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THE NATURE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

C.A. Tomy

Thought and consciousness are undoubtedly two of the most significant features of human mental life. The moment we juxtapose them, there arises a few questions naturally. Is there any relation between the two? If so, how are they related? Is it merely an accidental matter of fact that humans possess both thought and consciousness? Or is there any deeper logical or conceptual relation between the two such that at least one of them cannot occur or be conceived without the other? Any theoretical enterprise that purports to enquire into the nature and functioning of the human mind cannot expect to make any progress without answering these questions. From a logical point of view, there are only four possible ways we could conceive how thought and consciousness are related to each other. The first is to think that there is no conceptual relation whatsoever between thought and consciousness. Accordingly, either of thought and consciousness can be conceived apart from the other, which implies that they are distinct. On this view, if we were to discern some sort of relation holding between them, the relation in question is not necessary but merely accidental. The second way of conceiving the relation goes in the opposite direction: it says that neither thought nor consciousness can be conceived apart from each other. It means that there is a necessary or conceptual relation between the two, which could either be a relation of identity or at least a necessary and invariable correlation between them. The third way of envisaging the relation considers thought as a necessary condition for consciousness to occur; that is to say, though thought could occur without consciousness, it is not possible for consciousness to occur without thought. The fourth position is the converse of the third: it views consciousness as a necessary condition for thought but not *vice versa*. It allows the possibility of consciousness without thought while not conceding the possibility of thoughts without consciousness. The third and fourth approaches could also be construed as

reductionist in their orientations. It is possible to hold that the third position views consciousness in terms of thought while the fourth understands thought as some form of consciousness. The discussion of these positions assumes that our domain of discourse is restricted to thought and consciousness and that we want to understand how they relate to each other without taking into consideration other possible factors involved.

Which among the above four possible ways of conceiving the relation between thought and consciousness really obtains between them? The goal of this paper is to find out an answer to this question by means of an analysis of the concepts of thought and consciousness. However, the endeavour is not easy as there is no straightforward way to choose one of the four positions as the correct answer. What makes the choice difficult is the fact that there are myriad uses of the terms, 'consciousness' and 'thought', requiring us to clarify their meanings and then specify the nature of the relation that obtains between the two, given each of the diverse meanings of either of the terms. Hence, for answering the question, our first task would be to identity the ways in which the terms 'thought' and 'consciousness' are used in contemporary philosophical literature. This I shall set out to do in the first section of the paper, restricting my discussion to three senses each in which 'thought' and 'consciousness' are predominantly employed. By 'thought' we could mean mere propositional content, a contentful dispositional mental state or an act of the mind. Similarly, the term 'consciousness' could stand for phenomenal consciousness, intentional consciousness or awareness[1]. The next step in answering the question is to pair each of the three senses of the term 'thought' with each of the three senses of the term 'consciousness' so as to identify which among the four possible ways of conceiving the relation between them is realized in each pair. This task is accomplished in the second section, showing which among the four logically possible relations is exemplified between thought and consciousness in each of the pairs already identified. The exercise demonstrates that from among the three senses of 'consciousness' and the three senses of the term 'thought', consciousness as awareness and thought as act of the mind are primary. In the third section, I discuss the nature and function of awareness by showing that there is an inseparable relation between thought-act and awareness, and other senses of 'thought' and 'consciousness' are some way dependent upon their primary meanings.

I

The Meanings of 'Thought' and 'Consciousness'

We employ the term 'thought' primarily in three inter-connected ways. First of all, we employ 'thought' to mean propositional content conceived as subsisting on its own. Alternatively, one could view it as representational content abstracted from their normal loci such as mental states or natural language sentences. Thoughts, in this sense, are bearers of truth-values. Frege, for example, characterizes thought in this way:

> I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true. So I can say: the thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought. (Frege, 1956: 292)

In a similar vein, Wittgenstein says: "A thought is a proposition with a sense" (2002: No. 4). A logical or mathematical proposition, which is purely formal, is not a thought for Wittgenstein because it lacks sense. Neither Frege nor Wittgenstein understands thought as a mental state or episode. Just as mental states and episodes come to have thought content, various sentences of natural languages too express thoughts. Mental states and ordinary language sentences are merely carriers of thought along with other possible representational systems. If one maintains along with Frege 'that mankind possesses a common treasure of thoughts which is transmitted from generation to generation' (1996: 188) then by 'thought' one means merely propositional content.

Secondly, we employ the term to signify dispositional mental states having propositional content. Thought understood in this way is an unconscious mental state, which could be conceived as a potentiality. Depending upon what the potentiality of the state is for, thought as a disposition could be conceived of in either of the two ways. One, it could be conceived of as a potentiality for thought-acts with specific content, the result of whose exercise we report using language. The unconscious belief that *p* is a disposition to utter that *p* if the potentiality is exercised. That is, the dispositional thought that *p* could actualize the occurrent thought that p, which may lead to the utterance that *p*. Two, it could be conceived of as a potentiality for the production of complex behaviour of an organism in the

presence of the right stimuli. Dispositional states of this kind are invoked particularly for the explanation of non-verbal behaviour, which otherwise could not be explained.

Thirdly, it is used to designate acts of the mind, specifically those acts having propositional content[2] They are often referred to as 'thought-acts'. A thought-act is an occurrent representational mental state whose content is normally expressed by a *that clause*. The way it is used here, 'thought-act' is a generic term that covers occurrent mental states of propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. It is a feature of the thought-act that there is always an awareness of its occurrence.

Coming to consciousness, we know that it is a multi-faceted phenomenon; hence it is only natural that the term 'consciousness' is employed in many ways in ordinary language to reflect one or the other of its aspects. Consider, for example, the following description of John, a hypothetical football player, in the middle of action:

John is *trying to kick* the ball to the goal post. He becomes *aware* of the presence of the defenders of the opposite team and of the position of the goalkeeper. He *thinks* that one of the defenders could easily divert the ball if he were to directly kick it to the goal post. He *notices* that one of his fellow forwards in the right wing is free. He *believes* that the player is in an advantageous position to score a goal, if the ball is passed onto him. So John *decides* to loft the ball over the opposition defenders to the teammate. But suddenly by a powerful tackle by one of them, John falls down and his right leg gets injured. He *feels severe pain* and is *angry* with the defender. He controls his anger because he *knows* that display of any aggressive behaviour towards the player would fetch him a red card.

John, in the above description, is a conscious person and the linguistic expressions such as 'trying to kick', 'aware', 'thinks', 'notices', 'believes', 'decides', 'feels severe pain', 'angry', etc. are used here to describe a few aspects of his conscious mental life. It is held that such diverse features fall under three general categories of consciousness, namely phenomenal consciousness, intentional consciousness, and awareness.[3] To specify the kind of relation that is obtained between thought and consciousness, it is necessary to clarify the concept of each of these three types of consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness is defined in terms of experiential properties: a mental state is phenomenally conscious if and only if it is experienced in a certain way. Mental states of this kind are generally described by saying that there is "something it is like" (Nagel, 1974) to be in those states. For instance, sensory states are phenomenally

conscious because they possess some intrinsic qualities that are felt in their own characteristic ways. The ways things appear, sound, taste, etc. to someone who sees, hears, or tastes them, are said to be intrinsic qualities of the concerned sensory states. For example, when a person looks at the blue sky, the sky appears blue to the person. Independent of the experience of the subject who views the sky, the sky cannot be considered as appearing blue. The quality of "being-appeared-blue-to" (Shoemaker: 1991) is a felt quality of the perceptual state in question. Similarly a pain that one feels has some experiential features, which are essential for its being a pain. Sensory states having such qualitative characteristics are considered to be phenomenally conscious. A phenomenally conscious state is believed to be non-cognitive, non-representational and functionally indefinable.

By intentional consciousness we mean those features of our conscious experience by virtue of which it is about, directed towards or represents an object or a state of affairs in the world. When Mary blieves that Mount Everst is the highest Himalayan peak, her belief is about Mount Everest. Philosophers like Brentano are of the view that intentionality is the defining feature of our mentality; hence there cannot be any mental states that are not intentional (Brentano, 1973). It could be debated whether intentionality is an essential feature of our conscious mental life; but it cannot be denied that at least some of our conscious mental states are intentional.

By awareness, we mean that feature of our mental states on account of which we come to know of their occurrences. An awareness state has two important properties, namely that it is reflexive and transitive; it is reflexive because it reveals itself, and transitive in the sense that it is always of something. Reflexivity and transitivity could be viewed as two aspects of the intentionality of an awareness state, that is an awareness state is directed towards itself and is also about things other than itself, which include objects, qualities, states of affairs in the world as well as other mental states, phenomenal or intentional. It is the reflexivity of awareness states that sets them apart from intentional mental states properly so-called.

II

The Ways Thought and Consciousness are Related

We have seen that there are four possible ways of conceiving the relation between thought and consciousness. It is possible to find

out which of the four actually holds between them, depending upon the answers we get for the following two questions:

(1) Is it possible for thought to occur without consciousness?
(2) Is it possible for consciousness to occur without thought?

Let us assume that both the questions have definite answers, either affirmative or negative. If the answers to (1) and (2) are both affirmative, then they imply that thought and consciousness are distinct. If both have negative answers, then neither consciousness nor thought can occur without the other, which would mean that there is an invariable and necessary relation between the two or they are numerically identical. If (1) has a positive answer and (2) has a negative answer, then it is possible for thought to occur without consciousness but the latter cannot occur without the former. This would mean that thought is necessary for consciousness or that consciousness is dependent upon thought. Finally, a negative answer to (1) and an affirmative answer to (2) would mean that thought cannot occur without consciousness, but consciousness can occur without thought. This would imply that consciousness is a necessary pre-condition for thought.

One can arrive at any of the above positions only if there are definite answers to questions (1) and (2). But we do not have such answers, because the questions are vague given that the terms 'thought' and 'consciousness' are used in diverse ways. Our answers to them depend upon the senses in which we employ the two terms in (1) and (2). If we consider pairing each of the three senses of 'thought' with each of the three senses of 'consciousness', then there are nine possible ways in which questions (1) and (2) could be raised and answered. Accordingly, there are nine possible ways of specifying the nature of the relation between thought and consciousness. We shall now proceed to consider each of the nine ways of formulating the questions and answering them.

A. Thought as Propositional Content and Phenomenal Consciousness

If by 'thought' we mean merely propositional content without reference to the individual mind in which it is supposed to be located either as a thought-act or as a disposition, and by 'consciousness' we signify phenomenal consciousness, then we can rephrase questions (1) and (2) as

(A1) Could there be propositional content without phenomenal consciousness?

(A2) Could there be phenomenal consciousness without any propositional content?

Once we keep in mind that phenomenal consciousness is a mental phenomenon and the propositional thought content is conceived without reference to its locus in mind, answers to (A1) and (A2) become obvious: thought as a propositional content can be conceived—it is indeed conceived—without any phenomenal features. Taken by itself the propositional content, say, that the Earth is round has no qualitative feels or phenomenal features associated with it. In answer to (A2), it is clear that in conceiving phenomenal consciousness we do not think any propositional content as being part of it. So, it is possible that qualitative or phenomenal features of a mental state can occur without any propositional content. We have affirmative answers to both the questions. They show that thought as propositional content and thought as phenomenal content are distinct.

B. Thought as Propositional Content and Intentional Consciousness

To understand how intentional consciousness stands in relation to thought as propositional content, we must ask the questions:

(B1) Could there be intentional consciousness without propositional content?
(B2) Could there be propositional content without intentional consciousness?

Answers to these questions appear to be straightforward. With regard to the first question, it could be said that an intentional conscious state need not always be directed to a state of affairs, representable by a proposition because it is possible that the state in question is about an object or some particular feature of the world. This shows the possibility of having intentional consciousness without propositional content. In answer to (B2), we could easily grant the possibility of propositional content without intentional consciousness for two reasons. First, many of our natural language sentences express thoughts as propositional contents; yet, we do not consider them to be intentionally conscious. Second, we tend to believe that there are unconscious dispositional mental states with propositional content. Though we grant intentionality to such unconscious mental states, it is at least odd, if not a blatant contradiction, to say that unconscious dispositional mental states are intentionally conscious. Thus, we have affirmative answers to both the questions. They show

that thought as propositional content and thought as intentional consciousness are clearly distinct. And this is the expected answer because thoughts are conceived of here as abstracted from natural language sentences that express them or as the mental states that token them, and by consciousness we understand a property that belongs solely to mental states and processes, and not to abstract entities.

Despite the answers given above to (B1) and (B2), their formulation may strike us as problematic. It could be argued that since by 'thought' we mean abstract propositional content and by consciousness we mean essentially a mental phenomenon and not a characteristic of anything non-mental whether abstract or concrete, it is not right to ask whether abstract thought is intentionally conscious. Our talk of thought as propositional content makes no reference to tokening of such thoughts in mental states or natural language sentences. Such a talk is in abstract and neutral vocabulary. So we must reformulate questions (1) and (2) in equally abstract and neutral terms. This could be done using the term 'intentionality' instead of the expression 'intentional consciousness'. The expressions 'intentional consciousness' and 'intentionality' are not synonyms. Anything that exhibits the feature of aboutness or represents an object or a state of affairs is said to be intentional in general. The class of things that are intentional in this way includes our mental states, linguistic expressions, pictorial representations, etc. Since we consider consciousness as essentially a mental phenomenon, it would be quite strange to characterize linguistic expressions or pictorial representations as intentionally conscious, though they exhibit intentionality. We consider linguistic expressions certainly as intentional but not as exhibiting consciousness. And among the various mental states that are intentional, it is not only some of our occurrent mental states but even some of the dispositional mental states too are intentional. A dispositional mental state, we know, is an unconscious mental state; so if we consider 'intentional consciousness' as a synonym for intentionality, then we end up with the contradiction that an unconscious dispositional state, which is intentional, is conscious. The oddity of this sort arises primarily because we employ the adjective 'conscious' to characterize occurrent mental states, those mental states we are aware of as occurring.

Using 'intentionality' as a neutral term to signify a feature restricted to common mental states, natural language sentences and pictorial representations, and a host of other symbol systems in place of the expression, 'intentional consciousness', we may rephrase (1) and (2) as

(B3) Could there be propositional content without intentionality?
(B4) Could there be intentionality without propositional content?

The answers to (B3) and (B4) can specify how thought as abstract propositional content is conceptually related to the feature of intentionality. In response to (B3), it is possible to maintain that thought as propositional content is always directed to some state of affairs and, therefore, possesses intentionality. Indeed, propositional content is necessarily intentional because we cannot conceive a proposition without it being about some state of affairs or other. Thus, our answer to (B3) is pretty much straight forward. But this sort of an answer is unavailable in the case of (B4). Most of our mental states, if not all, are intentional. But intentionality, as we have already noted, is not restricted to mental states alone as natural language sentences and pictures have the capacity to represent. Since intentionality can be attributed to mental states, and linguistic expressions, we can pose the question with reference to both language and the mind. So we may further refine and disambiguate (B4) into (B4a) and (B4b):

(B4a): Could mental states be intentional without having propositional content?
(B4b): Could linguistic expressions in general exhibit intentionality without conveying propositional content?

In response to (B4a), it could be held that not only mental states with propositional content but also ideas or concepts, which do not have propositional structure, refer and are, therefore, representational. Thus, ideas or concepts are intentional though they do not possess propositional content. This means that we have an affirmative answer to (B4a): it is possible that some of our mental states are intentional though they lack propositional structure and content. (B4b) could also be answered on similar lines: in addition to natural language sentences that express propositional content, words and phrases are intentional in spite of not carrying propositional content because they are about objects or some features of the world. On the basis of above answers to (B4a) and (B4b), one could affirmatively answer (B4) and grant the possibility that there is intentionality without propositional content. Thus, we have a negative answer to (B3) and affirmative answer to (B4) suggesting that intentionality is a necessary feature of thought as propositions but it is not restricted to propositions. So 'thought as propositional content' is not co-extensive with 'being intentional in general'; rather the former picks up only a subclass of the intentional. Keeping this consideration in mind, one could assume that intentionality of concepts or that

of non-sentential linguistic expressions such as words and phrases is intentional in the primary sense, whereas the intentionality of thoughts or natural language sentences are explained in terms of intentionality of ideas and concepts or that of non-sentential linguistic expressions. Thus, intentionality of thoughts and natural language sentences are dependent upon intentionality of concepts and non-sentential linguistic expressions, respectively.

The affirmative answers given to (B4a) and (B4b), notwithstanding it is equally possible to come up with negative answers to them, by rejecting the possibility of intentionality without propositional content. One may argue that intentionality of thoughts or natural language sentences are primary and the intentionality of concepts or words is derived through a process of abstraction from the intentionality of mental states or sentences having propositional contents. This would mean that intentionality of non-sentential linguistic expressions as well as that of ideas or concepts is derived from intentionality of propositional content, which, according to this view, is primary.[4] Given this position, intentionality of propositional content is presupposed even when we speak of the intentionality of concepts or non-sentential linguistic expressions. Hence we have a negative answer to (B4), leading us to the conclusion that there is a necessary relation between thought and concepts or between natural language sentences and non-sentential linguistic expressions.

The answer to (B3) is negative: it is not possible to conceive propositions without intentionality. But one's answer to (B4) depends on what one considers as the basic semantic unit. If concepts and natural language sentences are taken as fundamental, then the answer to (B4) is affirmative because we can conceive the intentionality of words and concepts without assuming the intentionality of propositions. With a negative answer to (B3) and affirmative answer to (B4), we would grant primacy to intentionality of concepts or non-sentential linguistic expressions and explain intentionality of thoughts or sentences in terms of the intentionality of the former. Alternatively we could think of the intentionality of thoughts or natural language sentences as primary and consider the intentionality of concepts or words as derivable from the intentionality of the former. In this case, we have a negative answer to (B4): we cannot conceive of intentionality of concepts or non-sentential linguistic expressions without presupposing the intentionality of propositions. This, along with a negative answer to (B3), would mean there is some sort of conceptual relation between intentionality of propositions and the intentionality of the concepts

and non-sentential linguistic expressions. In a nutshell, what position one takes on this issue depends on one's semantic intuitions.

C. Thought as Propositional Content and Awareness

To identity the nature of the relation between consciousness and propositional content when by 'consciousness' we mean awareness, questions (1) and (2) may be reformulated as

(C1) Is it possible to conceive propositional content without awareness?

(C2) Is it possible that an awareness episode takes place without propositional content?

The possibility that propositional content as such can be conceived without reference to awareness is evident from the fact that we grant that there can be unconscious representational mental states as well as natural language sentences with propositional content. Hence the answer to (C1) is affirmative. But can awareness be conceived apart from propositional content? An awareness state is always transitive, meaning that it invariably has or is directed to some object; hence it is necessary that an awareness state is contentful. And certainly, contents of some of our awareness states are propositional in nature. But it is not necessary that all of them are propositional. Sometimes the content of an awareness state could be merely a phenomenal state or it could be directed to an object or its property in the world without signifying any propositional content. Hence, the answer to (C2) is that it is possible that an awareness state can occur without propositional content. Our answers to both (C1) and (C2) are in the affirmative; hence we conclude that thought in the sense of propositional content and thought as awareness are distinct.

Our discussion so far shows that the nature of the relation between thought as propositional content and consciousness varies depending upon what we take consciousness to be. If consciousness is understood as phenomenal consciousness, then there is no way they could be conceived as identical or as being necessarily related to each other as either could occur without the other. We arrive at a similar conclusion if by 'consciousness' we mean awareness, because awareness and propositional content can be conceived apart from each other. With regard to the relation between thought as propositional content and intentionality, we have seen that thought cannot be conceived without intentionality. Whether intentionality can be conceived of apart from thought or not depends upon what

one considers as the basic semantic unit. If the basic semantic units are concepts or words, then intentional content could occur without there being propositional content whereas propositional content cannot occur without its being intentional. This would lead us to the conclusion that intentionality is a necessary condition for thought as propositional content. On the other hand, if the basic semantic unit is considered as a proposition or a sentence, then we can identify intentional content with propositional content, and the intentionality-attributed concepts or words as derived from the intentionality of propositions. Though we can rightly attribute intentionality to propositions or sentences, it would be quite strange to attribute intentional consciousness to abstract entities like propositions or sentences since consciousness is considered fundamentally a mental phenomenon. Similarly, some of our unconscious representational mental states are ascribed propositional content but it would be inappropriate to suggest that unconscious representational mental states are intentionally conscious. This indicates that the expression 'intentional consciousness' perhaps should be restricted to occurrent mental states. With this, let us proceed to discuss how thought understood as dispositional mental state with content is related to consciousness.

D. Dispositional Mental States and Phenomenal Consciousness

Another way we employ the term 'thought' is to refer to a dispositional state with propositional content, say the dispositional belief that *p*. How does thought in this sense relate to phenomenal consciousness, intentionality and awareness? We shall first try to figure out if thought as a disposition is conceptually related to phenomenal consciousness. To do this, we render questions (1) and (2) as (D1) and (D2) and answer them.

(D1) Could thought as disposition be conceived of without phenomenal consciousness?

(D2) Could phenomenal consciousness be conceived of without thought as disposition?

Given the meaning of 'dispositional mental states' and 'phenomenal consciousness', answers to the above questions are obvious enough. As an unconscious mental state, a dispositional mental state is not felt in any way at all the subject who possesses it. So, there is nothing it is like to have a dispositional mental state. Phenomenal conscious states are not like dispositional mental states

in this regard. It is necessary that there is something it is like to have such states. For example, there is something it is like to be in a state of pain or in a state of being-appeared-green-to. But there is nothing it is like to have a contentful dispositional mental state. Given that by 'thought' we mean contentful dispositional mental state, the answer to (D1) is in the affirmative: thought as a disposition can be conceived of without any phenomenal features. This answer follows from the meanings of 'dispositional state' and `phenomenal state'. The answer to (D2) is also affirmative. It is by definition true that a phenomenal conscious state is not a dispositional mental state with propositional content. Hence that there could be phenomenal consciousness without dispositional thought content is almost trivially true as its negation is absurd. We have affirmative answers to both (D1) and (D2). Hence either of the two—thought as dispositional content and phenomenal consciousness—can be conceived of without the other. What follows from this is that thought as dispositional mental content and thought as phenomenal consciousness are distinct.

E. Dispositional Mental States and Intentionality

In order to determine how thought as a dispositional state with content, say the disposition to believe that *p*, is related to intentional consciousness, we need to render (1) and (2) as (E1) and (E2):

(E1) Could there be thought as dispositional mental state without intentional consciousness?
(E2) Could there be intentional consciousness without thought being a dispositional mental state?

Both the questions sound awkward because the way we use the term 'consciousness' seems to contradict our understanding of a dispositional mental state as an unconscious state. But the intent of these questions can be better appreciated if the term 'intentional consciousness' in (E1) and (E2) is replaced with 'intentionality'. The resultant questions are (E1a) and (E2a):

(E1a) Could there be thought as dispositional mental state without intentionality?
(E2a) Could there be intentionality without thought being a dispositional mental state?

The answer to (E1a) is obvious. A thought conceived as a dispositional mental state is always representational; hence it cannot be conceived without intentionality. In answer to (E2a), it is easy to

see that we can conceive of intentionality apart from dispositional mental states because there are thought-acts as well as linguistic expressions, which are clearly intentional but not dispositional. Thus thought, as a dispositional mental state, is not possible without intentionality whereas intentionality is not restricted to dispositional mental states. So we conclude that intentionality is a necessary condition for thought as a dispositional mental state. Though thought as dispositional mental state is intentional, yet it is odd to characterize it as intentionally conscious because a dispositional mental state by definition is an unconscious mental state.

F. Dispositional Mental States and Awareness

We can determine the nature of the relation between thought conceived as contentful dispositional mental state and consciousness understood as awareness, by answering (F1) and (F2).

(F1) Could there be thought as contentful dispositional mental state without awareness?

(F2) Could there be awareness without there being contentful dispositional mental state?

Answer to (F1) follows from the definition of 'dispositional mental states'. A dispositional mental state is a state that remains inaccessible to awareness. It means that a dispositional mental state is conceived apart from awareness. If it is necessary that a dispositional mental state by its very nature exist without awareness, then we cannot deny the possibility that dispositional mental states with content exist without awareness. The answer to (F2) follows from the nature of the awareness state. An awareness state, being always an occurrent mental state, cannot be a dispositional state. Hence, an awareness state can be conceived and is always conceived of as apart from dispositional mental states. Since answers to both (F1) and (F2) are affirmative, it follows that an awareness state and a contentful dispositional mental state are distinct.

Our discussion of the relation between thought as contentful dispositional mental state and thought as consciousness shows that thought in this sense is distinct from both phenomenal consciousness and awareness, while it cannot be conceived without intentionality. A dispositional mental state is called a thought only because it possesses propositional content. With this, let us now move on to discuss how thought in the third sense, namely thought-act, is related to phenomenal consciousness, intentionality and awareness.

G. Thought-Act and Phenomenal Consciousness

A thought-act, as we understand, is a mental episode or an occurrent mental state with propositional content. To understand the nature of the relation between thought-act and phenomenal consciousness, we must answer (G1) and (G2):

(G1) Can a thought-act occur without phenomenal consciousness?
(G2) Can phenomenal consciousness occur without being a thought-act?

To answer them we need to have a better grip on what we mean by 'phenomenal consciousness'. Phenomenally conscious states are those mental states about which it can be said that there is something it is like to have them. This general characterization of phenomenal states is due to Nagel (1974). But his original question is not directly concerned with phenomenology of mental states per se; rather it is to do with the phenomenology of a creature belonging to a particular species of animal. For his discussion, he identifies bats and humans as examples of two species and argues that what it is like to be a bat is different from what it is like to be a human. What it is like to be a bat is a function of sensory states that a bat is capable of possessing. These sensory states are not anything like the kind of sensory states that we humans have though it is possible that bats and humans can have identical non-sensory cognitive states. On the basis of this, Nagel concludes, it is not possible for us humans to know what it is like to be a bat. For Nagel, bat's phenomenology is a function of its sensory states. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there is something it is like to have those sensory states. By phenomenological feature of a sensory state we mean its qualitative content.

In this context, it is reasonable to ask whether phenomenology is restricted to sensory states with qualitative features. Each particular sensory state of a certain kind has its own characteristic qualitative feel, and it is different in nature from the phenomenal features belonging to sensory states of a different type. What is common to these different kinds of sensory states is that they possess the general phenomenal property, namely, that there is something it is like to be in those states. Certainly, this general feature can be attributed to a mental state only if it possesses some subjective feel. But there is no reason why this general feature is attributable only to sensory states. Any mental state that we are aware of as occurring can be said to have a subjective feel associated with it. For example, consider the non-sensory occurrent state of believing. There is something

it is like to have an occurrent state of belief, and what it is like to believe is different from what it is like to be in a state of desiring. Thus, it is not only feeling of pain or seeing something blue that possesses a subjective feel but even occurrent states of propositional attitudes like believing, hoping, desiring, etc. have their own subjective feels. Hence, we could say that there is something it is like to have those cognitive states.[5] This is not to say that the subjective feels accompanying sensory states and those related to no-sensory cognitive states are of the same kind. It is possible for us to differentiate between the subjective feels connected with sensory states and those associated with occurrent propositional attitudes. With regard to the former, we say that they have certain qualitative features. They arise in us insofar as we are in contact with physical objects including our own bodies. What is common to these qualitative states is that there is some aspect of spatiality built into them. Since these qualitative feels pertain to senses that relate to outer objects or objects in space, we shall call them *outer subjective feels*. Thus, the qualitative feel associated with the appearance of blue, the taste of honey, the sound of a trumpet, feeling a pain, feeling a tickle, etc. are outer subjective feels. In contrast, those subjective feels that accompany various occurrent cognitive states could be called *inner subjective feels*; as such they are not related to any external objects[6]. Their main function is to differentiate between various occurrent states of the mind. For example, given the thought content, *p*, I may believe that *p*, doubt that *p*, remember that *p*, etc. My believing that *p* is differentiated from my doubting that *p* or my remembering that *p* on the basis of the difference in subjective feels characteristic of them.[7]

Once the distinction between inner and outer subjective feels is granted in characterizing phenomenally conscious states, the questions (G1) and (G2) turn out to be ambiguous because we are not sure whether 'phenomenal consciousness' means inner subjective feel or outer subjective feel. (G1) can be disambiguated into (G1a) and (G1b) and (G2) into (G2a) and (G2b). Thus, we have two pairs of questions as substitutes for (1) and (2). The first pair is:

(G1a) Can thought-acts occur without inner subjective feels?
(G2a) Can inner subjective feels occur without thought-acts?

The second pair is:

(G1b) Can thought-acts occur without outer subjective feels?
(G2b) Can outer subjective feels occur without thought-acts?

To understand the nature of the relation between phenomenal

consciousness in general and thought-acts, we must address both the pairs of questions. Our understanding of thought-acts is that they are occurrent mental states with propositional contents. It is a necessary feature of thought-acts that when they take place, their subjects are aware of their occurrence, that is to say that they feel their occurrence. In addition to being able to be aware of their occurrences, we are capable of differentiating among various kinds of mental acts. From a phenomenological perspective, we type-differentiate or type-identify occurrent mental states on account of their differences or similarities among the inner subjective feels that accompany them. We differentiate an act of believing from an act of doubting because beliefs are felt differently from the way desires are felt. To put it differently, acts of belief are different from acts of doubts because what it is like to believe is different from what it is like to doubt.[8] Given this understanding, a thought-act has two essential features: a thought-act is what it is on account of its propositional content and the subjective feels necessarily accompanying it. This implies that our answer to (G1) must be in the negative: there can be no thought-acts without inner subjective feels. But can there be inner subjective feels without the occurrence of thought-acts. We come to know of the occurrences of mental states, whether cognitive or non-cognitive, by their inner subjective feels, which are the marks of their occurrences for the subject. So inner subjective feels are not confined to mere thought-acts; sensory episodes and emotions too have their own inner subjective feels. Hence, our answer to (G2a) is that inner subjective feels can occur even if thought-acts do not occur. Since thoughts cannot occur without the inner subjective feels, the latter are necessary conditions for thought-acts to occur.

Let us now consider (G1b) and (G2b). (G1b) asks whether thought-acts can occur without outer subjective feels. By outer subjective feels we mean those qualitative features associated mostly with sensory states or proprioceptual states. A thought-act, we know, is not a sensory episode; it is a cognitive episode, which does not have any felt quality of the sort that our sensory states possess. Outer subjective feels or qualitative features do not necessarily accompany the occurrent thoughts like the thought that the earth is round, the thought that 2 + 2 = 4, etc. Thus, we have an affirmative answer to (G1b), namely, that thought–acts as propositional episodes can occur without outer subjective feels or qualitative features.

Outer subjective feels may be directed to external physical objects or bodily states; yet they cannot be characterized as thought-acts having propositional contents. Consider, for example, the occurrence of a pain, which has felt qualitative features. But the feeling of pain

by itself does not have a propositional thought content, though on the basis of the pain felt, one may reach the conclusion that there is some damage to the tissues in that part of the body where pain is being felt. This means that the answer to (G2b) is that outer subjective feels or qualitative sensory states can occur without the occurrence of thought-acts having propositional nature. Since both (G1b) and (G2b have affirmative answers, we conclude that thought-acts and outer subjective feels (qualitative features) are distinct.

Our discussion shows that no occurrent mental states, whether they are cognitive episodes, like thought-acts or sensory states, can occur without inner subjective feels. In fact, it is the inner subjective feels that accompany mental states that enable us to characterize them as occurrent mental states. Thus, all occurrent mental states have inner subjective phenomenology. But the occurrent mental states could be divided into two classes: those that necessarily have outer subjective feels and those that are bound to possess propositional contents. Only sensory states have outer subjective phenomenology, which is not a necessary feature of the cognitive mental episodes that we characterize here as thought-acts with propositional content.

H. Thought Acts and Intentional Consciousness

The next question we examine is how thought-acts stand in relation to intentional features. To answer this, we shall raise the following questions:

(H1) Can a thought-act occur without intentional consciousness?
(H2) Can there be intentional consciousness in the absence of thought-acts?

Thought-acts are mental episodes with propositional content, and being contentful mental episodes they are representational episodes directed towards some possible states of affairs. So our answer to (H1) is that thought-acts being occurrent mental states with propositional contents cannot occur without being intentional. On the other hand, intentionality can be exhibited even in the absence of thought-acts. It is not a feature restricted to thought-acts, for there are two sorts of mental states that are considered to be intentional, but are not thought-acts: dispositional mental states with propositional content and sensory states that are directed to external objects or bodily states. Availability of such states shows that intentional features can occur even in the absence of thought-acts. We do not tend to ascribe intentional consciousness to dispositional

mental states despite having contentful mental states because ascription of intentional features alone would not suffice for a mental state to be regarded as possessing intentional consciousness. But the availability of conscious mental episodes like sensory events, which are intentional but lacks propositional structure shows that it is possible for intentional consciousness to occur without being thought-acts. So our answer to (H2) is that intentional consciousness can occur without being thought-acts. Since thought cannot occur without having intentionality while intentionality can occur even in the absence of propositional thought content, intentionality is a necessary feature of every thought-act.

I. Thought-Act and Awareness

Finally, to determine the nature of the relation between a thought-act and an awareness episode we shall answer (I1) and (I2):

(I1) Can a thought-act occur without awareness?
(I2) Can an awareness episode occur without being a thought-act?

The key to answering this question lies in the meaning of the term 'thought-act'. In this essay, we have been using the term to refer to an occurrent mental state with propositional content. We consider a state occurrent if and only if the subject is aware of its occurrence. This means that we cannot conceive of an occurrent mental state without awareness. Thus, the answer to (I1) is that thought-acts cannot occur without awareness. We have varieties of awareness of episodes. Thought-acts, as we have defined, belong to one such variety. In addition to thought-acts, we are aware of the occurrence of a multitude of sensory states, which are not propositional in nature. This shows that there are awareness episodes that are not thought – acts. So our answer to (I2) is that awareness episodes can occur without being thought-acts. Our answers to (I1) and (I2) shows that each thought-act must be an awareness episode but not all awareness episodes are thought-acts. Thus thought-acts are dependent upon awareness episodes but not *vice versa*.

It follows from our observation that thought-acts necessarily have three features of consciousness. First, they are, without exception, awareness episodes; it is on account of the possession of the feature of awareness that we hold mental states to be occurrent. Second, they are intentional because they possess propositional content. Third, they are phenomenal, as they invariably possess inner subjective feels on account of which we come to know of their occurrences.

They, however, do not necessarily possess outer subjective feels or qualitative features belonging to sensory states. We may note that a sensory episode also possesses all the three features of consciousness. Being occurrent states, they are states of awareness. Like thought-acts, they are phenomenal and intentional. However, they differ from thought-acts with regard to the nature of their phenomenality and intentionality. The phenomenality of thought-acts primarily consists in their inner subjective feels whereas that of sensory episodes includes, in addition, the outer subjective feels. Sensory episodes are intentional as they mostly represent perceptual properties of things while thought-acts are intentional because of their propositional structure and content. In this way, the intentionality of thought-acts is much more complex than that of sensory episodes.

The paradigmatic case of thought-acts, we considered so far are awareness events having propositional structure and content. An awareness event occurs always from a first person point of view. So thought-acts which necessarily have propositional structure and content can be conceived of as representational episodes with the added representation 'I am aware'. This means that thought-acts can be expressed in embedded propositions. For example, a thought-act whose content is the proposition that grass is green can be rendered as 'I am aware that grass is green'. That is to say, in the way we have been conceiving, thought-acts are those awareness episodes whose objects have propositional structures. However, it is possible to have a broader understanding of thought-acts in which any awareness episode could be construed as thought-acts. Since an awareness episode has the first person perspective, it can be considered as a thought-act having a subject and an object to which the act of awareness is directed, making it possible to render the awareness episode in a propositional form having a subject and a predicate. On this broader understanding, even sensory events can be considered thought-acts. Occurrence of a sensation is an awareness episode because there cannot be a sensation that the subject is not aware of. Consider, for example, the sensory episode of appearing of something blue to a subject. It has a first person perspective and is directed towards an object. So it is possible to describe it in the form of a proposition: 'something blue appears to me' or 'I am aware of something blue'. Insofar as we could express it in the form of a proposition, this awareness episode could be considered as a thought-act. Any representation accompanied by the additional representation 'I am aware' is a thought in the broad sense. It differs from the thought-act in the narrow sense in that it lacks the structure of an embedded proposition that the latter necessarily possesses.

If one were to answer (I1) and (I2) in the light of the broad sense of 'thought-act', one would arrive at the conclusion that a thought-act cannot occur without being an awareness episode and conversely an awareness episode cannot occur without being a thought-act. This along with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which states that any two objects that share all their properties are identical, implies that thought-acts and awareness episodes are identical. So if by 'thought' one understands thought-acts in the broad sense and by 'consciousness' one means awareness, then one can identify thought with consciousness. Such identification of is not unknown in the history philosophy. For example, Descartes identifies thought with consciousness and when he does this, he is cognizant of the fact that he understands the term 'thought' as thought-act in the broad sense. He makes it clear in his *Principles*:

> By the term `thought', I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, insofar as we have awareness of it. Hence thinking is to be identified not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, *but also with sensory awareness.* (Descartes, 1985 p. 195).

He expresses the same view about thought in his second replies: 'Thus, all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts' (Decartes, 1984:113). Thus, thought and consciousness can be identified only if by 'consciousness' we mean awareness and by 'thought' we understand thought-acts construed broadly as awareness episodes.

Along with this broad sense of thought-acts, it is possible to have a broad understanding of both intentional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Intentional consciousness in the broad sense would mean merely directedness or aboutness, without requiring that the content of the awareness episode necessarily have a propositional structure. Thus, any awareness episode, which represents objects, properties, or states of affairs, could be understood as intentional consciousness. An awareness episode is necessarily intentional in the broad sense because it is either a thought-act whose object is a proposition representing a state of affairs or a sensory episode directed towards some aspects of the world. Phenomenal consciousness in the broad sense would mean subjective feels accompanying occurrent mental states. They could be inner subjective feels that accompany thought-acts in the narrow sense, i.e., occurrent cognitive episodes like believing, remembering, doubting etc. with propositional contents or outer subjective feels, namely qualitative features that belong to sensory episodes. Since an awareness episode is either a thought-act or a sensory episode, it must

possess at least the inner subjective feel. That is to say, an awareness episode must necessarily exhibit phenomenal features in the broad sense. Thus, both phenomenality and intentionality, if construed broadly, are necessary and inseparable features of awareness, which is the most basic and primary form of consciousness.

Many philosophers assume that awareness, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness are three different types of consciousness, and a mental state belonging to any one of these states is distinct and separable from a state belonging to either of the other kinds of mental states. They arrive at this position as a result of practice of abstracting one aspect of our conscious mental states from others and highlighting it for the purpose of theorizing about consciousness. Thus, we abstract phenomenality, intentionality or awareness from consciousness depending on what we want to do. In our talk of sensation, for example, we suppress intentional features of a sensory state and concentrate on its qualitative aspects. In theoretical discussions on the nature of the sensation of pain, there is a dis-emphasis on its intentional features and the awareness of its occurrence, which results from an implicit view that only the qualitative feel of the sensation pain is essential to pain. Contemporary philosophical discussion of consciousness is centered on qualia, which are nothing but qualitative features of sensory states. When philosophers talk of a quale, say the state of being-appeared-blue-to, they want to concentrate on the qualitative feel of the sensory state considering it apart from its features of awareness and intentionality. In this process, we often forget that a qualitative mental state cannot occur without awareness and intentionality. The quale of being-appeared-blue-to cannot occur without an appearance, which is a state of awareness directed to some object or property. A quale is merely a mode of the awareness of an object or its property. Similar considerations apply *mutatis mutandis* to the other two features of consciousness: intentionality and awareness.

III

Nature of Awareness

What emerges from our discussion so far is that awareness is the most fundamental feature of our consciousness and a thought-act, irrespective of whether it is construed narrowly or broadly, would not qualify to be characterized as an occurrent mental state without the feature of awareness. Bearing in mind the centrality of awareness

in characterizing consciousness and thought-acts, we shall probe briefly into the general features of awareness episodes. What is important to note about awareness is that it can never occur without the features of phenomenality and intentionality; hence they are necessary features of an awareness episode. That an awareness episode is invariably phenomenal does not mean all awareness episodes exhibit qualitative aspects because, as we have already seen, qualitative phenomenal features are restricted to those awareness episodes that are sensory. A mental state has a phenomenal feature only if there is something it is like to be in that state. All awareness states are phenomenal states because there is always something it is like to be in those states. Conversely all phenomenal states are states of awareness because there cannot be a phenomenal state, which its subject is unaware of. That is to say, a phenomenal state, like being in pain, cannot be a state that the subject is not aware of. The claim made here is not merely that the terms 'awareness state' and 'phenomenal state' are co-extensive but that there is a necessary relation between phenomenality and awareness such that it is not possible for one to occur without the other.

There cannot be an awareness state that does not represent some state of affairs or is at least directed to some features of the world. Hence, as is the case with phenomenality, intentionality too is a necessary feature of awareness. However, terms 'intentional mental states' and 'awareness states' are not co-extensive because we grant intentional mental states that are not available to awareness. In answer to question (F1), we maintained that it is possible that there are intentional states that are not states of awareness and that dispositional mental states belong to this category. This would mean that though an awareness state is necessarily intentional, its converse, viz., that an intentional state is necessarily a state of awareness, does not hold. Despite this, one can maintain that a dispositional state having intentionality has some sort of conceptual relation to awareness. This can be clarified as follows. Intentionality can be considered as an active feature of a mental state because it *represents* or *is directed towards* something. But we attribute this active property to some dispositional mental states. Being an inert state, a dispositional mental state appears to be an unlikely candidate for exhibiting the active feature of intentionality. On the other hand, an awareness state is an active state and it is part of its active nature that it is directed to some object or state other than itself. Thus, awareness state appear to be the proper and natural loci of intentionality. How are, then, we justified in attributing intentionality to dispositional

mental states? The answer is that our attribution of intentionality to dispositional states is in some way dependent on the intentionality of awareness states. When we say a dispositional mental state, say a belief, is intentional, we do not mean that it is actually intentional, but only that it is potentially intentional, meaning that if it were activated and made available to the awareness, it would have represented or been directed towards some state of affairs. Thus, even when we speak of the intentional features of unconscious dispositional states, it is with reference to intentionality of the states of awareness.[9] Had it been impossible for our awareness states to be intentional, and had it been impossible for the dispositional states to be activated and made available to awareness, it would not have been possible for us to attribute intentionality to dispositional mental states.

A feature of awareness that has not received enough attention in contemporary discussion on consciousness is the revelatory function it plays in our mental life. Awareness exhibits a four-fold revelatory function. First of all, awareness reveals the intentionality of occurrent mental states. Second, it reveals the phenomenal features or the subjective feels — qualitative (outer) or non-qualitative (inner) feels as the case may be — of the occurrent mental states. Third, an awareness episode reveals its own occurrence. Fourth, an awareness episode is I-revealing or self-revealing. We have some idea about what it means to say that awareness reveals intentional and phenomenal features of our occurrent mental states primarily because we understand what it means to say that a given mental state is either intentional or phenomenal. To say that an awareness episode reveals intentionality of an occurrent mental state means that it informs us of the representational content of the occurrent state. And to say that an awareness episode reveals the phenomenality of an occurrent mental state means that it tells us what kind of mental state it is, that is whether it is a qualitative sensory state like being in pain, being appeared-blue-to, etc. or whether it is a cognitive state like belief, desire, etc. But we need more clarity on the other two revelatory functions of awareness episodes.

Let us examine what it means to say that an awareness episode reveals its own occurrence. The revelation of the occurrence of an awareness episode is achieved by the very same awareness episode itself and it could be viewed as a reflexive feature by which an occurrent mental state reveals itself. We may say that it is of the nature of an awareness episode that it reveals itself. An immediate fall out of this view is that the awareness of the occurrence of a mental state is infallible, that is, when an awareness state occurs, we cannot be mistaken about its occurrence and the kind of mental state it is. For example, if I

am aware that I believe that *p*, even if *p* is false, my awareness that I believe that *p* cannot be false. This feature of an occurrent mental state could be rejected on the ground that an occurrent mental state, *M*, cannot reveal its own occurrence; what reveals the occurrence of *M* is another awareness state *M'* directed towards *M*. This latter view about how the occurrence of a mental state is revealed identifies the revelatory function of a conscious mental state with its intentionality. Just as intentional features of *M*, a first order mental state, reveal the objective features of the world, the intentional features of *M'* which is a higher order mental state directed towards the first order mental state, *M*, reveal the occurrence of *M*. This position, unlike the view adopted in this paper, entails that revelatory function of a higher order awareness episode is fallible just as the first order mental states could go wrong with regard to the features of the objective world. The position, however, is unacceptable because apart from opening up the possibility of a regress, it leads to a contradiction as it grants the possibility that a subject could be unaware of the occurrence of an awareness episode.

An awareness episode is I-revealing, means that it invariably occurs from the first person point of view, that is, it always occurs with the representation 'I am aware'. Each thought-act in the narrow sense could be conceived as an embedded propositional episode of the sort, say, I am aware that snow is white; I believe that the grass is green; I think that the earth is round, etc. Similarly, being awareness episodes, sensory states too are I-revealing. A feeling of pain, for example, can be conceived as occurring necessarily with the representation 'I feel', a visual sensory episode with the representation, 'I see' or 'I seem to see', etc. Two philosophers who articulate the I-revealing function of awareness episodes are Descartes and Kant. Descartes' *cogito* argument is built around the I-revealing function of awareness episodes. Construing thought-acts in the broad sense, he arrives at 'I exist' (*sum*) from 'I think' (*cogito*). *Cogito* entails *sum* because each awareness episode is necessarily accompanied by the representation, 'I am aware' or 'I think'. The I-revealing function of the awareness episodes makes it clear how Descartes reaches 'I exist' from 'I think' using his method of doubt. Doubt is a thought-act and being a thought-act, it is an I–revealing awareness episode. What could be subjected to doubt is the truth of the propositional content of the awareness episode or the reality of the objects and properties represented by the awareness episode and not the thought-act of doubting which necessarily accompanies the awareness that I am. Therefore, each act of doubt reinforces that I am.

Kant is of the view that each mental representation, irrespective of whether it is sensory or conceptual, is *capable* of being accompanied by the additional representation 'I think' whereas any act of judgment is *always* accompanied by 'I think'. Since for Kant 'thought' in the strict sense of the term is a function of the faculty of understanding, it could be asked why Kant grants that a representation belonging to the faculty of sensibility is capable of being accompanied by 'I think'. The answer to this question lies in the distinction between 'thought' and the representation 'I think'. By 'thought' Kant means a propositional mental episode representing a possible state of affairs, which is a function of the faculty of understanding. On the other hand, 'I think' is an awareness episode, which is the function of a different faculty, the faculty of apperception.[10] This is the reason why Kant expresses 'I think' alternatively as 'I am', 'I am aware', etc. (For example, see Kant, 1998: Bxl, B131-2, B137-8, B 140, B155, B 157, A 266). Any conscious representational episode, for Kant, is a complex representation involving contributions from more than one faculty. However, no conscious representation can take place without involvement of the representation 'I think' or 'I am aware' added by an act of apperception. The representations 'I think', 'I am aware', 'I feel', 'I am', etc. added to occurrent mental states are responsible for imparting them the first person point view. This shows that each conscious mental episode, whether propositional or sensory, is from the first person point of view.

The first person point of view is often contrasted with the third person point of view or what Nagel calls 'the view from nowhere', which is considered as the objective point of view. It is generally believed that these two kinds of points of view by their very nature are opposed to each other. But the fact is that the third person point of view is anchored on the first person point of view: it results from abstracting the content of the thought-act from an awareness-episode which is from the first person point of view. For example, given the propositional thought-act, 'I am aware that grass is green', if we jettison the clause 'I am aware' and concentrate only on the embedded proposition 'the grass is green' the thought that we have is said to be from the third person point of view. Thus, an abstract thought or a thought from the third person point of view is nothing but a thought-act minus its first person point of view.

Conclusion

We have been inquiring whether there is any conceptual relation between thought and consciousness. Since concepts of both thought

and consciousness are multifaceted, we identified three important senses in which each of the terms, 'thought' and 'consciousness', is employed in the philosophical literature to see how each of the three senses of one term relate to each sense of the other term. First, we examined how thought in the sense of proposition is related to phenomenal consciousness, intentionality and awareness. We found that thought in this sense is distinct from phenomenal consciousness, and awareness, but it cannot be conceived without intentionality. On the other hand, an answer to the question, whether intentionality can be conceived without thought or not, depends on what one's basic semantic intuitions are. If propositions are considered as basic semantic units, then any intentional content that we can conceive of becomes dependent upon propositional content. If the basic semantic units are taken to be concepts instead, then intentionality turns out to be merely a necessary condition for thought because intentional features can occur without being thoughts (propositions) while thoughts cannot occur without intentionality.

Next, we probed how thought as dispositional mental state stands in relation to phenomenal consciousness, intentionality and awareness. This led us to the view that thought as dispositional mental state and thought as phenomenal consciousness are distinct since it is not possible for phenomenal mental states to be dispositional or for dispositional mental states to exhibit any phenomenal features. Similarly thoughts as dispositional mental states and thought as awareness episodes are also distinct because it is definitionally true that a dispositional state is not a state of awareness and *vice versa*. However, thought as a dispositional mental state would not be called 'thought' if it were not representational. From this we conclude that dispositional mental states are necessarily intentional though we can conceive of a mental state as being intentional without it being dispositional.

Finally, we explored how thought as an act of the mind is linked to phenomenality, intentionality and awareness. In order to get a proper picture of the relation, we distinguished between two senses of term 'thought-act': a narrow sense and a broad sense. In the narrow sense, thought-act is an occurrent mental state with propositional content, and in the broad sense, a thought act is an awareness episode irrespective of whether its structure and content are propositional or non-propositional. We also differentiated between two kinds of phenomenal features, which we labelled as outer and inner, respectively. Outer phenomenal states are qualitative sensory states while inner phenomenal features are the subjective feels that necessarily attend all occurrent mental states,

sensory or cognitive. If, by a phenomenal mental state, we mean a qualitative sensory state, then thought-act in the narrow sense is not phenomenal. On the other hand, if we use it to signify a mental state that necessarily possesses inner subjective feels then thought-acts in the narrow sense are phenomenal. Thought-acts in the broad sense in any case will have phenomenality since all of them necessarily possess inner subjective feels while some of them exhibit qualitative features in addition. Thought-acts, regardless of whether they are understood broadly or narrowly, necessarily possess intentionality because we cannot conceive them without intentionality though we can conceive of intentionality apart from thought-acts per se. So, we conclude that intentionality is a necessary condition for thought-acts to occur. In the same way, we found that awareness is a necessary feature of thought-acts because a thought-act, narrow or broad, is an occurrent mental state and an occurrent mental state cannot be what it is without awareness. However, an awareness episode can take place without being a thought-act in the narrow sense, but it is not possible for awareness to occur without being thought-acts in the broad sense. So, our consideration of the nature of awareness episodes and thought-acts lead to the conclusion that awareness is a necessary feature of thought-acts in general. According to the broader understanding of thought-acts, the properties of thought-acts and awareness episodes cannot be differentiated. Therefore, on the basis of Leibnitz' principle of the identity of the indiscernible, thoughts in the broad sense and awareness episodes turn out to be identical.

We cannot conceive of thought in any of the three senses we have identified without intentionality; hence intentionality could be viewed as the essential feature of thoughts in general. Similarly the primary sense of 'consciousness' is awareness because we cannot have phenomenal or qualitative states without having awareness. The same is true of intentional consciousness, which is nothing but a thought-act. The real connecting link between thought and consciousness in general is intentionality because neither of them can be conceived without it.

Notes

1. I do not claim that these are the only ways that the term, `consciousness' is used in the philosophical literature; it is also used in other senses such as creature consciousness, self-consciousness, and monitoring consciousness.
2. The term 'thought-act' can also used in a broader sense to signify any conscious mental episode irrespective of whether it has a propositional content or not.

See the discussion below on the nature of the relation between thought act and awareness in section 2. I.

3. It is a moot question whether all aspects of consciousness are reducible to one or more of these three types of consciousness. It could also be debated whether phenomenal consciousness, intentional consciousness and awareness are three different kinds of consciousness or whether they are inseparable features belonging to each conscious state. Using empirical evidence from blind sight cases, Norton Nelkin makes an argument to show that phenomenality, intentionality and awareness—he considers only introspective awareness—are distinct and separable states of consciousness (See Nelkin, 1993). In their theorizing about consciousness, many contemporary philosophers either tacitly assume or explicitly endorse positions similar to this. For example, Sidney Shoemaker's refutation of inverted spectrum argument is based on the assumption that phenomenality, intentionality and awareness are distinct (Shoemaker, 1982). Ned Block is of the view that phenomenal and intentional states are distinct states of consciousness and both must be distinguished from access-consciousness (Block, 1995). I do not claim that Nelkin's 'introspective awareness,' Block's `access-consciousness' and Shoemaker's `awareness' mean the same though one can discern a family resemblance among these concepts. For a defence of the position that phenomenality, intentionality, and awareness are inseparable features of a conscious mental state, see Tomy, 2003 and 2013.
4. Alternatively, one could also answer the questions (B3) and (B4) by arguing that intentionality and thought as propositional content are identical or at least inseparable: when one entertains a concept or utters a word under appropriate circumstances, the concept or the word signifies a proposition. For example, if one is having the concept of rose or utters the word 'rose' in the presence of a rose, the concept or the word could be understood as conveying the existential proposition that there is a rose. Hence both concepts and words could be seen as having propositional content.
5. Block acknowledges this. He says: 'P-conscious properties [properties of phenomenal consciousness] include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, desires, and emotions' (1995: 230).
6. The distinction between inner and outer subjective feels is motivated by Kant's distinction between inner and outer sense (Kant, 1998: A 22-23, B 37).
7. It could be said that we differentiate among various contents of a given type of an occurrent mental state on account of the differences in their phenomenal features. This position assumes that contents of occurrent mental states have their own phenomenal features. Accordingly, there is something it is like to believe that the earth is round and this phenomenal feature is different from what it is like to believe that the earth is flat. Ned Block considers this to be a viable position when he observes: 'A feature of P-consciousness [phenomenal consciousness] that is often missed is that differences in intentional content often make a P-conscious difference. What it is like to hear a sound as coming from the left differs from what it is like to hear a sound as coming from the right.' (1995: 230). He, however, does not believe that phenomenal content is reducible to intentional content. For him, both are distinct though phenomenal content often has intentional aspects.
8. In addition to the question how we know of the occurrences of mental states, the question, how occurrent mental states of one kind are differentiated from

another kind is answered here. In answering the latter, it is possible to take one of the two approaches different from the approach adopted here. I shall call the first one representational approach and the second one computational approach. According to the representational approach, thought-acts are type-identified on the basis of higher order representations that accompany them. Locke takes this approach in order to differentiate memory ideas from other kinds of ideas. A memory idea, for him, is nothing but `[p]erceptions, which it [the mind] has once had, with this additional [p]erception annexed to them, that it has had them before' (Locke, 1975, Book II, Chapter X, Section 2: 150). One could take a similar approach for differentiating various kinds of thought-acts: a thought-act is called a belief if it occurs with added representation `I believe' and it is called a doubt if it comes with the additional representation `I doubt' and so on. The computational approach is a more recent one. According to Jerry Fodor, who champions this approach, we differentiate between the belief that *p* and the desire that *p*, because beliefs and desires are computational states constituted by different algorithms. Invoking a metaphor invented by Stephen Schiffer (1981) various computational modules that Fodor postulates are generally described as boxes. If the proposition *p* is tokened in the belief box of the subject S, then we say that S believes that *p* and if it is in S's desire box, then we say that S desires that *p*, etc. These two approaches constitute two competing theoretical models for accounting for the differences among various types of mental states. But they do not explain how we come to know what additional representation is accompanied by the occurrent mental state or which computational box a proposition is placed in. From a phenomenological point of view at least, it is neither by identifying algorithms that computes the propositions nor by reading the content of the added representations, but on account of the inner subjective feels, which necessarily accompany them, that we come to know of their occurrences. Similarly, it is on account of the differences in their inner subjective feels that we differentiate among the diverse kinds of mental states. There can be no occurrent mental states without some kind of inner subjective feels that come with them.

9. John Searle (1991) holds a similar position.
10. For Kant, human intuitions belong to the sensibility, and a representation that is not an intuition is a thought in a very general sense. So the representation `I am' contributed by apperception is a thought and not an intuition.

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