

Political Science Versus Political Reality

DAYA KRISHNA

Head of Philosophy Dept. (Retd.)
Rajasthan University, Jaipur

A polity is not a natural entity, not even an entity in the same sense as society or family may be set to be. Man naturally may be set to have a family and a society, as without these he cannot be conceived to exist in the usual sense of the term. But both of these can exist without their being a polity or a political system which organises and supports them. The political function is a contingent function, not necessary for the survival of human species. Yet, as far as history is concerned it is co-terminus with the coming into being of polities, i.e., the transformation of the social into the political and the former's subservience and subordination to the latter. It is true that tribal societies may continue and have continued, along with polities but they do not have a history of their own apart from the polity under which they live and the interaction they have with it.

The constitution of the political, thus, introduces a different dimension of time, which is denoted by the term 'historical'. The 'historical time', thus, is different from 'social time' which itself is different from 'physical time' in which natural events may be said to occur. This is related to the achievement and formation of self-consciousness which is different from the one which is achieved at the social and the familiar level. The self-consciousness at the social level is still vague, even though there are natural formations within society which identify themselves in terms of their distinction they have from others. The boundaries of a society are thus not clear, either in term of identity or self-consciousness. However, the formation of a polity, when a polity emerges in a society for whatever reason, is a mutation which is as radical as the emergence of life in matter or of consciousness in life. This is symbolised visibly by the king or the ruler or those who exercise the ruling function.

And, the achievement of this radical "I" of the polity confronts the 'I' of other polities which may be assumed to arise simultaneously, or at a time-interval which cannot be of long duration, as the polity

itself will not continue to be a 'polity' for long if this does not happen.

Existence at all levels implies a 'plurality of existences' and a polity is no exception to this. It is inconceivable that something may exist or come into being and have no 'other' to itself which is like it and also different from it. The sense of difference, however, does not annul the sense of similarity as the latter not only predominates over the former but arises from a feeling or a realisation that the similarity is rooted in an identity, which overrides the differences.

The fact that a polity has to be necessarily amongst other polities is the central defining characteristic which has not been appreciated by those who have thought about the realm of politics, nor have they clearly understood the function that a polity has necessarily to perform in respect of that within which it is arisen in order to fulfil the need which could not be met without it.

A society can be without a polity, but a polity cannot be without a society, for the latter arises within it in order to perform a function which earlier was performed unconsciously by social-cultural formations. But once a society turns into a polity, many of the functions performed by the social-cultural formations lose their earlier character as some of the functions that they were ever performing are taken over by the new visible centre which comes into being and even the remaining functions lose their centrality as they get more and more subordinated to the overriding primacy of the new centre and its multifarious functions that are increasingly felt by everybody to be there. The visibility gives a new identity which is unprecedented in the sense that it could not be there in the case of a society which has not achieved the separation and differentiation of the integrative function which a polity performs for a society after it has come into being.

The identities formed by extended family, caste, tribe and territorial groups never achieve the same kind of 'closure' which the formation of a polity ensures by its very nature and makes visible to everyone both in the person of the ruler or the king who stands above everybody else and the walls of the town or the fort where he resides and whose doors are closed every night and opened every morning to make it clear to everyone where the centre exists.

The differentiation of the political functions and those who exercise that function within a society introduces a new distinction between the 'we' and the 'they' which never existed before. The distinction between those who rule and those who are ruled becomes

visible to everybody and as a polity always exists amongst other polities, the relation between polities is self-consciously seen in terms of the 'we' and the 'they' which thus occurs at two levels, i.e., within a polity and between the polities. The king or the ruler symbolises in himself the unity and identity of the polity *vis-a-vis* all other polities as was never the case before when only society existed and the political function within it was never differentiated enough to assume an independent form of its own. The boundaries between societies, cultures, tribes or extended families is never as sharp as it now becomes with the rise of the polity. The walls around the city where the ruler lives and the dispersed fortifications around the area are a visible symbol of this as any trespassing over the boundary makes one liable to be punished for one has entered a domain to which one does not belong.

The sense of identity and 'belongingness' that thus comes into being is radically different from the one that existed earlier and the notions of being the 'subject' of a particular kingdom makes one feel both proud of one's belonging to such a kingdom and as being alienated or distanced from all the rest to which one does not belong. The new emergent 'reality' which thus comes into being is defined by two important distinctions which create the central problem of politics without reference to which its nature cannot be understood at all. And yet, the science of politics which claims to study and understand the nature of political reality finds shy of coming to terms with these and ignores them, perhaps, in the hope that if he does not talk about them, they will not be there at all. The internal division in the polity is as real as the external division and the 'truth' of the political realm will never be grasped if these two basic cleavages and divisions in it are not understood.

The external danger is always there and can easily be understood as the history of man is full of wars and conquests and the building of empires on the one hand and the defeats and their decline and fall, on the other. But though familiar, its wide-ranging implications have never been grasped or theoretically formulated in such a way as to be seen as an integral part of the very being of a polity in the manner it is constituted. A polity exists among other polities which are, or can be hostile to it in the sense that it can become an 'object' of their attack and eventual conquests and thus meet its 'death' at their hands. The converse is also true and thus the relation between polities is always that of actual, or potential 'enemies' which, even when friendly cannot forget this relationship as it is the basic relationship which underlies

all other relationships and defines their very being in relation to one another. Even the 'friendliness' which they may have to each other is generally only in the context of their enmity to some third polity which perhaps is superior to them in power and strength, or both. And, as 'offence' is supposed to be the best means of defence, the polities are in a street of perpetual preparedness for war along with all that this 'preparedness' implies for them and their citizens and their peoples.

War has always been celebrated in history and glorified everywhere. The heroic mould is that of the warrior, whether it be in the form of Achilles or Arjun and the tales of their battles be called the Iliad or the *Mahābhārata*. It is only recently that wars have been looked down upon and the heroic character of one who died fighting bravely on the field of battle lost the central stage in human imagination. But the fact remains, as not only the money spent on defence-preparedness by different countries attests but the actual wars that have been fought since the IInd World War ended and which of course are not counted as 'wars' for we are supposed to live in an era of peace when even the 'cold war' has ended. The phrase itself is interesting as it indicates the fact that 'war' is the reality in the relationship between polities, no matter whether it be 'hot' or 'cold'.

The shifting boundaries of the states tell their own tale, but the shift in the power within the states is as, or even more important than the one caused by wars or conquests which have been such a perennial feature of all history.

The dream of stability in the political realm is as illusory as the one that concerns the frontiers of state. The political centre within is threatened as much by the usurpers or the power-hungry from within as it always is from without. Those who occupy the seats of power may appear to be securedly established there, but they 'know' as no one else does the threat and pressure from those who are floating for their removal and waiting in the wings to oust them out and seize the reins of power. The struggle for power from within is as perennial as the struggle from without and the two define the political reality as nothing else does, for they emanate from the structural situation which constitutes the political realm itself.

The science of politics cannot generally ignore or under play these essential constituents which define the political reality on the one hand and set constraints for it which limit all the other ends for the attainment of which the political system exists and in terms of which it legitimises itself. The political system, after all, justifies itself

in terms of the provision of 'welfare' for its people. The pursuit of this welfare when conceived of in ideal terms becomes the search for a utopia where all values are maximally realised for each and every member of the realm. The story of utopias is old, but it is seldom realised by the dreamers of such utopias that not only there may be a radical difference of opinion about the values to be realised or the primacy amongst them. But also that there may be a serious conflict among the values themselves both intrinsically and in terms of the conditions of their realisation in the empirical domain.

Also, the realisation of one value may militate against the realisation of others and thus set a dilemma for those who rule a situation which is unthought of by thinkers who believe that all values are equally realisable in the actual world whose 'existence-conditions' they generally ignore. The 'compossibility' of values is as necessary in any actual world as the compossibility of all 'possibles' in the Leibnizian world. Values are not as coherent as the innocent idealist things and as the protagonists of the open society have shown both against Plato and Marx that the utopias they imagined were a veritable prison-houses for those who wanted to breathe fresh air of freedom. But the freedom that the liberal thinkers promised has produced an economy where cut-throat competition reigns and profit alone matters and the air is so polluted that one does not know which one to prefer.

The problems of the political functionaries do not cease with the impossible task of making the realization of divergent values compossible within the limits of the constraints set by the external dangers to the polity, and the challenge passed by the legitimate and illegitimate aspirers for power from within, but extends to an area which has hardly caught the attention of the political scientists or even the political thinkers who try to study and understand the realm. The very separation of the political functions brings into being the task of integrating the diverse and conflicting functions which are performed by different groups within the society. Earlier, these functions were integrated in a semi-conscious, automatic manner as the functions themselves were not sharply differentiated within the social system. The separation and segregation of both the political function and the political functionary is a sign that the society is differentiating itself into more defined functions which have a separate identity of their own and hence have to be integrated in some sense to make the society function. That which appeared to be automatically integrated now seems 'disintegrated' to everyone and hence requiring integration by

the newly separated political authority which is supposed to ensure this by using all the 'authority' at its command including the use of coercive power, indirectly or directly. And the very fact that the political segment of the society has to perform now this specific function with the ultimate sanction of coercive force at its command, makes not only the task of integration more difficult but introduces a new division between the people and those who call themselves the 'servants of the people', but actually have to subordinate them by all means so that the society may function as some sort of integrated whole.

Thus, what the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness does take place at the individual level and at other levels of the society, now effects the social system as a whole which has to be integrated from 'without', i.e., from a segregated 'bysection' of itself which is extensively supposed to perform this function. This separation, isolation and segregation of the political function creates new problems for the social system which embodies itself in what is known as explicitly formulated and codified laws, which now are supposed to govern the functions of the system and thus ensure its survival and growth in the new situation created because of the separation itself.

Much has been written on this 'necessary' step in the coming into being of civilizations which are supposed to be the unique creations of the humankind. The 'necessity' has been seen in terms of the appropriation of the surplus from those who create it so that trans-biological ends and values may be pursued by man. The role of technology and the creation of institutional mechanisms and both the creation and appropriation of the surplus have been emphasised in the Marxist and the non-Marxist literature on the subject, but what has not been seen is the radical shift from consciousness to self-consciousness which lies at the roots of the transition from culture to civilization and which itself is founded in the transformation, if separated, disjointed, segregated bits of knowledge relating to specific fields into an organised body of knowledge called *śāstras* or science in the different civilizational traditions.

This, however, does not occur only in the field of knowledge but also in other domains and the political field provides an institutional counterpart to what happens in the realm of knowledge. The transformation of society into a polity is the analogue in the realm of Will to that which occurs in the realm of knowledge and whose evidence is easily seen by everyone in the foundational *śāstras* of a civilization. The role that Pāṇini or Aristotle has played in the life of a civilization is

well-known, but that the Athenian police or the empire founded by Chandra Gupta Maurya might have also played the same role in the life of civilization that has seldom been noticed or reflected and meditated upon. The Athenian democracy and the Macedonian empire provide the two foundational points in the political history of the West, but it is difficult to say whether the *janapathas* played the same role in the history of Indian civilization as providing a counterpoint to the Mauryan empire in the political imagination of the Indian civilization. Even in the case of the West, it is difficult to say whether it is the Roman *imperium* and Alexander's conquest which provide the ideal for the Western polities or the Athenian democracy which also seems to have shaped and haunted its political imagination. The conflict between the two is, perhaps, the clue to the understanding of the political reality as it has obtained in the Western civilization since the occurrence of the English, the French, the American and the Russian revolutions. On the other hand, what has haunted as the political ideal in the Indian civilization seems always is the dream of a *cakravartin* whose rule embraces the whole of India but, which strangely never included the idea of a conquest over other civilizations. There is no counterpart of either Alexander or Caesar or Napoleon in Indian history. Those who dominated the political imagination and have symbolised the political dream and aspirations of the Indian people in this realm are Aśoka, Samudra Gupta, Chandra Gupta, or Vikramaditya.

But, basically, there is no single figure which symbolises in himself what is symbolised in the names that have obsessed the Western imagination in this field. A Rāma or a Kṛṣṇa hardly fill the bill and it is strange to think that ultimately the civilization opted for the ideal of the *cakravartin* in the spiritual realm rather than in that where alone it means something concrete as it visibly symbolises the achievement of the transformation of the society or a society into a polity. Perhaps, the Indian society never achieved the transformation completely and many of its features may be understood in terms of the fact that this transformation was never completed.

But, whatever the problems of the Indian polity might have been, there can be little doubt that the thinking in India was far more clear about the issues we have raised than either in Plato or Aristotle or Confucius who are, perhaps, the best known representatives of those who have thought about the political realm and laid the foundations of that science in their civilization of which they have been regarded as founders. Kauṭilya was fully aware of the problem, which the political

ruler faces from both inside and outside. He makes no secret of the fact that a ruler has to be clearly aware that he has only two alternatives, either to conquer or be conquered and that he continues to be in danger from those who want to remove him and capture power for themselves. Surprisingly this includes among the latter even the closest king of the king, the queen and the prince even though the latter will become the ruler himself/herself in the natural course of time. But even Kauṭilya does not, seem to be aware of the 'integrating' function which the ruler has inevitably to perform, even though he shows an amazing awareness of the clever ways in which the different organs of the polity try to deceive the ruler and deprive him of the legitimate demands that he has to make on all the groups within the polity to provide financial support for the functioning of the system. Not only this, he is also clearly aware of the inner conflicts and tensions that plague the different sections of the polity because of the structural situation in which they are placed *vis-a-vis* the polity as well as within themselves. The relation between the Brāhmanaṣas, the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas, and the renouncers or the Bhikṣus, the Munis and the Saṅnyāsis are depicted as intrinsically ambivalent. And hence unresolvable in principle. Yes, the ruler, if he is to rule, as to perform this impossible task which has to be done self-consciously and hence requires a managing skill of which ultimately consists in reconciling the irreconcilable all existing interests in such a way that no single group is either too happy or unhappy with him. The task is sometimes managed either by minimally satisfying the needs and interests of most groups in the society or alternatively satisfying some a little more at the expenses of those who are not regarded as immediately dangerous for the interest of the state or not important enough in the existing situation as to make any decisive impact on the situation as it obtains at the time. But, whatever be the strategy adopted by the rulers, it has to integrate or reconcile or adjust the conflicting interests among the different social groups in a self-conscious manner and at a self-conscious level.

The separation and the segregation of the political function, strangely, make all other interests self-conscious and insist on self-identity even though they form an interdependent and integral part of the social whole to which they belong. Besides this, it also brings into being a whole, a new set of institutions which proliferate endlessly and create problems as they embody in themselves the political function which has, primacy over all others. This proliferation is

analogous to that which in the intellectual realm when any study takes the form of a *śāstra* or a scientific discipline as it creates new problems of its own which had existed before. The world of knowledge or 'skills' which had existed before and was used for the achievement of purpose and their own problems is now seen as inferior to look down upon by the new elite who create their own problems and then try to solve them. These problems have little relevance to the original purpose which the 'knowledge' served earlier, and yet they acquire a prestige that far surpasses the one accorded to the original ones, for reasons best known to man. The simplest example of this may be formed in the case of language which is used by everyone successfully. Yet, when the science of language arises and a *śāstra* is formed, there arises the distinction between those who know what language is and those who only know how to 'use' it. The former not only know what it is, but also what it should be or 'ought' to be, the latter are, thus, always told that their use is incorrect or ungrammatical or not in accordance with the rules of the language which 'ought' to be observed by everyone who wishes to use language properly. Thus self-consciousness about the 'rules' not only brings into being problems which have to be solved in order that a satisfactory knowledge about the realm may be obtained, but proliferate endlessly as each attempted a solution of the problem creates new problems which insistently demand their own solution in term. This process is endless, as the history of any *śāstra* or scientific discipline.

The separation of the political realm, thus, not only brings into being a new set of institutions with interests of their own, but also in some a science or a *śāstra* which tries to articulate the realm and reflect upon it. This reflection creates problems of its own and influences the political realm in direct and indirect ways which have not been studied or reflected upon. A Plato may generate dreams of a perfect 'Republic', an ideal 'utopia' which the actual polities may try to achieve by having a 'philosopher king' who may lead the policy into utter disaster. A Machiavelli or a Kauṭilya may engender dreams of an ideal prince or a perfect ruler who 'knows' how to achieve his ends by all the means at his disposal. A Marx may make the idea of a 'classless' society as practical and agenda for world history and turn the political reality into a nightmare where endless persecutions and killings become the order of the day.

These are extreme examples, but the science of politics creates and struggles with problems generated by itself, problems that have

little to do with those that plague the actual political reality surrounding them. This, to a certain extent, is the fate of all sciences in different fields that take the form of *sāstras* or sciences, but it is disastrous in the case of those which deal with man, society and polity. These are "the policy sciences" proper and any illusions about the 'reality' at the ground level is bound to be disastrous or both the actual practitioner and the theorizer who thinks about it. A little dose of 'realism' thus is necessary for those who seriously engage in the study of this realm. This is not a plea for engaging in 'real politick' in the sense in which the world is generally used nor is it an invitation to follow the path laid for '*The Prince*' by Machiavelli, or even the one detailed his Indian counterpart who flourished long before him and is supposed to have advised the founder of the first great empire in India. Nor does it deny the 'idealism' whose standard embodiment is spelled out in '*The Republic*' by one who may be regarded as the Master of all masters, the philosopher *par excellence*, to read whom is a perpetual intellectual delight. Rather, it is to suggest that 'the creations of open society' should open their own eyes to the real dangers that emanate from the very structure of the realm which they wish to study, understand and influence in order that man may live in a polity which may provide him a conducive environment for his individual and collective well-being. Power and welfare are the twin values that define the realm and they are intertwined to such an extent that the one cannot be conceived without the active exercise of power embodied in the polity. The dilemmas and the paradoxes involved in this twin relationship have to be understood and faced so that the dangers emanating from them may be minimized to the extent that it is possible.

The attempt at a solution of the structural problems has taken two forms upto now the one has been the dream of the establishment of a 'Universal Empire' which eliminates the problem by having no policy outside 'the policy that exists'. The second has consisted in the search for norms, rules and ideals which may govern the relations between the polities in such a way as to minimize or even rule out the 'possible hostility' between them. The distinction between a *sāttvika*, a *rājasvika* and a *tāmasika* conqueror in the *Arthaśāstra* is a step in this direction. So also is the distinction between 'sovereignty' and 'suzerainty' evolved by political thinkers on the one hand and practised by the polities on the other. There is also being the attempt to evolve some sort of loose organisation of polities or states to sort out and regulate the relations between them. All these attempts may be

regarded as attempts to create an 'international' order which is enshrined and embodied today in what is called the League of Nations. All such attempts, however, have always been vitiated by the fact that there is an unavoidable inequality of power and wealth amongst the polities which enter, or are forced to enter such an organization. The power to veto any decision enjoyed by the five permanent members of the Security Council is an evidence of it today in the U.N.O. which is supposed to embody such an international order these days. The fact of inequality among polities is as ineradicable as the one amongst individuals, and ensures that the relation between them will be necessarily a symmetrical in a character. The relation between polities, however has a character, i.e., seldom found amongst the ones that obtain between individuals. This, as pointed out earlier, consists in the potential hostility of the 'other', which has necessarily to be taken into account, anticipated and prepared for by the polity concerned. Besides this, there arises another difference when the political function gets differentiated in a society and treats itself as independent and autonomous from it. This consists in the emergence of a differentiation between what have been called *dharma* and *niti* in the Indian tradition, a distinction though implicit in the social formation, could not have emerged earlier as there was no need for it. The king or the ruler has, however, to make the distinction as he has to deal simultaneously with external and internal dangers to himself and the function he exercises. The inevitable primacy of preserving the independence of the polity against coup to replace him demands that he takes all measures, including those that may not be regarded as 'right' or 'good' by his own conscience. This occurs also at the individual level, but only in times of crisis when survival is immediately threatened. But in the case of polities such a situation is always present and hence the distinction between 'the right' and 'the wrong' or between 'the good' and 'the best' is always blurt. The moral dimension of political action, thus, is always intrinsically ambiguous in a sense which is essentially different from the one that essentially plagues individual action which also, faces moral dilemmas of its own. The dilemmas of public action again are different from both and provide the intermediate link between the two as they too are performed in a 'public' capacity where one 'acts' on behalf of some institution for the achievement of purposes which are not one's own. The distinction between the 'private' and the 'public' gets sharpened in the realm of the polity as, in a certain sense, it embodies in itself all that is 'public' in its most visible form

and all the rest may be said to be derived from it as it alone determines what is to be regarded as 'public' in nature. Yet in spite of this, the realm has not drawn the attention of those who are concerned with questions of all morality in the 'public' sphere, not has it been the subject of thought by those who have engaged in the dream of building an ideal utopia where men may live in peace and harmony with one another. The intrinsic strife that tears the body-politic apart is the result of 'structural' situation which constitutes the polity and unless this is understood the attempts to mitigate the problem are bound to fail. The "democratic" solution is one such attempt, but it is concerned only with the 'internal' problems that the differentiation of the political formation poses for society, it does not solve, or even try to solve the 'external' problem which a polity faces just because it is a polity. The dream of a solution of the problem in terms of a Universal Empire or a Universal Federation of independent politics seems to be 'a dream' as the latter is always haunted by the former and is, in many cases, merely a mask for the former. Unless the idea of an *imperium* is given up both in theory and practice, the attempts to create some sort of a workable 'international order' is bound to fail. Till then, what can only be hoped for is a gradual change in the nature of the polity as it has existed upto now. The self-consciousness which has primarily seen itself in terms of self assertion against the other polities has to shift its focus and see the relationship more in terms of the 'other'. Beyond this is the problem whether a polity which has no other polities outside it, can still be regarded as a 'polity' in the sense in which it has functioned upto now in history. Perhaps, it will involve a radical change in the self-consciousness of man which has been shaped, upto now in polities and civilizations which have regarded themselves as essentially distinct and different from all the others. The 'global' enterprise of man in the field of knowledge is a pointer to the way in which the realm of the political would also gradually transform itself in the way it did when 'knowledge' assumed the form of a *śāstra* or a science at the time when history started giving itself a specific shape because of the emergence of self-consciousness in man and the form it assumed at the level of both knowledge and action.

Man's enterprises in the field of knowledge and action have upto now been shaped in diverse traditions belonging to different civilizations with self-identities of their own which even now, they are finding it difficult to give up. It is true that there have been exchanges, interactions and give and take in the knowledge enterprise between

different civilizations but it is only now that some sort of a common, 'universal' enterprise is emerging in this realm, though that too is confined only to certain fields only. Also, it is taking place almost exclusively within the conceptual framework of the Western tradition of knowledge and on the terms set by it. The situation in the field of 'action' is not different as the emerging framework for it is set by the overwhelming predominance of the Western institutions in this field. The United Nations Organization and its various satellite organizations may have 200 sovereign nations as its members but the effective control, as everyone knows, lies in the hands of a few members only. And, in spite of the fact that both Russia and China have veto power in the Security Council, it is only the U.S. and its Western allies which exercise real power. This was true, even when the U.S.S.R. has not broken up as it only exercised in negative control and had little positive influence in the functioning of these 'international' organizations. Power and wealth have always been unequal and their influence has always been unequal also. Yet, in spite of these obvious limitations some sort of an international order is emerging at the political level which seems to embody the "predicted dreams" of Sri Aurbindo or Chardin as described in their works *The Ideal of Human Unity* and *The Phenomenon of Man* respectively. There has been no World War since the end of the World War II even though there have been wars galore here and there in every corner of the globe and when a 'big power' has been involved the U.N. has not been able to check or stop it. The U.S. bombings in Iraq after the Kuwait war and the Cosawa bombings by the NATO are the latest examples of this open disregard of the U.N. proclaiming to everyone that the 'World Organization' does not really matter. The behaviour of the NATO was, in fact, not only a challenge but an 'insult' to the world organization as it did not have given the trade of a U.N. resolution to 'justify' what it was doing. But, even though unjustifiable, it still at 'some excuse' for what was happening in Cosawa was itself unjustifiable on any ground whatsoever.

But, in spite of these and many other instances there can be little doubt that the world is slowly moving towards a political situation where there will be no 'other' polity outside the one that comprises the world political system as it exists today with all its weaknesses known to everyone. The crucial question for the science of politics is then what will happen to the very definition of a 'polity' which was defined by its relation to other polities? Will the 'other' become now the 'inner' and subvert it from within in the guise of 'demands' for political

autonomy and independence by multifarious religions, ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups ? Such claims to form a 'state' within a state are legitimised by the political theorist today who believes that the very notion of democracy necessarily involves this. The generalised acceptance of the legitimacy or such a demand encourages each existent state to overtly or covertly hasten this process in neighbouring states by all the means at their disposal. The break-up of the Soviet Union is a pointer, in this direction, even though it cannot be accommodated in the framework of "internal subversion" from an external force from outside. The current case of Chechenya is different, as also were the earlier cases of the break-up of India into the independent states and still later of the break-up of Pakistan into the Bangladesh and what was then known as West Pakistan. The point is that no country today is 'safe' from such demands being made from insiders at the behest of those who are, at least at present, outside that political system. No country can, in fact, be 'safe' in principle as the religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups exist everywhere and can be multiplied if one so desires.

The United Kingdom is not so well united as it generally likes to present itself to others. It consists of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales whose antagonistic relations to one another are well-known. As per the U.S.A., it should not be forgotten that it came into being through its War of Independence from the United Kingdom and has already had a Civil War to maintain its unity. What exactly will happen in the future can hardly be foretold, but the logic of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism wedded to the postulate that each such unit should enjoy a political autonomy of its own does not augur well for the future. The United States may find itself too 'disunited' and discover that each non-Western group within it has become a centre for the demand of 'political autonomy' which it may find difficult to control with all the political skills at its command. The neighbouring Canada is already riven by the demand for a division between the French and the Anglo-Saxon populations within it and the break-up of the artificially created political unities after the World War I in the eastern Europe tell the same tale. It is true, that the European Union has come into being in spite of all the rifts, tensions and oppositions between the historical self-identities of the French and the Germans and is a counter example where the idea of Europe seems to have won over the divisive and separatist tendencies which went into the making of modern Europe in the late nineteenth and in the first

quarter of the twentieth century. The counter example, however, it should be remembered stop-short at the line that divides eastern Europe from the western and that it came into being in response to the emerging predominance of the U.S.A. in all fields, including those of knowledge and culture. Europe had to 'save' itself but how long it shall continue to do so, is difficult to say. Shall China suffer the same fate, or India get politically divided further may seem today purely speculative questions just as they supposed break-up of the U.S.A. does ? But the logic of subversion that breaks political entities should at least be theoretically considered and a question raised whether the present structure of the U.N. and the postulates on which it is based can help in stopping it.

Another question which should equally engage the attention of the student of political science is whether the inherent external 'danger' from other polities has assumed new forms which deceive one into thinking that they have ceased to exist a cause of the present form of international order imposed by the nations which had 'won' the World War II. Also the political 'scientist' has to pay attention to the new forms that the threat to the 'ruler' from 'within' have assumed because of the acceptance of democratic form of Govt. which had evolved to ensure peaceful succession without involving coups, murders and blood-baths which was the order of the day in earlier times. Coups of course, still take place but mostly in 'immature' democracies. Yet, a 'Watergate' or the systematic attempt at the impeachment of the President as evidenced in the recent Clinton affair point to the fact that everything is not well in 'matured' democracies either.

Perhaps, a closer look at the other mature democracies might reveal that the situation is not as 'rosy' as one would like it to be. The "democratic process" has its own hidden 'political cost' which have not been studied until now. After all, the 'battle' of the ballot is as much a battle and as the Indian experiment with democracy increasingly reveals, the form of the battle is not exactly 'bloodless' either. The case of Bihar should be studied in depth by all those who feel that democracy can ensure a bloodless succession in the realm of political power. Ultimately, the "structural constraints" have to have their way unless the very nature of the structure changes in an essential sense. But then the nature of polity itself will have to change and that can only occur if the 'polity' collapses into society and becomes identical with it perhaps as a higher level or dialectical synthesis as Hegel and Marx

dreamt and prophesied. But, shall not be institutions created by the coming into being of the polities stand in the way of any such transformation as they have a vested interest of their own ? The *śāstras*, once they come into being, have to create intellectual problems of their own which cannot be given up by those who benefit from them, both intellectually and non-intellectually, and hence seek to perpetuate them through the institutions dedicated to their maintenance, proliferation and development. Perhaps, the human situation consists in creating complexities and difficulties for itself so that it may find excitement and joy in solving them. If so, we may expect the structural problems posed by the very nature of a polity taking new forms and thereby creating the illusion that they do not exist any more. The task of the political scientist would then be to unmask this illusion and suggest how the diverse specific problems within a historically given situation and their harmful effects can be mitigated or deviated to the extent that is possible under those circumstances. The task thus conceived is both theoretical and practical something analogous to the situation prevailing in the medical and legal professions. And, why should it not be so, if political science is a "policy science", as it is claimed to be.