥ pramā.* Ibid., 249.

vaded by, and so concomitant with, the object of the cognition in question is known, or does it signify anything else (leading to successful action and the like)?<sup>29</sup>

There can be a fourth interpretation of *avisamvāda* (non-incoherence) viz, ‘having for its object that which is efficient’. Dharmakīrti has said, ‘Valid cognition is cognition which is non-incoherent, and non-incoherence means efficiency or successful action’.<sup>30</sup>

Some again define valid knowledge as the direct apprehension of the real nature of things.<sup>31</sup> But this definition is not proper, since it is not possible to define what *tattva*, “the real nature or thatness of things,” means. *Tattva* cannot mean “the state of being of a thing that is relevant,” as there is nothing that is relevant to, or referred to, in the context.

Śrīharṣa has also enumerated four faults—*ātmāśraya*, *anyonyāśraya*, *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) and *apasid-dhānta*<sup>32</sup>—and attempted also to show their presence in the so-called definitions of *pramāṇas*.

Śrīharṣa similarly repudiates the concept of *anubhūti* (apprehension) by posing four alternative interpretations of it and refuting them: Is *anubhūtitva* a sub-division or species of the genus *jñānatva* (knowledgeness), or, is it knowledge distinct from memory or knowledge devoid of the characteristics of memory, or, is it knowledge whose special cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) is

<sup>29</sup> *Avisamvāditvam hi jñānāntareṇa tathaivollikhyamānārthatvam vā, jñānāntareṇa viparītatayāḥpratīyamānārthatvam vā, pratīyamānavyāpyaviśayatvam vā, anyad, anyad eva vā kiñcit.* Ibid., 236, 250.

<sup>30</sup> *Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiś ca visamvādaḥ.* Ibid., 253.

<sup>31</sup> *Tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā.* Ibid., 143.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 143–48. Also, *Etena kāraṇam tattvam iti nirastam sarvasya tathātve pramityabhāvenātmāśrayeṇa ca pratikṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-viśvāvaśyakāraṇatvopagame durapavādārtha-kriyākāritva-sattvalakṣaṇāṅgīkāri-jainacaraṇa-śaraṇapraveśa-vidambanāpādidōṣagrāsena ceti.* Ibid., 147–48.



produced in the moment preceding it?<sup>33</sup>

It may be urged that the definition can be modified to say, "The apprehension of the real nature of things if it is produced by non-discrepant special causes is *pramā*."<sup>34</sup> But in that case, the term '*tattva*' becomes superfluous.

Moreover, in the case of *siddhasādhana* (proving what is already proved), the cognition is correct (i.e., it corresponds to the object), so the definition will apply to it and be thus too wide.

If another line of argument were assumed, then, as explained before, there would be valid cognition even in the case of *siddhasādhana*, and the definition would be too wide (*ativyāpta*).<sup>35</sup>

Śrīharṣa then criticises the definition of valid cognition as given by Udayana. Udayana defines valid cognition as proper or right determination.<sup>36</sup> Discussing the meaning of *samyaktva* (rightness), Śrīharṣa says that *samyaktva* cannot mean 'having the true nature of a thing as its object' (*tattva-viśayatā*) or correspondence (*yāthārthya*) as explained above.

Moreover, *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) and volitional or deliberate error and doubt (*āhāryau samśaya-viparyayau*) arise only when the *viśeṣa* has been cognized (i.e., only when knowledge in respect of particular features has been attained). Here, he ends his arguments, by taking the rest for granted: It is not neces-

<sup>33</sup> *Kim cedam anubhūtitvam nāma? Jñānatvaḥfvāntara-jātibhedo vā, smṛtivyatirikta-jñānatvam vā, smṛtilakṣaṇa-rahita-jñānatvam vā, tad-avidūra-prākkālotpattiniyataḥsādhāraṇakāraṇakabuddhitvam vā.* Ibid., 133, 149–50.

It may be noted with regard to the last alternative that the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇas* of perception, etc., are sense-object contact, knowledge of concomitant probans (as residing in the minor term), knowledge of similarity and knowledge of *śabda* or word; these are produced immediately before them, whereas *samskāra* (impression), the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* of memory is not produced in the immediately preceding moment. See Ibid., 149–228.

<sup>34</sup> *Avyabhicārikāraṇajanyatve satīti viśeṣaṇīyām.* Ibid., 231.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 229–35.

<sup>36</sup> *Samyak-paricchittiḥ pramā.* See Ibid., 242.

sary to go into further details.<sup>37</sup>

Having repudiated the concept of *pramā* (valid knowledge), Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa have similarly repudiated the six main sources of valid knowledge, which have been variously recognized by the different schools of Indian thought—*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* (analogy), *śabda* or *āgama* (verbal or scriptural testimony), *arthāpatti* (implication) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension).

We shall here consider briefly inference which is not only closely connected with dialectic but which can also be said to comprehend most of the forms of indirect knowledge.

Let us see how Śrīharṣa tackles the problem of inference. He refutes the definition or signification of *anumāna* (special instrument of inferential cognition—*anumīyate anena iti*), namely, *liṅga-parāmarśa* (consideration of the presence in the *pakṣa* or minor term of the *hetu* or middle term which is invariably concomitant with the *sādhyā* (*probandum* or major term). What is *liṅga*? If you say it signifies ‘being an attribute of the *pakṣa*,’ *pakṣa* is that in respect of which there is a doubt about the presence of the *sādhyā* (*sandigdha-sādhyadharmādharma pakṣaḥ*).<sup>38</sup> *Pakṣadharmatā*, in the eyes of KKK, is not an essential condition in the case of all inferential cognition. This also repudiates the condition regarding doubt.

The definition of *anumāna* (means of inferential cognition)

<sup>37</sup> *Iti āstām vistaraḥ*. Ibid., 257. See also Ibid., 255–57.

<sup>38</sup> *Upalakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣaṇa* are different kinds of qualifiers. *Upalakṣaṇa* qualifies and helps one to recognize the qualificand even when not present; for instance, even when the crow is not sitting on the house-top, Devadatta’s house can be introduced or pointed out as the one on which the crow was known to sit. *Viśeṣaṇa* is an internal quality or qualifier; for instance, in the proposition ‘The blue lotus is dancing on the waters’, blue is qualifier, internal to the lotus and so associated with the action predicated of it. The external qualifier which is not integral to what it qualifies is regarded by Indian logicians as two-fold—(a) *upādhi* (adjunct) which is in actual association with the qualificand, e.g., ear-drum of *ākāśa* (ether). (According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the auditive organ is nothing but ether enclosed in the ear-drum); (b) *upalakṣaṇa* (pointer) which qualifies even when not in association with the qualificand.

may be modified to say that the *liṅga* is that which is the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*, “pervaded”), and its consideration is *anumāna*. The definition may be attempted to be modified thus: The consideration (*parāmarśa*) of the *vyāpya* (i.e., *liṅga*, *probans*), which does not have the *vyāpaka* (*sādhya*, *probandum*) as its object is *anumāna*. Thus, the concept of *liṅga-parāmarśa* is shown to be self-condemned.<sup>39</sup>

Then Śrīharṣa repudiates *vyāpti*, which is the very basis of inference.<sup>40</sup> What is *vyāpti*? It cannot be defined as *avinābhāva*, for does this mean that when one is non-absent, the other is present, or that when one is absent that other also is absent? If it has the former meaning, the presence of one when the other is present would be signified, and then there should be *vyāpti* (concomitance) between ‘earth’ and ‘possibility of being cut by iron’ because the latter is present in a log of wood in which ‘earthiness’ also is *present* (but the two are not really concomitant, because a diamond cannot be cut though it is earthy, constituted of earth).<sup>41</sup> It may be contended that occasional relation (*kvācītka-sambandha*) is not *vyāpti*; *vyāpti* signifies universal (*sārvatrika*) relation.

Some define *vyāpti* as the co-presence of two things in respect of which there is evidence against the presence of one (*probans*) in a substrate (*vipakṣa*), where the other (*probandum*) is absent.<sup>42</sup>

*Vyāpti* may be defined as follows: ‘*Vyāpti* is a relation that is not adventitious’ (*anaupādhikaḥ sambandho vyāptiḥ*). What is *upādhi*, freedom from which amounts to ‘non adventitiousness’? “*Upādhi* (conditional circumstance or adventitious factor) is that which, being more extensive than the *probandum*, is less exten-

<sup>39</sup> KKK (VitŚās), 347–53.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 353ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Kaś ca vyāpti-śabdārtha iti vaktavyam, avinābhāva iti cen, na, kim ekasyāfvyatirekefparasya bhāvo fvinābhāva-padārthaḥ, uta ekasya vyatirekefparasya vyatirekaḥ? yady ādyaḥ tada fvyatireko fnavayārtha ity ekasyanvaye parasyānvaya ity uktam syāt, evam ca sati pārthivatvalohalekhyatvayor apy anvayo vyaptiḥ syāt.* KKK (NavJha), 353.

<sup>42</sup> *Yatra vipakṣe vṛttau hetau bādhakam asti tayor anvayo vyāptir iti kecit.* Ibid., 359.

sive than the *probans*<sup>43</sup> This is the substance derived negatively from Udayana's definition, "Of the *probans* and the third factor (which is recognized as the *upādhi*), the two being unrelated, that is the *upādhi* whose negation is pervaded by the negation of the *probandum* when the relation of one (i.e., the *probans*) with the *probandum* is to be cognized.<sup>44</sup>

Then it can as well be said that afterwards (i.e., at the time of doubt) the perception of the specific character is already there, and so, there should not be doubt. But the doubt is there.<sup>45</sup> That is to say, knowledge of the particular is not possible with the help of inference.

Thus, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*, which are regarded as the special causes of inferential cognition, cannot be explained, and so, inference cannot be explained. Thus, the source of knowledge called inference (*anumāna*) is repudiated.<sup>46</sup>

Śrīharṣa has, besides repudiating the *pramāṇas*, however strange it may seem, refuted even *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies of reason)<sup>47</sup> and *nigrahasthānas* as also other faults of reasoning and debating. This shows that the *tattvopaplavavādins* on the one hand, and the *anirvacanīyatāvādins* (those who say that the Absolute is beyond expression, and everything else is indefinable and so unreal, i.e., the Mādhyamikas and Kevalādvaitins) on the other, challenge the concepts of truth and error, validity and invalidity, which are usually admitted by the other philosophers.

Some are of the view that *pramāṇas* and the like, being established as the accepted principles or tenets of all the schools of thought, should be recognized by both parties in a debate; other-

<sup>43</sup> *Sādhyā-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakaḥ*. Ibid., 372.

<sup>44</sup> "Ekaśādhyāvinābhāve mithaḥ sambandha-śūnyayoḥ; Sādhyābhāvinābhāvi sa upādhir yadatyayaḥ. Ibid., 372.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 382–85.

<sup>46</sup> Citsukhācārya also has refuted the *pramāṇas* in his *Tattvapradīpikā* or *Citsukhī*. His refutation of *anumāna* is almost a summary of the arguments advanced by Śrīharṣa. See *Tattva-pradīpika* of Citsukha, ed. Udasina P. Svamiyogindrananda (Varanasi, 1974), 378–97.

<sup>47</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 415ff.

wise discourse would be impossible. Others (the absolutists and the sceptics) do not agree with this. On what ground could it be said that both parties in a debate should recognize the reality of the *pramāṇas*, etc? (1) Is it so, because the two parties not recognizing these could possibly carry on their controversy or debate, which is invariably connected with the simultaneity of acceptance, so that whoever is a debater must always be one who recognizes the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc? (2) Or, is it because *pramāṇas*, etc., are the causes in respect of the controversy to be carried on by the two parties? (3) Or, because they are popularly accepted? (4) Or, if they are not recognized, could even those ordinary persons who know nothing of these be said to be able to determine the truth and to attain victory—which is absurd (that is to say, because the results of a controversy cannot be attained without the recognition of *pramāṇas*, etc.)?<sup>48</sup>

Thus, if the Lokāyatikas and the like have access to a debate, then it is contradictory to say that they have no right to enter into a debate; and, if they have no right, this check could be applied only in a debate, which must be initiated irrespective of the stand that they have no right to discuss.<sup>49</sup>

The second reason that *pramāṇas*, etc., are the causes of debate is also not acceptable. If there were no debates with or among thinkers denying the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., then alone could it be said that *pramāṇas*, etc., are the causes of the debate carried on by debaters.

Thus, this set of rules is unvitiated inasmuch as these rules are

<sup>48</sup> *Atha kathāyām vādino niyamametādṛśam manyante-  
'pramāṇādayaḥ sarvatantra-siddhāntatayā siddhaḥ padārthāḥ  
santīti kathakābhyām abhyupeyam', tadapare na kṣamante; tathā  
hi-pramāṇādīnām sattvam yad abhyupeyam kathakena, tatkasya  
hetoḥ? Kim tad anabhyupagaccad-bhyām vādi-prativādibhyām tad-  
abhyupagama-sāhitya-nityatasya vāg-vyavahārasya pravartayitum  
aśakyatvāt? (1), uta kathakābhyām pravartanīya-vāgvyavahāram prati  
hetutvāt? (2), uta lokasiddhatvāt? (3), athavā tad-anabhyupagamasya  
tattvanirṇaya-vijayaphalātīprasañjakatvāt? Ibid., 5–6.*

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 6–13.

self-established, since one could not even think of the possibility of debates being conducted without them. But it is not similarly incumbent on both the parties to accept the necessity of *pramāṇas*, etc., because a debate is possible only if the rules are recognized, even without recognizing the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., and even if the reality of the *pramāṇas* is admitted, determination of truth or victory, which is the desired end of the two rival parties, will not be accomplished in the absence of the above-mentioned set of rules.<sup>50</sup>

Śrīharṣa has made it clear that even these rules are only empirically real or valid, inasmuch as they help to carry on the debate, since they are fixed by mutual consent by both the parties.<sup>51</sup> The gist of Śrīharṣa's argument is that, though the sceptics and the absolutists do not admit the ultimate reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., they are not keen on proving them unreal in the case of each and every debate.

Śrīharṣa says at the end of *KKK*:

All definitions should be similarly confuted; if necessary, by inserting with slight changes an argument used elsewhere into these arguments, or by urging similar or other arguments. Thus, an intelligent man should confute the categories propounded by others.... But as a matter of fact, the *probans* is relevant because if the *probans* which is meant to prove the *probandum* cannot be explained (is *anirvacanīya*), the *sādhya* also will turn out to be indescribable (*anirvacanīya*).<sup>52</sup>

Śrīharṣa now concludes: "My method of confutation has a triple course—urging arguments similar to the ones advanced by me, use of arguments employed by me in one place in another context, and when one finds these insufficient, a chain of other

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 13–16.

<sup>51</sup> *Astu evam hi, tathāhi ... sampratipattyā pravartanāt.* Ibid., 23. Also compare *Tad evam upapluteṣu eva tattveṣu ... vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti. Tattvopaplavasimha* of Jayarāṣi, eds. Sukhlalju Sanghavi and R. C. Parikh (Baroda, 1940), 125.

<sup>52</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 730–31.

refutations.<sup>53</sup> Dialectic for all skeptic philosophers involves a series of *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅgāpādāna*<sup>54</sup>) arguments. Every thesis is turned against itself.

### 3.4.2. *Vitaṅḍā* as Critique of Reason unto Silence Climaxing in Absolute Consciousness

As a rule, the sceptical thinker in Śrīharṣa uses dialectic in a series of Nāgārjunian *reductio ad absurdum* arguments (*prasaṅgāpādānam*).<sup>55</sup> His dialectic is not merely bent on refuting the opponent. It is pre-eminently a critique of Reason undertaken by Reason itself.<sup>56</sup> Silence, as a matter of fact, is the only explanation reaching nearest the Absolute. Hence, Śrīharṣa refutes all categories recognized by the systems of philosophy (especially Nyāya) on the basis of their own tenets and grounds and observes that Reason cannot give us any knowledge of the Highest which is Pure Consciousness and can only be spiritually experienced or realized, but under the purview of non-duality, which is not subject to the Śrīharṣan reason that theorizes on the importance of Silence.<sup>57</sup>

In short, the scepticism of Śrīharṣa is only an attempt at critiquing Reason and establishing the climax as Advaitic Silence reaching up nearest the Absolute. Of the two sorts of sceptical philosophers—the pure Sceptics and the Absolutists (*anirvacanīyatāvādins*)—the second group headed by Śrīharṣa depended

<sup>53</sup> *Tattulyohas tadīyam ca yojanam viṣayāntare,*

*śrīṅkhālā tasya śeṣe ca tridhā bhramati matkriyā.* Ibid., 731.

<sup>54</sup> T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: Allen & Unwin, n.d.), 131.

<sup>55</sup> *Ācāryo bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiva parapakṣam nirākaroti sma. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, ed. J. W. de Jong (Madras: Adyar, 1977), 24. See also *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara, ed. Durgadhara Jha (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1977), 197; and Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 2:627.

<sup>56</sup> Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 2:616.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 2:616–17.

for their knowledge of truth upon spiritual or intuitive experience. Of these, Absolutists depended for the knowledge of truth upon spiritual or intuitive experience.

Sceptical thought, both the trends inclusive, in general made this effect on Indian logic to such an extent that it set all logicians thinking seriously and consequently all the schools of philosophy tried to evolve their own theories of truth and validity, and of error, in a very precise manner.<sup>58</sup>

Now we shall delve into a study of the very making of Śrīharṣan Advaita dialectic in the following chapter.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 2:617–18.



## CHAPTER 4

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# Structuring Advaita in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*: Methodological Dimensions

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### 4.1. TOPICS IN THE *KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYAM*

#### 4.1.1. Śrīharṣa's Recasting of Advaita in the Methods of Other Schools

Although pre-Śrīharṣan Vedāntins had a taste for dialectic, it was Śrīharṣa, the deconstructive-absolutist, who pioneered and intensified Advaitic dialectic approach beyond all telling. Although

Ānandabodha and Śrīharṣa showed the tendency, there was a difference. Ānandabodha concerned himself to defend the Advaita doctrine by logical methods, against objections raised by the logicians on a broad range of topics, but not against any particular thinker. Śrīharṣa's main effort was to refute the views put forward by the logicians themselves, and so, his work was the most pointed logical culmination of Advaita. For this purpose, he created an original method of his own. Moreover, he put it forth into the mouth of both the erudite and the commoner. Hence, we can call his work as the most animated crystallization of Advaita dialectic.

His accomplishment may be summarized thus: He rejected existing methods of theorization and their very theories and favoured Advaita theory by showing that the crux of Advaita theory is that “[t]o theorize is to define the truth which is indefinable.”<sup>1</sup> Dialectic in both Buddhism and Advaita attempt not to establish another theory against the existent ones, but to show the untenability of theories held by various philosophies. This leads naturally to *anirvacanīyatā*. That means, “... even according to the law of Excluded Middle, the final resort is only the *anirvacanīyatva*.”

He was equally careful to establish the authority of the scriptures, especially of the *Upaniṣads*, by use of the arguments in *KKK* and *NC*. He says at one point, “The authoritativeness of the Veda in general, and its authoritativeness in regard to already established and existing entities in particular, will be demonstrated in the *Īśvarābhisandhi*.”<sup>2</sup> From this we conclude that Śrīharṣa accepted that *Śabda* could be an authoritative means of

<sup>1</sup> Sarma, *Citsukha's Contribution*, 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa, eds. and trans. Ganganatha Jha and Georg Thibaut, 2 vols (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986), 1:36; *KKK* (NavJha), 80. [When Thibaut and Ganganatha Jha's English translation is used, the reference will mention the volume and page number of that translation followed by the page number of Navikanta Jha's edition of the text, separated by a slash, e.g., 1:3/4]. There is a highly accomplished translation of most of the material, with many

knowledge in regard to already existing entities, and demonstrated the authoritativeness of the Veda on this basis. The book referred to, however, is not available today. So we cannot tell whether the author also took immediate experience into account in establishing the authoritativeness of the Vedic metaphysical teaching.

#### 4.1.2. *KKK*: Themes Highlighted

The phrase ‘*khaṇḍakhādyā*’ is familiar in the medical treatises, where it means a kind of tonic. The present work is entitled ‘*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*’. It trains to enjoy the supreme delight of refuting others’ doctrines. Śrīharṣa is not satisfied just to say that all is indeterminable because it is the effect *māyā*, which is itself indeterminable as real or unreal. Right at the beginning of the book he treats ‘indeterminability’ as incapability of being explained at all.

O! ye heroes of the realm of philosophy! Do but repeat the words that follow like a parrot (and, by a play on words, like Śuka Deva repeating the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*) and astonish the people with the miracle of a conquest of the world. Reduce the logicians in their overweening pride to silence everywhere by refuting their explanations of words and their meanings!<sup>3</sup>

The *KKK* should be understood as divided into two parts—the Introduction (inclusive of Chapter 1) and the part devoted to refutations (Chapters 2, 3, 4). The Introduction starts by refuting the alleged rule that a debate can only be started if both disputants accept the reality of the means of knowledge and the other fifteen categories of the Logicians. Then the Introduction goes on to prove the self-luminosity of the Absolute, and afterwards to show that difference as revealed by sense-perception does not contradict

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supplementary explanations, in Phyllis Granoff’s *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.

<sup>3</sup> *KKK*, 1:3/4. See also Swami Satchidanandendra Sarasvatī, *The Method of the Vedānta: A Critical Account of the Advaita Tradition*, trans. A. J. Alston (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997), 888.

and cancel the non-duality taught in the Veda. The second part of the work shows that all sixteen categories adopted by the Logicians as real are in fact indeterminable.

#### 4.1.3. Non-obligatoriness of Agreement on the Means of Knowledge

*KKK* begins with a discussion on the mode how a debate has to begin. The principles set forth should be agreeable for both the parties. The first principle to be observed is the indifference to the admission of *pramāṇas*. The first positive step in the process of the debate, therefore, is to refute the necessity for acceptance of the reality of the means of knowledge and other categories of the Logicians before a debate can begin. This is done here as follows:<sup>4</sup>

(1) What are the grounds on which it is claimed that a disputant must accept the reality of the means of knowledge and other categories before he can enter into dispute? (a) Is it on the ground that the two disputants will not otherwise be able to enter into communication, since verbal communication depends on the categories' being accepted? Or is it (b) because the acceptance of these categories as real is the cause of verbal communication between the two parties? Or is it (c) because it is standard practice to accept them as real? Or is it (d) because, if this rule is not accepted, there cannot be either discovery of truth or victory in debate however?

The first suggestion cannot be right. For the Materialists and the Buddhist Nihilists do not accept these categories, and yet we see them communicating copiously in debate. And if they could not communicate, your own efforts to refute them would be useless. I suppose you will be trying to tell me that it was this strange new *mantra* of yours, 'No one may argue who does not accept the Logicians 'categories', which strikes all who oppose it dumb, which prevented Bṛhaspati from composing the *Sūtras* of the Materialists, that stopped the Buddha from giving out the texts of

<sup>4</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 893. For the rest of the quote is extensively from that work.

the Mādhyamikas, that caused the failure of Bhagavatpāda Śāṅkara to write a Commentary on the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.<sup>5</sup>

(2) It cannot be that acceptance of the Logicians' categories as real is the cause of the verbal communication between the two parties. That could only have been true if the causality of the categories in regard to verbal communication between disputants ceased, when its reality was not accepted by either party. But, this cannot be the case. For if it were the case, there could not be verbal communication between disputants who did not accept the Logicians' categories, for lack of an essential condition. And we have already made the point that the fact of the Mādhyamika Buddhists and others communicating in debate cannot be denied, even though they do not accept the categories.<sup>6</sup>

(3) It cannot be that standard practice shows that one who does not accept the categories cannot enter into debate. For is it proper critical standard practice that you have in mind, or the standard practice of ordinary uncultured people in the world? The first will not do. For one cannot establish that proper critical practice is being followed without first engaging in a discussion. And one would need a preliminary investigation to discover the rules for that (which would imply a debate before the categories were accepted).

But the standard practice of uncultured people will not do either. For if you accept that as your criterion, you will also have to accept that there is no soul, and also accept other materialistic propositions which do not agree with the Logicians' system. If you say that such propositions will not have to be accepted if they are cancelled later by critical reflection, then we reply that the categories, too, will have to be rejected if they are cancelled by critical reflection, though they will have to be accepted if they are not (which implies debate before acceptance of categories).

<sup>5</sup> *KKK*, 1:4/6–7.

<sup>6</sup> *KKK*, 1:7/13.

One cannot say, therefore, that standard practice proves that the categories must be accepted before there can be debate.<sup>7</sup>

(4) It cannot be that the non-acceptance of the reality of the categories prevents debate because the one who does not accept it is not a fit candidate for the rewards of debate in the form of discovery of truth or victory. For we too, who are indifferent as to the reality or unreality of the categories, accept the same rules for communication in debate as you do, who regard the categories as real. So if there cannot be discovery of truth or victory in debate for me, there cannot be truth or victory for you either.<sup>8</sup>

Having thus refuted the rule about prior acceptance of the means of knowledge (and other categories of the Logicians) before debate can begin, Śrīharṣa concludes as follows:

(5) Generally speaking, worldly dealings are found to proceed on the basis of cognitions occurring to a limited number of people for a limited period of time; and it is this limited form of knowledge of reality that is a necessary element in debate. This is what is meant when we say ‘Debate can only begin on the acceptance (by both parties) of the means of knowledge and so on as real for practical purposes’. Therefore, he wins the argument in regard to whom the arbiter decides ‘He is the one who did not overstep the boundaries previously laid down as rules on this practical basis’. He in regard to whose words the arbiter does not have this feeling loses. One must certainly accept such preliminary rules for opening a debate as ‘where the arbiter is aware of the existence of self contradiction in the arguments of one of the disputants, the latter suffers rebuke, while the other disputant does not’.<sup>9</sup>

(6) But in what sense do we mean that perception and the other means of knowledge, together with Vedic tradition, belong to the realm of that afflicted with ignorance? What we say here is this. Without self-identification with the body and senses expressed in

<sup>7</sup> *KKK*, 1:9f./18.

<sup>8</sup> *KKK*, 1:10/19.

<sup>9</sup> *KKK*, 1:12/22.

feelings of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’ there can be no empirical knower and so the processes of empirical knowledge cannot begin.<sup>10</sup>

Now, a pertinent remark about the very epistemological pre-suppositions of Śrīharṣa:

It is clear that those who think that we have here an appeal to the means of knowledge called presumption to settle questions about the means of knowledge in general do not understand the application of the means knowledge. For when one is debating the reality of the means of knowledge in general, it is not correct to appeal to the instance of a particular means of knowledge. And it is clear that those who hold that all the means of knowledge are invariably accompanied by superimposition should not enumerate the means of knowledge (as sources of impeccable knowledge), even on the understanding that superimposition is present. If all experience of the means of knowledge and their objects is established as being associated with ignorance, the idea that one has to exercise reflection on the basis of accepting as real the means of knowledge and other categories taught to be real by the Logicians stands discredited in advance. But the author of *KKK* does not appear to have understood this. Since he specifically claims that he is only refuting the means of knowledge and other categories as taught by the Logicians, it is clear that he is merely engaged in refuting rules by empty logical arguments (not culminating in experience).<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.1.4. Even the Nihilist Has a Right to Enter into Debate

It is not necessary that the means of knowledge and other categories of the Logicians be accepted in advance by both parties in a debate. We have already the example of the Materialists, the Buddhists Nihilists. Śāṅkara-Vedāntins and others have a history of incontrovertibly engaging in arguments in support of their respective positions without accepting the categories of the Logicians.

<sup>10</sup> *BrŚŚB* I.i.1 (quoted in *Method of the Vedānta*, 890).

<sup>11</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 890–91.

Śrīharṣa now turns to a new question. He expounds the view of the Buddhist Nihilists in order to show how, in their opinion, a debate could be started without accepting the reality of the Naiyāyikas' means of knowledge or other categories.

(1) The prescription: 'One must argue according to these rules', means that the arbiter is led into a cognition such that he concludes: 'This one has argued according to the rules'. In the end it must always be admitted that even that cognition was real: for, in affirming its reality one would have to depend (not on a reality but only) on another judgment affirming reality. This cannot be denied for fear of infinite regress, we do not need an infinite series of tests communicate. According to Kumāriḷa, "We do not require the rise of more than three or four cognitions."<sup>12</sup>

It should also be noted that if the last cognition was unreal all the stream of previous ones too were unreal. If not, even the one who argues resorting to tests by cognitions is in jeopardy. The fact is that people proceed by mutual agreement in debate, limiting their investigations to a few cognitions. Without this agreed limitation, even if the means of knowledge and other categories were accepted as real, the acceptance itself would end in an infinite regress.<sup>13</sup>

(2) In one's view, it may be that cognitions and objects are alike real. Yet, only the nature of knowledge as real, not the reality of objects, makes communication possible. Even so, on the view that cognitions and objects are alike unreal, it is knowledge, and nothing else, though unreal, that makes communication in debate possible.

If one says it is contradictory to say that a thing can be unreal and yet be what makes something else (here, debate) possible, one can object, because it is equally contradictory to say that something is real, and that it is also what makes something else (debate) possible. It is also to be remembered that nowhere has it been

<sup>12</sup> *Ślokavārttika* of Kumāriḷa, ed. Dvarikadas Sastri (Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978), 2.61.

<sup>13</sup> *KKK*, 1:12 ff./23–25.



established that the real can make the existence of something else possible, while the unreal cannot.<sup>14</sup>

The reply of the *KKK*, as to whether the unreal has the potentiality to cause an effect, runs as follows:

(3) The parties agree that to be a cause is to precede something and be in constant and regular connection with it. In this respect, questions of the real and unreal are irrelevant, since they have no connection with the nature of causality.<sup>15</sup>

The possibility that the Nihilist accepts the ‘surface reality’ of the unreal is defended by *KKK* against all objections.

(4) One may ask whether surface reality (*samvṛti-satya*) is real or not, in order to argue that if it is not real it cannot introduce any distinctions (into consciousness). If it is real, then our own (Nihilist’s) position will be undermined, too! At any rate, that knowledge is a cause of practical experience. If this knowledge is tested true after tests limited to three or four new cognitions, then this experience would also have its source in real knowledge. If it proves otherwise, the knowledge that gave rise to it would also be unreal. The same is with erroneous cognition, where the false object introduces a distinction into the cognition whereby it is known (a distinction of such a form as knowledge of silver).<sup>16</sup>

The point *KKK* makes thus is that the Nihilist takes both knowledge and its objects unreal. Buddhist Nihilist himself might or might not have defended any cause-effect relation. The gist of the argument is that it is still possible to refute the claim that a debate can only be entertained if the means of knowledge and other categories of Nyāya are agreed upon.

So far Śrīharṣa has been dealing with the Nihilists. Now he goes on to expound the doctrines of the Buddhist Idealist who believed in the self-luminosity of cognitions. Śaṅkara’s *Brah-*

<sup>14</sup> *KKK*, 1:14f./25.

<sup>15</sup> *KKK*, 1:20/36.

<sup>16</sup> *KKK*, 1:22f./40.

*masūtrabhāṣya* lays down a thorough refutation of Nihilism on the ground that knowledge is self-evident.<sup>17</sup>

Although the Buddhist and Nyāya philosophies need not be found in a Vedāntic discourse, it was important for Śrīharṣa to refute any ultimate reality of the means of knowledge or other categories of the Logicians, by first using some of these categories themselves (after their own manner), and then to move to show their inconsistencies. This would serve as the right starting point for *KKK*'s refutation of the Nihilists and the Logicians. This helped him to use the epistemological foundations of these philosophies as the instrument for refuting the doctrines of these same doctrines. Thus, the negative means worked as a stepping stone for *KKK*. Thus, I would read his negative use of other philosophies as a positive take-off for realization of his own agenda.

#### 4.1.5. Quintessence of Methodological Structuring

Śrīharṣa sums up his arguments after his attempts at refutation of the definitions of knowledge and the means of knowledge and other categories given by the Logicians:

(1) He brings up a few suppositions: (a) Suppose there appears a new way of explaining things. (b) Suppose one has the intelligence to rebut our objections here and there. (c) Suppose critics have no good reply. What shall then be done? He proposes a summary of his methodology:

Thus my activity as a critic moves forward in three ways; I think of a new and equally powerful refutation; I apply the same refutation to a new topic in a new way; if anything resists refutation, I proceed analytically and apply a series of arguments to the words making up my opponent's propositions, robbing them of meaning one by one.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For further discussions, see *Br:ŚŚB* II.ii.31 and III.iii.32.

<sup>18</sup> *KKK* 246f./752–53; Swami Satchidanandendra Sarasvati, *Vedānta-Prakriyā Praṭyabhijñā* (Holenarsipur: Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, 1964), 125f.; and Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 906.

He gives a practical elaboration of this formula:

[T]ake one of the groups of words used by the opponent in the course of elaborating his new position, and give a new refutation of its meaning. And if the opponent should exhaust the intelligence of the critic on that point, the latter must shift his ground, choosing other parts of the opponent's discourse. There is no fear of this being counted irrelevant, as everything that the opponent says is part of his argument. Nor is there anything improper in shifting to a new point in the midst of discussing another point. Otherwise the result would be absurd. For it would mean that, when a person had argued 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced', there could be no arguments raised about the meaning of 'being produced'; and that would give the absurd result that arguing on premises not accepted as proved by one of the parties would not count as a fallacy. Here we should point out that if the means of proof is inexplicable, the conclusion proved will also be inexplicable (so that it is not irrelevant to examine the credentials of the premises, even though the argument is about the conclusion).<sup>19</sup>

The crux of all the arguments of Śrīharṣa here and in the whole of *KKK* is that all except the Absolute is indeterminable. One may question: In what sense, as real or unreal? His reply is: "Any philosopher who prides himself on his ability to give explanations will find that, in practice, he cannot explain things, on account of the defects inherent in any statement."<sup>20</sup> He thinks that, by developing this point with examples and by refuting objections that have been raised against it, one establishes the authoritativeness of the Vedic teaching, and its indeterminability.

Śrīharṣa considers now that his arguments at refutation have triumphed, since he has applied them to all philosophical doctrines. He thinks what has to be done is to set forth the arguments of the various philosophical schools in order to introduce these refutations by use of the formula we have discussed above. The style of these refutations has to be the style of skepticism (*vitaṇḍā*). If such a style of argumentation is in operation, one is privileged

<sup>19</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 906.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 283.

to have given no occasion for anyone to draw us away from the process and thus make space to defend one's own doctrines.<sup>21</sup>

#### 4.2. ŚRĪHARṢA AND HIS ADVERSARIES

KKK of Śrīharṣa begins with the refutation of the definitions of "valid cognition" and "the means of valid cognition," namely, perception, inference, presumption, non-awareness and testimony. His antagonists include the Naiyāyikas, Udayana, Vācaspati Miśra, and Bhāsarvajña; the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumāṛila and Prabhākara; the Buddhists, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, and Prajñākāragupta; and the Jains, Pūjyapāda, Vidyānanda, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, among others.

In general, the Śrīharṣan refutation of their doctrines proceeds along two lines: (A) Along the refutation of statements actually intended by the opponents as definition of given categories, and (B) along the refutation of statements originally intended for other purposes and which could, in accordance with the opponents' own assertions, also be taken as definitions. Most of the refutations in the first chapter are A-type. Throughout, Śrīharṣa's method of argument is consistent, and accords with what he himself carefully describes in his introductions to the text. Śrīharṣa does no more than to show that the opponents' own doctrines contradict themselves. Śrīharṣa does also tell us the advantage of such a procedure. Let us have a succinct glance at a random survey of some of the views of his opponents and his own counterviews.

Valid knowledge is defined by Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇamālā* as: *Tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*,<sup>22</sup> "Valid knowledge is an experience of the essence of an object." It is similar to that of earlier thinkers like Samantabhadra in the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (6<sup>th</sup> century AD, verse 101), of Pūjyapāda in his commentary to the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvāti (5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> century AD, p. 5) and of Akalaṅka (9<sup>th</sup> century AD) in his *Tattvārtharājavārttikā*, p. 19: *Tattvajñānam pramā*,

<sup>21</sup> KKK, 1:80f./127.

<sup>22</sup> KKK (NavJha), 130–218.

“Valid knowledge is a knowledge of the essence of an object.” Śrīharṣa undertakes the refutation of this definition by exploring the various possible meanings of its component words, *tattva*, “thisness” and “*anubhūti*,” “experience.”

He first concentrates upon the Naiyāyikas, taking the concept of *tattva* and citing Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭīkā*, p. 35, Jayantabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 8 and Udayana in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 96. All remark that “*tattva*” means the essence of an object: *tasya bhāvastattvam*, “*tattva* is the state of it.” Śrīharṣa replies by indicating a major difficulty in such a definition of the term *tattva*, because for the pronoun *tat* no referent is given. The definition is the first in the *Lakṣaṇamālā*. By Udayana’s own admission and also according to *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, the word is meaningless without a specific referent.

Śrīharṣa’s first criticism of the Nyāya definition of valid knowledge, “*Tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*,” could be of a direct quote from *Nyāyapariśuddhi*: *Abhidhānaparyavasānāt, Śabdavyāpārāparyavasānāt, tachhabdasya pūrvaprakrānta evārthe saṅketitatvāt, tadanabhidhāne vācakatvapasangād iti bhāvaḥ*,”<sup>23</sup> “Because it would end up without denotative power. That is to say, because it would end up devoid of any significant verbal function, as the pronoun, *tat*, refers only to that which has previously been designated, and when nothing has been so named it must end up being devoid of meaning.”<sup>24</sup> Śrīharṣa has researched for and quoted from Nyāya texts their definitions of the term *tattva*, and denied their validity by quoting again a paraphrase from their own sources—thus confounding their concepts by their own coins. Here he makes a direct exemplification of the method of debate.

Śrīharṣa now applies another of his favourite methods and thus opens his refutation of *anubhūtitva* by throwing a direct question at the opponents: he wonders exactly what is meant by the term “experience.” The alternatives cover all the possibilities admit-

<sup>23</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, 288 (quoted in Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 5).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

ted by the Naiyāyikas: (a) *anubhūtitva* is a universal inherent in experience,<sup>25</sup> (b) it is an attribute, “being other than memory,”<sup>26</sup> (c) it is an attribute, being devoid of the defining characteristics of memory<sup>27</sup> and (d) it is an attribute, being a knowledge the particular cause of which arises immediately prior to the arousal of that knowledge itself.<sup>28</sup> Here too Śrīharṣa’s process of culling out definitions, concepts and counter-concepts from the very texts of the opponents is what helped him in identifying these four suggestions made here.

First of all, with a view to prove that for his opponents the concept of recognition must be a single cognition in which memory and experience function together, Śrīharṣa begins with a question, “What is recognition?”<sup>29</sup> This time he makes sure that the answers cover all schools of Indians philosophy: (a) It is two knowledges, one memory and the other experience (Various Buddhists);<sup>30</sup> (b) It is one knowledge, part memory, and part experience (Various Mīmāṃsakas);<sup>31</sup> (c) It is one knowledge, memory (The Jains);<sup>32</sup> and (d) It is one knowledge, experience (Various Naiyāyikas).<sup>33</sup>

Śrīharṣa first refutes alternatives (a) and (c) and shows in the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine the incurrance of *sāṅkaryā*, “mixing, blending,” and derivatively, “confusion.” He then takes the Naiyāyika suggestion and attempts to confound the alternatives by showing the confusion in it. For this he gives an illustration of the contra-

<sup>25</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi* (quoted in Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 3).

<sup>26</sup> *Ṭīkā*, 35, 313; *Tarkabhāṣā*, 2; *Tārkikarakṣā*, 11, and *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, 124 (quoted in *Ibid.*, 3).

<sup>27</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, 110 (quoted in *Ibid.*, 3).

<sup>28</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, 106 (quoted in *Ibid.*, 3).

<sup>29</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 139.

<sup>30</sup> *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, 110–11; *Prajñākaragupta*, 22; cited *Abhayadevasūri*, *Sanmatitarkatīkā*, 84, 107.

<sup>31</sup> *Bṛhati* with *Rjuvimalā*, 238–39; *Śloka-vārttikā*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, śloka 229, 202; *Upamāna Pariccheda*, ślokas 9-10, 436–37; *Mānameyodaya*, 22.

<sup>32</sup> *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, 335.

<sup>33</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, 280; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 474; *Ṭīkā*, 230–31.

dictions involved in an admission of recognition as experience alone, and then reduces it to the Mīmāṃsaka contention with the same fault.

Veiled criticism is a hallmark of *KKK*. For example, intervening between the pages 147 and 151<sup>34</sup> is a brief refutation of the concept in Bhāsarvajña's (of early Naiyāyika school) *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, that doubt is a universal inhering in knowledge.<sup>35</sup> The most significant point which Śrīharṣa makes in this interlude is in effect a veiled criticism of Udayana's adaptation and modification of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*'s ideas.

He refutes, for example, *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* in a detailed manner, and thus attacks Udayana in an irreparable manner. The final attempt at refutation of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* appears on pages 152–53 of *KKK*. He attempts to show that the said relation cannot operate in the case in question. For *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* to operate one further qualification is necessary, that is, *tattā*.

The attribute which is to be grasped (in this case, *tattā*) must reside in a locus itself perceptible to the sense organ which is to grasp that attribute. Śrīharṣa proposes that this is a necessary rule. Wherever indirect relation is to apply, the quality to be revealed must *always* exist in a locus which can be grasped by the sense organ in question. He allows only one exception to this rule, and that is in the perception of an absence of a particular quality where that absence always resides on a locus which is *never* perceptible to the given sense organ.<sup>36</sup>

Śrīharṣa refutes the contention that experience and memory are to be differentiated and that *anubhūtitva* is universal. He says that Udayana's arguments may be reduced to the following:

- (a) Memory is different from experience.
- (b) Memory is invalid as reveals the past condition of an object and that past state is no longer in existence.

<sup>34</sup> *KKK* (NavJha)

<sup>35</sup> *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, ed. Swāmi Yogīndrānanda (Benares, 1968), 19; *KKK* (NavJha), 150.

<sup>36</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 18–9. See especially its endnote 23.

- (c) The past condition of an object can be recalled as it has in fact been previously experienced.<sup>37</sup>

Now he proceeds to show that Udayana here is guilty of circuitous reasoning, *anyonyāśraya*. The revelation of “pastness” in memory must in fact be a new experience and not memory at all. It is not legitimate to assume that “pastness” has also been previously experienced and is subsequently recalled: *Smaranasya pūrvādhigatārthatayānubhavābhinnatve siddha eva tadbhedasyānyathānupapattya pūrvatāyā api pūrvānubhavagocaratvam siddhyate. Pūrvatāyāḥ pūrvānubhavagocaratve siddhe ca smaranasyādhigatārthatayānubhavābhinnatvam siddhyate.*<sup>38</sup>

We sum up now Śrīharṣa’s views on the definition, *Tatvānubhūtiḥ pramā*. He borrows this definition, advanced by the Naiyāyikas, refutes it by use of Naiyāyika arguments themselves, and reaches first the refutation of the term *tattva*. Then he examines the word *anubhūtitva*. But firstly an understanding of *anubhūtitva* is necessary. He assumes as a first explanation that “experience” is a universal. Then he shows that, in all Indian systems, the fault of *sāmkarya*, mixing up or co-existence of this universal with another universal “memory,” cannot be avoided, because of the very confusing nature of memory and recognition. This purported demonstration of *sāmkarya* is made to extend to all the schools, so that Śrīharṣa’s refutation of the Nyāya definition obtains the aura of finality and completeness which it would otherwise not have had. Such an air of finality removes any doubt that even if the

<sup>37</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 21.

<sup>38</sup> Only once it has been established that memory is distinct from experience because it reveals only those objects which have been previously known, can one assume that “pastness” has also been previously known, in order to account for that distinction. But only when it has been proved that “pastness” is the object of a previous knowledge can it be said that memory differs from experience because it reveals only those objects which have been previously known. Śrīharṣa now closes with the statement that since it is the Naiyāyika’s own contention that all memory does in fact reveal the past state of an object. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* 574. See Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 21–22.



Naiyāyika were wrong, one of Śrīharṣa's other opponents might be correct or that validity might be capable of being so defined by the Mīmāṃsaka, Buddhist or Jain. This removes the Mīmāṃsakas, Buddhists and Jains from the scene. If the aforesaid doubt remained, Śrīharṣa would fall short of demonstrating his main contention, "*sarvāṇi lakṣaṇāṇy anupapannāni*," "no definition is possible in any school of philosophy." For the sake of simplicity, Śrīharṣa has already dispensed with the Buddhist and Jain interpretations of recognition and then illustrated the co-existence of the universals, "experience" and "memory," in Mīmāṃsaka doctrines.

He is now free to find this same fault on Naiyāyikas—the last in the list of opponents—and disproving them automatically proves also that recognition can never be considered as experience alone. In the process Śrīharṣa has also denies the applicability of "*sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā*" as a cause of recognition, destroying Udayana's improvement upon his predecessor's doctrines. Similarly, he denies also any validity of Vācaspati's explanations of the rise of recognition, refutes the possibility of doubt as the Naiyāyikas understand it, and demolishes the Prābhākara notion of error. The discussion of "experience" as a universal has been very complex in Śrīharṣa's *KKK*. We have merely touched a few aspects of it and drawn a general conclusion about the process. It can be called a masterpiece of logic and organization, of course from the negative point of view.

Again, he follows the same tactic of extending the attack to as many systems as possible. He passes the discussion now to the second alternative, that is, that "experience" means "being devoid of a quality, 'memory'." Now Śrīharṣa finds it easy to refute this alternative by showing that this attribute of "being devoid of 'memory' (*smṛtitvarahitātva/smṛtitvābhāva*) must still exist in memory. The definition *smṛtitvābhāvo eva yatra sānubhūtiḥ*, "experience is that knowledge in which there exists an absence of the general attribute, 'memory'." Naturally, as a definition of experience, it has been overextended, and is untenable, because it has slightly modified the definition by addition of *eva*. This addi-

tion has eliminated the possibility that the presence of the quality ‘memory’ also exists in the locus of the concept.

Discussion of the second interpretation of “experience” as “being devoid of the general attribute ‘memory’” concludes on pages 200 to 204 of *KKK*.<sup>39</sup> It remains another superb example of how Śrīharṣa uncovers the absurdities or assumed absurdities in the Naiyāyika doctrines. Śrīharṣa’s reply to all this hinges upon the notion of Vācaspati Mīśra and Udayana discussed earlier that a presence (*bhāva*) and an absence (*abhāva*) are mutually negating (*parasparānātma*).

Now he goes on to refute the third alternative of experience as an attribute being devoid of the defining marks of memory, then the next definition (of Udayana) *Sāpekṣajñānam smṛtiḥ*, “Memory is dependent knowledge,” then the second definition of valid knowledge, *yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*, “Valid knowledge is an experience which corresponds with its object,” then the third definition of valid knowledge, *samyakparicchittiḥ pramā*, “Valid knowledge is complete experience,” then the fourth definition of valid knowledge, *Avyabhicāryānubhavaḥ pramā*, “Valid knowledge is unflinching experience” as endorsed by Udayana,<sup>40</sup> Vācaspati Mīśra,<sup>41</sup> and Jayantabhaṭṭa,<sup>42</sup> and then a similar definition given by Vādidevāsuri’s, *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*,<sup>43</sup> namely, *Jñānasya prameyāvvyabhicāritvam prāmānyam*, “The validity of knowledge is its unflinching with respect to its own object,” and then the fifth definition of the Naiyāyikas, *Avisamvādyānubhavaḥ pramā*, “valid knowledge is undisputed experience.”<sup>44</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *KKK* (NavJha)

<sup>40</sup> *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, 266.

<sup>41</sup> *Ṭīkā*, 24; *KKK* (NavJha), 186–87.

<sup>42</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 12.

<sup>43</sup> *Sūtra* no.18, 3

<sup>44</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 231. This is the definition of the *Tarkābhāṣa* of Keśava Mīśra, 37; the *Aṣṭaśatī* and *Aṣṭasahasrī*, 171; the *Siddhivinīścaya*, 146; Akalaṅka’s *Granthatrayī*, 14; the *Syādvādaratnākara*, 251;

This concludes Śrīharṣa's refutation of definitions of *pramā*.

In review, the first definition, *tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*, was refuted by showing: (1) that *tattva*, as the Naiyāyika defines it, is by his very admissions meaningless; (2) that *anubhūtitva*, "experience," cannot be a universal, again by the Nyāya doctrine that *sāmkarya*, co-existence, must be avoided; (3) *anubhūtitva* also cannot be anything else the Naiyāyika has offered as *abhāva*, and absence, may refer to *anyonyābhāva*, a reciprocal absence as well as to *samsargābhāva*, a relational absence. Every attempt made to distinguish these two types of absences fails by the Naiyāyika's own rule of an absence and its counterpositive as *parasparānātma*, "mutually negating," or by his insistence that an absence cannot take an absolute fiction as its counterpositive, etc.<sup>45</sup>

In the same vein, *Yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā* is also refuted as being contradictory to Udayana's assertion that a single instance of knowledge can be both valid and invalid, and that a definition, for validity, can never be underextended or overextended but must exhibit *samavyāpti*, that is, equal extension. Śrīharṣa considers still another Naiyāyika definition, *Samyakparicchittiḥ pramā*, too, violates the same rule and is contrary to the Naiyāyika requirement of *tarka* (hypothetical/dialectical reasoning), *ādhāryasamśaya* (wilfully assumed doubt), and *ādhāryaviparyaya* (wilfully assumed error). These, he admits, are born of an awareness of all particulars and yet are invalid. Similarly, the definition offered by the Jaina school, *Abādhitānubhūtiḥ pramā*, is refuted directly with a Jaina argument.

In the first chapter of *KKK* are refuted definitions of the instrumental cause, as they appear in the various schools, but these are only a prelude to the destruction of the individual *pramāṇas*, which are the instrumental causes of valid knowledge. This he does thereafter, in a very elaborate fashion. We have discussed the former, in order to have a foretaste of the latter.

This sort of move of argument permits Śrīharṣa to navigate

Bhojavṛtti on the *Yogasūtras*, 4, and the *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.1 and all other Buddhist texts.

<sup>45</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 39.

easily, charged by the propelling force of refutations, through the adversary camp of the Naiyāyikas towards the Bauddha and Jaina camps, although he had moved into the Naiyāyika camp by help of the Bauddhas and Jains.

Śrīharṣa has set up the conditions for dialectic in the introduction of *KKK*. One may say he has also fulfilled these conditions if the interpretations of the *pūrvapakṣa* doctrines given here are correct. For example, one such major reservation with Śrīharṣa's interpretation and refutation of Dharmakīrti is that it appears too facile.

We have so far briefly examined how Śrīharṣa confronts his opponents. He refutes the definitions of the *sadvādins* by using the method of using the thinker or the system against himself or itself, here by illustrating the contradictions implied in other *sadvādin* tenets. He makes use of a wide variety of *pūrvapakṣa* sources, from the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatātparyāṭikāpariśuddhi* and the other works of Udayana, to the texts of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha Miśra, Bhavanātha Miśra, Kumārila, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākāragupta, Dharmottara, and the Jains.

The pattern we may make out of our study highlights the stature of Śrīharṣa as a master of critical argument. We may treat him on two levels. He can (A) specifically refute a given definition through his persistent schoolwork of his opponent's doctrines, or (B) skilfully manipulate a few cardinal principles of his opponents and attack his statements.

This second level has exemplified the following principles:

(1) A definition must carry the same meaning in all cases. (2) A definition must be known in order to accomplish its designed purpose. (3) Relationships of invariable concomitance demand a knowledge of a universal, but (x) as a universal is necessary to establish (y), a definition, then (y) itself becomes superfluous, the aim of the definition being met by (x) alone. The arguments against the definition of valid cognition and

perception are about equally divided. Most are refutations of the type (A) and approximately half are specific in nature.<sup>46</sup>

Whatever we have so far seen is the destructive and refutative part of the Śrīharṣa's work in *KKK*. The stage is thus set for the positive, constructive efforts to establish himself as a committed Advaita Vedāntin. This constructive aspect has been dealt with in the fifth chapter.

#### 4.3. *TARKA* AND THE PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICAL CRITICISM IN *KKK*<sup>47</sup>

In general, *tarka* is reasoning, or hypothetical/conditional/dialectical reasoning. In the course of centuries the number of *pramāṇas* accepted in Indian thought has increased. The reason for the acceptance of *tarka* by some schools as one of them may be said to be the following. The *vyāpti* (universal concomitance) between the middle and major terms yields one the power to jump from the premises to the conclusion. Determining the *vyāpti* is, therefore, also one of the ways in which we attain knowledge. In determining *vyāpti* with the help of *tarka*, one corroborates and serves to facilitate the conclusion of an inference. *Tarka* eliminates doubt, and this contributes to the apprehension of truth and facilitates the *pramāṇas*.

The Nyāya definition of *tarka* may be quoted: It is *avijñātat-vefrthe karaṇopapattitaḥ tattvajñānārtham ūhaḥ tarkaḥ*,<sup>48</sup> “an act of deliberation or really a dialectical act which is meant for the determination of truth by adducing logical grounds in favour of one of the alternative possibilities when the reality is not known in its proper character.” Among the different Indian schools, the Jainas, Rāmānujas and Madhvas have accorded to *tarka* the status of a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Veṅkaṭanātha of the

<sup>46</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 52.

<sup>47</sup> For the discussion that proceeds, I depend very much on Esther Solomon's *Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion*.

<sup>48</sup> *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.40.

Rāmānuja school has shown at length in his *Dinakarī* that *tarka* is a *pramāṇa* and a species of inference.<sup>49</sup> Jayatīrtha, a prominent author of the Madhva school, in his *Pramāṇapaddhati*, has classified inference under two broad heads: (a) inference for establishing a conclusion (*sādhānumāna*), and (b) inference for refutation of the opponent's position (*dūṣaṇānumāna*). He divides the latter into two sub-kinds: (i) for proof of a defect in the argument employed by the opponent (*duṣṭipramitisādhana*) and (ii) *tarka*. The former consists mainly in exposing a fallacy in the opponent's argument, and the latter in answering the objection put forth by the opponent by *reductio ad absurdum*. *Tarka* is thus regarded by Jayatīrtha as a variety of inference for refuting the opponent's position (*dūṣaṇānumāna viśeṣa*). He has defined *tarka* as the (enforced) admission of an undesirable contingency necessitated by the admitting of a particular thing or position (*kasyacid dharmasyāṅgikāre frthāntarasyāpādanam tarkaḥ*).<sup>50</sup> *Tarka* is a species of inference because it gives rise to indirect knowledge by virtue of necessary concomitance, just like the well-known inference of fire from smoke because of the necessary concomitance between smoke and fire. Only here the *probans* or ground (*āpā-daka*) is an assumed one, which would be regarded as a fallacy in the well-known case of inference. Jayatīrtha's contention is that though the actual presence of the *probans* is generally accepted, it ought not to be regarded as the essential requisite of inference.

In his *Ātmatattvaviveka* Udayana has classified *tarka* under five heads: (1) *ātmāśraya*—self-dependence, (2) *itaretarāśraya* (also termed *anyonyāśraya*)—mutual dependence, (3) *cakraka*—vicious circle or argument in a circle, (4) *anavasthā*—vicious infinite series, and (5) *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*—*reductio ad absurdum*, entailing of a contingency.<sup>51</sup> Varadarāja, following Udayana, gives

<sup>49</sup> “*Tarkaś ca dvidivho viṣaya-pariśodhako vyāptigrāhakaś ceti.*” *Dinakarī*, 419; also *Nyāyalīlāvati-Prakāśa*, 518–19.

<sup>50</sup> *Pramāṇapaddhati* of Jayatīrtha (Madras: Modern Printing Works, 1917), 36–37.

<sup>51</sup> *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana, eds. Vindhyesvariprasada Dvivedin and Lakshmana Sastri Dravida (Calcutta: Asiatic Society,

the same classification in his *Tārīkīka-rakṣā* (p.186); and so also Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.40. Viśvanātha has, however, mentioned other varieties of *tarka* as propounded by other logicians, though he himself does not accept these as genuine cases of *tarka*. These are (1) *prathamopasthitatva*, initial presentation, (2) *utsarga*, general rule, (3) *vinigamanāviraḥa*, absence of decisive proof, (4) *lāghava*, parsimony of simplicity, and (5) *gaurava*, complexity or clumsiness. Viśvanātha does not accept these as genuine cases of *tarka* inasmuch as they do not enforce an undesirable consequence, which is an essential characteristic of *tarka*. They have been set forth as instances of *tarka* on the ground of their serving as auxiliaries to an accredited *pramāṇa*. *Tarka* has been used as the symbol of the number six, and the expression *ṣaṭ-tarkī* (six-fold *tarka*) which is widely current in philosophical parlance, is also an indication of the six-fold classification of *tarka*.<sup>52</sup> So there must be a sixth variety of *tarka*, though it is not mentioned by Udayana. We find this sixth variety in Śrīharṣa's *KKK*, that is, *pratibandī* (*tu quoque* or recrimination), though *vyāghāta* (contradiction) is mentioned there instead of *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*.<sup>53</sup> This is not an original formulation of Śrīharṣa's, but only a restatement of that of some adherent of the Nyāya school who perhaps existed some time after Udayana.

We do not find any sort of classification of *tarka* in *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika* and *Tātparyā-Tīkā*. Udayana seems to speak of the five-fold classification for the first time in his *Ātmata-tvaviveka*. It may be mentioned that, though *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*) has been mentioned by Udayana as a variety of *tarka*, this is not logically justifiable as the urging or an undesirable consequence is the general character of *tarka* and so should not be regarded as a special variety of it. Śrīharṣa has therefore stated the first four varieties mentioned by Udayana and

1986), 404.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 404.

<sup>53</sup> *Api cātmāśrayo fnyonyāśrayaś cakrakam vyāghāto fnavasthā pratibandī cety āpādyair bhidyamānā ṣaṭ-tarkīṣyate*, *KKK* Medical Hall Press, p. 704.

completed the list by adding two other varieties, viz. *vyāghāta* (contradiction) and *pratibandī* (*tu quoque*). Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Vādivinoda* (p.19) has given almost the same classification as Udayana's; only he has wisely named the fifth variety *taditarāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* (emergence of an absurdity other than those involved in the cases mentioned before). Perhaps this is what Udayana himself intended. Venkaṭanātha of the Rāmānuja school has followed Udayana, except that he calls perhaps to save the position, the last variety as *kevalāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* (pure *reductio ad absurdum*), though this can hardly be said to be any considerable improvement on the original scheme. In the *Prajñāparitrāṇa*, a work of the Rāmānuja school, *kevalāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* has been divided into two sub-varieties—*virodha* (opposition) and *asambhava* (impossibility)<sup>54</sup> Venkaṭanātha has referred to three other varieties, viz. *pratibandī* (*tu quoque*), *samavacana* (equalization) and *ubhayataḥspāśā* (double noose). Śrīnivāsa, the commentator of the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* refers to two more varieties, viz. *gaurava* (clumsiness) and *lāghava* (parsimony).

Śrīharṣa has referred to five other varieties of *tarka* in addition to the six noticed above. These are (1) *avinigama/vinigamanaviraḥa*, (absence of decisive proof), (2) *utsarga*, (3) *kalpanā-gaurava* (complexity of hypotheses), (4) *kalpanā lāghava* (parsimony of hypothesis), and (5) *anaucitya* (impertinence) or *vaiyatya* (impudence). He seems to regard these as having the same status as *ātmāśraya* and the rest, because they have the general character of *tarka*, namely, *reductio ad absurdum* and because they cannot be included under any of these recognized varieties on account of difference of content.<sup>55</sup> Thus, Śrīharṣa has given eleven varieties of *tarka*. Śaṅkara Miśra in his commentary on the *KKK*

<sup>54</sup> *Prajñāparitrāṇe tu kevalāniṣṭaprasaṅgam eva dvidhā-kṛtya ṣoḍhā tarka uktāḥ. Ātmāśrayaṇam anyonyāśrayaṇam cakrakam tathā, anavasthā virodhaś cāsambhavaś cety amī budhair iti. Nyāyapariśuddhi, 347.*

<sup>55</sup> *Apārepi viṣayabhedāt tarkabhedā ātmāśrayādivan mantum ucitāḥ. Tad yathā avinigamaḥ utsargaḥ kalpanā-gaurava-lāghave cānaucityam ceti. KKK (VitŚās), 717.*



states that these are regarded as additional varieties as they are *tarka-pratirūpaka* (simulators of *tarka*), and not as orthodox instances.<sup>56</sup>

We may now give a brief exposition of these, mainly on the basis of the definitions given by Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa is the first to give a formal exposition of these varieties of *tarka*, though Udayana has before him given the names of the first five varieties.

(1) *Ātmāśraya* (self-dependence): *svasyāfvyavahitāpekṣaṇam ātmāśrayaḥ*.<sup>57</sup>

(2) *Anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence)—*anyonyasyāvvyavahitānyonyāpekṣitvam anyonyāśrayaḥ*.<sup>58</sup>

(3) *Cakraka* (argument in a circle or vicious circle)—*antaritasya tad eva dvayam ātmāśrayo fnyonyāśrayaś cakrakam*.<sup>59</sup>

(4) *Anavasthā* (vicious infinite series)—*upapādyopa-pādakapravāhofnavadhīr anavasthā*<sup>60</sup>—The continuity of the series of *probans* and *probandum* or of ground and consequent without limit constitutes the vicious infinite series. If this continuity is endorsed by the accredited *pramāṇas*, it ceases to be vicious, and can be called a legitimate (*pramāṇikī*) infinite series. Śrīharṣa has spoken of two infinite series—*regressus ad infinitum* (*adhodhāvanti anavasthā*) and *progressus ad infinitum* (*ūrdhvam dhavanti anavasthā*).<sup>61</sup>

(5) *Tadītarāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* or *Kevalāniṣṭa-prasaṅga*—all cases of *reductio ad absurdum* other than these, viz. acceptance of what is not supported by proof and rejection of what is supported by logical proof—which is the general character of all *tarka*.

(6) *Vyāghāta* (contradiction)—*viruddha-samuccayo*

<sup>56</sup> *Tarkapratirūpakatvena f bhimatānām utsargādinām khaṇḍanam abhidhātum svarūpam ādarśayati*. Śaṅkara Mīśra's commentary on *KKK* (VitŚās), 718.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 705.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 706.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 707–08.

*vyāghātaḥ*.<sup>62</sup> It consists in the admission of two mutually opposed attributes in one entity at one time, for example, My mother is barren.

(7) *Pratibandī* (*tu quoque* argument)—*Svābhyupagata-doṣa-tulyatā pratibandī*.<sup>63</sup> This arises when the arguer does not refute the objection pertaining to an undesired contingency raised by the opponent but ascribes the same consequence to the opponent.

Śrīharaṣa refers to a striking example of *pratibandī* in the *Nyāya-Vārttika* of Uddyotakara. The Naiyāyika contends that a positive effect inheres in its material cause, and thus the material cause must exist in the antecedent moment and also in the moment in which the effect is produced.

(8) *Avinigama* or *Vinigamanāviraha* (absence of decisive proof)—*Vikalpenānvayāvagamayogye ekasminnabhyupagate tadekadeśānvaya-niyama-nirdhāraṇāśakyatvam avinigamaḥ*.<sup>64</sup>

(9) *Utsarga* (general rule of empirical induction)—*Bādhulyadr̥ṣṭam apeksya bāhulyadr̥ṣṭatayā durbalasyāfnupagamārhatotsargaḥ*.<sup>65</sup>

(10) *Apavāda* (exception)—This is the reverse of *utsarga*. It is found mentioned as a variety of *tarka* in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* alone, where also it is not explained.

(11-12) *Gaurava* (complexity) and *lāghava* (simplicity or parsimony)—*Sugamāsugamayor asugamadurbalatvam kalpanā gauravam...dūṣaṇānukūlam idam tadvyatirekeṇa kalpanā-lāghavam sādhanānukūlam*.<sup>66</sup>

(13) *Prathamopasthitatva* (initial presentation) which was regarded as a variety of *tarka* by some logicians as can be seen from the statement of Viśvanātha in his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* 1.1.40,

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 705.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 706.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 718.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 719. Cf. *Vādivinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra (Prayaga: Śyāmārām Samskr̥ta Granthāvali, Indian Press, 1915), 38.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 721.

seems to be the same as *upasthitīkṛta-lāghava* though it might have been more general in character.

(14) *Vaijātya* (impudence) or *Anaucitya* (impertinence)—*Prāmāṇikāvyaavahāryatvam asamādheyajātīyam anaucityam vaijātyanāmakam*.<sup>67</sup>

(15) *Samavacana* (equalization)—This is similar to *pratibandī* with this difference that whereas *pratibandī* consists in the allegation of the same or similar fault in the opponent's position as has been urged by the latter against the proponent, *samavacana* rests on the claim of a similar advantage.

(16) *Ubhayataḥspāśa* (double noose or dilemma)—When an argument is shown to involve the opposite by impaling it on the horns of a dilemma, the result is said to be achieved by the application of this variety or *tarka*.<sup>68</sup>

(17) *Atiprasaṅga* (absurdity of over-extension)—This argument urging an absurdity is employed from very early times.

We may, after studying the different varieties of *tarka*, note briefly the conditions of a valid *tarka* as derived from these. These conditions are: (i) positive concomitance of the ground (*āpādaka*) and the consequent (*āpādya*), (ii) absence of rebuttal by a contradictory *tarka*, (iii) *tarka* must result in the proof of the opposite (*viparyaye paryavasānam*), (iv) the consequence entailed by *tarka* must be an undesirable contingency, and (v) the *tarka* employed must not be favourable to the proof of the opponent's thesis.<sup>69</sup> The default of any of these five conditions gives rise to five faults leading to *tarka* becoming *tarkābhāsa* (simulation of *tarka*). These are termed (i) *mūlaśaithilya* (lack of logical

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 721–22.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 530.

<sup>69</sup> *Ātmāśrayādi-bhedena tarkaḥ pañcavidhaḥ smṛtaḥ, aṅga-pañcaka-sampannas tattvajñānāya kalpate. Vyāptis tarkāfprathihatir avasānam viparyaye, aniṣṭānanukūlatve iti tarkāṅga-pañcakam. aṅgānyatama-vaikalye tarkasyāfbhāsātābhavet.*

*Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadarāja, ed. Vindhyesvariprasād Dvivedin (Benares, 1903), 186–87; also *Nyāyasāra* on *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, 348–50.

sanction or weakness at the root, that is to say, in respect of the basic condition), (ii) *mitho-virodha* (mutual contradiction). (iii) *viparyayā[pariyavasāna* (failure to culminate in the proof of the opposite), (vi) *iṣṭāpādana* (urging or proving of an issue acceptable to the opponent), and (v) *anukūlatva* (being conducive to the proof of the opponent's thesis).<sup>70</sup>

These are the faults or fallacies of pure *tarka* (*aniṣṭa-prasaṅga* which is also called *taditarāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* or *kevalāniṣṭaprasaṅga*).<sup>71</sup>

We may now consider briefly the fallacies of the different varieties of *tarka*. The absence of the fundamental character of each makes them *tarkābhāsas* (fallacious *tarkas*).

(1) *Ātmāśrayābhāsa*—If, when the fault of *ātmāśraya* is urged, a thing is found not to depend upon itself but upon a thing of the same class, it becomes a case of *ātmāśrayābhāsa*.

(2) *Anyonyāśrayābhāsa*: The charge of *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence) becomes false when there is a difference of individuals.

(3) *Cakarakābhāsa*: A *cakraka* is vicious when the argument moves in a circle and culminates in showing that the cause and

<sup>70</sup> *Mithovirodha-mūlaśaithilyeṣṭāpādanāfnukūlatva-viparyayāfpariyavasānais tarkābhāsatvāt. Āmatattvaviveka* of Udayana, eds. Vindhyesvariprasada Dvivedin and Lakshmana Sastri Dravida (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1986), 246. See also *Tārkikarakāṣā*, 188–90, 348–50.

<sup>71</sup> *Atra vyāptyādyekaika-vaikalyena kevalāniṣṭa-prasaṅgābhāsa-pañcakam udāhriyate. Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, 348.

It can be seen that the fallacies of *tarka* as also the conditions of a valid *tarka* are allied to those of inference and this explains why some logicians (Mādhvas, Rāmānujas, Śrīdhara) included *tarka* under inference (*anumāna*). Only the *bādhita hetvābhāsa* (contradicted probans) cannot have a direct parallel in *tarka* as in the latter the consequent (*āpādya*) entailed by the ground (*āpādaka*) must be absent in the subject, otherwise it would not operate as a *reduction ad absurdum*. The orthodox Naiyāyika has emphasized this difference between *anumāna* and *tarka* which he regards as fundamental.

the effect, the locus and the content, the subject and the object are identical.

(4) *Anavasthābhāsa*: When the infinite series is legitimate (*prāmāṇikī*) the charge that it is vicious becomes a case of *anavasthābhāsa*.

(5) *Aniṣṭaprasaṅgābhāsa*: We have discussed five (according to some, six) varieties of faults of *tarka* in general.

(6) *Vyāghātābhāsa*: Contradiction is a very effective weapon of refutation.

(7) *Pratibandhyābhāsa*: The *pratibandī* (*tu quoque*, recrimination) becomes an *ābhāsa* (simulation) when the objection urged by the opponents is shown to be untenable.

(8) *Aviṅgama* or absence of decisive proof will come to be fallacious if such proof can be shown to be available.

(9) *Utsarga* or general rule can be set aside by the discovery of a contrary instance, and

(10) *Apavāda* if it is shown to be only an apparent one not really serving as an exception to the *utsarga*.

(11-12) *Gaurava* is not a defect if it is shown to be logically necessary, and *lāghava* is no merit if it is found to be inadequate and based on insufficient data.

(13) *Prathamopasthitatva* is of no avail if the thing thought of is not found to be logically valid or necessary.

(14) *Anaucitya* or *vaiyātya* cannot be alleged if the series of queries is backed by a spirit of honest inquiry.

(15) *Samavacana* will be ineffectual if the claim of equal advantage is shown to be false.

(16) *Ubhayataḥ-spāśa* can be shown to be an *ābhāsa* if the alternatives are not opposed to each other, or if the predicates of the alternative propositions are repugnant to our logical sense.

(17) *Atiprasaṅga* can be shown to be an *ābhāsa* (simulation) if some criterion or determining principle can be demonstrated.

We have seen that the varieties of *tarka*, viz. *ātmāśraya*, etc. other than *kevalāniṣṭa-prasaṅga* are somewhat different in character from *tarka* as recognized in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, and it is these that were not readily admitted in works on logic. We find four

of these varieties—*ātmāśraya*, *anyonyāśraya*, *cakraka*, *anavasthā* systematically mentioned along with *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga* by Udayana and that too in his *Ātmatattva-viveka* (p.404) while discussing how the invariable concomitance between a thing being a product (*kāryatva*) and having a creator (*sakarīṭkatva*) can be incontestably determined.

#### 4.3.1. *Prasaṅga* and *Vitaṇḍā*: The Pattern of Reduction

The form of hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) which Nāgārjuna uses is called *prasaṅgāpādāna*. It is essentially a hypothetical supposition or an imposition of the *āpādaka* (consequent) necessitated by the imposition of the *āpādya* (ground) in a subject, but it does not genuinely assume in its presuppositional ground any necessary relation between the ground and the consequent. For by using *prasaṅga* or *reductio* the debater can show that if the opponent accepts a *pramāṇa*, say P, then the logical consequence of P will either be inconsistent with P (directly or indirectly) or it will be patently absurd.<sup>72</sup> Candrakīrti states in the *Prasannapāda* that the conclusion of the *prasaṅgāpādāna* is simply negative and Nāgārjuna has largely used this method to refute his opponent's theses by drawing absurd implications from them.<sup>73</sup>

*Prasaṅgāpādāna* of Nāgārjuna and the variety of reasoning (*tarka*) called *pratibandī*, (not *pratibandhī*) enunciated by Śrīharṣa bear similarities to each other. This is a type of 'tu quoque' (recrimination) reasoning, which consists in the counter-allegation of the same or similar defect against the opponent by the proponent. Satkari Mookerjee thinks that the *prasaṅgāpādāna* can be included under *pratibandhī*, a variety of *tarka* enunciated by older Naiyāyikas, we do not know whether any of the older Naiyāyikas had enunciated *pratibandhī*. The apprehension or doubt (*śaṅkā*) is called *pratibandhikā*, but it causes *prasaṅgānumāna*.

<sup>72</sup> Ramendranath Ghose, *The Dialectics of Nāgārjuna* (Allahabad: Vohra Publishers, 1987), 214.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

Udayana had classified reasoning (*tarka*) under five heads in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, namely,

1. Self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*)
2. Mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*)
3. Vicious circle (*cakraka*)
4. The vicious infinite (*anavasthā*)
5. *Reductio ad absurdum* (*aniṣṭaprasaṅga*)

Śrīharṣa has added *pratibandī* (not *pratibandhī*) as the sixth variety in his *KKK*. He gave a powerful defence of Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* method in the Advaita Vedānta tradition. He boldly proclaimed himself a *vaitaṇḍika*, supporter of *vitaṇḍā*, for which Nāgārjuna is blamed. He did not agree with the *pramāṇavādins* that the belief in a *pramāṇa* system must be a pre-condition for a debate. He resolved the platitude of the *pramāṇavādins* into four possible meanings in the beginning of his *KKK*, and rejects them altogether. He said that the "Mādyamikas did enter into serious philosophic debates despite their refusal to admit the existence of a *pramāṇa* system."<sup>74</sup> The four alternative meanings of the platitude, which he rejects one by one, are as follows:

- (1) that debaters who do not admit a *pramāṇa* system are unable to start a debate, or
- (2) that *pramāṇa* are directly related to the debate as cause to the effect, or
- (3) that it is the practice of all people and philosophers alike first to accept a system of *pramāṇas* and then to enter a philosophic debate, or
- (4) that without the acceptance of *pramāṇas* and logical fallacies, the twin goal of a debate, namely, the establishment of truth and determination of victory, will never be achieved.<sup>75</sup>

The justification of adding *pratibandī* as a variety of reasoning lies in the distinction between *prasaṅgānumāna* (*reductio ad*

<sup>74</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 6-8. Also, Ghose, *Dialectics of Nāgārjuna*, 216.

<sup>75</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 6; Ghose, *Dialectics of Nāgārjuna*, 217.

*absurdum*) and *prasaṅgāpādana*. Although *aniṣṭaprasaṅga* is recognized to be a specific variety of reasoning by Udayana, it is rather the general character of all other types of reasoning as being a form of *reductio ad absurdum* in each case. *Pratibandī* is distinguished from the general form of reasoning called *reductio ad absurdum*. Śrīharṣa made counter-allegation against the *pramāṇavādins* that the admission of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) leads to infinite regress. He said, ‘If reasoning is supposed to be based upon invariable concomitance, a dilemma is inevitable. The dilemma is: If it is provisionally accepted that reasoning is based upon invariable concomitance, it leads to infinite regress. If, on the contrary, the invariable concomitance is not provisionally accepted, the reasoning would be a mere simulation, the ground of reasoning being weak in the case.’<sup>76</sup> He means to say that acceptance of the existence of necessary relation does not follow from the provisional acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of invariable concomitance for the sake of reasoning.

#### 4.3.2. Debate Theory (*Vitaṇḍā*) and Informal Logic (*Tarka*)

Śrīharṣa’s interest at the beginning of the *KKK* is to disprove the Nyāya theory of debate, which has always maintained that in virtue of the act of participation in a debate, some specific epistemological and ontological positions may be presumed. But at the end of *KKK* chapter 1 and also at the end of chapter 4, the Advaitin examines details of this informal logic (*tarka*) of Nyāya and its debate theory (dialectic, of which the negative side is *vitaṇḍā*).<sup>77</sup>

In both the chapters, the larger issue is the whole Advaita/Nyāya controversy itself, whether one or the other may be said to be the acceptable position and on what grounds. In the first chapter, informal fallacies (*hetvābhāsas*) are taken up in order to show that any characterizations of them are incoherent insofar as they presuppose distinctness. Moreover, as he takes to pieces

<sup>76</sup> Ghose, *Dialectics of Nāgārjuna*, 217.

<sup>77</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 418-509 and 710-51.



what he calls the fallacious armaments, he makes his position safer, as none of these arguments could be used against the eminently Advaita positions. In that chapter he introduces the issue of how an inference-grounding pervasion (*vyāpti*) is known through dialectical reasoning. In the fourth and final chapter, dialectical reasoning, *tarka* is addressed again apparently as key to a wide range of Naiyāyika rejoinders. One thing to be admitted is this: anyone who has laboured through Śrīharṣa's cogitations in *KKK* would admit that the Advaitin is a master of *tarka*. Not only is he adept at applications, he even slips in several positive contributions to Logic's *tarka* theory at the end of *KKK*.

All through the reading of the variety of negative applications (*vitaṇḍā*) of informal logic in *KKK* one can only continually wonder what Śrīharṣa aims for his own dialectic to finally prove. Nevertheless, the types of dialectical reasoning that he identifies and explains are close to his heart: Śrīharṣa is fully cognizant that his refutations throughout his entire text involve identifying as faulty the logical patterns that Logicians talk about, whether they be informal fallacies, objectionable objections, or other censurable errors of debate. This includes the specific kinds of *tarka* (vicious regress, etc.) mentioned by Udayana or an anonymous Naiyāyika. And all *tarka*, dialectical reasoning, involves showing a fallacy in the opponent's views and also in any similar alternative view. That is, Śrīharṣa is opposed to any theory according to which fallacies have ontological underpinnings. He is particularly opposed to the Nyāya ontological understanding of pervasion, *vyāpti*. Other examples are replete in the text of *KKK*. The aim is simple: to establish that, if all possible particularistic or nihilistic alternative views are beset with fallacies, the only feasible conclusion is self-luminous Brahman-consciousness!

The arguments that Śrīharṣa voices are responsible for three important effects: (1) emergence of attempts of self-defence from the Advaita camp equipped with evolving Navya-Nyāya techniques, (2) on the Navya-Nyāya camp, a spree of massive revamping and sharpening attempts on their own defining techniques and concepts, (3) attempts at popularization of many of

these techniques among the masses and the literati of all persuasions, for example, his own *mahākāvya*, the *NC*, packed with philosophical allusions and covert and overt attacks on rival philosophical schools.

A stock example that both Śrīharṣa and Gaṅgeśa cite is that of a tree as simultaneously both qualified and not qualified by a monkey-conjunction (conjunction, or contact, *samyoga*, is a quality). We are to imagine a monkey in the branches, but not at the tree's roots. A monkey-conjunction and an absence of monkey conjunction do not, however, qualify the tree at precisely the same spot; the incompatibility has to be precisely specified, delimited. Śrīharṣa profits, in his own text, by the difficulty of providing precise specification in various additional cases. The deep issue here is criteria of identity. As is pretty well recognized in much contemporary philosophy, criteria of identity—and of distinctness, as well as of incompatibility—vary for *x* according to what *x* is material object, set, number, person, event, property, etc.

Thus, Advaita is supposed to be the deep alternative to the entanglements of Nyāya. The Upaniṣadic declarations are to be accepted (self-certifyingly) unless they themselves are successfully defeated, and Śrīharṣa's refutations, which may be understood as *tarka*, eliminate putative challengers. We can anyway assert that Śrīharṣa has to a great extent succeeded in distracting attackers of Advaita for a long time to come!

#### 4.4. ŚRĪHARṢA'S DIALECTIC IN GIST

Śrīharṣa's *KKK* ushered in a new phase into Vedāntic discussion. He believes that all duality is *anirvacanīya*, "indefinable." He is not content like his predecessors with the assertion that the world is *anirvacanīya* because it is the product of *avidyā* regarding that nature. He challenges the dualists—especially the Logicians—to produce an invulnerable definition of any logical category and claims to be able to refute it in total. He devised a scheme of dialectic for refuting all the categories of any dualistic system.

Śrīharṣa himself puts in gist what he has thus far done in *KKK*:

*Tattulyohastādīyam ca yojanam viṣayāntare |*  
*Śrīkhalā tasya Śeṣe ca tridhā bhramati matkriyā ||*<sup>78</sup>

My dialectic moves in three directions:

- a. Hit upon some argument similar to those already advanced to criticize any new definition brought forward by the other party;
- b. or apply one of the criticisms already set forth in this work to other cases where new modes of defence are brought forward by the disputant;
- c. or else, take up any one of the many terms which make up a proposition enounced by the opposite side and begins another criticism of what it denotes on the lines already indicated, and when the opponent has exhausted his resources of an argument on that point, take to the examination of another concept in the same manner. It goes without saying that this species of dialectics leads the disputants nowhere and that is just what hyper-criticism aims at.

Śrīharṣa's contention is that Advaita need not be proved inasmuch as it is self-established. Since all items of dualistic systems stand self-condemned, it necessarily follows that Reality is Advaita unaffected by the *anirvacanīya* phenomena.<sup>79</sup>

Śrīharṣa has also formulated the inner meaning and purport of his whole effort in establishing his fundamental thesis in *KKK*:

*Na brūmo vayam na santi pramāṇādīnīti svīkṛtya kathāḥ frabhyeti.*  
*Kinnāma santi na santi vā pramāṇādīnītyasyām cintāyāmudāsīnaiḥ:*  
*yathā svīkṛtya tāni bhavatā vyavahriyate, tathā vyavahāribhireva kathā*  
*pravartyatām iti.*<sup>80</sup>

To translate:

We do not claim that the investigation can begin by accepting the system of validation does not 'exist', but that debate can be embarked upon by topics indifferent to the problem of whether the *pramāṇas*, as such, exist

<sup>78</sup> *KKK* (Yogi), 791.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*; Sarasvatī, *Vedānta-Prakriyā*, 125–26.

<sup>80</sup> *KKK* (Yogi), 11.

or not, and then carry on just as you the admitters of such an existence do.

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad comments:

This is the kernel of his dialectical Advaita. The whole point of splitting the supposed invariable concomitance between the admission of the independently existent world and the admission of the utility of the *pramāṇa* system is not to reject the (possibility of the) existence of that world. It is to show that, given a common acceptance of the *pramāṇas*, he can carry on inquiry and issue claims on the content of his cogitations in precisely the same way as he would have, had he committed himself to the thesis that he had such experience and epistemic activity only because there was an independent world.<sup>81</sup>

Even by use of the “not-so-admittable” *pramāṇas*, it was possible for him to show the existence of an all-encompassing Brahman-sphere of consciousness, for which the particular and the nihilistic interpretations of what we here and now encounter and the *pramāṇas* thereof are, in the end, of least importance!

After having followed the methodological perspectives of Śrīharṣan dialectic in *KKK*, let us study the philosophical aspects, the constructive Advaitic programme and the contradictions involved in the schools of dualism in the following chapter.

<sup>81</sup> Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, *Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-realism* (London: Routledge, 2002), 143.

## CHAPTER 5

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# Structuring Advaita in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*: Philosophical Dimensions

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- 5.1. Harmony of Philosopher, Poet and Mystic in Śrīharṣa
  - 5.2. The Constructive Advaitic Agenda of *KKK*
    - 5.2.1. The Theses: *Svaprakāśa* (Self-illumination), *Svataḥ-prāmānya* (Self-certification) and *Trikālābādhitatva* (Non-sublatibility in the Three Tenses)
    - 5.2.2. *Śruti*: Scripture as the Only Pointing Dictum
    - 5.2.3. Self-luminous Cognition Results in Advaitic Idealism
    - 5.2.4. *KKK* on the Problem of Proof for Non-duality
    - 5.2.5. The Indeterminability of the Universe of Plurality
    - 5.2.6. The Absolute Based on an Ontological Argument
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### 5.1. HARMONY OF PHILOSOPHER, POET AND MYSTIC IN ŚRĪHARṢA

Śrīharṣa's extant works are: the philosophic masterpiece, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* ("Dish of Delectable Dialectic," referred to as *KKK*), and the epic poem, the *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (*NC*), the latter being a retelling of the *Mbh* account of King Nala's romantic relationship with Princess Damayantī. Other works written by the poet Advaitin are mentioned in Chapter two under the head, 'Works of Śrīharṣa'.

The little we know about Śrīharṣa's life originates directly from either the *KKK* or *NC*, except for a few probably apocryphal stories in Sanskrit commentaries. A particularly famous story is of Udayana and Śrīharṣa's father, a story that D. C. Bhattacharya opines to be true. According to Bhattacharya, the *NC* commentator Cāṇḍū Paṇḍita (*ca.* AD 1300), states that Śrīharṣa's father Śrīhīra was defeated by Udayana in a public debate. Then Śrīhīra prayed to goddess Durgā for a son to avenge him.<sup>1</sup> The *NC* colophons do also refer to Śrīharṣa's father, Śrīhīra, and his mother Māmalladevī as well.

Śrīharṣa states in the final sentence of the *KKK*—before the colophon or signature verse—that he received patronage from King of Kānyakubja—Vijayacandra (AD 1155–69) or his son and successor, Jayacandra (AD 1169–94). The exact location of the kingdom is disputed. Concerning the place of birth and activity of Śrīharṣa there is much dispute, for example, Phyllis Granoff favours Kashmir as the place of activity, that is, Śrīharṣa may have been a Kashmiri, since Mammaṭa the author of *Kāvya prakāśa* is supposed to have been Śrīharṣa's uncle;<sup>2</sup> D. C. Bhattacharya

<sup>1</sup> D.C. Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā* (Darbahanga: Mithila Institute, 1958), 50–51.

<sup>2</sup> "He [Śrīharṣa] is believed to have been the nephew of Mammaṭa, the author of the *Kāvya prakāśa*. After having composed the *Naiṣadhacarita* in 100 cantos, Śrīharṣa showed it to his uncle, who looked into it and remarked: 'What a pity you did not show this to me before I wrote the seventh chapter of my *Kāvya prakāśa*', where I have

speculates that Śrīharṣa lived in Bengal, since some Bengali words appear in the text and because he has authored a work titled *Gauḍorvīśakulaprasāsti* that describes the kings of Gaur, which was the ancient capital of the kingdom of Bengal.<sup>3</sup> As with many other great names of the classical civilization, there is little clear evidence on the issue.

The most reliable internal evidence about Śrīharṣa's life in the *KKK* is the final sentence: “*Tāmbūladvayamāsanam ... tasyābhyudīyādiyam,*” which is translated:

(Now ends) this work produced for the delight of the learned by the esteemed Śrīharṣa, who from Lord of Kanyākubja receives a seat of honour and a pair of betel leaves, who knows immediately in highest meditations the supreme Brahman, the ocean of bliss, whose poetry is a shower of sweetness, and whose pronouncements on reasonings have brought opponents to ruin.<sup>4</sup>

Thus Śrīharṣa declares himself to have accomplished mystic awareness of Brahman, the Absolute. The word translated as “highest meditations” is in fact ‘highest contemplation,’ *samādhi* (in the plural), as is meant in works of yoga of consciousness for mystic trance, a term used by several schools.<sup>5</sup>

This claim of ultimate contemplative experience is akin to a summary statement that he makes in the middle of the *KKK*: *Tad idam etābhir ātma-mata-siddha ... naiṣadhacaritasya para-ma-puruṣa-stutau sarge, iti eṣā dik.*<sup>6</sup>

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dealt with the defects of poetry! It would have saved me the trouble of hunting for examples of several defects.’ Being dejected by this severe criticism, the young poet threw away his manuscript in the river, from where his pupils rescued a portion, which is all that has come down to us in the shape of the 22 cantos of the *Naiṣadhacarita*.” *KKK* (GanJha), 1:xiv, xv.

<sup>3</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 60n5.

<sup>4</sup> *Tāmbūla-dvayamāsanam*.... *KKK* (NavJha), 754.

<sup>5</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 76.

<sup>6</sup> *KKK* (Yogi), 120, 121.

Therefore, this doctrine of non-duality (*Advaita*), into which you are being led by these arguments that are in accord with the definitions of cogent arguments established in your own school (i.e., Nyāya)—have faith in it, Sir, even though you desire to continue to dally in the sport of (fundamental, spiritual) ignorance (*avidyā*). And after you have faith, just through that faith in the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* you will come to desire to know the supreme spiritual reality (*tattva*). Gradually, with the fluctuations of mentality silenced, you will, just by your own self, directly and immediately experience that reality, a reality that witnesses itself by its own light and surpasses (in delight) the taste of honey. And as I have related in the *Naiṣadhīyacarita*, in the chapter devoted to praise of the supreme person, the mind (*mānasa*), with unsteadiness rejected, plunging into the waters of the immortal nectar of self-reality, comes most easily to delight—this is the gist.<sup>7</sup>

Granoff discusses the difficulties of locating the exact reference for this divine experience within *NC*.<sup>8</sup> However, I would opine with Stephen H. Phillips that the chapter referred to is the twenty-first, containing a long laudative hymn (verse 118) to the “Supreme Person” in his special manifestations or *avatāras*, where, soon after the laudative hymn occurs the only mention of such deep mystical trance. This verse reads: “After had invoked Hari in these words, Nala became complete absorbed in meditation while he did acts in keeping with his love and devotion to Viṣṇu, seen by him in a vision by virtue of contemplation.”<sup>9</sup>

Granoff finds the *KKK* reference to this verse to be troublesome, especially due to its theism after the god Viṣṇu, and perhaps also due to the explicit endorsement of a positive program in the above quote from *KKK*—“this doctrine of non-duality, *Advaita*, into which you are being led by these arguments.” She thinks such theism cannot fit in with her overall *KKK* reading. I would join Phillips in his claim that the primary difficulty here is the mystical element of the Śrīharṣan claim of mystical experience, not

<sup>7</sup> *Tadidam etābhirātmamatasiddha.... KKK* (NavJha), 125.

<sup>8</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 252–54n170.

<sup>9</sup> *Iti udīrya sa harim.... NC*, in all probability, verses 118, 119. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 76.



his theism in the *NC*. It is key to our overall view of his Advaita philosophy. I would personally opine that the impasse here can be solved by having in view the fact that Śrīharṣa attempts explicitly to bring down the *KKK* absolutism to the masses by use of theistic expressions of mystical experience, which is, in fact, only an unavoidable adumbration of the Advaitic absolutistic ideal.

The apparent tension between (a) the theism of the above and other passages and (b) the reputed atheism of Advaita had somehow to be communicated to the rival camps. First, therefore, one needs to present arguments that can lead one to intellectually assent to the Advaitic truth of the *Upaniṣads*. So we first look at the arguments that, according to the Advaitin, should lead the Naiyāyikas and others to accede to the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* non-dualistically interpreted. Śrīharṣa has already assented to the supreme mystical experience that reveals Brahman as non-dual (*advaita*).

The person of Śrīharṣa in *NC* and *KKK* is complete only if sufficient light is shed on his poetic stature. The vehicle he used to carry the logical devices to make the rival accede to the truth of the *Upaniṣads* is poetry. His *NC* is one of the finest accomplishments of world literature: an elegant poem, encyclopedic in its mythological allusions and masterful in its use of poetic figures and rhetorical devices, it brims with the wisdom and sensibility of the classical culture (at a time, moreover, that some have considered its zenith).<sup>10</sup> The *NC* may not have met with universal acclamation among scholars of an earlier generation, some of whom apparently found it distastefully erotic.<sup>11</sup> Within his own culture, Śrīharṣa was urbane in all the best senses of the word, and this is reflected in his superb poem.

<sup>10</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 1–2.

<sup>11</sup> S. K. De writes: “Śrīharṣa is careful ... an impatient Western critic should stigmatize the work as a perfect masterpiece of bad taste and bad style!” Dasgupta and De, *History of Sanskrit*, 328. K. K. Handiqui [*Śrīharṣa’s Naiṣadhacarita* (Poona: Deccan College, 1965)] refuses to render a few verses, flagging them with footnotes, terming it, “indelicate,” e.g., p. 277.

Śrīharṣa's aesthetic negative dialectic is very well expressed through *NC*. In its 17<sup>th</sup> chapter, for example, he discussed a key plot where there is a furious encounter between the *devas* and Kali personified. Kali has been presented as the root cause of all mischief in the world. Śrīharṣa sows the seed of the sequel of the poem dealing with Kali's persecution of Nala. At the outset, he describes the army of Kali consisting of many personified evil spirits such as Lust, Wrath, Avarice, Delusion and so on. Kali's panegyrist, a supporter of Cārvāka philosophy, vilifies the scriptures and religious practices. As a result, he is made tongue-tied by the gods. Kali is also accompanied by his friend Dvāpara on his route to attend the *svayamvara* of Damayantī.

Thus Śrīharṣa uses his *NC* as an aesthetic tool for the introduction of polemics between the traditional gods and the anti-traditionalist Kali. Śrīharṣa, in an attempt to remind Kali's overall presence and vigilance over the happy couple, feels a complete canto inadequate thereto.

Śrīharṣa's negative dialectics can be observed in two layers here. His Advaitic text *KKK* and the last great scholastic Sanskrit epic poem *NC* are the manifestations of these layers. Within *NC* itself there is another narrative layer for the development of this dialectical negative approach. The two mutually conflicting Vedic and non-Vedic traditions help Śrīharṣa establish his approach of negative dialectic. The climax or the second layer of Śrīharṣa's aesthetic Advaita dialectic implicit in the texts of *NC* and *KKK* in toto has to be visualized by reading between the lines of these works.

The *KKK* in itself is not merely a central work relative to the entire span of scholastic Indian philosophy and dialectic, it is also a masterpiece of witty and humorous, but rigorous and argumentative prose style, employing a fund of literary expressions seldom encountered in a philosophical treatise of such serious intent. Śrīharṣa was thus a philosopher who used poetry as a vehicle for philosophizing on the one hand, and on the other hand, thus, succeeded in presenting the Advaitic themes for the masses.

The *KKK* dismantles the Nyāya realist view, from the very

foundations, and the Advaitin in the author demonstrates deep appreciation of Buddhist, Mimāṃsaka, Jaina, Cārvāka, and of course Vedāntic philosophies. Even with the two extant works out of the ten, one marvels at his achievements as a philosopher-poet-*Brahmajñānin!*

## 5.2. THE CONSTRUCTIVE ADVAITIC AGENDA OF KKK

The method Śrīharṣa himself says he follows is *khaṇḍanayukti*. To quote himself from the very end of KKK (from the last sub-heading, ‘*Sārvatrika-khaṇḍana-prakāraḥ*’): *Evam prakārāṇi tattal-lakṣaṇeṣu khaṇḍanāni-ūhanīyāni. Tad-etāsu khaṇḍanayuktiṣu ... khaṇḍanamaye cakre samyag-avadheyam.*<sup>12</sup> To translate: Similar methods of definition can be utilized against other definitions also. Whenever a disputant may proceed to deal with topics other than those which we have treated above, the wise refuter should select any one of the many methods of refutation. And if the disputant presses hard the wisdom of the refuter then should entangle the opponent in the labyrinth of arguments.

Further, he says: *Yena hi tan-nirvāhyate, tad-anirvacanīyatayā-api nirvāhya-anirvacanīyatā-eva. Tasmāt—*

*Tattuly-ohastadīyam ca yojanam viṣayāntare /  
Śṛṅkhalā tasya śeṣe ca tridhā bhramati mat-kriyā //*<sup>13</sup>

To translate: To end, even when further argumentation for refutation is found difficult, and if the refuter can prove the arguments themselves enigmatic (*anirvacanīya*), then this too would lead to reinforce our argument that all things are enigmatic—

Therefore, the method of procedure implemented by us is three-fold: the application of arguments illustrated to the refutation of other topics with essential adaptations, the application of same arguments to other topics, and, as the last resort, to have recourse to a chain of arguments.

<sup>12</sup> KKK (Yogi), 790.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 791.

The term *khaṇḍana-yukti* can be analysed in two ways. In the first we obtain the meaning ‘*khaṇḍanasya-yukti*,’ “(positive, constructive) logic of refutation.” In the next we get *khaṇḍana-yuktiśca*, “refutation and logic (of positive, constructive agenda).” This *khaṇḍana-yukti* or *khaṇḍana-yukti-cakra* has two dimensions: one is the *khaṇḍana* aspect, that is, the negative dialectic refutation of the flaws of the rival camps; and the other the *yukti* aspect, that is, logical reasoning positive affirmation which we call here the constructive agenda of Śrīharṣa.

As per this reading of mine, it is possible to bifurcate the whole chapter into two parts: part 1, namely, the *yukti*-section, which deals with Śrīharṣa’s constructive agenda, containing the logical reasoning for his constructive Advaitic agenda, the theses: *svaprakāśa* (self-illumination), *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (self-certification) and *trikālābādhitatva* (non-sublation), *śruti* as scripture as the only pointing dictum, and Brahman based on the ontological argument; and part 2, the *khaṇḍana*-section dealing with the refutation of the problems of rival schools, like consciousness and theory of justification, “truth” and the “real” (*tattva*), *lakṣaṇas* and differentiating features, the attribution dilemma, universals and distinctness (*bheda*) and their contradictoriness (*bādhitatva*); and also refutation of indirect proof, mystic ways, intuition and trance, and debate theory (*vitaṇḍa*), informal logic (*tarka*), Advaita and theistic voluntarism.

Śrīharṣa has attempted to refute the Buddhist-Naiyāyika points of metaphysical construction. But as an Advaitin he has also a positive philosophic programme. He makes positive and sophisticated Advaita moves to bear out the Advaita world view. He attempts throughout his *KKK* and *NC*, most argumentatively and with utmost poetic verve, to inspire his society with the one Advaitic appeal to awareness: Śrīharṣa’s Advaitic intent is a full-fledged monistic, idealistic attitude of awareness of the Real, self-awareness itself.

To the question regarding the status of Śrīharṣa’s Advaitic agenda, I would, alongside Stephen H. Phillips, and contrary to the claims of the Indologist and *KKK* translator Phyllis Granoff,

propose the answer with an emphatic ‘Yes’. Granoff’s reading seems to have much following among Sanskrit scholars: although Śrīharṣa accepts certain (Advaita) doctrines, he does not argue in support of them, but is content to attack the positions of others, chiefly Naiyāyikas.<sup>14</sup> The crux of *KKK* and *NC* is thus lost or diverted due to lack of sufficient attention to the original texts. As an Advaitin, Śrīharṣa had to and has further the cause of Advaita by his own argumentation to urge acceptance of the philosophy of Advaita and its practice in contemplation. In the initial chapters of *KKK*, the positive programme needed handful of refutations. The various refutations were only a way to establishing the Advaita stance and to inspire the Advaita practice. It was natural therefore for Śrīharṣa to attempt to eliminate all existing challengers to Advaita, especially those that presuppose a fundamental distinctness (*bheda*) in reality, namely, the Naiyāyikas, and the Buddhists who presupposed *śūnyatā*, *vijñāna* etc., in a qualified or unqualified manner, as the ultimate fact. Thus, at one shot, he attains the refutation of the rivals’ challenge to *Śruti*. Now he is in a position to reinforce the Advaita teaching that and practice of the deep reality of non-distinctness only to be discovered mystically in yogic contemplation, in a transformed self-awareness.

It is important to look at details of the refutations, but more important is to review his eliminative patterns of reasoning and positive programme that Śrīharṣa initiates to bear out the Advaita philosophy and experience.

Śrīharṣa tells us that he needs a positive program.<sup>15</sup> For

<sup>14</sup> Granoff’s contention is pervasive, e.g., *Philosophy and Argument*, 54 (“Śrīharṣa ... never independently proves at all”), 111, 203, 226n64. (Maybe he indeed fails to *prove* anything, but he does *argue for* something.) Other scholars too have made this error. For example, Agehananda Bharati, a modern deconstructionist for whom Śrīharṣa stood as something of an idol, practically takes it for granted that the Advaitin’s arguments are solely attacks. See, for instance, his *Ochre Robe* (Santa Barbara: Ross-Erikson, 1988), 237; See also Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 345n14.

<sup>15</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 15. Cf. Granoff’s translation on *Philosophy and*

example, in the opening discussion of the *KKK* on a question of preconditions of debate, he admits some minimal rules, against the Logicians' prerequisites. One such rule is that a winning position would have to be defended by *pramāṇa*, "justifiers" or "reasons" in a broad sense. He does positively offer a full array of Advaita arguments, although he does not give further metaphysical speculations about what the nature of Brahman could possibly be, from the point of view of human reasoning.

### 5.2.1. The Theses: *Svaprakāśa* (Self-illumination), *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (Self-certification) and *Trikālābādhitatva* (Non-sublatibility in the Three Tenses)

As we have pointed out earlier, Śrīharṣa rejects the argument (1) that the *Nyāya-Pramāṇasāstra* with its method of inquiry is to be accepted and (2) that any *Nyāya-Prameyasāstra* position could be understood to be presupposed in the act of debate.<sup>16</sup> Now, what ontological base could be there for us to speak at all? He gives a strong criterion for ontic commitment in presupposition to the very possibility of discourse: the mark of the truly real (or existent, *sat*) is *Trikālābādhitatva*, an absolute non-sublatedness in past, present and future: "That which is not sublated by any manner or means is to be accepted as real."<sup>17</sup> This claim may be taken as part of the non-sublation thesis.

Śrīharṣa proceeds with additional moves concerning preconditions and presuppositions of debate. These opening moves span some thirty-nine paragraphs in *KKK* Śamkara Miśra. He brings in the key thesis of the Advaita understanding of awareness, namely, "self-illuminating," *svaprakāśa*. Now he introduces the epistemo-

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*Argument*, 79 and her discussion in pages 78–81.

<sup>16</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 9. Granoff seems accurate here: Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 76.

<sup>17</sup> *Yatra sarva prakāraiḥ bādhitatvam na asti tad sad iti abhyupagantavyam*. *KKK* (NavJha), 21.

logical key behind it, the thesis that awareness is “self-certifying,” *svataḥ prāmānya*.<sup>18</sup>

He does not argue for it but posits it. The reason behind this self-illumination requirement is that it is basic to the Advaita system. A self-certification principle was essential to Śrīharṣa’s Advaita dialectic. Although perhaps self-certification is to be bootstrapped, Śrīharṣa, at one place, positively argues in support of it. This he does by using the very self-illumination thesis “and an eliminative argument form that presupposes that faults such as inconsistency eliminates views that exhibit them.”<sup>19</sup>

The self-illumination plank blocks doubt concerning self-awareness. The doubt never occurs, ‘Am I aware or not?’<sup>20</sup> Then Śrīharṣa argues that awareness is self-certifying because it is self-illuminating. As he observes, “Nor does the opposite awareness, ‘I am not aware,’ occur. And finally, (where no awareness occurs) the veridical cognition (‘I am not aware’) never occurs’.”<sup>21</sup> Śrīharṣa sums up, awareness itself is, then, the only ground relevant to any question about awareness itself, its existence or its nature. But this self-awareness is not merely a personal one, which limits its scope. It is universal. Self-certification is therefore grounded in self-illumination based on the universal.

So, the issue Śrīharṣa concludes to is this: the Advaitin is investigating not whether awareness is self-aware, but whether self-awareness is *known* to be veridically cognized, and whether there is certification. To quote Stephen H. Phillips:

His argument may be reconstructed as follows. From the perspective of an inquirer, i.e., someone wondering whether self-awareness is veridical

<sup>18</sup> KKK, 1:66/44.

<sup>19</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 78–79.

<sup>20</sup> KKK (NavJha), 44. Stephen H. Phillips adds: “This statement of Śrīharṣa echoes a famous passage within Śaṅkara’s *Brahmasūtrabhaṣya*, *BrŚSB* I.1.1: *Sarvo hy ātma astitvam pratyeti, na ‘na aham asmi’ iti.*” “Everyone cognizes the existence of self; no one thinks ‘I am not’.” Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 346n21.

<sup>21</sup> KKK (NavJha), 44.

or not (this is an epistemic perspective), there are five possibilities: (1) doubt (“Am I aware or not?”), (2) awareness of the absence of awareness (i.e., the non-veridical awareness, “I am not aware,” when the person is aware), (3) non-occurrence of awareness, (4) awareness of the occurrence of awareness when there is no awareness (another non-veridical awareness), and (5) veridicality. The first four candidates are ruled out by the fact of the inquirer’s awareness. Thus veridicality—here to be understood as self-veridicality—is the only standing possibility. It is not eliminated because it is not contradicted by something else we accept as true.<sup>22</sup>

Śrīharṣa imagines a Naiyāyika opponent as his adversary, in the text immediately following the eliminative argument. This eliminative Naiyāyika method is called *tarka* (“hypothetical/dialectical reasoning (aimed at eliminating alternative views)”) by the Naiyāyika. He augments the Advaita position by trying to show by *tarka* the inadequacy of a Nyāya alternative view of awareness.

The floorboard of the Nyāya realism that stands most directly in opposition to the Advaita view of awareness as self-illuminating is a theory of apperception (*anuvyavasāya*). A previous awareness is known by becoming the object of an immediately subsequent awareness. Now this theory has, like the Advaita alternative, a complement concerning justification, known as *parataḥ pramāṇa*, “extrinsic certification.” Śrīharṣa seems to be claiming that there is really nothing to say in defence of self-illumination. What we can do is to eliminate the obstacles in the way of someone viewing it directly. Thus self illumination entails self-certification. Now, by showing that either “extrinsic certification” or “apperception” is absurd, the Naiyāyika may automatically be led into seeing for himself the truth of the Advaita view of awareness, for a transition from self-illumination to self-certification is instantaneous here. All the contrary Nyāya views lead to an infinite regress. The context would invite further questioning.

It is significant that Śrīharṣa’s primary concern is certification for self-awareness, not justification for the worldly content

<sup>22</sup> *Tena jijñāsitasya.... Ibid.*



of an awareness, such as, say, a pot. “There would be no epistemologically relevant sight of objects if perception were not self-certifying.”<sup>23</sup> Śrīharṣa amplifies his attack, but, in order to arrive at his positive programme, his next important move is to return to the self-illumination thesis: *Prakāśa-ātmatā-mātrasya eva svataḥ-siddhi-sambhave jaḍa-ātmanām dharmāṇām keṣām api tad-antarbhāva-anupapatti*, “Since it is only what is of the nature of illumination (that is, awareness itself that can possibly stand as self-certifying, there is no possibility that awareness can include within its own nature any property whatsoever of a material or inconscient sort [*jaḍātmanām*]).”<sup>24</sup> That is, consciousness has no material attributes.

Awareness self-certifyingly illumines itself but not anything else. That is, awareness as such has no proper object. But why not external objects? Śrīharṣa shows they cannot be. Here Śrīharṣa has in mind (a) the well-known Advaita sublatability argument, which is part of the sublation theme, and perhaps also (b) the problem of relations, which we today call “the Bradley problem/Regress.”<sup>25</sup> In the true sense, that is, in the sense of ultimate fact, external objects cannot be self-certifyingly illuminated because any external object is incapable of being object of the highest consciousness, and because any presentation of an external object is sublutable, that is, possibly shown to be experientially non-veridical. And self-illumination of awareness itself is non-sublatable. “Thus there is an Advaita twist to the self-certification thesis: whereas all awareness may be *prima facie* self-certifying, only self-awareness is *ultima*

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 45–48. “*Sā iyaṃ apratyakṣa-upalambhasya na artha-dṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati*,” literally, “perception of objects would not be established as valid (i.e., as epistemologically relevant) for one whose perception is not perceptually given.”

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>25</sup> I have dealt with the Bradley Problem/Regress in the Conclusion of this work under the subtitle: “2. Indian Lineage of Deconstructive Absolutism: The Śrīharṣa Chapter.”

*facie* self-certifying, for all content other than self-illumination is sublatale, negatable.”<sup>26</sup>

Further, any objective content other than self-transparent ultimate awareness would entail a duality. Thus a relation between awareness and its object is in itself incoherent. So it requires a further relation between it and its relata, which in its turn moves on *ad infinitum*.

Thus the self-certification principle is applied differently to each of the following: (1) the self (or awareness) as it is in itself and (2) cognitions with worldly content. The two tiers are differentiated according to sublatability (and defeasibility): the self as it is in itself is non-sublatable (and, as transparent to itself, not subject to the relation regress), whereas any cognition with worldly content is sublatale (and also rationally defeasible, as shown by the relation regress). This additional criterion of sublatability/defeasibility is what distinguishes Śrīharṣa’s understanding of self-certification from that of the Exegetes (Mīmāṃsakas).<sup>27</sup>

Contrary to the Nyāya stance, Mīmāṃsakas hold the *svataḥ pramānya* principle as the cornerstone of a world-oriented epistemology. An awareness, for example, of a pot, is self-certifying; certification does not stem from anything outside the awareness itself. Hence, the Vedānta question of *ultima facie* self-certification is out of the question for the Mīmāṃsakas.

Śrīharṣa does not elaborate the non-sublatability issue, nor does he deal at length with the problem of relations. He asks the question of how to understand *Śruti* “scripture” as the source of certification. The two arguments of non-sublatability and relation-regress were well-known through the writings of Śaṅkara and his disciples, and stand at the heart of Śrīharṣa’s Advaita polemic. All the same, Śrīharṣa’s positive program is of greater complexity.

<sup>26</sup> *Bādha* is rendered by Granoff as ‘contradiction’. G. Jha gives it as ‘sublation’, which seems superior in intent, and at times as ‘rejection’. Stephen H. Phillips renders it in a wider sense as ‘defeat’ or ‘defeating’, and *bādhaka* as defater. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 347n31.

<sup>27</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 81.

He gives other positive considerations to defend the Advaitic view of certification by scripture.

### 5.2.2. *Śruti*: Scripture as the Only Pointing Dictum

Śrīharṣa holds that for the Advaita position on ultimate awareness, scripture is a positive source of knowledge, *pramāṇa*, and further, for identification of self-awareness with Brahman, the Absolute. Scripture does only intellectualize the Reality, and the knowledge comes automatically thereafter.<sup>28</sup> Of course, scripture as a *pramāṇa* is not to be compared with immediate experience. In the supreme mystical awareness, as Śaṅkara points out, *pramāṇa* (perception, inference, scripture, etc.) are sublated along with all external appearances.<sup>29</sup> In other words, belief in the reliability of scripture is as conditioned by spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) as is any experience, with the exception of the direct self-illumination of awareness (which is identical with Brahman). Thus in a sense, there can be only one proof of the Advaita view of awareness, that being the mystical experience of Brahman, the attainment of the *summum bonum*. Reinterpreting Granoff as emphasizing that there are two tiers of argumentation with worldly *pramāṇa* viewed as conditioned by fundamental ignorance, we see the (sizeable) grain of truth in her reading: no argument provides the mystical illumination.<sup>30</sup> However, within the conditions of spiritual ignorance, we can still come to the right intellectual view, directed thereto by scripture.

Indeed this (awareness as self-illuminating) is made known by scripture, which is a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for it. (Scripture does not

<sup>28</sup> G. Mishra, “Turning Points in Vedānta in Second Millennium A.D.: Intellectual Ratiocination and Spiritual Discourse in Advaita Vedānta,” in *Turning Points in Indian Sastraic Tradition*, eds. Radhavallabh Tripathi and Nilakantha Dasa (Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1999), 11.

<sup>29</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 28–29.

<sup>30</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 202.

make it known directly, since—as I have already argued—it cannot, by its very nature, be known directly through words, but scripture) indirectly indicates it through its general purport (i.e., in considering the general purport of Upaniṣadic texts). Thus, although as it is it cannot be directly denoted, from the perspective of spiritual ignorance, in contrast, scripture in its general purport is 'to be taken as the knowledge source (*pramāṇa*) after the manner of our opponents. In reality, however, it is self-certified in the form of consciousness.<sup>31</sup>

Further,

Śrīharṣa clearly points out that the *Upaniṣads* are the sources of knowledge for the Advaita position of knowledge and for identifying the knowledge with the ultimate reality.... In other words, the belief in the reliability of scripture is conditioned by spiritual ignorance as in any experience. Hence, scripture only intellectualizes the reality and the knowledge comes automatically thereafter.<sup>32</sup>

Śrīharṣa finds it now important to explicate the import of scripture as the testificatory and positive source of knowledge, by focusing directly on the concept of Brahman from the very scriptural sources. The content of scriptural declarations goes beyond the self-illumination thesis. He now introduces the various scriptural statements of the identity of self-awareness with Brahman, the Absolute, the Blissful, and the Alone, and marshals his resources to defend the so-called identity texts (e.g., *Tat-tvam-asi Śvetaketo*, "That Thou art, O Śvetaketu!" [*ChāU* VI.8.7]).

The Brahman-awareness is difficult, and so, realization of the source of Brahman-awareness is also difficult, due to *adhyāsa*, "superimposition." Hence Śrīharṣa considers all possible objections to the possibility of a non-duality of action (as regards agent and object), and of experience, (as regards subject and object). Like Śaṅkara, Śrīharṣa defends the universality of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the world on Brahman in human consciousness, by

<sup>31</sup> *Tadetat tu Śrutyā pramāṇena ... KKK*, 1:77/55.

<sup>32</sup> Radhavallabh Tripathi, *Reorganizing Indian Sastraic Tradition* (Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1997), 10–11.

pointing to a similar structure in everyday experience; that is, by showing the fact of perceptual illusion he concludes to *adhyāsa*, which alone is the stumbling block that obstructs our view from realizing the source-nature of scripture.

### 5.2.3. Self-luminous Cognition Results in Advaitic Idealism

Practical experience is only explicable if the self-luminosity of knowledge is established first, which Śrīharṣa now sets out to do first.

(1) Knowledge is self-luminous. It is self-evident through its own power because, when there is knowledge, not even a person of any extent of critical and sceptical powers doubts: ‘Do I know or not?’ It is also impossible to think that anyone erroneously feels that he possesses no knowledge (suffers from absence of knowledge). “Therefore, when there is neither incorrect knowledge of something one is seeking to know, nor doubt, nor knowledge that one does not know it, the collective absence of these forms is a sufficient guarantee that there is correct knowledge of that thing. Otherwise, people who desired to know something and were qualified and able to know it without impediment might have a cognition suggesting its non-existence, an idea that always accompanies absence of correct knowledge of that which one is seeking to know.”<sup>33</sup> So the true self-revealed nature of knowledge is provable by its direct awareness, as it is experienced by all.

Self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) is attributable to the self-evident self and to the very nature of knowledge. This is proved by the mere fact that the self is the witness of the distinction between the knower, the knowing and the known (*jñāta*, *jñāna* and *jñeya*). So one does not have to prove it (when it is self-evident) through a consideration of the nature of empirical knowledge. To this end, the author points out various defects in the doctrines of those who do not accept that knowledge is self-luminous, declares that they do not occur in his own doctrine.

<sup>33</sup> KKK, 1:25f./44.

(2) Because of the possibility of there remaining the question as to why knowing should be self-luminous, one need not affirm that knowledge does not exist at all. It would be denial of the existence of what is evident to everyone. Evidence to everyone is self-evidence. Verse 26<sup>34</sup> shows how all logical problems are dispelled by mere acceptance of the fact that the immediate experience is self-luminous. Only what is of the very nature of consciousness can be self-evident. So no non-conscious attributes can be present within consciousness. But speech proceeds on the basis of accepting positive attributes. So, consciousness is not subject to direct denotation through speech! On the basis of its not being limited by time, however, consciousness is spoken of figuratively as eternal. On the basis of its not being limited in space, it is taught figuratively to be all-pervading. And because it is not limited to any particular mode of being, it is taken as ‘the Self of all’ and as ‘non-dual’.<sup>35</sup>

Empirical knowledge works with its instruments and objects, including all hypothetical reasoning. Such empirical knowledge depends for its very existence on this very self-evident principle of consciousness. This principle is of the nature of immediate experience, that is, it does not depend on hypothetical reasoning. So, it cannot be established by hypothetical reasoning. Śaṅkara says that one cannot say that the Self does not exist, and that it is not known. The Veda already affirms the existence of the self in the text: “This Self is neither this nor that”<sup>36</sup> This shows that the spirit proclaimed by all the *Upaniṣads* is our own self. And no one can deny the existence of one’s own self, for it would be the Self of the one performing the act of denial’.<sup>37</sup>

(3) It is now clearer that there is no conflict with non-duality in our doctrine, on the ground that the absence of time, etc., presupposes a distinction between the absence of the thing and

<sup>34</sup> KKK, 1:78f./124–25.

<sup>35</sup> KKK, 1:31f./53–54.

<sup>36</sup> *BrhU* III.9.26.

<sup>37</sup> *BrŚŚB* I.1.4 and Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 50, 1.

that in which it is absent. Absence is nothing over and above that in which it occurs. This is in agreement with the Buddhists and the Prābhākara-mīmāṃsakas, for whom an absence is never anything but that in which it occurs, and also with the Logicians, who hold that a non-existence following from another non-existence is nothing over and above the first non-existence. It is not also needed to hold that the negation of duality implies the existence of what is negated. The existence of that which is negated is by that very act totally disproved for all time, for example, negation of the object of an erroneous perception. All these yield that our theory is without genuine objections.<sup>38</sup>

Distinctions between existence and non-existence, belong to describable objects lying within the world appearance. But one cannot conceive of alternative existence or non-existence, or of the alternative “being” that is contradictory of non-existence in regard to the substratum of all imaginations of duality. The Upaniṣadic text using the negative formula ‘neither this nor that’ about the Absolute does not touch the Absolute itself, because it is beyond the scope of words. It is only a negation of alternative imaginary forms superimposed on it. It should be understood that the notion that the absolute is the substratum of imaginations is itself a piece of imagination, as the Absolute is beyond the scope of words and conceptions.<sup>39</sup>

(4) The Veda, standing as a valid means of cognition, indicates Brahman, though it cannot express it—and it has been explicated through indirect indication. From the standpoint of the highest truth, the Absolute resists denotation, since there is no word that could denote the highest. That is, it is in the state of Ignorance that we speak of the Veda as a means of knowledge for the Absolute, just as the opponent does, on account of its power to at least indicate the Absolute. This is unavoidable in the pragmatic world. Strictly speaking, however, the Absolute is the nature of pure

<sup>38</sup> *KKK*, 1:32/54.

<sup>39</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 113, 2.

Consciousness, revealed by it alone.<sup>40</sup> The supreme Self in its undifferentiated form cannot be revealed as such even by indirect means. For direct and indirect means of knowledge depend on it for whatever meagre power of revelation they have.

The Veda is accepted as an authoritative means of knowledge solely when conceived in the manner of Śaṅkara, not when conceived in the manner of the Logicians. On this, we quote. The first tells us that nothing new is informed in the Veda, but only the already existing, the Inner Self:

When it is said that the Veda is “the final means of cognition”, it means that it is an “instrument of cognition” only in the sense of putting an end to the erroneous superimposition onto the Self of properties that do not belong to it; that is to say, it is not an “instrument of cognition” in the sense of “that which makes a previously unknown thing known”. And the Veda itself confirms this, saying “The Absolute which is immediately evident (i.e., self-evident), that is the Self within all.”<sup>41</sup>

The second says that the Self is more important than the means of knowledge, because the latter cease just as the Self is realized:

For the final means of knowledge (the highest texts of the Veda), which yield knowledge of the self, brings to an end the notion that the Self is an individual capable of the act of cognition through means of knowledge. And the final means of knowledge itself ceases to be a means of knowledge the moment it brings that notion to an end, just as the (apparent) means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) that prevailed during a dream cease to exist on waking.<sup>42</sup>

(5) One might argue that there was but a slight difference between the knower-known relationship in self-luminosity on the one hand, and the knower-known relationship in the case of common knowledge of external objects on the other. One might thus argue, therefore, that one or the other must be false and subject to cancellation. This is clearly unwarranted so long as the two can

<sup>40</sup> *KKK*, 1:32/55.

<sup>41</sup> *BhGŚB* II.18.

<sup>42</sup> *BhGŚB* II.69; Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 46, 11.



stand, each on a different footing. This is so because the pot and the knowledge of the pot are known through metaphysical Ignorance; both are due to be cancelled eventually; and the supreme reality of self-luminosity is uncontradictable.<sup>43</sup>

Say, for purposes of argument, the existence of a knower-known relationship is accepted as a concession to the opponent's standpoint. From that standpoint, the Absolute is of the nature of constant and 'eternal massed homogeneous Consciousness', this does not require any other knowledge apart from itself through which itself or anything else is known, and so, the line of reasoning here presented is correct. On this *Gauḍapādakārikā* says: 'The enlightened ones proclaim that the pure, unborn principle of knowledge, void of all representations, is non-different from the Absolute, that which has to be known. That knowledge through which the Absolute is known is itself unborn. Through this unborn knowledge is the unborn known'.<sup>44</sup>

There is no knower or known in the viewpoint in which the Absolute is revealed. The *Upaniṣads* deny all subject-object relationship in the state of enlightenment. 'But when for him all this has become his own Self, then what could a person see, and with what?'<sup>45</sup> The intense awareness of this fact makes Śrīharṣa disapprove of the view he has just expounded and drop it immediately.

(6) Or rather, it is better to say that we do not have to accept an act-object relation or a 'knowing-subject'-'known-object' relation to explain self-luminosity. The Logicians themselves have held that everything other than the universal 'Being' exists and is referred to by reason of its relationship with Being. Being is Being by its own nature. They do not also regard this last conception as begging the question (*ātmāśraya*). In the same vein we should also be allowed to hold that knowledge is independently self-evident, without incurring the fault of begging the question.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *KKK*, 1:38/63.

<sup>44</sup> *GauK* III.33.

<sup>45</sup> *BrhU* II.4.14.

<sup>46</sup> *KKK*, 1:29–30/63–64.

In Western logic, *tu quoque*, “you too,” means “you who say so are also of the same kind,” “you too make the same mistake,” etc., and derivatively, “two wrongs make a right.” KKK refers to it as *pratibandhī*.<sup>47</sup>

Self-luminosity is a presupposition that goes as the condition for the possibility of anything. It cannot be proved or disproved by hypothetical reasoning. It is already evident before hypothetical reasoning begins. Śaṅkara says about its presupposed nature thus: “And it is known to all as the inmost Self because it is immediately evident.”<sup>48</sup> And he has explained the difference of the Absolute as pure being from the universal called ‘Being’, accepted by the Logicians in his Commentary to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

The *tu quoque* argument is positively applicable here, perhaps, only with respect to the present, because even the Vaiśeṣikas hold everything is correlated with Being, but only in the present. The word and notion of Being accompanies categories like substance and attribute, for example, “existent substance,” “existent quality,” “existent act,” but this is applicable only to the present. In regard to the past the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit that any given effect was existent before its production; for they explicitly maintain the opposite view, namely, that the effect was non-existent before production. They do not hold the Upaniṣadic doctrine that Being existed before the production of the universe as the one without a second. This supreme cause is described by the *ChāU* in terms of clay and other things. As such, it *is* Being. But this is different from the universal called “Being” as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas.<sup>49</sup>

The Self as Consciousness as in Advaita differs from the knowledge in Nyāya. Knowledge is absent in dreamless sleep and similar states. The Self as Consciousness is present both when all duality has disappeared and when it is present. With respect to the Self, there is no break in the knowing of the knower, for it is

<sup>47</sup> KKK (NavJha), 722.

<sup>48</sup> *BrŚŚB* I.1.1, Introduction.

<sup>49</sup> *ChāU* VI.2.1; Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 37, 3.

indestructible. Moreover, there is nothing in this state over against him that he could know.<sup>50</sup>

(7) It is now possible to assert that the difference of knowledge's knowledge of itself from other forms of knowledge shows it to be self-luminous. This is, according to Aristotelian logic, an apagogic (Greek, "leading away") argument, which is otherwise called *reductio ad absurdum*.

And the apagogic proof (through inexplicability otherwise) of the self-luminosity of knowledge that we have offered will force acceptance of all those differences. For example, the principle 'The knower is one and the object he knows another' is perceived elsewhere; but it must be given up in the case of the cognition 'I', as this latter experience is inexplicable unless we do so. Similarly, the principle 'Knowledge is one thing and its object another' must be given up in the case of 'I know', as this latter experience is inexplicable unless we do. The presumption arising from the impossibility of a thing being otherwise (i.e., the apagogic proof) is a more powerful authority than any other, and would overrule hundreds of arguments based merely on what is perceived. On this point it has been said:<sup>51</sup> 'One must be prepared to assume things that have not been perceived, even in large numbers, if proof for them exists'.<sup>52</sup>

From the logical point of view, this might imply three things with regard to the Absolute:

Various rules have to be given up in certain circumstances (notably, if it is intended to apply them to the Absolute) because experience in those circumstances is inexplicable unless they are given up; the Absolute falls within the scope of practical experience; the self-luminosity of the Absolute is proved on the evidence of presumption, arising from the inexplicability of any other view.

But, with respect to Advaita, these are incorrect. The *Upaniṣads* teach that the Absolute is beyond the scope of any of the means of knowledge, and of practical experience in general: 'But when

<sup>50</sup> *BṛhU* IV.3.30.

<sup>51</sup> Kumāṛila, *Tantra Vārttika*, II.1.5.

<sup>52</sup> *KKK*, 1:39/66–67.

for him all has become his own Self, then what could a person see and with what?<sup>53</sup> The self is present, self-luminous, in states like dreamless sleep which are not within the scope of practical experience in any form. In other words, the Self is known to be self-evident in and only in immediate experience, that is, the chief of all the means of knowledge is immediate experience.

(8) The most acceptable conclusion, therefore, is self-luminosity itself. On the basis of immediate apprehension alone Consciousness is independently self-evident.<sup>54</sup>

*KKK* institutes all sorts of arguments on the doctrine that Consciousness is self-luminous, to show that there would be difference (in knowledge's knowledge of itself) from what is found in knowledge elsewhere (in ordinary subject-object knowledge).

#### 5.2.4. *KKK* on the Problem of Proof for Non-duality

By using the sophist method of Cārvāka, namely, that of attacking systems from within, Śrīharṣa shows that the question of the proof for non-duality is illegitimate. He proceeds thus:

(1) The question cannot be raised by anyone who does not already accept non-duality (again, *tu quoque*). How could such a question be raised unless the proof was already known? The proof would be known only if one possessed a knowledge of the *probandum*!

If non-duality (the subject of the question) is known, then the next question is if that knowledge is valid or invalid. If it is taken to be valid, then the means towards that knowledge is the proof of non-duality; so it is useless to raise this question.

If one says that knowledge of non-duality is invalid, then no proof can be given for something that is not the object of a valid cognition. Now Śrīharṣa says, to ask for proof of what is not an object of valid cognition is self-contradictory—indeed an example for sophistic argument! In this sense, Śrīharṣa can be appellated

<sup>53</sup> *BṛhU* II.4.14.

<sup>54</sup> *KKK*, 1:40/67.

with the “discipleship” (1) of the author of *Tattvopaplavasimha*, (“the lion of annihilation of all principles”), namely, the outright sceptic Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa of the Lokāyata school and (2) of the author of *Mādhyamikakārikā* and *Vigrahavyāvartini*, namely, Nihilist-Buddhist-Absolutist Nāgārjuna.

One might now further argue that one’s knowledge of non-duality is itself invalid, which the Advaitin considers to be a valid proof, and which it is impossible for the first person to prove as valid. One cannot show how the instrument for another’s knowledge of non-duality was a genuine proof. In short, merely because one admits non-duality, the instrument for another’s knowledge of non-duality need not be a genuine proof.<sup>55</sup>

Further, Śrīharṣa attempts to show by purely negative dialectic that the question raised by the opponent is improper. One possible objection is the following:

If there is a proof for the non-duality to which you adhere, then, from the very fact of its having a proof, it has a second thing over against it and is therefore not non-dual; if, on the other hand, there is no proof of it, then, being without proof, it should not be believed.<sup>56</sup>

The answer Śrīharṣa gives is too simple: ‘There is a proof, but this does not imply that non-duality has a second thing over against it, because the proof is indeterminable either as real or as unreal’. This reply is not satisfactory to an enquirer into truth, because it leaves the objection unanswered or insufficiently answered!

Now Śrīharṣa leaves the path of negative refutation and pursues the issue of proof of non-duality as follows:

(2) The fact remains that the Veda is the valid means of cognition, also for the question of non-duality, for example, ‘One only without a second’<sup>57</sup> and ‘There is no plurality whatever here’.<sup>58</sup>

Śrīharṣa refers this discussion now to another work of his: ‘The

<sup>55</sup> KKK, 1:44ff./76–78.

<sup>56</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 904.

<sup>57</sup> *ChāU* VI.2.1.

<sup>58</sup> KKK, 1:46/80; *BṛhU* IV.4.19.

authoritativeness of the Veda in general, and its authoritativeness in regard to already established and existing entities in particular, will be demonstrated in the *Īśvarābhisandhi*.<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately, this work is not extant. Then he raises the objection that the Veda is contradicted by perception and the other valid means of empirical knowledge, and rebuts the objection with logical arguments of the following kind.

(3) The metaphysical statements of the Veda are immortal. Perception and other means of empirical knowledge do not contradict and cancel them. The powers of perception which seem to be doing so, apply not to Veda, but only to their own objects. For example, the difference between things around, like the pot and the cloth. It is also impossible to find instances of such means of knowledge, agreed upon commonly by all and permitting apprehension of difference in past, present and future.<sup>60</sup>

He moves now to finer details of the concept of non-duality and attempts to refute differences on the lines of Maṇḍana Miśra and others. To this end, he considers its subdivisions. He shows that the concept can only break down if the various alternative types such as essential difference, mutual exclusion, difference of attributes and so on are considered.<sup>61</sup> He reminds us that the Veda depends on distinctions for its power of communication, only to argue that the authority of the Veda for non-duality is not thus undermined since distinctions do not have reality in the full sense.<sup>62</sup> The author sums up his arguments on non-duality as follows, with a spiritual note, a consolation:

(4) Although one is at present caught up in the play of Ignorance, it is advisable to put one's faith in the doctrine of non-duality. He is sure his arguments are correct according to the reasoning and definitions proved to be sound by anyone's personal system. He promises that faith in the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* will lead one

<sup>59</sup> *KKK*, 1:46/80.

<sup>60</sup> *KKK*, 1:47f./81.

<sup>61</sup> *KKK*, 1:62–74/103–18.

<sup>62</sup> *KKK*, 1:75–78/118–22.

to knowledge of the inner Self. This would be the first step to gradual withdrawal of the mind from all external activity. This would yield direct knowledge of the Supreme Reality, the Self-luminous Witness, sweeter than honey, as one's own Self.<sup>63</sup>

A defect of Śrīharṣa's whole argument is that he does not tell the way to immediate experience of non-duality. Instead, he offers refutations and counter-refutations around the doctrine of non-duality. It should be stressed that if persists in stressing that non-duality can be experienced only in contemplation and mystic trance (*samādhi*), it would end up in infinite regress into the operations of the text 'That thou art', and end in contradictions with the Vedic text that made that pronouncement.

### 5.2.5. The Indeterminability of the Universe of Plurality

The author indicates the difference between Vedānta and the doctrine of the Buddhist Nihilists.

(1) The Buddhist-Nihilist regards everything as indeterminable. Thus it was said by Lord Buddha in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*,<sup>64</sup> "when things are examined analytically by the mind, it is found that they have no essence. Hence they are taught as being inexplicable and without essence." The teaching of the Upaniṣadic school regarding Brahman is indeterminable as real or unreal, but everything other than Consciousness is.<sup>65</sup> First, anything other than Consciousness cannot be real, as it is affected by certain defects. Secondly, it cannot be totally unreal, because if it were, it would weaken all practical experience, worldly and philosophical.

The Buddhist-Nihilist statement, 'None of the entities to

<sup>63</sup> KKK, 1:79/125.

<sup>64</sup> *Laṅkāvatārasūtram* II.175.

<sup>65</sup> *Saugatabrahmavādinorayam viśeṣaḥ :-*

*Buddhyā vivicyamānānām svbhāvo nāvadhāryate |*

*Ato nirābhilapyāste niḥsvabhāvāśca deśitāḥ ||* (quoted from *Laṅkāvatārasūtram* II, 175)

*vijñānavyatiriktam punaridam viśvam sadasadbhyām vilakṣaṇam Brahmavādināḥ samgirante. KKK (Yogi), 62–63.*

which we can refer by words have any essence, as their essence is never determinable', seems appropriate. But the Brahma-vādin statement, 'Everything other than Consciousness is neither-real-nor-unreal', needs further explanation. The *Upaniṣads* say also, 'A modification is a name, a suggestion of speech'.<sup>66</sup> Whatever is the effect in a modification (say, of clay or of gold) is a suggestion of speech, it is a mere phenomenon, and false. That is, the *Upaniṣads* say, 'The truth is that it is only clay,' that is, a modification is real only in terms of material cause. Hence the verity of the Upaniṣadic conclusion: 'This whole universe is the Absolute, this whole universe is the Self'. That is, the Self of the universe, in its true nature, is the Absolute. On the doctrine that the universe was neither real nor unreal, the unreal would fall outside the universe and so could not exist in any sense.

A claim might now arise that the doctrine of the Vedāntins says nothing but 'What exists and is other than the Absolute is neither real nor unreal'. This should anyway be first properly proved. But it is impossible to prove that the universe is indeterminable merely by refuting people's belief that they can explain things. That is, the indeterminability between reality and unreality arises not merely by language, but by the very nature of things. So, Śrīharṣa holds in *KKK* that indeterminability does not arise from the defects of speakers.

Can one say that the world is indeterminable merely because one perceives the defects in saying (a) that it is real and (b) that it is unreal? Do doubt about reality and unreality, and positing of a grade of reality other than real and unreal play this game on us? Śrīharṣa raises these questions, argues succinctly and rejects both these alternatives.

(2) He states that this very disjunction and the questions that arise rest on a misunderstanding of the opponent's intention.

For, if a person says that nothing is determinable as real or unreal, he should not be asked how indeterminability could be real. For indeterminability is included in the word 'all', which covers the whole universe

<sup>66</sup> *ChāU* VI.1.4.



of plurality. The notion that indeterminability results from the refutation of determinability—this only arises on the opponent’s principles. For it is his view (corresponding to the Law of Excluded Middle) that, if one of a pair of contradictories (contradictories are, e.g., ‘cat’ and ‘not cat’) is refuted, the other is consequently affirmed. So it is only through a concession to the logic of our opponents that we (sometimes) say that the world must be indeterminable. In reality, we abstain from any judgment about the reality or unreality of the world. We find abundance in the self-evident Self as Consciousness, the Absolute, the transcendent, where we rest contentedly, having gained our ends.<sup>67</sup>

It can now be said that he who claims that all is indeterminable as real or unreal should not be asked how indeterminability itself could be real. This is a valid point. Śrīharṣa does not intend to say what, on his own view, the nature of the universe is, if the statement that it is indeterminable is merely based on a concession to the logic of his opponents. This does not of itself yield the doctrine of non-duality stand, that is, merely on the basis of accepting that the Self as Consciousness is self-evident. For even on that basis, no difference will have been established between this doctrine of non-duality and the dualism of the Sāṅkhyas.

The view of the true expert in the tradition was: ‘If the universe of plurality had been real, it could no doubt have been brought to an end. But this duality is a mere illusion. Non-duality is the final truth’.<sup>68</sup> The meaning is that as the universe has been erroneously imagined like a snake in rope, it neither exists nor comes to an end. So the school of Śrīharṣa (in that he offers no view about the reality or unreality of the universe) is different from that of the old classical Vedānta (which condemned the world as unreal from the standpoint of the highest truth).<sup>69</sup>

This difference of the Śrīharṣan school from that of the old classical Vedānta can be visualized from the background of the four most prevalent of the different existing standpoints of indeterminability. In what follows, we discuss these.

<sup>67</sup> KKK, 1:41f. /71–72, (quoted in *Method of the Vedānta*, 900).

<sup>68</sup> *GauK* I.17.

<sup>69</sup> *Method of the Vedānta*, 900.

(A) This indeterminability-doctrine according to Śaṅkara says that name and form in relation to the supreme Self result from imagination through Ignorance, as if these imaginations were the Self, being indeterminable either as the real principle or as anything different.<sup>70</sup> But they do not in any way differ from the Self, because in reality their ‘indeterminability’ is only a perceived illusion (*Māyā*) and concerns only their form.

(B) The reason why Ignorance, taken synonymous with *Māyā*, stands as a material cause is that indeterminability means being neither real nor unreal. This is held by those who hold that distinctions are set up by positive indeterminable Ignorance (the followers of the Pañcapādika, Iṣṭa Siddhi, Vivaraṇa and other schools of Vedānta). For them, rope-snake, shell-silver etc. are the result of modifications by their material cause, namely, Ignorance. According to Śaṅkara, they are not attributes falsely imputed to the rope or shell.

(C) By the Nihilist Buddhist doctrine, all beings are indeterminable in a special sense: when the mind examines them analytically, the mind finds no determinable essence in them. The doctrine here is, ‘The truth is that nothing has real essence’.

(D) Śrīharṣa holds that ‘indeterminability’ means that everything but the Self is indeterminable as real, and indeterminable as unreal.

### 5.2.6. The Absolute Based on an Ontological Argument

For the Naiyāyikas the mental event of understanding a speaker’s sentence is a verbal awareness, *śābda-bodha*. Śrīharṣa argues that Brahman-awareness conveyed by scripture has its content the one, all-inclusive Reality, and is a veridical awareness that cannot be defeated, that is to say, within the conditions of spiritual ignorance, *avidyā*. That is, the scriptural *śābda-bodha* is infinitely truer than that of the rivals. Hence, Śrīharṣa’s position is that no evidence can be brought against the Advaita view of Brahman. A

<sup>70</sup> *BrSŚB* II.2.14; *Method of Vedānta*, 45 (1).

skeletal pattern of Śrīharṣa's positive argument could therefore be conceived thus:

P<sub>1</sub> Brahman is cognized (from scripture).

P<sub>1a</sub> Brahman is cognized as self-conscious, all-inclusive, and non-differentiated.

P<sub>2</sub> What is cognized is to be accepted, unless the cognizing is (challenged and) defeated. (Every cognition is innocent until proven guilty.)

P<sub>3</sub> The logic of the content of the teaching about Brahman (or the nature of Brahman) precludes any challenge or defeat.

The conclusion is:

C Brahman is to be accepted.<sup>71</sup>

The question that emerges is, Is the argument cogent?

The first premise is direct and simple, at least in the loose sense of "is cognized": it is not important for us to see if Śrīharṣa is coherent about his own Advaita view of Brahman. Whatever he understands by his cognition of Brahman and is explained in *KKK* has for its source as scripture, *Śruti*, that is, certain Upaniṣadic texts that speak of Brahman-experience. This gives us some understanding of what he means by Brahman-experience and Brahman-knowledge. So far the authority of *Śruti* is not relevant. The first premise does not claim that Brahman-cognition is in any way valid, exactly of something real or authoritative. This first premise has force only in connection with the other two premises.

P<sub>1</sub> has to be unpacked as P<sub>1a</sub> in connection with P<sub>3</sub>.

The second premise implies the Mīmāṃsaka version (Kumārila's) of our familiar self-certification thesis, with the implied scope for cognitions and claims regarding the world as is operative in spiritual ignorance. "Concerning cognition (*dhī*, "thought"), self-certification is to be denied only when there is a defeater (*bādhaka*, broadly construable as "eliminator")."<sup>72</sup> This shows that P<sub>2</sub> is an epistemological thesis. There is a collective and mutual obligation in any logical procedure to give the benefit

<sup>71</sup> *KKK*, 1:102–20/80-95.

<sup>72</sup> *Dhiyām svataḥ-prāmāṇyasya bādhaka-eka apodyatvāt. KKK* (NavJha), 80.

of the doubt unless there accrue considerations to the opposite. In other words, the Brahman-cognition should be accepted unless challenged.

The refutations of Śrīharṣa directed at Nyāya views have for their reason his perception of these views as potential threats to the Brahman theory. Śrīharṣa shows that (a) awareness is the only possible reality, which is beyond the given diverse facts, and (b) *bheda*, “distinctness,” inclusive of its ensuing appearances of diversity of what is perceived, resists any rational explanation by the very Nyāya coin, and so, is *anirvacanīya*, “inexplicable”. This is what the Advaita Brahman view warrants. Much of Nyāya philosophy presupposes *bheda*, distinctness; it opposes P<sub>1</sub>. This spurs Śrīharṣa to refute Nyāya views. He may be construed as saying: “When we look at what you Naiyāyikas see as challenging, and indeed defeating the Advaita position, we see that your challengers cannot withstand scrutiny, that they self-destruct (and are eliminated).”<sup>73</sup>

The ontological argument implies also the assertion that Brahman’s nature, as contained in the scriptural declarations, is undefeatable. This facilitates the desired inference and there is thus only an extra step to go in the overall procedure: Brahman cognition is unchallenged, and so undefeated. This underlying inference delivers P<sub>3</sub>, which in conjunction with P<sub>1</sub> and P<sub>2</sub>, secures the conclusion. The success of the argument depends in fact on what a successful challenge is. If there can be no valid challenge, however, there can be no defeat. Śrīharṣa finds no more challenges, since the Nyāya and other claims are already flawed.

Śrīharṣa’s final strategy in defense of his view that Brahman cognition is in principle undefeatable involves, therefore, three prongs: (1) the challenger’s source of warrant (perceptions, etc.) is suspect; (2) to defeat another’s view requires a cognition that is, let us say, “equal in scope” (*sagocara*, *saviṣaya*) I with what it would challenge; and/or (3) the seeming challenger is incoherent.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 84.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

These three aspects of logical strategy give us the direction of Śrīharṣa's attacks, although they are not mutually exclusive, and often overlap. The fact that Śrīharṣa is on the offensive throughout most of *KKK* need not offer difficulty for a constructive-affirmative agenda, since the aim or direction of the attacks is positively ontological. In general, the "refutations" (*khaṇḍana*) in *KKK* are to be viewed within the context of the ontological argumentation reconstructed above. In particular, the Nyāya view presupposes distinctness; all its definitional projects proceed on that assumption and result in contradictions— ... *lakṣaṇādhīnā tāval-lakṣya-vyavasthiti, lakṣaṇāni anupapannāni. Jñātādhikaraṇa-ādi (Jñāna-adhikaraṇa-ātma-ādi) lakṣaṇa-nirūpaṇa-dvāreṇa cakrakādy-āpatteḥ*.<sup>75</sup> That is, 'All determinations/proofs (of reality) that are to be made depend on definitions: no satisfactory definitions, however, are possible, because all endeavours to define lead us to reasoning of an objectionable or vicious sort, such as "circular reasons": as when the knower (the knowing subject) is defined as the locus of knowledge.' That everything is distinct from everything else is, however, a supposition whose ramifications are problems of many sorts (contradictions, infinite regresses, and other faults). The only alternative now available is the Advaita philosophy, which is fortunately present in the scriptures, namely, the *Upaniṣads*.

### 5.3. EXTRA-ADVAITIC SYSTEMS: BASIC ISSUES

Śrīharṣa's chief opponents are the Naiyāyikas who form a big chunk of extra-Advaitic systems. We have already reviewed the motives the Advaitin has for his overall attack: basically, he is guided by his sense of how Nyāya conflicts with the Advaita view. Hence, it is imperative that we study the strengths and weaknesses

<sup>75</sup> *KKK* (Yogi) 126. This reminds us of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa who said in *Tattvopaplavasimha*: "*Lakṣaṇa-nibandhanam māna-vyavasthānam, māna-nibandhanā ca meya-sthitiḥ, tad-abhāve tayoh sad-vyavahāra-viśayatvam katham?*" (Quoted in *KKK* (Yogi), 126.)

of Nyāya, with due respect and attention to their claims and those of Śrīharṣa, especially to the broad areas of Nyāya theory that come under attack. We try to identify recurrent patterns in Śrīharṣa's "refutations," key reasonings employed in a variety of contexts, etc. The basic issues we are going to see are exhaustive and are related to consciousness and theory of justification, truth and the real (*tattva*), the differentiating features of definition, the attribution dilemma, universals and contradictions implied in distinctness. The primary weapon in Śrīharṣa's sheath, is the problem of relation/regress, namely, the Bradley problem.

### 5.3.1. Consciousness and Theory of Justification

The most conflicting area between Śrīharṣa's Advaita and the Naiyāyikas is the theory of veridicality, the mode and the nature of cognition. Śrīharṣa's dialectic is closely tied to his own constructive programme. It goes to Śrīharṣa's credit that he identified the central problems in Nyāya and began in the very initial chapters of *KKK* to attempt and encounter the Nyāya school. He takes up, for example, the question of consciousness. He find that the Naiyāyika epistemology of awareness (as a multiplicity of awarenesses) as not self-illuminating is itself beset with the problem of infinite regress, with one awareness requiring another for the first to be cognized etc., and makes self-awareness impossible. Put differently, "the Naiyāyika view that the success of activity based on a cognition  $C_1$  is what proves  $C_1$  correct is objectionable because there would be a question about the grounds for the cognition  $C_2$  of the success of such activity, given that there is a question about the grounds for  $C_1$ ."<sup>76</sup> Thus any answer will invite further questions, *ad infinitum*: "Nor does this necessitate the assumption of a *regressus in infinitum* (that other cognition again being dependent on another cognition, and so on)."<sup>77</sup>

Another infinite regress he has purportedly discovered in the

<sup>76</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 48. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 95.

<sup>77</sup> *KKK* (GanJha), 13.

Logicians' theory of inference as a *pramāṇa* is the following: to the extent that an inference is known as a *pramāṇa* by another inference, this will have to be known by another, and so on, *ad infinitum*.<sup>78</sup> Thirdly, our daily activity, according to the Logicians, proceeds from cognition, and there is a real world independent of consciousness and causally related to it; but, for Śrīharṣa, it is useless to suppose so because here too one faces the regresses (this could be called a causal-relational regress, for example, I have my everyday experience comparable to a dream, behind it I know of a world of tastes, sights etc., I know that world, behind its experience should therefore be still another world which excludes the first world, and so on, *ad infinitum*) and begs the question against the idealist who alone has, in the theory of the Absolute, a case to defend against all infinite regresses. This Advaita concept of consciousness is that of a unity of consciousness due to its realization of *Ātman*-nature.

For the Naiyāyika, consciousness exists only as a multiplicity of states, without its own unity. But, for Śrīharṣa, consciousness (of course, with ultimate unity due to its ultimate Brahman-consciousness) is what is essentially required for life pursuits and for a sense of success in action. In that case, the problem with the Naiyāyika concept of a multiplicity of particular consciousnesses begs the deep question against the idealist while talking about real causal relations in connection with his epistemology of justification.<sup>79</sup>

Finally, there are the particular problems with the specific terms used in a variety of characterizations of veridical awareness and the sources of veridical awareness, where the incoherent web spun by the realist has to be patiently traced.

In the first chapter of *KKK* Śrīharṣa attacks also the subject-object relationship (*viśayaviśayi-bhāva*) so crucial to the Logician theory of consciousness. An elaborate argument is attempted early

<sup>78</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 352. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 95.

<sup>79</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 40.

in the fourth and final chapter.<sup>80</sup> In both of these, the crux or argument is an apparent paradox of relationality, which is unnecessary to spell out in the present context. His conclusion is anyway to be stressed: any relation between any multiple awarenesses and its content jeopardizes the very concept of consciousness, because that can only lead into an infinite regress.

Now remains the question of self-linkage (*sambandha-svarūpāt sambandhinor*). This, according to Śrīharṣa, yields the identity of cognition and its content. But this is precisely the Advaita position, too! We discuss questions related to it under the sub-title on the “attribution dilemma.”

### 5.3.2. “Truth” and the “Real” (*Tattva*)

According to Śrīharṣa, there is no world external to or independent of Brahman-consciousness, which alone is true in the best sense of the word. “In contrast, the Naiyāyika understanding of truth, or veridicality (*prāmāṇya, pramātvā*), supposes such independent reality because, most generally, awareness related to it in one way constitutes truth but in another constitutes falsehood or non-veridicality.”<sup>81</sup> The Naiyāyika tries his best to spell out these relations between particulars themselves and between particulars and the multiplicity-infected consciousness. Śrīharṣa tries his best to prove that it is futile. He attempts to understand the meaning of veridical awareness (*pramā*). He analyses and dissects the Naiyāyika epistemology of veridical awareness as “an experience of what is real, that is, of something’s being what it is, *tattva*, its *being that*.”<sup>82</sup>

There are two fundamental problems identified: (a) what it is to be a reality is not spelled out intelligibly, and (b) the precise cut between the illusory and the veridical is not secured.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 608.

<sup>81</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 96.

<sup>82</sup> KKK (NavJha), 130.



The two are interrelated. The object of a veridical awareness is supposed to be a reality; veridical awareness captures what is fact. The object of a non-veridical awareness is in some way not a reality; non-veridical awareness does not capture fact, or presents something erroneously. Śrīharṣa argues that it is impossible to spell out what *tattva* is—what it is that a veridical awareness captures or makes known—other than by reference to the content of awareness, in which case there is no way to make the cut between the veridical and non-veridical.<sup>83</sup>

Śrīharṣa points out that other definition, too, incur similar dilemmas. To make our inquiry easier, it is useful to state what Śrīharṣa considers to be the metaphysical impasse here. He is sure that the irrational hiatus between the veridical and the non-veridical is what engineers the dilemma. The definition, for example, “Veridical awareness is experience of a thing as it is (*yathārtha*),” works on a supposed similarity between the supposed object in the world and awareness (awareness may also be called as what is objectified in the awareness).<sup>84</sup>

### 5.3.3. *Lakṣaṇas* and Differentiating Features

Śrīharṣa wants now to undermine the very foundations on which Naiyāyikas have worked all their theories, namely, the *bheda*-concept of definition. They believe that definition means to specify differentiating features. The process is to identify something by differentiation and to understand its essential features. The *Nyāyasūtra*, defines definition (*lakṣaṇa*) as explanatory characterization by features. In the course of time this definition has been embellished with special minute requirements and qualifications. Udayana has stressed the purpose to be identifying something. But the purpose of definition as understanding is evident particularly in the *Nyāyasūtra* and early pre-Udayana commentaries.

In early Nyāya, *salient* differentiating features are focused upon. Udayana was not interested in the pedagogically striking

<sup>83</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 96.

<sup>84</sup> KKK (NavJha), 218–23.

features of differentiating qualities. He wanted only formally differentiating qualities. Thus he reaffirmed the tradition of explaining the Nyāya system through a series of definitions. Udayana insisted only on differentiation, which was understood to be "... any feature is viewed as adequate that is both (a) possessed by all tokens of type  $x$  and (b) not possessed by anything that is not an  $x$ ."<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, both definitional projects centre on distinctive characteristics. This presupposes that there are such characteristics (at least normally) and, more fundamentally, that things and types of things are distinct. Thus, whether we stress positively the distinctive characteristics of a particular or of a token, or negatively anything that differentiates something from others, the definitional project is premised on *bheda*, distinctness. Śrīharṣa is committed to showing unintelligible.

Śrīharṣa calls this entire process in Nyāya as a "systematic arrangement of things," where things are already presumed to be distinct from one another and related causally and otherwise.<sup>86</sup> Śrīharṣa finds it convenient to follow this procedure of Udayana in dismantling Nyāya. He dexterously takes advantage of the arrangement of formal qualities upon things meant for creation of definitions. But he also searches into the spirit of a definition and the underlying view that informs it. He goes beyond pointing out the formal problems ("formal" in the sense of Udayana). The passages from the *KKK*, where he attempts to define the Nyāya concept of veridical awareness, exhibit a manner that befits such a critical stance.

The Logicians have set up various requirements that would show if the things defined are significantly similar ("uniform" or exhibit a "consecutive character") or dissimilar. Śrīharṣa attacks these *anugama* requirements of a good definition. This automatically leads us to the theory of universals.

<sup>85</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 97.

<sup>86</sup> "Lakṣya vyavasthitir." *KKK* (NavJha), 130.

### 5.3.4. Universals

Śrīharṣa criticises the Nyāya theory of universals, *sāmānya* or *jāti*, more precisely, what the West today call as “natural kinds,” exposes its weaknesses, and spells out six or seven independent lines of criticism, all of which recur in the whole text of *KKK*. One of them concerns definitions and theory of meaning. This too recurs throughout *KKK*.

Śrīharṣa goes head on for a criticism of the Nyāya concept of universals in the first half of his fourth chapter where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology is taken up and definitions of each of the categories are refuted, that is, using his own method of dilapidation of the definition of the concept of *bhāvalakṣaṇa*, “positive entity,” he goes on to refute the definitions of the other sixteen universal categories, namely, *bhāva*, “positive entity,” *a-bhāva*, “negative entity,” *viśiṣṭa*, “qualified,” *dravya*, “substance,” *sāmānya*, “universal,” *viśeṣa*, “particular,” *sambandha*, “relation,” *ādhāra*, “substratum,” *viśayaviśayībhāva*, “subject-object relation,” *bheda*, “difference,” *kāraṇatva*, “causality.”

These lines of criticism have already been introduced earlier in other chapters, and in the fourth he gets more elaborate on them. The line of argument is similar to that of the attribution dilemma. An individual pot can be known, according to Nyāya, as a pot only through the qualifier, ‘potness’ of pots. Then arises the question: In virtue of what is the potness of the pots known? Thus the problem widens. This gives rise again to the attribution dilemma,<sup>87</sup> which we discuss in the next sub-heading. The result of the criticism of universals has already given rise to dilapidation of the whole system of categories, which have their origin in the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. According to Phillips:

Just as the tie between a property and its bearer must first be accomplished by another tie tying the tie, so a property whereby a property bearer is known must be first known by another property. Now, since every verbalization of an awareness requires mention of a qualifier

<sup>87</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 572ff.

through which a qualificandum is known, this, the problem of predication, is deep indeed. Though for Nyāya the problem is not on the level of language but of awareness, it remains troublesome: how can the explicit content (*prakāra*) of an awareness be known as a qualifier of a qualificandum? If the qualificandum is known to be so through a qualifier, how then is the qualifier known? (How can the qualificandum even be known as a qualificandum; qualificandum-hood would have to be mentioned or presented.) The question threatens a foundation of the Nyāya ontology, the property/property-bearer relation, as Śrīharṣa argues explicitly in the fourth chapter of the *KKK*.<sup>88</sup>

The concept of universals that Śrīharṣa had aimed at criticizing in Nyāya has thus achieved also the dilapidation of the edifice of post-Udayana Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology as derived from the Vaiśeṣika system!

### 5.3.5. The Attribution Dilemma Resulting in Relation Regress

The infinite regress paradox has still another prey in Nyāya. It is the attribution dilemma that Śrīharṣa's *KKK* identifies in Nyāya. Śrīharṣa sets the larger context of the attribution dilemma in a question: "And just what is that distinctness purportedly established by perception?"<sup>89</sup> He says that in Nyāya a property is unrelated to the property-bearer substance. This incurs lots of theoretical problems, from which Śrīharṣa derives his conclusion that Brahman is the final theoretical solution to the paradox. We may call this paradox as the Attribution Dilemma. Let me quote from Stephen Phillips:<sup>90</sup>

*Kim ca, dharmasya tasya dharmiṇā samam asaṃbandheftip-rasaṅgaḥ, saṃbandhānantye fnavasthā, prathamato fntato gatvā vā*

<sup>88</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 101. See *KKK* (NavJha), 576–57.

<sup>89</sup> *KKK*, 1:128/103; Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 171.

<sup>90</sup> The translation of the verse is also from Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 221. See also Appendix 5 of the present work for more details.

*sva-bhāva-saṃbandhābhyupagame saṃbandhy-antarasya api tat-sva-bhāva-praveśād abhede eva paryavasānaṃ syād iti.* (Text 107, line 6)

Now follows the translation:

Moreover, if the property is unrelated to the property-bearer, there is an obvious problem; (if, on the other hand, it is related) there will be an endless number of relations and thus infinite regress. Or if at the beginning or the end the relation is admitted to be of the very nature of one of the terms (property or property-bearer), then since even the other term of the relation would enter into the very nature of that (the combined relatee-relator), nothing but nondistinctness would result.

Phillips makes the following observations about the issue:

Here Śrīharṣa identifies what we have called the attribution dilemma and the relation regress. Three options are sketched: (1) a property, such as blue, is unrelated to the property-bearer, such as a pot; (2) if there is a relation that relates them, such as inherence, then there has to be further relations to relate the inherence to each of the terms, the blue and the pot, *ad infinitum* (aRb, aR'R, aR''R', *ad infinitum*, likewise with the second term); unless, (3) it is the very nature of one of the terms to link with the other: such linkage would amount to non-distinctness. Gaṅgeśa and his followers embrace the third option: it is, at some point, the very nature of one of the terms to self-link. Of course, Naiyāyikas do not, however, embrace non-distinctness.<sup>91</sup>

Now, to the attribution dilemma that results from taking a relation to be a term (that could stand for an ontologically primitive being or quality), is suggested a response credited to Bertrand Russell who addresses the Bradley problem:<sup>92</sup> relations are a different sort of animal; they are not terms. This response resonates with Nyāya in that, *samavāya*, “inherence,” is regarded as an ontological primitive—neither like substances that are the bearers

<sup>91</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 221.

<sup>92</sup> Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), 16–18, 54–61.

of qualities, motions, and universals, nor like any of these properties. *Instead it is only the concept of mutual bond.*

Śrīharṣa attacks the paradox differently, by presenting three possibilities with regard to attribution: (a) the property and the property-bearer are unrelated according to Nyāya (which incurs illogicalities), (b) but to follow the Nyāya line of argument, they are in fact related by a third term, *ad infinitum*, as inferred by Śrīharṣa (which incurs illogicalities) or (c) “it is the very nature of one of the terms to link with the other,” which option, as he says, results in non-distinctness, and fails to keep the property and the property-bearer apart from each other. Thus, the problem, if followed up to its end, by taking for granted the Naiyāyika perspective, could only end in the justification of the Advaita theory of uniqueness of Brahman-consciousness and the subsidiarization of all *bhedas*.

The passage concludes with a claim that perception, the supposed prover of distinctness, “proves nothing but non-duality (*Advaita*).”

*Evam anyasminn api dharma-vikalpe iti. tasmāt sva-rūpa-bhede pramāṇam bhavati | pratyakṣam advaite eva pramāṇam bhavati.*

Any other view of properties is to be addressed in this way. Therefore, your “prover,” *pramāṇa*, of perception, sir, which was supposed to show an essential distinctness among things, proves nothing but non-duality (*advaita*).<sup>93</sup>

Brahman’s non-duality is thought to entail the unintelligibility of distinctness, but “the unintelligibility of distinctness” is not thought to be precisely equivalent to Brahman’s nonduality.<sup>94</sup>

To put it more clearly, Śrīharṣa says, at two places in *KKK* chapter 4,<sup>95</sup> that the regress shows the futility of viewing not only the qualification relation as independent of consciousness but also the subject-object relation as obtaining between externally related

<sup>93</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 222.

<sup>94</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 78.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 572ff.

realities. That is, any external relation is a misfit in the field of theoretical foundations. He concludes that this proves the *idealist* thesis: “Consciousness alone should be accepted as the source of this and ... everyday experience and activity, [is] consciousness variously transformed through its capacity for self-causality.”<sup>96</sup>

### 5.3.6. Distinctness (*Bheda*) and Their Contradictoriness (*Bādhitvatva*)

The fort Śrīharṣa wants to conquer is that of distinctness, *bheda*, although he is well unhappy with universals. The Advaitin does not deny that distinctness is commonly experienced. Distinctness (as of a cloth from a pot) is cognized by everyone.<sup>97</sup> The problem is regarding intelligibility of distinctness. The crux of this problem is that unintelligibility (indeterminability) is intermediate between claim of reality and claim of unreality. Unintelligibility is warranted by the *Upaniṣads*’ central concept of Brahman’s all-inclusiveness and non-duality. “We do not hold that distinctness is in every way unreal, but only that it is not absolutely real. It is acceptable to us to say that this kind of thing is known through spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*), a (so to say) process that is not the truest knowing.”<sup>98</sup> This is also the essence of mystical awareness—which is the highest form of awareness and is beyond pragmatic knowing, this is what the scripture concludes too. Moreover, the moment we reflect deeply of the paradoxes of distinctness, this is what comes true as the only possible ways out.

Śrīharṣa attacks distinctness at two places in the *KKK*, one toward the end of the introductory portion of the first chapter, the other in the middle of the fourth chapter, which is devoted to ref-

<sup>96</sup> *Buddhireva sva-kāraṇa-sāmarthyāt tathā-utthitā tad-tad-vyavahāra prasavitṛī svīkriyatām*. Ibid., 578.

<sup>97</sup> *Bheda eva ... sphuṭam sarva-loka-sākṣikāḥ pratīyamano*. *KKK* (NavJha), 109. Cf. *KKK* (GanJha), 1:153.

<sup>98</sup> *Na vāyam bhedasya sarvathā eva asattvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ, kim nāma, pāramārthikam sattvam. Avidyā-vidyamānatvam tu tadīyam iṣyate eva*. Ibid., 118.

utation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology.<sup>99</sup> His method of attack here too is to find paradoxes in distinctness. He sees distinctness to be the prime challenger to the Upaniṣadic Brahman. His fundamental objection is that distinctness is unreal, if the concept of ‘unreal’ is to be taken in its full sense.

#### 5.4. REFUTATION OF INDIRECT PROOF

In the order of the text, the positive argumentation, sketched above, precedes the detailed refutations, *khaṇḍana*, for which the book is entitled. Specifically, the first of the four chapters of the *KKK* has three broad divisions: (1) an introductory section on debate, (2) the Advaita programme, and (3) an orderly progression of refutations. Refutations also dominate the remainder of the book. My view is that the focus of the refutations derives, most broadly, from Śrīharṣa’s sense of what are the serious challengers to Advaita, and, in particular, from conflicts with the Advaita positions concerning the non-duality of awareness and the unity, or non-duality, of Brahman. Śrīharṣa’s refutations support the non-duality of Brahman by showing that appearances of distinctness cannot coherently be understood. This interpretive thesis—emphasizing conflicts, with Advaita—is not current among scholars, and I wish to say just a few more words in its defense before going on to scrutinize the refutations. Beginning with the third section of the *KKK* chapter 1, the nature of Nyāya’s conflicts with Advaita usually goes unstated. The refutations often seem no more than fault-finding with individual Nyāya positions (and Śrīharṣa the heir of Jayarāśi as much as of Śaṅkara). Faults, such as contradiction and infinite regress, are lodged by the Advaitin against Nyāya views—beginning with the *pramāṇas* but including the full gamut of Nyāya positions—and against views of a few others as well-Mīmāṃsakas, Jainas-taken to be opponents. But despite the refutations’ breadth of scope, the logic of eliminative argument forms deep context. Śrīharṣa tells us explicitly, in general terms,

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 103–18.



that elimination is part of his strategy, as we will see concretely in a passage translated below.<sup>100</sup> With every refutation, the strategy is to be back into Advaita, even when the apparent strategy is otherwise. Advaita is taken to be the deep alternative to the errors revealed. Sometimes a refutation is even said to be itself a proof of Advaita, not just an elimination of a competitor. Thus the strategy includes indirect proof, where alternatives are taken to be not only contrary competitors (both couldn't be right though both could be wrong) but true contradictories (the falsity of the one would prove the truth of the other).

There is, however, a hermeneutical problem in reconstructing Śrīharṣa's view of contradiction, which is key to the logic of indirect proof formally construed. (To prove  $q$  given premises  $P_1$  through  $P_n$ , assume  $\neg q$  and deduce a contradiction,  $P$  and  $\neg p$ . Since a false proposition cannot be deduced from true premises—and the premises given are assumed to be true— $q$  has to be false and thus  $q$  true.) With Śrīharṣa—and with the Logicians, too—indirect proof is subsumed under *tarka*,<sup>101</sup> which is rendered as “dialectical reasoning” but which usually amounts to eliminative argument. First, any fault will do to falsify a view, not just contradiction but also, for example, vicious infinite regress (*anavasthā*) and (in certain circumstances) reasoning in a circle (*cakraka*). According to Nyāya, the falsification shows that an opposed candidate view—presumed to have some independent warrant source at least marginally in its favour—is established, sometimes a contrary and sometimes a true contradictory. In this way, indirect proof is subsumed into the wider pattern of argument. And with eliminative arguments considered in general, no warrant for a position need derive from the falsification of a rival. Nevertheless, both Logicians and Śrīharṣa do employ true indirect proofs where the negation is presumed to have justificational power.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *KKK* (NavJha), 125.

<sup>101</sup> ‘Dialectical reasoning’. According to Nyāya and classical schools, a hypothetical reasoning that shows a fallacy in maintaining a position  $\neg p$  opposed to another position  $p$  that is thus shown to be right—so long as  $p$  has some additional evidence in its favour.

Now the hermeneutical problem. The Advaitin is particularly intent on showing fallacies that follow from the view that things are distinct, but he is also suspicious of contradiction (and thus of indirect proof), and even of the eliminative pattern of reasoning that, on my reading, is his key strategy in the *KKK*. Dialectical reasoning (*tarka*) is expressly attacked by the Advaitin. Śrīharṣa argues that contradiction is no guarantee of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*, inference-grounding pervasion). Indeed, this latter is itself inexplicable, according to him. Is, then, the Advaitin to be looked upon as himself eschewing contradiction, indirect proof, and indeed all *tarka* and eliminative argument?

The answer is, No. Naiyāyikas understand contradiction ontologically, and it is their ontological suppositions that Śrīharṣa objects to. For Śrīharṣa, the reality of Brahman entails that appearances of distinctness cannot be veridical. This, we may say, is the view from the top down. From the bottom up, the unintelligibility of distinctness, demonstrated by argument, suggests, but does not strictly demonstrate, the reality of non-distinctness, because cognition of non-distinctness has to have its own proper source (scripture, or better, self-experience).<sup>102</sup> Nevertheless, philosophy has a message; indeed, it is what has just been said. The top-down and bottom-up views of Brahman and the world converge.<sup>103</sup>

In sum, Śrīharṣa's use of dialectical reasoning is best understood overall as eliminative argument, where alternatives on the table need not be understood as true contradictories. He does put forth a couple of instances of true indirect proof. But his general method is to show commonly recognized faults in alternatives to Advaita; the elimination of Nyāya, for example, allows us more clearly to see the truth of the *Upaniṣads*. This is the predominant or base-line tactic. In certain instances the plan is more complex. For example, the Nyāya view of distinctness, and its claim that perception establishes distinctness, is refuted in *KKK*'s first

<sup>102</sup> *KKK*, 1:159–66/122–25; Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 198–202.

<sup>103</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 124.

chapter. Thus perception is incapable of contradicting scripture (since perception purports to warrant incoherencies). In addition, the non-duality view is strengthened.<sup>104</sup> Non-distinctness is not thought to be precisely equivalent to the non-duality of Brahman. Nevertheless, the claim that distinctness is unintelligible serves to support the right view of Brahman, according to Śrīharṣa: Brahman considered in relation to the world requires an indeterminability plank. With these considerations, Śrīharṣa is concerned with more than elimination in his argument.

A straightforward example of indirect proof occurs in the fourth chapter of *KKK*. The Nyāya understanding of the relationship between cognition and its objects is refuted, and the refutation is said to prove that awareness is the sole reality.<sup>105</sup> Śrīharṣa asserts elsewhere that awareness is the only reality; this argument apparently supports that claim. In addition, in *KKK* chapter I, there are two passages that take an overview of the book's refutational method; they are worth reviewing at some length.

The first passage concerns the Advaita doctrine of the indeterminability of appearance. The passage is important. Ganganatha Jha quotes it in his introduction, and it is promoted by Granoff as establishing her reading.<sup>106</sup> Here Śrīharṣa seems to (eject non-contradiction and the formal logic of indirect proof: although there are faults in the position that the phenomenal display of distinct things is real, these faults do not entail that distinctness is unreal. Yet Śrīharṣa uses such logic in concluding indeterminability from, so to say, the bottom up.

By the principles of none other than our opponent is it thus concluded: because of the defeat of the effort to determine distinctions by definitions, indeterminability follows. For it is accepted that with an assertion and its denial the rejection of the one requires an embrace of the other.

<sup>104</sup> See *KKK* (NavJha), 125.

<sup>105</sup> *KKK*, 2:67/613.

<sup>106</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, 141–42.

Thus by the method of our opponent this is to be said: the indeterminability of everything is to be embraced.<sup>107</sup>

Not (the sign ‘-’) determinability, as demonstrated, is equivalent to indeterminability. This is reasoning “from the bottom up”—reasoning that is motivated, I maintain, by other reasoning “from the top down.” Indeterminability, or inexplicability, is thought to follow from Upaniṣadic declarations about Brahman, in particular about Brahman’s being everything. Thus, the position is supported by such indirect arguments.

The defense involves a promissory note: the failure of the effort to determine distinctness by definitions remains to be shown. The promissory note is paid by the refutations that follow. Inexplicability is tightly tied to nondistinctness: why there are appearances of *distinct* things (given the sole reality of non-dual Brahman) cannot be explained.

The interesting interpretive question concerning the passage above is, how seriously are we to take the “proof.” One might argue, as does Granoff,<sup>108</sup> that the logic invoked (“the rejection of one requires an embrace of the other”) is thought to constrain only those, who, like the Naiyāyikas, accept it (“by the method of our opponent”). Then Śrīharṣa, speaking for himself, goes on to say:

But in fact, we, setting down the burden firmly in the truth of Brahman, the self-proved and self-existent, the conscious soul, the alone, are satisfied and do not engage in trying to establish the reality or unreality of the whole display of diverse phenomena.<sup>109</sup>

Granoff’s reading is, somehow, not radical enough: here Śrīharṣa invokes the mystical perspective transcendent of spiri-

<sup>107</sup> *Parasya eva vyavastayā ... paryavasyati*. KKK (NavJha), 71.

<sup>108</sup> The terms Śrīharṣa uses to express contradictoriness between an assertion and its denial, viz, *vidhi* and *niṣedha*, are employed broadly in this sense. But, more narrowly, the Mīmāṃsakas use the terms for injunctions and prohibitions.

<sup>109</sup> *Vastutastu, vāyam sarva-prapañā-sattva-asattva ... sukham āsmahe*. KKK (NavJha), 72.

tual ignorance, *avidyā*; in the mystical perspective, no argument holds. Furthermore, Śrīharṣa does not engage in trying to show the reality or unreality of things, for Advaita takes neither position (it holds that things as distinct have, instead, an ontological status that is indeterminable, *anirvacanīya*, as real or unreal).<sup>110</sup> Similarly, Śrīharṣa continues:

And it is not the case that just mention (of your views) is a cause for objection, since, as has already been pointed out, it is quite (*param*) possible to engage in debate and reflection, accepting that such debate can be undertaken by those indifferent to matters such as whether to accept the reality or unreality of what is mentioned within a debate.<sup>111</sup>

This passage is not to be understood as a denial of all positions including Advaita's, but, literally, as a denial of reality and unreality with respect to things as distinct, in an embrace of the doctrine of indeterminability. Śrīharṣa concludes: "Then in this way it is established that the phenomenal display of diversity is indeterminable while Brahman alone is real in the supreme sense and non-dual."<sup>112</sup>

There is, finally, a general statement in the first chapter that is transitional between the positive program and the refutations that occupy most of the rest of the book. This follows the summary passage,<sup>113</sup> concerning the establishment of Advaita by arguments in accordance with Nyāya canons, and on the need to have the direct experience of self-illuminating awareness. Thus the subsequent verse, which I now translate, is dramatically framed: "There is no law like a king's command that blocks refutations and keeps them from being used in support of one's own views."<sup>114</sup>

Granoff, near the end of her book, brings the overall picture

<sup>110</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 91.

<sup>111</sup> *Na ca upanyāsa eva ... aveditatvāt. KKK* (NavJha), 73.

<sup>112</sup> *Tad evam bheda-prapañcofnirvacanīyaḥ, Brahma eva tu parama-artha-sad advitīyam iti sthitam. Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

into focus with respect to this verse (although she again obscures it in the very last pages):

Although it has been said for the opponent's sake that scripture constitutes a valid means to know non-duality and that the validity of scriptures can be demonstrated by careful examination, in fact, non-duality is nothing more than self-valid consciousness, requiring no external proof and beyond the range of discursive thought marking all inquiry. For him who recognizes this fact, the proofs herein outlined have no place. As before, by means of the arguments here given, employing only those means the opponent himself has outlined as constituting legitimate reasoning, it is the opponent who is forced to accept the doctrine of non-duality. And starting from this belief, he too can come to know his own soul with the immeasurable joy that such self-realization brings. For Śrīharṣa, then, non-duality is self-evident; for the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and Jain it is demonstrated by the very principles they all admit.<sup>115</sup>

Śrīharṣa concludes the section of the first chapter on the Advaita programme, prior to the refutations, by talking again, briefly, about debate.<sup>116</sup> We noted that according to Nyāya there are different kinds of debate; to be precise, there are *vāda*, "inquiry aiming at the truth," *jalpa*, "debating for victory (where utilizing tricky arguments is okay so long as one gets his way)," and *vitandā*, "refutational debate by captious argument with no express regard for establishing a thesis of one's own."<sup>117</sup> The question is, how should Śrīharṣa's refutations be taken by Naiyāyika (and other opponents)? Fundamentally, again, the refutations are to serve to back them into the Advaita view, by means of eliminative argument and more. But Śrīharṣa anticipates that the refutations will be construed as confined in scope to the particular topics examined and the epistemological positions and ontological categories of Nyāya,

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 127–29.

<sup>117</sup> *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.2.1–3. Concerning *vitandā*, Esther Solomon holds it to be clear that Naiyāyikas came to regard debate of this type as motivated by a positive position, not skepticism for its own sake. Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, 1:116.

et al. He anticipates as well the objection that were he, Śrīharṣa, concerned with the truth (*vāda*), he would offer an alternative, patched-up view on each of the topics. Thus Śrīharṣa has in mind someone who insists on a replacement theory for each and every individual topic in which the Logician position is shown to be untenable. His reply is that his reflection should be (provisionally) taken as being in the spirit of a radical *vitāṇḍin*, a debater who has no positive view *on that topic*. Thus he emphasizes that what principally concerns him is not any individual topic, but rather relinquishment of the entire Nyāya realist view in an embrace of the Advaita alternative.<sup>118</sup>

### 5.5. MYSTIC WAYS, INTUITION AND TRANCE

Advaita indeed faces dilemmas of its own. There is a basic tension between Advaita's understanding of the content of scriptural revelation and immediate mystical experience of Brahman, on the one hand, and the non-Brahmanic content of perceptual and perception-related cognitions, on the other. Śrīharṣa is not as much of an anti-rationalist about this tension as one might think. Like Maṇḍana, Śrīharṣa regards Brahman as object, not as the *satta*, being-ness, revealed in all cognition, but nonetheless as *the* all-inclusive and omnipresent existent, *sat*. Indications of Brahman's all-inclusiveness can be gained by reasoning and close attention. But scripture is what we mainly have to rely on, although to personally become accomplished in profound meditation (which is what scripture teaches) would be best of all. The reality of Brahman as revealed mystically and proclaimed by the *Upaniṣads* negates suffering and the display of disparate, distinct phenomena. Precisely how the negation is to be understood is admittedly problematic; we like to use perceptual illusion as an analogy. But you can begin to see the negation for yourselves by examining ramifications of the proposition that things are fundamentally distinct. We will show that the distinctness display is negated by

<sup>118</sup> See *KKK* (NavJha), 571.

“debate-authorized” reasons, which claim presupposing distinctness cannot withstand scrutiny. Nevertheless, we admit that the display (and the suffering), are not to be classed as fictions, like the horn of a hare. We do not want to contend the precise ontological determination: this is in part what we mean when we say that things are indeterminable, *anirvacanīya*. We do not wish to deny the appearance of distinctness altogether. What we propose is that the mystical revelation is what is to be desired. That goal is proclaimed in the *Upaniṣads*, in particular in the identity texts (Thou art That, Thou art Brahman), and we see that these proclamations are supported by realizing that their opponents are dead.

In this way might the Advaitin be expected to lash out. Of course, any two comprehensive philosophies may be expected to be at odds. Ironically, the evidence that might best resolve Advaita’s disputes with Nyāya derives from mysticism. Have the Advaitins rightly understood the mystical experience that they exalt? Śrīharṣa gives us some clues about a supposed phenomenology of mystic trance, principally in the epic *NC* but also in the *KKK*.

## 5.6. ADVAITA AND THEISTIC VOLUNTARISM

An outstanding interpretive question concerns the seriousness of the apparent theism of Śrīharṣa’s epic poem (the *NC*) and the attitude, toward God (*Īśvara*) expressed in *KKK*. An exegetical tactic exploited by Śaṅkara regarding the blatantly theistic passages of the *Upaniṣads* is to applaud scripture as like a wise and compassionate guru tailoring its message to its audience’s capacity for comprehension and spiritual accomplishment. The Upaniṣadic statements about God creating this world, etc., are not to be taken as literally true, but are aids to meditation, for in the supreme self-experience all is non-dualistically known as one: there is no God over and above, separate from the self, and no world other than the omnipresent Brahman which is strictly identical with the self.

This apparent denial of a God transcendent to *māyā* and *avidyā*



(cosmic illusion and spiritual ignorance) appears all the more striking for its contrast with the reading of the *Upaniṣads* by Vedāntic theists. The appearance that Advaita is atheistic is further reinforced by the Advaita teaching of a phenomenology of meditation and mystic trance according to which a penultimate state of *samādhi* (“enstasy” or “self-absorption”) “with prop” (*samprajñāta-samādhi*) is sublated (all further world appearance has already disappeared) by a final state of “objectless” *samādhi* (*asamprajñāta-samādhi*) where only, the self is known non-dualistically, “by its own light” (*svayamjyotiḥ*). Śrīharṣa uses these very terms, borrowed from *Yogasūtras*.<sup>119</sup> Thus the apparent theism of the epic *NC* would be just that, apparent only.

The term Śrīharṣa uses in the poem to express a meditational attainment on Nala’s part is *samprajñāta-samādhi*, enstatic mystic trance “with prop”.<sup>120</sup> Thus this mystic accomplishment would fall short of the truth of Advaita (though often Nala is described as a “knower of Brahman”). Nala’s devotion and good works would be viewed, on this reading, as endorsed by the poet as a model for those unable to attain the ultimate state, but not as endorsed without qualification.

This is the easy way to fill *KKK* theistic *aporia*, “expression involving doubt, perplexing difficulty,” in particular, connecting the vague reference in *KKK* p. 125, to the *NC* chapter devoted to “praise of the supreme person.” This is Alexander’s way of untying the Gordian knot: cut through it with the clear, rigid logic of non-dualism borne out by the logic of sublatability. However, the extent to which Advaita jibes and moves in harmony with a voluntarist theism—and the sincerity of Śaṅkara’s and other Advaitins’ theistic statements—has been under-appreciated. In a passage immediately subsequent to this *KKK* reference to the *NC*, that is, following the key summary statement (where Śrīharṣa urges the Naiyāyika to “have faith in the doctrine of non-duality” taught by the *Upaniṣads* and reinforced by his arguments)

<sup>119</sup> For example, *Yogasūtra* 117.

<sup>120</sup> *NC* Canto XXI, verse 118.

Śrīharṣa says that his arguments of refutation ... cannot be rejected (or ignored) except by accepting that the world's arrangement is by the (arbitrary) supreme command of God. Ganganatha Jha translates, "[these] arguments of refutation ... cannot be impugned by any counter-argument except by such arbitrary assumptions as that 'the arrangements of the Universe depend on the will of a personal God.'"<sup>121</sup>

Among classical Advaitins, we find two poles: at one extreme, the world would disappear in a supreme self-absorption; and, at the other, the world as it is in all its diversity would be Brahman. Śrīharṣa makes gestures toward both extremes, and Śaṅkara can likewise be read as favoring one position and then favoring the other. Most of his other disciples, however, more clearly tend to one or the other stance. The question hinges on the Advaita understanding of the *jīvan-mukta*, the "living-enlightened," and there is much to take account of—both in primary Advaita texts and in modern scholarly discussions,<sup>122</sup> as well as in related metaphysical issues.

The world has to be dependent on consciousness to maintain the possibility of the Advaita understanding of Brahman. Or, viewed from another angle, the Advaita understanding of mystic trance and "living enlightenment" motivates a view of the world that is thoroughly idealist. If the world is not tightly dependent on consciousness, then neither could it be sublated and disappear (on the one extreme view) nor could it be known as not separate from Brahman (on the other).

The positive aspects of Śrīharṣan Advaita, in a nutshell, springs from a constructive thesis of self-illumination, self-certification and basis on Scripture. The contradictions shoot off, Śrīharṣa would say, from the dualistic standpoints and hence, refutations follow. KKK has already dealt a philosophical dialectic blow on

<sup>121</sup> KKK (NavJha), 126.

<sup>122</sup> See, for example, A. G. Krishna Warriar, *The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 1961); and Andrew Fort, "Śaṅkara on Jīvan-Mukti," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 19, no. 4 (Dec. 1991): 365–89.

the various non-Advaitic systems. Now, *NC* follows suit. The next chapter focuses on the methodological and philosophical dimensions in *NC* and a glance at how the apparent contradictions between the Brahman of *KKK* and the theistic voluntarism of *NC* are to be viewed.

## CHAPTER 6

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# Aesthetic Structuring of Advaita in *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*: Methodological and Philosophical Dimensions

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- 6.1. *Mahākāvyas* in Sanskrit
  - 6.2. *NC*: A Summary of the Twenty-Two Cantos
  - 6.3. Sources and Innovations of *NC*
    - 6.3.1. Sources
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    - 6.3.8. Language and Style of *NC*
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    - 6.4.2. Vedāntic References in *NC*
    - 6.4.3. How to View the Poetic Refutations in *NC*?
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### 6.1. MAHĀKĀVYAS IN SANSKRIT

During the first millennium, Sanskrit literature witnessed a huge corpus of grand epics (*mahākāvyas*)<sup>1</sup> comprising several books or cantos. The grand epics of Kālidāsa and Aśvaghōṣa are a class in themselves in classic Sanskrit literature. Soon afterward, there grew up a rich variety of epic poetry, for example, the *Jānakīharaṇam* of Kumārādāsa, *Kirātārjunīyam* of Bhāravi, *Rāvaṇvadham* of Bhaṭṭi, *Śiṣupālavadhā* of Māgha and *Naiṣadhīyacaritam* (NC) of Śrīharṣa.

The NC is based on the story of King Nala of Niṣadha kingdom. It abounds in many philosophical doctrines. Śrīharṣa criticizes and

1 NC is worthy of the name as one of the *pañcamahākāvyas*. I give here below only references to two definitions of *mahākāvyas*:

- (1) *Sarga bandho mahākāvyam tatraiko nāyakaḥ suraḥ ...* (Viśvanātha, *Sāhitya Darpaṇam*, *Pariccheda* VI)
- (2) *Āṣīrnamaskriyā vastunirdeśo vāpi tanmukham...* (Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaḍarsaḥ* I)

The salient features of these definitions are:

1. Its subject should be historical or pertaining to some good or great personage.
2. It may have a single *dhīrodatta* celestial or *kṣatriya* hero or it may deal with a famous race of kings.
3. It must be an extensive work having at least 8 sargas, which must neither be too short nor long. The sargas must have a single basic metre with change of metre towards the end. There may be a sarga having a variety of metres. There must be a suggestion of the subject matter of the next canto, at the end of each canto.
4. A *mahākāvya* must be embellished with descriptions of cities, oceans, mountains, seasons, the rising and setting of the sun and the moon, hunts, battles, marches, counsel, birth of princes, etc.
5. The predominant sentiment should be *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vīra* or *Śānta* and other sentiments should be subsidiary to them.
6. It may begin with *āśiḥ*, “benedictive statements,” *namaskriyā*, “salutations” or *vastunirdeśa*, “gist of the plots.”
7. In keeping with its subject matter it must have an elevated and dignified style decorated with figures of speech and following the norms of poetics.

aesthetically rejects non-Advaitic philosophical views through important verses scattered throughout the cantos of *NC* and argues in favour of the tenets of Advaita. Here the author tries to project his philosophical views under the beautiful presentation of the story of Nala re-formed under the protection of his aesthetic and literary innovations.

*NC* contains a large number of philosophical allusions. In his *KKK Śrīharaṣa* establishes the supremacy of monistic Vedānta on a logical basis. In *NC* he refers to doctrines of Non-Vedāntic and Vedāntic philosophies, and passes in review a number of characteristic theories, as if he desired his poem to serve also as an introduction to the study of the philosophical systems and popularize it by his dialectic and aesthetic refutational references in *NC*. So, an attempt has been made in this chapter to enumerate and discuss, where necessary, the various doctrines referred to in the poem, especially those of Indian Philosophy.

Śrīharaṣa, the philosopher-poet, as a firm adherent of the non-dualistic doctrine, has established the concept of the Advaitic Brahman in an original manner using conspicuous expositional techniques. With the view of establishing the Advaita tenets, the philosopher poet has sought to repudiate the views of other philosophical systems. Such views of opposition are scattered here and there over different verses in different cantos of the epic. So a systematic presentation of structuring of his dialectic in *NC* has been a long-felt desideratum, which is attempted here.

## 6.2. THE NC: A SUMMARY OF THE TWENTY-TWO CANTOS

*Naiṣadhīya* means 'of Naiṣadha', Naiṣadha was the king of the Niṣadha country. Thus the title *Naiṣadhīyacaritam (NC)* means the biography of King Nala of the Niṣadha country. The poem thus gives a biography of King Nala.

The story of Nala and Damayantī is one of the most popular stories of India, codified in the epic *purāṇa*, namely, *Mahābhārata*. It has attracted many poets and dramatists, who have enriched

Sanskrit literature by frequently drawing upon it. More than sixty works like dramas, poems and *campūs*<sup>2</sup> based on this story in Sanskrit language alone bespeak its popularity. The reason for its popularity lies possibly in a tradition that has accorded to it a religious sanctity by declaring that its recitation destroys sin and ill-luck.

*Kārkoṭakasya nāgasya Damayantī Nalasya ca |*  
*Ṛtuparṇasya Rājarṣeḥ kīrtanam kalināśanam ||*<sup>3</sup>

The story of Nala, called Nalopākhyāna, occurs in the *Mbh*, the *purāṇas*, and in folklore literature such as the *Kathāsaritsāgara*. Its Jain versions appear in the *Kumārapālapratibodha* and many other works.

Śrīharṣa has followed the story of *Mbh* in spite of some deviations, elaborations and additions necessary to cast the simple matter of fact narrative into the mould of an ornate grand poem. The poem deals only with the earlier part of the life of Nala, that is, up to his marriage with Damayantī and his dalliance with her. It is divided into twenty-two cantos.

Canto I. *Haṃsasaṅgamanam* (Meeting with a swan): The poem opens directly with the description of Nala's greatness, prowess and physical beauty due to which the damsels of all the three worlds including Damayantī are attracted towards him. Nala is also attracted towards her on hearing about her matchless beauty and unparalleled feminine qualities. To hide his love-sickness he goes to his park, where he captures a golden swan which implores the king to relieve it. The piteous king leaves the bird free. The piteous lovelorn condition of Nala is effectively described. The pathos delineated now into the mourning of the swan is also very touching.

Canto II. *Vihāṅgagamanam* (Departure of the swan): The

<sup>2</sup> See *NC*, trans. Jani A.N, Appendix on literature on the Nala story.

<sup>3</sup> *Mbh* III.79.11. Cf. also, Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical*, 184.

freed bird returns to the hand of Nala, describes the beauty of Damayantī and promises Nala that it will describe him before her in such a way that his image will not be ousted from her heart even by the Lord of Gods. The bird leaves, with the consent of Nala, for Kuṇḍinapura, the capital of Vidarbha, where Damayantī's father Bhīma reigned. The poet is eloquent in describing the alluring physical beauty of Damayantī. The diplomacy of the swan is also noteworthy.

Canto III. *Patipataga-dūtālāpa* (The bird-envoy's chant of the message from the king): The bird alights on the ground near Damayantī and describes the beauty and virtues of Nala before her. Damayantī confides in it and confesses her love for Nala and entreats the bird to unite her with him. The bird returns to Nala and conveys him the success of his mission. Here the bird describes the physical charm and covetable traits of the hero before the heroine so cleverly that the image of Nala is firmly implanted in the heart of the heroine as promised by the swan to Nala.

Canto IV. *Vaidarbhī Vipralambhā* (Lovelorn Damayantī): The entire canto is devoted to describe the lovelorn condition of Damayantī, who, unable to bear further the pangs of separation, falls unconscious. On hearing the cries of her friends, her father comes to the scene, gauges the situation and declares that he will soon arrange for the *svayamvara* of Damayantī. The pangs of Damayantī are very pathetically described in detail. The poet's skill in delineating the *vipralambhā* eros is evident here.

Canto V. *Puruhūtakaitavam* (The fraud of Indra): Nārada informs Indra about the *svayamvara* of Damayantī, the description of whose maddening beauty by the sage makes Indra, Agni, Yama and Varuṇa love-sick for her. They start earthward to win her hand. On the way they meet Nala, whom the crafty Indra binds with a promise to be their envoy and to request Damayantī to select one of them. Nala puts forth an excuse of his inability to enter the fully-guarded harem. Indra then grants him power of remaining invisible as long as he wishes. The description of lovelorn condition even of gods nicely suggests the maddening charms and qualities of the heroine.



Canto VI. *Niṣadheśapraveśaḥ* (The entry of Nala, the Lord of Niṣadha country): Nala enters the harem. His romantic experiences by dashing against girls of harem are vividly described. He hears the messages of the go-betweens of the four gods, conveyed to Damayantī and is pleased to hear their rejection by her. Here we find a nice picture of humorous and wonderful experiences of Nala moving invisible in the harem. The temptations and the threats of gods trying to win the love of Damayantī through the female messengers are aptly put forth.

Canto VII. *Varavarṇinīvarṇanam* (Description of the beautiful Damsel): Nala observes Damayantī closely and describes her from top to toe. The poet becomes very eloquent in this canto. Following the rules of *mahākāvya*s he dedicates the entire canto for describing the different parts of Damayantī's beautiful body. Such a detailed description of feminine beauty is rarely found in *mahākāvya*s.

Canto VIII. *Niṣṣṭārthanaiṣadhaḥ* (Nala conveys the message): Nala becomes visible. Being asked by Damayantī, he introduces himself as a messenger of gods and entreats her to select one of them as her husband. Here Nala's character as an ideal messenger is effectively delineated.

Canto IX. *Bhaimī-Nalānūlāpaḥ* (Conversation between Bhaimi and Nala): The entire canto is dedicated to a capturing dialogue between Nala and Damayantī. Nala is shown at his best in being loyal to his mission. Desperate Damayantī pours forth her grief in melancholy strains of the deepest despair. Nala, unable to bear the plight of Damayantī, discloses unconsciously his identity but repents his blunder. Suddenly the swan appears and advises Nala not to trouble Damayantī anymore. Here the poet has very successfully brought out the clash between personal love and duty on the part of Nala.

Canto X. *Svayamvaraḍambaraḥ* (The pomp of the *svayamvara*), Canto XI. *Anaiṣadhaniṣedhaḥ* (Rejection of all except Nala), and Canto XII. *Dvitiyaḥ anaiṣadhaniṣedhaḥ* (Rejection of all except Nala continued), are devoted to the description of *svayamvara* in which persons from the three worlds are present. Bhīmasena

receives them and offers them seats according to their status. Nala sees Gods impersonating his form. Bhīmasena, not finding any one capable of introducing the suitors, invokes Sarasvatī, who introduces to Damayantī the gods, semi-gods, serpent-kings and many mortal kings, one after the other. These three cantos highly speak of the poet's art of elaboration. The detailed description of suitor-kings is unique in the field of Sanskrit poetic literature.

Canto XIII. *Anirṇītanalaḥ* (Damayantī on the horns of dilemma): Damayantī is finally brought before Nala. But she is perplexed to see five Nalas instead of one. Sarasvati in order not to invite wrath of gods, extols them one by one in such a way that the same stanza may yield double entendre, two meanings one referring to a particular god and the other to Nala. While introducing Nala also she resorts to the same trick. Śrīharṣa's command over the language reaches its zenith in a verse (XIII.34) which, by force of paronomasia, yields five meanings applied to Nala and four gods individually. Poet's command over Sanskrit language reaches its climax in this canto.

Canto XIV. *Vairasenīvaraṇam* (Selection of Nala by Damayantī): Damayantī at her wits' end propitiates gods to identify Nala. By the power granted by them she grasps the meaning of the verse yielding five meanings, identifies Nala and garlands him. Gods now appear in their real form and confer boons upon Nala and Damayantī and retire to Heaven.

Canto XV. *Varavadhūvibhūṣaṇam* (The decoration of the bride and the bridegroom), and Canto XVI. *Vaidarbhīpariṇayaḥ* (The marriage of Damayantī), are devoted to the description of decoration of the bride and bridegroom for marriage ceremony, the procession of Nala, the marriage rituals, the marriage party, the farewell of the bride, and the entry of the newly-wed couple in the city and in the palace of Nala. The description of marriage ceremony and customs—especially the erotic jokes and mockeries of female attendants at the marriage banquet are very graphic.

Canto XVII. *Kali-Nala-dveṣaḥ* (Kali's jealousy of Nala) is devoted to the description of Kali, a belated suitor of Damayantī who, on hearing from gods about Damayantī's selecting Nala,

declares his stern resolution to ruin Nala by snatching away both Damayantī and the kingdom from him. He enters the capital of Nala and resides on a *bibhītaka* tree seeking an opportunity to possess Nala. The powerful presentation of Cārvāka's philosophy of materialism seems indefatigable. His stern resolution, however, remains unfulfilled in this poem.

Canto XVIII. *Vaidarbhīsambhogaḥ* (Nala's enjoyment of Damayantī) is devoted to the descriptions of Nala's amorous dalliance with Damayantī in which the poet ransacks the whole *Kāmasūtra*. The poet here surpasses Kālidāsa's description of Śiva-Pārvatī's amorous sports presented in the *Kumārasambhava*.

Canto XIX. *Vibhātavibhāvanam* (The description of the daybreak), and Canto XX. *Parihāsavilāsa* (The description of amorous jokes and funs), describe the daybreak and the amorous jokes and funs of the couple.

Canto XXI. *Cārucaritam* (Excellent conduct) presents Nala's daily program such as bath, worship of gods, and evening adorations.

Canto XXII. *Śaśāṅkasāṅkīrtanam* (Description of the moon): The poem ends with a beautiful and poetic description of evening and the rising moon. The description of moonrise is unique and most enchanting.

## 6.3. SOURCES AND INNOVATIONS OF NC

### 6.3.1. Sources

The story of Nala and Damayantī is one of the most popular stories of India and as such it has attracted many poets and dramatists, who have enriched the Sanskrit literature by frequently drawing upon it.<sup>4</sup> It occurs in the *Mbh*,<sup>5</sup> in the Purāṇas<sup>6</sup> and in folklore

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix on literature on Nala story.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Āraṇyakaparvan Part 1 (quoted in Jani, *Critical Study*, 13).

<sup>6</sup> Padma-srṣṭikhaṇḍa 8; *Liṅgapurāṇa* I.66.24–25; *Vāyupurāṇa* II.26; *Matsyapurāṇa* XII.56; *Harivamsapurāṇa* I.15; and *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* II. 63.173–4 (quoted in *Ibid.*).

literature.<sup>7</sup> But Śrīharṣa seems to follow the account as given in the *Mbh* in spite of certain deviations, elaborations and additions which are necessary to cast the simple matter-of-fact narrative of the *Mbh* into the mould of an ornate poem.

### 6.3.2. Innovations

Though following the *Mbh* episode in the broad outline of the story, Śrīharṣa seems to deviate in the minor details which are noted as under:

(1) In the *Mbh*, Nala sees the swan in the garden, but Śrīharṣa gives a specific location, namely, a lake in the garden where the swan is seen by Nala.

(2) In the *Mbh*, Nala releases the swan only after securing a promise of going to Damayantī with Nala's mission. In the *NC* the bird is released unconditionally by Nala, who is moved by its pathetic lamentations. The bird undertakes the work only out of his high regard for the king whose kindness it wants to repay.

(3) The *Mbh* informs us that many swans flew to Kuṇḍinapura and alighted near Damayantī and her companions who pursued them each running after one. Śrīharṣa on the other hand, sees propriety in sending just the one swan.

(4) Damayantī's lovesickness is conveyed to her father by her female friends in the *Mbh*, while Śrīharṣa renders it more effective by introducing Bhīmasena who appears on the scene on hearing the cries of confusion of Damayantī's friends who are trying to restore her to senses from swoon.

(5) The gods Agni, etc., are described in the *Mbh* as coming to Indra when Nārada is speaking about Damayantī. Śrīharṣa, on the other hand, introduces them on the scene very late. They come after the departure of Nārada and follow Indra, who is ready to start earthward.

(6) The *Mbh* introduces Kali, when a long period has elapsed after the marriage of Nala and Damayantī, while Śrīharṣa intro-

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Kathāsaritsāgara* IX.56 (quoted in *Ibid.*).

duces him immediately after their marriage and makes him witness their various enjoyments.

(7) Regarding the nature and number of boons bestowed upon the king by the gods, there is a considerable change.

(8) But all these are minor changes when compared to the change introduced by Śrīharṣa regarding the characterization of Nala.

### 6.3.3. Expansions of the Original Theme

Expansions are an outstanding feature of the *NC* which expands the first 158 verses of the *Mbh* epic story into an elaborate composition of 2827 verses. The following are instances of elaboration in *NC*:<sup>8</sup>

S/No	Theme	<i>Mbh</i>	SH's <i>NC</i>
1	Description of Nala	50.1–4 & 14	I.1–30
2	Description of Damayantī on the threshold of youth	50.1–4 & 14	II.17–39
3	Their mutual love	50.15–16	I.32–41 & 42–48
4	Nala's lovelorn condition and going to the garden	50.17	I.49–116
5	His seeing golden swans and catching one of them	50.18	I.117–128
6	The speech of the swan	50.19–20	I.129–142
7	King's releasing of the bird and its flight to Vidarbha	50.21	I.143 to II.72
8	Swan's alighting near Damayantī, who pursues one of them	50.22–25	II.107 to III.12
9	Dialogue between the swan and Damayantī	50.26–30	III.13–128
10	Damayantī's lovelorn condition	51.1–4	IV.1–114
11	Nārada and Parvata going to Indra; their dialogue with Indra	51.11–21	V.1–44

<sup>8</sup> Jani, *Śrīharṣa*, 55–56.

12	Gods' meeting with Nala on their way	51.26–27	V.60–72
13	Dialogue between gods and Nala	51.28 to 52.10	V.73–137
14	Damayantī as seen by Nala	52.11–12	VII complete (1–109)
15	Dialogue between Damayantī and Nala	52.18 to 53.11	VIII.19 to IX complete (1–158)
16	Description of kings coming to attend the <i>svayamvara</i>	51.9–10 and 54.1–2	X.1–36
17	Description of the <i>svayamvara</i> hall	54.3	X.57–66
18	Introduction of various kings	54.10	X.7 to XIII.
19	Damayantī's marriage	54.33	XV complete (1–92) and XVI.48–112
20	Nala's enjoyments	54.34, 37	XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI (1–6 & 119–162)
21	Nala's religious zeal	54.36	XXI.7–118
22	Encounter of gods with Kali accompanied by Dvāpara; their dialogue with Kali	55.1–4	XVII.109–221

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### 6.3.4. Additions

The following are some Śrīharṣan additions which have no parallel in the *Mbh*:

Description of a horse (I.57–63), of trees (I.76–103), of a lake (I.108–116), of the swan (I.117–123), of the city of Kuṇḍinapura (II.73–106), of Damayantī's palace (VI.58–72), of the love pangs of Indra (V.45–54 and VIII.61–70) and of other gods (VIII.71–108), of the romantic experiences of Nala moving invisibly in the apartments of Damayantī (VI.10–47), of preliminaries (XV), of the nuptial ceremony (XVI.13–47), of the entertainment of Nala and his party by Dama, the brother of Damayantī (XVI.48–112), of Kali's host (XVII.14–34), of the philosophy of the Cārvāka school, and its refutation by gods (XVII.36–106), of Nala's capital (XVII.163–204), morning (XIX.1–64), of Nala's jokes (XX.26–

139), of Nala's daily programme (XXI.1–162) and, lastly, of evening, darkness and moonrise (XXII.3–148).

### **6.3.5. New Characters**

Over and above these additions, the poet has invented some new characters also, for example, the female messenger of Indra (VI.77–86), the goddess Sarasvatī (X.74–XIV.99), playful companion of Damayantī, namely, Kalā (XX.26–139) and the materialist Cārvāka (XVI.36–108), not to mention other minor characters—Lust, Wrath, Avarice and Delusion (XVIII.16–34)—as personified by the poet.

### **6.3.6. Kali versus Gods/Dramatic Dialectic in *Devākālīyam* (Canto XVII)**

To give a dramatic flavour to all these philosophical discussions and controversies, Śrīharṣa borrows the *Mbh* plot, transforms it and introduces Kali into Canto XVII. The vehement attack on the *āstika*/Vedic religions under the garb of a Cārvāka is dramatically presented in *NC*.

The fact that the poet wanted to write his poem further and did not intend to stop where the present poem ends, is quite evident from the clever introduction of Kali, the root cause of all mischief, in Canto XVII, wherein he sows the seed of the sequel of the poem dealing with Kali's persecution of Nala, to which he alludes in various places as seen above. In the beginning he describes the army of Kali, consisting of evil spirits such as Lust, Wrath, Avarice, Delusion, etc., and gradually introduces his panegyrist Cārvāka, who vilifies the scriptures and religious practices, and is made tongue-tied by the gods.

Next comes Kali, who, when informed by the gods about Damayantī's selecting Nala as her husband, being enraged, pronounces his stern resolution to wreak vengeance in following words: 'Ye who are wise, know this to be my vow, mine, Kali's, with regard to Nala. Deprive him I will of Damayantī and his

kingdom as well. Vanquish him I will.' His malignant disposition is further evinced from his own words, namely, 'Lo, let the worlds celebrate my enmity with Nala, adorned as my valour is with a wild wrath, as they do the Sun's hostility to the night lotus blossom.'<sup>9</sup> Disrespecting gods' threatening advice, he, blinded by jealousy, starts, with Dvāpara alone as his companion to execute his resolve; comes to Nala's capital (XVII.161–162) and in spite of many obstacles on his way (XVII.163–204) reaches the pleasure garden of Nala and takes shelter on a *bibhītaka* tree, waiting for an opportunity to oppress Nala (XVII.217). Thus practically the whole of the Canto XVII, the longest one in the poem, is devoted to narrate the hostile attitude of Kali towards Nala. Again, Śrīharṣa is not satisfied in simply devoting a full canto in his poem to Kali, but artistically tries to remind his readers, in XX.8, about Kali's vigilant watch over this happy couple, a hint to which was given previously in XIII.37 as seen above. Damayantī, who is not able to bear separation from Nala even for a very short period during which he can attend the morning adorations, is addressed by Kali (speaking in his mind), who is all of a sudden introduced by the poet, with following words: 'Foolish girl, thou art vexed even at a rite that separates thee from thy beloved for a moment. But do I not purpose to sever thee from him for good?'

All these forecasts and introduction of Kali in the poem would become inconsistent if the present poem is deemed to be complete. It is not proper to say that such incidents exemplify Śrīharṣa's loose construction, as it would be most unbecoming on the part of a poet of his achievements. Thus the internal evidence shows that the extant poem is incomplete, and that the sequel is either lost or the poet could not finish his book.

Through our general study of the role of *NC* in Sanskrit *mahākāvyas* and the philosophical relevance of *NC* from the view point of the refutational material available in *NC* and the constructive Advaitic programme of Śrīharṣa, we may conclude that

<sup>9</sup> Canto XVII, 138–39.



Śrīharṣa had an agenda in *NC* with respect to other philosophical systems. *NC* should thus serve as an introductory philosophical manual for the connoisseurs and the public, while his *KKK* serves as an in-depth dialectic study.

### 6.3.7. Dramatic Style

His style is sometimes dramatic, theatric, performative, and conversational, especially in the speeches, which are full of wit and repartee (VI.90, 100; IX.8–14; XVII.121–132; XX.37–49). Use of speech within a speech (VI.101–107) or colloquial phrases such as *bravīṣi na, vada, katham* (IX.89) *na na* (IX.114); *tadveda* (IX.124), *hum hum* (XX.66) *dr̥ṣṭam dr̥ṣṭam* (XX.67) give a colloquial tinge to Śrīharṣa’s poetry and show him as a good conversationalist.

If Kālidāsa’s muse should be described as a Padminī, if Bhāravi’s muse should be described as a Śaṅkhinī, if Māgha’s muse should be described as a Citriṇī, Śrīharṣa’s muse might well be described as a Hastinī, though capable of assuming the other forms also.<sup>10</sup> Or to put it in another form, if one describes Kālidāsa’s poetry as *dr̥kṣāpāka*, Bhāravi’s poetry as *nārikelapāka*, Bhāmaha’s disciples would like to call Śrīharṣa’s poetry as *kapitthapāka*.<sup>11</sup> MM Prof. Kuppuswāmī Śāstrī, on the other hand, characterizes the *pāka* (fruitive mode) of Śrīharṣa’s poem as *auśadhapāka* as denoted by the oft-quoted tag, “*Naiṣadham vidvadauśadham*” and as suggested by the name *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*—which in Ayurveda, denotes a certain medicine—given to his greatest polemic work. But the one of the last four epilogue stanzas, which have not come from Śrīharṣa’s pen, as is generally believed, it may be called as *amṛtapāka*, which when secured, at first with a laborious process of churning, rewards, in the end, the exertion by giving highest joy to the reader.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Brahmaśrī Muttappā Śāstrī, alias Veṅkaṭa Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī’s words as reproduced by MM Prof. Kuppuswāmī Śāstrī, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Bhāmaha, 5.62.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. XXII.151.

The real villain of the poem is Kali, whose army is constituted of Lust (XVII.14–18), Wrath (XVII.19–23), Avarice (XVII.24–28) and Delusion (XVII.29–34). Each of these is personified and a graphic description of each of them is given by the poet. Cārvāka the materialist is Kali's panegyrist (XVII.108) indulging in denouncing and attacking upon the Vedic religion and practices (XVII.3683).

As from the point of view of dramatic style, the character of Kali may be studied as follows, although it bears some repetition from point of view of characterization in our foregoing study of Kali. Kali is represented as accompanied by his friend Dvāpara and many other personified sins. He is en route to attend the *svayamvara* of Damayantī, but is enraged on knowing from the gods that she has already selected Nala as her husband. He invites the four gods to help him in his mission and to enjoy Damayantī jointly, as Draupadī was enjoyed by the five Paṇḍavas (XVII.132). Being laughed at for this foolish attempt of his, he pronounces his stern resolution of oppressing Nala so severely, that he shall have to give up not only Damayantī but also his kingdom (XVII.138). His enmity with Nala is vehement and life-long. He takes pride in his undertaking and is delighted in coming into a conflict with Nala (XVII.139). Disregarding the various advisory instructions of the gods, he starts out for Nala's capital and, not finding any suitable place, ultimately lodges himself on a *bibhītaka* tree in Nala's garden (XVII.217) to have a vigilant watch over Nala's doings and to possess him, when the proper opportunity arises. He threatens Damayantī, speaking, of course, to his own self, that in no time he will separate her from her husband (XX.8).

The story of Nala's afterlife is, however, not treated by the poet and hence we do not get any further information about Kali's role and the execution of his resolution, in the poem. Though seen for a short time, the picture of Kali is everlasting. His enmity, malevolence, cruelty, stern resolution and many other evil qualities are so nicely depicted by our poet, that it becomes difficult to forget him.

Argumentative elements in these speeches lend a dramatic touch to them. The poet's dramatic skill is seen in other places

also, like the dramatic removal of Damayantī's friends<sup>13</sup>. To suggest confusion and hurry, he uses series of verbs and gerunds (IV.111; XV.10, 27). Such examples may serve to illustrate dramatic elements of his style as well as his eloquent style. Śrīharṣa is equally adept in giving good word-pictures.<sup>14</sup>

To crown our literary and aesthetic study of his dramatic style, let me remind that Śrīharṣa dramatises the whole Advaitic philosophical import of the whole work of *NC*, for which it was drawn up—and for repudiating all the non-Advaitic philosophies:

Vedānta philosophy has been critically construed ... [in *NC*]. Māyā or Illusion has been depicted as the root cause of the empirical world. Several verses of the epic are indicative of Illusion. Orthodox viewpoint has been adapted by the poet, Supreme Self or Brahman has been depicted as “*Pañcama Koṭi*.” King Nala the hero of the epic, has been very often fancied as Brahman while philosophical discussions have come in the epic. Princess Damayantī has been portrayed as *Upaniṣad* that is inclined to Brahman. A separate section has been utilized with regard to the Refutation of Dualistic view.<sup>15</sup>

To put the theoretical aspect of our study in gist, the Advaita theories of Subtle Body, Dream and Dreamless Sleep, Supreme Self, path to attain Brahman, self-realization, liberation in life, concept of Brahman, etc., can be seen to be profusely discussed through the medium of *NC*.<sup>16</sup>

Let me give an example for the way in which the *NC* narrative

<sup>13</sup> Cf. III.7.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. III.54, IX.60, XII.31, XV.79ff, XVI.56, XX.62.

<sup>15</sup> Hare Krishna Meher, *Philosophical Reflections in the Naiṣadhācarita* (Calcutta: Kunti Pustak Mahal, 1989), 19. “*Pañcama Koṭi*” refers to the famous verse of the nihilist Buddhists: *Catuṣkoṭi vinirmuktam śūnyam mādhyamikāḥ vaduḥ*, “The reality is that which transcends the four modes of predication (all possible ways of talk end up in the four modes: is, is not, is or is not, is and is not), which is Nihil,” but the Advaitin transcends this *Catuṣkoṭi*, by positing beyond them the fifth, namely, the Brahman! The *Catuṣkoṭi* runs in Sanskrit thus: *asti, nāsty, asti-nāsti iti, nāsti-nāsti iti vā punaḥ*.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 19, 235–310.

projects the Advaitic portions in the scriptures in the most delicious manner. Śrīharṣa illustrates the metaphysics of the Vedānta forming *Jñānakāṇḍa* in an esthetical style thus: “In accordance with the Vedic divisions, metaphysical and ritual, the Mīmāṃsā by its two aspects forms Sarasvatī’s fleshy thighs gracious with marvellous costume.”<sup>17</sup>

### 6.3.8. Language and Style of NC

A. K. Warder says thus of Śrīharṣa:

The best twelfth-century epic is Śrīharṣa’s *NC* on Nala. The sensitive *rasa* predominates, with much of the comic also. The author was a philosopher and displays his learning, but the descriptive effusions are relevant to the story and the style full of charm. The scale is grand and Śrīharṣa did not finish the work.<sup>18</sup>

We may not expect the lucid and natural language of Kālidāsa from Śrīharṣa, the author of an abstruse philosophical work like *KKK*, he being a repository of traditional Sanskrit learning, as well as a product of an age of learning as seen earlier. Śrīharṣa’s literary style is Vaidarbhī, which is favourable to the erotic sentiment, as is clear from his own clever suggestion at III.116; XIV.91. But his Vaidarbhī differs from that of Kālidāsa, on account of the fact that Śrīharṣa is a product of an age of learning.

An outstanding feature of Śrīharṣa’s style is excessive use of alliteration and rhymes. Almost all the stanzas are adorned with these two figures. The next feature of his style is his perfectly fair use of double entendre. He always suggests more than one meaning. His fondness for alliteration and rhyme from among word-figures and for paronomasia from among the sense-figures is responsible for making his poetry stand in sharp contrast with that of Kālidāsa, whose poetry becomes at once intelligible to the

<sup>17</sup> *Brahmārtha-karmārthaka-veda-bhedād ... ūru-yugmam. NC X.81.*

<sup>18</sup> Warder, A.K., “Classical Literature,” in *Cultural History of India*, ed. A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 192.

readers by the presence of *prasādaguṇa* (perspicuity), which is absent, though not totally, in Śrīharṣa who culls obscure words from lexicons for alliteration and rhyme and who is fond of paronomasia which is by its very nature incompatible with the *prasādaguṇa*.

Another figure often employed by Śrīharṣa is *paryāyokta* or circumlocution. The next important figure in Śrīharṣa is *utprekṣā* wherein the different characteristics of Śrīharṣa's fancy are seen. Like his *utprekṣā*, his *upamā* is also varied.

The use of the word 'Ānanda' as a stamp of his authorship at the end of each canto<sup>19</sup> is also a remarkable mannerism of our poet. Similarly the words 'Auciti' (III.2–97) and *Mudrā* (III.86) seem to be catchwords of Śrīharṣa as *Uccakaiḥ* is of Māgha.

It must be said to the credit of Śrīharṣa that he has purposely avoided the *citrabandha tours de force* stanzas from his poem.

Thus on the whole his style is artificial and full of figures and at times full of compounds, in which case it comes near the Gauḍī style, it can be described unreservedly as vigorous *Vaidarbhī* to show its contrast from graceful *Vaidarbhī* of Kālidāsa.

*Khaṇḍakhāḍya* is an ayurvedic medicine. In Ayurveda, it is called as *avaleha*, which is considered to be a tonic for better health and cure of diseases—that is, it has a positive and a negative function. In this sense, *KKK* is a tonic of refutation (or Dish of Delectable Dialectic) and a boost for Advaita Vedānta. A parallelism may be drawn with the Western terminology too. The Greek language has *pharmakon*, with the combined meaning of medicine and intoxicant. The term 'drug' also possesses this combined sense. Therefore, to put it in brief, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍyam* or "Anirvacanīyatāsarvasvam" ("encyclopaedia of the doctrine of indefinability") has a dual meaning, for the particularist realist

<sup>19</sup> Bhāravi's stamp mark is 'Lakṣmī' and Māgha's 'Śrī'. This practice is found in *prākṛta* poems also. Pravarasena (Setubandha)'s stamp mark is 'Anurāga'; while Haribhadra Sūri (early part of 8<sup>th</sup> cent.) uses 'Viraha' as his mark.

(for non-Advaitins) it is a punch of refutation, and for the Advaitins it is a boost for better dialectic exercise.

*NC* is a medium to advance the cause of *KKK* in the mind of the non-specialist. Hence the relevance of the epithet: “*Naiṣadham vidvadauśadham.*” His dramatic style has been subservient to his whole purpose of sharpening the dialectical tools of *khaṇḍakhādyam/auśadham* for consumption by the populace in the shape of *NC*. From this it may be concluded that his dialectic had the conscious aims of bolstering, fostering and structuring the cause of Advaita.

### 6.3.9. How to View the Literary Defects of *NC*?

The tendency of putting form over matter, use of double entendre, verbal jugglery, etc., became more powerful after Kālidāsa, and the critics, who were all great pandits, began to judge poetry from this point of view and tried to see whether all the rules as prescribed by the rhetoricians were fulfilled by a poet or not. We, therefore, find in Bhāravi, Māgha and other poets elaborate descriptions of political councils, seasons, water sports and so on. But the critic in Bhāmaha had already rebelled long ago, against this tendency making one’s poem unintelligible without the help of a lexicon, due to the excessive use of obsolete and mostly lexicon-based words availed of for the sake of double entendre and other poetic feats. He denounced this by saying that there should be a difference between a poem and a *śāstra*. If a poem is to be understood like a *śāstra*, with the help of a commentary, alas it is a pleasure to the erudite only, while ordinary readers are undone. But this warning of Bhāmaha was out of place for the scholars whose tastes had not changed and Bhaṭṭi threw an open challenge to this warning by making his poem wantonly difficult and unintelligible without a commentary. His words ‘*Vidvatpriyatayā mayā*’ are a clear indication of the class of erudites who welcomed such poems.

We find other currents also in Sanskrit poetry beyond this current of the form becoming more prominent than matter. With

Subandhu, whose desire was to compose a work with *pratyakṣara śleṣa* (pun on every word) we see the rise of a tendency towards double entendre which influenced later poets like Bāṇa, Bhāravi, Māgha and Śrīharṣa. This art ultimately terminated in producing a different kind of literature called ‘*anekārtha sandhana kāvya*’ (or the poem where one and the same stanza was made to yield many different narratives) such as *Rāghavapāṇḍavīya*, etc.

In Bhaṭṭi, whose work illustrates grammatical forms, we find the role of grammar in poetry, the influence of which is visible in peculiar grammatical forms found in Māgha and Śrīharṣa.

Rhetoric, *Kāmasāstra* and *Arthasāstra* also played a great part in the development of Kāvya literature and this we find in the use of various figures, erotic descriptions of female beauties, the description of daily duties of kings, political discussions (*mantra*), etc., in the works of Sanskrit poets.

The influence of the Vakrokti school is also seen on poets like Maṅkhaka (AD 1135–1145) who wrote *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* and in the works of Śrīharṣa. The *Campū* literature has also influenced the Sanskrit poets.

So far we have seen how Śrīharṣa was influenced by these different currents. But a few facts from Śrīharṣa’s own works will show that, he was a product of an age of learning. A century or two before Śrīharṣa, a great controversy was going on regarding the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsakas, on the one hand, were trying to do away with Him, while the Naiyāyikas, like Udayana, were trying to establish His existence. Śrīharṣa seems to suggest this great problem of the day in XI.64. His *KKK* is nothing but a destructive critique of Udayana’s *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. *KKK* was refuted in its turn by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā. Great disputes were held in the royal courts to decide the superiority of the pandits, who were throwing open challenges to others. In order to surpass the rivals, the pandits sometimes even resorted to the supernatural powers and there are many references to the propitiation of Sarasvatī, the Goddess of Learning, for such powers. Śrīharṣa’s poem is an outcome of such a *Cintāmaṇi Mantra* of Sarasvatī to which he devotes some stanzas (XIV.88–92). Amaraçandra Sūri and Har-

ihara are described as Siddhasārasvata scholars by Rājaśekhara. Bālacandra (first-half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century), the author of the *Vasantavilāsa*, is also described as having received such a Sārasvata Mantra from Udayasūri of Vasudevasūrigaccha. Somadeva, in his *Yaśastilaka Campū* (AD 959), says that a poetry was merely a by-product of his philosophical studies. This is true in case of *NC* as well, whose author is well-known also for his philosophical work *KKK*, and who, like his predecessor Somadeva, is a classic example of contributions to *tarka* and poetry. The *NC* being a by-product of a Vedāntic scholar, is naturally a difficult poem, being fully influenced by the age of Learning to which its author belonged. Such poems are not meant for the masses but for a special class of learned persons, for whom it was at once intelligible. Poets like Śrīharṣa cared to satisfy the wants of such classes and ignored the masses. Thus, what was difficult to others was brain- tonic to some and thus *NC* is rightly called ‘*vidvadauṣadham*’.

Ravindranath Tagore says,

Artists and connoisseurs build their towers on the summit plateaux of art. It is idle to hope that all and sundry will climb up there easily. It is because multi-coloured and multi-savoured clouds confer there on the heights, that the plains get the benefit of their fertilising showers. It is only in this way that the commonalty joins hands with the rare spirits which cannot be achieved if you dwarf the heights, so that, these may always mate with the plains. Those who are creators of *rasa* could only take orders from all on penalty of ship-wreck. They can take orders from none other than the Supreme Resident of the heart, and once this is done, when they succeed in fashioning things of beauty for all times, then these must come authentically within the right of enjoyment of all. To say that all have this right is not to say that all can profit by it; here and now good things are not so cheap as all that ... If you respect the masses and go on supplying them with things of quality, then by and by, their minds grow more and more sensitive to the quality.<sup>20</sup>

It is not proper, therefore, to call such an age of Sanskrit poetry as an age of decadence of poetry. If Śrīharṣa’s poem is called a

<sup>20</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, 240.



poem of decadent age, Kālidāsa's *Raghuvamśa*, especially Canto IX, will also come under that age. Is it ever possible to think that such an age of decadence can continue for such a long period from Kālidāsa to Śrīharṣa? It would, therefore, be proper to call this an age of learning, rather than an age of decadence. That is to say that the so-called literary defects of Śrīharṣa are to be analysed not as mere pedantry, but as exemplifying a massive genre by its own right, characterized by the qualities of the age of learning, which, in combination with his scientific dialectic, is historically more responsible for Śrīharṣa's so-called literary defects than his desire to exhibit dry erudition!

### **6.3.10. The Wide Acceptance of NC<sup>21</sup>**

Together with Śrīharṣa's own aim of popularizing Advaita, the religious approval<sup>22</sup> already given to the Nala story of *Mbh* was a key factor in the popularization of the *mahākāvya*. But the spread of use of the story of *NC* was not restricted merely among the Jains of far wide. It seems to be enthusiastically studied since the 13<sup>th</sup> century up to the present day by all peoples in the different parts of India, as is clear from a very big number (nearly 46) of commentaries on it. Thus Vidyādhara (AD 1250 or 1260) and Cāndū (AD 1297) wrote their commentaries in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. 14<sup>th</sup> century gives us a good number of commentaries from the following scholars: Vamśivadana (not later than AD 1321). Īṣānadeva (AD 1322). Bhavadeva (AD 1335), Mallinātha (between AD 1350 and AD 1425) and Narahari (*ca.* AD 1380). Caritravardhana's (AD 1455) commentary belongs to the 15<sup>th</sup> century, while Nārāyaṇa probably wrote his commentary in the 16<sup>th</sup> cent. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century the poem seems to reach the climax of its popularity, as it gets ten commentators in that century, namely, Bharata Mallika, Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Mahādeva Vidyāvāgīśa, Ratnacandra, Śrīnivāsa, Jinarāja, Ānanda Rājānaka, Bhagīratha, Gopinātha Ratha and Visveśvara

<sup>21</sup> I am indebted to late Prof A. N. Jani for these details from his work.

<sup>22</sup> *Mbh* III. 79.11.

Bhaṭṭa (*alias* Gāgā Bhaṭṭa). Visveśvara, the son of Lakṣmīdhara, belonged to the 18<sup>th</sup> century. While Premacandra and Venkaṭa Raṅganātha belonged to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The 20<sup>th</sup> century has given us the well-known scholar M. M. Haridāsa Siddhāntavāgīśa as a commentator, whose commentary was published in 1927.

These commentators come from the different provinces of India. Thus Ānanda Rājānaka (Kashmir) and Bhagīratha (Kūrmācala) come from the North. Īśānadeva (Banaras) and Gadādhara (Doab country) come from U.P., while from Bengal are Bharatasena (Kāñchrāpāra in Hoogly Dist.), Haridāsa Siddhāntavāgīśa (Unasiya in E. Bengal), Mahādeva Vidyāvāgīśa and Premacandra (Calcutta). From the South have hailed Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Mallinātha, Narahari (Andhra), Nārāyaṇa, Śrīnivāsa and Venkaṭa Ranganātha; while from Gujarat are Vidyādhara, Cāṇḍū (Dholaka near Ahmedabad), Cāritravardhana, Jinarāja, Ratnacandra and Municandra.

The all-round acceptance of the *NC* can be seen also from its translations into the languages of the different provinces as well as from its influence on the provincial literatures of India. Thus it was translated, probably for the first time, by a Telugu poet called Śrīnātha as early as the 15<sup>th</sup> century AD. It is further translated freely into Hindi in different Hindi metres by Gumāna Mīśra, a protégé of Ali Akbar Khan, in *ca.* AD 1769.

Śrīharṣa has given a new model of poetic composition, and as such many poets have tried to tread the path chalked out by him. Thus *Uttaranaiśadha*, a poem of 16 cantos, by Vandārubhaṭṭa (or Āttūr Bhaṭṭattiri) describes the later life of Nala; it replaces in a measure the lost portion of Śrīharṣa's poem and must be regarded as a sequel to it. For this composition, Śrīharṣa's poem was the model. The closing verses of each canto take a similar form and indicate the number of the canto that ends there. There are many instances where he has adopted the style of Śrīharṣa.<sup>23</sup> Similarly

<sup>23</sup> Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical*, 184–85.

*Haihayendracarita*, by the poet Bhānubhaṭṭa alias Hari is also written on the model of the *NC*.<sup>24</sup>

Among the Hindi poets, Canda (end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century) in his *Prthvīrāja Rāso*, mentions Śrīharṣa with great respect and places him before Kālidāsa.<sup>25</sup> Again the late Pt. Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, who wrote a drama called *Damayantī-svayamvara*,<sup>26</sup> is one of the poets influenced by Śrīharṣa, as his drama mainly draws upon the *NC* for its plot.

Marathi poets like Narendra and Raghunātha Paṇḍita also betray traces of influence of the *NC* in their poems. The former wrote, in AD 1292, a poem entitled *Rukmiṇīsvayamvara*, where, according to Dr. Watve, the description of the love of Kṛṣṇa and Rukmiṇī, of the assembled king by the Kinnara, of the lovelorn condition of Rukmiṇī and of the measures taken by her friend to counteract it, of the physical charms of Rukmiṇī and Kṛṣṇa are modelled upon the *NC* while Raghunātha Paṇḍita, in his small poem (254 stanzas) called *Damayantī-svayamvara*, not only frankly admits his indebtedness to Śrīharṣa but also says that his poem is just a commentary on the *NC*.<sup>27</sup>

Among the Gujarati poets, Bhālaṇa in his *Nalopākhyāna*, not only draws upon the *NC* but at times reproduces the original stanzas in Gujarati garb.

Wide-spread study of the *NC* can be inferred not only from the different abridgments of the poem, or from the summaries of

<sup>24</sup> Dasgupta and De, *History of Sanskrit*, 629.

<sup>25</sup> *Naramrūpa Pancama Śrīharṣasāram* | *Nalairāya kaṇṭham dinai suddhaharam* || *Indian Antiquary*, II.213.

<sup>26</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, 278.

<sup>27</sup> *Lokom saurabhakāvya ... bheṭe harī sādarem*.

Priyolakar in “Introduction” (Jani, *Critical Study*, 278).

Devanātha (AD 1754–1821) in his tribute to Raghunātha Paṇḍita also refers to the fact that his poem is a commentary on the *NC*.

*Raghu Nātha Paṇḍita Rāṇā kavi thora samartha* |

*Adbhutarasa kela tīkā Naiṣadha grantha* || Priyolakar, “Introduction” (Jani, *Critical Study*, 278).

the poem, at the hands of several scholars, but also from its being extensively quoted in the different anthologies.

Indian scholars have thus highly valued this poem and have given it a place among a very small class of the *mahākāvya*s— (only five including the *NC*; *pañcamahākāvya*s) along with the works of Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and Māgha. The *NC* thus has unique honour to be classed as one of the *mahākāvya*s out of nearly 300 to 350 poems in the Sanskrit literature, which are overshadowed by its intrinsic merits.

## 6.4. PHILOSOPHICAL REFERENCES AND POETIC REFUTATIONS IN *NC*

### 6.4.1. Non-Advaitic References in *NC*

Let us now see the philosophical references in *NC*.<sup>28</sup> *NC* contains a large number of philosophical allusions. Śrīharṣa in his *KKK* tries to establish the supremacy of the monistic Vedānta on a logical basis. In *NC* he refers to doctrines of almost all the Indian systems including the Vedānta, and passes in review a number of characteristic theories, as if he desired his poem to serve also an introduction to the study of the philosophical systems. An attempt has been made here to enumerate and discuss where necessary the various doctrines referred to in the poem, especially those of Indian Philosophy.

#### 6.4.1.1. Buddhist Doctrines

Śrīharṣa speaks of the Buddhist Śūnyātmatā vāda, Vijñānasāmas-tya, and Sākāratāsiddhi in several places in *NC* (e.g., in X.87). The first refers to the Śūnya-doctrine of the Mādhyamikas (which we shall discuss later). The second refers to the theory of the Yogācāras, generally known as the Vijñānavādins. According

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<sup>28</sup> For details of these discussions, I depend heavily on the following authors: K. K. Handiqui's translation *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, Hare Krishna Meher's *Philosophical Reflections in the Naiṣadhacarita*, and A. N. Jani's *Śrīharṣa and A Critical Study of Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*.

to them, the universe is nothing but consciousness, there being no external objects, which are a creation of the mind. External objects and notions have no existence apart from the forms conceived by the intellect and thus exist only in the mind.<sup>29</sup> The forms conceived by the mind seem to us to be external objects. The Sākāratāsiddhi mentioned by Śrīharṣa refers to the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas who believe in knowledge endowed with form (*sākāra*). They, with the Vaibhāṣikas, represent the Sarvāstivādin school of Buddhist philosophers. The Sautrāntikas, like the Vaibhāṣikas, believe in the existence of the external world, though transitory; but while the Vaibhāṣikas hold that external objects can be perceived directly, the Sautrāntikas assert that they must be inferred.

An external object first imprints its form on our consciousness, and from this form or image we infer the existence of the object. Just as the act of eating is inferred from nourishment, a country from the language spoken by its people, and affection from cordiality, similarly, external objects are inferred from the form or image left on the consciousness. In other words, we infer the existence of external objects from their reflection in our consciousness, just as we infer the existence of the face from the reflection in the mirror.

The reference to Śūnyavāda in X.87 may be brought into relation with the verse in canto XXI of our poem in which the Buddha is called *vidhutakoṭīcatuṣka* and *advayavādin* (XXI.88). According to the Śūnyavādin or the Mādhyamika school, things have only an illusory or dreamlike existence. They are like the figures created by a magician, which are believed to be real by the ignorant. Things exist so long as the attendant cause is present, and disappear when the cause ceases to exist. They are like the reflection of an object, which appears when there is a mirror near it, and is lost to view when the mirror is removed. None can tell whence these illusory objects come and where they go. The Śūnyavādins do not believe in the origination of things in the real sense, and things according to them are neither really existent

<sup>29</sup> See also *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Vedāntasūtras*, 2.2.28.

not suffer extinction. The Ultimate Reality is, on the other hand, described as beyond the four *koṭis* or modes of predication; that is, it is neither existent nor non-existent nor their combination nor the negation of the two. It is, in other words, *catuṣkoṭivīnirmukta*, that is, cannot be brought under the four categories mentioned above. It is to this doctrine of the Mādhyamikas that Śrīharṣa refers when in XXI.88 he describes the Buddha as one who discarded the four *koṭis* or modes of predication. Similarly, the Buddha is called in the verse an exponent of Absolute Monism (*advayavādin*), because *Śūnyatā* or ultimate reality is described as *advaya* or non-dual. The expression *advayavādin* is included among the names of the Buddha in the *Amarakośa*, but Śrīharṣa uses it with a view to the philosophical aspect of the term. A Vedāntin like him was, of course, familiar with the following line occurring in a quotation from the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* found in Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī*.<sup>30</sup>

We may also refer to the following verse cited in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* to illustrate the nature of *Śūnyatā*:

*Alakṣaṇamanutpādamaśamkṛtamavānmayam |*  
*Ākāśam bodhicittam ca bodhiradvayalakṣaṇā ||*<sup>31</sup>

It may also be noted that, according to Advayavajra, one of the two Mādhyamika schools is called Māyopamādvayavādin, a believer in *advaya* or non-duality comparable to *Māyā*. Advayavajra explains that the doctrine that the reality transcends the four categories of existence mentioned above is propounded by this school.

It is noteworthy that in X.87 Śrīharṣa mentions only three of the four Buddhist schools—Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika—and omits the Vaibhāṣika school. It is generally believed that the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools belong to the Mahāyāna, while the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools are affiliated to the Hīnayāna. But Advayavajra says in his *Tattvaratnāvalī* that the Yogācāra, Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika schools belong to

<sup>30</sup> *Bhinnāpi deśāna fbhinnā śūnyatādvayalakṣaṇā*. (II.2.18)

<sup>31</sup> Quoted in Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 534.

the Mahāyāna. The grouping together of these three schools by Śrīharṣa seems to suggest that he is following the same tradition as Advayavajra, and presents the three Mahāyāna schools envisaged by that tradition. This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that Advayavajra, who is assigned to the eleventh century, is not far removed from Śrīharṣa in date.<sup>32</sup>

#### **6.4.1.2. Jaina Doctrines**

The Jaina doctrine of the three Jewels is mentioned in IX.71 of *NC*. The conception of the three jewels is found both among the Buddhists and the Jainas, but commentators agree in taking the reference as one to Jaina tenets. The three Jewels are *samyagdarśana*, *samyagjñāna* and *samyakcāritra*. *Samyagdarśana* means faith in the teaching of the Jaina Scriptures. It is sometimes called also *samyaktva* and *ruci*. *Samyagjñāna* means a thorough knowledge of the doctrines propounded in the Scriptures. *Samyakcāritra* is cessation from all activities leading to sin. It involves the practice of the five *vratas* or vows to renounce violence, theft, falsehood, lust and greed. Kuṇḍakuṇḍācārya says in his *Pravacanasāra* (I.7) that *cāritra* is Dharma which is *sama* or equanimity, a condition of the soul free from delusion and perturbation. Jayasena remarks that *sama* is that which alleviates the suffering caused by the fire of the passions. *Cāritra* is thus a quiescent frame of mind, and described as the cessation of all worldly activities containing the germ of *karma*.

Why has Śrīharṣa concentrated his Jaina portion of the work on the three Jewels? Before the time of Śrīharṣa the three Jewels were made popular in the *kāvya* literature by Jaina poets and writers. There are many references to them in Somadeva's *Yaśastilaka* where there is one place they are collectively called *bodhi*. In the allegorical *Upamitibhāvaprapañca Kathā*, they are elaborately explained and represented as three medicines for the soul. There are references to the three Jewels also in *kāvyas* like *Candraprabhācarita* and *Dharmāśramābhyudaya*. The latter work gives a

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 532–35.

lucid and simple definition of the Jewels as the means of salvation.<sup>33</sup>

#### 6.4.1.3. *Cārvāka Doctrines*

A general exposition of Cārvāka doctrines is found in XVII.37 ff. of *NC*. The Cārvāka attack on the Nyāya conception of salvation<sup>27</sup> and God will be found in XVII.75; 77; 78. The Vedānta theory of the Self is attacked in XVII.74. The Cārvāka being a gross materialist does not believe in the existence of the soul and rebirth, and argues that a creature once burnt to ashes at death can by no means return.<sup>34</sup> This is the doctrine of annihilation known as Uchedavāda and referred to in works like Āryāsura's *Jātakamālā* (*Mahābodhijātaka*). Being without any vision of the life beyond, the Cārvāka devotes himself to the world and its delights. Sensual pleasure is his *summum bonum*, and the Cārvāka in our poem requisitions even the aid of grammar in support of his doctrines; he quotes and misinterprets a rule from Pāṇini to prove that salvation is fit only for a eunuch.<sup>35</sup>

#### 6.4.1.4. *Sāṃkhya-Yoga Doctrines*

There are very few references to doctrines of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system in our poem. The Satkāryavāda seems to be referred to in V.94, where the poet says that there is no difference between the cause and the effect. Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita finds a reference to Sāṃkhya doctrines also in XXII.76, where the slaughter of animals is represented as a blemish or an unclean feature of the Vedic sacrifices. Cāṇḍū here quotes *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, verse 2, which characterises the Vedic sacrificial system as impure, and hence ineffective as a means of averting pain. In XXI.119 there is a reference to the *samprajñāta* form of Yogic meditation.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 535–36. Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 158–65.

<sup>34</sup> *Bhasmībhūtasya bhūtasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ*: 17.69.

<sup>35</sup> Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 536. Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 20–66.

<sup>36</sup> Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 527. Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 67–90.



#### 6.4.1.5. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Doctrines

NC contains many references to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines.<sup>37</sup> In III.125 the poet refers to *dvyanuka* or a combination of two atoms, the first item in the process of atomic creation. More interesting is the reference to the Vaiśeṣika theory of darkness in XXII.36. The poet playfully says that the Aulūka system of philosophy (lit., the system propounded by Ulūka or an owl) is capable of determining the true nature of darkness.

According to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda, darkness is non-existence or Abhāva, because it is different in origin from Substance, Quality and Action, and is occasioned simply by the obstruction of light by some other substance. This has led to considerable discussion among Vaiśeṣika writers, who generally raise the point in connection with the question whether there are only nine substances as held by Kaṇāda or ten. If darkness is regarded as a substance in accordance with the Mīmāṃsaka view, the number of substances would, of course, be ten; but the Vaiśeṣika thinkers limit the number to nine, and say that darkness is not a substance, but merely the absence of light.

Pre-Śrīharṣan Vaiśeṣika scholars like Vyomaśivācārya, Śrīdhara and Udayana discussed the nature of darkness in detail in their famous commentaries on the *Praṣastapādabhāṣya*, and the poet was familiar with their view. Vyomaśiva, who is probably the earliest of the three, criticises the view that darkness or a shadow is a substance, because it moves, and is endowed with qualities like coolness. Vyomaśiva points out that the movement does not belong to the shadow, but to the object which shuts out the light; while attributes like coolness are transferred to the shadow, because these are experienced where there is shade.

The next writer who discusses the nature of darkness was Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī*. He, too, holds that darkness is not a substance, there being only nine substances excluding darkness. But he rejects the view that darkness is absence of light on the

<sup>37</sup> Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 509–17. Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 54.

ground that it has a distinct black colour, which would be impossible if it were mere non-existence. At the same time it is not a substance, because it cannot be proved to be produced by atoms, and because what is perceived is nothing but blackness. Śrīdhara, therefore, concludes that what appears to be darkness is a kind of colour or form (*rūpa*) superimposed on all sides in the absence of light. He seems to hold that darkness is not a substance, but a quality.

The next writer to discuss the question of darkness is Udayana who in his *Kiraṇāvalī* gives the most systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika view. Udayana's task is twofold. First, he proves that darkness is absence of light by showing that it does not come under any of the categories *sāmānya* (Generality), *viśeṣa* (Individuality), *samavāya* (Inherence), action, quality, space, time, mind, self, sky and air. Secondly, he refutes Śrīdhara's theory by saying that darkness is not a colour or form (*rūpa*) visible in the absence of light, because the eye cannot perceive anything without the help of light. Nor can it be said that the perception of darkness is a mental process like a dream, not requiring the activity of the eye; because if we keep our eyes shut, we cannot find out by the mind alone whether there is darkness in a room or not. Śrīdhara had said that if darkness were non-existence, it would be impossible to attribute to it positive qualities like blackness. To this Udayana replies that this is not impossible. We attribute, for instance, the positive quality of pleasure to a condition characterised by absence of pain; a man carrying a burden says, for example, that he is happy as soon as the burden is removed. Udayana concludes that darkness may be black, but blackness, whether imaginary or real, is not darkness. If it were so, we would mistake a black cloth or skin for darkness. The conception of darkness as a black colour is not possible even as an error, for even an error must have a basis. We have thus to rely on personal experience and say that darkness is merely absence of light.

We have summarised the views of Udayana and Śrīdhara at some length, as Śrīharṣa must have been well-acquainted with them, especially with those of Udayana. The other systems of phi-

losophy have also treated the question of darkness. The Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas of the Kumārila school hold that darkness is a substance; while according to the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, darkness is the absence of the vision of colour. The reason why Śrīharaṣa singles out the Vaiśeṣika theory for reference in his poem seems to be that the latter view is the most plausible of the various theories of darkness, and gave rise to a controversy which continued till after the time of the poet.

In XVII.75 the poet refers to the Nyāya conception of salvation.

*Muktaye yaḥ śilātvāya śāstramūce sacetasām |*  
*Gotamam tamavetyaiva yathā vittha tathaiva saḥ ||*

Here the poet plays on the word Gotama (lit., a perfect ox), a fit appellation for a sage who reduced salvation to a condition similar to that of a stone. According to the Nyāya system, salvation is absolute cessation of pain, and this pain is regarded as having twenty-one forms covering the whole range of human experience including knowledge and pleasure. As Vātsyāyana says, salvation is a state of quietude; it is the absence of all attributes, and the cessation of all experience. Vātsyāyana insists that there can be no element of bliss in the state of salvation. Happiness is like honey mixed with poison, and must be avoided by all who desire final release. This is not only the view of Vātsyāyana but of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and other authoritative writers on the Nyāya system. According to this view salvation is a colourless condition devoid of all attributes, it is described in this verse as a state resembling that of a stone. It may be mentioned that this view of salvation is the same as that of the Vaiśeṣikas and of the Mīmāṃsā system, as interpreted by writers like Kumārila and Pārthasārathi.

It should, however, be noted that there is at least one important Nyāya writer whose conception is different from that of Vātsyāyana and his followers. Bhāsarvajña says in his *Nyāyasāra* that salvation is brought about by the vision of Śiva, and it is an existence full of bliss. Salvation is, indeed, the absolute cessation of pain, as the older writers held, but according to Bhāsarvajña, it is accompanied by eternal bliss. Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa assigns

Bhāsarvajña to the early years of the tenth century, and he is therefore earlier than Śrīharṣa, but the poet has ignored his view and followed the earlier view represented by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati.

Bhāsarvajña mentions the fact that according to some, salvation consists in the extinction of all particular attributes, and means a condition of the soul resembling that of the sky. This seems to be a reference to the earlier Nyāya view, but commentators agree in holding that the author here refers to the Vaiśeṣika conception of salvation. The influence of Bhāsarvajña is clearly visible in the opinion expressed in some later texts that the Nyāya view of *mokṣa*, is radically different from the Vaiśeṣika view in as much as the former admits and the latter denies the presence of bliss in the state of salvation. The distinction between the two views is alluded to in *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* of uncertain date. In spite of the popularity of Bhāsarvajña's view, it has never eclipsed the more authoritative theory of the earlier writers, and it was natural for Śrīharṣa to ignore the former's opinion.

The testimony of the above writers shows that Bhāsarvajña's opinion, though accepted by a few as the standard Nyāya conception of salvation, failed to oust the earlier theory, and was either ignored or kept apart from the orthodox view. In these circumstances it is easy to see why Śrīharṣa ignored his views, if he was at all acquainted with them.

In the *NC* verse under consideration, the speaker is a Cārvāka, who, being a sensualist, was opposed to a kind of salvation which had no room for happiness. But as an Advaitin Śrīharṣa himself was bound to be opposed to such a view of salvation, and we have no doubt that he takes this opportunity of ridiculing the Nyāya conception which ran counter to the Vedānta theory that liberation is eternal bliss. The Naiyāyikas were, in fact, aware of the Vedānta objections, but they contended that the word 'bliss' in the *Śruti* texts bearing on the question meant simply 'absence of pain', an interpretation which suited the negative view of *mokṣa* held by them.

It will be seen that the earlier Nyāya view of *mokṣa* is the same

as that of the Vaiśeṣika system. Both systems held that salvation was simply absence of pain, only the method of acquisition was different. The charge of being like the condition of a stone (*śilātva*) has thus been brought against the salvation of the Vaiśeṣikas as well, and we find the great Vaiśeṣika authority Śrīdhara defending the view against this charge in his *Nyāyakandalī*. It is not impossible that Śrīharṣa got the idea of *śilātva* from the opponent's objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) mentioned in the *Kandalī*. However that may be, the simile of the stone came to be generally applied to the type of salvation which involved the extinction of pleasure, pain and all other individual attributes. The *Prapañcahrdaya* applies the comparison to the salvation of the Vaiśeṣikas, and the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* uses it for that of Prabhākara. The 'stony' type of salvation found a strong opponent in Veṅkaṭanātha who attacks it in several of his treatises on the philosophical system of Rāmānuja.

There are a few more references to Nyāya doctrines. In V.29 the poet calls the mind an atom, a theory propounded by the Nyāya as well as the Vaiśeṣika system, according to which the mind is an atom, because if it were all-pervading, there would be simultaneous cognitions of colour, taste etc., owing to the fact that the mind would be in contact with all the sense organs at one and the same time.

The rays of the eye are referred to in VII.3. *Apāṅgam-apyāpa dr̥śor-na raśmīr-nalasya bhaimīm-abhilakṣya yāvat*, "Before the ray of Nala's eyes reached even their corner with Damayantī as its aim." According to the Nyāya system, the human eye has rays like those of the eyes of a cat, and perception takes place when the ocular rays come into contact with an object.<sup>38</sup> In X.81 the poet refers to the sixteen categories of the Nyāya philosophy, and to enunciation (*uddeśa*) and definition (*lakṣaṇa*), two of the three methods of scientific discussion recognised by that system.

In XVII.79 the poet refers to the fallacy known as *satpratipakṣa*, which may be described as an ambiguous or inconclusive state-

<sup>38</sup> *Nyāyasūtras* III.1.35, 46.

ment, being counterbalanced by a contrary proposition of equal force. Gotama and Vātsyāyana call this *prakaraṇasama* (1.2.7), but the term *satpratipakṣa* occurs in Vācaspati's *Nyāyavārtikatāparyatikā*.

#### 6.4.1.6. *Mīmāṃsā Doctrines*

*NC* mentions and discusses various theories of the Mīmāṃsā system in detail.<sup>39</sup> In V.39 and XIV.73, the poet refers to the Mīmāṃsā theory that the gods have no existence apart from the *mantras* with which they are invoked. The gods have no corporeal form, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, because they are never visible. Besides, if they had bodies, it would be impossible for them to attend the large number of sacrifices performed by the priests at one and the same time.

In II.61 Śrīharṣa refers to the Mīmāṃsā theory of the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*). Nala says to the swan that the benevolence of the good proceeds from their own impulse, just as cognitions are valid on their own account. The reference here is to the Mīmāṃsā view that the validity of cognitions is inherent in them, and they are therefore able to bring about the apprehension of an object without depending upon any other source of knowledge. If the apprehension of an object must be deferred until the purity of the source of the cognition is ascertained, we shall have to wait for the production of another cognition to test the validity of the first. The latter again will require another cognition for the same purpose, and there will be an endless series of cognitions, making knowledge itself impossible. The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, believe in the authoritative character of the cognising faculty (*buddhi*), and maintain that a cognition that has definitely taken place does not require corroboration by other cognitions, and should be regarded as authoritative or self-evident.

The self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of knowledge is held by the Mīmāṃsakas in general but there are differences of opinion

<sup>39</sup> Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 518. Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 91–131.

about the truth of the cognitions so produced. In the *NC* verse we are considering, the word *yathārtha* means, strictly speaking, “true”; and it is probable that the poet here refers to the Prabhākara view that all cognitions are true, because they are cognitions. It may be noted that, according to the Prabhākara school, knowledge or cognition is self-luminous and the sense-organs have by nature the power of bringing about correct cognitions; hence there is no error or misconception as such.

The theory of the Prabhākaras that all cognitions are correct has led them to propound a theory of error known as *Akhyātivāda*. Śrīharṣa refers to this view in *NC* VI.51.<sup>40</sup>

In the sixth canto, Nala goes about invisible in the inner apartments of Damayantī, and distracted with love, he sees her in an illusion all around him. Damayantī is in a similar condition, and sees Nala before her in an illusion. Though both of them are together in the same place, they think themselves to be away from each other, and embrace each other’s illusory figure, thinking it to be real. But still they may be said to have had real embraces in the midst of the embraces of their illusory figures; that is, although there were no actual embraces, the illusory ones were in a sense real or true, and this is possible according to the Prabhākara view. As we have said above, the Prabhākaras do not recognise error as such.

Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita applies the Prabhākara theory with great ingenuity to the verse in question. First, the embraces of the illusory figures were a direct experience. Then came the remembrance of past embraces, of which both Nala and Damayantī may be supposed to have had actual experience among their comrades. Both experiences were thus in a sense real, and there was no illusion about the embraces of Nala and Damayantī in the present case, according to the Prabhākara view.

Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita is the only commentator who finds a reference to the Prabhākara doctrine of cognition in *NC* VI.51. According to the other commentators, since Nala and Damayantī were both

<sup>40</sup> *Anyonyamanyatravadīkṣyamāṇau...pariśasvajāte.*

present in the inner apartments (though the former was invisible), they happened to come into contact with each other, and had some real embraces in the midst of the illusory ones. Cāṇḍū, however, lays stress on the phrase, and rules out the possibility of any actual embrace, which would have been repulsive to both Nala and Damayantī, in view of the former's mission on behalf of the gods. Cāṇḍū's interpretation keeps up the atmosphere of illusion better, and seems to be the right one.

In XI.64 Śrīharṣa refers to the atheism of the Mīmāṃsā system. Mīmāṃsā is described as rejecting Lord Śiva, though he is glorified by all the Vedas, and exerts himself for the sake of others without any interest of his own. There is no doubt that Śiva here stands for the Supreme Being. The chief exponents of the existence of God were the followers of the Nyāya system, and they were generally Śaivas. It is also interesting to note that in XVII.16, Śrīharṣa himself represents Śiva as the formless God, while referring to the episode of the burning of the God of Love by Śiva.

In XI.64 Śrīharṣa has obviously in view the controversy about the existence of God, which was carried on by the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā writers in the centuries immediately preceding his time. We need only to refer to Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vidhiviveka* with the comprehensive *Nyāyakaṇikā* commentary of Vācaspati<sup>89</sup> among Mīmāṃsā works, and to Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* among Nyāya treatises. It may also be noted that the poet makes a significant allusion to the spontaneous benevolence of Śiva or God, for this is one of the thesis brought forward by the theists and rejected by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Some of the commentators in their gloss on XI.64 hint that the Mīmāṃsakas do not entirely reject the existence of God. Viśveṣvara says that they do not believe in the corporeal existence of God, and this looks as if a formless God would be acceptable to the Mīmāṃsā school: *Mīmāṃsakā-hīśvarasya vighrahavatvam nāṅgikurvanti*.

The atheism of the Mīmāṃsā is contrasted with the theism of the Nyāya and the Vedānta in NC VI.102. The Mind of man is



described as being dependent either on God or on the chain of cause originating the succession of individual souls (or the cycle of worldly existence) without a beginning. The self-sufficient character of *karma* or *adr̥ṣṭa* is denied by the Nyāya as well as the Vedānta. Uddyotakara says that neither atoms nor *karma* can do their work unless controlled by an intelligent Cause. Śāṅkara compares the *apūrva* propounded by the Mīmāṃsā to a piece of wood or a clod of earth. Both the Nyāya and the Vedānta postulate the existence of God, without, however, denying the activity of *karma* or *adr̥ṣṭa*. As a matter of fact, they advocate the co-operation of God and *karma*, and conceive God to be dispenser of the results of actions done by sentient beings, whose freedom is thus not denied. Vātsyāyana rejects the theory that God alone produces the results of action, and says that he only favours or helps forward the personal endeavour of the individual. Śāṅkara reiterates and explains the same view in detail in his commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras*. The Mīmāṃsakas object to this dual conception of God and *karma*. The simultaneous insistence on the omnipotence of God and the activity of *karma* is to them an inconsistency. As Kumārila says, if the will of God be the cause of the world process, it is useless to postulate the activity of *karma*; if on the other hand, the course of the world is assumed to be regulated by *dharma* and *adharmā*, which would be accepting an agency other than the will of God. Nevertheless, the Vedāntins and the Naiyāyikas, especially the latter, insist on the supremacy of God, and quote in this connection a verse from *Mbh*, which says that all creatures are ignorant and helpless, and go to hell or heaven as directed by God. This verse has been cited by some of the commentators while explaining Śrīharṣa's reference to the dependence of the working of the human mind on God. In *NC* verse we are considering, the poet has, in fact, in view the controversy about *karma* and *Īṣvara* carried on by the followers of the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vedānta schools, and Śrīharṣa here gives in a nutshell the two main conclusions put forward by the rival systems. In XVII.61 Śrīharṣa refers to the Mīmāṃsā view of certain Smṛti injunctions and their authority, too.

### 6.4.2. Vedāntic References in *NC*

As we have said earlier, *khaṇḍanayukti*,<sup>41</sup> the “logical reasoning” adopted by Śrīharṣa to refute the rival systems, takes a constructive turn here in this section. Śrīharṣa, with his positive programme of Advaita, had aimed at having a primer of Indian Philosophy in the *NC*, which is very well testified by the diverse references and discussions of Advaita doctrines in it.<sup>42</sup> In the *KKK* his main opponents were the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakās etc. The strategy here is negative and destructive. In the *NC* too the chief opponents are the same, and the total number of references to them outnumbers those to Advaita! This shows that the strategy in *NC* is also negative, and the positive and constructive programme is reserved only for Advaita.<sup>43</sup>

There are several references to the Vedānta doctrine of the realisation of the Absolute. The characteristics of salvation and the worldly state—joy and delusion respectively—are referred to in VIII.15. There is an allusion to the Vedāntic theory of dreams in I.40.

In *NC* XI.94 there is a reference to the *liṅgaśarīra* (subtle body), which is regarded as the repository of impressions. Damayantī says that her inner being is occupied by her beloved, her mind is attached to him, and the five vital breaths are attached to the mind: so she cannot die. Mind is here taken as referring to the subtle body. The mind being the chief of the constituents of the subtle body, it is often used in the latter sense, and the poet here refers to the process of departure of the subtle body at death, as described in the *Upaniṣads*. The *liṅgaśarīra* is composed of various elements such as the mind, the vital breaths, the senses etc., when death comes, the soul departs followed by the vital breath (in its five forms), the mind and the ten senses, all of which belong to the subtle body.

In XI.129 we have an elaborate description of the devotion of

<sup>41</sup> *KKK* (Yogi), 69, 790.

<sup>42</sup> Handiqui, *Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita*, 527–32.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. also Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 237–307.

the *Upaniṣad* to the Absolute. The doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* is described as devoting itself to the One Being, beyond the range of speech, an ocean of consciousness, an infinite joy, by discarding air and earthly objects, watery objects and light, the sky, time, space and the mind. Certain commentators find in this enumeration of objects a reference to the nine substances of the Vaiśeṣika system minus the soul. Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita, however, refers to the story of Nārada and Sanatkumāra in the seventh chapter of the *ChāU*, and explains the verse in the light of the Upaniṣadic passage, which propounds the nature of the Absolute as transcending all physical objects and mental processes, such as water, light, ether, name, speech, mind and its processes, hope, strength and food.

In IX.121 the poet refers to the emergence of the knowledge of the Self, and the consciousness that it is different from Prakṛti or the Primordial Matters, accompanied by relevant utterances based on the recollection of the past.

In XXI.108 the poet gives us a synthesis of Vaiṣṇava and Vedāntic doctrines. The apparent diversity of the external phenomena attributed to *māyā* is represented as being a mere flash of the will of Viṣṇu.

Perhaps the most interesting reference to Vedānta doctrines is to be found in XIII.36, where the description of *pañcanalīya* occurs. Speaking of the failure of Damayantī to distinguish the real Nala from the four pseudo Nalas, the poet says:

Just as in the presence of a diversity of doctrines people do not believe in the truth of monism, the fifth alternative, though truer; four other theories, wishing to win this (faith), being engaged in preventing such a belief (in monism) from gaining ground: similarly, Damayantī, in the face of this doubt about Nala, did not believe in the reality of the fifth alternative, though more genuine than the rest, four other persons desirous of winning her, having prevented her from acquiring such a trust.<sup>44</sup>

The imagery of Śrīharṣa is based on two verses of the *Gauḍapā-dakārikā* which mention four modes of predication about the

<sup>44</sup> NC XIII.36.

Self, namely, the *Catuṣkoṭi*: ‘It exists,’ ‘It does not exist,’ ‘It exists and exists not,’ ‘It exists not, it exists not’, (*asti, nāsty, asti-nāsti iti, nāsti-nāsti iti vā punaḥ* (NC IV.83–84); *na sannāsanna sadasanna cāpyanubhayātmaṅ/Catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduḥ*.)<sup>45</sup> and represent the Self as ‘untouched,’ that is, incomprehensible by any of these *koṭis*. According to Śāṅkara, as interpreted by Ānandagiri, the first *koṭi* refers to the Vaiśeṣikas and others, the second to the Vijñānavādin Buddhists, the third to the Jains, and the fourth to the Śūnyavādin Buddhists. The Vedānta doctrine, which represents the Self as beyond the ordinary modes of thought and expression, is different from all these theories and is thus the fifth *koṭi*.

The *Gauḍapādakārikā* is a work which shows unmistakable traces of Buddhist influence, and the *Kārikās* in question seem to be based on the Mādhyamika definition of the Ultimate Reality found in Buddhist works.

*Na sannāsanna sadasanna cāpyanubhayātmaṅ |*  
*Catuṣkoṭi vinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduḥ ||*<sup>46</sup>

The Ultimate Reality of the Mādhyamikas is here represented as beyond the four *koṭis*, which means modes of predication (or categories of existence) rather than ‘theories’ as interpreted by Śāṅkara. It will be seen Gauḍapāda and Śrīharṣa alike applied the same definition to the self, the Ultimate Principle of the Advaitavādins, and likewise described it as beyond the four modes of predication. The rejection of the *koṭis* is thus common to the Mādhyamikas and the Advaita Vedāntins. In XXI.88 Śrīharṣa himself describes the Buddha as having discarded the four *koṭis*, while the Advaitins, too, have been blamed by other schools of thought for rejecting the *koṭis*. Both the Mādhyamikas and the Advaita thinkers describe the Ultimate Reality as beyond the comprehension of mind and speech, and beyond the range of world phenomena

<sup>45</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, 138.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted in *Tattvaratnāvalī*, 19. See *Advayavajrasaṅgraha*; also in *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañcīkā*, 9/2.

(*prapañca*). The Vedāntins, it is true, did not admit this remarkable similarity between their Brahman, and the Śūnyatā or the Ultimate Principle of the Mādhyamikas. Śāṅkara characterised the doctrine of Śūnyatā as contrary to all proof, and relying on the literal meaning of the word, reduced the Śūnyatā theory to mere nihilism. In view of the striking similarity between the doctrines of the two schools (Advaita and Buddhism), Śrīharṣa's definition of the *Advaitatattva*, though apparently based on the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, looks like an adaptation of the Mādhyamika definition of the Ultimate Reality.

#### **6.4.3. How to View the Poetic Refutations in *NC***

It is important for us to keep in mind here that in *NC* Śrīharṣa is primarily a poet and only secondarily a philosopher; whereas he is only a philosopher and dialectician in *KKK*. Hence, we would have to read between the lines to find the pearls of dialectical arguments in *NC*.

Śrīharṣa assumes the Gauḍapāda (and Śāṅkara) view that the Self transcends the four *koṭis*, “modes of predications,” and on this basis holds that the Individual Self (*Jīva*) and the Supreme Self (*Brahman*) are in fact identical beyond the nescience of the empirical world, namely, *Māyā*. When the illusory difference is sublated by Brahman-knowledge, only the One Brahman shines, not the Individual Self.<sup>47</sup> This is the theoretical basis of all that is poetically expressed in the *NC*: that is, during mundane existence, there remains the individual Self as well as Brahman, but when emancipation comes, Brahman alone exists. Such a declaration that liberation is the destruction of Individual Self displays the skill of the exponents of the Vedic scriptures.<sup>48</sup> And this line of thinking is found in a great number of verses, especially in contradistinction and polemic opposition with concepts of other systems. He has

<sup>47</sup> Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 251.

<sup>48</sup> *NC* X.74; Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 252.

couched all his arguments in fine verse, the Vedāntic arguments being difficult to identify at the first reading of *NC*.

Now, the Individual Self is supposed to be concentrated only on the essence of the Vedas, namely, the *Upaniṣads*, and their essence, namely, Brahman. This absolute demand on the Individual Self is poetically brought out by Śrīharṣa, for example, in verse XI.129. At the *svayamvara* Damayantī chooses Nala as her husband and rejects the innumerable gods and kings, who represent the diverse phenomena. This is supposed to be the rejection of all phenomena except Brahman, against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the great epistemological and ontological value of the diversity of phenomena. Nala is depicted as an ocean of knowledge, (as Brahman is *the* ocean of Consciousness, infinite Being, blissful and the Sublime Self), and also as a man whose beauty transcends the range of speech and as an infinite joy. Entirely devoted to him, Damayantī resembles the *Upaniṣads*.<sup>49</sup> This is nothing but an attempt to poetically win over Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In another verse of *NC*, diversity of objects supported by the Logicians is repudiated. A synthesis of the Vaiṣṇava and Vedāntic doctrines is depicted. Nala worships Viṣṇu as Supreme Brahman. Mundane objects cannot be the source of diversity, because manifold contradictions and antitheses based on reasoning are against this conception. It is the will of Brahman with the assistance of *māyā*, that the world has apparent diversity; and this is the purport of Reality.<sup>50</sup> Thus, he harmonizes the Vaiṣṇava sect *under* the Advaitic system, by use of his poetic imagination. As a forerunner of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Śrīharṣa, with his *Advaitasiddhiḥ* and *Bhaktirasāyana*, tried to converge Advaita with Vaiṣṇava *bhakti* cult.

Thus, it is possible to find that Śrīharṣa uses many and varied ways to drive home his beloved Advaitic system into the minds of the connoisseur, by use of the medium of poetry.

<sup>49</sup> *NC* XI.129; Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 256–57, 258.

<sup>50</sup> *NC* XXI.107; Meher, *Philosophical Reflections*, 261.

## CHAPTER 7

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# Post-Śrīharṣa Developments in Advaita Dialectic: A Brief Sketch

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### 7.1. Śrīharṣa's Philosophical Influence on His Followers

#### 7.1.1. Citsukha

#### 7.1.2. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

### 7.2. Repercussions in and from Navya-Nyāya

#### 7.2.1. Role of *KKK* in the Emergence of Navya-Nyāya

#### 7.2.2. *KKK*: Commentaries from the Navya-Nyāya Camp

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## 7.1. ŚRĪHARṢA'S PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE ON HIS FOLLOWERS

### 7.1.1. Citsukha

Citsukha<sup>1</sup> (*ca.* AD 1295) continued the dialectical campaign begun by Śrīharṣa with greater technical perfection, application of all

<sup>1</sup> Citsukha wrote a commentary on Śrīharṣa's *KKK*, published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, edited by Surya Narayana Shukla (1936, 1048). His major work, however, is not a commentary: *Tattvapradīpikā* (also known as *Citsukhī*), edited by Udasina P. Swami Yogindrananda

possible forms of argument and conversational and catechetical style. He follows Śrīharṣa's footsteps in criticizing the categories of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. His *Tattvapradīpikā* (also known as *Citsukhī*) is most famous for such an accomplishment. Citsukha, in addition to refuting Nyāya definitions also refutes other definitions. He also gives us an accurate analysis and an elaborate interpretation of the main concepts of Advaita. Thus he fulfils the work left unaccomplished by Śrīharṣa.<sup>2</sup>

The lure of logical treatment of topics tempted him so much that he attempted fresh definitions and proceeded to offer logical proofs—sometimes even adopting *Mahāvīdyās*—which were sophistic round-about syllogisms, inaugurated by Kulārka Paṇḍita (and refuted by Vāḍindra in his *Mahāvīdyā-Viḍambana*) meant to prove the *anirvacanīyavīdyā*. Thus, he overshot his mark, forgetful of his model Śrīharṣa's insistence that his own dialectic is interested only in demolishing the definitions of the dualists, and not in defining or proving anything, since the dialectic never presumes the reality or unreality of any definition or proof. Śrīharṣa's strict position is that no proof can be demanded for defending Advaita, since proof may be right or wrong even when what is sought to be proved is real. It was enough for him that Advaita is revealed by the *Upaniṣads/Śruti*.<sup>3</sup>

Śrīharṣa's negative programme was over-stepped by the positive and constructive ones of Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who attempted to prove the Advaita position using fresh definitions, which Śrīharṣa had attempted to demolish by his life's work. This seems to be the reason why his followers failed to elicit the attention they deserved from both Advaitins and non-Advaitins.

(1974). Surendranath Dasgupta summarizes the text in volume 2 of his *History of Indian Philosophy* (1932), 148–63. An extensive study has been done by V. A. Sharma, under the title *Citsukha's Contribution to Advaita* (1974).

<sup>2</sup> Chandradhar Sharma, *A Study of Advaita in Buddhism, Vedānta and Kāshmirā Śaivism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996), 236.

<sup>3</sup> Sarasvatī, *Vedānta-Prakriyā*, 126.



Čitsukha was an Advaita follower of Śrīharṣa who voices the same Advaita positive program (i.e., the self-illumination and self-certification theses along with the sublatability argument) buttressed by similar dialectical attacks on competing views; but he also provides much greater elaboration—defensive arguments—of the Advaita understanding of illusion than occurs in Śrīharṣa’s *KKK*. He also re-engages the metaphysical debate—present among earlier followers of Śaṅkara, such as Padmapāda and Vācaspati Mīśra—about the locus of spiritual ignorance, *avidyā*.

### 7.1.2. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

The background for the emergence of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is as follows. The prominence of Advaita Vedānta began to fade as a result of the origin of the *Dvaita* proper of the Vedāntin Madhva (13<sup>th</sup> century AD). The very origin of *Dvaita* was a reaction, in the main, against Advaita. For the same reason, controversy between the two schools was inevitable. *Dvaitins* vehemently criticized and retorted the arguments of the rival school. For over the last seven hundred years, *Dvaitins* and *Advaitins* have been actively engaged in a wordy warfare.

Madhva’s works form the nucleus of *Dvaita Vedānta*. Madhva maintains the *Dvaita* interpretation of the *Prasthānatraya*. He holds that Śaṅkara’s excessive emphasis on the *nirguṇa Brahman* was quite unwarranted and a matter of his personal idiosyncrasy. Madhva defends difference: Five differences, namely, difference between God and soul, between God and matter, between matter and soul, between one soul and another soul, and between one matter and another matter are real. The school of Madhva being essentially dualistic in character and realistic in approach, maintains absolute reality of the manifold world on a par with that of Īśa.

Jayatīrtha (14<sup>th</sup> century AD) wrote a voluminous commentary on the *Anuvyākhyāna* of Madhva on the *Brahmasūtras* called *Nyāyasudhā*. While Madhva criticized the views of Śaṅkara,

Jayatīrtha refuted the *māyāvāda* of Śaṅkara and his followers. He quoted and refuted the Advaita views contained in *Citsukhī* (*Tatvaprādīpikā*) and *Vivaraṇa*.

The example of dialectical criticism of Advaita set by Jayatīrtha was soon followed by his successors. Viṣṇudāsa (15<sup>th</sup> century) was the most notable among them. His *Vādaratnāvalī* examines, in detail, the Advaita principles dealt with in *Pañcapādikā*, *Citsukhī*, *Iṣṭasiddhiḥ*, etc., and refutes all of them. He establishes the validity of Madhva's interpretation of *Śrutis*.<sup>4</sup>

It was Vyāsatīrtha (15<sup>th</sup> century) who vindicated the prominence of Dvaita and gave Advaita an almost fatal blow. In his work *Bhedojjīvana* he resuscitated the principle of *bheda* stifled by Advaitins. In another work, *Tātparyacandrikā*, Vyāsatīrtha criticized the interpretations of the *Vedāntasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. He refuted the justifications of Vācaspati also, at times, and harmonized the utterances of Madhva and his commentators. The masterpiece of Vyāsatīrtha is *Nyāyāmṛta*. In it he elaborately deals with the discrepancies in Advaita. By the composition of *Nyāyāmṛta*, Vyāsatīrtha virtually pushed Advaitins to a miserable position.<sup>5</sup>

The challenge thrown by Vyāsatīrtha was taken up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Madhusūdana, in his masterpiece *Advaitasiddhi*, retorted *verbatim et literatim*, to the arguments contained in *Nyāyāmṛta*. It can be said that *Nyāyāmṛta* caused the origin of *Advaitasiddhi*. As the name indicates, it re-established Advaita which was about to be *asiddha*. Without the origin of *Advaitasiddhi* the position of Advaita would have been pathetic in many ways. It inaugurated the birth of a series of controversial literature, through its example of being written exclusively for the purpose of demolishing the philosophical tenets of one school, in favour of another, of the same system.<sup>6</sup>

An expanded philosophic agenda is also evident with the great

<sup>4</sup> Nair, *Advaitasiddhi*, 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

dialectical Advaitin, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (ca. AD 1570), who masters Navya-Nyāya techniques of cognitive analysis and uses them to defend the Advaita view, particularly the understanding of illusion. The positive program remains constant with Madhusūdana and still later Advaitins, who also continue to battle against all views granting reality to distinctness. But there appears to be increasingly more defense of the Advaita stance on illusion and metaphysical argument about *avidyā*, while dialectical attacks seem to diminish in importance comparatively—to speak in generalities, sweeping over centuries and dozens of authors.

Thus, Advaita dialectic attained its zenith with Śrīharṣa, although he stands as a teacher of scores of later Advaita reasoners. Śrīharṣa clearly gets the winner's wreath according to the judgment of Naiyāyikas; no subsequent Advaitin ever comes to command a fraction of the attention that Śrīharṣa gets from the Logicians. Madhusūdana's attacks on distinctness are answered by theistic Vedāntins, who, though they seem to learn much from the Logic school, have their own concerns, and are, generally speaking (excepting Śaṅkara Mīśra) more focused on exegetical matters than are Naiyāyikas.<sup>7</sup>

Excepting Śrīharṣa, influence exerted by Logicians on Advaitins seems more pronounced than the other way around in the later periods. Madhusūdana, for example, takes Gaṅgeśa's characterization of veridical awareness to be a proper characterization of awareness in general. His polemic is to show that awareness has intrinsic veridicality by arguing that nothing that does not fit the formula should be counted as awareness. Thus, every awareness would be intrinsically veridical.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Surendranath Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, 1951, contains extensive discussion of the debate between the followers of the theistic Vedāntin Madhva (ca. 1280) who draw on Navya-Nyāya, and Advaitins in particular Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and commentators on his *Advaitasiddhiḥ*.

<sup>8</sup> See J. N. Mohanty's discussion in his *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), 14 and 16–17.

## 7.2. REPERCUSSIONS IN AND FROM NAVYA-NYĀYA

### 7.2.1. Role of *KKK* in the Emergence of Navya-Nyāya

Śrīharṣa, through his incisive critique of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories of *pramāṇas* in general, and of the definitions of the logical and epistemological concepts of Udayana in particular, paved the way for the rise of the Navya-Nyāya school of Śaṣadhara, Maṇikaṅṭha and Gaṅgeśa, who introduced abstruse and mind-boggling technicalities in the formulation of definitions of such logical and epistemological categories as reason (*hetu*), inference (*anumāna*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*). Śrīharṣa's trenchant criticism of Nyāya categories had a salutary effect on the Indian philosophic scene, and philosophic sophistication of later authors of both Nyāya and Vedānta deepened as a result.

### 7.2.2. *KKK*: Commentaries from the Navya-Nyāya Camp

Udayana, the committed Logician, and Śrīharṣa, the hardcore Advaitin, were the two towering figures that dominated the horizon of dialectics in Eastern India and later the whole of India for about three centuries before the advent of Gaṅgeśa. Śrīharṣa's *KKK* had commentaries from the Advaita camp as well as the chief rival Nyāya camp.

In *KKK*, the logician's method of fixing and defining the categories with formidable precision was assailed in such a devastating manner that it was hailed throughout India as a novel contribution in the field of dialectics. Śrīharṣa's method of argument earned a special name as "*Khaṇḍanayukti*" and more wonderful, the *KKK*, the *anirvacanīyatāsarvasvam* as this work is commonly called, came to be regarded as one of the classical works of Navya-Nyāya!<sup>9</sup>

Śrīharṣa's great achievement was naturally hailed by the

<sup>9</sup> Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya*, 42.

Vedāntins and was commented upon by them, too. Vidyāraṇya triumphantly wrote in *Pañcadaśī*:

*Niruktāvabhimānam ye dadhate tārīkādāyah |  
Harṣamiśrādībhiste tu khaṇḍanāḍau suśīkṣitāḥ ||*<sup>10</sup>

To put it in gist: The Logicians, with pride, are well equipped with works like *Khaṇḍana* (KKK) of Śrīharṣa!

*Khaṇḍana* has been one of the favourite topics of students of logic. Its reception in the land of Udayana was a revelation. Many Navya-Nyāya scholars of Mithilā and Bengal came to scoff at it. Divākaropadhyāya, Vardhamāna, Śāṅkara Miśra and even so late an author as Gokulanātha have written commentaries on it. So did Pragalbha, Padmanābha Miśra and Raghunātha (Vidyālaṅkāra) of Bengal. Vardhamāna attempted a refutation of it also, but it is completely lost. Vācaspati II and Śāṅkara, it is true, wrote powerful refutations. They were followed by two later scholars, Mādhava Miśra of Mithilā and Viśvanātha Pañcānana of Bengal. But, on the whole, the refutation of Śrīharṣa's arguments at the hands of the Nyāya scholars of Mithilā and Bengal is somewhat half-hearted and considerably outweighed by their agreeable studies of those arguments.<sup>11</sup>

As it is clear by now, although the history of post-Śrīharṣa Advaita dialectic was set in motion by Citsukha, it extended far deep into the centuries through different Indian philosophical systems and literary works and continues still. It must be admitted for sure that Śrīharṣa was by far the sole originator of the whole trend of spreading dialectic from philosophy into religious literature, and hence, he has to be considered as the monolithic miracle on the horizon of Advaitic Dialectic.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

# General Conclusion

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1. Critical Remarks
  2. Indian Lineage of Deconstructive Absolutism: The Śrīharṣa Chapter
  3. Kudos, Śrīharṣa!
- 

Let me begin with (1) a few general critical remarks about the achievements of Śrīharṣa; (2) then move to a possible way of viewing his achievements against the background of the Indian systems from which he inherited his method and against whom he trained his gun, and also within the backdrop of contemporary Western thought; and (3) then, using this suggested way of projecting the achievements of Śrīharṣa, I conclude with a positive appraisal of his work.

## 1. CRITICAL REMARKS

We have so far been attempting to see the structure of Śrīharṣa's contributions to Vedānta in particular and Indian philosophy in general. We now apply the scanner of criticism onto Śrīharṣa's achievements, thus suggesting a relatively new way of appraising Śrīharṣa.

- (1) To express the cultural-philosophical standstill that the dialectic tools of Śrīharṣa have ushered in to the Indian

religious and philosophical milieu, let me quote N. K. Devaraja:

The introduction of the dialectical method by Śrīharṣa and others was one ... innovation of a major character. It controlled the course of Indian philosophy in general and that of the Vedānta and Nyāya schools in particular from the twelfth century until very recent times, resulting in an enormous growth of polemical literature revelling in logical subtleties, and in the total disappearance of creative metaphysical thinking from our land. After Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, India ceased to produce great and original thinkers in the realm of metaphysics.<sup>1</sup>

There may have been religious, sociological, cultural, political, linguistic and economic reasons for this standstill. But I would submit that Śrīharṣa's overly positive popularization of Advaita to the detriment of other systems have contributed its massive share. That is, the standstill may have something to do with the Śrīharṣan veiling of all Vedāntic thinking by the method of *vitaṇḍā* in the *KKK*, and especially with the popularization of the same by the *NC* through its chanting and performance in village temples, paintings related to it,<sup>2</sup> popular and classical themes of art that stem from, or are related to, *NC*.

- (2) “Śrīharṣa ... [in his method of *vitaṇḍā*] is more thoroughgoing [than Śaṅkara] in his non-realist method, concentrating strictly on the negative strategy of refuting realism. The result is a weaker metaphysics ... merely held to be indeterminate; his approach seeks to transcend realism rather than oppose it.”<sup>3</sup> “In adopting the Mādhyamika dialectical method, Śrīharṣa bade goodbye to serious constructive

<sup>1</sup> N. K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), 25.

<sup>2</sup> B. N. Goswami, *Pahari Paintings of Nala-Damayanti Theme* (New Delhi: National Museum, 1975). This work is a collection of the said sort of paintings, from the Pahari region alone.

<sup>3</sup> Ram-Prasad, *Advaita Epistemology*, 196.

metaphysics and installed verbal victory in the place of enlightenment as the aim of philosophical reasoning and controversy.”<sup>4</sup>

- (3) Although he was a product of the age of intellectualism, yet, as a result of the high-flown verbosity of the *NC*, the very genre of *mahākāvya*s in Sanskrit came to suffer retardation. He had the aim of popularization of Advaita through the very high-flown verbosity of the *NC*, which happened to have learned followers who had to further simplify it, thus holding it on a higher pedestal. This is reflected in the history of use of the Nala story of the *NC* at the grassroots under religious sanction by the *Mbh* (that recitation of the Nala story causes riddance of sins in this Kali age).<sup>5</sup>
- (4) It is for anyone to see that popularization is achieved by presenting Advaita through Theistic Voluntarism and aesthetic appeal. The pendulum of relationship between the Brahman and its personification set up in the *mahākāvya NC* in the character of Nala and of Kṛṣṇa of the epic *Mbh* can be visualized in the relationship between the trans-theistic Monism/Absolutism (standing for *Nirguṇa Brahman*) of the *Upaniṣads* and the *KKK* on the one hand, and the Theistic Voluntarism (representing *Saguṇa Brahman*) of the epic *Mbh* and Nala in the *mahākāvya NC* on the other. Yet, given the purely absolutistic ratiocinations of the *KKK* and its non-commitment to anything other than Brahman-consciousness, there is no guarantee that he has been able to achieve anything like a synthesis of the Absolutism of *KKK* and the Theism of the *NC*, except that he could popularize absolutistic Advaita beyond all telling by appeal to popular Theism. But, this movement too required theoretical sanction, which Śrīharṣa presumed! The sort of synthesis one could positively have achieved between the Absolute Brahman and the theistic Īśvara, Kṛṣṇa, etc., is not seen pre-

<sup>4</sup> Devaraja, *Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory*, 148.

<sup>5</sup> *Mbh* III.79.11.



sented by any, or part of any, of his writings, without which the *NC* theism seems suspended in vacuum! Sanskrit literature had to wait for the *Advaitasiddhiḥ* and *Bhaktirasāyana* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. *Mokṣasādhanasāmagryām bhaktireva garīyasī*. To translate it freely, as V. Rajagopalan does, devotion is greater in (accelerating) the realization of the Absolute than *jñāna*, and there is no difference in the conception of *mokṣa* achieved through either.<sup>6</sup>

- (5) The methodology of the *NC* is not novel. It is rather an elaboration of the literary instrumentalism of the Vedānta, which is foreshadowed in the epic *Mbh* in the person of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, which is only further developed in the *NC* in the character of Nala.
- (6) His *NC* is, at least in many verses, an example for disproportionate narration of the theme. The narration does not keep an even flow, and is at times over-exaggerated. The individual descriptions are promontory to the narrative of the poem. The cantos X, XI, XII and XIII are over-descriptive. The canto XIV is almost the end of action, but the poet prolongs the work with unnecessary descriptions.

*Niraṅkuśatva* or poetic licence carried to extreme ... with several instances, e.g., too gross *atiśayoktis*; anachronisms of time where Nala of Treta age is put in Kṛta age; [the] Buddha from Kali age also is there. The time of Śrīkṛṣṇa also is shuffled. The *setubandha* by Rāma, a thing of the past, is shown as a future event. He makes bees sit on a *campaka* flower. The poet, according to Śrīharṣa, seems to be more connected with poetry than with history. It is a truism, no doubt: but applied at places beyond limit.<sup>7</sup>

- (7) As we have mentioned in the very first statement in the General Introduction, schools of thought and religious

<sup>6</sup> V. Rajagopalan, "Madhusūdana Sarasvatī," in *Preceptors of Advaita*, ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan (Chennai: Samata Books, 2003), 259.

<sup>7</sup> S.V. Deekshit, *Naiṣadhacarita of Śrīharṣa: Canto I–III* (Belgaum, 1962), 31.

systems always interact, connube and convive. Philosophical and religious interactions smack hardcore dialectic. Philosophical and religious agreements at the level of the higher philosophical and deeper mystical experiences taste philosophico-religious connubium. But, philosophical and religious seeking and attainment in mutual unison and enhancement of life by schools of philosophy and systems of religion, happily, denote convivium. To what extent has Śrīharṣa been able to attain the latter two—namely, connubium and convivium—through his dialectic in *KKK* and his philosophical reflections in *NC*, I have serious doubts. I believe Śrīharṣa has remained more or less at the level of philosophical and religious interaction (disputation), but not connubium and convivium. The latter two would have made him to develop a philosophy and a religion that attempt to help all philosophies and religious systems live together in mutual enhancement!

- (8) Śrīharṣa, the herald of early second millennial Advaita dialectician, helped Advaita to compete the prevalent mutually divergent schools of thought (like Nyāya, Buddhism, Mīmāṃsā, etc.) by adopting the methodologies of the Buddhist Nāgārjuna—in the *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* and *Viśvavāyāvartanī*—and of the Cārvāka thinker Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa—in his *Tattvopaplavasimha*. And, further, this trend of dialectic was boosted by Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* (*Citsukhī*) and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi*. But, although it has served the epistemological development of Advaita, the exaggerated dose of *viṭaṇḍa* and its extreme employment of unrestrained verbosity introduced by Śrīharṣa into the works of these disciples have done much havoc to the metaphysical core of Advaita Vedānta.
- (9) Śrīharṣa says about the categories:

Though the admission of such rules may imply the cognition of the categories, it by no means implies their essential *reality*. For the admission that the categories form the basis of all philosoph-

ical enquiry—as explained by Vātsyāyana—in no way obliges us to acknowledge their reality. The mere fact of the categories being the *cause* of the enquiry and discussion does not necessarily prove that they are *real*; the *unreal* can be a cause, just as much as the Real can. To maintain that a Cause must have real being involves the Logician in contradictions.<sup>8</sup>

What he does here is to make use of one of his previous evasions of the concept of reality of the multiple as presumption for not admitting the categories themselves! Moreover, under 4.1.3 we have discussed a logical failure of Śrīharṣa in *KKK*: It is clear that those who think that we have here an appeal to the means of knowledge called “presumption” to settle questions about the means of knowledge in general do not understand the application of the means knowledge. For when one is debating the reality of the means of knowledge in general, it is not correct to appeal to the instance of a particular means of knowledge. And it is clear that those who hold that all the means of knowledge are invariably accompanied by superimposition should not enumerate the means of knowledge (as sources of impeccable knowledge), even on the understanding that superimposition is present. If all experience of the means of knowledge and their objects are established as being associated with ignorance, the idea that one has to exercise reflection on the basis of accepting as real the means of knowledge and other categories taught to be real by the Logicians, stands discredited in advance. But the author of *KKK* does not appear to have understood this. Since he specifically claims that he is only refuting the means of knowledge and other categories as taught by the Logicians, it is clear that he is merely engaged in refuting rules by empty logical arguments (not culminating in experience).<sup>9</sup>

(10) One of the chief defects of Śrīharṣa’s criticisms is that they

<sup>8</sup> *KKK* (GanJha), 1:v.

<sup>9</sup> Sarasvati, *Method of the Vedānta*, 890–91.

often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent's definitions and do not do him the justice of liberally dealing with the crux of his general ideas. It is easy to see how these refutations of verbal definitions of the Nyāya roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyāyikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts, by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the attack of Śrīharṣa and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the criticisms of Śrīharṣa and some of his followers had done a great service to the development of Navya-Nyāya thought; for, unlike the older Nyāya thinkers, the later Nyāya writers like Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha and others were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms, could be directed as a motivating force to improving the defects of Nyāya thought. If this had not happened, later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal expressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. Śrīharṣa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in Navya-Nyāya thought.<sup>10</sup> The work of Śrīharṣa may also be considered to be a disservice to further development of Nyāya, because his work kept the Naiyāyikas on the defensive with respect to the verbal aspects of their definitions and formulations, and on tenterhooks looking for semantic and sophistic ways of re-formulation of their language rather than their philosophical content.

- (11) Another defect of Śrīharṣa's criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyāya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas

<sup>10</sup> Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, 2:146.

involved in such categories of thought. However, in all fairness to Śrīharṣa, it ought to be said that, though he took the Nyāya definitions and categories as the main objective of his criticisms, yet, in dealing with various alternative variations and points of view of such definitions, he often gave an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the very concept and rules of discussion and dialogue. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for example, in his treatment of the concept of relation, he only tries to refute the definitions of relation, which might well have been dealt with. Thus, a characteristic feature of his refutations, as has already been pointed out, is that they had only a destructive point of view and were not prepared to undertake the responsibility of defining any position from their own point of view. He delighted in showing that none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way and that, thus, they are indescribable. But our incapacity to define or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the thing is false. Śrīharṣa did not and could not show that the ways of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of defining the different categories. They could probably be defined in other and better ways, and even those definitions which he refuted could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory phrases. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that, in whatever way one might try to define, one could not escape from those inner contradictions, which were inherent in the very nature of the concepts themselves. Instead of that he turned his attention to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the Nyāya and sometimes by Prabhākara and tried to show that these definitions were faulty. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show that things defined are wrong. It is, not true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the refutation of particular way of presentation of the concept nor does

it mean that the concept itself is impossible. In order to show the latter, a particular concept has to be analyzed on the basis of its own occurrences, and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis have to be shown.

- (12) According to Ben-Ami Scharfstein, the logical jugglery of Śrīharṣa puts a trap to his own jeopardy:

From an intellectual standpoint, he is left with an incorrigibly vague world, about which—in contradiction to common experience—nothing or almost nothing reliable can be learned. He can affirm the world to be inexplicably there and unfathomably effective. He can decide to be silent, mystical, or absurd—self-contradictory, antirational—while most probably living in much the same way as anyone else. We can see that the skeptic’s declaration of equanimity (or, for Śrīharṣa, bliss) is in ironical contrast with the ardour of his contrariness. Surely, it was also ambition that drove Sextus Empiricus to compile his encyclopedia of doubts; surely it was also the un-Buddhistic pleasure of philosophical conquest that drove Nāgārjuna to wield his dialectical doubts—in a witty book directed against the “arrogance” of logicians, [which] he proposed to “grind to dust.” And surely it was also small-minded, divisive pride that led Śrīharṣa to gloat that his detailed rejoinders were infallible in entangling “the opponent” in the labyrinth of refutations.<sup>11</sup>

The long quote is clear in itself. Suffice it to say that anyone with sufficient psychological insight can reach the conclusions Scharfstein has reached. Is it a matter of pride and propriety that a philosopher and poet of his stature indulged in such pursuits of apparent victory, as his Buddhist grand forefather Nāgārjuna too did using negative dialectic? Could he not have used intellectual and poetic techniques other than verbal and logical juggleries, which bring out a comparable level of response from the readers—justifiable though his thrust was to follow the inclinations of

<sup>11</sup> Ben-Ami Scharfstein, *A Comprehensive History of World Philosophy* (Albany: New York University Press, 1998), 272.

his era? Kālidāsa engaged in aesthetic and linguistic exercises to bring out the desired human, religious and aesthetic effloration, and even cathartic experience, in the minds of the connoisseurs; but Śrīharṣa, often harshly motivated by victory, indulged in purported attempts to exhibit scholarship, and in the process unconsciously exhibiting also the offensive and intellectually insulting conqueror that his own psyche and that of his age harboured.

## 2. INDIAN LINEAGE OF DECONSTRUCTIVE ABSOLUTISM: THE ŚRĪHARṢA CHAPTER

The symmetry/asymmetry (uniformity/non-uniformity) of definitions within the locus of refutations by Śrīharṣa, brought to light as he proceeds to structure Advaita (through his methodical *vitaṇḍā*/dialectic), may rightly be construed as the culmination of the Indian lineages/history of attempts at what—for want of more suitable phraseology or inquiry after equivalent Sanskrit terms—might partially be termed ‘Deconstructive Absolutism’, of which a major ingredient is ‘De-struction’. This lineage emerges out of the rooting of thoroughgoing scepticism in the Prasaṅga model of dialectic of Nāgārjuna in *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* and *Viśvavākyavivartanī*, and the Cārvāka model of dialectic in *Tattvopaplavasimha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa.

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad’s Introduction to his *Knowledge and Liberation in Classical Indian Thought* makes a pertinent comment on the dialectic of Nāgārjuna and connects it historically to Śrīharṣa, thus:

The approach of Nāgārjuna and, certainly, his commentators, was fundamentally different in orientation and method from that of the other philosophers here, concerned more with what could not be said than what could be. A proper contextualisation of their reasoning would unbalance the book, necessitating an exploration of the function of dialectic and the possibility of ineffability. This reason extends to the

twelfth-century Advaitin Śrīharṣa, whose attitude and method are admittedly strongly influenced by Mādhyaṃika ...<sup>12</sup>

The mode of Śrīharṣa's dialectic (i.e., in the *vādaprasthāna*) has done a special service to Advaita. This mode may be considered to be that of relativising everything that the opponent argues, from the very presuppositions of their definitions, concluding to their contradictoriness and finally stating (without any other proof) that the only option left is to hold the ontological premise that Absolute Brahman is all that is there basing on *Śruti*.

Nāgārjuna addresses his critical concern in *Vīgrahavyāvartanī*. Kumārajīva concerns himself with the same problem in his *Dāzhiđù Lùn* and admits his debt to Nāgārjuna. With great respect, Śrīharṣa too refers to Nāgārjuna as his Guru in dialectic.<sup>13</sup> Although Nāgārjuna, as the *Vaitaṇḍika* par excellence as Śrīharṣa seems to view, may be expected to abstain from judgment, but not make a judgment like the following:

*Yadi kācana pratijñā tatra syādeṣa me bhaved-doṣaḥ |  
Nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me doṣaḥ ||*<sup>14</sup>

To translate, "If I have any proposition (*pratijñā*), then this defect (*doṣa*) would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (*nāsti ca mama pratijñā*). Therefore, there is no defect that is mine (*tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ*)." To expatiate on the meaning of the couplet,

If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition (*mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptavāt*). [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature

<sup>12</sup> Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, *Knowledge and Liberation in Classical Indian Thought* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 5.

<sup>13</sup> Youxuan Wang, *Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 216.

<sup>14</sup> Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vīgrahavyāvartanī*, eds. E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 113. See also KKK (Yogi).



isolated,<sup>15</sup> how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition (*kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptih*)? [And] how can there be a defect, caused by the fact of affecting the spe-

<sup>15</sup> *Śūnyeṣu atyantopasānteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu*. The things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature does not mean that they have no nature at all. In their essential nature (*prakṛti*), they are nothing but the universal and absolute Reality, which is 'perfectly appeased' (*atyantopasānta*) and 'by nature isolated' (*prakṛti vivikta*). That Nature, isolated from its appearances, is not, however, an entity that can be determined objectively. 'By their nature, the things not a determinate entity. Their nature is a non-nature; it is their non-nature which is their nature. For they have only one nature, i.e., no nature (from the objective standpoint)'; *Prakṛtyaiva na te dharmāḥ kiñcit. Yā cā prakṛtiḥ sā prakṛtiḥ, yā cā aprakṛtiḥ sā prakṛtiḥ sarvadharmāṇām—ekalakṣaṇatvād yad utālakṣaṇatvāt. (Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramita, ed. by P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga, 1960), 96. The expression prakṛtivivikta occurs on the same page of the Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramita. Nāgārjuna uses the words sānta and upasānta in the same sense. The absolute is 'appeased', because it is not 'grasped', and hence not expressed in words. Cf. Mādhyamika Kārikā, XVIII, 9; XXV, 24.*

In the Mahāyāna works the Absolute is often spoken of as beyond 'grasping' (*upalambha*). Objectively speaking, it is 'non-existent'. But from its objective non-existence we should not conclude its metaphysical non-existence. On the contrary, its objective 'non-existence' is evidence of its highest metaphysical 'existence', its being 'not grasped' in an objective sense is evidence of its being 'grasped' in the highest metaphysical sense, i.e., beyond the subject-object split. We read thus in the *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra*:

*Yāvidyamānatā śaiva paramā vidyamānatā |  
Sarvathānupalambhās ca uplāmbhaḥ paro mataḥ ||*

(IX, 78; ed. by S. Lévi, Paris, 1907). Cf. also Candrakīrti, *Mādhyamikakārikāvṛtti*, 265: *Avidyātimiraprabhāvopalaḥḍham bhāva-jātam yenātmanā vigatāvidyātimirāṇām āryāṇamadarsānayogena viṣayatvam upayāti tad eva svarūpam eṣām svabhāva iti vyavasthāpyate ... sa caiva bhāvāṇām anutpādātmake svabhāvo fkiñcittvenabhāvamātratvāt asvabhāva eveti kṛtvā nāsti bhāvasvabhāva iti vijñeyam (Candrakīrti, Mādhyamikakārikāvṛtti, 90; see also K. Bhattacharya, *Atman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien*, Paris: 1973 (*Publications de l'Ecole française d'Extreme-Orient*, vol. XC), 67n3; 96–98.*

cific character of a proposition (*kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ*)? In these circumstances, your statement: ‘The defect is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition’, is not valid.<sup>16</sup>

This argument of Śrīharṣa in the *KKK* is a resonance of Nāgārjuna, the ‘*vaiṭaṇḍika māṛtaṇḍa*’. In short, Śrīharṣa’s claim is that he has no agenda. This should be read as meaning that he has no definitional or categorical agenda. But, his main agenda has been to merely reduce all else so that one may be persuaded to accept Absolute Brahman as the only unlimited (*abādhitā*) option, based on the presupposition that, in the absence of reality of anything unlimited, *abādhitatva* must be the only criterion for concluding Brahman. This need not be the case at all, because, even granting that he has disproved the reality of all that is limited, it does not follow that there should remain something else and that it should be unlimited!

The crux of this problem dealt with by Śrīharṣa may be found in F. H. Bradley’s work in favour of a settlement of the idealist issue of reconciling appearances and reality (similar to the Vedāntic question of reconciling multiplicity in the world and in perception and the final interpretation of Reality as these all in unification or just one part of it). In his *Appearance and Reality* (1893), he equates the whole of ‘experience’, all at once, all blended harmoniously, as reality. Experience is the *totality* of all appearances, which are inherited/abstracted by thought from ‘immediate expe-

<sup>16</sup> The Mādhyamika may say that, if in the realist’s opinion he cannot deny with his void statement the reality of the things, the realist himself cannot deny the Mādhyamika’s negation. To this the realist replies that the objection does not apply to him, for it is the Mādhyamika, not he, who holds that all things are void; his statement negating the Mādhyamika’s negation is therefore not void. But the Mādhyamika replies in turn that the realist’s objection is not valid, for the Mādhyamika has no proposition of his own. ‘All things are void’ is not a “proposition”. It only expresses the Inexpressible, with the help of the conventional truth—as he has already explained in the preceding verse. The real language here would be silence: *parāmartho hy āryāṇām tūṣṇimbhāvaḥ*, Candrakīrti, *Mādhyamikakārikāvṛtti*, 57; Cf. Murti, 232.

rience'. Termed by the tradition as the "Bradley's Regress," his argument in favour of a settlement may be summarized in the following:

Reality, he proclaimed, does not contradict itself; anything that does is merely appearance. In Part I of *Appearance and Reality* Bradley relied on an infinite regress argument, now called *Bradley's regress*, to contend that relations and all relational phenomena, including thought, are contradictory. They are appearance, not reality. In Part II he claimed that appearances are contradictory because they are abstracted by thought from the immediate experience of which they are a part. Appearances constitute the content of this whole, which in Bradley's view is experience. In other words, reality is experience in its totality. Bradley called this unified, consistent all-inclusive reality "the Absolute".<sup>17</sup>

The problem of a final interpretation to what is seen as multiple, which Śrīharṣa busied himself with in the *KKK*, is logically cognate to that of Bradley, and the method he used was that of infinite regress. In short, Bradley's may perhaps be termed as a nineteenth century Western version of Śrīharṣa's *KKK*.

Now, the same situation is encountered in the arguments put forth by the Postmodernists and, particularly, the Deconstructionists, in their justification of impossibility of talk of something Real, Absolute, etc.

For this reason, Stephen H. Phillips makes an interesting comparative comment about Śrīharṣa: "It is tempting to read Śrīharṣa as a free-wheeling deconstructionist of the Indian classical age, with no agenda except to reveal a mess of presuppositions in Nyāya claims."<sup>18</sup>

I would readily admit that elements of *De-strukt-ion* (after Heidegger) of all sorts of ontologies, definitions and proofs are clearly present in Śrīharṣa. This was exactly what can safely be meant by the negative stance of Śrīharṣa. But I wish to point the finger at Phillips for not recognizing and putting down exactly the

<sup>17</sup> *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., "Bradley, F[rancis] H[erbert]."

<sup>18</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 3.

difference in the fundamental assumptions and results of Śrīharṣa and the deconstructionists. To this end, let me begin by discussing the major, thoroughgoing assumption and result of Śrīharṣa, quoting Ganganatha Jha:

Against the Vedānta conception of *Non-duality* deriving its authority from Vedic texts, it has been urged that these texts themselves are *diverse*. But *diversity* of the texts does not disprove the *non-duality* being real; for the Veda itself, as well as the process through which it gives rise to the knowledge of Reality, lies within the sphere of the *Unreal*, the *Illusory*. It is only *knowledge* in the true sense—i.e., knowledge in its pure essence of non-differentiated Consciousness—that is *real*; that alone is eternal; it is never brought into existence; it always *is*.<sup>19</sup>

This shows that the Śrīharṣan destruction is not mere destruction, but also a construction. His positive, constructive programme was to result all his dialectic in the realization of the Non-differentiated Absolute Consciousness, Brahman, which for him is the All. This was also his presupposition. In short, his deconstruction is constructive of the Absolute. This variety of deconstruction, therefore, is specially characterized primarily by destruction as in all sorts of deconstruction, and secondly by construction of the Absolute, not of the specific playful world of experiences and constructs.

On the other side, Derridean deconstruction is not merely destructive, but also constructive of the specific, without involving any sort of infinity or absoluteness. On the Derridean side, I must submit, the concept of *différance*, as bringing in ‘the question of the sign’, is connected to Heidegger’s ‘question of Being’, which latter, according to Derrida, is deficient in that the question of Being indulges in presence (and also in absence). *Différance* is definable as “the irreducible movement that transcends both presence and absence,” and signifies the little signifieds. Heidegger indulges in thinking presence and absence, without defining them or demarcating them from each other. Derrida thinks at the

<sup>19</sup> KKK (GanJha), 1:vii–viii.

dimension of their *différance*, and strikes at the ‘sign’ of the small, the marginal, the peripheral, the vestige, and their rule-aspect called the game, etc., which are not at all in line with the ‘Being’ of Heidegger or with the Absolute Brahman/Consciousness that Śrīharṣa presupposed and in a way concluded.

The Derridean sign is the meagre conceptual remainder of the pragmatic “specific.” It is what remains in the perennial alterity beyond the central. It resists all the infinitization and absolutization of thinking or of being. It does not merely indulge in the Nāgārjunian *prasaṅga* and escape logically *between* the horns (*madhyamapratipada*) *ad libitum*. Instead, it pragmatically recognizes the little, the marginal, the peripheral, the vestige and their rule-aspect called “game” as the only thing/s that are so to say signifiable, if it is admissible attempt to intuit the ontology of deconstructionism. That is, deconstruction does not infinitize or absolutize, but infinitesimalizes just and merely *ad libitum*, not *ad infinitum*, without incurring infinitesimals at all. Śrīharṣa infinitized unto the Absolute, but Derrida infinitesimalized to the extent that is possible and desirable, without involving the notion of infinity or absoluteness.

Though Śrīharṣa, Nāgārjuna and Derrida are, temporally, almost millennia distant, and spatially, continents distant, their negative projects are very, very similar. This similarity, I submit, is not in deconstruction, but in destruction, which is the first part of deconstruction! The destructive aspect of his aim is clear in the following dialectical itinerary of disproof he assumes via the extra-Vedāntic tripole, namely, Nyāya, Mādhyamika (Śūnyavāda) Buddhism and Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) Buddhism.

In short, by way of comparing and contrasting the trio Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa and Derrida, we may make the following appraisal. Nāgārjuna’s and Śrīharṣa’s versions of destruction have this in common: *prasaṅga* or *vitaṇḍā* of everything that the mind constructs and of everything that the mind thinks as existing. Nāgārjuna would say, after the mystical methodical *vipassanā* of everything, ‘Everything is *anityam/aniccam*; the world of things may passingly exist, and why do you bother?’

Śrīharṣa's statement would be, 'Everything is a *māyā*-level production; but nothing is definable (*anirvacanīyam*), nothing is provable. Hence, everything that is not self-certifying, self-illuminating, self-awareness and non-contradictory (*abādhita*) is, *ipso facto*, self-contradictory. The world of things may or may not passingly exist, and why do you bother? Bother only about the Really Real, namely, Brahman, which is the only Absolute Consciousness!'

Derrida's deconstructionist stand would be, 'Everything of presence and everything of absence is metaphysical, and pertaining to centralizing power. These should dilapidate, should be de-structed. Instead, there are only the little, the marginal, the peripheral, the vestige and their rule-aspect called "game" as the only thing/s that are so to say signifiable; these are the major unrecognized creators of history. These are what we happen to play with. These, therefore, are to be played with in experience, life and society. All absolutes are metaphysical absolutes, mere constructs of power by the powers that be which immortalize themselves and by the powers that would be who too tend to immortalize.'

Hence, there is no Śrīharṣan deconstruction, but only destruction and construction of the Absolute. This we may call as "Deconstructive Absolutism."

### 3. KUDOS, ŚRĪHARṢA!

It must be admitted by all Śrīharṣa scholars that his excellences in *KKK* and *NC* far outnumber the defects.

Firstly, I quote Phyllis Granoff, the Śrīharṣan scholar, who summarises Śrīharṣa's contributions:

Śrīharṣa's contributions to the field of Indian philosophy may be summed up in two broad points. (1) He presented the Advaita school, with an independent philosophic method which uniquely suited the rational discussion of its monistic doctrine of the ineffable truth. (2) Through his incisive critique of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories of *pramāṇas* in general, and of the definitions of the logical and epistemological concepts of Udayana in particular, he paved the way for the rise of the Navya-

Nyāya school of Saṣadhara, Maṇikaṅṭha and Gaṅgeśa, who introduced abstruse and mind-boggling technicalities in the formulation of definitions of such logical and epistemological categories as reason (*hetu*), inference (*anumāna*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*). To take the second point first, Śrīharṣa's trenchant criticism of Nyāya categories had a salutary effect on the Indian philosophic scene, and philosophic sophistication of later authors of both Nyāya and Vedānta deepened as a result. But for Śrīharṣa, an Advaitin might observe, who could have dreamt that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī would appear later in the Advaita tradition?<sup>20</sup>

Thus, Śrīharṣa's positive contribution to Indian thought has been not only positive, by way of contribution of a method (*vitaṅḍa*) and an epistemologically qualified metaphysical content (*svaprakāśatva*, *svataḥprāmāṇyatva*, *abādhitatva*, etc.) to Advaita Vedānta, but more consequentially also persuasive, by way of inspiring revolutions in other systems.

Secondly, let me quote a befitting tribute given to Śrīharṣa by one of his commentators, Viśveśvara (*alias* Gāga) Bhaṭṭa:

*Jāyante kati jajñire kati, janīsyante katīha kṣitau  
Sraṣṭāro nitarāmidam tu kavibhirnirmatsaraiḥ kathyatām  
Āpūrvāparadakṣiṇottaraharīḥ sāhitya simhāsana—  
Svairārohaparākramam bhajatu kaḥ Śrīharṣasūreḥ paraḥ ||*

Many poets were born in the past, many are there at present and many more shall be born in time to come. But let the non-jealous frank poets admit the fact that who else other than Śrīharṣa Sūri can dare to ascend the literary throne of all quarters of the country?<sup>21</sup>

Thirdly, the relentless spirit of questioning and inquisitiveness unto a degree of grandeur and magnificence, coupled with the proud experience of responsibility for the other—be it by way of the intellectual, the moral, the cultural, etc.—was the academic quality that the second millennium has witnessed in Śrīharṣa. This is the positive spirit that has for centuries paid back from Śrīharṣan scholarship too. It would accordingly be imperative on

<sup>20</sup> Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument*, x.

<sup>21</sup> *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, vol. XIX, 2556.

the nation's educational policies and the policies of educational institutions to inculcate these Śrīharṣa qualities and just these for cropping much desirable fruit from scholarship. These qualities may be enumerated thus: (1) his argumentative and debating atmosphere that seeks to learn from all that is different, and (2) his experience of responsibility towards the discipline of Advaita, which is also responsibility towards the other. Permit me to say, a comprehensive work on Advaita dialectic in the Indian historical and philosophical context is yet to come, so that we have further light on education and policy for the third millennium.

Fourthly, Śrīharṣa's influence on the Sanskrit literature and philosophical trends that were to come was enormous. As the pioneer and patriarch of Advaita dialectic, he has inspired countless thinkers and litterateurs. The most prominent of his descendants were Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, whose descendants in their own folds too looked up finally at Śrīharṣa. Thus India witnessed waves of renewed interest in his works, through the centuries that followed. That is, Śrīharṣa has been a megalith in the history of Sanskrit literature, Indian philosophy and Indian religion, to be reckoned with by all who are interested in all the three disciplines. To quote Sanjukta Gupta,

[Madhusūdana Sarasvatī] was not less influenced by Śrīharṣa, Ānandabodhācārya and Citsukha. In his *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*, Madhusūdana has virtually adopted the very method of argument followed by Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. In *Advaita-siddhi* too *Khaṇḍana* is often mentioned. Madhusūdana has indeed placed the Advaita-Vedānta dialectics on its zenith, which was first brought about in its distinguished form by Śrīharṣa.<sup>22</sup>

Fifthly, Śrīharṣa attempted, at least indirectly, to keep aside all sorts of discriminations—caste, creed, sex, language, region, culture, religion—throughout the whole of *NC*. The Advaita non-divisibility of society may be seen as brought out in *KKK*,

<sup>22</sup> Sanjukta Gupta, *Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1966), xviii.



provided we read between the lines. The various Prākṛta languages, colloquial terminologies, etc. are also given due space.

Lastly, *khaṇḍakhādyā* is an ayurvedic medicine. In Ayurveda, it is called as *avaleha*, which is considered to be a tonic for better health and cure of diseases—that is, it has a positive and a negative function. In this sense, *KKK* is a tonic of refutation (or “Dish of Delectable Dialectic”) and a boost for Advaita Vedānta. A parallelism may be drawn with the Western terminology too. The Greek language has *pharmakon*, with the combined meaning of medicine and intoxicant. The term ‘drug’ also possesses this combined sense. Therefore, to put it in brief, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam*, which is also called “*Anirvacanīyatāsarvasvam*,” has a dual meaning. For particularist realists (dualists and in general non-Advaitins) it is a punch of refutation, and for the Advaitins it is a boost for better dialectic exercise. The disease of categorizing everything, inclusive of peoples and their strata, and seeing everything only in multiplicity, without their fundamental *a-dvaita* nature, is averted by consumption and imbibing of *Anirvacanīyatāsarvasvam*. As such it would still remain a *pharmakon* for the nation and for the world today, too!

*NC* is a medium to advance the cause of *KKK* in the mind of the non-specialist. Hence the relevance of the epithet: “*Naiṣadham vidvadauśadham*.” His dramatic, literary and poetic style has been subservient to his whole purpose of sharpening the dialectical tools of *khaṇḍakhādyam/auśadham* for consumption by the populace in the shape of *NC*. From this it may be concluded that his dialectic had the conscious aims of bolstering, fostering and structuring the cause of Advaita dialectic.



## APPENDIX 1

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### *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* on Inference<sup>1</sup>

And, what do you exactly mean by inference (*anumāna*)?

If it be said that, in the sense of the instrumental, inference means the ‘cognition of the mark’ (*liṅga-parāmarśa*)?

We ask, then, what exactly constitutes the essential, characteristic of a mark?

If it be said that [the said characteristic] consists in the invariably concomitant mark’s being resident in the subject (*pakṣa*)?

[We answer] If ‘doubt’ (*samśayā*) is taken to be a ‘separable qualifier’ (*upalakṣaṇa*), [the definition of inference] would apply unduly to the cognition of the mark even after the ‘pervader’ (*vyāpaka* = *sādhyā*, “inferable property”) has been ascertained in the subject. And for this reason [i.e., since doubt is taken to be an *upalakṣaṇa* (it cannot be said to be a distinguishing mark as actually present) in the thing distinguished], for a separate qualifier differentiates even at the moment it is absent from the thing to be distinguished.

If, on the other hand, doubt is taken to be a ‘non-separable qualifier’ (*viśeṣaṇa*), there would arise an absurdity: no one would have an activity in respect of the subject-even after inferring the

<sup>1</sup> Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay, *Indian Logic in Its Sources: On Validity of Inference* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984).

presence of the pervader (“inferable property”) due to the disappearance of the actual subject (*dharmin*).

[Objection] The presence of the inferable property is established, from the cognition of the mark as resident in the subject, in only the ‘object qualified’ (*viśeṣya*), which forms a part of the actual subject (*pakṣa*). And this kind of ‘non-agreement in locus’ (*vaiyadhikaraṇya*) is rather to be accepted. Therefore, the said objection does not hold.

[Answer] No, such a contention is untenable. For, taking into account this non-agreement in locus [of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*—as in the instance of the subject—one may say that thus concomitance (*vyāpti*), defined to be the non-violating agreement in locus, would disappear. [As such, no inference would be possible].

[Objection] Even then, it may be said that the concomitance is there, when we take into consideration only the object qualified.’

[Answer] No, this too is untenable. When, on the strength of invariable concomitance, the presence of the *sādhya* in its general form has been established, the presence of a specific form of *sādhya* also follows by virtue of the fact that the awareness of the general cannot be fully realised [without reference to a specific one]. Thus, ‘residence in the subject’ (*pakṣadharmatā*), admitted by you [as one of the causes of inference] would not really be necessary for establishing the *sādhya* either in its general form or in its specific forms. It may be accepted as a cause of inference only for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of ‘proving the proved’ (*siddha-sādhanā*). However, ‘proving the proved’ is not a fallacy in the case of ‘inference for one’s own self’ (*svārthānumāna*) and hence, residence in the subject should not be mentioned as a cause for inference in general.

[How is it that ‘proving the proved’ is not a fallacy in the case of certain inferences?] In fact, those striving after liberation consider, as their supreme goal, the convergence of three kinds of *pramāṇa* in [the one and the same] self (*ātman*), namely, [acquiring right knowledge about it] through scriptural statement

(*āgama*), through inference and through perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the state of meditation (*dhyāna*).

The above also refutes the view that the subject (*pakṣa*) [of an inference] is what has the fitness (*yogyatā*) of being an object of a (possible) doubt.

[Those upholding the validity of inference may then leave the “residence in the subject” portion and say simply instead:] [Inference as a *pramāṇa* means] the cognition of the ‘mark having invariable concomitance’ (*vyāpya*).

To this, we ask: Does then inference mean (i) the cognition of the invariably concomitant mark *as such* (*svarūpeṇa*), or, (ii) the cognition of the mark specially *as invariably concomitant* (*vyāpyatayā*)?

The first alternative is untenable, because, in that case, the cognition of the smoke etc. [which are offered as the mark] even by one who has not ascertained the concomitance would unduly become inference.

Nor is the second alternative acceptable, because, in that case, the *pramāṇa* leading to the ascertainment of the concomitance [e.g., the perception in the form *dhūmo vahnivyāpyaḥ*] would unduly become inference, since it also would have to be treated as a cognition of [the mark as] having invariable concomitance.

Therefore, the qualifiers [to the cognition of the mark]—‘second’ and ‘third’—also stand refuted. [That is, inference can be defined as neither *dvitīya-liṅga-parāmarśa* nor *trītiya-liṅga-parāmarśa*.] For, in that case, [the definition of inference] would unduly apply to [the second and the third cognition-members] when there is a continuous (*dhārāvāhin*) cognition of the invariably concomitant mark.

Moreover, the definition of inference would unduly apply to the cognition—these two [e.g., smoke and fire] are the pervaded and the pervader—acquired by one; who has beforehand ascertained the concomitance, but perceives afterwards the two together [in some locus].

It cannot be argued that such a cognition also is nothing but inference, because the locus with reference to which such a

cognition occurs is not an object of doubt and hence, cannot be considered properly as a subject (*pakṣa*) of inference. Therefore, the reason (*hetu*, “mark,” e.g., smoke), though present there, would not have the requisite characteristic of ‘being resident in the subject’ as in a case of ‘proving the proved’.

If it be said that this [i.e., not having the characteristic of being resident in the subject], is not a fault in the case of inference for one’s own self?

No, such a contention is not justified. For, to the knowledge of fire [produced subsequent to the knowledge ‘those two are the pervaded and the pervader’], the definition [not only of inference] but also of perception being applicable, it would have to be considered as both immediate (*sākṣāt*) and mediate (*asākṣāt*), and as a result, there would arise contradiction [since ‘immediacy’ and ‘mediacy’ are contradictory].

If it be argued that [inference means] the cognition of the invariably concomitant [mark], which does not have as object (*viṣaya*) the pervader?

No, such a contention is not tenable. For, in that case there arises an absurdity: Even the pervaded [i.e., the invariably concomitant mark] would not be an object of cognition. [The terms ‘pervader’ and ‘pervaded’ are relative.] That something is the pervaded can only be understood with reference to the relatum (*pratiyogin* = the pervader); as for instance, [one apprehends] ‘this [e.g., smoke] is pervaded *by* that [e.g., fire].’ Such being the actual case, one has got to admit that [when there is a cognition of the pervaded] there is a cognition of the pervader also, which represents the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) [in such a cognition]. Otherwise, it would not be possible to speak of a ‘qualificative cognition’ (*viśiṣṭa-grahaṇa*) [involving the pervaded and the pervader as qualificand and qualifier respectively].

If it be said that [in the cognition of the pervaded, which is really an inference] the pervader becomes an object not in a specific form [but only in a general way].

No, such a contention is unjustified. A person may have the knowledge about the invariable co-existence of smoke and fire

through the ‘words of a trustworthy person’ (*āpta-upadeśa*) namely, smoke and fire are invariably related; or, through earlier repeated observation. Afterwards, when he is not actually looking at smoke and fire, he may deliberate [by himself about smoke and fire] and have a mental awareness about the invariable concomitance [in the form ‘smoke is pervaded by fire’]. [If the said contention is accepted], such [a mental] awareness of the invariably concomitant [mark] too would have to be considered unduly as inference. [Here also the pervader is an object only in a general way.]

[Objection] The cognition of the invariably concomitant [mark] [which is claimed to be inference] does not simply mean any knowledge [of such a mark], so that the definition of inference may be said to apply unduly to the initial (*prathama*) cognition [i.e., the mental awareness referred to above] of the mark; in fact, [inference means] the re-cognition (*pratyaabhijñāna*) [of the invariably concomitant mark, after the concomitance has been revealed by the initial mental awareness].

[Answer] Such a position is illogical. One who has beforehand ascertained the concomitance through deliberation (*vicāra*) or through the words of a trustworthy person may, once again, listen to the words of a trustworthy person or have a further deliberation [about the same concomitance] and consequently, may have also a re-cognition, namely, ‘this is the same concomitance as had been previously ascertained by me’. And this knowledge of the concomitance on the part of one thus re-cognising would also unduly become inference.

If it be argued that [the cognition of the concomitance as inference] means a cognition having as object specifically an individual case of the invariably concomitant? [The re-cognition of the concomitance, referred to above, has no reference to an individual case, and hence, does not unduly become inference.]

No, such a contention is untenable. In that case, the definition of inference would become narrow, because the concomitance, which is known as relating to [i.e., as the property of] one individual, cannot be known as relating to another individual. If, on the

other hand, it is claimed that the individuals become object only in a general way [i.e., it would be enough if only *any* individual becomes an object], the definition would be too wide, [for even in the said re-cognition the individuals may be said to become object in a general way].

Moreover, [it is argued that] from [the knowledge of] the smoke there occurs the ascertainment of fire. But when does this ascertainment take place—at any unspecified moment, or, at the specific moment when the mark is present? The first alternative is untenable, for there arises an absurdity—as in that moment [i.e., when one sees smoke in the mountain], one desirous of collecting fire, would be led to the mountain even at any other moment [i.e., even when one may not see smoke in the mountain]. The second alternative also is untenable, for the mark has not been ascertained to be concomitant in relation to that specific moment. [That is, concomitance is established simply between smoke and fire, and not between smoke-and-fire-as-contemporaneous-with-smoke.]

If it be said that ‘specific moment’ (*tadā*) means a ‘moment in which smoke [i.e., the mark] is present’ (*dhūmakalā*)? [That is, let the concomitance be ascertained between smoke and fire in a general form: Whenever there is smoke there is fire.]

No, such a claim is not justified. For, still, smoke may be present in some other spot [i.e., a spot other than the mountain, e.g., the kitchen] at some other moment [i.e., a moment when smoke is present not in the mountain, but in some other spot], and this other moment too would become a ‘moment in which smoke is present’. [As a result, one should have an ascertainment of fire even at this other moment, and should rush to the mountain for collecting fire.]

If it be said that only a moment in which a ‘specific individual smoke’ (*tad-dhūma*) is present is to be taken into account, [and not a moment in which any smoke is present].

No, such a claim is not justified. For, if ‘specific individual’ (*tat*) would stand for ‘one and only one particular individual’ (*vyaktiviśeṣa*), there would never be an ascertainment of concomitance, [for concomitance or *vyāpti* implies generalisation]. If, on



the other hand, it is said to stand for, [in a general way], anyone of the particular individuals, the same difficulty, as pointed out above, would arise.

[If it be said that the inferential ascertainment of fire would result only in a specific moment on the strength of the mark's residence in the subject—the moment in which smoke is observed to be present in the mountain is the specific moment in which the ascertainment of fire would result? No, such a claim is not tenable]. From the fact that the mark has got to be known as resident in the subject is only established the fact that the inferential property cannot belong to anything other than the mountain [i.e., residence of the mark in the subject can only regulate the space (*deśa*) and not the time (*kāla*) of the presence of the inferential property. Such residence does not debar the inferential property's presence—and hence, one's activity towards it—even when the mark may be absent from the subject]. Thus, why should not the inferential property be ascertained even at other moments?

If it be said that the subject is a subject as being characterized by the specific moment [in which the mark is present as invariable concomitant, so that the inferable property would be ascertained only in that specific moment]?

In that case, how is to be explained the fact that one rushes unhesitatingly [to the subject] even after that specific moment has passed off?

If it be said that the mountain is considered a subject so long as it is related to the time in which smoke is present [not specifically as invariable concomitant, but only as such]? In that case, the previously pointed out difficulty would arise over again.

If however [the mountain is considered a subject] as related to the time in which a specific smoke [viz., smoke as being known invariable concomitant as well as resident in the subject (*parāmrśyamāna-dhūma*)], there would arise the fallacy of partial self-dependence (*sva-vṛtti = ātmāśraya*).

Moreover, it has to be stated what exactly is the meaning of the word *vyāpti* (concomitance). [If it is said to mean] *avinābhāva*, we ask, [which of the following meanings is to be assigned to

the word]—(a) presence of the *one* (viz., *vyāpaka* = *sādhya*) in the ‘absence of absence’ (*avyatireka*) of the *other* (viz., *vyāpya* = *hetu*); or, (b) the absence of the *other* in the absence of the one?

If the former alternative is accepted, ‘absence of absence’ would mean ‘presence’ (*anvaya*) and [*avinābhāva*] would be reduced to the presence of the one as followed by the presence of the other. If that be really the case, the concomitant presence of ‘being an earth-substance’ (*pārthivatva*) and ‘being scratchable by iron’ (*loha-lekhyatva*) even would have to be considered as *vyāpti*, [which it is really not].

If it be said that *vyāpti* is not merely accidental (*kvācitra*) concomitance, for by *vyāpti* is meant such concomitance as is invariable (*sārvatrika*)?

We, then, ask, what exactly is this invariability of the concomitance?

If it be answered that this invariability means the concomitance [of the two, viz., *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*] as present in the case of *all* individuals of that particular class [i.e., the classes of *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*], then, *vyāpti* would never be ascertained so long as *all* the individuals of that particular class are not known. But, in fact, all those individuals cannot be each known separately, because all the instruments [of cognition] leading to the right cognitions of each of the individuals cannot be available [to a single person at the same moment].

[In short, it is not possible to know *all* individuals].

[As against this, the following may be urged:] Vācaspati has already pointed out the defective nature of the above objection. When one ascertains *vyāpti*, one cognizes with the sense-organ [i.e., by perception], through the [extra-ordinary] sense-object contact called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* all the individuals of a class, and if this is not accepted, it would be similar [on the part of one desirous of defending the possibility of ascertaining *vyāpti* to a foolish woman’s craving for a son after marrying a person who is impotent.

No, such a contention is not justified. For if one, while ascertaining *vyāpti*, may have the cognition of all the individuals of a class

through the sense-object contact called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, one would have to become omniscient (*sarvajña*) when one would ascertain the *vyāpti* of the properties like provability (*prameyatva*), etc. [which are present in all objects]. This undue assumption of omniscience [on the part of the opponent] would result due to the fact that [in his view] in such a case no object would remain unknown to the person [ascertaining the *vyāpti*], and there is no answer to this difficulty.

If it be said that, at that time, all things are known [generally] as *prameya* only, but not as endowed with their other [i.e., specific and individual] characteristics?

No, such a contention is not justified. If a thing be really provable as endowed with its other characteristics also it would be a *prameya* [lit., locus of *prameyatva*] even as endowed with these other characteristics. But, then, [when you say that, at that time, a thing is known as a *prameya*] why should not a thing be known as such? If, however, a thing be really not provable [as endowed with the other characteristics], it would be simply non-existent [as such]. [That is, it is to be admitted either that the other characteristics are known, which leads to the charge of omniscience or that the other characteristics are simply non-existent]. In fact, a thing is a *prameya* as having all the other characteristics—characteristics as endowed with which the thing is [proved to be existing], [and when it is known as a *prameya*, it must be known with all its characteristics]. Thus there remains the absurd possibility of knowing things, [even when they are known as *prameya* only], having all the characteristics as endowed with which they are [proved to be] existing. However, if you accept such a position, you should also know my own mental processes, for you would be one with the knowledge of all that is to be known (lit., *prameyas*) and in that case alone, I may have reverence for you.

Moreover, let it be admitted that, through the [extra-ordinary] sense-object contact called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* all the different individuals of a class are known. But, then, what would be the ‘instrument for cognizing’ (*pramāṇa*) the concomitance as present in the case of all the different individuals?

It may be answered that just as for cognizing all those different individuals the instrument is nothing but the sense-organ (*indriya*), which moreover ascertains the concomitance, so also for cognizing the concomitance [as present in the case of all the different individuals] let the sense-organ itself be the instrument.

[Such an answer is inadequate.] It is a fact that even if such concomitance may be ascertained [in respect of a certain individual], it may sometimes be found to be actually irregular. But [if the above answer is accepted], such a case would not be logically possible, for the concomitance [just like the different individuals] has been cognized by the sense-organ [i.e., by perception].

If it be said that the alleged ascertainment of the concomitance is erroneous, for it is afterwards contradicted?

No, such an objection does not stand, for, there being no difference in the 'collocation of causes' (*sāmagrī*), there can logically be no distinction [in the cognitions resulting therefrom] so that the one is erroneous and the other is non-erroneous. [The knowledge of the different individuals as well as the knowledge of the concomitance are both derived through the sense-organ. But how is it that the former is non-erroneous and the latter is erroneous?]

If it be said that it is very difficult to determine the variation (*vaicitrya*) arising out of the presence of a 'faulty condition', (*doṣa*) or the absence of a 'faulty condition', [the former making a cognition erroneous and the latter making a cognition non-erroneous] and hence, difference in the collocation of causes has to be deduced from the difference in the nature of the effects? Well, then, you please deduce some difference. But it is to be clearly stated to us what exactly constitutes this difference.

It cannot be said that [faulty condition and absence of faulty condition] are constituted respectively by the presence and the non-presence of concomitance in *all* individual cases. For, at that time [i.e., while ascertaining concomitance, e.g., between smoke and fire, which is a case of genuine concomitance] the presence of concomitance in *all* individual cases cannot be a cause due to the fact that the presence of concomitance in the case of *future* individuals is not possible.

[It may be replied that, though the presence of concomitance may not be determined in all individual cases,] it may still be said to be *already there* [i.e., to be antecedent and hence, a cause], because the concomitance between individuals of those two particular classes is determined to be present in a general way. [But such a reply is futile.] In that case, the antecedence of the ‘presence of concomitance’ in such a way would be equally possible in both the cases—in the case of cognitions erroneous as well as non-erroneous, because if the concomitance be not present at least in *some* case, the non-erroneous cognition involving the concomitance would not arise at all.

The alternative meaning [of the term *avinābhāva*, as earlier suggested] is as follows. The [constituent] term *vinābhāva* means the non-absence (*avyatireka*) of one in the absence of other, and *avinābhāva* means the opposite of it.

However, this alternative meaning too is not acceptable, for there would follow an absurdity. [In the above sense,] one would have to admit *avinābhāva* [i.e., *vyāpti* or concomitance] even between ‘being an earth-substance’ and ‘being scratchable by iron’, because in some locus [e.g., in *ākāśa*] there exist simultaneously both the absence of iron-scratchable-ness as well as the absence of earth-substance-ness.

If it be said that [by *avinābhāva*] is meant the simultaneous absences [of the two] in all cases, and not merely in *some* cases? [The two absences, referred to in the above charge, are not possible in all cases, because in the instance of diamond (*vajra*) there is absence of iron-scratchable-ness, but not that of earth-substance-ness.] That is why the term actually used [to mean *vyāpti*] is *avinābhāvaniyama* (*avinābhāva* which is invariable) [and not simply *avinābhāva*.]

No, such a contention would be unjustified. [We have already shown] the manner in which the possibility of ascertaining ‘the presence of one in the presence of ‘Other’ (*anvaya*) as relating to all cases is negated. In the same manner, it can be shown that it is also impossible to ascertain ‘the absence of one in the absence of other’ (*vyatireka*) as relating to all cases.

[Moreover,] if the possibility of an ascertainment as embracing all cases is at all admitted, let it be so in the case of the ascertainment of ‘presence followed by presence’ (*anvaya*); what is the use of going unnecessarily in a round-about way by admitting the possibility in the case of the ascertainment of ‘absence followed by absence’ (*vyatireka*)? [That is, in the latter alternative, there would be *kalpanā-gaurava*.]

According to some, concomitance (*vyāpti*) means the ‘agreement in presence’ (*anvaya*) [of the two, viz., *hetu* or reason and *sādhya* or inferable property], when there is also ‘negatory evidence’ (*bādhaka*) regarding the reason’s residence in an ‘indisputable locus of the absence of *sādhya* (*vipakṣa*). [That is, there is also conclusive evidence to show that the *hetu* cannot be present in a *vipakṣa*.)

This is however not proper. What would be the nature of the so-called negatory evidence regarding the reason’s residence in a *vipakṣa*?

Would it be a *pramāṇa*, or, a reductio (*tarka*)?

Let us examine the former alternative.

It cannot be the sense-organ [i.e., perception], simply because it would be impossible. [Perception cannot reveal past or future objects and hence, would not be able to preclude the possibility of residence in a *vipakṣa* in the past or in the future]. Otherwise [i.e., if perception is admitted to negate residence in a *vipakṣa* even in past and future cases], there can never arise a doubt concerning the reason’s deviation (*vyabhicāra*) and non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*).

Nor can it be inference, for that would lead to the absurdity of infinite regress.

Nor can it be postulation (*arthāpatti*), because [according to some] it is nothing distinct from inference.

Or, [as the two schools of the Mīmāṣaka argue] let postulation be distinct [from inference]. Now, in that case, [the postulation may be of the form] ‘the presence of the *probans* cannot be logically justified in the absence of the *probandum*’, [and hence, they must be concomitant]. But then, the presence of the *probandum* being very well established by this [form of postulation], inference

itself [as a source of valid knowledge] would be annulled. [That is, all cases of inference would be cases of postulation. Hence, the admission of inference would be unnecessary.] If the two be not of such a nature [i.e., if there be no such relation of the justifier and the justified between the presence of the *probandum* and the presence of the *probans*], what would then be the result thereof? [That is, there can be no postulation at all.]

Or, let it be admitted that postulation is somehow the negatory evidence. Even then, it is to be asked, what exactly would be the nature of the concomitance admitted by you? [In this regard, the following are the possible alternatives.]

- a) [Concomitance is] agreement in presence only in *some* case, accompanied by the negatory evidence regarding the reason's residence in a *vipakṣa*.
- b) [Concomitance is] agreement in presence in *all* cases, accompanied by the negatory evidence.
- c) What is the use of our dilating upon the specific nature of the cases [i.e., whether agreement pertains to *some* or *all*]? [We simply say:] Concomitance is agreement in presence 'in a general way' (*sāmānyataḥ*), accompanied by the negatory evidence.
- d) [Concomitance is] agreement in presence as pertaining to 'all cases' (*sārvatrika*), and such agreement is known through the negatory evidence regarding the reason's residence in a *vipakṣa*.

Of these four, the first one is not tenable, because it can be justified in neither of the [possible] alternatives. [The alternatives are:] Should the negatory evidence regarding the reason's residence in a *vipakṣa* pertain to (i) *all* individual cases [of the occurrence of the reason], or, (ii) such cases in general only [i.e. *some* individual cases only]?

If the former alternative is accepted, the postulation as negating the possibility of the reason being otherwise [i.e., the reason being present even in the absence of the *probandum*] would have to be

applied even to the individual case in respect of which an inference is being resorted to, and by this very postulation the presence of the *probandum* would be well-established. What purpose, then, is to be served by your deplorable passion for employing an inference?

If the latter alternative is accepted, even though there may be deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in some case, the negatory evidence may very well have its purpose served with reference to some [other] case where there is no deviation. [Thus, in fact, taking such a case into consideration, concomitance would be unduly established.] For, the *vipakṣa* in general would be [any locus in which] there is smoke in spite of the absence of fire and the negatory evidence regarding this would ultimately consist [in showing] that there is no incompatibility (*virodha*) between the two [viz., the *probans* = smoke; and the *probandum* = fire]. [That is, if it can be shown that smoke and fire are located in the same substratum and there is no opposition between the presence of smoke and the presence of fire, concomitance between the two would be established.] But this absence of incompatibility may very well be determined by their [i.e., of *probans* and *probandum*] co-presence (*sāhitya*) in some locus [only]. All this is however true of earth-substance-ness and iron-scratchable-ness also. [There is non-deviation, e.g., in the case of an unbaked jar.] As such, concomitance would have to be admitted even in the case of these two. [This is wrong, because there is deviation in the case of diamond.]

Nor is the second alternative [of the four alternatives enumerated above, marked (b)] acceptable, because there the ‘qualifying expression’ (*viśeṣaṇa*) [viz., accompanied by the negatory evidence] would be redundant. Why do not you say simply that [concomitance is] ‘agreement in presence in all cases’ (*sārvatriko*]*nvayaḥ*)? [That is, if it can be shown that the *probans* is accompanied by the *probandum* in *all* cases, the question of the former being present without the latter would not arise and hence, there would be no need for the negatory evidence.]

However, it has already been shown that even such a definition [i.e., the definition without the qualifying expression] is improper.



[That is, it is not possible to have knowledge about *all* the cases which include also the past and the future ones. Hence, such concomitance would never be established.]

Nor is the third alternative [marked (c) above] justified, for it can be refuted with the argument mentioned already [in the case of the first alternative] by raising alternatives as to whether [the negatory evidence] is to be taken with reference to *all cases* or only *some cases* [of the occurrence of the reason].

Nor is the fourth alternative [marked (d) above] justified. By the expression ‘agreement as pertaining to *all cases*’ would be meant, for instance, [the rule] whatever is a locus of smoke is a locus of fire. Now, if this co-existence with fire on the part of all smoke-individuals (*dhūma-vyakti*) is [already] ascertained at the time one ascertains the concomitance, [it has to be admitted further] that the subject (*pakṣa*) [viz., mountain] which is a locus of smoke has already been known as a locus of fire. [In other words, the co-existence of smoke and fire in the subject, namely, the mountain, would be an already known fact.] Thus when [one sees smoke and allegedly *infers* fire in the mountain], one actually *recollects* [the said co-existence]. Therefore, inference as such would be annulled. [Because all cases of inference would be reduced to cases of recollection or *smaraṇa*.]

If it be argued that [at the time of the ascertainment of concomitance] the subject is known generally just as a locus of fire; but at the time of inference it is known specifically [as a locus of the various appropriate characteristics]? [Thus inference cannot be reduced to recollection, since it reveals some characteristics not previously known.]

No, such a contention is not justified. For, what is exactly meant by the term ‘specifically’ (*viśeṣataḥ*)? Does it mean ‘being a locus of a particular fire-individual’ or ‘being a locus of fire as related to some particular time, space, etc.’?

The first alternative is untenable, for you admit yourself that when one ascertains the concomitance, all individuals appear as object. [That is, at the time of ascertaining the concomitance, one has the knowledge of all fire-individuals (including the one

present in the subject) and as such, the *probandum* would only be recollected later, and there is no need for admitting inference.]

The second alternative too is untenable. The thing offered as the subject which is a particular locus of smoke is only recollected as a locus of fire, and its specific characteristics, such as 'being a locus of smoke', 'having mountain-ness' and 'having relation with some particular time, space etc.' may very well be apprehended by the visual organ etc. [i.e., by perception]. [There is thus no need for admitting inference as a distinct source of knowledge.] When one ascertains through the visual organ etc., aided by impressions (*sallakṣaṇa*) produced by previous cognitions, an object [previously known] as related to the present time and located in a particular spot in the form "this [i.e., the thing present here now] is that [i.e., the thing present elsewhere, elsewhere]," it is regarded as re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) [i.e., a kind of perception, and not as inference]. Let the present case [i.e., the knowledge of fire from smoke, alleged to be an inference] be similar to it. What is the use of admitting inference [as a distinct source of knowledge]?

Nor is it possible to claim that comparison (*upamāna*) is to be regarded as the negatory evidence regarding the reason's residence in a *vipakṣa*, for the object to be known by comparison is fixed (*niyata*) and it cannot have competence in such matters [as determining the presence or the absence of the reason in a *vipakṣa*, etc.].

Nor can 'verbal testimony' (*Śabda*) be considered to be so, for, in that case, an absurdity would follow: There would be no ascertainment of the concomitance in the absence of [instructions from] a 'trustworthy person' (*lipta*).

Non-apprehension (*abhāva*) may sometimes be considered to be so [i.e., as the negatory evidence]. However, when one tries to determine exactly the nature of the non-apprehension one finds that it too fails. The non-apprehension [as relevant for the present context] may be formulated as follows: If smoke were ever present in the absence of fire, it would have been apprehended as such; but it is never apprehended as such; hence, because of such

non-apprehension, it is established that smoke is never present without fire.

All this is, however, untenable. To explain, when is such non-apprehension competent enough [to establish the concomitance]—when there is non-apprehension of deviation only in *some* cases, or, when there is non-apprehension of deviation in *all* cases?

The first alternative is not acceptable, for, in that case, concomitance would have to be admitted even between earth-substance-ness and iron-scratchable-ness. [E.g., there is non-apprehension of deviation in the case of wood, a lump of clay etc.]

The second alternative too is not tenable. For, what [exactly is the meaning of] this all-embracing non-apprehension—non-apprehension of deviation in all *possible* cases or in all *actual* cases? Of these, the former is not justifiable, because non-apprehension in all possible cases [which include the past and the future ones] is not practicable. Nor is the latter alternative acceptable, for such non-apprehension would be possible even in the case of earth-substance-ness and iron-scratchable-ness. [Thus, one observing the absence of deviation of these two in a number of cases would be led to ascertain concomitance between the two.]

If it be said that nevertheless these two have deviation in the case of the diamond [and hence, there would be no ascertainment of concomitance]? No, such a contention is not possible. So long as it [i.e., the case of the diamond] remains unknown one would have no idea about deviation [and would ascertain concomitance].

[To this, it may be replied that] when one actually comes across the case of the diamond [one cannot but determine that] there is indeed deviation; [and we maintain that] concomitance would be present only when there is *never* any observation of deviation. No, such a reply is futile, for it is not possible to find any ‘decisive ground’ (*niyāmaka*) which would ensure the non-observance of deviation in other cases yet to be observed.

Nor can *reductio (tarka)* be regarded as the negatory evidence regarding the reason’s residence in a *vipakṣa*. For, if *reductio* is admitted to have concomitance as its foundation, the fallacy of

infinite regress would ensue. If, however, this is not admitted, the very foundation of the reductio would be weakened and it would be reduced to pseudo-reductio (*tarkābhāsa*).

Now, one [trying to defend the validity of inference] may urge the following: It is not possible to make such an objection [i.e., the charge of infinite regress]. Thus, for instance, if there ever arises a doubt regarding deviation [in the relation of] smoke and fire, a reductio of the following form may be cited as the negatory evidence: ‘If smoke be ever present without fire, it would be without a cause; hence, it would be either eternal or not produced at all.’ And this reductio is such as is ‘without any possible rejoinder’ (*anuttara*), because if a doubt is raised even in the case of such a reductio, there would follow the absurdity of self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*). Indeed, it is the accepted principle of people in general that a doubt is to be raised with reference to such a fact only, which, when being doubted, does not lead to any absurdity in the form of ‘contradiction with one’s own activity’ (*sva-kriyā-vyāghāta*), or the like. Thus, in every case [of the ascertainment of concomitance] a suitable reductio, which is without any possible rejoinder, is to be cited as the negatory evidence.

All the above however does not stand to reason. Is it that a doubt is to be raised in such a form that there would not at all be a cause-effect relation [between fire and smoke]? [Certainly not.] On the other hand, a doubt is to be raised in the form ‘Can this smoke be produced from some cause other than fire?’

As against the above, it cannot be objected that, in that case, smoke would not always be characterised by a uniform generic property. [Difference in cause is followed by difference in effect. Thus, smoke-from-fire and smoke-from-other would be different in nature.] For, it can be logically justified with the instance of cognition (*viññāna*), which is [admitted to be] characterised by a uniform generic property [viz., cognition-ness or *jnānatva*], even though it is produced sometimes from the sense-organs and sometimes from the ‘inferential instrument’ (*anumāna*). [That is, in the case of cognition, difference in cause is not followed by difference in effect.]

If it be argued that there [i.e., in the case of *vijñāna* or cognition] the sense-organ and the like are responsible (*prayojaka*) not for [determining] the universal of cognition-ness (*jñānatva*), but for [determining] such ‘less pervasive universal’ (*avāntara-jāti*) as immediacy (*sākṣatkāritva*) and the like?

No, such a contention would be futile. For, in that case, to avoid the charge that [the determination] of cognition-ness is accidental, you would have to state necessarily some uniform (*anugata*) cause for it [i.e., such determination]. [But it would not be possible to cite any cause other than the sense-organ etc. Hence, the original charge would remain.]

Moreover, an objection may be raised, in a similar way, in the case of smoke also: Let fire be responsible for only some specific characteristic as resident in smoke, [and not for determining smokeness as such]. As against this, it cannot be objected that no specific characteristic is found to be resident in smoke due to fire. Because [at least] a doubt regarding it [i.e., there being some specific characteristic], may justifiably be raised on the ground that ‘for the time being’ (*āpātataḥ*), the non-apprehension [of the specific characteristic] is due to its unfitness for perception—which unfitness again is due to the non-apprehension of a less pervasive universal [in smoke] as resulting from some other cause. In fact, the possibility that when one apprehends some specific characteristic, resident in smoke, as resulting from some other cause, one definitely apprehends it [i.e., smoke as endowed with that specific characteristic] can in no way be negated.

If it be said that there is in fact one uniform cause for the production of ‘cognition’, namely, the self-mind conjunction?

No, such a contention is untenable. If it be [admitted] that something becomes ‘cognition’ because it is produced from self-mind conjunction, even desire (*icchā*) and others would have to be unduly considered as ‘cognition’.

One may no doubt try to point out as one uniform cause some peculiar *adr̥ṣṭa*, or some special potency, or the universal of cognition-ness, or the ‘antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of ‘cognition’. But then, the same may be maintained in other cases

also; for example, even though smoke may be deviating from fire [i.e., even admitting that smoke may be produced from some cause other than fire] a doubt may be raised by maintaining that the ground for the uniform nature of smoke is [one of the causes enumerated above in the case of ‘cognition’.]

If it be said that only when deviation is actually observed [as in the case of ‘cognition’, where one uniform cause cannot be provided], *adr̥ṣṭa* or the like is assumed to be the ground for explaining the uniform nature? [That is, in the case of smoke there is no deviation, fire being the common or uniform cause of smoke. Hence, in the case of smoke, it is not necessary to assume any ground for explaining the uniform nature.]

[However, such a contention is unjustified.] Let [anyone of the *adr̥ṣṭa* etc.] be ascertained to be so in the actually observed cases [of deviation]. But there is no decisive ground to show that in the cases [where deviation is not observed at present] no deviation would be observed [in future]. And it is possible to raise a doubt on the basis of this. [That is, even though there may not be deviation in the so far observed cases of smoke, the possibility of deviation in the yet unobserved cases of smoke cannot be ruled out. Hence, the possibility of assuming a ground for uniform nature remains, and consequently, the scope for a doubt too remains.]

[The opponent defending the validity of inference may urge the following.] If you go on raising doubts in this manner, inference for you would be nowhere possible. However, you yourself have got to admit [the validity of] inference, for it is not possible to explain one’s participation in a ‘philosophical debate’ (*kathā*) unless one ascertains by inference the existence of the opponent’s self etc. [i.e., his intelligence, capability of understanding and such other qualifications, which are not to be determined by perception]. It would be possible to raise doubts even in the case of your own inferences [for establishing the qualifications of the opponent]. [As a result, these inferences too would become invalid.] And this fact would constitute self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*).

No, all the above is unjustified. If such a position is maintained, just like [the inference of fire from] smoke, the inference of one

special cause [e.g., grass] of fire [in all cases, simply from the presence of fire, the effect] would have to be regarded as a valid inference. For, in the case of both, the ‘collocation of causes’ (*sāmagrī*) is similar and thus, the peculiarity of each—validity of the one and falsity of the other—cannot be logically explained.

Moreover, if no doubt be produced in spite of there being the apprehension of common characteristic [and such other causes], [one would be forced to accept] that in spite of the presence of the [causal] collocation there is no appearance of the effect. Thus the charge of contradiction would be equally possible against you (the defender of inference’s validity), for you try to offer [lit., produce] a causal collocation in the form of words (*vacana*) and the like for producing an awareness in others.

[Objection] We maintain that the contradiction itself is the ‘distinguishing mark’ (*viśeṣa*) and when there is an apprehension of it there is, in our view, no causal collocation for a doubt (*śaṅka*). Hence, how is it claimed that [the charge of] contradiction is equally possible [against us]?

[Answer] It [i.e., the apprehension of the distinguishing mark] cannot be said to be resulting from causes such as [deliberate] ‘false imputation’ (*āropa*) and the like, because such an imputation which has for its object something false would only lead to absurdities, [but not to the removal of a doubt concerning deviation].

If it be said that such imputation as is not really false indicates perforce the absence of deviation where it [i.e., the absence of deviation] is actually established on valid grounds, [and not merely imagined]?

No, such a claim is not possible. For, we shall refute all this while discussing [the efficacy of] *reductio*.

Therefore, we ask, [what is the nature of] this apprehension of the distinguishing mark, said to be of the nature of contradiction and the ground for the removal of the doubt concerning deviation? Is it produced by some *pramāṇa*, or by *reductio*? If the first alternative is accepted, the possibility of a doubt also would have to be deduced by the same, for there can be contradiction only if there

is a doubt. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that there may be contradiction even without a doubt, it would be established that the charge of contradiction has equal applicability against both one having a doubt ‘and one not having’ a doubt.

[Objection] Let the same *pramāṇa* [as is the *pramāṇa* for the apprehension of contradiction] be the *pramāṇa* in the case of the doubt also. What is the harm? When there would be an apprehension of the distinguishing mark in the form of contradiction which rests as dependent upon the doubt arising for the first time, no further doubt would be produced [and consequently, concomitance would be ascertained].

[Answer] No, the above is not tenable. As long as the contradiction would be present there would also remain a doubt about the reason’s deviation because of the doubt on which the contradiction is dependent for its very existence. When that doubt is removed, the contradiction, claimed to be itself the distinguishing mark, can no longer be present, for it is dependent upon that doubt for its very existence. In that state, [there being no distinguishing mark the apprehension of which is the cause for the removal of a doubt], what is there to prevent the production of a further doubt? Would you kindly state?

[Objection] Let the contradiction itself, which is the distinguishing mark, be not present there. However, the apprehension about it or the impression (*saṃskāra*) produced therefrom may very well be there.

Thus, the apprehension of the distinguishing mark or the impression produced by it may be the cause for the removal of the doubt. In fact, [it is observed that] the presence of the distinguishing mark by itself does never serve the said purpose.

[Answer] No, all this is unjustified. If it is admitted that the apprehension or the impression produced there from about the distinguishing mark—which is not contemporaneous with its substratum and remains present even at an earlier moment—can be the cause for the removal of a doubt concerning an opposite property even at a later time, there cannot logically be any doubt concerning some particular colour expected to be produced, at a



later moment, due to contact with fire, in the [whole] jar, according to those admitting chemical change due to heat in the whole itself, or in the [separated] atoms constituting the jar, according to those admitting chemical change due to heat in individual atoms, which [jar or group of atoms] is already ascertained as having the black colour.

If there is contradiction against doubt, then, due to the apprehension of contradiction which is of the nature of the distinguishing mark and has doubt for its foundation, there may not be further doubt against the [initial] doubt. If however [contradiction] be resting upon deviation, in that case, deviation is bound to remain, for deviation, the foundation of contradiction, also should be a fact established by *pramāṇa*.

If it be said that those reductios [which negate the doubt about deviation] have for their basis concomitance which is 'established from time immemorial' (*anādisiddha*)? No, such an objection is unjustified. For, it is not established that the notion of the said concomitance is valid knowledge. [For example,] the notion that the body is the self—[a notion] also of the same nature [i.e., established from time immemorial]—is ultimately proved to be false knowledge, although the fact of being established from time immemorial is equally present in both the cases.

Nor can it be said that the ascertainment of contradiction would result from a reductio, which would be of the form 'If here a doubt is raised about deviation, there would follow contradiction'. For, if the basis of the reductio bringing out the contradiction is weakened it would only be a pseudo-reductio. If however you admit that even such a pseudo-reductio is capable of bringing out the contradiction the charge of a contradiction may similarly be levelled [against you also]. It is possible that a contradiction may be shown against you also with the help of a pseudo-reductio.

If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the said reductio, has for its basis concomitance, there may be a doubt regarding deviation even therein and thus, there would follow infinite regress. If contradiction is shown even there, infinite regress would follow in the same manner.

Therefore, in this regard, it would not be much difficult for us to reiterate the very verse offered by you, changing only a few of the words contained in it, namely, ‘If there is contradiction, there is doubt necessarily. If not, it is all the better for doubt. Therefore, how can doubt be dispelled by contradiction? Or, how can reductio negate the possibility of doubt?’

Thus it has been said that non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*) means the presence (*anvaya*) of the other (*apara* = *vyāpya*), the absence of the one (*eka* = *vyāpya*) being negated, and such non-deviation, in the case of [smoke] which is observed to be produced and destroyed at the same moment, being unobserved, may be the object of a doubt.

According to some, concomitance means ‘natural relation’ (*svābhāvika-sambandha*). He is to be asked: ‘Natural’ for what? For the two relata, or, for something else? The latter alternative is obviously untenable, for there would follow just an opposite conclusion. [The relation—that is, concomitance—is said to be natural for, not the relata (e.g., smoke and fire), but something else. Thus there would follow an absurd conclusion: There is no relation or concomitance between smoke and fire which are actually related and there is between some other things which are not actually related.]

On the other hand, if the former alternative is adhered to, the following question is to be put: What exactly is the meaning of the term ‘natural’? Does it mean (a) being dependent upon the nature of the relata, or, (b) being produced by the nature of the relata, or, (c) not being other than the nature of the things intended to be the relata, or, (d) being concomitant with the essential property of the relata, or, (e) not being due to anything other than the nature of the relata, or, (f) something else not covered by the above alternatives?

Of these, the first alternative [cannot be accepted] for there arises the absurdity of admitting concomitance even in the case of earth-substance-ness and iron-scratchable-ness.

The second alternative also is untenable, because, in that case, the definition becomes too wide as well as too narrow.

On the same ground, the third alternative too is unacceptable.

Nor is the fourth alternative acceptable. For, so long as concomitance is not specifically determined, the [significance of the] expression 'being concomitant' (*vyāpya*) cannot be rightly determined. Moreover, if the relation, [viz., concomitance] is said to be the pervaded (*vyāpya*) [and the two relata the pervader (*vyāpaka*)], it would follow that the two relata, which are the pervaders, may be present in space and time wider than the space and time in which the proposed relation [viz., concomitance] would exist. [That is, the two relata may be present, though the relation may not.] As such, it would not be possible to justify a rule to the effect that when one of the relata is perceived the other relatum is to be inferred.

There is no justification for the acceptance of the fifth alternative either. If not, 'being due to' (*prayukta*) means not 'being produced by' (*janita*). The qualifying expression [viz., other than etc.] would be useless in case the relation is considered non-producible (*akṛtaka*), for what is non-producible is not to be produced even by the nature of the relata. If, on the other hand, the relation is admitted to be producible (*kṛtaka*), it would not at all come into being, for although every effect is produced by its own particular 'collocation of causes' (*sāmagrī*), it is necessarily to be admitted that it is produced even by some other general causes, namely, at least, time, space and *adr̥ṣṭa*.

The sixth alternative is not tenable, simply because it is not possible to formulate one.

In this way, everywhere, possible alternatives are to be advanced and also, such a final alternative is to be added. Then they are all to be rejected, for otherwise, there is a chance of being charged with the fallacy of deficiency (*nyūnatva*).

According to others, concomitance is a relation 'free from condition' (*anaupādhika*). They are to be asked: What exactly is the nature of this 'condition' not being accompanied by which is said to constitute 'concomitance' [lit., being-free-from-condition]?

[In answer, the following may be offered as a definition of

condition:] A condition is that which is a pervader of the *probandum* (*sādhya*), but is not a pervader of the *probans* (*hetu*). That a condition is of such a nature follows from the final interpretation of the meaning of the following verse, which states, through negations, that that thing the absence of which is [invariably concomitant with the absence of the *probandum*] is a condition:

Of the two things which are not concomitant with each other [e.g., fire and wet-fuel-conjunction], one [e.g., wet-fuel-conjunction] is ascertained to have invariable concomitance with the [so-called] *probandum* [e.g., smoke] and thus, the absence of one is determined to be invariably concomitant with the absence of the [so-called] *probandum*. And that one thing is to be known as a condition.

Concomitance is really the property of the condition, but it appears as a property of the [so-called] *probans*, just as redness, a property of the *japā* flower appears as a property of a piece of crystal [placed nearby]; hence, such a thing [attributing wrongly its property to something else] is called an *upādhi*. Thus the following has been asserted [by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa]:

Concomitance is observed to exist [between two things] and it is ascertained in the form “If ‘this’ is there, ‘that’ also must be there.” There must be some property which is responsible for it [i.e., the invariable presence of the two in the same locus], that is going to be determined now. There are other kinds of *probans* also; they possess concomitance for which some [extraneous] factors only are responsible. Even if they are observed to be present in some spot, it would not be desirable to ascertain there the presence of the *probandum*.

And such a condition may be of two kinds, the ascertained (*niścita*) as well as the unascertained (*sandigdha*). Thus it has been said [again by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa]:

So long as the presence of the *probans* in an ‘indisputable locus of the absence of *probandum*’ (*vipakṣa*) is doubted to the extent of even one-hundredth part only, how can the *probans* have the necessary strength to prove the *probandum*?

[Sriharsa's refutation] No, all the above is unjustified. For [the said definition of a condition] applies unduly to difference-from-subject (*pakṣetaratva*), which also is a pervader of the *probandum*, but not a pervader of the *probans*.

If it be said that [we shall add a qualifying expression to the above definition of a condition]? [Thus a condition] must moreover be something 'other than difference-from-subject'. No, such a position is not justified. For, such a definition would become narrow—it would not apply to a condition called up by the fallacy of the contradicted (*bādha*). Otherwise, in such a case, the relation [between *probans* and *probandum*] being one free from condition, the contradiction itself would remain unproved. Thus it has been said, "Whether [a condition] is called up by the contradicted or by something else, there is really no difference."

If it be said that for this purpose also a further qualifying expression is to be added? No, it would not be justified. For, even then, it would not be possible to comprehend the expression 'which is not a pervader of the *probans*', there being no ascertainment of the concomitance of the *probans*. [For understanding *upādhi*, *vyāpti* will be necessary; again, for understanding *vyāpti*, *upādhi* will be necessary.]

Similar would be the case of the expression 'which is a pervader of the *probandum*'.

Now, one may say that 'a pervader of the *probandum*' means 'that which is not observed to be deviating from the *probandum*.' [Thus, for the knowledge of *upādhi*, the knowledge of *vyāpti* would not be necessary.]

No, such a claim would not be proper. Because a thing which is really deviating from the *probandum* may appear, for the time being, as something not observed to be deviating from the *probandum* and, then, it also would unduly become a condition.

If it be said that [a pervader means not simply which is observed to be non-deviating at present, but] which will also not be observed [to be deviating] in future, it would be quite impossible to determine the fact [that it is a pervader, for it is not possible to know definitely about the future cases]. Moreover, at the time

the concomitance [between two things] is being ascertained, the one is not specifically determined as *probandum* and hence, how would it be possible then to ascertain non-deviation from [i.e., the fact of being a pervader of] the *probandum*?

If it be said that by *probandum* is meant [not what is actually offered as the object of an inference] but only that which [out of two invariably related things] is the pervader (*vyāpaka*)? No, it would not be proper. So long as concomitance is not ascertained the meaning of the term ‘pervader’ also cannot be rightly ascertained.

If it be said that by ‘pervader’ is meant that which may *possibly* be determined as the pervader? No, it would not be proper. So long as the fact of being pervader is not determined, in what form would the possibility be reckoned?

[Opponent of Śrīhara] Or, let us maintain that the expression ‘pervader of the *probandum*’ is quite alright. At the time [concomitance is actually ascertained], one of the terms may not be specifically determined as *probandum* [lit., may not have the property of *probandum*-ness]. [But, then, there is no harm;] what we mean by the term ‘*probandum*’ is only what has the *fitness* for being offered as a *probandum*.

[Śrīhara’s answer] No, such a contention is unjustified. For, how is it to be determined that *this* particular thing alone has the fitness for being a *probandum*, and not *that* other thing? It would not be possible to do so by saying that [*this* particular thing alone has the fitness] since it is the pervader, [for, as has already been pointed out, the term ‘pervader’ cannot be determined without first determining ‘concomitance’].

Nor is it possible, in all cases, to determine with certainty that [the condition is] not a pervader of the *probans*. For instance, in the wrong inference “He must be dark, because he is a son of Mitra,” it is very difficult to ascertain the absence of ‘physical transformation due to the consumption of vegetables etc.’ [i.e., the condition, *sāka-pākajanyatva*]. [In all the observed sons of Mitra, dark complexion and ‘transformation’ co-exist. Hence, it would

be easier to conceive that in the case of an unobserved son also the two should co-exist.]

[Opponent of Śrīharṣa] [The condition may be of two kinds, *niscita* or ascertained and *śaṅkita* or unascertained.] When there is proof definitely establishing the said characteristics [of a condition], the condition would be ascertained; in other cases, the condition would be unascertained. There is however no specific ground to establish that ‘physical transformation due to the consumption of vegetables etc.’ should necessarily pervade ‘being-son-of-Mitra’ [= the *probans*]. [Thus, [there would only be a doubt regarding the condition’s being a pervader of the *probans* and ‘transformation’ should be taken as an unascertained condition. What is the harm?]

[Śrīharṣa’s answer] No, all the above is unjustified, because it is possible to remove even such a doubt, by establishing the presence of that ‘transformation’ [in an *unobserved* son of Mitra] by the very *probans* ‘being-son-of-Mitra’. [The inference would be: He must have the said ‘transformation’, because he is a son of Mitra.] As to the objection that a series of conditions one after the other, in the form of the ‘collocation of causes producing the *probandum*’ (*sādhyasāmagrī*) may be cited in the succeeding inferences, [our answer would be that] such further conditions also may be proved [to be the pervaders of the *probans*] by the same *probans*, namely, being-son-of-Mitra.

If it be objected that thus there would be infinite regress, [for there would follow a series of inferences proving the condition a pervader of the *probandum*]? No, such an objection would not hold. For, why should not there be an infinite regress [in your view as well] as you go on pointing out further and further conditions [in our inferences]? [Thus the charge of infinite regress is equally applicable to both.]

Besides, if the collocation of causes producing the *probandum* is accepted as a condition, it would be possible [even in the case of a valid inference, for example,] in the inference of fire from smoke. Therefore, some qualifying expression is to be added in

the definition so that the collocation of causes producing the *probandum* does not unduly become a condition.

[Opponent of Śrīharṣa] When ‘having a dark complexion’ (*śyāmatva*) is offered as the *probandum*, the condition would be ‘having physical transformation due to the consumption of vegetables etc.’ (*śāka-pāka-janyatva*); and when such ‘physical transformation’ is offered as the *probandum*, the condition would be ‘having a dark complexion.’ Thus, how would it be possible for the same *probans* to establish also the condition?

[Śrīharṣa’s answer] No, all the above is unjustified. For, it is possible to establish anyone of these two or both by [the same *probans*, namely,] being-son-of-Mitra, and then, it would not be possible to have a doubt regarding [the condition’s] being or not being a pervader of the *probans*. Otherwise, [one may very well say], when ‘having an agent’ (*sakartṛkatva*) is offered as the *probandum*, the condition would be ‘being produced by *adr̥ṣṭa*’, and [conversely,] when the latter is offered as the *probandum*, the former would be offered as the condition; thus, both would remain unproved.

Similarly, [when the *probandum* offered is] ‘being guided by an intelligent being’ (*buddhimat-pūrvakatva*), [the condition would be] ‘being the result of effort’ (*prayatna-pūrvakatva*) and [conversely,] when the latter [is the *probandum* offered], the former [would be offered as the condition]. In the same way, when the *probandum* offered is the presence of a thing sharing the universal of fire-ness (*agnitva*), the condition would be the presence of a ‘burning agent as produced from fuel’ (*indhanaja-tejas*) and conversely, when the latter is the *probandum* offered, the former would be offered as the condition.

Thus, in fact, each and every possible inference [would be vitiated by a condition] and would become invalid.

On the same ground is also refuted the contention that being a pervader of the *probandum* means being pervader to the *probandum-probans* relation.

Moreover, even in an instance where a condition is ascertained, there may exist the possibility of an imperceptible (*atīndriya*)



condition. The absence of such a condition too would be imperceptible and hence, to determine that it is not a pervader of the *probans* [i.e., to determine that there is an absence of the condition in a locus of the *probans*], one would have to take recourse to an inference. But, then, it would be possible to counteract such an inference by the very *probans* which is being sought to be shown as vitiated by a condition. [In short, it is not possible to have an actual instance of an ascertained condition, because one inference seeks to prove *sāadhanāvvyāpakatva*, and another *sādhana-vyāpakatva*.]

If it be said that, in that case, there would be proved, beyond all doubt and difficulty, the presence of an unascertained condition? [That is, our main concern is to show that the *probans* is fallacious, which may very well be done by an unascertained condition. Hence, even if no ascertained condition be possible, not much harm would be done].

O, the dull one! If you say like this; it becomes clear that you have certainly overcome all sense of shame. You start with the avowed claim that there can be an ascertained condition, but as soon as you are led [by the opponent] to the view that a condition can only be unascertained, you simply own it as your own conclusion [leaving aside the original position]. For whom is such an action possible, except one who has fully overcome all sense of shame?

In fact, it is not possible to have a doubt regarding a condition [i.e., it is not possible to admit an unascertained condition] unless the presence of an ascertained condition is established at least in some actual instance. [In short, both kinds of condition are inadmissible].

[Opponent of Śrīharṣa] It is a fact that in some instance the condition may be ascertained by perception. [E.g., wet-fuel-conjunction, pervader of smoke, is observed to be non-pervader of fire in the iron ball]. And that particular thing [e.g., the iron ball] will be the actual instance in which it [i.e., non-pervasion of the *probans* by the condition] can be known by perception. [Thus the

objection that *sāadhanāvvyāpakatva* can nowhere be ascertained would not hold.]

[Śrīharṣa's answer] No, such a contention is not possible. For, even if the presence of a perceptible condition [e.g., perceptible wet-fuel-conjunction] may be negated there, the presence of a similar one which is imperceptible [e.g., wet-fuel-conjunction, which is beyond the senses] may be established by the very *probans* that is being sought to be invalidated [by the condition]. [In other words, *sāadhanāvvyāpakatva* or absence of condition in a locus of the *probans* would remain doubtful.]

It is not a fact that a thing which is found, at a certain instance, to be perceptible by nature may not be proved, at some other instance, to be imperceptible by nature, on the strength of valid ground, in case the presence of that thing as perceptible is negated there; as for instance, the presence of fire in the stomach [which is imperceptible] is inferred from the fact of digestion [*pāka*, lit., cooking]. [Fire is inferred from the fact of cooking. In the case of rice-cooking it is perceptible; but in the case of food-digestion (digestion also being a form of cooking) it is imperceptible.]

The definition 'a condition is not a pervader of the *probans* but is a pervader of the *probandum*' suffers from the fallacy of being too narrow also, for [the alleged condition, namely,] physical transformation due to consumption of vegetables etc. cannot be a pervader of the *probandum* [viz., dark complexion]. There is in fact no such single thing as 'vegetables etc.' which may be said to be a pervader of the *probandum*. Even if it be possible somehow [to count vegetables etc. as a single thing] it cannot be a pervader of dark complexion, because the dark colour of the sapphire (*indranīla*) is not due to the consumption of any food.

If it be said that the *probandum* here is 'darkness as belonging to human body' and the said condition is actually a pervader of this *probandum*?

No, such a rejoinder is unjustified. For, a condition is to be cited in accordance with the concomitance established and [in the present case], the concomitance is not established with 'darkness as belonging to human body'.

The *probandum* is established as a property of the subject, not simply because there is concomitance, but because the *probans* [which is invariably concomitant] has residence in the subject. Otherwise [i.e., if the opponent insists that, by implication, the *probandum* comes to darkness as belonging to human body] the expression ‘as belonging to human body’—for which nothing to be distinguished—would remain, would not be a qualifier.

If it be said the expression ‘as belonging to human body’ is to be added to exclude darkness, indirectly related to the subject [= a human being] [but properly belonging to some extraneous matter], for example, darkness due to the smearing of collyrium etc., then, how would be excluded, [for example], darkness, also indirectly related to the subject, because of the subject’s having conjunction with a dark person. [In the latter case, darkness which is indirectly related to the subject belongs itself to human body. Hence, it cannot be excluded by the word *puruṣa*.]

It cannot be said that ‘pervader of *probandum*’ means *that* in respect of which deviation with the relation of the *probans* and the *probandum* has never been observed, because, in that case, even in the [correct] inference of ‘being made of fire’ (*taijasatva*) by the *probans* ‘being an instrument for the direct cognition of colour’ *rūpa-sākṣātkāra-karaṇatva*), ‘having manifest colour’ (*udbhūta-rūpavattva*) would become a condition.

[To the clause ‘pervader of *probandum*’] may be added as a qualification the expression ‘as accompanied by the *probans*’. But, then, what is to be excluded by this qualification? If the one to be excluded be [a condition] which is the pervader of mere *probandum*, then, such a condition, though capable of producing a doubt regarding deviation, would not be covered by the definition of condition. [Thus the definition would be too narrow.] If, on the other hand, there be nothing to be excluded, the qualification itself would be useless. It is not that a qualification becomes relevant simply because one feels the need for it, but only because it is capable of excluding something [unwanted]. Otherwise, it would become a clear case of the fallacy of the unproved; just as, in the inference of ‘not being produced by a conscious agent’

(*akartṛkatva*), [if the *probans* offered is] ‘not being produced by one having a body’ (*śarīrājanyatva*).

Moreover, how can this definition of condition be established in [a so-called] only-negative (*kevala-vyatiṛekin*) inference, really a form of pseudo-inference, in case the *probans* happens to be resident in the subject, as, for example, in the inference: different living bodies have different selves, because they possess vital breath (*prāṇa*) etc.? It is not possible for what is offered as the *probandum* in an only-negative inference, really a form of pseudo-inference, to be present as being pervaded by the condition, for, in that case, there arises the undue possibility of the said *probandum*, an accepted conclusion of the opponent, being established somewhere else [than the subject.]

If it be said that in the case of only-negative concomitance, the condition too should have only-negative concomitance? In that case, however, it is to be admitted that the condition should be pervaded by that which is the pervaded (*vyāpya*) in the case of an only-negative inference [viz., absence of *probandum*]. [But, then, the definition, stipulating that the condition is to be a pervader of the *probandum* would not apply to it.] Otherwise [i.e., if the condition is not admitted to be pervaded by the absence of *probandum*], there would follow the absurdity that the *probandum* may be present in the presence of the condition [and then, the inference would no longer be a case of an only-negative inference].

Thus it follows that only-negative concomitance in respect of the condition is necessarily to be admitted; and hence, as the one pervaded by the absence of condition is to be admitted the very absence of that which is the pervader of the condition. As a result, there arises the possibility of the opponent’s position being established, because where there is non-equipollent concomitance between two, the only-negative concomitance is established by showing the reverse of what is established by the positive concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*).

For this reason, then, in the case of such an inference [i.e., an only-negative one], some other fallacy [than the presence of condition] is to be shown.

No, such a contention is not possible. Since the *probans* is well-established as having residence in the subject, even you have to admit necessarily the presence of a condition to vitiate the concomitance.

Or, let us accept whatever may be offered in the name of ‘concomitance’. Still, since there is ‘inference’ only when there is ‘concomitance’, concomitance between concomitance and ‘inference’ too is to be admitted and as a result, there would be self-dependence (*ātmāsraya*). If however [the second] concomitance is admitted to be different, there would follow the charges of ‘absence of consecutive character’ (*ananugama*) and ‘absence of criterion for choosing only one alternative’ (*avinigama*).

Further, it has been said that inference is produced by [the *probans*] ‘concomitance’ and ‘residence in the subject’. But what is meant by this residence in the subject? If it be said to mean ‘being present in the subject’, then, in the case of the Naiyāyika etc., *prameyatva* would never be a *probans* [of an inference]. For, the character of ‘being-an-object-and-its-cognition’ (*viśaya-viśayibhāva*) [which is ultimately the meaning of *prameyatva*] is not admitted to be anything distinct from the object and the cognition themselves, and as such, neither of the two [i.e., being-an-object and being-a-cognition] would be present in the ‘object known [= the subject]’.

Moreover, what exactly is this ‘subject’ (*pakṣa*) being present in which is described as residence in the subject? If it be said that ‘subject’ means an object which may have as its characteristic (*dharma*) a thing that is ‘desired to be established’ (*sisādhayiṣita*)?

No, such an answer is not justified. What exactly is meant by this desire for establishment—the desire to convey to somebody else [the presence of the thing] or the desire to know oneself [the presence of the thing]? If the first meaning is accepted, there would arise the undue possibility of no inferential knowledge being produced in the case of an inference for oneself, [when one is alone and there is no other person to whom anything may be communicated]. If the second meaning is accepted, there would arise the undue possibility of the non-production of the inference

for oneself which has for its object ‘ugly taste’ (*kutsita-rasa*) as inferable by putrid smell.

Nor can it be said that subject means an object the characteristics of which are not yet determined (*anavadhārita*). For, if it is not determined even as a locus of the *probans*, it would be impossible for it to be a cause for the production of inferential knowledge. If, on the other hand, it is determined to be so, it cannot be called an object with undetermined characteristics.

Nor can it be said that subject means an object in which is not yet determined, as a characteristic, the thing to be established by the *probans*. For, we then ask: By whom is it not yet determined? It cannot be said that [it is not determined] by one who offers the inference to another [to make him aware of the presence of the *probandum*], because one cannot offer to convey to another what is unknown to one’s own self. If it be said that [it is not determined] by the contestant (*prativādin*)? No, that would be unjustified. Because, even in respect of a conclusion advocated by the contestant [and hence, well known to him], it is observed that two persons may offer inferences, while simply discussing the conclusion, with a view to make a show of each other’s excellence of learning.

Moreover, what does this non-determination pertain to—a thing to be established by any *probans*, or, a thing to be established by a *probans* particularly offered by a participant [of the debate]?

The first alternative is not tenable. For, in that case, even when the mountain is ascertained to be a locus of fire, the mountain may remain a subject in respect of smoke, due to the fact that even then various other things to be established by various other *probantia* may remain unproved as its characteristics.

The second alternative too is untenable, for even then the same difficulty would arise, since those various other *probantia* may very well be offered by a participant.

If it be intended [that subject-hood is to be determined in each case] with reference to a particular *probans* only, there would arise the charge of non-consecutiveness (*ananugama*).

There would also follow the charge of mutual dependence, for

a *probans* would be what has concomitance and residence in the *subject*, and the subject, again, has to be determined with reference to a *probans*. [A *probans* is a thing invariably concomitant and resident in the subject; a subject again is an object which has for its characteristic a thing to be established by a *probans*. To understand ‘*probans*’ one has to know ‘subject’ and *vice versa*].

Moreover, since in the case of inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*) there is no offering of the *probans*, there can be no subject [according to the opponent’s definition that a subject is a locus of a thing to be established by a *probans as offered by the contestant or the participant*]; hence, there arises the undue possibility of no inference being produced there.

Further, there also arises the charge of there being no subject in the case of the [invalid] *probans* called the contradictory (*viruddha*). For, in such a case, the *probandum* is not a thing to be established by the *probans*; in fact, the *probans* there is invalidated because of its having concomitance with the very opposite [i.e., absence] of the *probandum*.

By the above refutation is also refuted the view that a subject is a thing in which the presence of an inferable property is being doubted and that an ‘inferable property’ (*sādhyā*) is what is the object of a cognition, produced in the same form, in the cases of both inference-for-oneself and inference-for-others.

If it be said that [residence in the subject really] means the capability of ultimately making the cognition convey-the cognition which already on the strength of concomitance is going on to reveal the pervader [i.e., *probandum*] in its generality—the implication with reference to an individual *probandum*.

No, such a contention would be of no avail. For, no illogicality as regards such a cognition’s revealing the generality only is proved. Just like concomitance, it may very well be possible with reference to the generality only. [Hence, there is no need to make it convey implication in respect of the particular or individual also.] If it is admitted that such illogicality is proved, the same may be extended to the case of concomitance also. [Thus, concomitance

too should ultimately refer to the particular only and not to the generality; as a result, inference itself would be impossible.]

Indeed, if one expects that [a cognition] should reveal some additional content, there would follow the absurdity of either [a cognition] functioning even after it has ceased to exist itself or there being the necessity of admitting another distinct *pramāṇa*.

If it be argued that there is illogicality so far as [the cognition's] capability of revealing a particular is concerned, there would be absurdity.

Moreover, if it is admitted that the presence of an individual *probandum* is established by residence in the subject, then, one who infers an individual *probandum* first and next sees it with the eyes or one who infers a male from the voice and next sees with the eyes two males should not have a doubt regarding any of these individuals. [But the fact is that one has such a doubt: (1) of these various fire-individuals before me, which one was inferred by me? (2) Of these two persons before me, which one was inferred by me?]

If it be said that there may be a doubt [regarding the inferred one even], because first the distinct characteristics remain unperceived? No, such an answer would be futile. For, in that case, there should be no doubt afterwards [i.e., at the time of seeing with the eyes], when the distinct characteristics are perceived. [But the fact is that there may be doubt even at that time.]



## APPENDIX 2

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### *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* against the Differences in the Points of View of the Scriptures

Śrīharṣa is renowned both as a non-dualist philosopher and as an epic poet in Sanskrit. The justly celebrated *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* (the *Dish of Delectable Dialectic* or *Tonic of Refutation*) otherwise appellated *Anirvacanīyatāsarvasva*, a classic of the Indian dialectical tradition, is an elaborate defense of the Advaita worldview. Śrīharṣa's primary interest, however, seems to be to refute the views of the opponents of the Advaita like the Nyāya logicians, the Jainas, and the proponents of dualistic Vedānta. In order to defend the non-dualistic view, Śrīharṣa has to reject the view that difference or distinction (*bheda*) is real.

Difference, although experienced at the transactional level, is, for the Advaitin, a product of spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*). This illusion is overcome when reality, which is ultimately one, has been realized as such. He has to defend his rejection of difference by not only showing the logical difficulties which follow if difference is accepted, but also that the reality of difference is rejected by the scriptures.

Śrīharṣa offers arguments against the concept of reality of difference. Here is a selection of a sample of his arguments taken

from the translation of *KKK* by Ganganatha Jha<sup>1</sup>. His strategy seems to be, on the one hand, to point out the contradictions which follow on the acceptance of difference, and on the other, to press the claim that difference is illegitimate from the scriptural point of view.

### ***KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYAM***

#### **Section 6**

(Non-duality is in a certain sense proved by the very doubt regarding it, which our Adversary sets forth. And it is fully proved by the inherently authoritative Vedic texts that declare it.)

Here the logician interposes the question: “But what is your proof for Non-duality?” This very question, the Vedāntin replies, cannot be asked by one who does not admit Non-duality. Unless one has an idea or conception of Non-duality how could the question as to its proof be asked at all? For what you ask for is not proof in general, but proof which has for its object a particular thing: and such a question is possible only if the questioner has an idea of that thing. For every question is a kind of energy of speech, and all energy of speech is determined by the object of the idea (or cognition) which gives rise to the energy. If there were no cognitions determining the objects of verbal energies, general confusion with regard to those objects would prevail.

If then you admit that you have a cognition of that Non-duality regarding which you ask a question, we further ask you—Is this cognition of yours a true or a false one? If you hold it to be a true cognition, then the very same means of proof (or true cognition) on which that cognition is based is, at the same time, the means of proof for Non-duality; and as thus the means of proof is already known to you, the question is idle. Nor can we allow you to argue that, “though the proof for Non-duality be already known in a general way, yet what I want to know is the particulars

<sup>1</sup> *KKK* (GanJha), 1:44ff.

of such proof.” For the proof known in a general way is enough to establish Non-duality, any further enquiry as to particulars would be as futile as an enquiry about the teeth of a crow. In fact the knowledge of the proof in general will at the same time imply and bring before your mind the particulars required: what need then of a further question? For among the number of the well-understood means of right knowledge, that one in which, in the given case, you have no good reason to discern any defect, is the particular means of knowledge in which proof in general will find rest and be completed. If, on the other hand, you on valid grounds trace defects in all the kinds of proof already known to you, the general proof will have to find its resting place and completion in some other means of proof which it may be found to imply. And if, finally, the purport of your question is to enquire as to the individual proof (that might convince you), we reply that is not possible for us in every case to put our finger upon all the individual proofs (that would convince each and every enquirer); and hence even though we fail to point out such an individual proof, there is no harm done to our position.

If, on the other hand, you declare the cognition you have of Non-duality not to be true, then your question amounts to this: “What is the proof for that which is the object of wrong cognition?” And does not this question clearly imply a self-contradiction? You perhaps will rejoin, that the cognition of Non-duality is false according to you, while it is true according to us (the Vedāntins); and that hence it is to us that the question as to the proof of the cognition is addressed (and as the means of this can be called “*pramāṇa*,” there will be no self-contradiction). But here we demur; we certainly do not consider it our business to point out the right means of proof for the cognition that you may have of Non-duality (and yet this is what is intended by your question, when it presupposes the *wrong* character of the cognition of Non-duality). We no doubt hold Non-duality to be ever true; but does this imply that the means of proof, on which your cognition of Non-duality rests, are valid? Let us imagine the case of a man who infers the existence of fire on a mountain, on which a fire is

actually burning, from the perception of a fog which he mistakes for smoke—would this (erroneous) cognition of smoke, with fog for its real object, have to be regarded as a valid means of knowledge?

Let your question, however, be allowed to stand in some way or the other; we have a reply to it—viz., that the proof of Non-duality is nothing else but the Veda, in which we meet with texts such as “one only without a second,” “there is no diversity whatever”<sup>2</sup> We shall in the *Īsvarābhisandhi* show that the Veda is a valid means of true knowledge, and specially that it is such a means with regard to (not only things to be accomplished, such as sacrifices, but also) accomplished entities (such as Brahman and its Non-duality). For even if the passages making statements as to accomplished entities really had another import (viz., that of enjoining the meditating upon Brahman as one, non-dual), yet that import would rest upon the validity of what the connected words of the text directly express (i.e., the validity of the injunction of cognizing or meditating on Brahman as one rests on the validity of the fact, directly stated by those texts, of Brahman being one); and thus only those texts would be capable to refute other means of proof (which the logician might employ against the doctrine of Non-duality). We here must remember that cognitions remain authoritative in themselves until they come to be sublated or invalidated by opposed cognitions (and so unless the conception of Non-duality based on Vedic texts be invalidated by other means of proofs, it remains valid).

## Section 7

(There is no force in the objection raised by the Naiyāyika, that the Vedic texts which declare universal Non-duality are refuted by the ordinary means of knowledge, Perception in the first place, which reveals to us a world characterized by diversity. No tenet with a claim to universality can be established by perception,

<sup>2</sup> *BrhU* IV.4.19.

which never extends to more than a limited number of objects and the difference of these objects from one another. It does not, on the other hand, establish either the difference of these objects from the cognitions of them, or of the several cognitions from each other. In this latter sphere therefore the Vedic declaration of Non-duality at once asserts itself, without being encountered by any valid counter-authority; and if the general non-difference of the object from the cognition, and of cognitions from each other, has once been admitted, we are driven to view the difference of objects of thought from each other as a mere false appearance, which, just as individual mind or sensory apparatus, is due to the great cosmic defect (*avidyā* or *Māyā*), which somehow is attached to what alone is real—the principle of universal non-dual intelligence. All arguments, which the Logician brings forward in order to prove that cognitions differ from each other, and that hence their objects also must be allowed to be different, can be shown to be fallacious.)

The Logician now proceeds to impugn the position that Non-duality is to be known through the Veda. The Vedic texts, he says cannot be taken as valid sources of knowledge with regard to those matters which they appear directly to express; since such knowledge is sublated by sense-perception and the other valid means of knowledge. Hence we must assume them to have another, altogether different, import.

You are mistaken, we reply. You hold sense-perception etc., to sublate the Vedic texts declaring Non-duality; but as a matter of fact, perceptions, inferences and so on arise with reference to their own limited objects only, such as a particular jar, or piece of cloth and the like. But there is no sensuous perception or inference etc., acknowledged by both of us, which would apprehend all individual things, past, present and future. Such perception, if it existed, would make of you an omniscient person; but I should believe in this your omniscience only if you gave proof of knowing what is going on in the mind of myself. If then, sense-perception and other kinds of cognition have for their objects a few things only, they have no power to sublate the Vedic texts declaring Non-du-

ality, which refer to other things also; for the rule is that a valid cognition sublates a contrary cognition only with regard to its own particular object. Were it not so, great confusion would arise: for instance, in that case, the Vedic text which enjoins the killing of a goat to be offered to Agni and Soma might set aside the general injunction of not killing any animals, so that the latter injunction would become meaningless.

And if this is so, then the Vedic texts (which asserts the one-ness of all things) are not subject to any sublation (and hence are fully valid) in so far as intimating the non-difference of the so-termed sublating cognition (i.e., the perception of individual difference) and the sublated cognition (i.e., the cognition of general oneness), and hence do intimate the oneness of those cognitions; and do you then mean to say that the perceptual cognition sublates itself (as it would do if, as you claim it were to sublimate the Vedic cognition with which it is one)? On what ground, indeed, could one assert that the Vedic texts which declare the Non-duality of all existence, possess no validity with regard to the non-difference of the sublating (perceptual) cognition from its own object, i.e., the jar, the cloth, and the difference of the two? For certainly the cognition of the oneness of all things cannot be sublated (by the cognition of the difference of two particular things—the jar and the cloth); since that latter cognition has for its object neither itself nor its own difference from the jar and the cloth. For the cognition actually presents itself in the form “The jar and the cloth are different from each other”; not in the form “I am different from the jar and the cloth,” or “The jar and the cloth are different from me.”

## APPENDIX 3

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### *Śrīharsa on Dialectical (Hypothetical) Reasoning (Tarka)*<sup>1</sup>

#### **Introduction**

Here in the following passages<sup>2</sup> of *KKK*, Śrīharsa's Logician-opponent tenders "dialectical/hypothetical reasoning" (*tarka*) as a way to ascertain an inference-grounding pervasion (*vyāpti*).

The Advaitin makes a case against the thesis that pervasion, defined as concomitance, *avinābhāva* (no *x* without *y*), can be known. Then he takes up a second definition, "pervasion is the connection of two things, *x* and *y*, such that wherever the pervader, *y*, does not reside, there is blocking (prevention, opposition, *bādhaka*) of an occurrent *probans*, *x*." This definition he attacks by asking whether a pervasion so understood is known by a recognized source of knowledge—perception, etc.—or by "dialectical reasoning" (*pramāṇam vā tarko vā syāt*).

One by one, Śrīharsa examines the candidate's sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), arguing that each is unequal to the task at hand. He presents reasons for rejecting not only the Logi-

<sup>1</sup> Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, 151–56.

<sup>2</sup> The background for the following passage begins on *KKK* (NavJha), 355, or *KKK* (GanJha), 1:289.

cians' four sources but also an additional two (advanced by Mīmāṃsakas)—namely, presumption (*arthāpatti*) and negative perception (*abhāva*). Perception falls to the criticism that since only non-doubtful cognition satisfies Nyāya's definition of perception,<sup>3</sup> a pervasion known perceptually would have to have the same non-doubtful character as, for example, a particular human being known perceptually. This, however, is not true of the Logicians' favourite example of pervasion, i.e., smoke (as *probans*) and fire (as *probandum*), since it is possible to suspect that any particular bit of smoke may have something other than fire as its cause. Inference is ruled out because that answer would involve a vicious circle and regress (inference founded cognitively in knowledge of pervasion and knowledge of pervasion founded in another inference). "Presumption" (*arthāpatti*) is a form of inference according to Nyāya, but Śrīharṣa finds separate grounds for throwing it out, too, namely, the non-generalizability of particular circumstances. The remainder of the list we need not rehearse.<sup>4</sup>

The candidate *pramāṇa* for ascertaining a pervasion having been disposed of, Śrīharṣa examines dialectical reasoning, *tarka*. This is taken by Logicians not to be a separate *pramāṇa*, but rather the eliminator of an alternative to a view that has some presumption in its favour in virtue of being the product of a true *pramāṇa*. Dialectical reasoning in some cases has the structure of indirect proof: assume the negation of the proposition in question and deduce a contradiction—or show another fault such as *regressus ad infinitum*—which establishes the double negation of the proposition in question and thus the truth of the proposition in question. But *tarka* is best understood as eliminative argument, since there may be more than two alternatives and, as mentioned, the uneliminated, right view must be warranted to some extent independently.

Śrīharṣa's arguments concerning *tarka* fill the next several paragraphs of his text with much elaboration. The heart of the argument is all that will concern us—along with, that is, some

<sup>3</sup> *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.4.

<sup>4</sup> See *KKK* (GanJha), 1:287–88.



summary text of Śrīharṣa. This text is most notable in the context of our study: Gaṅgeśa himself quotes a verse from it, and directly refers to Śrīharṣa in his own treatment of dialectical reasoning.

Is dialectical reasoning, *tarka*, Śrīharṣa asks his Logician opponent, (a) founded in pervasion or (b) not founded in pervasion? The first option (a) is no good, because that leads to a vicious regress. The second (b) is no good, because if *tarka* is not founded in pervasion, then one could play fast and loose, with no *invariable* division between fallacious *tarka* and valid *tarka* (valid *tarka* would not *pervasively* exclude the fallacious).

Śrīharṣa continues by examining a bit of dialectical reasoning directed against the doubt that occurrences of smoke deviate from occurrences of fire and thus that the presence of fire cannot be inferred from perception of smoke. Does the doubter, then, think that smoke has no cause? In that case, it would be eternal, and a belief to this effect would contradict, we may suppose, something else the doubter believes, namely, that smoke is produced. Thus the pervasion would be established by the method of indirect proof.

Assume: 1) Smoke has no cause. (A premise contradicting the conclusion to be established, namely, smoke is caused by fire.) This entails: (2) Smoke is eternal. (From 1 and some suppressed premises.) But this contradicts: (3) Smoke is a product. (Presumably, a belief firmly held by all. To resolve the contradiction, 1 is denied by way of accepting the original conclusion denied, to wit) (4) Smoke is caused by fire. Other options lead to other contradictions.

But, it is possible, says Śrīharṣa, that a particular bit of smoke has something other than fire as its cause. Doubt based in the possibility of multiple causation cannot be pushed to contradiction through dialectical reasoning. The Logician opponent tries, however, to tease out a contradiction in several ways, and is countered in each move by our Advaitin: there is no way to be sure that any particular bit of smoke does not have something other than fire as its cause.

The argument at the end comes back around to the dilemma

between (a) vicious regress and (b) failure to exclude non-well-founded, fallacious *tarka*. Śrīharṣa then summarizes, rehearsing his main points.

The translation below begins with one last fresh move by the Logician opponent, concerning “immemorial foundation,” then continues with Śrīharṣa’s summary, Text 1, 2 and following.

### Text 1: Transliteration and Translation

*Anādi-siddha-vyāptikās te tarkā iti cen, na, tad-buddheḥ  
pramitatvasiddheś, śarīreṣv ātma-pratyayasya tādr̥śasya apy  
apramātvopagamāt, anādi-siddheś ca ubhayatra aviśeṣāt.*<sup>5</sup>

Should you try the following, “(Well-grounded) dialectical reasonings rest on pervasions established immemorially,” you would be wrong. It is not established that cognitions of that sort would be veridical. (A counter example:) The cognition of self as applying to the body is of that sort (i.e., has continued from time immemorial), but we (Advaitins) see it as non-veridical. And with this example and your so-called pervasions there is no difference with respect to beginninglessness or immemoriality of their presumed establishment.

### Comments

Śrīharṣa’s Logician opponent apparently would try this “immemorially founded” move in order to avoid the viciousness of the circle and regress of embracing the first horn of the dilemma: to wit, that *tarka* is cognitively founded in cognition of pervasion as well as the other way around. Śrīharṣa’s parry is to argue that the Logician would only fall from the one horn to the other. The dilemma has bite, to change metaphors. If you refuse to admit that *tarka* is founded in pervasion, you are going to allow the possibility of faulty *tarka*, because without pervasion, there is no touchstone whereby deviations that would vitiate inference-and

<sup>5</sup> KKK (NavJha), 363.

*tarka* as well-could be discerned. Of course, on the pervasion option you face the infinite regress.

The example Śrīharṣa uses to counter the immemoriality move is particularly interesting in that the illusion of false identification of self with body includes behaviour, according to Advaita. But it is behaviour on which Gaṅgeśa hangs his response to Śrīharṣa.

## Text 2: Transliteration and Translation

*Na api yad yatra vyabhicāraś śankyeta tadā vyāghātaḥ syād  
ity evam-rūpāt tarkāt vyāghātāvagamaḥ vyāghāta-pratipā-  
dakasya tarkasya mūla-śaithilye tarkābhāsatvāpātāt.*<sup>6</sup>

(In sum) you are not (let me repeat) able to establish pervasion as the basis of inference by arguing that when doubt should arise about a failure of  $x$  to pervade  $y$  then by dialectical reasoning (*tarka*) a contradiction would be revealed in the ‘deviating’ option of an opposed pair that the doubt would presuppose. For “dialectical reasoning” of this sort brings about (according to you) an understanding of a contradiction (*vyāghāta*), and since this reasoning bringing about an understanding of a contradiction may not be well-founded, you still face the problem of not being able to rule out the possibility of fallacious dialectical reasoning (*tarka-ābhāsa*).

## Comments

An example would be (1<sub>a</sub>) Occurrences of smoke deviate from occurrences of fire (a false original conclusion to be established). Assume (1<sub>p</sub>) Occurrences of smoke is pervaded by occurrences of fire (a premise contradicting 1<sub>a</sub>). This entails (2) Smoke is the same colour as fire (by fallacious reasoning). But (2) contradicts the firmly held belief (3) Smoke is not the same colour as fire. Therefore, (4) Occurrences of smoke deviate from occurrences of fire.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

**Text 3: Transliteration and Translation**

*Tādṛśasya api vyāghātopanāyakatve vyāghātāpatte sāmyam,  
śakyate eva tarkābhāsād bhavato fpi vyāghātopanetum.<sup>7</sup>*

Since such reasoning can lead to what you would call a contradiction when the reasoning is fallacious, you face a problem of possible contradiction equally on each side, i.e., on both sides of the option and opposed pair, one of which the reasoning is undertaken to eliminate. Because of the possibility of fallacious dialectical reasoning, contradiction on the side that you, sir, wish to establish (as opposed to eliminate) could occur as (fallaciously) deduced. (Thus you could not in principle be free from doubt here.)

**Comments**

Any given bit of deducing could be fallacious: the criteria for discerning good *tarka* presupposes awareness of pervasion. In contemporary terms, Śrīharṣa may be said to have hit upon the problem of the foundations of *a priori* knowledge: there is no way to pull the canons of deductive reasoning out of the hat without putting them there to begin with. If the canons of the *a priori* have been drawn into question, there is no way to deduce them—on pain of begging the question.

**Text 4: Transliteration and Translation**

*Atha tasya tarkasya vyāpti-mūlatā abhyupagamyate, tatra  
api vyabhicāra-śāṅkāyāṃ punar anavasthā eva, tatra api  
vyāghātopapādane punar ittham anavasthā eva.<sup>8</sup>*

Then if it is held that the ‘dialectical reasoning’ has its foundation in pervasion, that won’t help (because cognition of pervasion, you will remember, is just the problem). When there is doubt about

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

deviation from a true pervasion, there no cognitive foundation can be upheld. In trying to prove another contradiction with respect to the unwanted option that the new doubt involves, (you presuppose another pervasion and so) again, the difficulty arises *ad infinitum*.

### Comments

Infinite regress seems to be the final resting place (*avasthā*) for the Logician, which is no resting place (*anavasthā*) at all!

### Text 5: Transliteration and Translation

*Tasmād asmābhir apy asminn arthe na khalu duṣpaṭhā |  
tvad-gāthā eva anyathākāram akṣarāṇi kiyanty api ||  
vyāghāto yadi śankā asti na cec chaṅkā tatastarām |  
vyāghātāvadhīr āśankā tarkaś śaṅkāvadhiḥ kutah ||*<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, on this topic it is not too difficult for us to read your verse (i.e., Udayana's verse) with the letters just slightly altered: "If there is contradiction, then there is doubt. If none, there is doubt all the more. Contradiction includes doubt within its borders; how then can dialectical reasoning be the limit (or end) of doubt?"

### Comments

The verse from Udayana that Śrīharṣa parodies: "If there be doubt, there is inference indeed; all the more if doubt does not occur. Dialectical reasoning is regarded as the limit of doubt; anxiety does not proceed past (a demonstration of its) inconsistency."

The broadest context for Udayana's verse is his project to prove (by inference) the existence of God. The more immediate context—provided by Udayana's auto-commentary—is a challenge to the *pramāṇa* status, or reliability, of inference. Specifically, Udayana construes a challenge to an inference<sub>1</sub> to be a doubt, a meaningful doubt, about possible deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of an

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

occurrence of the *probans* from occurrences of the *probandum* (pervasion requires no deviation: wherever the *probans* there the *probandum*). But such doubt presupposes a criterion whereby deviation can be determined, namely, the pervasion between deviation and lack of grounds for inference. Thus doubt about the basis for inference<sub>1</sub> relies on a pervasion-grounding inference<sub>2</sub>, the inference from deviation to well-founded doubt. Thus, “if there be doubt, there is inference.” But if there is no well-founded doubt about inference<sub>1</sub>, then inference<sub>1</sub> proceeds regarded as reliable (the default position).

This very reflection is an example of dialectical reasoning. It shows that doubt about the possibility of deviation cannot be generalized to undermine the reliability of inference, for it would be self-defeating, contradicting its own basis.

Śrīharṣa turns the reasoning on its head. Contradiction presupposes pervasion (in propositional logic, that  $p$  and  $\sim p$  are contradictory presupposes that if the one is true, the other is false, and conversely; in a naturalistic logic of ontological opposition, if, for example, fire and water are opposed, then wherever there is water, such as a lake, there is no fire). Thus with the burden of proof of the reliability of inference borne by the Logician, dialectical reasoning is no help at all. For dialectical reasoning presupposes the very cognitive basis of inference, namely pervasion, which is in question. To be precise, it presupposes contradiction, which, in turn, presupposes pervasion. Thus, if the Logician proffers a contradiction to solve his problem, then he simply reiterates the question—how is pervasion known? If, on the other hand, he is unable to find a contradiction in the doubt about the cognitive basis of pervasion, then by his own admission the doubt will not end.

## APPENDIX 4

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# Śrīharṣa on Defining Valid Knowledge or Veridical Awareness (*Pramā*)

### Introduction

Śrīharṣa's attacks on definitions of veridical awareness (*pramā*) are closely followed by Gaṅgeśa as the New Logician shows what is wrong with wrong views on the topic. Thus Śrīharṣa's arguments inform the problem space in which the great Naiyāyika works. Śrīharṣa's arguments are also interesting in their own right. In particular, he shows the difficulty of maintaining the right cut between veridical and illusory awareness. He also mounts a devastating critique of a correspondence theory, criticisms that force Gaṅgeśa to try a new strategy. Moreover, the Advaitin clearly shows that veridicality does not meet the Naiyāyika conditions for a natural kind, a demonstration that Gaṅgeśa not only accepts but that moves him to rethink the general project of characterization and to use, as will be explained, an appropriate variable in the most influential of the definitions of veridicality he endorses.

### Text 1: Transliteration and Translation

*Tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā ity apy ayuktam, tattva-śabdārthasya  
nirvaktum aśakyatvāt | tasya bhāvo hi tattvam ucyate, prakṛ-  
tam ca tac-chabdārthaḥ, na ca atra prakṛtaṃ kiñcid asti yat  
tac-chabdena parāmrśyate |<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 130.

The definition of veridical awareness as “experience of reality (*tattva*, thatness)” is incorrect, since it is impossible to explain the meaning of the word *tattva*. For *tattva* is said to be the “being that,” and the meaning of the word “that” (*tat*) is something referred to in a context of utterance. But (with just this definition) there is nothing referred to in context that could be meant by the word “that.”

### **Observations**

This definition is given by Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇamāla*. Gaṅgeśa considers and rejects it, crystallizing Śrīharaśa’s objections.

### **Text 2: Transliteration and Translation**

*Atha anubhūtyā sva-saṃbandhi-viṣaya ākṣepād buddhisthaḥ kāryate, sa tacchadbena parāmṛśyate, vaktr-śrotr-buddhi-sthāyām eva prakaraṇa-padārtha-viśrāmāt; tena yasya arthasya yo bhāvas tat tasya tattvam ucyate iti, na, arajātāder api rajatādy-ātmanā anubhūti-viṣayatā-saṃbhavād asatyānubhūty-avyavacchedāt.*<sup>2</sup>

Opponent: Then what the word “that” means is the content (*viṣaya*) presented by an experience that is by itself related to it and, we may suppose, established by the cognition (or cognitive context), since in determining meaning we do not look further than the context as established exclusively by the cognition of the speaker and hearer. Thus the meaning of *tattva* would be: for whatever object (is intended), its *being that* (reality).

Śrīharaśa: No. The definition (then) would fail to exclude non-veridical experience, since it is possible that an experience have content as, say, silver, even when it is of what is not silver.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



**Observations**

If the “being that” is determined by cognition, then illusion will not be excluded. Both veridical and non-veridical awareness have content. There is nothing in the cognitive context alone that is capable of differentiating the veridical and non-veridical.

**Text 3: Transliteration and Translation**

*Bhavitur atattva-śabdārthatva-prasaṅgena dharmy-aṃśe  
viśiṣṭe ca pramāyā apramātvāpātāt* |<sup>3</sup>

There is also the difficulty that with regard to what is (the possessor of reality, *tattva*) it should be designated by a word other than *tattva*. So a veridical awareness would be non-veridical with regard to that portion of its content that is the property-bearer, the qualified.

**Observations**

The possessor of reality would have to be, as the *possessor* of reality, something else as well, and the definition on the table would not capture its being in itself the property-bearer (with respect to multiple properties).

**Text 4: Transliteration and Translation**

*Atha ucyate avayavārtha-cintayā dūṣaṇābhidhānam idaṃ  
tyajyatām, yatofyaṃ tattva-śabdaḥ sva-rūpa-mātra-va-  
canaḥ iti, etad apy ayuktam, svarūpatvasya jāter upādher  
vā svātmani vṛtṭy-avṛttibhyām anupapatteḥ | svarūpa-śab-  
dārthasya ekasya asaṃbhavena pratiṣṭhaya-vyāvṛtṭyā  
lakṣaṇasya avyāpakatvāpātāt* |<sup>4</sup>

Opponent: Then please stop listing problems in the spirit of

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

etymologizing. For this word *tattva* means simply *svarūpa*, “essential nature” or something’s “own form.”

Śrīharṣa: That also won’t do. Whether “being an essential nature” (*svarūpatva*) is understood as a natural kind or an accidental property (*upādhi*), it cannot be nested in itself, nor can it be not nested in itself (and there is no other alternative).

Furthermore, the definition would then fail to be sufficiently inclusive, since there can be no single meaning of the word *svarūpa* as it differs with each and every object.

### **Observations**

The first objection is Śrīharṣa’s oft-utilized attribution dilemma. According to Nyāya, a property, whether a natural kind character or an accidental or abstract property (*upādhi*), cannot rest in itself; it must have a distinct substratum.

The second objection—taking off from the premise that the meaning of the term *svarūpa* varies according to context—is used by Śrīharṣa in bashing the theory of universals with practically every Naiyāyika definition he examines. A definition, like a universal, has to unify its instances, or, more precisely, in the case of a definition of *x*, apply univocally to each and every instance of *x*. There must be “consecutive character,” *anugama*. In particular, if the Naiyāyika insists that *tattva* amounts to *svarūpa* in the sense of the uniqueness of an individual thing known, then there can be no consecutive character in the definition of veridical awareness.

Gangeśa accepts this critique. He breaks with earlier Nyāya in admitting that his favoured definition fails the consecutive character test. That is to say, he proffers what he takes to be good definitions in spite of abandoning the *anugama* requirement—an abandonment, moreover, that he explicitly defends.

### **Text 5: Transliteration and Translation**

*Katham ca tattva-iti-viparyāsāder nirāsaḥ | tathā hi, śuk-  
tau yo rajatatva-pratyayaḥ so fpi sva-rūpa-buddhir bhavaty*

*eva; na hi dharmī vā rajatatva vā na sva-rūpaṃ, na api pratibhāsamānaḥ sambandho na sva-rūpaṃ iti yuktam | samavāyo hi tayoḥ sambandhaḥ pratibhāti, sa ca sva-rūpaṃ eva ||*<sup>5</sup>

And how, again, is the mention of reality to exclude wrong and other non-veridical cognition? For example, an understanding of silverness with respect to mother-of-pearl is also a cognition of an essential nature, *svarūpa*. It is not the case that either the property-bearer or the silverness fails to be an essential nature. Nor does the relation that appears between the two fail to be an essential nature. For (according to your own Nyāya view) inherence (*samavāya*) is the relation manifest, and it is indeed an essential nature.

### **Observations**

Considered objectively, and in accord with the Nyāya theory, each of the factors manifest in cognition,—the property-bearer, the qualifier, and the relation—is an essential nature, though in some cases the qualifier and/or the relation may not be a separate, independent real. Even with non-veridical awareness, each is thought to exist somewhere in the world; there is no such factor that is unreal. So again there is failure to get the precise cut between an illusion and a veridical awareness.

Now let us look at another definition and its refutation.

### **Text 6: Transliteration and Translation**

*Yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā ity apy alakṣaṇam | yathārthatvaṃ hi tattva-viśayatvaṃ vā? artha-sādṛśatā vā syāt? na ādyaḥ, pūrvaṃ nirastatvāt | na api dvitīyaḥ, vyabhicāriṇo'pi prameyatvādinā artha-sādṛśyena pramātvāpātāt | na ca prameyatvādi-rūpasya vyabhicāriṇy api prakāśa-sambhavana tathā apy atip-rasaṅgaḥ iti vācyam, prameyatvādy-aṃśe prakāśamāne*

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 108.

*viṣayābhūta-dharmāntarāpekṣayāvvyabhicāriṇo fpi pramātvā-  
bhyupagamāt, itina etadyuktam | prakāśamānenarūpādi-sam-  
avāyitvenarūpeṇajñānasya artha-sādṛśyānabhyupagame fpi  
tatra tadīya-pramātvāṅgīkārād iti ||<sup>6</sup>*

“Veridical awareness is experience in conformity with the object” is also a wrong definition. For would this conformity be “content that is real (*tattva*)” or “similarity with the object?” The first alternative won’t do, because that was thrown out earlier (i.e., when we examined *tattva* in connection with the definition, “Experience of reality”). Nor is the second option any better, because an erroneous awareness would have to be counted veridical in that it is similar to the object in some respects, for example, as knowable.

Opponent: The similarity intended is with the form objectified by cognition. And it is wrong to hold that there would still be unwanted inclusion in that an erroneous awareness could also appear making manifest (or objectifying) knowability, and so on. For in just such a respect’s being manifest, namely, knowability, even an erroneous awareness—erroneous with respect to another characteristic objectified—is to be accepted as veridical.

Śrīharṣa: No, what you say won’t do. For you accept the veridicality of an awareness that you do not view as having similarity with its object, namely, an awareness veridical with respect to colour, etc., being manifest as *inherent* (i.e., object-wise, whereas on the other hand, cognition-wise, colour, etc., do *not* inhere).

### **Observations**

Colour as a quality inheres in coloured substances, for example, blue in a pot, but colour manifest in an awareness does not inhere in the awareness.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 218.

**Text 7: Transliteration and Translation**

*prakāśamānena rūpeṇa viśeṣaṇa-bhāvād artha-sādrśyam  
anubhavasya vivakṣitam, arthasya ca yathā samavāyād  
rūpaṃ viśeṣaṇībhavati tathā viśaya-bhāvād jñānasya api  
tad viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavaty eva ? iti cen na; evaṃ hi purovartit-  
vādinā rūpeṇa tathā- bhāva-sambhavāt purovartinīṃ śuktim  
rajatatayā avagāhamānaṃ jñānaṃ pramā syāt <sup>7</sup>*

Opponent: The similarity between the object and awareness we intend derives from the qualifier as the manifest form. So in the case of the form objectified deriving from inherence on the side of the object, there would likewise be, on the side of the awareness as well, something (a qualifier, namely, inherence) derived from the awareness's content. That we call the qualifier (both cognition-wise, as informing the content of the awareness, and object-wise, as an objective real).

Śrīharṣa: Wrong. For in that case an awareness fathoming mother-of-pearl as silver would have to be counted veridical: mother-of-pearl that is right in front, and thus in this respect, being right in front, would be just as you have specified, namely, with such (manifest) form.

**Observations**

Here Śrīharṣa's opponent provides the germ of the sophisticated response of Navya-Nyāya. Śrīharṣa's counter-response is accepted by Gaṅgeśa; that is to say, Gaṅgeśa endorses the view that an erroneous awareness can be veridical in part, for example, with respect to the "being in front." Moreover, the next move the opponent makes is criticized by the Logician with Śrīharṣa's exact argument.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 219.

**Text 8: Transliteration and Translation**

*Nacavācyamiṣyataevasāpramāapiitinavyabhicāra-codanā  
iyam yuktimatī iti, yathārthatā-viśeṣaṇa-vaiyarthya-  
prasaṅgāt | anubhūtiḥ pramā ity ukte eva hi tāvan, na asty  
atiprasaṅgaḥ, sarvasya vyabhicāry-anubhavasya antatof  
nyathā-khyāti-vādi-naye dharmiṇy api pramātvā-sambhav-  
ena pramāyām eva anubhavatvasya sthairyāt ||<sup>8</sup>*

Opponent: That is just the consequence we want! Such an awareness would be veridical, too. Your urging a deviation is no argument.

Śrīharṣa: No, this should not be said, because you invite the objection that the term in the definition *yathārthatā*, “conformity with the object,” would be meaningless. For experience would be equivalent to veridical awareness according to this statement of yours, so that there would indeed be no incongruity (in there being no illusory awareness at all). All deviant awareness, according to the (Nyāya) “misplacement” theory (*anyathā-khyāti-vāda*), as being about a property-bearer, too (i.e., no less than a non-deviant awareness), would, in the final analysis, show veridicality. With respect to (defining) veridical awareness, “being experience” would indeed be the firm conclusion

**Observations**

Gaṅgeśa is forced by these considerations to view every illusory awareness as veridical in part, that is, as veridical with respect to making manifest a “being a thing”.

Now we shall consider a definition attributed to Dharmakīrti.

**Text 9: Transliteration and Translation**

*Avisamvādy-anubhavaḥpramāityapinayuktam | avisamvādit-  
vaṃ hi jñānāntareṇa tatha eva ullikhyamānārthatvaṃ vā*

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

? *jñānāntareṇa viparītatayā pratīyamānārthatvaṃ vā ?  
 pratīyamāna-vyāpya-viṣayatvaṃ vā ? anyad eva vā kiñcit  
 ? na prathamah, dhārā-vāhino bhramasya pramātvā-  
 prasaṅgāt | na ca pramā-bhūtaṃ jñānāntaraṃ vivakṣitam iti  
 vācyam, pramāyā eva lakṣyamānatvāt*<sup>9</sup>

“Veridical awareness is experience not failing to conform (or agree) with others.” This too is wrong. For is lack of failure of conformity to be (1) with another awareness only insofar as its object is explicitly mentioned (or manifest), or (2) with another awareness whose object is not cognized as opposed, or (3) whose content is pervaded by (the content) being currently cognized, or (4) is it something else? The first option is no good, because an error that continues in a series (e.g., a ‘sequence of misperceptions of silver as mother-of-pearl’) would have to be counted veridical. And it should not be said that the other awareness specified has to be veridical, since it is just veridical awareness that is being defined.

### **Observations**

Śrīharṣa presents this argument in refutation of what we call the coherentist definition. This passage seems closely followed by Gaṅgeśa: (see *TaCM*, p. 419 – ‘*na api samvādy-anubhavatvam | jñānāntareṇa tathōllikhyamānatvasya samvāditvasya bhrama-sādhāraṇatvāt*’ = Nor (D6) “experience whose content agrees with another cognition”. Agreement or conformity with another cognition insofar as it is made explicit is (potentially) common to error).

He even repeats the phrase, *tathā ullikhyamāna*, “insofar as it is made explicit.” Probably Gaṅgeśa had the text of the *KKK* in front of him while he composed the *TaCM* section on defining veridical awareness. Converting the double negation, he focuses, however, on “awareness in conformity with others,” in other words, on Śrīharṣa’s third alternative, not on the other three.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

Śrīharṣa himself, in a rare mention of a historical figure, identifies the definition as Dharmakīrti's:<sup>10</sup> Phyllis Granoff finds it endorsed by several other authors.

### Text 10: Transliteration and Translation

*Na api dvitīyaḥ, anupajāta-bādha-bhrama-vyāpanāt;  
svastha-daśōtpannasya śuklaśaṅkhādi - jñānāder  
duṣṭendriya-daśōtpanna-tat -pītim ajñānādy- ullikhita-  
viśayavaiparītyasya apramātvā-prasaṅgāc ca |<sup>11</sup>*

Nor will the second alternative do. This would include errors that have not yet been proved wrong. Moreover, this would involve counting as non-veridical an awareness occurring when one is healthy, an awareness of, say, a white shell, which is opposed to another whose explicit content is, say, yellow, occurring when the sense organ is not properly functioning.

### Observations

Thus the later veridical experience of white would have to be counted as nonveridical, since it fails to conform. Coherence as the sole criterion of veridicality does not cut the ice between fiction and fact, as is often remarked by contemporary epistemologists.

We are now near the end of Śrīharṣa's treatment of definitions of veridical awareness. Now we shall summarize the Advaitin's next few paragraphs, and then discuss the translation of one last section.

The definition targeting coherence as the mark of the veridical cannot be saved by stipulating that the agreement has to be with other 'right' cognitions, for what is meant by "right" is in question. The third alternative fails because of the unavailability of a viable sense for "pervasion." Moreover, an entire life with a series of cognitions having the same content would be required to make

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 236.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 231.



a cognition veridical, and a break at the end would undermine the whole chain.

Next, Śrīharṣa fills out the fourth option, “something else,” with a sympathetic presentation of Dharmakīrti’s pragmatism.<sup>12</sup> The phrase “not failing to conform” in the coherentist definition is interpreted pragmatically, that is, as cashed out in successful action, action satisfying desire. Śrīharṣa objects that it is possible that we have a wrong view of “successful action.” Moreover, the intentions or desires of a cognizer can change over time, vitiating the pragmatic touchstone. The Advaitin closes with a summary statement that on no interpretation will the coherentist view fly, and also with this concession, “This approach of Dharmakīrti’s is pretty difficult to rule out, and one has to be careful with it”.<sup>13</sup>

Śrīharṣa continues with the observation that the time problem faced by Dharmakīrti’s theory also wreaks havoc with the understanding of veridical awareness as “undefeated experience,” *abādhita-anubhūti*. Every awareness is undefeated at the time it occurs, and if one wants the deeper undefeatedness that would take into account the cognitions of everyone, that is unavailable. Now since Śrīharṣa has gone to great lengths to defend a similar epistemology earlier in his work, we might worry that these remarks—albeit occurring in a single sentence in the midst of a long examination of faulty definitions—draw into question the seriousness of his earlier espousal of a positive epistemological program whereby he would defend the Advaita world view.

However, there is indeed a crucial difference in context: here undefeatedness is taken as a proposal of a mark of absolutely veridical awareness, whereas earlier undefeatedness is championed as the mark of what we have a right to assert and believe (i.e., the content of undefeated awarenesses). Śrīharṣa wants to reserve veridicality exclusively for the mystical awareness of Brahman, as he wants to reserve reality (*sattā*) exclusively for Brahman, the One.

<sup>12</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 235; *KKK* (GanJha), 1:286.

<sup>13</sup> *KKK* (NavJha), 236.

**Text 11: Transliteration and Translation**

*Tarka-saṁśaya-viparyaya-smṛti-vyatiriktā pratītiḥ  
 pramā ity api na, smṛti-vyatirikatva-khaṇḍana-  
 nyāyena nirastatvād iti, jāti-saṁkaram icchataś ca  
 pramātvā-lakṣaṇa-jāty-abhisambandhāt pramā ity api  
 durlakṣaṇam, asya ajñātasya tad-vyavahāra-janakatve  
 pramāyām apramā-bhrama-saṁśayau na syātām |<sup>14</sup>*

“Veridical awareness is awareness other than dialectical reasoning (*tarka*), doubt, erroneous awareness, and memory,” also is no good (as a definition), for it is thrown out by the same reasoning that refutes (the definition of veridicality as an awareness’s) being other than memory (that is, with regard to the phenomenon of recognition, Śrīharṣa has argued, (a) awareness and (b) memory cannot be distinguished).

Therefore, to try to define veridical awareness according to the relation to a natural kind characterizing a class—namely, veridicality—is a bad idea, unless one wants a confusion or cross-section of kinds. (Moreover,) there could be no error or doubt about a non-veridical awareness’s being veridical if it (veridicality), without itself being cognized, were to be responsible for everyday usages of the term (*pramā*, veridical awareness).

**Observations**

Here Śrīharṣa again shows his command of the Nyāya theory of generality, exploiting it for his own purposes. As the natural kind character cowhood is responsible for identification of an individual as a cow, so veridicality, according to the current proposal, would be responsible for identification of an awareness as veridical. One problem is then that just as being-a-cow would be given in perception such that it would not normally be subject to (meaningful) doubt, so veridicality would have to be perceptually given and likewise not subject to doubt. This, we will see,

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

is the consideration with which Gaṅgeśa opens his discussion of the veridicality characterization project. He also repeats the “cross-section” objection, agreeing with the Advaitin that, for that reason, too, veridicality is not a natural kind.

Śrīharṣa goes on to anticipate Gaṅgeśa’s own view that veridicality varies with the types of things that there is veridical awareness of. First he argues that if veridicality is known not perceptually but by way of an inferential mark, then supposing veridicality to be a natural kind would be otiose.<sup>15</sup> All that we would need is a clear statement concerning the inferential mark, or marks. And just what might these be? You owe us an answer, the Advaitin avers. Whatever you might suggest, we will be able to show it to be in error. Then Śrīharṣa promises further details in a later section where he says that the “extrinsic justification” view is refuted. Finally, Śrīharṣa proffers a general objection against all definitions—not just purported definitions of veridical awareness—that they are either (if analytic) otiose (we already know that) or (if synthetic) too wide (that’s not what we mean).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

## APPENDIX 5

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# Śrīharṣa on Distinctness and Relation Regress

### Introduction

No further introduction of this portion of Śrīharṣa's text is needed: see above, pp. 98-100.

### Text 1: Transliteration and Translation

*Kim ca, dharmasya tasya dharminā samam asaṃbandhefti-  
prasaṅgaḥ, saṃbandhānantye fnavasthā, prathamato fntato  
gatvā vā sva-bhāva-saṃbandhābhyupagame saṃband-  
hy-antarasya api tat-sva-bhāva-praveśād abhede eva  
paryavasānaṃ syād iti.*<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, if the property is unrelated to the property-bearer, there is an obvious problem; (if, on the other hand, it is related) there will be an endless number of relations and thus infinite regress. Or if at the beginning or the end the relation is admitted to be of the very nature of one of the terms (property or property-bearer), then since even the other term of the relation would enter into the very nature of that (the combined relatee -relator), nothing but nondistinctness would result

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 107.

### Observations

Here Śrīharṣa identifies what we have called the attribution dilemma and the relation regress. Three options are sketched: (1) a property, such as blue, is unrelated to the property-bearer, such as a pot; (2) if there is a relation that relates them, such as inherence, then there has to be further relations to relate the inherence to each of the terms, the blue and the pot, *ad infinitum* (aRb, aR'R, aR''R', *ad infinitum*, likewise with the second term); unless, (3) it is the very nature of one of the terms to link with the other: such linkage would amount to non-distinctness. Gaṅgeṣa and his followers embrace the third option: it is, at some point, the very nature of one of the terms to self-link. Of course, Naiyāyikas do not, however, embrace non-distinctness.

### Text 2: Transliteration and Translation

*Evam anyasminn api dharma-vikalpe iti. tasmāt sva-rūpa-bhede pramāṇam bhavati| pratyakṣam advaite eva pramāṇam bhavati.*<sup>2</sup>

Any other view of properties is to be addressed in this way. Therefore, your “prover,” *pramāṇa*, of perception, sir, which was supposed to show an essential distinctness among things, proves nothing but non-duality (advaita).

### Observations

Thus it seems that Śrīharṣa would back into the Advaita view, that is, on the assumption that only the third option is viable. However, my interpretation is, again, that this is a taunt, that what Śrīharṣa seriously takes himself to show is the incoherence of the realist position. Thus it cannot be a challenger to the idealism taught by the *Upaniṣads*.

The context of this passage is the Logician claim that percep-

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 108.

tion establishes distinctness. But since perception is thought to reveal layered facts properties, property-bearers, and relations tying them together, with distinctness understood as a property-it seems perception establishes nondistinctness instead. Note that the argument does not depend on taking distinctness to be the property in question; any property would do.

## APPENDIX 6

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### *A Chronology of Ancient and Classical Works and Authors*

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<i>Ṛg Veda</i>	1200–900 BCE (excluding the 10 <sup>th</sup> bk.)
Early <i>Upaniṣads</i>	800–300 BCE
Middle and late <i>Upaniṣads</i>	ca. 300 BCE–1000 CE
The Buddha (Siddhārtha Gautama)	ca. 500 BCE
Mahāvīra (founder of Jainism)	ca. 500 BCE
Pāṇini (grammarian)	ca. 400 BCE
Southern Buddhist Canon	ca. 300–200 BCE
<i>Mahābhārata</i> ( <i>Great Indian Epic</i> ):	
earliest portion	ca. 500 BCE
latest portion	400 + CE
Bhagavad-Gītā	
earliest portion	200 BCE
latest portion	400 CE
<i>Mīmāṃsā-sūtra</i>	200 BCE–200 CE
<i>Brahma-sūtra</i>	200 BCE–200 CE
Patañjali (grammarian)	ca. 150 BCE
<i>Vaiśeṣika-sūtra</i>	ca. 100 CE
Mahāyāna scriptures	100 BCE–800 CE
Nāgārjuna (Mādhyamika)	150 CE
Āryadeva (Mādhyamika)	fl. 180
<i>Nyāya-sūtra</i> (Gautama)	ca. 200
<i>Yoga-sūtra</i>	300–400 (final redaction)
Vasubandhu (early Buddhist Idealism)	fl. 360

<i>Sāṃkhya-kārikā</i>	ca. 375
Vātsyāyana (Nyāya)	fl. 410
Bhartṛhari (grammarian)	ca. 450
Diñnāga (Buddhist Idealism)	ca. 500
Gauḍapāda (Advaita)	fl. 525
Candramati (Vaiśeṣika)	ca. 550
Prāśastapāda (Vaiśeṣika)	ca. 575
Uddyotakara (Nyāya)	ca. 600
Dharmakīrti (Buddhist Idealism)	fl. 625
Kumārila (Mīmāṃsā)	fl. 660
Prabhākara (Mīmāṃsā)	fl. 700
Maṇḍana Miśra (Mīmāṃsā and Advaita)	ca. 680–750
Śankara (Advaita)	ca. 750–750
Padmapāda (Advaita)	ca. 750
Jayarāśi (Cārvāka)	ca. 750
Sureśvara (Advaita)	fl. 750
Bhāskara (theistic Vedānta)	fl. 750
Dharmottara (Buddhist Idealism)	fl. 770
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Nyāya)	ca. 875
Jñānaghana (Advaita)	ca. 900
Bhāsarvajña (Nyāya)	ca. 950
Vyomaśiva (Vaiśeṣika)	ca. 950
Vimuktāman (Advaita)	ca. 950
Vācaspati Miśra I (chiefly Advaita and Nyāya)	fl. 960
Śrīdhara (Vaiśeṣika)	fl. 990
Udayana (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika)	975–1050
Sarvajñātman (Advaita)	fl. 1027
Śankhapāṇi (Advaita)	ca. 1070
Rāmānuja (theistic Vedānta)	fl. 1120
Śrīvallabha (or Vallabha, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika)	1225–1275
Madhva (theistic Vedānta)	ca. 1280
Citsukha (Advaita)	fl. 1295
Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1300
Gangeśa (Navya Nyāya)	fl. 1325
Vardhamāna (Navya Nyāya)	fl. 1360
Śankara Miśra (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1425
Vācaspati Miśra II (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1450
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1500
Rucidatta Miśra (Navya Nyāya)	fl. 1510
Mādhava (intellectual historian, Advaita)	fl. 1515
Vallabha (theistic Vedānta)	fl. 1525
Vyāsatīrtha II (theistic Vedānta)	fl. 1535



Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Advaita)	ca. 1570
Bālabhadra (Advaita)	ca. 1610
Jagadīśa (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1620
Viśvanātha (Navya Nyāya)	fl. 1640
Mathurānātha (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1650
Rāmakṛṣṇādharin (Navya Nyāya)	fl. 1650
Gadādhara (Navya Nyāya)	ca. 1660
Gauḍa Brahmānanda (Advaita)	ca. 1680

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## APPENDIX 7

### Editions of the NC<sup>1</sup> (in the order of publication)

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|-----|--|-----------------|
| (1) | Pūrvanaiṣadhacarita  | Calcutta, 1836. |
|     | Vol.1. (I–XI); Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta; with Premacandra Tarkavāgīśa's comm.; rpt. 1870–72; 1882.       |                 |
| (2) | Naiṣadhakāvya  | Madras, 1849.   |
|     | The poet's name is given here as Harṣadeva; only Canto I, with Mallinātha's comm.; Telugu character; pp. 80. |                 |
| (3) | Naiṣadhīya   | Poona, 1854.    |
|     | Only Canto I, with Nārāyaṇa's comm.; size oblong; leaves 68.   |                 |

<sup>1</sup> Most of the editions are now unavailable. Information is given from:

- (1) *A catalogue of the library of the India Office*, volume II, part I, London: 1897.
- (2) *A catalogue of Sanskrit and Pali books in the British Museum*, London: 1876.
- (3) *A catalogue of the collection of MSS deposited in the Deccan College*, Pune: 1888.
- (4) De, S. K., *A History of Sanskrit Language*, vol. I, Calcutta, 1947. See also Jani, *Critical Study*, Appendix I: 1–3.

- (4) Uttaranaiṣadhacarita Calcutta, 1855.  
Vol. II (XII–XXII); Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta;  
with Nārāyaṇa’s comm.; 2 parts; 1<sup>st</sup> part up to  
XIII; 2<sup>nd</sup> part from XIII to the end; Ed. E. Roer.
- (5) Naiṣadhakāvya Madras, 1858.  
Cantos I–VI with Mallinātha’s comm.; character  
Telugu; pp. 286.
- (6) Naiṣadhakāvya Madras, 1862.  
Cantos I–VI with Mallinātha’s comm.; Character  
Telugu; pp. 270; Ed. Dampuru Venkata Subbā  
Śāstri.
- (7) Naiṣadha Madras, 1864.  
Cantos I–VI with Mallinātha’s comm.; character  
Telugu; pp. 234; Ed. Bagguluru Veṇu Gopila  
Nāyana.
- (8) Naiṣadhacarita Bombay, 1864.  
Canto I only with Nārāyaṇa’s comm.
- (9) Śrīharṣakavikṛta Naiṣadha Poona, 1869.  
Canto I only (with Marāthī Tippanī.); pp. 4 +  
236 + 4; size – 9.4” x 6.4”; Śilā (stone) type. Ed.  
Rāmacandra Śāstrī Talekar.
- (10) Naiṣadhakāvya Madras, 1871.  
Cantos I–VI with Mallinātha’s comm.; character  
Grantha; pp. 282.
- (11) Naiṣadhakāvya Madras, 1871.  
Cantos XIII–XIV, with Mallinātha’s comm.;  
character Telugu; pp. 90.
- (12) Naiṣadha Madras, 1872.  
Cantos I–VI, with Mallinātha’s comm.; pp. 244;  
Ed. Nelaturu Venkaṭa Subbaśāstrī.
- (13) Naiṣadhacarita Poona, 1875–76.  
Canto I (1–22 sts. only) explained in Marāthī; pp.  
48. Ed. B. N. Phadak.
- (14) Naiṣadhacarita Calcutta, 1875–76.  
2 Vols.; Vol. I. (I–XIII); Vol. 2. (XIV–XXII); with  
Mallinātha’s comm.; Ed. Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara.

- (15) Naiṣadhakāvya Madras, 1878.  
Cantos I–VI, with Mallinātha’s comm.; character Grantha; pp. 288.
- (16) Naiṣadhacarita Banaras, 1879.  
Cantos I–XI, with Nārāyaṇa’s comm.
- (17) Naiṣadhakāvya Palghat, 1883.  
Cantos I–VI, with Mallinātha’s comm.; Character Grantha; pp. 282.
- (18) Naiṣadhīyacarita Bombay, 1894.  
Cantos I–XXII, with Nārāyaṇa’s comm.; with critical and explanatory notes by Pt. Śivadatta Śarma and V. L. Paṇṣikara; NSP, Bombay; 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1912; 6<sup>th</sup> ed. 1928; 8<sup>th</sup> ed. 1942; pp. 18 + 1043 + 20.
- (19) Naiṣadhacarita Madras, 1903.  
Cantos X–XII, with Nārāyaṇa’s comm.; with an Intro. and critical and explanatory notes; Ed. P. K. Kalyāṇarāma Śāstrī; pp. iv + 148 + 80.
- (20) Naiṣadhakāvīyāratnam Tricinapalli, 1916.  
Cantos I–VI; Ed. Subrahmanya Vadhayara.
- (21) Naiṣadhakāvīyāratnam Palghat, 1924.  
2 Vols.; Vol.1. (I–VI); Vol.2. (VII–XII) with Mallinātha’s comm.; Ed. Pt. K. L. Vyāsarāja Śāstrī and others.
- (22) Naiṣadhacaritam Calcutta, 1927.  
2 Vols.; Vol.1. (I–XI); Vol.2. (XII–XXII) with his own comm. called Jayantī and Bengali translation by MM. Śrī Haridāsa Siddhāntavāgīṣa; (Vol.1. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1949); pp. 840; pp. 631.
- (23) Naiṣadhacaritam Calcutta, 1929–30.  
Cantos I–III, with comms. of Nārāyaṇa, Bharata Mallika and Vamṣīvadana; Ed. Nityasvarūpa Brahmācārī.
- (24) Naiṣadhīyacarita Banaras, 1949.  
Cantos I–XXII with Hindi translation. Ed. Pt. Rṣīsvaranātha Bhaṭṭa; pp. 2 + 2 + II + 638 + 3.

- (25) Naiṣadha Belgaum, 1952.  
Cantos I–III only; with introduction, translation and notes, etc. Ed. Prof. S. V. Dixit.
- (26) Naiṣadha Mahakāvya Cannanore, 1952.  
A critical exposition, in Malayalam, of the poetic beauties of the poem by P. K. Kurup. Chs. 22, pp. 369 (demi octavo size). It is an enlarged edition of the author's previous publication (chs. 16; pp. 175. AD 1927)—a competitive essay which won a gold medal awarded by the Sanskrit College of Trippunithura (Cochin).
- (27) Naiṣadha Madras, year not given  
Character Telugu, (Cantos VII–X both inclusive, are not printed).
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## APPENDIX 8

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### Translations of NC in Other Languages<sup>1</sup> (in the order of publication)

The poem has been translated into various languages. The following are the translations known.

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#### 1. Bengali

- (1) *Naiṣadhīyacarita* (I–IV). Calcutta, 1862.  
Translated in prose by Śrī Jagaccandra Majumdar. pp. 177.
- (2) *Naiṣadhacarita* (I–XXII) in 2 Vols. Calcutta, 1927.  
Translation in prose along with his own commentary by MM. Śrī Haridāsa Siddhāntavāgīśa.

#### 2. English

- (1) *Naiṣadha of Śrīharṣa*, cantos I–II only. Madras, 1905.
- (2) *Naiṣadha*. Poona, 1920.  
Translation and notes on Cantos I–II only; by an experienced Graduate.
- (3) *Naiṣadhacarita of Śrīharṣa*. Lahore, 1934.

<sup>1</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, Appendix II: 4–5.

- Translated completely for the first time, with introduction, critical notes and extracts from unpublished commentaries, appendices and a vocabulary; Ed. Prof. K. K. Handiqui. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.; Roy. pp. ix + 647; Poona, 1956.
- (4) *Naiṣadha*, (I–III only) Belgaum, 1952.  
With introduction, notes, etc. Ed. Prof. S. V. Dixit.
3. Gujarati
- (1) *Naiṣadhacarita* (I–XXII).  
Translation in prose, by Śrī Gokuladāsa M. Shah of Baroda. It is unpublished yet, on account of his death.
4. Hindi
- (1) *Kāvyaakalānidhi* or *Hindi Naiṣadhacarita* by Gumāna Miśra (composed in AD 1769) Veṅkateśvara Press Bombay, 1936; Hindi Sāhitya Sammelana, Prayāga, 1943; Ed. Satya Jīvana Varmā, M.A. It is a free translation of the original into Sanskrit and Hindī metres. Bombay, 1936. Prayāg, 1943.
- (2) *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*. Banaras, 1949.  
Pt. R.N. Bhaṭṭa or Agra. This is perhaps the first complete translation in Hindi. It has a foreword by Śrī N.C. Mehta and an introduction by Śrī J.S. Yājñika
- (3) *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*. Dehradun, 1951.  
Acārya Caṇḍikā Prasāda Śukla, Sāhitya Sadana, (Text with prose Translation).
- (4) *Naiṣadhamahākāvyaṃ* Banaras. 1950.  
Text with the comm. of Mallinātha; and Hindī translation with explanatory notes, called Prabodhinī by Pt. Kedāranātha Śarma (on I–III); called Maṇiprabhā by

- Pt. Haragovinda Śarma (on IV–XXII); with intro. by Pt. Rudradhara Jha (Rpt. in 1954); Chaukhamba Skt. Series.
- (5) Naiṣadhamahākāvyaṃ Banaras, 1954.  
Text with the comm. of Mallinātha and Hindi translation (Maṇiprabhā) with explanatory notes by Pt. Haragovinda Śāstrī with a foreword by Tribuvanaprasāda Upādhyāya with detailed introduction by the editor. Chaukhamba Skt. Series.
5. Malayalam
- Naiṣadha Travancore, 1941.  
Translation of the whole poem into Malayalam poetry (Sanskrit metres). Ed. Puruṣottaman Nambūdiri; published by Śrī Rāma Vilāsam Press, Quilon, Travancore.
6. Telugu
- (1) This is the first translation of the poem into vernacular language. It is translated into excellent *campu*, omitting verses here and there by a Telugu poet called Śrīnatha as early as the 15<sup>th</sup> centry.<sup>2</sup>
- (2) There is also a modern Telugu version for 3 cantos only, by Mr. Akondi Vyasamiviti Śāstrī (died in 1916), who worked at Govt. Arts College, Rajamahendravaram.
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<sup>2</sup> Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical*, 182n15.



## APPENDIX 9

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### Literature on Nala Story<sup>1</sup>

The story of Nala and Damayantī is one of the most popular stories of India; and “there is not a household where its narration does not serve as a real solace in many of grievous calamity. Tradition has likewise accorded to it a religious sanctity and a recapitulation of Nala’s tale destroys sin and ill luck.”<sup>2</sup>

The name of Nala, King of Niṣadha, goes back to Vedic antiquity, as it is mentioned in the *Vājasaneyasaṃhitā*, and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (II.4.1–2). But the story in full is found in the *Mbh*, *Purāṇas* and the story-literature. Many poets—Sanskrit, Prākṛta, Gujarātī, Marāṭhī and so on—have tried their hand either to poetise or to dramatise this popular story, as can be seen from the following works arranged alphabetically:

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<i>Abodhākara</i>	:	A poem of Ghaṇaṣyāma.
<i>Anarghanalacaritra</i>	:	A mahānāṭaka of Sudarśanācarya of Pañcananda (Tiruvaḍi, Tanjore Dist.).
<i>Bhaimīpariṇaya</i>	:	A drama of Śrīnivāsa (Ratnakheṭa) Dikṣita.

<sup>1</sup> Jani, *Critical Study*, Appendix III:8–13.

<sup>2</sup> *Kārkoṭakasya nāgasya Damayantyā Nalasyaca | Ṛtuparṇasya rājarṣeḥ kīrtanam Kali nāśanam*. Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical*, 184n2.

- Bhaimīpariṇaya* : A drama of Śaṭhakopācārya.
- Bhaimīpariṇaya* : A drama of Venkaṭācārya.
- Bhaimīpariṇaya* : A drama of Rājacūḍāmaṇi.
- Bhaimīpariṇaya-nāṭakam* or *Nalavijayanāṭakam* : A drama (10 Acts) of Rāmaśāstrī of Maṇḍikal, a court poet of Mysore (20<sup>th</sup> century AD)
- Damayantīkalyāṇa* : Drama, probably 5 acts (MS incomplete).
- Damayantīkalyāṇa* : Of Nallan Cakravarti Śaṭhakopācārya (end of 18<sup>th</sup> century AD)
- Damayantīkathā* : In the *Bharateśvara-Bāhubalivṛtti* of Śubhaśilagaṇi.
- Damyantīpariṇaya* : A poem of Cakrakavi.
- Damayantī pariṇaya kāvya* : A poem. Anonymous.
- Damayantīpariṇaya* : A poem of Mrtyuñjayasvāmi of Tirunāva in Malabar.
- Damayantī pariṇaya-akāvya* : A poem. Anonymous.
- Damayantīpariṇaya* : A *Campū*. Anonymous.
- Damayantīprabandha* : Prose.
- Damayantīprabandha* : Verse.
- Damayantīcaritam* : In the *Mallinātha mahākāvya* of Vinayacandrasūri.
- Damayantīcaritam* : Prākṛta, in the *Kumārapālpratibodha* of Somaprabhācārya.
- Damayantīkatha* : In the *Śilopadeśamālāvṛtti* of Somatilakasuri.
- Damayantīkathā* : In the *Karpūraprakaratīkā* of Jinasāgarasūri.
- Kaliviḍambana* : Poem of Nārāyaṇaśāstrin.
- Kalyāṇanaiśadha* : A poem (7 cantos). Anonymous.
- Mañjulanaishadha* : A drama (7 acts) of MM. Veṅkaṭa Raṅganātha (AD 1822–1900).
- Naiśadhānanda* : A drama of Kṣemīsvara (10<sup>th</sup> century AD)
- Naiśadhānanda* : A poem of Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita.
- Naiśadhānanda* : A drama (7 Acts). (MS. Dated AD 1611).
- Naiśadhapārijāta* : A poem of Kṛṣṇādhvarin or Kṛṣṇadīkṣita or Ayyādīkṣita. Here the stories of Nala and Pāri-jātaḥaraṇa are related simultaneously.

- Naiṣadhīyacaritam* : A poem of Śrīharṣa (12<sup>th</sup> century).
- Nalabhūmipālarūpaka* : A drama. Anonymous.
- Nalābhyudaya* : Drama of King Raghunātha of Tanjore (17<sup>th</sup> century AD).
- Nalābhyudaya* : A poem of Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa or Ahinava Bhaṭṭabaṇa (first-half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. MS incomplete. Only 3 cantos).
- Nalacampū*  
or  
*Damayantīkathā* : Campū (7 chapters) of Trivikrama Bhaṭṭa or Simhāditya (Early part of the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD).
- Nalacarita* : A drama of Devīprasāda Śukla
- Nalacaritanāṭakam* : A drama of Nīlakaṇṭhadīkṣita (7 Acts) (about 1636 AD).
- Nalacaritam* : In the *Nemināthacarita* (in prose) by Guṇavijayagaṇi.
- Nalacaritam* : In the *Pāṇḍavacarita* of Devavijayagaṇi.
- Nalacaritam* : In the *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacarita* (VIII.3) of Hemacandrācārya.
- Nalacaritam* : Prākṛit (Prose); in the *Madhyamakhaṇḍa* of Vasudevahiṇḍī by Dharmasenagaṇi.
- Nalacarita* : A poem. Anonymous.
- Nala-Damayantīyam* : A drama of Kālipāda Tarkācārya. The editor of the Samskr̥ta Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā, Calcutta.
- Nala-Hariścandrīya* : A poem. Anonymous. In its natural order the verse relates the story of Nala and in the reverse order the story of Hariścandra.
- Nalakathārṇava* : A poem. Anonymous.
- Nalakīrtikaumudī* : A poem of Agastya. Only 2 cantos available.
- Nalānandanāṭakam* : A drama (7 acts) of Jīvavibudha (end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century AD).
- Nalapākaśāstram* : On cookery.
- Nalarāmāyaṇa* : Of Rājaśekhara (first quarter of the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD)
- Nalastotram* :
- Nalavarṇanam* : A poem of Lakṣmīdhara.

<i>Nalavikrama</i>	:	A <i>prakaraṇa</i> (8 acts).
<i>Nalavilāsanāṭakam</i>	:	A drama (7 acts) of Rāmacandrasūri (12 <sup>th</sup> century AD).
<i>Nala-Yādava-Pāṇḍava-Rāghavīyam</i>	:	A poem. Anonymous.
<i>Nalāyana</i> or <i>Kuberapurāṇa</i>	:	(10 cantos, 10 Skandhas) of Māṇikyāsūri (12 <sup>th</sup> century AD).
<i>Nalāyanicarita</i>	:	Of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri (Bhaṭṭapāda) (AD 1560–1646).
<i>Nalodayakāvya</i>	:	A poem, 4 cantos (217 verse) of Kerala poet Vāsudeva, son of Ravi; once attributed to Kālidāsa and Ravideva.
<i>Nalopākhyānam</i>	:	In the Pāṇḍavacarita of Devaprabhasūri.
<i>Pratinaiśadha</i>	:	Of Nandanandana. (Sam. 1708 = AD 1652)
<i>Pratinaiśadha</i>	:	A poem of Vidyādhara and Lakṣmaṇa (composed Sam. 1708 = AD 1652).
<i>Puṇyaślokodayam</i>	:	A drama of Devīśaraṇakavicakravartī.
<i>Rāghava-Naiśadhīyam</i>	:	A poem of Haradattasūri (about the beginning of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century AD).
<i>Sahṛdayānanda</i>	:	A poem (15 cantos) of Kṛṣṇānanda (not later than 14 <sup>th</sup> century AD)
<i>Uttaranaiśadha</i>	:	A poem (16 cantos) of Vandāru Bhaṭṭa or Āttūr Bhaṭṭatiri ( <i>ca.</i> AD1825).
<i>Vidhivilasita</i>	:	A drama. Anonymous.
Summaries of the <i>NC</i>	:	(1) Naiśadhīyacaritasāra of Kṛṣṇarāma. (2) Āryānaiśadha of Pt. A.V. Narasiṃha Chāri, Triplicane, Madras.

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### Gujarāti works on Nala story:

Jain authors:	Rṣivardhana (V.S. 1512).
	Munimeghasrāja (V.S. 1664).
	Nayasundara (V.S. 1665).
	Samayasundara (V.S. 1673).

Jñānasāgara (V.S. 1720).

*Nalākhyāna*: Non-Jain authors: Bhālaṇa (V.S. 1545?).

Nākara (V.S. 1581).

Premānanda (V.S. 1728?).


Marāṭhī: *Damayantīsvayamvara*: Raghunātha Paṇḍita (17<sup>th</sup> cent.).

Hindī: *Damayantīsvayamvara*: Pālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa.

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APPENDIX 10


Map: Regional Kingdoms of Middle Ages (900-1200 CE) and the Tripartite Struggle for Kanauj (750-1200 CE)



## APPENDIX 11


### Post Śaṅkara and Immediate Pre-Śrīharṣa Events (10th–12th Centuries CE)

Post Sankara & Immediate Pre Harsha events (10th - 12th cent.)



## APPENDIX 12

### Bells of Indian Philosophical Echoes





**BELLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ECHOES****Roots and Routes of Śrīharṣan Advaita Dialectic**

Here we attempt an explanation of Appendix 12, by situating Śrīharṣa in the history of Indian philosophy and Sanskrit literature.<sup>1</sup> Indian philosophy, with its idealist and non-idealist wings, has had two ur-traditions or tributaries, namely, Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa. Our search is for structuring the roots and routes of Indian idealism culminating in Śrīharṣan Advaitic dialectic. The Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa traditions converge in the *Upaniṣads*, that is, the *Upaniṣads* are the reservoir into which the idealism of the Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa traditions have converged. Our description of Indian idealism begins with the *Upaniṣads*, because philosophical idealism is first clearly foreshadowed in these texts only in the rudimentary form of speculations recorded within the Brāhmaṇa tradition. But it should always be remembered that the Śramaṇa tradition has inculcated itself into it in a significant measure.

The name of '*Upaniṣads*' in any form was unheard of for about six hundred years after their centuries of formation. About the first century CE they were revived by a few who professed their faith in the Buddha. In contrast with the older and orthodox (Theravāda/Hīnayāna) these neo-idealists proclaimed themselves as the followers of the Noble Path/Mahāyāna/Greater Vehicle, with greater popular appeal. The Theravādins were also called the Meaner Vehicle, which being the name despisingly given them by the Mahāyānists, since the former had less popular appeal. As to the nature of the new scriptural texts, although very much despising their earlier Upaniṣadic allegiance, they might have formulated their own miraculous narratives of the life and Mahāyāna-looking teachings of the Buddha in order to obtain scriptural authority for

<sup>1</sup> For this discussion, I am indebted to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, *What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1976), 20ff.

the then-recent Mahāyānasūtras that could take the place of scriptures in the Mahāyāna.

In the next phase of development of Indian Idealism we come across the Mahāyāna camp of Buddhism combating in *mādhyamaka* (*śūnyavada*) and *yogācāra* (*viññānavāda*) idealistic groups under the stalwarts like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Candrakīrti and Śāntideva in one block and Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dinnāga, and Dharmakīrti in the other.

After the stalwarts of both the camps apparently exhaust their energies, a stage is reached when the basic agreement between *śūnyavada* and *viññānavāda* can be honestly emphasized and their apparent differences pushed to the background. This is actually done in the 8<sup>th</sup> century CE by Śāntarakṣita, and his disciple commentator, Kamalasīla, who are mentioned as representing the synthesis of the madhyamika and yogacara philosophies. With the achievement of this synthesis Śāntarakṣita also feels that there is actually not much of real philosophical ground for the Mahāyāna Buddhists to quarrel with the followers of the Upaniṣadic idealism. By this stage the Buddhist camp reaches a philosophic terminus and the followers of Buddhism turns to the so called the tantric cults and the practices. The career of Indian Idealism continues with the returns to the original source, the *Upaniṣads*, though with all the philosophical grandeur added to it by the Mahāyāna Buddhists. This starts taking shape roughly from the 8<sup>th</sup> century CE and assumes the form of Advaita Vedānta.

The Advaita Vedantins have their dual affiliation: to the Upaniṣadic idealism as well as the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Next in the discussion comes Gaudapāda who is the first real representative of Advaita Vedānta and who belonging to as he does to the 8<sup>th</sup> century CE is roughly contemporary of Śāntarakṣita. Gaudapāda assimilated the all the Buddhist *śūnyavada* and *viññānavāda* teachings and took the smallest *Upaniṣad*, the *Mandukya Upaniṣad*, to comment upon and laid the foundation of a revival of *Upaniṣad* studies on Buddhist lines. Gaudapāda's views were left for his disciple, the great Śaṅkara to examine and explain.

A few centuries after Śāṅkara, the sectarian animosity against the Mahāyāna Buddhists gradually fades out among the followers of Advaita Vedānta when Śrīharṣa in the 12<sup>th</sup> century revives and reinforces the negative dialectics of Nāgārjuna for a better defence of advaita philosophy, “acknowledging that there is, but an insignificant divergence, between his views and those of mādhyamikas”.

## Commentatorial and Super-Commentatorial Devices of Advaita Dialectic

The dialectic and polemic flowering of the super-commentatorial period in Advaita resulted in the *KKK* of Śrīharṣa, *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha and *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Hermeneutic discussion of the meaning of the texts being commented on or sprouting out of these texts usually takes the form of a dialogue between the commentator or independent author and one or more opponents raising objections to the interpretation given in the texts. Stretches of the dialogue are interspersed by certain super-commentatorial conventional terms that may be roughly divided into those used to introduce an objection and those used to facilitate the reply to an objection. Certain other terms also mark an alternative interpretation in cases where the commentator or author changes his position or is willing to admit another view due to the discourse.

Hermeneutics and exegesis used to be conceived as the two most important aspects of meaning generation. Hermeneutics is the methodology and process of conflating the unearthed shapes of the intended and unintended meanings of a text. It is, in healthy cases, always outward-spiralic in movement. Exegesis is the act of deciphering the intended revelation in the text. Both involve composite textual reading. Exegesis can thus be taken to be equivalent

to the *Adhikaraṇa-prasthāna*, which is *prameya-pradhāna* (ontology-based). It includes terse and pithy *sūtras*, commentaries or *bhāṣyas*, super-commentaries like *vṛttis*, *vārttikas*, *ītkas*, *ṭippanis* etc., and has fixative ends like canonical definitions, which, at any given time, are taken by interested parties as full-well defined. But hermeneutics is a never-ending spiralic process, beginning with the ontology-motivated exegetical processes and ending in its culmination, namely, dialectic-polemic dialogue, which may be taken to be equivalent to the epistemology-dominant methodological fructification of the *Adhikaraṇa-prasthāna*, namely, *Vādaprasthāna* which is *pramāṇapradhāna* in orientation.

*Prācīna Vedānta* was *prameyapradhāna* (ontological) and *adhikaraṇapradhāna* (topical), whereas *Navya-Vedānta* is the *pramāṇapradhāna* (epistemological) and *vādapradhāna* (polemical and dialectical) shift from the exegetical to the dialogical hermeneutical, effected and characterized by polemic-dialectic works like the *KKK* of Śrīharṣa, *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha and *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Śrīharṣa was the pioneer and promulgator of the *Navya-Vedānta* era, and his *KKK* became the pioneering text in the series of the triple texts of the *Navya-Vedānta* dialectical hermeneutic.

The commentary- and super-commentary stage was, as we said, dominated by exegesis. Its final result, anyway, goes beyond itself, and points to the hermeneutical, namely, the dialectico-polemical. To quote the five characteristics of the commentatorial stage according to a *Parāṣarapurāṇa* verse cited in the *Nyāyakoṣa*,

*Pada-cchedaḥ padārthoktir vighraho vākya-yojanā /*  
*Ākṣepeṣu samādhānam vyākhyānam pañca-lakṣaṇam //*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, *Nyāyakoṣa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy*, Review by Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudev Śāstri Abhyankar, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49 [quoted in Gary A. Tubb and Emery R. Boose, *Scholastic Sanskrit: A Handbook for Students* (n.p.: n.p., 1999 by authors), 3]. (This book seems to be a pre-publication version or printed

(The word-division, paraphrasing, analysis of grammatical complexes, construing the sentences and answering of the objections—these are the five indicators of *vyākhyāna*, “exegetical interpretation.”)

Among these, the answering of objections is concerned with the ideas contained in the original text rather than with its words. Accordingly, it is different from the preceding four functions. First, at this level a commentary goes beyond straightforward exegesis and takes the form of an argumentative treatise in its own right. Second, this portion of a commentary bases on the style of verbal debate rather than the style of oral instruction, so that it can employ a different cache of vocabulary, syntax and organization. Answering of objections is the most useful instrument for the polemico-dialectical debates.<sup>2</sup>

The stages of polemic-dialectical debates in Indian philosophy in general are discussed in detail in Gary A. Tubb and Emery R. Boose, *Scholastic Sanskrit: A Handbook for Students*. What follows in this Appendix depends heavily on that work, and I further embellish their material with examples from *KKK*.

## 1. The Dialectic Style of Verbal Debate

The super-commentatorial dialectic style appears as a historically and stylistically based oral dialogue. The view of the author or commentator and his school is known as the *Siddhānta*, literally, “the demonstrated conclusion.” Hence the opposing view is *Pūrvapakṣa*, literally, “the prior view,” which may be another school’s established doctrine or a question or doubt anticipated by the *Siddhāntin*. Often a general problem is posed, a *Pūrvapakṣa* is put forth, and a debate develops between the two parties, that eventually leads to confirmation of *Siddhānta*. At times *Siddhānta*

notes supplied by the authors to the Library of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Consulted at the same Library, in May, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Tubb and Boose, *Scholastic Sanskrit*, 4.

is stated first, to be attacked by a series of arguments by the *Pūrvapakṣin* and defended in the discourse that follows. In longer debates there may be many mutually opposing *Pūrvapakṣins*.

## 2. *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhāntapakṣa*

Occasionally the terms are used directly to address each other, for example, the term *tu*, “but, however” in *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya* (*BrSŚB*) I.1.4: *Tu-śabdaḥ pūrvapakṣa-vyāvṛtyarthaḥ*, “The term *tu* (in the “Sūtra”) is to rule out the *Pūrvapakṣa*.” If the *Pūrvapakṣa* is a celebrated view of another school, it may be identified as such.

*BrSŚB* I.1.5: *Kāṇādas tv etebhya eva vakyebhya īśvaram nimitta-kāranam anumiyate 'nūmṣ ca samavāyī-kāranam*. The adherents of Kaṇāda however, infer from these same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause and the atoms are the material cause.

*KKK*, 22, 26.<sup>3</sup>

The term *pakṣa* in *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhāntapakṣa* means a side/alternative/a particular view.

Direct “we-you” address is the first part of presentation of a *Pūrvapakṣa* and a *Siddhāntapakṣa*. A *Pūrvapakṣin* and a *Siddhāntapakṣin* may often address each other directly, using, for example, *yuṣmat* (*BrSŚB* I.1.1), *bhavān* (*BrSŚB* I.1.5), etc.

*KKK*, 10, 11.

## 3. Post-commentatorial Objection-markers

Objections by *Pūrvapakṣin* and counter-objections by *Siddhāntapakṣin* are raised by use of specific terms like *nanu* (*Pañcapādika* of Padmapāda—*PañP* 84)<sup>4</sup>, “but, objection,” to indicate the beginning of the first sentence of the objection (and it is common to objections that run into several sentences) and *atha* “now, then, but,” to introduce a new idea (or a new topic). *Atha* may also stand

<sup>3</sup> In this context I quote from *KKK* (Yogi).

<sup>4</sup> *Pañcapādikā* (Sastri).

at the beginning of a sentence. Objections are often articulated as direct questions introduced by interrogatives like *katham* (*BrSŚB* I.1.1), *kva* or *kim* (*BrSŚB* I.1.4). This is common with *katham punar*, “but how ...?” *Kim* combined with the instrumental has the idiomatic meaning “what is the use of ...?”

*KKK*, 10, 11.

Other expressions are also attested, like (1) *Iti cet* (*BrSŚB* I.1.4), “if, thus/If this objection is raised/if you says this,” to denote the concluding words of an objection; (2) *Ity āṣaṅkya* (*PañP* 248), “having raised this doubt,” *āṣaṅkyeta* (*BrSŚB* I.1.3), “is suspected, is wrongly held to be true,” which marks an interpretation that appears to be reasonable but is incorrect; (3) the past participle *Prāpta* (*BrSŚB* I.1.12 and I.1.4), “Obtained/obtained at first view superficially concluded,” often marking a *Pūrvapakṣa*, hence *Prāpta* is “obtained as *Pūrvapakṣa*” and *Iti prāpte* meaning “this being obtained as *Pūrvapakṣa*”; and in the same manner, the past participle *Ākṣipta* (*BrSŚB* II.1.6.), “objected, put forth as an objection”; (4) the verb *Āha* (*PañP* 199), the third person singular form of “to speak,” which introduces an objection, for example, *āha* (*BrSŚB* I.1.6.), “(an objector) says,” *apara āha*, “another says,” *atra ke cid āhuḥ*, “on this point some say,” etc., which may also introduce another interpretation acceptable to the commentator; (5) clauses beginning with *Na ca*,<sup>5</sup> “not/nor should it be,” which introduces a brief objection in an *iti*-clause introduced by *na* and followed by a gerundive, for example, *na ca ... iti mantavyam*, “nor should it be thought that ...,” or *na ca ... iti codanīyam*, “nor should it be urged that ...,” for which the reason for prohibition follows immediately.

#### 4. Reply-indicators

To answer an objection in most cases the *Siddhāntin* employs the same terms as that of the *Pūrvapakṣin*, for example, the verb *ucy-*

<sup>5</sup> *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Sāyana Mādhava, ed. T. G. Mainkar (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1987), 8.



ate (*BrŚŚB* I.1.28), “it is said,” that is, “this is said in answer, we reply.” Similar expressions are: *atrābhidhīyate* = *atrocyate*, “here we reply, on this point we reply” (*BrŚŚB* I.1.4). Denials like *Tanna*, “Not that” and *Tad asat* “That is not right,” *Tad ayuktam*, “That is not reasonable,” *Nāitad evam* (*BrŚŚB* I.1.31), “This is not so,” *Tan mā bhūd iti* (*Bhagavadgītāṣaṅkarabhāṣyam—BhGŚB* II.18), “Let that be the case,” etc. are also attested. At times the denial is in a dramatic fashion, for example, *Tad etan mano-rājya-vijrmbhaṇam*, “so this (i.e., the argument you have presented) is just building castles in the air.” To reject a proposition by pointing out the undesirable consequences of an argument, the derivatives of the roots *prasañj*, “to become attached to” and *āpad*, “to fall into misfortune,” etc. are employed.

*Prasaṅga*, “undesirable implication,” is derived from *prasañj* “to become attached to.” *Āpatti* “undesirable implication,” derived from *āpad*, means “to fall into misfortune.” The applied verbal form *prasajyate* (*BrŚŚB* I.1.22), *āpadyate* (*BrŚŚB* I.1.1), both mean “is implied as an undesirable consequence.” To refer to a flaw in a argument or doctrine, *doṣaḥ* (*BrŚŚB* I.1.12 and *BrŚŚB* I.1.4), “fault” is employed. The Optatives *Syāt* and *Bhavet*, “may/might be,” (*BrŚŚB* I.1.4 and *SarM* 7) is used to state that the objection might have been valid if the objector had not overlooked an important point. Concessives like *Yady api ... tathāpi*, “Even if ... still ...” (*BrŚŚB* I.1.4 and I.1.24 and *PañP* 73) is used to grant part or all of an objection. The Particle *Tarhi* (*BrŚŚB* I.1.19 and *PañP* 128), “In that case” indicates the implications of a statement or objection. Alternative interpretation is employed, after giving one interpretation of the text being commented on, with particles like *athavā* or *yadvā*, in the sense of “or else, on the other hand.” For example, in *BrŚŚB* 1.1.3, a second interpretation of the *Sūtra*, namely, *Śāstrayonitvāt*.

## APPENDIX 14

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### Adumbrations of Śrīharṣa's Negative Dialectic in Nāgārjuna

Candrakīrti states in the *Prasannapāda* that the conclusion of the *prasaṅgāpādāna* is simply negative (*Prasaṅgāpādānasya nāsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpatti*) and Nāgārjuna has largely used this method to refute his opponents' theses by drawing absurd implications from them (*Bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiiva prapakṣam nirākaroti sma*). Some of the subjects to which Nāgārjuna has used the method of *prasaṅgāpādāna* in *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* are specified below:<sup>1</sup>

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	...Chapters
<i>Utpādaprasaṅga</i>	I
<i>Gamanadvyaprasaṅga</i> and <i>Gantrdvyaṅga</i>	II
<i>Darṣanadvyaprasaṅga</i>	III
<i>Skandhaprasaṅga</i>	IV
<i>Lakṣyalakṣaṇaprasaṅga</i>	V
<i>Rāgaraktaprasaṅga</i>	VI
<i>Samskr̥talakṣaṇaprasaṅga</i>	

<sup>1</sup> Ghose, *Dialectics of Nāgārjuna*, 215.

<i>(Utpāda-sthiti-nirodha-prasaṅga)</i>	VII
<i>Kāra-ka-kriyā-karma-prasaṅga</i>	VIII
<i>Asamskṛtatvaprasaṅga</i>	XI
<i>Janyajanakatvaprasaṅga</i>	XIV
<i>Samsṛṣṭiprasaṅga</i>	XIV
<i>Śāśvata-Ucchedadarśanaprasaṅga</i>	XV, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI.
<i>Anudayāvyayatvaprasaṅga</i>	XX
<i>Tathāgataprasaṅga</i>	XXII
<i>Viparyāsaprasaṅga</i>	XXIII
<i>Āryastyānāmabhāvaprasaṅga</i>	XXIV
<i>Nirvāṇaprasaṅga Drṣṭiprasaṅga</i>	XXV
<i>(Udayavyayaprasaṅga, Santānabhāvaprasaṅga, etc.)</i>	XXVII

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## APPENDIX 15

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### A Lexicon of Śrīharṣa's Erudition

Śrīharṣa's erudition spread its wings into various fields. Here is an enumeration of the fields he has covered in his works:

1. Geographical: Puṣkaradvīpa, Śakadvīpa, Krauñcadvīpa, Kuśadvīpa, Śālmaladvīpa, Plakṣadvīpa, Jambudvīpa (to which Bhārata/India is included), etc.
2. Historic-political: kings of Avantī, Gauḍa, Mathurā, Kāśī, Ayodhya, Pāṇḍya, Kaliṅga, Kāñcī, Nepāla, Malaya, Mithilā, Kāmarūpa, Utkala, Magadha, etc.; the position of kings, feudatories, general political conditions of the various countries, etc.
3. Socio-religious: caste system, occupations, position of the daughter, marriage, marriage ritual, costumes, social and religious costumes, beliefs and superstitions, astronomical believes, omens, life after death, past and future birth, superstitions, ghosts, oath-taking, black magic, ways of expressing different feelings, pastimes, jokes and word jugglery, sexual jokes, tricks to suggest the time of appointment, ways of befooling, methods of writing, materials of writing, education, flora and fauna, eatables, drinks, art and architect, arts and crafts, musical instruments, pots, imple-

- ments, machines, decorations, aesthetic sense, economic conditions, moral standards, punishments, etc.
4. Religious: religious life of the people, idol worship, materials used in the worship, institution of sacrifice, religious practices, treatment of guests, religious customs and beliefs, ordeals like fire-ordeal and water-ordeal, etc.
  5. Philosophical: Orthodox systems like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, and Heterodox systems like Buddhism, Jainism, Cārvāka, Pāsupata, Kāpālika, etc.
  6. Paurāṇic myths and stories: Agastya, Arjuna, Aśvins, Baladeva, Bhagīratha, Bhavānī, Brahmā, the Buddha/Lokajit, Candra, Dattātreya, Durvāsā, Garuḍa, Harihara, Hiranyākṣa, Hiranyākāśyapu, Indra, Indrajit, Jarāsandha, Kaca, Kalki, Karṇa, Kārtikeya, Madana, Maināka, Mandeha, Mārkaṇḍeya, Nārada, Paraśurāma, Pṛthu, Purūravas, Rādāhā, Rāhu, Rāma, Rāvaṇa, Sagara's sons, Sahasrārjuna, Śaṅkhalikhita, Samudra, Satī, Śeśanāga, Śiva, the sun, Śūrpaṅakhā, Tārā, Triśaṅku, Trivikrama, Vālmīki, Viṣṇu, Viśvāmitra, Vyāsa, Yama, etc.
  7. Vedas: *Samhitā* recitation, *Pada* recitation, *Krama* recitation, *Atharva*, *Samhitā*, *Trayī*, etc.
  8. *Vedāṅgas*: *Śikṣā* (phonetics), *Kalpa* (ritual), *Nirukta* (etymology), *Chandas* (prosody), *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar) and *Jyotiṣa* (astronomy and astrology), etc.
  9. *Upavedas*: *Āyurveda*, *Dhanurveda*, etc.
  10. *Śāstras*: *Dharmaśāstra*, *Arthaśāstra*, *Kāmaśāstra*, *Tantraśāstra*, *Saṅgītaśāstra*, *Gaṇitaśāstra*, *Aṣvaśāstra*, *Ratnaśāstra*, etc.
  11. Lexicographical and literary: idioms, diction, colloquial usages, literary style (e.g., his own style is Vaidarbhī, useful for arousing erotic sentiments), *śakti* (poetic skills), alliterations and rhymes, perfectly fair use of double entendre, puns, for example, as in *pañcanalīyam* (*śloka*s giving multiple layers of meaning), *paryāyokta* (circumlocution),

*śleṣavakrokti* (crooked speech based on pun), art of playing on words and mathematical numbers, *alaṅkāras* like *utprekṣā*, *upamā* (onomatopoeic words) etc., theatrical style, conversational and argumentative styles, remarkable mannerisms, character sketching, etc.

12. Miscellaneous: Koṣas, Rhetorics, Epics, *Purāṇas* and topics like Botany, Chemistry, Biology, Physiology, Psychology, Navigation, Ornithology, Dyeing and painting, *Sāmudrikaśāstra* (Palmistry), etc.

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