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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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**Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking
Communists and Their Preparations for
Subversion and Violence**

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
MAID ON THE TABLE OF PARLIAMENT ON
FEBRUARY 18, 1965.

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**INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
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**Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking
Communists and Their Preparations for
Subversion and Violence**

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STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Starting from December 30, 1964, about 900 active members of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of India have been detained in different States under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. On January 1, 1965, I made a brief statement over the All India Radio on the circumstances leading to the detentions. I am now placing on the table of the House a fuller statement giving the background of the action that we felt called upon to take. It contains only a part of the material, available with us, concerning the activities of the pro-Chinese communists. It is not in the public interest, including the interest of security, to disclose at this stage more information than has been furnished in this statement. The statement only gives the background of the decision to take action; it does not purport to cover the specific grounds on which each individual has been detained by the State Governments.

We were watching the growing activities of pro-Chinese communists with increasing concern, but there was reluctance on the part of the Government to take recourse to preventive detention until the decisions taken by the left CPI at its Calcutta Congress, followed by energetic preparations for subversion and violence, made it necessary in the vital interest of the nation to take action.

We are dedicated to the ideals and values of a free and democratic society. Our democratic Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech, expression and association, and however strongly opposed we may be to the political philosophy of a party, we would not interfere with it unless its way of functioning constitutes a threat to national security. We were convinced that the plans and activities of the pro-Chinese Communists had developed into such a threat.

G. L. NANDA,
Minister of Home Affairs.

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ANTI-NATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PRO-PEKING COMMUNISTS AND THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE

CHAPTER I

Support to China over Tibet and the border question

The Chinese inspiration

The new doctrinal formulations which gave the international communist movement a new orientation in the late fifties met with vigorous opposition from a section of the Communist Party of India. This section was in full agreement with the Chinese view that the concept of peaceful transition to socialism had little more than tactical value and that, on the contrary, the peaceful path would breed dangerous illusions and weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat. The Chinese had affirmed at the conference of communist parties, held at Moscow in November, 1957, that the bourgeoisie would inevitably use armed force to suppress the people's revolution; it wanted the communist parties and the proletariat to be fully prepared "at the critical juncture of the revolution when the working class is seizing state power to overthrow the bourgeoisie by armed force". It asserted that the parliamentary form of struggle had a very limited role and that the really important thing was "to proceed with the hard work of gathering the revolutionary forces". Thus the Chinese had endorsed the new formulations adopted at the 1957 conference with several mental reservations.

2. The Chinese view found ready acceptance in the left wing of the Communist party of India and it was entirely in the spirit in which the Chinese had accepted the Moscow Declaration that the leftists in the CPI endorsed the line regarding the possibility of peaceful transition at the Amritsar Congress in April 1958. This was evident from the tenor of the statements made by leftist leaders soon after the Amritsar Congress. B. T. Ranadive, a prominent leftist leader, told party workers at Patna on May 30, 1958 that the CPI had adopted the line of the peaceful path largely from considerations of expediency and that it figured in the preamble to the constitution only as a "possibility" without imposing any fetters on the party. He assured them that theirs would remain, unlike the Congress and the PSP a revolutionary party with unflinching faith in the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. In similar vein, P. Ramamurthi, another prominent leader of the left wing, explained to party workers at Coimbatore in the same month that the Amritsar line stemmed from their success in Kerala and the possibility of coming to power through elections in other states and that it was totally wrong to think that the party had given up its belief in revolutionary methods.

3. It is significant that as early as May, 1959 left CPI leaders among whom were Muzaffar Ahmed, Hare Krishna Konar and Promode Das Gupta, produced a document entitled "On Revisionist trend inside the CPI" which clearly affirmed their faith in the revolutionary path. They ridiculed the "peaceful revisionist path", and

the ideas advocated by rightist party leaders that socialism could be achieved by evolutionary methods. The path to be followed, they stated, had been clearly set out by the Chinese and they quoted an extract from the 'Peking Review' No. 17 of June 24, 1958 :

"Through revolution in one form or another the working class must smash the bourgeois State apparatus and replace the bourgeois dictatorship by proletarian dictatorship"

The same Peking Review had gone on to criticize the revisionists for "spreading this nonsense about peaceful evolution from capitalism to socialism".

Anti-national stand on developments in Tibet

4. The developments in Tibet early in 1959 leading to the presence of a strong communist power on India's northern borders appear to have evoked a good deal of satisfaction among the left-CPI leaders. Ignoring the general feeling in the country, they welcomed the "liberation of Tibet" and fully echoed, despite the Government of India's assertions to the contrary, the Chinese accusations that Kalimpong in India was being used as a 'command centre' of the Tibetan rebellion. B. T. Ranadive saw in the sympathy extended to the Dalai Lama "a deeply political motive, to use the Dalai Lama to build political propaganda against China" (New Age Monthly—May, 1959) and was positive that India's policy towards the Tibetan problem was dictated by the fear of a strong socialist Tibet on the Indian border. In an article in the 'New Age' of May 3, 1959, he went to the extent of denouncing the Government of India's attitude as one of intervention in the internal affairs of China. The Peking radio made effective use of some of these pro-Chinese utterances of left CPI leaders to convey the impression that large sections of the people of India condemned the stand taken by the Indian Government.

Attitude to Chinese border incursions

5. In the meanwhile, China had been steadily pushing on with her stealthy occupation of Indian territory in Ladakh and had begun a series of intrusions into our territory. After the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, the Chinese attitude to India became more hostile and the new Chinese incursions displayed a spirit of belligerency that had not been in evidence before. The Prime Minister's disclosures in the Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959 of the details of Chinese incursions into India and the capture of Longju led to a wave of anti-Chinese feeling, and indignation rose high over the Chinese perfidy to a country which had consistently befriended her in the past. The leaders of the pro-Chinese faction of the CPI, however, took a different view and refused to believe that China had committed aggression. They fully endorsed the extraordinary claim of the Chinese Premier made for the first time in his letter to the Indian Prime Minister on September 8, 1959 that the Sino-Indian border had never been formally delimited. Speaking at a public meeting at Gaya on August 30, 1959, A. K. Gopalan stated that he did not believe the reports of Chinese aggression and that the much publicised intrusion was a bogey raised by newspapers. P. Ramamurthi declared at a public meeting at Tirupur (Madras State) on

September 5, 1959 that "the reported Chinese incursion into Indian territory was baseless". At another public meeting at Tiruchirapalli on September 10, 1959 he declared that the McMahon Line had never been accepted by China. China, he added, was strengthening her forces on the border to guard against activities of Tibetan rebels and Kuomintang groups, and vested interests had raised the bogey of China's aggression in order to check the growing influence of the communists. Harkishen Singh Surjeet stated at a public meeting at Hoshiarpur on September 14, 1959 that the McMahon Line was a creation of British imperialism and had never been recognized by the Chinese Government. He charged India with interfering in the internal affairs of China by giving political asylum to the Dalai Lama.

6. At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee held at Calcutta in September, 1959, the pro-Chinese faction in the CPI championed the Chinese stand on the border dispute and produced a document heavily loaded with those very arguments that the Chinese had been advancing. It described the McMahon Line as "a fraud against China" since China had not signed the draft convention drawn up at the tripartite conference held at Simla. The Nehru Government, it said, pursued in NEFA the same old British imperialist line and interposed between India and Tibet an "inner line" in the shape of NEFA and also sought to create buffer states through subsidised semi-independent protectorates like Sikkim and Bhutan. The Indian Government, it alleged, had "no doubt committed acts of aggression . . . After the revolt in Tibet, Indian troops have kept on pushing northward to give protection to the fleeing Tibetan rebels". Thus this faction not only questioned the territorial integrity of India by disputing the validity of the McMahon Line but even accused India of aggression against China.

7. Another document by B. T. Ranadive on India-China relations, fully supporting the Chinese case was also circulated at that meeting. B. T. Ranadive stated therein that the asylum to the Dalai Lama and the attempt to rouse public opinion in his favour were "part of the sordid diplomacy 'to insulate Tibet against social change, to intervene in the internal affairs of China and to keep Chinese revolution far away from India's borders". He said that having failed to put Tibet between India and China, Nehru wanted to put the Himalayas between the two countries and hence his stand on the McMahon Line. The party, Ranadive continued, should not "take an unprincipled stand saying that we will defend the country against Chinese aggression and give up our internationalism". He brushed aside the story of Chinese incursions beyond the McMahon Line as a "pure fabrication". "Juridically and historically . . . India's position", he said, was "thoroughly indefensible" and India had begun pressing steadily forward in the NEFA border only after the liberation of Tibet. He even blamed China for exercising unnecessary restraint on many questions and thereby allowing the propaganda initiative to pass into the hands of India's ruling class.

8. No less anti-national were the views expressed by B. T. Ranadive in an article in the 'New Age Monthly' of October, 1959. He quoted from the Chinese Prime Minister's letter of January 23 to make out that there had been no aggression. B. T. Ranadive then

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delved into the origins of the McMahon Line and arrived at the perverse conclusion that it had neither the sanctity of custom or tradition nor the binding force of a treaty.

9. The cold-blooded massacre of Indian policemen by Chinese troops at Hot Springs on October 21, 1959 sent a wave of indignation all over the country but made no impression whatsoever on the leaders of the pro-China faction. At the meeting of the National Council of the party held at Meerut from 10th to 15th November, Hare Krishna Konar and other leftists strongly espoused the Chinese view on the border dispute. Konar wanted the National Council to specifically take note of the Chinese view that the McMahon Line was a product of British imperialist policy of aggression and that in Ladakh area the boundary was vague and not properly delineated. At a meeting of the Maharashtra Provincial Executive Committee held shortly after the session of the Meerut National Council, M. Basavapunnaiiah advanced views so blatantly in support of the Chinese that Tushar Pawar, an important member of the Maharashtra Provincial Executive Committee, resigned from the Communist party declaring that "the pro-Indian group in the Communist party was incapable of influencing the party's policy on the Sino-Indian dispute". He revealed in a press interview (Times of India—February 14, 1960) that M. Basavapunnaiiah had stated at the Provincial Executive Committee meeting that the Sino-Indian dispute was neither territorial nor geographical, but purely a political dispute between communism and bourgeois democracy; and that the Government of India had raised the bogey of Chinese aggression out of fear of the far-reaching consequences of the socio-economic revolution in Tibet. He also stated that M. Basavapunnaiiah had affirmed that those who held China guilty of aggression had no place in the Communist party of India.

Pernicious propaganda in the Indo-Tibetan border areas

10. Meanwhile pro-China elements in the CPI had spearheaded a subtle and sinister propaganda campaign in the sensitive border areas, particularly in West Bengal. Underlying the propaganda was the desire to produce in a strategic area an atmosphere favourable to China and to weaken the position of the Government of India. Bright pictures were drawn of the developmental activities in Tibet and of the economic progress achieved in China. In Darjeeling district, leftist leaders such as Ratan Lal Brahmin took the lead in spreading subversive propaganda among the tea plantation workers. Speaking at a public meeting on September 27, 1959 at Chowk Bazar, Darjeeling, Ratan Lal Brahmin stated that China had no intention to intrude into Indian territory and that the dispute with China had been unnecessarily magnified by reactionary elements and pro-imperialist forces. A whispering campaign was set afoot to the effect that Darjeeling District really belonged to Tibet and would soon go under Chinese suzerainty. In view of the importance of Darjeeling as a major recruiting centre, the propaganda had a sinister meaning. The propaganda on the Indo-Tibetan borders of Uttar Pradesh was no less sinister and was aimed at exploiting the distress of the Bhotias in the Kumaon region caused by the fall in the border trade with Tibet following the over-running of Tibet by China. 'Janyug', the weekly organ of the U.P. party, edited then by a mem-

ber of the pro-China faction and in circulation in the border areas said on July 24, 1960 in an article entitled "Falsehood and Dishonesty is the Only Shelter", that the bogey of the Chinese threat had been used so often that its hollowness had been thoroughly exposed and the people had realized that this was only a slogan to suppress their demands and conceal the reactionary policies of the Government. The basic disloyalty of the communists was evident when this paper, in its issue of July 31, 1960, published an apology for an earlier insertion of an advertisement of the U.P. Government inviting the people to face Chinese aggressive activities on the northern border. It stated that many readers had drawn attention "to the mischievous advertisement" and expressed regret for its inadvertent publication. In the Punjab, public attention was drawn by a PSP member of the legislature to the dangerous propaganda in the border areas. He stated on the floor of the Vidhan Sabha on February 19, 1960 that pro-Chinese literature was being freely circulated among simple hill folk and visions were being conjured of a liberation army marching from across the border.

11. To contain and check these activities which were causing great concern to the public, the Government of India passed in May, 1961 the Criminal Law Amendment Act which enabled the Government to declare any area adjoining the frontiers of India to be a notified area. Thereafter statements in such areas prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, essential supplies and safety and security of India became punishable with imprisonment. This measure received the support of all sections of Parliament—barring the communists. In the course of the discussions on the bill, N. G. Goray (PSP) drew attention to "the whispering propaganda which is going on creating doubts in the minds of the people" and narrated his own experience in Darjeeling where one of the Nepali leaders had told him that in all the estates where the communists were working, the propaganda was "whatever your grievances may be, you will get rid of them very shortly because the Chinese are coming".

Chinese guidance and left CPI's outbursts against the official leadership.

12. Meanwhile, the Chinese intensified their efforts to strengthen their supporters in the Indian communist party. One of the main agents for the transmission of the Chinese line to India was Hare Krishna Konar, a prominent leftist member of the West Bengal party. After attending the Congress of the Vietnam Party held at Hanoi in September 1960, Konar had proceeded to Peking where he was briefed by the Chinese leaders on the attitude the CPI should adopt to the border issue and to the Nehru Government. The effects of his visit were almost immediately apparent when the West Bengal State council, dominated by the pro-China faction, in a resolution (October, 1960) indicted the Central Executive Committee for hastily adopting in September, 1960 a pro-Soviet resolution on ideological questions. In this resolution the CEC had criticized the Chinese for their dogmatic views on issues like non-inevitability of war and peaceful co-existence and their attitude on the border question which had resulted in "frittering away the mass sentiment of friendship for China". The CEC resolution had also stated that "whatever the origin of the McMahon Line may be, it has been for many years the *de facto*

frontier of India". The West Bengal Communist party, in its resolution assailed the CEC for hastily adopting a stand on ideological questions without waiting "to acquaint itself with the views of Chinese communist party". The Punjab State Executive Committee, also dominated by the pro-China group, toed the same line and rejected the CEC resolution as "a crass example of bourgeois nationalism tantamount to complete surrender to Indian bourgeoisie on the question. It gives complete alibi to the Indian Government and fixes the main responsibility on the Chinese communist party and puts it in the dock alongside Indian reaction". The leftists in the Andhra Pradesh party also adopted a similar stand.

13. On November 20, 1961, when the Prime Minister disclosed in Parliament fresh Chinese incursions on the northern border and the establishment of new checkposts by them in Ladakh, Ajoy Ghosh issued a statement regretting these incursions. He said that such acts would not but heighten the tension, create deep resentment among the Indian people and further embitter the relations between the two countries. He demanded that China should immediately put an end to such acts and take effective measures to see that they did not occur again. This created a furore among the pro-China leaders, particularly in Andhra and West Bengal. The West Bengal State secretariat of the party took the unusual step of adopting a resolution criticizing the General Secretary for making serious accusations of alleged aggression against the Chinese without ascertaining the reply of the Chinese to the series of diplomatic protests made by the Government of India. This criticism of Ajoy Ghosh was fully reinforced by the editorial of the 'Peking People's Daily' issued three days later on December 7, 1961 entitled "The Truth About the Anti-Chinese Campaign launched by Nehru in India". Party journals edited by the leaders of the left CPI avidly seized upon Chinese statements to prove that it was India that was in the wrong in the incident in which the Chinese troops opened fire on an Indian patrol party in Ladakh on July 21, 1962. 'Visalandhra', the organ of the Andhra State committee, and then edited by a top leader of the pro-Peking faction, gave publicity to the Chinese version which accused the Indian troops of firing first on her frontier guards. In several subsequent issues this paper consistently put out the Chinese versions of the border incidents.

CHAPTER II

Disloyalty during the Chinese invasion

Faced with an upsurge of national feeling in the wake of continuing Chinese incursions into India in September 1962, the National Council of the CPI adopted an equivocal stand. In October, 1962, the secretariat of the National Council passed a resolution which on the surface appeared to lend support to the Government of India's stand. But explaining the resolution at a press conference at New Delhi on October 17, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, then General Secretary of the party, stated that the resolution had merely underlined the fact that the "Government of India had alleged violation of the McMahon Line and the Chinese had denied it". He declined to come out with any categorical assertion of Chinese aggression on the plea that the "CPI had no access to independent sources of information".

2. Soon after this occurred the Chinese invasion of NEFA and Ladakh. Even the rank and file of the Communist party was not unaffected by this and several state units passed resolutions pressing the National Council to issue a clear statement condemning Chinese aggression. Even while the fighting was going on in the Himalayan passes, leftist leaders such as B.T. Ranadive, however, tried to lull the people into a false sense of security by stating that a war between India and China was impossible. He referred to the 'nebulous' border between India and China and expressed disbelief in the Government's version that the Chinese had committed aggression by crossing the McMahon Line. ('Navakal' October 21, 1962). About the same time, P. Sundarayya declared at public meetings at Salur and Parvathipuram (October 23, 1962) that as a communist of 33 years' standing he firmly believed that a communist country could have no expansionist designs and that in view of the "undemarcated border", he was certain that the Chinese had not committed aggression. In West Bengal, at a meeting of the State party leaders, held on October 24. Hare Krishna Konar, Promode Das Gupta and a number of other pro-China leaders asserted that as a socialist country, China could never seize an inch of any other country's territory and the campaign against the so-called Chinese aggression by the Government of India was politically motivated. On the contrary they held that India had for many years occupied large tracts of Chinese territory and had even sent troops and other personnel on numerous occasions across the line of actual control to intrude into Chinese territory, establish additional checkposts and extend its illegal occupation. The meeting, however, decided that as a matter of tactics they should support the resolution adopted by the secretariat of the National Council in October 1962. Leaders of this faction propagated at various party meetings in West Bengal that the Government of India was responsible for the deterioration in the Sino-Indian relations, that China had only occupied territory which rightly belonged to her and that the bogey of Chinese aggression was being raised by Government in order to divert public attention from the internal crisis

facing the country. Party units were told to carry on a whispering pro-China campaign in villages and towns. Some leaders even gloated over the Chinese invasion. Sankar Dayal Tewari, a member of the National Council, gave out at a party meeting that China's aim was not to gain territory but to help the CPI with arms and ammunition in the likely event of a civil conflagration in the country. This, he stated, was the reason why the state committees of West Bengal and the Punjab, the two states close to the Chinese line of control, did not regard Chinese action as aggression.

Peking's open call to revolt

3. On October 27, 1962, the Peking People's Daily published its well-known editorial "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question". The sum and substance of this editorial was that the border conflict was entirely due to the deliberate provocations and aggression of the Nehru Government; that the expansionist ideas of India's big bourgeoisie formed an important part of Nehru's philosophy and that the concept of a great Indian Empire was one which the big bourgeoisie had taken over from the British imperialists. In pursuance of this policy and taking advantage of China's troubles, the Indian Government had, it stated, illegally occupied more than 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory and had crossed the "so-called McMahon Line" at several points. It stated that Nehru had become a loyal representative of the interests of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India. Though India had become independent, she had not gained economic independence from imperialism and was becoming increasingly dependent on foreign aid with US imperialism taking over British imperialism's monopoly position in India. The editorial then went on to state how when the reactionary KMT launched their anti-Soviet war in North-East China, the Chinese communists had resolutely called upon "the broad masses to rise against the war on the Soviet Union". It stated:

"Today, the communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than thirty years ago".

The article then gave a call to the "suffering Indian people" to overthrow the Nehru Government. It stated:—

"We note with profound concern that since the Nehru Government has ignored the sufferings of the Indian people and has aggravated the tension on the Sino-Indian border and extended the armed clashes, the Indian people will have to shoulder heavy military burdens in addition to the exorbitant taxes which are weighing down on them. Indian soldiers are being used as pawns by the selfish ruling circles; they are making meaningless sacrifices in the border clashes, while India's big capitalists and big landlords are taking the opportunity to feather their own nests. The Chinese people have the greatest sympathy for the broad masses of India's working people who are facing such sufferings. The Chinese people sincerely hope that the Indian people will free themselves from this lot".

4. This incitement to Indian communists to overthrow the Nehru Government found a sympathetic echo in the hearts of the pro-Chinese communists. At the meeting of the National Council held at New Delhi from October 31, to November 2, 1962 the pro-China faction generally followed the guidance provided by the above editorial. Hare Krishna Konar and other leftists from West Bengal contended at that meeting that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' note of November 30, 1961 and the subsequent statement issued in December had proved "with incontrovertible facts" that it was not China which had encroached on Indian territory, but the "Indian side" that had for many years been in occupation of large areas of Chinese territory. P. Ramamurthi moved a draft resolution which completely failed to recognise China's large scale invasion as aggression. He was not prepared to demand that the Chinese should withdraw to the pre-September 8, 1962 line before commencing negotiations; his in effect was a plea for capitulation before the armed might of the enemy. At this meeting the rightists moved a resolution refuting the contention of the Chinese Government that the McMahon Line was illegal and conceding that the Chinese, by crossing the line, had committed aggression against India. The resolution also appealed to all sections of the people to extend full support to the Prime Minister in taking all necessary measures for the defence of the country. It repudiated the Chinese assessment that the Prime Minister of India was an agent of "US imperialism" and an "expansionist" and that the Government of India was acting as a "tool of U.S. imperialism" in order to secure more dollar aid. This resolution was carried only in the teeth of opposition from the leftists. With this resolution the party had clearly split on the issue of the Chinese aggression and support to the defence efforts of the Government of India. Immediately after its adoption the three leading leftist leaders Jyoti Basu, P. Sundarayya and Harkishan Singh Surjeet submitted their resignation from the central secretariat of the party on the ground that they should not be asked to act on a political line with which they were not in agreement. At a separate meeting immediately afterwards they characterized the National Council as "thoroughly right revisionist and so bitterly anti-China that it would not take any initiative which does not have the approval of the Government of India". They decided on a political and organizational line entirely different from that of the National Council and considered it to be a "life and death struggle to expose these tactics and overthrow this leadership". They envisaged that "Indian dependence on imperialism, both economic and military would grow; there would be a rapid shift to the right; Nehru Government would abandon its non-alignment, there would be no democracy, semi-fascist and fascist conditions would be created and the Congress Government would stand revealed as a stooge of imperialism". The striking resemblance to the views expressed in the Peking People's Daily article of October 27, 1962, is so patent that it hardly needs any comment. The meeting came to the conclusion that in the prevailing situation there would be no possibility of the party functioning legally and saw the need for the party to take to the road of "semi-legal and illegal existence". This marked the beginning of the emergence of a separate faction in the CPI closely aligned to the Chinese communist party and ready to carry out its behests.

5. These leaders then resolutely set about the task of sabotaging the National Council resolution and of propagating their pro-Peking line. In the Punjab, Jagjit Singh Lyallpuri circulated a document containing statements of foreign communist leaders and editorials from the foreign communist press supporting China's stand on the border issue. In West Bengal, the propaganda took the insidious form that there was no real war on the borders and that the Government of India were carrying on false propaganda against the Chinese. Debi Basu, a prominent leader of Nadia, told party workers that the Indian Army in the name of defending the country was only safeguarding the interests of the capitalists. He recalled the action of the Russian army which while fighting for the czar and defending Russia against foreign aggression had turned back on hearing the call of Lenin and had brought about the downfall of the "bourgeois Kerensky Government". He asked party workers to explain the significance of this event in the context of situation prevailing in the country. In the same district communist workers propagated the theme that the Chinese liberation forces were knocking at the doors of India and the people should welcome the liberation army to get rid of the existing government. In West Dinajpur party workers were advised not to be worried about the Chinese aggression and not to heed Congress propaganda about the war with China. They were assured that their hardships would end with the establishment of a "socialist set-up" in the country. Mohan Punamia, the Rajasthan leftist leader, described the resolution of the National Council as "a betrayal of the cause of communism".

CHAPTER III

The Dissemination of Pro-Chinese and Anti-National documents

Arrest of leftist communist leaders—November 1962

1. Confronted with this persistent and mischievous propaganda designed to sap the will of the country to resist aggression, the various State Governments arrested on November 21, and on subsequent dates a number of pro-Chinese communists all over the country. The detention of these leaders resulted in a temporary lull in the open anti-national activities of this group. But it soon became evident that this faction had struck deep roots and that its plans of disseminating its views had reached a fairly advanced stage.

2. In the months following the arrests numerous documents supporting the Chinese view on the border and denouncing the Government of India's internal and external policies with arguments derived from Chinese sources began to make their appearance all over India. Along side these a number of articles published in the foreign press supporting the Chinese stand were put into clandestine circulation among the rank and file. The propaganda purveyed in these documents was generally on the following lines:—

It was the Government of India which precipitated the border clashes; China had displayed commendable magnanimity by its unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal; India continued to be intransigent by insisting on pre-conditions such as the acceptance of the Colombo proposals; the whipping up of war hysteria in India and the prolongation of the emergency were intended to suppress the democratic movements and to take the country into the camp of imperialism; the CPI should get rid of its class-collaborationist leadership and the legalistic illusions that it was fostering; and the dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords headed by Nehru should be replaced by a workers' government through a violent revolution.

3. Considerations of space preclude the enumeration of all these documents. A few of the typical ones, however, are listed below:—

(i) *'The Present Situation and Our Tasks'*—This document in Bengali circulated by the newly formed parallel centre in West Bengal in December 1962 at a time when large areas of Indian territory were still under Chinese occupation, saw the real threat to Indian independence not in the Chinese invasion but in Nehru's policies.

"It must be perfectly clear to us that the real threat to our independence and sovereignty does not lie in the so-called 'Chinese invasion', but in the policy of the Nehru Government which tries to keep alive the border conflict in order to serve its political needs both internally and externally and to depend more and more on imperialism for aid, not only economic for five year plan crisis, but also military for strengthening its striking power".

It called for the building up of a whispering campaign in Calcutta and other densely populated areas to force India to settle the border issue with China on the latter's terms. It also stressed the need for strengthening the underground and illegal apparatus of the party. It stated:

"The question of organization assumes special importance at this stage. Our past legacy in regard to this is very weak. So long our organizational activities were generally based on spontaneity and were guided by legalistic illusions . . . Now we must get rid of this legacy, make ourselves free from legalistic illusions and restore in our party life true revolutionary discipline and Marxist-Leninist organizational principles . . . Such suitable organizational forms are necessary to co-ordinate our open activities with underground work".

(2) *"The inevitable nemesis of a right-wing social democrat".*— This document was circulated in West Bengal in December 1962 along with a photostat copy of a map showing the McMahon Line published in the 'Peking Review' of October 26, 1962 which had been proscribed by the Government of India. The document, following the lead given by the Peking press, launched a vicious attack on Shri Nehru. "The Nehru Government's anti-China plot", the document said, "is an integral part of US imperialism's anti-China policy". NEFA, it declared, had never been a part of India and Indian troops taking advantage of China's pre-occupation with other problems, had moved north of the McMahon Line and in Ladakh and occupied many points which had never been part of India. It categorically asserted that it was India that had provoked serious border clashes and closed the door for negotiations.

(3) *Bengali document entitled "Let the People Ponder" by Satyenweshi.* This document which was circulated under the pseudonym Satyenweshi in West Bengal in January 1963, disputed the legal validity of the McMahon Line, accused the Government of India of constantly changing its maps and of shifting the border line and praised China for its cease-fire and offer of negotiations.

(4) *Circulation of extracts from D. N. Aidit's Political Report.*— In Maharashtra the pro-China faction circulated in February, 1963 extracts from the political report of D. N. Aidit, Chairman of the Indonesian Communist party to the plenum of its central committee. One of the extracts stated:—

"The India-China border question is a concrete example of American imperialist aggression. The policy of expansionism was launched by Nehru against People's China for the purpose of begging for dollars he so badly needs to surmount economic bankruptcy at home. This is in conformity with the aggressive plan of the United States which therefore gives concrete unlimited assistance. In actual fact, Nehru has associated himself with aggressive imperialist policy and in this way has betrayed the ten principles of Bandung which he himself participated in drawing up, he has betrayed the new emerging forces. But it is a great pity that some

of the progressives in India have been taken in by the poisonous chauvinist incitements of Nehru with the result that they support him and in this way are helping the implementation of Nehru's expansionist policy. Nehru and his group would not dare to launch an aggression against a socialist state, People's China, if the ranks of Indian progressives were not split and if they oppose him. Were Nehru to launch aggression in such conditions, the Indian progressive movement would reap great harvest because the people do not want to wage war against socialism".

By circulating this document the pro-China faction wanted the people to believe that "Nehru and his group" had committed aggression against China at the behest of the U.S.A. and that it was wrong to support the Government in the fight against China.

(5) *A document entitled "Information on Sino-Indian border dispute" (In Malayalam).*—This document circulated in Kerala in March 1963 supported the Chinese claims to large portions of Indian territory, reproduced Peking's arguments refuting the validity of McMahon Line and stated that Indian maps from 1865 to 1952 had indicated the border as undemarcated in the western and central sectors. It roundly accused the British and the Indian authorities of encroachments into Chinese territory and exhorted all real patriots to disbelieve the claims made by India.

(6) *A document entitled "Draft Proposals".*—This was a document in Bengali issued in May, 1963 in West Bengal under the pseudonym "Prithvi Raj". It elaborated the view that the Sino-Indian conflict was not a border issue but part of a wider struggle for the establishment of communism in Asia. In this context it stated:—

"Those who regard the crossing of the McMahon Line as the cause for the war should remember what Lenin stated: 'The character of a war—whether reactionary or revolutionary cannot be determined from the fact as to who has been attacked or who has occupied whose territory. It is to be determined by the class which is conducting the war and what political forces are in operation'... The conflict now is between monopoly capitalists on the one side helped by the imperialists and on the other side the working class. The political objective of one group is to stabilize unrestrained capitalism in Asia, to prevent the spreading of communism, to divert the attention of the people from the internal crisis and to foil the agitational activities of the people. The political objective of the other group is to foil the imperialist conspiracy in Asia and to safeguard freedom, democracy and socialism. These are the political objectives behind the undeclared war between India and China.... The political objective of the working class is peace and as such they have declared unilateral cease-fire and withdrawn their troops and offered to negotiate. On the other side, the political objective of the monopoly capitalists is war and

so they want to keep the conflict alive by refusing to sit for negotiations, to make efforts to push the troops inside the demilitarized zone as far as possible and to make preparations for a prolonged war.

It outlined the immediate perspective before the CPI as follows:—

“To create an atmosphere in favour of immediate participation in discussions for an honourable settlement of the border problem, to expose the futility of the argument calling for the acceptance of Colombo proposals as a pre-condition for starting of negotiations; and to show that the prolonging of the dispute leading to a long-drawn-out war would only pave the way for the entry of the imperialists and bring total destruction of the country”.

The document called on the working class to resist tax burdens since the conflict with China was being purposely kept alive by the monopolists and imperialists from ulterior motives. It also justified China's refusal to accept the Colombo proposals on the ground that it was not the verdict of a “mediator”.

(7) *Document entitled “Draft for Discussion” by Two friends.*—This document which was circulated in West Bengal in June 1963, warned against the danger of over-estimating the possibilities of peaceful transition to socialism and emphasised the need for the launching of revolutionary struggles by the working class to achieve peoples' democracy. It also drew pointed attention to the prospect of the “exploited classes” obtaining “moral and material aids” in their struggles from the powerful camp of socialism. It contained a scurrilous attack on Shri Nehru closely in line with the Chinese campaign of slander: and concluded: “At this critical juncture of the country, the entire people look to the communists as a rallying point for a mighty new upsurge which will sweep away for ever the last bulwark of imperialism in Asia, the collaborationist, monopolist, big bourgeois, big landlord ruling classes of India and their political representative, the Government of the Congress and which will lead our beloved motherland on the high road of progress”.

(8) *Dange's Road to Socialism.*—This document circulated in June 1963 by the underground faction in Maharashtra affirmed faith in the violent path and repudiated the path of peaceful transition to socialism as a bogus slogan raised by rank revisionists like Dange. It stated:—

“The theory of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism is the bastard child of the erroneous interpretation of the nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and its government under the leadership of Shri Nehru”.

“Since he (Dange) is the leader of middle class intellectuals he abhors any kind of civil war which involves bitter class struggles resulting in bloodshed also”.

“Comrade Dange is a Titoist-Marxist—who suffers from the worst kind of nationalism and parochialism and his new road for socialism is a class collaborationist religion bas-

ed on the peaceful road to socialism. It is now essential that Marxists in India should fight against revisionism and opportunism and stand by Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism".

(9) "*A Reply to Mr. Dange*".—This was an article prepared by the Andhra left faction and was found in extensive circulation in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Mysore in June and July, 1963. It found "nothing surprising" in the assessment made in the Peking People's Daily articles "Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy" and "More on Nehru's Philosophy".

On the Chinese invasion it expressed the following views:—

"It is nothing more than a border dispute. A hue and cry was raised by the ruling class for its own reason. The Chinese Government wanted to settle the dispute peacefully and made efforts but the Indian Government is not prepared to start even negotiations unless Chinese forces withdrew beyond the line claimed by India. As the border clashes increased with India 'inching forward' first in Ladakh and later in NEFA, the Chinese retaliated and threw them back to the line which China claimed as its own territorial boundary.....".

It characterized Dange's call to the working class to rally for national defence against socialist China as a "betrayal of the working class interests to the Indian big business..... for Mr. Dange the socialist state is not infallible but a bourgeois government like Nehru's is infallible". The article then went on: "What does defence in the context of the anti-China border conflict mean? It meant waging an armed struggle against an army of socialist China. Once the working class and the peoples of both these countries under the lead of their respective communist parties follow the tactics of taking up arms against each other for slaughtering, what is left of Marxism and of proletarian internationalism?"

Thus the document fully agreed with the Chinese assessment of the Indian political situation, accused India of moving into "un-occupied areas" south of the McMahon Line and of adopting an intransigent attitude on the question of resolving the border dispute, and called on the working class not to take up arms against "socialist China".

(10) "*In reply to Dange's Reply to 'A Mirror for Revisionists'*".—Irked at the failure of the CPI (Right Wing) to co-operate with the Chinese in their aggressive plans against India, the Peking People's Daily had come out on March 9, 1963 with a scathing attack on S. A. Dange in an article "A Mirror for Revisionists". Peking accused "the revisionist clique headed by Dange" of betraying the revolutionary cause of the Indian proletariat and of turning the CPI into "an appendage of India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords and a lackey of the Nehru Government". It alleged that the "Dange clique" had "shamelessly provided cover for the large-scale attack launched by

the Indian troops against China". It professed deep concern and profound sympathy for the Indian communists, Indian proletariat and Indian people, "who have a glorious revolutionary tradition". The future of the country, it said, lay in the hands of "the genuine representatives of the interests of the Indian people", namely, those who firmly adhered to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. In his reply to this attack, S.A. Dange in an article "Neither Revisionism Nor Dogmatism is our Guide", (New Age, April 1963) referred to the marked change in the Chinese attitude to the Government of India and to their basically wrong assessment of the Indian situation. The Chinese, he said, held that the Indian masses were yearning for a revolution to overthrow the Government and that an armed conflict with such a Government had become both necessary and inevitable in the interests of world revolution. Dange also stated that the Chinese had firmly hoped that the Indian Communist party would go to their help during their attack on India.

The document "In Reply to Dange's reply to 'A Mirror for Revisionists'", which was found in circulation in Tamilnad in July, 1963 set out the pro-Peking group's stand on the border dispute and other questions and repeated the arguments advanced in the Peking People's Daily article of May 6, 1959 (The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy) and of October 27, 1962 (More on Nehru's Philosophy). It accused the Government of India of unilaterally altering maps and making encroachments into Chinese territory and contended that the border, despite provocations from the Indian side, remained tranquil from 1950 to 1959 mainly because of China's desire to settle the dispute through peaceful negotiations. It asserted that it was not the Chinese who should make territorial concessions but independent India which should undo British imperialist aggression and annexation of China's territories. It stated:

"It was Nehru who on March 22, 1959 just four days after the rebellion of the Tibet serf-owners had been crushed, wrote to Chou En-lai claiming large tracts of territory on the basis of its unilaterally altered maps and it was with this letter that the Indian side broke the tranquillity which had generally prevailed on the border from 1950-59..... It does not require very much of Marxism-Leninism to understand that it was in the nature of British imperialism, entrenched in India, to take advantage of China's weakness and annex Chinese territory. And this is in reality what happened and has created the present border problem. Only an apologist of British imperialism can deny this truth..... Independent India far from renouncing the legacy of British imperialist aggression wanted to inherit it completely and even put forward further claims How did India behave? From 1955 after the liberation of Tibet, India began occupying large tracts of territory north of the customary traditional line in the eastern sector. India thus unilaterally decided on the border and drew it in its own maps without in any way consulting China.....

After the suppression of the Tibetan serf-owners' rebellion in March, 1959, a new phase began with Prime Minister Nehru's letter to Premier Chou En-lai making claims on 90,000 square kilometres in the Eastern sector, 2000 square kilometres in the middle sector and 33,000 square kilometres in the western sector

We have seen that while China was all along trying to maintain the tranquillity of the border and seeking an amicable settlement of the dispute, India was adamantly refusing to respond to these initiatives and was actually making further encroachments as admitted in Nehru's statement about the 43 new strong points set up in the western sector and the report in the western press that the Dhola post in the eastern sector was set up in August and September beginning".

Referring to the advice given by the AITUC to honour the industrial truce and to support the national defence efforts the document stated: "Some of the AITUC leaders appealed to workers to work on Sundays to swell the defence funds—all glory to the workers as in Bombay who ignored the leaders and refused to do Sunday work after the initial hysteria had died down and those as in Jamshedpur who refused to allow their wages to be cut for contributions to the defence fund".

This was a clear exhortation to the working class *not to honour the industrial truce and not to support the Government's defence efforts so that the national will to resist the aggressor could be weakened.*

(11) *Printed Bengali Document captioned "The Present Situation and the Policy of the CPI" by "Kautilya".* The document circulated in August 1963 in West Bengal was virtually a call to the party to abjure the "wrong" path which it had been following since the Madurai Congress, to unite with "revolutionary allies and friendly classes" and take to the path of revolution *in the context of the Sino-Indian border conflict.* It stated :—

"The revolutionary tactics and strategy of the working class at every step in the national revolution is to unite with revolutionary allies and friendly classes while maintaining international working class unity and unity of international communism. When the working class party deviates from it they become the tails of the bourgeoisie and become victims of the bourgeois nationalism. Nationalism to the working class people means national revolution (uprising) to be supplemented by an international revolution. The Sino-Indian border dispute and the slogan of bourgeois nationalism have to be judged from this angle".

It went on to state that the Chinese revolution had dealt a blow to the imperialist camp and ushered in a new situation in Asia. "The revolutionary change in India will doubtless, strengthen the camp of socialism and the combined strength of India and China would speed up the revolution in entire Asia".

Referring to the parliamentary "illusions" that had come over the party and to the basic cause of their failure in Kerala, it stated: "Parliamentary outlook and reformist mentality developed in the party..... After this the formation of a Communist Government in Kerala doped the entire party, which turned its aim towards it. The party leadership was accordingly overcome with a vision and thoughts of acquiring power in this way.

"Every State has the strength of arms behind it, without which it is not possible to preserve the State power. Bereft of that power the Communist Government in Kerala was destined to die at the hands of the bourgeoisie." It cast derision on the "flow of Parliamentary politics" which had "polluted" the revolutionary fervour of the party. "The party landed itself into the position of choosing the Kerala way as its aim and to accepting the policy of attaining power through elections. Constitution of the party was made election-wise. Programme of class struggle was really given up. The party actually became transformed into a left parliamentary party. In this situation the duty and responsibility of re-establishing the party on true Marxist principles, of introducing revolutionary processes in the party organisation and of creating revolutionary leadership, devolved on Marxist-Communist workers". Among the immediate tasks it set for the party were the establishment of primary cells in place of the present branch committees, the wiping out of the bourgeois character of the party, the removal of the present revisionist leadership and the eschewing of parliamentary politics.

(12) *A cyclostyled document circulated in Andhra Pradesh captioned "Comrade Sundarayya's speech in Katur (Krishna District) and other general body meetings".*—This document contains the views of P. Sundarayya, now General Secretary of the pro-China CPI, which he expressed at various general body meetings in Krishna District in September 1963. The following excerpt on peaceful transition is significant:—

"China said even in 1956 itself that it has no belief in the peaceful path. It says, it is true that we are on the ascendancy, but this means we have possibilities to avert a world war, but it does not mean that inside individual countries it is possible to go over to socialism through peaceful and parliamentary means and the bourgeois ruling class has become so weak as to hand over power voluntarily. It will be a rare example even when it exists.....

"Capitalists in power will never allow a peaceful transformation. People take to arms when the ruling class uses its armies to suppress the masses advancing to achieve power. Even today we say that we are always for peaceful transformation and for striving to get a majority of people behind us. But it is the ruling party that resorts to arms and then people take to arms only in self defence. China says it is wrong to think that the enemy will hand over power to us voluntarily. It can happen only when a particular country is encircled by socialist countries.

The capitalist class will not voluntarily give up power and it will resort to force. Every party should be prepared to meet this violence, if necessary, by non-peaceful means”.

This was a clear exhortation to the party to prepare for a violent revolution to achieve socialism.

The parallel party centre and its activities.

4. The new party centre which operated from New Delhi under A. K. Gopalan's personal direction became the clearing house for the exchange and clandestine distribution of documents all of which bore the unmistakable impress of Peking's ideology. A network of underground centres was organised in various States. In West Bengal, a rival party centre was formed with the code name P.C.Z. In Punjab, a parallel party centre was set up. In Andhra Pradesh at a conference of important leaders held at Hyderabad early in January 1963 a 6-member co-ordination committee was formed to strengthen the pro-China faction and to start secret cells for spreading pro-Chinese propaganda. A rival publication centre known as the Marxist Publication Centre was formed at Tenali. In Maharashtra, the rival party centre functioned from Bombay under the name Marxist Revolutionary Bureau. In Kerala a parallel centre commenced to function in Cannanore district. A series of new journals intended to propagate the pro-China line were started in several States—‘Desh Hitaishi’ in West Bengal, the ‘Janasakthi’ in Andhra Pradesh, the ‘Chinta’ in Kerala, ‘Theekadir’ and ‘Sengodi’ in Tamilnad and the ‘Lok Lehar’ in Punjab.

The C.P.I. National Council's probe into the activities of its left faction.

5. In July 1963 the National Council ordered its Central Control Commission to probe into the activities of the parallel Party Centre. The Commission visited several States and interviewed a large number of party members. *The report of the Commission published in April 1964 constitutes irrefutable evidence of what the Commission itself termed the disruptive activities of the pro-China wing and the length to which it went in propagating anti-national views. The report stated:—*

“Immediately following the adoption of the November 1 resolution by the NC*, some members of the CEC** of ‘like-mindedness on political and ideological issues’ met separately in Delhi and decided on a political and organizational line of action entirely different from that of the N. C.

“To work out this political and organizational line and to see to its implementation, an all-India directing centre was set up. Comrades Gopalan and Ramdas were in charge of this centre and Comrades Surjeet, Ramamurthy and Sundarayya moved to the States organising the necessary apparatus to carry out this decision.

Foot note— *National Council. **Central Executive Committee.
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"This all-India parallel centre within the CPI has been functioning from the first week of November 1962 from Delhi with subsidiary centres in some of the States. The circulars, reviews and reports issued from these centres clearly reveal the parallel nature of the activities pursued by them.

"The directives of the All-India centre were implemented in West Bengal almost without delay. Comrade Promode Das Gupta met selected comrades separately and gave them instructions. Papers and records, typewriters and other equipment were removed from the State Council Office. At least one member of the State Executive, some members of the office staff and some comrades in the district went underground.....

"The same thing happened in Punjab. Papers and records were removed from the State Council Office and some senior comrades including Comrade Surjeet moved about in a semi-legal manner evidently to organise underground functioning.....

Period between December 1962 and April 1963.

"In this period, under emergency conditions, the activities of the parallel centre were mostly secret and underground. The main effort was to propagate the political and organizational line decided at their Delhi meeting and to consolidate their bases in the different States. Circulars were issued attacking the NC leadership and asking the party comrades to repudiate its authority. Hindi circular No. 1 issued from this centre stated for example—

"This revisionist clique has given up the path of international proletarianism and taken to blind nationalism and betrayal of the revolutionary masses and working class. The living example of this is the so-called patriotic resolution of November 1 of the National Council".

"The parallel centre distributed a large volume of literature on the India-China border issue. The Chinese standpoint as explained in "More on Nehru's Philosophy" (published in the Chinese Press in October 1962), "A Mirror for Revisionists"—People's Daily March 9, 1963, and several other articles from the foreign press were widely popularized. Some of the articles and pamphlets in English and Indian languages—typed, cyclostyled and hand-written, have come into our possession. Important among these are:—

—R. P. Dutt's Note in Labour Monthly—December 1962—
Letter of Premier Chou En-lai to heads of Afro-Asian States.

—Background facts about India-China Border "Why does Nehru Refuse to Negotiate?—

People's Daily Editorial of December 7, 1961. "Let the people Ponder"—pamphlet in Bengali by 'Satyan-weshi'

"In the international sphere also things began to take on a more apprehensive turn. Ideological differences in the world communist movement came into open and various documents—theoretical and polemical—started coming out. Some of this ideological material has been published by the Party Publishing House but the parallel centre had taken in hand its multiplication and circulation in different States not for the purpose of controlled and principled inner-party discussion but for consolidation of its alternative platform. Some of the documents which were found to have been circulated are—

"Unity of International Working Class against Common Enemy"—Editorial of Red Flag in Malayalam.

"Whence the Differences—Reply to Thorez" in English and Telugu.

"More on Differences between Togliatti and us"—in English, Telugu and Malayalam.

"On Seventieth Birthday of Stalin"—Speech by Mikoyan in Telugu.

"The split in the Socialist Camp"—New York Monthly Review.

"The Bengali pamphlet 'The Present Situation and Policy of the Communist party' consisting of 64 printed pages and written by 'Kautilya' is a complete thesis elaborating the ideological political line of the alternative platform and laying down the tactical line with detailed organisational steps for its implementation. Another Bengali pamphlet of 36-page written by Prithvi Raj and published in May 1963 is a draft political resolution, evidently meant for discussion by those who were pursuing their alternative line.

"A study of the decisions taken by the CPI from time to time on national and international questions and the views put across in the documents mentioned above, clearly establish the alternative nature of this ideological platform.....

"Our investigation covered the period from November 1962 to November 1963, and we have given our findings on that basis earlier in the report.

"The existence and functioning of an all-India parallel centre and its subsidiaries in the States has been established beyond doubt and some of the comrades actively associated with the parallel centre have been mentioned by name in the course of our report".

C.P.I's exposure of the anti-national stand of the pro-China group.

6. The Chinese invasion of India and their open call to the communists to overthrow the Indian Government were an eye-opener



even to Indian communists except the pro-China faction who endorsed the Chinese views and took on the role of China's fifth column in the country at a critical moment in her history. S. A. Dange, the Chairman of the Communist party of India in the course of a frank analysis into the motivations of the Chinese and of the pro-China faction in the 'New Age' article ("Neither Revisionism nor Dogmatism is our Guide"—April 1963) stated:—

"The Chinese leadership thinks that India is already a base of the American imperialists, that Nehru is a "tool of the American dollar", that "the anti-China campaign in India grows in direct proportion to the amount of US aid", that the Indian masses are all yearning and ready to overthrow the Government. So an armed conflict with such a Government is necessary and inevitable, both in the interests of the Indian people and Chinese people, because only through an armed conflict—anywhere, on any issue and at any time—can the American imperialists, the enemy of mankind, and their lackeys be fought and overthrown. World revolution is ripe on the agenda; only the modern revisionists come in the way.

"The root cause of the border dispute would thus appear to be not the maps, nor past history—but changing political and ideological attitudes. And that is precisely why they show the least desire to settle it".

On the role that China expected the CPI to play, S. A. Dange was in no doubt and stated:—

"Then they put the following question: "What stand should Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reactionary nationalism, followed by Nehru?" Obviously, it meant: what should the Indian communist party do? They did not want to say directly what they wanted us to do. The Chinese leadership wished the Indian communist party to help their advance in the NEFA border by an attack from within the country and thus hold the Nehru Government in a sort of pincer movement".

In a document prepared in December 1963 by an ideological commission which included S. G. Sardesai and several others it was stated:

"China attacks India, a peace-loving non-aligned neighbour with a parliamentary democracy and a proved record of friendship towards China.....It gambles with a world war in its mad advance to the borders of Assam. And having committed all these crimes against humanity and Marxism, it attempts to instigate the Indian people and communists to join hands with it in overthrowing the Indian Government".

CHAPTER IV

A split at Peking's call

The fundamental question confronting the Communist Party of India was whether in the hour of national crisis with the enemy entrenched on Indian territory, it was to support the Government or utilise that very crisis to subvert and overthrow it. Unable to bend the entire communist party to its line of thought and action, the Chinese exhorted their supporters in the CPI to break away. The arrest in November, 1962 of a large number of leaders of the pro-China faction temporarily foiled the plans of the left-CPI to assist the Chinese advance by subverting the national defence effort. But the underground organisation of this faction utilized this period to circulate a large number of pro-Chinese documents in order to convince the rank and file of the party that China's case on the border dispute was correct while India's stand was wrong and that it was necessary to replace the present Government through a violent revolution. At the same time, leaders like A. K. Gopalan bent their energies to organizing and strengthening the left wing to function "as a party within the party". Their activities during this period were thus portrayed in a party document drawn up by Z. A. Ahmed, M. N. Govindan Nair and Yogendra Sharma of the CPI—

"With the intensification of the ideological controversies within the World Communist movement, most of these comrades (leftists) have hitched their wagon to the apron string of the ideological positions of the Communist party of China. They blatantly endorse the Chinese standpoint on Cuba, Test Ban Treaty and Colombo Proposals.....They reiterate with glee the call of the CPC to genuine Marxists inside and outside the party to overthrow the leaderships which have fallen a prey to modern revisionism".

2. On March 9, 1963 the Peking People's Daily published an article "A Mirror for Revisionists" which was a strident call to the CPI to rid itself of its revisionist leadership. The article stated:—

"In brief, the Dange clique have already gone so far in their degeneration they have betrayed Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.....This is not the first time in history that revisionists like Dange and Company have turned up in a Communist party..... History will prove that those who are firmly upholding truth and justice and firmly adhering to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism are the genuine representatives of the interests of the Indian people and the Indian nation. India's future is in their hands....."

The central secretariat commenting on this and subsequent calls for a split stated:—

“An open call for split was contained in the notorious article “Mirror for Revisionists” published by the Chinese leaders in March 1963 and circulated in millions of copies all over the world with all the resources which the Chinese leaders possess. The call for the formation of a separate Communist party in India was still more explicit in the notorious seventh comment on the CPSU open letter, issued by the Chinese leaders on February 4. This is what the Chinese leaders said: “The renegade clique headed by Dange usurped the leadership of the Indian Communist party. It is following the Nehru Government’s policy of hiring itself to US imperialism”. The February 4 article was the culmination of a long series of statements made by the Chinese leaders and their chief lieutenants in support of the splitting of the CPI”—(‘New Age’ Weekly, April 26, 1964).

3. The Chinese exhortation to split was forcefully reiterated by D. N. Aidit, Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party in a speech on September 29, 1963 (The International Communist Movement and the South-East Asia Revolution) copies of which were promptly made available by the pro-Chinese faction to the rank and file of the party. The Central Executive Committee of the CPI characterized this speech as “an unashamed call to set up another communist party—an open call for disruption”.

Aidit stated: “Take, for example, India. Can the Dange clique that already act as spies for Nehru so that Marxist-Leninists can no longer talk freely in the Communist Party of India which, hand in hand with the reactionary Nehru Government, is hunting down, arresting and imprisoning Indian communists, still be called the general staff of the Indian proletariat?.....But Indonesian communists are fully convinced that a time will come when the Indian proletariat will definitely obtain a correct vanguard or general staff; the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninists are sufficiently strong in India.....”

4. The pro-China leaders also circulated a speech delivered by Chou Yang, alternate member of the central committee of the CCP, to the Chinese Academy of Sciences on October 26, 1963 which provided the theoretical justification for splits in the communist parties of the world. Yang stated that when revisionism gripped the communist movement and had taken firm root even in the very birth place of Lenin, it was the revolutionary duty of true Marxist-Leninists to split.

5. Thus, it was clearly in response to these explicit calls to split rather than differences in ideology that the pro-China Left faction decided to set up a separate party. Differences in ideology were nothing new in the CPI. Right from 1948 the party has frankly admitted serious inner party differences resulting in recurring crises

within the party. But at no time had these differences been carried to the point of an open schism. The reasons for the present split then are clearly to be sought elsewhere; it commenced the day the CPI adopted a resolution in November 1962 affirming support to the Government's defence efforts for resisting the Chinese aggression. It was also only after this resolution that the Chinese gave their open call to the Indian communists to split.

6. Commencing from March 1963 the various State Governments reviewed the cases of pro-Chinese communists in detention and several of them were released in the hope that they would see the error of their ways and stop their anti-national activities. However, as soon as they were released they addressed themselves with great vigour to furthering pro-China activities.

7. The chain of weeklies they had started fully endorsed the stand of the Chinese Communist party on all important ideological and practical questions and gave publicity to leading articles published in the Peking press. At the very first meeting of the National Council held after their release (New Delhi, October 14—19, 1963) the pro-China leaders advanced the view that the CPI would not be able to play any effective role by merely giving support to the declared intentions of the Nehru Government for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute; they wanted the whole "agit-prop" line of the party to be changed. At a time when China was heaping vituperative abuses on Indian leaders they wanted the CPI to stop its criticism and attacks on the Chinese party. They also wanted the rank and file to launch a propaganda campaign to force India to go to the conference table on China's terms. They persisted in giving vent to anti-national views on the border dispute. For instance, speaking to pressmen at Bombay on May 19, 1964, P. Sundarayya said that he was not prepared to concede that the Chinese had committed aggression on India; the Chinese had only committed a "big blunder" by crossing the McMahon Line which had been a "subject of dispute for years". He asserted: "No communist country will ever commit aggression with a view to occupy other people's territory. This is the fundamental principle with us. If we do not agree to this, then we would never be in the communist party". Similarly, speaking to pressmen at Muzaffarpur on June 26, 1964, Promode Das Gupta said that China had committed no aggression against India and that the disputed McMahon Line was nothing but a legacy of British imperialism. He felt that India should not stipulate any pre-conditions to negotiations with China such as vacation by her of the "so-called" Indian territory which she was said to have swallowed. Early in April 1964, the leaders of the pro-Peking CPI held a foundation conference of their new party at Delhi. This meeting was attended among others by M. Basavapunnaiah, A. K. Gopalan, P. Ramamurthi, P. Sundarayya, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Hare Krishna Konar and Promode Das Gupta. They decided to draw up a separate draft programme and a document on ideological questions. Then followed the walk-out of thirty-two pro-Chinese members from the meeting of the National Council on April 11. Jyoti Basu declared on their behalf:

"We do not recognise them the Dange group, as the communist party. We are the communist party". He also announced that they would organise a separate party congress

which would be "a congress for struggle against reformism, factionalism and the renunciation of revolutionary traditions, which are the characteristics of S. A. Dange and his group".

8. The decision to form a separate party was immediately followed by a fierce struggle for the allegiance of the rank and file. This struggle assumed violent form in some places and at Vijayawada (Krishna district) it erupted in a series of acts of incendiarism. In this holocaust the property of a large number of people unconnected with the party was destroyed. Because of this violence the venue of the All India convention of the leftists had to be shifted from Vijayawada to Tenali.

The All India convention of leftists—Tenali July 1964

9. The Tenali convention, marking as it did the emergence of a separate pro-Chinese communist party, is a watershed. The keynote of the new party was struck by Muzaffar Ahmed who declared in his opening speech "Let us begin a new chapter in the life of our party and start a real Communist party of India". The significance of the display of a large portrait of Mao Tse-tung at the convention was obvious: it was a clear demonstration of loyalty to the leader of a nation in occupation of large areas of Indian territory acquired by aggression, and still posing a grave threat to our security. It was an indication further of commitment to Mao Tse-tung's ideology and programme of subversion, violence and revolution.

10. The convention adopted a resolution on the Sino-Indian border dispute which sought to convey that it was India and not China which was intransigent and reluctant to support the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute. Its call for the formalization of the ceasefire and for negotiations without pre-conditions, was tantamount to a demand that China should be allowed to keep the fruits of her aggression. It scrupulously avoided any criticism of China for her aggression and for her refusal to accept either the Colombo Proposals or the suggestion of the Ceylon Prime Minister that India and China should have no posts in the de-militarized zone of Ladakh. In keeping with its general intent the resolution omitted to mention the fact that India had clearly accepted the latter suggestion.

11. The meaning of Tenali as seen and clarified by a prominent communist will bear quotation:

"However much the splitters might protest, their proceedings were a clear testimony to their affinity with the Chinese tune, Mao Tse-tung's portrait was not only in the foreground with the conspicuous absence of any portrait of any other living Communist leader, but his spirit pervaded the proceedings.

"This reverence for a leader who is in the forefront of splitting the world Communist movement and whose "thought" guided the aggression against India, was drawn attention to by Congress MLAs in the Legislative Assembly. It also drew comment from many

others who hitherto were disinclined to believe that the splitters had accepted the ideological hegemony of Peking.

"This point was rubbed home by the resolution that the Tenali gathering passed on the dispute between our country and China. They called upon the Government of India to engage in direct negotiations.

"There was not a single phrase even mildly critical of the Chinese aggression, of their refusal to accept the Colombo proposals and of their studied silence, (apart from the obnoxious HSINHUA commentary) on Pandit Nehru's agreement to negotiate provided the Chinese withdrew their posts in Ladakh.

"It is reported that P. Sundarayya turned his full wrath against those who timidly suggested that something should be said about the Chinese attitude. He argued that the splitters were concerned with India and could not interfere and dictate to the Chinese party.....

"It was evident to everybody that in their aggressive postures, in their slanders against the CPI, in their approach to the problems facing India, the splitters had decided to accept the ideological hegemony of Peking". (Mohit Sen 'New Age' Weekly July 19, 1964).

12. The pro-China leaders, on the other hand, were pleased with their performance. Writing in the 'Janashakti' of August 12, 1964 M. Hanumantha Rao stated that while it did not require courage to condemn China in the atmosphere prevailing in the country, it certainly required "guts" to suggest that the Government of India should take the initiative to resolve the deadlock over the border dispute. Defending the display of Mao's portrait at Tenali the 'Sengodi' (Tamilnad), stated on July 16, 1964:—

"Every true communist if he had any revolutionary fervour in him could not but feel proud at the display of Mao's portrait and it was no matter for shame or apology".

Pro-Peking CPI's views on Ideological Questions and its belief in the non-peaceful path

13. The ideological debate between China and the Soviet Union which had begun to steadily build up from 1958 and stood openly revealed at the Bucharst conference of 1960 showed that the Chinese held diametrically opposite views on all the main fronts of Soviet policies: on peaceful co-existence of the two systems, the non-inevitability of war, the peaceful transition to socialism, the support to "bourgeois governments" and the relaxation of international tensions. On every one of these questions the left CPI took up positions strongly supporting the Chinese stand. The main articles outlining the Chinese stand such as: 'Long Live Leninism' (Red Flag-April 1960) "Holding High the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Banner of the Moscow Declarations" (People's Daily July 29, 1960) and "Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us" (People's Daily December 31, 1962) were faithfully reproduced in their

string of journals. The following brief extracts from these articles illustrate clearly the Chinese doctrines which were thus propagated:

"The fundamental question of all revolutions is the question of state power. Lenin showed in a comprehensive and penetrating way that the fundamental question of the proletariat is dictatorship. The proletarian dictatorship, established by smashing the state machine of the bourgeois dictatorship by revolutionary means, is an alliance of a special type between the proletariat and the peasantry and all other working people; it is a continuation of the class struggle in another form under new conditions; it involves a persistent struggle, both sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative, against the resistance of the exploiting classes, against foreign aggression and against the forces and traditions of the old society. Without the proletarian dictatorship, without its full mobilization of the working people on these fronts to wage these unavoidable struggles stubbornly and persistently, there can be no socialism, nor can there be any victory for socialism". (Long Live Leninism).

"But the ruling classes will never yield State power of their own accord, and will invariably use suppression by violence, when the people rise and start a revolution"—(Holding High the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Banner).

"The bourgeoisie will never step down from the stage of history of its own accord. This is a universal law of class struggle. Communist must not in the slightest degree relax their preparations for revolution. They must be prepared to repel the assaults of counter-revolution and to overthrow the bourgeoisie by armed force" (Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us).

14. These and other views of the Chinese were featured in the pamphlets and articles released by the pro-Chinese communist and crystallised in a document which forms a true political testament of the new party. This document—On some ideological questions under debate in the World Communist Movement—was drawn up by P. Sundarayya, M. Basavapunnaiah, N. Prasadara, A. K. Gopalan, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Jagjit Singh Lyallpuri, P. Ramamurthi, M. R. Venkatraman, and Hare Krishna Konar and was circulated to party units for discussion. On the question of peaceful transition, the document stated:—

"But it would be a grievous mistake to make peaceful transition more or less a general law of the epoch. To our surprise we find that with a few exceptions a great majority of the communist parties of the world have declared not merely their striving to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful methods but also assert the

peaceful path to more or less exclude all other possibilities.....Even the new possibilities of peacefully achieving the revolution or achieving it with comparatively less violence can be transformed into actuality only when the proletariat and its party is fully prepared to meet all eventualities.....As far as our party is concerned, a totally revisionist understanding of this concept has gained currency.....

"The realization of the possibility of peaceful path depended on the preparation of the working class for the other eventualities.....This formulation (of the Amritsar Congress) was again interpreted by some in a revisionist way. Forgetting the significance of the word 'strive' they began advocating the peaceful path as already a fact of reality in our country and as emanating from the assessment of the concrete situation in our country. In fact, all revolutionary ideas of combining of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary work, utilizing different forms of struggle and organization were given a go-by and in practice, we adopted the social-democratic approach to the question. It is very clear to all Marxists that the question of transition to socialism is a question of proletarian revolution where the State power is taken from the bourgeoisie. Leninism teaches and experience proves that the ruling classes never relinquish State Power voluntarily.....In such a situation where the possibility for a peaceful transition arises, we should do our utmost to change the possibility into a reality. But, while striving to realize this possibility the communist party of the country, on the other hand, must always be prepared to repulse the armed intervention of the bourgeoisie. To sum up, we cannot realise the first possibility without preparing for the other".

With reference to the Indian situation, it added:

"Democracy in our country is recently introduced and deep roots have not yet been struck by it. The working class and other mass organizations have not been united and powerfully built; the Communist party in itself is very weak; most of the parties either of the Left or the Right category in the country are rabidly anti-communist.....The bureaucracy and the armed forces are strictly kept in isolation from any impact of political and social activities. To be more plain, it is sought to be maintained more as a mercenary type as in the former British days. In the face of all this reality, to talk of the peaceful path in our country more or less as a fact of reality as an inevitable path, is nothing but self-deception and deception of others".

The implications of this passage are unmistakably clear. The left CPI's frustration and chagrin at their inability to subvert the

armed forces and administrative machinery has led them to declare the futility of the peaceful path!

15. On questions of war and peace it was critical of the Soviet party for "clumsily clubbing together different categories of war" and for asserting that "under new conditions war is not fatalistically inevitable". It accused the Soviet party of preaching defeatist and pacifist ideas, of emasculating the militancy of the working class and of undermining its faith in the need for revolution by propagating the theory that the alternative before mankind was either a thermo-nuclear war or peaceful co-existence. On the question of peaceful co-existence it held that the leaders of the CPSU were wrong in withholding support to the national liberation struggles and working class revolutions in the name of pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence.

16. The left CPI, it will be seen, was in full agreement with the Chinese in their ideological conflict with the Soviet Union that national liberation wars were not only inevitable but necessary. According to the Chinese, the concept of national liberation war applies not only to countries which were yet to gain their independence but also to those which had gained, like India, political independence, but "remained economically subservient to imperialism". These ideas form the basis of the assertion in the document that:

"Marxist-Leninists have always upheld revolutions, civil wars between the exploited and unexploited classes and national liberation wars as an inherent right of the people".

In condemning Soviet views opposing war, therefore, the pro-Chinese faction was in fact advocating armed struggle against the Indian Government.

17. The document was extremely critical of the appreciative references by a Soviet writer in the *New Times* to the policies of the Government of India.

It stated: "The revisionist ideas and their depth in our party can be grasped if, for example, we look at the way several leading comrades of our party reacted and approved of the opportunist thesis contained in Soviet Academician Rubenstein's article in *New Times* Nos. 29, 30 of July 1956, under the heading 'A non-capitalist path of Under-developed Countries'".

* * *

"The thesis in a nutshell concedes that the bourgeoisie of India under Nehru's leadership will not only be able to fulfil the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic tasks of our revolution but also is capable of placing the country on to the road to socialism. This negates the necessity either of the democratic revolution or the Socialist revolution and above all, the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It goes without saying that it negates also the role of the working class and of the

communist party as the leading force of the revolution”.

18. The extent of the indoctrination of the left CPI in the views of Peking and the thought of Mao Tse-tung is self evident in the ideological document referred to above. The left communist leaders did not hesitate to voice their adherence to these views even at open public meetings. Addressing a meeting organized at Calcutta on June 26, 1964 during the Silver Jubilee celebrations of the National Book Agency, Promode Das Gupta, the West Bengal P.C. Secretary, observed that there was nothing wrong in following the Chinese path, if it was good for the working class in India. It is, therefore, not surprising that even S. A. Dange stated at a meeting in Bombay on June 23, 1964, that the leftist party members were “Chinese agents” in the sense that they subscribed to the Chinese views on the analysis of the Indian political situation and the methods to be pursued in bringing about a proletarian revolution.

CHAPTER V

Preparations for subversion and violence

The Calcutta Congress of the pro-China CPI was preceded by a brisk ideological debate in which the ranks were thoroughly indoctrinated with the ideas of the new party. At district and state conferences held all over the country, the demand was raised that the party's programme should clearly and unequivocally inscribe the thesis that socialism could be achieved in India only through a violent revolution, that the foreign policy of the Government had been essentially pro-imperialist even before the conflict with China and that the border question was a legacy of India's pro-West policies. At the Punjab State conference several delegates asked whether the absence of Mao Tse-tung's portrait signified that the leadership was lacking in revolutionary courage. Surjeet replied, to the evident satisfaction of these critics, that though the portrait did not adorn the walls of the conference, it was engraved in their hearts. Both Surjeet and Lyallpuri stated that the draft programme did not categorically repudiate the peaceful path for the reason that they did not wish to attract undue attention and invite retaliatory action at a formative stage of their party. Surjeet declared that "neither then (in 1962) nor now" were they prepared to brand China as an aggressor. He justified China's action on the border as "an act of self-defence against the provocation of the Indian army and the Indian Government". Portraits of Mao Tse-tung were prominently exhibited at the district party conferences held at Bagdogra (Darjeeling district), Berhampur (Murshidabad district), Bombay city and in Guntur (Andhra Pradesh) in September 1964 and at Krishnagore (Nadia district) in October 1964. Mao worship, with or without the aid of a picture, had become a part of their creed.

2. The pronounced pro-Peking orientation was further evident in their attitude to China's explosion of an atomic bomb in October 1964. In sharp contrast to the reaction of the people of India who were deeply perturbed by the new threat posed to the country's security by China's emergence as a nuclear power, the left CPI was jubilant over this development. Addressing a press conference on October 17, Jyoti Basu argued that China's emergence as a nuclear power posed no threat to India in view of China's assurance that China would not be the first country to use the bomb. The news of China's atomic blast was received with acclamation and rejoicing at the meeting of the West Bengal State Council of the left CPI on October 22. There were thunderous cheers from the 350 delegates attending the conference when M. Basavapunnaiah hailed China's first nuclear test explosion. These statements and reactions if considered along with the declarations of the left CPI leaders that India should not develop atomic bombs, show the sort of balance of military strength between India and China which the left CPI would desire.

3. Addressing the Calcutta congress (October 31 to November 7, 1964) Jyoti Basu reminded the delegates of the militant traditions of

Bengal. In terms strikingly reminiscent of B. T. Ranadive's call to the party at the momentous Calcutta congress of the CPI held in 1948 he said "When a huge wave of anti-imperialist mass struggle swept through the land at the end of the Second World War, the big bourgeoisie leadership of the Indian National Congress betrayed the struggle instead of leading it, and assumed power through compromise with British imperialism.....Bengal was partitioned. The land overflowed with blood, the dark blood of fratricidal strife, not the sacred blood that is shed in a liberation war". The struggle of the workers, peasants, students and the labouring masses and their revolutionary traditions, he asserted, had created the necessary conditions for undertaking the historic task of replacing the existing Government by a Government of people's democracy. "There is no hope" he observed "of escape by stereotyped methods". This exhortation to the party to forsake "stereotyped" methods sums up in a nutshell the plans and programmes of the Calcutta congress!

4. The political organizational report presented at the congress provided further proof, if any was needed, of their anti-national and pro-Chinese views. It condemned the National Council resolution of November, 1962 which had supported the Government's defence efforts, as an "unambiguous call for an all out attack on the Chinese" and renunciation of struggle against the ruling class "in the name of patriotic defence of the country" and boasted that it was not prepared to "toe the line of the Government". The resolution stated:—

"First, the basic political position adopted by the majority was that of "flowing with the current", i.e. the current of bourgeois nationalism. The majority resolution is an unambiguous call for all-out (ideological and political as well as military) attack on the Chinese—an attack which would hardly be distinguishable from the chauvinistic anti-China campaign indulged in by the most rabid anti-communist elements.....While it gave support to the government's measures of defence of the border, it refused to toe the line of the Government in looking upon the Chinese as an invader intent on grabbing our territory or subjugating our people.....

Second, the majority was not prepared to consider any negotiation and settlement with the Chinese except on the basis acceptable to the Government of India. For instance, they took the stand that no talks could be initiated unless and until the position held by both India and China on September 8, 1962 was restored. The minority took a more flexible position; it felt that what was necessary was to evolve a formula which would lead to such a settlement of the problem as would not be derogatory to either nation.....

Third, the majority toed the line of the Government in another aspect—with regard to the correctness of securing Western military 'aid'. The Dange group, of course, qualified the acceptance of 'aid with the conditions that it should be only on commercial terms'. The minority held the view that receiving military 'aid' even on commercial terms would be the beginning of the process

through which many other countries lost sovereignty and became dependent on the imperialist powers.

The line adopted by the majority was, in short, one of retreat from the ideological positions of the working class. It meant surrender to bourgeois nationalism; renunciation of struggle against our own ruling classes in the name of 'patriotic defence of the country', surrender to the ideology of imperialism according to which the role of imperialist powers is not one of subjugating independent nations but helping them to preserve and further develop their independence and sovereignty. The minority could not naturally accept these policies".

5. The resolution on the Sino-Indian border dispute further projected in bold relief its pro-China orientation. The resolution fully reiterated the earlier anti-national stand taken at the Tenali convention and ignored the peril to India from Chinese aggression.

6. Elaborating their attitude at a press conference at Calcutta on November 8, M. Basavapunnaiah explained that there was no use going into the Colombo proposals. Questioned closely at a press conference at New Delhi on November 14, on the equivocal nature of this resolution he declared that they were not in a position to come out openly with their stand on the border dispute because of the Defence of India Rules. The implications of these statements are obvious. At the same press conference both M. Basavapunnaiah and P. Ramamurthi stated that their party wanted India to contact the Chinese Government directly to find a basis for starting negotiations and observed: "In spite of the Colombo proposals, we should go further".

7. The programme adopted by the Calcutta congress was as adventurist as the political thesis endorsed at the second party congress in 1948 after which the party had launched its armed struggle in Telengana. Ranadive had at that time spoken of the "inter-twining of the two revolutions"; the leaders now wanted the working class to quickly complete the democratic revolution taking it to the stage of the socialist revolution. Repeating Peking's analysis of the Indian political and economic situation and the nature of the Indian Government, the programme rejected the concept of national democracy elaborated at the Moscow conference 1960 as unsuitable for India and placed before the people the immediate objective of the replacement of the present Government by a Government of "people's democracy". The programme stated:—

"92. It is obvious that for the complete and thoroughgoing fulfilment of the basic tasks of the Indian revolution, in the present stage it is absolutely essential to replace the present bourgeois-landlord state headed by the big bourgeoisie, by a state of people's democracy led by the working class.....

96. Ours is a democratic revolution in an entirely new epoch of a world history, where the proletariat and its political party is destined to assume its leadership and not leave .

to the bourgeois class to betray it in the middle. In the present era, the proletariat will have to lead the democratic revolution as a necessary step in its forward march to the achievement of socialism. Hence it is not the old type bourgeois-led democratic revolution, but a new type of people's democratic revolution, organised and led under the hegemony of the working class.....

99. Naturally, under these circumstances, the people's democratic revolution inevitably comes into clash with the state power of the big bourgeoisie of India.....

115. The establishment of a people's democratic government, the successful carrying out of these tasks, and the leadership of the working class in the people's democratic state will ensure that the Indian revolution will not stop at the democratic stage but will quickly pass over to the stage of effecting socialist transformation."

8. The Calcutta congress dropped the preamble to the constitution adopted at Amritsar in 1958 which had envisaged the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. The preamble had stated *inter alia*:—

"The Communist Party of India strives to achieve full democracy and socialism by peaceful means. It considers that by developing a powerful mass movement, by winning a majority in Parliament and by backing it with mass sanctions, the working class and its allies can overcome the resistance of the forces of reaction and ensure that Parliament becomes an instrument of people's will for effecting fundamental changes in the economic, social and state structure".

The dropping of this preamble at the Calcutta congress is a clear indication of the new path along which the party intended to proceed. This has to be read with the statement in the ideological document that to talk of the peaceful path to socialism under Indian conditions is "self deception and deception of others", and against the background of the various speeches made by party leaders both before and after the congress. Moreover the following extract from the programme, which it has been claimed has replaced the preamble is so much at variance with the latter that it is a travesty of truth to call them the same:—

"113. The Communist Party of India strives to achieve the establishment of people's democracy and socialist transformation through peaceful means. By developing a powerful mass revolutionary movement, by combining parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms of struggle the working class and its allies will try their utmost to overcome the resistance of the forces of reaction and to bring about these transformations through peaceful means.

"However, it needs always to be borne in mind that the ruling classes never relinquish their power voluntarily. They seek to defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by lawlessness and violence. It is, therefore, necessary for the revolutionary forces to be vigilant and so orientate their work that they can face up to all contingencies, to any twist and turn in the political life of the country".

The casual lip service to the peaceful path, it will be noted, gets quickly dissolved in the faith affirmed in the need "to face up to all contingencies". The exploration of the possibility of the peaceful path involves in the logic of the left CPI preparations for the non-peaceful path.

9. The programme, it will be noted, had omitted important formulations in the preamble that the CPI would try to effect fundamental changes "by winning a majority in Parliament" and ensuring that "Parliament becomes an instrument of people's will". These omissions are highly significant in the light of the expressed contempt for parliamentary democracy of left CPI leaders and their Peking mentors. The Peking article—"Long Live Leninism" which was among the main sources of their political ideology had stated:—

"We should take part in parliamentary struggles but have no illusions about the bourgeois parliamentary system. Why? Because so long as the militarist—bureaucrat state machine of the bourgeoisie remains intact, Parliament is nothing but an adornment for the bourgeois dictatorship even if the working class party commands a majority in Parliament or becomes the biggest party in it..... It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that changes will take place in a bourgeois dictatorship itself as a result of votes in Parliament and it is just as difficult to imagine that the proletariat can adopt measures in Parliament for a peaceful transition to socialism just because it has won a certain number of votes in Parliament."

The preamble had also envisaged:—

".....the widest possible extension of individual liberty, freedom of speech, press, association and the right of political organisation to all, including those in opposition to the government, as long as they abide by the constitution of the country".

By deleting the preamble the left CPI also got rid of this inconvenient formulation which was in conflict with their objective of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

10. The congress adopted certain changes in the structure of the party eliminating one of its three tiers and making each deliberative body more compact. These changes were designed to facilitate underground activity.

11. The similarity in the positions of the CPI in 1948 and of the pro-China wing in 1964 are striking. The goal in both cases was clearly defined as people's democracy and the concept of people's democracy is brought out in the following statement hailing Telen-gana in 1948: "Here at least is the force that will achieve India's liberation..... In 2000 villages People's Democracy has been established".

12. The left communists were firmly convinced that in 1964 the international situation was far more propitious to the achievement of their objectives. The ultimate success of the Chinese communists, it had been time and again emphasised, was due to the presence of the friendly hinterland of the USSR, and their own failure in Telen-gana in 1948-51 had been traced, in the last analysis, to the absence of such a friendly base in the rear. A document adopted by the party in 1951 had stated.

"India is a vast country, with a backward and basically colonial economy and with 80 per cent. of its people dependent on agriculture. In such a country partisan warfare, as the experience of China has shown, is one of the most powerful weapons in the armoury of the revolutionary movement and the weapon will have to be wielded by the communist party in their fight for national liberation..It was only when they (Chinese communists) made their way into Manchuria and found the firm rear of the Soviet Union that the threat of encirclement and threat of annihilation came to an end and they were able to launch the great offensive which finally led to the liberation of China. It was thus the support given by the existence of a mighty and firm Soviet rear that was of decisive importance in ensuring victory to the tactics of peasant partisan warfare in the countryside in China.

"In these respects the situation in India is different. We have no army to start with, it has to be created. The transport system in India is far more developed than in China, enabling the Government to swiftly concentrate big forces against partisan areas. And above all, geographical position of India is such that we cannot expect to have a friendly neighbouring State which can serve as a firm and powerful rear".

"This deficiency had now been made good by the firm entrenchment on India's northern borders of communist China following the conquest of Tibet. The armed struggle which had been put off till conditions were ripe for resuming it, was back on the agenda. The hard core of the extremists were once again at the helm and party units were being impressed with the need to pay attention to "semi-legal and illegal" methods of work.

13. The striking resemblance of the programme adopted at the Calcutta congress to the 1948 thesis has been commented upon even by communists. Mohan Kumaramangalam, a prominent communist leader stated in the New Age of November 1, 1964: "The basic

approach of the 'Lefts' in their draft programme bears a close resemblance to the ill-fated Political Thesis adopted at the Second Party Congress". Kumaramangalam juxtaposed many statements made in the Political Thesis of 1948 and those in the draft programme accepted at Calcutta in 1964 to show the close similarity between the two on questions like the characterisation of India's freedom, the nature of the Indian Government, the role of the bourgeoisie and the strategy to be followed.

14. Bhupesh Gupta in his comments on the leftist programme also came to the same conclusion. He stated:

"Indeed, the Left Draft not only takes the Party back to old programme but it apparently goes one 'better'..... Incidentally, even the 1951 programme which gave the slogan of People's Democracy did not however make such a howling sectarian formulation..... While retaining much of the position of the 1951 Programme on the question, the Left Draft has added its own ideas about the character of the state. The innovation is patently sectarian.....and takes the Party back to the 1948 Political Thesis of our Second Party Congress" (Comments on the two Draft Programmes—Communist Party Publication).

Preparations for implementing their Programme

15. Even before they held their Calcutta congress (November 1964) the pro-Peking communists had geared up their propaganda machinery to spread their militant ideology among the rank and file of the party. The articles and documents issued by the parallel underground party in the various States had done much spade-work in this direction. The ideological drive derived inspiration from Peking. For instance the 'Janasakthi' (the left weekly from Andhra Pradesh) published on June 27, 1964, the 8th Commentary of the Chinese communist party entitled "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism" issued in March, 1964. This was an elaborate denunciation of peaceful transition and of the revisionists, "The betrayal of Marxism and of the proletariat by the revisionists" it stated "has always manifested itself most sharply in their opposition to violent revolution and to the dictatorship of the proletariat and in their advocacy of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism". The commentary had also a good deal to say on the mechanics of violent revolution. It drew attention to Mao Tse-tung's statement that "Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords" and asserted that "Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution". On the main lessons of a successful proletarian revolution the commentary stated: "To make a revolution it is essential to have a revolutionary party.....a party which is irreconcilable towards revisionism and opportunism and which takes a revolutionary attitude towards the reactionary ruling classes and their state power. To insist on revolutionary armed

struggle is of primary importance not only to the proletarian revolution but also to the national democratic revolution of the oppressed nations”.

16. These ideas were vigorously propagated in the left CPI press. The ‘Sengodi’ set the tune and pace for this propaganda. Some examples of outpourings of this paper are given below.—

“We say firmly that the aim of ‘Sengodi’ is to create a Red India in order to lessen the tax burden, to check the rise in prices, to curb increase of foreign investments and consequent growth of monopolists, to stop the revisionists who call the national bourgeoisie as socialists and to rectify the injustices done by the Government to put down the working class on the pretext of the national emergency....Our slogan is the lesson taught by Lenin that there is no revolutionary party, if there is no revolutionary idea. Our aim is to follow the path shown by Castro of Cuba to stimulate revolutionary ideas..... There is no need to find justice for revolution—Revolution seeks justice by itself”—(September 25, 1963).

“Could this government be changed without a revolution by the working class?.....It is definite that this capitalist Government could be changed only by a revolution of the working class and not by elections to the Parliament.....Dange argues that the Government could be captured through parliamentary means. Comrades ponder over this deeply and come to the conclusion whether you want ‘Revolution or Parliament’. Then only will you be able to know as to why the 32 leaders (leftist members of the National Council) staged a walk out”. (May 6, 1964).

In an article in its issue of May 29, 1964 entitled ‘Shape the Revolution’, this journal stated:

“After 12 years, we hear the voice of revolution throughout India. The working class that was dormant is now awake. It is known that the Indian Government is a capitalist Government. This Government cannot be removed by parliamentary methods. Realising that it could be only ousted through a revolution, the working class has started to act.....No force would be able to stem the growing revolutionary spirit. The Nehru Government and their American agents would resort to all tactics to stifle our campaign. There is, no doubt, that our revolutionary campaign will sweep away all their tactics. Let our campaign be true to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Let us follow the teachings of Mao Tse-tung”.

On October 2, 1964 this paper published an article by M. Shanmughadasan, leader of the pro-Peking Communist party of Ceylon entitled ‘Greetings to the Indian Marxist-Leninists’ which among other things stated:—

“The revisionist myth that power could be captured through parliamentary means should be removed. This is an

important problem. The present capitalist political set up should be blown up only through a revolution”.

17. The revolutionary line was also assiduously canvassed before and after the Calcutta congress at both inner party and open meetings all over the country. At a meeting of the left communists in Bihar in April 1964, Promode Das Gupta stated that socialism could be achieved only through revolution and never through peaceful means and asked party members to be prepared to train themselves in guerilla tactics. In September, 1964 Niranjan Sen told party workers in West Bengal that People's Democracy could not be established by legal and peaceful methods and that they were seeking to overthrow the government through an armed revolution which would not be declared openly until the preparations were complete because “as soon as the programme for illegal means would be announced, the opportunity for legal means would be completely lost”. Mangal Singh, a prominent member of the left CPI urged party members at Narnaul (Punjab) in November 1964 to prepare to launch a Telengana type revolution and added that brave and militant workers should be selected for this purpose. Speaking to party workers at Calcutta soon after the Party Congress, P. Sundarayya stated that revolution was necessary for capturing power and wanted preparation to be made for it. Participation in elections, he added, was only a matter of tactics. Pran Krishna Chakrabarthy, a prominent leader of West Bengal, told party workers in May, 1964 that armed struggle was essential to overthrow the Congress Government and reminded them of the example of Telengana and Kakdwip.

18. The general pattern of the activities of the pro-China CPI bore a marked resemblance to their activities in 1948 with the emphasis on underground and conspiratorial work. In a “Note on the differences among the comrades in jail and our tasks” circulated in West Bengal as early as December 1963, instructions were issued on building up the underground organization. The document stated—

“The previous situation will not come back even if the State of Emergency is lifted. That is why a permanent machinery must be built up for enhancing political consciousness on the one hand and saving the movement and its leadership from the attack of the Government and reaction on the other. This task has been ignored in the past. But because it is not possible to propagate legally our political line in its totality, we will not be able to carry on our political propaganda properly in the absence of special arrangements..... Instead of weakening, it will be necessary to extend and build up on permanent footing our machinery for other forms of activities at all levels of the party.”

19. The left CPI had drawn up plans to develop and strengthen its underground apparatus. Secret underground committees were set up and arrangements were made to provide shelters for important party workers to go underground, to maintain links between them through couriers, and to organize secret dens for safe custody of records, holding meeting and clandestine dissemination of literature. In some places funds too were provided for this purpose.

20. The left CPI also began at this time to disseminate documents on guerilla tactics on lines similar to those adopted in 1948. A booklet containing the speech of Fidel Castro at the Congress of Women of All America on January 15, 1963 entitled "A War was prevented but peace was not achieved—fighting (not peaceful) transition in Cuba", and published earlier by the leftist publication centre in Andhra Pradesh "Marxist Publications Tenali" was widely circulated. In this speech Castro had highlighted the experiences of the Cuban Revolution which he stated was achieved through a fighting, not peaceful, transition, and had asserted that "an army drawn from the heart of the people defeated a modern army armed and trained by Yankee imperialism".

21. In West Bengal the leftists put into circulation a document "Guerilla Warfare—a Means" by Ernesto Che Guevara published in the 'Global Digest' of January 1964. This article had laid special stress on the point that the communists need not wait for all revolutionary conditions to develop but should themselves create such conditions. It stated :

"We hold that in the current situation in the Americas the Cuban revolution has made three basic contributions to the revolutionary movement there. They are: firstly, that it is possible for the people's force to win victory over reactionary troops. Secondly, that we ought not wait for all the revolutionary conditions to become ripe, and that the centre of the uprising can create such revolutionary conditions. Thirdly, that in the under-developed parts of America, the battle-field for armed struggle should generally be in the villages".

Other important points made in the article were that guerilla warfare was a kind of mass struggle for the seizure of state power, a necessary and inevitable objective of all revolutions; that conventional armies were powerless against such irregular warfare of peasants; and that a people's army was essential to eliminate the oppressor's army.

22. It will be recalled that at the end of the Calcutta congress in 1948 the communists had paid careful attention to the question of training of guerillas. For example, the Hyderabad State Committee had issued Party Letter 1/48 on the lessons of guerilla war. This was followed by a number of circulars explaining how 'huge armies' could be formed and armed revolt could be developed through guerilla tactics. The circulars also commended the example of the Chinese guerillas and partisan armies. The circulation in 1964 of pamphlets issued by Cuban leaders was intended to show that guerilla warfare could be launched even without waiting for revolutionary conditions to develop and even without the massive support of the people. These had been the primary lessons of the Chinese path and the Cuban experience pointed to new perspectives. Alongside the circulation of these documents on guerilla warfare, party leaders stressed the need for the party to resort to similar tactics at the appropriate time.

23. The areas bordering on Tibet had begun to receive special attention from the left CPI leaders. Party workers in the Punjab were told to concentrate on places like Dalhousie and Manali where there were a large number of Tibetan refugees who could be recruited as agents for the party for work on the other side of the border. Harkishen Singh Surjeet emphasised the need to start as many secret cells in the border areas as possible, in order to maintain direct links with the Chinese. Surjeet toured the border areas in Bilaspur district early in 1964 to strengthen the pro-China 'ft faction there. P. Ramamurthi visited border areas in Himachal Pradesh in June 1964 where he addressed inner party meetings at Jogindernagar (Mandi District) and held study classes. In April 1964 Dr. Narayan Roy, MLA, Niranjan Sen, MLA, Ganesh Ghosh, MLA and Satish Pakrashi, four West Bengal left leaders, visited the hill areas of Kulu. This extraordinary interest in the distant border areas of the Punjab by the West Bengal and Madras communist leaders speaks for itself.

24. The Calcutta congress of the pro-Peking communists also exhorted the party to bring the trade union movement under its control. The strategy outlined was to capture the AITUC without splitting it, by propagating that its present leadership was class collaborationist and by launching united struggles over the demands of workers which, it was emphasised, had acquired great importance in view of rising prices and Government's modification of the Bonus Commission's recommendations. The aim clearly is to bring under its control strategic sectors of the country's economy in order to dislocate the country's industrial and defence efforts and to disrupt the country's economy.

25. From the foregoing paragraphs it should be clear that the pro-China communists are firmly committed to the cause of promoting China's designs in furtherance of her grand strategy of establishing her hegemony over Asia and her declared aim of world revolution. The evidence of their plans to launch a violent revolutionary struggle—which they hope, will synchronise with a fresh Chinese thrust on our borders cannot be lightly brushed aside. The reversion at Calcutta to the 'Left' strategy with the socialist revolution and people's democracy as the immediate goal, the assumption of leadership by the hard core of the extremists, the emphasis on illegal and underground work, the dissemination of tracts on guerilla warfare, the declared allegiance to Peking's revolutionary ideology and the ready response to its call to split—all these unmistakably point to the fact that the party was poised for a violent struggle.

26. The memory of the trail of death and destruction left by the communists during the years 1948—51 when they attempted to overthrow the Government of India through a violent revolution in Telengana and many other parts of the country is still fresh in the minds of the people. In the communist analysis the country was then in the thick of a political and economic 'crisis' and revolutionary waves were sweeping over the whole of South-East Asia. India, too, they felt, could be engulfed in this revolutionary torrent. They reckoned that the young Republic of India would crumble

under the weight of problems that faced the country. The Telengana and Andhra communists hoped to build in a selected area in Hyderabad, in the heart of India, a strong "liberation base", linked up with several other bases they planned to create in the country. They had familiarised themselves with the revolutionary technique of the New China and hoped that like Yen-an in China, Telengana would become a base and spring-board for capture of power. At the height of their violence large parts of the country—Hyderabad, Travancore-Cochin, Malabar, Tripura, Manipur, Andhra and parts of West Bengal, North Bihar, Eastern Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra—were seriously affected. Industrial strikes in the cities and peasant unrest in the rural areas were fomented on a large scale and workers and peasants were intimidated and coerced to join in their brutal ventures. The cult of the acid-bulb and the tactics of guerilla struggles based on the methods advocated by Mao Tse-tung were fully employed to carry death and destruction. Hundreds of innocent men, women and children were killed and extensive destruction was caused to public property in the course of the long struggle. In Hyderabad alone they murdered about 700 persons; they carried out hundreds of raids and assaults in which many persons were killed or seriously injured. Men and women were often dragged out of their houses and murdered in cold blood. In many cases men were killed in the presence of their wives or parents and women were tortured to force them to betray the whereabouts of their menfolk. Distorted and highly exaggerated accounts of their 'liberation achievements' were widely disseminated to incite the peasantry to 'liquidate' landlords and to defy the Government. Strenuous efforts were made to undermine the morale and loyalty of the armed forces and the police. A violent movement was started in the jails. The leadership, blind with fury at the flagging tempo of the struggle, turned on its own cadres and heavily punished and even killed a large number of them for their lack of revolutionary ardour. It was deaf even to the warning of its own prominent leaders who pointed out in the course of the struggle that "having become ineffective against the actual military power of the Congress the guerilla squads in Telengana indulged in a lot of indiscriminate and unnecessary killing of non-military individuals such as deshmukhs, patils, patwaris and Home Guards or CIDs" and that far from being a liberation fight the struggle had become "a suicide struggle by small bands of party members without the backing of the peasants".

27. It is this grim and tragic tale that the left communists were attempting to repeat. In the view of the left CPI the Government of India is again in the throes of a crisis' with a threat to the country's external security from a strong and heavily armed neighbour who can be trusted to provide them with a friendly hinterland and powerful base in the rear so essential for the success of their plans. They also see in the problems of rising prices and food scarcity a deepening internal 'crisis' favourable to the launching of their violent struggles. At the Calcutta congress the left wing emerged as a fighting monolithic organisation armed with the militant line of violent revolution and led by men firmly committed to Peking's interests and ideology.

28. The militant line decided upon at Calcutta was rapidly transmitted to party cadres at all levels. It was explained at various State and district committee meetings; party leaders emphasized that the Calcutta congress had made a radical departure from their past views and that it had come to the conclusion that they would be able to achieve people's democracy in India only through a violent revolution. The central committee asked the various State units to indoctrinate the cadres and to activate the peasantry, students and agricultural and industrial labour for their new tasks. They were instructed to throw themselves "heart and soul" into the urgent task of leading mass actions of resistance to the policies of the Government. Simultaneously the party started strengthening the "Tech Apparatus" in the various states by recruiting reliable and unmarked party members for underground work. Instructions were issued for infiltration into Government departments. The decks were thus being cleared for action when it was decided to intervene. The country could ill-afford to allow the left CPI to go ahead with its plans to function as a fifth column of China and put in jeopardy the country's internal and external security.

29. The arrest and detention of left CPI leaders roused, as was only to be expected, the anger and resentment of Peking and impelled it to heap abuses on the Government of India and to prophesy its doom. It lavished on the arrested communists sympathy and concern. A commentary issued by the Peking People's Daily and broadcast by the Peking Radio on January 17, 1965 extended "their high regard and hearty sympathy to the comrades of the CPI now under detention" and described the "mass arrests of the Indian communists" as "a new counter-revolutionary action taken by the Indian Government to suppress the national democratic movement of the broad sections of the Indian people". It proceeded to say that the reactionaries and others had "rejoiced too soon", that the Indian Government which "is trying to save its tottering rule" had become "more rotten and brittle". The commentary compared the action to the mass arrests and massacre of communists by Chiang Kai-shek and pointedly referred to the "irrevocable doom" that had come over Chiang Kai-shek. The counter-revolutionary move of the Indian Government, it added "can in no way arrest the advance of the Indian revolution". The commentary then went on to invest the detained communists with the aura of martyrs. In fulsome praise which was at once an open encouragement to them and an interference in the internal affairs of this country, it stated:—

"The Communist Party of India is a party with a glorious revolutionary tradition. In leading the revolution in a country of several hundred million people, it inevitably has to traverse an arduous, complicated and tortuous road. It is not the first time that it has been suppressed by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class. But far from being destroyed, the party has constantly developed and has grown ever stronger in its struggle against imperialism, reaction and renegades. Neither the prison nor the firing squad can cow the Indian communists. The wanton arrests of the Indian communist leaders by Indian reaction will of course

bring temporary difficulties to the Communist Party of India but we are firmly convinced that the revolutionary will and revolutionary fortitude of the Indian communists would be further tempered in the crucible of their trials. Their ranks will swell and they will go forward to meet the great struggle with boundless revolutionary zeal. History will prove that the genuine representatives of the interests of the Indian people and nation are those Indian communists who uphold truth and justice and adhere to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The future of India certainly belongs to them.....".

The left communists were thus clearly told that this was a wave of counter-revolutionary violence which justified their revolutionary violence. The April 1960 article "Long Live Leninism", it will be recalled, had stated, "As long as there is counter-revolutionary violence, there is bound to be revolutionary violence to oppose it. It would be impossible to wipe out counter-revolutionary violence without revolutionary violence. The state in which the exploiting classes are in power is counter-revolutionary violence".

30. Peking's professed concern and sympathy for the detained communists is a requital for the devotion and loyalty that the leftist communists have consistently shown towards it. The left CPI was one of the earliest wings of any communist party to join Peking's crusade and onslaught against the new orientation in the international communist movement. And right from the beginning Peking has nourished them with ideological and moral sustenance. It has throughout put this party in large funds through various clandestine channels. It is, therefore, not surprising that the pro-China communists are firmly convinced that in the 'final crisis' they can count upon Peking's powerful support. It is worth recalling that in a procession in Kerala taken out in connection with the Trivandrum District Party Conference in October, 1964, one of the slogans shouted was "Let four months pass, let the Chinese come, we shall rule the country and teach you a lesson".