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SIR OLAF CAROE, THE END OF AN ERA

By SIR OLAF CAROE, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

A meeting held at Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on October 14, 1959. Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair. The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all, I have an apology to make for Mr. Hugh Richardson who was going to deliver his talk. At very short notice indeed he was invited by the Tibetans to represent their case at the United Nations. He is at this moment in New York. But we are fortunate in having a member who does so much for this Society, Sir Olaf Caroe, who, at very short notice indeed has stepped into the breach who not only has Mr. Richardson's notes but can also speak from his own personal knowledge of the area. We are very grateful indeed to Sir Olaf. The Society will always be a healthy one so long as we have someone of the calibre of Sir Olaf to ensure that our members will not be disappointed—and no one will be disappointed today.

SIR OLAF CAROE: I am greatly indebted to the Chairman and, first, I must ask you to forgive me if my talk is scrappy. I have Mr. Hugh Richardson's notes and what I propose to do is to try to tell you something of what he was going to say—I think I shall have to read some passages, which I do not usually do when speaking, but it is difficult to give somebody else's points except in his own words—and also to fill in from what I know of the situation myself. You may be thinking, "What on earth does he know?" I know about the North-West Frontier from the posters scattered about London, where one has to go to learn about the North-West Frontier; and for ten years I dealt with the North-East Frontier before 1947, as well as the North-West, from Delhi, both as Deputy Secretary and as Foreign Secretary to the Viceroy.

I have tried to keep up to date since then and have had many talks with the Tibetan Delegation, which recently passed through London on their way to New York. That is my warrant. I may say that I have not been into Tibet beyond Yatung, five or ten miles across the frontier. The map I am using today is a Russian map. I have been on the Kashmir border, to the United Provinces, Nepal, Sikkim, and the North-East Frontier. I can claim to have been all along the frontiers of Tibet and to have known intimately men like Basil Gould and Hugh Richardson who have actually lived for many years in Lhasa.

I think any talk on Tibet must start with some historical background. What I want to emphasise more than anything else is that Tibet has an excellent claim in history to be an entity, a diplomatic entity as well as an historical entity. The first Dalai Lama lived, I believe, in either the 15th or early 16th century. It was not until the time of the fifth Dalai Lama in 1641 that temporal and ecclesiastical power, spiritual power, was vested in the same man. It was that Dalai Lama who built the great acropolis of Lhasa.

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BY

The sixth Dalai Lama was equally famous in his way. He was a great poet and even a love poet. His subjects did not deny him the afflatus of a Byron or a Shelley and he is still greatly respected. It was the thirteenth Dalai Lama who really came for the first time into close relations with the British Government in India. Going back some time, it was not until the Manchu dynasty that China got any authority in Tibet. The Manchus came to power at the time of Charles II.

In 1720 the Manchus conquered Tibet, but they never made it a province of China. It was always a kind of autonomous dominion on the outskirts of China, and they never interfered with the Tibetan way of life. From time to time the Manchus had more or less authority in Lhasa. When Warren Hastings was Governor-General of India he tried very hard to get in touch with the Lhasa Government, both directly and through the Chinese, and he failed utterly. Though when he wrote to the Chinese they sent nice but unhelpful answers, when he wrote to the Tibetans he never received an answer at all. Things went on like that for over a century and the British Government in India had very little dealings, even over border disputes, with the Tibetan Government in Lhasa, or with the Chinese Government who were supposed to be their suzerains.

When it came to Curzon, he thought something should be done about it, because there were then signs that the Tsars were trying to get in first in Tibet working through Mongolia. He tried to do the same as Warren Hastings had tried to do. He wrote to the Chinese Government—the Chinese claimed they could speak for Tibet—but Curzon found, as Warren Hastings had, that nothing happened and he never got an answer when he wrote to the Dalai Lama, which showed what the Chinese authority really was in Tibet.

Owing to the fear of Russian encroachment, he decided, very much against the wish of the then Government in London, to take the bull by the horns and go to Lhasa. That was the origin of the 1904 Younghusband expedition to Lhasa which for the first time opened up Lhasa to the Western world. That was in the time of the thirteenth Dalai Lama.

I will pass over rather quickly the next ten years, from 1904 onwards, and will say only that in 1911, as all of you know, the Manchu dynasty fell and was succeeded by the Chinese Republic. Just before the fall of the Manchus, in a kind of expiring effort, they decided once more to extend their authority to Lhasa, encouraged by the 1907 agreement of Sir Edward Grey, made with the Russians, in which we both acknowledged we had no real position in Tibet and it was in some sense a part of China. Encouraged by that, Chao-er-Feng, who has been known as "the Butcher," occupied Lhasa again and established Chinese authority just before the fall of the Manchu Empire.

When the Manchus fell they had a garrison in Lhasa. I see Colonel Bailey is here and he knows as much about Tibet in those days as anyone, so I shall have to be careful what I say. The Chinese garrison was isolated in Lhasa and in the following year it had to be evacuated—this was in Charles Bell's time—*via* India. That was the end of the Manchus. That is at about the time Colonel Bailey was there and no doubt he will tell us more about it later.

Then the first thing the Chinese Republic did, or almost the first thing, was to decide they would try to occupy Tibet. The British Government of the time acted through the Viceroy, largely under the influence of men like Charles Bell, and the result was a convention which met in Simla in 1913-1914. The parties were the British Government, represented by McMahon, the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government. The Chinese agreed to the Tibetans attending as a third party, which is very good evidence concerning the diplomatic entity of Tibet.

The Simla convention resulted in agreement on various things. I will mention what they were. One was that Tibet was divided into two parts. Inner Tibet was acknowledged as an integral part of China; Outer Tibet—*i.e.* the part round Lhasa—was under a vague kind of Chinese suzerainty; and the Chinese undertook that they would not do anything to interfere with the local autonomy of the Dalai Lama. They would not have troops in Lhasa or control the Government in any way. The only troops they were allowed were a small contingent of 300 to accompany the Chinese Envoy in Lhasa.

Then, among other things, this agreement laid down the frontier between Inner and Outer Tibet, and also the frontier between Tibet and India, and particularly this frontier here (illustrating), which stretches right along until it reaches a watershed at a pass here. The important part for the purpose of our talk today is the part from the North-Eastern corner of Bhutan, which follows the line of the Himalayas and then turns a little more southwards and goes across the mountains. This is what is now known as the McMahon Line.

The point is that that frontier as then designated was nearly 100 miles north of the foothills where the map I am now using shows the frontier, along the Assam Valley, and it will be seen that this Russian map shows the frontier of China right down in the plains of India. There were various negotiations before that line was laid down. It was never demarcated on the ground, only delineated on a map. There were certain areas inhabited by Tibetans which were incorporated in India. The Tibetan Government agreed at the time.

It looked very nice. They had signed this convention in Simla on July 4, 1914; but the Chinese Government repudiated their plenipotentiary's signature. The ground they gave for repudiating it was merely that they could not agree to the frontier as laid down between Inner and Outer Tibet. They said nothing about the frontier towards India and they made it quite clear, orally and in writing, that the only ground on which they objected to this convention was the frontier referred to.

As a result a separate agreement was made between the British Government and Tibet only, which was very nearly on the same lines as the Simla convention and laid down the frontiers towards India. That is the origin of the McMahon Line. I should like to say here that owing to preoccupation with World War I, and the fact that McMahon himself went to Egypt, nothing effective was done at the time by the Government of India to establish that line as a fact or to occupy the whole territory, or even to ensure that the maps were altered. It was not until 1936 that the alteration was made on British maps. If you look at British maps prior

to that period you will find that the frontier of India is as shown on this Russian map. The fact is that none of this territory was handled by Tibet or India in the way of administration. It was very much like the North-West frontier. British maps originally did not show anything beyond the administrative line as part of India. The parts beyond, where there was a loose political control, were very often not shown. The Afghans did not take much advantage, but the Chinese were cleverer and they have continued to show their frontiers on the line, which is the limit of the administration of Assam.

I must go on to say something about the system of Government in Tibet. In doing that I must say something about the Dalai Lama himself, about Mahayana Buddhism and about Church and State in Tibet. As you all know, Buddhism is an offshoot of Hinduism, which started about 500 B.C. There are two main forms of Buddhism, Mahayana and Hinayana. Mahayana is the form which is prevalent in Tibet and Nepal and in Mongolia and which has also spread in China. Hinayana is the form which is prevalent in Burma and Ceylon among other places. Mahayana, as one might expect, being so close to India, has had a more continuing influence of Hinduism upon it than has the other; and one finds the Buddha used as a central figure. It is rather like the difference between the Christians who favour images and those who do not and think images are wrong.

The idea of reincarnation, which is central to Buddhism in the Tibetan form, is briefly this. When a man becomes good enough he is absorbed in Nirvana, but if he is even better than that (if one can put it that way) he agrees to be born again to help his fellow beings. According to the Tibetan belief he is born again and again to help his fellow human beings. He comes back to this world with an essence of the divine and is regarded as the incarnation of a god. The Dalai Lama is the incarnation of the God of Mercy. The God of Mercy, I think you will agree, is a very suitable god to preside over a country.

That is the background of the position of the Dalai Lama. He is a high priest, a king and a god, and that should never be forgotten. He is in his person divine.

Anybody who has met the present Dalai Lama—I have not myself—from when he was a child has been deeply impressed by him. Basil Gould, a friend of mine, who went to Lhasa for the inauguration of the present Dalai Lama, has often spoken to me and has also written in his book about the impression that this child made on him. Basil Gould was a very normal Englishman of Winchester, New College and the I.C.S. vintage—I am not quite all those things myself but very nearly! He wrote of the sense of blessing one felt flowing from the two small, cool, firm hands—this child was four and a half—which lay upon his head. He says: "I noticed the steadiness of the child's gaze, the beauty of his hands, and the devotion and love of the abbots who attended him. . . . I sensed an atmosphere and almost the music of 'Unto us a son is born and the Government shall be upon his shoulders'." Many of you will have read that book? Those who have also read Heinrich Harrer's "Seven Years in Tibet" will realize that the author, who knew the Dalai Lama when

he was older, was just as much impressed by the youth as Basil Gould had been by the child. This is what is written by Hugh Richardson, who spent the best part of fourteen years in Lhasa :

“ The Dalai Lama has an unusually clear and penetrating intellect, but his uniqueness lies in his natural and therefore entirely unpriggish and unselfconscious sanctity. This unusual combination produces his great qualities of dedication, fearlessness, modesty, gaiety and a serene self-possession and courtesy.”

I think anyone who read the statement of the Dalai Lama, who is only twenty-four years of age now, when he reached the end of his flight from Tibet at the beginning of this year will admit that even the drafting of it is quite worthy of any Foreign Office and that it is a very remarkable and extraordinary document.

Some people say, “ We are quite ready to admit the sanctity and religious authority of the Dalai Lama, but we cannot admit his temporal authority.” That is what we might call in Christian phraseology a Pauline dichotomy between flesh and spirit. There is no division between Church and State in Tibet: it is the same thing. I suppose it is really rather like the time of the Judges in Israel, something of that kind. There is no division of Church and of State. They call it religious government, and every act of the State is designed to preserve the religion. And it is impossible, I think, for a Tibetan to think otherwise than “ Where the Dalai Lama is, there is the Government of Tibet.” I think Mr. Nehru and everybody else in India, whatever they may say in Public, are very well aware of that. I think every Hindu is well aware of this fact in his heart; and I do not think that any Hindu, however he may profess to be agnostic, is proof against the aura of holiness.

There seems to be no doubt whatever that the reason why Indian sympathy has been shown in the plight of Tibet is that the Indian mind is more than attracted—is moved deeply—by holiness when it thinks it sees it, and I think there is no doubt the Indian mind sees evidence of what it regards as holiness in the Dalai Lama and the set-up in Tibet. I have a feeling that that will grow and will not decline at all.

I must resume the historical thread. As a result of the question of the Chinese signature at the Simla convention the Tibetans have always held that they were not bound by it *vis-à-vis* China, and in fact from then onwards until 1950 the Tibetans enjoyed not only autonomy but *de facto* independence and they themselves considered they had *de jure* independence also because their position has been, “ We owed an allegiance to the Manchu Empire but none to the Chinese Government that succeeded it.” We can see that the Manchus, who were themselves Buddhist in origin, had a kind of religious veneration for the seat of Buddhism in Lhasa very much as it exists in India today. I think there is a lot to be said for that point of view, because, after all, the Chinese troops had been turned out of Lhasa; the Chinese had come to negotiate a treaty to which Tibet was a full party; the Chinese had refused to make that treaty, and the Tibetans say, “ We are not bound in any way; we are now independent.”

It is fair to say here that the British Government have never admitted

that claim. They have always taken the line that they are *prepared*—note the word—to admit the suzerainty (rather a vague term) of China over Tibet provided the Chinese admit a real autonomy in Tibet. That is perhaps a very typical British pronouncement.

All through this period to 1950, up to and beyond the time of the demission of British power in India, the Tibetans were factually independent. The Chinese sent occasional missions there—they sent a mission there when the present Dalai Lama was inaugurated—but the Chinese Republican Government, and the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek who succeeded it, were never able to assert a real authority in Tibet.

They did produce what was called the Five Nations Principle as a kind of doctrine; that is, the Chinese Nationalists. They designated for inclusion Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims—the five steeds of the five-yoked chariot which was the greater China. They tried to pretend the Tibetans were Chinese. The Communists have not tried to do that. They have followed much more the lines of the U.S.S.R. in admitting cultural autonomy and nationality, rather like the case of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union.

I now come to 1950 when the Communist invasion of China took place and the announcement that the Chinese made was that they had come “to free three million Tibetans from imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defences of Chinese western frontier.” Their radio said they had come to “sweep the imperialist powers out of Tibet and eliminate reactionary elements.” Those are very typical announcements, are they not? Meanwhile, they invaded Tibet.

As a result of that the Dalai Lama went to Yatung, close to Sikkim, so as not to be too much under duress, but he was persuaded by various influences, including Indian influences, to go back to make an agreement. There then resulted the 1951 agreement between China and Tibet which, on the face of it, seemed to preserve a certain amount of Tibetan autonomy. The main points of the 1951 agreement were that China assumed responsibility for defence and control over Tibet's foreign relations; and was allowed to move troops about as much as she liked and make a Chinese military headquarters in Lhasa. On the other side, the agreement stated that the Dalai Lama's authority would be maintained and the Tibetan people would be allowed to exercise a national-regional autonomy under the unified control of the Chinese People's Government; and the last point was that there was to be a religious and political action committee in Tibet to ensure its implementation. That agreement was made, as the Dalai Lama has said, under duress because Chinese troops were then within reach of Lhasa and as a result of it they occupied Lhasa.

At this point I think the best thing I can do is to read some of Hugh Richardson's draft on what happened after the Chinese had occupied Lhasa:

“From the start it was obvious that the Chinese meant to force the pace and had no intention of keeping their side of the agreement. They saw clearly enough that the real obstacle to making Tibet part of their own system was the ultra-conservative hold of the monks and of religion. The Chinese themselves had the passionate belief

of recent converts in the advantages of material progress and they began their campaign against conservatism by practical benefits, which they thought would certainly be welcome. I think they really had quite a large measure of benevolence in their introducing such things as hospitals, rudimentary medical training, improvements in agriculture and stock breeding, new seeds, farm implements, agricultural loans and, above all, schools. Not all these things were in fact innovations. Magnificent medical work had been done by the British and Indian mission hospitals for many years, and tentative experiments had been made in agricultural and stock improvement and in schools.

“But the spirit and the scale of the Chinese activities were unmistakably an attack on the position and influence of the monks, who were opposed to change of any sort. You might say that this was the opening skirmish against monastic control of ideas and social and economic life. The Church also dominated the administration of Tibet and that position, too, came under fire.

“The symbol and the apex of religious rule was, of course, the Dalai Lama. His temporal authority was complete and absolute, because it was accepted as the rule of a divine being. So in much the same way as the Americans tried to dispel the aura surrounding the Japanese Emperor, the Chinese tried to bring the Dalai Lama down to earth. Instead of being unique and supreme, he was to be made to appear as a colleague of the Chinese military administrator. He was to take part in committees and to be more accessible.

“His actual authority was attacked in detail by a proposal to divide Tibet into three areas, of which he could administer one. In that way his territorial influence would be reduced and he would be made to appear on the same footing as the Governors of other Regions. In addition, it was proposed to take from his personal control the body of monks (civil servants), and put it under the lay council which could be more easily dominated by the Chinese administrator.

“If the Communists expected quick results, they were soon disappointed. The material gifts which they offered were accepted without gratitude. Their schools were attended largely by compulsion and in reply there was a tremendous increase in traditional Tibetan education. Their attempts to be sociable were too patronizing, artificial and regimented and were coldly received.

“The Chinese were also greatly mistaken if they thought that the Dalai Lama was merely a figurehead or that he could be cheapened by anything they could do to him. There had been great and remarkable figures produced by the system, but none has been more remarkable than the present Dalai Lama.

“When the agreement with the Chinese was signed he was only sixteen but had already become a mature and able leader. . . . From his early youth he had been genuinely and very intelligently anxious to bring about changes in Tibet, and so he could and did welcome in principle many of the practical activities of the Chinese. But he wanted changes to come in a Tibetan way and at a Tibetan pace and

he continued to remind the Chinese of their promise to introduce reforms only to the extent that the Tibetans asked for them. He met attacks on his own position in much the same way, quietly assuming the good faith and good intentions of the Chinese, and quietly pointing out where they were infringing the terms of the agreement.

“By open and courageous but firm behaviour he succeeded in holding the Chinese in check.

“So far as the Dalai Lama’s accessibility was concerned the Chinese miscalculated. He was never in the least aloof and was pleased to appear in public. The more he was seen the greater was public devotion and affection for him. His sermons, without ever preaching against the Chinese, were an inspiration to unity and resistance.

“Dislike of the Chinese and all foreign interference was the natural and traditional attitude of the Tibetan people. After the invasion in 1950 there had been confusion and despair, but as soon as Chinese troops and officials appeared in Lhasa there was vigorous revival of the old Tibetan spirit, made all the sharper by scarcity of supplies and huge prices due to the presence of so many foreign troops. And so it was among the ordinary people, the proletariat of Lhasa, a resistance movement began.

“That is just the opposite of the picture the Chinese now want to present. They speak of a rising by the serf-owning aristocrats. In fact, the nobles did what they had done in previous periods of Chinese pressure. They remained in their official posts and bowed before the storm. Some of them, not very many, were actively co-operative. The majority just “dragged their feet” and blunted Chinese efforts as much as they dared. A few spoke out openly against proposals and actions which went counter to the agreement of 1951. They were removed from office, and that increased the resentment of the ordinary people. In this way a sullen non-co-operation originating in Lhasa spread through Tibet. It was probably something of a surprise to the Chinese to find themselves not welcome as liberators of the people but regarded as a hostile and unwanted foreign army of occupation. The benevolent smiles gradually vanished.”

Mr. Richardson then goes on to say that at the same time they went on very speedily building communications and establishing troop posts all over the place. He continues:

“The campaign against the monks also went on by constant derogatory criticism and by economic measures, and so did the efforts to win the minds of the people, especially the young. Several thousand were taken to China for education and many others, old and young, went for instructive sightseeing tours. All that indoctrination was bound to have some effect. Some of the younger men, both monk and lay, became ardent supporters of the regime, but when the test of loyalty came in the rising this year the Communists found some of their prize pupils among the leaders of the resistance.”

There was, if you remember, the 1954 agreement between India and China which was in the context of Tibet being a unified part of China.

In 1951 the Indian Government was obviously against the Chinese invasion of Tibet and sent two notes in which they emphasized Tibet's autonomy and that they were a separate people. But they did no more than send notes and eventually Indian influence persuaded the Dalai Lama to go back and make the 1951 agreement.

In 1954 Mr. Nehru made what has come to be known as the Panch Shila agreement. The subject of the agreement is unimportant and relates to holy places, Indian pilgrims going to Tibet and Tibetan traders going to India. But it is important in that it enshrines five principles, and you might like to know what they are; they were the basis of the Bandung Conference. The first is mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty; secondly, mutual non-aggression; thirdly, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; fourthly, equality and mutual benefit; and, fifthly, peaceful co-existence. Those are very rosy and nebulous generalities on which to found an international agreement, I think you will agree. They are extraordinarily removed, are they not, into abstraction?

The importance of the whole thing is that under this agreement Mr. Nehru for the first time admitted Tibet to be an integral part of China and, therefore, that anything that happened in Tibet was the domestic concern of China. That had never been admitted by the British Government, and India had succeeded to the British Government's position in 1947. They had tried to maintain it in 1950 and 1951 when the Chinese occupied Tibet, but here in 1954 the pass was sold.

From 1954 things went on in Tibet very much as I have explained in the extracts I read you from Hugh Richardson's paper, but getting more and more difficult for the representatives of the local regime at Lhasa. In 1956 the Dalai Lama was allowed to go to India for the 2,500 anniversary of Buddha's birth—I think that was the occasion—and he consulted Mr. Nehru about whether he should remain there because he felt he could not do anything; there were such pressures from the Chinese that he could not carry out his divinely appointed task. Mr. Nehru persuaded him to go back, after extracting from Chou En-lai an assurance that the Chinese would go slow in altering the social pattern in Tibet.

That looked as if, on the surface, it was perhaps rather a triumph for the Tibetan point of view; but in the light of after events I feel—and perhaps you will agree—the Chinese objective in making an apparent concession was to get the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa and to put off India and make India feel that she was of some weight in this matter. When the Dalai Lama got back to Lhasa, the practical pressures were not relaxed in any way.

Here I think I ought to say something about the Tibetan social system. There are many in this country and elsewhere who condemn it as the merest mediævalism and so on, and they do not think that unchanging regimes such as that in Tibet can be expected to survive and that there may even be something good in the long run in what has happened. The real state of Tibetan society, as I have it from those who really know, is very different. It is of course to some extent feudal, but the relationship between landowners and peasants has been, on the whole, extremely

kindly. We ourselves have to go back only 150 years or so, to Cobbett's time, to see what was the position of the English agricultural labourer when Cobbett wrote his *Rural Rides*; and what was the position of the children in England before the Factories' Act of 1833; what was the position in English law when a man stole a sheep, not much more than 100 years ago? It is really an extraordinary thing the way so many people among us in the West accept our own system at this day as the yardstick by which progress should come to countries like Tibet. After all, the main question is surely, "Is it ever in this age justifiable for another country to invade a territory in order to impose a different regime?" I think it was Mahatma Gandhi who said "Self-government is always better than good government."

Here I should like to come to the Chinese theme that the recent revolt, which I shall refer to shortly, was the last fling of the nobility. That is not the case at all as I have gathered it from the Tibetan delegation. This is from people like Hugh Richardson, Marco Pallis and friends who know a lot about these parts and have recently been on a tour of Assam and have met Tibetan refugees.

The reason was in a sense accidental. The Dalai Lama was asked to go, almost ordered to go, to Peking after he came back in 1956. He believed that if he went he would be kept there and there would be an end of the Tibetan system altogether. So, not unnaturally, he was evasive. That was the first step. Then came an order, or almost an order, that the Dalai Lama should attend a celebration in the Chinese barracks in Lhasa and should not bring with him his bodyguard. This was an obvious move. His advisers thought the Chinese intended to kidnap him and take him off to China, or at any rate hold him under duress and make it impossible for him to carry out his function, and that sparked off the revolt.

But it would not have been sparked off but for what the Chinese had been doing to the Khambas. They are people like the Highlanders of Scotland 200 years ago and the Pathans of today, or at any rate of my time. They are touchy and tough; picaresque and very tribal in their outlook; they are fierce fighters and resist all change. Even in the greatest Chinese days the Chinese never really and properly controlled the Khambas. Nor were they properly controlled by Lhasa. They have earned their political independence, but they owe their spiritual allegiance to Lhasa.

If the Chinese were going to get to Outer Tibet they had to control Inner Tibet and the Khambas, and they made efforts to do so. They poured an immense quantity of troops into the country and had a tribal war on a large scale, in which they lost heavily. But monasteries were razed, and a great many Khambas fled from this Chinese invasion to Lhasa to seek the protection of the Dalai Lama; and their presence was certainly an element in the rising which took place in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama and the Cabinet and the nobles generally of the hierarchy of Tibet had been stalling and trying to keep the Chinese in check by diplomatic methods and the last thing they wanted was to have an open fight, because they knew what the result of that would be. So the revolt really was a thing that sparked itself off. It was partly due to the Khambas and it was the outcome of popular tumult. It was not a rebellion of the nobles, as the Chinese claim.

Perhaps I ought to say something about the frontiers. If Tibet was free, they might not particularly like these frontiers because they would think there was something to be said on their side about why there are Tibetans on the other side, and about only making an agreement in order to get an agreement with China at the time, and so on. But as things stand, it is not a question at all between India and Tibet; it is a question between India and China. I think I said enough at the outset about the points on which the agreement rests and what is the foundation for the claim of the McMahon Line.

The Chinese have built a road which cuts across this corner (illustrating) and infringes the Ladakh frontier that is shown on the Indian maps. None of this frontier has ever been formally demarcated. The Kashmir frontier was drawn between Kashmir and China before Kashmir came under British suzerainty, at the end of the Sikh regime. It has never been demarcated on the ground. The Russians and the Chinese show the frontier along here. The same with the United Provinces frontier. Some of that has never been demarcated on the ground, and I think the Chinese claim comes very close to the holy places at the source of the Ganges.

I have seen it suggested in letters to *The Times* and elsewhere that the fact that people of Tibetan race live south on the Indian side is an argument for ceding an area to China. That would be a good argument for ceding Liverpool and Glasgow to the Irish! Of course it is an impossible argument in the international conception that frontiers should be drawn according to ethnic origins.

I have not time to talk much about tortures. The most appalling stories are coming through, and these are confirmed by Marco Pallis, whom I mentioned earlier and who has been amongst the refugees—stories of beatings and torture to women and children, sterilisation, removal of masses of people, and everything that could be done to exterminate a race. That has happened before in Chinese history and I am afraid there is very little reason to hope it is not happening again. The Chinese have exterminated a race before.

What in the conclusion can be the object of China in doing this? Possibly it is merely a ruthless Chinese determination to possess every bit of territory their people have had at any time, however vaguely acknowledged was Chinese suzerainty. It is the crudest form of imperialism and nothing else. It is even worse than the old physical domination, because it now sets out to dominate the mind. I believe the nearest parallel is the capture of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70. The only defence is superior force or the arousing of worldwide conscience to the tragedy, which is in every way as great and horrible as what took place in Hungary.

Therefore, we who have spent so many years in India and in dealing with Tibetans, and have always liked them and done our best to support their autonomy in the past, have a moral duty—our Government and our people have—to do what we can to ensure that the world knows the facts. Also a practical way in which help can be given is giving money to the refugees. There is a Tibet Society recently formed in this country—its address is 58, Eccleston Square, S.W. 1—and its main object is to do those things: to ensure that the world does not forget the facts and to

help the refugees. Anyone who feels moved by what I have tried to describe of this tragedy might do well to see whether they cannot give some practical aid in this way. (Applause.)

DISCUSSION

MRS. SWIFT: I have seen the letters from the Dalai Lama to the Chinese Commander-in-Chief published in India. Would you say they were genuine or not? The Dalai Lama has signed an agreement and he was very definitely anxious for social improvements in Tibet. In those letters he agrees to attend the ceremonies. When he was unable to do so he said he had been withheld by a reactionary clique whom he had great difficulty in controlling, and he realized the future of Tibet rested on friendly co-operation, and he himself was anxious that that should continue. The letters were published in India and signed by the Dalai Lama. Do you think they were genuine?

SIR OLAF CAROE: I do not know Tibetan, but Hugh Richardson tells me they have been translated into Communist jargon. You say "reactionary clique." If one translated into non-Communist language, it would be very different. Letters of some sort were written but they have been edited. The Dalai Lama said things had gone beyond his powers, and that was a fact because this was a popular upsurge of feeling that he could not control and he was playing for time. I should like to see a correct English translation before answering your question in detail.

MR. C. G. HANCOCK: Could our speaker say something about the future? Supposing the United Nations say human rights in Tibet have to be respected. Does he think China would be persuaded to that view because she wants to join United Nations herself?

SIR OLAF CAROE: I doubt whether a solution will come out of United Nations in a practical form, but something might come to help the world to know what is happening. If some of the things I have said today can be said in New York about the Tibetan position on the world stage, perhaps those people will alter their views. I doubt whether a bargain could be struck between China and Tibet alone. I do not see that as a kind of psychological reaction which any Communist would have.

A VISITOR from KALIMPONE: I know some of the people who have been referred to, Younghusband and Basil Gould, whom I have met and listened to. I am interested in the position of Mr. Nehru. He is in a very invidious position, because the Chinese cannot be accommodated any more than the Russians were. We must not point our finger unduly at Mr. Nehru. I agree that the whole thing is disastrous, to say the least of it, and Mr. Nehru in continuing as a politician cannot remain a puritan like Mahatma Gandhi because he must move with the times. Of course we hope this question can be sorted out to mutual benefit.

SIR OLAF CAROE: I agree that Mr. Nehru is in an extremely difficult position. He made an agreement with China, which is a kind of foundation of his whole foreign policy. Realism is breaking in. Of course, in point of fact, India and China have practically nothing in common. The fact that they are both in Asia does not make them any more capable of

understanding one another than are, say, Portugal and Russia because they are both in Europe. In history I cannot imagine two cultures or civilizations more different than India and China. I would say, having spent over 30 years in India and having met a lot of Chinese, that India is far closer to Europe.

I think India and Mr. Nehru are in a terribly difficult position. But I also think India will more and more feel that something has to be done. They are at the moment holding back in the United Nations, but I think the Indian conscience has been roused because they hate to see good and simple men being oppressed. And Mr. Nehru is very great-hearted. I feel that our Government cannot do very much except be behind the Indian chariot wheels, because it is India which is chiefly concerned with what is happening in Tibet. We can do little more than help refugees and so on but we must try to follow India and I think India will more and more take a leading part in this business.

COLONEL F. M. BAILEY : I do not believe that the Chinese will ever be able to colonize Tibet. They want to fill it with Chinese people. I have travelled a little on the Chinese-Tibet borders and there I found a place where the Chinese had deliberately tried to colonize, and the things that sent the colonizers back to China were the food and the climate. The Chinese from Taiwan lived on pork and rice; and others lived on yak meat and barley. The Chinese could not eat these other things and they went back.

There is a large amount of feeling in China about the fifth bar in the Flag; that is the bar that refers to Tibet. They are always very anxious to get that put right. That flag was all wrong by them, and although it is not a very serious point it may have a great influence on the Chinese in this matter. We talk about taxes and the people there complaining, but I believe they say more about taxes here than they do there, although the Tibetans are badly taxed. It is regarded as just something that happens, like an earthquake, and I do not think they mind so much about it. If they have a nice landlord or agent, he is kind to them and they will all get on very well together.

The CHAIRMAN : We have now gone past the time for concluding the meeting. I am sure all of you would wish me to express more adequately than I can our great appreciation of Sir Olaf Caroe's talk today. It would almost be impertinent for me to say how clear and how interesting it was, because he is such an experienced speaker. But, nevertheless, I am sure you would all like to thank him for what he has done for us today and I ask you to do so in the appropriate way. (Applause.)





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