The Tribal Predicament

JAGANATH PATHY

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN TRIBAL SOCIETY

EDITED BY MRINAL MIRI

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Towards the end of the 1960s the Indian Institute of Advanced Study organized a seminar on the tribal situation in India. The proceedings were subsequently edited by Dr K.S. Singh, the distinguished scholar and administrator. As the volume encompassed the whole gamut of tribal problems at both regional and national levels, an entire generation of concerned researchers, administrators and activists have had repeated dialogue with its contents. It continues to be in demand and has already gone through three reprints. The overall thrust of the volume, with a couple of exceptions, was to grasp the tribal economies, cultures, politics, policies and administration so as to formulate such integrated social and economic development strategies as would eventually integrate the tribal peoples into the national 'mainstream' and thereby consolidate the Indian nation-state.

In late 1991, after nearly a quarter century, the IIAS aptly decided to review achievements and failures and persisting and emerging issues in the tribal scenario through another seminar. The book under review contains around forty papers presented at that seminar. Although it covers as broad a range as did the earlier volume—and, indeed, incorporates a couple of new dimensions—a shift of emphasis and focus can be discerned. The assumed universal model of development/modernization and the notion of nation-building through cultural integration are transformed by the perspective of the compatibility of diverse cultural practices with a multiplicity of models of socio-cultural development. Perhaps this reflects changing theoretical and ideological perspectives on the one hand and, on the other, a growing realization that tribal scholarship has immense potential to contribute to overcoming environmental, cultural and cognitive crises. Besides, as Dr Singh indicates, there is a change from the perspective of tribal homogeneity and regional specificity to a complex differentiated and stratified tribal scenario. The shifts, however, should not be construed as any radical departure. There is in fact a conspicuous continuity in tribal studies.

In their recapitulation of the diversification of tribal studies in India, one would have expected the editors of the present seminar proceedings to also acknowledge the limited theoretical and methodological developments of the last couple of decades. Being oblivious to the fact that no leading discourse or practical implications have emerged, despite India's having the second largest number of anthropologists in the world and its immense ethnic diversity, will certainly prevent us from engaging in any earnest academic or activist enterprise. At the same time some of the classical methods of intensive fieldwork are degenerating into insensitive, quick and crude quantification and statistical jugglery. With honourable exceptions, tribal researchers are so alienated that they have never lobbied for nor endorsed the genuine assertions and struggles of the tribal peoples. Conceivably this is the critical reason for the near-stagnation in tribal research.

The optimism of the past exercise and the recognition of tribal and

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had fallen in love with a beautiful, accomplished and highly educated girl but was being forced to live with a girl who was physically clumsy, virtually illiterate and who had very few personal charms to boast of. But she was brought up in a traditional family. She was always looking up to her husband to give her his attention, to find accommodation in his heart. I wanted to show the contrast between the two girls and place this boy in a natural situation—rather, convincing. Thul Thul is a secondary character. She meets with a rather painful end, does not assert herself. Being placed in a joint family she at least has a corner to live in, her situation is somewhat similar to that of her eldest sister-in-law whose husband has gone off to Germany.

VR: This combination of gender and class oppression in Basanti is very interesting indeed. Where does your emphasis lie—on structural inequalities or on gender oppression or both? Would you acknowledge the influence of Premchand or Yashpal or any other writer on your handling of such themes? Or is it due to your own radical left leanings?

BS: So far as influences go, they remain in the subconscious; and if you look at it from the angle of class conflict, Basanti belongs to the exploited class. The impression people get is because of my Marxist outlook but this is not deliberately done. Once you pick up a character from amongst the poor people, naturally the entire treatment has to be viewed in the context of the struggle of her class also. I have picked her up from the street—from the migrant labourers. She belongs to that class. Her struggle is partly the struggle of that class as such. But the novel does not merely portray class struggle. It portrays a woman from that class struggling for survival, building her future. She imbibes the qualities of that class—endurance, courage, and such initiative as that class has. I picked her up from that *basti* taking into account her peculiar personal situation.

VR: I would like you to take these two questions together. Do the problems of morality in Basanti have anything to do with a diasporic situation—the shifting, uncertain future of migrant labour in big cities? Secondly, Basanti seems to posit a difference between male and female notions of morality. Take Basanti's insistence on observing the forms of marriage with Deenu while his silence is proof of his dishonest intentions. In fact a gendered notion of morality seems to stretch through many of your novels. Would you comment?

BS: Poor people do not have the middle-class kind of prudery so far as morals are concerned. But Basanti's moral attitude differs from Deenu's. Basanti's insistence on having a proper marriage is perhaps a universal weakness in every woman. She feels psychologically secure if she is properly married, the result of ages-long belief in a proper marriage ceremony. Men, whether of the middle class or otherwise, do not give as much importance to the ceremony part as women do. There are other traditional influences also upon Basanti. She had been living in a compact family. She would not like to live a wayward, rudderless life with Deenu. So it is not a question of morality so much as one of physical, personal and psychological security for the woman.

VR: The influence of TV and the media on the working classes is a significant motif in Basanti. Basanti exists simultaneously in a harshly realistic world and also in a make-believe world of film heroes and heroines. This is also true of the heroine of your short story, "Radha Anuradha." Where would you place Basanti — a movie-smitten teenager or a realist?

BS: You are very right. Radha was another girl from the same *basti*, though less of a fighter than Basanti.

VR: This pertains to the accommodative spirit in your heroines—Basanti in relation to Rukmi, Kunto in relation to Sushma, etc. Would you regard this as a sign of weakness, a compromise with the inevitable or their magnanimity?

BS: It is because they love their men so intensely. It is for their men's happiness. So it is both. Inwardly the woman may be resentful. She may feel that the person she loves does not belong to her totally. Also, Deenu is an unreliable kind of person. There's very little consistency about him.

VR: Finally, would you regard yourself as a feminist writer? And whom would you rate the greatest among the Hindi novelists writing about women?

BS: I do not regard myself as a feminist writer. I think that in people whose writing is socially oriented, attention is bound to go towards the injustice being done to women. I liked Yashpal's *Divya*. I translated it into English. I also translated a few short stories of his. He wanted me to translate *Divya*. Marxism enables one to fix the individual in a social context. Why, even earlier, Bharatendu and Premchand adopted a social perspective in their writings, although Premchand till 1925-26 was Gandhian, not Marxist. Sharatchandra was not a Marxist but he dealt very sympathetically with women. With Marxism this crystallizes into an awareness of class and gender conflicts.

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regional specificities within the framework of the nation-state have given rise to a confusion in which the autonomy of socio-cultural space has been placed within the macro-structural complexes of articulation of dominant interests. The co-existence of tribal and non-tribal structures is found to be relatively stable, to the advantage of the regionally and globally dominant forces. Within this matrix much more serious intellectual input is required to substantiate the self-congratulatory assertion of Dr Singh that "Integration is a continuing process in a nation- state...and it is for all of us to see that it does not stop" (p.6). The assumption that the creation of tribal states in the north-eastern region resolved the tribal crisis is far from established. The increased public-sector investment in the tribal areas does not necessarily convey acceptance of the 'mainstream' and the domination of the ruling classes. In addition, the tribal problem is likely to be exacerbated with globalization and liberalization. The emerging scenario thus demands a logical and substantive review of the Western model of the nation-state. Howsoever grand and pervasive the model may be, its mere repetition does not help us comprehend the dynamics of endemic dissension or provide for alternative resolutions. Instead it asphyxiates intellectual creativity.

Professor Mrinal Miri's call for a dialectical interaction between the dominant modern scientific vision and the customary indigenous circular vision to fathom reality and change direction towards the benefit of all is timely. But this is too demanding an exercise for the Northernized intellectuals of the metropolises and there is hardly any contribution on this count in the volume. Professor Miri's attempt at a philosophical redefinition of the concept of identity is stimulating; and this reviewer appreciates his alert statement that the "...moral force of 'allegiance to the tribe' becomes prone to exploitation by forces which have nothing to do with this allegiance. [The quest for identity] becomes the front for motivations which range from self-aggrandizement of a few to economic gain and political power" (p. 174).

Refreshingly, quite a few of the papers implicitly or explicitly testify that the unilateral imposition of an individualist epistemology and legal framework, of mega-development projects, and of surreptitious strategies of nation-building, have together de-recognized the tribals' customary rights over land and land-based resources and their cultural complexes, and consequently have endangered their survival and socio-cultural reproduction. A few authors argue for the immense significance of self-awareness, assertion and legitimate struggles for economic, cultural and linguistic survival.

Javeed's paper pursues the question of the conditions under which diverse cultural identities aggregate themselves and establish trans-ethnic consciousness. But to presume that "the cultural question is im-mediately a basis of politics" (p. 19) may undercut the issues of the econo-mic and political subjugation of the indigenous peoples and their ethos. Saraswati's conceptual framework of tribal life-style being within the broad premises of the theory of cultural relativism cannot fully grapple with the qualitative dynamics emanating from the dialectics of endogenous and exogenous motive forces. Besides, to assume that 'technocratic selection' "takes away the cultural freedom" (p. 31) is to deny the multiplicity of technology and the futuristic drive of tribal life-styles. Sujata succinctly points out that the so-called secularist policy of the state has ignored the role and organizing principles of religion in tribal social and cultural matrixes and has thereby eroded their cultural existence. More or less in the same vein, Raman argues for preserving the rich religious and cultural heritage of the tribal peoples.

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Fernandes establishes that the foragers' and swidden cultivators' treatment of forests has, in recent years, tended to shift from being treated as a renewal resource under communal management to a mere raw material for the commodity market and individual profit. Consequently the egalitarian ethos and practices of tribal societies have been drastically altered. Saldhana traces the process of forest denudation to colonial times. Mahapatra regrets that despite constitutional guarantees, massive developmental and environmental projects have extinguished the tribals' customary rights in land and forest resources with impunity. In contrast, Sarkar holds that the tribals' customary rights stand as formidable obstacles to their development and assimilation into the 'mainstream' and hence are best sent to the morgue.

Only two papers deal with the gender question. Exceptionally lucid and striking is the paper by Govind Kelkar and Dev Nathan, who argue that owing to the internalization of dominant patriarchal values, the limited land rights of women tend to be further redu-ced. The rise in witch-hunting is one of the manifestations of the attempts to reduce women's access to and control over land. Geeta points to the need for tribal development strategies wherein concern for women and ecology receive appropriate attention.

There are a number of papers on continuity and change in land rights and management in the north-east, and on the role of the Sixth Schedule. Professor Ganguly's elucidation of the motive forces of agrarian dynamics and impediments is welcome. Critically reviewing the impact of the official jhumia rehabilitation programmes in Tripura, Malabika suggests an alternative and just strategy. Ramakrishan rightly asserts that the future of sustainable development in the Himalayan ecosystem depends on comprehending in a multidisciplinary way the complex local cultures of management and on the full participation of local people in the planning and execution of policies for ecodevelopment.

Professor Roy-Burman's paper covers almost all critical spheres of the tribal situation with a wealth of references. U.P. Sinha handles tribal demography, while A. Basu's concern is tribal health. Chaudhuri's paper covers tribal health, culture and environment together and calls for an exploration of the positive aspects of tribal systems of medicine and health care. Salil Basu too considers the major health problems of the tribal peoples and notes the distressing responses from the state and the NGOs.

Five eminent linguists have as many theoretical papers related to change and continuity in tribal languages and their association with ethnicity. This is very welcome and one hopes for more substantive studies in this field in the coming years. Several papers consider culture, religion, ethnicity and tribal movements. Dasgupta enumerates the consolidation of ethnic identities in tribal India in a historical perspective. A.C. Sinha discusses the complexity of conversion of the Ao Naga to Christianity and unique persistence of their identity. Writing about the Oraon immigrants to Assam tea plantations, Sharma and Kar describe their limited cultural adaptation. Areeparampil describes the various socio-religious movements among the Ho. The Jharkhand movement in colonial days and post-colonial times is analysed by Basu Mullick and Sharma, respectively. Danda does a good job of surveying the socio-political movements across the regions of tribal concentration and outlines the salient limitations of the European nation-state model.

Gupta's data suggest that there are inter- and intra-tribal disparities of different kinds and advocates incorporation of that aspect in tribal planning. Mathur's appraisal of tribal development programmes in Kerala is informative. Mehta offers a rather overdrawn critique of anthropologists-cum-planners and that without providing any conceptually sound underpinning.

Despite these few critical comments and remarks, the book is absorbing and valuable. With its vast coverage of the heterogeneity of theoretical and methodological perspectives and policy prescriptions, backed by some of the best minds in Indian tribal studies, it will certainly encourage further work in the coming years. It is virtually a compulsory reading for all those interested not only in the tribal question but also in human dignity.

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Professor Shankar Gopal Tulpule who died on 30 August 1994, spent three years at Shimla as a fellow. During his stay at the Institute he worked on an important book, *The Divine Name in the Indian Tradition* (published by IIAS, Shimla).

An eminent scholar of Marathi language and literature, Professor Tulpule had an abiding interest in the life and works of Maharashtrian saint-poets. This interest was given an added fillip by his association with the mystic and philosopher Professor R.D. Ranade.

After retiring as Professor and Head of the Department of Marathi, Poona University, Professor Tulpule spent time at the South Asia Institute at Heidelberg as Visiting Professor. His other works include *Classical Marathi Literature*, *Mysticism in Medieval India*, and *The Great Poet-saints of Maharasthra*. His death is deeply mourned by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

DIVERSITY AND UNIFORMITY IN THE SIKH TRADITION

Birinder Pal Singh

THE CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS BOUNDARIES: CULTURE, IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE SIKH TRADITION

Harjot Oberoi

Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, pp. 426+90. Rs. 475/-.

Oberoi's book is a welcome addition to the corpus of studies on Panjab and the Sikh history. This ambitious project took 14 years to be encapsulated in 426 densely written pages, besides other accessories spread over 90 odd pages. It is not simply an interpretative discourse on Sikhism but more a 'story' of real people who lived real lives. They not only practised the new religion but synthesized it with their own socio-cultural and historical reality.

It is a 'story' because Oberoi starts the narration with a few actors and variables which gradually become complex, well cut-out parts later linked with each other for clarity, obtaining a moral at the end. Such 'cut-outs' and the 'drawing of morals' make the text readable and intelligible. It is a strength of this volume that it does not induce boredom and fatigue.

True to its subtitle, Oberoi situates the history of the Sikhs in the 18th and 19th centuries. This study of religion combines the insights of history and anthropology (p. 425). The theories and methodologies of the two disciplines were made converged for the understanding of "social construction of meaning and the transformation of religious and cultural ideology of religions" of Panjab. He has also explored the issue of why a certain configuration of religious thinking stays stable over a period before undergoing change, sometimes radical.

Oberoi undertakes the study of Sikh religious tradition in three sections — Diversity, Uniformity and A New Episteme, which are epistemes in the Foucauldian sense, best suited to understanding the change in question. As is clear from the sequence, the initial phase was pluralistic, full of diversity, combining the newly emerged Sikhism with local and regional traditions, cutting across not only minor sects and cults but also the major religions of the region. He argues explicitly that the early elites of the community, intellectual and religious, definitely theorized this plurality of the Sikh tradition to ensure its coexistence with other sects, communities and religions. It was a device not only to minimize conflict but also to enfold its opponents within Sikhism. It is here, I think, that critics of Oberoi who hold him guilty of misrepresentation and distortion of facts may find his formulation most vulnerable.

His second formulation is closely linked to the previous one. That is, in the following century a new elite represented a view which was damaging to the Sanatani Sikhs and their plurality. They asserted the primacy of uniformity over diversity, monotheism against polytheism, acknowledging the ten gurus and not any living one, bowing only before the Guru Granth and no other scripture and visiting the gurudwara only, not any temple, *mazar* or *pir*, etc. This is the episteme of uniformity which dominated and gradually eliminated the episteme of diversity. The Singh Sabhas thus formed subscribed to the Khalsa tradition now spearheaded by the Tat Khalsa. Theorized by the intellectuals, these ideas were propagated by the institutions of learning, the gurudwara, the Sabhas and the print media.

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In the words of the author himself, "This book is a study of this transitional process: of how one paradigm or vision of the world was replaced by another" (p. 25). Two important questions follow which need to be explored in social theory: (a) how to conceptualize a certain constellation of religious practices and rituals and (b) how to account for religious change and transformation. And Oberoi thinks that these can be answered well using epistemes (Foucault), practice of human agency (Bourdieu) and schema of intentional action (Ortner). The three modes of action — routine activities, intentional action and praxis—can be "meaning-fully expanded and synthesized with Foucault's episteme", establishing a dialectical relationship between an episteme and human practice. How an episteme rises and dissolves is an important concern of this work. It can be shown best with data from Sikh history (p. 30).

I think a question of methodological import can be raised here. How is this dialectic between an episteme and human practice to be delineated and elucidated with characteristic specificity such that the 'causal' connections become distinctly manifest? An episteme like the mode of production is an overarching concept involving over-determination. And the difficulty lies precisely in isolating the effect of an episteme and vice versa.

I wonder if some scholars who "alleged that the philosophical foundations of research were weak and that his methodology was full of loopholes" (Reeta Sharma, the *Tribune*, December 1, 1994) were drawing attention to this feature. They have also accused him and the University of British Columbia for not having taken into consideration the fact that "the Sikh religion's research was a sensitive matter" (ibid.) without referring to the "sensitivities" that have been hurt by this book.

A pointer towards methodology above does not imply that Oberoi has not done justice to the thesis he has built. Covering the broad canvas from Guru Nanak to the early 20th century, he has meticulously gone about raising questions, providing explanation stage by stage, such that to an outsider (non-Sikh) the arguments become clear and the agencies (individual/collective) involved and shifts in positions and ideologies become manifest. The reader can without strain connect the arguments and carry them forward. That is why, at times, the details given seem too many to an insider. But since the book is not merely addressed to the insiders their presence is legitimate.

The author's awareness of different approaches in political economy, anthropology and sociology, and of the interpretation of culture and texts is reflected in the analysis of the data collected from all over the globe. The texts, primary and secondary, government and private records in English and vernacular languages, have been used extensively. But conspicuous by his absence in the long bibliography is J.P.S. Uberoi, whose structural analysis of the Sikh symbols has advanced our understanding of the Sikh religious tradition and its relations with the dominant religions of the subcontinent.

Probably it is a 'slip', because it does not fit into the author's interpretation of Guru Arjan Dev's verse in the Adi Granth, which is stated to be a "reinforcement of Kabir's verse" in the same text (p. 57). The popular interpretation of this verse supports the distinctiveness and separate identity of the Sikhs, which is also Uberoi's contention. But if one goes by the author's argument then the question arises why a new and similar verse was included. The incorporation of Kabir's verse meant that the Guru had put its seal on it. This seems another grey zone where Oberoi's critics would find a case against him for his "misinterpretation of Sikhism".

One objection may be raised against the protagonists of the question "Who is a Sikh?" This is a wrong question to which there cannot be a right answer. If the same is asked of a Hindu or a Christian, do we get a different answer? Oberoi too seems to be remotely concerned with the relevance and genuineness of such a query. Hence the dichotomies of "diversity and uniformity", of "Sanatan Sikhs and the Tat Khalsa", and a long exposition of multiple traditions and pluralist activities, a variety of faiths and cults among the peasantry and early Sikh tradition.

The situation today, despite modernity and militancy, is no different. If not Sakhi Sarvar, there is Gugga at Chhapar, a *mela* which runs for five days round the clock. I witnessed this mega-event for two successive years in the early 1990s when militancy was at its height. So much was the terror that no political party dared camp in the *mela* against the militants' dictates. But people enjoyed the *mela* in 'its true spirit'. Moreover, the urban literati, despite their identity consciousness, are equally pluralistic. They would visit any sacred place provided they believed that their wishes would be realized.

The author is aware of the complexity of an interpretation involving the dialectic of the internal dynamics and external forces affecting the Sikh tradition. He writes, "In sum, a separate Sikh identity cannot be explained simply by referring to the British policy of divide and rule, or

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Poetry of Isolation and Alienation

K. Raghavendra Rao

THE POETIC ART OF A.K. RAMANUJAN

A.N. Dwivedi

Indian Writers Series, B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1995.

A.N. Dwivedi's monograph on A.K. Ramanujan's poetic art is a detailed study of the background, themes, frames and craftsmanship of this precious poet, who passed away in his second home, the USA, in July 1993. I want to begin this review with a poignant reference to my own connection with the poet. Though I never had occasion to know him very well, we knew about each other as persons hailing from the same Kannada cultural-linguistic region. I had met him a couple of times in Dharwad, once in Chicago in 1968, and later more recently in Hampi as a fellow-editor of an anthology of modern Kannada poetry in English translation, sponsored by the Kannada University in Hampi. In fact Ramanujan, Ramachandra Sharma and I, the three joint editors of the volume, were to have the last round of editorial meetings in Bangalore to finalize the manuscript in July 1993, a week after the day of his death. We had to finish our work without the benefit of Ramanujan's participation, but he had already become a part of the enterprise. Years ago, I wrote a somewhat negative piece on his poetry (listed in Dwivedi's bibliography), and now on second thoughts and in light of this new volume on him, I think that one must make a clear distinction between the macro-historical literary fate of Ramanujan and his worth as an individual poet in a specific situation. But recognizing this distinction does not mean ignoring the structural relationship between the two aspects.

I shall first say something on the first aspect because it figures marginally in Dwivedi's discussion. His reference to Ramanujan's patriotism or his bi-rootedness, it seems to me, requires a more serious and penetrating gloss. I do not think that Ramanujan was in any conscious sense a patriot, though this does not mean that he had no attachment, whether intellectual, emotional or cultural, to the land of his birth and first thirty years. Also Ramanujan's bi-rootedness is no simple phenomenon of bridging cultures or synthesizing civilizations. His problems, whether in poetry or in life, seemed to me purely personal, and hence his poetry reduces large-scale things to a small, personal scale. This is not in itself a bad thing, but it involves a cost, and the cost is basic rootlessness and spatial-cultural suspension. This comes in the way of Ramanujan's transforming his admittedly substantial creative resources into major and more sustained poetry. Ramanujan preferred to accept this fate and invest his resources in chiselled, controlled and elegantly clever miniature masterpieces. But the enormous limitation and exhaustibility of his thematic resources arose out of his inability to tackle head-on, with violence and rashness, the violence and rashness that structure most of human life. His inability, for instance, to deal with evil is part of the same story. The closest he comes to showing passion and violence is in his pieces on his former wife, Molly. I remember the evening I spent at his Chicago home in 1968 over dinner. In all the two hours we spent together, Molly allowed poor Ramanujan, by nature a gentle and self-effacing creature, just half a dozen statements, and monopolized the whole conversation with cannibalistic aggressiveness! Ramanujan's nature constrained him in his horizons, but within those horizons he produced exquisite work of limited quantity and quality, whether it be in poetry, linguistics or whatever. While the Indian poet in English finds it difficult to be accepted as Indian by Indians and as English by English, never mind the patronizing pats on the back, an Indian poet writing in English in Chicago would mean an even more complex, perhaps even tragic, fate. While at a personal level it may be all right not to question Ramanujan's not homing in India, as a creative writer he should have and could have returned home to suffer and toil with us, his fellow-Indians, the marginalized non-entities of a history dictated by the West. I am raising these issues because some of the general limitations that Dwivedi's study points up should be seen as rooted in this self-chosen destiny. Was Ramanujan opportunistic, eating his cake and still having it, making his omelette without breaking the egg? I don't think so, and yet the possibility keeps on haunting his friends and admirers.

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The strongest feature of this volume is the detailed analyses of individual poems, and its weakest point is its inability to articulate an appreciation or critique of the poetic corpus as a whole. His overall comments revel in very loose and vague terms such as "genius", "highly talented", etc. It is also questionable whether Indian poetry in English can be reasonably canonized. The poets in this tradition can be examined only as individuals of varying degrees of worth or worth-lessness, according to the politics and poetics of the critic or the scholar. Another minor irritant is the tendency to repeat comments and even exact words. However, the most problematic part of the volume is the commentary on Ramanujan as a translator. I know as a Kannadiga that, for all the smoothness and elegance of his beguiling English versions, his translations from Kannada at least suffer from one major constraint. There is in these versions a strong process of displacement at work — a displacement of the original authors and texts by Ramanujan as the only text. I am not competent to talk about his Tamil translations, though I suspect that a similar situation may exist in their case also. One last crucial point. Ramanujan wrote poetry both in Kannada and in English, and I dare say that the two are so interdependent that one of them cannot be properly grasped critically or enjoyed aesthetically without some attention being given to the other. Even if one does not know Kannada, one should make some effort to get a general idea of his creative work in Kannada.

But then one should not ask a short monograph like this to do too many jobs, and one must appraise it on its own terms, accepting its self-imposed parameters. From this eminently reasonable and legitimate perspective, A.N. Dwivedi's critical monograph succeeds very well. It is a painstaking and meticulous study of the text, and as such it is bound to be invaluable to professional students and teachers of that nebulously problematic terrain called Indian writing in English or Indo-Anglian literature. The publishers deserve our gratitude for sponsoring a series which should enable us to make sense of the contemporary Indian intellectual landscape, both discursive and non-discursive, under A.N. Dwivedi's general editorship.

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the compulsions of elite politics. It resulted from a complex evolution. In many respects it pre-dates both separate electorates and intra-elite competition. This important fact has often been ignored by scholars" (p. 424). The availability of more socio-economic data (a limitation indeed) would have made the dialectical interpretation doubly authentic.

Finally, let me mention J.S. Grewal's criticism of Oberoi's formulation of the Sikh sacred space. In a paper presented at the IIAS in October 1994, he suggested that if the Tat Khalsa's notion of the sacred space and its management "appeared novel to Oberoi", it was because he did not look into the Sikh institutions before the 18th century. According to this critic, it was simply a re-emergence of the concept of Guru-Panth in the late 19th century which was eclipsed due to the establishment of the Sikh rule. This argument seems plausible, and Oberoi may find it worth exploring.

In passing let me mention an enigmatic statement in the text: "The Sikhs are an unusually symbolic people". May I ask, who are not?

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Literature and Society: A Creative Interface

Bodh Prakash

SOCIAL AWARENESS IN MODERN INDIAN LITERATURE

Edited by R.K. Kaul and Jaidev

Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1993, Rs.200

This volume is a collection of seventeen papers presented at a national seminar held at the IIAS in 1991. The topic of social awareness in literature contains within itself a vast area of contemporary critical studies — the relevance of Gandhi, nationalism, colonialism, neo-imperialism, modernism, progressivism, the post-colonial discourse and post-modernism, to name just a few. The variety of methodologies and perspectives reflected in the papers are indicative of the sheer enormity of the discursive space that a seminar on such a topic must accommodate.

This volume will be of interest to all students of Indian literatures, especially those conversant only with English. The case for critical studies in English on literatures in Indian languages cannot be overstressed, and in recent years, Meenakshi Mukherjee and Harish Trivedi, among others, have done significant work in this area. Such works open up a whole new vista for students who are unacquainted with the tremendous variety of literatures from different regions and contribute to a useful interaction across literatures at the creative and critical levels. One wishes the editors had provided an English translation of the only essay in Hindi in this volume as this would have made it available to a wider readership. The papers are organized around three sections: (1) Theoretical Perspectives; (2) Literature: Indian Languages; and (3) Literature: Indian Writing in English. The first section is made up of two essays. The first, by K. Ayyappa Paniker, "Beyond the Boundaries: Creativity—Engagement as Self-Transcendence", recalls an older argument about art aspiring to the condition of universality. The author challenges the traditional Marxist position, held by, among others, Terry Eagleton, which regards culture and art as a part of the superstructure: "All changes in society, including changes in modes of production, take place because of a change in man's understanding and expectations of life—it is man's vision of what society should be like that determines his daily activity including his engagement with socio-political doctrines. And it is a work of art that powerfully prefigures this vision of his" (pp. 2-3).

In the contemporary critical discourse, post-modernist theory is quite fashionable and thus it is somewhat unusual to come across Paniker's theoretical position. Nevertheless it is an important reminder in a more than cynical age about the relevance of literature. The only reservation one has concerns the rather simplistic assumption that the writer as visionary stands outside his class and society and aids the process of social transformation through his works. The writer is both a product of his socio-historical conditioning and his class, as well as a visionary, so that while he can show the way forward for society, his perspective is also limited by his positioning and his work therefore cannot be read absolutely innocently.

The second essay in this section, "Black Skin, Black Masks" by Alok Rai, is the *tour de force* of this book. Employing a forceful style the author convincingly exposes the intellectual and moral blindness of the post-liberal pluralist, the post-modern cultural relativist and the subaltern points of view. Citing the controversy over Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, Rai shows how commentators who have seen the incident as "a clash of civilizational values", have implicitly defended the death-chanting zealots of Khomeini who stand for anything but cultural pluralism. This defence of pluralism, indigenism, nativism, against all that the West is allegedly supposed to stand for—modernity, science, rationalism (a position made popular by Ashis Nandy and Partha Chatterjee)—has important consequences for the Third World. First, by subscribing to a binary opposition between East and West, one rejects the considerable amount of interpenetration between the two. Post-colonial societies just cannot wish away their colonial past and the considerable influence it has exercised and continues to exercise on them. Further, as the author puts it, there is "an irreducible similarity between the nineteenth century racists' construction of 'primitive non-whites' and 'Eastern non-rationalisms' of the post-liberal, pluralist kind" (p.10). Secondly, and this is the seminal political point made in the essay, there is an essential continuity "between the moral nihilism that appears to be an inescapable corollary of that post-modern tolerance and the brutal intolerance of the hit-squad". Roop Kanwar of Deorala, Khomeini's hit squads, and communal massacres in an independent India are a visible indictment of the valorization of indigenist and nativist tendencies. What is particularly distressing for the author is the Third World intellectual's inability to recognize the implications of this position. Protest against the ban on the *Satanic Verses* was muted in India and "it is doubtful if the intellectual disturbance that the widow-burning should have caused lasted even as long as the smell of charred flesh did in Deorala ."

Contemporary critics like Aijaz Ahmad and Umberto Eco have held up a mirror to the distortions and fallacies of post- modernism in recent years. And Rai's essay lends good support to the anti-post-modernist position, especially in the Third World. The perception of East and West as exclusive categories has also been undermined by the post-colonial discourse and the study of diasporas. Hybridity is recognized as an essential condition of post-colonial societies.

Sukrita Kumar's "Between the Outer and Inner Realities: Perceptions from Modern Hindi and Urdu Short Stories" takes a position on the question of social awareness in modern Hindi and Urdu fiction, unlike most of the other essays in the section of the collection which deals with literatures in Indian languages.) Implicitly dismissing the divide between the 'progressive' and 'modernist' stances, she argues that the personal and social, far from being distinct, are intimately related in 'modernist' Hindi and Urdu fiction. The author briefly examines Shrikant Verma's "His Cross", Joginder Paul's "Prayee", Mohan Rakesh's "Miss Pal!", Ashok Mitran's "One Touch of Garlic" and C.M. Naim's "The Outcasts" to show how the inner anguish of a private individual or a traditional woman in a male-dominated society can be a direct or indirect consequence of the process of "socialization". Modern society, according to the author, is changing rapidly and "engendering dissonance", the social groupings with which the individual traditionally identified are fast breaking up, resulting in an "isolated existence" and a "crisis of identity". "The creative exploration of female consciousness" in a "male-dominated, tradition-oriented society" is by itself a political and social statement. "The new story (a category used for the Hindi short story of the late 1950s) sensitively captures that narrow zone in the female psyche in which her socially built resilience and low self-esteem become visible to her own self, which now accommodates new stirrings for self-identity" (p. 65). What is particularly noteworthy for the author is that an exploration of the female psyche need not carry with it the banner of women's liberation and may yet raise the woman's question quite powerfully.

Kumar's essay stands out in the collection because of the delicate balance that it maintains between her theoretical framework and textual analysis. The author also persuasively argues against a reductionist view which sees a creative work as either socially relevant or irrelevant.

In Jaidev's article, "Of Pigs and Men: The Intellectual in Contemporary Hindi Fiction", there is a sharp denunciation of what the author considers an idealization of the "Western" notions of existentialism and aestheticism, in the fiction of Nirmal Verma, Krishan Baldev Vaid and Mridula Garg. The privileging of High Modernism and existentialism, according to Jaidev, results in pastiche characters who are not sufficiently contextualized and float in a social vacuum and assume an arrogant, dismissive and condescending attitude towards the poor and under-privileged sections of society. As a counterpoint, the author discusses some novels of Mohan Rakesh, Shrilal Shukla, Kamleshwar and Renu to show how these writers engage directly with the more relevant material problems of existence, politics, etc. Their heroes are socially and historically placed and are able to see through the pseudo-Western facade of the pastiches they encounter in the elite, urban society.

One is not quite clear whether the intellectual being referred to in the essay is the protagonist of the creative

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Disappointing Look at Himadri Temples

Laxman S. Thakur

HIMADRI TEMPLES
(A.D.700—1300)

SUBHASHINI ARYAN

Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1994, Rs.600

In recent years the temple art and architecture of Himachal Pradesh has received considerable attention from art historians. Subhashini Aryan's present work is an example. This monograph tries to analyse the stages of development of the Nagara temples from c. A.D. 700 to 1300.

The author emphatically states (p. 10) that the term "Himadri" was coined by Krishna Deva and M.A. Dhaky in *Encyclopaedia of Indian Temple Architecture: North Indian Style, c. 250 B.C.—A.D. 1100*, Delhi, 1988, vol.ii, pt.1, but gives no page number. No such reference has been made by the above authors to the Himadri style. Krishna Deva, however, in the subsequent volume, *Encyclopaedia of Indian Temple Architecture: North India — Period of Early Maturity, c. A.D. 700—900*, Delhi, 1991, chap. 29, has classified the Nagara temple of Himachal into a "Himachal style". To the present reviewer neither "Himadri" nor "Himachal" style has any *vastusastric*, stylistic or geographical justification. From among the many varieties of the Nagara temples described in the Puranas, Himadri does not figure as distinct style. Three temple styles (excluding the Buddhist monasteries), with several sub-styles, were most common in Himachal between c. A.D. 700-1300. They are the Nagara, the Timber-bonded or Pent-roofed, and the Pagoda. The fourth style, i.e. the Indo-Mughal, became popular from the 16th century onwards.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter briefly outlines the geographical conditions along with a sketchy discussion of the religious background of the region. On page 3 the author remarks that the "state of Himachal did not exist before 1966", ignoring the fact that Himachal came into existence on 15 April 1948 after the integration of about thirty independent principalities. What happened in 1966 was the merger of the Pahari-speaking hilly areas of Punjab with Himachal.

In her review of earlier works Ms Aryan has excluded all studies on the temple art of Himachal published in the decades of the 1980s and early 1990s.

In an effort to show the interaction of the region with the Gupta empire in Chapter II she has misread the epigraphic evidence from the Salari rock inscription. What she misconstrues from the inscription is that "the Gupta Emperor Chandragupta received military assistance in such campaigns from some of the hilly chiefs" (p.12). The inscription has nothing to do with the Gupta dynasty. It records that a maharaja, Sri Chandesvarahastin, who was the son of maharaja Sri Isvarahastin of the Vatsa *gotra*, built a city (Bhatasalipuri) in a locality called Srenyaka after his victory in battle over Rajjila. Both rulers were of local origin and have no political or matrimonial or lineage connections either with Chandragupta I or Chandragupta II Vikramaditya. Kachhapagupta (p. 12) seems to be a mistake for Kachgupta.

The third chapter describes the architectural features of stone temples. Apart from the Vaidyanatha temple, Baijnath, there are two other notable examples of the Nagara style possessing windows. Both are Saivite and are located at Mangarh (Sirmaur) and Savara (Shimla) respectively. While discussing the varieties of the *sikhara* of the Nagara temples the author could not trace any example of the Valabhi or barrel-vaulted type in Himachal (pp. 28, 38). The present reviewer has already discussed two examples of the Valabhi type in his doctoral thesis entitled "Temple Architecture in Himachal Pradesh", submitted to the Himachal Pradesh University in September 1984. Navagrahas, which are prominently carved on the *uttarangas* of several temples, do not figure either in a sub-section on the decorative motifs or in a chapter on sculpture.

Chapters IV to VI analyse the architectural development of temples under "formative", "transitional" and "culmination" phases. What was the contribution of each phase has remained unexplained. Ms Aryan had a specific question to probe, which

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work or the creative writer himself, or both. In the context of modernist fiction this is an important question since all the criticism that Jaidev directs at this intellectual would be misplaced if the creative writer (Verma, Vaid, Garg) could ironically distance himself from his pastiche characters. The second problem with the argument lies in the outright rejection of existentialism and aestheticism in an Indian context. While both existentialism and aestheticism have their origins in Europe, they may perhaps be sufficiently "Indianized" if they are of any relevance to our experiences in the modern age.

The *Mahabharata*, like many great classical works, has been found relevant by practically all ages and the 20th century is no exception. While traditional scholarship emphasized the element of universality in what was seen as an archetypal story, contemporary critics and writers alike have deconstructed the text and read feminist and radical political discourses between the lines—the epic has become the representative post-modernist text. B. Chandrika's piece, "The Puranic Novel: Contemporary Redactions of the Puranic Narrative Mode", examines three novels, two of them in Malayalam and one in English, to show how ancient myths from the Mahabharata are modernized through shifts in perspective or a distortion of the original or by simply superimposing the political events of 20th-century India on the basic structure of the Mahabharata.

Three other essays in this section trace the evolution of Marathi and Telugu poetry and poetry from Rajasthan (the language used by the poets was Dingal) through different phases in the 20th century and how they were influenced by, among other factors, European Romanticism, Progressivism and the Indian National Movement. While these essays are quite informative, there is little attempt at analysis. This is however, not the case with E.V. Ramakrishnan's paper on Kedarnath Singh's poetry in Hindi, which traces the poet's growth from an early formalist phase to an involvement with the socio-political realities of his time.

The last section of the book deals with Indian Writing in English. The essays engage with the impact of colonial rule on Indian society and with perspectives on Gandhi. T.N. Dhar's article on Mulk Raj Anand outlines the unambiguous social and political commitment of the novelist, his exposure of the injustice of British rule as well as of the negative, regressive tendencies within the Indian social system. But the author argues that Anand's commitment to social transformation does not commit him to any specific ideology. It may be recalled here that Mulk Raj Anand was a founder member of the Indian Progressive Writers' Association and subscribed to a "progressive" ideology in the sense in which Premchand interpreted it in his Presidential Address to the IPWA in 1936: "All writers are by nature progressive" (translation mine).

The innumerable dimensions of Gandhi—political activist, social reformer, orthodox spiritual Hindu, believer in non-violence, etc. —have evoked renewed interest on the part of political and social activists and researchers alike in the 1980s and 1990s. For both creative writers and critics, interpreting Gandhi has become an even greater challenge — the piece by Kumkum Yadav, "Gandhian Influnce on Indo-English Novelists", doesn't meet it. .

The social relevance of literature is an area which can perhaps never be fully exhausted. From the 1930s, with the emergence of the Indian Progressive Writers' Association, until today it has remained at the centre-stage of the critical discourse. The perspectives on how literature can be relevant or what kind of literature can be relevant to society may have changed. Scholarship in the 1930s might have seen the issue from the traditional Marxist position and today one might be interpreting it via a multi-disciplinary and less rigid approach. But the essential question remains important.

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Wittgenstein on Philosophical Psychology

Mrinal Miri

WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1946-47

Edited by P.T. Geach, notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson

Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, 1988, 348 pp.

The 20th century might well go down in the history of Western philosophical thought as the century that belonged primarily to Ludwig Wittgenstein. While the *Tractatus* had a decisive influence on Anglo-American philosophy of the 1930s and 1940s, *Philosophical Investigations*, published posthumously, dominated the same philosophical scene through the 1950s and 1960s. The remarkable thing however, is that what has come to be known as the 'later' thought of Wittgenstein, or the 'later Wittgenstein', has not just made a crucial difference to academic philosophy in the Anglo-American world, it seems to have played a determining role in the practice of theoria, as such, in European thought, and, thereby, has helped bring together these two streams of thought in a living relationship. Thus, Wittgensteinean ideas are inescapably present in path-breaking theoretical thinking in the human sciences — particularly anthropology, sociology and literary criticism — as also in the latest developments in the philosophy of the natural sciences. Much of this influence is, of course, subterranean, and it is impossible to articulate it with any degree of precision or adequacy, but it will not be much of an exaggeration to say that there is a subtle Wittgensteinean aura about the Western intellectual self-consciousness of the 20th century — especially of its second half.

Only a small number of people, however, had sustained direct access to the thought of the 'later' Wittgenstein: he had published nothing after the *Tractatus*, and *Philosophical Investigations* was published posthumously. In the few years that he taught at Cambridge before he resigned his chair in philosophy, small groups of dedicated students attended his lectures which took on the character of intimate but intense dialogue between himself and the pupils on a variety of topics. Some of the ideas developed in these lectures inevitably escaped into the wider arena of academic philosophical debate and began to circulate and be used in ways unintended and unauthorized by their author. Also, ideas similar to Wittgenstein's were being developed around the same time, perhaps fairly independently of what was going on in the lectures. It is this, perhaps, that provoked the rather remarkable statement in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*: "For more than one reason what I publish here will have points of contact with what other people are writing today. If my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property" (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. x).

In 1946-47 Wittgenstein delivered his last course of lectures before retirement. "Each year at the beginning of his course of lectures Wittgenstein would have a great many listeners, largely female; this crowd would rapidly shrink to a hard core of regular attenders [almost all male] by

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prompted her to work on the Nagara temples. This is amply clear from her own remarks: "I tried my best to get hold of the architectural treatise that furnished the guidelines to the Himachal *sthapatis*, but did not succeed due to the narrow and queer outlook of Himachalis" (p.vii). Considering the importance of the above statement this monograph seems to be an utter disappointment, for she did not provide measurements for any monument. She lost the opportunity to explore the underlying *vastusastric* principles embodied in these temples. How could she have proved it without taking in her hands a *sutradhara's* cord? The present reviewer has successfully tested the validity of the textual prescriptions and the actual constructional techniques practised by the *sutradharas* in Himachal for the Nagara temples in an article, "Application of the Vastupurusamandala in the Indian Temple Architecture: An Analysis of the Nagara Temple Plans of Himachal Pradesh", *Artibus Asiae*, vol.50, nos. 3-4, 1990, pp. 263-84.

The ground plans of the Siva temple, Parahat, which is referred to as "Barat" throughout the text (fig. 2, p. 42), the Siva temple, Hat Koti (fig. 7, p. 61), the Champavati temple, Chamba (fig. 8, p. 70), the Hari Rai temple (fig. 9, p. 76), and the Vajreswari temple (fig. 10, p. 78), though drawn without scale, are not proportionate to their actual settings. The plans of the Masrur complex (rough index plan) and the ground plan of the Vaidyanantha temple (fig. 11, p. 85), the Siddhanatha temple (fig. 12, p. 91) and the Ganapati temple (fig. 13, p. 93) are reproduced from Dilip K. Chakrabarti and S. Jamal Hasan's *The Antiquities of Kangra*, New Delhi, 1984, without acknowledgement. Chakrabarti and Hasan themselves reproduced the rough index and ground plans of the Masrur complex from the works of H.L. Shuttleworth (article published in *Indian Antiquary*, vol.xliv, 1915, pp. 10-23) and H. Hargreaves Annual Report, Archaeological Survey of India, 1915-16, pp. 39-48).

The weakest chapter, both from the point of view of presentation and in its interpretation of the existing epigraphic material preserved in the temples, is on inscriptions. A reconstructed text of an inscription in Siddhamatrika script engraved on either side of the *torana* of the Mahisasur-mardini bronze image, Hat Koti, cannot be accepted. Subhashini Aryan has inserted several letters which are not part of the actual text (p.116). *Kalpitam* for *kararpitam* and *vardhayitva* for *vadatiya* suggested by the author cannot be accepted for the following reasons. The letter *ra* in *kararpitam* is absolutely clear and a similar letter is engraved on the right-hand side in the case of *raghava*. *Kalpitam* does not make any sense since *bhatta Sri Sthana* cannot be considered a person who conceived and planned the image or a *torana*. He seems to have fixed the image upon the pedestal. In the case of *vadatiya* (my readings), the engraver has committed a mistake by using the word *dha* for *da*. In another instance the artisan has used *thi* instead of *ti* in the last word. Therefore the meaning of the inscription is quite clear and we offer the following translation: "The image was caused to be fixed upon (placed) by *bhatta Sri Sthana*. Padmanabha Raghava, a son of the *kayastha*... Dahila gave instructions for shaping the image."

The borrowing of the text and translation of a Sarada inscription engraved on the pedestal of the Nandi image (Bharmaur) from J.Ph. Vogel's *Antiquities of Chamba State*, Part I, Calcutta, 1911, p.144, is equally unacceptable. Vogel himself failed to recognize the importance of several architectural terms mentioned in this inscription, as he states: "The rendering of the third *pada* of the first stanza is problematic. For the *navanabha nama* ... I cannot offer any plausible explanation.... Nor is it clear what is meant by *candrasala* and *praggrivaka*" (p. 144, fn. 2). The Nandi image inscription is one of the rarest surviving epigraphic documents which acquaints us with the architectural terminology used by the *sutradharas* at the site of temple construction. Significantly, terms such as *candrasala, praggriva, mandapa* and *navanabha* (nine navels, i.e. the plan of the temple divided into 9 x 9 = 81 squares) are widely mentioned in the Indian *vastusastras*. The corrected translation has been published by us elsewhere (see *History and Culture of the Chamba State*, New Delhi, 1989, pp.155-60).

No consistent method has been adopted by Ms Aryan in spelling and the use of diacritical marks. A dozen examples of variations could be cited. The locations of places such as Kanhiara, Chari (actually the exact name is Chahri, which can be distinguished from Chari, situated on the Dharamsala-Pathankot road, whereas the place referred to in the text is located near Pathyar, only 2 km away from Nagrota-Bagwan on National Highway 20), Balag, Sarahan and Dhabas are wrong on a map provided at the beginning of the book. It is extremely difficult for a reader to find a reference to a particular region or a temple-site in the absence of an index. No reference has been given to plates and illustrations in the text. The captions to colour plates 3 and 21 are wrong. The former shows Saivalaya instead of Hatesvari Devi, and the latter the Narasimha rather than the Manimahesa temple. The bibliography certainly needs to be updated.

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the third or fourth lecture". (Editor's Preface, p.xii) Among this 'hard core' there were three attending the 1946-47 lectures, who kept notes of them. They were P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson. It is these notes that have been brought together in this volume after over forty years of what the publishers have called "somewhat of an 'underground'" existence. P.T. Geach, the editor, has "used a very light hand as editor" and the "three records as they stand are bona fide reports of what three young men could make of a great philosopher's living words" (p.xv).

The ground covered in these lectures is now familiar to all readers of Wittgenstein: thinking, willing, intending, sensation, emotion, memory, meaning, privacy, the first-person-third-person asymmetry, the nature of philosophy, and so on. What is remarkable about them is: (i) the insight they give into Wittgenstein's method of teaching; (ii) the extraordinary powers of imagination that he brings to bear upon small but significant points of detail; and (iii) the subtly different impressions that the lectures made on three gifted and sensitive pupils.

These lectures, like the others, are in the form of a dialogue where Wittgenstein is the supreme authoritative participant. Yet, under the powerful and resolute guidance of the great man, the others do not remain just 'actors' but become, as it were, 'the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the mode of their productions' (Alasdair MacIntyre on conversation in *After Virtue*, London, 1981, p.196). There was, of course, no question of following a set syllabus. As Geach puts it in his editorial preface:

> Wittgenstein lectured without notes: but manifestly not without preparation. He expected of his audience close attention and cooperation. Since after the first lecture of a course the way the discussion went depended on what had been brought up in the previous meeting, there could have been no question of his following a prearranged syllabus. Wittgenstein was patient with people's genuine difficulties, and often brought out from a listener's remark much more than might have been expected (p. xii).

The topic under discussion changes frequently — from thought to meaning to intending to sensation, emotion, knowing, memory and back again — not, of course, in the same order. This is not because of any lack of organization in the lectures — quite the contrary: the nature of the subject itself demands such change and movement back and forth. Psychological concepts are inter-related in a great variety of ways; while there are similarities, there are also differences of a 'categorical' nature. And the same concept, say, thinking, invariably gathers within its net a complexity of elements which cannot be captured in a 'definition' or a 'philosophical' explanation: "If you try to apply an explanation you plunge into a mass of exceptions" (Shah). Or take the following response to the suggestion that intending is an 'experience':

> Let us mean by experience something like imagery or perception. An experience is something that can have duration in time — like a continued note or colour. The same note again...still...still...now no longer. This is NOT a natural expression for intention — or for knowing for that matter. If a man says he sees a red disk, I might frequently ask if he still sees it, but if he says he intends to visit his grandmother tomorrow, I won't keep on asking if he still does. An image that lasts for five minutes may obsess a man, but an intention qua intention, does not obsess him — though thoughts connected with it may. This distinction between thought and intention is categorical. A move in chess has no velocity, unlike the physical movement that executes it... what I mean about chess is that one might ask in mid-move which move I am making, and a reply is possible. But the temporal determination: 'I move to that square now' (in mid-move) is odd. So in 'I intend now' the 'now' isn't as in 'I think now'. One mustn't think of intention and thought as two different parts in a score. (Geach)

The temptation to look for unitary answers in philosophy is great; but this temptation must be resisted, for to yield to it is to invite darkness and confusion: mind is neither inner private process nor behaviour. "I am not doing behaviourism. 'I have pain' doesn't mean 'I cry'; it replaces crying or other expressions of pain". (Geach) Or, "It is misleading to say words mean behaviour. Words replace the behaviour, say, a cry". (Shah) But then, think of "I am trying hard". Does it "replace expressions of feeling? The circumstances here are completely different, e.g. having been given an order, beginning to do what I have learned to do; and the kind of interest are completely different". (Geach) In either case, however, the important thing is not that a particular feeling is or is not recognized — the important thing — and here we come to another recurring Wittgensteinean theme — is whether or not the use of words here is firmly anchored in 'ordinary', 'normal' human life.

We say a man has learned to use such words, only when he behaves like a normal human being. If a child looked radiant when it was hurt, and shrieked for no apparent reason, one couldn't teach him the use of the word 'pain'. Even if we taught him to use it instead of shrieking it would still not have consequences like taking him to the doctor; it would be a new use. One couldn't teach him our use of psychological words. (Geach)

"If we want to teach a child a psychological word, he must behave like a normal being: even if because of courage he represses the expression of pain. But even this has to be based upon, derived from, a suppression of the expression of pain". (Shah) "There will be exceptions" (Geach) [but interestingly Shah: "It is always, and here too, a question of 'rule and exception'"]. "But the centre of reference is ordinary human life, and [the] further we go from ordinary human life, the less meaning we can give such expression". (Geach)

The idea, implicit in the dualist picture of mind and body, that it is possible — even if only logically — for the mind and the body to lose, as it were, their normal points of contact, to become dissociated, seems to have haunted Wittgenstein in all his thinking about mind and mental concepts — whether in these lectures, in *Philosophical Investigations*, or in various other works published posthumously. Indeed, sometimes it looks as though by far the greater part of his enormous intellectual energy is devoted to combating this idea. "I am in pain" is not a report, but an "utterance" that replaces natural expressions of pain; the asymmetry between some first-person, present tense psychological sentences and corresponding third-person ones ("I am in pain" and "He is in pain") is not one between my superior, private knowledge of myself and inferior public knowledge of another, but is one of the fundamental givens of human life. Some things I know about myself, say, the position of my limbs, are not based on anything (e.g., a feeling or the "observation" of a feeling); I just know them; the question how does not arise, or, if it does, it cannot have an answer — all these and more (e.g., the parable of the "soulless" tribe, the intriguing remarks about lying [Shah, pp.196-7], the rejection of the idea that intentions are causes and so on) are — or can be seen as — so many fortifications against any possible infiltration by the dualist idea of the possible sundering of the normal relations between the 'mind' and the 'body'.

Some time ago I read a "true" story about a lady who, on waking up one morning discovered, with terror, that she was no longer able to tell the position of her limbs which, consequently, acquired a horrifying independence of movement. The story tells of the partial recovery that the lady made by a painful process of relearning how to correlate muscular and kinaesthetic sensations with positions of her limbs. The recovery was partial because the lady was, for ever afterwards, in real doubt whether the correlations she had learned would "work" the next time round. The story, of course, may not be true; and, in any case, there are details to be filled in, which might change its entire import (the lady's affliction might, for instance, be understood in the same way as a normal person's ignorance of the position of an anaesthetized limb). But on the face of it at least, it seems to bring mind-body dualism right back to the centre, and it is possible that Wittgenstein might have found it profoundly disturbing: it seems to let in the dualist ideal of the possible dissociation of the mind and the body, through all his fortifications, and puts it in a position from where it can threaten the entire 'Wittgensteinean world' — if such a phrase is permitted — behind the fortifications.

While there is a marked correspondence between the notes taken by Geach and Shah, Jackson's seem to strike, as it were, a somewhat different note. They are in a way 'better organized', but, in the process, they seem to lose a little the sense of spontaneity and surprise which is powerfully present throughout the other two sets. This is, however, unsurprising, for Jackson 'used to write up his notes from memory in the evening of the day on which the lectures were given' (Publishers' Preface, p. viii), and "the attribution to Dr. Wittgenstein of verbatim sentences is intended to convey one auditor's understanding of the opinion expressed" (A.C. Jackson as quoted by publishers, p.viii).

There are, however, other interesting differences in the three records. Some of these differences must be put down to individual specificities of perception. But one would like to think — in respect of Shah's notes, for instance — that his own civilizational background entered into them, however unselfconsciously, to give them, in part at least, the distinctive character that they have. I wish to point out here just one difference in the three records which might conceivably be seen in this light. Early on in the lectures Wittgenstein makes a remark about how philosophical problems arise. And here are the three records of it:

Philosophical problems arise when a man has the King's English use of 'thinking' but describes it wrongly. Why should a man misdescribe?

A description of the use of a word is given when we define it — when we show a sample (e.g. of colour). But a child 'picks up' psychological expressions. No explanation is ever given. Cf. the word 'perhaps'. If a child asks 'What is perhaps'? one doesn't explain; the child picks it up. If we are asked to describe the use, we are bewildered. Any explanation that comes into our head is always wrong. (Geach)

Then there is a tendency to say that the trouble was verbal. But how can it be verbal? 'Thinking' and 'pain' can be confused. But in that case philosophical conflict does not arise. There is a philosophical conflict only when the person has some right idea of the use. But what is the right idea of the use? Really the person has a use and practises it. The problem has nothing to do with conflict between different persons, it has to do with conflict within the person himself (emphasis added). Though the person has the right use he has a wrong idea of the use. How does this happen? It happens because the description of the use of the words is not needed for learning the use of a word; but it is needed when we define the word. (Shah)

Now why does it [the idea that philosophical trouble is verbal] seem unsatisfactory? One idea comes at once. How can such an enquiry have any importance or depth? And how could it cause us any trouble? Suppose someone used 'thinking' for what we mean by 'feeling'. His mistake would have no philosophical importance; it will be like confusing Oxford blue with Cambridge blue. But he would have 'a wrong idea of the use of the word'. The philosophical problem arises when you have the 'right idea' as opposed to that sort of wrong idea; that is, where you have a use which you practise but cannot describe. There is a conflict between the practice and the description you can give of it. (Jackson)

What I find intriguing here is the sentence in the Shah version of the record: "The problem here has nothing to do with conflict between different persons, it has to do with conflict within the person himself". Although nothing corresponding to this is present in the other two versions, it has undoubtedly to do with the Wittgensteinean view — not much talked about in these lectures — that a philosophical problem arises out of a sort of self-inflicted intellectual imprisonment of the mind ('fly in the fly-bottle') and that to see one's way out of it is also to achieve liberation from such imprisonment ('to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'). The connection between self-delusion, self-awareness and liberation is, of course, a matter of almost axiomatic variety in a powerful strand of Indian thought. In any event, the differences in the three versions will be a most interesting subject of research, apart from the fact that "these three contemporary perspectives will surely be of immense value to all students of Wittgenstein giving us such a rare and privileged access to his didactic style, the difficulty of the philosophical problems discussed, and Wittgenstein's way of tackling them' (Publishers' Preface, p.viii).

For us in this country, what is of special interest is the impact it is likely to have on contemporary Indian thought, particularly on account of Professor K.J. Shah's record of the lectures. Professor Shah's own assessment of the significance, over the years, that the lectures had for him is:

In the course of time, I came to learn that in the Indian context what was important was not deciding between Shankara and Sankhya, or between Kant and Wittgenstein, but between Shankara and Kant, or between Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein. It is in a framework where classical Indian thought and modern Western thought are mutually proposition and opposition that significant philosophical discussion takes place (Publishers' Preface, p.vii).

To me this statement means, among other things, that while the Western tradition of thought is inescapably part of our intellectual self-awareness, we are also in the fortunate position of being the inheritors of another powerful and, in many ways, very different tradition of thought. The latter has doubtless remained somewhat dormant, but it is our special responsibility and privilege to bring it into living contact with the Western tradition — it is only then that our intellectual life will acquire an authenticity and become truly creative and possibly give a surprisingly fresh turn to modern intellectual life as such. One looks forward, with great expectations, to seeing the product of Professor Shah's own continuing efforts in this direction. One knows other pupils of Wittgenstein's through their writings, that is, those among them who have published. And whatever personal contact one has had with one or two of them has been much too superficial to leave any lasting impression; but having known Professor Shah fairly intimately for the past several years, one can see now—thanks to these notes—the deep and abiding influence this privileged proximity to Wittgenstein during his Cambridge days must have had on his intellect, and indeed, on his entire personality. K.J. Shah might have gone his own way, unlike most other pupils of Wittgenstein; but the quality of his journey surely owes much to his two years of close contact with the philosopher of the century.

The otherwise attractively produced book is marred by several printing errors. The addition of an index — difficult as the task of producing one might have been — would have been of enormous help to the reader.

Professor Mrinal Miri was at the Department of Philosophy of the North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, when he wrote this review. It appeared originally in *The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 8(3), May-August 1991.

IN MEMORIAM K.J. SHAH

(In place of a prose obituary)

K. Raghavendra Rao

The stormy hair on his head
scaring the encroaching air,
his immortal soul squatting somewhere
within his endlessly reshuffled body space,
past seventy he should have gone home to rest.
Never accustomed to win walkovers,
he wrestled the old devils
returning as nightmares from lost dreams, lost nights,
an incorrigible angry old devil himself,
he churned out of old myths, new truths,
and out of old truths, new myths.
He heard the haunting timeless music of Shruti
and fashioned out of it ordinary melodies for ordinary use.
The West roared within him like a caged beast
while he hacked the native forest to make its exit.
A tailor-made caricature of a philosopher,
apparently unmindful of his material mooring,
he tickled the sides of ordinary crowds.
But beyond the tempting facade
breathed a cautious, calculating, even cunning moralist,
beyond the volcanic brain and the volatile flesh,
he laughed like every one of us,
made, drank and got us drunk on his weak, watery tea,
shared with us the joys of his beloved Parle biscuits,
and filled the void with the figure
of a great father, a creative husband,
a warm friend, a beguiling foe, a feathery stranger
and a thinker in constant battle with thinking —
they said he was dead and burned his body —
so what?
Nobody can take him away from us
once he has been ours.