

## Is Verbal Testimony a Form of Inference?

JOHN A. TABER  
University of New Mexico  
Mexico

In one of his later papers, "Understanding, Knowing, and Justification",<sup>1</sup> B.K. Matilal is concerned to present a certain view of linguistic understanding which he finds developed in Nyāya texts as an alternative to a widespread view in contemporary philosophy. The latter view, which he wishes to oppose, is roughly as follows. When we receive knowledge from what someone says or writes we first have a non-committal awareness or "understanding" of what the speaker or writer means, then on the basis of evidence that the speaker or writer is sincere, knowledgeable, etc., or the lack thereof, we either accept or reject what he or she asserts. Matilal himself characterizes the position as follows:

It is frequently heard "I understand what you mean" and along with it comes the disclaimer – "but I do not accept it". As knowledge or belief is based upon total acceptance, such an understanding of what the speaker means can hardly amount to knowledge on the part of the auditor. If this way of viewing the matter makes it imperative that we must first analyze our understanding of the meaning of a given expression as a primary attitude – a simple non-committal comprehension of what has been intended and communicated by the speaker – then understanding ... can be the intermediate stage in providing us with the final knowledge or belief that we may possibly derive from the testimony....<sup>2</sup>

Against such a view Matilal pits the later Nyāya position as found presented primarily in the works of Gaṅgeśa, namely, that the words of a sentence immediately impart to us a firm belief that a certain state of affairs is the case and that no stage of mere understanding intervenes between hearing the words and accepting what they mean. Again, in Matilal's words,

... It is not essential to talk about a prima facie understanding of the meaning of a sentence before we can judge it to be true or false. The Naiyāyikas were against the deployment of such a basic attitude prior to the belief-claim or knowledge-claim that arises in the

hearer. The belief-claim or knowledge-claim should arise in the hearer, according to the Naiyāyikas, as soon as the *well-formed* utterance is heard.<sup>3</sup>

Part of the importance of this position for Matilal is that it seems to eliminate any role to be played in linguistic understanding by thoughts or propositions, since a "knowledge-claim" will always concern, not states of mind, but states of affairs in the world. The Naiyāyikas indeed seemed to develop an account of communication that postulates nothing beyond speakers, listeners, substances, properties, and relations between substances and properties (as well as of course universals).<sup>4</sup>

In the present paper I would like to suggest a minor qualification of Matilal's interpretation of the Nyāya position. While it is indeed the case that Nyāya, especially later Nyāya, rejects an initial grasp of the meaning of a statement as *the author's thought or intention*, it nevertheless does make a distinction between apprehending the meaning of a statement and apprehending its truth. Such a distinction, to begin with, would seem to be implied by the Nyāya commitment to the theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*), that is, the notion that the truth of a cognition is established *after* it arises by *other* cognitions that confirm it. Holding such a theory, Nyāya must conceive it to be possible somehow to be in possession of a cognition before one is (fully?, consciously?) convinced that it is true. Thus indeed it would seem that one can be aware of what a sentence means, i.e., cognize a certain state of affairs from words, but not yet be fully convinced that the state of affairs that the sentence relates really is the case. In other words, it is not altogether wrong to say that Nyāya understands a sentence to evoke an initial awareness that is in a sense "non-committal".

I do not presume in what follows to be able to demonstrate my amended interpretation of Nyāya in detail but only to begin to show it, and even then only in relation to the earlier Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa. But I hope that it will be clear how such an interpretation might be extended to Nyāya as a whole. I take as my point of departure the debate about whether *śabda*, verbal testimony, is a separate *pramāṇa*. It is in the context of this debate that the issue of the capacity of language to evoke cognitions, with which Matilal is concerned, is discussed. However, by returning to the earliest phases of the debate in the classical period I am able to adopt a somewhat different perspective on it from Matilal, by seeing it primarily as a debate about reference.

*Is verbal testimony a form of inference?*

First of all, why should we care?

At first glance, the question of whether verbal testimony is a distinct means of knowledge, *pramāṇa*, or to be included in the *pramāṇa* of inference, seems to be one that would interest only Indian philosophers of centuries past. The modern philosopher, who generally rejects testimony as a valid means of knowledge, especially testimony in regard to supernatural or transcendent matters, may find it intriguing that most Indian thinkers accepted it, but the controversy over which *pramāṇa śabda* falls under will appear to him a mere quibble, a consequence of the compulsion of Buddhist and Hindu philosophers to try to refute each other whenever possible. Yet upon closer scrutiny the debate about the status of *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa* is of considerable contemporary interest; for it has to do ultimately with *how words mean what they mean*, and the theory of meaning has been a central concern in modern analytic philosophy.

I shall, first, present the position that verbal testimony is a form of inference as it was developed in Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika texts. Then I shall outline some of the principal objections against that position that were presented by Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophers. After indicating how I think the classical discussion dictates a certain amendment of Matilal's interpretation of the Nyāya position, I shall conclude with some comparative remarks intended to support the philosophical viability of the view that verbal testimony is not a form of inference. As I see it, the latter harmonizes well with the current tendency in philosophy of language to deny that meaning is something "in the head" or mental.

Consider, then, the following *prima facie* view. Testimony is a form of inference in the following sense: An utterance serves as an inferential mark, *liṅga*, of an intention (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker who utters it. From that intention to speak and from the fact that the speaker is trustworthy (*āpta*), one is able to infer in turn that the speaker possesses knowledge (*jñāna*) of the state of affairs of which he speaks. Finally, from this knowledge on the part of the trustworthy speaker one is able to infer the existence of the state of affairs that he knows. In short, language serves, first, as a means of becoming aware of a certain intention of the language user, then through that of an object or state of affairs in the world. Words do not directly give rise to the idea of their meaning, but they do so indirectly, by first giving rise to an idea of the speaker's intention; for they are presumably the result of the speaker's intention, as we know from our own case. Thus,

words are indirectly *liṅgas* of meanings or states of affairs in the world.

This position is roughly that of Śrīdhara in his *Nyākandalī*.<sup>5</sup> I have added some embellishments from Vācaspati's discussion of this view in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭika*.<sup>6</sup> The theory probably originated with Dinnāga; Vācaspati attributes it to him, quoting a half verse from the second chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: *āptavākyaṅvisamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā*.<sup>7</sup> It is taken up by Dharmakīrti,<sup>8</sup> as well as Śāntarakṣita:<sup>9</sup> and so it became entrenched as the Buddhist logician's position. The acceptance of this view by a Hindu philosopher does not mean an act of apostasy on his part. Śrīdhara is still able to accept the authority of the Veda on the grounds that it consists of the utterances of a trustworthy person, namely, God. In general, Vaiśeṣika philosophers seem to have been more open than other Hindu philosophers to considering ideas on their own merits and less constrained to refute them simply because they were held by Buddhists. However, it should be noted that another leading Vaiśeṣika philosopher and commentator on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Vyomaśiva, rejects the view that testimony is a form of inference.

The statement of Praśastapāda that Śrīdhara defends by recourse to this Buddhist theory actually appears to represent an earlier, more primitive doctrine. This is the notion that verbal testimony is a form of inference insofar as it "functions" in the same way (*samānavidhitvāt*). In order to comprehend the meaning of a word one must recall a previously learned connection between word and meaning, just as one must remember the previously established connection between probans and probandum in order to receive a cognition of the latter from the former. In general, words, like inferential marks, serve to bring to mind unseen facts insofar as they are signs of them, in the sense of symptoms.<sup>10</sup>

Now this earlier theory easily falls prey to various objections. A few are stated in the *śabdaparīkṣā* section of the *Nyāyasūtra* and in the corresponding sections of Paṅśilasvāmin's commentary, where this theory is considered and rejected. In understanding the meaning of a verbal sign, Paṅśilasvāmin says, we do not avail ourselves of a direct connection between sign and significandum, as we do in inference; for we must also take into account the trustworthiness (or lack thereof) of the person employing it.<sup>11</sup> There is a natural connection between fire and smoke, so that if one sees the latter one knows that the former is at hand. But there is not such connection between the word 'fire' and fire itself; rather, there is only a conventional one, and the use of the sign by the speaker may be in accord with it or not.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, the word does not occur where the meaning is or vice versa. When I pronounce the word 'fire' I do not have a burning sensation in my mouth; when I say 'food' I do not taste food! There is no relation of regular co-occurrence between word and meaning which would serve as the basis of an inference in this case.

Later Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā authors supplemented these arguments with a more technical one: If language is kind of inference, then how is the inference to be formulated? Typically, in inference we become aware that a certain subject (*dharmin*, *pakṣa*) is possessed of a certain property (*sādhya*) by virtue of having the property which is the middle term (*liṅga*, *hetu*). What would be the *pakṣa* in this inference? Presumably the word is the *liṅga*. Is the meaning the *pakṣa*? Well, in a proper inference, the *pakṣa* is something already given, for which it is established through the middle term that it has the property to be proved. We seek to prove, e.g., that the mountain we see is on fire because it is smoking. But obviously the meaning of a word is what we become aware of through the word; it is not already given. So it cannot be the subject of the inference. In fact, it would seem that there is no way in which the inference can be coherently formulated, if we require the word and the meaning to be two of its terms.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, cognizant of these sorts of objections. Śrīdhara sought to interpret Praśastapāda as propounding the more sophisticated Buddhist theory: from a word or linguistic sign one does not directly infer its meaning but rather the state of mind of the speaker who employs it, and from that – given that the speaker is reliable – one infers its meaning. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* neatly formulates the inference in the proper way, with the speaker as the *dharmin*, the intention (*vivakṣā*) as the *sādhya*, and the word as the *liṅga*, a *liṅga*, he claims, which satisfies the three requirements of a valid *liṅga* specified by Dīnāga.<sup>14</sup>

This *prima facie* view which I have outlined is, I believe, an attractive one. For it relates to one of the most basic tendencies of the theory of meaning, namely, the view that language expresses not just things and states of affairs in the world but also, perhaps primarily, our thoughts. We find this view expressed throughout the history of Western philosophy. Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke all tell us that words stand for ideas in the mind. Modern philosophers such as Frege, Carnap, and Grice can be seen as heirs of this theory insofar as they hold that the meaning of a word is a concept or intension (Frege, Carnap), or an intention (Grice). Simon Blackburn in a recent work traces this view ultimately to the belief that *the referring function of words apparently cannot be explained in any other way*.<sup>15</sup>

Words themselves do not have the power to refer to things; there is no natural connection between words and what they mean. Only thought, it seems, have the power to refer. This power of thoughts is called intentionality. Words, then are able to *mean* things only *through* our thoughts. This reasoning is perhaps not exactly the source of the Indian view I have been discussing; for the latter does not introduce thoughts to explain the referring function so much as it does away with reference altogether. On the Indian view, thoughts indicate things *as inferential marks*. Because we know that a certain thought is present (from what someone says), we know that a certain state of affairs exists. But the thought no more *refers to* or *means* that state of affairs than smoke *refers to* or *means* fire.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the Indian language-is-inference theory shares with the standard Western theory of meaning the basic idea that thoughts are somehow instrumental in meaning; words indicate primarily, or in the first instance, what we are thinking and do not directly refer to things.<sup>17</sup>

I now move on to consider the arguments against this position that were brought forward by Nyāya and Mimāṃsā authors. I shall refer particularly to Kumārila and Jayantabhaṭṭa. Perhaps the most important insight of the latter thinkers is that when words are uttered, we become immediately aware of certain things or states of affairs, without at all taking into account the state of mind of the speaker who utters them. For, Kumārila notes, a sentence will bring to mind the same meaning when uttered by an untrustworthy person as when uttered by a trustworthy person.<sup>18</sup> Thus, clearly, linguistic understanding does not involve an inference to a particular state of affairs that has as a premise the reliability of the speaker. That means, in turn, that the fact that the speaker says what he really thinks, or is thinking what really is the case, does not enter into an understanding of what the sentence means. Words, rather, convey their meanings prior to our apprehending the intention or knowledge of the one who speaks them, and in fact serve as the means by which we recognize what he or she has in mind. Indeed, only because the words a person speaks indicate a certain state of affairs, are we able to know that he is thinking of that state of affairs. Words may in fact tell us what someone knows or intends, but only by independently indicating the state of affairs of which he (if he is reliable) is aware.

One of the places this issue comes up for Kumārila is in the discussion of the authority of testimony in the *Codanāsūtrādhikaraṇa* of his *Ślokavārttika*. There he is concerned to show that the Veda is valid by virtue of *svataḥ prāmāṇya*, intrinsic validity. That is to say, the Veda is a valid means of knowledge because it is eternal and

authorless. Its authority is not vitiated by its having been composed by a human being, who could not possibly have known the transcendent matters (*dharma*) of which it speaks. Nor, of course, is it ever disconfirmed by anything else we know. It is valid simply because the initial sense of truth with which it is received is never contradicted.

Now, while Kumāṛila asserts that the Veda is valid intrinsically in this way, he nevertheless follows Śābara in affirming that the validity of *human* testimony depends in some sense on the qualities of the person who presents it. Specifically, something someone says is a reliable means of knowledge about a certain state of affairs for us if we have reason to believe that he or she has cognized that state of affairs by another *pramāṇa* (perception or inference).<sup>19</sup> This is precisely why the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures are without authority for Kumāṛila; for they are attributed to human authors and humans cannot possibly know (independently of the Veda) the matters of *dharma* and salvation they talk about.

This account of human testimony clearly implies that spoken language does express the speaker's cognitive state. Only if the speaker is generally trustworthy and is in a position to know what he is saying does his statement serve as a *pramāṇa*, otherwise not. That is to say, we can be confident in what he says because we know that it is based on his cognitive state – for being trustworthy, he would not be attempting to get us to believe something he himself does not believe – and that his cognitive state accurately reflects things as they are – for, since he is trustworthy, we know that he believes only what he *knows*. Thus, clearly, spoken language ultimately functions as a *pramāṇa* insofar as it makes us aware of what the speaker is thinking.<sup>20</sup>

Yet Kumāṛila stresses that that does not mean that language, even spoken language, does not also *independently* give us knowledge of states of affairs, without reference to the speaker's knowledge and intentions. The full story of what happens in a case of human testimony is this. The sentence the person speaks initially *by itself* causes us to cognize a certain state of affairs. But because the sentence was spoken by a human being and humans are often mistaken – because it was *used* by a human to express how he or she perceives things – the cognition the sentence evokes must also be supported by a conviction in the speaker's reliability for us to continue to be confident that it is true. Otherwise, the initial cognition evoked by the sentence will be nullified, or as Kumāṛila prefers to put it, the words of the sentence “become neutral or lose their force” (*udāsate*).<sup>21</sup> In any case language by itself does immediately evoke in the hearer a

cognition that has intrinsic validity, hence a belief that matters really are a certain way. If the speaker is untrustworthy or "talking over his head" (as Kumārila believed the Buddha to be) one's initial belief as to how things stand is revoked, but we are nevertheless – initially at least – made to have such a belief merely by the *words* that he used.

Thus language is a separate *pramāṇa*.<sup>22</sup> It *directly* makes us aware of how things are in the world, and an appeal to the reliability of the language user is correct in the case of human testimony only because there language is appropriated specifically to express what someone has allegedly cognized. In summary, Kumārila says, "The truth [of a sentence], based on the trustworthiness of the author, is one thing, the meaning of the sentence, which is known prior (to its truth), another. If the truth of the sentence is something that is inferred from trustworthiness, then how can the cognition of the meaning of the sentence be an inference?"<sup>23</sup> For, once again, we can only know what the speaker has in mind from what the sentence means.

Now the point I wish to stress in this paper is that the Nyāya philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa develops essentially the same view as Kumārila in his *Nyāyamañjarī*: "Language is [indeed] a means of inferring an intention as its cause", he says there, "as it is a means of inferring the existence of *ākāśa* as its medium. But it is not what expresses [it is not the *vācaka* of] that intention". What the speaker is thinking is certainly made known by language, but that is not what it *refers* to. Rather, it refers to things in the world. The word 'door' means a door and not the thought of a door, the word 'chair' means a chair and not the idea of a chair. And so, "from a pronounced word arises an awareness of what it expresses", viz., as something in the world; "then subsequently it makes the intention [of the speaker] known".<sup>24</sup> The same goes for sentences: they make us aware of states of affairs in the world prior to any consideration of the author's intention. Therefore, language is a distinct *pramāṇa*.

But if, according to Jayanta, we can be aware of what language means without being aware of any author's intention, then we can be aware of what it means without being aware of whether it is *true*; for the truth of testimony necessarily for the Naiyāyika has reference to the trustworthiness of the author, hence to his knowledge and intention in speaking. Indeed, Jayanta himself cites with approval the above-quoted assertion of Kumārila, "The truth [of a sentence], based on the trustworthiness of the author, is one thing, the meaning of the sentence, which is known prior [to its truth], another". And, as already noted at the outset of this paper, Nyāya considers the truth of a cognition to be known extrinsically, that is, *after* the cognition has



arisen by means of confirmation by other cognitions. Thus, Jayanta would appear to have the notion of an initial belief evoked by language itself that things are a certain way followed by an explicit awareness that one's belief is indeed true. Here the Mīmāṃsaka could even ask, "But what is this initial belief if not a cognition that presents itself as true, i.e., an *intrinsically valid* cognition"? It would seem that the Naiyāyika (at least Jayanta), in his endeavor to avoid the Buddhist position that we are initially aware only of what the language user is thinking, has moved closer to the Mīmāṃsā position than he would really like.

It should be clear how the above calls for a certain modification of Matilal's interpretation of Nyāya. While it is indeed correct to say that Nyāya holds that we have no awareness of thoughts or propositions but only of (allegedly) existing states of affairs in linguistic communication as such – for Jayanta himself insists that the initial awareness evoked by a sentence is not a "mere intuition" (*pratibhāmātra*) but a "definite cognition" (*sampratyaya*)<sup>25</sup> – it still considers it possible to stand back from language and regard what it means without committing oneself fully to its truth. Thus it recognizes such a thing as a non-committal awareness of the meaning of a sentence. The whole argument against the view that language is a form of inference in fact depends on seeing this distinction. And certainly it would be odd if Nyāya did not make it, for then it would be very problematic how one could reflect, e.g., on what another philosopher says and question it instead of merely believing it! The same subtlety to be found in Jayanta's position, I suggest, is there to be found throughout Nyāya literature.

Another objection raised against the view that verbal testimony is a form of inference is a corollary of the above, namely: an inference from what someone says to what he is thinking, and from that to what he knows and what is the case, would not be possible unless language were an independent *pramāṇa*. For, although we might know in general that no one says anything unless he has something in mind, we cannot know specifically what he has in mind, except from what he says. A person's mental states are invisible to others; we cannot directly ascertain another's mental state. The only clue to another person's mental state is his utterance, which *refers* to the state of affairs he is thinking about.<sup>26</sup> Thus, words must be able independently to indicate states of affairs; and so again, testimony is a *pramāṇa* distinct from inference. Of course, this argument overlooks the possibility that connections between certain utterances and intentions could be established by observing the context in which the

utterances are made and the actions of those who make them and those who respond to them – as the later Buddhist logician Kamalaśīla suggested.<sup>27</sup> I believe, however, that the Mīmāṃsaka, at least, discards this possibility because he believes, in anticipation of the modern controversy about the indeterminacy of meaning, that speaker's intention can never be exactly determined from context. If we guessed at the intentions of speakers on the basis of observations of context and behavior, and speakers' intentions were the meanings of words, then the meanings of words would probably vary from person to person. But it would take considerable space to show that Mīmāṃsā holds this.<sup>28</sup>

I am unable here to evaluate fully the Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya doctrine that testimony is a *pramāṇa* distinct from inference. I can only suggest, along with Matilal and Chakrabarti,<sup>29</sup> that it is of considerable philosophical interest and not to be dismissed as patently ridiculous. It is, at least, consistent with the trend of modern philosophy of language away from the older theory of meaning that words refer to things and states of affairs in the world only insofar as they stand, initially, for ideas or concepts towards a view that the relation between language and the world is more direct. The latter view began to emerge with Wittgenstein, who showed in his *Philosophical Investigations* that the reference function is just as problematic for mental representations as it is for words and sentences. It has been further developed by Putnam, who has devised clever arguments to show that the psychological state of the language user does not determine the extension of the word he uses. (For example, since I am ignorant of botany, my *concepts* of 'birch' and 'elm' may be roughly the same; yet the words will still have different extensions).<sup>30</sup> One can see it also in Searle's critique of Grice. The latter argued that the meaning of an utterance depends strictly on what the utterer intends the hearer to understand by it. But Searle shows that intending something by what one says cannot be completely disconnected from what one's utterance objectively means in the language on is speaking.<sup>31</sup>

In general, modern theory of meaning affirms that meaning is independent of individual speakers' intentions and psychological states and attempts to show instead how it is determined by social conventions. The Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya theory that language is not a form of inference also, I believe, represents the bold step of discarding the plausible notion that meaning is in the first instance a mental state, a concept or an intention. From there, however, the Indian philosophers go their own way. In particular, their positive account of

linguistic understanding is quite different from that favored in modern philosophy of language. Linguistic understanding in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā consists not in a certain pattern of behavior but in an awareness of the meaning of a word, evoked by the word. According to Mīmāṃsā this occurs by virtue of an eternal, natural connection between word and meaning, the word's *śakti*; according to Nyāya, by virtue of a conventional connection. Neither school wants to renounce the reference function; rather, reference is the very essence of language for both. Modern Western philosophers, on the other hand, seem to want to eschew reference altogether as an inherently mysterious phenomenon, and so they appeal to such things as language games or speech acts in accounting for linguistic understanding.

Whether the view that verbal testimony is a distinct *pramāṇa* is ultimately a valid philosophical doctrine or not, it should be clear that it is of crucial importance for Mīmāṃsā. For if testimony is a form of inference, if it derives its authority in part from the knowledge of the person who uses it, then the Veda is not valid; for it is without any author, divine or human. Indeed, since language would mean something only insofar as it indicates the state of mind of its utterer, the Veda would be gibberish. Thus the thesis that verbal testimony is a distinct *pramāṇa* is at the very heart of Mīmāṃsā philosophy of language, just as the principle of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* is at the core of Mīmāṃsā epistemology. For Nyāya, on the other hand, it is less crucial; for according to that system the Veda has an author. The Naiyāyika, rather, seems committed to this thesis mainly for systematic philosophical reasons, in particular, it would seem, because he is convinced that there is no way simply to explain reference away or reduce it do something else.

## REFERENCES

1. *In Knowing From Words.*, ed. B.K. Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 347-366.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
4. Arindam Chakrabarti in an article in the same volume ("Telling As Letting Know", *op. cit.*, pp. 99-124) works out another quite original and forceful defense of the Nyāya view.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya with the Nyāyakandali*, ed. Durgādhara Jhā (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1977), pp. 514-16.
6. *Ad sūtra* 1.1.7, which gives the definition, *āptopadeśaḥ śabhaḥ*; Ed. Taranātha Nyāya-Tarkatūtha (Calcutta: Metropolitan Publishing House, 1936-44), p. 177, 15ff.

7. "[Language is] inference from the general fact of the truth of a sentence uttered by a reliable person." That is to say, from the fact that a statement is uttered by a reliable person, we know that it is true; and from that we know that a certain state of affairs exists. Language refers to states of affairs only *via* the states of minds of speakers.

8. See *Pramāṇavārttika* I.4 and especially 3 (*Svārthānumāna*) 213ff.

9. *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) 1512-24.

10. See *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 512: *śabdādīnām api anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt, yathā*

*prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdhalingadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam evaṃ śabdādibhyo 'piti.*

11. AD NS 2.1. 52.

12. AD NS 2.1. 55.

13. See *Śloka-vārttika* (ŚV), *śabda* 55cd ff. See also *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* ad 2.1.52, pp. 537 ff. Vācaspati considers another alternative: the *pakṣa* could be the word meanings, the *sādhyā* the sentence meaning *qua samsarga*.

14. TS 1520-24: *pādapārthavivakṣāvān puruṣo 'yaṃ pratiyate/vṛkṣaśabda-prayokṛtvāt pūrvāvathāsv ahaṃ yathā//* (1521). Chakrabarti in the above-mentioned article, expertly drawing on Nyāya sources, presents careful analyses of various formulations of the inference, including a version of Śāntarākṣita's.

15. *Spreading the Word* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), chap. 2.

16. This should intrigue modern philosophers of language, because one of the main objections to the theory that words refer to things *via* our thoughts is that signifying is just as problematic for thoughts as for words.

17. It is interesting to note, however, that the "older" doctrine that is evidenced by *Praśastapāda* does try to establish a direct inferential connection between words and meanings.

18. ŚV, *vākya* 246ab.

19. See *Śābarabhāṣya*, ed. E. Frauwallner, *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā* (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1968), p.

18: *yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ, tac cet pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviṣayaṃ vā, avitatham eva tat.*

20. ŚV, *codanā* 165-66.

21. ŚV, *codanā* 167-68.

22. Here the Bhāṭṭa position is to be distinguished from the Prābhākara. The latter school held human testimony to be a kind of inference, while it considered scripture to be an independent *pramāṇa*. In this, it seems to follow Śābara more closely. See the *Niṭipatha* section of Śālikanātha's *Prākaraṇapañcikā*. For Kumārila's refutation of this view, see ŚV, *śabda* 38-51; and for an exhaustive treatment of the debate from the Bhāṭṭa standpoint, see the *Vākya-rathanirṇaya* section of Pārthasārathimīśra's *Nyāyaratnamālā*.

23. ŚV, *vākya* 244-45.

24. *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), ed. K.S. Varadacharya (Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1983), vol. 1, p. 412, v. 27ab.

25. *na ca prāmāṇyāniścayād vinā pratibhāmātraṃ tad iti vaktavyam; śabdārthasampratyayasānubhavasiddhatvāt*, *ibid.*, vol.1, p. 411.

26. See ŚV, *śabda* 40-41; NM, vol. 1, p. 412, v. 27cd.

27. See his *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* ad TS 2620.

28. Something like the indeterminacy doctrine is considered in connection with

the discussion of convention in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* section of the ŚV. There Kumārila rejects the view that each person might use words in accordance with meaning conventions unique to himself (see ślokas 14ff.). Although the Buddhists do not appear to hold that conventions vary from person to person (see TS 2631), they hold the more radical position that any convention will vary constantly over time, due to the momentariness of all entities. Thus, no one ever uses a word in the same sense he originally learned it as having (TS 2619-30).

29. See, again, the work of Chakrabarti cited above.

30. And Putnam argues that nothing is to be gained by substituting "intension" for "psychological state". See "The meaning of meaning" in *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

31. See *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 42-45.

