

# IMAGINATION AND FREEDOM: BHATTACHARAYYA, HEIDEGGER AND THE KANTIAN INHERITANCE<sup>1</sup>

Rahul Govind

(I)

## *Introduction*

The relationship between thought and history is a difficult one. To use thought as a marker of (historical) change is precarious, fraught with self-contradictory possibilities, suicidal. If thought has to be so thought it would be sequestered – to mark – in a time of discrete parts. Such self-induced necrosis will be unable to distinguish itself from what it purportedly refers to, and in thinking thus, or otherwise, it cannot be captured by a time of discrete parts, just as the latter cannot as such capture change. One cannot know the particular part in its particularity without assuming to know the whole that cannot be *given* in the same way. That which marks out particularity cannot — in a peculiar death-drive — be really distinguished from the character of the whole. Such an inherent defect is politico-historical and epistemological in equal measure. To say that an idea has an (empirical) provenance – for instance, “human liberty was first truly conceived in the Enlightenment” – damages idea and site by congealing them in an abstraction that is bent upon abstracting itself.<sup>2</sup>

This sleight of hand is freely available in philosophical literature today. Among many, Immanuel Kant has a privileged place in the characterizing of modernity as a historical marker. The recent work of Charles Taylor speaks of the Kantian intervention as characteristic of modernity in its contribution to an “exclusive” humanism. As distinct from humanisms that preceded the modern era where being-human spoke of a flourishing within the world as well as beyond it, exclusive humanism is to have marked the making of modernity as found in and founded by Kant. Taylor argues that “In spite of the continuing place of God and immortality in his scheme, he is a crucial figure also in the development of exclusive humanism, just

because he articulates so strongly the *inner* (my emphasis) sources of morality”<sup>3</sup> (Taylor 2007: 312).

There is little attempt to explicate the nature of reason, will, humanity or freedom in its specific Kantian elaboration. There is no clarification of the fact that the moral cannot merely be taken as the source of, or apply to, the phenomenal world, just as *that* we live in the phenomenal world — such as when we are hungry and eat or behave in a particular way — is not an action for which *we* can provide or verify absolute laws. Neither is there anything, in Taylor, on the relations and interrelations between reason, understanding and the will as they criss-cross the critiques. In what earthly sense can we speak of “exclusive humanism” in the context of Kant’s discussion of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the “empirical ego” and autonomous will, the sensible and intelligible nature(s) of man?<sup>4</sup> Since for Kant the moral law and will are “noumenal” and therefore the question of “application” – especially in the world of unending appearance – is fraught<sup>5</sup>. If “theoretical” reason reveals to us nothing but phenomena and the will is ‘noumenal’ the characterization of man or “exclusive humanism” becomes an arduous task.

In this context, in attempting the task of understanding what appear as the human and knowledge, the following essay studies Kant and his inheritance in the work of Martin Heidegger and Krishnachandra Bhattacharaya<sup>6</sup>. The primary guiding thread of the following effort would be to weave pure reason, practical reason and, to a much lesser extent, aesthetic judgement. More specifically, in the thesis to be elaborated below, the contention is that, imagination in the construal of knowledge, including sense perception, allows for a congruency with the problematic of freedom and autonomous will. Imagination in knowing and freedom in acting is grounded in a more fundamental way of approaching the subject-world. In this sense it is hoped that the perennial difficulties of thinking though knowledge and action may be approached yet once more.

In this light we turn to the famous “Davos Dispute” that staged the encounter between the venerable and established Ernst Cassirer and a young and by all accounts charismatic Martin Heidegger in 1928. An important thread in their discussion is the acute recognition of the uneasy congruence between Kant’s practical and theoretic reason and the conceptual difficulties this implies; a point scarcely broached by Taylor. Cassirer argues, that practical reason breaks away from the limits posited by the critique of pure reason; “in the

ethical a point is reached which is no longer limited to the finitude of the knowing creature”<sup>7</sup> (Heidegger 1997: 195). In response, Heidegger argues, that such transcendence “shows an inner reference to the finite creature..this transcendence too still remains within the [sphere of] creatureliness and finitude” (Heidegger 1997: 196). That there could be beings that are rational and yet finite i.e. angels implies the ‘inner’ relationship between rationality and finitude. For Heidegger, transcendence lay in a “certain infinitude” — which can itself only be grounded in the ontological — even while it is always robustly distinguished from divine infinitude that plays the role of a ‘orientating horizon’ in the Kantian investigation.

Both Cassirer and Heidegger, unlike Taylor, stay clear of an anthropocentric – “exclusively humanist” — position in their interpretation of Kant<sup>8</sup>. Their discussion and dispute lie in the nature of conceptualizing that – “objective form” for Cassirer and “Being” for Heidegger — with reference to which the human being is thinkable. For Heidegger’s detailed studies on Kant, this involved a persistent critique of an “epistemological” reading that analyzes the Kantian project as laying the ground work for scientific truth i.e. Kant is not one who lays down the rules by which scientific truth or mere experience are to be measured since this unjustifiably presumed a picture of nature as the site of rule governed objects. Rather, in Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s fundamental endeavour is to probe the very nature of being, time and the subjectivity of the subject. In this approach Heidegger finds an ally in his much lesser known elder contemporary, Bhattacharayya. While Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant saw the latter’s corpus as whole, he refrains from a unified and univocal interpretation of the corpus; with much less attention to the aesthetic judgement<sup>9</sup>. On the other hand, Bhattacharayya’s studies in Kant seamlessly wove the three critiques together in the power of their constructive interpretation.

There are obvious and strong affinities between Bhattacharayya and Heidegger in their concerted departure from an ‘epistemological’ reading of Kant’s works that dwell on the status of knowledge and validity without an investigation into the nature of being or the being for whom such validity in fact is. For both Heidegger and Bhattacharayya, imagination, time and the schematism together are given a central place in the interpretation of pure reason and understanding<sup>10</sup> and the horizon of the divine (intellectual intuition) is underlined and exploitatively explored; concepts such as rationality and universality are themselves

scrutinized differentially; and the importance of action – across the grades of bodily mental and moral – are emphasized. The transcendental and experience remain important reference points. While Heidegger emphasizes moving beyond the proposition/assertion-judgement as the paradigm for truth and falsity, being and non-being, Bhattacharaya begins his one published study of Kant, wondering about certainties beyond that of knowledge, where an object is other than the consciousness of it i.e. what is conventionally treated as judgement or “theoretical” knowledge. In this sense the practical and the aesthetic are interpreted with a rigour and seriousness that reconfigure our understanding of the paradigmatic form of judgement or what we may more easily recognize as propositional knowledge. Both employ a reading – a constructive interpretation<sup>11</sup> – such that the identification of categories and words exhibit and defend in themselves the indentificatory procedures and interpretative protocols of their coming into being; a process that is as concretely rich as it is abstractly rigorous (Bhattacharaya 2008: 5; Heidegger 1997:141).

In relation to the different interpretations of the practical and theoretical reason as articulated in the Davos Dispute, Bhattacharaya interprets practical reason as a certitude that has no object distinct from itself. Therefore the self that wills – and practical knowledge as a form of knowledge is also a form of certitude – does not refer to an object and itself cannot be one. This characterization of practical reason forms the guiding thread for an understanding of the phenomenal nature of the object as it appears to — and as it is construed by — the human faculties. The *a priori* nature of thinking and the pure concepts would not be comprehensible if the very nature of the object was not (already) suspect; and not merely the object that is encountered (appears) in sense-perception (Bhattacharaya 2008: 664-5). Bhattacharaya argues that the Kantian distinction between the phenomena and the noumena refers not to the distinction between what is sensorially apprehended and its condition, the mentally comprehended, but rather to the fact that the latter itself is also as object (content) – in its construction and reception of objects – phenomenal (Bhattacharaya 2008: 666)<sup>12</sup>. This ‘phenomenology’ he argues would be “mere metaphor” without the idea of free causality as willing i.e. practical or moral certainty. The latter is congruent with and redemptive of the detailed arguments of the first critique. That is to say, for Bhattacharaya, Kant’s works have to be understood as a coherent – even while differentially elaborated – whole.

It is in such an exposition that Bhattacharayya's arguments in relation to imagination, concepts, intuition and practical reason traverse Heidegger's interpretative work. To anticipate a line of argumentation that which will be detailed below on the relationship between practical and theoretical reason: Bhattacharayya defines an object as a content that is distinct from the consciousness of it (self), whereas the transcendental is defined as that which is not distinct from the consciousness of it (self)<sup>13</sup> (Bhattacharayya 2008: 663-4). The role of the concepts, intuition and objects as sketched out in the first critique are characterized by the difficulty of 1) distinguishing objects and knowledge of objects and 2) the distinction between knowing something and knowing it as distinct from such knowing. This 'external' world – of and as object(s) — is itself not so much given in space but rather might be seen as a "determination of space". These space-figures themselves are determined through time, the imagination and apperception (and understanding) in what is called the work of the "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 671). The appearing world is therefore itself in the process of being constructed just as it is simultaneously in its phenomenology that which does not determine the self-as-freedom (practical reason). Heidegger's diagnosis of phenomena is not without analogy to this line of inquiry. For him, appearance [object] is two-fold being, both what shows itself as object of empirical intuition and "appearance" as "an emanation of something that hides itself in that appearance" (Heidegger 1962: 51). Yet, in this instance, he does not appeal to practical reason as a way to resolve the impending difficulties of such conceptualizing<sup>14</sup>, choosing to critique Kant in favour of a more radical interpretation of being and *Dasien*.

We now attempt a more detailed study of Heidegger and Bhattacharayya's respective interpretations.

## (II)

### *Intuition and Concept*

The fundamental distinguishing between intuition and concept is tethered to an interpretation of *judgement*, with Heidegger wanting to cut it down to size, as it were, and Bhattacharayya identifying it as one among other – and ultimately dependent – certainties. In the analysis of the first critique in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, understanding (concepts) rather than being a sign of human sovereignty is a characteristic mark of its finitude – the "humanness

of reason” — because thinking is essentially “relative to intuition”. By its very nature it is neither absolutely distinct nor distinguishable from intuition<sup>15</sup>. Both intuition and concepts are representations but while intuition relates itself immediately to the object and is singular, the concept refers to it [the object] “mediately by means of a feature which several things have in common” (Heidegger 1997: 16). An expression of this unity of the two lies in the fact that the Apophantic and Predicative syntheses are grounded in the Veritative syntheses i.e. the classical form of judgement as the joining of subject and predicate (Apophantic synthesis) is based on the unity and synthesizing of the predicate itself as concept (predicative synthesis) which is itself based on the unity and synthesis of thinking-intuition that is given in advance so that the ‘object’ may appear as “given” and “known” in the first place (Veritative synthesis). For Heidegger, the superiority of intuition lies in the fact that divine knowledge is characterizable as (originary) intuition because of the singular and whole representation that is responsible for the coming into being of being; it *creates* being, unlike finite intuition that assumes “givenness”<sup>16</sup> (Heidegger 1997: 17-21). Thinking always assumes something at hand, in the context of which it can articulate itself as judgment in the conventional sense (apophantic: joining of subject and predicate). Thus the finitude of thinking is infra-structural and only for such finitude is something like an object – appearance – possible.

The understanding is itself not an object like the object of sense-perception, and so its intelligibility cannot but be grounded in the imagination, that presents what is not present. Analogously the “pure forms” of intuition – space and time – are not (given) objects but are (imaginatively) represented in advance for knowledge to occur. Space is not one space among others but neither does the unity of spaces lie in space as if the latter were a concept and not a pure intuition. Rather space lies in all spaces as singular and is not the “common” feature of a multiplicity as would an (empirical) concept<sup>17</sup> (Heidegger 1997: 32). Time as “inner sense”, on the other hand, Heidegger argues, has no reference to spatial objects but still determines space in that it determines what is represented in the representation of spatial objects. As opposed to pure intuitions, the concept in/as judging requires a unifying; the bringing of the many under the one. The oneness of the concept as anticipatively given is, all the same, necessarily expressed in the particular (intuition).

Bhattacharaya, for whom too, the light of the “divine” gives shape to the Kantian endeavour, arrives at similar conclusions on

the “superiority” of intuition. For in his reading too a distinction has to be made between the knowledge of intuition and the knowledge of the concept. Pure forms of intuition are characterized as “form” and concepts as “qualifiers”, with the former “grasping” and the latter allowing for “relation” or judging. In characterizing the relationship between the two Bhattacharayya writes, “knowledge of a conceptual qualifier presupposes knowledge of this type of (non conceptual) qualifier, but not vice versa” (Bhattacharayya 2011: 68). And later, “Judgement is knowledge of grasped objects, and so it has to be said that it presupposes grasping. Grasping does not presuppose judgement” (Bhattacharayya 2011: 70). Grasping is ‘ordered relation’, and ‘arrangement’ by which the whole is constituted by its parts, whereas judgement (relation) is the “formless unification of two formed objects”. “Space is experienced as essentially an act of grasping”, and not an object received by the senses (Bhattacharayya 2011: 101). Judgment as subsumption is therein distinguished from grasping, and this distinction has an affinity with Heidegger’s distinguishing between the immediate/singular and the subsuming/mediate<sup>18</sup>.

The “subservience” of the concept to the intuition in Kant radically transforms the very nature of the concept as judgement in the Heideggerian reading. However this subservience is only to be appreciated if it is located within the two-fold nature of both cognition (intuition and concept) and object (particular/immediate and universal/universalized). The concept as representation in its referral to the object (intuition) in Kant is to be comprehended in distinction from traditional metaphysics that identified the assertion with the judgement *within* the element of the concept (Heidegger 1967: 153-165). In contrast, for Heidegger’s Kant, the crucial unity required by the judgement is provided by apperception i.e. the I-relation. It is to be emphasized that the I-relation is a requirement for an object but not itself an object, which Heidegger characterizes in almost Bhattacharayyesque way as “that which is aware of that which encounters” (Heidegger 1967: 158).

The break with “traditional metaphysics” is further elucidated by the Kantian analytic and synthetic judgements whereby the former is merely a clarification of the (subjective) concept while the latter returns via the object (as x i.e. not determined or really determinable in itself). The fact that Kant’s analytic judgement in its negative conditional – the principle of non-contradiction – does not take into account temporal determination illustrates the analytic to be merely conceptual. The move to the question of how “synthetic

judgements *a priori* are possible” then will have to move beyond mere logic – or the domain of the concept conceived according to the laws of identity and contradiction – into transcendental logic. That is to say the Kantian concept performs an altered function; it is now necessary that thought participates as thought referred to intuition, i.e. as synthetic judgement” (Heidegger 1967: 176). The necessity of the synthetic *a priori* is thus expressive of the fact that the object is determined-in-advance (synthetic and *a priori*) in order for it to become an object of a judgement. This would also require that the “object” is not known in itself but rather as that which is “altogether different” from the concept i.e. synthesis that allows judgement (concept/assertion). Heidegger cites Kant, “But in synthetic judgements I have to advance beyond the given concept, viewing as in relation with the concept something altogether different from what was thought in it” (Heidegger 1967: 192). That is to say the “mode of objectivity” has to be presupposed for the (individual) object to appear as object and object of knowledge and thought. It is this that requires the move from mere logic to Transcendental Logic.

In other studies Heidegger returns to this problematic by carefully interpreting the Kantian critique of the Ontological Proof, summed up in the line “being is not a real predicate” (Heidegger 1988: 27-49). He expounds the meaning of “real” as it operates here, which, rather than designating an object of sense perception – as contemporary philosophy or everyday language might have it – would have to be understood as characterizing, predicating the thingness of a thing. Reality is to be contrasted with existence (actuality and necessity) in that it (further) determines something, speaking to the essence of a particular thing. This is what makes Kant’s argument – that a 100 real thalers adds no more coin than a hundred possible thalers – meaningful. That is to say, the conceptual determination (100) is unaffected by existence. Thus the real is a positing in relation to another positing, a determination of a determination. Existence on the other hand is an “absolute positing” – does not determine in the sense that the real does – that has only reference to the “cognitive faculty”. Therefore it [being/existence] might well be a predicate – a determination – but not a real predicate<sup>19</sup>. The relation between the “absolute positing” and the “cognitive faculty” Heidegger names perception, or more accurately, as perceivedness. Existence or actuality is thus equivalent to perceivedness in the sense that it is neither the (act) of perception nor the perceived object but rather *that* in the latter which is



perceived. The objectivity of the object i.e. actuality or existence is the perceivedness indicating the ‘unity’ of conceptualization, the act of (sense) perception and the ‘object’.

In distinguishing and relating intuition and understanding, both Bhattacharaya and Heidegger underline the role of the imagination in Kant, distinguishing it from mere imagination as conventionally understood. Bhattacharaya almost identifies thinking and imagination, arguing “from imagination (thinking) of form [intuition] and qualifier [concept] in the object received by the sensibility, knowledge of form and of qualifiers arise” (Bhattacharaya 2011: 72).<sup>20</sup> In a not dissimilar manner for Heidegger, the synthesis that brings the intuition and the concept together in their structural unity is due to the “power of the imagination”<sup>21</sup>. The manifoldness of intuition and the unity of the concept are therein synthesized. As Heidegger argues, in the first edition of the first critique, the imagination is rendered as the faculty of synthesis. Such a synthesis is included in transcendental apperception which is the pure unity of the “I think” that accompanies all applications of the concept (judging)<sup>22</sup>. Imagination is characterized as productive and pure (transcendental) in that it does not represent what is already given (an object/appearance). And so *that* which it synthesizes must in its turn be pure i.e. pure intuition which is time. Time in advance connects what is given in sense while transcendental apperception ensures the immutability required for the formation of unites (concepts). Heidegger, all the same, contends that Kant did not follow through radically enough this relation between time, imagination and apperception.

### (III)

#### *Transcendental Imagination: Concept and Intuition*

And yet, one needs to move more slowly to follow the role of imagination in the production and reproduction of objects (appearances), though an examination of the chapter on schematism. Heidegger argues that the crucial function of the imagination and schematism lies in the fact that the latter “makes sensible” concepts. In his interpretation of imagination he elucidates the nature of images: The image is the “look” given in advance – the horizon – in which something can be encountered and then characterized (judged). As an image it refers, simultaneously, to the immediate sensed, the image-sign of what is no longer there (as ‘after image’) or yet to come (premonition), or the general

feature. The role of schematism — the “making sensible” — functions in the following way: What is sense-perceived as a particular house is in fact the application of the rule of the concept house neither of which — sensed object or rule — can be abstracted from one another. Schema is the regulative rule whereby the concept takes sensory-perceptual expression. Therefore a rule is made manifest in its regulation, in its “picking out” or sketching, of that, which is the particular house. The how, of the image appearance, being regulated by the rule is the schema that is linked to, but not reducible to, the image. Such an operation is not the enumeration of a concept already formed beforehand — that can itself be apprehended as an object — but a concept whose unity can only lie in its “regulation” by the schema. (Heidegger 1997: 63-71). What Heidegger names “regulation”, might in another idiom be called “implication” or not complete image but what is “intended to be completed in an image” (Bhattacharaya 2008: 696). Analogous to the argument about “making sensible”, here too the image-concept nexus is expressed, and not assertable (judged), in the face of experienced fact; it is the “self becoming flesh” (Bhattacharaya 2008: 697).

While in relation to sensibility what is received is called matter, Bhattacharaya, in his emphasis on the importance of time writes, “the direct matter for understanding is the object grasped by inner sense, which has time as its form”. (Bhattacharaya 2011: 79). Qualifiers or categories can only be applied in something temporally formed and not directly on the “manifold intuition” that is received by the sensibility. Now categorical relation is not to be found in the object but rather the latter is found to correspond to the “categorical relation imagined as ultimate form”. (Bhattacharaya 2011: 85). The thought of the ultimate limit is described as “imagining, which is and is not with image, or is schematic imagination” (Bhattacharaya 2011: 86). A distinction between space as form [intuition] and the idea of the universal lies in the fact that though “universals have limits, a limit of universals is not experienced as a part of a universal with unknown limits”. That is to say, the perception of a (spatial) object is simultaneous with the perception of the latter’s connection with (other) spatial objects, while this is not the case with color for instance, that is perceived individually and not in connection with other colors. In this sense space as form is not perceived though it encodes a *belief* in its existence as an unlimited and yet total series. While its limits are not perceived it cannot be perceived as limitless. In this sense space appears as a relation, and not a property; like a

color or that which can be “understood” by concepts/qualifiers. Time, for Bhattacharaya too, has the same features of order and relation, and cannot be known apart from space.

Judgement, on the other hand, is “sentential knowledge”, in the form, *this* object has *this* qualifier. A qualifier is constituted as a relation of predication, the latter, is identified as “objecthood, qualifierhood or knownness”. In sentential knowledge, qualifying means that “the individual appears as part of the relation and not as its substratum”. (Bhattacharaya 2011: 107). While spatial and temporal forms too are designated as “implicit judgements” they are all the same distinguished from explicit judgments as a kind “of knowledge of an object which is not distinct from knowledge” (Bhattacharaya 2011:110); resonating with Heidegger’s distinguishing of space as in all spaces in the singular and therein unlike a concept that is the designation of a common feature among many. The latter, concept-judgement, cannot take place without distinguishing knowledge from the object of knowledge. Within the structure of (such) judgement a distinction is thereby made between knownness and knowledge of an object, the latter present in the former.

Such an explicative orientation has parallels with Heidegger’s effort to turn the question of knowledge away from judgement as assertion towards thinking ontology and transcendental questions. This is not unlike the certitudes other than judging – that are in a sense more fundamental — that Bhattacharaya speaks of. The priority of time for the latter is recognized in its (near) identification with the “mental object” although space is all the same required as symbol. Heidegger draws an inner thread between time and concepts by treating time as a “pure image”, a schema-image enjoying a privileged relation to concepts. In this endeavour, he gives Kant’s example of substance, explaining that the latter can only be understood in terms of time. Schematism is thus about concept formation, concept formation that is linked to a making sensible that is not determined by – or directly determining of — empirical representations (appearances). In fact it is only through time that concepts can be related to objects, because concepts are themselves “non homogenous to objects” being unlike objects in their being non-intuitable. Neither causality nor substance is (empirically) intuited as an object; they require time to mediate between them and objects (appearances). Similarly for Bhattacharaya the fact that

causality can neither be perceived nor inferred but is an implication of what is experienced has to be taken as (self) evident indexing of the function that is transcendental subjectivity.

In such a context apperception remains crucial – as relation – in relation to the imagination and the categories. While form and grasping are presupposed by qualifying (concept/judgment), imagination-schema as “active forms” — “knowledge by implication” — are implicit in perceptual knowledge where the form is taken as complete or completed (Bhattacharaya 2011: 76-7). Congruently universality itself requires differentiation; empirical universality is the common property instantiated in the individuals, while Kantian categories as “fundamental universals” do not find instantiation i.e. cannot be apprehended as objects of sense-perception. Relation is one such universal, for there is no such thing as a particular relation. This fundamental significance of “relation” as primary universal underlies the crucial category of recognition<sup>23</sup>. In such a context it is transcendental apperception and imagination that secure the ‘knowability’ of/as experience which lies in experiencing and not in “that which” is experienced. This means that what is known or experienced is a something that cannot ‘itself’ be (simultaneously) known. Rather it is known only as the correlate of the transcendental apperception and the imaginative faculty which forms the *nomos* by which the horizon is delimited, a judgement formed. For Bhattacharaya recognition is identifiable with transcendental apperception as the awareness of the “manifestation of the unmanifest” (Bhattacharaya 2011: 89). The imaginary component of knowledge is both active *and* a manifestation, the latter in its possibility has to lie in transcendental apperception and objecthood or knownness or what Kant calls the transcendental object.

(IV)

*Transcendental Apperception and Moral Ascertainment*

While Bhattacharaya moves on to link transcendental apperception with practical reason, Heidegger does so in more tentative fashion<sup>24</sup>. For the former since transcendental apperception “cannot be called an act of knowing an object, it has to be called knowing present in itself, as essentially willing” (Bhattacharaya 2011: 90). Only the act that (makes) manifest(s) i.e. recognition, enables specification (qualifiers: understanding/categories and form: time but also space). “Reason is primarily practical or imperative, and theoretic reason may be taken to presuppose it not as constitutive of objective

knownness, but as constitutive of the *fact of knowing*" (Bhattacharaya 2008: 709). It is this exigency that explains Kant's "formalism" of the moral. No object i.e. meant content as indefinite can confirm, deny or verify moral willing. The latter can no more than be described as a "spiritual attitude" since it cannot be applied in terms of consequences with both terms – application and consequence – implied as indefinite. Since they cannot be known what is to be known is whether an exception is being made in the act of willing i.e. the spiritual attitude itself. The conscious repudiation of inclination is the universalization of (good) willing that harmonizes with others in the Kingdom of Ends. This is to simultaneously correspond with the "purposive system of nature" (Bhattacharaya 2008: 711).

Without moving directly into a characterization of practical reason in an interpretation of Kant's first critique, Heidegger nevertheless explicates in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, a synthesis of a "higher" level between intuition and understanding. Ultimately the transcendental power of the imagination synthesizes the pure thinking I and the inner sense (time). This is so because it is peculiarly characterized as a faculty of intuition that doesn't represent an immediate object (at hand). It forms an image – though not "creative" in the divine sense — and partakes of both spontaneity (as active) as well as sensibility. Pure intuition (time) and (transcendental) imagination are joined by the fact that what is intuited in intuition does not have the unity of a concept but is "caught sight of in advance" and is not the mechanical application of a rule.

Bhattacharaya would say that "imaginative anticipation" is a requirement for the concept to apply to the percept (Bhattacharaya 2008: 697-98). Space and time are not "categories" in the logical (abstractly conceptual) sense a la the Marburg School and judgement is not the mere propositional joining of subject and object. Rather, Kant's linking of the understanding (concepts) to transcendental apperception, and the elucidation of a transcendental logic, show judgement to require the 'self' that gives the horizon/ground in advance. Thought — rather than being reduced to judging — is associated with the free forming and projecting faculty of the imagination. Finally the unity of the understanding is also derived from ideas and reason, which by its very nature is "architectonic" and therein given in advance.

In such an interpretative effort Heidegger takes a slight detour to practical reason and the idea of the person. The idea of the

person is the moral law and the respect [for it] with which it is indisassociable is characterized as a *feeling*, though a “pure” feeling unlike that of sensorially induced pleasures and pains (Heidegger 1997: 109-112). Analogies for even conventional pleasures contain a double dimension: pleasures for and in something but also pleasure in oneself (enjoyment) that finds pleasure in something (else). In a similar way the feeling of respect for the law is a feeling in which I show myself as a free and rational being; therein respect is for persons and not things. Not the basis for the judgement of actions already accomplished but rather that which is presumed in advance so that one can act freely and rationally. In respecting the law – that I give myself as the moral law – I show myself to be who I really am. Yet this detour does not sufficiently ‘join’ the critiques. And Heidegger’s accusation that Kant does not fundamentally follow through the promise of a “subjective deduction” could well be countered by Bhattacharayya’s explorations of the interrelations between practical reason and the reflective judgement.

A few years after *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger takes up the relation between the first two critiques more fully in his lecture course, *The Essence of Human Freedom*. Beginning with the problem of freedom as formulated in the Antinomies, Heidegger identifies it as related to as well as distinguished from nature and causality (in nature) by its features: it is spontaneous and transcendental. Characteristic of this way of framing the problematic is the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the intelligible/transcendental and the empirical, freedom (spontaneity as causality) and nature (natural causality) (Heidegger 2005: 148-156). Freedom is posed from within the “cosmological” and speaks of the possible unification of nature and freedom. While the Antinomies point to the false contradiction necessarily entailed in the ascription of characteristics to appearances that are taken for things-in-themselves, for Heidegger, Kant’s second Critique strikes out a distinctly different path. This way of tethering the two critiques is authorized by a philosophical momentum of its own that is all the same not the abandonment of textual fidelity. The citation from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* serves as motto: “speculative philosophy clears the way for practical philosophy”.

Pointing to the “actuality” of freedom in the second critique, Heidegger argues that for Kant freedom is not an empirical concept and therefore cannot be found in experience. Even though a “fact”, it is not to be encountered or found in nature as a datum but rather is that which gives itself its own law. The will therefore is not directed

towards an object but realizes itself in its knowledge in praxis. This is not to say that it is opposed to reason. Rather insofar as it is an action that acts according to a concept, it is autonomous and not heteronomous; as it would be if determined by sensible nature. The will's identity and conformity with pure reason – as representation and willing – lies in its regulative, not constitutive, nature. Neither referring to — nor reflecting — an object of knowledge (experience), it is a special form of knowing itself. Universality, in such knowing, thus conceived, is not caught in the false opposition of (empty) rule and circumstance but is rather that which forms itself and itself forms. This grounds the idea of law as the 'original' law giving itself. And hence the otherwise incomprehensible combination of the hypothetical if-then and categorical in the "ought" (Heidegger 2005: 181-202). The *Critique of Judgement* provides for Heidegger a crucial clue to this elucidation of practical freedom by naming the latter as "fact", but is otherwise not central to the unfolding of the general problematic, as is in the case of Bhattacharayya<sup>25</sup>.

For in Bhattacharayya's meditative reflections on Kant there is a dense rigorously calibrated clarity to the distinctions and folding across the critiques : "It may be stated in advance that the moral judgement takes the subject as a *symbol* (typic) of the predicate (ought, 'final purpose', good), the theoretic judgement understands the predicate (concept) as *approximation* to (or schematically figured by) the subject, and the reflective judgement regards the subject as the *expression* (self-specification) of the predicate (reason, 'purposiveness')" (Bhattacharayya 2008: 695). In theoretical judgement the known phenomena is an "always unsatisfying necessary and not self evident...a mixture of concept and percept", not "self- subsistent like the phenomena of the reflective judgment or the judgment of value". Phenomena is thus for reflective judgement a "living nature" a "spatialized mind that specificates itself". No knowledge, as it were, exists in the aesthetic judgement because here phenomena is "no longer apperceived", already made up, as it is, of an "external percept inter-penetrated with the concept". As an "accomplished presentation of expression", this is distinguishable from a theoretical judgment where the object is (imaginatively) anticipated by principles even while its specificity cannot be (Bhattacharayya 2008: 699). However we can never theoretically explain the fact that what is given by and in nature corresponds to our *a priori* principles. That even what we could never anticipate 'fits' in with our 'cognitive' apparatus while

unknowable, is felt and it is this “felt content” that we can “reflectively interpret as the purposiveness of nature”. “Felt content” links the reflective judgement to the judgement of the ought, which is an expression of a “felt immanence of the concept of the good in the perceivable object” (Bhattacharayya 2008: 700). However as in (theoretical) cognition practical reason is determinative and amounts to knowledge, though of a different kind. In Bhattacharayya’s subtle parsing, in practical reason:

“The predicate as in theoretic judgement is fully formulated and transcends the subject, determining only the apprehension or the internal perception of it. Its immanence in external nature is indeed felt: nature is the felt as the body of the holy law, though a mystic and not manifest body, not as informed by the law of freedom but as its distant symbolism (typic). In the theoretical judgement the transcendence of the concept is expressed by its indefinite approximation to the percept in the *schema*”<sup>26</sup> (Bhattacharayya 2008: 701).

(V)

### *Implications*

In the light of the above the great attraction of large historical theses such as those of Taylor’s become evident. Kant himself has become a feature characteristic of an object — historical development and ultimate uniqueness of the West – in a form of knowledge that he would be the first one to suspect. For (theoretical) judgement is always but approximate while ideas are to be “regulatively employed”. Current trends that speak of the history of ideas can no longer distinguish ideas and things, and thought as predicating a historical epoch can no longer meaningfully be differentiated in its structure from the judgment that has a color characterizing an object; with time reduced to the latter as a given whole formed of discrete parts. What Bergson might laugh off as trying to capture motion through an arbitrary conjoining of immobile parts. But while things are objects of perception/experience arguments that identify ideas with things may well be called à la pataphysicians the “imaginary solution [that which characterizes a historical epoch: content characterizing time (change)] to a non-existent problem [which geographical location – West,<sup>27</sup> East, Country A or Country B – has a history that is unique and *produces* modernity [a meaning-value: what has territoriality]?]”.



On the other hand, for Kant himself an idea is to be to be pictured as a “*focus imaginarius*”; it does not itself characterize since it doesn’t directly apply to intuitions. Rather it is to unify (order) the understanding just as the latter unifies in the object the manifold intuition. Kant writes, “Thus the idea of reason is an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this difference, that the application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself (as is the case in the application of categories to their sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now since every principle which prescribe *a priori* to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds, although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason must also have objective reality in respect of that object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it, but only in order to indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself” (Kant 1965: 547). Reason as an analogon of a schema may be compared to the distinction between symbol and schema made in the Third Critique. Unlike schemas which contain “direct exhibitions of the concept”, “symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuitions as well), in which judgement performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the firmer object is only the symbol. [Here] the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but contains merely the symbol for our reflection” (Kant 1987: 227).

Humanity as idea or ideal cannot, in the light of the above, be taken as an indivisible (semantic) part that the totalizing endeavour of history can engender; a prized trophy on the celebratory showcase of the West. For it is ultimately aporetic as to whether the distinguishing of parts in the whole is a feature of the whole or the parts in their indefinite individuality: this is why such an endeavour hurts itself. The fundamental flaw of a history of ideas would be to treat the latter as ultimately irreducible parts of the totalitarian will of History to which is ascribed value and direction. Both Bhattacharayya and Heidegger read and renew Kant with the imagination and will and faith to the text at hand. We now conclude this essay by reflecting on the nature of sensibility and reason, in the context of the importance of the imagination and will.

Heidegger's investigations into *Dasien* are undertaken through readings of Kant that reflect on a finitude that is seen to mark rationality by the fact that, for Kant, there are kinds of (purely) rational finite creatures such as angels. Rationality is marked by a 'primitive' sensibility, the latter symbolized by sense-perception. The finitude of rationality is detached from the issue of whether it is or isn't mediated by the bodily sense organs. In humans pure reason is sensible in itself and not "because" it is embodied or has a body<sup>28</sup>. I can experience my body as my body only because of the "sensibility" of reason (Heidegger 1997: 121)<sup>29</sup>. In his interpretation of the Greek elaboration of truth Heidegger speaks to its attempt at fusing two distinct notions: seeing and knowing-one's-way-about<sup>30</sup>. What appears as sensory is thus an essential constituent of what will 'result' as knowledge, since the image-schema of (sensory) certainty codes knowing or might we say ascertainment<sup>31</sup>. What we take to be (mere) sensing is already pervaded by understanding just as that we 'see' a book assumes we know what a book is. Knowing is revealed as the resonance of the continuous folding of concepts and intuitions. We might add that since reason stands in for the totality (unconditioned) not given in intuition (which is 'understood'), analogous to sensibility in its most basic sense, it is that by which objects (appearances) are given to us. By recognizing practical reason as reason-will in the self enables the constitution of – and freedom from – that which appears.

Speculatively one might conjoin this insight of the body with Bhattacharaya's elaborated "felt content" or "felt body"<sup>32</sup>. Freedom is not to be inferred or perceived and is in fact arguably the prototype of causality — as category of understanding/in nature — in its realizing itself and differentiating itself from sensory inclination. Enjoying freedom from that which 'it' has— in turn — construed. Here, the phenomenon of the world is ultimately supported – not merely voided – by the self in practical knowing and reflective judgement. Knowledge cannot know an object in itself but the fact that it takes place with reference to and in inextricable involvement with the world — as transcendental object — is its characteristic feature. It presupposes the self leaving us with a wonder that is expressible in aesthetic and teleological judgement. Apperception, good will and aesthetic judgement in turn resist the reduction of the human – like any meant content – to mere object or appearance. This apparent loss of knowledge is in fact the gain that is dignity: that the person is an end and not a means<sup>33</sup>. This does not mean that human beings cannot themselves be – and not be merely treated

as — “merely empirical” as and when they are sensorially determined. One of the most succinct and disturbing results in Kant’s politics is the formulation and defence of the category “rights to a person akin to the rights to a things”<sup>34</sup>. (Kant 1991: 61). Akin, analogy, here too must be cross-referenced with reason and symbol. Yet in this way Kant endows actual experience with a valence that later philosophy and human science could scarce live up to.

The general problem of experience and science has been linked to the differential reception of Kant’s three critiques by Georg Lukacs’s *Young Hegel*. Lukacs locates the controversies within German Idealism and their far reaching implications here; with Fichte’s I-positing and Schelling’s “objective dialectics” but a philosophical elaboration of practical and aesthetic reason respectively<sup>35</sup> (Lukacs 1976: 241-259). Gillian Rose’s more recent, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, continues to speculate on the inheritance of Kant in “neo-Kantianism” that, according to her, forms the conceptual infrastructure of contemporary sociology<sup>36</sup>. She argues that the neo-Kantian paradigm severs the logical (validity) from cognition, perception and consciousness<sup>37</sup> (Rose 2009: 7). Whereas for Kant the transcendental had an “empirical employment” and experience was in a sense not distinguished from the objects of experience<sup>38</sup> — with the phenomenal noumenal distinction doing crucial work — for the neo-Kantians the transcendental now referred to a set of objects that did not take form in — or even have meaningful reference to — actual experience (Rose 2009: 6-23).<sup>39</sup>

If experience and the objects of experience cannot be really distinguished, that which is experienced as experience needs to be taken seriously.<sup>40</sup> Rose interestingly remarks that while for Kant the transcendental was to be understood with reference to actual experience and the figurations of space and time, the Neo-Kantian interning of validity and value as transcendental (in a non Kantian sense) cut it off from the world of sense-experience. Ironically, from such a perspective, the human sciences have exchanged the problem of ‘actual experience’ for an oscillation between the verities (of validity and value) and facts (data); both of which turn out to be ultimately inexplicable. While Rose goes on to speculatively salvage Hegel, her work does not ask whether the specifically Kantian, as opposed to the Neo-Kantian, formulation of the problem might at all be fruitful for a future human science. In a sense Lukacs already answered this question, giving it primacy of place in a genealogy of Marx through Hegel. The importance of practical reason and aesthetic judgement for Fichte and Schelling and their critique in

the hands of Hegel who converted a primary social and historical problematic into a philosophic-epistemological one is the story of *Young Hegel*; of how labour and recognition epistemologically and historico-politically account for and re-imagine the world and change in a way impossible with the will (practical) and art (aesthetic). However in the light of Heidegger and Bhattacharayya another attempt – howsoever provisional – at a rehabilitation of the original Kantian formulation may well be made.

This would mean that the human would not become simultaneously an empty placeholder (axiom) and a dead object (datum). Rather than the seeker of phantom treasures – when and where did liberty, man, freedom etc. first come about — history might find meaning as a speculative art finding gravity in experience. The facts of brutal murder or systemic hunger would have to be taken as “facts” in the sense of the Aesthetic Judgment, the ‘imaginary points’ of pure reason, the “feeling” that is primitive fact for practical reason; points requiring interpretative elaboration rather than either deriving meaning from an abstract system absolutely outside the ambit of intuition (e.g.: the economy, the political) or becoming an object of consumption (the newspapers appetizing breakfast). Remaining complacent with the irresolvable contradiction between axiom (human are free and good) and that which is experienced (humans are unfree and commit acts that are inexplicable from the foregoing axioms) reproduces the contradiction of knowing an object that leaves (such) knowing itself unknown. By virtue of its very nature, no amount or kind of experience – in the Kantian sense – can disturb such complacency, awaken such slumber. In the interest of recognizing and acting through experience it would be necessary to move from *knowing* contradiction<sup>41</sup> to *feeling* it. This would allow for an action that as free can begin (a change) rather than change in the terms of which change is already known, eviscerating the distinction between action and process. This is congruent with the need for the imagination which is the presentation of that which is not present.

For this, a ‘fact’ is to be taken in a primitive sense; the “moral feeling” that is as central for will as is imagination for knowing. The senses that pervade might guide so that the interpretative effort is not merely consumed in its object — knowing disappearing without trace in the known – but transcends itself. To return to sensibility as guide; the flavour suffuses the whole in a way that poverty or violence does not suffuse the knowledge of which they are subject and object. Would it be possible to sketch, for instance, a history of hunger that

would be a history that is touched and touches the hungry rather than write a history of hunger that locks out its very subject? Rather than being consumed in itself it would be a provocation, an effort for its eradication in fact. Experience – as much as the act of writing — would have to be taken not as mere datum but as itself a form of knowledge to be acted upon in the imaginative-theoretical and free-willing sense. Imagination and time in their construal of the object that is fundamentally given would thereby be true – do justice — to the kernel of affective experience that affirms the object while resisting the tranquilizing effect of cumulative processes of objectification. Knowing thus powered is free to change – self-world – in a way that would not be possible if the known is always but a case of the already known and therein infallible in its infinitely dense inertness (Objective laws/Nature). Reason is practical in the recognition that what appears as known awaits a realization in which it is voided as particular.

Justice would therein propel the theoretical judgement as its telos and not remain confined to mechanically applying a ready-made rule. To take the imagination and freedom seriously is to call the bluff that the application of a rule is without content<sup>42</sup>. Claims towards the formal application of rules mask this entrenchment of particular content. This is indistinguishable from existing contingency and what could be growing inequities<sup>43</sup>. That it is the same criminal act – whether done by poor or rich, deprived or endowed – and so requires the same judgement evades the fact that no amount of scrutiny of the act can ascertain beyond doubt the nature of the action i.e. its cause whether in the nature of ‘humanity’ or the world in which the act occurred. That the individual act is expressive of the whole is what flavouring in taste might teach us; for knowing the criminal act cannot simply be a case of folding the act back into the criminal as though discrete ingredient. The formulae – all are equal — that shield and are impervious to growing content or discontent is something Marx will have picked up from Kant. Even if the latter poses the problem differently: How is the self concerned with such – as well as its own – unknowable ‘content’ is paradoxically the univocal site of the moral and conceptual.

Here, one may recognize the wisdom that Kant has in common with traditions that have their faith in the ‘self’, but all the while resist definitions and axioms, remaining content with guiding principles and the facts of finitude. Kant would be more on the side of the Mahabharata, which says, “Do not inflict upon others

what is intolerable to yourself”<sup>44</sup>, and less on the side of those perhaps most well received lines of the Bible, “As you wish that men would do to you, do so to them” when yanked out of their context. We can be certain of pain (and ignorance) in a way that is perhaps not possible with pleasure (and knowledge). And so there is great risk of self deception — violence and injustice — in deceiving ourselves that we are treating others like ourselves; a risk that is not present in the negative – but by no means paralyzing – dictum of the Mahabharata. Our abstract identification with others in terms of laws – all are equal and free – is necessarily indifferent to differentiations in content. Humility and faith, on the other hand, that yoke the moral and the epistemological – via freedom and imagination — may also well have been the lesson of Socrates who was the wisest man, because, perhaps, “I am wiser than this man, it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know” (Plato 1997: 21)<sup>45</sup>. And the rest, is unceasing imagination as much as courageous will, for, rather than paralysis, in the caesura, the twilight of certain death that is the *Phaedo*, Socrates tells us that he has begun the art of story-telling and verse, gets into the game of most stringent arguments with friends and the greatest friend death in wait, only to end with a fable, the imagination of what awaits, with the will powerfully reposed in itself as practiced virtue.

#### WORKS CITED

- Arendt, Hannah. 1989. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1978. *Life of the Mind*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.
- . 2006. *Between Past and Future*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Bergson, Henri. 2011. *Creative Evolution*. Trans. Arthur Mitchell. Digireads.com Publishing.
- Bhattacharayya, Krishnachandra. 2008. *Studies in Philosophy* (ed.) Gopinath Bhattacharayya. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
- . 2011. *Implications of Kant's Philosophy*. Trans. By J.N. Mohanty and T. Chatterjea. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Billimoria, Purushottama. 2008. *Sabdapramana*. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld.
- Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1997. “Rationality in Indian Philosophy” in

- Deutsch and Bontekoe (ed.) *Companion to World Philosophies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chandoke, Neera. 2014. "Manifesto for the Moderate Indian" in *Economic and Political Weekly*. Vol. - XLIX No. 21 Mumbai: Sameeksha Trust.
- Govind, Rahul. 2008. *Antinomies of Political-Economy*. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, New York.
- Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1988. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press
- . 1997. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- . 1967. *What is a Thing?*. Trans. W.B. Barton, Jr./Vera Deutsch. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
- . 2005. *The Essence of Human Freedom*. Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Continuum London.
- . 2002. *The Essence of Truth*. Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Bloomsbury
- . 1962. *Being and Time*. Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson New York: Harper San Francisco.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1965. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. N.K. Smith. St. Martin's: Bedford.
- . 2006. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. and Ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1987. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.
- . 1982. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*. Trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.
- . 1960. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Trans. T.M. Greene and H. H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row.
- . 1991. *Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. and (ed.) Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lukacs, Georg. 1976. *Young Hegel*. Trans. R. Livingstone. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- . 1971. *History and Class Consciousness*. Trans. R. Livingstone. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Mohanty, Jitendranath. 1992 *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought* Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Plato, 2007. *Plato: Complete Works* (ed.) John M. Cooper. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.

- Rose, Gillan. 2009. *Hegel Contra Sociology*. London: Verso.
- Rossi, Paolo. 2006. *Logic and the Art of Memory*. New York: Continuum.
- Taber, John. A. 2005. *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology*. New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Taylor, Charles. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- . 1989. *Sources of The Self*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1985. *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

#### NOTES

1. I thank Sanghamitra Misra for this as well as that.
2. So Charles Taylor can claim, “The great *invention* of the West was that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and explained in its own terms, leaving open the question whether this whole order had a deeper significance, and whether, if , if did, we should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it. This notion of the “immanent” involved denying – or at least isolating and problematizing – any form of interpenetration between the things of Nature, on the one hand, and “the supernatural” on the other, be this understood in terms of one transcendent God, or of Gods or spirits, or of magic forces *or whatever*”. (my emphasis). So defining religion in terms of the distinction immanent/transcendent is a move tailor made for “our civilization”. (Taylor 2007: 15-16) Truly Taylor made, the clear lack of intelligibility of the above “characteristic” is germane to the hubris of a text that simultaneously claims to know the totality [the globe] by (even) knowing the individual – exemplary and orienting? – (western) part. Taylor doesn’t shy away from writing a few lines on Taoism and Buddhism – traditions and life-worlds as complex as these – to shore up his argument without bothering to reference even the rich secondary literature, let along the primary. Of course even this sideways glance is more than mainstream philosophers of the Western world whether Habermas or Rawls do when speaking of the modern. It is such a cavalier attitude to complex traditions, in general, that allows in turn for as respected a political philosopher in India, Neera Chandoke, who has nowhere demonstrated any expertise in Indic traditions notwithstanding her important contributions otherwise, to claim, with little argument, that “The Shanti Parva anticipates not only Locke but Hobbes” (Chandoke 2014: 11). That the latter has not been known for such kinds of pronouncements might indicate that the current political harvest has begun.
3. Earlier Taylor had argued that in Kant, “We have the power as rational agency to make the laws by which we live...the place of fullness is where we manage finally to give this power full reign and so to live by it”. In Taylor’s earlier work on the sources of the self, he had argued that, “[Kant] He insists on seeing the moral law as one which emanates from our will. Our awe before it reflects the status of rational agency, its author, and whose being it expresses”. That is, “The law of morality, in other words, is not imposed from outside. It is dictated by the very nature of reason itself. To be a rational agent is to act for reasons. By their very nature, reasons are of a general application”. And later, in a way that will anticipate



the arguments of *The Secular Age*, “Kant explicitly insists that morality can’t be found in nature or anything outside the human rational will” (Taylor 1989). We will below deal with the problem of the unconditioned/totality (reason) and understanding (intuition/givenness). Taylor is of course not alone in singling out Kant for a characterizing of modernity; Jurgen Habermas’s crucial argument on the emergence of the public sphere also gives Kant an important role and this argument has enjoyed enormous importance in the study of both Europe as well as colonial and post-colonial societies. One could also name thinkers as different as Foucault (in Kant’s “critical attitude” to the contemporary) and Kosselleck (on time). Our essay through Kant, Bhattacharayya and Heidegger hopes to re-think much of the above especially in claims about modernity, its theologico-religious deductions and its relation to human rationality.

4. Man is ‘itself’ conceptualized though different predispositions; animal (living) and human (living and rational), and personality (rational and accountable) as clearly elucidated in (Kant 1960). Freedom as practical has to be located on the ‘noumenal’ register. “On the other hand, the moral law, even though it gives no such prospect, nevertheless provides a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world and from the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact that points to a pure world of the understanding indeed, even determines it positively and lets us cognize something of it, namely a law. This law is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible nature (in what concerns rational beings), with the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a *supersensible* nature though without infringing on the mechanism of the former. Now nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational being in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws and is thus, for reason, heteronomy”. This difficulty is elucidated in many ways: “In the moral principle we have presented a law of causality which puts the determining ground of the latter above all conditions of the sensible world; and as for the will and hence the subject of this will (the human being), we have not merely thought it, as it is determinable in as much as it belongs to an intelligible world, as belonging to a world of pure understanding though in this relation unknown to us ( as can happen according to the *Critique of Speculative Reason*) we have also determined it with respect to its causality by means of a law that cannot be counted as any natural law of the sensible world; and in this we have extended our cognition beyond the boundaries of the latter, a claim that the *Critique of Pure Reason* declared void in speculation. How then is the practical use of pure reason here to be united with its theoretical use with respect to determining the boundaries of its competence” (Kant 2006: 38, 44).
5. “Now, in order, in the case at hand, to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action, one must recall what was said in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or follows from it: that the natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting subject as appearance, and that, accordingly the determining grounds of every action of the subject in so far lies in what belongs to past time and is no longer within his control (in which must be contended his past deeds and the character as a phenomena thereby determinable for him in his own eyes). But the very same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable for him through

law that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his action – in general every determination of his existence changing conformable with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being – is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon”. And later, “But a difficulty still awaits freedom insofar as it is to be united with the mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the sensible world, a difficulty which, even after all, the foregoing has been agreed to, still threatens freedom with complete destruction...That is to say: if it is granted us that the intelligible subject can still be free with respect to a given action, although as subject also belonging to the sensible world, he is mechanically conditioned with respect to the same action, it nevertheless seems that, as soon as one admits that God as universal original being is the cause also of the existence of substance (a proposition that can never be given up without also giving up the concept of God as the being of all beings and with it his all-sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends), one must admit that a human beings’ actions have their determining ground in something altogether beyond his control namely in the causality of a supreme being which is distinct from him and upon which his own existence and the entire determination of his causality absolutely depend. In fact, if a human being’s actions insofar as they belong to his determinations in time were merely determinations of him as appearance but a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved”. (Kant 2006: 84-5).

6. We will be largely referring to (Heidegger 1967); (Heidegger1988); (Heidegger 1997); (Heidegger 2005); confining ourselves largely to the writings of the 1920s and early 30s; and (Bhattacharayya 2008) and (Bhattacharayya 2011).
7. In passing one may note that well before this dispute Lukacs had already written, that “Kant’s ethical analysis leads us back the unsolved methodological problem of the thing-in-itself”. Lukacs argued that Kant had in fact an insight into true praxis that is not followed through, which is directly linked to the elaboration of the critique of pure reason. “But the very moment when this situation, i.e. when the indissoluble links that bind the contemplative attitude of the subject to the purely formal character of the object of knowledge become conscious, it is inevitable that the attempt to find a solution to the problem of irrationality (the question of content, of the given, etc.) should be abandoned or that it should be sought in praxis”. And later he credits Kant with this very insight into praxis through his critique of the ontological proof, “..he is compelled to propose the dialectics of concepts in movement as the only alternative to his own theory of the structure of concepts..it has escaped Kant and the critics of his ontological argument that here..Kant has hit upon the structure of true praxis as a way of overcoming the antinomies of the concept of existence”. See (Lukacs 1971: 126-7). However a careful attention to the Kantian elaboration of imagination and schematism in conjunction with the autonomous will – as analyzed below — may credit the Kantian enterprise with greater intention than Lukacs would have it.
8. An “exclusive humanism” would be a necessary ground for any anthropocentric position. On the other hand, Bergson has spoken eloquently on the place of humanity in Kant. “True when he [Kant] speaks of human intellect, he means neither yours nor mine: the unity of nature comes indeed from the human understanding that unifies, but the unifying function that operates here is impersonal. It imparts itself to our individual consciousness, but it transcends

them. It is much less than a substantial God; it is however, a little more than the isolated work of a man or even than the collective work of humanity. It does not exactly lie within man; rather, man, lies within it, as in an atmosphere of intellectuality which his consciousness breathes. It is, if we will, a formal God, something that in Kant is not yet divine, but which tends to become so". (Bergson 2011: 178).

9. May well be factually in error since I have been only able to consult – non-exhaustively—English translations of Heidegger’s work.
10. On reason and understanding Kant writes, understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Accordingly, “reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give the manifold knowledge of the latter an *a priori* unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason” (Kant 1965: 303). And later, “For pure reason leaves everything to the understanding – the understanding [alone] applying immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavors to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned..reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such a manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole”. (Kant 1965: 318). Such a description would also have to include Kant’s discussion of the “natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason” which is “inseparable from human reason”. (Kant 1965: 300) and the Antinomies. In this context, we can understand the central place of the “moral” that is directly broached in the above section.
11. Bhattacharyya describing his own interpretation of Vedanta, writes, “exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophical construction and this need not involve any intellectual dishonesty”. And later, “The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too”. (Bhattacharaya 2008: 4-5). Heidegger writes, “Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able to through this place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech”. (Heidegger 1997: 141)
12. It is this fundamental point that recent studies, including those of Taylor’s, that distinguish between (Kantian) “motivations” and (utilitarian) “consequences”/”outcomes”, seem to ignore. Such arguments on motivations — whether as qualified through “moral instinct” or as “purely formal” (Taylor 1985: 322) — scarce does justice to either the arguments regarding the concept-intuition nexus, the inevitability of ‘illusion’ and/or the broader Kantian problematic of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the analogies, the paralogisms or the antinomies. On this issue one could compare Bhattacharaya’s insight with (Heidegger 1962: 50). Lukacs would call this “irrational” or the “content” [matter] that allows for

the infinite scope of freedom and knowing. See his critique of Engels in this regard. In this relation we might recall that Kant defines matter as “that in appearance which corresponds to sensations” (Kant 1965: 64). But more importantly in defense on Lukacs’s line of argument we can cite from the Paralogisms, “For matter, the communion of which with the soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. There may well be something outside us to which this appearance, which we call matter, corresponds; in its character of appearance it is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us, although this thought, through the above mentioned outer sense, represents it as existing outside us. Matter, therefore does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct and heterogeneous from the object of the inner sense (the soul), but only the distinctive nature of those appearances of objects – in themselves unknown to us – the representations of which we call outer as compared with those which we count as belonging to inner sense, although like all outer thoughts these outer representations belong only to the thinking subject” (Kant 1965: 355).

13. The manner of the formulation – and perhaps more – might well be reminiscent of Hegel’s opening gambit in the chapter on Self-Consciousness “In the previous modes of certainty what is true of consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it”. (Hegel 1977: 104).
14. We might say, in a manner we hope will be justified as the essay progresses, that such an endeavor – the ‘nexus’ tying concept, action and language — is congruent with many lines of inquiry within the Indic philosophical corpus. Different philosophical traditions might view “resulting action” as a criteria for truth. The early Mimamsa debate on interpretation was directly linked to action and purpose, and the equally sophisticated and intricate debate between Kumarila Bhatta and the Buddhists lay precisely on the means of knowledge with regard to Dharma, involving the issue of whether perception was conceptualized. For detailed and intricate discussion on these related issues see (Billimoria 2008) and (Taber 2005; 1-44). The introduction, by Tara Chatterjee, in (Bhattacharayya 2011), attempts to sketch out the Indic philosophical background to Bhattacharayya’s essay; an effort we are by no means competent to evaluate.
15. The following sections could be seen as interpretations of Kant’s well known statement regarding concepts without intuitions being empty and intuitions without concepts being blind.
16. See (Heidegger 1988: 77-99), on the shift from the problematic of creation (Aquinas) to “nominalism”.
17. See also (Bhattacharayya 2011: 97), Bhattacharayya calls this the double nature of space as “relation present in object and also [a] self-located relation” or “reflexive relations of space”.
18. However, Bhattacharayya does argue that grasping can be known only through relation and judging and so ordered relation will have had a “shadow of a relation” like Heidegger’s argument that the concept finds expression in the particular.
19. In Lukacs’s reading this predicate that is not a real predicate would indicate the rational and be the register that allows praxis.
20. “Understanding receives completed form of time or mental form as matter and then appears as schema or rule present in it”. (Bhattacharayya 2011: 93). The “superiority” of form is maintained in the light of the imagination too for Bhattacharayya argues that, “In knowledge of object imagining (thinking) of

qualifiers presupposes imagining (thinking) of form, the imagination (thinking) of form does not presuppose that of qualifiers, but presupposes thought of qualifierhood or objecthood". (Bhattacharayya 2011: 72). Heidegger also links what he calls "pure thinking" to the imagination and the "self"; "This original "thinking" is pure imagining. The imaginative character of pure thinking becomes even clearer if we attempt, based on the essential determination of the understanding, which has now been achieved, to come nearer to pure self-consciousness, to its essence in order to grasp it as reason" (Heidegger 1997: 106). Hannah Arendt also given analytic importance to the distinction between Thinking and Knowing in Kant that she reads as the distinction between Truth and Meaning. See (Arendt 1978: 53-65).

21. The role of the imagination in Kant would not be completely surprising if for instance one studied Kant in the context of the arts of memory and the "imaginative logic of Bruno". On the latter Paolo Rosssi writes that, "In Bruno's art it [*subiectum*] is given a 'convenient meaning which is technical or artificial'. It is not the 'subject' of a formal predicate which, in logic, is the counterpart of the predicate, neither is it the 'subject' of substantial, accidental or artificial forms as in Aristotelian physics. Bruno's *subiectum* is the subject of imaginative operator, which can be attached or detached, which shifts and changes according to the wishes of the cognitive or imaginative operator". (Rossi 2006: 87). This line and direction is scarce attended to in the standard scholarship.
22. "Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has unity in apperception" (Kant 1965: 365). It must also be noted that Heidegger makes it clear that he is against the prevalent interpretation of Kant that saw him moving from a "psychological" first edition to the "logical" second edition; rather both have questions of the transcendental and being as their pole star. (Heidegger 1997: 119-20)
23. One might refer to Heidegger's rendering of the transcendental and transcendence; "Transcendental reflection is not directed upon objects themselves nor upon thought as the mere representation of the subject-predicate relationship but upon the passing over and the relation to the object *as this relation*" (Heidegger 1967: 176)
24. See (Heidegger 2005: 172-74), where there is a linking of apperception with the ought.. "Pure apperception is an action which is non-receptive i.e. it involves a different relation between cause and effect. It is a determination from itself rather from something else...In these actions of the 'I think' which we ourselves enact (in this kind of effecting), we provide rules for the 'acting forces'. This provision of rules is a kind of determining. What we stipulate for our action has in each case an 'ought' character". (Heidegger 2005: 173). See (Heidegger 2002: 124-5) where different kinds of knowing are emphasized. "If one wants to translate the Greek ... by the German 'Wissen' [knowledge], then one must also take this German word in its corresponding primordial meaning and hold fast to this. As a matter of fact our language recognizes a meaning of 'know' which corresponds to the original meaning .. we say that someone knows how to behave, knows how to succeed, "knows how to make himself liked". The affinity with Bhattacharayya is evident. This problematic may be illuminated by the statement in the film, *Dewaar* where, in reference to a near impossible task, the hero is asked whether he thinks he would be able to do it, and the hero replies by saying that he doesn't think he can do it he *knows* that he *can* do it.

25. Arendt has in the context of the Aesthetic Judgment drawn to our attention the two operations present in judgment: imagination and reflection. Giving a central place to imagination, she argues, that the “operation of imagination prepares the object for the ‘operation of reflection’”. And this second operation – the operation of reflection is this actual activity of judging something. This two-fold operation establishes the most important condition for all judgments, the condition of impartiality, of “disinterested delight”. We cannot go into the larger argument that drives this text i.e. Kant’s ‘politics’ that is studied through a reflection on spectatorship, action, the “common sense” and the imagination. (Arendt 1989: 68)
26. This is not the first time that “feeling” has been used to exhibit an inner experience that has critical ‘epistemological’ status and as primordial cuts though theoretical judgement via the imagination. For instance, elsewhere Bhattacharayya has written that the form of space can only be imagined i.e. it can be imagined as detachable from objects which is “to be aware of its being their pervasive location and to organically feel oneself pervading them”. Pure perceiving or form thus cannot be disassociated from feeling oneself pervading. While space is thereby picturable time can only be “felt duration or self-feeling”. It is important to remember that “feeling” is used in Kant too in reference to respect and therefore has to in this instance be differentiated from the sensorially induced (pathology).
27. See endnote 2, with Taylor arguing for the Western “invention” of “immanence”. This kind of argument is the apogee of a series of transferences. Initially confined to technology, technology was to stand for superior culture; such an argument then migrated taking as its subject less tangible ‘objects’ such as “markets” and institutions [Douglas North etc]; and now it has vitiated the realm of ideas. This alchemy that converts ideas to culture itself has a market in places that are happy to either 1) vehemently differentiate themselves from what they perceived as Western culture to a kind of nativism that can nether in reality deny the presence of the ‘West’ whether as norm (which sets the terms for differentiations) or history (colonization and the transformation of institutions) (2) Claim superiority by having reached there first: whatever is claimed elsewhere is already present. What is subsequently lost is a rigorous elaboration or understanding of the nature of the claim and its content itself.
28. Arendt in her reading of Kant distinguishes the “objective senses” [seeing, hearing and touching] from the sensed sensations [taste and smell]. She argues that Kant’s identifies aesthetic judgment with taste to indicate the “internalization” that judgment stands for which is therein not an object [of sense perception such as is the case with seeing, hearing and touching]. She links this form of representation with the imagination where too there is a representation of an “absent” object. See (Arendt 1989)
29. We might remind ourselves that for Kant sensibility is that through which objects are given to us The inter-linking and ‘overlap’ between sensibility and knowledge is elaborated in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, where he argues, “It is for this reason that the sense of seeing provides the guideline for the meaning of knowledge i.e. knowledge does not correspond to smelling and hearing but seeing”. [Although earlier Heidegger had etymologically linked hearing and seeing, by linking “brightness”, reverberation and echo]. And later, “just as sensory seeing is not the yoke, the light, the light source itself, just as little in the field of non-sensory seeing is the faculty of knowledge, thus the understanding of being, or on the other side the manifestness of being, the highest and genuine source of the possibility of

- knowledge". (Heidegger 2002: 83, 45). The sun to the visible is the like the good to ideas that not only enables the latter but are also responsible for their existence (growth, nourishment and the like).
30. The importance of "seeing" and light and the unity of the two as a form of truth-certainty has been described in a different context, elsewhere by Bhattacharaya. "A light sphere in circumambient darkness: it is the indeterminate infinite Brahman. At the circumference, however, it reaches its limit (not resistance) and retires into itself, the limiting darkness falling outside of it; the sphere, as viewed from circumference onwards is the determinate Infinite or the closed in Absolute, Isvara. The limit, however, determines its quality, not as darkness but as darkness lighted up, which again defines the darkness". (Bhattacharaya 2008: 49). The consistent cross referencing with the Western philosophical tradition in a discussion of Vedantic metaphysics cannot be followed here.
  31. Hannah Arendt elsewhere argues for the diagnostic importance of the loss of sense-certainty (and "nature") with the intervention of modern science. See "Concept of History" in (Arendt 2006)
  32. Two other essays by Bhattacharaya that would rigorously illuminate this problematic would be, "The Concept of Rasa" and "The Concept of Value" in (Bhattacharaya 2008)
  33. This fundamental distinction is as much between kinds of reasoning as it is about the subject/object i.e. Mechanical and Teleological.
  34. I have elaborated the possible implications of this and the silence with which it has been received by recent scholarship, such as that of Habermas's public-sphere argument, in my doctoral work at Columbia University (2008).
  35. This line of argument is found even in (Lukacs 1971)
  36. In (Rose 2009) Lukacs himself is ultimately domiciled within the neo-Kantian framework.
  37. According to Rose, for neo-Kantians, logic and validity have to refer to propositions and not concepts (as with Kant). Such an analysis of Kant and the neo-Kantian position could well be used to critique attempts to differentiate Indian and Western understandings of philosophy. For instance the claim that in Indic traditions where "cognition that is expressed is not sense, but an event (property, act, or substantial modification, depending upon which system one happens to be talking about) belonging to someone's self. Consequently, Indian logic is a logic of cognitions – in spite of its preoccupation with sentences and sentential contexts"; See (Mohanty 1992: 19-20). On the other hand, for a less rigid characterization of the Indic and Western corpus that reads rationality across them i.e. allowing for the rigorous reading together of as diverse figures as Kumarila Bhatta and Gadamer, Dummet and the Nyaya philosophers see (Chakrabarti 1997). Our attempt at a reading of Kant perhaps allows for a rehabilitation of such import philosophically as well as 'historically' (or the consequences of characterizing traditions of thought).
  38. "We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have prospective validity in a synthetic *a priori* judgement" (Kant 1965: 194)
  39. The moral (named value) and logic (named validity) are analyzed separately by distinct traditions that ultimately find their way into Durkheim (validity/social) and Weber (value/culture)
  40. "Accordingly, since experience, as empirical synthesis, is, in so far as such

experience is possible, the only species of knowledge which is capable of imparting reality to any non empirical synthesis, this latter [type of synthesis], as knowledge *a priori*, can possess truth, that is agreement with the object, only in so far as it contains nothing save what is necessary to synthetic unity of experience in general” (Kant 1965: 194). And elsewhere, “If by merely intelligible objects we mean those things which are thought through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective employment of all our concepts of understanding is merely the mode of our sensible intuition, but which objects are given to us; if we abstract from these objects, the concepts have no relation to any object...We cannot, therefore positively extend the sphere of objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and assume besides appearances objects of pure thought, that is, noumena, since such objects have no assignable meaning”, (Kant 1965: 292-3).

41. Knowing contradiction would be knowing that contradiction appears only by the ascription of meaning to an object-content treating the latter as though it were a thing in itself. The Antinomies in the first critique thus play a different role in the third critique.
42. As Kant says, “Between theory and practice, no matter how complete the theory may be, a middle term that provides a connection and transition is necessary. For to the concept of the understanding that contains the rule must be added an act of judgment by means of which the practitioner decides whether or not something is an instance of the rule” (Kant 1982 : 61).
43. Kant recognized that this may well be a historical accumulation and so may be said to have given a clue to Hegel and Marx. He argues, “For we are here concerned with the canon of reason (in practical matters), where the worth of practice rests entirely on its appropriateness to its underlying theory. All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the application of law are made conditions for the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self-sufficient theory”. (Kant 1982: 62) . .
44. The next line one could argue is even more ‘Kantian’; “This in short is dharma and it is other than what one naturally desires”. (Cited in Chakrabarti 1997)
45. In this regard, Arendt’s has been one of the most persistent and subtle efforts to salvage the original ground of the moral and the logical through a reading of Plato.