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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGGRESSION

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By OSWALD WHITE,



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The first of a series of three lectures on the Far East
Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 17, 1943, by
Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

IN the course of these remarks I shall dwell rather insistently on some of the more unpleasing traits of the Japanese character, and it may be thought that in common fairness I should also note their better qualities. I hasten, therefore, to disclaim any attempt to give you a picture of the Japanese character. Militarism has been described as a form of national disease. To adopt this analogy for a moment, the physician whose duty it is to combat disease looks first at the symptoms and then studies the underlying causes and the condition that forms its growth. Having made his diagnosis, he tackles the disease and endeavours to eradicate it. It is the first stage of this process that I am attempting to-day—to diagnose the disease of Japanese militarism. I shall not attempt to suggest the remedy, since that will be dealt with later in this series of talks.

You will not want me to describe the symptoms. The history of Japanese aggression during the last half-century lies open before your eyes. I shall go straight to the background—the form of government and the manner in which it has moulded Japanese character and made of it a malleable instrument and, finally, the views of the Japanese themselves as to their rôle on the stage of Asia first and the world next.

The record of Japan's aggression in the last fifty years reminds one forcibly of Hogarth's "Rake's Progress." Beginning in a small way with the seizure of Formosa, Japan proceeded to overcome Corea and then, in 1931, by a *coup-de-main* to snatch Manchuria. Up to this point it was always possible to discern extenuating circumstances. Even in the case of Manchuria apologists could make out a colourable case, though by this time Japan's own disingenuous explanations had worn threadbare. It is probable that if she had at this stage turned over a new leaf, Japan would have eventually been left in secure possession of her spoils; but she had, as it were, "got away with murder," and success had gone to her head. No sooner was Manchuria within her grasp than Japan began systematically to detach Inner Mongolia and Northern China from China, and here she made the first false step in her career of crime: she roused Chiang Kai-shek to fight to preserve the integrity of China. Here, again, for a time all went well. Before long she had overrun the greater part of China's seaboard. But the victory was barren, for China resolutely refused to come to terms. Then occurred the second Great War, and Japan decided to stake all on the gambler's throw—everything or nothing. If she succeeded

she could control the whole of East Asia and the Pacific. If not, she courted absolute disaster.

These facts are too well known to require elaboration. I want to-day to examine the background of this career of aggression. To what extent have Japanese political ideas, her system of government, her traditions, the will of her people, contributed to this result? In a word, how does Japan "get that way"?

Now, in attempting to answer these questions, I am treading on controversial ground, and I can but put before you my own personal views, with which you may or may not agree.

I think, however, that most people would agree that from the twelfth century, if not from a much earlier period, down to the Meiji Restoration, the Government of the country was predominantly military. As regards the position of the Emperor during the second half of this period, I cannot do better than quote to you what Professor Kuno has to say in his book on Japan's continental expansion: "Iyeyasu considered carefully the national tradition of the divine origin and powers of the Emperor. He then completely secluded the Emperor, the imperial family and the imperial court from human affairs and human contacts, thus making it impossible for the Emperor even to be seen by the people. This policy of seclusion was adopted in order to prevent the Emperor from exercising his divine influence upon the people, and men of power or ambition from aspiring to render service to the Throne" (page 2). "In Article I. of the Code of the Imperial Household, Iyeyasu defined the duties of the Emperor as being exclusively to learn how to compose poems that would be contributions to the national literature and to study Japanese poetry as a fine art." Under this system the *Tokugawa Shoguns* governed the country autocratically for 260 years.

The object of the Meiji Restoration was to restore to the Emperor the powers that were considered his by divine right. Was this object achieved? I think not. All that happened was a transfer of power to a bureaucracy. The fiction continues to be observed that decisions are made by the Emperor, but it must be obvious that he still does no more than allow his seal to be attached to the decisions of the Cabinet.

The Constitution of 1889 seemed to promise popular government, but it was so framed that the Diet was always ineffective. The Cabinet was responsible not to the Diet but to the Emperor, and two members of the Cabinet—the Ministers for the Army and for the Navy—have direct access to the Emperor. No Government has been able to stand which opposed the policy of these two Ministers, whose loyalty is given not to the Cabinet but to the Services that they represent. It is these two Services, then, that determine the policy of the country.

There was a time in the nineteen-twenties when Japan seemed to be moving gradually towards popular government, but appearances were deceptive. The Army soon tired of what it considered the feeble fumbling of politicians and diplomatists. The so-called Manchurian and China incidents followed, and from then on the military took the bit between their teeth and, making common cause with the Navy, eventually plunged the country into the present war.

The truth is that just as Iyeyasu astutely used the divine origin of the Emperor to further his own ends, so the fighting Services have, since the restoration, continued to use his name to justify their usurpation of power. Once the Imperial sanction has been obtained, then it becomes rank treason to suggest that the course they are pursuing is wrong.

There is another weapon of which unscrupulous use is made—assassination. The record of assassination, particularly in recent years, is a melancholy one. Almost without exception the men who have been done to death were men who, by our own standards, would be regarded as patriots. Their sole crime has been that of trying to restrain the hot-heads. But the most heartbreaking feature of this revolting system is the attitude of the Japanese themselves to these assassinations. Were there any public condemnation of these crimes one might hope that in time the system would die out, but, so far from any horror being shown, popular sympathy tends to centre on the assassin. The trial usually drags on interminably. Counsel for the defence covers the whole ground of internal and external policy, animadverts on the wickedness of foreign powers that are plotting Japan's downfall, deplores the Government's weakness in foreign affairs and its apathy in the face of crying evils at home, and finally castigates the corruption of high officials and the decadence of the public generally. The picture presented, in fine, is of a pure-minded patriot of vision and foresight whose action has had the effect of saving his country from alarming dangers. The effect is generally enhanced by the sentence of the court, which, as it were, condemns him more in sorrow than in anger. So long as this "hooley," to use a convenient American expression, is condoned, assassination will continue as a convenient political weapon.

Behind the assassin lurks the secret society. The most famous is the Black Dragon, at the head of which is the notorious Toyama Mitsuru, whose power is feared by high and low alike. The platform of these societies is composed of extreme chauvinism, hatred of the foreigner *qua* foreigner and thorough-going aggression. They are entirely unscrupulous and would as lief murder a whole Cabinet as not. There is only one limit to their ruthlessness: they would not lay hands on the Emperor or his family. It is not always necessary for them to proceed to extremities. A word of warning is sometimes sufficient. Shidehara, who as Foreign Minister made a courageous effort to settle outstanding difficulties with China by a policy of moderation and consideration, was forced into retirement and lived immured to his villa "for the good of his health."

Pausing for a moment to summarize my remarks up to this point, I would say that in so far as the Meiji Restoration professed to restore to the Emperor his rightful position as ruler and to confer a Constitution on the Japanese people, it was an entire failure, if, indeed, it cannot be regarded as a gigantic bluff. Power rests in the hands of a predominantly militaristic bureaucracy, with the military so strongly entrenched that they can at will brush aside the civilian element in the Government and abrogate such slender constitutional rights as the people in general are supposed to possess.

The next question to study is this: What do the Japanese people as a whole think of this state of affairs?

The great mass of the people take it as a matter of course. The ideal of freedom—liberty of thought and speech, liberty of action, etc.—has never flourished in Japan. The very idea is alien to their whole manner of thought, for their education, their training, their environment, all point inexorably to duty and discipline. Right through the fabric of society runs the recurrent thread of obedience—the submission of the child to the parent, the wife to the husband, the members of the legal family to its head, of the servant to the master, of the inferior to the superior. And so the Japanese political structure is like the American skyscraper—carried on a broad base and set back at intervals until it terminates in the apex; the base is composed of the masses, and each successive stage is subservient to the stage immediately above it until the last stage but one is, in theory, subservient to the Emperor at the top, who, being divinely inspired, can make no mistake. Only, unfortunately, the service is given not to the Emperor but to an imaginary entity (the State), whose good is arbitrarily decided by the *de facto* rulers as seems good to them.

Obedience, then, is second nature to the Japanese, and it would never occur to him to question the wisdom of any order. The order may seem strange, not to say arbitrary, but no doubt there is some good reason for it and the only thing is to obey. Not that there have been no instances of revolt, such as the rice riots during the last war, but the reaction is not against the Government, only against the immediate superior who is supposed to have misinterpreted or abused the orders he himself has received, and, even so, it is recognized as disobedience for which punishment will be received in due course.

If the implicit obedience of the governed be the ideal of the administrator—and Heaven forbid that we should admit it—then the system devised by the Tokugawa Shoguns is the most perfect system ever seen, for the people not only submit but are quite contented to do so. Public opinion, as we understand it in this country, does not exist in Japan. Obvious abuse of popular rights is accepted. For centuries the people have been taught not to argue but to obey, so that submission has become automatic. Under such conditions policemen and gendarmes develop into petty tyrants. Nor do the public show any disposition to intervene when the weak are bullied by the strong. It is not their business and interference is much too dangerous.

So much for the masses. It may be helpful at this stage to push this survey a step farther and study certain sections of Japanese society. What of the intelligentsia—the thinking people, the teaching class, the scholars, the students? What part do they play in the scheme of things?

In one way their rôle is a simple one. It is their task to assimilate the knowledge of other countries, their science and their learning, and make it available to their country, just as the business men, the manufacturer, the engineer, the merchant must be *au fait* with the trade and industry of the world, so that between them they may keep Japan abreast, if not ahead, of other countries in the technical side of modern progress. For this purpose, then, learning is not only desirable, it is also necessary, to

Japan. But it has also its dangers. Authority has always been a little nervous of it, for, however useful it may be when it is canalized and turned to practical purposes, learning encourages thought. It has no frontiers but embraces all knowledge. Nor is it content to stand still, but wants to throw new light on dark corners and to re-interpret old beliefs in the terms of newly acquired knowledge. This is inconvenient, to say the least of it, in a country where beliefs are stereotyped and settled for all time by Government order.

It was the scholars who put their finger on the weak point in the Tokugawa régime—the fact that the Emperor had been stripped of all his supposed functions. It was the men of affairs who brought down the *shogunate*, but it was the scholars who furnished them with the weapon. In more recent times the scholars have been busy with the ancient records—the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon Shoki*—which purport to tell the early history of Japan. They have not ventured to question their authenticity, but they have done what may ultimately prove just as dangerous. They have made an exhaustive study of the chronology which, as pointed out by foreign students—notably Bramsen and Aston—is untenable. In the event, they have proved that the dates assigned to the early Emperors have been expanded to conform to an early theory of year cycles, and they would, therefore, place the reign of the Emperor Jimmu not 600 B.C. but about the beginning of the Christian era. Similarly, the archaeologists have studied prehistoric culture in Japan and Corea and have formulated theories as to the origins of the race. So long as these remain, as it were, side branches of study, no particular harm is done, but the time must come when adventurous spirits wish to co-ordinate the results of these studies and note what light they throw on the authenticity of the ancient chronicles. They will want to rationalize their stories and teachings in an attempt to bring them into line with modern knowledge. An instance occurred a few years ago when a Professor Minobe enunciated the bold theory that the Emperor was an organ of State and not the State itself. The Government reacted violently and the unfortunate professor suffered for his temerity. I believe, but am not certain, that he spent some time in prison. The teaching profession, then, is highly regarded in Japan, but it has to watch its step very carefully.

The student class is for the most part only interested in learning for the profits it brings and is docile enough, but there is a small percentage that is attracted by foreign theories of government, notably of communism. From time to time reports are given that “cells” have been rounded up. Usually the proceedings are held *in camera* and only a brief report is published, from which it appears, however, that the investigations take many months. It is probable that the authorities handle these outbreaks as they would an outbreak of plague—by the isolation not only of actual victims but of all who have come in contact with them—in an attempt to stamp it out entirely. On the whole, I imagine that these essays in the direction of new forms of government do not go very deep and that these students are merely playing with fire.

I turn next to the business class. In the course of my work I was for a number of years in touch with the business men of Osaka. In my

position it was not possible for me to discuss with them the foreign policy of their Government, but I formed a very distinct impression that they mistrusted the activity of the military. They understood all too well that one requisite of commerce is goodwill and confidence, and that these assets were not to be acquired by military aggression. Moreover, they had learnt from experience that when the military were in control trade and industry were ringed round with restrictions that tended to develop into a strait-jacket. The merchants' impulses, therefore, were initially in favour of peaceful methods of penetration.

The merchant, however, suffered from an obsession of his own. He was convinced of the superiority of Japanese goods, of Japanese technique in their manufacture and sale. He thought that all the markets of the world should be thrown open to his products and that other competitors who could not meet his prices should stand aside even in their principal markets. He pictured himself as the benefactor of the nations of the great undeveloped countries of the world, whom he persisted in regarding as oppressed by the white races. These ideas were encouraged by the great increase of Japanese exports from the end of 1931 as the result of the depreciation of the yen. He overlooked the fact that the ever-increasing flood of Japanese goods was dislocating the economy of the countries whose markets were being swamped, and when drastic steps were taken to stop the flood his rage knew no bounds. So the merchant also came in time to regard the British, Americans and Dutch as standing between him and his birthright, and though he might have misgivings as to the risks entailed, his own fancied interests tended to bring him into sympathy again with military aspirations. He was, moreover, well aware of the danger of opposing the military and knew that his only hope of remaining in business was to keep on the right side of the Army.

We come then to the military. They have always been the "top dog" in Japan. Up to the Restoration, society was divided into four classes in descending order of importance—the *samurai* or warrior-gentry, the peasantry, the artisans and the tradespeople. The *samurai* had his own code—unquestioning obedience to his feudal superior. Japanese writers such as Nitobe and foreign writers who have followed their lead have conspired to give the world an entirely fictitious picture of Japanese chivalry—*Bushido*. Writing in 1912, Chamberlain had this to say: "Chivalrous individuals of course existed in Japan, as in all countries at every period; but *Bushido*, as an institution or a code of rules, has never existed." However sweeping this assertion may seem to be, it is, I think, justified. The record lies plain in the history of the feudal period. Instances there are in plenty of chivalry, but there are also all too many instances of the blackest treachery. I will give you but one. Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the warrior-statesman, swore loyalty to Hideyoshi's son, Hideyori, on the former's deathbed, and yet, in the fulness of time, Iyeyasu forced a quarrel on Hideyori and, not content with having compassed his downfall and death, proceeded to do to death his infant son and daughter after publicly degrading them.

And what of the warrior's attitude towards the Emperor, the supposed fountain-head of his authority? Here is the record. Emperors have

been deposed; at least one, if not more, was assassinated. Emperors were exiled and came to violent ends in exile. One escaped from his island exile hidden under a load of dried fish. For fifty-eight years there were two rival Emperors, and eventually it was the Northern or illegitimate Court that won the day. One Emperor made a living by selling his autographed poems. I might go on multiplying instances, but my time is short. The story is written in Japanese history for all who care to read.

One is tempted to say that apart from his immediate duty the warrior had one ideal—his sword. It had a marvellous cutting edge, and the warrior practised and practised with it until he could cut through a pile of copper coins without nicking the edge. To make a clean cut through a human neck was child's play, and, though the practice was frowned upon by authority, it was common enough for the gentry to test a new blade or to try out a new technique in this way. The expert studied human anatomy in order to make an absolutely clean cut.

The warrior had one business, and that was to fight. The immediate cause was not his affair; that was decided for him by his chief. That idea persists to the present day. The Army exists, not to defend the country against aggression, but to fight for the glory of Japan. It may be thought strange that I should maintain this view in face of Japan's entire seclusion during more than two centuries, but this was an entirely artificial policy adopted by the Tokugawas, and, as I shall endeavour to prove to you, the idea of carving out an empire by the sword was always present.

During the second half of the nineteenth century the country was in a state of flux, but by the turn of the century Japan had set its house in order and the Government set to work to build up the new Japan. I speak of a new Japan, but actually it was only old Japan in a new guise. The material side of Western civilization was adopted and an entirely new machine was built up, but the Japanese spirit remained the same as ever. I propose to return to this point later, but for the moment I wish to speak on the subject of the Japanese idea of "empire." For the purpose it is necessary to touch on the subject of Japanese origins.

The obscurantism of the Japanese Government has prevented any exhaustive study of Japanese origins, but it is generally accepted that there are two main strains in the Japanese race—one a Malay type and the other a Mongol type, the former reaching Japan via the chain of islands that stretch up from the equator and the latter via Corea. It is not surprising, then, to find the Japanese a seafaring nation. It is true that the Tokugawa Shoguns, for reasons of their own, shut off Japan from the outside world, but just previously to this unnatural policy the Japanese had established trading centres as far afield as India, the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Annam, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, Borneo, etc.

During the time of the Ashikaga Shoguns, Japanese pirates ravaged Corea and the China seaboard, and the third Shogun bought for himself the title of King of Japan from the Ming Emperor by promising to check Japanese piracy and by subscribing himself a subject of the Ming Emperor.

A result of their partly continental origin was that the Japanese always considered themselves as entitled to intervene in the affairs of Corea. At the dawn of history Japan was inhabited by a number of warring tribes,

many of which were as nearly related to the tribes struggling for supremacy in Korea as they were to each other. There were Japanese settlements in Southern Korea, and up to the end of the seventh century Japanese forces regularly crossed the straits to take a hand in the struggle. When they were finally worsted and withdrew from the peninsula, numbers of Koreans emigrated with them and were assigned districts in the neighbourhood of Osaka and Yedo, still popularly known as Kudara and Korai from the old Korean kingdoms of those names. To this era is to be assigned the legend, enshrined in their mythology, of the conquest of Korea by the Emperor Jingō. In defiance of all evidence to the contrary the Japanese firmly believe in this legend, and it has undoubtedly strengthened their colonial aspirations.

When Hideyoshi rose to power in the sixteenth century he formed the ambitious project of establishing an Asiatic Empire. This campaign was envisaged by him in six stages (I quote from Professor Kuno's book): (1) Before the end of May, 1592, he would make a triumphant entry into the Korean capital; (2) before the end of 1592 he would occupy Peking; (3) in 1593 he would assume the title of *Kampaku* (Imperial Regent) of China; (4) in 1594 the Japanese Imperial Court would be removed to Peking and the Emperor of Japan would ascend the throne of the newly created Empire; (5) when China, Japan and Korea were thus united into the *first unit* of the great Asiatic Empire, Hideyoshi would establish himself at Ningpo; and (6) the military leaders would extend their operations into India and other Asiatic countries.

As is well known, Hideyoshi's armies got no farther than Korea and the two Korean campaigns brought Japan no material gains, but the ease with which the Japanese forces had overrun Korea was remembered in Japan and encouraged the hope that better planning was all that was required to bring success the next time.

When the power of the Tokugawa Shoguns was waning and opposition to Japan's policy of seclusion was gaining ground, Japanese scholars revived these ideas of an Asiatic Empire. We find Yoshida Shōin, for instance, advocating that Japan should occupy Yezo and Sakhalin and undertake the conquest of Kamchatka as well as the domination of the Sea of Okhotsk. Loo Choo and Corea were to be made tributary, Manchuria was to be conquered, and then Japan should turn southward and continue her expansion on the continent and among the southern islands. Several other writers also maintained the thesis of a Greater Japan. The Shogunate found their writings awkward and lopped off their heads, but they are honoured to-day as founders of the Empire.


On one point these armchair strategists differed. One school advocated an alliance with Russia and the other an alliance with Great Britain. It is curious that these two schools continued in existence until 1902, when the problem was finally settled by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the meantime, Japan had entered the family of nations and had shown herself an apt pupil of Western diplomacy. She no longer talked of expansion, of conquest, of empire. She now spoke glibly of the peace of the Far East, of the integrity of Corea and of China, of the open door, of the protection of oppressed nations, of free trade, of the right of

self-defence, of all the hundred and one clichés that would throw dust in the eyes of the West. She fought Russia to preserve the integrity of Corea and promptly annexed the country; she engineered a *coup d'état* in Manchuria and set up a sham Government; she introduced anarchy into North China as part of her policy to dismember that country piece by piece, and, when war broke out with China in consequence, made terms with the arch-traitor Wang Ching-Wei, who was prepared to sell his country in the hope of attaining power thereby. She seized the opportunity of France's defeat by Germany to acquire a stranglehold on French Indo-China, bribed Siam to come in on her side, and eventually, when Britain and the United States were fully occupied elsewhere, nailed her colours to the mast and overran the whole of East Asia.

If we pause for a moment and look back over the past, I think it must be apparent that Japan's actions have been perfectly consistent. The Japan of to-day is the Japan of Hideyoshi. The outward trappings have changed but the spirit has remained the same. It is Japan's mission to control the whole of East Asia and the Pacific. Nothing less will satisfy her. Where we in the West have made the mistake is that we have listened to Japan's words and not judged her simply and solely by her actions. The latter have been eloquent enough in all conscience.

It is no wish of mine to criticize British policy in the past. I think myself that we have had our hands too tied elsewhere and were, therefore, compelled to hope for the best. But one criticism of British policy should be dealt with—I refer to the accusation that we drove Japan into her present course by renouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I submit that the whole of history disproves this claim. We have, first, Japan's past record, which, as I have tried to show you, is one continued aggression. We have the fact that, under the ægis of the alliance, she destroyed the independence of Corea, and next we have the attempt made in 1916 to reduce China to a state of vassaldom. In case you have forgotten the famous *twenty-one demands*, I would remind you that in the height of the European war Japan suddenly, out of a clear sky, when she thought the West was too busy to intervene, secretly presented demands to China the acceptance of which would have tied her hand and foot to Japan. China, by a calculated indiscretion, made known the facts to the world, and Japan was compelled to wriggle out of a difficult position as best she might. But the military did not renounce their aims. They merely bided their time and made fresh plans. If Britain has any regret, it must be that we ever allied ourselves with a nation that has made a mockery of treaty pledges.

One other instance may be given of Japan's technique in foreign aggression. It has always been a sore point with the Japanese that by their policy of seclusion the Tokugawa Shoguns lost the golden opportunity of founding a Japanese Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the time of Hideyoshi's death Japan was the finest fighting machine in the Far East—at least, the Japanese now are convinced it was, and for all I know they may be right. A forward policy then would have seen Japan firmly established as the dominant power before the Western powers had time to secure a foothold.



Nothing will convince the Japanese that they did not sell their birthright, and they bitterly resented—though until recent years they cloaked their feelings—that Britain, the Netherlands and the United States should have stolen a march on them while they were sleeping. To their own people the Japanese militarists did not openly admit their aims, which were to snatch the prize from the hands of their rivals. They took a more pious line. Asia had been enslaved by the Western powers. It was Japan's sacred mission to rescue the races of Asia from their oppressors and restore to them their liberty. Incidentally, the experiences of Korea, Manchuria and China show what is meant by liberty under Japanese protection, and I have little doubt that when the curtain is rolled back from the occupied areas throughout East Asia the story will be the same.

In Japan's eyes, then, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States were the real enemies, and of these probably Britain appeared the first and so Japan began an insidious campaign against Britain. In 1939 extraordinary anti-British demonstrations broke out suddenly in Japan, Korea, Manchuria and North China. To all protests Japan indignantly replied that the movement was spontaneous and that therefore the Government would not be justified in interfering. I was at Mukden at the time. Subordinate local officials volunteered to me the statement that Mukden had no desire to demonstrate, and all evidence pointed to the truth of their protestations. Presently, however, orders came that Mukden must show its solidarity, and so a committee toured the principal offices and ordered that a fixed number of the staff of each should join the parade. The daughter company of the B.A.T. had to provide its contingent, and lots were drawn to select their representatives. The parade then took place with much noise and little result. From all parts the story was the same. The demonstrations were entirely organized and in so far as the participants were concerned, their feelings were of annoyance and fear. I think that psychologically the Japanese made a mistake in organizing this campaign. It was uncomfortable to the British, but the Koreans and Chinese, at all events, were well aware that the movement was an entirely artificial one. But probably the aim of the authorities was to accustom the public to the idea that in some way the British were the enemies of the Japanese and that sooner or later a war would break out.

I have now attempted to show you that Japan's form of government leads naturally to militarism, and that Japanese leaders and thinkers have always cherished the dream of a greater Japanese Empire. I have also tried to show you how the Japanese system of government has created a people eminently docile and malleable. It only remains to show how these conditions have been used to implant in the minds of the people that it is their sacred mission to fight any and every country that may stand in their path.

In some ways the technique is similar to that employed in other militaristic countries. There is the same glorification of war, which is represented not as a disagreeable necessity when peaceful methods fail but as something ennobling and purifying. To die in battle is the supreme privilege of the Japanese patriot. Soldiers leaving for the front are addressed in terms which would suggest that ever to return is disgraceful.

The Japanese Government does not formally admit the existence of Japanese prisoners of war. In theory they have died, though in practice the fiction obviously cannot be maintained.

But Japan has also methods that are peculiarly her own. The Germans have laboriously built up a theory of racial superiority. The Japanese not only claim superiority; they go one better and prove it! Early in this present century foreign observers noted and ridiculed the movement to build up a new religion. Early records were taken down from the shelf, sifted, and solemnly given forth as authentic history. That Shinto had never been more than a primitive nature cult and that the so-called history was nothing more than myth and legend was calmly ignored. To the outside world it seemed incredible that the Japanese people could be made to believe that, for instance, the islands of Japan came into existence as a result of the physical union of a god and goddess—Izanagi and Izanami—and that Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, should be born from the left eye of the former and that the present Japanese Emperor is descended in direct line from the Sun Goddess or her brother, the Moon God—the point is a little obscure—but that is part of the creed the Japanese child is taught and believes. How is it done?

In the first place it should be understood that the average Japanese does not study the records in the original. They are contained in a language that is so archaic that even the advanced student can understand it only with the greatest difficulty. The version given to the Japanese child is a bowdlerized edition that omits the *naïvetés* of the original and presents the broad outlines in rationalized language. The impressionable child is given the story largely in picture form. The Sun Goddess, Emperor Jimmu, Empress Jingo, Prince Yamato-dake appear to him as powers of light overcoming the powers of darkness. That they should triumph is not only inevitable, it is necessary, for otherwise evil would reign in the place of right. And—here comes the lesson—just as the divine progenitors of the race fought to establish right on earth so must the Japanese, who has succeeded to this wonderful heritage, carry on the sacred mission of his race.

The connection between the ancient gods and goddesses and the present Emperor is driven home by the practice of bowing towards the Imperial Palace on all ceremonial occasions, and the essential relation between these beliefs and the Shinto religion is enforced by the practice of proceeding to the local Shinto shrine and bowing before it on the principal holidays. It is probable that when the Japanese grows to years of discretion certain features of this creed must strike him as crude and improbable. In his heart of hearts he may even discard them, but the essential outlines will remain. That the whole story must be either true or false is apparent to the foreign observer but not to the Japanese, for no discussion of the subject is allowed. Conduct is a matter of habit and character is largely a matter of custom. Whatever he may come to think of the creed, two beliefs have been firmly implanted in the mind of the average Japanese—one that he belongs to a superior race and the other that whatever his country does is right. It is unfortunate that other countries should have a wrong standard of values and refuse to acknowledge these

obvious truths, but if they oppose, Japan must fight them, secure in the knowledge that right will triumph over wrong.

From 1931 onwards the military proclaimed the existence of a *hijōji*—a state of emergency. What was the danger was never explained, but the public were gradually prepared for the belief that Japan was encircled by dangerous foes and that the time would come when Japan would have to take her sword in hand. No doubt the average Japanese is a little hazy in his mind as to how it has come about, but of one thing he is convinced and that is that he is engaged on a just war.

And that is the note on which I wish to conclude these remarks. It is the military and the military alone who have brought Japan into this war, but we could make no greater mistake than to think that we have only to remove the military and the Japanese people will then see the error of their ways. It is the whole of the Japanese race with whom we have to deal, a people that is convinced that it is Japan's sacred mission to carve out an Empire in Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. H. VERE REDMAN said he would like to pay a tribute to Mr. White's lucid and comprehensive survey. The question which had been revolving in his own mind while Mr. White was speaking was as to how, in the light of these unchallengeable facts in their history, the Japanese could be induced to become reasonable members of the community of nations. Mr. White had talked of political assassination; the Japanese had been very impressed by the great bravery of these assassins who would risk their own lives in assassinating someone they considered harmful to the State, for they took their lives in their hands, and if they were not killed themselves they would often commit suicide in order to prove the sincerity of their act. This was a state of mind which must be taken into account.

Mr. Redman continued: "That leads me on to what I think myself is the essence of the Japanese problem, which is the difficulty of making them accept universal standards of right and wrong. They believe that their Emperor is of divine origin and that they are therefore governed by different moral standards from the rest of the world. It is lawful for them to do what others must not. The whole myth is, of course, childish, but, after all, we should most of us be willing to say with Gibbon that all religions are to the believer equally true, to the unbeliever equally false, and to the magistrate equally useful. Our problem, then, is hardly to convince the Japanese of the absurdity of their myth, but rather to get them through it in some way to accept the universal moral standard. If we can do this we shall have gone a long way to solving the Japanese problem."

Mr. Redman went on to say that the Japanese were in the habit of comparing their civilization with what they saw as ours. Theirs inculcated hardihood, frugality, extreme loyalty to the State and absolute obedience combined with hard work, while what they saw as our ideals were short hours of work, a certain amount of luxury, plenty of money and a great number of free privileges for everybody. Before they accepted our standards they must be convinced of the superiority of our ideals, and

it would be our task to carry that conviction to them. We should be the better equipped for that task as the result of Mr. White's masterly survey of the Japanese character as revealed throughout the nation's history.

The CHAIRMAN, when he closed the meeting, thanked Mr. White, and said he thought that the first thing to do was to beat the Japanese both on land and at sea and to see that they knew they were beaten. He thought that then the first part of the problem would be solved.

FAR EASTERN POLITICS, 1894-1941

By SIR JOHN PRATT, K.B.E., C.M.G.

Based on a lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 1, 1943.

IT does not often happen in these days that anyone is asked to give a lecture on the historical aspects of any of the burning questions of the day. The average Englishman thinks that history is unnecessary. The Chinese philosopher Laotzu, who was an older contemporary of Confucius, preached the doctrine that, if you want to keep the people happy, you must keep them ignorant. The same idea seems to underlie a pregnant saying by G. M. Young on the subject of history. "No worse affliction," he says, "can a nation be cursed with than a historic memory. The great happiness the English people enjoy is due to their habit of forgetting everything that happened last week, and assuming that everything before that was a win for our side."

I was reminded of this saying of G. M. Young's a few days ago, when I had the privilege to be present at a discussion by distinguished officers of the problems involved in combined operations. We were told how a brilliant staff of officers is kept constantly at work studying these questions, and we were told something of the elaborate machinery for placing all the expert knowledge that they accumulate at the disposal of the Commanding Officers actually conducting the operations. We were told that by means of lectures, articles and books all this expert knowledge would in time be brought within reach of all grades of officers with gradually improving results as regards the conduct of the war.

Towards the end of the lecture and discussion a very distinguished retired Admiral got up and said that he had listened with great interest to the brilliant exposition of the technical problems involved in combined operations, but that he would like to say that there was nothing new in anything that had been said that evening. Weapons changed, but fundamental principles remained the same, and all the principles of combined operations that had been so brilliantly expounded by the serving officers present had been known to and had been applied by Wolfe in his celebrated campaign in Canada in the eighteenth century. He deplored the fact that the lessons of history were so quickly forgotten. All the mistakes avoided by Wolfe in Canada were made at Gallipoli. The lessons at Gallipoli were forgotten and the same mistakes were made again at Dieppe, and he had no doubt they would continue to be made in this war and in all future wars.

He wound up by begging the serving officers present to encourage their young officers to study history and to be guided by its lessons.

Ignorance of the historical causes that have produced any particular situation is one of the chief causes of error both in the political and in the military world. Officers had not bothered to learn the lessons of Wolfe's

campaign, and therefore easily avoidable errors were committed at Gallipoli and again at Dieppe and in the Mediterranean, and in exactly the same way ignorance of the circumstances in which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was negotiated, ignorance of the meaning of splendid isolation, will in the political field be responsible for grave errors in dealing with the existing situation in the Far East.

It is only through a correct interpretation of the events of the last fifty years that it will be possible to arrive at correct solutions of our present difficulties. Let us begin by recapitulating the salient facts of the present situation in the Far East. The present war between China and Japan broke out in 1937. By that time there was no longer even the simulacrum of any system of collective security. The utmost therefore that the democracies could do was to promise to give individually as much help as they could spare to aid China against aggression. The help that China has thus received from England, Russia and America has never amounted to more than a mere trickle, but Japan was able to obtain all the essential war materials that she required. No less than two-thirds of this came from America.

Two years later, in 1939, the European war broke out, and our position was greatly weakened by the fact that Japan was no longer our ally but was indeed bitterly hostile. Another two years passed, and in 1941 there came the attack on Pearl Harbour. The power basis of Britain's position in the Far East had silently crumbled away, and her whole Far Eastern Empire had collapsed.

This was a bitter disappointment to China, who had pinned great hopes upon the entry of England and America into the war. But China continued to fight on, and is still as confident as ever of victory. The two great snags in China's situation are the collapse of her currency and the danger from the Communists. The Communists are gaining ground in occupied China, and this raises a difficult question as regards the possible attitude of Russia in Manchuria and North China when the Japanese collapse takes place.

The most salient fact of all in the Far Eastern situation is, of course, the presence of an aggressive and all-conquering Japan. Our chief immediate problem is how to defeat Japan, and our chief post-war problem will be how to prevent future Japanese aggression. This will not be so difficult as the corresponding problem presented by Germany in Europe, though it is unlikely that Japan will again be attended by the extraordinary good fortune that has enabled her in the last fifty years to become a powerful military nation.

The impact of the West fell upon both China and Japan at about the same time in the nineteenth century. It was a favourable moment for Japan, for she had just emerged from two hundred and fifty years of profound peace and seclusion, but it was a very unfavourable moment for China, for the impact of the West caught China at one of her periods of decay. At the end of the nineteenth century China had reached the very lowest point of her long decline, but Japan had succeeded in transforming herself after the Western model into a powerful military and industrial State. She achieved this without arousing any suspicions, for in the

nineteenth century Russia was the great aggressor State, and the advance of Russia across Asia to the Pacific was a menace to both Japan and China. It seemed only a reasonable precaution, therefore, when Japan in the nineteenth century built up powerful armaments.

The first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 was directed not so much against China as against Russia, with the object of keeping Russia out of Korea and Manchuria. After the war no suspicions were aroused when Japan proceeded to treble her army and quadruple her navy and to build up a steel industry. These moves were indeed applauded by England and America, for a powerful Japan seemed to be a useful instrument with which to check Russia. This idea underlay the decision to make the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and it was only after the crushing defeat of Russia three years later that it was perceived that the alliance had effected a disastrous change in the balance of power in the Far East, a change which was as damaging to China as it was to England and America because Japan was a far more dangerous aggressor than Russia had ever been.

It is very unfortunate that no English historian has yet made any study of the origins of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Even eminent historians have only a vague general idea of Far Eastern politics, and Far Eastern specialists are not historians and are not competent therefore to fit Far Eastern developments into their proper perspective in world events. Slapdash rationalizations therefore take the place of historical research, and it is still glibly repeated that in 1902 the rise of Germany caused the abandonment of splendid isolation. We wanted, it is said, to restore the balance of power by supporting the weaker side, and we felt that it would be dangerous to remain isolated any longer without any friends.

These plausible arguments fall into the elementary error of confusing splendid isolation with something resembling American isolationism. Splendid isolation never meant that England dissociated herself from the affairs of the Continent. Lord Salisbury played an active and effective part in everything that happened in Europe, but he wisely kept his hands free and refused to chain himself to the chariot wheels of one country or of one group. England was therefore courted by all, for the support of England was a great prize in European politics. In order to win our support, European countries had to frame policies calculated to win our approval. We were thus able to control and to some extent to guide developments. It is quite untrue that splendid isolation left us without any friends, for Europe was so disunited that at least half Europe was always on our side. It was quite impossible for the whole Continent under any circumstances, as was amply proved during the Boer War, to combine against us. It was only after we lightly abandoned the tradition of five hundred years and reversed the policy of Canning, Palmerston, Gladstone and Salisbury, it was only after we had tied a millstone round our neck in the shape of an ally that this country ran for the first time into mortal danger.

The abandonment of splendid isolation had nothing whatever to do with the rise of Germany. It was really due to the disastrous intrusions into foreign policy of that forceful politician Joseph Chamberlain. During the winter of 1897-8 Joseph Chamberlain was thrown into a sudden panic

and conceived the idea that the British Empire could only be saved by an alliance. His panic had nothing to do with the rise of the German navy, for in its initial stages from 1898 to 1906 German naval expansion caused no great anxiety in England. Ludicrous as it may seem now, Joseph Chamberlain's panic in 1898 was over the battle of the concessions in China, he thought that the seizure of Kiaochow and Port Arthur threatened us with dangers "as great as when the great Napoleon laid an interdict upon our trade."

His remedy was, not to join the weaker side, as some slapdash writers still maintain. He looked for the strongest possible ally in the market, and for nearly five years he made public overtures for an alliance to both Germany and the U.S.A.

The disgust that these tactics inspired was expressed by Asquith in a biting speech in the House of Commons: "What have we done, what have the people of Great Britain done and suffered that, after bearing as we have done for nearly fifty years the ever-growing weight of Empire on our own unaided shoulders, without finding the burden too heavy for the courage, the enterprise, the self-reliance of our people, what have we done or suffered that we are now to go touting for allies in the highways and byways of Europe?"

In 1902, however, Lord Salisbury had lost his grip upon affairs, and Joseph Chamberlain's ideas at length prevailed. If we had stood aside, a true balance of power would have been maintained, because the ambitions of Japan and Russia would have cancelled each other out.

Unhappily the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain prevailed, and this was the greatest piece of good fortune that befell Japan, for the alliance was signed, and it launched her on her career of aggression. The full scope of Japanese ambitions was revealed ten years after her victory over Russia. In 1915 she presented the twenty-one demands to China and clearly indicated that her policy was to exclude both England and America from the Far East and turn China into a vassal state.

The next great landmark in the Far East is the Washington Conference of 1921-2, and here again Japan was attended by extraordinary good fortune. The Washington Conference was, at the time, hailed as a triumph of statesmanship and of the results that might be achieved by Anglo-American co-operation.

In ten short years, in 1931, it was already possible to view it in the perspective of history as one of the most disastrous of all failures. The Washington Conference was called under the influence of the ideas which dominated the world in the inter-war period, ideas that were Utopian, self-deceiving and incapable of standing any real test. It was believed that Japan could be persuaded to abandon her deep-rooted ambitions as regards the continent of Asia; that she would be willing to join with England and America in a self-denying policy that renounced competition in favour of collaboration for the purpose of the rehabilitation of China.

There were, in fact, some plausible reasons for these beliefs. The army was out of favour in Japan because aggression, tempted by the collapse of both the Russian and the Chinese Empires, had overreached itself and had disastrously failed. For a brief period the Japanese seemed to

believe that in future there was going to be a League of Nations world, in which aggression would no longer be either practicable or profitable. She therefore came to the Washington Conference, signed the Nine Power Treaty and agreed to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the abolition of spheres of influence in China.

But here again Japan was lucky, because in the arrangements made at Washington three important points were overlooked. In order to secure Japan's consent to the Nine Power Treaty, measures of disarmament were agreed upon, which placed Japan in an impregnable position in the Pacific. Spheres of influence were abolished in name, but nothing was done in fact to minimize or sterilize Japan's special position in Manchuria; and this, as the Lytton Report showed ten years later, when it was too late, was certain to lead to conflict between China and Japan and further aggression.

The third point that was overlooked at Washington was the strength of the nationalist feeling in China, with the result that all the arrangements were made on the supposition that the rehabilitation of China could only be effected under foreign tutelage.

The foreign Powers were soon to learn all about the strength of China's nationalism, for the Washington Conference was followed almost immediately by what is known as the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation. The Kuomintang is the Nationalist party of China. The Nationalist revival began at the end of the nineteenth century. It brought about the revolution and the expulsion of the Manchus in 1911, but for twenty years it suffered frustration. This was partly due to the constant interference of Japan, whose aim was to keep China disunited, and partly due to the fact that the Nationalists were groping after ideal constitutions, copied from Western democracies, which were quite inapplicable in China.

They were rescued by the Comintern from this floundering. The Bolshevik revolution took place in 1917. The Chinese revolutionists were greatly interested to see that the Soviets had succeeded in conducting their revolution to a successful issue. Each revolution took a great interest in the fortunes of the other, and eventually in 1923 Comintern emissaries from Moscow arrived in Canton furnished with vast sums of money. This started the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation, which lasted about five years (1923-8). This is a very crucial period in world history, for it was crowded with dramatic events which had far-reaching effects on the evolution of Modern China and on Chinese relations with England, Japan and Russia.

The first step in 1923 was the reorganization of the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist party, and the adoption of the idea that there should be a dictatorship by a single party—*i.e.*, the party should establish and control the Government, and that in both party and government affairs the committee system of administration should be adopted. This reorganization was extremely successful, so that almost immediately after the Washington Conference the Powers were faced with a rising tide of nationalism.

Great Britain was the first to see the implications of this movement—namely, that the time had arrived to liquidate the encroachments on China's sovereignty effected by the unequal treaties and to leave control

of Chinese affairs in the hands of the Chinese themselves. This new policy was announced in a memorandum issued by the British Government in December, 1926, and its adoption was attended with extraordinary success. The ground was cut from under the feet of the Communists, and when it was discovered that the object of the Comintern had been to capture the Chinese revolution for Communism and world revolution, the Comintern emissaries were expelled.

The National Government of China was established at Nanking in 1928. The success of the Nationalist movement coincided with Japan's disillusionment with the post-war world. In constructing the new League of Nations world, the statesmen at Versailles had neglected to construct an economic framework within which nations could live together in harmony. Japan suffered severely from the restrictive policies adopted by other nations, both in the political and in the economic spheres. Japan was hard hit by the slump and the general dislocation of industry in the first decade after the war. Between 1928 and 1931, for example, the price of raw silk, on which in the last resort both industry and agriculture in Japan were dependent, fell from 1,450 to 570 yen per picul. During the whole decade Japan's difficulties were aggravated by the restrictive policies of other nations until eventually she decided that her economic future could only be secured by gaining political control over the regions from which she drew her raw materials and which were the markets for her manufactured goods. Japan thus returned to the dream that manifest destiny led to empire on the mainland of Asia.

When Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931 many people believed that there was a system of collective security in existence, and that it was only necessary to proceed to Geneva and touch the button and the system would begin to operate. When this did not happen hysterical accusations were made that it was England's fault, that England had killed the League.

America was not a member of the League, but those who blamed England were anxious to excuse America. A myth was invented to the effect that America had offered to take strong action to restrain Japan but that England had refused. There was no truth whatever in this story, for no such offer was made. It was impossible to restrain Japan, because ten years before Japan had been placed in an impregnable position at the Washington Conference, and the utmost that America could do was to mobilize the moral opinion of the world by means of the non-recognition doctrine. Nevertheless, this mythical story of America's offer was eagerly taken up by isolationists in America and their dupes in England, because it supported the isolationist thesis that America must never co-operate with England, for England was sure to let her down.

That the story is false has been demonstrated up to the hilt. Nevertheless, it continued to be an article of faith in isolationist circles in America. In the recent debate on the Conally resolution in the Senate, Senator Nye said:

"Shall we forget that we had an agreement with Britain, on which we wanted her to follow through with us when Japan moved

into Manchuria? Must we forget that Britain would have nothing to do with our expressed purpose when we asked for her co-operation in enforcing that agreement? Is it unfair to ask why, if Britain would not co-operate then, we can expect her to co-operate now under some new plan or agreement?"

The story of Japanese aggression in the decade after 1931 is familiar to us all. The seizure of Manchuria was followed by a few years of uneasy truce, during which the young officer group obtained control of Japanese policy and elaborated a plan for detaching the five northern provinces of China from the control of Nanking. From 1935 onwards, China made a most remarkable recovery, which was largely due to the help she received from Great Britain in reforming her currency. She was rapidly forging ahead, when in 1937 Japan struck again before she could become too strong and united.

In 1937 the League was already dead, and America had plunged still further into isolationism. There was therefore no possibility of bringing collective aid to China. In 1938 Japan thought that peace was in sight and announced her plans for a New Order in East Asia, but China continued to fight on. On several occasions during 1939 and 1940 there was extreme danger that Japan might launch an attack upon Great Britain, leaving America on one side. The turn of the tide, however, came at the end of 1940. Great Britain had won the Battle of Britain, and as a result of the Presidential Election President Roosevelt was confirmed in another four years of office.

Up till that time it had been America's policy to propitiate Japan in order to keep out of the war. President Roosevelt was now able to pursue a more constructive policy. The first signs of this were seen in the Lend-Lease arrangement of January, 1941, and six months later came the freezing of Japanese assets in America and the British Empire, which was the direct prelude to the attack upon Pearl Harbour in December, 1941. In spite of initial disappointments, this has made China's ultimate victory certain.

The most serious factor in China's present position arises from the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Comintern. We must therefore go back and trace developments that followed the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation of 1923-8 and their effects upon Russia. The Comintern emissaries rendered a very valuable service to China at that time, but they also did her a great injury. When they were expelled they left behind them Communist groups which developed into independent Soviet Governments. For ten years from 1927 to 1937 there were continuous attempts to suppress these independent governments. In 1937, in the face of Japanese aggression, an arrangement was patched up, but in practice it has since broken down. There have been clashes between the Kuomintang and the Comintern armies in the field and much mutual recrimination, each side accusing the other of being more anxious to enhance its own influence than to defeat the Japanese.

There is no doubt that Chinese powers of resistance have been greatly weakened by this conflict. There is no great difference in the social

programme each side has in view, but the Communists insist upon maintaining a separate government, army and administration, and their first loyalty and obedience are given to another State.

At the present moment it seems that the Communists are gaining ground in the rural areas of occupied China. This is a source of anxiety to the Kuomintang, for when the Japanese are defeated and begin to retreat, they fear that the Communists may establish themselves in the chief towns as well. This may make it difficult to re-establish Kuomintang rule over large areas of Manchuria and North China, especially as there are doubts as to the attitude that Russia might take up.

Russia has an important strategic interest in these areas and would be glad to see them under an administration which was friendly to Russia and sympathetic with Soviet ideals. The Japanese are fomenting doubts in Kuomintang circles whether the Kuomintang, even if they win the war, would be able to recover Manchuria. The Japanese no doubt hope that by fomenting such doubts they will weaken the Kuomintang determination to resist. There are, however, no signs of this propaganda having any success and no signs of defeatism in Free China circles. There are, indeed, good grounds for hoping that a solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem will be found. It has long been clear that Russia has no desire to foment separatist tendencies in China or to split her into different sections. Their policy and attitude has been perfectly correct, for it is a Russian interest no less than a British interest not only that Japan shall be defeated but that a united and prosperous China should emerge from the struggle.

In each major crisis of her history in modern times the Kuomintang has turned to Russia. The Kuomintang is greatly influenced by the Russian example, for apart altogether from questions of ideology, Russia has been faced with the same kind of problems as China and has dealt with them with conspicuous success. In 1923 the Kuomintang turned for guidance and inspiration to Russia, and it is likely that she will do so again. The solution of the Kuomintang-Communist difficulty will probably therefore be found in a process of evolution within the Kuomintang itself, which will give rise to a Kuomintang administration closer to and more friendly to Russia.

The main lesson to be learned from the history of the Far East during the last fifty years would seem to be that the fundamental interest of Russia, China, England and America is the same—namely, that Japan should be defeated and confined within her four islands, so that the cycle of aggression shall not start up again, and that China should be helped to solve her constitutional and economic difficulties and emerge a united and a prosperous nation from the present struggle.

A MEMBER: What shall we do with the population of Japan?

SIR JOHN PRATT: I think that is a problem for the Japanese themselves to solve, but I see your point. The idea is that the population of Japan is rapidly expanding and the people have to find an outlet somewhere. Emigration to various countries is the solution of the problem that is usually put forward, but emigration has never been a solution of the

Japanese population problem. The people have never been able to emigrate in sufficiently large numbers to make any real difference. In recent years the population of Japan has increased at the rate of a million a year, and not more than a few thousands can emigrate. In spite of this rapid increase in their population, the Japanese have hitherto found no difficulty in absorbing their excess population into industry, and there has not really been any population problem. Fairly good evidence that the Japanese themselves do not fear the prospect in front of them can be seen in the fact that about three years ago they passed a law involving certain measures designed to increase the population from its then figure of about 75,000,000 to 100,000,000.

I think the solution of the Japanese population problem is to be found in industrialization, and the responsibility rests upon us, when we make peace this time, to construct a world with a sane economic framework, so that if Japan is forbidden to develop her heavy industries, on which she can build up armaments, at any rate she shall be allowed to build up her light industries. If she is allowed to do that, she will do it with extraordinary success, and, if she has access to raw materials and the tariff policies of other countries allow her to export her goods to those countries, I do not think we shall have any difficulty with the Japanese population problem.

A MEMBER: Does Sir John Pratt think that there are in China elements which will produce a stable central government in the future? So much of the future of the Far East seems to depend on the existence of a stable national government in China.

SIR JOHN PRATT: That is a very difficult question to answer. I think the Chinese will have a sufficiently stable government for their own purposes, but I do not think they can ever overcome their excessive decentralization and their excessive suspicion of centralized control. I think they will still derive their great power and force from the fact that they are a homogeneous people, that they are a vast mass of 450,000,000 people who all think the same thing and do the same thing at the same time. That is an extraordinary fact which it is very difficult for the rest of the world to appreciate. But, whether the Chinese have a stable centralized government or not, I think they will have to be left to control their country in their own way, and we shall have to accept any kind of government that they institute and find a way to deal with that government.

A MEMBER: I should like to ask a question with regard to the relations between Russia and China after the war. I gather that Sir John Pratt thinks that Russia will not interfere in the internal affairs of China. The question I wish to ask is what is Sir John Pratt's view of Russian aspirations with regard to Mongolia and Manchuria.

SIR JOHN PRATT: Those two countries stand in different categories as far as Russia is concerned.

With regard to Mongolia, I think there will always be an element of dissension between Russia and China over that country. The Chinese have got it into their heads that Mongolia ought to be part of the Chinese Empire. It was brought into the Chinese Empire by the Manchu con-

quest. The Mongols came in as equal allies with the Manchurians and therefore became part of the empire over which the Manchus reigned. When the Manchu Empire became the Chinese Empire, the Chinese got into the way of thinking that Mongolia was part of the Chinese Empire, and when the Chinese begin to think a thing like that they go on thinking it for hundreds of years. The Russians are quite determined that Mongolia shall not go back to China but shall be orientated more towards Russia, and I think that is also the desire of the Mongols. I do not think that anything that China can do will disturb that arrangement, which is going to last, but it will have the effect of creating a certain suspicion between the Russians and the Chinese.

With regard to Manchuria, the Russians flooded into that country in 1900; they seized the whole country, and it was the Japanese and not the Chinese who turned them out. But Manchuria is far more part of China than is Mongolia. As was pointed out in the Lytton Report, the immigration of 30,000,000 Chinese peasants into Manchuria made it unchallengeably part of China. The Chinese feel very bitterly indeed about this, and the one thing for which they are going on fighting this war is that Manchuria shall once more be incorporated into China. If they saw no chance of that happening it would very greatly weaken their determination to go on fighting. I think the Russians are very well aware of the strength of Chinese feeling on this point. I am inclined to doubt whether the Russians will think it worth their while to have such a terribly acute cause of contention as that between themselves and the Chinese. I do not see what the Russians have to gain by trying to seize Manchuria for themselves. What the Russians do want is a government and an administration in Manchuria that will not be a menace to them. The Japanese in Manchuria are a standing menace to them, but there is no reason why a Chinese administration in Manchuria should be a menace to them.

A MEMBER: What does Sir John Pratt think about Korea?

SIR JOHN PRATT: I think that Korea is a completely insoluble problem.

A MEMBER: Does Sir John Pratt think that the Chinese have any aspirations in regard to French Indo-China?

SIR JOHN PRATT: They have aspirations. I doubt very much whether they want to incorporate French Indo-China into the Chinese Empire in the same way as they want to incorporate Manchuria, but I think they would like to be the Suzerain Power. I think it will be found at the Peace Conference that the Chinese very strongly favour the idea of an international body to which the administration of such regions is accountable, the reason for that being that, if the Chinese play their part in an international body of that sort, it will enable them to have a finger in the pie in Indo-China and Malaya. In Malaya there are large Chinese communities, and for the last thirty or forty years or more China has regarded those communities as an integral part of the Chinese State. The Chinese in Malaya are entitled to have representatives on the Council in Chungking and to nominate people on the Administrative Council, all of which tends to make them a little *imperium in imperio*. The Chinese like that sort of thing, and the only trouble is that our Colonial administrators do not react at all kindly to it. The same kind of thing happens

in Indo-China too. I do not know who is going to govern Indo-China, but it will be a difficult task if the Chinese act in this way.

A MEMBER: What does Sir John Pratt think about Sinkiang?

SIR JOHN PRATT: Sinkiang is a very peculiar case. The Chinese have suddenly re-established control there, and the Russians have withdrawn. Sinkiang is separated from China by over a thousand miles of desert; it is most inaccessible, and there is no trade between the two countries, yet in some mysterious way the Chinese manage to maintain their control in Sinkiang. The Russians were entrenched there very strongly and controlled the administration completely; there was a Chinese government there, but it was entirely in the pockets of the Russians, who were developing the country. Then suddenly there were some political murders and the Russians cleared out of the country, bag and baggage. The Chinese then got control of the country again, but the Russians took away everything they could; a friend of mine was told that they even took the panes of glass out of the windows.

A MEMBER: Have the Chinese any aspirations with regard to Tibet? I saw in a recent publication that the China Summer School included Tibet as part of the present Chinese dominions.

SIR JOHN PRATT: You may be interested to know that in a pamphlet which I wrote the Oxford University Press put a map, without my knowledge, and on that map Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia and China were all coloured in different colours. Two or three days ago the Chinese Government complained about this map because it conveyed the wrong impression that Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria were not parts of the Chinese Empire.

A MEMBER: Is it true that the British Government continues to pay the tribute that Burma used to pay to Chungking?

SIR JOHN PRATT: We annexed Burma in 1885. At that time Burma was one of the tributary States of China and used to send tribute to China every five years. When we annexed the country we incautiously took over all its international obligations. In looking at some old archives I found that Lord Rosebery, when he was Foreign Secretary, suddenly discovered that he was under an obligation to send tribute to China from Burma the following year, and the result was that there were frantic negotiations to get rid of this obligation before it materialized. I do not think that Burma pays tribute now.

The CHAIRMAN: We have been extremely fortunate in hearing from Sir John Pratt such a brilliant historical sketch, in which cause and effect were traced in so lucid a way. We do not often have instruction given to us so charmingly, and I should like to offer to Sir John Pratt, on behalf of everyone present, our most sincere thanks.

RESHAPING THE FAR EAST

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT CLIVE, P.C., G.C.M.G.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 15, 1943, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: This is the third of our series of lectures on the Far East, which began with Mr. White, was continued by Sir John Pratt, who brought us up to date, and to-day Sir Robert Clive, who was our Ambassador in Tokyo and who can indeed speak with very great authority, is going to take a glimpse into the future.

IT somehow seems to me that this talk is rather redundant. It is called "Reshaping the Far East," but in the Cairo Conference, or rather the Mena House Conference, a good deal of the Far East has been reshaped, certainly so far as Japan is concerned; we were told that Japan will have to hand back all the territory she acquired from China during the last fifty years since the China-Japan war. But there still remain some other points. It is such a vast subject, the reshaping of the Far East, that no single charter, no single communiqué, could cover the whole subject.

Another thing, this talk of mine is rather unlike the ordinary talks of this Society, because unfortunately I am not dealing with facts. I am attempting to surmise the future, a most dangerous thing to do on a most contentious subject.

I propose to divide my talk under three headings: first of all, the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Pacific Charter; secondly, the possible Japanese reaction as soon as it becomes clear that Germany having been defeated, Japan cannot win this war; and, thirdly, an outline as to what may happen to all those other territories now occupied by Japan which were *not* part of the Chinese Empire when this war began.

First, Soviet relations with Japan. Those relations are to-day what in diplomatic language is called friendly. Friendly has a definite diplomatic meaning, for it means practically everything short of a state of war. About two and a half years ago M. Matsuoka made a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union for a period of five years, to last until April, 1946. But with reference to these friendly relations, which might perhaps deceive the unaware, it may be of interest if I just read to you what a Japanese historian writing in 1939 has to say of Soviet-Japanese relations. This is what he says:

The nation that surprised and awakened Japan from her long sleep was neither England nor America but Russia. Japan gradually came to realize the seriousness of the situation and the impossibility of longer maintaining seclusion. For a period of nearly 125 years beginning in 1781—that is not long after the first contacts of the Japs and Russians (the first was actually in 1739)—and ending in 1905, Russia was regarded as a menace to Japan. Throughout this long

period Japan planned and conducted her national affairs and defensive measures with Russia in mind. Russia was always regarded as a nation which threatened the very existence of Japan—in fact, Russia and the Russians were a nightmare to both the Government and people of Japan. The ever-increasing advance of Russia in the Far East was a source of apprehension among Japs of all classes. This natural fear reached its climax in 1904, although it practically ceased with the successful termination of the war in 1905. Yet even at the present time (he was writing in 1939) fear of the propagation of communism in Japan is acting directly and indirectly on the minds of leading Japanese, creating for them a Russian menace in a new form.

So much for the Japanese point of view. And now what is the Russian view about the Japanese? The Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905, and until the Bolshevik Revolution Russo-Japanese relations were not too bad. Then in 1925 the Japanese recognized the Soviet Union. But 1931, that vital year, when the Japanese seized Manchuria and really broke with the world, put a big strain on Russo-Japanese relations. It was about that time, I cannot remember the exact year, that the Russians got hold of various secret documents issued by the Tokyo Ministry of War, outlining a Japanese scheme for conquering the whole of Eastern Siberia right up to Irkutsk. The Japanese naturally denied this, but there is little doubt about their authenticity.

The Russians have certainly not forgotten this. Four years later, in 1935, they were not strong enough to stand up to Japan, and had no option but to sell to the Japanese at an infinitesimal price compared to what it cost the Chinese Eastern Railway passing through Manchuria.

The following year came the Anti-Comintern Pact, which the Russians at once concluded, and which everybody realized, could only have been directed against Russia.

In 1937 Japan attacked China. The whole sympathy of the Russians was on the side of China, and they did their best to aid them with arms, ammunition and so on. Since 1935 there had been increasing friction, with frequent clashes all along the Chinese Manchurian frontier, which culminated in a really big battle in the spring of 1939, when the Japanese admitted the loss of 10,000 men.

It was only due to German intervention after the war started in 1939 that things were patched up between the two countries. So we must not be deceived by this neutrality pact of Matsuoka's into overestimating "friendly relations" between the two countries, because I have shown you what the Japanese historian thinks about Russia, and I have tried to indicate what the Russians are likely to think about Japan.

Now as to the Russian interest in the Pacific pact. It seems inconceivable that that pact was concluded by three of the leaders of the four great United Nations—i.e., by the British Prime Minister, the American President and General Chiang Kai-shek—without the head of the Soviet Union being kept fully informed if he did not actually give his approval to the charter. We may not know for a long time. But it is difficult to believe

that these three leaders could have made this pact about Manchuria—especially about Manchuria and Korea—without Russian approval, because, after all, the Russian-Manchurian frontier of some 4,000 miles is, I believe, the longest in the world after the American-Canadian frontier.

When you think that the Russo-Japanese War, which started in 1904, had its origin in the fact that the Russians refused to admit the Japanese interest in Manchuria, it seems obvious that the Russians must desire to see Manchuria returned to China instead of having such an extremely unpleasant neighbour as Japan.

And what about Korea? Korea is different from Manchuria, because Korea is to regain her independence "in due course." "In due course" may mean a long time, but, supposing the Japanese have to leave, it is very doubtful whether the unfortunate Koreans, who for the past forty years have been allowed no say in the government of their own country, would be fit to take over the government immediately. Somebody will have to be responsible, and it is unbelievable that any European country, or the United States or China, alone could be responsible for the government of Korea without Russian goodwill and assistance. Therefore we have every reason to assume that the Russians must have been privy to the pact, and in the interregnum period they are bound to play an important part.

In fact it comes to this, that the country which holds the key to the whole situation in the Far East, and which in the last resort will call the tune, must be the Soviet Union, and it is very necessary to realize that. The Americans are thousands of miles away; we are thousands of miles away; while the Soviet Union, with their vast interests in the Far East and their enormous frontier with Manchuria, are next door. It seems obvious, therefore, that they are really the Power that is going to have the big say.

However, we are assuming that Japan is going to be beaten. People who have lived in the Far East and are interested in that part of the world realize the extraordinary ignorance in this country of the Far East. Many people think that, once the war is over in Europe, it is only a matter of a short time before the Japanese must be knocked out. It is a very dangerous feeling, though perhaps a natural one, because the war there is so terribly far away and so remote from here.

And, now, what is likely to be the Japanese reaction to the present events? The Japanese at the beginning of this century, as Sir John Pratt pointed out a fortnight ago, attempted to come to an understanding with Czarist Russia, and failed to do so. They then switched over and came to an understanding with this country which went far beyond their hopes. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded in 1902 and lasted for twenty years.

Why is it that the Japanese were so anxious to have an alliance with a European Power? It was a complete reversal of previous Japanese history. You remember their period of seclusion, which lasted for over two hundred and fifty years. At the end of the last century they realized that no great country could remain friendless in the modern world. It was absolutely essential to have a friend, and if possible an ally.

Well, the Japanese secured an ally in Great Britain, and when the alliance came to an end at the Washington Conference it came as a frightful blow to the Japanese. It was to them a tremendous loss of face. They were again, so to speak, up in the air, isolated.

For the nine following years the Japanese appeared to the world at large to be on their best behaviour, but in 1931 the military hierarchy again took charge and upset everything. They realized, however, that they must try and get another friend. Having antagonized all the other eight members of the Nine-Power Treaty, there were only two possible friends left—Germany and Russia.

But when the Russians seized those Japanese secret plans to which I referred earlier, Russia was excluded. There remained only Germany, and four years later, in 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. It was not quite an alliance, but it brought Japan and Germany very close together in antagonism to Russia.

I was in Japan at the time. Mr. Araki, the Foreign Minister, asked me to go and see him. He handed me a copy of this Anti-Comintern Pact and said, obviously with his tongue in his cheek, that he looked forward to my communicating it to my Government and hearing that the British Government had also joined the pact. That was a Japanese way of saving their face *vis-à-vis* the British Government. Araki knew, of course, the proposal was absurd. The Anti-Comintern Pact was the first stepping-stone on the way to an alliance with Germany.

That alliance came in 1940. Germany and Italy and, later, various satellite countries came into the alliance, and Japan again felt safe and happy, because she was allied to the greatest military power in the world.

To-day the Japanese must be contemplating the possibility of that great military power being defeated, which would shatter all their hopes.

In the past, Japanese policy has always been extremely cautious. Japan is not governed like other countries. It is really governed by a series of committees. You have the Cabinet with the Prime Minister, but behind the Cabinet there is the Privy Council, consisting of about twenty-five elderly gentlemen, none of them less than sixty. Behind the Privy Council there were, until recently, the Elder Statesmen. Now there are no longer any Elder Statesmen, but you have in their place a sort of committee of ex-Prime Ministers who may be called in for consultation.

Before any really big step is taken, not only have all these committees got to be more or less in agreement, but also a committee of all the generals and admirals. Everything is most carefully thought out. The Japanese always try to bank on an absolute certainty. When they attacked Pearl Harbour in December, 1941, they thought it was an absolute certainty, but I think history will record that it was one of the greatest miscalculations ever made.

It is always useful to look back on history. What has happened on previous occasions? At the end of the seventeenth century, when Hideyoshi, their great conqueror, died, the Japanese dropped all their schemes for Asiatic conquest, withdrew their armies from Korea and came back to their own country. When some years later the Japanese got nervous about the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, nervous at the power

which these Christian countries possessed in the way of modern firearms, what did she do? She shut herself off from the world altogether.

It may be of interest if I read to you a short extract from a book I was re-reading the other day, written by Hugh Byas, who was for many years *The Times* correspondent in Tokyo, a man for whose judgment I had a great respect. He wrote an admirable little book called *The Japanese Enemy*. This is what he says:

History repeats itself—not in situations which change with circumstances, but because character repeats itself. The qualities, the inner forces, that impel a man or a nation to act in a particular way in a crisis will make their power felt again when new crises impose new tests. We look to a nation's history for some knowledge of what it is likely to do under strain, just as we refer to a man's record and character.

Japan shut itself off from the world for two hundred and thirty-one years. No despot could have done that if the nation had not been willing to be shut up. When Japan in 1854 signed its first treaty with the United States, it threw off seclusion and, like most nations in a state of revolutionary emotion, it thought it had thrown it off for ever. But action and reaction follow each other. Japan also threw off military government, but the wheel has come round again to military government, and Japan's recent policy reveals a revival of a deep national urge to be again shut up and secluded.

There seems to be a sub-conscious feeling that many of the distinguishing features of Japanese civilization cannot survive contact with the world. The Sun Goddess, the Shinto mythology, the Emperor's divine descent, the uniqueness of Japan, the Imperial Way, the fables that are taught as national history—these are the things that make the Japanese pulse beat faster, and all of them suffer change and decay when the sceptical air of the modern world touches them. The Japanese mind is uncomfortable in the new world of Western free thought. As the Japanese big-business man goes home from his office at night and tries to lose his modern self in the tea ceremony—a ritual of barren and fantastic politeness—so the race seems impelled by its character to seek another era of seclusion.

That is a very pleasing thought, that the Japanese should shut themselves up again. It would settle a lot of very awkward questions. We can hardly hope for it to happen quite like that, but a man of Byas's experience, with his long knowledge of the Japanese, would not have written that if there was not something in it.

It may well be that the Japanese are beginning to realize that their military leaders have led them along the wrong path. It is no use to expect a revolution in Japan, a revolution against the military. That is inconceivable. In fact, another Englishman with recent experience of Japan, Mr. Morris, wrote in his book, *A Traveller from Tokyo*: "The Japanese would never give in. They would go on to the very last gasp rather than give in at all."

Mr. Grew, the last American Ambassador, has said more or less the same thing. It may be true. On the other hand, you have got these historical precedents of the Japanese suddenly doing something unexpected. I have told you that they withdrew their armies from Korea in 1597; that they shut themselves off from the world some twenty years later; again in 1905 they had reached almost their last gasp in the Russo-Japanese War when President Theodore Roosevelt intervened and offered his mediation, which they were thankful to accept.

It is said that the Japanese will go on indefinitely unless means can be found by which their civilization can be assured. But that has been done in the Pacific Charter. Nobody wants to take any part of Japan. What we want to get rid of is that pernicious military government and the perpetual threat to the future. If ways can be found to let the people realize that they may again have freedom of speech, of the Press and of Parliament, I still have hopes that the Japanese will not necessarily go on to the very last gasp.

Finally, what about these various countries and dependencies which are now in Japanese occupation and about which a settlement will have to be come to when Japan is defeated? The first one is the International Settlement in Shanghai, a subject on which there are people here who have expert knowledge and can express an opinion, which I would not venture to do.

The future of Hongkong is a matter which rests between China and this country. It does not seem to be a question in which other countries have any claim to intervene; it is a matter for us to settle with the Chinese, and I do hope some satisfactory settlement can be found.

Then Indo-China. It seems hardly possible that Indo-China can be just handed back to the French without any condition at all after the ignoble way in which the Vichy Government handed over that country to the Japanese to serve as a base with which to attack us in Singapore and the Americans in the Philippines. However, it is a delicate question.

Then you come to Burma. I do not know whether the Burmese prefer to be under Japanese or British rule. I have never heard of any people who liked being under Japanese rule. I can only suppose the Burmans, like every other Asiatic people, would infinitely prefer to govern themselves, however badly, to being governed by an alien race, however well. But the future of Burma is an obvious concern of this country more than of any other.

As to Malaya—my own feeling is that Singapore has got to come back to this country and it is not for any other country to intervene: Singapore must be British again. The Australian and New Zealand Governments have the same interest. There is no other country which has the smallest claim to Singapore, and it seems to be absolutely vital to the British Empire and to our strategic position.

The Dutch East Indies is a question which perhaps it is hardly suitable for this Society to discuss.

The only thing one can be certain of is that in all these countries after this war things are bound to be different. This war cannot be treated just as an unpleasant interlude. There are bound to be funda-

mental changes everywhere, and probably in the Dutch East Indies as well.

Finally, the Philippines and the mandated islands. With the Philippines the Americans made a treaty in 1935, under which in ten years' time the Philippines were to regain their independence, but one can hardly imagine that the Americans can just clear out of the Philippines after the war, or that the Philipinos would want them to do so. Therefore it is likely that the Americans will remain there in some form or other, and if they remain there, it is obviously America more than any other country which has the greatest interest in the future of those groups of islands which most unfortunately were handed over as a mandate to the Japanese after the last war. Somebody has to look after those islands, and if the Americans retain their interest in the Philippines, it is certain that they are the Power chiefly interested, because they lie in the direct route between Honolulu and Manila.

That is about all I have to say. It is a very big and contentious subject, and I am sure there are several people here who can speak with great knowledge on the various points I have referred to or on others I have not raised at all. So now I look forward to hearing what other people have got to say.

The CHAIRMAN: We have been fortunate. We have had three members to speak to us with very expert knowledge—Mr. White, Sir John Pratt and now Sir Robert Clive.

I will call on Mr. Hubbard to open the discussion.

Mr. HUBBARD: We ought to be grateful to Sir Robert, not only for his excellent outline of the reshaping of the Far East, but more particularly for having at the beginning of his talk taken us right to what I feel is the heart of the problem—namely, the position of Russia. It is very apt to get overlooked by those people who discuss the future of the Far East, partly, of course, because it is very difficult to form any opinion as to what Russia's attitude and policy will be. We do not even know whether she is going to finish the war as an enemy or as a "friend" of Japan, but the fact remains that, as Sir Robert says, she is really the supreme element in the situation, at all events in the Far Eastern section.

I have a feeling that in the Far East, as I think also in Europe, in thinking about the situation at the end of the war and the problems that will then arise, people are a little bit too inclined to make them revolve round our present enmities, what is to be done to Germany and to Japan and the countries which they occupy, and very naturally not to look to the further step ahead, to what sort of disequilibriums will arise after you have settled with your immediate enemies.

In the case of the Far East we are assuming obviously for the purpose of to-day's discussion that Japan has been unconditionally defeated. In any case I would say nothing further about Japan. It would be presumptuous of me to do so following Sir Robert's address.

I would like to take that step further forward and ask whether, having settled the problem of Japan, you will have left a situation which

is more or less stable and free from anything like the immediate seeds of future conflict? When you look at that portion of the world I think you are bound to have a certain amount of doubt, and even at this stage it is just as well to face up to the sort of problems which may arise very soon after Japan's defeat.

Sir Robert pointed out how much the Russians have had to give way to Japan in the past—all their enormous investment in Manchuria and all their dreams of development in that part of the world. I certainly hope, and I believe that Sir Robert is right in thinking, that the Russian Government have agreed in principle to the return of Manchuria to China. But I cannot help feeling that there will be some qualifications to that agreement. If I were a Russian at the end of a successful war, and more particularly if Russia had come into the war with Japan towards the end and was one of the victors, I should feel something was due to me in the way of getting back some of the cost which Russia had incurred in the past.

In the case of Korea, I have a feeling that it will not be too easy to find that interim government of Korea which presumably must be something of a mandatory sort, to find a mandatory power in Korea who will be acceptable equally to China and to Russia, and there will be a very difficult problem in regard to those extremely useful ports which the Japanese since their occupation of Korea have built on the Korean coast.

As you move farther to the west, you get the question of Outer Mongolia. We know China has not entirely surrendered her claims to Outer Mongolia, and we equally know that Russia is very unlikely to be ready to diminish the connection which at present exists between the Outer Mongolian Republic and the Soviet Union. And perhaps, when you go still farther west to Sinkiang, you get to a part of the world where there is even more possibility of tension. At the present time, according to such information as we have, the Chinese Government are recovering to a very considerable extent their authority over Sinkiang and over the local authorities. We do not know how the Russians regard that, though there are rumours at any rate that they are reacting rather strongly; they had already established a very considerable authority over the Sinkiang Government, which they are not at all willing to relinquish. I think it is a mistake not to look forward a little bit farther and see the sort of problems which will have to be faced by any sort of organization which will be set up eventually for maintaining peace and general security in that area.

There is one other subject I would like to mention. The southern portion will present very different problems. The specific problems of the various countries occupied by Japan were dealt with by Sir Robert, but there will also be the question of setting up some sort of international organization for co-ordinating policies and helping to prevent conflicts in the Far East; in fact, the planning in that has already advanced farther than the similar planning in regard to Europe. You have the scheme for a Pacific zone council which was launched by Lord Hailey, which has been to some extent endorsed by H.M. Government in a speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. But one thing which, I think, has not

been sufficiently taken into the picture is this, that, side by side with these plans for having a regional council in the Far East on an international basis, there are plans going forward—and I would refer particularly to some articles which many of you will have read in the *Spectator* by Sir George Schuster—which foresee a commonwealth organization for defence in that part of the world centred more or less on India.

Merely as a problem for people to reflect upon, I would throw out the suggestion that it will not be simple to co-ordinate these two ideas—the idea of a general Far Eastern or Pacific international organ and a commonwealth system. I do not say they are incompatible, but I do think the integration of the one into the other is going to be one of the major problems.

SIR JOSIAH CROSBY: I have only one comment to make. It is on that part of Sir Robert Clive's address in which he referred to the future of Indo-China.

I admit that the future of Indo-China is a very difficult one. It is so difficult that I believe the United Nations have been careful to make no commitment on the subject, but I think there is something to be said for the eventual restoration of those territories in a suitable manner to a French mandate, not a mandate for a Vichy Government, but a mandate for the new France as represented by General de Gaulle and those brave men who are keeping the flag of liberty flying even in occupied France to-day.

These people will certainly demand from the United Nations the right to return to Indo-China, and I think that it will be a reasonable demand, provided they go back there and adopt the policy which all the Western Powers who have enjoyed colonial domination in Asia will have to adopt—the policy of bringing the native populations along the road to full autonomy.

I was next door to Indo-China when the disastrous overrunning of that country by the Japanese took place. I have nothing but contempt for the attitude of collaboration of the present Governor-General, Admiral Decoux, but I have a great admiration for his predecessor, General Catroux. The acquiescence of Decoux was ignoble, but let us remember that there was some resistance offered by the French when the Japanese first came in. There were French troops who then died on the field of honour. Therefore, I am not inclined to blame the French for letting the Japanese in when they could not hope to keep them out. I blame the Decoux Government, but it is not true to say that the country was entirely given over to the Japanese. Even Decoux resents the presence of the Japanese there.

Let us lay this lesson home to ourselves. We were not there in force to keep the Japanese out of Malaya, let alone out of Indo-China. Therefore I scarcely think we have the right to throw stones at the French for having let the Japanese in. (Applause.)

MR. OSWALD WHITE: I should like to take up one or two points raised by Sir Robert.

In the first place, I am afraid I am a bit of a pessimist. I cannot agree that there is a possibility of the Japanese giving up half-way. I fully

admit that in the war with Russia they were very lucky to get out when they did, but they were able to do so and get away with what they wanted. I think that in this present war Japan will certainly do her best to get away with, say, half the swag. If the Allies were prepared to leave Japan a certain amount of what she has got now, then she would probably be only too pleased to make peace, but there lies the danger. She is likely to put forward plausible peace suggestions in the hope that we will be duped once more.

Personally, I think that the only possible way to deal with Japan is to clip her wings. Not only must she give back Manchuria, Korea and other parts where she has no business to be, but also she must hand over all her investments in Manchuria and elsewhere. If Japan merely leaves the territory and still retains the control over the South Manchuria Railway, over the various mines in Manchuria and in Korea, and in the various factories which she has set up there until she has made Manchuria practically a military arsenal, if she retains those and similar investments in North China, then it will only be a few years before she has carefully stored up the provision for another attempt.

I do not think it could be regarded as spoliation if those investments were taken from Japan. If we think of the misery that she has caused in China, and the evil that she has done for which she can never pay back, then it is only right that she should pay some form of indemnity. Therefore I would say that, subject to the rights of foreign bondholders in these various Japanese investments, they should be handed over to China.

If I am not talking too long, there is another point I would like to refer to, and that is the southern part of Eastern Asia. Sir Robert pointed out that conditions will be very different. I would like to elaborate that a little. We have to remember that the Japanese have preached various insidious doctrines—the expulsion of the Westerners from Asia, Asia for the Asiatics, liberation, freedom and so on. We can assess those at their true value, but I am not quite sure that the various native races before whom those ideas have been put can do so. I think that when the Japanese have left, quite a large proportion of the evil they have done will remain behind them. We have also to remember that those areas have been under Japanese complete control for two years now and may be I do not know how long yet.

They make use of local officials. No self-respecting Burmese, or Malayan, or Dutch East Indian for that matter, or Chinese will serve under the Japanese. So it only follows that the good men in those countries have gone into oblivion. Bad money drives out good, and the result will be that the only people left will be the officials that have been trained up under the Japanese.

When we remember also that the prestige of the white man in those parts has suffered a disastrous blow, I think we must agree that we have got to make our plans in advance. The present is a time for stocktaking. I think perhaps it is overdue. In the past in our Colonial administration we have concentrated on justice—quite rightly so—and security. But when we thought of security we merely thought of security from bad men. We never thought of economic security. As a result, most of the

colonies at one time or other have suffered from the fact that they have been dependent on outside markets. We need more economic planning.

Sir JOHN PRATT: It is so much easier to see the snags than the solutions of all these problems. One thing I do most earnestly agree with, and that is Japan has to be completely defeated and that she has to be made to return to her four main islands. If Japan is allowed to retain a foothold on Asia the whole cycle of aggression will start all over again. Japan is equally the enemy of Russia, China, England and America, and it is a vital interest to all four countries that she be not allowed to break out again.

The most difficult of all the problems of the Far East is China. If China were an orderly and powerful country, it would not be difficult to fill the gap that will be created by the removal of Japan from Asia. China is a great country, but the great difficulty is that she is not organized in the way that Western countries expect a great country to be organized. But even though the Chinese do not quite reach up in certain directions to our standards, in other directions they reach to standards that we cannot attain; it would be wise, therefore, to treat them as if they were a great and orderly country, for that is the only basis on which our future relations with China can be conducted. All the great firms who have built up big businesses in China in the last hundred years or more have made up their minds to go back and rebuild the position they held before on an entirely new basis; that is the most hopeful thing I have seen yet. It is the right spirit in which to approach the whole problem. If we succeed in rebuilding our former position we may be able to bring sufficient reinforcement to China to enable her to carry out her rôle of a great and orderly country.

It is unlikely that the trouble with the Communists will lead to a split or a big civil war. I am inclined to think that some accommodation will be found between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Communists are not really Communists. Both parties are seeking the right solution of the various grave problems with which the country is faced, and the Communists incline to a radical solution, whereas the Kuomintang lean more to the right.

I have been impressed with the fact that, however much the Kuomintang may be right-wing inclined, yet they cannot help but be attracted by the Russian example. However much they dislike the Communists, the Kuomintang cannot help but look to the Russian example and draw closer to Russia. The solution of the Kuomintang-Communist conflict may therefore come about through some process of internal evolution which may bring the Kuomintang more into sympathy with Soviet Russia and make the Russians content to have a Kuomintang government in Manchuria.

Manchuria is going to be a terribly difficult problem, for the withdrawal of Japan is going to leave a very big gap. How are all the factories and industrial undertakings which Japan has set up in Manchuria to be run? Where is the personnel to come from? I raised that question about a year ago at a conference which I attended in America. I asked the Chinese delegates: "How do you propose to carry on those mines

and railways? Are you going to retain the Japanese personnel and keep them under your control?" They did not like this suggestion at all, which rather sounded as if the Japanese should keep Manchuria—though that, of course, was not at all my idea. So they said, in their airy Chinese way: "Oh, we have plenty of technicians for all that will need to be done." It is, of course, doubtful whether the Chinese can in fact fill the vacuum, but this will present us with a great opportunity, for we may play a great part in training the Chinese technicians that will be required. Developments along that line are in fact making good progress, for there is talk of no less than five hundred Chinese technicians coming to continue their studies here.

The CHAIRMAN: This series of lectures has now come to an end. Mr. White stressed the growth of the Japanese megalomania. Sir John Pratt told us how everything seemed to conspire to increase that idea in them and to give them the conviction of the possibility of gaining greater power in the Far East—the China war, Korea, Manchuria, the lessening of the British naval power, the mandated islands and the like. Incidentally, with regard to Korea, you will remember that when Sir John was asked what he thought was going to be the future of Korea, I greatly admired him when he said you could not possibly expect any historian to answer that question. I presume, then, that the British Government cannot be classed as historians, because two days afterwards they told us exactly what they were going to do with Korea, but in the very dim future.

We have the guidance of two very wise men: Mr. Churchill said that we had got to give Japan a lesson which she would remember for a thousand years. Without looking so far ahead as a thousand years, let us be convinced that the first thing that has to be done is to give Japan such a lesson that she will have at any rate a change of heart and see that the military direction in her country which has brought her to her present state has got to give place to something else. Whether it will be the seclusion that Sir Robert suggested one cannot say.

We have had to our great interest in this hall to-day so many suggestions as to what might happen and what will be done. We have always to remember that, whatever solution you come to, you have got ninety million Japanese to whom you have to give some place in the world.

We must remember what General Smuts said in his advice some months ago. He said that the mistake that we made last time was that we looked too wide and we looked too large. Perhaps it would be wiser and more beneficial to take the problems just as they happen to come.

We are very lucky indeed that we are able now to renew our thanks to Mr. White and to Sir John Pratt for all the profound interest they gave us. And I think you will agree that we owe a deep debt of gratitude to Sir Robert Clive for having finished this series in so entrancing a way.



