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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Risk, Anxiety and Innovation

SUSHIL KUMAR



AN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY
RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA

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Foreword

The Indian Institute of Advanced Study has been a centre for higher research for long time. Its main focus is on humanities and social sciences, especially on fundamental themes of life relevant to humanity. In order to achieve this objective, the Institute organizes intensive research by its resident fellows, lectures and talks by eminent visiting scholars and visiting professors, and arranges seminars, conferences, and workshops both at Shimla and outside through its collaborative institutes and centres. The Institute has to its credit a large number of publications including books, monographs, proceedings of seminars, symposia, and workshops. Beyond this, it publishes three journals – *Summerhill: IAS Review*, *Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences*, *Chetna: Manav Anusandhan Patrika*. These publications immensely contribute to the academic life of the Institute. The Institute has also launched a series entitled “Dissemination of Knowledge” under which it publishes occasional papers by eminent experts on significant themes of knowledge relevant to society, economy, and humanity.

Domestic effects of international relations have not been studied adequately. A study of these effects in our part of the world needs to be taken forward. The cold war context of the de-colonization process is an important site for locating such an inquiry. The implications of this context for development strategies of the new states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, for example, need to be understood. The risk of these new states making an impact on the course of the cold war and its outcomes was a source of anxiety for both of its protagonists – the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Both tried to neutralize the risk. This was the rationale for launching political development studies, first by scholars in the West especially the U.S. and later in the

socialist countries. The focus of these studies was on innovative institutional solutions to development related problems in the new states. Professor Sushil Kumar describes the enormous intellectual effort that has gone into the field, and underlines its continued relevance to the post-cold war strategic environment characterized by weapons of mass destruction and threats of terrorist attacks.

The Institute is committed to encourage and disseminate knowledge in various areas/disciplines. I am happy to give this monograph in the hands of discerning readers, published under the – Dissemination of Knowledge series, in the field of political science.

January 2003

V.C. SRIVASTAVA
Director

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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SUSHIL KUMAR

The attempt to locate 'bad' practices in bad states is as flawed in approach as is the attempt to locate 'good' practices in good states. Such neat Platonic tautologies just fall apart in practice. There are 'bad' fascist states like Germany that took lives with impunity; there are other fascist states like Italy that rarely took lives. There are 'good' democratic regimes, like England, the Netherlands, and Belgium, that would never dream of violating the civil liberties of their native citizenry. But these same regimes, when operating in imperial contexts, whether in Africa or Asia, had few compunctions about engaging in near-genocidal practices against native populations.

Irving Louis Horowitz in his *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, Fifth Edn., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002, p.297.

What are held as virtues in some accounts are vices in another. More seriously perhaps, the virtues themselves, what is held to make a particular form of nationalism good rather than bad, may have nothing essentially to do with nationalism itself.

Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman in their *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, London: Sage, 2002, p. 95.

As the quotes above show, states and nations are neither good nor bad but they get so labeled when the forms of their organization and behaviour hold out a risk of undermining normative and political preferences of the great powers. When such a situation arises, the great powers and their associates activate themselves to neutralize the risk. Such a context of risk has been a constant presence in the post-colonial world. It shaped the international responses to politics and international relations there. One

would remember that the cold war had begun and was intensifying while the colonized nations of Asia and Africa were waking up to independent statehood. The dawn of freedom was also a dawn of anxiety – the anxiety relating to the risk of the new states lining up with the one or the other great power.

This anxiety opened space for launching academic effort for analyzing the contingencies of foreign policies and relations in the new states. By linking foreign relations to structures and processes within domestic societies, the anxiety spread out to risks arising from changes within these societies. And so the internal political processes of the new states emerged as a new site for conducting the cold war. The end of the cold war only enhanced the significance of this site, now for neutralizing other risks. The risk of the new states trying to fashion themselves after the European models of state and nation has throughout been of paramount consideration, lest the new states should choose to repeat the European history of state construction and nation building through war and suppression of freedom. The operative idea during the cold war was that the strategic environment had imperatives for rethinking nationalism and its political arm, the state. This had then led to the emergence of a new field of inquiry called political development. The idea continues to be relevant. The growing gap between state and society, politics and ethics, is the new context of risks and related anxieties. In a way, the earlier and the new contexts are related. Hence a fresh look into the enormous intellectual effort that went into addressing the problematic of political development is called for.

Techno-economic and industrial development of the new states was closely intertwined with diverse interpretations of the transitional problems. These interpretations were along ideological lines and in line with the power position of the great powers. Hence political development studies diffuse across a range of discourses and contexts, embracing liberal

and social democratic, Marxist and neo-Marxist, modernist and post-modernist, conservative and radical perspectives. Counter discourses articulated by feminists and ecologists, and value-loaded writings on “good governance” and “sustainable development” add to the complexity. The studies encompass many disciplines, sub-disciplines and theoretical frameworks including international relations, state and nation-building, democratization, governance, social and economic development.¹

Engagement with textual genealogies and historical examples of states and nations, especially of Europe, is integral to political development studies but not enough. At no stage there has been clarity about what is being sought.² Political development has thus been a subject of heated controversy among competing interests. This predicament of academic study of it was, in a way, rooted in the global strategic environment: the protagonists of the cold war, the US and the former Soviet Union, contested between them for organizing the political order in the post-colonial societies in line with their ideological preferences and power considerations. Neither of them wanted the new states to destabilize the inter-bloc equilibrium by involving the super powers in their conflicts. The present predicament is likewise rooted in the post-cold war strategic environment characterized by unipolarity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and threats of terrorist attacks.

Further difficulties arise because political change as a spatio-temporal phenomenon is of infinite variety and complexity. In the absence of a scientific history of politics, there are no known laws of political mechanics. The analysis therefore proceeds along empirico-deductive generalizations, based on postulates and assumptions of normative kind, which serve as a meta-theory for concepts and frameworks that are eventually formulated. These meta-theoretical aspects of political development study can be briefly stated as follows.

Path

The end-state of political development was keenly contested during the cold war. The question was: should the end-state be modeled after the US or the former Soviet Union? Would the dynamic be that of market-led capitalism or that of non-capitalist development? And, would the movement along the path to one or the other end-state be smooth and linear? The initial postulates about the path gradually changed in tone and imagery from optimism to caution and scepticism. In the beginning, the optimistic image of linear progression was accepted. It corresponded with Christian theology and enlightenment philosophies. The *unilinear* view implied that political development was an orderly and continuous process occurring in a given direction through uniform sequences of related forms. Historical data, comparative sociology and politics were used to elaborate this theme. But this view did not take the cultural history of the post-colonial societies into account and so it was discredited.³

Now a more cautious image of *multilineal* development, modeled after the biological theory of phylogenetic evolution, is accepted. This implies that the paths of political development are divergent and re-divergent, because the process of political development is orthogenetic, having direction and orientation, arising from the different structural characteristics of politics in its different ecological and environmental settings. Thus, the *multilineal* view accepts the mechanistic hypothesis that the interplay between politics and the environment has possibilities of causing mutative changes, leading to divergencies and convergencies in developmental paths and end-forms. This necessarily focuses attention on empirical study of paths or ontogenies, as they should be called, for establishing major types and their taxonomies.⁴ Such an empirical profile based on comparative studies clearly shows that the path is not orderly and continuous; it is rhythmic, or cyclically

progressive, characterized by oscillations between development and decay, advance on one dimension being accompanied by retrogression on another; or may be, it is immanently dialectical and thus episodic and revolutionary.

Perfectibility, Inevitability and Universality

The postulates under these three categories have been a subject of debate and disagreement. This means that differences of view on certain aspects of political development can be traced back to differences in their starting postulates. When the study of political development was first taken up in the United States, it was postulated that there was a fully developed polity, an ideal form, a single state of perfection, to which forms of political organization everywhere were moving, through automatic working out of autonomous forces. This buoyant hopefulness was a combination of Judaic prophetic zeal with Christian universalism, and was rooted in the enlightenment faith in the perfectibility of all mankind. The consequent necessitarian view of political development was justified by reference to instrumental rationalism. It was, thus, an adaptation on neo-Kantianism that moralization and rationalization of man was the telos of history.

In concrete terms it meant that the possibilities of cultural, ethical (or political) innovation were taken to bring about a concomitance of a kind of cultural universalism with the emerging techno-industrial universalism. In this context, cultural values were regarded not as static and absolute; they were regarded as imbued with a historical sense and need for continuing suitability to the requirements of science, industrialism and the modern state. This historical perspective was not uniformly built into different sets of values, and, as a result of it, they differed among themselves in their responses to the imperatives of innovation arising from industrialism. These differential responses were regarded as of great scientific potentiality for constructing

systems of purposive-rational action in the sphere of politics and values. As a first step in this direction, general models of political development were formulated in terms of polar concepts. These concepts were in fact a synthesis of similar concepts in traditional theories of social change, and were articulated with Parsons' alternative value-orientations. And, within the framework of these models and concepts, it was assumed that observable differences in form of political organization throughout the world represented universal and uniform stages of political development, and could even be converted into a temporal series.⁵

These postulates were soon found to be *naiveties*.⁶ As experience of political development in the new countries accumulated, and the alleged perfectibility of the so-called developed countries, particularly the U.S.A., was exposed, the postulates ceased to enlighten problem-solving in political development. It was found that political development, in different contextual settings (especially cultural settings and practices), has different limits and possibilities, and, therefore, instead of one single state of perfection, there are many such states, towards which different countries are moving along a succession of unequal and broken curves. Similarly the assumption of universality is found to be untenable.⁷ Nor is political development inevitable. The inevitability hypothesis rests on positivistic fact-value identity and the related belief in orderly progression of civilization and virtue. It is argued that the positivistic notions are both ill-conceived and untrue to experience. The argument runs like this: techno-economic advance is not necessarily followed by political development in the form of better and more harmonious interpersonal relations; often the case is just the contrary. This argument is now generally accepted, and belief in the inevitability of political development is given up. It is now postulated (on positivistic lines) that the relationship between techno-economic growth and political development, though not continuous and perfect (may be, it is dialectical) is of

significance. Simultaneously it is also postulated (on non-positivistic lines) that the questions of value being distinct from questions of fact, there exists ultimate criterion of political development – a postulate which tends to re-instate the *natural law* tradition in politics.

Freedom, Determinism and Teleology

The mechanistic view of political phenomena was postulated as part of the general belief in universal natural causation.⁸ All political phenomena was assumed to have antecedently determined formal and efficient causes which could be discovered and generalized as invariable laws. In this context, the different perspectives on naturalistic determinism and causal monism were accepted as frameworks for generating hypotheses for investigation. The perspective of linear and hierarchical causation is also accepted, and change is postulated as occurring in this sequence: *technology-economy-polity-ideology*. The perspective of the reverse linearity, with ideology as prime mover, is also accepted. Thus, within this framework, political development is looked upon as a dependent variable of techno-economic growth, as part of the social superstructure; while, within the other framework, political development is looked upon as an independent development agent. In actual practice, however, techno-economic growth and political development are seen as co-linear, and the question of their sequence and of the primacy of the one over the other in specific situations, is left open for empirical determination and ideological debate.⁹

The perspective of cultural determinism has been the dominant framework of study. In common perception the notion of political development has come to be identified with it. This framework postulates that the mentalistic (cognitive, subjective and ideational) causes of political development, being not observable, can be inferred from cultural traits; and, thus, a conscious introduction of

cultural traits is assumed to promote political development. This framework is given a developmental dimension by postulating an evolutionary view of culture. In the evolutionary context, political development is viewed either as cumulative development of certain traits of political culture towards a maximal value, and, for this, quantitative values of political development are computed on the basis of indicators postulated to be of universal validity;¹⁰ or political development is viewed as a series of integration levels terminating in the formation and consolidation of the state.¹¹ In the diffusionist context, political development is viewed in terms of acculturation, and, for this, the transitional polities are seen in their multiple relationships to the so-called developed polities; and when the systemic perspective is brought to bear on this process, the emphasis shifts to intermeshing of political cultures.¹² Soon this view was found taking an inflated evaluation of Western political culture. Hence a lot of rethinking has been there on the role of culture in politics,¹³ and attempts towards a reorientation of perspective have already gone a long way.

Of the several aforesaid deterministic perspectives, none has as yet been instrumental in demonstrating sufficient (as distinct from necessary) causal relationships in political development processes. Each one of them lacks finality, some more, some less. For this reason, the explanatory and the predictive component of political development studies undertaken within the framework of any of these perspectives, is often neither convincing, nor does it turn out to be true. Now, therefore, an integrated perspective of naturalistic determinism is being postulated. For this, cumulatively and non-cumulatively developmental dimensions of political development were classified and mutually related to generate hypotheses, which, through empirical testing, helped in identifying significant variables in political development, and also, eventually, in locating levels of analysis where the different deterministic compulsions are found to be mutually related and meaningfully complementary.¹⁴

Naturalistic determinism (whichever deterministic perspective is accepted) postulates that the laws of political development, once discovered by analyzing empirically observable and verifiable characteristics of politics in their natural relations of succession and resemblance (given an awareness of functional and operational possibilities in specific situations) and that, within the limits of this awareness, the laws can be consciously harnessed for systematically promoting the desired end-state of political organization. This postulate conforms to, what Comote said, the true positive spirit, which consists, above all, 'in seeing in order to foresee'. Conscious action, in accordance with such foresight, meant to utilize the context of causation pervading a specific situation of politics, is postulated as *freedom* in politics. When a people, aware of the cause-effect context of politics in which they live, consciously begin to achieve their political development, they ascend, 'from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom'. This unity of freedom and necessity is a fundamental postulate in political development studies.

The question now is: does freedom in political development pre-suppose fore-ordainment? The answer is, yes. Politics, in its different contextual settings, has built-in political forms which, to use Aristotle's phrase, are prior to it. Political development is conscious realization of this *immanent teleology* – that is, realization by politics, in its specific contextual setting, of its immanent political form. It is an orderly and purposive process, which follows set patterns. The intrinsic and extrinsic causes operating on it can be analysed scientifically. In other words, political development is a teleonomical process, and its study can probably be better described as *political teleonomy*.

This is not all. Political development also postulates a kind of evolutionary inequality of political forms in transitional societies, and these forms are assumed to be tending towards a transnational, pan-political ultimate form. There was no agreement on the shape of this ultimate

form – whether it was the great society or the socialist society. And these rival forms, in relation to the new nations, were in a situation of competitive pressurization and rhetoric. The new countries, either being torn between the rival claims or otherwise, have been denouncing this postulate of inequality, and, from an equalitarian perspective, have been emphasizing on the equality of all political forms.

Ethical Foundations of Political Development

The normative dilemma is resolved by postulating, in un-Humian manner, the possibility of inductive reasoning in matters of value. Thus, ethical norms are deduced from the criteria of political development itself. These criteria can be summed up into one single continuous variable: *differentiation-interdependence-integration*. Political development is classified and typologized along this variable. This means that political forms are visualized as a series of ascending levels; and forms at the higher levels are also evaluated as better forms. Further normative implications of this view are just elaborations on this simple organismic criterion. These elaborations imply that those political forms are better which show a growing tendency towards differentiation and individuation in their internal organization, and manifest such characteristics as autonomy and plasticity in relation to their environment, and, consequent on these traits, have greater survival value. Differentiation and integration, leading to better organization or closer approximation of what Durkheim calls 'organic solidarity', are supposed to bestow a superiority of power in the struggle for survival. The continued survival of a political form is taken as the key test of political development, and this test is assumed to justify itself. The fittest to survive are assumed to be the best to survive. This assumption leads to the functionalist

view of political development that whatever aids the survival of a political form is both politically developmental and desirable.¹⁵

This ethical postulates of political development was readily accepted by Western scholars. It was found to imbue politics with the 'Darwinistic' optimism of an *evolutionary teleology*. Ongoing differentiation within political organization was postulated to be concomitant with a similar process within social organization, and this was supposed to enhance the complementary feature of individual freedom and diversity. Maximization of these features within society was regarded as an inevitable outcome of a successful struggle for political survival. In other words, a polity, by just managing to survive, was assumed to move, over time, towards greater freedom and diversity. In this way, political development, as movement along the differentiation continuum, was postulated to be consistent with the values of liberalism in politics and society.¹⁶ The liberal triumph was postulated as a logical extrapolation of a universal imperative: *the need for survival*.¹⁷

Attempts were made to articulate the liberal optimism into an ideology of political development consisting of a set of political beliefs and directives for the new nations. This ideology was meant to be a counterweight to parallel ideologies, especially that of non-capitalist development. Though the different ideologies have sought to define themselves against each other, they share a common ground in *constructivist rationalism* that regards an independently existing reason as capable of designing civilization through reconstruction of social and political institutions in accordance with a pre-conceived plan. They accept the basic postulate of *democratism* – that is, the majority is the repository of sovereign power – but emphasize on mediation of majority power by the norms of British liberalism.¹⁸ The reconciliation of democratism with liberalism, within the broad framework of constructivist

rationalism, can be elaborated through a matrix.

Democratic Liberalism	Democratic Totalitarianism
Authoritarian Liberalism	Authoritarian Totalitarianism

The ethical considerations in political development studies thus dichotomized democratic-liberalism with authoritarian-totalitarianism and sought to specify the proximate stages to the goal of democratic-liberalism. It was thought that the specification of the proximate stages should eventually serve as a helpful guide to political action in the new countries. But the proximate stages could never be worked out. Logical specification of the stages was difficult for two reasons: *first*, political liberalism was found to be reduced to an abstract ethical conception, because even the premier 'liberal' countries were found to be moving, in different ways, to non-liberal forms of political action; and *second*, Western scholars generally thought of political development in terms of Western interests in the cold war, and since the Western presence in Afro-Asian countries had no uniform pattern of relationship to the internal political conditions in these countries, a unified ordering of Western interests and types of regime was not possible.¹⁹

Specification of the stages was difficult even on the basis of empirical evidence, because the change of regimes in the new countries was rather erratic and did not seem to follow any set pattern. The result was this: the sequential and preferential relationship between democratic-liberalism, democratic-totalitarianism, and authoritarian-liberalism, was confused.²⁰ It could not be used as a programme of action. Thus, in normative terms, political development was reduced to a sentimental commitment to the ethics of political liberalism. The situation got worse as the distinction between democratic-totalitarianism and authoritarian-totalitarianism, operationalized in terms of competitive and

non-competitive political structures, was blurred, with doubts arising about the efficacy of competitive party system, periodic elections and universal franchise as instruments for giving the people an effective political voice. The consequent blurring of distinctions between varying combinations of liberalism and democratism tended to undermine ideological confrontation in the world, and substituted it by a growing ideological convergence.²¹ The ideological issue was no longer posed in the form of 'man versus the state'. The nineteenth century collectivist dogma – 'will, not force, is the basis of the state' – is the general position of the rival ideologies. This means that the notion of political development was simply the twentieth century extension of old collectivism in the garb of new conservatism. The new collectivists in the garb of socialism oppose it. Both, none the less, were collectivist ideologies. For both, freedom was not absence of restraint, but imposition of restraint. Both regarded political development as actuation of potential general will. The debate between them is this: should general will be actualized in favour of the old collectivists through institutionalization of democratic techniques in governance, or in favour of the new collectivists through institutionalization of communitarian techniques in governance?²² As differences between these techniques of governance are being discovered as tending to be more and more unreal, the debate does not seem to pertain to substantive ideological issues of governance, and is, at best, emotional and ethical in content.²³

But the debate continues to be sharp and intense. The reason is this. The reconciliation of collectivist perspective with norms of political liberalism compromises the collectivists postulate of constructivist rationalism, and give political development an ethical preference for slow, peaceful and orderly change. Political development has will-nilly come to accept the liberal view of transitional social problems. The 'establishment' values are generally idealized,

and social solidarity with them is emphasized even on those who obviously suffer from structurally built-in social disadvantages.²⁴ Social problems are defined in psychological categories of 'maladjustment' and 'poor motivation', or are described as manifestations of 'cultural deprivation'. Solutions to these problems are sought through modification of formal institutions, without relating the problems and their proposed solutions to the broader social and political order.²⁵ The new collectivists criticize it. They condemn it for its liberal ethics. The liberals regard this criticism as rather unfair to them. They maintain that political development, because of its collectivist orientation, does not represent their true position, and therefore attack on political development should not be treated as attack on their position.²⁶ Between this cross-fire of new collectivists and old liberals, political development studies have to grapple on ethical issues.

The ethical dilemmas become further acute as the *survival-differentiation-individuation* causality postulated by it for deriving ethical norms, is found miserably wanting in universal validity. Experience has shown that political survival is made possible through diverse and often contradictory ways. Ongoing structural differentiation is found to be no guarantee against political decay and breakdown. Thus, the ethical postulates of political development are its Achilles heel. John Montgomery states this when he says:

Nearly every one would concede that economic growth, however measured, is good; wealth has its problems, but most people consider it desirable. Yet even if changes in the capacities of government to use power could be measured, not every one would agree that this form of growth is inherently desirable.²⁷

State and nation-building (the most important constituents of political development) are wanting in normative terms. No immanent morality seems to unfold itself through these processes.²⁸ Therefore, its desirability should be regarded as contingent on a notion of development. Political

development *qua* development can be regarded as desirable, not otherwise. But, what is 'development?' It was easy to answer this question in the context of an 'optimistic universalism' when a 'sociology of development' postulated the possibility of innovation in different sectors of social life, and development was 'empiricized and seen as ever closer approximation of the concrete characteristics of the developed societies'. But such an easy answer to the question was confounded when the optimism gave way to 'sceptical relativism', with the transitional societies responding differently to the development imperative.

Lateness as Variable

Economic development and industrialization, seen in a historical context, is a spatially differentiated, sequential process. A few countries were the first to industrialize. Several others followed suit at different points of time. The new countries are the last to queue up for industrial affluence. A kind of development continuum is thus postulated. The historical point of entry into it is taken as a significant variable of great importance in grouping countries for purposes of analysis and comparison. For example, countries are classified as early-starters and later-starters. A late start is now generally accepted as of pre-eminent consequence for the development experience of the countries concerned. The implications of *the late effect* in development are elaborated by treating *lateness* as a variable. These implications are broadly explained in terms of 'spontaneous' and 'imitative' development. The first to develop were the countries that experienced spontaneous development. The countries that historically followed them experienced imitative development.²⁹ The notable point is that the successive imitations, though alike in certain respects, are markedly different from one another, because, as E.H. Carr says, 'one reason why history so rarely repeats itself is that the *dramatis personae* at the second performance have prior knowledge of the denouement.'³⁰

A characteristic feature of imitative development is 'the primacy and relative autonomy of politics'.³¹ Without the centrality of political order in relation to other orders in society, the goals of development, as formulated by a development elite, cannot be pushed through with speed and compression. The development elite (whether modernizing civil or military elite) first acquire political power and consolidate their position in the state, and then, while representing the nation and claiming to act in its name, do not actually behave like the executive committee of the nation, but as a power capable of independently interacting with it. Political order, thus, tends to be authoritarian.

Political power, in situations of imitative development, is acquired through an articulation of development goals into a popular ideology, and is not by and large an outgrowth of economic power. In other words, political power is more ideologically determined than economically determined. So does the ideology of political development. But ideological determinism of politics does not mean indeterminism of ideology. 'Autonomy of politics' as a development imperative is conceivable only within a deterministic context of development. Unless development is believed to follow certain general laws, planned implementation of development goals, within the framework of a development ideology, is not possible. This is generally accepted. Yet ideological controversies arise. Two main reasons for such controversies are:

- (i) there is no known, universally valid, optimal relationship between development goals and objective conditions; and
- (ii) development goals, though basically oriented towards economic development, are often interpreted in relation to other national and political objectives, either rooted in the specific cultural and social situations of particular countries, or arising from opportunities and constraints of their international environments.

Part of the explanation for these controversies is 'the late

effect' in development. It can be broadly generalized that historically successive developing countries tend to place greater emphasis on 'autonomy' and 'efficiency' of politics in development than the preceding countries, and also tend to articulate their development goals with ambitions of national honour, or imperatives of national survival *vis-à-vis* the developed countries. This can be illustrated by referring to the various ideologies of '*etatiste* nationalism', which emphasize on the need for a power-state to secure development, interpreted in terms of economic welfare, cultural satisfaction and national survival. The ideological implications of 'the late effect' can be further illustrated by referring to the ideological controversy between the former Soviet and Chinese communists. The Soviet communist ideology had emphasized on 'autonomy' of politics to 'bypass capitalism', while the Chinese communist ideology emphasized on 'greater autonomy' of politics to 'bypass even socialism'. Criticizing the Chinese policy of 'great leap forward', G. Glezerman says:

This policy represented a pretentious attempt by the Mao Zedung group, filled with great power chauvinist aspirations, to jump over the necessary states of socialist construction, to dictate through political means unreal rates of development, to replace the material base of the socialist economy with political slogans.³²

Such ideological controversies as manifestations of 'the late effect' are a rich source of models and assumptions in the study of political development. Differences among these models relate largely to assumptions about the place of politics in development. On the basis of this assumption, the models can be classified into two groups:

- (i) Models based on an *epiphenomenist* view of politics (or techno-economic determinism of politics) and taking a necessitarian view of political development as a process of necessary sequences and closed options. These are known as 'modernization models'. These models swayed the minds of the Western scholars, and were a starting point of empirical studies of social and

political change in the new countries. These models are now being criticized from a perspective which denounces 'slavish imitation of the developed countries' and regards national autonomy as an important component of development.

- (ii) Models based on an *autonomous* view of politics, and regarding political development as a process full of options and choices. To quote Rajni Kothari, 'the concept of politics as adopted here consists precisely in the ability to exercise freedom of choice, to keep options open in respect of socio-economic and technological alternatives of preferred futures.'³³ These models are generally acceptable in the new nations, because they emphasize on national autonomy in choice of development paths.

'Autonomy' of politics, and faith in its efficacy in telescoping necessary stages in development, have significant consequences for political order in transitional societies. 'The late effect' has built-in 'acceleration' towards political authoritarianism, and the use of violence, in internal politics and external relations, to achieve development goals. The big question, therefore, is this: can this 'acceleration towards political authoritarianism' be counterweighted? The U.S. relies largely on 'development assistance' to facilitate the concomitance of democracy with development'. The former Soviet Union relied largely on 'moderation' of ideological perspectives to facilitate 'peaceful transition' to 'socialism and development'. In countries where the development elite is fascinated by both democracy and socialism, an integrated package of 'democracy, socialism and development' is visualized. Thus, development, conceptualized as a 'package deal' has three general models; (i) democracy and development, (ii) socialism and development, (iii) democracy, socialism and development. Each of these *packages* visualizes a set of interrelated and, more or less equally important dimensions of development. Fixed hierarchy, and absolute levels of generality between these

dimensions are not visualized. While, thus, the undesirable political consequences of imitative development are visualized in the context of hierarchical relationship between political and economic sectors of society, and dialectical relationship between political democracy and economic development, the 'package' models seek to intervene in these relationship to minimize the economic role of politics, and to make the political and economic sectors of society represent two differentiated (not closely interrelated) temporal rhythms of change. Such a model opens up the possibility for a society to jump off the stages of political development, and underlines the need for development in economic and other sectors of society to harmonize with the pre-existing developed political system.³⁴

The problem of imitative development is not merely that of reconciling an essentially mechanistic and coercive view of politics to principles of democracy and humanism, but is also that the adjusting politics to unplanned and unpremeditated sociological realities which tend to assert themselves in formal political institutions. Confronted by these problems, the study of political development has reached a post-Weberian phase of awareness of the perennial problem of political theory: how much premeditation should characterize political order? And how much can?³⁵

Hence political development is ongoing response of political order to developmental processes within the framework of a development model chosen by a transitional society for itself. These responses can be 'invented' backward and forward in time to draw a trajectory of progressive movement of a political form appropriate to developmental choices and specific conditions of such a society. It is in this sense that political development can be considered as realization of an immanent teleology. Convergence and divergence of political development paths, seen in terms of political structure, political organization,

and foreign policy attitudes of transitional societies classified according to their choices of development models is an important subject matter of political development study. Such a study needs to be made with a two-fold objective: normative objective of providing scientific enlightenment in the making of development choices; and technological objective of providing help in finding innovative solutions of political development problems as they arise within the framework of development choices already made.

THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS

Academic Background

Political development is studied against the background of a long academic tradition of reflection and research on aspects of political order, including the place of political order in relation to other orders. This academic tradition can be broken up into three broad trends; (i) moral-speculative trend, concerned with the quest for the best political order, or with the evaluation of political orders according to moral criteria; (ii) comparative-historical trend, concerned with the great variety of political orders, their rise and fall; and (iii) technical-political trend, concerned with guidelines to rulers in the conduct of political action and public administration. For long, academic effort along these trends was, by and large, characterized by a kind of universalistic idealism, because the primacy of political order in social life was postulated, so much so that social order was regarded as subsumed by political order. When these postulates were subjected to empirical test, the different orders were found to be in varying degrees of autonomous interaction with one another. Social and political orders were also found to be in similar relationship. This brought about a marked change in academic orientation towards problems and potentialities of political order.

The change was in the form of confrontation of universalistic idealism with sociological relativism. These academic trends were now oriented to this changed perspective. The political order now came to be seen as it was, and was analysed, compared, and evaluated in terms of the possible now and in future. This brought home the reality of the political order in its multiple and manifold variety, and it was realized that the best political order was not one but many. This variety was attributed to these: (i) the possibility of several types of social, political, and cosmic orders, as well as of several patterns of interaction between types of these orders; and (ii) the possibility of variety in individual beliefs and orientations towards different orders, and the consequent possibility of variation in relations of the political to other orders.

Recognition of this variety was academically significant. New analytical categories and frameworks were now evolved to study political order. Two important foci of study were: (i) conditions and mechanisms of political order; and (ii) sociological nature of political order as a distinct aspect of social order. Study was usually cast within some conception of good political order, or within some idealized view of political power and legitimacy. Some notion of political disorder and disorganization was also often visualized, together with some idea of the relative importance of individuals, groups, classes, institutions, or symbols in political order and disorder. Against this general background of study, several academic traditions developed and flourished. These academic traditions can be classified into two broad categories: (i) the traditions which developed around components and processes of political order, such as political elite, political organization, political parties, political participation, and rules of political game; and (ii) traditions of comparative political study, such as the anthropological tradition, historical tradition, and the legal-constitutional tradition.

Political development, as an overarching academic focus,

called for the convergence and integration of different academic trends and traditions to enlighten problems of continuity and change of political order in transitional societies. The need for such convergence inevitably led academic effort in three directions: (i) construction of analytical categories and schemes for describing and comparing types of political order, their continuity and change, in different societies; (ii) promotion of paradigmatic and conceptual similarity among the several academic traditions;³⁶ and (iii) methodological innovation and sophistication to facilitate meaningful interaction across these several traditions. Some advances in these directions have been made. These serve as the starting point for an analysis of the specific conditions necessary for stability and continuity of different types of political order, as well as for an analysis of the conditions necessary for the transition of one type of political order to another. These trends of analysis are significant for political development study.

Operationalizing Political Development

Development as guided change underlines the role of politics in development, and, as part of development strategy, requires organization of societies into political units that have power and control over their environments. The *nation-state* as such unit has tremendous appeal, not only because of its historical association with Western development experience,³⁷ but also because of the widely accepted ideal of a world order based on nation-states, conjured up in such phrases as 'family of nations' or 'united nations'. Political development is, thus operationalized as 'universalization of the nation-state system', and 'national growth' or 'nation-building' are identified as its key processes. Rupert Emerson, while analyzing the problems of change from colonial status to independence, says:

The state structure derived from the past only occasionally and accidentally coincided with the national make-up of the world.

That, indeed, the entire furor was about. To bring the states in line with man's new found national aspirations required a major act of political reconstruction.³⁸

The 'reconstruction' was to be effected, by and large, in a peaceful manner, without involving major territorial changes that is, the 'sacrosant' view of territorial boundaries was accepted as the general framework for the 'reconstruction' work. This framework is accepted as laying down the guiding norms. Of course, doubts about its applicability to specific situations of particular countries have been expressed. For example, Karl Deutsch has recently written,

Some of the new countries may not stay in one piece. To speak of a single indivisible nation, and to speak of territorial integrity as of paramount importance in countries where loyalties are fluid and national unity may not in fact exist, is to let rhetoric obscure reality.³⁹

Such doubts notwithstanding, the notion of territorial inviolability continued to be a significant definitional component of the state as an operational concept. This is so not only because the state generally coincides with the nationalist sentiments of people in the new countries, but also because nation-building through break-up of countries, with a cohesive national group seeking a separate state for itself, is normally accompanied by internal war which, by holding out the threat of its internationalization, is considered a danger to world peace. Thus, nation-building and political development through break-up of countries is acceptable only in a few, rare cases. In most of the cases, the diverse communities living within the territorial limits of a country are to be forged into a nation and fused with the matching, prior existing juridico-political entity, the state. The aim is not to assimilate the diverse communities, but to integrate them. The nation is not conceptualized as a homogeneous group; it is conceptualized as integration of social diversities on the basis of some feelings of togetherness. This emphasis on 'unity in diversity' is

Aristotelian in overtone. Aristotle says:

A polis that goes on and on and becomes more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a polis at all. A polis by its nature is some sort of aggregation. If it becomes more of a unit, it will first become a household instead of a polis, and then an individual instead of a household. (sic) It follows that, even if we could, we ought not to achieve this object, it would be the destruction of the polis.

State-nation fusion, or nation-building as aforesaid, is operationalized as historically sequential transition from class, tribe, nationality to nation. This has served as a powerful framework for analyzing nation-building processes. It is assumed that states over time build complex economic, social and cultural systems that successfully knit the aggregate of people into a nation, owing supreme loyalty to the state. It is believed that the extension of state authority from what is called the political 'centre', which is the locus of state authority, to the 'periphery', orients the mass of the people towards the state, until gradually the entire population, or a great part of it, gets politicized, and the state authority becomes the central axis of social order; social and cultural systems are woven around it, and, as this gradually happens, the disintegrated mass is integrated into a nation.⁴⁰ Thus, states, beginning as politico-juridical entities, slowly trickle down through structures of authority supported by secular belief-systems or what Apter calls 'political religions',⁴¹ until they become nation-states. This process is characterized through such descriptive categories as 'political penetration' or 'production of political goods'. Political penetration is bringing government and society closer, in a development-oriented relationship, and consists, as Almond and Powell say, in creation of 'new structures and organizations designed to penetrate the society in order to regulate behaviour in it and draw a larger volume of resources from it'.⁴² The net result is centralization of authority and resources. "The whole process is", to quote Weber, "a complete parallel to the development of the

capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers."⁴³ The resources thus centralized in government are used for production of *political goods*. There are public goods as conceived in the context of collective goals in national and international spheres. Members of the society consume them jointly. An individual member must consume them whether or not they have a place in his utility functions. To bridge such discontinuities between individual utility functions and social welfare functions, as they occur during transition towards the terminal political community, leading to greater production of *political goods*, is to effect political development.

There is no agreement on sequence of processes in political development. Broadly, there are two views. One view holds that construction of political community is prior to political penetration – that is, consensus formation through national integration or national development, under the impact of economic development and modernization, is the key that sets the limits to all other processes. The other view holds that political penetration is prior to community construction – that is, the extent and magnitude of political penetration, in the form of institutionalized sanctions to social and political behaviour, are sufficient to generate processes for creating a matching political community. In short, the two views are articulated around the two immanent structural principles of political order: *consensus* and *sanction*. The relationship between these components of political order has always been a subject of much controversy. The controversy appears and reappears around the dilemma between the need for absolute power and the need for freedom. It has long been a grave question, as Lincoln says, 'whether any government not too strong for the liberties of the people, can be strong enough to maintain its liberties in great emergencies'.

More important thing is that these components have served as starting-points of effort towards identification of major dimensions of political development. This effort

forms the bulk of political development study. In fact, the effort has bogged down there. A plethora of conceptual categories and scheme, identifying and itemizing political development traits and dimensions, have appeared. These are regarded as operational concepts, with clear cut connotations or empirical referents, capable of quantification and measurement. Almond and Lucian Pye take 'consensus' as their starting point. Believing that the area of consensus is enlarged as modernization progresses, they regard political development as continuous adaptation of politics to ongoing modernization. Their 'development syndromes', though differently worded, are largely overlapping. Almond talks of 'autonomy, differentiation, and secularization'; Lucian Pye talks of 'equality, capacity, and differentiation'. Huntington does not deny the importance of 'consensus' but takes 'sanction' as his starting-point. He distinguishes 'modernization syndrome' of 'rationalization, national integration, democratization, and mobilization' from political development conceived as 'institutionalization syndrome' of 'adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence'. This academic debate on identification and listing of political development traits and dimensions has not helped in operationalization of political development as a pattern of simultaneous change along several related dimensions.⁴⁴ Change along any one of the dimensions is summarily described as political development, without relating to it change along other dimensions.

Models and Approaches

There are two generic models for study of political development. These can be characterized as (i) systemic models, and (ii) strategic models. The *systemic models* accept, more or less, deterministic view of politics, and treat political development as a dependent variable. They focus on *whole* political systems. They visualized a political system as embedded in its environment, and hypothesized

a set of system development problems as they arose from pressures in the environment. System variations in terms of political structure and procedures are explained with reference to the nature and timing of environmental pressures. These models are generally known as 'social mobilization' models, and heavily rely on aggregate data analysis in offering explanations in political development. The *strategic models*, on the other hand accept more or less 'autonomous' view of politics, and, treating it as an independent variable, view political development as a problematic process of continuous choice-making between conflicting goals. They focus on *partial* political systems – that is, on political leaders or 'entrepreneurs' who are required to make the choices. Formal political structures are regarded as relatively of less significance. Their main function is not to make choices between competing values and goals but to maintain and legitimize the values and goals already chosen. These models, thus, hypothesize that transitional societies are in a state of continuous crisis over values, in the sense that collective goals and bases of political legitimacy are articulated by different groups in terms of different values and in different idioms and styles. Political development in such a situation is found contingent on the rise of a strong political leader to inspire general consensus around new standards and goals to serve as a viable value-base for political and social solidarity. This gives political leadership a strategic place in political development. And the types of political leadership are used as criteria for classifying development strategies.

Generalizations about political development, within the framework of these two types of models, were soon found to be of only limited significance. For example, generalizations about sequences and stages of political development within the framework of systemic models, or about strategies of political development within the framework of leadership types were far removed from the actual problems of political survival in transitional societies. What was the crucial factor in political survival? The

answer was: the 'capacity' of the political system. This inevitably shifted the focus of political development study on the *capacity aspect*. The systemic and the strategic perspectives converged on it. 'Capacity' models of political development were formulated within the framework of each of these perspectives, and these models came to be classified as (i) communication models, and (ii) institutional models.

The *communication models* regard political development as increase in the survival capacity of a political system. This capacity is low when political system is specific to a particular environment. The capacity increases as political system moves away from its environment specificity and acquires capacity for a wide range of available actions over an increasing variety of environments. Such increase in system capacity is assumed to be concomitant with increase in degrees of nationness. Thus, processes of national development are also processes of 'capacity' (or political) development. These processes, according to Karl Deutsch, are mobilization and assimilation. These processes, in their varying degrees of mutual interrelations, are visualized as working towards territorial and cultural integration around a 'centre' of leading nation builders. The operative factor in these processes is communication. This means that different levels of nationness are indicative of differential capacity of a population for social learning through social communication. A people who have undergone periods of intensive communication are assumed to have become a nation. Karl Deutsch puts this view in the context of cybernetic theory of goal-seeking behaviour, and concludes that an increase in nationness inevitably leads to an increase in political system 'feedbacks', and thereby endows the political system with greater capacity to 'steer' its way through its environment. System capacity can, therefore, be located on 'nation-non-nation continuum' on the basis of such indicators as population density, growth of markets and increase in literacy. These formulations are the core of

communication models. Daniel Lerner organizes them into a causal theory of political development, maintaining that a mobilized society is a participant society. He treats participation as a dependent variable.

The institutional models reject the postulate of continuous relationship between social mobilization and political development. They assume that this relationship is characterized by discontinuities and ruptures, and is, therefore, uncertain. It occasions political breakdowns and decay. Such a problematic situation underlines the importance of two groups of variables in political development: (i) leadership variables, and (ii) variables of institutional growth, expansion and effectiveness. Institutional models are formulated around these variables. The 'leadership' models emphasize that political leaders, when confronted with a problematic situation, are compelled to devise strategies and practise skills to achieve their political objectives. Howard Wriggins, for example, classifies strategies that rulers in the new nations may employ to maintain themselves in power.⁴⁵ The 'institutionalization' models, on the other hand, emphasize on dimensions of institutional growth and development. Hence a feature of political development studies is a multiplication of models within the general framework of systemic and strategic perspectives.

The models lay down broad propositions about political development. These propositions are helpful, no doubt. But they have not helped in comparative study of political development. This left a big lacuna in political development study. To fill in the lacuna, *comparative studies* were articulated around 'political centre', because it was identified as possessing the major thrust in political development. *Centre variables* thus became important in comparing and contrasting political development experiences.

Several studies have been made along this line. These studies can be classified into two types:

(i) The studies that posit the state as the locus of the

political centre. Bendix, for example, compares and contrasts the characteristics of the agencies of territorial decision-making and control, and explains these characteristics in terms of distinctiveness, strength, and cohesiveness of centre-forming collectivities.⁴⁶

- (ii) The studies that posit the possibility of a political centre other than the state. J.P. Nettles emphasizes on this possibility when he says, "what constitutes nations is surely the organized diffusion of common experience, and this may be structured and experienced by a king, leader, church, party, army or state – or all of them."⁴⁷ Moore works on this hypothesis. He constructs a model of 'polity-building options'. These options are seen as possible coalitions between bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, landlords, and peasantry. The coalitions are visualized as always bipartite or tripartite, the interests left out acting as opponents. It is asserted that different centre forming coalitions have different consequences for the political system and its institutions.⁴⁸

Within-region comparisons have also been made. Lipset and Rokkan studied West European countries in a comparative perspective. The study starts with the assumption that in all these countries the drive in the direction of political development started more or less at the same time in their history. But each of these countries started from different 'initial conditions'. These differences are treated as important and are therefore typologized. Starting from different 'initial conditions', each of these countries is assumed to have passed through certain critical 'option points' in its history. Such 'option points' that are common to all these countries, are identified and listed. As each of these countries passed through successive 'option points', it was required to make certain 'system-building' choices, which from time to time served as baselines for social cleavages. From this it is concluded that social cleavages in each of these countries have been structured over time, and are a kind of 'historical package'. The study

assumes a strong 'developmental linkage' between the 'initial conditions' and the 'system-building' choices, and uses it as an explanatory variable in accounting for differences in political development experiences of the countries.⁴⁹

These comparative studies, as well as the general models, are useful insofar as they generate insights into complex political processes. Such engagement with comparative politics should have been helpful in political development related 'puzzle-solving' through institutional and policy innovation. But it was not so. The things went the other way. Political development studies were attacked as a cold war ploy and also came to be subjected to serious methodological questioning.⁵⁰

SHIFT IN FOCUS

When discomfiting facts relating to politics in the new states came to light – that is, when the record of several of these states both in domestic politics and international relations was found to be dismal – the risks rooted in the strategic environment of the cold war relating to a link up of the third world conflicts with conflicts in the central system, emerged into the foreground. This led to redirection of effort in the study of political development. The emerging political realities in Asia and Africa came to be reinterpreted to bring the people to the centerstage and take the grim aspects of their life situation as the yardstick for judging the 'high' politics of the state elite. It is a moot point whether the avoidance of a major war by delinking 'high' politics in the central system with 'high' politics in regional systems has been a case of democratic convergence of great power interests on the welfare of the common man in the third world. But it did generate imperatives for giving primacy to great power interests in state and nation-building strategies. It was in this context that the reinterpretation of 'high' politics in the new states moved along two directions

which in a way were an about turn in political development study but continued to shape to this day the mindset for interpreting politics in post-colonial societies.

First, the nation-state is not a type of political unit that enjoys sovereignty in the sense of sufficient control over its internal and external environment, despite historical associations of the concept with facts that point to the contrary. It is common knowledge that the new states are not so constituted. They are subject to domination and control by a few great powers and huge multi-national corporations. They enjoy legal sovereignty no doubt. But it is difficult to believe that they can act independently in economic and political matters without taking into account the context with which their economic and security interests closely interact. While there can be differences of opinion on the operative part of such dominance-dependence relationship, the fact of such relationships operating, cannot be denied. The transitional societies have reacted differently to the structural features of their international environments. But the overall effect of such international constraints has been to undermine the assumptions of immanent teleology, or of progressive immanent political change in the direction of peaceful and democratic nation-state.

And second, the nation-state is not a viable concept in transitional societies which are made up of ethnically, culturally, or economically diverse groups and classes, maintaining separate ways of life, and living in a condition of intense mutual cleavage and marked social disbelief and discontinuity. In such societies, a developmental thrust in the direction of nation-state formation is often followed either by anomic participation in the form of riots and demonstrations, or by bestowal of political loyalties, on the part of dissatisfied social groups, on parties and leaders who oppose the system, 'the establishment', and favour forms of political opposition, mass migrations, civil war, or even break up.⁵¹ It was therefore realized that the realities

of Asian and African societies were not amenable to formation of nations and states there.

It was argued that these societies must first go through a democratic revolution. The states and nations in post-colonial world were nothing more than juridical entities and had to be socially constructed. 'Social churning' as a new coinage came into vogue to describe this normative preference, even though little theoretical and empirical effort was undertaken to give it meaning and depth. In the absence of such a democratic revolution, it was further argued, these states and nations could not construct political communities of shared legacy and common destiny.

Hence the reinterpretation of third world realities and a redirection in political development study (which now clearly underlined the impact of great power politics in post-colonial societies) was the background against which an attack was mounted on the structural – functional approach to the study of political development. This approach used the integration perspective to posit normative consensus and structural equilibrium as self-evident bases of a society. It emphasized that the choices in political development were a matter of simple inference from the cultural traits shown by a mass of people corresponding to the level of their modernization and economic growth. The applicability of this model was now claimed to be limited to societies encompassed by a single cultural and institutional framework.

The rebels claimed that the societies characterized by structural inequalities of different socio-cultural groups and classes, resulting in unequal incorporation of such groups and classes into the political system, were not amenable to the analytical premises of this model.⁵² The structure of social, economic and political relationships operating within and across societies was relevant to such an enterprise. The academic focus in political development studies thus shifted towards the dynamics of class and community solidarities across international borders, especially in the regional and

wider inter-national environment.⁵³ The inevitable result was normative dissension and social fragmentation which could not be contained and regulated within state borders.

The different structural features of this dynamics were taken as baseline for formulating simple causal sequences as part of effect-measuring and cause-choosing exercises meant to draw attention to their possible consequences through time. Awareness of the possible consequences of given structural features were thought to be helpful in taking decisions on matters relating to political development. The academic and political activity along this line was also claimed to be of use in widening the range of choices available to a society for the erosion of such structural features of national, regional and international political orders which tended to limit the 'political present'. This approach proved to be handy in articulating value-based theories of politics. The transnational approach, for example, focused on issue-based solidarities across international borders and characterized them as significant factors both within and between states. With the passage of time such actors sprung up all over the world addressing a wide range of issues often in opposition to government policies and actions mainly in the third world. They clustered around feedback loops in policy process. They interrogated the political elite on what they were doing or even planning to do. No leader would like to risk their displeasure. These solidarities were in a way channels for cross-border flows of finance, information and other resources needed for actor visibility and political participation generally in opposition to political autonomy in choice of public policies. The density of these flows has increased to a level that the doyen among transnationalists, James Rosenau has recently written,

The institutions, structures and processes that sustain economic, political and social life today are undergoing extensive transformations that are rendering the international-domestic dichotomy obsolete and, even worse, severely distorting our grasp of how the world works. Today what is foreign is also domestic,

and what is domestic is also foreign. The two domains overlap and in some respects they are even one and the same. They form a new frontier where politics unfolds, a frontier that is marked by an endless flow of new technologies, by an endless flow of new organizations and by an endless movement of people across borders, not to mention the endless flow of polluted air and water, drugs and diseases.⁵⁴

This line of thinking was soon appropriated by post-modernist and 'critical' scholars for putting in context the general theories and models of state and nation and look for possibilities foreclosed by them. They rejected the dominant discourse as limiting political imagination. But this approach had a sub-text also. The analysis took the contemporary economic crisis as the starting point and focused on political and cultural processes considered increasingly essential for sustained and legitimate reproduction of capitalist society. In this sense they went beyond the Marxian crisis theory and set for themselves the goal of emancipating the people from both historically specific situations that prevented them from realizing their human freedom, and the kind of thinking that muddled their ability to fully understand the sources of their bondage. In this way they create a discursive space for articulating a reflexive approach to theorizing in order that the political subject can make a better sense of its own life. The subject is called upon to work from within conditions of domination (as if from under a dome) to break out into freedom. It is again a moot point whether the concern of the 'critical' theorists for the freedom of the political subject (especially marginalized communities and groups) is really helpful to them.

Similarly in international relations the 'critical' approach looks beyond the institutional approach of comparative politics and articulates a sociological perspective on war and peace. They turn the heat on the social base of 'high' politics especially in the new states. They seek to expose the political economy of arms build up and of armed

conflicts including terrorism. The ‘critical’ scholars define themselves as civil society activists and prefer to locate themselves in non-governmental and autonomous bodies. They network globally and provide feedback on the activities of the groups engaged in ‘high’ politics. They closely collaborate with global social movements for inputs and for social mobilization in support of their political goals claimed as ultimately leading to the formation of a global society based on cosmopolitan principles. This goal has a direct bearing on political development, and for good reasons, in the sense that it prescribes limits to freedom, especially in post-colonial societies, in defining state and nation, the limits which Mary Kaldor affirms when she says,

The term cosmopolitan, when applied to political institutions implies a layer of governance that constitutes a limitation on sovereignty of states and yet does not itself constitute a state. In other words, a cosmopolitan institution would coexist with a system of states but would override states in certain clearly defined spheres of activity.³³

Notes and References

1. It points to the fact that political development encompasses almost the entire range of political phenomena
2. The confusion about the meaning of political development is partly a spill over of similar confusion about the nature of political theory as a discipline. It is not yet clear as to what the discipline should be like – whether it should unify and extend the time-honoured trends in political studies, or it should address itself to an entirely new set of problems, or it should make a complete break from the past and set off from a clean start. The result is that those who pursue theoretical politics are not definite among themselves of what they are seeking. The same is, by and large, true of political development.
3. The idea is that politics as predicate has various states having spatio-temporal relationships among themselves. In the study of political development, these relationships are seen in terms

of manifest characteristics. These characteristics are found changing from one state to another. The problem arises when a sufficient number of characteristics are found to have changed. How should one view such a change? The general trend has been to describe the new state as a new predicate. But this trend of study is opposed by those who prefer to describe the change as a new state of the same old predicate.

4. There has in fact been a shift in academic concern from exclusive emphasis on classificatory types of societies representing developmental gradations of logical relationship according to some criteria, to substantive variations among societies.
5. These in fact were of the nature of logico-spatial series, Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 195-97.
6. "This sequential conception, historically always ambiguous at best, leaves many things unspecified. Are the sequences identical, invariant and dependent? Do they represent an unfolding entelechy – an homuncular pattern of orderliness – in change – or a functional emergence of one from the other? Are sequences and patterns probability statements or structural statements about events? Historicisms of different varieties come up with answers which contrast sharply with the critical skepticism of more jaundiced observers". Paul Meadows, "The Metaphor of Order: Toward a Taxonomy of Organization Theory", in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Sociological Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms*, New York: Harper and Row, 1967; Indian Edn., New Delhi: Allied, 1975, p. 84.
7. J. P. Nettl emphasizes on the need for accommodating the break-up of states into the theory of political development, and calls for a classificatory scheme which marks out 'states with high, even and low chances of survival'. See his "Strategies in the study of political development", in Colin Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, London: The Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 28.
8. The reference is to the logico-empirical view of causality as constant conjunction. This view implies that cause and effect are both necessary and sufficient for each other, in the sense that each is equally a cause of the other. This served as the broad methodological framework for the earlier studies in political development. These studies took the observed

relationships between variables as the baseline for formulating deductive-nomological propositions about political development. These propositions were about the relationship of certain empirically identifiable variables to political development in necessary and sufficient relationships of causal sequences. For this reason, they were regarded as the great explanatory and extrapolative significance, and paved the way for empirical study of political development. Different methods were used to collect data on the suggested relationships, and sophisticated statistical techniques were used to quantify and tabulate them in terms of correlations, ratios, and frequencies, not only to describe the phases of political development, but also to locate concrete polities on the spatio-temporal dimensions of the developmental state.

This pattern of study soon invited criticism from those who rejected the constant conjunction account of political development, and could point the turn of events in the world to show that such an account was academically shallow. The critics argued that the nomological propositions formulated within the constant conjunction framework, were devoid of any explanatory power, because first, they sought to define causal relations on the basis of the logical relations of implication and, thus, incorrectly posited causality on what was merely 'inverse inference'; and, second, they sought to generalize the deductive models based on simple statistical correlations discovered in the historical evolution of Western societies, and, as such, incorrectly claimed validity of these models for other societies (while, of course, several scholars had been emphasizing on the probabilistic nature of the nomological propositions in relation to the other societies). Against the background of this view, the critics rightly argue in favour of 'asymmetrical' causal relations, and emphasize on the real possibility of different causes independently producing the same effect. The critics also emphasize on the need for identifying the structural principles and immanent forms as important elements in causal explanations. Still, however, it is not clear how these perspectives can accommodate qualitative political changes and the historicity of political forms.

9. The examples are the debates between liberals and non-liberals on the relative merits and demerits of bureaucratization,

and the debates in radical social thought found in the writings of Leozek Kolakowski, Stanislaw Ossowski, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, Jean-Paul Sartre and others.

10. This view is taken by those scholars who like classical sociologists proposed a dichotomy between traditional and modern types of societies (more or less after the fashion of Parsonian pattern variables) and postulated a static theory of social evolution, visualizing an inevitable and unilinear course of social change from a traditional to a modern system.
11. This is preceded by a change in political values brought about by technological developments leading to a transformation of production systems. The changed political values make people see the worth and advantage of territorial expansionism and political consolidation, while such consolidation is made possible by the simultaneous change in techniques, political and military, as well as by a change in the techniques of communication. Within this developmental framework, the characterization of the state as the terminal community only shows the anthropological bias of political scientists.
12. This means that social evolution comes about not through displacement of tradition but through tradition taking over modern functions. This is not to define tradition in terms of a worldview but in political sociological terms of certain social institutions like caste, idioms, and styles of social behaviour. It is maintained that tradition gets modernized, first, when there occurs a differentiation between social and political functions of these institutions, behavioural idioms and styles; and second, when these are organized and adapted to perform modern political functions without, at the same time, giving up their traditional social functions. Such juxtaposition of modern politics with traditional society in developmental and complementary relationship makes the notion of tradition and modernity as polar concepts appear unhistorical and of little academic promise. No longer, therefore, it is thought to be correct to regard tradition as continuity and modernity as break. See, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Suzanne Hoerber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967. Cf.: "The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of

modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them." p. 3. Also see R. Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX, 1969, pp. 292-346. For further discussion on developmental relationship between tradition and modernity, see David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1967; Samuel E. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; Dunkwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations : Problems of Modernization*, Washington, D. C. : Brookings Institution, 1967; and C. H. Dodd, *Political Development*, London: Macmillan, 1972.

13. The shift is from the perspective of cultural universalism to a perspective of cultural persistence.
14. In fact, this has been the general direction of study within the broad theoretical framework of purposive-rational action. But in these studies, the bias in favour of universalistic orientations led to an optimistic assumption about possibility of transformational changes in all sectors of social life. This was not correct. And, then, the emphasis was not on discovery of 'causal sets' in the context of given 'action programmes' to generate greater capacity for control and steering.
15. Such normative underpinnings of functionalist-teleological view of political development invite sharp criticism from universalistic value perspectives which inevitably are external to particular societies; the critics say: nonsense is nonsense, functional or not. But the criticism does not go beyond a dialogue, and does not show a practical way out.
16. This theory of sociological determination of political liberalism is not acceptable to liberal democrats; see note 28 below.
17. The consolidation of state power in third world societies was very likely to undermine the political prospects of ideologically based dissent movements in these societies. The sociological theory of consolidating state power was, thus, described as a kind of "debate with Marx's ghost". See, Irving M. Zeitlin, *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*, Englewood-Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, pp. 111-321. The debate from the other side was soon picked up and was being carried forward in an extensive way (of course from the Soviet perspective) mainly through progress books published

in Moscow on problems of the third world, and on theories and critical studies.

18. Cf. "Like every new theory, modern socialism had, at first, to connect itself with the intellectual stock-in-trade ready to its hand, however, deeply its roots lay in material economic facts." Frederick Engels in the introduction to the 1892 special edition of *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, reprinted in Marx-Engels, Selected Works, Vol. III, Moscow: Novosti, 1969, p. 115.
19. The situation was a product of the U.S. wavering (like that of the other powers also, especially the former Soviet Union) between the choice of being a great society or the greatest power. There is an undercurrent of social Darwinism in this dilemma: in the struggle for survival between the Slav and the Saxon, the fittest to survive may not be the best.
20. The liberal doctrine of freedom as absence of coercion is opposed by non-liberals who rely on the use of force. It is also opposed by totalitarians who seek to influence behaviour by limiting choices open to the behaving units. The totalitarians also oppose another aspect of the liberal doctrine, namely, freedom defined as spontaneity, and in contrast, define freedom as pursuit of an absolute collective purpose. As a consequence, while the liberal democrats envision spheres of activity in which the state does not participate, the totalitarian democrats visualize the state absorbing all activity into its societal plan. In short, the issue between authoritarianism, liberalism, and totalitarianism centres on the validity of the use of force and the necessity of limiting spheres of state action. This time-honoured issue in political discussion is confounded by attempt at an empirical classification of political systems as authoritarian, liberal and totalitarian. These rather than being attributes as claimed, appear to be variables, and political systems are found to be of mixed types. But among these mixed types, one can easily see some general trends. For example, one general trend is that modern political systems aim at eliminating the use of force, and rely, in its place, on creating structures of coercion and persuasion, and as such, tend to be totalitarian. Herbert Marcuse regards this trend as rooted in the "ideology of industrial society". He says: "Not only a specific form of government or party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and

- distribution which may well be compatible with a pluralism of parties, newspapers, countervailing powers, etc." *One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society*, London: Sphere, 1968, p. 20.
21. The liberal democratic ideal as the goal of political development has receded into the background, and different patterns of totalitarian organization are being increasingly accepted as viable solution to the anarchy of under-development. This view finds expression in several recent writings on political development. Huntington, for example, says that 'the primary need is the accumulation and concentration of power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking, and not in Washington that this lesson is to be learnt'. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1968, p. 138. The exclusion of Washington, D.C. from the list is more for reasons of personal prejudice than actual fact. This is evident from the chain of recent events in the United States, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy. Dante Germino has this trend in mind when he writes: "A key task of a critical political science or political theory in our time is to expose those modern tendencies which, even in the non-totalitarian world, favour the development of a closed society." *Beyond Ideology*, Evanston: Harper and Row, 1967, p. 190. It is, thus, important to bear in mind that, as a result of the growing emphasis on totalitarian solutions to problem of political development, the revolutionary and organizational strategies of Lenin are being increasingly incorporated into the theories of political development, bringing about a slow convergence of these theories on socialism, and their sharp contrast with the ideology of political liberalism.
 22. The third world societies are basically peasant societies. The great power political competition in the third world is therefore primarily a competition for peasant's allegiance. The peasantry has "two souls": its pre-bourgeois instincts of private property, and its instincts of mutual aid and solidarity. This duality which the peasantry shares with other groups of pre-industrial origin, notably the youth, makes the third world societies amenable to steering in either of the directions.
 23. This is the thrust of cross-cultural comparative studies. The comparativists argue that all politics, including those in non-Western and communist societies, evince certain behavioural

- regularities, patterns and processes which are important and essential to the process of governing. See Alfred Diamant, "Is there a Non-Western Political Process? Comments on Lucian Pye's "The Non-Western Political Process", *Journal of Politics*, IX, February 1959, pp. 123-27; and Joseph LaPalombara, "Monoliths or Plural Systems: Through Conceptual Lenses Darkly" *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VIII, Autumn, 1975, pp. 305-32.
24. In fact, this reformist, meliorative, or gradualist approach is nothing but an apology for the status quo.
 25. This is known as atomization of problems, which is also partly a consequences of academic departmentalization. Thus, problematization in the study of political development (as of other social sciences also) needs to be criticized for its penchant for the trivial.
 26. Christian Bay is a strong critic of the sociological interpretations of the liberal position by such scholars as Lipset and Dahl. He maintains that such interpretations cast within the framework of democratic pluralism, have a built-in bias for the status quo, and generate a strong disinclination to study alternative forms of political organization to achieve objectives which the pluralist democracy cannot achieve; and that, therefore, study within this framework, is pseudopolitics. He says: "Man himself is the only end. As I understand this principle, it should mean that the maximization of every man's and woman's freedom – psychological, social and potential – is the only proper first priority aim for the joint human efforts that we call political." *The Structure of Freedom*, New York, 1968, p. 390. He emphasizes on basic human wants and needs that extend beyond biological necessities. In this context, he approves of the Maslowian categories and their order or precedence. He thinks that maximal human development around these needs should correctly define the liberal approach to politics, and not the mystification of state power in terms of some national or international objectives.
 27. "The Quest for Political Development, *Comparative Politics*, I (2), 1969, p. 289.
 28. Such is the impact of macro-sociological generalizations when they serve as constants in making rational choice in political development. There is a long academic tradition of defining

development in terms of power parameter. The state as the highest institutional manifestation of power was the centre of concern; the individual and social values were seen in relation to it. But this was a static analysis, even though the emphasis later shifted from institutional to process aspect of power. Power continued to be the central concern. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan say: "The concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science: The political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power (in a wider sense, of all deference values, or of influence in general). *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 75. A significant result of this focus on power was the undermining of the academic concern for individual and social values. Or, such concern was lost in inappropriate and inadequate operational definitions of these values.

29. Imitation is not copying or repetition; it is also variation, competition and renovation; or in other words, it is an imitation not of developed societies but of the method of development. A society which imitates a model, also competes with it, and in the process, varies from it and sometimes even outclasses it; and thus it does not cling to the model, but to the law which it exemplifies.
30. *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. I, London: Macmillan, 1960, p. 41.
31. For a discussion on the primacy of the political in relation to the social, see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958; Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960; Lord Plowden and Sir Robert Hall, "The Supremacy of Politics", *The Political Quarterly*, 39, October-December 1968. The theory of an autonomous political realm was put forward in Italy by Gaetano Mosea and Vilfredo Pareto, and its dynamic character was emphasized upon by Antonio Gramsci. The notion has been articulated in the study of political development within the perspectives of Weberian organizational theory and the scientific management movement. The notion so articulated erodes the distinction between state and society. The state absorbs the society within itself, and is viewed as a total or custodial institution in relation to it. The societal complexity is

overlooked – that is, the differentiated, interdependent, and pluralistic institutional character of society is considered as of not much significance – and attempt is made to order society according to simple premeditated principles. This is what is meant by politicization of society. This results in a messianic belief in the limitless potentialities of organized politics. C.f.: “The political system is the legitimate, order maintaining, or transforming system in society,” in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 7.

32. “Leninist Principles of Correlation of Politics and Economics”, in *Leninism Today*, Moscow: Novosti, 1970, p. 160.
33. “State-building in the Third World: Alternative Strategies,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, 1972, p. 235.
34. The “whole society” approach to the study of political development took this as the problem of central concern. Within this academic tradition it was attempted (i) to formulate concepts, like Karl Deutsch’s ‘social mobilization’, to throw empirical light on the relationship between socio-economic change and the political system; (ii) to identify the institutions, such as the political party or the public sector, which could serve as the engine of directed change in society; and (iii) to typologize societies within an evolutionary framework. The empirical usefulness of these ‘whole society’ studies has however been limited: “it is precisely in the area of concern and writing about whole political systems that we now find the greatest confusion, the most dizzying array of typologies of obscure utility; the most striking examples of historicism, unilinear notions of systemic development, cultural parochialism, lack of genuine concern with how one gets logically from broad theoretical formulations to indicated empirical research, and, if I may suggest it, a contemporary variety of scholasticism that masquerades as systemic theory”, Joseph LaPalambara, “Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View”, in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds. *The Methodology of Comparative Research*, New York: The Free Press, 1970 p. 126.
35. As emphasis shifted in organizational analysis from formal rationalistic character of organizations to social complexity within them, the earlier optimism about potentialities of

- organized politics in the study of political development was moderated. See, Leonard Binder, *Iran*, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1962; and Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory", *World Politics*, XVI, July 1964. For an interesting discussion on strains and stresses arising within the political system when rapid social change is attempted, see John W. Lewis, "The Social Limits of Politically Induced Change", in Chandler Morse *et al*, eds., *Modernization by Design*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969, pp 1-33. The criticism is sometimes given a populist dimension also when attempted social change through organized politics is described as "domestic experiment in colonial administration".
36. The paradigmatic unity focuses on limitations and possibilities of rational directedness of man and society. From this perspective, there are two contrasting paradigms: one attributes the capacity for rational thought and action to the mass of the people, while the latter limits it to a select few. This latter paradigm is by and large accepted by the social sciences. A majority of the people are believed to be irrational, and are regarded as guided by self-interest as rooted in their natural and social circumstances (particularly class positions). The so called rational ideas and ideologies, being a direct efflux of the circumstances, are thus believed to be only symbols of self-interest. No doubt, there are variations of view on the social scientific paradigm, but the *conditioned* nature of the rational faculty in the case of a large number of people is generally accepted. Only a few people are believed to be capable of rational thought and its use for common good. This view of human nature marks a departure from humanistic optimism, and owes its inspiration to Marx and Freud. This later served as the broad context for raising a very genuine question: knowledge for what?
 37. Nationalism and patriotism have been indispensable to progress in modern Europe, and as such have been regarded as equally indispensable to progress in post-colonial societies.
 38. *From Empire to Nation*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p. 299.
 39. *Nation-Building*, New York: Atherton, Atheling edition, 1996, p. ix.
 40. The inapplicability of this structural-functionalist view of nation-building to the countries of the third world was claimed

to be for two reasons: (i) the differential colonial impact on the institutional bases of different sub-national groups within these countries; and (ii) the practical difficulties of eroding the separate institutional characteristics of these groups.

41. "Political Religion in the New Nations", in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, Indian edition, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 57-104.
42. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966, Indian edition, 1972, p. 35.
43. "Politics as Vocation", in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mill, editors and translators, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1948, p. 82.
44. This calls for a study of co-variations, sequences, rates, and time-lags of change along two or more related dimensions of political development.
45. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
46. *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, New York: Wiley, 1964.
47. "The State as a conceptual Variable", *World Politics*, XX (4), 1968, p. 565.
48. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, London: The Penguin Press, 1966.
49. "An Introduction", in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.
50. The methodological questioning has been by two types of scholars: first, by scholars who are 'friendly insiders' in the sense that they at least share with those whom they criticize certain epistemological principles of logical positivism; and second, the 'hostile outsiders' who start from a different principle – that man is not subject to the same logic as nature.
51. These tendencies were interpreted as signifying the breakdown of the functionalist model which used the integration perspective to posit normative consensus and structural equilibrium as self-evident bases of any functioning society. This led to a shift in political development study from emphasis on a cluster of psycho-cultural attitudes to institutional social, economic and political relationships operating within a society. This also led to a shift in the level of analysis from the state to that of the group and the individual.

It is at this level that the study of political development came to face the most difficult normative challenge. See Noam Chomsky, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*, London: Fontana, 1972, Chapter 2, "On Changing the World", pp. 47-83.

52. Rather than positing normative consensus and structural equilibrium, the rebels posited normative dissension and structural disequilibrium as the starting point in political development. This opened up space for articulating parallel and competing value-based theories. The situation is no different since the end of the cold war. In fact, the events of 1989 have given these value-based theories greater legitimacy.
53. This focus has been articulated in the form of critical and radical theories in different social science disciplines.
54. James N. Rosenau, "Aging Agendas and Ambiguous Anomalies: Tensions and Contradictions of an Emergent Epoch," in Stephanie Lawson, ed., *The New Agendas in International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 22.
55. Mary Kaldor, *Proposal to Economic and Social Council for a Seminar on Cosmopolitan Democracy*, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K., 1993. Also see, Sushil Kumar, "A Retrospect: Imperatives for Reconstituting Statehood", in his edited volume *New Globalism and the State*, New Delhi: Research Press, 1999, pp. 281-92. Cf.: "They (neo-Marxists) mounted a structural attack on the state by articulating a society-centred theoretical perspective. They attacked the 'anti-people' character of the state. (sic) The aim was to realize freedom, equality and justice breaking national and state barriers and affecting a transition towards a world system which was free from domination, alienation and capitalists exploitation. Sovereign statehood was obviously under attack" p. 288. In this sense, the neo-Marxist approach to political development is now both post-modernist and post-communist. The Enlightenment based modernity, both liberal and Marxist, is now a thing of the past. The focus in political development studies has shifted to the subject: "consciousness ultimately determines being (sic) the key to the future lies not in the external, objective condition of states – political, military, economic and technological – but in the internal subjective condition of individuals." Timothy Gordon Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?" in G. Schopflin and N. Wood, eds., *In Search of Central Europe*, Oxford: Polity Press, 1989, pp. 200-1.

