

# THE QUESTION OF 'NOVELTY' IN 'INDIAN PHILOSOPHY' DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

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... we can neither formulate nor answer any philosophical question, however universal, without reference to the concrete social background.

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## Positioning the discourse

Indian Philosophy is usually treated in terms of the so-called six 'orthodox' and three 'non-orthodox' schools which are designated as Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika, on the one hand, and Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka, on the other. One may add a few more, but this is the usual way of presentation and it is taken as adequate by everybody. But, is it really so? Does this help us in understanding and grasping the philosophical scene in India as it unfolded over three millennia of its recorded existence?<sup>2</sup>

The above question raised by Daya Krishna reflects the acknowledgement of the belief that the mode in which we construe and present traditional Indian thought-schemas is immediately co-related with how we begin to understand them. Such a claim is grounded in the implicit assertion that the historical positioning of an 'Indian philosophy' can no longer be treated as being peripheral to an exploration that delves into the deep intricacies of the discourse that has come to be so marked. The available thought-schemas of the twentieth century have established a fairly respectable position to the claim that our everydayness can be construed as having its constitutive, as well as its regulative principles, or *arche*, firmly rooted in its own temporal trajectories within the complex structures of its history,<sup>3</sup> and specifically in the structures of power-negotiations.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the twentieth-century thought-schemas inform us that

not only does every discourse have a history that can be narrated, but also, and more importantly, that every discourse *is* historical. Hence, they move beyond the obvious claim that every philosophical position or concept has a trajectory that is traceable in terms of its history, towards a much more novel and perceptive claim that every philosophical position or a concept has its originary grounds in the *zeitgeist* or the spirit of the time, and that our evaluative structure of choice is grounded in this *zeitgeist*. It is in the horizon of this relationship between a discourse and its historical positioning that we see a resurgence of the question of philosophy in India in relation to its colonial past in the recent decades.<sup>5</sup> Daya Krishna's question is precisely rooted in this firm conviction regarding the relation that obtains between the discourse marked as 'Indian Philosophy' and its historical positioning. Daya Krishna, thus, legitimately raises the issue of the possibility of an alternative mode of construing the trajectory of 'Indian philosophy' from the vantage point of a post-colonial consciousness. His question can thus be reformulated as, 'How else can we construe the traditional Indian thought-schemas' apart from its dominant presentation as *darśana*?' Notwithstanding the gravity of this question, we can, however, also ask why such a construal of 'Indian philosophy' appeared as an adequate presentation then. Thus, in this mode of interrogating the construal of 'Indian Philosophy' as *darśana*, what is being addressed is not the interrogative 'how' as in Daya Krishna's question, but rather is an engagement with this construal in terms of the historical positioning of an interrogative 'why'. In other words, we ask, why was the past construed thus *then*?

More often than not, engagement with questions pertaining to the past within the context of the colonized, following the discourse of nationalism, invokes the fact of colonization. The discipline of History has been effectively employed in the construction of the contours of the narrative of nationalism, and in the definitive securing of a historical positioning of such a narrative. This securing is evident from the simple fact that Gandhi, for instance, can now hardly be made sense of in isolation from the discourse of our freedom struggle. The role of the discourse on nationalism through the historical positioning of its entrenchment within the fact of colonialism cannot be over emphasized in the construal of a collective identity of the diversity called 'India' into a unitary 'we'. Our purpose here is not to evaluate the success or the failure of such a historical positioning, but rather to highlight the mode in which the fact of colonialism informs a variety of our discourses in

the securing of particular historical positioning of these discourses within the locus of our colonial past. In other words, the colonial past is invoked for a historical positioning of our present, and as a legitimate mode of understanding it. Thus, for instance, the crisis of the nature our discourses in present times often invoke the fact of colonial intervention as the site which grounds the moment of rupture in its trajectory. Although, such an invocation does often come close to appearing as a fetish for convenient explanations of the crisis encountered by the discourse in the present times, it nevertheless must be noted that it is the colonial intervention that forced us to recognize the need to reflect upon our own discourses. The denial of a discourse that could legitimately be called 'History' within the epistemological framework of the colonized, for instance, is a classic example in hand. It is in the quest to respond to this assertion that the trajectory of the discourse of History in India gets categorically shaped. The discourse of Philosophy carries a similar charge as well, but the distinctive mark that pertains to the responsive discourse that came to be branded as 'Indian philosophy', lay in the fact that it was undeniably, and was precisely, this colonial intervention that awakened the awareness of the colonized as the possessor of a discourse called 'Philosophy' as such. More importantly, it is this colonial intervention that opened up the avenue for the construal of a unified front of the various traditional inquiries into the nature of reality and the legitimate modes of acquiring knowledge about it, as *darśanas* under the singular banner of 'Indian Philosophy'. In other words, we must not confuse the historical positioning of 'Indian philosophy' with the history of the traditional thought-schemas in India *as such*. The history of 'Indian philosophy', as Kalidas Bhattacharyya emphasizes, begins only in the first decade of the twentieth century when 'the living continuity of... philosophical thinking with the old philosophical traditions was snapped' with the introduction of Western philosophical thoughts and with the emergence of the tendency among thinkers from within the philosophical fraternity in India to apply 'themselves seriously to the fundamentals of the Western and the old Indian philosophy to see if they could completely reconcile the two philosophies...'.<sup>6</sup> The distinction between the historical positioning of 'Indian philosophy' and the history of the traditional thought-schemas in India *as such* demands our attention because of the fact that what comes to be pursued under the label of 'Indian Philosophy' is undeniably, not merely a colonial product, but is precisely a product that has its locus in the intersecting point between the axis of the East with that of

the West in contrast to the history of the traditional Indian thought-schemas *as such*, which can be viewed in modes that are independent of the fact of colonization.

Of course, postcolonial consciousness has brought about a vocal questioning of the very nature of this naming of the traditional thought systems as 'Indian Philosophy' since it is implicitly suggestive of the mode in which these traditional thought systems are to be approached. As is the case with all acts of naming, this specific act of naming too, is not an innocent one. The term 'Indian Philosophy' betrays the politics of orientation in the mode in which it positions these traditional thought systems under the purview of the lens that is specifically moulded by the historical trajectories of the schemas of thought in the West, and informed by the notion of 'thinking' that emerge precisely in the unfolding of these schemas of thought within the historical context of the West. It thus, in no lesser terms, brings along with it the entire evaluative paradigm, through and against which, the traditional Indian thought-schemas could be measured. But also more importantly, it forced the early Anglophone thinkers in India to selectively construe its traditional thought-schemas within certain imposed paradigms. It is this imposed paradigm of construing what would eventually constitute 'Indian Philosophy' that enforces an erasure of the available multiple interpretative modes of classification of these traditional thought systems that are internal to its historical trajectory in a bid to provide it a monolithic unitary classification that could be recognized by the West *as* 'Philosophy'.<sup>7</sup> It is in this construal of a singular identity, under the colonial gaze, that the discourse called 'Indian Philosophy' delineates its own distinctive identity traits as *darśana*.<sup>8</sup> In other words, the term *darśana* is itself indicative of the selective narrowing of the available traditional thought-schemas to 'systems of thoughts', by which, what was essentially meant were those traditional thought-schemas that had a greater affinity towards epistemological and ontological concerns. The term '*darśana*', remaining within the intersecting locus of the East-West paradigm presented Indian thought-schemas as a counterpart of Western thought systems, while also allowing for the proclamation of the distinctiveness of the former in terms of its positioning of *mokṣa* as its *telos*. It is this emphasizing of the *telos* of *mokṣa*, which when translated as 'spiritual', allowed for the construal of 'Indian Philosophy' as *darśana* as being in continuity with the ancient traditional past of India. This critical project of tracing its own identity traits is what demands an engagement with the question of *telos* of the activity of philosophizing. By the first two

decades of the twentieth century, this had already taken a distinctive shape as is reflected in the emphatic projection of *mokṣa* within the Indian thought-schemas. In other words, the choice of our early Anglophone writers on the history of 'Indian Philosophy' in their positing of these traditional thought-schemas as *darśana* over the other available alternative of construing 'Indian Philosophy', as *anvikṣiki* for instance, is itself an act that reflects a certain mode of construing the available traditional thought-schemas.<sup>9</sup> It must be remembered that this reductive approach of narrowing down of traditional Indian thought-schemas into systems of thought was first adopted by Max Muller in his presentation of traditional Indian thought-schemas to the West, distinguishing the 'philosophical systems' from both their Vedic and Upanisadhic sources, as well as Indian Literature in general.<sup>10</sup> Though Muller presents merely the 'orthodox' systems in his work, what remains as a basic influence upon the early Anglophone writers on 'Indian philosophy' is his view of the linear evolutionary nature of Indian thought-schemas since, for Muller, it was in 'the six systems [that] the philosophical thought of India has found its full realization'.<sup>11</sup> In the light of such a characterization, we must pause here to reflect upon the choice exercised by our early Anglophone writers of the history of 'Indian Philosophy' like Radhakrishnan,<sup>12</sup> Hiriyaana,<sup>13</sup> or D.M. Dutta,<sup>14</sup> to characterize these traditional Indian thought-schemas as *darśana*. It is a deliberate choice indicative of a subversive move that seeks to foreground those traditional thought-schemas that clearly emphasize the ontological and epistemological structure in the pursuit of *mokṣa* over other available thought-schemas that conceive the task of philosophy as constituted in a meta inquiry into the socio-political and economic conditions of the everydayness of our lived experiences, like that of Kautilya, for instance. Within the intersecting locus of the East and the West and lodged against the backdrop of colonization, the construal of 'Indian philosophy' as *darśana* managed to project the victory of the epistemological and the ontological over the alternative orientation as a critique of the everydayness within the historical trajectory of the traditional Indian thought-schemas. It thereby clearly resonated with the corresponding victory of Aristotle over Socrates that is manifest in the engulfing of the Socratic concerns within a thick forest of ontological and epistemological framework as highlighted in both Kant, as well as in Hegel, the two most dominant figures of the English world then.<sup>15</sup> Though it is also a fact that the revival of Vedāntic traditions during the early nineteenth century by the social reform movements places

*darśana*, with its emphasis on *mokṣa*, more favourably within the common consciousness (given its invocation of ancient conceptions of philosophy as either ‘*brahmodya*’ following the Vedic literature, or as ‘*atma vidyā*’ and ‘*parā vidyā*’ following the Upanishads).<sup>16</sup> It is the adoption of the evolutionary framework of Muller that enabled these Anglophone philosophers to place ‘Indian philosophy’ at par with ‘Western philosophy’ in the evolutionary trajectory of ‘thinking’.

More importantly, in the following section we shall try to locate the historical position of the construal of ‘Indian philosophy’ as *darśana* within the locus of the East-West intersection. Through this, we would not merely show the legitimacy of such a construal as a historical choice, but also throw light on the role it played in the assertion for the superiority of, or at the least, in the claim for a distinct identity for the traditional Indian thought-schemas.

#### Origins of the question of ‘novelty’

Though the reformative visions of the Christian missionaries in the wake of the colonial intervention did manage to ignite a fresh engagement of the colonized with the traditional thought-schema of the Vedantins in the early half of the nineteenth century itself, this engagement can be better characterized as a defence of the cultural sphere against the Evangelists’ assertion of the indigenous culture as being ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’. It is this engagement that grounds the birth of such indigenous reformative movements like the *Brahmo Samaj*, which though informed in its general spirit by the ideas of Western Enlightenment, was nevertheless a foregrounding of the indigenous thought-schemas in a novel interpretative manner.<sup>17</sup> In this sense, it must be noted that within the context of the Indian colonial landscape, the cultural preceded the political struggle. However, it is this early phase of engagement with traditional thought-schemas that informed and instigated the rise of the Orientalists’ discourse. Though in contrast to the Evangelists, the Orientalists were largely responsible for the glorified and consolidated image of the thought-schemas of the colonized, it is in their hands that the traditional thought-schemas get enmeshed inseparably with religion. That the celebration of the Orientalists’ discourse<sup>18</sup> is what directly informs the shaping of the distinctive *telos* of the traditional Indian thought-schemas as being *spiritual* in contrast to the trait of *rationality*, which was held to mark Western thought-schemas of the ‘modern’ period, requires no proof.<sup>19</sup> But apart from the grafting of the distinctive *telos* in an effort to secure the distinctive identity for the construed

unified front of 'Indian philosophy', the Orientalists' discourse attributed another problematic trait to 'Indian philosophy', namely, that of 'stagnancy'. The Orientalists' merging of 'Philosophy' with 'Religion' inevitably entailed that given the absolutist nature of religion, philosophy too would be averse to the notion of 'growth and progress' in the context of Indian thought-schemas. It is this uncritical refrain of 'stagnancy' as the defining mark of Indian traditional thought-schemas that was largely singled out for its rejection. Thus, the Orientalists' discourse subsequently foreclosed the traditional thought-schemas from the very possibility of 'novelty'.

We must recall that by the late nineteenth century the asserted 'stagnant nature' of the traditional thought-schemas of the colonized is what enabled the neat transformation of the Oriental *Other* from an object of threat into a realm of the exotic. This shift in attitude towards the Orient was largely facilitated by the position of political supremacy of the West, but it was also significantly grounded in the triumph of modern science and its mechanistic explanatory paradigm. It is the latter which had instilled in the West the idea of a linear process of evolution of human races opening up the avenue to conceive of Eastern civilisations to be stagnating in time.<sup>20</sup> This new conception of the temporality of civilization also provided the Western powers with the much needed moral justification that legitimately 'obligated' them to colonize. It allowed them to defend their self-entrusted project to spearhead the progress of these societies on an ethical plane, and thereby enabled them to embed their political and economic interests within the realm of the moral.<sup>21</sup> Thus, if the earlier construal of the Orient as a 'threat' demanded an attitude of 'caution' embedded in a form of *respect for the unknown*, its construal as 'primitive' objects stuck in the temporal trajectory of 'progress', eased the adoption of an alternative attitude of curiosity. The Orient thus came to be seen as an opportunity to move back in time to know about one's own past. It is this attitude of curiosity, steeped in a spirit of supremacy, which shapes the trajectory of the marking the traditional Indian thought-schemas as ultimately lacking in any novelty, either in form or in its content. This characterization is, perhaps, the most audible refrain within the academic philosophical fraternity in India till date.

#### The engagement with the question of novelty

The two correlated aspects of 'spirituality' and 'lacking in novelty' that came to mark the traditional Indian thought-schemas came to

be a matter of contentious concern for the Anglophone academic philosophers in India by the beginning of the twentieth century. This is amply highlighted in the works of these thinkers and in the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress (IPC).<sup>22</sup> It is this concern that shapes the broader contours of their philosophical engagements. But the question of 'novelty' must first be briefly explored in its historical position in order to better understand what precisely was being denied to the traditional Indian thought-schemas. It must first be noted that the notion of 'novelty' was never a seriously articulated value within the thought-schemas of the West itself. Ironically, the notion of 'novelty' in fact creeps into the discourse in the West with the rise of mechanistic science which construes the world in terms of mechanical structures of causation that is determined as a whole by the laws that govern Nature. Such a world denies the possibility of any authentic case of novelty thus making prominent, the question of its possibility. In this scenario, only a life that is not governed by any laws *as such* can offer us the possibility of novelty. Stace rightly highlights the fact that the insistence on novelty is in fact an 'emotional revulsion' against the dominance of the scientific world-view.<sup>23</sup> Thus, novelty comes to be closely associated with freedom, such that a threat poised to one would entail a threat to the other.<sup>24</sup> Both Bergson and William James fervently sought to protect the idea of novelty, not for the sake of novelty itself, but rather for the possibility of freedom. Thus, the rise in the natural mechanistic sciences in the West invariably entailed a deep conflict between the discourse of that sought to ensure a secure foundation to the notion of freedom and the impossibility of rejecting the picture of the mechanistic-world put forth by the natural sciences. This, for instance had already led to the call to reject the 'traditional' or 'dogmatic' mode of investigating the legitimacy and truths of our beliefs, as instantiated in the works of Bacon. However, philosophy in the West had also begun to see the rise of thought-schemas that aligned themselves within the phraseology of the mechanistic sciences by the seventeenth century as instantiated in the works of the so-called 'rationalists' of the modern period.<sup>25</sup> But it was in the works of the so-called 'empiricists' that philosophy adopted, not merely the phraseology of the positivistic sciences, but also its methodology. It is this alignment of philosophy with the natural sciences that saw the discourse on morality move precariously on the borderline of a deterministic system, barely managing to secure freedom. Bentham's Utilitarianism clearly manifests this tension. The Aristotelian idea of 'metaphysics' now takes a back

seat as the philosophical engagement with metaphysics gets to be indistinguishable from 'physics' under the banner of 'Natural Philosophy', and epistemological and moral inquiries get into the investigation of mechanical 'powers' and 'structures' of the mind leading to the development of a new domain of Psychology. It is in this moment of crisis that Kant explores the possibility of securing an independent domain for philosophy as a metaphysical inquiry. Kant's critical philosophy is an attempt to free the notion of 'autonomy' and 'freedom' from the realm of phenomena and to provide for it the securer grounds of the noumenal realm. This brief trajectory in the history of Ideas in the West is of cardinal importance to our concern here since this intervention of the Newtonian mechanistic world-view within the world of ideas posed a serious threat, and challenged the very nature and purpose of philosophy as the discourse to illuminate and provide ultimate truths. Thus, Kant's project of devising a scientific metaphysics, thereby securing an exclusive realm for the 'transcendental' that authenticates the purpose of philosophy, can be viewed as a response to this challenge, without in turn challenging the world-view presented by the Newtonian mechanistic vision of the world.

Looked at from this perspective, the acceptance of the marking of 'Indian philosophy' as 'spiritual' appears to be a well thought-out move since it provides the possibility of grounding philosophy elsewhere, as was perhaps seen by Radhakrishnan and Malkani, who were both well versed in the problems that plagued philosophy in the West.<sup>26</sup> Radhakrishnan's declaration in 1923 that 'Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual'<sup>27</sup> is thus not just an innocent characterization that follows Muller's emphasis of 'Indian Philosophy' as essentially grounded in the pursuit of 'mokṣa' as a product of leisure,<sup>28</sup> but is rather the opening up of the possibility of framing 'truth' within a discourse other than that of science within the complex epistemological and ontological structures of traditional Indian thought-schemas. The acceptance of the mark of 'spiritual' thus entailed that philosophy shared its ground with religion rather than with the natural sciences. Ewing, who attended the Silver Jubilee of IPC, perceptively remarks that he finds a ray of hope in philosophical thinking prevalent in India as it escapes the positivistic mode of thought that has plagued the West, since philosophers in India source their inspiration from Philosophy of Religion, rather than from the Philosophy of Science.<sup>29</sup> Further, one can now appreciate the mode in which the early Anglophone philosopher in India upheld the spiritual nature of the Indian thought-schemas in

the context of their engagement with the question of *novelty*. The discourse concerning the notion of 'novelty' in the West<sup>30</sup> understood it as a discovery that presented a new relation amongst shared elements of our understanding about the world of experience. In this sense, novelty consisted in an assertion of a relation between entities that was hitherto unnoticed and un-asserted, though the claimed relationship between the elements had *always been there*. Since 'novelty' in natural science was construed to be of this nature, and thus, if philosophy shared its grounds with science, then novelty in philosophy too would have to be of this nature. Further, 'rationality' in the West was beginning to be defined in terms of such discoveries that would in turn cater to the idea of the 'progress' of a discourse. But a claim asserting that the very ground of philosophy differs from that of science allowed for a legitimate response to the assertion of 'stagnancy' and 'lack of progress' of traditional Indian thought-schemas by simply pointing out that those notions of 'novelty' and 'progress' did not apply to the discourse that is philosophy. Akhilanda's review article clearly highlights the awareness that the Anglophone thinkers had pertaining to the peculiarity of the question concerning 'novelty' that was brought in by the dominance of the Newtonian mechanistic science. The mechanistic paradigm heralded in the West confined the world of philosophical discourse to the realm of experience. Hence, traditional Indian thought-schemas, whose domain essentially engaged with a realm that transcended it, could never really be seen as progressive in that light. Thus, for asserting a legitimate claim of novelty and progress, early Anglophone Indian philosophers too made an attempt to secure an autonomous domain for philosophical discourse which would free it from the binding notions of scientific progress and novelty. Though one can, from the privileged position of the present, question the necessity of this responsive engagement of the Anglophone thinkers of the period with the question of science, yet within the colonial spirit of the time, this was seen as necessary for the defence of the legitimacy of the pre-eminent pursuit of 'ultimate truth' as propounded by the traditional Indian thought-schemas. Since 'reason' was held to be synonymous with the progress of science in the West, the Indian concern with *mokṣa*, which provided it its distinctive feature of spirituality, also placed it at odds with reason itself. Indian Philosophy, which by virtue of its orientation transcended the world that could be accessed through the tools of either 'reason' or experience, therefore called for the securing of a distinct domain and a distinct tool.<sup>31</sup> Towards this end, one can

better appreciate the efforts of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya whose philosophical engagement assumed the form of an investigation into the contrasting nature of science and philosophy to argue for a distinct *telos*, and therefore, a distinct domain for philosophy. Thus when seen within the larger context of the question of 'novelty' and 'progress', one gets a clearer picture of the perspective that lay beneath the unwavering efforts of the earlier Anglophone Indian thinkers to defend the spiritualistic nature of philosophy, as well as their upholding of 'introspection' as a distinct cognitive tool, over and above those of sense experience and reason.<sup>32</sup> A similar sentiment is reflected in the thoughts of Nawab Mehdi Yarin, a contemporary of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, in his Welcome Address to the 15<sup>th</sup> session of IPC held in Hyderabad in 1939.<sup>33</sup> It is in the light of this alternative mode of arguing for the possibility of 'novelty' within the traditional Indian thought-schemas that this enigmatic acclaiming of 'spirituality' as a distinctive mark of Indian Philosophy gathers appreciative force. We qualify this force as 'appreciative' since it subverts the very stigmatic mark within a power structure and turns it, with astute clarity, into a defensive tool.<sup>34</sup> It is also in this light that one can interpret the 'missionary spirit'<sup>35</sup> that shapes G.R. Malkani's Presidential Address delivered during the twenty-fourth IPC held at Patna in 1949, where he defends the persistence in the so-called traditional preoccupations of Indian philosophy with the pursuit of eternal truth within its *spiritual telos*. Overtaken by this missionary spirit for the cause of philosophy in India, Malkani addresses the contention regarding the stagnancy and un-progressive character of Indian philosophy, more directly. Reflecting upon the alleged stagnancy prevalent in the 'field of philosophic creativeness' in India, he admits the loss of an *ideal of truth* during the interim period of 'political subjection' that is necessarily presupposed by traditional Indian thought-schemas as a guide in the pursuit of philosophical activity.<sup>36</sup> One cannot miss the soft but emphatic underlining by Malkani of the fact that this political subjection empowers, what is otherwise a superfluous and erroneous ideal of the West of 'pure scientific reason' to become an influence to reckon with. Malkani holds that within the prevalent structure of power, such is the influence of this Western ideal that it has managed to make us believe in the binary opposition between discourses related to religion as representing Indian scholarship, and the discourse on modern science as representing the scholarship of the West. Malkani finds this equation between religion and ancient Indian scholarship problematic not because this equation does not hold. His discomfort

rather lies in his positive conviction that the West fails to realize that it is precisely because 'Indian philosophy' is rooted in ancient Indian religion that it is more philosophical and grounded in the lived-experience than is science with its ideal of 'pure abstract reason'. However, the crux of his argument is that even if this transition in ideals is granted, and if we do dismiss the ideal inspired by ancient religious thoughts of India to be no more in vogue, the question about the ideal that philosophy as a discipline of inquiry should aim for, would still persist. Hence Malkani's stance is to probe further into this question of the ideals that *ought* to guide the *telos* of philosophical inquiry and whether they can be conflated with the ideal that guides science. For Malkani, the cardinal concern thus transforms into a question pertaining to the nature of truth that the philosophical inquiry *ought* to be in pursuit of, in contrast to the truths that natural sciences pursue. Malkani holds that scientific ideals mould themselves around a notion of truth that is held to be 'probable and practical'<sup>37</sup> in nature, while philosophical inquiries are invariably in search of absolute truths, notwithstanding their differences among themselves regarding the nature of these truths. Thus, he holds that philosophical and scientific truths serve different purposes and aspects of life. For Malkani, inherent in the hypothetical nature of scientific truths, is the fact that they can only serve the practical ends of life such as gaining control over the environment and nature. On the other hand, philosophical truths are meant to serve a higher end of the *spirit* that dwell in higher levels of life. In other words, Malkani's argument implies that whatever be the nature of truth that we attribute to philosophy, this truth will come to guide our lives, in the sense that philosophy and life inspire each other. In this respect, the full blown entailment of Malkani's position is that confusing the nature of scientific truth with the nature of philosophic truth, and the equating of the philosophic pursuit of truth with mere reasoning will ultimately result in a life that is in abject poverty in terms of its *telos*.

Malkani further argues that the idea of progress that is rooted in the scientific attitude is occasioned by its ideal of 'reason' that is disassociated from life.<sup>38</sup> In other words, Malkani asks, can philosophical truth appear progressive if it is rooted in the *telos* of life and is inspired by it? That is to ask, can life take radically new forms when the absolute truth remains constant? Malkani admits that though absolute truth as the orientation of philosophic life cannot give rise to radically new forms periodically, this does not imply that absolute truth always takes the form of religion such as in

Advaita Vedānta, which was the predominant philosophical thinking during his period. Rather, the ways in which we come to 'appreciate' and experience absolute truth vary with the change of times, so that it may come to acquire a form of dialogue with science, due to the predominant influence it has in the present age.<sup>39</sup> Nonetheless, Malkani maintains that this should not lead one to conflate the nature of philosophic truth with that of scientific truth.

Likewise, A.C. Mukerji's Presidential Address to the IPC in 1950, explicitly gestures towards a stance that is adopted in order to respond to the allegations prevalent about Indian scholarship in philosophy of its failure to contribute anything novel to the fields of epistemology and metaphysics due to stagnancy and redundancy prevalent in its domain of ideas.<sup>40</sup> Mukerji expresses a concern that the question of 'novelty' that has come to be forced upon the traditional fields of philosophical inquiry has had a devastating result in so far as the concern for 'truth' has been subjugated by the concern for novelty in a bid to acquire a 'modern form'.<sup>41</sup> Mukerji perceives this superficiality to be a debilitating influence upon Indian traditional scholarship and argues that we should, in contrast, encourage ourselves to 'resolutely and boldly' continue in the traditional mode of knowledge production in the respective fields of epistemology and metaphysics. Therefore, what follows is an appeal, as much as a justification for his 'allegiance to the old method' and perspectives that consisted of such engagement in Indian philosophical scholarship.<sup>42</sup> Thus, Mukerji chooses to analyse the 'new orientation'<sup>43</sup> in the field of epistemology and metaphysics that holds the dawn of a 'new insight' into the understanding of reality as being synonymous with 'progress' or a philosophical advancement. He deems such a construal of 'advancement' to be disastrous if this craze for novelty is taken to entail a complete discontinuity from the initiatives of the past inquiries. No novelty, Mukerji holds, could be detached from the old theories for

...paradoxical as it may appear, a total discontinuity between a new theory and the old would render its critical weapons totally ineffective against the latter. To put it from the other side, the underlying unity and continuity of views is the very reason why they come into clash...<sup>44</sup>

For Mukerji, if novelty is not seen in the light of this relation that the 'new' must bear with the past, then it comes to assume a form that is driven by a personal initiative to depart from the past. He avers that

... [the] assumption is disastrous for it promotes an unhealthy craze

for originality and encourages a sort of dilettantish attitude to the achievements of the past. Personal initiative is, no doubt, a great virtue in philosophy...but...when completely divorced from an intelligent appropriation of the heritage of the past...is ill-suited for furthering the cause of truth.<sup>45</sup>

Mukerji contends that the West has always conceived Philosophy as an activity that was presumed to operate with a natural predisposition towards the 'speculative impulse'<sup>46</sup> that hinges upon creating 'aberrations' from the preceding history of thought as is evident through Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel. Or, in other words, as Mukerji holds, the West has held the belief that to attribute the character of progress or novelty to the discourse of philosophy, one has to arrange the epochs of philosophical thought in historical order and establish that a specific philosophical activity has necessarily displaced the preceding tradition of thought and has departed from it considerably.

Mukerji's concern, it can be observed, is not with the criterion that can be deemed as a yardstick to measure novelty. Rather in tune with Malkani, it is about novelty's relation with truth itself. That is to say, the question about novelty could also have been addressed by seeking a redefinition of the yardstick to measure it. The path chosen by Malkani and Mukerji to forge a relationship between the questions of truth and novelty can be arguably seen as the crystallization of the perspectival approach of the early Anglophone Indian philosophers in a bid to demarcate a distinct identity for 'Indian Philosophy'. These early Anglophone Indian philosophers, who can be classified as the Traditionalists<sup>47</sup> choose, given the demand of the hour, to partake and own the emergent appellation called 'Indian Philosophy', by identifying the relation between truth and traditional Indian thought-schemas within a distinctive realm of the 'spiritual'. In other words, they adopted an attitude that takes a step aside, a way of detour, in addressing the question about novelty that is identified as being absent from the Indian philosophical discourse, by instead probing into the equation between novelty and truth. In other words, these thinkers sought to present 'Indian philosophy' primarily as an activity in the pursuit of a 'distinct kind of truth' from that of science. This enabled them to recast the emergent perception regarding philosophy's relation to novelty in a way that made the scientific ideal of 'progress' as adopted by the thought-schemas of the West appear as misplaced.

However as anticipated by Malkani, this mode of addressing the question of 'novelty' by securing an independent realm for the

discourse that is philosophy, and thereby securing for it an exclusive relation to a notion of truth that is inaccessible to the insights of the discourse of natural sciences, faces a distinct problem. The problem can be formulated as follows. Suppose we do grant the securing of a domain that is distinct from the realm with which science is engaged, and thereby, also allow for a distinct and exclusive nature of truth disclosed by philosophy, then we would consequently have to grant a distinct notion of 'novelty' and 'progress' to the realm of philosophy. But then, a question pertaining to the nature of this novelty and progress within this distinctive realm of philosophy would arise. Since truth in this realm is held to be absolute and hence impervious to change, the relation of the discourse to that of truth within the realm of philosophy could only differ in terms of its disclosure and in the stylistic structures adopted for its rendition. This would make novelty a matter of method and style. Hermeneutical understanding, in that case, would have to confine itself to mere rhetoric.

It is in light of this challenge, that one sees the efforts of P.T. Raju's<sup>48</sup> whose works can be categorized as marking a transition from the strict Traditionalists' view to the non-Traditionalistic ones as seen in works of later thinkers like Matilal, Mohanty and Daya Krishna. Addressing the idea of progress in Indian philosophy, Raju carries over the concerns that the Traditionalists were occupied with, such as the perception that the ultimate goal of philosophy was the pursuit of ultimate truth and that this was synonymous with ultimate reality. Nonetheless, he develops a dual temporal structure of time, that underlines that the understanding and contemplation upon this timeless eternal truth has to relate 'time' itself to the 'life of the time', and can only be legitimately expressed as the 'life of the time reflecting upon itself'.<sup>49</sup> This perception of philosophy implies that while the ultimate reality to be uncovered remains the same for all *darśanas* of Indian traditions as well as for those who seek it through Western philosophy, the way we apprehend this reality may vary from tradition to tradition and from time to time. Hence to the question, whether there is progress in (Indian) philosophy Raju provides an ambivalent answer. He would thus affirm progress to the extent that we do not confuse progress in philosophy with the progress of truth itself, though our 'understanding'<sup>50</sup> of this same eternal truth can vary from age to age. Thus progress can be celebrated in terms of this variance in the understanding of the truth, where this variance will come to express itself through different concepts. Under the ambit of the postulate of a universal truth that is indifferent to the mundane division of the East and

the West, the significance of Raju's move lies in the mode in which he posits the flourishing of new concepts within our discourse—both eastern as well as western—scientific as well as religious, as nothing more than the mere expression of the variance in the understanding of the universal truth by virtue of the grounds through which one is attempting to grasp it. The adoption of such a spatio-temporal frame of understanding the eternal truth allows P.T. Raju to link his conceptual scheme with science. This allows him to easily blend it with the non-Traditionalists' opposition to the fixity of tradition. Raju's perception about science is not that it is the predominant mode of conceptualising truth in the modern age; rather he makes the subversive assertion that 'scientific thought'<sup>51</sup> is the mode in which 'time' leaves its imprint upon thought *here and now*, in this historical epoch. Given the scientific spirit of contemporary times, philosophical thought invariably has to relate itself to the scientific one in order to assume the spirit of contemporaneity. Implicit in his advocacy of science as the mode of contemporaneity is his belief that scientific thought is representative of Western philosophical thinking as such. It is this conflating of the connotation of these two terms, that is 'science' and 'western philosophy', that allows him to declare the need of a comparative framework of doing philosophy, where Indian philosophical activity should feel obliged to compare and relate itself with the Western thought-schemas. He writes,

The student of Indian philosophy is therefore under the special obligation of bringing Indian thought into line with the Western...We should see not only similarities but also differences between Western and Indian thinkers and should study these similarities and differences systematically.<sup>52</sup>

For Raju, this comparative framework is a way of revoking the Traditionalists' belief that the ultimate truth is a revelation unmediated by reason through either *nididhyāsana*, or *aparokṣānubhūti*, and amounts to 'empty speculation'.<sup>53</sup> He therefore rejects the possibility of treating it as a mode to assert the superiority of one discourse over the other.

This concern with revoking the *telos* of the philosophy-truth framework that insistently tried to re-define philosophy around this equation, had also another objective or task at hand. As opposed to the Traditionalists who were defensive of the 'spiritual' aspects of Indian philosophy, and thus stood in an uneasy relation with the discourse of science, the non-Traditionalist is confronted with a task of developing a counter-view that treats Indian philosophy to be of

'antiquarian interest',<sup>54</sup> which had quarantined Indian philosophy as the subject matter of Indologists, Orientalists, and Philologists. P.T. Raju observes, there was a similar tug-of-war going on between Indian history and archaeology on the question whether Indian historical material belongs to the legitimate concern of archaeologists, or if it is still of any contemporary value.<sup>55</sup> It is to counter this trend of classifying Indian thought systems to be of mere antiquarian interest, that Raju argues for the comparative framework in order to reconstruct Indian thought 'according to certain scientific methods borrowed from Western philosophy, so as to bring it into 'close contact with modern life'.<sup>56</sup> In other words, his effort consisted of affirming life to traditional Indian thought-schemas, which otherwise was deemed dead, precisely by revisiting the past, much in tune with Mukerji, from the historical position of the *now*.

In a similar vein, Matilal also writes, 'The age of my material seems to justify a philological treatment, whereas the content of the material pleads for use of philosophy'.<sup>57</sup> Defending Matilal's thesis, Mohanty overrules the view held by Western canonical thinkers such as Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger et al., who held that Indian thinking lacks theory and conceptual orientation.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the non-Traditionalists who attempt to resurrect Indian thinking from the realm of antiquarian interest find themselves to be endorsing 'comparative philosophy' as a counter step. Moreover, as opposed to the philologists' and the indologists', who mostly refer to this corpus in its original form in Sanskrit, the philosophers' interest in the same material, set them apart due to their articulation in English. Thus, the choice of the English language as the medium of expression cannot merely be seen as a mode of assuring a pseudo proximity to power, but is rather to be construed as a methodological tool of differentiation. This linguistic advantage of philosophising in English made them readily embrace the comparative framework as the sole platform that would set them apart from the antiquarian interest in the same. Hence for both Matilal and Mohanty, the comparative method of philosophy is unavoidable for a modern Indian philosopher who invests himself or herself in extending the trajectory of thought from ancient philosophical traditions of India. As Mohanty puts it, comparative philosophy is the only way to dissolve and 'cut across East-West dichotomy'.<sup>59</sup> Language, for Matilal as well, becomes both the bridge that could 'initiate a dialogue between the ancient Sanskrit classical philosophers and the modern [Indian] philosophers', while at the same time bridging the temporal gap of providing the dialogue with a spirit of talking to contemporaries, rather than to

the dead thoughts of dead people.<sup>60</sup> Thus for Matilal, the notion of 'contemporaneity' provides a mode of bridging the temporal gap between the past and the present and thereby, allows contemporary Indian philosophers to distance themselves from the concerns of the indologists and the philologists. It is crucial to note here, that the optimistic heralding of comparative philosophy is predicated on the underlying belief that comparisons can only take place between systems that are commensurable and thus theoretically at par. This belief, as we shall see later, acts as the originary grounds for the paradigm of a universal discourse.

### The question of novelty in the context of post-colonialism

Murty very aptly portrays the post-colonial experience of the post-colonial philosopher when he writes:

Contemporary Free India seems to present to many Western people a phenomenon difficult to comprehend. They have been taught to believe that the Indian genius is predominantly mystical, that traditions in India endure for centuries without change... Indian scholars themselves in their works often gave their readers the impression that India cared only for things spiritual, that renunciation, detachment, and moksa... were the themes which formed the core of the Indian Way of Life. The subconscious inferiority complex of the older generation of Indian scholars made them assert the superiority of Indian culture over Western at least in that respect... the almost exclusive emphasis which both European and Indian scholars placed on the *sastras* concerned only with nirvana and mokṣa were responsible for this. If Kautilya, Brahma Gupta, Varahamihiri, Caraka, and Vatsyayana had received as much attention as the writers of Upanisads, the Buddha and Sankara from competent European and Indian scholars, the picture of India in both modern Western and Eastern minds would have been different....[sic]<sup>61</sup>

As stated in the very introductory paragraph of this article, the position of respectability that was secured for the claim that every philosophical position or concept has its originary grounds in the *zeitgeist* or the spirit of the time, has led to a much more radical and critical reading of the early Anglophone Indian philosophers' engagement with the question of novelty. The fact of the absence of the colonial *other*, in a sense, left a vacuum in the very structure of philosophical engagement that made it even more arduous to follow the trajectory that philosophical discourse had been given thus far. Further, by the second half of the twentieth century, the celebratory spirit of the natural sciences was on the wane resulting in

a general disenchantment with the very idea of 'progress' it offered, especially after the experiences of the two world wars. Though, this saw a rise in the projection of 'Indian philosophy' with its humanistic and spiritualistic approach as an alternative to the paradigm of progress as upheld by the West, it also saw a fresh move from other Anglophone Indian thinkers who found themselves in a fresh, and a distinct position of 'freedom' in the second half of the twentieth century. For the latter group, the availability of a fresh ground translated into a critical opposition towards the perspective that sought to protect and defend a set of perceptions that had come to be associated with the spirit of 'Indian philosophy'. The question regarding the nature of 'Indian philosophy', now positioned itself in independence of the demands of the nationalist movement. The Traditionalists' perception, which aligned itself with the views of the early Indologists', came to constitute the Orientalists' discourse which identified certain absences as characteristic of the stagnation of oriental civilisations. This new set of radical Anglophone Indian thinkers was no longer academically obliged to espouse the cause of the hallowed and consolidated notion of 'Indian Philosophy'. Since they appear on the academic scene of India post-independence, no such ideological requirement weighed them down, and this granted them the freedom to be highly critical of the position upheld by the Traditionalists. In the hands of these post-nationalist thinkers, philosophical discourse tried to wriggle away from the image that 'Indian philosophy' had come to be circumstantially associated with. This very demand to move away entailed that they also had to move away from all the discourses that were cardinally shaped by the acceptance of the mark of 'spirituality' as the differentiating feature of 'Indian philosophy'. In this group of post-colonial thinkers we could count Daya Krishna, J. N. Mohanty and Rajendra Prasad who brought about a shift in the very mode of construing the engagement with traditional thought-schemas.

As J.N. Mohanty puts it, those thinkers who emerged in the post-colonial Indian scenario of academic philosophy,

...were looking for some way of doing Indian philosophy that would steer us clear of the paths that lay before us and with which many of us had already become disenchanted.<sup>62</sup>

In Mohanty and Matilal, one can clearly discern the urgency to dissociate from the philosophical trajectory provided by the Traditionalists who upheld the view that the hallmark of Indian philosophy is its practical orientation towards *mokṣa* that makes its

spiritual search culminate in the 'mystic intuition of truth'.<sup>63</sup> Thinkers such as Matilal, Mohanty, and Daya Krishna wanted to exorcise Indian philosophising of traditionalism and affirm its legitimate presence through the 'theoretical', 'analytical', 'logical' and 'intellectual' character in a bid to place Indian philosophy on an equal footing with that of the West.<sup>64</sup> In the context of the changed scenario, the emphasis thus, was now upon the value of equality rather than that of differentiation. In other words the defining *arche* of their engagement was to enable the participation of traditional Indian thought-schemas in a 'universal discourse'. It is this demand that presses Rajendra Prasad to emphatically insist on the distinction between 'Indian culture' and 'Indian philosophy'.<sup>65</sup> Prasad's insistence upon this distinction rests on the fact that while the former can legitimately claim a unique identity of 'Indianness', the latter must move away from all such claims of distinction in order to legitimately raise itself to the level of a universal discourse. Thus, the first concern at hand was to address and to undo the legitimacy of the claims of *peculiarity* upheld by the Traditionalists prior to them. It is towards this end that Daya Krishna's highly critical stance towards thinkers of the colonial period, who associated the purpose of philosophical activity with the attainment of *mokṣa*, makes calculative sense. Daya Krishna's plot is to trace the concept of *mokṣa* and to engage with it in such a way so as to show that the idea of *mokṣa*, if upheld as the pivotal concept grounding the mark of a spiritual *telos*, would culminate in redundant forms.<sup>66</sup> Daya Krishna argues that if it be the case that philosophy's task is merely to show the possibility of *mokṣa*, then it fails to project itself as an evolving discourse that continues its activities across centuries and into the modern age, since philosophy can then only be construed as merely 'apprehending the same possibility'.<sup>67</sup> In other words, Daya Krishna argues that within the Traditionalists' construal of philosophy, the sameness of the object that philosophy *ought* to concern itself with and pursue, namely *mokṣa*, makes the conception of Indian philosophy 'redundant',<sup>68</sup> as it fails to give an account of a 'progressive and evolutionary character'<sup>69</sup> of the concept of *mokṣa*. Daya Krishna's argument implies that the concept of *mokṣa* upheld by these thinkers as the one on which philosophy is grounded, lacks a scientific character, and rather comes to present itself as one constituted of an artistic nature. Thus, Daya Krishna's central argument against the Traditionalists was that if the activity of philosophy is tailored to serve any rigid *telos*, such as *mokṣa* (as construed by the Traditionalists), then philosophy can only be construed as a subjective pursuit of individuals over the ages; and

that philosophy as such possesses no 'autonomous validity' as such.<sup>70</sup>

But the stiff resistance towards the Traditionalists' paradigm and the need to move away from it is also grounded in the slow but steady realization that after all, the very acceptance of the unified label of 'Indian philosophy' was not an easy category to uphold, unless one conflated the unified whole to be Vedānta. Rajendra Prasad's reflections upon the Traditionalists' resistance towards the idea of progress probes into the presuppositions implicit in the views of Malkani, J.N. Chubb, R.C. Varadachari, Narasingh Narain, T.M.P. Mahadevan et al. He highlights the fact that the Traditionalists' defence of the spiritualistic aspect of Indian tradition, consciously or unconsciously, referred solely to the philosophical tradition of Vedānta in the form in which it came to be embraced by the nationalist movement. This appropriation which had its reasons then,<sup>71</sup> was however, seen by the radical thinkers of the post-colonial period as being detrimental to the project of engaging with the rich traditional Indian thought-schemas in the context of an independent India. As Rajendra Prasad argues, if on the one hand, the overwhelming attention garnered by Vedānta that was projected as *the* thought-schema during the period of colonial intervention came to heavily overshadow the other existing philosophical traditions, it on the other hand, underplayed the variegated nature of traditions that subsist on the Indian sub-continent that resisted a single homogenous classification under a category called 'Indian'.<sup>72</sup> However, for Prasad, it is not merely such constricted picture of 'Indian philosophy' that is problematic for the furthering or 'progress' of 'Indian philosophy' in contemporary times. Rather, any move to restrict the scope of the term 'Indian philosophy' to connote classical Indian traditions is itself a problem since it inevitably draws one to accept the parameters of philosophizing that is set by the boundaries of the tradition. In other words, for Rajendra Prasad, such a move would subsume the 'contemporary' firmly within the 'tradition'. For him such an imposed essential 'return to the tradition' translates into a mode of control that consequently results in the impossibility of any 'originality' of thought in contemporary philosophical engagements. He contends,

...it is wrong, too, to mean by Indian philosophy only ancient Indian philosophy. But, if the traditionalist is liberal enough to include in the Indian tradition all that genuinely forms a part of it, then, by requiring future developments to conform to it, he cannot exercise on them the kind of control he wants to, because, in that case, it would not be impossible to establish the concordance of any new theory with it.

'Originality', for Prasad, can emerge only when the intellectual

respect for one's tradition is not 'allowed to degenerate into uncritical devotion'<sup>73</sup> and opens the tradition to a critical appraisal. He holds that it is such timely critical appraisals that open up the possibility of 'our deep-seated convictions [to get...] challenged and well established beliefs questioned in a reasoned way [such that] we are forced to think afresh and make new departures in our intellectual journey'.<sup>74</sup> Thus for Prasad, philosophy finds its 'creative expressions' of originality<sup>75</sup> not in a 'return to the tradition' or in 'one's groundedness in it' but rather in the 'intellectual challenges' that emerge when the tradition is looked upon with a critical gaze that is due. Thus, in the context of a politically free India and the disenchantment with science with its ideal of scientific progress under question, the question of novelty gets subsumed under the correlated notion of 'originality of thought'. However, since the concept of 'originality' is seen as the mark of 'creative thinking'<sup>76</sup> itself, it no longer becomes the dominant pillar in the scaffolding erected for the project of the re-construction of the traditional modes of Indian thought-schemas in the latter half of the twentieth century. The primordial concern that vexes the Anglophone philosopher in India now is the question of raising the traditional Indian thought-schemas to a 'universal discourse'. It is this paradigm of 'universal discourse' that draws the critics of the Traditionalists towards the complete downplaying of the epithet 'Indian' that prefixes the term 'philosophy' in the context of philosophical discourse in India. Thus, if the Traditionalists were geared towards providing a meaning to such a characterization of the traditional Indian thought-schemas in terms of the mark of 'spirituality', their critics, in stark contrast, takes this to be nothing more than a 'geographical label' that denotes the country where philosophical 'creative expression' sees the light.<sup>77</sup> It is also this project of aligning itself towards the paradigm of a 'universal discourse' that the question of language becomes a matter of contentious concern. Following Matilal, English was conceived both by Mohanty and Prasad, as a choice that would ease the process of dissociating the philosophical discourse that emerged in India from its 'cultural milieu' to a universal platform.<sup>78</sup> Though Mohanty does not conceive anything intrinsic to the English language as such that renders it a suitable medium for, constructing and engaging with, a 'universal discourse'; he nevertheless takes the 'historical contingency' of the situation that raises English as the most suitable medium for such a universal discourse as an undeniable fact. Since the critics of the traditionalists' discourse sought to re-present a rectified picture of the traditional Indian thought-schemas to

scholars, both at home and abroad, and given their aspiration to place them within a paradigm of 'universal discourse', their choice of English as the medium of this re-presentation was a carefully crafted decision. It was a decision that was made well within the awareness of the power structures of the politics of language. Their choice of language was thus a choice that was not merely incidental to the larger landscaping of 'Indian philosophy', but was rather cardinal to their very project of 'universalizing' the traditional Indian thought-schemas into a position of a 'universal discourse'.<sup>79</sup>

#### Towards a seeming conclusion

Let us return to the question of 'novelty'. The Anglophone Indian philosopher's engagement with the notion of novelty can be read as emerging during the colonial times, in a trajectory that sought to secure an autonomous domain for philosophy vis-à-vis the natural sciences. This being so, the early Anglophone Indian philosophers were tightly framed within their own historical position of colonialism. Thus, 'Indian philosophy' in their hands, seems to recede into the ideology of the nationalistic discourse, which was undeniably the overarching spirit of the times.<sup>80</sup> In contrast, the positioning of traditional Indian thought-schemas within the broader framework of 'universal discourse' in the hands of the critics of Traditionalism, is precisely an attempt to distance the traditional Indian thought-schemas from such an ideology of the nationalistic discourse and project it in terms of a more universal or/and 'secular' trajectory that is devoid of any constrictive 'cultural traits'. However, the absence of the ideology of the nationalistic discourse in the deliberations on the nature of traditional Indian thought-schemas in the writings of Daya Krishna, Mohanty and Prasad cannot be read as an ideological vacuity, for a closer reading of their critiques of the Traditionalists disclose that their proposed paradigm of philosophy as a 'universal discourse' itself emerges within the new global ideology of 'contemporaneity'. Daya Krishna contends that,

Indian Philosophy will come alive only when it is seen to be a living stream of thinkers who have grappled with difficult problems that are, philosophically, as alive today as they were in the ancient past. Indian philosophy will become contemporarily relevant only when it is conceived as philosophy proper.<sup>81</sup>

It is evident that for Daya Krishna, the death of 'Indian philosophy' is inalienably related to its inability to portray itself within the

paradigm of contemporaneity. For him, this failure on the part of Indian philosophy is due to the fact that

...it hardly forms a part of the philosophical climate of today- not even in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle form a part-not even in India, where at least, it may legitimately be expected to be so.<sup>82</sup>

Daya Krishna asserts that,

...the fault for all this lies squarely on the shoulders of all those who have written on the subject and tried to create the impression that Indian philosophy is not philosophy proper, but something else- something they regard as more profound, but certainly not the sort of thing which goes under that name today.<sup>83</sup>

Mohanty and Prasad, who also align themselves with Daya Krishna's vehement rejection of the modality in which the Traditionalists projected 'Indian philosophy' under the rubric of 'spirituality', bring to light a fundamental belief that underlies this rejection: namely, that it is only when a tradition finds itself to be in dialogue with a thinker of the past, as a contemporary rather than a dead soul, that it comes to mark itself as being contemporary to the time. One can thus read Mohanty's effort to redefine the notion of tradition by subtly dissociating its meaning from the notion of 'orthodoxy' and aligning it with the notion of 'modernity', thereby side stepping the problem of novelty in Indian philosophical thought.<sup>84</sup> But we must realise that this side-stepping is only a move to replace the concept of 'novelty' with that of 'contemporaneity' as a cardinal notion that 'mediates' between tradition and modernity.<sup>85</sup> Thus, one can observe a shift in the post-colonial thinkers' mode of characterizing 'Indian philosophy' as equipped to engage with the concerns of 'contemporariness', in which the question of 'novelty' gets translated into a notion of 'relevance'. After all, notwithstanding the vagueness that surrounds the notion of 'contemporaneity', the notion, minimally speaking, is suggestive of a discourse as being present to the time in which it emerges. In that respect, so to speak, a discourse that is contemporary must have within its reach the concerns of the present time, whatever those concerns be. This belief is what comes to be foregrounded in the critiques of the Traditionalists' positioning of philosophy. While the Traditionalists resisted adopting the Western definition of philosophy by taking an introspective turn into the *telos* of philosophical pursuit and its equation with 'truth', their critics like Daya Krishna, Mohanty, and Prasad, adhered to the Western construal of 'secular' philosophy by trying to uncover

the non-spiritual dimensions of Indian philosophical corpus so that it can talk to a global and a contemporary *other*. Thus, while both the 'traditionalists', as well as their 20<sup>th</sup> century critics, aimed at positioning the philosophy as pursued in India as a relevant mode of philosophizing, their respective engagements prodded them into exploring two different modes of commitments. While the Traditionalists highlighted the aspect where the discourse itself seeks to interpretatively engage with the 'contemporary' through their engagement with the then concern of 'novelty' and the position of philosophy, the latter thinkers take the 'contemporary' as regulating the interpretative aspect of the discourse itself. After all, it must be foregrounded that the pivotal position secured by the notion of 'contemporaneity' is itself rooted in the loss of faith in framing philosophical pursuit as a quest for essential truths that transcends our experienced everydayness. The critics of Traditionalists have a viable philosophical engagement in the broader background of contemporaneity, precisely because the framing of philosophical engagement as the mode to uncover 'ultimate truths' dissolves within the broad philosophical scenario by the late twentieth century.

However, what we seek to emphasize is that, notwithstanding the differences, the critics of Traditionalists positioning of philosophy nevertheless share a common point of anchor, namely, the 'tradition'. That is to say both the Traditionalists, as well as their critics, are in agreement with the givenness of a 'tradition that could be legitimately called 'Indian'. The primary difference between the two can be said to revolve around the mode of presenting the tradition, and the ways in which interpretative measures come to play in the respective modes of presenting the tradition. We must not lose sight of the fact that what defines the 'contemporaneity' of a discourse within the framework of the critiques of traditionalism is precisely the mode in which we relate to our tradition. Thus, Daya Krishnan's efforts can be seen as mode of interpreting the tradition in fresher lights, where the quotient of 'freshness' is dependent upon the modality in which the tradition can be appropriated within the present times through dimensions of the traditions that were either suppressed, or ignored, by the Traditionalists.

In other words, what we are suggesting is the urgency to reflect upon the historical positioning of the emergence of our obsession with being 'adequately contemporary' or what amounts to the same as being 'relevant'. The question, what is it to do 'Indian philosophy' in the twenty-first century, is not a question that either the Traditionalists or their critics like Daya Krishna, Mohanty, or

Prasad can provide a foundation for us to answer. After all, the critics of the traditionalists' representation of 'Indian philosophy' merely paves the way for us to reinterpret Indian philosophy or enables us to rewrite its trajectory and the mode in which we understand them in alternative and broader ways. Mohanty's *Classical Indian Philosophy*,<sup>86</sup> for instance, is a case in point. But unless we take philosophy to be an interpretative effort of rewriting the history of ideas, we would have to face an even more pressing challenge, namely, what do we do with these interpretations. By and large, philosophical engagements carried out under the label of 'Indian philosophy', both at the hands of the Traditionalists, as well as their critics, have nevertheless been an engagement that seeks to either present or re-present precisely what constitutes the traditional Indian thought-schemas, in terms of the content as well as its form. Though the critics of the Traditionalists position does provide us with a broader alternative, or what Daya Krishna labels as the 'field theory', perspective of the traditional Indian thought-schemas, they do not, however, tell us how this broader perspective is 'contemporary' or 'relevant' to the times. That is a task that is left open and unaddressed, unless, as we stressed before, we come to equate philosophical activity with the penning down of the history of ideas or providing the sketches of the conceptual contours of the traditional thought-schemas. 'Contemporaneity' in the critiques, at least explicitly in Daya Krishna's critique of Traditionalism, is portrayed in terms of the cleansing of the picture of 'Indian philosophy' from any 'theological hangover',<sup>87</sup> which though makes us aware that the notion of 'contemporaneity' is 'secular' but nevertheless fails to throw much light on what we ought to do with such 'secular' philosophical pictures. Of course, Daya Krishna would tell us that this engagement with the tradition, is not exegetical as we seem to depict it here, and that such an engagement with the tradition is inevitable since, '...thinking is a process that...is not solitary, individual monadic exercise but rather the joint undertaking of a community of visible and invisible persons... [and is]...an unfinished process, unfinishable in principle'.<sup>88</sup> This is, however, suggestive of the idea that philosophical perplexities transcend the specificities of space and time as well as the specificities of the individual who is engaged with them, and thus are universal in their essential nature. Such a suggestion is inevitable given the adherence to the paradigm of a 'universal discourse' and hence the unquestionable need to write Indian philosophy in English. However, to uphold such a position is to burden the intricate relationship between the questions 'what

is Indian philosophy?' and, 'what is it to *do* Indian philosophy in the present times?' by suggesting that an answer to one of them would dissolve the other question. It is precisely the non-demarcation between these two questions as demanding distinct justifications and orientations that allows the critics of Traditionalism to position their critiques as a mode of 'doing' Indian philosophy, when in fact they are more broadly engaged with *showing* what 'Indian philosophy' truly is when rescued from the Traditionalists' clutches.

However, that said, the critics of the traditionalists' positioning of history of Indian thought-schemas had, at the least, a legitimate concern, namely, to undo the singular and the imputed erroneous representation of 'Indian philosophy' in the hands of the Traditionalists. It is this reconfiguration of the contours of 'Indian philosophy' that still renders their philosophical endeavour as a meaningful contribution towards understanding the traditional Indian thought-schemas. On the other hand, we, who are now equipped with the broader horizon of the tradition as sketched in these critiques, must appropriately address the question of what this reinterpretation entails for us. It is for this reason that we must treat with due seriousness the questions as to, 'what is it to *do* Indian philosophy in the twenty-first century?' and 'to whom is Indian philosophy addressing itself to?' The latter is in fact a question that demands a conscious attention to the concerns towards which philosophical activity ought to gear itself. The notion of 'contemporaneity' after all is informed by the nature of concerns that a discourse attunes itself to. It is only against the horizon of these twin questions that we can seek to meaningfully engage with question of the trajectory of 'Indian philosophy' in the present times.

## Notes

\* We are grateful for the reviewer's critical comments.

1. Dharendra Mohan Datta. 'Modern Indian Philosophy: Its Needs and its Social Role', in *Indian Philosophy and History*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996. p. 221.
2. *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Rawat Publications. 2001. p. 13.
3. It is no wonder then that it is only within such a privileging of the *everydayness*, where the everydayness has within its own bounds the power and the structure to constitute, regulate and explain itself, that a discipline like Sociology emerges and flourishes from the late Nineteenth century. In this respect, both Marx and Weber, irrespective of the distinct thought-schemas with which they approach everydayness, agree nevertheless that the everydayness must be explored within its own boundaries. For instance, faced with the enigmatic contours of the everydayness of the modern age and the fundamental problems encountered

therein, both Marx and Weber sought to understand these experiences in terms of relations that were rooted in the *past*. They thus sought the historical positioning of the everydayness rather than seeking to locate it in relation to a realm that transcended it. They both exemplify, and in a significant mode, the faith upon the immanence of the explanatory structures of our lived-world by firmly positioning their explanatory models within the schema of a historical positioning of the everydayness itself. Thus, within Sociology, though Weber's approach towards everydayness is in terms of an interpretative historical positioning of the intellectual and religious structures in contrast to the materialistic approach of Marx, both nevertheless, in their approaches manifest a faith in the immanent explanatory powers found within the bounds of the everydayness itself.

4. The smothering of 'critical philosophy' to its death, notably in the mode in which Kant, and following him Husserl, ardently upheld, echoes the celebration of the triumph of immanent explanatory structures over those that transcend the *everydayness*.
5. The recent projects that re-investigate the philosophical activity of our colonial past have, at the least, taken two forms. The first is constituted by those that probe into the reasons for negligence that is prevalent in Indian scholarship of philosophy that was produced during the colonial period, which then paves the way to the recovery of the works that was produced in this era from its moth eaten form. For instance, Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield's attempt falls within this category; see Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield, (ed.) *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2011. The second mode engages with these works thus recovered by re-imagining and re-envisioning the universe of this academic discourse, so as to build the fabric for engaging in the philosophical activity during the colonial period, and relating it to the present. Raghuramaraju's works have nudged the current scholarship to critically engage with the philosophical discourse of the colonial past in order to more meaningfully engage with the present; see, A. Raghuramaraju, *Philosophy and India: Ancestors, Outsiders, and Predecessors*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2013. Also see S. Deshpande, *Philosophy in Colonial India*, New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015.
6. *Recent Indian Philosophy: Papers Selected from the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925-1934*, Vol. I. (ed.) Kalidas Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers. 1963. p. viii.
7. The label 'Indian philosophy' enabled a large majority of Western scholars to treat the term 'Indian' not as a descriptive term, but rather as a term that qualifies a discourse as philosophy by measuring it against the 'Western' paradigm of what it is to 'philosophize'. For a detailed elaboration upon this distinction, see P. G. Jung, 'The Road Not Taken: Mathrani's Wittgensteinian Quest for Transformation of Philosophy' in *Philosophy in Colonial India*. (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. pp. 167-69 (pp. 165-193)
8. Satchidananda Murty, reminds us that '...in ancient India, at one time philosophy (*ānvīkṣki*) was conceived as the rational, critical and illuminating review of the contents of theology, economics and political science and also as the right instrument and foundation of all action and duty, which helped one to achieve intellectual balance and behavioural competence (*prajñāvākyakṛiyāvaiśāradya*)...

- But unfortunately over the centuries this conception receded due to the domination of the darśana-concept of philosophy as essentially ontology and metaphysics conducive to liberation.' See *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*. Delhi: ICPR. 1985. p. 173.
9. Troy Wilson Organ, was acutely aware of violence that the term 'Indian Philosophy' does to the traditional Indian thought-schemas precisely because it seeks to trap these thought-schemas as a counterpart to Western Philosophy. As a cautionary remark he lists eleven possible terms that could all be used to signify a discourse as philosophical within the Indian traditional thought-schemas, namely, 'drṣṭi, darśana, tattva-jñāna, viveka-jñāna, ānvīksakī, adhyātma-vidyā, prajñā, bodhā, sādhana, anu-īksakī, mata.' (pp. 17-18). See *Western Approaches to Eastern Philosophy*. Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1975.
  10. Max Muller. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Associated Publishing House. 1973. (First published, 1899). p. v.
  11. Ibid. Further it is this linear evolutionary approach that is clearly carried forward by Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy*, though he grants a much larger space in his work to the period before the rise of the systems of Indian thought. Hiriyana and Dutta are much closer to Muller in so far as their minimalistic treatment of other Indian thought-schemas, apart from the 'systems of thought', is concerned. Hiriyana's chapter title 'Transition to the Systems' in his *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, is a clear indicator of Muller's influence. But what is of importance is the fact that these books were readings prescribed for 'Indian Philosophy' both in the East as well as the West and 'Indian Philosophy' came to be seen as synonymous with 'the Systems of thought' by the second half of the twentieth century.
  12. *Indian Philosophy*. (Vol.I & II), London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1923.
  13. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1993. (First Published, 1932); Also, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949.
  14. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Dutta. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. 1960.
  15. It must be emphasized that the 'West' then largely meant the prevalent traditions and thinkers taught, or in vogue, in English speaking countries, in Oxford and Cambridge in particular.
  16. K. Satchidananda Murthy provides a brief, but lucid and informed, account of these terms and the periods that they were in vogue in his, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, ICPR. In this regard, especially see pp. 3-9; 173, which informs the specific claim made by us here.
  17. It is also a similar spirit of cultural defense that roots the birth of *Arya Samaj* in the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, it must be noted that though both the *Brahmo* as well as the *Arya Samaj* were deeply entrenched within the Hindu cultural folds, unlike the *Brahmo Samaj*, which remained a clear fortification against Evangelic forces, the latter, at least in U.P., Bengal and Punjab, was also appropriated as a defense against the Islamic faith with an explicit claim of the superiority of the Vedic religion.
  18. Tilak, for instance, following Max Muller, clearly accepts the inseparability of philosophy and religion in the context of Indian thought-schemas. Further, Radhakrishnan's explicit spiritualistic rendition of 'Indian philosophy' had a profound impact upon this characterization since he was almost identified

as one of the most prominent faces of 'Indian philosophy'. Moreover, even a cursory glance at the articles and reviews that were written beginning in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and going up to the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, show the highlighting of this aspect in a celebratory tone to assert the relevance of 'Indian philosophy' to the West as such.

19. Of course, it could be added here that the grounding of the philosophical reflections as well as religious doctrines within the ambit of the same corpus of Texts might have further helped in blurring the distinction, but to conflate the two on the basis of a singular ground would be to confuse metaphysical reflections within the ambit of theology with religion itself.
20. William Jones, notwithstanding his contributions, is a clear fore-runner of this legacy. Though he did attach an intrinsic value to the study of Asiatic cultures given his 'universal philosophy' where Asiatic philosophy is deemed integral to its history, his motivating force was to explore the reasons behind the 'inferiority of the Asiatic nations'.
21. See, Michael Gottlob, (ed.) 'Introduction' in *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2008. pp.1-11. It is on similar moral grounds that the British Parliament presents its accord to take over charge of India as her colony from the East India Company. See, Metcalf, R. T. *Ideologies of the Raj*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 1995.
22. *Recent Indian Philosophy: Papers Selected from the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925-1934* (Vol. I). (ed.) Kalidas Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers. 1963. p. viii. The Indian Philosophical Congress [IPC] was established by Radhakrishnan, who was then the King George V Professor at the University of Calcutta in 1925 as an avenue for 'philosophers of the country to meet once a year to exchange ideas on the state of research in various branches of the subject'. See *The Metaphysics of Spirit*. (ed.) S.P Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. p. xi.
23. W. T. Stace. 'Novelty, Indeterminism, and Emergence', *The Philosophical Review*, 48: 3. 1939. p. 296.
24. The discourse on 'novelty' construes itself in terms of an opposition between freedom on the one hand and determinism on the other. It is no wonder then that William Jones conceives the backwardness of the Asiatic societies in relation to their lack of political freedom.
25. Descartes epistemological framework, for instance, clearly highlights this tendency.
26. That Radhakrishnan was more than familiar with other Western traditions of the continent and the problems that were cardinal to them is amply highlighted in his *Traditional Philosophy: A Need for Reinterpretation*. See, *Indian Philosophy and History*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996. pp. 148-159.
27. Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Oxford University Press (Vol. I). 2008. p. 4.
28. Muller writes, 'There was hardly any political life in ancient India, such as we know it from the Vedas, and in consequence neither political strife nor municipal ambition. Neither art nor science existed as yet, to call forth the energies of this highly gifted race. While we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and discussions, with new novels and time-killing social functions, have hardly any leisure left to dwell on metaphysical and religious problems, these problems formed almost the only

- subject on which the old inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual energies... What was there to do for those who, in order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys, except to meditate on the world in which they found themselves placed, they did not know how or why?' - *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Associated Publishing House. 1973. (First published, 1899) pp. vi-vii.
29. A.C. Ewing, 'Philosophy in India: Note on Visit to Indian Jubilee Philosophical Congress', in *Philosophy*, 26:98 (July 1951). p. 263.
  30. See, for instance, Charles E. Whitmore. 'The Locus of Novelty', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 35: 6. 1938. pp.141-149; W. T. Stace provides a fairly extensive idea about the nature of concerns pertaining to the notion of 'novelty' in the discourse that would have informed Anglophone thinkers in India in the early half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. See 'Novelty, Indeterminism, and Emergence', *The Philosophical Review*, 48: 3. 1939. pp. 296-310.
  31. This concern of the early Anglophone writers is clearly evident in the nature of their engagements towards the first half of the twentieth century. By and large, these writings, apart from being an engagement with the 'traditional systems of thought of India' are essentially a positioning of 'Indian philosophy' by virtue of its 'spiritual' nature as distinct from science and scientific reason. The Presidential Addresses of the IPC, and the papers presented at the Silver Jubilee Session of the IPC would clearly highlight this fact. It is for this reason that the notion of 'spiritual' and its nature become a matter of significance and garnered a good deal of engagement from the Anglophone philosophers during the early periods of the twentieth century. See, *The Metaphysics of the Spirit*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. It must, however, be mentioned that a notable figure who did not particularly align himself with this tendency was Surendranath Dasgupta. He in fact held the notion that the spirit of abstract reason that the West celebrated in contemporary times was what the traditional thought-schemas of India celebrated centuries earlier; thus he asserts that the reinventing of 'Indian philosophy' would have to find other indigenous avenues. In this sense, Dasgupta presents before us a unique subversive move where the evolutionary nature of philosophical thought and reason is accepted precisely to show how the West was lagging behind. See, 'The Philosophy of Humanity' (1936), in *The Philosophy of Life*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1998. pp. 62-65.
  32. It is this spirit that resonates later in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Presidential Address at the IPC in 1967 as well. He writes, '...the dominance of the present day sciences has confounded us all the more. Sciences, we are told, have covered the entire field of Knowledge, and they are more firmly established than ever before. Either, then, there is no cognitive field left for philosophy, it being concerned with certain dubious values and prescriptions only, or it is nothing more than linguistic analysis of propositions used by laymen, sciences and what has hitherto been called metaphysics... this is not a correct assessment.' 'The Concept of Philosophy' in *The Metaphysics of the Spirit*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1994. p. 1.
  33. For instance, he writes 'There was a time when metaphysics dominated the field. With the growth of scientific technique and the development of Natural Sciences, modern man has become highly skeptical to Metaphysical truths... Experience and experiment are the two catch-words of modern science. But

- the revival of Metaphysics is, I think, necessary'. Mahdi Yar Jung Bahadur 'The Fifteenth Session of the All-India Philosophical Congress, Held at Hyderabad, Deccan', *Philosophy*, Vol.15, No.58 (Apr.,1940), pp.199-200; In so far as his characterization of Indian Philosophy goes, he is no less clear when he declares that the traditional Indian thought systems is a synthesis of metaphysics and religion. His concerns over the rift occasioned by the clash of scientific and philosophical thinking assumes the form of challenge posed by science towards metaphysics. In general, the awareness of the uncomfortable relation between Science and Philosophy in the West was well understood by the early Anglophone philosophers in India. See for instance, A.R. Wadia, 'Synthesis of the Eastern and the Western Thought in Gandhi' (1930); D.M. Dutta. 'Modern Indian Philosophy: Its Needs and its Role' (1952); Rasvihary Das, 'What is Philosophy' (1956), in *Indian Philosophy and History*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR. 1996.
34. By the 1930s this seems to have been a fairly accepted position as is evident from Shishir Kumar Maitra's ('The March of History of Philosophy') and Mahandranath Sircar's (Unity of Philosophy and Life) Presidential Addresses to the IPC in 1928 and 1930 respectively. See, *The Philosophy of Life*. (ed.) S.P. Dubey. Delhi: ICPR.
  35. G.R. Malkani. 'Philosophical Truth' (1949), in *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*. (ed.) Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 555.
  36. *Ibid.*, p. 556.
  37. *Ibid.*, p. 557.
  38. *Ibid.*, p. 558.
  39. *Ibid.* further, it has to be noted that for Malkani, religion and forms of its truth were much closer to life than in the case of scientific forms of truth. This is the reason why for him, in ancient India, when religious truth was equated with philosophic truth, it did not result in a clash between the nature of its truth forms.
  40. A.C.Mukerji, 'The Realist's Conception of Idealism' (1927), in *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*. (ed.) Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2011. pp. 471-498.
  41. *Ibid.*, p. 587.
  42. *Ibid.*
  43. *Ibid.*
  44. *Ibid.*, p. 586.
  45. *Ibid.*, p. 587.
  46. *Ibid.*
  47. Elsewhere, I (Jung) have classified the ambit of academic philosophical activity that took place in India during the colonial period that engages with the problematic of (absolute) truth pertaining to the nature of ultimate reality to be operating within the traditional apparatus predominant during the period that I have termed the 'East-West paradigm'. In this paraphrasing, 'East' represents those whose philosophical activity was looked upon by themselves as giving voice to a distinct philosophical tradition that Indian geographical-political boundary can claim as its own. And the 'West' designates those Western thinkers who happened to exert an influence in the registers of 'comparative philosophy' as the Western iconic counterparts with whose works Indian philosophy's coming of age during the colonial era had a profound

- give and take. These predominant Western counterparts were the Idealists, as Idealism was the philosophy that carried an affinity with the nationalist philosophy of this period encapsulated by a popularized version of Advaita Vedānta. Those Indian philosophers whose activity of philosophizing operated within this East-West paradigm hinged on the conviction that the function of philosophy is to unravel the ultimate truth. That is to say, they operated on the premise that philosophy's ultimate preoccupation should be with truth, which is presupposed to be the true form that ultimate reality acquires or reveals itself in. In other words, their preoccupation with truth was shaped by their quest to know absolute reality, and thus for all practical purposes, 'truth' came to be held as synonymous with this quest. See, P. G. Jung, 'The Road Not Taken: Mathrani's Wittgensteinian Quest for Transformation of Philosophy' in *Philosophy in Colonial India*. (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. p. 173.
48. P.T.Raju. 'Progress and Indian Philosophy', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol.25, No.1/3 (1944). pp. 88-98.
  49. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
  50. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
  51. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
  52. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
  53. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.
  54. J. N. Mohanty, 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992), p. 400.
  55. P. T. Raju. 'Progress and Indian Philosophy', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol.25, No.1/3 (1944). p. 97
  56. *Ibid.*
  57. Cited in J. N. Mohanty, 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 398.
  58. *Ibid.*, p. 399
  59. *Ibid.*, p. 401
  60. See J.N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992) p. 402.
  61. K. Satchidananda Murty. *The Indian Spirit*, Waltair: Andhra University Press. 1965. pp. 3-4.
  62. J. N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 397.
  63. *Ibid.*
  64. *Ibid.*, p. 398. Also see Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991; In this context especially see 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy'. pp. 3-15.
  65. Rajendra Prasad. 'Tradition, Progress, and Contemporary Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No.3/4 (Jul.-Oct., 1965) p.258
  66. Daya Krishna. 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1965). pp. 37-51. In the work, he accuses Karl H. Potter who in his work, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (1963), treated Indian philosophy as a 'therapeutic discipline', where its sole activity is deemed to consist of the removal of impediments or 'intellectual difficulties' in the 'path to *mokṣa* (p. 39). Daya Krishna dismisses this view held by Potter with a clause that unless it is also held that philosophers themselves are the creators of their diseases, it cannot be held that Indian philosophical systems are meant

as a 'cure' to the 'illnesses' that impedes the path to *mokṣa*, on the ground that this makes philosophy a futile activity: for once such impediments are removed philosophy loses hold of its purpose. Moreover, this view would necessarily entail that Sankara and Ramanuja were not doing philosophy nor were they philosophers, as it is generally held that they were already on the path of *mokṣa* or had attained *mokṣa* (p. 39). K. C. Bhattacharyya is similarly held responsible for propagating the view that Indian philosophy is ultimately tailored to attain *mokṣa*, but its attainment is split between philosophy and spiritual practice. That is, Daya Krishna holds that for Bhattacharyya, philosophy's task consists of showing the possibility of *mokṣa* methodologically whereas, it is then the task of spiritual practice to take over and actualize the experience of this possibility (p.45). But if this be so, Daya Krishna argues, philosophy loses any further role to play in its attainment. However, it must be noted that what Daya Krishna misses out in this reading is the role that the concept of 'truth' plays as the intermediary link between philosophical activity and *mokṣa*.

67. Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991. p. 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 47.
70. Ibid., p. 40.
71. See for instance, S. Deshpande, 'G.R. Malkani: Reinventing Classical Advaita Vedānta', in (ed.) S. Deshpande, *Philosophy in Colonial India*, New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2015.
72. Rajendra Prasad. 'Tradition, Progress, and Contemporary Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 15, No. 3/4 . (Jul.–Oct., 1965) p. 255. In this context, it is also worth noting here that even today, the thought-schemas which is preserved through an oral tradition of the various tribal groups that populate India, have hardly made it to the annals of 'Indian philosophy'.
73. Ibid., p. 256.
74. Ibid., p. 258.
75. Ibid., p. 257.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 258.
78. J. N. Mohanty. 'On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West*. Vol.42, No.3 (Jul., 1992). p. 404.
79. But given that language is nourished by the conceptual vocabulary of the 'form of life' in which it is embedded, we must remember that this choice has also been held by some to have very well been responsible for the very state of 'Indian philosophy' as of today. For instance, Mullick argues that the choice of English as the medium of philosophizing in India, must shoulder the responsibility for the 'near total dependence' of philosophers in India upon the conceptual framework of the West. Mullick characterizes contemporary 'Indian philosophy' as 'straining to ensure that [it is] ... suffused with the latest theoretical language produced in the West'. See Mohini Mullick. 'Colonialism and Traditional Forms of Knowledge...' in *Philosophy in Colonial India*. (ed.) S. Deshpande. New Delhi: Springer and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 2015. p. 242. (pp. 239-253). Perhaps the critics of the Traditionalists did not adequately fathom the aftermath of their choice.
80. The overwhelming nature of the spirit of the times, in maintaining the mark of spirituality as the unique characteristic of Indian traditional thought-schemas,

is particularly reflected in Mathrani's philosophical trajectory. Mathrani, who was trained in the Analytic tradition in Cambridge and perhaps the first Anglophone Indian thinker to have taken the linguistic turn, after his return to India, first vehemently opposed the Traditionalists, by propounding the Wittgenstenian spirit of skepticism towards traditional philosophical concern. However, within the span of a decade or so, Mathrani's position drastically changes and he reformulates his philosophy of language to accommodate metaphysical propositions of religious experience.

81. Daya Krishna. *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1991. p. 15.
82. *Ibid.*, p.16.
83. *Ibid.*
84. J.N. Mohanty. *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*, New Delhi: Oxford, 2002. p. 11.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
86. J.N. Mohanty. *Classical Indian Philosophy*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
87. Daya Krishna. *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*. New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2001. p. 258.
88. *Ibid.*