

THE POSITION OF TIBET

By A. J. HOPKINSON, C.I.E.

Lecture given on April 25, 1950, Lieut.-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkinson, who has kindly come to lecture to us today, paid his first visit to Tibet in 1926, when he was a member of the Indian Political Service. He remained in Gyantse and Yatung as British Trade Agent until 1928.

In 1944 he went to Sikkim on special duty, and in August, 1945, he became Political Officer in Sikkim. As such he was responsible for conducting the relations between H.M. Government and Tibet, and his work therefore included a visit to Lhasa, where he spent several months on an official visit to the Tibetan Government.

On August 15, 1947, the day of the Transfer of Power in India, Mr. Hopkinson's service under the Crown ceased, but at the request of the new independent Government of India he continued to serve in the same capacity as he had been serving the British Government, and he was for a year the only British officer holding Resident's rank serving in India.

SO far as my own connection with Tibet is concerned my main regret is that, owing to the fortunes of war and circumstances such as the break-up of Empire and Transfer of Power, my connection with Tibet was not so long or so intimate as that of my distinguished predecessors, Colonel Bailey, whom I am very glad to see here, and Sir Basil Gould. Neither had I the good fortune to go to outlying parts such as those visited by Mr. Hanbury-Tracy, whom I am glad to see here also. I am grateful to you, Sir, for your moderation in introducing the subject of Tibet without reference to Shangri La or any such clichés. Tibet is such a fascinating subject that the more we can avoid fiction about it and stick to fact, the better.

That has not always been easy in the past, because Tibet is an isolated, unsophisticated country, ignorant of the ways of the world; ignorant of the necessity for publicity and what are nowadays called Public Relations. The Tibetans have so far been non-vocal, but they are, rather belatedly, beginning to realize that necessity. Frequently publicity has been left to interested Chinese misrepresentation; false or tendentious Chinese reports have therefore frequently gone unchallenged and have been swallowed by those who should know better, including our own journalists.

That is particularly the case in regard to the map of Tibet. In circumstances which I shall explain in a few minutes, the eastern border between Tibet and China has never been formally defined, though what the actual border is is fairly well known. Chinese official maps, however, such as are found in the *Chinese Year Book*, ignore all this. They err in favour of China not by a mile or two, but by several hundred miles. Also, although the southern boundary between Tibet and India has been defined by treaty, the Chinese map annexes quite a considerable portion of Assam territory, right down almost to Sadiya on the edge of the plains. This Chinese map bears no relationship to fact, and the Royal Geographical Society have furnished the press with a guidance note on the subject.

Nevertheless, the British press, off and on, continue to follow the Chinese map, allotting to China hundreds of miles of Tibetan territory and bringing China almost to the door of Lhasa. I have seen versions of this map quite recently both in daily papers and in one of our leading weekly periodicals.

Whatever the actual boundaries, it is clear that Tibet is bounded by two Powers, on the southern side, for nearly 2,000 miles, by the Indian continent—that is, India and Nepal; and for the rest by China or territory under the control of China. From this it follows that these two neighbours of Tibet inevitably have a special interest in Tibet, interest of a sort that non-neighbour countries cannot have.

What is the special interest of Tibet's southern neighbour, India? That interest is not primarily commercial. Tibet's main export is wool. About 3,000 tons a year goes via Kalimpong from Tibet to America for carpet-making. With the record prices now obtaining—when I left Gartok at the end of 1948 the prices were then a record, 90 Rs. a maund: now I hear the price is Rs. 150—this export brings a handsome profit to the individuals concerned: but from a world point of view it is a mere flea-bite. Tibet's commercial value to the outside world is small.

No: India's interest in Tibet is not so much commercial as strategic or military and political. Tibet stands along India's northern frontier, a bastion, nearly 2,000 miles in length, unsurpassed anywhere in the world. That has been the generally accepted view for long past: and however much the views of experts may have been modified by modern developments, all that I, a mere civilian, can say is that in the event of war India and her friends would, I am sure, be far happier if this great land mass were neutral as hitherto, and friendly, rather than if it were in the hands of a hostile power. Remember that hitherto the only regular troops we have had along this long frontier have been a company of infantry at Gyantse and Yatung, for, as you might say, ornamental purposes. How long could that continue with Tibet in the hands of another power? Whatever the position in a "warm" war, in a "cold" war Tibet in the hands of a hostile Power would be a constant menace. And I am sure that that peace and amity, those cordial relations which are so desirable between India and China, stand a far greater chance of preservation if those two great Powers are not coterminous along a lengthy common border, with all the chances of daily friction that such a common border would produce. Remember too that Bhutan to the south is another Mongoloid country closely connected with Tibet, commanding for nearly 200 miles some of the most fertile country of Bengal and Assam. It has plenty of room and a suitable climate for colonization by Chinese. The Chinese in the past have made no secret whatever of their wish to dominate Bhutan, and I am certain that if they got hold of Tibet they would not hesitate to repeat their claims. And do not forget that the Chinese have claims—claims dormant at present, but shown in their maps—right down into the Assam plains in the neighbourhood of Sadiya.

When the Tibetan Goodwill Mission visited Delhi in 1946, at the time of the reception at Viceroy's House, I remember a Delhi official saying: "It's easy to see their Chinese origin." Actually, while the

Tibetan upper classes have adopted many of the externals of Chinese culture, such as the use of chop-sticks, for instance, they are in fact no more closely related to the Chinese than we are to the Italians, from whom we have learnt the use of the table-fork. It is important to realize this, because of the Chinese efforts to claim that the Tibetans are Chinese by race.


I do not want to waste your time by repeating facts of ancient history with which you are already familiar from books, and articles such as Sir Charles Bell's in the Society's Journal of January, 1949, or the article on Tibet in the *Statesman's Year Book*. You know that the Chinese only established a form of suzerainty in Tibet as late as 1720, and that by the end of the last century this Chinese suzerainty had become a shadow. So much so that in order to get settlement of outstanding matters the British had to send the Younghusband Expedition direct to Lhasa to negotiate there with the Tibetans themselves, the Chinese in Tibetan matters being nonentities. Those are all matters of which Colonel Bailey can say: "Quorum pars magna fui," matters of which Colonel Bailey can speak much better than I.

You know also that the Chinese took advantage of the internal confusion which naturally resulted in Tibet from the British incursion so as to establish a military occupation more harsh and violent than any they had had before. The memory of that occupation—I can say this from what people in Lhasa have told me and from what I have seen there—is still bitter. You know, too, that that Chinese domination was very short-lived, for by 1911 the Tibetans turned on their oppressors and drove them out, and the Chinese garrison were thankful to get safe conduct back to their own country via India. Ever since 1912 the Tibetans have, in fact, been unquestionably independent.

One of the attributes of independence is the conduct of separate independent negotiations, direct relations, with foreign countries. Tibet has long had such separate relations. There have been Nepalese representatives in Lhasa and elsewhere, under a treaty, since 1856. From the time of the Younghusband Expedition, Britain had representatives in the country—the British Trade Agents at Gyantse and Yatung, with a small escort of troops, for purposes of prestige, and a seasonal Trade Agent touring in the area of Gartok in the summer months. Throughout the period the Political Officer in Sikkim has been responsible for the conduct of relations with Tibet, and he made fairly frequent visits to Lhasa for the purpose. My predecessor, Sir Basil Gould, during one of his visits, in 1936 left behind a permanent officer who became head of the British Mission which has existed and has been a Mission ever since in Lhasa at the headquarters of the capital.

Now as regards the Chinese, the other neighbour: the Tibetans would not admit any Chinese permanent representative into Lhasa until in 1934 they consented to the visit of a Chinese envoy ostensibly for the purpose of conveying condolences on the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, and since that date a Chinese representative has remained in Lhasa continuously until the end of 1949, when, in circumstances which I shall relate, the Tibetans again turned out the Chinese. They firmly removed the

Chinese Mission and all those merchants in Lhasa whom they suspected of Communist sympathies. The Tibetans did this very firmly and very politely; they gave the Chinese envoy and the Mission all the usual farewell parties and guards of honour, but they very firmly removed them.



On their part the Tibetans dispatched a goodwill mission to India and China in 1946, with congratulations on victory and complimentary presents for H.M. the King Emperor, the President of the United States of America, the Viceroy of India and General Chiang Kai-Shek. Later they sent representatives to the Asian Relations Conference at Delhi in 1947,

and later still, in 1948, they dispatched an official trade delegātion which went as far afield as the United States, in addition to visiting China, England and several other European countries.

During this period since 1912 there has on occasion in the past been fighting on the border—fighting not always to the advantage of the Chinese—and there have been alarms and excursions. There has never been any formal settlement with the Chinese; but throughout this period the Tibetans have, in fact, kept their independence intact.

During this period of nearly forty years since 1912, what has been the policy of the three parties concerned—Britain, or British India, China and Tibet?

What, in the first place, has been British policy? Britain's policy has been to preserve friendly working relations simultaneously with both China and Tibet. We have made it our aim to preserve the peace and integrity of a Tibet friendly to Britain and to India: and in order to get this on to a solid basis we have sought, whenever opportunity offered, to get a settlement between the parties, or at any rate to preserve the peace between them. Thus it was that when there was border fighting, it was a British consular officer, Sir Eric Teichman, deputed by H.M. Government, who effected a truce between the Tibetans and Chinese; it was the British who, at the time of Chinese weakness in the 1920s, counselled moderation to the Tibetans. And at one time, in 1914, we nearly effected a settlement between the Chinese and Tibetans. All three parties, Chinese, Tibetan and British, initialled at Simla a draft agreement in which the Chinese acknowledged Tibetan autonomy, while the Tibetans reciprocally acknowledged China's *pro forma* suzerainty. But the Chinese backed out over the matter of the actual boundary between Chinese and Tibetan jurisdiction, and there the matter has remained ever since. But the British and Tibetans made that draft treaty, which we call the Simla Convention, binding between themselves, and that treaty was the basis of the relations between Tibet and Britain and is now the basis of the relations between Tibet and India in succession. It is that treaty also which secures the boundary of Assam, though owing to other preoccupations, we forgot, or omitted, to vindicate the boundary allotted to us—which is commonly known as the MacMahon line.

That lack of agreement between Tibet and China confuses the situation, but we have done our best, in this state of confusion, to strengthen Tibet to a reasonable extent. Firstly, materially, to a mild degree, and secondly, morally. We have never—and this is important—promised the Tibetans any form of military support against the Chinese or anybody else but, when responsible for India, we have, more than once, promised Tibet diplomatic support. And we have done our best from time to time to emphasize the economic and commercial advantages to Tibet of their continued relationship with India. At the same time, we have always hoped for settlement between China and Tibet—an increasingly pious and ineffectual hope it proved to be, as time went on, because of Chinese obstinacy and intransigence.

Though at one period the Chinese seemed to be on the point of acknowledging Tibetan autonomy, they have never abandoned the aim

of completely absorbing Tibet and blotting out the country as an entity. They make the wish father to the thought by representing Tibet to the world as already an integral part of China. They have never made any attempt at settlement; except on their own terms of Tibet's absolute surrender. They have never accepted any reasonable boundary on Tibet's eastern side, and notoriously pursue a policy of expansion in that neighbourhood. And you can read in Teichman's book of the atrocities the Chinese have committed in that area. They do not want peace and settlement in Tibet, and they lose no opportunity of making difficulties for Tibet.

Let me cite a few random examples of these tactics. If you look at the *Chinese Year Book* you would be led to think that the Dalai Lama was installed by the permission of the Chinese representative, whereas the Chinese representative was merely a distinguished visitor on the same footing as other visitors, such as Sir Basil Gould, my predecessor. Again, during the war the Chinese laid immense stress on the necessity of providing facilities for the transport of goods to China through Tibet and we, the British, coerced the Tibetans into agreeing, but much against their will. And then the Chinese wanted to station numerous Chinese officials all along the proposed Trans-Tibet transport route inside Tibet, to supervise the transport, but on no account would the Tibetans agree to this.

Anyhow, when the Chinese got their Trans-Tibet transport conceded, the Chinese Government made no use of it, and the main attraction of the whole idea seems to have been merely to get their spoke in in Tibet. Tibetans visiting China could not get out of the country unless they took out Chinese passports and exit permits. When the Tibetan Goodwill Mission visited China in 1946, they were commissioned to seek settlement of the boundary dispute, but the Chinese saw to it that nothing came of that. On the other hand, they did their best to make the unsophisticated Tibetans attend the Chinese Constituent Assembly; and when they got them there they tried to make the Tibetans sign the new Chinese Constitution, as though they were Chinese subjects. But even the unsophisticated Tibetans saw through that, and refused. There was a bit of a scene, and one of my Tibetan friends knocked an inkpot over, and you may be sure the story lost nothing in the telling. So unaccommodating were the Chinese that eventually the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, informed the Chinese representative, Mr. Soong, in 1943 that our recognition of Chinese suzerainty was conditional on Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy. So as the Chinese have never, so far as I know, recognized Tibetan autonomy formally, I suppose we on our part have not recognized Chinese suzerainty.

And since 1912 what has been the attitude of the Tibetans? What can it be? They are weak, with a small population, between two mighty neighbours; and so they must do their best to temper the wind to the shorn lamb. They value their independence as much as you or I do. They are born individualists, attached to liberty. They are a kindly and hospitable folk, sociable and cheerful. But, above all, they are afraid of foreign penetration, foreign domination: and that governs their attitude to strangers and their policy about visitors. They do not intend to be

exploited by foreign merchants—Indian Marwaris, for example—and I do not blame them. But, in particular, they fear not only Chinese aggressiveness, but also Chinese irreligion: and they dread Communism. But being weak they cannot afford to flout the Chinese entirely; they have got to keep in with them, and they feel they have got to humour them as much as reasonably possible. The normal Tibetan army is only 12,000, but lately I hear they have been recruiting rapidly—I have heard the figure of 30,00 mentioned. But though the Tibetans are tough and have acquitted themselves well in the past, no one maintains that Tibet could withstand a serious invasion, properly equipped: in a military sense, their salvation would ultimately lie, I imagine, in the persistent application of guerrilla tactics. And, in the end, liberty would return from the natural decay of slackness that would inevitably set in in the Chinese occupying force.

Two new factors have appeared on the scene which I have described—Independent India and Communist China. As you know, the new Prime Minister of India, Pandit Nehru, was by repute a close friend of the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, and before the Transfer of Power in India there were all sorts of rumours flying round as to an intended sell-out of Tibet to China. In the period before the Transfer of Power we permanent officials, Indian or British, who were interested in Tibet, spent our efforts in trying to explain the set-up to our future masters on the one side and, on the other, trying to make things smooth on the Tibetan side. There was what seemed to us terrible delay in informing the Tibetans of future intentions: and it was only in July, 1947, less than three weeks before the actual Transfer of Power in India, that I was informed that India would succeed to the rights and obligations of His Majesty's Government in Tibet, though H.M. Government would continue to be represented through the High Commissioner in New Delhi. We were instructed to convey the assurance of India's goodwill to the Tibetan Government. *Forsan et hæc olim meminisse juvabit*: but I shall not trouble you with the details of those memories now.

When responsible for India, H.M. Government were careful to promise Tibet only diplomatic support. As I have already said, they never promised military support, and I suppose no more can be expected of India. What diplomatic support India can give must, I suppose, depend on the circumstances of the time, including the backing she can get from the Commonwealth and from America.

The second new factor, or phenomenon, is Communist China, a new phenomenon on the horizon, but not unforeseen. It is a case in which the saying applies, "*Plus cela change plus c'est la même chose*," the chief difference being probably greater efficiency and intensity of purpose in the case of the Communists. And so, in January of this year, the Communist radio announced to the world that the 1950 programme included the "liberation" of Tibet and warned the Tibetan Government against "violating the will of the Tibetan people . . . by engaging in separatist activities and betraying the interests of the people by continuing to submit themselves to the slavery of American imperialism."

According to Chinese sources, several divisions of the Chinese People's

Liberation Army made a forced march to the Tibetan border. They boast or threaten that they are going to liberate Tibet. They set up a person of Tibetan stock, resident in China, as so-called President of the Provisional Government of Tibet. And then there is the matter of the Panchen Lama. On the Chinese side of the actual border there is a considerable population of Tibetan stock who are Chinese subjects. Among these is the twelve-year-old boy, called in the press the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama is, after the Dalai Lama, the next most important potentate in Tibet. The late Panchen Lama, owing to disagreement with the Lhasa authorities, left Tibet in 1924 and stayed in China until his death in 1937. Efforts to secure his peaceful return failed because the Chinese would insist on sending an army, and the Tibetans did not want to let in the wolf that way. The boy mentioned in the press is really only a candidate for the post of Panchen Lama: certain formalities at Lhasa are necessary. But the Chinese rushed through a bogus installation ceremony, and once more they insist on sending an army and are running him apparently as the rightful ruler of Tibet. So this boy who has never been to Lhasa and has not acknowledged the Tibetan Government has become the chief Chinese stooge, dispatching publicity telegrams about the liberation of a land he has never seen; under tuition of an entourage long in Chinese pay, who have, most of them, never seen the Panchen Lama's seat at Tashi Lhunpo at all.

In this difficult situation what did the Tibetans do? In the past, as I have explained, they have been in friendly contact with Nepal, Britain, India and even the United States. Britain in the past has promised them diplomatic support, and India has now succeeded to Britain's rights and obligations. And so the Tibetans proposed to send envoys to the capitals of those different countries, as well as to China, to state their case. The names of the envoys were actually announced. But the Chinese uttered imprecations, and we have heard no more about those proposed missions—except the one for China. This is headed by Tsipon Shagappa, the official who headed the trade delegation to London fourteen months ago, assisted by Lachag Jegmed Tering, the nephew of the Maharaja of Sikkim, as English interpreter, and Dorji Nyima, the brother-in-law of the Dalai Lama. They came down to Kalimpong only two months ago. But, though they are anxious to establish contact with the new Government in China, physical difficulties seem so far to have stood in the way. And now, though I have no inside information, I should say that, as far as I can gather, the previous tension seems to be somewhat relaxed—on the military side, that is—at any rate, there is something of a lull, and it appears from recent statements in Peking that Tibet is no longer part of the active military “agenda” for 1950.

And from what sort of government are the Chinese proposing to “liberate” Tibet? I do not want to spoil the case for Tibet by exaggeration. Of course there is room for improvement and reform—in what human institution is there not? But human nature being what it is, I do think there is much to be said for the view that the “State that's governed best is best”; that there is much wisdom in Mahatma Gandhi's dictum that self-government is better than good government; and I main-

tain that Tibet's institutions are better suited to the genius of her people and their way of life than any that outsiders could give, whether Chinese, Russian or Indian, or British or American. True, Tibet is an autocracy, with a feudal landed aristocracy. But you must make allowance for the fact that half the officials—that is, the monk officials—are recruited from all classes: the Dalai Lama himself is of humble origin. The government rests on the sanction not of force but of the goodwill of the people. I must admit that it is a point of weakness in the Tibetan system that, inevitably, there must be long periods of minority of the Head of the State, the Dalai Lama, as at present. I feel that a long period of minority tends to indecision in the government and to slackness of subordinate officials.

Tibet knows nothing of industrialization, nothing of the effects, the good or evil effects, of the mechanization of life that we take for granted. Tibet's is a rural and pastoral economy. But whatever criticism you may see fit to make of Tibet, remember that it is an economy that is in full working order, it is a going concern. Remember, Tibet is better administered than the neighbouring areas of China. Tibet has never had to issue famine appeals. You never see anyone—when you are travelling in the central part of Tibet, at any rate—under-nourished or ill-clad, and the houses are good and have character. I did hear of a case of mal-administration in south-eastern Tibet, but that on being brought to the notice of the authorities was dealt with effectively. Abuses cannot be entirely avoided; it is something when there are remedies for abuses.

Change no doubt must come to Tibet, as to all else; indeed, it can be discerned already. But it should come gradually; it should be adapted to the Tibetan *ethos*, and under Tibetan auspices, not imposed from without.

Is Tibet capable of commercial exploitation? That is a question that will be inevitably asked. I am doubtful, and personally I hope that that day is far off. Even if iron ore were discovered, at that altitude there is not the fuel for working purposes. And what benefit would the Tibetans get from the discovery of, say, oil? Exploitation of oil must inevitably upset the working rural economy, on which the country depends, and increase the worst aspects of capitalism—a disproportionate increase of wealth in the hands of a lucky few, foreigners mostly, with perhaps one or two Tibetans, slick and wealthy enough to get in on the ground floor at the start, while the hitherto self-respecting and self-sufficient peasantry, deserting their ploughs and their yaks and sheep, are converted into a mass labour corps of coolies, with wants hitherto unknown, dependent on the bounty of their foreign wage-paying employers for the satisfaction of those new wants: privileged thus to spend their daily wages on cigarettes and cinemas, on ready-made shoddy clothes and boots, and such-like foreign imports: thus contriving in Tibet, as our school hymn-book used to say, "to make the world a better place, and life a worthier thing."

In this same connection it would be a bad turn to sell the Tibetans motor agricultural tractors. In the circumstances of the country—light soil, high dust-blowing winds, danger of denudation—are not deep ploughs more likely to do harm than good?

Western education? These days, leading Tibetans will inevitably want some Western education for their children. Far better that they should get it inside Tibet, in their own environment, rather than go, for years at a stretch, away from their homes, into a foreign country and environment, to Anglo-Indian schools at Darjeeling, where they become denationalized and lose all that is best in their own culture. Twice, at Tibetan invitation, we have started schools inside Tibet, and very fine and successful schools they were. But they were not given a chance; conservative opposition forced their closure. If only the Tibetans knew it, this education away from home is a far greater danger to their culture.

The Tibetans are physically tough, and can be as obstinate as mules. At the same time, they are, in general, in the centre of the country at any rate, law-abiding, kindly, unaggressive. This is doubtless due to the fact that religion is the prime factor in the everyday life of the nation and of the individual. The Tibetan muleteers one sees at Kalimpong are just as hardy and muscular as the Afghan caravan men, the Kuchis, that one sees at, say, Jamrud. But between the two, in character, there is all the difference that there is between Islam and Buddhism. Before Buddhism came to them, the Tibetans were a warlike folk, carrying war into China. But now they are a peaceful, non-militarist people. They have harmed none; they threaten none. Theirs is not a sickly bankrupt state, needing the charity of Marshall Aid or famine relief. All they want is to live and to let live; to continue in possession of the freedom they have so long possessed and never abused, and to develop along their own lines according to their own genius.

Recently Mr. Jessup, American Ambassador at Large, summarized American foreign policy, and this was his first point: "We believe that every people has the right to be independent, to govern itself, and to work out its own problems in its own way." We believe that, too. And who will deny that Tibet has the right to be independent, to govern itself, and to work out its own problems in its own way?

Mr. C. HANCOCK: I wonder whether Mr. Hopkinson would add to the pleasure he has given us by saying whether there is any secret agreement between Russia and Communist China—the Russians have recently made an air reconnaissance of Tibet—and whether the Chinese have an army of 150,000 on the border. If that is so, whether he thinks the time has come for the British Government to urge U.N.O. to send a representative to investigate and report what is going on there. Secondly, is Sir William Barton right in saying that the Dominion of India, having recognized China, is unable to recognize the independence of Tibet because the Chinese claim that Tibet is part of their country, and does not that equally apply to the British Government?

The LECTURER: I do not want to pretend to knowledge I have not got. So far as a secret agreement between Russia and China goes, I have no information about that at all, and I cannot attempt any information on that subject. I do not know what force the Chinese have on the Tibetan border. I read just now from a Chinese Communist source about a division of the "Liberation" Army going to the border of Tibet, and I

had a message from Lhasa saying they had no use for the army of ragamuffins on their border. But I really do not know anything more about that.

As regards U.N.O., the Tibetans were, I believe, led to hope that they might appeal to U.N.O. or perhaps become members of it at the United Nations, but that latter I believe is, in fact, an impossibility, because of the veto which others would immediately apply. Whether in the smaller matter U.N.O. could send a commission of inquiry, I cannot say; whether that would be subject also to veto or not, I do not know. Anyhow, I do not suppose that the Tibetans would welcome a commission of inquiry unless they thought it had goodwill behind it and the intention to do something.

Col. CROCKER: Has the lecturer any information about the reported training of local commandos on the frontier? I have seen it stated that local units of Tibetans, both men and women, have been trained on the north-eastern frontier of Tibet to act as the spearhead of the "Army of Liberation" to "liberate" the Tibetans from the imperialism of the Western Powers. Has Mr. Hopkinson any information on that subject?

The LECTURER: I have no inside information, but I have either read or heard that the Chinese were recruiting Amdoas—that is to say, tribes in the north-east of Tibet—as a spearhead for their army. I do not personally believe that any people of Tibetan stock would agree to march against the Dalai Lama when it really came to the test. And mind you, that information comes exclusively, so far as I know, from Chinese sources.

Col. CROCKER: It is supposed to be in support of the rival Lama.

The LECTURER: The Panchen Lama. Still, I do not believe, if it came to the test, that the people of Tibetan stock would march against the Tibetans at Lhasa.

Mrs. GREGORY: Is the "Liberation Army" living on the Chinese or the Tibetan side of the border? And what are they living on?

The LECTURER: I do not pretend to have been up in the Kumbum area on the north-east border, and I do not want to pretend to knowledge I have not got. I would like to know myself.

Col. BAILEY: As to the map, it was only three or four years ago that I got the Society's map altered to take that Chinese boundary off.

Mention was made of the old days. It was not generally realized that Younghusband's expedition stayed for six months in Tibet merely to negotiate. There was no intention of a move forward by the British at that time. If the Tibetans agreed to what we were asking there would have been no trouble whatsoever; no further move at all, but they refused even to discuss matters. That one could annex a country by making maps and teaching wrong geography in schools is the attitude of the Chinese in this matter.

Gen. BECKETT: Is there any suggestion of uranium or other precious and rare metals in Tibet?

The LECTURER: I do not know about uranium. I believe Sir Charles Bell, in that paper in the Society's Journal in January, 1949, said there might be valuable metals in the extreme east of Tibet. Anyhow, I think

it is all in the mountainous country, if there is any at all. There is some gold-washing and I believe copper also in Tibet.

Col. BAILEY: Sir Henry Hayden was paid by the Tibetan Government for a long time to explore for that purpose, and he wrote a report and a book on the subject. He told me he did not find enough coal with which to boil one kettle!

A MEMBER: Is Mr. Richardson still in Lhasa?

The LECTURER: Yes. I am sorry that time did not permit of my mentioning him and other personalities. At the time of the Transfer of Power in India, Mr. Hugh Richardson agreed to stay on temporarily, and is still there, I am glad to say. The Political Officer in Sikkim is Mr. Harish Dayal, of the old Indian Political Service. Formerly he was Deputy Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry at New Delhi, dealing with Tibet matters. Sir Charles Bell complained that frequently Tibet or the agency dealing with Tibet is the Cinderella of the Indian Foreign Office, and that was too often true, but never during the régime of Mr. Dayal as the Deputy Secretary concerned, as I know from my own experience; and when my time to swallow the anchor came it was a real pleasure to be able to hand over to an officer so sympathetic to Tibet and the Tibetans. And also I am sure that so long as Mr. K. P. S. Menon continues as Foreign Secretary no one will be able to repeat Sir Charles Bell's complaint with any justice.

SIR GILES SQUIRE: The lecturer mentioned the Panchen Lama as being a Chinese stooge. Is there a legitimate Panchen Lama?

The LECTURER: I do not say that this boy is necessarily not going to be the Panchen Lama. It is rather like a king before being crowned. There are two or three candidates. I think he is favoured, but he has not gone through all the requisite stages; he cannot be called the Panchen Lama yet. I suppose whoever becomes Dalai Lama is Dalai Lama from the date of his birth, though not discovered or recognized till later.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkinson, I want to thank you very much for your most interesting lecture and for having come to talk to us at all. I am personally very ignorant, and I have had another disillusionment today. I rather envied the Tibetans their independence. I never realized we gave them such diplomatic support. I have now changed my mind! We all thank you very much for your lecture.

