



PH
050
H755A

16543
24/11/66

ANNIVERSARY LECTURE

THE COLONIES AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

By THE RIGHT HON. LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.I.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

Royal Central Asian Society's Thirty-Second Anniversary lecture, the Right Hon. Earl WINTERTON, P.C., M.P., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: The British as a race are very fond of clichés. Usually when they take the Chair they begin by saying that it is a privilege and pleasure to take the Chair.

It is not in any conventional sense that I say this afternoon that I feel deeply honoured to take the Chair for my old friend Lord Hailey, for whom, as is the position of all who know him, I have the most unbounded admiration, not only as a great Empire statesman and administrator, but also as a man.

It is a very proper rule of our Society that the Chairman should say practically nothing in his opening remarks, but I would like to make what I think will not be a very serious breach of it by making one observation.

Among very many things which I have been in life, I happen to be a large land-owner in Northern Rhodesia, and I am very interested in African problems generally. I am possibly the only person in this room who has visited every territory in Africa except British Somaliland and one or two other territories.

We have in Africa very, very difficult questions arising from the relationship of the European to the African, questions which *mutatis mutandis* are rather similar to those which arise in India.

I would like to say to this audience that all of us who are interested in Africa, whether we be Africans who live there, Europeans who reside there, or those like myself who are interested in the continent and in our great territories there, owe an immense debt of gratitude to Lord Hailey for what he has done in helping us to resolve those problems. His name will live, not only in the sphere with which this Society is interested, but also in that other sphere, equally large and important, of Empire affairs to be found in Africa. I would like you, Lord Hailey, though it has nothing to do with the object of this meeting, to receive from me, as one interested in Africa, the most grateful thanks of all of us for what you have done in connection with our interests in that great continent. (Applause.)

The PRESIDENT, after acknowledging the very friendly and appreciative terms in which Lord Winterton has referred to him, proceeded as follows:

I SHALL not apologize for bringing before you the subject of the Atlantic Charter and its special relation to the Colonies, for the Royal Central Asian Society has never held a narrow interpretation of the scope of its interests. Moreover, the Charter itself has a world-wide application, and there are many who regard it as of an epoch-making character. It would not be too much to say that it is regarded in this light by the public of the United States. In America the first question addressed to those who have occasion to debate the issues of British post-war policy is almost invariably based on a reference to the terms of the Charter. A recent study of the problems of Africa by an American group has stated that "all Americans are convinced that the Charter is an acid test of democratic ideals in any new world order to be achieved after the

present war.”* The world broadcast delivered by President Roosevelt in February of last year is proof of the significance which he attaches to the terms of the Charter, and the speeches of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Sumner Welles show that it has the same importance for them. It has been formally accepted by the representatives of the United Nations who joined in the Twenty-Six-Nation Agreement of January, 1942. Let me recall also that General Smuts has said that after the war the world will be governed by its principles. It will be, he says, “a world of international collaboration as distinct from the old competitive order.”

In judging of the influence which the Charter may be expected to exercise on our own policy, it is of some importance to note the circumstances in which it was concluded. On September 9, 1941, Mr. Churchill stated that in the previous month he had accepted an invitation from Mr. Roosevelt to meet with him in order to survey the entire world position in relation to the settled and common interests of the United States and the United Kingdom. You will remember that at that time Japan had not yet entered the war, but, as Mr. Churchill pointed out, it had been felt necessary for America and Great Britain to consider the policy which they should pursue in order to stop further encroachments by her in the Far East. The Prime Minister said that he had always deprecated the formulation of peace aims or war aims while the end of the war was not yet in sight, and the conditions and associations at the end of the war were unforeseeable. But he went on to say: “A Joint Declaration by Great Britain and the United States was an event of a totally different nature. The principles in the Declaration had long been familiar to the British and American democracies, but the fact that it was a united Declaration set up a milestone or monument which only needed the stroke of victory to be a permanent part of the history of human progress.” He emphasized that the Declaration was one of general principles only; questions had already been asked and would be asked again as to the interpretation that would be placed on them. He went on to speak in particular of the questions that had been raised regarding its application to India and the Colonies.

That is a point to which I shall have to refer subsequently. But before I do so it will not be out of place to examine the position which the Charter actually holds in the minds of the British public. I have referred to the prominent position it occupies in current American thought. I am far from suggesting that we in Great Britain would be likely to disregard an engagement on which our Government has entered. But in the modern world the strength of an obligation which such an engagement imposes, and the effort which the nation will undertake to support it over a course of years, must depend on the value which public sentiment attaches to it. That there has been a general acceptance of its terms there can be no doubt. It embodied ideals which are part of our own tradition. If I may quote Mr. Eden's words, it expressed principles that were not only just, but were felt to be in accord with the best interests of us all. But when

* *Africa: A Study by the Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims.* New York, 1942, p. 17.

this much has been said I think that one may fairly add that the Charter hardly occupies in the current thought of the British public a place similar to that which it occupies in the minds of the people of the United States. It is, at all events, true to say that it does not seem to the British public to supply the touchstone which they would instinctively apply in discussing the problems of post-war developments.

We recognize, of course, the limitations which must necessarily attach to any such Declaration. It must of necessity be framed in very general terms, for it would be impossible to formulate in any concrete form policies which would commend themselves equally to the very diverse interests represented among the twenty-six United Nations. But it is perhaps the very generality of its terms which robs it of some significance for us. We are far less attracted than some peoples by attempts to find guidance for practical policy in the statement of abstract principles. Other nations have seen in this the evidence of a certain lack of moral logic on our part; our policy, they say, is one of expediency rather than of principles. But whatever the truth of this as a criticism of our international policy, there is perhaps another explanation of the fact that we attach a less positive value to declarations framed in more abstract ethical or political terms. Our experience warns us of the great variety of interpretation to which such terms can be subject, and of the disillusionment that this may bring in its train. "Liberty," "freedom," "equality"—these are phrases which have at different times had an inspiration which has caused dramatic changes in the world's history. But they have not had the same meaning for every people nor for every section within the same community. There have in the past been stout champions of liberty who have seen no objection to the slave trade; the doctrine of equality has not always been felt to be incompatible with the existence of great social and economic disabilities; freedom of conscience has not everywhere been held to be inconsistent with the retention of religious discriminations. We are, in short, more inclined to attach importance to the concrete application of these ideals than to the formal acceptance of the ideals themselves.

But there is a second consideration, perhaps even more directly relevant to the position which the Atlantic Charter holds for us. It has been said that in the modern world no nation can afford to go to war without a moral justification, and that if no such justification exists one has to be invented. We ourselves may perhaps have engaged in other wars for which we had consciously to find a moral justification. But on this occasion there was no such need: every interest told us that not our entry into the war, but our standing aside from it, would demand to be justified. As Mr. Churchill said a few days ago, our entry into this war was a single and spontaneous impulse. If at a later date there were many who asked for a definition of our war aims, it was not so much because they questioned the decision which we then took, or felt the need for confirming our own resolution, but because they believed that this was needed in order to secure an increased effort from peoples who were supporting our cause, or to bring to our side others who still hesitated to join us.

These considerations may serve to throw some light on the place which the Charter occupies in current opinion in Great Britain. The public

attitude is far from one of apathy or disregard of the Charter; it is rather the attitude of those who, while appreciating the aspirations which it embodies, are even more concerned with the practical interpretation which may be given to them. If so, then the matter with which I am dealing to-day—namely, the application of the Charter to our Dependencies—is of special significance, since it is in regard to them that the question of interpretation has first arisen in a practical form. This will be clearer if I take in order the first six of the Eight Points embodied in the Declaration which particularly affect our Dependencies; the Seventh and Eighth Points do not need consideration in this connection.

The First Point emphasizes that the United Nations seek no territorial aggrandisement. That is a principle which does not perhaps directly affect the existing Colonies. But it leaves open, as did also the Fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, a difficult problem regarding the disposal of the colonies held by the Powers with whom we are now at war. That they could be given self-government immediately after the war is an assumption which few would readily accept. But take the alternatives. Would our acceptance of any form of mandate over them be regarded as aggrandisement? It will be recalled that our acceptance of mandates for the ex-German colonies was so treated by critics in other countries and, indeed, by some in our own. It was characterized as a subterfuge by which certain of the Allies gained possession of territory which they could not have annexed without offence to the principle of non-aggrandisement. We must ask ourselves, then, whether the only remaining alternative is, or is not, recourse to some form of direct control by an international body.

I come to the Second Point. It discountenances any territorial changes that "do not accord with the fully expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." That stipulation was doubtless made primarily in respect of conditions in Europe. But in the case of the Colonies it would frequently prove difficult to ascertain "the fully expressed wishes of the inhabitants" in the absence of any organized agencies for the expression of public opinion. The principle itself is, however, readily acceptable. It is, indeed, that on which we have acted in regard to the proposed transfer of the South African Protectorates to the Union of South Africa, and it is, again, one of the factors which has hitherto influenced our attitude to the proposed fusion of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia.

There is, however, more substantial difficulty about the Third Point. Its wording is important.

"They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been deprived of them."

I need not remind you that it was this Point which, as soon as the terms of the Charter were made public, provoked from India, Burma, Ceylon, and certain quarters in West Africa and the West Indies, the enquiry

whether it was proposed to extend to them immediately after the war the right of full self-determination. As I have already mentioned, Mr. Churchill's statements of September 9 proceeded to give the answer to those questions. Here, again, it is important to note the terms used by him :

"The Joint Declaration" (he said) "does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma, or other parts of the British Empire. We are pledged by the Declaration of August, 1940, to help India to attain free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth with ourselves, subject, of course, to the fulfilment of obligations arising from our long connection with her and our responsibilities to her many creeds, races, and interests. Burma also" (he went on to say) "is covered by our considered policy of establishing Burmese self-government and by the measures already in progress. At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government, and the national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown. We have made declarations on these matters which are complete in themselves, free from ambiguity, and related to the conditions and circumstances of the territories and peoples affected. They will be found to be entirely in harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the Joint Declaration."

I referred at an earlier stage to the difficulty which must always be inherent in declarations of policy framed in abstract political or ethical terms. The circumstances in which the Prime Minister found himself form an admirable illustration of that difficulty. It might have been possible for him to have asserted that the general principles of the Third Point of the Charter were applicable to our Dependencies, and to have called attention to the steps we had already taken to introduce self-governing institutions in them. I can, indeed, imagine that others might in his place have considered this the more politic course. But to have done so might have left room for misunderstanding. The course which he adopted was at all events scrupulously frank and left no opening for those charges of bad faith to which the wide currency given to the principle of self-determination gave rise in India towards the end of the last war.

As it was, Mr. Churchill's statement met with an unfavourable reception both in India and in some of the Dependencies. Many Indians affected to find in it evidence of a characteristically die-hard attitude about India's claim to independence. They could not, of course, have foreseen at the time the offer which was shortly to be made to India through the

Cripps Mission of March, 1942, and which—if logic counts at all in such matters—must serve to dispel any ground for suspicion based on the Prime Minister's interpretation of the terms of the Charter. There were, again, complaints in the Burma Legislative Council that Burma had been given a stone when she had asked for bread. A section of the West African press declared that the Government had ruled that the Charter did not apply at all to the coloured races, and one of the English dailies in reporting this asserted that the Charter might become for hundreds of millions a symbol of hypocrisy. These were some of the more immediate reactions. It is not easy to determine how far any feeling on the subject extended to the general population of the Colonies, nor how far the matter is still one of real concern. But I notice that there are still some reverberations of that feeling in Great Britain; thus the Fabian Society Conference of November, 1942, demanded that the Colonies should not be excluded from the Atlantic Charter.

The reactions in America are so well known that I need hardly dilate on them. The Prime Minister's statement proved a very acceptable weapon to that section of American opinion which was concerned, for whatever motive, to assume that Great Britain would not vary what was termed her imperialist outlook. Much was made of the apparent discrepancy between the President's statement that the Charter "applied to all humanity" and the restricted scope which it was considered that the Prime Minister had given to it. Was this, it was asked, the first step in a general resiling on the part of Great Britain from the principles of the Charter? Did it in any case mean that Great Britain refused to accede to that programme for the liberation of all subject peoples from external control which Americans themselves had welcomed as one of the most significant achievements of the Charter? Even if, as Britain might argue, there might be obstacles to immediate liberation, did she refuse to consider the determination of a definite period within which independence could be guaranteed, similar to that laid down by the United States for the Philippines?

I do not think that the dispassionate historian of the future will hold that the suspicion which is implied in these questions is justified. But an issue of this nature does not readily secure a dispassionate study in America. That must not be attributed simply to ignorance of the facts, or to prejudice, or to malice, though no one could deny that these feelings may actuate some sections of opinion. It is partly due to a tendency to simplify what, by their nature, must always be very complicated questions. American idealism is a very real thing; and if it is at times apt to be impatient and to seem to be unduly insistent on its own moral rectitude, yet it is an idealism which the rest of the world cannot have reason to undervalue, and the force of which it certainly cannot afford to overlook.

But let me turn from what may be only a passing phase in the debate on this issue to what, after all, is the substance of the case. As I have said, self-government for the Dependencies is part of our tradition. We have already gone far in the development of self-governing institutions in them, and hardly a year passes which does not mark a material advance in this direction. I do not believe in the possibility of assigning any date

by which self-government can be guaranteed to all the Dependencies, for the great variety of their social and political circumstances renders this impossible. But I put it to you that our adherence to the Charter has now placed us in a somewhat different position from that which we have hitherto felt that we occupied. I do not, of course, suggest that it has given to other partners in that agreement the right to intervene between Great Britain and her Dependencies. Nevertheless, others may have some reason to feel that it gives them some share of interest in the future of our Dependencies, just as we might feel that it has given us a shared interest in the future of the dependencies of other colonial Powers. How far this interest will take substance remains to be seen. It may, for instance, evince itself in the course of the post-war peace conference, where the future of the colonial dependencies in the world must inevitably be one of the outstanding topics of discussion.

Meanwhile, do circumstances require any action on our part, other than that which we are constantly taking to promote self-governing institutions in the Dependencies? It is opportune to point out that we have a conspicuous proof of the consistency of this policy in the constitution recently proposed for Jamaica, and the guarantees lately given to Ceylon and Burma. But this policy, though well recognized by us, and endorsed in many authoritative pronouncements, has never been formally embodied in any statutory or constitutional enactment, or in anything which has that legal force to which other people attach so much importance. Our position would be greatly strengthened in the eyes of the outside world if we could find some means of achieving this. Again, I myself am one of those who join in believing that the opportunity should now be taken of instituting Regional Councils for dealing with the Dependencies, suitably grouped for this purpose. These bodies would endeavour by consultation and joint discussion to co-ordinate the economic and other policies of the Dependencies, and would review the progress made by them. Here would be a first practical step in co-operation, directed towards the general aims which the Charter seeks to achieve.

But I suggest that we must at the same time leave no room for misunderstanding our own attitude on certain points. We must not be understood to look forward merely to the negative policy of emancipating the Colonies from external control. Our aim must be positive—namely, to secure for them the form of government which will best enable them to play their part in a modern world, for to give them self-government on any other terms would be an abdication of our responsibilities. And let us be clear on a further point. We ought no longer to think of self-government apart from the framework within which it will be exercised. Very few of these peoples would be fitted to stand alone in modern conditions. Merely to add to the number of sovereign nations with small populations and economic resources, without an effective affiliation to more competent political and economic units, would be of very limited benefit to the peoples themselves, and would certainly be no contribution to the maintenance of future world order. (Hear, hear.)

I turn now to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Points of the Charter. The Fourth declares that the signatories will further the enjoyment by all

States of access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world. The Fifth expresses the desire for such collaboration in the economic field as will secure to all peoples improved labour standards and social security. The Sixth Point is the Article now so often quoted, which looks forward to establishing a state of world security that will give all men safety within their own boundaries, and afford to them the assurance that they may live out their lives in freedom from care and want.

I have combined these Points because they express aspirations which, by common consent, must extend also to the Colonies, but the application of which to them does not—save, perhaps, in one particular—seem to raise any special problem in colonial policy. They indicate, of course, a greater quickening of action in more than one direction. We must clearly press forward with measures to improve the social conditions of the Colonies; but there is much truth in the observation of a recent writer in *The Times* that the last few years have already seen something like a revolution of policy in this respect. That is not shown merely by the provision which Parliament made in the Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940, nor by the recent great expansion of the social services in the Colonies. It is seen even more significantly in the great awakening of popular interest in Great Britain itself in everything which affects this question. It is clear, again, that we must now pursue a much more active programme for the improvement of colonial economic life. This is, indeed, many of us think, a field in which we stand convicted of some remissness. Our failing has not been in the direction of exploitation; it lies rather in the lack of any systematic organization of economic development. Much has been left to private enterprise, and it would be wrong to underestimate the part which private capital has taken in the material development of the Dependencies. But private enterprise has a limited sphere of action, and there is a wide field left in which the Government must now take its own part.

We must not hesitate if this leads us into activities such as the stimulation of secondary industries, the organization of local marketing, the participation in enterprises for agricultural production or utility services which a previous generation would have regarded as lying beyond the normal range of Government action. The economic life of the Colonies must not only be quickened; it must, if I may use this word, be domesticated; and we can engage ourselves in this with the greater freedom because in the long run this will make its own contribution to the expansion of their trade with ourselves and with the outside world.

I have mentioned, however, that in one respect the practical application of these Articles of the Charter may give rise to a problem in colonial policy. I refer to the hope expressed in the Fourth Point that all States may have access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world. So far as concerns access to the raw materials produced by the Colonies, our own record is clear. There is, perhaps, only one item—the duty on tin ore exported from Malaya and Nigeria—in which we have adopted any form of discrimination in our own favour. Any difficulty experienced by some nations in securing other exports of raw materials from our Colonies has been created by their own exchange and currency

systems, and it is a difficulty which we should have *been only too glad* to see removed.

But the effort to secure equal access by all nations to the market afforded by the Colonies for the consumption of manufactured goods will raise far-reaching issues of tariff policy which cannot be confined to the colonial field. If these efforts are to be successful, it can only be as the result of co-operative action over the whole range of international trade. Colonial trade is, after all, only a very small proportion of the total trade of the world, and the substance of the problem, therefore, lies elsewhere. But we can say this much for the share which we ourselves may be expected to take in this movement: we were the pioneers in the Open Door system; if we departed from it, it was largely because other nations closed their doors against our trade. The effort to work towards a world régime of freer exchanges, of low tariffs, and of freedom from trade restrictions, would involve greater sacrifices of existing policy on the part of some other peoples than it would on our own. If the other partners in the Atlantic Charter are prepared to make that effort and to undertake these sacrifices, then it will certainly not be Great Britain which will stand in their way. (Applause.)

MR. OSWALD WHITE: I would like to ask Lord Hailey a question about indirect rule, of which we hear so often. That, I presume, is intended to lead eventually to self-government. We have had an experience of indirect rule now for nearly seventy years in the Malay States, and under that system the Malay States have made very great progress, yet I cannot see that it has led on the path to self-government; rather the opposite, because the States are now federated. The Federal Council sits at intervals. That is, in turn, under the High Commissioner, who in turn is under the Colonial Secretary. Does Lord Hailey think, from his experience of the Malay States, that indirect rule leads towards self-government?

The next point I would like to ask is in connection with the Legislative Councils. Does he not think that they have remained too long in the form of half official, half unofficial nominated members?

THE PRESIDENT: I take it that these questions refer rather to the tempo at which we have carried out our policy of extending self-governing institutions rather than suggest any doubt as to the sincerity of that policy itself. As regards the first question, indirect rule really takes two forms. There is, first, the more fully developed form, best known in connection with Africa, in which native institutions are fully integrated as part of the Administration. There is, secondly, the form of the Protected State, and this is the form that indirect rule takes in Malaya. The State retains its semi-sovereign powers, but the ruler acts under the "advice" of the Resident. I do not question the benefits that have accrued to Malaya under the system of the Protected State. But I doubt whether the maintenance of this system in its present form can be said logically to lead to self-government. We might progressively curtail the scope of "advice" or control, but so long as control is maintained at all the system cannot properly be called one of self-government. If, on the other hand, we withdrew control altogether, we could not then secure that government would take the form which we are attempting to give to self-governing institutions elsewhere, as, for instance, in regard to representation of minority interests and the like. I think, therefore, that when the time comes we may have to reconsider

the position of Protected States in this respect, and endeavour to devise for them a constitution which will ensure a better foundation for what we consider to be the essential conditions of self-rule.

The second point refers to the constitution of the Legislative Councils. Our present problem is to give them a more fully representative character; they are not yet at the stage at which we can consider the grant of political responsibility to them. Nomination has its definite value in present conditions, which do not permit us to consider a widespread extension of the elective system. But I agree that the time has come when we should use nomination to secure a fuller representation of non-officials, and that where we find a suitable field for extension of the principle of election, as in urban communities and the like, we should not hesitate to make a fuller resort to election. We must, on the other hand, still hesitate to look on election as a suitable means for obtaining representation of tribal and similar communities, and must endeavour to find alternative methods of securing representatives in such cases.

Captain GAMMANS, M.P. : Lord Hailey pointed out that the Prime Minister's remarks on the application of the Atlantic Charter have been rather misunderstood in certain parts of the world. He then hinted that something more might be said. Does he feel there is anything to be gained by bringing to what one might almost call a Colonial Charter some definite statement of policy, which would not in any way alter our declared aims, which are perfectly clear and specific, but which would make it clear to our own people, to our Allies and also to the peoples of the Colonies, that we really do intend to adhere, as we do, to the spirit underlying the Atlantic Charter, and would make that above all suspicion?

The PRESIDENT : As Captain Gammans knows, I myself once put forward a proposal for something in the nature of a Colonial Charter, but it did not secure a great measure of support, perhaps because of the difficulty in framing its precise terms. But, as I suggested in my address to-day, I feel that we ought to take measures to make clear our position in regard to self-government in some more formal manner than we have hitherto adopted—something that would convince the world that we had a fixed and irrevocable policy with full Parliamentary sanction behind it. We did something of this kind in the well-known Declaration of 1917 about responsible government in India, and in the preamble to the Government of India Act of 1935; we could do something of the same kind when occasion arises to amend existing Colonial constitutions. We might use the amendment of the Jamaica constitution, for instance, on such an occasion.

A MEMBER : Would Lord Hailey inform us how far the territories resulting from our victories in North Africa would be affected by the Atlantic Charter after the war?

The PRESIDENT : You mean the territories just conquered from the Italians in North Africa? I called attention in my address to the effect which the Atlantic Charter might have on their disposal, in so far as all events as might affect our own part in controlling them. I could only point out the problem which would arise; I have not ventured on suggesting the solution.

Dr. RITA HINDEN (Fabian International Bureau) : If Lord Hailey does not consider it feasible to formulate a Colonial Charter, would it not be possible to publish those statements on Colonial policy which the Prime Minister has described as being complete in themselves and free from ambiguity? Many people have tried to find those statements and have not been successful, and if they could be published perhaps in the form of a White Paper it might do something to meet the situation.

The PRESIDENT: The pronouncements made are partly in the declarations made by Ministers, partly in such White Papers as the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, which may be said to carry a measure of Parliamentary authority. The material is perhaps better known to students of Colonial policy than to the general public, and there is much to be said for making it more accessible to the latter.

Mr. M. PHILLIPS PRICE, M.P.: Might I ask Lord Hailey whether, when he led the British Delegation in America recently, he noticed any readiness on the part of Americans to understand the peculiar difficulties that we have in regard to an Indian settlement; and whether he saw, secondly, any readiness on the part of American opinion to go beyond their traditional isolationism and take some part in the settlement of Colonial problems after the war?

The PRESIDENT: That is not an easy question to answer, for there are many cross-currents of opinion in the great population of the United States. The questions of "internationalism" and "isolation," for instance, do not have the same meaning for Americans where European commitments are concerned as they might have when Pacific security is at stake. My own discussions in the States were largely concerned with the attitude which Americans held on British imperialism and the effect it might have on their own willingness to co-operate in securing world order. Let me, however, point here to one impression which I formed. Discussion on our attitude is likely to be a less-engrossing topic as the Presidential election draws nearer. Moreover, much of it arose when America was impressed with a sense of our own military failures in the Far East. As our strength grows, and as our successes increase, there will perhaps be less tendency to discuss the ethical aspects of our policy.

Mr. G. CATOR, C.M.G.: I represent a rather curious part of the British Empire at the moment, for I represent only that part—or my personal acquaintance is only with that part which is under Japanese control—*i.e.*, Malaya. I was interested to see that that part of our Empire came into the discussion once by Lord Hailey over the question of the non-treated ores duty and by the gentleman who raised the first question in the discussion.

There is one point that we can remember—that in respect of Malaya we shall, so to speak, start with a clean sheet. I do not mean by that that we are going to say that, because we failed to protect them from Japanese aggression, that means that all the undertakings we have given in the past are null and void; but we do have the chance to look back and see where the mistakes have been made and how they can be remedied.

The first questioner, for instance, stated that in the course of seventy years' indirect rule in Malaya had led to no development in the direction of self-government. I think I might ask him to remember two things. That, first, seventy years is a very short period in history. It has taken us about one thousand years to reach universal suffrage even in England; and seventy years is a very short time in which to instruct a nation, as had to be done in Malaya. For the population there is mixed, the indigenous Malayan representing only a minority of the population; therefore any political scheme that has to be evolved has to work out an equal balance between the indigenous and the immigrant population, and that is a matter that, as America has found, is not a process of seventy years, but a process of several hundred years.

I have spent about half that period of seventy years in service in Malaya itself. I will not detain this gathering with details of what progress has been made. But very considerable progress in the direction of self-government has been made, and no State was ever forced into the Federation. There was one original Federation of four States, and the other nine States which formed

Malaya subsequently accepted British protection. They did not join the Federation. They were not asked to do so, and no pressure was put on them to do so. They remained outside the Federation and still are.

The question of the non-treated ores duty, to which Lord Hailey referred, was a matter not of economic security but of physical defence. Like many other similar questions, it would, I think, if reconsidered now or after the war, receive a very different answer from that which was given when it was imposed in the earlier years of this century.

To take up an almost parallel instance, there was until some years ago in Singapore an ordinance which forbade American vessels to enter the Singapore waters at all. That was a long and distant relic of the Dutch war. Of course, as soon as the point was raised and the matter was discussed, this ordinance was simply wiped off the map, and I think the probability is that the same would occur in the case of the non-treated ores duty.

I will not detain you any longer except to say how much I appreciated Lord Hailey's very admirable address.

Mr. BENSON (International Labour Office): Anyone who has been in the States recently will have been struck by the importance which is attached by informed as well as less informed opinion to the application of the Atlantic Charter to the Colonies. Although Lord Hailey's explanations and Captain Gammans' were very useful on that occasion, I do not think that they were always accepted as conclusive. In any event, we must take it as a political fact that there are nations in the world, including the American nation, which attach a very great deal of importance to formal statements of public principle. If it is the mood of the present generations of Great Britain to attach more importance to concrete measures, in the very interests of decent international collaboration, we must not ignore this desire for formal solemn declarations by which nations feel they should be bound.

Lord Hailey has dealt with some of the political aspects. There is also another aspect in regard to the fifth and sixth principles of the Atlantic Charter. In this respect I want to follow my own line of country—*i.e.*, I am an official of the I.L.O.

In the course of our twenty years of life we have drawn up, with the assistance of the Governments in particular, a number of principles of labour and social policy. Some of those principles have been inserted in international conventions, and the British Government in particular has a very fine record in the application of those principles to the Colonies. The Netherlands Government has also applied many of those principles to the Colonies.

Nevertheless, the general application of principles which are of particular value for territories which are coming into a new economic life is somewhat uneven. It would be useful in amplification of the fifth and sixth principles of the Atlantic Charter if those principles could be standardized to a greater extent than is the present position. They should be linked up with the principles of the co-ordination of economic and social policy, which is the basis of the British 1940 Act, and which has been the basis of Netherlands policy since 1933, and also with another principle of civilized Colonial development—*i.e.*, the increasing association of the indigenous peoples in the development of social policy.

I submit that it would be possible and useful for these three reasons for these principles of labour policy in the broad sense of the working conditions of the Colonial producers to be examined by expert Colonial statesmen, to be then examined by the Colonial Powers responsible for administration, and then to be offered to whatever appropriate peace or other conference is engaged in examining the responsibilities for Colonial government in the future.

This would be in a sense a non-political application of the Atlantic Charter, because it would not affect in any way the administrative responsibility of Colonial Powers for the development of the territories for which they are responsible. In a higher sense it would be a wise political move; it would be a measure of associating the responsibilities of the Colonial Powers with the desire of other Powers to share in the ascertaining of conditions on which the maintenance of world security in some respects depends; it would help to develop among the Colonial people a sense of their social responsibilities and of a realization that their aspirations to self-government are not merely a political matter but a means of applying the Atlantic Charter principle of freedom from want.

The CHAIRMAN: I think you would like me to say on behalf of all of you how immensely interested we have been in Lord Hailey's lecture this afternoon, one of the best that I have ever heard even Lord Hailey deliver.

I would permit myself one comment. It is not a criticism, because I take a very great interest in this matter. I am not quite sure that Lord Hailey dealt sufficiently extensively with the interest which is taken in certain quarters in America in the economic and political policy of this country towards the Colonies and Dependencies. He said, very truly, that it was very largely of an idealistic character, arising from the same feelings that we in this country have in our minds. That is probably the ~~tap~~ root, but there are other roots which it would be obviously most improper for me to deal with this afternoon.

I believe great good service would be done to Anglo-American relationship if someone of the quality of two friends of mine, Walter Lippman or Miss Dorothy Thompson, perhaps writing under a pseudonym, were to publish a brochure to show the British public what all those roots are.

On a certain occasion at a certain meeting some of us had the privilege of hearing a very distinguished American statesman. One of the questions put to him was, "Do you think the British Government does enough to dissipate the feeling of disquiet in many circles in your country about our British imperial policy?" This distinguished American replied: "I do not agree with the questioner. I think your Government's propaganda is very good. You have to get into your minds that there is a portion of our population which, on religious and racial grounds, will never be reconciled either to the British Empire or to your country. That will not affect the general relationship of the great mass of the American people to you. About 25 per cent. of the American people are not only opponents of you and your imperial system, but equally opponents of the President and the Administration." That tells very clearly what is at any rate at the back of some of the discussions which we hear.

If such a pamphlet as I have suggested could be written, and printed in this country, it would do a great deal of good and would persuade a certain number of people who do not wish to be persuaded.

THE TERMS OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

First: Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second: They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third: They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth: They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth: They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security;

Sixth: After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh: Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth: They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.


FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

PRESENTED TO THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY, SIMLA

BY



PH
050
H 755 A



Library

IIAS, Shimla

PH 050 H 755 A



00016543

