THE INTERPRETATION OF LITERARY TEXTS

A research seminar sponsored by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study and organized by the Department of English, Gauhati University, was held from the 21 to 26 November, 1994. The seminar was inaugurated by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Dr N.K. Choudhury. In her brief introduction to the topic the convenor, Dr Anita Baruah Sarmah, stressed the importance of openness and plurality in interpretation in the current post-modern climate.

The first day of the seminar was devoted entirely to New Historicism and its impact on interpretation. During the morning session Professor P.C. Kar presented the key paper on "New Historicism and the Interpretation of the Literary Text". He argued that New Historicism emerged as an inevitable reaction against the failure of both new critical and deconstructionist approaches. Building his paper around Greenblatt's seminal concept of "resonance" and the New Historicist reformulation of the context-text relationship, he distinguished these from both the new critical belief that text and reader are stable and the deconstructionist stand where text and context are "subsumed under the notion of textuality". He stressed the need to "redefine the meaning of context as both determined by the contingencies of the text's originary moment of production and its displacement to a new location charged with fresh resonance".

During the afternoon session, chaired by Professor Kar, two papers on New Historicism were presented. "Historicism Effaces History: Phenomenology of Literary Texts", co-authored by Sukalpa Bhattacharjee and Prasenjit Biswas, applied historicist ideas derived from Benjamin, Jameson, Derrida and Greenblatt to read Third World texts like Ben Okri's *The Famished Road* and Nuruddin Farah's Maps. The second paper, by Sumanyu Sathpathy, examined the assumptions behind New Historicism regarding the interpretation of a literary text as a historical document.

In the first session of the second day, Professor K.N. Phukan presented his paper, "Text, Meaning and Interpretation: An Overview of Critical Thought", working on the assumption that novelties entering critical thought through increasing interdisciplinary activity are better encountered when grounded in, for example, the relatively more familiar ideas of Eliot or those of Sontag. The session chaired by Professor Phukan began with a presentation by Pori Hiloidari, "Metaphors and Metonymies in D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love: A Deconstructionist Reading". The second paper, "Restoring the Text: A Classroom View" by Rajat Bhattacharya, carried on the spirit of the morning in pleading for the necessity of stable meaning. The third presentation by Bharat Bhusan Mohanty, "Writing a Text: A Brief Study of Barthe's Interpretation of Text", concentrated on Barthes' role in freeing the text through certain important concepts. In the fourth presentation, "Restoration of Text in Ancient India and the Role of the Commentators", Malinee Goswami discussed the methods adopted by commentators in the restoration, reconstruction and preservation of ancient Sanskrit and Prakrit texts.

On the third day, during the first session Professor Dilip Barua gave a free-ranging talk on the status of interpretation after the proliferation of various linguistic philosophies starting with Saussure's distinction of language and parole and of the division of the sign into the signifier and the signified.

The second session of the third day, chaired by Professor Kar, started with "Interpretation of Text: A Problem of Translation", by L. Biswanath Sharma, which suggested that translation is complicated by the fact that a literary work, besides having a universal element, has also a specific cultural element which might obstruct communication if translated literally and which must therefore be interpreted for the target language. The second paper, by Anil Boro, "The Text in Translation", situated the problem in the classroom, in the need to provide a translation of English texts to students who are not equipped to grapple with the subtleties of a foreign tongue.

The third presentation, "Feminism and the Text" by K.C. Baral, based itself on the feminist's encounter with post-structuralist questioning of the unified subject, the centre and the self, and their subsequent grouping into those who use such theories to erase the author and subvert patriarchal authority and those who argue that such a concession will erase the woman's identity as author or reader. The final paper of this session, "Feminist Critical Practice and the Idea of a Male Medusa" by Liza Das, aptly enough, tackled the question of whether a male can be a feminist critic. In the morning session of the fourth day, Professor M.L. Raina mounted a trenchant attack on theories that have decentred the text in favour of the critic's discourse on the text. His paper, dramatically titled "Who Killed the Text?", pleaded for a return to a position where the text has a meaningful existence, exclusive of the linguistic pyrotechnics that might be unleashed upon it.

During the second session, chaired by Professor Raina, three papers were read. The first, "Resentment as a Critical Position: The Post-Colonial Critic" by Nandana Dutta, noted the popularity of the us/them syndrome in post-colonial critiques and sought to question, through the familiar Western text of *Huckleberry Finn*, whether a more rigorous critical position can be achieved. The second paper, by Krishna Barua, used Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* and Patrick White's *The Twyborn Affair* to illustrate the continued possibility of an androgynous interpretation of literary texts. In her presentation, "Reading Richard Wright's Native Son", Aparna Bhattacharyya established her own marginal context as a reader before going on to discuss Wright's treatment of black women, specifically the treatment meted out by black men to their women, which shows an unconscious bias towards the position taken by white men themselves.

On the fifth day Professor Birendranath Datta opened up an entirely new dimension by pointing to the oral tradition that is intrinsic to both literature and folklore. He talked about differences that would emerge between oral and written traditions within folklorist studies. He provided excellent examples of the oral tradition passing into the written one in the *Katha Guru Charita*, a prose biography of the great neo-Vaishnava saints Sankaradeva and Madhava-deva (15th to 16th centuries). Professor Datta suggested that in literate cultures textuality involves interplay between the written and the oral.

In the first paper of the second session on translation, "Transference of the Cultural Moment or Is Literature a View from Nowhere?", Pradip Acharya discussed the fact that there is no transcendent luminous moment but that the 'empty space' between the lines becomes the utopian space for primary deliberations before the text of the source language is transferred to the text of the target language. The second paper, by Ranjita Chaudhury, "The Literary Text and Its Interpretation: The Text in Performance", suggested that the reading of a text is a dynamic process of recreation. The third paper, "Text, Performance, Interpretation and the Problems of Pedagogy" by Asha Kuthari, explored the relationship between the written dramatic text and the text in performance, particularly for students in an Indian classroom, where a theatrical performance is a remote possibility. The session was chaired by Professor Birendranath Datta.

On the sixth and final day there was just one session. Professor Hirendranath Gohain in his presentation, "Validity of Interpretation" took the debate back to questions raised earlier in the seminar, on the violation of a text's integrity by an overzealous adherence to post-structuralist methods of interpretation. While acknowledging the necessity of coming to terms with ideas which have progressively gained favour among academics, he suggested that the critic should be capable of historicizing his approach and should use his newly acquired critical tools with discrimination.

Dr. Bh. Krishnamurthy, eminent linguist and a former Vice-Chancellor of the Central University of Hyderabad, was a Visiting Professor at the Institute in May, 1994. He delivered three lectures at the Institute. In the First Lecture, he discussed the official language policies in India, focusing on the historical and constitutional dimensions. He concluded with two recommendations: (1) the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution should include all the Indian languages which command one lakh speakers or (2) the Eighth Schedule should be scrapped and all languages with one lakh population should be developed by the respective governments as a matter of official policy.

The second lecture focused on the question of mother tongue as a medium of education. After a detailed historical survey of official policy on the issue, he offered a critique of this policy. He concluded with specific policy recommendations. The regional language should be extended as a medium of education at all levels, including professional courses, while simultaneously English input as an instrument of practical use should be progressively increased.

In his third and final lecture, he discussed the form and function of English from an overall national perspective. He was severely opposed to English becoming an instrument of elite dominance in India. He criticised the use of English as a medium of instruction on the ground that it tended to cripple the development of Indian languages. But English still has its uses as a medium of communication with the outside world, can therefore be a second or third language.

ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTI

Pleasure, Teaching and Use:

Exercises in Philosophical and Metaphilosophical Analysis

In the face of a general pessimism prevalent inside and outside professional/academic philosophy in India—that creative philosophical thinking/writing is either impossible or useless in the current economic/technological/social context—this series of lectures were delivered on to first *illustrate* and then *reflect upon* the possibility, teachability and use of philosophical analysis across the Indian and the Western Traditions.

1. FALSE PLEASURES: The first lecture deals with the nation of false feeling like pleasure and pain are usually exempted from moral or epistemic assessment. Though we talk about "bad desires", "true fears" and "false hopes"—it is odd to criticise genuine pleasure as "erroneous" or, for that matter, praise a pain as "correct". Yet both Jayanta Bhatta (9th century A.D.) and Plato developed independent arguments to show that some pleasures are themselves false. Jayanta's context was showing that the expression "non-erroneous" (*avyabhicari*) does not protect the definition of perception from over-coverage to pleasure or pain. Some pleasures (like the forbidden pleasure of sleeping with another man's wife) are claimed to be false, whereas others, e.g. the pleasure of contemplating God or a philosophically juicy concept are true. Note, that Jayanta is not losing "True pleasure" in the popular sense of the term to mean real pleasure. Of course one could make mistakes about one's own hedonic state (since Nyaya takes pleasure as an object of cognition) and their can be mistakes in the casual conditions of a pleasure. But neither mistakes about pleasure nor pleasure caused by mistakes is meant by the expression "erronenous pleasure"—in Jayanta's peculiar use. Comparing it with mistaken awareness, Jayanta claims that false pleasures are very genuine cases of pleasure but they are cancelled out by subsequent assessment just like a genuine perceptual experience is exposed to be an error by subsequent corrective cognition. Such a view, it was argued, leads Jayanta to the following inconsistency:

(a) Only awarenesses have objective reference.
(b) Pleasures being distinct from awareness (of pleasure) do not have any intentional content either.
(c) Truth or falsity can be ascribed to a mental state only if it has an intentional content.
(d) But pleasures can be true or false.

Did Jayanta get into this mess because he took the word "non-deviant" (*avyabhicari*) too literally? False cognitions are called "deviant" or "promiscuous" only metaphorically because they are not faithful to the objects they profess to represent. From this Jayanta seems to have been led to the view that the pleasure of promiscuity must be deviant.

Plato distinguished between a belief accompanying a pleasure being false and the pleasure itself being false. He gave the following four sorts of cases where pleasures could be in error (Philebus, 36a-44b). First, when the proposition embedded in an anticipatory or recapitulatory pleasure is false (If I am very happy that I shall be elected a Member of Parliament, when actually I lose the election); second, where the degree of pleasure is overrated; third, where mere absence of pains feels like pleasure; fourth, where pleasures mixed with pains are felt as pure pleasures.

Contemporary critics have decided that he too was either conflating falsity of the associated beliefs with falsity of the feeling itself or equivocating between "true" in the sense of unmistaken and "True" in the sense of real or non-fake.

Even if Jayanta's or Plato's effort to extend truth-evaluation to feelings does not succeed — the normative evaluation of our emotional reactions to the world is a profound part of any traditional system of thought (Platonism, Christianity, Buddhism or Nyaya) which finds an unexamined life of worldly pleasures and pains unsatisfactory. Unless one is a sceptic (like Rorty or Jayarasi) who refused to draw the appearance-reality distinction at all, one has to subject both one's beliefs and sentiments to the normative notion of Truth as that which is worthy of pursuit and permanent. Only the permanent, the pure, the inexhaustible is "true" in this unabashedly value-loaded sense. That is why pleasures which are impermanent, impure and exhaustible are said to be false pleasures. One could find in the notion an epistemological echo of the Upanishadic dictum: "There is no joy in the limited, only the Infinite is Joy."

The second lecture focused on the theme of the Teachability of Understanding.

Coming to the meta-philosophical part of these reflections: How does one try to transmit philosophical understanding, or understanding of any sort for that matter—through teaching? Can philosophy be taught or does it have to be evolved from within by each one of us all by oneself?

Saint Angustine argued in the dialogue "De Magistro"—that no one could teach any one else anything whatsoever—in the sense of bringing him or her to understand. In a nutshell the argument went like this: You cannot give any new knowledge through words or language, and you cannot give any knowledge without words. Since these are logically exhaustive alternative ways of giving knowledge, you simply cannot give knowledge. If, this, teaching is strictly irrelevant to understanding — what are we philosophy teachers doing? This lecture analysed the steps of this cleverly crafted argument and tried to block it at several stages. First, it was argued that there could be a third way of teaching the meaning of a word (that is the example Augustine takes) which is neither by verbal explanation nor by showing or pointing at the meant entity. This could be the direct method of teaching the meaning by showing the use of the word rather than trying to show the meant object. This is more like "allowing somebody to learn" or creating the conditions for knowledge by contagion. The ensuing notion of passive teaching has a risk of merging into metaphors like "The tree has taught me tolerance"—but our tradition, especially of music and craft has an entrenched place for such silent spontaneous passive teaching.

More frontally, one could attack the premise that through speech or using words you cannot make people know what they did not already know. Western philosophy, by and large, supers from the myth of the autonomous knower who does not gather knowledge except from his own senses and reasoning power. A robust, realistic and rational theory of knowledge by testimony can easily upset this crucial premise of Augustine's argument.

Finally a complex notion of teaching how—as distinct from teaching that was developed which can, with assumed reliance of the mother-wit (*pratibha* - la Bhartrhari) of the pupil, awaken in us a kind of knowledge which is neither knowing—how nor knowing—that but could be called knowing what. Understanding or knowing what something means is such knowledge and it is teachable.

The third lecture tried to suggest the ways and senses in which philosophy could claim to be useful. Eight different popular objections questioning the worth of academic philosophy were discussed. Is it relevant to practice? Is it significant in the age of advanced technology and science? Isn't it harmful in so far as it makes people confused, argumentative, sceptical and indecisive? Apart from a detailed answer to each of these objections a general theory of use was developed by examining Marx's distinction between use value and exchange-value and Socrates' defence of his kind of inconclusive attempts to define basic concepts and reveal our ignorance about our own life, thought and principles of action. The basic idea was this: "X is useful for Y" can be defined as "Y needs X". Needs, unlike desires, can exist unrecognised in someone and people may be mistaken about them. Most practical people do not desire clarification, systematisation and digging out of their own fundamental beliefs about life, world, and themselves. But some people actually need them. In a society like India where dogmas, fanaticism, unacknowledged cultural colonisations exist side by side with growing sensitivity to justice-issues, revisionist urges and frenzied decision making about the future and revaluation of the past — the society in general needs some people who are trained in the art of self-referring thought, imaginative inter-linking of basic concepts and endless clarification of beliefs too basic to be avowed in day to day life.

Every one does not need philosophy in the academic sense of the term. But everybody needs some people to be in their midst who need philosophy—as an analytic,—phenomenologically insightful, argumentative and morally sensitive discipline. These people would find true pleasure in philosophical thinking. In the personal life of those few people who need philosophy (and whom any sane society needs)—philosophical analysis remain useful for its own sake as an intrinsic value, until death, senility or mystical transcendence make their minds melt away.

Dr. Gail Hinich Sutherland
gave three lectures at the Institute as a Visiting Professor during November 1994

Lecture 1: "The Politics of Alms Gathering: Asceticism, Exchange, and the Alimentary ethics of Ancient Indian Mendicants".

In ancient Indian ascetical literature, discussions of the purity, procurement, and consumption of food provided a vehicle by which intricate moral, social, and sectarian distinctions could be made between ascetical communities, such as Buddhists, Jains, Hindu renunciates, and Ajivikas. Such distinctions were weighted with a significance that might escape casual observation, precisely because of a predominance of shared moral assumptions among those same communities. These discussions are often the loci of colliding representations of the powerful social exigencies governing the exchange of food in Indian society. Wandering ascetics and mendicants who had foresaken their ritual, economic, and caste obligations "worked out upon" their own bodies, by means of ascetical technologies and dietary formulations, altered social and ethical relationships to the communities upon which they continued to depend for sustenance.

Rules governing food exchange shape religious ideology and the development of moral communities. Despite their differences, the alimentary ethics with which both Buddhist and Jain mendicants distinguished themselves were founded, each in its own way, on contradictions that undermined the credibility of the very principles they were meant to establish. The contradictions proceeded from the fact that the phenomenon, namely diet, which these mendicants imbued with great significance was, ultimately, something over which they had little control.

In particular, this central paradox gave rise to significant adjustments of the strictly defined principle of *ahimsa* among both Buddhists and Jains: The Buddhists relaxed restrictions on what food could be accepted for consumption by monks in order both to build strong exchange relations with lay patrons that were uniquely contractual or voluntary. In his ultimate sanction of feasting, the Buddha ceded the fundamental Indian cosmological and ontological metaphor of the world as a place of rampant and infinite consumption. The Jaina monks addressed the pervasiveness of consumption by attempting to circumscribe, specify, and delimit the moral relationship between the eater and the eaten. In becoming eaters of very little, they storve to reverse the conflagration of consumption. Buddhist mendicants, on the other hand, made a difficult but definitive peace with their need to eat, their dependency on alms providers, and the expectations of reciprocity that came with the alms. In becoming, for all intents and purposes, eaters of everything, Buddhist mendicants caused Buddhism to become the first Indian religion to overcome its fear of food.

Lecture 2: The Origins and Limitations of Ahimsa

For decades, scholars have attempted to uncover the origins of the Indian ethos of *ahimsa* ("non-injury") which apparently contradicted the dominant, sacrificial theology of brahmanical Hinduism and contributed to the emergence of a new alimentary ethic of vegetarianism. Interpretations of *ahimsa*, starting in the early part of this century, tend to see it as the central component of a "protest movement" which swept across northern India, in the course of which the moral landscape was forever altered.

Mohandas K. Gandhi's abundant writings of *ahimsa* become the *locus classicus* of the concept for a modern readership. In his political writings and through his activist employment of the principle, Gandhi attempted to craft an innovative view of *ahimsa* which identified it as: 1) an active condition of self-surrendering love, 2) a possible basis for the creation of a modern state, and 3) the special moral legacy of the Indian people. It is particularly because of his considerable success in promulgating the latter view of *ahimsa* that both Indians and non-Indians are consistently puzzled by the inordinate amount of actual violence which plagues the subcontinent.

This essay explores the manner in which early Buddhist and Jain mendicants characterized violence and propagated an ethos of *ahimsa*. I submit that *ahimsa* was not primarily the irreducible moral core of a protest movement but, rather, a potent ideology, useful in the full emergence of statecraft and commerce, with which Buddhism and Jainism, respectively, were particularly connected. I also claim that *ahimsa*, as practiced by these mendicants and, therefore, established within the Indian ethical tradition, entailed a limited moral vision, constrained and contradictory in ways that made it meaningful only in particular social, economic, and political climate.

The domain in which the Jain ethos of *ahimsa* is predominantly elaborated, among both ascetics and laypeople, is the personal and the corporeal. Generated as it was in a context of renunciate mendicancy (and, therefore, utter dependency on patronage), the sphere of effectiveness of the principle of *ahimsa* remains narrowly circumscribed and powerless to illuminate and indict larger structures of social and economic conflict.

The principle of *ahimsa*, I contend, emerged precisely as a useful compensatory morality which was never meant to be generalized within any larger arena than that of personal responsibility for non-injury of subhuman lifeforms. In this sense, it was undoubtedly a doctrine that was advantageous for monarchs to adopt as they attempted to wrest authority away from the brahmanical establishment without ceding their own expedient use of political aggression.

Prof. D.K. Barua, Visiting Professor at the Institute, delivered three lectures on 7, 20 and 28 October 1994. His central focus was on the significance of minor literary and intellectual figures in the Indo-English relations. The first lecture dealt with the life and writings of James Henry Cousins (1873-1956). An expatriate Irishman who made India his home, he contributed actively to the cultural and intellectual life of India through his work in the fields of journalism and higher education. He was associated with nationalist leaders like Tagore, Aurobindo, Sarojini Naidu and others. He challenged the supremacy of the West in the domian of culture, religion and philosophy, and he linked ideologically the Celtic revival with the Indian renaissance. He also wrote significantly on Indian art, especially on painting. He held that India enjoyed a unity based on its spiritual life and imagination. The second lecture discussed the significance and implications of the text, "Five Sermons on Indian Mutiny" entitled *Indian Crisis (1857)* by Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872), a renowned theologian of the mid-nineteenth century. A central figure in his time of English religious and intellectual life, he was moved as a Christian to show a sympathetic attitude towards India but within the framework of his imperial-Christian commitments. He was critical of the crude and commercial postures of the English Church. While wanting the Mutineers to be punished righteously, he opposed any racial prejudice against the Asiatics. He criticsed the Mutiny as a step in the wrong direction as it halted the progress of India under the paternal guidance of British imperialism. He also linked the British brutality in India to the brutality of the ruling classes towards British working people themselves. The third lecture focused on W.B. Hockley's novel *Pandurang Hari* (1826). He viewed this novel as "a paradigm for Anglo-Indian fiction". Hockley wrote on the basis of his first-hand experience in India. He was in India at a crucial juncture when the Mahratta power was disintegrating and the Company rule was getting consolidated. He wrote in the realistic mode, using his experience with the whole range of contemporary Indian life. In his perception, holiness and humbug went hand in hand, and he was particularly hard on religious characters. On the political and ideological side, he was hostile to Indians whom he regarded as morally degenerate. The novel also shows the fragmentation of Indian society and hence the virtual impossibility of creating a nation out of it. All in all, the three lectures illuminated a neglected aspect of the colonial encounter between India and England.

Sikhism and Gender

Professor W.H. McLeod, who teaches History at University of Otago, New Zealand, delivered three lectures at the Institute in October and November 1994 as Visiting Professor.

The question of women's rights in the Sikh Panth (the Sikh community) is actually a very complex one and the analysis ought certainly not to be undertaken by someone who experiences considerable confusion when confronted by it. And I am one such person. My purpose is to encourage some Sikhs to face it honestly and if these lectures achieve only this purpose they will have been worthwhile.

We begin our analysis with a note on gender issues in the West particularly in the United States and in Canada. But, progress has actually been very slow (including those areas covered by religion in the West). In a normative sense Sikhism is actually better placed than western religions to provide answers.

We begin with an analysis of Guru Nanak's *shalok* from *Asa di Var*, which shows that Nanak was adamantly opposed to discrimination against women. Other Gurus follow Nanak in this regard and so too does normative Sikhism as defined by the Singh Sabha movement. Sikh Rahit Maryada makes this clear by specifying the duties and privileges of women, portraying a situation which makes them the equal of men.

When we turn to the actual situation of the Panth, however, difficulties appear. All the Gurus were men; Sikh history concerns the doings of men. Sikh society is patriarchal. Women find little opportunity for leadership in panthic roles. Should this continue or should women be accorded complete equality?

The second lecture takes up the question from a feminist point of view, focusing on forms of feminism, namely moderate feminism and radical feminism. It then turns to an important book, recently published, which seeks to demonstrate that Sikhism, though misunderstood, is actually a religion which holds the feminine aspect in perfect balance with the male. This is Nikky-Gunindar Kaur Singh's *The Feminine Principle in the Sikh Vision of the Transcendent.*

Nikky Singh's book has a number of strong points: its emphasis on the genderless nature of the Divine Presence; Guru Nanak's championing of equality and denunciation of concepts of female pollution; the quality of Nanak's poetry; and the importance it gives to the figure of *mata* or the Mother. But the book also has some weaknesses: a strong tendency to exaggerate; her stress on Vir Singh in fact makes it two books; her view of Guru Nanak's origins; her use of the *janam-sakhis*; her use of the *Dasam Granth*; the feminine meaning attached to such words as *bani* or *joti*; her overlooking of the fact that the *Adi Granth* assumes a patriarchal background; and her reinterpretation of the bridal image in the *Adi Granth*. As a feminist contribution to the debate it is assuredly welcome, but I do not feel that it carries conviction.

In the third and final lecture we look at just who should be regarded as a Sikh, concentrating in particular on those who would not be regarded as "good" Sikhs. Are they to be included in this debate? The conclusion was that certainly they are to be included and for this reason the title of these lectures ought to be "Sikhs and Gender" rather than the normative "Sikhism and Gender".

At the same time the normative faith does have a significant role to play. What constitutes Sikhism filters down through the Panth as a whole and Sikhism insists that we must turn to the scriptures for guidance in this matter. In this regard we are fortunate in that J.S. Grewal recently published *Guru Nanak and Patrimony*, with a wealth of scriptural quotation. Two things emerge from this publication. First, in the teachings of Nanak the way of liberation is equally open to women as well as to men. Secondly, Guru Nanak did not renounce the patriarchal framework of society.

This leaves us with three questions. First, how has Sikh society measured up to the teachings of the Gurus in granting women full equality? Secondly, have patterns of social change evolved in such a way that patriarchy is going out of date? Thirdly, if true what does this change involve for the Panth?

The first question I do not attempt to answer myself, but leave to others. The result, we are told, means that the Panth is not completely fulfilling its responsibilities. The second question is still producing a variety of answers, but change is certainly coming. The third question poses a list of four options for the Panth. The first is to do nothing. The second is to leave social patterns intact, but strive to do better for women. The third is to provide women with much greater access to business, politics, and education, resulting in a progressive weakening of the patriarchal system. And the fourth is to take steps to root out patriarchy. The decision which will be made, I suggest, lies between either the traditional second option or the more adventurous third option.

S

SOUTH ASIA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
DOCUMENTATION
(9-volume set)

Vol. 1-3 : Science and Technology
Vol. 4-8 : Social Sciences
Vol. 9 : Humanities

Edited by B.M. Gupta

Price Rs. 4950 ISBN 81-85330-32-8

Published and Distributed by
SEGMENT BOOK DSTRIBUTORS
B-23/25, Kailash Colony, New Delhi - 110048
Phone : 6443013 • Fax : 91-11-6470472

GOOD NEWS FOR BOOK LOVERS

IIAS BOOK CLUB

MEMBERSHIP FEE - RS. 100.00 FOR LIFE

Book Club members are kept informed about all IIAS publications and are entitled to 30 to 50 per cent discount. The Institute has 180 publications to its credit.

For further details write to

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER,
Indian Institute of Advanced Study
Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla - 171005

JOURNAL OF THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE
FOR HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences
General Editor: Mrinal Miri

Vol I. Images of Communities in Modern Indian Literature
Editor - Jaidev
Royal 8vo, pp VI+146 1994 Rs. 150.00

FORTHCOMING ISSUE

Vol 2. Discourse, Truth and Objectivity in Social Sciences
Editor - Javeed Alam

Published by Inter-University Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

For subscription, please write to
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY PVT. LTD.
23/90, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110001
Phones: 344448, 344478, 344508