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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA

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(I)

AMERICA'S CHOICE

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Not at a little cost,
Hardly by prayer or tears,
Shall we recover the road we lost
In the drugged and doubting years.

But after the fires and the wrath,
But after searching and pain,
His Mercy opens us a path
To live with ourselves again.—KIPLING.

AMONGST the war-bred additions to our Parliamentary terminology there is a 'Propellants' branch of the new Munitions Department. This branch, in the hands of a very capable chief, is 'rounding up' amongst other nitro essences immense supplies of whale fat in the remote Antarctic for the purposes of this Great War. A high proportion of glycerine to fat in these gigantic mammals results in their being bombed to death—the new fashion which has superseded the old harpoon in killing whales—that they in turn may bomb Huns to death! How wonderful and far-reaching is not this endless cycle of destruction? It happened that four of us were dining a few nights since, and while our minds ran on this and on a score of other remote causations that were within the Propellants Department, its Administrator said 'In considering this War it seems to me the propellant which has secured about the highest muzzle velocity of all is that which touched Mr. Balfour off at a moment's notice to Washington!' That this particular personage, well on the road to seventy, should have been fated through a sea infested with submarines and mines to look in at long last on Washington, arriving too on the threshold of May, at a time when for a full fortnight the capital on the Potomac is the most beautiful thing created yet—its long avenues bowered in limes, its squares and parks reflecting sensuously on our hibernated eyes the bloom of the Judas tree, the spiraea, the magnolia and the dogwood—that such a man should discover such a thing at such a time seemed to us one of the excesses of this exceeding war. Our walk and our talk was with Alice in Wonder-

land! It is difficult in these days to be in a merry mood, but, provided always his good ship escaped mines and submarines, which the kind Fates grant, the humour in this visit appealed to us not less agreeably than its timeliness. The other diners in a rather somnolent club—a club full of traditions and which takes itself seriously—were perplexed by our levities! We agreed to stalk our illustrious emigrant from the moment he set foot in Washington, to snap him with our Kodaks, to report by phonographs under the sofas at the White House all he said to ‘Mr. President,’ and next we followed him to the Marble Room at the Senate and watched the ‘wild men’ of that body—‘Battle Bob,’ La Follette, the Vardaman and the other lesser lights—come furtively out of the Chamber across the long passage to look this stranger well over! And next we note Roosevelt walk into the picture and his handshake almost bonesetting in its cordiality, ‘Mr. Balfour, DElighted to see you.’ With the ex-President are a gallant band all now happily united—Cabot Lodge and Root, Robert Bacon and ‘Our Mr. Choate’ of many mirthful memories, Nick Longworth from Ohio, and Augustus Gardner from the north.

But who are these two henchmen, ‘Arcades ambo,’ in close attendance on this group of statesmen? Mr. Balfour may well look two such men over with a psychic insight, for he has not met their peers, nor has the Kaiser in all his doomed State any such men as these with the steel-grey eyes. The one ‘Bat’ Masterson, the dread City Marshal of Dodge City when that was a ‘live’ town more than thirty years ago, and a wonderful man still when ‘the hardware’ has to talk. The other I can see is Colonel Seth Bullock, of Deadwood; old friends these and followers of ‘The Colonel’ whether in peace or war. No Hun assassin will get any ‘show’ while these two are on hand. Mark you their long frockcoats which hang loosely on lean frames, yet not so loosely but you may remark that slight bulge above the right hip which betrays the ‘gun.’ Great characters, and of great worth, at the ‘Winning of the West’ but ‘nothing doing’ there these days. ‘West,’ said the author of *The Virginian* to me not long since; ‘there is no West.’

We then embarked on a discussion of the various brands of courage in man—a discussion really interminable. Our big-game hunter had started this by a reference to the wide-eyed nerve of a man who was dear to Roosevelt as to us all, the late F. C. Selous. From Selous we reverted to this other friend of Roosevelt from Dakota—the gentle-voiced Colonel with the ominous grey eyes, and him we contrasted with a vast General of Dragoons who has come to Washington in the train of A. J. B. Now the Dakota Colonel, as I have heard tell, can fire two ‘guns’ simultaneously

from his hip level, picking out with hardly a miss each red disk of a ten of diamonds. A very pretty piece of trick shooting, and very serviceable no doubt during election times in Dakota. In such an environment as a saloon row, would not the 'big dragoon' aforesaid be at some disadvantage in this company if unfriendly? We decided that he would; but yet Henry Newbolt had paid his respects to this same 'weary big dragoon' in verses that one of us happily held in memory—verses that we thought had merit. Now it has to be prefaced that in 1914 the British Army had retreated from Mons on Le Cateau and next to St. Quentin. Our big dragoon now in Washington had reached St. Quentin, and this is what a friend who had got in half an hour ahead says of two battalions—all that was left of two renowned British infantry regiments. He writes:

Try and imagine what sort of state men get into when they have marched and fought with very little to eat for several days; defeated in a pitched battle, retreating all the time; two thirds of the men and all the officers save two either killed, or wounded in the enemy's hands; dead, absolutely dead on their feet for want of sleep. I don't think you can realise the mental condition under these circumstances unless indeed you have seen the men's faces. It is not a nice thing to see.

And this is Newbolt's vision, for the reproduction of which I hope to be forgiven by Newbolt and the Dragoon!

A SONG OF THE GREAT RETREAT.

Dreary lay the long road, dreary lay the town,
Lights out and never a glint of moon!
Weary lay the stragglers, half a thousand down,
Sad sighed the weary big Dragoon.
'Oh, if I'd a drum here to make them take the road again!
Oh, if I'd a fife to wheedle, "Come, boys, come!"
You that mean to fight it out, wake and take your load again,
Fall in! Fall in! Follow the Fife and Drum!'

'Hey, but here's a toy shop; here's a drum for me,
Penny whistles, too, to play the tune!
Half a thousand dead men soon shall hear and see
We're a band,' said the weary big Dragoon.
Rubadub! Rubadub! Wake and take the road again!
Wheedle-deedle-deedle-dee. Come, boys, come!
You that mean to fight it out, wake and take your load again,
Fall in! Fall in! Follow the Fife and Drum!

Cheerly goes the dark road; cheerly goes the night,
Cheerly goes the blood to keep the beat;
Half a thousand dead men marching on to fight
With a little penny drum to lift their feet.
Rubadub! Rubadub! Wake and take the road again!
Wheedle-deedle-deedle-dee. Come, boys, come!
You that mean to fight it out, wake and take your load again,
Fall in! Fall in! Follow the Fife and Drum!

As long as there's an Englishman to ask a tale of me,
 As long as I can tell the tale aright,
 We'll not forget the penny whistle's wheedle-deedle-dee
 And the big Dragoon a-beating down the night.
 Rubadub! Rubadub! Wake and take the road again!
 Wheedle-deedle-deedle-dee. Come, boys, come!
 You that mean to fight it out, wake and take your load again,
 Fall in! Fall in! Follow the Fife and Drum!

But 'clear the Galleries'; we and our thoughts and our kodaks are booted out. The Senate will go into 'Executive Session,' Mr. Balfour to address it; no ordinary compliment. Beautiful, beautiful Washington! And next one of our four said 'What a misfortune he did not go there straight from the Chief Secretary's Lodge! Long since there would have been no Irish Question.' And then another said 'Yes! And he alone of English statesmen ever knew the "Silver Question"; with Aaron and Hur—Jones of Nevada on the one side and big Tom Reed of Maine on the other, he would have settled that horrent problem of the Rupee.' Nature, we all said in unison, ordained him for the 'Premier Ambassador,' and, when we had agreed that, we affirmed 'Britons are "mugs," just "mugs" pure and simple. Of course he should have been caught young and trained and taken over there early to run for the great Anglo-American Stakes; for the want of this, History has been cheated and Manifest Destiny clean sidetracked.' Such a racing metaphor reminded one of us of a good story very true to type—'I was dining,' said he, 'in the early 'eighties with the late Lord Fitzwilliam. It was the day after Mr. Lorillard's American-bred Iroquois had won the Derby. The fine old Northern Earl was quite undone. In twenty-four hours he had aged visibly. "An American horse to win the Derby"! ' Lord Fitzwilliam had 'discovered America'! We felt that we were glad 'A. J. B.' had discovered America; glad, too, that America had discovered A. J. B.; but greater than all was our gladness that America had discovered before quite too late the unutterable Prussian. Finally, all the bubbles on the cup of our mirth exhausted, we willed our Missioner out to beautiful Rock Creek Cemetery to confront him with the *Amazing Thing*. For *there*, at Rock Creek, is a Presence that more than the oracle at Delphi knows what the blind Fates weave. A million years after the Star-Eyed Goddess of Liberty on the dome of the Capitol shall have crumbled into dust that figure of omniscient immortality will still be distributing Hope and Courage to mankind. And though we know how inevitable is our Victory and how appalling its dimension, yet also we who have gone there on every conceivable errand, while the cypress grove that drapes Her has grown tall, would wish far more than ever before to receive Her message at this tragic time.¹

¹ The Nirvana of Augustus St. Gaudens.

Yes! America has 'come in'! President Wilson has finely uttered her fateful 'choice.'

In the Gates of Death rejoice!
 We see and hold the good—
 Bear witness, Earth, we have made our choice
 For Freedom's brotherhood.

Then praise the Lord Most High,
 Whose Strength has saved us whole,
 Who bade us choose that the Flesh should die
 And not the living Son!

Probably no one living as yet stands even at the threshold of appreciation of what vast world-changes this 'choice' may lead up to. The War, its issue pregnant with the rebirth and the re-structure of things here below, is already on its very last legs. It is little likely that any considerable American armed force will be in time for the bloody game. But the event is, as we begin dimly to discern, of quite incalculable moral importance to the future of mankind for, without America 'in,' Peace, however victorious that Peace, would have been a starveling. Now with America committed the great gates are thrown wide open through which we walk in upon a new domain of political philosophy. It is indeed difficult to write, as yet at all connectedly, of that great gulf fixed between the world of yesterday and to-day. 'We accept,' said President Wilson in his message to Congress, '*the gage of Battle with this natural foe to Liberty.*' This Natural Foe to Liberty!—these words have gone out into all lands, not merely to Americans. They are the Verdict wrung, and with an almost horrified reluctance, from the great polyglot neutral Nation, and they must be the text for every writer of modern History wherever that polyglot folk can claim a home-land. Think for a moment of the effect of this verdict on the future politics of Prussia. In August 1914 the ineffable Bernstorff racing to Washington from Munich to break the impact of the Belgian murder to and for Americans—this one, when passing through New York, told an interviewer (Paris being, as he supposed, already a mere lair for his 'blonde Beasts') that Germany had no intention of annexing France; that what Germany would stipulate at the Peace table was a free market in France and Russia for all that Germany desired to export. Almost might the Cobden Club have made him a medallist! Next, on the 5th of September 1914, we discover that eminent publicist Herr Maximilian Harden so elated by the rape of Belgium that he writes²:

The most distinctive merit of the Germans is that they do not fit in with the crowd of peaceful nations. German manhood has not become

² *Zukunft*, September 5, 1914.

effeminate because of a long peace. War was always the most profitable business of the Germans. . . . For these reasons the present war is a good war.

One more quotation will suffice to show the mind of intellectual Germany in 1914 and the madness of her 'psychopathic elation.' It is the considered judgment of one rated before the War at least as highly in this country as Darwin was in Germany. It is Professor Ernst Haeckel who writes (November 16, 1914) :

The following results of victory seem to be most desirable:—(1) Freedom from England's tyranny; (2) the necessary invasion of the British pirate State by the German army and navy and the occupation of London; (3) Belgium's partition. The larger part west of Ostend to be a German Federal State. The northern part to fall to Holland. The south-eastern part to Luxemburg, which also should become a German Federal State. (4) Germany to obtain a large part of the British Colonies and the Congo State. (5) France to surrender part of her Northern Provinces. (6) Russia to be crippled by reconstituting the Kingdom of Poland, to be joined to Austria-Hungary. (7) The Baltic Provinces of Russia to fall to Germany.

On one condition after Peace we are all agreed in advance: that there must be a new birth in Germany. You can hang a murderer. Yes! But you cannot hang a nation of murderers. If Germany desires to return to the family of nations, outside of which for many years she must continue a pariah, then very much indeed must depend, as to the period of purgatory, upon the education conveyed to her, and then by her to the children in her schools. Her dynastic subterfuge—that she had been cinctured by nations bent on her destruction—would certainly for a century hold the field in Germany as against any English- or French-made history, but not for a decade could such lying obtain in the case of an American verdict and the pronouncement of American history. The myriad Germans in the United States, their ties with their Fatherland most intimate, will write home their inevitable acceptance of the frigid disgrace they experience daily at the hands of the great community which has secured them wealth and freedom. And every wireless installation, almost every telephone out of the British Dominions, world-wide, will advance the 'natural foe to Liberty' theory to explicate the boycott within their domain of the German man and the German thing. Nothing can be more certain in human affairs than that Germany, thus educated during a few years from a myriad sources *outside her*, will meet Revolution and embrace it, and the more tense that History, and the more strangulant our economics, the sooner her agonies and the divorce of her people overseas from their home ties will be at an end. From what we have learned of the German people and their 'frightfulness' such a dynastic Revolution is fated to be the bloodiest in all history. We may expect that not the Hohenzollerns merely and their Camarilla, but their Junker class will be clean wiped out at the hands of an infuriate proletariat. This is

the Nemesis impending; it is one which clean rolls up the map of Central Europe, and which is now, strange to say, assuming the shape of the pacific presence of America's Chief Magistrate. And it is wise to recall that this terrible verdict on 'the natural foe to Liberty' would have jangled a new note of discord had the United States, as we all hoped, joined the War in 1914.

Of secondary, but still of very great importance indeed, is the probable economic incidence of all that must follow from America's 'choice.' What is it that has really saved civilisation? Not even the glorious gallantry of France, still less the somewhat leisurely and scholastic soul-hunt of America's Chief Magistrate; nor even that 'Pragmatist' revival both in New York and New England, splendid and matter for great inspiration though it is for the disciples of the late William James and the Boston school of thought. But what has really saved civilisation, under Heaven, is Britain's Sea-power—that and nothing else. Admiral Mahan is no more, but if we forfeit in the smallest degree that recognition—the sheer omnipotence of sea-power—then the chart and the compass of this War are lost. We are not much concerned, it may be said, for our own Empire's salvation, which has not been really in doubt from the first, but what is the lesson of the menace? That menace has come not at all from the utterly vile excesses of Hun armies,³ but from Hun pollution of the ocean.

It would seem, then, that the time is at hand when 'The Admiral of the Atlantic' must be publicly stripped of his epaulettes. I have pointed out in the pages of this Review⁴ that the concern of the Americas, North and South, in international politics does not, and should not, travel much beyond the Monroe Doctrine. By this time the Americas know all about Germany as a neighbour, and that is of all the most valuable legacy of the War for them. They know, too, her hyphenates and the interpenetration of her politics and their finance. They want nothing so much as never to see a commercial German bill again. For the German Bill Market was the *fons et origo* of this murderous attack on human freedom. Never in our generation shall we here look at any note with a German endorsement without recalling Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt. And if so, what then? The German Bill must disappear from the Bourses and the German flag from the ocean. That flag has alone menaced the Monroe Doctrine. England's Flag has alone buttressed that Doctrine the last hundred years. If no German merchant marine, then no German warships. If no German warships, then the Monroe Doctrine is

³ Not perhaps that we should palliate overmuch Hun Kultur on land. We have all read Herr Karl Rosner's account of the Kadaververwertungsanstalt. This planet, said Kipling, is populous with Men, Women, Huns. America's 'Choice' in the third year of the war seems to disapprove Herr Rosner's chemistry.

⁴ 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War,' February 1916.

secure. A great Pan-American Tariff Union within which the Allies negotiate for some sort of reciprocal trading, but which admits no German products in German bottoms, then indeed the ocean may presently go unpolluted.

Now what of Japan? What does America's choice involve for Japan? A gallant, progressive people this, destined in the centuries to come to raise the prestige and the social status of the Oriental folk. But it is idle to ask consideration for the view that the product of any labour, not white, will ever gain a footing of equality within any *parados* about to be agreed by Pan-American statesmen. If there is an article which, manufactured in Bradford for American consumption, contains a shilling paid to labour, and a similar article from Yokohama or Shanghai contains only fourpence paid to labour, we may be quite sure that, in the case of any tariff hall-marked Washington, the future duty will be 66 per cent. less in the case of the Bradford than the Yokohama article. Not that the existing American duty against Bradford will be reduced, any more than will England, in the days after Peace, 'free-list' things merely because such things come over from our American Allies. But the Pan-American duty, be sure, will recognise to the full the different wages scale in the case of Bradford and Yokohama and the responsibility which is owing by white folk to white folk. It must at once be recognised, then, that any such economic evolution as this weights the scale against our gallant Islander Allies. Again, in the complete absence of German ocean carriers, how can the world's oversea trade be carried on? With such conditions in view we should do all in our power, in conjunction with the United States, to advance Japan's national aspiration to become the sea carriers for the world. Japan's economic position is a very difficult one. Her islands congested with a huge and increasing population, her natural resources very limited indeed, what she needs most of all is a lodgment where the rate of wages for her emigrants is much higher than at home. Both the racial and the sociological difficulties which fence her off from the white communities opposite across the Pacific are permanently insurmountable, but on the ocean highways, through freight service to mankind, there and there alone she can earn at once, without adjustments, the international rate of wages. This Asiatic issue, then, which is acute, and which most of all concerns our new Ally the United States, arises out of her participation in the Great War. The United States must so steer her course as to protect China against any aggressive tendency of the Islanders; and yet by freely welcoming not indeed Japanese goods but Japanese shipping, in the place of German shipping, she will render impregnable the Monroe Doctrine, she will secure the permanent friendship of Japan and build up all her trades, but particularly the trades of her Pacific littoral through the service of Japan's mercantile marine.

In a letter to the Press⁵ Lord Beresford recognises cautiously, perhaps over-cautiously, the probable effect on Ireland's future of America's 'choice.' 'As an Irishman,' that gallant Admiral writes, 'I see in the distance a faint light.' A faint light! Yes! but one that may well become a beacon fire. His friends have always believed that but for the hunting accident which overtook the fifth Marquess of Waterford while still a young man the good Beresford House had thrown up in the eldest brother of Lord Beresford a great leader of the Irish people. Now I deem it no less than a certainty that with the utter alienation at hand of American sentiment from Germanism in every shape and form—an alienation from the whole ethical and philosophical structure with which Germany has attempted to destroy Christ's work of Justice through Love on this planet—a great change of heart in America, and in America's relations with England, is inevitable. Nothing as we now see, even remotely resembling 'Ireland a Nation' is compatible with Ireland's safety, with England's safety, with America's safety. In the Press of the very same day, which gives us the admirable letter of Lord Beresford,⁶ we read also Judge Gerard's speech at Boston, in which he, fresh from Berlin, declares that had Germany's submarines destroyed, as they expected, Britain's sea-power, then 'Germany had positively planned to come to the United States and levy the entire cost of the War on this (the United States) country. The Teuton idea was to bombard the Eastern seaboard and occupy our big cities.'

This writer has been an ardent Home Ruler ever since he reached man's estate. The necessity of Home Rule in Ireland, if the British Constitution was to survive at all, seemed as inexorable as the writing on the wall. Yet there is no man, Irish or British, but who will admit to-day that the problem stands nowhere near where it did three years ago. In Ireland Dillonism of the Sinn Fein streak is now rampant and is avowedly Separatist. John Dillon has usurped John Redmond's place in Parliament, and the latter, a patriot of the Butt or O'Connell order, has been undermined by his truculent follower. And yet every British citizen knows that Separation is utterly out of the question. That Ireland should be free, should she so decide, to enter into relations with the Hun and to entertain the navy of Germany in her harbours, just as before the War Norway did—that is, we now see, not less a menace to the British Empire than to the United States. Picture Blacksod Bay as the Treaty Port for a vast German Flotilla! Thus the whole conception of 'Ireland a Nation' has clean gone for ever.

MORETON FREWEN.

⁵ *The Times*, April 20.

⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, April 20.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA

(II)

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

THE coming of the United States into the War affects the moral and political, as much as the military, situation. The accession of the Republic to the circle of the belligerents should evidently shorten the struggle and bring peace nearer. The Prussian rulers, even before the American Government declared against them, must have known, as indeed they showed plainly enough last autumn when they began to emit peace 'offers,' that they cannot win the War. Germany and Austria are besieged fortresses, and in the end a besieged fortress must surrender unless it is relieved. But no relief can come to the Central Powers from outside. Their only hope was so to protract the leaguer, and so worry the investing forces by 'alarums and excursions,'—in this case taking the special form of submarine raiding—that at length the besiegers would grow weary, or would quarrel among themselves, and the garrison would then be able to capitulate on easy terms, or perhaps even march out with the honours of war.

The entry of America upon the scene has wrecked that prospect. Time is not now on the side of the Germanic group, even giving them full credit for the effect of U-boat ravages upon our commerce. If they can protract the contest long enough they will give the United States opportunity to develop its immense potential war-power, so that in the end a fresh army of a million or two million trained men, with an overwhelming mechanical and artillery equipment, may be arrayed against the exhausted Teutonic legions upon the fields of Europe. It seems likely that Germany and Germany's dependents will abandon a desperate and hopeless resistance before that stage is reached. The time is approaching when we may be able to turn our minds from the supreme anxieties of the War to the intricate problems of the Peace. And here too the action of the United States has profoundly affected the situation.

At the time of writing the Republic is not politically and

diplomatically one of the 'Allies.' It has no treaty or formal engagement with the Entente states as to the manner in which the War is to be concluded, or the terms to be exacted. Its government will act in the closest co-operation with our own, and that of France, for military and naval purposes, and will do all it can to assist us in bringing about the defeat of the common enemy. But the United States is making war on its own account, and for objects which are not necessarily, or at all points, those of the European Alliance; and it hesitates to give its complete adhesion to the engagements of this group. President Wilson, it is believed, favours a 'gentleman's agreement,' an honourable understanding for mutual aid and support, rather than a definite convention. The United States will go into the War without reserves. Now that it has been forced into conflict with the German military power it is 'all out' to beat that power thoroughly and decisively; and its statesmen recognise that the best way to achieve this end rapidly is to second the Allied military effort with all the gigantic resources at their disposal. But when the peace-making stage is reached the United States is not committed to go all the way with us. Here it retains its reserves; it may require some things which we do not seek; it may, on the other hand, decline to support us in pressing upon our vanquished foes some conditions on which we may be disposed to insist.

This attitude may be changed under the solvent of events. We naturally hope it will be. But the position assumed for the Washington State Department is intelligible to anybody who has watched the course of American opinion. President Wilson knows that many of his countrymen still regard the politics of Europe with a certain constraint. Their enthusiasm has been kindled for the larger moral aims of the Allies, who are fighting, as they feel, for the principles which Americans most value; and they see, in its true light, what the triumph of Prussianism would mean not only for the free nations of Europe but for the civilisation of the world. They wished Germany to be defeated, even before they resolved to take a hand in bringing about her discomfiture.

But the long era of isolation has left its traces upon them. They shrink from being involved in the rivalries and ambitions of the Old World. Though they may feel that the President had no option but to take up the challenge so brutally flung at him, they are nevertheless anxious that the policy of the United States should not be too violently deflected from its orbit. They want the German menace to be stamped out, and peaceful states rendered secure against terrorism and wrong-doing. But there is still a suspicion, with which the President must reckon, that the opponents of Germany may not be content with these results alone. The War will be followed by an extensive reconstruction and remodelling of Europe and the Near East, if the Allied plans

can be fulfilled; and many Americans feel some doubt as to how far their country should participate in this process.

'Very likely,' the American citizen may say, 'the Allies may be warranted in transferring Austrian provinces to Roumania and Serbia, German provinces to France, Poland, and Denmark, Turkish districts to Russia, Greece, or Italy. But we do not see that it is exactly our business to bear a hand in these arrangements; particularly as we are not altogether sure that they will promote the ultimate end for which we are fighting, which is that of making it more difficult in the future for any Government to do what the German Government has done to us, and to other neutrals.'

'We are quite with you in smashing up the Prussian war machine, and we shall be eager to help you in so damaging the affair that it can never be got into full working order again. But we don't feel entirely convinced that your proposed reconstructions and redistributions are really essential to this object; nor that they will effectively promote that other object we have at heart, which is the creation of a League to Enforce Peace, or a League to Prevent War, or some other organ of international insurance, if human wit can devise one.'

This sentiment is somewhat widely prevalent in America, and it must be taken into account by the statesmen of the Entente governments. It is obviously desirable that the United States should be a party to the European settlement, and so closely concerned in it that the whole weight, material and moral, of the Union will be pledged to its maintenance. For if that settlement is to be stable, if it is not to be upset again at the first convenient opportunity, if it is to be something more than a fresh bundle of scraps of paper in the diplomatic rag-bag, it must have behind it the sanction of a practically irresistible force. It will be valid only if it is certain that the armies and the navies, the credit and the mobilised industries, of a combination of great armed Powers will be employed, when occasion arises, to preserve it. If that combination included the United States of America it would be not only irresistible but unresisted. The police would be so strong that in due course it could walk unarmed, and rely on moral constraint alone. For this reason it would be worth taking some pains, worth making some sacrifices, for the Allies to carry America all the way with them in the peace negotiations, and engage it in that 'community of power' of which President Wilson has spoken.

If, however, this result is to be achieved it may become necessary to distinguish clearly between what may be called the primary, and the secondary or ultimate, issues of the War. By the first I mean the causes that directly led to hostilities, so far as the various belligerents are severally concerned; by the second

the larger and remoter consequences which they expect, or desire, from a victorious peace. Every combatant on the Allied side took up, or was compelled to take up, arms for a specific purpose which could be quite simply stated. In the case of France, Belgium, and Serbia, the purpose was sheer self-defence; they were left no choice; the invader had flung himself upon their soil, and they were compelled to bend all their faculties upon his expulsion. Great Britain went to war to redeem Belgium, and release France; Russia to protect Serbia; Italy to obtain 'compensation' from Austria for the breach of Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance agreement with regard to the Balkans.

Those were, and are, the first objects which the Entente Powers keep before them. Restitution and reparation are the 'irreducible minimum' on which they must insist before they can even listen to any proposal to sheathe the sword. The occupied countries and districts must be restored to their owners, the marauding armies must be withdrawn, and guarantees given that the enormous injuries they have done shall be made good by adequate indemnities. Further, and as an integral part of this programme, the Allies must do their best to blunt the murderous instrument by which the crimes have been perpetrated. Mr. Asquith explains the process as the destruction of Prussian militarism, Mr. Wilson as the overthrow of Prussian autocracy. It has never been made quite clear how the Allies can take direct steps to bring about this result, beyond inflicting crushing defeat upon the armies, and if they can get at them, the fleets, of the aggressor. But we are justified in including among the primary objects of the War, to which all the Allied belligerents are committed, the weakening and reduction of the Prussian war-power, so far as that may be possible and practicable.

On these primary issues of the War the Americans are likely to go as far as any of us. They intend that Prussian militarism, and the political system on which it is based, shall be thoroughly discredited and disgraced. They will not shrink from the logical consequences of this decision, and will support us in pressing for all the reparations and restitutions we are able to exact. Americans, owing to the magnificent share they have taken in the relief work, know more than we do of the ravages in France, Belgium, Serbia and Poland. When the bill for damages is presented the United States will agree with us in insisting on payment, and will probably endorse our action if we find it necessary to take territorial, or other security, for the liquidation of the account. If we have to recover two thousand millions or so from the Teutonic Empires I imagine that the American conscience would not be shocked should the Allies find it necessary to enter into possession of German iron mines, or Austrian customs revenues, for a term of years, and use the proceeds for the benefit

of the robbed and injured parties, including perhaps the neutrals whose ships have been wrongfully destroyed.

We may go further. America is at war for the 'freedom of the seas,' in a different sense from that in which she has hitherto interpreted the phrase. She contends, as we do, that the submarine cannot be used without setting at nought the dictates alike of humanity and of international law. She would probably concur with us in making it a condition of peace that Germany should join Great Britain, France, and the United States in an agreement to forbid the employment of submarine vessels for the future in naval warfare. But she would know that Germany could not be trusted to observe this convention except under compulsion; and she might concur with us in requiring that the Kiel Canal should be neutralised, and its gates held by an Allied force, until such time as Germany had redeemed her character and shown that she had ceased to be a danger to the world. The United States, as we have been told, intends to make a 'clean job' of the business of stripping Prussianism of its opportunities for doing mischief. It will not be hampered, or expect us to be hampered, by any undue leniency in pursuing this task to a conclusion.

But as the War has gone on the original programme has been supplemented by other items. Some of these have arisen from the incidents of the campaigns, and the necessities of the military situation. Warlike operations have been carried on over a wide area, and have brought us in contact with obstinate facts and irrevocable actions. Britain, which assuredly had not the smallest desire to annex another square yard of territory anywhere in the world, has already found herself in possession of a new overseas empire. Against her will, by the mere logic of events, as the sequence to military and naval movements she could not avoid, she has seized, and is holding, and must continue to hold, districts in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific many times larger than Germany and Austria. In one of her famous fits of 'absence of mind,' she plunged confusedly upon Mesopotamia, suffered disaster, quietly set to work to turn defeat into victory, and now is clearing the Turk out of Irak as well as Palestine, and resuscitating the Arab Caliphate. Presently she will have another great Moslem nation on her hands or under her protection. Here are vast possibilities, which assuredly we did not contemplate when we declared war against Germany on the 4th of August 1914 because she refused to promise that she would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

For others the outlook has widened more consciously. France did not go to war to recover her lost provinces; but now that she is at war, the latent yearning has become a definite desire which she intends to gratify if victory gives her the chance. Serbia struck back only in self-defence, nor did she strike at all until

the first blows had been dealt her. But if her assailants are sufficiently humbled she hopes that from their ruin may emerge the Greater Serbia of her dreams, the united Jougo-Slav nation that will embrace all the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Illyrians of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Balkan wedge. Italy aspires not only to the *Italia Irredenta* of the Trentino and Gorizia but to Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia; and to Valona, the Gibraltar of the Adriatic, with its hinterland. Roumania wants Transylvania and some adjacent districts, so as to incorporate all the Wallachs and Roumans of Hungary with those of the old principalities. Poland, terribly burnt, but yet scorched into vibrant vitality, by the stinging flame of war, and promised national revival by both sides, may claim that her reintegration should be made complete by the inclusion in the new autonomy of the Polish-speaking districts of Prussia and Galicia. Russia, or so at least her late Government declared, saw before her the goal of her long southward march and the city of the Eastern Caesars in her hands.

To some of these aspirations the Allied Governments have given their formal adhesion. They have added others. They have understood now much that was misapprehended or ignored when the conflict opened. The remoter causes of the catastrophe have been laid bare; many books have been written to reveal the true motives and character of the Prussian policy; many others to show that Europe has long been suffering from the malaise and distempers of neglected, perverted, or unfulfilled, nationality. There might be healing by a bold surgery applied to the diseased and distorted areas. Permanent peace may find its roots in the release of all peoples groaning under an alien dominion, and in the completion of the arrested development of unsatisfied nation-states.

The Allied Note of January 10 in reply to President Wilson hints at a large territorial remodelling in accordance with these ideas. It speaks of 'the reorganization of Europe' based on 'respect for nationalities'; of the restitution of provinces 'formerly torn from the Allies by force'; of the liberation from alien dominion of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks, and 'the populations' subject to the tyranny of the Turks; of the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe. By this scheme Turkey will be driven across the straits and confined to Anatolia. Austria will be deprived of more than half, or perhaps two-thirds, its inhabitants. New states, or newly consolidated and enlarged national units, will stretch across Central and South-Eastern Europe from the Aegean almost to the Baltic.

The 'war-aims' (*buts de guerre*) of the Allies, as they are styled in the January Note, have been inspired by a closer under-

standing of the ambitions of Germany, and of the atmosphere in which these were generated. They see that the great armed autocracy had been long preparing to plant its heel upon the bodies of the quivering, unsatisfied, divided nationalities, so as to bring them all under its military and economic control. When that had been accomplished a population probably exceeding a hundred and fifty millions, immense resources, and a vast solid block of territory reaching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, and covering the main land routes of the eastern hemisphere, would be at the disposal of the Berlin and Potsdam executive, and could be organised for still wider conquests, and the gratification of the most sweeping Asiatic, African, and Oceanic aspirations. A chain of barrier-states, self-governing, and impregnated with full national consciousness, would check the Teutonic surge to the South and the East; and would cease to be the sport of the internecine jealousies and external intrigues which have made a large part of Europe a danger zone of volcanic activity for more than a century. The project of 'Mitteleuropa,' as conceived by the Prussian 'Eastern' school of publicists and propagandists, must be defeated; for its achievement would mean an organisation of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan regions, and Asia Minor, inconsistent with the freedom and security of the world in general.

The aim of the Allies is admirable, and its ethical basis unquestionable, since it rests on the principles of nationality and popular government, the passionate and inspiring thoughts of the modern age. That all peoples should be masters of their own destinies, and that all should be enabled to develop to the full their national identity and individuality—these are propositions that few, in western countries at least, would dispute. But the path to this goal is neither smooth nor easy. There are many difficulties in the reconstruction outlined above, difficulties so serious that it may well be doubted whether the tangle can be cut through at a stroke, even if the stroke is dealt by the victors in a triumphantly successful war.

It is assumed in many quarters that the Allies will make this reconstructive process one of their conditions of peace, and will refuse to lay down their arms till they see it in a fair way to accomplishment. The fighting will go on till Austria-Hungary is broken up¹; till the Ottoman Empire is routed out of Europe; till Bulgaria has been pared down or shared out; till Germany has been forced to hand over Alsace and Lorraine to France, Luxemburg to Belgium, North Schleswig to Denmark, Posen to

¹ 'It is now plain that the satisfaction of the national principle involves the complete break-up of the Dual Monarchy.'—Prof. Ramsay Muir in *The New Europe*, February 1, 1917.

Poland, in addition to the restitutions and reparations of the territories she has forcibly appropriated since July 1914.

It is not however quite certain that this is really the meaning of Article VIII. in the Allied Note of January 10, 1917. Its authors set forth their 'war-aims' in response to President Wilson's request that they should define their several objects in prosecuting the War. This request they 'find no difficulty in answering'; and accordingly they proceed to enumerate the heads of the propositions to which I have referred. But these are expressly distinguished from their view of 'the terms on which the War might be concluded.' Mr. Wilson's question as to those terms, they say, has already been answered in their reply to the German 'Peace' Note of December 12, 1916²:

In that reply nothing is said of the territorial redistributions: but

Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation of violated rights and liberties, recognition of the principle of nationalities, and of the free existence of small states; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end, once and for all, causes which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations [*qui depuis si longtemps ont menacé les nations*], and to afford the only effective guarantees for the future security of the world.

From this it may be suspected that the Allied diplomatists draw a distinction between the *buts de guerre*—the objects they hope to secure as the ultimate results of the War—and the terms on which they would be ready to conclude peace.

Such a distinction, if it is implied, might perhaps be explicitly stated. This might have an enlightening effect upon American public opinion. For that opinion is not, it would seem, at present disposed to encourage its government to go all the way with the Allies in the territorial rearrangement of Europe though it is quite with them in what I have called the primary aims of the War. If we are to carry America with us throughout the settle-

² Art. VIII. of the Note of January 10 opens as follows (I give the French text, which is more precise and intelligible than the official English version):

'Ils [les Alliés] estiment que la note qu'ils ont remise aux Etats Unis en réplique à la note Allemande répond à la question posée par le Gouvernement Américain et constitue suivant les propres expressions de ce dernier "Une déclaration publique quant aux conditions aux quelles la guerre pourrait être terminée."

'M. Wilson souhaite d'avantage: il désire que les puissances belligérantes affirment en pleine lumière les buts qu'elles se proposent en poursuivant la guerre. Les Alliés n'éprouvent aucune difficulté à répondre à cette demande. Leurs buts de guerre sont bien connus; ils ont été formulés à plusieurs reprises par les chefs de leurs divers gouvernements. Ces buts de guerre ne seront exposés dans le détail, avec toutes les compensations et indemnités équitables pour les dommages subis, qu'à l'heure des négociations. Mais le monde civilisé sait qu'ils impliquent de toute nécessité et en première ligne, la restauration de la Belgique, de la Serbie et du Monténégro et les dédommagements qui leur sont dus; l'évacuation des territoires envahis en France, &c.

ment, we may find it advisable to make a definite separation between our terms of peace, that is the conditions on which we will allow hostilities to cease, and the remodelling of the international system which we have in mind.

To keep the two things intermixed, and to attempt to deal with both of them in the process of setting a close to the present conflict, means in the first place carrying on the fight not only with Germany, but with Germany's allies, till they are utterly incapable of further resistance. There are many indications that Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria are chafing under the Prussian hegemony and heartily tired of the War. The time may soon come when they would be glad to be out of it on any terms short of extinction. But if we say to Austria 'We will only give you peace when you consent to dismemberment,' and to Turkey 'You shall be exiled and imprisoned,' they may refuse to yield until their predominant partner throws up the sponge and the whole coalition can be brought to the ground together.

It might suit us better to let Germany's clients lay down their arms so that we could finish the War with all our force concentrated upon the crushing of the great pirate-Power. True, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria call for no consideration at our hands. Their guilt is little less than that of their confederate; Magyar selfishness, Bulgarian treachery, and Ottoman savagery have earned punishment as well as Prussian egotism and violence. But Germany is not only the worst offender but by far the most dangerous. Our main business is with her; she is our chief and most formidable adversary; it is on her collapse that the liberties of mankind hinge. The others are mischievous mainly because she might use their material and geographical resources for her own ends. If we could grant them peace, not indeed on easy conditions but on conditions that would leave them some political cohesion, and might serve as a stepping-stone towards the wider reforms we contemplate, they might grasp at the opportunity to divorce themselves from the association which has led them to the edge of ruin already. Germany would have little scope for incorporating into 'Mitteleuropa' an Austria and a Turkey which she had led into disaster; which had left her in the hour of her own extremity; which continued to exist by the mercy of the Allies; and which would be under guarantees to them of good behaviour both in their external and their domestic relations. In such circumstances the two Powers might themselves, with Serbia and Roumania, be built into the hedge of barrier-states which will oppose itself to the German *Drang nach Osten*, and shut off Teutonic penetration into the Balkans and Asia Minor.

We want the War to end with the weakening of Prussia-Germany; but we must be careful not to commit ourselves in haste to a reconstruction scheme which would weaken her

allies much more than herself, and might even strengthen her commanding position in Central Europe, after she had recovered from the loss and suffering of the past years. The break-up of Austria would make Prussianised Germany the only strong Power between the Baltic and the Mediterranean. She would be free from contact with another great and partly Germanic state, which has indeed lately shown itself her subservient tool, but is nevertheless always her potential rival. If we hand over all the Jougo-Slavs to Serbia, all the Wallachians to Roumania, all the Italians and some others to Italy, all the Poles and Ruthenians to Poland and Russia, and all the Czechs and Slovaks to an independent Bohemia, there will be nothing left to the Austrian monarchy but the Magyars and the Germans. The Hungarians will probably then declare for complete separation; the Germans will no doubt opt for absorption with the German Empire. It would be difficult for the Allies to prevent them, nor could they attempt to do so without flagrantly repudiating their cherished doctrines of nationality and self-government.

The Pan-Germanists and Prussian Imperialists might conclude that they had after all come rather well out of the Great War. Germany could be content to surrender her two millions of Alsace-Lorrainers, even two or three millions of her Poles, if she could exchange them for ten millions of Austrian Germans, and could bring her frontiers down to the Tyrol, the northern spurs of the Dolomites, and the Julian Alps. A solid block of nearly eighty millions of German-speaking people, all under Prussian control, walled across Europe, ringed about by nests of small nations, and shut off from the waters of the Adriatic, whose waves they could almost hear breaking at the foot of their southern rampart—this does not seem to promise an unembarrassed international future.

The territorial reorganisation of Europe is, in fact, an extremely complex task, which must be undertaken with the utmost circumspection if it is not to aggravate the evils it is intended to cure. It is easy enough to perform the enterprise on paper. Mr. Arnold Toynbee,³ Mr. Herbert Adams Gibbons,⁴ M. Chéradame, and other clever and well-informed people, sit down in their libraries with large-scale maps, compasses, and tables of statistics, and draw the new frontiers for us in a masterly and comprehensive fashion. Ethnology, economics, geography, are marshalled into the witness-box. The carving-knife and the glue-pot are boldly used. Here a boundary must be let out, here it must be taken in; in one place a nationality must resign some of its members and receive the proper makeweight in another

³ In *Nationality and the War* (1915).

⁴ In *The New Map of Europe* (1914).

quarter; a Great Power must give up a harbour, a fortress, or a strategic base, and look for 'compensation' elsewhere; where no safe national lines can be drawn there must be international areas, placed in the charge of disinterested neutrals, or a joint police, with free ports, neutralised routes of communication, and so on.

It makes a fascinating picture, this of the new Europe re-arranged on a scientific plan; though one is haunted sometimes by an uneasy suspicion that after all the new method is a little like some old ones with which we are unhappily familiar. There is a certain resemblance in it to those congresses and conventions of the past, in which towns and principalities and margraviates and populations were weighed off against one another in the high diplomatic scales, and boundaries cut, and trimmed, and twisted, in the honoured cause of legality and the rights of rulers as they may now be in that of nationality and the rights of peoples. And the net result of these studies and researches is to leave us with a large part of Europe still somewhat confused. Roumanians will be exercising dominion over Magyars and Saxons, Orthodox Serbs will be ruling Catholic Croats and Moslem Bosniacs, Czech majorities will control a substantial minority of Germans, Slovenes will be governed from Rome, or Italians from Belgrade, Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs will continue to be mixed together in Macedonia. Small states, cut off from the sea, will be economically dependent on their greater neighbours. Mr. Toynbee thinks that all his string of Balkanic, Danubian, and Mid-European minor countries will find salvation in a Zollverein or commercial federation. But it looks as if some time must elapse before Serbia and Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, and Bohemia would be likely to come to amicable agreement with one another. The history of the Balkan peninsula suggests that a number of small contiguous nations, acutely conscious of their linguistic and religious differences, are more likely to quarrel for generations than to work together.

The details of the process present obvious difficulties. Take the expulsion of the Ottoman regime from Europe. No doubt it is high time that the sordid and tragic farce of Turkish misrule over subject populations came to its long overdue finale. And no doubt also it would be an impossible piece of wickedness to hand back to that archaic despotism peoples or districts from which it has been lifted. Armenia, with what is left of its Christian inhabitants, must be made an autonomous province under Russian protection. The Arabs of Mesopotamia and Syria, released by British arms from the Ottoman yoke, will not be returned to servitude. The new Caliphate, with its spiritual centre at Mecca, may recreate, under British and French protection, something of that ancient and noble Moslem civilisation

which Turks and Mongols crushed to the earth. Ottoman officialdom will be chased back to Cilicia and the Taurus; and with it incidentally disappears the Berlin-Baghdad dream which was one of the proximate causes of the War.

But the expulsion of the Turk from Europe is more complicated. Who is to take his place on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles? A few months ago it was announced that Russia had earmarked Constantinople as the prize of victory; and it was understood, though it has never been stated officially, that the Western governments had given their assent to this claim. They must have done so with reluctance, blackmailed by the corrupt and treacherous ministers of the late Czardom with the threat of an accommodation with Germany. Nobody really wants to see Russia installed at Constantinople, mistress of the Black Sea and the Danube outlet from Central Europe. And now it seems doubtful whether Russia herself wants to be placed there. Prince Lwoff and M. Kerensky have disclaimed any such designs; the occupation of 'Tsargrad,' like the other aggressive ambitions of the old Caesarism, is unsuited to the new Slav democracy. But if not Russia, who then is to be the heir of the evicted Osmanli? On the nationality principle the strongest claimant would be either Bulgaria or Greece; but we cannot very well make over this resplendent prize to the shifty and treacherous potentate of Sofia, or to that honest broker, King Constantine. If the Turk is expelled it would seem that Constantinople and the Straits, with the adjacent district, must be constituted an international state under the joint government of the Powers. We have tried international states, inhabited by mixed populations, before, and the experiment has not been conspicuously successful.

Nor shall we have got rid of the Turkish question by merely driving the Sultan and his retinue beyond the Bosphorus. There are Christians of various kinds, Greeks, Chaldaeans, Italians, Levantines in Asia Minor; the Armenians are not confined to Armenia, and we may remember that the horrible massacres of that unfortunate people in 1909 started at Adana. If we shut up the Turks in Anatolia and Cilicia, and simply wash our hands of them there, we shall only be at the beginning of a fresh period of European interventions and international rivalries with the resulting complications. There must be some effectual means of keeping the Turk from the sort of mischief which ends in general conflagration, even when we have turned him out of the Seven Towers and forced him to set up his throne at Konia or Broussa.

The partitioning of Austria is not a problem which can be lightly approached, even with the sacred lamp of nationality to guide our steps. For one thing we cannot be quite sure about the feelings of the various nationals. We know that the Croats

heartily detest the arrogant and bigoted tyranny of Buda-Pesth ; it is not so certain that they seek to be absorbed into a Greater Serbia, or that Agram, which regards itself as the intellectual centre of the Illyrian race, would willingly subordinate itself to Belgrade. The Slovenes again are a somewhat doubtful factor. They do not love German Magyar rule ; but is it clear that they are anxious to exchange it either for that of Italians or of Serbs ? The Czechs have been disgracefully treated, and denied the privileges to which they are legally, as well as morally, entitled. But they would not accept independence unless they were allowed to annex the Slovak districts of Hungary, because without the two millions of Slovaks they would be too weak numerically to counteract the large, powerful, and energetic German minority. The Slovaks have never developed any marked national consciousness, and it is not known whether they really desire incorporation with their Czech kinsmen. Even if they consented to come in, the proposed Czecho-Slovak state, squeezed in between Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, buried in the very heart of the Continent, with no outlet to the open world for its flourishing industries except through alien territory, would not be in a very enviable position ; and it would be burdened with its 31 per cent. of hostile and bitterly resentful Germans, always looking hungrily to the greater Teutonic aggregation beyond the frontier. It is at least conceivable that genuine Home Rule, and racial equality, under a Viennese central government, might be preferred by many Czechs and Slovaks, in spite of their abominable oppression during the present War, to this precarious independence.

All this does not go to show that the reorganisation of Europe is hopeless, or that a new international system, grounded on something better than a balance of material force, cannot be established. This War will be fought in vain if the attempt is not made, or if the attempt is a failure. But there is a danger that it will fail if too closely associated with the task of putting an end to strife and restoring peace : instead of being kept apart from this essential preliminary work, and thought out on broad and disinterested principles. Otherwise it may share the fate of the other great settlements of Europe which have only sown the seeds of future wars. This was not entirely due, as is often suggested, to selfishness and dynastic egoism. The negotiators of the Peace of Paris, the Treaty of Vienna, the Treaty of Berlin, were not blind to considerations of humanity and justice. They were in the main quite sincere in their desire to give Europe security and order ; some of them were filled with much the same large conception of an international unity, a concert or federation of civilised nations, which is just now in many minds. But they were compelled to lay their foundations on ground cut up

and honeycombed by war, still smoking from the cannon. The interests of humanity and the universal peace were overlaid by the more urgent necessity of reconciling divergent ambitions, and holding the balance even between jealous and powerful rivals. The transaction was apt to degenerate into a series of makeshifts and compromises; discreditable bargains were made, so that agreement of some kind might be reached.

There is a danger that the peace negotiations of this year or the next may be coloured by some such sinister influences. Here too there will be ambitions to be gratified, rivalries to be adjusted, acquisitions in one quarter to be set against compensations in another, a good deal of territorial bargaining and chaffering to be undertaken. The high ideals before the Allied statesmen will assuredly not be abandoned; but it may be difficult to give full expression to them in this tense atmosphere. The inexorable preoccupations of the moment, as they press upon the belligerents, may take precedence of the wider demands of the future and the world. Therefore it may be hoped that means may be found to separate, so far as may be, these two functions of peace-making and reconstruction; and if, by so acting, it becomes possible for the United States to be intimately associated with both, a more stable settlement is likely to be reached.

If that settlement is to escape the destiny of many predecessors it must be capable of being enforced and capable of being revised. The treaty or treaties will not satisfy everybody; and the dissatisfaction will not be limited to the Germanic group. The conventions will only be observed if the Higher Contracting Powers are determined to maintain their sanctity by the employment of armed force. And for this purpose, I repeat, the co-operation of the United States is requisite. Without its active aid it may be doubted whether the International Police can hold together, or whether it can be strong enough to discharge its duties. That is why we should seek to make America a working partner in all the arrangements, those for concluding the War and those for reorganising the European family.

The surest guarantee against the abrogation or evasion of the settlement is to provide machinery for its modification. The negotiators of the past regarded the international system as static instead of dynamic; they forgot that they were dealing with living organisms and a constantly changing environment. They made a rigid cast-iron vesture for growing bodies, and thought their arrangements or re-arrangements would last for ever, even though they were designed only to fit the conditions of the passing hour. Progressive and open-minded as the Allied diplomatists may be, they have no magic to bind the future. Their most skilfully drafted schemes may become obsolete or irksome as circum-

stances and opinions alter. After we have finished carving up and pegging down Europe in accord with the demands of nationality, we may discover that nationality, satiated and pacified, has ceased to be a compelling motive, and has been superseded. States and jurisdictions may require to be reconstituted afresh to meet a new industrial or transport synthesis; the cry for economic unity may be as fierce as that we now hear for nation realisation. Diplomacy must be enabled to cope with such developments. Treaties should not be merely scraps of paper; but they are not graven on adamant. They must be obeyed so long as they are valid; but it should be possible to modify or annul them without drawing the sword.

It may therefore be hoped that any treaties which may form part of the coming settlement will be subject to periodical revision. It should be provided that at a fixed date—after an interval, perhaps, of twelve or fifteen years—a Conference should be held of representatives of all the contracting states, in which the agreement would be reconsidered. It should be open to any of the parties to propose the annulment of the instrument as a whole, or the modification of any clause. The Conference would give or withhold its assent to the proposal as it thought fit. If it refused, the contract would still be binding and enforceable; if it accepted, the requisite amendments would be discussed and authorised. Thus if Germany bitterly resents, as may be expected, and is indeed to be desired, some of the conditions imposed upon her, she will at least be able, in due course, to bring her case before the assembled Powers and ask for alteration. Whether she would get it would depend on many factors, including her own conduct and action during the intervening period. But this would at least furnish her with a *locus poenitentiae*; this would allow her opportunity to vindicate a claim for re-admission to the comity of nations; this would give her or any other Power a chance to improve her position, or to remedy an alleged injury, without resorting to violence. The periodical Conference for the Examination of Treaties would not indeed be that council of nations, or world-legislature, which would turn all civilised mankind into a political commonwealth; but it is about as near it as we are likely to get in our time. In combination with an armed League against Treaty-Breaking, it would go far to relieve the world from the fear of aggressive force, and the sudden menace of war. But such a League could hardly be operative unless it included the United States among its fully constituted and responsible members.

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