




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
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# Adjectives and Substantives as a Single Class in the “ Parts of Speech ”

by

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The logically distinct word-classes dealing with grammatical facts are recognised as separate “ parts of speech ”. The classification of grammatical<sup>1</sup> categories is different from that of words into “ parts of speech ”. Such a classification of categories is based on the morphological structure. The term grammatical category refers to the morphemic form conveying the notion of gender, number, person, tense, mood, etc. “ The parts of speech ” is a logical categorisation presenting the general procedure for the classification of words upon a plan which, although supported by logic, is in no way contrary to the grammatical facts. It is generally said that a language has a different grammatical category when we have a separate form to convey a particular concept. The grammatical categories may place different logical facts under the single category provided that they have the same grammatical function, notwithstanding they have nothing in common from a logical point of view. On the other hand, the logical categories may place the different grammatical facts under the single category even if they may have nothing in common from a grammatical point of view. If the grammatical facts are based on logical distinction, the intended distinction becomes significant.

With this background we will try to examine the classification of nouns into adjectives (*viśeṣaṇa*) and substantives (*viśeṣya*). Before attempting this, I furnish the traditional classification of the “ parts of speech ” presented by the Sanskrit grammarians in what follows. Yāska<sup>2</sup>, the doyen among the early grammarians to handle this problem, presents the fourfold classification of “ parts of speech ” : *nāman* : ‘ noun ’, *ākhyāta* : ‘ verb ’, *upasarga* : ‘ preverb-preposition ’ and *nipāta* : ‘ particle ’. His ingenious analysis runs on parallel lines of linguistic and logical facts. The structure of Sanskrit, as that of all the Indo-European languages, is such that it makes a clear distinction between verbs and nouns. These two categories can be defined semantically as well as morphologically. In Sanskrit, a verb is *tiñanta*, that is to say, it ends in a *tiñ* suffix, whereas noun is *subanta*, which ends in a *sup* suffix. To distinguish verbs from nouns semantically, Yāska<sup>3</sup>

1. J. VENDRYES, *Language*, pp. 91-112 ; also JESPERSEN, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, pp. 58 ff.

2. *Nirukta* I. i: चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपाताश्च ।

3. *Ibid.* I. i: तत्रैतन्नामाख्यातयोर्लक्षणं प्रदिशन्ति । भावप्रधानमाख्यातं सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि । तद्यत्रोभे भावप्रधाने भवतः, पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रम-प्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तं, मूर्तं सत्त्वभूतं सत्त्वनामभिः व्रज्या पक्तिरिति ।

says that a verb denotes activity in process which consists of definite sequence of beginning, middle and end. Nouns on the other hand, do not denote a process but a frozen action in the form of a substance.

Regarding his classification of words into *upasarga* : 'prepositions' and *nipāta* : 'particles', one can say that they cannot be distinguished morphologically, because both of them are indeclinables and linguistically similar forms. But they are functionally different. Particles serve to reveal the relation existing between two different words, whereas the prepositions<sup>4</sup> serve to specify the meaning of the verb. Grammatically *upasargas* are always connected with verbs<sup>5</sup> while *nipātas* show relation between the different words. The distinction between the *upasargas* and *nipātas* is not structural or morphological but it is functional. This functional classification corresponds to the grammatical fact that prepositions are always connected with verbs in the sentence and bring out inherent signification of the verbs, whereas the *nipātas* are regarded as word-connectives or sentence-connectives. Although this classification furnished by *Yāska* has not attained the degree of exactitude, still it can be claimed that this division of words is based on the combined aspects of form, meaning and function, and it is suitable to the structure of Sanskrit.

By the phrase *catvāri padajātāni* : 'there are four "parts of speech"', *Yāska* does not admit more or less number of the "parts of speech". Surprisingly enough, *Yāska* does not recognize adjectives, pronouns, adverbs as separate "parts of speech". He is aware of these categories but does not include them in his fourfold classification of the parts of speech, nor does he give any reason for their non-inclusion.

*Pāṇini* (I. iv. 14), a true descriptive grammarian as he is, acknowledges only two parts of speech : *subanta* : 'a word ending in the case termination', *tinanta* : 'a word ending in the verb termination'. According to him, prepositions, particles, adverbs, adjectives fall under the category *nāman* or *prātipadika*. By the compilation of the lists of suffixes and by the use of the fiction of omitted suffixes, it was possible for him<sup>6</sup> to construct a criterion for assigning all adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, pronouns, particles to the category of nouns. Thus *Pāṇini*, who always avoids the problem of semantics as assiduously as modern descriptive linguists, places all these grammatical categories under the single name *nāman*, in spite of the fact that these categories have nothing in common from a logical and functional points of view. It is true, of course, that *Pāṇini*<sup>7</sup> defines the function of the *upasargas* and *nipātas*. But in his descriptive categorisation, he includes *upasargas* and

4. *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* XII. 8: क्रियावाचकमाख्यातमुपसर्गो विशेषकृत् ।  
सत्त्वाभिधायकं नाम निपातः पादपूरणः ॥

Also *Nirukta* 1. 4: निपाता उच्चावचेष्वर्थेषु निपतन्ति ।

5. P. C. CHAKRAVARTI, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, p. 175.

6. *Pāṇini*. I. ii. 45; I. i. 37; II. iv. 82; IV. i. 2.

7. *Ibid.*, I. iv. 57; I. iv. 59.

*nipātas* under the single category 'noun'. Pāṇini is always devoted to the technicalities of his system and does not care, if logic is sacrificed. Patañjali<sup>8</sup> generally follows Yāska's scheme of the "parts of speech".

Bhartrhari<sup>9</sup>, a Philosopher-grammarians, maintains that some grammarians consider only two "parts of speech", which are of fundamental importance. The words which present the static<sup>10</sup> notion are nouns, and words which convey the notion of process of happenings are verbs. According to this plan, all adjectives, pronouns, conjunctions and indeclinables are nouns, because they stand for the static existence. On the other hand, prepositions and adverbs express only qualities of action and, thus they are not differently viewed from the verb. Thus pursuing the process of elimination, the Indian grammarians leave intact only two "parts of speech": nouns and verbs. All the other "parts of speech" fall within these two fundamental classes. To Bhartrhari<sup>11</sup> pronouns might be a subclass of nouns or adjectives. According to him pronouns are either restrictive adjectives or they stand for the things in general. Thus they function either like adjectives or like nouns, and when they are used to restrict the sense of the substantive, they are treated like adjectives. Similarly the Indian grammarians who were aware of the conception of adverbs, have not treated them as a separate "part of speech". The adverbs are grouped under the category of nouns, because structurally<sup>12</sup> they have similar forms with nouns. Alternatively adverbs may be grouped together with *gatis* or *upasargas*, since functionally they are like *upasargas*.

The omission of adjectives, like that of pronouns, in the classification of the "parts of speech", springs from the fact that the contrast between substantives and adjectives has not much grammatical importance for the description of the language. The adjectives and substantives have the same inflection in Sanskrit. As in Greek and Latin, the chief difference between the Sanskrit adjectives and substantives is that the former class varies in three genders, as it is shown by their agreement with substantives. But substan-

8. *Mahābhāṣya Paspasā*: चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्च । KIELHORN, Vol. I. p. 3.L.17.

9. *Vākyapadīya* (abbrev. VP) 3.1.1:  
द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधाऽपि वा ।  
अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ॥

10. Helārāja on VP.III.1.1: सिद्धसाध्यलक्षणोऽशब्दव्यविषयः पदापोद्धारो द्विविधो नामाख्यातरूपः ।

11. VP III.1.3:  
वस्तूपलक्षणं यत्र सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते ।  
द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेदत्वेन विवक्षितः ॥  
Also Helārāja on VP.3.1.3: इह सर्वनाम्नां द्वयी गतिः ।  
वस्तुमात्राभिधायिनः केचिद्यथा सर्वादयः । विशिष्टवस्तुवाचका-  
श्चान्ये यथान्यतरादयः ।

12. Punyarāja under VP. 2.5.: क्रियाविशेषणानां कर्मत्वं नपुंसकता च । Also CHAKRA-  
VARTI, *Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, pp. 153-4.

tives have definite gender. In other words, adjectives agree<sup>13</sup> with substantives in number and gender. This is not true in all the cases. There are certain exceptions to this grammatical distinction. *Vyutpattivāda*<sup>14</sup> points out that in the following examples—*vedāḥ pramāṇam* : ‘the Vedas are authoritative’, *śatām brāhmaṇāḥ* : ‘hundred brahmins’, *trayaḥ samudītā hetuḥ* : ‘the three facts put together constitute the cause’, *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni* : ‘the instruments of right cognition are perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony’—the words *pramāṇam*, *śatām* and *trayaḥ*, although used adjectively do not agree with the following substantives in gender, number or both in gender and number.

Pāṇini, as is characteristic of him, does not define the terms *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* semantically or structurally but uses them in the rule II.i.57 which means: a case-inflected word standing for a qualifier is compounded with a case-inflected word standing for a qualificand. For example, *nīlotpala* : ‘a blue lotus’, *raktotpala* : ‘a red lotus’. The words *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are interpreted by the commentators<sup>15</sup> to mean the distinguisher (*bhedaka*) and to be distinguished (*bhedya*). Here the words *nīla* and *rakta* intend to differentiate the blue and red lotuses from the white lotus etc.

Patañjali, while interpreting the rule<sup>16</sup> (II. i.57) finds it difficult to explain the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*. He tries to find out the contrast between *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* placing them side by side in two sentences in

13. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini I. ii. 52.: गुणवचनानां शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्ति । KIELHORN, Vol. I. p. 228.

Also *Samāsacakra* :

यल्लिङ्गं यद्वचनं या च विभक्तिर्विशेष्यस्य ।

तल्लिङ्गं तद्वचनं सा च विभक्तिर्विशेषणस्यापि ॥

14. *Vyutpattivāda*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, pp. 22-30: स्वसमानविभक्तिकत्वं च स्वप्रकृतिकविभक्तिसजातीयविभक्तिकत्वं । साजात्यं च विभक्तिविभाजकप्रथमात्वादिना न तु समानानुपूर्वीकत्वं साजात्यम् । वेदाः प्रमाणं, शतं ब्राह्मणा इत्यादावन्वयबोधानुपपत्तेः । ननु “विशत्याद्याः सदैकत्वे” इत्यनुशासनात्शतं ब्राह्मणा इत्यादेः साधुत्वेऽपि वेदाः प्रमाणमित्यादयः कथं प्रयोगाः, विशेष्यविशेषणवाचकपदयोरसति विशेषानुशासने समानवचनकत्वनियमात् । समानलिङ्गकस्यले तथा नियमोपगमेन वेदाः प्रमाणमित्यादेः साधुत्वोपपादनेऽपि ...इति त्रयः समुदिता हेतुरिति काव्यप्रकाशव्याख्याया असंगतिर्दुर्वारिव ।

15. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini, II. i. 57: भेदकं विशेषणं भेदं विशेष्यम् । विशेषणवाचि सुवन्तं विशेष्यवाचिना समानाधिकरणेन सुवन्तेन बहुलं समस्यते, तत्पुरुषश्च समासो भवति ।

16. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini, II. i. 57: यदाऽस्य तिलाः प्राधान्येन विवक्षिता भवन्ति, कृष्णो विशेषकत्वेन, तदा तिलाः प्रधानं, कृष्णो विशेषणम् । कामं तर्हि अनेनैव हेतुना यस्य कृष्णाः प्राधान्येन विवक्षिता भवन्ति तिला विशेषणत्वेन, तेन कर्तव्यं तिलकृष्णा इति । Also Kaiyata on the *Mahābhāṣya*: कृष्णशब्द उच्चारितो भ्रमरकोकिलादिद्रव्यमात्रं प्रतिपादयति तिलशब्देन त्वभिसंबन्धमानस्तिलेऽत्रेव नियम्यत इति कृष्णशब्दो विशेष्यस्तिलशब्दो विशेषणम् । एवं तिलशब्दस्यापि विशेष्यत्वं कृष्णशब्दस्य च विशेषणत्वमवसेयम् ।

which the same word has both the uses. *kr̥ṣṇāḥ tilāḥ*: 'the sesamum (seeds) black' and *tilāḥ kr̥ṣṇāḥ*: 'the black (substance as) sesamum seeds'. In these phrases, the first word of each pair is an adjective and the second is a substantive. Finally he comes to the conclusion that the difference between *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* lies in the point of view<sup>17</sup> which we put forth. If we consider black as a whole class, the distinction is to be made among the groups of the diverse black things, and we say the black (substance as) sesamum seeds. If we think, on the other hand, of the sesamum seeds in general, black, white, etc., the distinction is to be made of the black seeds from the white seeds, etc.

Thus Patañjali maintains that adjectives can be turned into substantives and substantives into adjectives. The difference lies in the point of view of the person who is the speaker. Then Patañjali raises the question why the compound *tilakṛṣṇa* is not used in the language. To get rid of this difficulty, he gives up the notional definition of the words *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*. The notional definition of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* expresses the difference in the point of view of the speaker. The *viśeṣaṇa* stands for the qualifying term and the *viśeṣya* for the qualificand; but this definition does not help us in determining which words are intrinsically qualifying and which are intrinsically qualificand. The notion of qualifier and qualificand is purely subjective with reference to the wish of the speaker. And thus adjectival notion can be easily turned into the substantivated notion. Therefore, Patañjali tries to find a suitable terminology<sup>18</sup> which may point out the intrinsic difference between the adjectives and substantives. Finally, he calls adjectives *guṇavacanāḥ*: 'denotative of qualities', that are found in substances, and in his terminology, *viśeṣya* stands for *dravyavacanā*: 'denotative of substances'. Both terms are fairly correct in representing the adjectives and substantives, because words like *śukla* etc. are generally adjectives and others like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, *puruṣaḥ*, *śakuniḥ*, etc. are always substantives. More often Patañjali uses the terms *guṇavacanā* and *dravyavacanā* for the adjectives and substantives respectively. Pāṇini<sup>19</sup> has also used several times the word *guṇavacanā* in the sense 'qualifying attribute'. Here I must mention that the term *guṇavacanā* used by Patañjali and Pāṇini on various occasions need not necessarily be taken to represent the *Vaiśeṣika*<sup>20</sup> notion of *guṇa*. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the relation between quality (*guṇa*) and qualified (*guṇin*) is permanent and it is always found inseparable. But the grammarians' term *guṇa* stands for the attributes or qualities separable or inseparable from the substances. According to the grammarians, the term *guṇavacanā* means

17. J. VENDRYES, *Language*, p. 130.

18. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini II. i. 57: तत्र त्वेतावान्संदेहः । किं प्रधानं किं विशेषण-मिति । स चापि क्व संदेहः, यत्रोभौ गुणशब्दौ । . . यत्र हि अन्यतरद् द्रव्यमन्यतरो गुणस्तत्र यद् द्रव्यं तत्प्रधानम् । KIELHORN, Vol. I. p. 399.

19. Pāṇini II. i. 30; VI. ii. 115.

20. ATHALYE, *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 2nd edn., pp. 83-96.

any attributive<sup>21</sup> word which serves to distinguish one object from the others. For instance *kārṇaveṣṭakikam mukham* : 'the face ornamented with the ear-rings'. Here the term *kārṇaveṣṭakika*<sup>22</sup> is *guṇavacana* which can be easily separated from the substance.

But this conception of *guṇavacana* and *dravyavacana* is not useful for the *karmadhāraya* compound prescribed for the *viśeṣya-viśeṣana* words because we see this compound formed out of collocations where both the members are *dravyavacana*; e. g., *āmraṅkṣaḥ* : 'a mango tree', *śiṃśapā-vṛkṣaḥ* : 'a śiṃśapā tree', similarly the *karmadhāraya* compound is also seen in the case of the two *guṇavacanas*; e.g., *śuklakṛṣṇaḥ* : 'white-black'. The terms *guṇavacana* and *dravyavacana* have definite meaning, and they cannot be normally interchangeable. But the notion of *viśeṣyaviśeṣanabhāva* is purely dependant upon the view of the person speaking.

From a philosophical point of view, Patañjali<sup>23</sup> says that qualities are real and the notion of substance is a fiction. What we perceive is actually the quality, and substance is inferred thereby. The conception of quality becomes incompatible unless it has a substratum. Patañjali<sup>24</sup> also finds out that qualities are often changed but substance remains the same. What he means to say is that the notion of substance is rendered necessary by the habits<sup>25</sup> of our thinking. The notion of substance is assumed because we feel that qualities always reside in something. But this philosophical distinction between substance and quality has no great value from the grammatical point of view.

Patañjali gives another classification<sup>26</sup> of words into four groups : words denoting class, quality, action and singularity. This classification

21. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini I. i. 1 : "Devadatta retains the same name, no matter whether he is a boy, a young or old man, and shaved or wearing matted hair". In Patañjali's statement, the words *śikhin*, *jaṭin* and *mūḍin* are *guṇavacanas* in grammar. But they cannot be termed as denotative of qualities, from the point of view of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. KIELHORN, Vol. I. p. 42.

22. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini VI. ii. 155 : संपादि-अर्ह-हित-अलम् इत्येवमर्था ये तद्धितास्तदन्तान्युत्तरपदानि नञो गुणप्रतिषेधे वर्तमानात्पराण्यन्तोदात्तानि भवन्ति । संपादि । कर्ण-वेष्टकाभ्यां संपादि, मुखं, कार्णवेष्टकिकम् । न कार्णवेष्टकिकम् अकार्णवेष्टकिकम् ।

23. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 5.1.119 : किं पुनर्द्रव्यम् । केपुनर्गुणाः । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा गुणाः, ततोऽन्यद् द्रव्यम् । . . अन्यत् शब्दादिभ्यो द्रव्यम् । तत्त्वनुमानगम्यम् । KIELHORN Vol. II. p. 366.

24. *Mahābhāṣya Paspāśūhnika* KIELHORN, Vol. I. p. 7. : आकृतिरन्या चान्या च भवति, द्रव्यं पुनस्तदेव.

25. JESPERSEN, *The philosophy of grammar*, p. 75 : "While formerly substances were thought of as realities *per se* and qualities were considered as having no existence in themselves, there is perhaps now a strong tendency in the opposite direction, to look upon the substance or "substratum" of various qualities as a fiction, rendered more or less necessary by our habits of thought, and to say that it is the "qualities" that ultimately constitute the real world, i. e. everything that can be perceived by us and is of value to us."

26. *Mahābhāṣya*, on the second *Sivasūtra*, KIELHORN., Vol. I. p. 19. : चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः । जातिशब्दाः, गुणशब्दाः, क्रियाशब्दाः, यदृच्छाशब्दाश्चतुर्थाः ।



springs from the fact that the words employed in communication are regarded as different with reference to the thing meant by them; e. g., the word *gauḥ* denotes the meaning 'class' (i. e. universal concept of cow found in a particular cow). The second category of words like *śukla* denotes the quality which is inherent in the substance. The third category of the words like *calati* denotes action inherent in the substance. The fourth category of the words like *dittha* always stands for the single object. This classification, which brings out the distinction among words, is based upon the nature of objects which they refer to. In this classification, the words *jāti* and *guṇa* represent the properties of substantives and adjectives respectively. The term *guṇa* refers to qualities, while the term *jāti* refers to a substance; furthermore the term *jāti* refers to or is used to signify the essence of a thing which is considered universal nature of objects by the philosophers. The function of adjectives is to differentiate one individual from the rest within a single class. This classification is based on the things meant by words because they correspond to the external objects in the mode of their representation. The grammatical fact of agreement or concord between the adjectives and substantives is well brought out by Patañjali by classifying them logically as denotatives of qualities and substances.

Bhartṛhari<sup>27</sup>, while speaking of *guṇas* emphasises the differentiating character and the depending nature of the *guṇas*. The latter nature refers to the fact that one cannot conceive of *guṇa* without considering at the same time the substance in which that particular quality might inhere. In the sense of distinguishing nature, the term *guṇa* can be applied to the adjectives. Helārāja commenting on the *Vākya-padīya* III. p. 145, says: *bhedakatvaṁ cātra mukhyaṁ guṇalakṣaṇam* : "the main characteristic of term *guṇa* is its differentiating nature".

Bhartṛhari<sup>28</sup>, while discussing the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, points out that *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa* is a syntactic category and not a morphological or grammatical one. The designatives *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* refer to a word as a member of combination and not as an isolated individual. If *nīla* and *ghaṭa* are not put in combination but used separately, they denote the similar nominal notion (*prātipadikārtha*). But if they are used in combination as *nīloghaṭaḥ*, the listener thinks that *nīla* designates an attribute of an object referring to the word *ghaṭa*. The stem-meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) or word-meaning (*padārtha*) conveyed by both *nīla* and *ghaṭa* appears to be the same from a grammatical point of view. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, the difference in *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* is not a morphological but a syntactical one.

27. VP. III. p. 145 : Poona University edn. :

संसर्गभेदकं यद्यत्सव्यापारं प्रतीयते ।

गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्र उदाहृतम् ॥

28. *Ibid.* p. 116 :

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वं पदयोरुपजायते ।

न प्रातिपदिकार्थश्च तत्रैवं व्यतिरिच्यते ॥



In the *Vyutpattivāda*,<sup>29</sup> Gadādhara points out the two-fold function of adjectives : identification and differentiation (*bhedaḥ abhāvaś ca*). The collocation *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* shows that the adjective *nīla* corresponds in number, gender and case to the noun which it qualifies. This correspondence shows that *nīla* is not intended to refer to the objects different from *ghaṭa*, i. e. the quality 'blue' is non-different from the qualified 'jar'. The use of adjectives in language also aims at the elimination of other qualities. For instance, the word *nīla* is used in the phrase *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* to eliminate non-blue jars. But this function of elimination cannot be attached to the adjectives in all the cases. For example, in the collocation *prameyo ghaṭaḥ*<sup>30</sup> : 'a knowable jar', the universal attribute *prameya* cannot eliminate anything because we do not find anything in the world which cannot be made the object of knowledge. In such cases the adjectives do not indicate *itaravyāvṛtti* but simply the identification of the qualified with the qualifier. Thus the phrase *prameyo ghaṭaḥ* intends to mean that knowability is emphasised as one of the aspects of a jar.

Gadādharaḥṭaṭṭa<sup>31</sup> further points out that the qualifier and qualificand are considered as belonging to a single entity. The adjective *nīla* differentiates a blue jar from the white, black, red jars, etc. The class of jars is divided into sub-classes : black-jars, blue-jars, yellow-jars, etc. All the sub-classes are considered the qualified individuals falling within the larger class of jars. A qualifying word *nīla* presupposes a class of jars having more than one qualified individual i. e. blackjar, yellowjar etc. The adjective *nīla* differentiates one qualified individual from the other qualified-individual of the same class. It means<sup>32</sup> : the qualifying word differentiates the individuals of the same class and not individuals of the other classes. The adjective *nīla* differentiates the blue-jars from the yellow-jars, but it does not differentiate a jar from other classes bearing the same colour (blue birds, etc.) In other words, in the phrase *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* we regard a jar as representing a whole class, and by adding the adjective *nīla* to *ghaṭa* we distinguish the individual or qualified individual among the jars, that is to say, the group of jars, possessing diverse colours (blue, black, yellow, etc.) are differentiated. To be explicit, an adjective distinguishes the individual of the same class but not the classes of the same attribute.

29. *Vyutpattivāda op. cit.*, p. 81 :

भेदोऽभावश्च विशेषणविभक्तेरर्थः । विशिष्टलाभस्त्वाकाङ्क्षावशात् ।

30. *Ibid.*, p. 82 : अथ प्रमेयो घट इत्यादौ प्रमेयत्वाच्चिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदाप्रसिद्ध्या... विशेषणविभक्तेरभेदार्थकत्वासंभवः ।

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-92 : अभेदस्तादात्म्यम् । तच्च स्ववृत्त्यसाधारणधर्मः । ... तादृशधर्मस्तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वादिरूप एव । अपूर्वव्यक्तिनिष्ठतादृशधर्मस्य विशिष्य ज्ञानुमशक्यत्वेऽप्येकमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वादिना सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तितः सुग्रहत्वमेव ।

32. R. C. PANDEYA, *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarasidass, p. 154.

The substantive is possessed of various qualities but the adjective singles out the particular quality to the exclusion of others. This idea is suggested by the definition: *bhedyam*<sup>33</sup> *viśeṣyam*, *bhedakam viśeṣaṇam*: 'qualifier is distinguisher and qualificand is to be distinguished'. This conception of adjectives and substantives is somewhat different from what was held by Western<sup>34</sup> Semantists. The modern semantist<sup>35</sup> would say that an adjective expresses the general quality, and the substantive, which refers to a particular individual, renders the quality individualized. According to this conception, substantives have a more special signification and adjectives have a more general signification. Indian philosophers think<sup>36</sup> that content of substantives is greater than that of the adjectives because substantives denote objects possessing various qualities and adjectives single out one quality to the exclusion of others. The word *ghaṭa* may be used with reference to the jars possessing qualities blue, black, white, red, etc. The adjective *nīla* makes a quality definite instead of indefinite. In the Indian terminology the modern semantist would say *viśeṣya* is *bhedaka* and *viśeṣana* is *bhedyā*.

Similarly commenting on the formation of the *karmadhāraya* compound *śimśapāvṛkṣaḥ*: 'a *śimśapā* tree', Kaiyata says that the word *vṛkṣa* in the compound *śimśapāvṛkṣa* is *viśeṣya*, because the content<sup>37</sup> of substantive is greater than that of adjective; and the word *śimśapā* is *viśeṣana* because the content denoted by it is less than that of substantive. Certainly there are less number of *śimśapā* trees than the trees in general. Again this conception of adjectives and substantives is exactly contrary to the western idea<sup>38</sup> of adjectives and substantives.

But the difference, regarding the notion of adjectives and substantives according to the two systems—Indian and Western—need not necessarily

33. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini II. i. 57.

34. JESPERSEN, *Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 75: "On the whole substantives are more special than adjectives, they are applicable to fewer objects than adjectives".

35. J. VENDRYES, *Language*, pp. 130-31: "Doubtless, between 'Peter is good' and 'goodness is a virtue', there is this difference, that good expresses the quality individualized, rendered concrete in a certain being i. e. Peter—whereas goodness is the expression of the quality itself abstractly conceived" also "the general quality expressed by the adjective is referred to a particular individual, that is to say, whenever it becomes definite instead of indefinite, which it is by nature".

36. This is known to JESPERSEN, *op. cit.*, p. 81: "Substantives are broadly distinguished as having a more special signification, and adjectives as having a more general signification because the former connote the possession of complexity of qualities, and the latter the possession of one single quality".

37. Kaiyata on *Mahābhāṣya* II. i. 57: वृक्षस्य व्यापकत्वाद्विशेष्यत्वमेव, शिशपात्वं तु स्वल्पविषयत्वात् ... विशेषणमेव. Also Nāgeśa on Kaiyata, *op. cit.* व्याप्यव्यापकजातिसमभिव्याहारे व्यापकस्य विशेष्यत्वमित्यपि बोध्यते ।

38. J. VENDRYES, *Language*, p. 131: "We often express this difference by saying that the content of adjectives is greater than that of substantive"; also JESPERSEN, *op. cit.*, p. 75: "On the whole substantives are more special than adjectives, they are applicable to fewer objects than adjectives, in the parlance of logicians".

be exaggerated. The Westerner, when a statement like *nīlo ghataḥ* is uttered, will consider the category *nīla* as a whole, and the substantive *ghata* renders that quality individualised. The Indian Philosophers think that from the above statement the listener would consider that the speaker wants to present the category of jars as a whole, and the word *nīla* differentiates blue jars from the other individuals of the same class. To the Indian thinkers, the statement is conditioned by the speaker's will and it does not speak of external nature of things at all. Since viewing towards adjectives and substantives in this angle is purely subjective, Patañjali thinks that adjectives can be turned into substantives.

The terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* are not restricted to the adjective and substantive words but they are also used by the philosophers to point out the principal and subordinate status of linguistic expression. By way of illustration, the Sanskrit grammarians, while explaining the phrase *rājñah: puruṣaḥ* 'king's man', assign the principal status (*viśeṣyatva*) to the constituent *puruṣaḥ* and the subordinate status (*viśeṣanatva*) to the other constituent *rājñah: 'king's'*. Thus the terminology *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* is conveniently used to make a distinction in the rank or status of the various linguistic expressions. According to the grammarians, the genitive attribute (*vyadhikaranaviśeṣana*) *rājñah* is also designated as *viśeṣana* : 'subordinate' with respect to the meaning *puruṣaḥ*. Thus these terms stand for the words occupying principal and subordinate positions.

To sum up : It is very difficult to provide a satisfactory definition of the concepts *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana*, because we do not have any adequate criterion for the differentiation of adjectives and substantives. The words standing for the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* have not a fixed grammatical aspect. Patañjali maintains that *viśeṣana* can be turned into *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣya* into *viśeṣana*. According to him, the difference indicated by *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* lies in the point of view of the speaker and thus these are interchangeable.

The main difference between adjectives and substantives, which is grammatically important, is that the substantives have fixed gender, while the adjectives vary in gender and number following the substantival character. This intended grammatical distinction is not always borne out by the words standing for *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana*. Accordingly, in the expression *āmro vṛkṣaḥ* or in the compound *āmra vṛkṣaḥ* : 'a mango tree', *āmra* is the *viśeṣana* (differentiating attribute) possessing a fixed gender. Similarly, in the expression *śatām brāhmaṇāḥ* : 'hundred brahmins', *śata* is *viśeṣana* but does not show agreement with the substantive in gender and number. Both the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* point out the semantic character of the grammatical forms. The words standing for adjectives and substantives may have certain grammatical character, but this fact does not correspond to the semantic character intended by the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana*. These terms are too wide to include even those cases where we do not find structural variation in gender and number of adjectives. Thus the choice of the terms

*viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* is not happy. These terms lead to a misunderstanding, because the words which are grammatically substantives can act as *viśeṣaṇa* and the words which are structurally adjectives can act as *viśeṣya*, in the semantic explanation of the sentences.

Therefore, Patañjali uses the terms *guṇavacana* and *dravyavacana* for the adjectives and substantives. This somewhat corresponds to the English terminology of adjectives and substantives. These terms clearly point out the distinction between *dravyavacana* which denotes substances and *guṇavacana* which denotes qualities. The difference between adjectives (*guṇavacana*) and substantives (*dravyavacana*) actually depends upon the things meant by them. Patañjali points out that the linguistic character of adjectival and substantival words are fundamentally characters of the things meant by them. The words functioning as adjectives and substantives have the same intrinsic value which corresponds to the external objects denoted by them.

In Yāska's four-fold classification of the "parts of speech", the word *nāman* includes all substantives, adjectives, pronouns, etc. This classification falls within the scope of Morphology. In this grammatical classification, functional approach is not violated. In other words this classification is not based on the representation of the external facts. Infact this is a morpho-functional classification. For instance, *bhavati* is a verb in form, *bhavaḥ* a noun, *pra* (*bhavati*) is a preverb-preposition and (*ghataḥ paṭaḥ*) *ca* is a particle. The only difficulty is that if the forms *pra* and *ca* are taken out of the context, their particular category cannot be decided. Therefore, these categories are contextually explained, when they form part of a linguistic expression. In this classification the adjectives and substantives are not recognised as separate categories. Yāska has grouped them under a single category of nouns.


Another way of classification is rank or relation of the words to each other. This classification points out relative importance of the elements of the given sentence. The term *viśeṣya* refers to the modifier (qualifier or subordinate) and the term *viśeṣaṇa* refers to the primary or qualificand. This classification is not theoretically restricted to the finished words (*pada*) but also applicable to the morphemes and phrases. The Sanskrit grammarians consider that the suffixes are primary with respect to stems which are subordinated to suffixes. From this we say that words like *śukla*, *nīla* etc. have always a tendency to occur only with the words which represent the primary notion of substantives. This analysis is not restricted to the adjectives-substantives but also applicable to adverbs-verbs, noun-verbs, etc. We see some affinity between the first word of each pair of related words and the following word. The first is generally subordinate (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the second is primary (*viśeṣya*). This classification represents a hierarchical structure of the semantic units and has no absolute grammatical value.

Patañjali's fourfold classification is logical corresponding to the grammatical facts, not strictly falling within the scope of morphology. But Yāska's classification, as has already been mentioned, is more or less morpho-

logical but not logical. Pantañjali classifies the categories corresponding to the external facts of the things meant by words. His terms *dravya* and *guṇa* seem to be too narrow to represent in its entirety the concepts—adjectives and substantives. In his classification: *dravya* and *guṇa*, collocations like *pacan devadattaḥ* are not properly taken care of.

The popular terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are too wide to represent the concepts of adjectives and substantives, as has already been exemplified. Moreover, *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa* is a syntactic term which represents the hierarchical structure showing the principal and subordinate status of the linguistic elements.

In conclusion, it can be stated that Sanskrit philosopher-grammarians were aware of the grammatical and logical distinction between the substantives and the adjectives. In fact they have attached greater importance to logical difference than to the grammatical aspect. To put it particularly, the nature of things meant by the words only justifies the classification of words into adjectives and substantives. This is in no way a morphological classification but a classification supported by the logical facts. This makes it clear that no serious importance was attached to this terminology strictly from the grammatical point of view. Thus these two categories were grouped under the single class nouns.



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