

The
Fusul al-Madani
APHORISMS OF THE STATESMAN
of
al-Farabi

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY

D. M. DUNLOP

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS

The Fusul al-Madani of Al-Farabi

Edited by D. M. DUNLOP

*Lecturer in Islamic History in the
University of Cambridge*

Dr Dunlop has edited, introduced, translated and annotated a collection of aphorisms on political thought by the medieval philosopher Al-Farabi, the founder of Arab political philosophy. The work had an influence on subsequent Muslim thinkers; it is also one which clearly shows the influence of Greek philosophy.

The text is printed in English and Arabic. There are notes to the translation, and an apparatus criticus to the Arabic. Dr Dunlop's introduction places the text in its historical and intellectual setting.

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ĀL-FĀRĀBĪ
FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ

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UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE



CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1961

PUBLISHED BY
THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London, N.W. 1
American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.Y.

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1961

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*Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge
(Brooke Crutchley, University Printer)*

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INTRODUCTION

I. PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE ARABS

IN spite of important recent contributions, the study of the rise and development of philosophy among the Arabs remains fraught with a thousand difficulties. In broad outline the facts are fairly clear. After the promulgation of Islam the Arabs were exposed, partly owing to the transforming influence of the new religion and still more perhaps through contact with higher cultures in the conquered lands, to a civilizing process which according to Ibn Khaldūn had already begun by the time of the Caliph 'Abd al-Malik (685-705).¹

We may assume that the Arabs were at first impressed by the material aspects of the older civilizations to which they had served themselves heirs. Where the sciences are concerned, it was the more practical branches of which they first saw the value. Medicine was represented from the early days of Islam by men like Ibn Kaladah, who had studied at the Sāsānid medical school of Jundishāpūr,² and the Christian Tayādhūq (?Theodokos), physician of al-Hajjāj.³ Alchemy is mentioned in connection with the Umayyad princes Khālīd b. Yazīd⁴ (a minor in A.D. 683) at Damascus and Bishr b. Marwān⁵ (before 694) in Iraq.

¹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, ed. Cairo, 244=translation of F. Rosenthal (London, 1958), II, p. 22.

² See Ibn Juljul, *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā' wa'l-Ḥukamā'*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid (*Textes et Traductions d'Auteurs Orientaux*, X, Cairo, 1955), p. 54, and the literature there cited.

³ Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, *Uyūn al-Anbā'*, ed. A. Müller, I, 121-3.

⁴ The historian of science Julius Ruska in *Arabische Alchemisten* (Heidelberg, 1924), I, was unduly sceptical about Khālīd b. Yazīd, though he had a predecessor in Ibn Khaldūn, who finds the attainments ascribed to Khālīd b. Yazīd impossible in that age (*Muqaddimah*, 505=transl. F. Rosenthal, III, pp. 229-30). Yet Khālīd was contemporary with the celebrated scholar St John of Damascus, who in early life had been his father's intimate friend (Philip K. Hitti, *History of Syria* (London, 1951), p. 499), and the case of Bishr b. Marwān (see next note) shows alchemy in Iraq about the same time.

⁵ See Ibn Qutaibah, *Kitāb al-Ma'ārif*, ed. Wüstenfeld, 180; *al-Imāmah wa'-s-Siyāsah* (Cairo, n.d.), II, 55.

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The intellectual traditions of both Persia and Byzantium contained also philosophical elements, to which, at first no doubt along the line of theological enquiry, since the new circumstances raised all kinds of questions in regard to the Qur'ānic revelation,¹ some of the Arabs began to turn their attention. Practical and theoretical interests combined to make desirable the translation of foreign books into Arabic, and the production of such translations was not long delayed. Māsarjawaih, a Jew of Baṣrah, translated the medical Pandects (Kunnāsh) of a certain Aaron of Alexandria from Syriac, apparently as early as the time of Marwān (Caliph 683-5).² If a relatively late tradition³ may be relied on, the translation was found in the Umayyad archives by the pious Caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz (717-20), and published by him only after he had exercised himself in prayer for forty days, as to the propriety of making known a possibly heretical work to the Muslims. Under the later Umayyads and the early 'Abbāsids, especially al-Ma'mūn (813-33), the intellectual movement gathered momentum. By the tenth century of our era, the century in which al-Fārābī lived, philosophy at Baghdad had reached a high level and at this time or later was cultivated in other parts of the Muslim world. A philosophical school arose in Spain, whose leading representatives in the twelfth century, Avempace (Ibn Bājjah) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), may stand comparison with the greatest names in the East earlier.

2. BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Mas'ūdī, writing in 956, mentions as a singular fact that he had seen at Iṣṭakhr (Persepolis) a large work in Arabic, apparently compiled from local sources, containing an exposé of the sciences of the Persians, with a history of the Persian kings and their statecraft (*siyāsat*), which had been translated for the Umayyad Hishām b. 'Abd al-Malik in 731.⁴ The work seen by Mas'ūdī was

¹ At least as early as Mu'āwiah II (A.D. 683). Cf. Hitti, *loc. cit.*

² Ibn abī Uṣaibī'ah, *op. cit.* I, 163-4.

³ Reported by the Spaniard Ibn al-Qūṭīyah to Ibn Juljul; see *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā' wa'l-Hukamā'*, 62.

⁴ Mas'ūdī, *Tanbih*, 106.

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different, he tells us, from the *Kbudāi Nāmāh* and *Ā'in Nāmāh*, Pehlevi books on Persian history and administration, which about this time were translated into Arabic by the celebrated Ibn al-Muqaffā' (executed by al-Manṣūr in 759). It is doubtless in such works as these that we have to see the beginnings of what came to be political philosophy in Arabic. The Greek contribution was, it seems, made only later, though eventually it was the more important.

The *Republic* of Plato and other Greek works were put into Arabic by the famous translator Ḥunain b. Isḥāq (ninth century), and al-Kindī (c. 800-66) wrote a dozen short treatises (*risālāt*), described as political.¹ The titles are as follows: "On Government"; "On Facilitating the Paths to the Virtues"; "On the Warding off of Grievances"; "On the Government of the Common People"; "On Morals"; "On Direction to the Virtues"; "Account of the Virtue of Socrates"; "On the Words (*alfāẓ*) of Socrates"; "On the Conference between Socrates and Archigenes";² "Account of the Death of Socrates"; "On what passed between Socrates and the Ḥarrānians";³ "Account of the Intellect". The Greek inspiration of most of these is obvious.⁴

The so-called political works of al-Kindī, of which two have now been published⁵ from the Aya Sophia MS. discovered by Professor Ritter, might, it seems, equally well be described as

¹ By Ibn an-Nadīm in the *Fihrist*, where he gives the titles (ed. Flügel, p. 260).

² If this is the physician of Apamea, the work evidently rests on a serious anachronism. Archigenes of Apamea (cf. Hitti, *History of Syria*, p. 321) flourished in the time of Trajan.

³ Again evidently an anachronism. A connection between the historical Socrates and the people of Ḥarrān (Carrhae) in Mesopotamia is not credible.

⁴ As-Sarakhsī, a pupil of al-Kindī, also wrote a *Kitāb as-Siyāsah al-Kabīr* and a *Kitāb as-Siyāsah as-Ṣaghīr* (F. Rosenthal, *Aḥmad b. al-Ṭayyib as-Sarakhsī*, American Oriental Series, xxvi (1943), p. 56).

⁵ H. Ritter and R. Walzer, "Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī (Temistio περὶ ἀλυσπίας)", R. *Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, ser. vi, vol. VIII (1938-9), fasc. 1, pp. 1-63 ("On the Warding off of Grievances"); and Muḥammad Abū Ridāh, *Risālat al-Kindī fī'l-'Aql*, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-Falsafīyah* (Cairo, 1369/1950), pp. 353-58 ("Account of the Intellect").

ethical.¹ The same applies to another work of general *siyāsah* type, the *Kitāb as-Sa'ādah wa'l-Is'ād* ("Book of Happiness and Making Happy") of Abū'l-Ḥasan b. abī Dharr, recently studied by Professor Arberry, which cites al-Kindī and refers apparently to al-Fārābī as a contemporary.² Apart from this book, which survives in a single MS., now in the possession of Sir Chester Beatty, nothing hitherto was known of the author. He has now been identified by Professor M. Minovi³ as Abū'l Ḥasan Muḥammad b. abī Dharr Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī of Nīshāpūr, who was a pupil of Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Balkhī (*ob.* 322/934) and died at an advanced age in 381/992.⁴ Al-ʿĀmirī displays an extensive knowledge of Greek philosophy, especially Plato. *Inter alia* he gives a long quotation from an epitome of the *Republic* which is remarkable for its retention of the original dialogue form.⁵ At the same time al-ʿĀmirī cites numerous Persian authorities, principally, it would seem, from translations made by Ibn al-Muqaffa' (see above). All this indicates a different line of development from that represented by Ḥunain b. Ishāq—al-Kindī—al-Fārābī, the theories of the last of whom (assuming the identification of the

¹ Or psychological in the case of the "Account of the Intellect". The fact is that in Arabic at all times the usage of *siyāsah* fluctuates and is not confined to what we call politics. Cf. the *Risālah fī's-Siyāsah* of al-Fārābī mentioned in the Introduction, § 3, and the *Kitāb fī's-Siyāsah* of al-Ḥusain b. ʿAlī al-Maghribī, rendered by its editor, Dr Sami Dahan, *De l'Éthique* (Institut Français de Damas, 1949).

² A. J. Arberry, "An Arabic Treatise on Politics", *Islamic Quarterly*, II (1955), pp. 9-22.

³ See his transcript of the Chester Beatty MS., *As-Sa'ādah wa'l-Is'ād*, *University of Tehran Publications*, No. 435 (*Mahdavi Fund Series*, No. 5), Wiesbaden, 1957-8, Introduction, p. iv, and the earlier 'Az Khazāyin-i Turkīyah, Part II', *Bulletin of the Tehran Faculty of Letters*, Year 4, No. 3 (pp. 9 ff. of the offprint).

⁴ For al-ʿĀmirī cf. *Muntakhab Siwān al-Ḥikmah* (MS. Murad Mullah 1408, 67b-68b); Miskawaih, *Jāwīdān Khirad* (*Sapientia Perennis*), ed. ʿAbdurrahmān Badawī (Cairo, 1952), pp. 347 ff.; Abū Ḥaiyān at-Tauḥīdī, *Muqābasāt* ed. Ḥasan as-Sandūbī, p. 202 n. and indices; M. Minovi's long article referred to in the previous note; and F. Rosenthal, "State and Religion according to Abū'l-Hasan al-ʿĀmirī", *Islamic Quarterly*, III (1956), pp. 42-52.

⁵ A. J. Arberry, "Some Plato in an Arabic Epitome", *Islamic Quarterly*, II (1955), pp. 86-99.

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unnamed "modern philosophaster"¹ with al-Fārābī) on the subject of the ideal ruler, which are shortly to concern us since they come in the *I'nṣūl al-Madanī*, al-ʿĀmirī professes not to understand. There is no reason to suppose that the *Kitāb as-Saʿādah naʿl-Isʿād*, evidently written after al-Fārābī's characteristic ideas had been made public, had any effect on his development. The case is somewhat different, as already indicated, for the "political" writings of al-Kindī.

3. AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S WORKS ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

It has become increasingly plain within recent years that the real founder of political philosophy among the Arabs was al-Fārābī. His debt to the Greeks and to their Arabic translators is indeed such that without them his work would have been impossible, but *qua* political philosopher he appears to have had no immediate predecessors. Al-Kindī's influence on al-Fārābī seems to have been limited. To judge by the titles of his books already given, al-Kindī was interested in the figure of Socrates, but his appreciation of political and kindred problems and the questions and solutions put forward by the Greek thinkers does not appear, though a final decision on this will have to wait for further MS. discoveries. (Al-Kindī's real flair was probably for natural science.) It is unlikely that al-Fārābī was not familiar with al-Kindī's works, which "were in every hand, and to be found in every place",² but his obligations to them in his own political writings seem to have been restricted to externals, such as the use of the *risālah* form.³ We may also note that there is a coincidence of title in the case of the *Risālah fī s-Siyāsah* of the two authors, and that al-Kindī like al-Fārābī has also a *Tanbīh*.⁴ There is no

¹ Arberry, "Arabic Treatise", pp. 15, 16; cf. Minovi, *As-Saʿādah*, p. 194.

² *Muntakhab Ṣivān al-Hikmah* (of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijazī), MS. Murad Mullah, 1408, fol. 59a. Cf. D. M. Dunlop, "Biographical Material from the *Ṣivān al-Hikmah*", *Proceedings of the 23rd International Congress of Orientalists*, pp. 352-3; *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1957), pp. 82-9.

³ According to the *Muntakhab Ṣivān al-Hikmah* (see previous note), al-Kindī introduced the scientific *risālah*.

⁴ For these works of al-Fārābī see below. Al-Kindī's *Tanbīh ʿalāʾl-Faḍāʾil* has already been mentioned as "Direction to the Virtues".

possibility that al-Fārābī was preceded by Ibn ar-Rabīʿ, author of the *Kitāb Sulūk al-Mālik fī Tadbīr al-Mamālik*, though this has been stated by Brockelmann to be the oldest surviving work on political philosophy in Arabic.¹ It was convincingly demonstrated by Jurjī Zaidān that the *Kitāb Sulūk al-Mālik fī Tadbīr al-Mamālik*, which bears on the title page and in the course of the work that it was written for the Caliph Muʿtaṣim (833–42), a contemporary of al-Kindī and long anterior to al-Fārābī, cannot belong to this early time.² Jurjī Zaidān pointed out that the honorific “Shihāb ad-Dīn” applied to Ibn ar-Rabīʿ is impossible for the ninth century, since this style of nomenclature was introduced much later, and concluded that there is confusion between al-Muʿtaṣim and al-Mustaʿsim, the last Abbasid Caliph (1242–58). Other considerations were raised by Martin Plessner against the early dating,³ and Brockelmann’s later volumes embodied the correction. The matter was again put in doubt by Professor H. K. Sharwani, who attempted to meet Jurjī Zaidān’s arguments and restore the ninth-century date.⁴ To what has already been said against this it may be added simply that Ibn ar-Rabīʿ quotes al-Fārābī, mentioning an ideal ruler, and then giving almost *verbatim* the twelve or thirteen qualities which according to al-Fārābī the “first chief” or ideal ruler must possess.⁵ These Ibn ar-Rabīʿ transfers in terms of extravagant flattery to the reigning Caliph.⁶ There can be no question on which side the originality lies.

The apocryphal *Kitāb as-Siyāsah li-Aflātūn* of Ibn ad-Dāyah⁷

¹ Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 1st ed. (Weimar, 1898), I, p. 209.

² Jurjī Zaidān, *Taʾrīkh Adāb al-Lughah al-ʿArabīyah* (Cairo, 1912), II, p. 214.

³ Plessner, *Der Oikonomikos des Neupythagoräers Bryson* (Heidelberg, 1928), pp. 31 ff.

⁴ Sharwani, “A Muslim Political Thinker of the Ninth Century A.C.; Ibnī (sic) Abī ʿr-Rabīʿ”, *Islamic Culture*, xv (1941), pp. 143–56.

⁵ See below, note on § 54.

⁶ Ibn ar-Rabīʿ, *Kitāb Sulūk al-Mālik fī Tadbīr al-Mamālik* (Cairo, A.H. 1329), pp. 8 ff.

⁷ This has been edited by Jamīl Bek al-ʿAzīm (Beirut, n.d.) (Brockelmann, *op. cit.*, Supp. I, p. 229, gives Jamīl Bek al-ʿAzīz, apparently in error) and by ʿAbd al-Rahmān Badawī, *Al-Uṣūl al-Yūnānīyah li-n-Naṣarīyāt as-Siyāsīyah fī l-*

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(died 951) points to contemporary interest, apart from al-Fārābī, in *siyāsah*, which we have already noticed in the case of al-‘Āmirī. Ibn ad-Dāyah, a meritorious writer upon many subjects,¹ scarcely made a very important or influential contribution to political philosophy, and he appears to remain unquoted by later writers.²

The works of al-Fārābī on politics were esteemed by later generations,³ and, as we can now see, he had a stimulating effect on the Spanish school of philosophy centuries after his death.⁴ As to the works themselves, some of them seem to be of little account, in particular, if they are really his, the *Tanbīh*,⁵ in effect a plea for the study of logic, and the *Risālah fī’ s-Siyāsah* (“Treatise on Government”)⁶ which deals, in spite of the title, with a man’s conduct towards superiors, equals, etc., after a more or less familiar pattern. In the more important works, the *Tahṣīl*,⁷ the *Kitāb as-Siyāsah al-Madanīyah*⁸ and the *Madīnah*

Islām (Cairo, 1954), I, pp. 3–64, under the title *Kitāb al-‘Ubūd al-Yūmānīyah al-Mustakbrajah min Rumīṭ Kitāb as-Siyāsah li-Aflātūn*.

¹ Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-Udabā’*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth (*Gibb Memorial Series*), II, pp. 157–60.

² With the exception of Ibn al-Khaṭīb of Granada, in the 8th/14th century. See D. M. Dunlop, “A little-known work on politics by Lisān ad-Dīn b. al-Khaṭīb”, in *Miscelánea de Estudios Arabes y Hebráicos*, Universidad de Granada, 1960.

³ Cf. Šā‘id b. Šā‘id, *Ṭabaqāt al-Umam*, ed. Cheikho, 54=R. Blachère’s French translation, *Livre des Catégories des Nations*, 109. The original work was written in 460/1068, and is quoted on al-Fārābī by Ibn abī Uṣaibi‘ah (*‘Uyūn al-Anbā’*, ed. Müller, II, 136).

⁴ Cf. Introduction, 4(c).

⁵ In full, *Kitāb at-Tanbīh ‘alā Sabīl as-Sa‘ādah* (“Direction to the Way to Happiness”), (Hyderabad, 1346/1927).

⁶ Ed. Cheikho, *al-Mashrīq*, IV (1901), pp. 648–53, 689–700.

⁷ In full, *Kitāb Tahṣīl as-Sa‘ādah* (“Attainment of Happiness”), (Hyderabad, 1345/1926). A new edition of this important text is a desideratum. The Hyderabad editions, in spite of their merit in making available works otherwise only to be found in widely scattered libraries, fail to provide the reader with information about the MSS. used, variant readings, etc., and this greatly reduces their scientific value.

⁸ Translation by Dieterici-Brönnle, *Die Staatsleitung von Alfarabi* (Leiden, 1904); text, *Kitāb as-Siyāsāt* (sic) *al-Madanīyah* (Hyderabad, 1346/1927). This is apparently an old mistake. Ibn abī Uṣaibi‘ah (*op. cit.* II, 139) already lists a *Kitāb as-Siyāsāt al-Madanīyah wa-yu‘rafu bi-Mabādi’ al-Manjūdāt*, but it is a duplicate entry. The work is conveniently referred to as the *Siyāsah*.

*Fāḍilah*¹ we find him dealing with a real and for al-Fārābī evidently central philosophical problem, since he returns to it repeatedly: that is, the end of political association. In these works, under Platonic inspiration, he lays down that the aim is the good, i.e. virtuous or happy, life, these terms being in effect the same, and that it is to be attained under the aegis of a ruler who is himself good, and therefore alone capable of providing virtue and happiness for his subjects. Combined with this is an appreciable amount of Aristotle, e.g. al-Fārābī's analysis of the virtues, which are rational (intellectual) as well as ethical and are means between opposite extremes, together with (especially in the last-named two works) an elaborate metaphysical structure derived from Neoplatonism, intended to show that all things, including the "active intellect" which operates directly on man's intellect and produces the objects of intelligence, emanate from the Deity, who is the first mover and cause of all. The ideas involved bear on psychology, theory of knowledge, ethics and metaphysics, and in effect form a philosophical system. If the ingredients appear somewhat incongruous (their combination may have been suggested by later Greek texts available in Arabic, though rather more probably it was al-Fārābī's own), from them he was able to produce an account of man's place in the world and action in society which still possesses a good deal of interest. It can scarcely be doubted that the ideas expressed in al-Fārābī's principal works on politics had never before appeared in Arabic together. It is for this reason in the long run that his claim to be the founder of political philosophy among the Arabs seems solidly based, if we are not indeed entitled to regard him as the first and perhaps the only system-builder in Islam.

¹ In full, *Kitāb Arā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* ("Opinions of the People of the Ideal City"), ed. Dieterici (Leiden, 1895), (there described as a *risālah*= short treatise, but elsewhere as a book, *kitāb*); translation by Dieterici, *Der Musterstaat* (Leiden, 1895), and more recently by R. P. Jaussen, Youssef Karam and J. Chlala, *Idées des Habitants de la Cité Vertueuse* (Textes et Traductions d'Auteurs Orientaux, ix, Cairo, 1949). This French translation is sometimes markedly better.

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4. THE "FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ"

(a) *Nature and date of the work*

The *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, to call the book by a convenient title,¹ represents on the face of it yet another attempt of al-Fārābī to formulate his ideas on politics and what he considered to be allied matters, on the lines especially of the *Kitāb as-Siyāsah* and the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*. The range of ideas is the same as in the other works. The definition of happiness, its pursuit and realization on earth, at least in part, under the rule of a virtuous king, the characterization of the states and rulers which fall short of the ideal, and the same metaphysical structure, recur again here, at greater or less length and with more or less emphasis. If we knew for certain the relation between the other works, it would evidently be easier to place the *Fuṣūl*. One difference in the latter seems to be a wider application to the art of government of the metaphor of medicine, which is worked out in considerable detail and appears throughout the whole book; also the metaphysical matter comes in the second half, not the first. The most striking external feature of the new work are the sections (*fuṣūl*), from which it derives its name.

Works in the *fuṣūl* form are to be found in Arabic literature

¹ So in MS. B only. MS. A has (fol. 1 a) *al-Fuṣūl al-Ḥikmīyah*. Neither of these titles comes in the enumerations of al-Fārābī's works in al-Qiftī, *Ta'riḫ al-Ḥukamā'* (ed. Lippert, 279-80) and Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, *'Uyūn al-Anbā'* (ed. Müller, II, 138-40), nor in the comparatively meagre lists in the *Fihrist* (ed. Flügel, 263) and *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-Ḥikmah* (ed. Muḥammad Shafī', 17). MS. A has the further title (fol. 1 b) *Fuṣūl muntaẓa'ah min aqāwīl al-qudamā, fī tadbīr al-mudun wa-mā taṣlihu bihi*, which may be brought into connection with one or other of those mentioned by Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah: *Mukhtaṣar fuṣūl falsafīyah muntaẓa'ah min kutub al-falāsifah*; *Kitāb fī'l-fuṣūl al-muntaẓa'ah li'l-ijtimā'āt*; *Fuṣūl labu mimma jama'ahu min kalām al-qudamā'*. These may possibly refer to a single work, viz. our *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, to which also the last item in al-Qiftī's list could apply: *al-Fuṣūl al-muntaẓa'ah min al-akhbār*, which Dieterici appears to mistranslate as "Einzelne geschichtliche Abschnitte" (*Alfarabi's philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leiden, 1892), p. 192). The *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* passed into Hebrew in an existing version, entitled in MS. *Ḥ Peraqīm li-Abū Naṣr*, etc. and in MS. *Ḥ Pirqē Abū Naṣr*, etc., i.e. simply Sections—or Aphorisms—by/of Abū Naṣr, etc. Cf. the Hebrew variants.

before the time of al-Fārābī, as well as later. Thus we have the medical *Fuṣūl* of Ibn Māsawaih (died 857), of the celebrated Rhazes (ar-Rāzī, died 925) and of Ibn al-Jazzār (died 1004), the original of all of which is doubtless the *Fuṣūl* or *Aphorisms* ascribed to Hippocrates, which had been translated by Ḥunain b. Ishāq. The Arabic word is rendered correctly "aphorisms" or "axioms". Maimonides (1139-1204) in the introduction to his own medical *Fuṣūl* explains the meaning of the term in Arabic literature and makes direct reference to al-Fārābī in the following passage.¹

It is plain to anyone who gives the slightest attention to the matter that all those who have composed *fuṣūl* in any science have not done so on the assumption that these *fuṣūl* are sufficient in that science, or include all its principles (*uṣūl*). Every one who has composed *fuṣūl* after this method has done so on meanings (*ma'ānī*) which he saw must all be present to the mind but are disregarded, or afford most of what is needed, and in general the aim which all who have written *fuṣūl* have had in mind is not to include everything needed in the particular science—neither Hippocrates in his *Fuṣūl*, nor Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī in all that he wrote in the form of *fuṣūl*,² nor anyone else.

It is clear from this that to write *fuṣūl* on a subject is in theory a convenient way of treating the salient points of an existing body of knowledge. In the case of al-Fārābī's political *Fuṣūl*, some or all of his other works mentioned above had in all probability already been written.

In subject-matter, as already mentioned, the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* bears a close resemblance to the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and the *Kitāb as-Siyāsah*, and also the *Tahṣīl*, which in at least one instance it actually quotes.³ We may expect some light on the relationship of these works from an important passage in Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, as follows.⁴

¹ Maimonides, *Fuṣūl*, ed. P. Kahle, in *Galenī in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Supplementum)* (1934), I, 94.

² Al-Fārābī wrote *fuṣūl* on logic, which I published with an English translation as "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic", *Islamic Quarterly*, II (1955), pp. 264-82. Cf. also n. 1, p. 9.

³ See notes on §§ 89, 90.

⁴ In 'Uyūn al-Anbā', ed. Müller, II, 138-9.

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The Book of the Ideal City, the Ignorant City, the Unrighteous City, the Altered City and the Deluded City.¹ He (*sc.* al-Fārābī) began the composition of this book in Baghdad and took it with him to Syria at the end of the year 330 A.H./941-2 A.D. He completed it in Damascus in the year 331/942-3, and wrote it out fair, after which he examined the MS. and divided it into chapters (*abwāb*). Then someone asked him to give it sections (*fuṣūl*), which would show the division of its subject-matter, so he made the sections in Egypt in the year 337/948-9. They are six in number.

The "Book of the Ideal City, the Ignorant City, the Unrighteous City, the Altered City and the Deluded City" is apparently the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*—or perhaps strictly, if the view which has recently been maintained by Dr 'Umar Farrūkh, that the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* is composite, is right²—the second, political half of that work. This is virtually certain, since "the Ignorant City, the Unrighteous City, the Altered City and the Deluded City" are the main types of divergence from the Ideal City only in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*.³ The natural assumption is that the *fuṣūl* of which Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah is here speaking are those of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* which, since it deals with the same subject as the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* in schematic form, may reasonably be supposed to have been written later, and on other grounds appears to have been a late work of al-Fārābī.⁴

There are, however, serious objections to this view. In the first place, the number of *fuṣūl* in the present Arabic text is ninety-five, not six as in the notice of Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah. The disparity is insuperable. Not all of the ninety-five appear in any one MS. and some may be additional, but in round figures ninety or so is the total. We could indeed suppose that "ninety" has somehow slipped out from Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah's text—though there is no MS. record of this—and that ninety-six was intended, but the suggestion is not very plausible. No MS. of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, Arabic or Hebrew, contains that number of sections. There is no evidence that the original number was ninety-six.

¹ For these terms see note to § 25.

² 'U. Farrūkh, *Al-Farābīyān* (Beirut, 1369/1950), p. 13.

³ Cf. note on § 25.

⁴ See below, pp. 13 ff.

But further, in Ibn Khallikān we find the following: ‘Abū Naṣr (sc. al-Fārābī) mentioned in his book entitled *as-Siyāsah al-Madanīyah* that he began its composition in Baghdad and completed it in Egypt.”¹ The sentence is not found in Dieterici’s translation of the *Siyāsah*, nor in the Hyderabad text. Like the passage just quoted from Ibn abī Uṣaibi’ah, it appears to be taken from the colophon of an ancient MS. which has not been re-copied subsequently.

Is the work which was begun in Baghdad and completed in Egypt the same as the work begun in Baghdad and afterwards divided into six sections in Egypt? If so, we get the results that the process described by Ibn abī Uṣaibi’ah has nothing directly to do with the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* as such, and that the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* represent different forms of the same work. The *Madīnah Fāḍilah* as we have it (i.e. including the metaphysical and political parts, in view of a passage in Mas’ūdī,² which appears to give a synopsis of both taken together and was written in 956) was completed in Damascus in or after 942–3, and the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* was apparently made from it in Egypt in 948–9. There is at least no doubt that the general content and arrangement of these two works is very similar, and that the affinities of the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* with the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* are much closer than, for instance, with the *Tahṣīl*, which appears to belong to another stage of al-Fārābī’s thinking. It has also to be added that the Hebrew version of the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* is called the “Six Principles” (*Shēsh Hathḥālōth*),³ from an expression

¹ Ed. of A.H. 1275, II, 113=translation of De Slane, III, 308.

² Mas’ūdī, *Tanbih*, 117–119. The passage should be compared with a table of contents at the beginning of the Arabic text of the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (ed. Dieterici), 1–4, headed: *Ikhtisār al-abwāb allatī fī kitāb al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah tā’līf abī Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ṭarkhān b. Ūṣlagh al-Fārābī at-Turkī*, and apparently forming an integral part of the work. If this is from the hand of al-Fārābī himself, it would follow that the division into nineteen *abwāb* there envisaged (not marked in Dieterici’s text) is that recorded by Ibn abī Uṣaibi’ah as having been made by al-Fārābī some time after 942 or 943.

³ M. Steinschneider, *Al Farabi, Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences de St.-Petersbourg*, VIIe série, tome XIII, 4 (1869), p. 64.

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which occurs at the beginning of the work. Though the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* in Dieterici's translation is in eleven sections, not easily reducible to six, there may be some relation, not necessarily the obvious one, between these "six principles" and the six *fuṣūl* mentioned by Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah.

As to the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* we have as yet, on this view, no satisfactory dating. Apart from close resemblance to the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and the *Siyāsah Madanīyah* already noted, there are indications of late date in the allusive character of its references to the states or cities opposed to the ideal (§§ 25, 28, 88). (The quotations from the *Tahṣīl*, especially that in § 90, which is found in all the MSS., are also to be noted, though they may be later additions.) Further, al-Fārābī in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* introduces two important terms, which apparently occur nowhere else in his political writings and seem to be new. In § 54 he says of the "first chief", or ideal ruler, that he is to have "power to fight the holy war (*jihād*) in person", and also, with some tautology apparently, "that there should be nothing in his body to prevent his attending to the matters which belong to the holy war". The "qualities" and "conditions" of the "first chief" are given in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, but there his functions are not envisaged as specifically military, though he must be sound of limb and have the physical strength necessary to carry out his task (*Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 59). Also in § 54 a "king according to the law" (*malik as-sunnah*), who is to rule in default of the ideal king and the true aristocracy, is given characteristics similar to those which are involved in the "six conditions" of the "second chief" in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (60-1), one of which is that he is able to go on the holy war. In the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* the "second chief" should have bodily strength to attend to the duties of war *simpliciter* (*ḥarb*). That the *jihād* was distinctly in al-Fārābī's mind in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* is clear from a long passage in Part II, where he speaks about the *mujāhid* (warrior for the faith). These striking references to *jihād* are surely not due to mere inadvertence, but rather correspond to a substantially different point of view. We naturally enquire what may be supposed to be meant by

jihād, in its ordinary sense, in al-Fārābī's lifetime. Similarly we may ask if the other term "king according to the law", which al-Fārābī seems to have derived from study of the *Laws* or the *Politicus* of Plato (see below), has also a contemporary reference.

These questions can only be answered by considering the course of events. If they can be answered satisfactorily, we shall get a dating for the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, which has so far escaped us. It has already been assumed that the work is late, *post* the *Taḥṣīl* and probably also *post* the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*. Al-Fārābī left Baghdad and went to Syria in 330/942, according to Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah. There was great confusion in the Muslim empire at this time, and in the same year the Caliph al-Muttaqī was forced to apply for help to the Ḥamdānids of Mosul. Nāṣir ad-Daulah, the Ḥamdānid, and his brother Saif ad-Daulah escorted the Caliph back from Mosul to Baghdad and received their honorific titles for so doing. Saif ad-Daulah, for a time governor of Wāsiṭ, occupied successively Aleppo and Homs in 333/944-5 and Damascus the following year, and by so doing became the leading political figure in northern Syria. Already he had been engaged against the Greeks, and after a check in 337/948-9 in 339/950 he raided Greek territory. This aggressive campaign, most unusual in the declining state of the Muslim empire, was the prelude to further severe fighting, and eventually in 962 the Greeks under Nicephorus, a future Emperor, took Aleppo and forced Saif ad-Daulah to flight.¹ Al-Fārābī did not live to see this disaster, having died in December 950 (Rajab 339).² The circumstances of his death are given in one source in the following terms:³

Al-Fārābī was journeying from Damascus to Ascalon, and was met by a company of the thieves called "the Lads" (*fityān*). Al-Fārābī said to them, "Take what I have of riding animals, arms and clothing, and let

¹ Marius Canard, *Histoire de la Dynastie des Ḥamdānides de Jazīra et de Syrie*, I (Paris, 1953), pp. 809-817. The other dates in the career of Saif ad-Daulah are from Ibn al-Athīr (ed. Tornberg), VIII.

² Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, *op. cit.* II, 134.

³ *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-Ḥikmah*, ed. Muḥammad Shafī', 19.

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me go". But they refused and determined to kill him. Seeing that there was no escape, Abū Naṣr (al-Fārābī) dismounted and fought till he was slain, with his friends. This greatly displeased the rulers of Syria (sc. the Ḥamdānids), who pursued the thieves and buried Abū Naṣr, and crucified them on tree-trunks close by his grave.

Another account says that Saif ad-Daulah and fifteen of his courtiers performed the funeral prayers for al-Fārābī.¹

These events form a framework into which various matters mentioned in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* may easily be fitted. At the end of § 88 al-Fārābī, after speaking of the disasters brought on the world by misrule, of which he must certainly have seen sufficient in Baghdad under al-Muttaqī and his immediate predecessors, goes on to say: "Therefore it is wrong for the virtuous man to remain in the corrupt politics, and he must emigrate to the ideal cities, if such exist in fact in his time. If they do not exist, then the virtuous man is a stranger in the present world and wretched in life, and to die is preferable for him than to live." Similar ideas are expressed in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and the *De Platonis Philosophia*² by al-Fārābī, but here in the *Fuṣūl* he speaks emphatically of the duty of emigration (*hijrah*). The word has important religious associations for every Muslim. It may well be that al-Fārābī regarded his departure from Baghdad as his personal *hijrah*.³ It certainly looks also as if the enemies of the faith, whose existence seems to be implied in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, and among al-Fārābī's extant political writings only there, were the Byzantine Greeks, against whom under the vigorous rule of Saif ad-Daulah the Muslims were again taking the offensive, as we have seen, in the last years of al-Fārābī's life. When he first made the acquaintance of Saif ad-Daulah is uncertain (perhaps already in Baghdad after the Ḥamdānid entry),⁴ but it is evident that at the

¹ Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, '*Uyūn al-Anbā'*', II, 134.

² Ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi, Plato Arabus*, II (London, 1943).

³ Avempace (Ibn Bājjah) speaks in one place (*Tadbīr al-Mutawaffih*, ed. Asín Palacios, 78) of the obligation upon his solitary sage to emigrate (*yuhājir*), evidently under the influence of al-Fārābī. Cf. below, 4(c).

⁴ Referred to above.

time of his death al-Fārābī enjoyed that ruler's high esteem. It is not at all unlikely that the "king according to the law" who in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* is in certain circumstances to take the place of the "first chief" is Saif ad-Daulah himself, especially if the "king according to the law" may be equated with the autocrat in the Arabic summary of the *Laws* who forcibly establishes the divine law in the state with the philosopher's approval.¹ How as a Shī'ite presumably, like the rest of the Ḥamdānids, he qualifies for the title *malik as-sunnah* may not be perfectly clear, but, apart from this, Saif ad-Daulah who assumed in Syria the power which the Caliph was incapable of exercising and became the active champion of Islam, is extraordinarily well adapted to the role of "second chief".

These and the foregoing considerations seem to be sufficient to allow us to place the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* at the end of al-Fārābī's literary career, when the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and the *Siyāsah* had been completed and the first engagements of the long war between Saif ad-Daulah and the Greeks were already being fought. It cannot be conceded that the *Tahṣīl* was later. The *Tahṣīl*, quoted in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* (§§ 89, 90) but rarely if ever referred to by subsequent Arabic writers, was evidently eclipsed by the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* and seems to belong to an earlier period of al-Fārābī's development. In the *Tahṣīl* al-Fārābī promises to describe separately the philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle.² This intention he afterwards carried out in the *De Platonis Philosophia* and its companion treatise on Aristotle, both of which are extant. There is certainly no room for all this literary activity in the period after 337/948-9, in which the composition of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* seems most naturally to fall. Tentatively, we may arrange al-Fārābī's main political writings in the following order: the *Tahṣīl*, written in Baghdad (the *De Platonis Philosophia* and its companion treatise later, probably in Baghdad); the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, begun

¹ Cf. F. Gabrieli, *Alfarabius: Compendium Legum Platonis, Plato Arabus*, III, Arabic text, 22 (quoted by E. I. J. Rosenthal, "The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Al-Farabi", *Islamic Culture*, XXIX (1955), p. 178, n. 1).

² Ed. Hyderabad, 47.

in Baghdad and completed in Damascus, as Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah tells us, in 331/942-3; the *Sijāsah* completed in Egypt in 337/948-9; the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, before al-Fārābī's death in Rajab 339 (December 950). If this scheme is correct, the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* is to be regarded as the last of al-Fārābī's extant political works, and perhaps the last he ever wrote, before his career was abruptly and unexpectedly terminated.

(b) *Relation to the Politicus of Plato*

Al-Fārābī certainly knew the general contents of the *Politicus*, which he describes as follows in the *De Platonis Philosophia*:¹

Then (Plato) investigated afterwards the practical art which gives the desired way of life, disposes actions aright and leads men's souls to happiness. He showed that it is the art of the king and the statesman, and showed the meaning of king and statesman. Then he showed that the philosopher and king are one, that both are perfected by a single craft and faculty, that both have a single craft which gives the knowledge desired from the first and the way of life desired from the first, and that it is that which effects, in those who acquire it and in all the rest of mankind, the happiness which in truth is happiness.

It is noticeable that the name of the dialogue is not mentioned here. Perhaps al-Fārābī did not know it. The name *Politicus*, however, occurs in Arabic earlier than al-Fārābī in a passage of Hunain b. Ishāq relative to Galen's *Synopses of the Platonic Dialogues*, which he translated.² No Arabic translation of the *Politicus* itself seems to be recorded.

We can hardly expect to find in the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* anything like a systematic exposition of the *Politicus*, yet evidently al-Fārābī had a wider acquaintance with its contents than is shown in his work just quoted. That the 'statesman and king' of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* (§§ 3, 4, cf. 11) is τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν of the *Politicus* (266E, cf. 311C) is beyond doubt. The *De Platonis*

¹ Ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, § 18.

² G. Bergstrasser, *Hunain b. Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xvii (1925), Arabic text, p. 50.

Philosophia has a similar expression, but nothing like the famous sentiment of *Politicus* 259B is found there. This comes in § 29 of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, where it is said that the king is king by virtue of the kingly art "whether he rules over people or not, whether he is honoured or not, whether he is rich or poor".

The idea of measurement as applied to the ruler, directly or by implication (cf. §§ 17, 89, etc.), and with reference to one of the subordinate classes in the ideal city in § 53, where the unusual term "measurers" or "assessors" (*muqaddirīm*) covers the "accountants, geometers, doctors, astrologers and the like", seems traceable to the "art of measurement", as expounded by Plato in *Politicus* 283B–287B. Again, the collocation of secretaries and priests, which catches the eye in § 62, may derive from a similar collocation in *Politicus* 290A–E.

The expression "king of, i.e. according to, the law" (*malik as-sunnah*) in § 54, which is difficult to explain as it stands and, as already mentioned, seems to occur nowhere else in al-Fārābī's political works, probably derives from *Politicus* 301A–B: "But when one man rules according to the laws, imitating him who possesses knowledge (*sc.* the ideal king), we call him king, not distinguishing in name between him who rules alone by knowledge and him who rules alone by opinion according to the laws."¹ The same idea of obedience to law as a second-best, when the ideal has been set aside, comes again in *Politicus* 297E.

From the instances where the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* shows points of contact with the Platonic dialogue we may infer that al-Fārābī knew it, not directly, but perhaps in some such compendium as that of Galen mentioned above.

(c) *Subsequent influence*

Something has already been said about later knowledge of al-Fārābī's political works. As far as the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* is concerned, there is not a great deal to add. It does not appear to have been at any time as highly regarded as some of the others,

¹ This seems nearer than the passage from the Arabic summary of Plato's *Laws*, referred to in n. 1 on p. 16.

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yet it was undoubtedly read and transcribed. It is cited by Joseph b. 'Aqnīn, the pupil of Maimonides,¹ and referred to inclusively by Maimonides himself in his *Aphorisms*.²

The *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* appears also among the sources of Averroes in his *Paraphrase of Plato's Republic*, as has already been pointed out by Dr E. I. J. Rosenthal.³ It may have been known to Avempace (Ibn Bājjah), though this is scarcely demonstrable. Two passages of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī* are relevant here. The first of these is in § 11: "The ancients named this man (*sc.* the possessor of all the virtues) divine (*ilābī*), while his opposite. . . they sometimes named wild beast (*sabū'*)." The same antithesis comes in the *Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid* ("Rule of the Solitary").⁴ It is perhaps due to a common source, cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VII, 1 (1145 a). The second passage, at the end of § 88 of the *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, has already been referred to (4 (a)). Here al-Fārābī speaks emphatically of the duty of the virtuous man to leave the corrupt polities and of the unenviable condition to which he may be reduced if there is nowhere for him to go. The *Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid* may be said to offer a solution of the predicament in which such a man finds himself, by recommending withdrawal from all society as a means to the good life, even in existing conditions. In one place Avempace envisages "*emigration* to the polities (*siyar*) in which are the sciences",⁵ making use of the same striking expression as here (§ 88).

The work continued to be read long afterwards. Not to speak of the MSS. listed below, the Hebrew translation is cited by Joseph b. Shēm Tōb as late as the fifteenth century.⁶

¹ Steinschneider, *Al Farabi*, p. 70.

² In the passage quoted above.

³ "The Place of Politics", pp. 174 ff., with reference to *jibād* (§ 54) and the "king of, according to, the law" (*ibid.*). See also Dr Rosenthal's *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's 'Republic'* (Cambridge, 1956), 208, 283.

⁴ Ed. Asín Palacios, 16–17, Spanish translation, 47–9, also D. M. Dunlop, "Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid* (Rule of the Solitary)", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1945), pp. 71–2, English transl., 80–1.

⁵ *Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid*, 78, cited above, p. 15 n. 3.

⁶ Steinschneider, *Hebräische Übersetzungen*, 292.

THE FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ

5. THE MANUSCRIPTS

In preparing this edition the following MSS. have been used:

B=Bodleian MS. Hunt. 307=Uri 102, fols. 91b-109a. This MS. was collated by Margoliouth for Dieterici's edition (p. vii) of the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*. Used in Bodleian photostats. Professor Beeston of Oxford kindly supplied the information that the MS. is without date or name of scribe or place of copying, but from the appearance of the paper and ink it can hardly be later than the seventh/thirteenth century. This MS. contains only the first part of the work, i.e. to the end of *fuṣl* 61 in the present text. From it a translation was made, which appeared in 1952. See D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Aphorisms of the Statesman", *Iraq*, xiv, 93-117. (The translation is there given from MS. B only and is in consequence very defective.)

A=Chester Beatty MS. 3714. Identified by Professor Arberry in the Chester Beatty collection. This MS. appears to have been completed in the first Rabi' 704, corresponding to October 1304, by Ibrahīm b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā at Damanhūr in the district of Buḥairah, i.e. in the north-west of the Nile delta. It contains Part I of the text (omitting §§ 26, 27 and 47 and running together §§ 25 and 28) and Part II, complete as here, i.e. a total of ninety-one *fuṣūl*, twenty-nine folios in all. The MS. has no other contents. Parts I and II have separate headings and colophons. Used in original MS.

These are the only known Arabic MSS.

⌘=Bodleian MS. Mich. 370=Neubauer, *Catalogue of Hebrew MSS. in the Bodleian Library*, No. 1424, fols. 102b-120a. Undated, but apparently older than

␣=Bodleian MS. Poc. 280=Neubauer, No. 1270, fols. 69b-91a. Dated on fol. 91a A.M. 5223=A.D. 1463.

The two last-mentioned MSS. contain the same Hebrew version, made by an unknown translator, which is better preserved in ⌘. MS. ⌘ has been collated throughout, MS. ␣ in part, from Bodleian photostats. ⌘ contains Part I (omitting with A §§ 26, 27 and 47) and Part II (omitting §§ 89 and 92), ninety *fuṣūl*. It has no separate colophon for Part I or heading for Part II. ␣ also contains both Parts (omitting §§ 89 and 92), eighty-nine *fuṣūl*. (The other data mentioned for ⌘ have not been checked.)

The procedure adopted has been to adhere to A, as the better

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of the two Arabic MSS., wherever possible, but to admit readings from B occasionally, where they seem clearly better. In Part II of course A is the basis of the text. The Hebrew version, principally in א, has been helpful in two directions, for computing the original number of *fuṣūl* and for controlling A in Part II. The number of additions from the Hebrew, some of them of considerable importance, practically all in Part II, calls for special remark. It may be noted here that while the Hebrew version is evidently nearer to A, which it repeatedly follows in major omissions, as well as in many readings, it occasionally offers the readings of B. The prevailing fault of all the MSS. is gratuitous omission owing to homoioteleuton. B and א, to judge from the few folios of the latter which have been collated, are the worst offenders, but the others are by no means exempt from blame on this head, as may readily be seen in the case of א by glancing at the table of Hebrew variants. A itself is little better. It is clear that each of these MSS. offers a widely different text. In the attempt to recover what al-Fārābī wrote eclecticism has seemed the only recourse.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasant duty to thank Professor A. J. Arberry for allowing me to make use of the complete text of the *Fuṣūl al-Madani* discovered by him (see 5: "The Manuscripts"), as well as for helpful suggestions in regard to the presentation of the work, and Professor A. F. L. Beeston of Oxford, who has been kind enough to answer a number of questions about MS. Huntington 307. For a better understanding of al-Fārābī's political philosophy I owe a special debt to Dr E. I. J. Rosenthal. If I have not always found myself in agreement with him, I have constantly felt the benefit of the rather frequent consultations which he has permitted me. I am grateful also to Dr Richard Walzer of Oxford for a number of pertinent criticisms of errors and omissions, which would otherwise have escaped notice. Dr J. L. Teicher has kindly provided the explanation of the anagram in the colophon of MS. א (see Hebrew Variants). I have also

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to thank the publications committee of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, who over a considerable period spent time and pains in seeking a medium for bringing out the work, the authorities of the Bodleian and the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, and finally the University Press, who have carried out the printing with the maximum of efficiency.

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE APHORISMS OF THE STATESMAN

PART I

The asterisks refer to the notes starting on p. 79

These are detached aphorisms* which include many basic considerations from the sayings of the ancients on how cities must be ruled and rendered prosperous and the lives of their people reformed, and how they must be directed towards happiness.

[1] To the soul as to the body belong health and sickness. The health of the soul is that its states and the states of its parts are those by which it always does good and noble deeds and fair actions. Its sickness is that its states and the states of its parts are those by which it always does wicked and evil deeds and ugly actions. The health of the body is that its states and the states of its parts are those by which the soul does its actions in the most complete and perfect manner, whether the actions done by the body or its parts are good or wicked actions. Its sickness is that its states and the states of its parts are those by which the soul does not do its actions, which are by the body or its parts, or does them defectively or otherwise improperly.

[2] The states of the soul by which a man does good deeds and fair actions are the virtues, and those by which he does wicked deeds and ugly actions are the vices, defects and base qualities.

[3] He who treats bodies is the doctor, and he who treats souls is the statesman, who is also called the king. But the doctor's aim in treating bodies is not to make their states those by which the soul does good or evil deeds. He aims merely at making their states those by which the actions of the soul performed by the body and its parts are the most perfect, whether these actions are evil or good. For the doctor who treats the hands does so simply that the man's power of grasping by their means may be excellent, whether he employs the excellent power of grasping in good or

evil deeds, and the aim of him who treats the eye is that by its means the sight may be excellent, whether it is employed in what is right and good, or in what is wrong and bad. Therefore it is not the business of the doctor *qua* doctor to consider the health or sickness of the soul in this way, but of the statesman and king. For the statesman by the political art and the king by the royal art estimates* where it is necessary to employ his art, and upon whom and upon whom not, and what kind of health it is necessary to provide for bodies and what kind it is necessary not to provide. Therefore the situation of the royal art and the political art among the other arts in the cities is that of the master-builder among the builders, because the other arts in the cities only operate and are employed that thereby the aim of the political art* and the royal art may be completely attained, just as the arts of the builders are employed to complete the purpose of the art of the master-builder.

[4] Just as the doctor who treats bodies needs to know the body as a whole, the parts of the body and their relation to the whole, the diseases which are liable to affect the whole body and each of its parts, whence they occur and from what amounts of a thing, the method of their removal and the states which when they appear in the body and its parts, the actions existing through the body are perfect and complete, so the statesman and king who treats souls needs knowledge of the soul as a whole, the parts of the soul, the defects and vices which are liable to affect it and every part of it, whence they occur and from what amounts of a thing, what are the states of the soul by which a man does good deeds, and how many they are, how the vices are to be removed from the people of the cities, the device for establishing them (*sc.* the virtues)* in the souls of the citizens* and the method of proceeding for their preservation among them, so that they do not cease. But it is requisite for him to know about the soul only as much as he needs in his art, just as the doctor requires to know about the body, the carpenter about wood and the smith about iron, only as much as he needs in his art.

[5] Physical objects are either artificial or natural. Examples of

the artificial are a couch, a sword, glass, and the like. Examples of the natural are man and the other animals. Each is made up of two things, matter and form. The matter is, for example, the wood of a chair, and the form is, for example, the shape of the chair, i.e. its squareness, roundness, etc. The matter is potentially a chair, and by the form it becomes a chair actually.

[6] The main parts and faculties of the soul are five: * the nutritive, the sensory, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational.

Λ. The nutritive, in general, operates in, with, or from the nutriment. Nutriment is of three types, first, intermediate, and last. The first type is such as bread, flesh-meat, and all that has not yet begun to be digested. The last is that which has been digested completely, so that it has become like the member which is nourished by it. If the member is flesh, it is by this nutriment becoming flesh; * if bone, it is by its becoming bone. The intermediate type is subdivided into two, viz. that which has been concocted * in the stomach and intestines till it is ready to produce blood, and the blood itself. To the nutritive belong the various sub-faculties: the digestive, the growing, the generative, the attractive, the retentive, the distinguishing and the expulsive. Strictly, the nutritive process is that which breaks down the blood accruing in the separate members till it becomes like that member, and the digestive process (*a*) is that which breaks down the first kind of nutriment in the stomach and intestines till it is ready to produce blood. Then it concocts * this preparation in the liver, for example, till it becomes blood. (*b*) The faculty of growth is that which through nutriment increases the size of the member in all its parts, as it develops, till it reaches the maximum size possible for each member. (*c*) The generative faculty is that which produces from the excess of the nutriment which is near to the last type, viz. the blood, another body alike in species to the body from whose nutriment the excess appeared. This faculty is of two kinds, the female, which gives the matter of the new birth, and the male, which gives its form. From these two an animal comes into existence from another alike in species. (*d*) The attractive faculty is that which

draws the nutriment from place to place, till it reaches the body which is nourished,* so that it may be in contact with it and mingle with it. (e) The retentive faculty is that which preserves the nutriment in the vessel of the body into which it has accrued. (f) The distinguishing faculty is that which distinguishes excessive amounts of the nutriment and the kinds of nutriment, in order to transmit to each member what is suitable to it. (g) The expulsive faculty is that which expels the different kinds of excessive nutriment from one place to another.

B. The sensory faculty is that which perceives by one of the five senses known to all.

C. The imaginative faculty is that which preserves the traces of the objects of sense after they have passed from the operation of the senses upon them. It combines some of them with others in various combinations and separates them from each other in many different ways, some true, some false, in waking and dreaming both. This faculty and the nutritive may be active in sleep, unlike the rest of the faculties.

D. The appetitive faculty is that by which the animal is drawn to a thing, and in consequence there come into existence desire for the thing and dislike of it, seeking and fleeing, preference and avoidance, anger and pleasure, fear, boldness and cowardice, cruelty and mercy, love and hate, passion, lust and the other accidents of the soul. The instruments of this faculty are all the faculties by which are facilitated the movements of all the members and the body as a whole, e.g. the faculty of the hands to grasp, of the legs to walk, etc.

E. The rational faculty is that by which a man intellects. By it comes deliberation, by it he acquires the sciences and arts, and by it he distinguishes between the fair and ugly in actions. It is partly practical and partly theoretical.* The practical is partly a matter of skill and partly reflective. The theoretical is that by which man knows the existents which are not such that *we* can make them and alter them from one condition to another, e.g. three is an odd and four an even number. For we cannot alter three so that it becomes even, while still remaining three, nor four so that it

becomes odd, while still four, as we can alter a piece of wood so that it becomes round after being square, remaining wood in both cases. The practical is that by which are distinguished the things which are such that *we* can make them and alter them from one condition to another. What is a matter of skill and art is that by which the skills are acquired, e.g. carpentry, agriculture, medicine, navigation. The reflective is that by which we deliberate on the thing which we wish to do, when we wish to know whether to do it is possible or not, and if it is possible, how we must do the action.

[7] The virtues are of two kinds, ethical and rational.* The rational virtues are the virtues of the rational part, such as wisdom, intellect, cleverness, readiness of wit, excellence of understanding. The ethical virtues are the virtues of the appetitive part, such as temperance, bravery, generosity, justice. The vices are similarly divided into two classes.

[8] The ethical virtues and vices result and are established in the soul, simply by repeating the actions which proceed from a particular disposition many times over a certain period and becoming accustomed thereto. If these actions are good deeds, what results to the soul is a virtue, but if they are wicked, what results to it is a vice, just as in the case of the arts, e.g. writing. For by our repeating the actions of writing many times and becoming accustomed to them, there results to us and is established in us the art of writing. If the actions of writing which we repeat and accustom ourselves to are bad actions, bad writing is established in us, but if good actions, good writing is established in us.

[9] A man cannot be created from the beginning naturally endowed with a virtue or defect, just as he cannot be created naturally a weaver or a secretary. But it is possible that he should be naturally disposed to the conditions of a virtue or vice,* by its actions being easier for him than the actions of anything else, just as it is possible that he should be naturally disposed to the actions of writing or another art by these being easier for him than the actions of anything else, so that he is moved from the first

towards doing what is naturally easier for him, when there is no outside force working in the opposite direction. This natural disposition is not spoken of as a virtue, just as the natural disposition towards the actions of weaving is not spoken of as weaving. But when a natural disposition is towards the actions of a virtue and those actions are repeated, become habitual and are established by habit, till there appears in the soul a state from which precisely those actions proceed, the state established from the habit is said to be a virtue. The natural state is called neither a virtue nor a vice, even if there proceed from it actions of the single type only. The natural state has no name, and if anyone calls it a virtue or a vice, this is simply because of homonymy, not that the meaning of the one is the meaning of the other. It is for the state which is due to habit that a man is blamed or praised. He is neither praised nor blamed for the other.

[10] It is unlikely and improbable that anyone exists who is by nature completely disposed to all the virtues,* ethical and rational, just as it is unlikely that anyone exists who is by nature disposed to all the arts. Similarly it is unlikely and improbable that anyone exists who is by nature disposed to all wicked actions. Yet both cases are not impossible. Most commonly, each man is disposed towards a certain virtue or a certain definite number of virtues, or a certain art or certain definite arts, so that this man is disposed towards a first virtue or art, another to another, and a third to a third.

[11] When to the natural states and dispositions towards virtue and vice there are annexed the ethical qualities resembling them and they become established by habit, the man is perfected therein, and the disappearance of such states as have once been established in him, whether good or bad, is difficult. When at any time there exists someone who is by nature completely disposed towards all the virtues and they become established in him by habit, this man is superior in virtue to the virtues found in the most of mankind, so that he almost passes beyond the human virtues to what is a higher class than man. The ancients named this man divine, while his opposite, the man disposed to all

wicked actions, in whom the states of those wicked acts have become established by habit, they almost removed from human wickedness to what is yet worse than it. He had no name among them because of the excess of his wickedness, though sometimes they named him "wild beast",* and the like. These two extremes are found but rarely among mankind. When the first type existed he was in their opinion of higher rank than to be a statesman, serving the cities, but should rule all cities as the true king. As for the second type, if it happened that he existed, he neither ruled any city at all nor served it, but was driven out from all cities.*

[12] Of the states and natural dispositions towards a virtue or vice some may be made to disappear and be altered by habit completely, being replaced by states contrary to them. Others may be broken down and weakened and impaired in force without disappearing completely. Others again cannot be made to disappear and be altered, nor to have their strength impaired, but may be opposed by resisting and by restraining the soul from their actions and by contending and striving, so that the man always does the opposite of their actions. Similarly when the qualities are bad and are established in the soul by habit, they also are subject to the same division.

[13]* Between the man who restrains himself and the virtuous man is a difference, viz., that the man who restrains himself, though as doing good deeds he does virtuous actions, likes and desires wicked actions and contends with his liking. In his action he does the opposite of what his state and desire prompt him to. He does good deeds, yet suffers in doing them.* The virtuous man* in his action follows what his state and desire prompt him to, and does good deeds, liking them and desiring them, not feeling pain but finding pleasure in them. It is like the difference between enduring a violent pain from which one suffers and not being pained or feeling pain at all. And similarly the temperate man and the man who restrains himself. The temperate man simply does what the law (*sunna*) lays down in matters of food, drink and sex, without desire or longing for anything else, other

than what the law lays down. The man who restrains himself has a desire for these things which is excessive and contrary to what the law lays down. He does the actions of the law, but his desire is opposed to it, except that in many things the man who restrains himself is similarly situated to the virtuous man.

[14] Wicked acts disappear from the cities either by the virtues which are established in the souls of the people, or by the latter being made subject to self-imposed restraint. When the evil coming from any man cannot be removed either by virtue being established in his soul or by self-imposed restraint, he is driven out from the cities.

[15] It is unlikely, or rather impossible, that a man exists created with a disposition towards certain actions, and is then unable to do the opposite of those actions. Rather any man created with a state and disposition towards the actions of a virtue or vice is able to resist and do an action issuing from the opposite disposition. But that is difficult for him, until it is facilitated by habit and becomes easy, just as in the case of what is established by habit. For leaving off what he has become accustomed to and doing the opposite is possible, though difficult till he accustoms himself to it, as we have said.

[16]* Actions which are good deeds are the moderate, mean actions between two extremes, both of which are bad, the one excess and the other defect. And similarly the virtues, for they are mean states and qualities of the soul between two other states, both of which are vices, the one excessive and the other defective. For example, temperance is a mean between greed and non-perception of pleasure, where one, viz. greed, is excessive, and the other defective. Generosity is a mean between parsimony and extravagance. Courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice. Wit is a mean in jesting, play and so forth between impudence and folly, and dullness. Being respectful is a middle quality between pride, and base behaviour and familiarity. Courtesy is a mean between haughtiness, boasting and vain-glory, and self-abasement. Forbearance is a mean between excessive anger and the state in which one never becomes angry at any-

thing. Modesty is a mean between shamelessness, and bashfulness and confusion. Friendliness is a mean between surliness and flattery. And so on.

[17] The expressions “mean” and “moderate” are applied in two ways: (*a*) the mean in itself; and (*b*) the mean compared and related to something else. Of (*a*) an example is six being a mean between ten and two, for the excess of ten over six is like the excess of six over two. This is a mean in itself between two extremes, and similarly for every number resembling this. It is the mean without increase or decrease, for what is a mean between ten and two is not at any time other than six. (*b*) The relative mean increases and decreases at different times and with reference to the difference of the things to which it is related, e.g. moderate food for a boy, and moderate food for an adult, labouring man, which differs with reference to the difference of condition of their two bodies. The mean in one of them is different from the mean in the other in amount and number, in roughness and smoothness, in heaviness and lightness, and, in general, in quantity and quality. Similarly moderate temperature is relative to the bodies. That is also the case of the moderate and mean in foods and medicines,* for they increase and decrease in quantity and quality according to the bodies which are treated with them, according to the patient’s previous custom, according to the time of year and according to the strength of the actual remedy, so that in the case of one sick man one remedy differs in its quantity according to the difference of the time of the year.

It is this latter mean which is employed in actions and in morals. For the quantity of actions must be measured by number and amount and their quality by strength and weakness, according to the relation to the agent and the object* and cause of the action and according to the time and place, e.g. anger, in which the moderate has reference to the condition of him against whom one is angry, the cause of the anger and the time and place involved. Similarly beating and punishments are measured in quantity and quality with reference to the beater and the beaten,

the crime for which the beating takes place and the instrument which is used. And so in other actions. The mean in every action is what is measured with reference to the circumstances of the action.* The things with which the different actions are compared in order to be measured are not the same in amount in every action. On the contrary, this action, for example, is measured in relation to five things, and another action in relation to things fewer, or more, than five.

[18] Just as the mean in foods and medicines is a mean and moderate for most men most of the time, is sometimes moderate for one group to the exclusion of another at a particular time, and sometimes moderate for individual bodies at individual times, long or short, similarly the mean and moderate in actions is sometimes moderate for all or most men most or all of the time, sometimes moderate for one group to the exclusion of another at a particular time and sometimes moderate for a man at one time and not at another.

[19] He who brings out and produces the mean and moderate of whatever kind in foods and medicines is the doctor. The art by which he brings it out is medicine. He who produces the mean and moderate in morals and actions is the ruler of the city and the king. The art by which he brings it out is the political art and the kingly craft.

[20] By "city" and "household" the ancients did not mean the dwelling simply, but the dwelling which contains people and the people whom the dwellings contain, of whatever kind the dwellings, of whatever material and wherever they are—under the earth or on it, of wood or clay or wool and hair,* or anything else of which dwellings which contain men are made.

[21]* The household consists of and is rendered prosperous by parts and definite partnerships. These are four in number: (1) husband and wife; (2) master and servant; (3) parent and child; (4) property and owner. The ruler of these parts and partnerships, who combines some of them with others and joins each individual to the other, so that from them together there come partnership in actions and mutual help towards the perfec-

tion of a single aim and towards the complete establishment of the household with good things and their preservation to them, is the lord and ruler of the household. He is called the householder, and in the household he is like the ruler of the city in the city.

[22] The city and the household may be compared with the body of a man. Just as the body is composed of different parts of a determinate number, some more, some less excellent, adjacent to each other and graded, each doing a certain work, and there is combined from all their actions mutual help towards the perfection of the aim in the man's body, so the city and the household are each composed of different parts of a determinate number, some less, some more excellent, adjacent to each other and graded in different grades, each doing a certain work independently, and there is combined from their actions mutual help towards the perfection of the aim in the city or household, except that the household is part of a city and the households are in the city, so the aims are different. Yet there is combined from these different aims, when they are perfected and combined, mutual help towards the perfection of the aim of the city. This again may be compared with the body, since the head, breast, belly, back, arms and legs are related to the body as the households of the city to the city. The work of each of the principal members is different from the work of the other, and the parts of each one of these principal members help one another by their different actions towards the perfection of the aim in that principal member. Then there is combined from the different aims of the principal members, when they are perfected, and from their different actions, mutual help towards the perfection of the aim of the whole body. And similarly the situation of the parts of the households with respect to the households and the situation of the households with respect to the city, so that all the parts of the city by their combination are useful to the city and useful for the continued existence of the one through the other, like the members of the body.

[23] As the doctor treats any sick member only in accordance

with its relation to the whole body and the members adjacent to it and connected with it, since he treats it with a cure by which he affords it health whereby the whole body benefits, and the members adjacent to it and connected with it benefit, so the ruler of the city must necessarily rule the affair of each part of the city, small, like one man, or great, like a household, and treat it and afford it good in relation to the whole city and each of the other parts of the city, by seeking to do what affords that part a good which does not harm the whole city nor any of its parts, but a good from which the city as a whole benefits, and each of its parts according to its degree of usefulness to the city. And just as when the doctor does not observe this, aims at providing health to a particular member and treats it without regard to the condition of the other members near it, or treats it with what is bad for all the other members, and affords it health but thereby does something which does not benefit the body as a whole nor the members adjacent to it and connected with it, that member is impaired, as well as the connected members, and the evil permeates the other members, till the whole body is corrupted, so the city also.

[24] It is not disallowed that there is a man who has power to produce the mean in actions and morals as far as he himself is concerned, just as it is not disallowed that a man has power to produce the mean and moderate as regards the food with which he alone is nourished. The latter is a medical action, and he has power over a part of the art of medicine. So he who produces the moderate as regards morals and actions, as far as he himself is concerned, does so because he has power over a part of the political art, except that he who has power to produce the moderate for a particular one of his members, when he is not careful that what he is producing is not prejudicial to the other parts of the body and it is not made useful to the whole body and to its parts, operates with a part of a corrupt medical art. Similarly the man who has power to produce the moderate for himself in particular, with reference to morals and actions, if in what he produces he does not seek the advantage of the city

nor of the rest of its parts, not perceiving it, or perceiving it and not minding the disadvantage to them, operates with a part of a corrupt political art.

[25] The city is sometimes "indispensable" and sometimes ideal.* The indispensable (or "minimum") city is that in which the mutual help of its members is restricted to attaining merely what is indispensable for the continuance of man, his livelihood and the preservation of his life. The ideal city is that in which the inhabitants help each other towards the attainment of the most excellent of things by which are the true existence of man, his continuance, his livelihood and the preservation of his life. Some think that this most excellent thing is the enjoyment of pleasures. Others think that it is riches. Yet others think that it is the combination of both.* But Socrates, Plato and Aristotle thought that man has two lives. The continuance of the first is due to nourishment and the other external things which we need today for our continued existence. It is our first life. The other is that of which the continuance is in its essence without its requiring for the continuance of its essence things external to it, but it is sufficient in itself for its continued preservation. It is the after-life. Man, according to them, has a first and a last perfection. The last results to us not in this life but in the after-life, when there has preceded it the first perfection in this life of ours.

The first perfection is that a man does the actions of all the virtues, not that he is merely endowed with a virtue without performing its actions, and the perfection consists in his acting, not in his acquiring the qualities by which the actions come, as the perfection of the secretary is that he performs the actions of writing, not that he acquires the art of writing, and the perfection of the doctor, that he performs the actions of medicine, not that he acquires the art of medicine merely, and similarly every art. This perfection affords us the last perfection,* which is ultimate happiness, i.e. the absolute good. It is that which is chosen and desired for itself and is not chosen, at any time whatever, for the sake of anything else. All else is chosen for its use in the attainment of happiness. Everything is good when it is useful for the

attainment of happiness, and whatever interferes with happiness in any way is bad. The ideal city according to them is that whose inhabitants help one another towards the attainment of the last perfection, i.e. ultimate happiness. Therefore its inhabitants in particular are endowed with virtues above the other cities, because in the city whose inhabitants aim at helping each other to attain riches and enjoy pleasures they do not need for the attainment of their end all the virtues, or rather perhaps do not need even a single one. That is because the harmony and justice which they may employ among themselves is not truly justice, but only something resembling justice, not being so,* and similarly the other pseudo-virtues which they employ among themselves.

[26] Moderate, mean actions, measured in relation to the circumstances which attach to them must be, among other conditions, useful in attaining happiness, and he who produces them must make happiness the mark for his eyes.* Then he must consider how he is to measure the actions so that they may be useful either to the people of the city as a whole or to single persons among them, in the attainment of happiness, just as the doctor makes health the mark for his eyes when he tries to produce the moderate in the foods and medicines with which he treats the body.

[27] The true king is he whose aim and purpose in the art by which he rules the cities are that he should afford himself and the rest of the people of the city true happiness, which is the end and aim of the kingly craft. It is quite necessary that the king of the ideal cities should be the most perfect of them in happiness, since he is the cause of the happiness of the people of the city.

[28] Some think that the end and purpose in kingship and the rule of cities is greatness and honour and domination and commanding and forbidding and being obeyed and made much of and praised,* and they choose honour for its own sake, not for anything else which they obtain by it. They make the actions by which they rule the cities actions by which they may attain this aim, and they make the laws of the city laws by which they may

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attain this aim from the people of the city. Some of them attain it by employing virtue towards the people of the city, doing good to them, bringing them to the good things which in the opinion of the people of the city are goods, preserving the good things for them and preferring them above themselves therein. They thus obtain great honour. These are chiefs of honour and the most excellent of chiefs.* Others of them think that they merit honour on account of riches. They aim at being the richest of the people of the city and at being unique in wealth that they may obtain honour. Some of them think that honour is given for descent alone.* Others seek to obtain it by forcing the people of the city, dominating over them, humiliating and frightening them.*

Yet others of the rulers of cities think that the aim in the rule of cities is riches.* They make their actions by which they rule the cities actions by which they may attain riches, and they make the laws of the people of the city,* laws by which they may attain riches from the people of the city, and if they choose a good or do anything of that kind, they choose and do it that riches may accrue to them. It is well known that between the man who chooses riches that he may be honoured for them and the man who chooses honour and the obedience of others that he may be wealthy and attain riches there is a great difference. The latter are called people of base headship.*

Others of the rulers of cities think that the end in the rule of cities is the enjoyment of pleasures.* Others again think that it is all these three, honour, riches and pleasures, and they monopolize them and make the people of the city as it were their tools to obtain pleasures and riches. Not one of these was called king by the ancients.

[29] The king is king by the kingly craft,* by the art of ruling cities and by the power to employ the kingly art, at whatever time he has come to be chief over a city, whether he is known for his art or is not known for it, whether he has found implements to use or not, whether he has found people to receive from him or not, whether he is obeyed or not, just as the doctor is doctor by the medical craft, whether men know him for it or not, whether

artificial implements are ready for him or not, whether he has found people to serve him in carrying out his orders or not, whether he has met with sick persons to receive his words or not, and his medicine is not deficient if he has none of these things. Similarly the king is king by the craft and the power to employ the art, whether he rules over people or not, whether he is honoured or not, whether he is rich or poor.

Some people think that they should not apply the name of king to him who possesses the kingly craft without his being obeyed and honoured in a city. Others add to that riches, while others think to add rule by force, subjection, terrorizing and fear. None of these belong to the essential conditions of kingship, but are things which may be useful to the kingly craft, and are thought on that account to be kingship.

[30]* The rational speculative part (*sc.* of the soul) and the rational reflective part have each a corresponding virtue.* The virtue of the speculative part is speculative intellect, knowledge and wisdom. The virtue of the reflective part is practical intellect, practical wisdom*, discernment, excellence of idea and correctness of opinion.

[31] Speculative intellect is a faculty to which comes by nature, not by search and not by analogy, the certain knowledge of the universal necessary premisses which are the principles of the sciences, e.g. our knowledge that the whole is greater than the part, that quantities equal to the same quantity are equal to one another, and the like premisses. It is from these that a man begins, and he goes on to the knowledge of the rest of the speculative existents, which are such that they exist without man's contrivance. This intellect is sometimes in potency, when these first principles do not occur to it, but when they do occur, it becomes intellect in act, and its disposition is strong enough to produce what is prepared for it. This faculty cannot be in error in regard to what occurs to it, but all the species of knowledge which reach it are true and certain and cannot be otherwise.

[32] The word "knowledge" is applied to many things, but the knowledge which is a virtue of the speculative part is that

there comes to the soul certainty of the existence of the existents whose existence and continuance do not depend on the contrivance of man at all, what each of these is and how, from proofs composed of true premisses, necessary and universal—first principles* in which is certainty and which occur known to the intellect naturally. This knowledge is of two kinds: (*a*) where there is certainty of the existence of the thing, the reason for its existence, and the fact that neither it nor its cause can by any means be different; and (*b*) where there is certainty of its existence and the fact that it cannot be different, without attending to the cause of its existence.

[33] Real knowledge is what is true and certain at all times, not at some time rather than another, and (not) what exists at a particular time and may not exist afterwards, for in that case we should know something existing now, but when some time has passed, it has possibly ceased to exist, so that we do not know whether it exists or not and our certainty turns to doubt and falsehood. And what may be so is not knowledge and certainty. On that account the ancients did not make perception of what may alter from one state to another knowledge, e.g. our “knowledge” that this man is now sitting down. For it may be that he will change and come to be standing up after he was sitting. Rather they made knowledge certainty of the existence of a thing which cannot change, e.g. that three is an odd number. For the oddness of the number three does not change. Three cannot in any case become even, nor four odd. If the example cited is called knowledge or certainty, it is by a metaphor.

[34]* Wisdom is knowledge of the remote causes by which exist all the rest of the existents and the proximate causes of the things which are caused, i.e. there is certainty of their existence,* and we know what and how they are, and that, however many they are, they ascend in order to one Existence which is the cause of the existence of those remote causes and the proximate causes below them; that that One is the First in truth, and its continued existence is not due to the existence of anything else, but it is sufficient in itself, not deriving existence from another;

that it can by no means derive existence from another and can by no means be body or in body; that its existence is a different existence, outside the existence of the other existents, sharing not at all with any of them in meaning, but if it shares, this is in name only, not in the meaning understood from the name; that it can only be one; that it is the One in truth and that which affords to the rest of the existents the unity by which we come to say of any existent that it is one; that it is the First Truth, affording truth to other things and self-sufficient in respect of its truth, not deriving it from another; that it is impossible for greater perfection to be imagined, much less exist, and no existence is more complete than its existence, no truth more (true) than its truth, no unity more complete than its unity. And we know (*sc.* by wisdom) at the same time how the rest of the existents have derived existence, truth and unity from it, what is the share of each of them in existence, truth and unity, and how other things have derived from it their significance.^{1*} We know all the classes of the existents, that among them are first, intermediate and last, and the last have causes but are not causes of anything lower, while the intermediate have a cause above them and are causes of the things below them, and that the First is the cause of what is below it but has no other cause above it. And we know at the same time how the last ascend to the intermediate and how the intermediate ascend variously till they reach the First, then how the rule begins from the First and is transmitted through each individual of the rest of the existents in order, till it reaches the last. This is the true meaning of wisdom. The name is sometimes applied by metaphor, so that those who excel and are perfect in the arts are called wise.

[35] Practical intellect is a faculty by which a man from much experience of things and long observation of the data of sense attains certain premisses by which it is possible for him to take account of what should be chosen and avoided in the individual things within our power.* Some of these premisses turn out to be universal, subsuming things which should be chosen and

¹ Or "and how other causes have derived from it their causality". Cf. the Hebrew variants.

avoided, while others are isolated and partial, to be used as examples for what the man has not seen and wishes to take account of. This intellect is only intellect in potency, so long as the experience has not come. When the experience has come and is remembered, it becomes intellect in act. This intellect in act increases with the increase of the experiences in all the occasions of a man's life.

[36] Practical wisdom* is the power of excellence of deliberation* and production of the things which are most excellent and best in what is done to procure for a man a really great good and an excellent and noble end, whether that is happiness or something which is indispensable for obtaining happiness. Cleverness is the power of excellent production of what is finest and best for attaining certain minor goods. Astuteness is the power of correct deliberation in the production of what is most excellent and best for a large amount to be realized of the riches, pleasure or honour regarded as good. Deceit, slyness and dissimulation is excellence of production of what is most effective and best for a paltry amount to be realized of the base gain or base pleasure regarded as good. All these things merely lead to the end but are not the end, and similarly all deliberation. For a man merely sets up the end which he desires and longs for as the object of his thought, then after that he deliberates on the number, nature and quality of the things by which he may attain that end.

[37] Just as the sick in body are led to imagine by the derangement of their sense that what is sweet is bitter, and what is bitter, sweet, and they conceive a thing to be wholesome when it is not* and unwholesome when it is wholesome, so wicked and vicious men, being sick in their souls, are led to imagine that wicked deeds are good and good deeds wicked. The man virtuous with the ethical virtues desires and longs always for the ends that are good in reality and makes them his aim and purpose. The wicked man desires always the ends that are wicked in reality, but imagines them good, on account of the sickness of his soul. Therefore the man of practical wisdom must be virtuous with the ethical virtues* (and so the clever man, the astute and the deceitful

man being wicked and vicious),* in order that the man of practical wisdom may get the end right by the virtue which is in him, and get right what leads to the end by excellence of deliberation.

[38] Practical wisdom is of many types, including excellence of deliberation on that by which the household is ruled, which is domestic practical wisdom. Also it includes excellence of deliberation on the most effective method of ruling cities, which is political practical wisdom. Or again it includes excellence of deliberation on what is best and finest for the attainment of excellence of livelihood through acquiring human goods, such as riches, greatness, etc., after its being good and being indispensable for obtaining happiness. Another type is consultative, viz. what is produced not to be employed by the man for himself, but to give advice thereby to another, either in the rule of a household or a city or otherwise. Another type is special, viz. the power to produce a true and excellent idea with which to resist the enemy and the opponent in general, or ward him off thereby. It is likely that a man needs some practical wisdom in all that he is concerned with, either little or much. This depends on the business he handles, for if it is much or important, he needs stronger and more complete practical wisdom, while if it is little or unimportant, he has enough with little practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is also that which the common people call intelligence. When this faculty is in a man, he is called intelligent.

[39] True opinion is that whenever a man sees a thing, his opinion always finds the truth of how the thing seen must be.

[40] Discernment is the power to find the true judgement in regard to that on which the customary opinions are at variance, and the faculty of being right. It is excellence in producing the opinion which is right, and is therefore a kind of practical wisdom.

[41] Excellence of idea is that a man should have ideas or excellent ideas, i.e. that a man should be good and virtuous in his actions, then that he should have ideas, and his words, ideas, and counsel should have been tested many times and found sound and right, bringing the man, when he employs them, to approved

results, and that his words should therefore have come to be welcomed, I mean, because of the truth which is commonly witnessed in him, so that his well known virtue, sound judgement and counsel can dispense him from having to say or point out anything by way of argument or proof. Evidently when a man gets the idea right and takes account of the truth of it, he does so only by practical wisdom. This then is a kind of practical wisdom.

[42] The principles used by the person deliberating in producing the thing which he deliberates on, are twofold: (*a*) the well-known presuppositions taken from all or most people, and (*b*) the facts which come by experience and personal observation.

[43] The simple man is he whose imagining of the common form of what should be chosen and avoided is sound, except that he has no experience of the practical things which should be known by experience. A man is sometimes simple in one class of things and not simple in another class.

[44] The confused man is he whose imagination is always, in what should be chosen and avoided, the opposite of the well-known things and the opposite of what the custom is. Sometimes it happens to him besides that he imagines the opposite of what is well known in the other existents, in many of the sense-perceptions.

[45] Foolishness is that his imagination of the well-known things is sound, he has stored experience, his imagination of the ends which he desires and longs for is sound, and he possesses deliberation, but it is deliberation which always causes him to imagine in what does not lead to the end that it leads to it, or causes him to imagine in what leads to the end that it does not lead to it, so that his action and counsel are always according to what his impaired deliberation causes him to imagine. For that reason the fool at first sight has the form of the intelligent man. His purpose is sound, but often his deliberation brings him into trouble, when he did not intend to fall into it.

[46]* Readiness of wit is excellence of conjecture about a thing quickly, without any time, or in a short time.

[47] Practical wisdom and cleverness both need a natural

employment for which a man is created. When a man is created disposed to complete practical wisdom, and then becomes habituated to the vices, he is changed and altered and there come into existence, instead of practical wisdom, astuteness, dissimulation and trickery.*

[48]* Certain people call the practically wise of mankind wise. But wisdom is the most excellent knowledge of the most excellent existents.* Since practical wisdom merely attains things human, it need not be wisdom, unless indeed man is the most excellent thing in the world* and the most excellent of existents. But since man is not so, then practical wisdom is not wisdom, except by metaphor and simile.

[49] Since wisdom is particularly knowledge of the ultimate causes of every last existent,* and the ultimate end on account of which man exists is happiness,* and the end is one of the causes,* then wisdom is that which acquaints one with what is true happiness. Also, since wisdom alone possesses knowledge of the One, the First, from which the rest of the existents derive virtue and perfection, and knows how each one derives these from it and how much each takes as its share of perfection, and man is one of the existents which derive perfection from the One, the First, then (wisdom) knows the greatest perfection which man derives from the First, viz. happiness. Wisdom then acquaints one with true happiness, and practical wisdom acquaints one with what must be done to attain happiness. These two then are the two ingredients in the perfecting of man, so that wisdom is that which gives the ultimate end, and practical wisdom gives that by which the end is attained.

[50] Rhetoric is the power of address by which comes excellence of persuasion in regard to each of the possible things which are to be chosen and avoided, except that the virtuous man who possesses this faculty employs it for good deeds, and so the man of practical wisdom in good [and evil] deeds, while astute men employ it for evil deeds.

[51] Excellence in producing an imaginative impression is not excellence of persuasion. The difference between them is that

excellence of persuasion aims at the hearer doing the thing, after a conviction of truth, while excellence in producing an impression of this kind aims at the soul of the hearer rising up to seek the thing imagined or flee from it, and be drawn to it or dislike it, even without a conviction of truth, just as a man is disgusted with something which, when he sees it, resembles what really calls forth disgust, though he is certain that what he sees is not what calls forth disgust. Excellence in producing an imaginative impression is employed in what causes anger and pleasure, fear and trust, in what softens the soul and hardens it, and in all the passions of the soul.* With excellence in producing an imaginative impression the aim is that the man should be moved to do the thing and rise up towards it, even though his knowledge of the thing necessitates the opposite of what is represented to his imagination. Many people, when they love and hate, and choose and avoid, do so by the imagination not deliberation, either because they have not deliberation naturally or have rejected it in their affairs.

[52]* All poetry has been invented to produce an excellent imaginative impression of the object. It is of six kinds, three of which are praised and three blamed. Of the three which are praised one is that by which are aimed at the improvement of the rational faculty, and that its actions and thought should be directed towards happiness, the production of an imaginative impression of divine matters and good deeds, excellence in producing an imaginative impression of the virtues and approving them, the reprobating of evil deeds and the vices, and holding them in scorn. The second kind is that by which are aimed at the improvement and correction of those accidents of the soul which are related to strength, and the breaking of them down till they become moderate and cease to be excessive. Such accidents are anger, pride, cruelty, effrontery, love of honour and domination, greed and the like. Those who possess these qualities are led (*sc.* by this kind of poetry) to employ them in good, not evil deeds. The third kind aims at the improvement and correction of the accidents of the soul related to weakness and softness, viz.

desires, base pleasures, falseness and slackness of soul, pity, fear, anxiety, grief, shame, luxury, softness, and the like, that they may be broken down and cease to be excessive, till they become moderate, and (the possessor) is led to employ them in good, not evil deeds. The three kinds which are blamed are the opposites of the three which are praised. For the former ruin all that the latter correct, bringing it from the moderate state to excess. The different kinds of tunes and songs follow the different kinds of poetry and have the same divisions.

[53] The parts of the ideal city are five: the most virtuous or excellent, the interpreters, the assessors or measurers, the fighting men, and the rich. The most excellent are the wise, the men of practical wisdom and those with ideas on great matters. Next come the bearers of religion* and the interpreters, who are the orators, the eloquent, the poets, the musicians, the secretaries and the like, belonging to their number. The measurers* are the accountants, geometers, doctors, astrologers and the like. The fighting men are the army, watchmen, and the like, reckoned with them. The rich are the gainers of wealth in the city, such as the farmers, herdsmen, merchants, and the like.

[54]* The chiefs and rulers of this city are of four descriptions.*

A. The king in reality. He is the first chief,* and it is he in whom are combined six conditions:* (a) wisdom; (b) perfect practical wisdom; (c) excellence of persuasion; (d) excellence in producing an imaginative impression; (e) power to fight the holy war (*jihād*) in person; (f) that there should be nothing in his body to prevent him attending to the matters which belong to the holy war. He in whom all these are united is the model, the one to be imitated in all his ways and actions, and the one whose words and counsels are to be accepted. It is for this man to rule according as he thinks right and as he wishes.

B. The second case is when no man is found in whom all these are united, but they are found separately in a group,* since one of them provides the end, a second provides what leads to the end, a third possesses excellence of persuasion and excellence in producing an imaginative impression, another possesses the

power to fight the holy war. This group then together takes the place of the king. They are called the best chiefs and the virtuous men. Their system of rule is called the rule of the most virtuous.

C. The third case is when these are not available either. The chief of the city is then the man* in whom are united: (a) that he should possess knowledge of the ancient laws and traditions which the first generations of *imāms* acknowledged and by which they ruled the city; (b) that he should have excellent discrimination of the places and conditions in which those traditions must be employed, according to the purpose of the earlier generations therein; (c) that he should have power to produce what is not found explicit in the old traditions, oral and written, imitating therein the model of the ancient traditions; (d) further, that he should have excellence of idea and practical wisdom in the events which happen one by one and are not such as to be in the ancient traditions, in order to preserve the prosperity of the city; and (e) that he should possess excellence of rhetoric and persuasion and in producing an imaginative impression. At the same time, (f) he should be able to go on the holy war (*jihād*).^{*} Such a one is called the king according to the law, and his rule is called lawful kingship.

D. The fourth case is when no man is found in whom all these are united, but they exist separately among a group, and they together take the place of the king according to the law. This group are called the chiefs according to the law.*

[55] In every part of the city is a chief, with no chief above him among the people of that group, and a subject who has no rule over any men at all, also one who is chief of those below him and subject to those above him.

[56] The classes in the ideal city take precedence over each other in different ways.

A. When a man performs an action to attain thereby some end but employs something which is the end of an action and that end is a good which another man arranges and produces, then the first is chief and takes precedence over the second in the city, e.g. the art of horsemanship. Its end is excellence in the use of

arms. Its exponent is a knight, who employs the reins and the horse's furniture, which are the end of the art of making the reins. He is therefore chief, taking precedence over the maker of the reins, and likewise over the trainer of the horse. And so in other actions and arts.

B. When two persons have the same end and one of them is better able to produce an imaginative impression of that end, and more perfect in virtue, possessing practical wisdom to produce all that will bring him to that end and better adapted to employ another in realizing the end, then he is chief over the second, who does not have this. Below him is the man who imagines the end spontaneously, but does not have perfect deliberation to accomplish all by which the end is attained. Yet when he is given a beginning of deliberation, by there being sketched out to him something of what he must do, he imitates in what is given him the pattern of that which has been sketched out to him and produces the rest. Below him is the man who does not imagine the end spontaneously and has no deliberation also, but when he is given the end and it is represented to his imagination, and then he is given a beginning of deliberation, he is able to imitate in the remainder the pattern of that which has been sketched out to him, and he goes to work or sets another to work therein. Below him is the man who does not imagine the end and has no deliberation, nor even if he is given a beginning of deliberation can he produce the rest. But if he is charged with what has to be done to attain the end, he remembers the charges and is always humble and obedient, swift to perform all that he is charged with, even if he does not know to what end the action will lead him, and is well adapted to do the thing as he has been charged. This man is always a servant in the city, not a chief, or rather he is naturally a slave, while the others are subjects and chiefs. Everything the slave and servant is skilled in doing, the chief must be skilled in employing another therein.

C. The third case is when two men are both performing an action where a third employs their action in completing some end, except that of the two one does the thing more nobly and more

indispensably for completing the third man's end. The man whose action is nobler and more indispensable takes precedence in rank over him who is responsible for an action which is baser and less indispensable in regard to that end.

[57] The parts of the city and the classes of its parts are united and bound together by love. It is controlled and maintained by justice and the actions of justice. Now love is sometimes natural, as the love of the parents for the child, and sometimes willed, by its beginning being in voluntary things followed by love. Voluntary love comes in three ways: (*a*) by sharing in virtue; (*b*) on account of advantage; and (*c*) on account of pleasure. Justice follows upon love. Love in this city first occurs on account of (*a*) sharing in virtue. This sharing is connected with thoughts and actions. The thoughts which they must share in are threefold: (α) in regard to the beginning; (β) in regard to the end; and (γ) in regard to what lies between. Agreement of opinion in regard to the beginning (α) is the agreement of their opinions about God and spiritual beings,* about the good men who are the pattern, how the world and its parts began, and how man came into being, then (about) the classes of the parts of the world, their mutual relation, their station with reference to God and spiritual beings, and man's station with reference to God and spiritual beings. This is the beginning.* The end is happiness (β). What lies between are the actions by which happiness is attained (γ). When the opinions of the inhabitants of the city* are agreed on these things, and that has been completed by the actions by which happiness is mutually attained, there follows mutual love, of necessity. Then because they are neighbours of one another in one dwelling-place, some of them needing others and some being useful to others, there follows (*b*) the love which exists on account of advantage. Then on account of their sharing in the virtues and because some of them are useful to others, some of them take pleasure in others, and that again is followed by (*c*) the love which exists on account of pleasure, so that through it they are united and bound together.

[58] Justice is first of all in the division of the good things

shared by the people of the city among them all, and next in the preservation of what is divided among them.* These good things are security, wealth, honour, dignities, and the other good things which they can share in. For each one of the people of the city has a portion of these good things, equivalent to his deserts. His decrease and increase therein are injustice, his decrease injustice against him, his increase injustice against the people of the city, and perhaps his decrease also is injustice against the people of the city. When the division has been made and each man's portion has been fixed, it must next be preserved to him, either by its not passing from his hand, or, if it does, by safeguards and conditions, securing that thereby no injury attaches either to him or to the city. When a man's portion of the good things passes from his hand, it is either voluntarily, as in a sale and gift and exchange, or involuntarily, as when he is robbed or forcibly constrained. In both cases there must be safeguards by which the good things in the hands of the people of the city remain preserved to them. That can only come about by the return of a substitute for what has passed from his hand voluntarily or involuntarily and an equivalent to it, either of the same kind as that which has passed from his hand, or of a different kind, and what returns, returns either to the individual man or to the people of the city. In whichever of these two ways the equivalent returns, justice is that by which the good things, having been once divided, remain preserved to the people of the city, and injustice is that there should pass from a man's hand his portion of the good things, without the equivalent returning either to himself or to the people of the city. Further, the return must, when it is to the individual, be either beneficial to the city or not hurtful to it. He who causes to pass from his own hand or from the hand of another his share in the good things, when it is hurtful to the city, is also unjust and is prevented. In many cases of prevention pains and penalties are needed. The pains and penalties must be measured, so that every injustice may be confronted with a commensurate punishment. When the doer of the injustice is requited with an equivalent portion of evil, justice is done. When he is

requited with more, it is injustice against him as an individual, when with less, injustice against the people of the city; and perhaps when with more, it is injustice against the people of the city.

[59] Some rulers of cities think in the case of all injustice occurring in the city that it is injustice against the people of the city. Others think that injustice specially concerns him to whom the injustice has been done. Some divide injustice into two categories, the first, injustice which specially concerns individual persons, though they make it at the same time injustice against the people of the city, and the second, injustice regarded as specially concerning the individual and not passing over him to the people of the city. Some therefore of the rulers of cities do not think that the guilty should be pardoned, even if he to whom the wrong was done has pardoned him. Some think that the guilty should be pardoned when he to whom the wrong was done has pardoned him. Others think that part should be pardoned, and part not pardoned, viz. that the penalty deserved by the guilty party, when regarded as personally due, to the exclusion of the people of the city, to him to whom the wrong was done, and this man pardons him, cannot be required by anyone else; but when regarded as due to the people of the city and to all men, the pardon of him to whom the wrong was done is not considered.

[60] The term "justice" is sometimes applied in a more general sense, viz. a man's employment of acts of virtue in relation to others, whatever the virtue. The justice which consists in making a division and in preserving what has been divided is a species of the more general justice, and the more special is called by the name of the more general.

[61] Everyone in the ideal city must have assigned him a single art with which he busies himself solely and a single work to which he attends, either in the class of servant or master, nor must he go beyond it. None of them is left to pursue many works nor more than a single art, for three reasons. (*a*) Every man is not always suitable for every work and art. Rather one

man is sometimes better than another, for one work rather than another. (*b*) Every man who attends to a work or art does so more perfectly and excellently and becomes more proficient therein and skilled in the work, when he devotes himself to it and from his childhood grows up to it and not to anything else besides. (*c*) Many works have particular times. When these are left late, the works are not performed. It sometimes happens that there are two works to be done at the same time and if a man is occupied with one of them, he has no time for the other, nor is it overtaken on a second occasion. For this reason there must be assigned to each one of the works one man, that each one of them may be overtaken at its own time and not fail to be performed.

PART II

[62] The city's provident fund is the provision made for the groups whose business is not that they should acquire wealth. Those who are such, and for whom first and foremost and in the opinion of all the rulers of cities money is to be provided are those divisions of the city the end of whose crafts in the first place is not the acquisition of wealth, such as the bearers of religion, the secretaries,* and the like (for these are among the most important parts of the city, and have need of money), and further, in the opinion of some of the rulers of cities, the cripples and those who have no strength to acquire wealth. Others think that no cripple should be left in the city, and no one who is unable in any way to perform any useful function in it. Others of the rulers of cities think that they should set up in the city two funds, one for those the end of whose crafts is not in the first place the acquisition of wealth, the other for cripples and the like. It must be investigated where this money is to come from, and in what ways.

[63] War is either (*a*) to ward off an enemy who has come against the city from without; or (*b*) to acquire a good to which the city is entitled* from without from those in whose hands it is; or (*c*) to bring and force people to what is best and most fortunate

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for themselves apart from others, when they do not know it of themselves and do not submit to those who know it and invite them to it; or (*d*) war on those who do not submit to slavery and servitude, of those for whom it is best and most fortunate that their place in the world should be that of slaves; or (*e*) war with men who are not of the people of the city, and against whom the city has a prescribed right, and they withhold it from them.* This is a matter involving two things, one of which is the acquiring of the city's good (*b*), and the other is that they are brought to render justice and equity (i.e. *c* or *d*). As for making war on them to punish them for some crime which they have committed lest they repeat the crime, and lest others venture against the city and hope to overcome them, this combines acquisition of a good for the people of the city (*b*), bringing those people to their own shares and the best for them (*c*) and warding off an enemy by force (*a*). As for making war on them to destroy them as a whole and extirpate them because their continued existence harms the people of the city, that also is acquisition of a good for the people of the city (*b*).

The war of the chief with any people merely that they may be humbled and submit to him and honour him for nothing else save the running of his writ among them and their obedience to him, or merely that they may honour him for no other reason save that they honour him, or that he may be their chief and rule them as he sees fit and they assent to all his commands in anything he pleases, whatever it may be, is an unjust war. Similarly if he makes war for nothing else save that conquest is his end, that too is an unjust war. Similarly if he makes war or kills to appease rage, or for pleasure which he takes in victory merely, that likewise is injustice. And similarly if those people have enraged him by injustice and what they deserve for that injustice comes short of war and short of killing, war and killing are undoubtedly unjust. Many of those who intend by killing to appease rage kill not those who have enraged them but others who have not, because such a man aims at removing the annoyance which the rage caused him.

[64] The first divisions are three: (*a*) what cannot not exist; (*b*) what cannot at all exist; and (*c*) what can exist and not exist. The first two are the extremes. The third is a mean between them. It is an aggregate which contradicts the two extremes. All existents fall into two of these three divisions, for of the existents some cannot at all not exist, and some can exist and not exist.

[65] What cannot not exist is so in its essence and nature, and what can exist and not exist is also so in its essence and nature. For it is impossible that what cannot not exist should come into existence and only becomes so because its essence and nature are otherwise and it is an accident that it becomes so, and similarly what can exist and not exist. The kinds of existents are three: (*a*) the creation from matter; (*b*) the heavenly bodies; (*c*) the spiritual bodies.* What cannot not exist is of two sorts, one being such in its nature and essence that it exists at a particular time and nothing else is then possible, the second such that it cannot not exist at any time at all. To the spiritual (bodies) belongs the second class of what cannot not exist, and to the heavenly (bodies) belongs the first class. To the material (bodies) belongs the division which can exist and not exist. The worlds are three: a spiritual, a heavenly and a material.

[66]* The first divisions are four: (*a*) What cannot at all not exist; (*b*) what cannot at all exist; (*c*) what cannot not exist at a particular time; (*d*) what can exist and not exist. What cannot exist at a particular time can have existence at another, so the first are two opposite extremes, and what can exist, can not exist at a particular time. The existents are of these three divisions: (*a*) what cannot at all not exist; (*b*) what cannot not exist at one time but can at another; and (*c*) what can exist and not exist. The most excellent, noblest and most perfect of them is what cannot at all not exist. The basest and most defective of them is what can exist and not exist. What cannot not exist at one time only is a mean between them, for it is more defective than the first and more perfect than the third. What can exist and not exist does so in three ways: (*a*) to the highest degree; (*b*) to the least degree;

(*c*) to an intermediate degree. Of these the most excellent is what exists to the highest degree, the basest what exists to the least degree, and the intermediate degree is a mean between them.

[67] If a thing has a lack, it is a defect in its existence. If in its existence it needs anything else, it is also a defect in existence. Everything which has a like in its species is defective in existence, since that is only possible in what does not have sufficiency for it to exist in its species alone and in what is insufficient for that existence to be completed by it alone, so that only a portion of that existence* is completed by it and there is not sufficiency in it for a universal to be completed by it, as is the case with man. For, since it is impossible for the existence of man to be realized by any individual, there is need for more than one at one time. So then whatever contains sufficiency for completing a thing, has no need of a second in the case of that thing, and if a thing has sufficiency for the completion of its existence, quiddity and essence, it is impossible that there should be anything else of its species, and if that were the like of its action, nothing else would share its action.

[68] Everything which has a contrary is defective in existence, because everything which has a contrary has a lack, the meaning of contraries being this, that each of them cancels the other, if they meet or are brought together. Thus it requires for its existence the cessation of its contrary. Also there is an impediment to its existence, so that it is not itself alone sufficient in its existence. What suffers from no lack has no contrary, and what does not need anything at all save itself has no contrary.

[69] Evil has no absolute existence, nor is it in anything in these worlds, nor in general in anything of which the existence is not by man's will, but all these are good. Evil is of two sorts: (*a*) the misery which is the opposite of happiness, and (*b*) everything by which misery is attained. Misery is evil in the sense of the end which is reached, beyond which there is no greater evil to be reached by misery. The second evil is the voluntary acts, which are such as to lead to misery. Similarly the opposite of these two evils is two goods, one of which is happiness (*a*), which

is good in the sense of the end beyond which there is no other end to be sought by happiness. The second good is everything which profits in any way in the attainment of happiness (*b*). This is the good which is the opposite of (evil), and this is the nature of both. Evil has no other nature except this which we have mentioned. The two evils then are voluntary, and similarly the goods which are their opposites. As for the good in the worlds, it is the First Cause, and everything which is consequent on it, and whose being is consequent on what is consequent on it, to the end of the chain of consequents, whatever it is. For all these are according to harmony and justice with merit, and what comes to pass from merit and justice is altogether good.

Some think that existence of whatever kind is good, and non-existence of whatever kind is bad. They spontaneously fashion imaginary existences, which they then make good, and non-existences which they make bad. Others think that pleasures of whatever kind are goods, and that pain of whatever kind is evil, especially pain affecting the sense of touch. All these are in error, for existence is only good when it is with merit, and non-existence (bad) when it is without merit, and similarly pleasures and pain. What exists and does not exist without merit is bad. None of these things exists anywhere in the spiritual worlds, for no one thinks that in the spiritual and heavenly (worlds) anything happens contrary to merit, for possible natural things, by virtue of being natural, do not happen contrary to merit, when they are preserved in them by merit, nor does one seek in them the voluntary merits, for the possible natural merits are either with form or with matter. What anything merits, it merits either to the highest or the least or an intermediate degree,* and what they receive of it does not go beyond these, so they are all good. Good then is of two sorts: (*a*) a sort of which no evil at all is the opposite, and (*b*) a sort of which evils are the opposites. Similarly every natural thing, the beginning of which is a voluntary action, is sometimes good, sometimes bad. We have been speaking here of what is purely natural, with no share of the voluntary.

[70] Some think that all the passions of the soul, viz. what

proceeds from the appetitive part of the soul, are evil. Others think that the faculties of desire and anger alone are evil, while others think so of the other faculties in which are the psychological affects, such as jealousy, cruelty, miserliness, love of honour, and the like. These also are in error, for that which is adapted to be employed in good and bad together is neither good nor bad, for it is not more fit for one than the other, or is good and bad together or neither. Rather all of these are evil when they are employed in that by which misery is obtained, but when they are employed in that by which happiness is attained, they are not evil but all of them good.

[71] Some indeed say that happiness is not a reward for the actions which are such that happiness is attained thereby, nor is it a recompense for actions which have been given up, which are not such that it is attained thereby, just as the wisdom which is attained by learning is not a reward for the antecedent learning, nor is it a recompense for the repose which the man would have enjoyed if he had not learned and given it up and preferred toil in its place. Neither if pleasure follows the knowledge which results from learning is the pleasure a reward for learning, nor a recompense for the toil and trouble and pain which he obtained, when he chose learning and gave up repose, so that this pleasure should be a recompense for another pleasure which the man gave up, to be recompensed for it by this other. Rather happiness is an end such that it is attained by virtuous actions, as knowledge results from learning and study, and the arts result from learning them and persevering in their actions. And misery is not the penalty for giving up virtuous actions* nor a requital for doing defective actions.

Therefore if anyone believes this of happiness,* and thinks at the same time that his recompense for what he gives up is of the same kind as what he gives up, that man's virtues will be akin to defects. For instance, the temperate man who leaves the pleasures of sense, all or some of them, simply to be recompensed, in place of what he has left, by another pleasure of the same kind as he has left but greater, is led by his greed and desire for increase

of pleasure to leave what he has left. At the same time he must think that the pleasure which he has left was his, and he has only left it to come to its like and an increase of what he will gain. Otherwise how is he recompensed for what he did not have?

Similarly in the case of the justice which he employs in leaving money and not taking it. It too is simply greed and desire for what he will obtain and be compensated with for leaving it. He simply does so out of desire for gain and to be recompensed for what he leaves with something much larger than what he leaves. It is as if he thinks that all wealth is his, his own and everybody else's, but he lets them retain it when he has the power and opportunity to deprive them, in order that he may get many times as much by way of reward. That represents what the rulers of the cities do. So he does not acquire justice and temperance as good in themselves, nor does he leave what he does leave of ill-doing and vice for itself, because it is ugly and he hates it.

Similarly the case of the brave man among them.* He thinks that he loses the pleasures for which he desires this transitory life in order to be recompensed with other pleasures of the same kind, far greater than these, and he advances against the evil which he detests for fear of an evil greater still. He thinks that to advance against death is an evil, but bears an evil greater still.

For that reason you find that what they suppose to be virtues are nearer to being vices and base qualities than virtues.* That is because their essence and nature are not the nature of the real virtues, nor near it, but are of the kind (genus) of defects and base qualities.

[72] The virtuous man loses by death simply the ability to multiply the actions by which his happiness after death is increased. Therefore his anxiety about death is not the anxiety of one who thinks that by death a very great evil will overtake him, nor the anxiety of one who thinks that by death he will lose a great good, which has come to him and will pass from his hand. Rather he thinks that by death no evil at all will overtake him, and he thinks that the good which has come to him up to the time of his death is with him and is not separated from him by

death. Rather his anxiety is the anxiety of one who thinks that what he loses is a gain which was coming to him, but when it was added to him, would be like a remainder additional to the good which had already reached him, and near to the anxiety of one who thinks that what he loses is not his capital but a gain which he was measuring and hoping for. So he does not fear at all, but loves life, in order that he may increasingly do the good by which he has increased happiness.

[73] The virtuous man must not hasten death. Rather he must seek means to survive as long as possible, in order that he may increasingly do what brings him happiness, and in order that the people of the city may not lose his usefulness to them by his virtue. He must go forward to death only when his death is more useful to the people of the city than his survival. When against his will death comes upon him, he must not be anxious but virtuous. He is not at all anxious about it, nor does it frighten him so that he neglects his duty. Only the people of the ignorant cities and the unrighteous* are anxious about death, the former for what they will lose of the goods of the present world which they leave behind—pleasures, wealth, honours or other goods of the ignorant—and the unrighteous man for two reasons: the loss of what he leaves behind of his worldly goods, and the thought that by his death he will lose happiness. The last causes him more pain than is felt by the ignorant, for the ignorant know nothing of happiness after death,* so as to think that they will lose it, but these do know, and at their death are affected, through anxiety and regret for what they think they are losing, with deep repentance for what they have previously done in their lives,* so that they die suffering grief of many kinds.

[74] When the virtuous warrior* risks his life, he does so not with the idea that he will not die through that action of his, for that is foolish, nor without regard to whether he dies or lives, for that is rashness. Rather he thinks that perhaps he will not die, and perhaps he will escape. But he is not anxious about death, nor anxious when it comes upon him, and he does not risk his life knowing, or supposing, that what he desires he will obtain

without danger. Rather he risks his life when he knows that what he desires he will lose and not obtain, unless he endangers himself, and he thinks that if he does so perhaps he will obtain it, or he thinks that the people of the city will without doubt obtain it from that action of his, whether he dies or lives, and that if he survives he will share with them, and if he dies, these will obtain it and he will attain happiness for previous virtue, and because he has now sacrificed himself.

[75] When the virtuous man dies or is killed, one must not mourn for him, but rather mourn for the people of the city, in the measure of his indispensability in the city, and admire him for the state which he has attained, according to the measure of his happiness. At the same time it is the special privilege of the warrior killed in battle to be praised for his self-sacrifice on behalf of the people of the city and for his going forward to death.

[76] Some people think that the man who is not wise becomes wise only by the separation of the soul from the body,* the body remaining devoid of soul, which is the state of death, and if he were previously wise, his wisdom is increased because of that and is complete and perfect, or becomes more perfect and excellent. Therefore they think that death is a perfection, and that the separation of the soul from the body is a necessity.

Others think that the wicked man is only wicked by reason of the union of the soul with the body, and by its separation he becomes good. These people would be obliged to kill themselves and kill the soul,* so they afterwards take refuge in saying: "We are ruled by God who is exalted, and the angels and by the *malāʾik** of God, and do not of ourselves have power over the union or the separation of the soul. We must wait for the loosing of Him who joined them, and not take the loosing upon ourselves,* for those who rule us best know our affairs."

Others think that the separation of soul and body is not a separation in space, nor a separation in idea, nor that the body perishes and the soul remains, or the soul perishes and the body remains devoid of soul, but rather the meaning of the separation of the soul is that it does not need for its continued existence that

the body should be its matter, and that it does not need in any of its actions to employ the instrument of the body, nor to employ any faculty of body whatsoever, for as long as it continues to need any of these things it is not separated. That only happens to the soul which is special to man, viz. the speculative intellect. For when it reaches this condition, it separates from the body, whether that body belongs to a living creature which takes nourishment and perceives by the senses, or its faculty for taking nourishment and perceiving by the senses is already rendered void. For when it has no longer need in any of its actions for perception and imagination, it has already reached the after-life, and then its representation of the essence of the First Principle is more perfect, since the intellect seizes upon its essence without the need for its representation by analogy or example, nor does it reach this condition except by the previous need to seek the help of the corporeal faculty and its actions to perform its own actions. This is the after-life, in which a man sees his Lord and is not defrauded in the seeing Him.*

[77] Everything of which the existence is composition and combination, in whatever sense, is defective in existence, since it needs for its continuance the things of which it is combined, whether the combination is quantitative or the combination of matter and form or any other type of combination.

[78] If one thing makes another, this means that the other necessarily follows from the thing, and the making by a thing of another is the necessitation of that other by the thing. The thing is maker of the other when the other necessarily follows from it, and that which makes the thing is that from which the thing necessarily follows. That by which the other is made is that from which the other cannot necessarily follow, as long as it is not moved. And that includes all which by its movement derives a condition in which it acts alone, or a condition added to what it possessed before, so that it makes that other by the association of the second (condition) with the first, and it is the combination of the two which makes the other. That only happens in something which at first has what is insufficient to act with without the

addition of the other, and that which only makes another by being moved is in a state of need and insufficient in its essence (substance) for another thing which is such as to be its necessary consequent, to be its necessary consequent, and for that which is such as to come into existence from it, to come into existence from it and for it to make what is such as to be made. Therefore all that is sufficient in its essence (substance) and existence to make another, does not make what it makes, and what necessarily follows from it does not necessarily follow, by its being moved.

[79] Any maker of anything knows that his making that thing at a particular time is better or best, or it is worse or worst. What delays his making it is the obstacle to his making it, and the non-success which he thinks and knows will occur if he makes the thing at that time is the obstacle which prevents his making it. He must know what is the cause of the non-success at that time, and what is the cause of success later. If there is no cause of non-success, its non-existence is not preferable to its existence, and why did it not happen? At the same time, has the maker power to stop the non-success which happens through his making it at that time, or not? If he has the power, then its happening is not preferable to its not happening, and (the thing's) coming into existence at some time is not impossible for its maker. But if he has not power to stop the non-success, then the cause of the non-success is stronger, and the maker has not in himself complete sufficiency for the thing to be absolutely his, and at the same time there is a contrary in his action and an obstacle to it. In any case then not he alone is sufficient to complete the action, but rather the cessation of the cause of the non-success and the presence of the cause of success. For if he were personally the sole cause of the success, the success of the action should not be retarded in time, but both should happen together, and therefore when the agent is sufficient in himself alone for something to come into existence from him, it follows that the existence of the thing is not later than the existence of the agent.

[80] It is said of a man that he is intelligent and that he uses intelligence (intellects) when two things are united in him:

(*a*) that he has excellence of discrimination with reference to the actions which should be chosen or avoided;* and (*b*) that he employs the most excellent of all that he becomes aware of by excellence of discrimination. For when he has excellence of discrimination and does in what he examines and observes that which is worse and inferior, it is said of him that he is a mocker or deceiver or corrupter. Sometimes we use the expression "Such a man has intelligence now", in place of "He has taken notice of what he was disregarding", and it is employed instead of "He has understood what the allusion of the person addressing him pointed to" or "He has had an impression made on his mind". Sometimes we say that he has used intelligence, meaning that the objects of intelligence have been represented to him and impressed on his mind, and we say of him that he is intelligent, meaning by that that the objects of intelligence have come to his mind, i.e. that he knows the objects of intelligence. For there is here no difference between saying "he uses intelligence" and "he knows", between "the intelligent" and "the knowing", and between "the objects of intelligence" and "the objects of knowledge".

The man of practical wisdom is he who possesses excellence of deliberation* in producing what should be done, according to the opinion of Aristotle, of the actions of virtue, in an emergency, when he is at the same time excellent with ethical virtue.*

As for what the dialecticians mean by saying that this is necessitated by intelligence or denied by intelligence, they mean what is well known at first sight in the opinion of all, for the first sight which is shared by all or most men they call intelligence.

[81] Some people say in regard to the First Cause that it does not intellect or know anything but itself. Others assert that all the universal objects of intelligence are present to it at once, and that it knows and intellects them together timelessly, and all of them are assembled together in itself, known to it in act continually from eternity to eternity.

Others assert that although the objects of intelligence are present to it, it knows (also) all the partial existences perceived

by the senses and represents them to itself and they are impressed upon it, and that it represents to itself and knows what is not now existing but will exist hereafter, what was in past time and has ceased to be, and what is now existing. The consequence for them is that truth and falsehood and contradictory convictions follow each other in succession in regard to all the objects of its intelligence, that the objects of its intelligence are infinite, that the affirmative become negative and likewise the negative become affirmative at another time, that it knew in the past things without end, so that among them were what it knew would be in future, what it knew existed now, and what it knew had been, then was existing in times without end before that present time, i.e. the hypothetical time, and afterwards in times without end it knows these objects of intelligence in ways different to what it knew of these same things at another time. An example will show what I mean. Take as the example the time of Hermes* or of Alexander.* What it knew in the time of Alexander as existing at the present time, which is nearly "now" at that time, it knew many ages before would come into existence, then it knows afterwards at another time that it has been. It knows the thing in the time which was in the time of Alexander, as existing in three times in three conditions of knowledge, viz. it knows before the time of Alexander that it will be, knows in the time of Alexander himself that it is now present, and knows thereafter that it has been and is now over and past. Then similarly when the condition of individual times, or years or months or days is examined, in spite of the vast number and the difference of the circumstances, and similarly the condition of persons and the successive changes which happen to each of them, e.g. it knows that Zaid* is a *walī* of God, obedient and useful to his *walīs*, then knows him as an enemy of God, rebellious, and harmful to his *walīs*. And similarly for the conditions of the various places, the movements of bodies in space, and the passing of one into another. The holders of this view resort to ugly, hateful deeds,* and there arise from it wrong ideas which are the cause of great evils, together with its ugliness and what necessarily follows from it of the different

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kinds of change and alteration in the soul of the knower, the succession of events, and the like.

[82]* Different beliefs are held by many people about the care of the Lord for his creation. Some maintain* that he cares for his creation as a king cares for his subjects and their welfare, without conducting personally the affair of any of them, and without connection between him and partner or wife,* but by appointing for the task one* who will undertake it and discharge it, and do in regard to it what right and justice demand.

Others think that it is not sufficient unless he undertakes the personal management of each one of his creatures in each one of their actions, and the directing them aright, and leaves none of his creatures to (the care of) others. (Otherwise these would be his partners and aids in his ruling the creation, and he is exalted above the need for partners and helpers.*) It follows that he is responsible for many actions which are defective, blameworthy, ugly actions, errors, and abominable words and deeds, and when any of his creatures aims at attacking one of his *walīs*—a reversal of a truth by way of argument—he is his helper and responsible for leading him and guiding him, and the man is directed in the way of unchastity and murder and theft and worse than the actions of children and drunkards and madmen. And if they deny that he directs and helps him for some things, they must deny the whole doctrine. Such principles give rise to wrong ideas, and are the cause of vicious and abominable ways.

[83] The polity in the absolute sense is not a genus for the other types of polity, but is a kind of homonym for many things, in which they agree though differing in their essences and natures. There is nothing in common between the ideal polity and all the types of ignorant polities.

[84] The ideal polity is that in which the ruler attains a kind of virtue which he could not possibly attain except in it—the highest virtue that can be attained by man. The ruled attain in their temporal life and the life of the world to come virtues which could not possibly be attained except in it. As for their temporal life, their bodies are of the most excellent form that is possible

for the individual natures to possess, and their souls are in the most excellent state that is possible for the nature of individual souls and for what is in their power to attain among the virtues which are the cause of happiness in the life to come. Their life is sweeter and pleasanter than all others.

[85] It is unlikely and improbable that the actions of a chief of the ignorant people should necessitate a pure type of the ignorant state without the admixture of other types, since the actions of each of them proceed from his opinion and notions and the impulses of his soul, not from knowledge and acquired art. For that reason what exist are polities combined from these ignorant polities, or from most of them.

[86] The ancients laid down only these ignorant polities, because science includes and fixes only general laws, even though what exists of the ignorant polities is mostly mixed polities, because the man who knows the nature of the individual polities is able to hit the mark and know the existing polity and the elements from which it is combined, judging it according to what he finds of its combination and what he already knows of the nature of every kind of simple polity. The case is similar for all scientific and practical matters such as rhetoric, sophistry, dialectic and the art of poetry, for the man who occupies himself with them without knowledge of them, only thinking and supposing that he employs demonstration, is mostly found to employ it mixed in different ways.

[87] Each of the types of the ignorant polities includes different and very divergent types, some extremely bad, and some whose harm is slight* and whose benefit is great to certain people. For the condition of the polities and their relation to souls is like that of the seasons and their relation to bodies possessing various temperaments. Just as some bodies are well in temperament and condition in autumn and some are well in summer, while others find the winter best and most suitable for them and others again the spring, so is the condition of souls and their relation to the polities. Yet the principles of which bodies are composed are apt to be more restricted than the principles of

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the states and ways of life. For the states and ways of life are made up of things voluntary and natural which are apt to be endless and some of them fortuitous, and many of the people of the various ways of life are wretched without knowing it, whereas the sick and those possessing bad temperaments can scarcely fail to be aware of it, as well as those who investigate their conditions.

[88] The types of the experiential faculty vary according to the different places in which it is employed, the arts with which it is connected and those who employ it, just as the art of writing varies according to the arts in which it is employed and those who employ it. What is employed of both kinds in the rule of the ideal cities* is excellent to the highest degree. As regards the experiential faculty, the man of practical wisdom employs it in his growing up and activity in the presence of the first chief, while he is being trained in the ideal polity, so that it emerges a very noble faculty, useful in the ideal polity, and attains in the end to rule in the person of him who contains the ideal rule in potency, till it becomes his rule in act. The noblest kind of writing is that which is employed in the service of the first chief and the ideal king, but it is in nobility and excellence below the experiential faculty which the first chief employs. The absolutely noble of the experiential faculty is nobler than the noble of the art of writing.

When the experiential faculty is employed in the lowest of the ignorant polities, the conquest polity,* it is baser and worse than in the other places. Similarly when writing is employed in the ways of life of conquest, it is worse and baser than the other kinds of writing employed in the other polities and arts, and what the lowest people employ is nobler than writing employed in the service of conquest. Just as the nobility of writing employed in the service of the ideal king and the ideal rule is superior to the other types of writing employed in the city, so the baseness of writing employed in the service of conquest, its hurtfulness and the increase of its evil and trouble, are greater than the other types of writing, and as the experiential faculty when employed by the man of practical wisdom and the first chief is nobler than the writing he employs, so when employed by the man of

conquest it is baser than the writing employed by him. In general, every nobility which is superior to what is below it of its kind when employed in the ideal rule, is base and hurtful and increasing in baseness and hurtfulness over the rest of its kind, when employed in the conquest polity, and similarly all the psychological faculties by which man is noble, such as discrimination and the like, which in good men is a cause of all good, and very noble and excellent, but in a wicked man is a cause of all evil and corruption. These things in the case of a king of conquest are a cause of many times the evil which they cause in those who do not rule. Therefore (the ancients) did not call the reflective faculty,* by which what is useful towards a bad end may be produced, a reflective virtue but called it by other names, such as deceit, artifice and stratagem. Those human things which are the greatest of voluntary goods, and the arts, are apt in the conquest state to be evils or disasters and causes of disasters which happen in the world. Therefore it is wrong for the virtuous man to remain in the corrupt polities,* and he must emigrate* to the ideal cities, if such exist in fact in his time. If they do not exist, then the virtuous man is a stranger in the present world and wretched in life, and to die is preferable for him than to live.

[89]* On the advantages of the speculative part in philosophy, and that it is necessary for the practical part from several points of view. One is that a deed is only right and a virtue when a man rightly knows the virtues which are thought to be virtues, but are not so,* and has accustomed himself to the actions of the real virtues, until there come to him a certain state and merit and he places them all aright and assigns them their due, which...and their grade in the classes of existence, and chooses and avoids what should be chosen and avoided. This is a condition which does not come and is not perfected except after experience, perfect knowledge of demonstration and perfection in the natural sciences with what follows them and comes after them in due order, until he attains lastly to the knowledge of happiness which is in truth happiness. It is that which is sought for itself and not for anything else, at any time whatever.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The speculative and reflective virtues* are sometimes a cause and principle for the coming into existence of the practical virtues and practical arts. All this does not come into existence except by contact with speculation and by passing from stage to stage and from station to station, and can only do so thus. For he who desires to learn speculative philosophy, begins from numbers, then ascends to magnitudes, then to the other things to which numbers and magnitudes essentially belong, like perspectives and moving magnitudes, which are the heavenly bodies, and music, and to weights and mechanical devices. These things are understood and represented without matter. He ascends little by little in the things which need matter to be understood and represented till he comes to the heavenly bodies.* Afterwards he reaches the introduction of principles other than the principles What? and By what? and How?,* to help him to employ the things which are difficult or impossible to be understood, without passing into matter, and he comes later into a region midway between the genus which has no principles of existence except What? and the genus for whose species exist the four (*sic*) principles.* There appear to him the natural principles in order, and he investigates thoroughly the natural existents and the principles of mathematics belonging to them, till he comes to the principles of existence. What he acquires of the principles of existence becomes for him a ladder and principles of instruction, and the principles of existence which he has acquired are only principles of instruction with reference to two things....

Then he passes to the sciences of the causes of existence of the natural bodies and investigation of their essences, substances and causes. When he reaches the heavenly bodies, the rational soul and the active intellect, he passes again to another grade,* and the observation of the principles of their existence obliges him to study principles which are not natural. What he has acquired of the principles of existence in that third grade becomes again pedagogic principles for these existences which are more perfect in existence than the natural. So he passes again to a middle place between two sciences, the science of natural things and the science

of metaphysics, in the order of enquiry and instruction. He studies also their principles, on account of which they were brought into existence, and the end and perfection on account of which man was brought into existence, and knows that the natural principles which are in man and in the world are insufficient for man to come by them to the perfection, to reach which man was brought into existence, and that man needs therein intellectual principles by which he may run towards that perfection.

So the man has by now drawn near to the station and stage of speculative knowledge where he attains happiness, and speculation brings him on in both directions till he reaches an existent which cannot have any of these principles, but is the First Existent and the First Principle of all* the existents which have previously been mentioned, whose existence is by it and through it and for it, in the ways which are without defect, or rather the most perfect ways in which a thing is a principle to existents. There results to him knowledge of the existents with the most remote of their causes, and this is the divine view of the existents. And at the same time he is continually enquiring into the goal for which man was brought into existence—the perfection necessary for man to attain—and into all the things by which man reaches that perfection. So then he is able to pass to the practical part, and it is possible for him to reach and do what he must do.

As for the man who is given the practical part by a revelation* which guides him towards measuring each separate detail of what should be chosen or avoided, that is a different way, and if they are both called ‘knowers’, the name of knowledge is a homonym for both of them, just as it is a homonym for the possessor of natural science and the diviner who makes known things to come from the possibilities. For the diviner has no power to know all the individual possibilities, because they are without end, and it is unthinkable that knowledge should embrace what is limitless (he only has the power of uttering the knowledge of what is possible which happened to occur to his mind, or to the mind of the man who asked him the question) and because knowledge of what is possible is knowledge contrary to the nature of

the possible. Therefore the diviner does not have knowledge of the nature of the possible, which belongs only to the possessor of natural science. Therefore the knowledge of both is not of one substance, but the two are opposites. Similarly the case of him who has perfected speculative knowledge and him to whom the measuring of the actions of the people of one or more cities has been revealed, without possessing any knowledge of speculative science. Between him to whom a revelation has been made, being perfect in speculative knowledge, and him to whom a revelation has been made, being imperfect in speculative knowledge there is in fact no relation or agreement. The agreement is one in name only.

[90]* Reflective virtue* is that by which a man has the power of excellent production of what is most useful for a virtuous end, shared by one or more nations or a city, in case of a shared emergency. One kind of it produces what changes over short periods of time, and this is called the faculty for kinds of partial, temporary rule during the occurrence of the things which come occasionally on nations and on a single nation or on a city. As for the reflective faculty which produces what is most useful for an evil end, it is not reflective virtue.

[91] Just as among bodies there are some in which all kinds of health are not possible, by reason of their temperament, or constitution, or custom, or special condition, or the employment by which the people gain their livelihood, etc.—the case of most bodies—and there are places where the inhabitants are able to gain only a little of the kinds of health, so the condition of souls, because there is in them something which makes it impossible for the soul to acquire the virtues, or most of them, and it cannot realize more than a little. It is not the business of the ideal governor and the first chief to perfect the virtues of one the nature and substance of whose soul are such that it does not receive the virtues. His end is simply to bring souls like these as far as possible for them, and to a point of virtue consistent with the advantage of the people of that city, just as it is not the duty of the ideal doctor to bring the bodies whose condition is as we have described to the most perfect grades and highest levels of

health. It is his business merely to bring them, as regards health, as far as possible with their nature and substance, and consistent with the actions of the soul. For the body is for the sake of the soul and the soul for the sake of the last perfection, viz. happiness,* which is virtue, hence the soul is for the sake of wisdom and virtue.

[92]* No man is apt to exist endowed by nature from the first with perfection,* so that there is no discrepancy in him, and that all his actions and way of life and ethical qualities are in accord with justice and equity, not turning aside to any extreme or predominance of one contrary over another. That is because the human disposition is made up of opposites which the combination forces together, and if its natural characteristics were isolated and equalized, there would be no harmony, since they are so dissimilar and so discrepant and different, and, in spite of their forced cohesion, a slighter or more considerable tension may easily cause lack of equilibrium in the constitution. Any disposition where the tension between the elements is slight is nearer to equilibrium, and *vice versa*, so that the natural temper depends on equal proportions of antagonism and equilibrium in the antagonism and equilibrium of the natures.

[93]* We posit two men, one of whom knows what is in all the books of Aristotle on natural science, logic, theology, political philosophy and mathematics, and all his actions or most of them are contrary to what is good at first sight* in the opinion of all, and the actions of the other are all in accordance with what is good at first sight to all, even though he does not know the sciences which the first knows. Then this second man is nearer to being a philosopher than the first, all of whose actions are contrary to what is good at first sight in the opinion of all, and is more able to possess what the first man possesses than the first man is to possess what the second man possesses. Philosophy at first sight and in reality is the coming to a man of the speculative sciences and the agreement of all his actions with what is good at first sight in the common opinion and in reality. If a man confines himself to the speculative sciences, without all his actions

agreeing with what is good at first sight in the common opinion, his established custom prevents him doing the actions which are good at first sight in the common opinion of all. Therefore it is more likely that his custom will prevent his deeds being in agreement with what is good in reality. He whose customary deeds are in agreement with what is good at first sight in the common opinion of all will not be prevented by his custom from learning the speculative sciences, nor from his deeds coming to be in agreement with what is good in reality, since first sight necessitates that he does what is good in reality and obligatory more than that he does what is at first sight uncriticized opinion. What in reality is opinion is opinion which has been criticized and confirmed after criticism, and first sight necessitates that opinion which has been criticized is truer than first sight.

[94]* In the association for virtue there occurs no difference and no disagreement, because the aim of virtue is one, the good which is wanted for itself and nothing else besides. Since the desire and intention of the two is simply towards the end, which is the good in itself, their path to it is one, and their love for the thing in itself is one. They are never at variance so long as their aim is one. Disagreement only occurs through difference of desires and discrepancy of aims. Then there comes the behaviour which makes association impossible, because each has a different aim and a different way. These with their analogy also* are mischievous and wrong, not good like the first aim and the first association, to seek for truth, attain happiness, and love knowledge and excellent things, and the second association is the association for gain and mutual support in commerce and business affairs—mischievous and wrong, because each of the participants and partners wishes to rob the other of his share, in order to have more than he has, and similarly the other also wishes the same and believes it of the first, so then difference begins. The first two associate for nothing outside themselves and for nothing they need in anyone else, and there is no bond of union with any other. There arises between them no difference as long as their aim is one, just as there arises no association between

the other two as long as their aim is different. Also, since truth is the aim pursued in everything, and likewise good and virtue, the seekers after truth understood their aim and knew it and did not disagree in regard to it. What is not truth and virtue is a path which cannot be trodden, and when a man walks on it he goes astray and is perplexed. The others did not understand their aim and were at variance because of the diversity of their aim, and they trod a path which did not lead to their goal, even though they did not know it, because in the soul the search for truth is natural, even if it comes short of it. Do you not see that if you asked each one of them to admit the virtue of truth and knowledge, he would admit it, knowing it even if he did not employ it on account of his defect and the passions attaching to him?

[95]* What results to the careless man and to the man who affects carelessness is the same, because carelessness leads the careless man to non-success, and the affectation of carelessness leads him who affects it to non-success, so the two agree in the result, which is non-success. It does not profit the man who affects carelessness that he knows what he is careless of, when he has not employed in it what he ought, nor does it harm the careless man that he is forgetful of what he does not know when he has not acted as he ought, because both of them agree in the annexation, and differ in knowledge and ignorance.

NOTES TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The figures in square brackets refer to the faṣl number

[Heading]

aphorisms, Arabic *fuṣūl*, literally “sections”, with reference to the subdivisions of the work (numbered in the English translation), each of which is headed in the Arabic simply *faṣl*, “section”. The same word is found in the titles of many Arabic books, especially in the earlier period, e.g. *al-Fuṣūl fi’l-Ṭibb* of Rhazes (Muḥammad b. Zakariyā ar-Rāzī) and a work of the same title by Maimonides (Mūsā b. Maimūn al-Qurṭubī). In these two cases the *Aphorisms* ascribed to Hippocrates doubtless suggested the title. The latter was available in Arabic as *al-Fuṣūl* simply (*Fihrist*, ed. Flügel, 288). The works of Rhazes and Maimonides passed into Latin as the *Aphorismi* of their respective authors (Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, I, 232, 234), so that, apart from the consideration of securing an agreeable-sounding title, we need have no hesitation in rendering here and on the title-page, “aphorisms”. See also Introd. 4(a).

PART I

[3]

estimates. Or “measures”. Cf. [17], [89].

the aim of the political art. Literally “the aim in the political art”. Cf. [22] “the aim in the city” = “the aim of the city”.

[4]

the device for establishing them (sc. *the virtues*). According to the text, “them” should be the vices, which cannot be right. The Hebrew is explicit: “the device for the settlement and establishment of those good deeds”, etc.

citizens seems the natural translation here of *madanīyīn* (plur. of *madanī*), rather than “statesmen”, i.e. *madanī* serves for Greek πολιτης as well as πολιτικός.

[6]

The main parts and faculties of the soul are five. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* I, 13 (1102a-b). Al-Fārābī follows Aristotle in basing the division of virtue into intellectual (rational) and ethical (cf. [7] and following) on the division of the faculties, which he carries further. (Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, within the irrational element distinguishes only the nutritive and appetitive.) Cf. similarly *Madīnah Fādilah*, 34-6; *Siyāsah*, 43. Al-Fārābī’s relatively long account here of the nutritive faculty, which is not called for by the argument, is no doubt due to his unwillingness to forgo what was of interest to him.

THE FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ

If the member is flesh, it is by this nutriment becoming flesh, etc. The translation seems necessary (*bi' an yasīra* distinctly in both MSS.), but "If the member is flesh, this nutriment becomes flesh" would be more natural in the context. Al-Fārābī has just said that a certain kind of nutriment, when digested, becomes like the "member" which is nourished by it. His attention appears to have moved to the "member", i.e. organ or part of the body, which he now says is what it is *because* the nutriment has been taken. This is no doubt an illustration of the process which he wishes to mention, but the point of view has altered, somewhat awkwardly.

has been concocted, "concocts", or "has been cooked", "cooks".

till it reaches the body which is nourished. So in both MSS., but we would expect "the member which is nourished".

It is partly practical and partly theoretical. Cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 47. The distinction is Aristotelian, cf. *Eth. Nic.* VI, 1 (1139a), where the two subdivisions of the rational part of the soul are τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν and τὸ λογιστικόν (translated by Sir David Ross as "the scientific" and "the calculative"). But the parallel is closer between al-Fārābī here and a passage in the *Politics*, which is usually thought not to have been available in Arabic. There (*Pol.* VII, 14, 10=1333a) reason (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) is divided, as here, into practical and theoretical, or speculative (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός). Here the Arabic equivalent of θεωρητικός (*naẓarī*) has been rendered "theoretical", elsewhere, as may be seen by consulting the Arabic index, usually "speculative".—The same distinction comes again in the *Tanbīh 'alā Sabīl as-Sa'ādah* (for which see Introd. 3), ed. Hyderabad, 1346 A.H., 20: *ṣārat ṣinā'at al-falsafah ṣinfain . . . an-naẓarīyah . . . wal-'amalīyah*.

[7]

The virtues are of two kinds, ethical and rational. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* II, 1 (1103a). The following *fuṣūl* (8–19) are concerned with the ethical virtues and vices. The intellectual (rational) virtues and vices are dealt with in [30]–[49].

[9]

disposed to the conditions of a virtue or vice. Perhaps "actions" *af'āl* for "conditions" *aḥwāl* is right, and should be read. In any case, in the phrase *af'āl* or *aḥwāl faḍīlah*, *faḍīlah* is a dependent genitive, not an adjective.

[10]

It is unlikely and improbable that anyone exists who is by nature completely disposed to all the virtues, etc. Cf. [92].

[11]

The ancients named this man divine, while his opposite . . . had no name among them . . . though sometimes they named him "wild beast". The antithesis of "divine man" and "wild beast" occurs later in Avempace (Ibn Bājjah), *Tadbīr al-*

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Mutawāḥḥid, ed. Asín Palacios (Madrid-Granada, 1946), 16-17, cf. D. M. Dunlop, "Ibn Bājjah's Rule of the Solitary", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1945), 72, where the same Arabic words are used. The probable source in Aristotle has been referred to already, Introd. 4 (c). The collocation of beast and god comes also in Aristotle's well-known dictum (*Pol.* 1, 2, 14=1253a) that he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be one or the other.

As for the second type, if it happened that he existed, he neither ruled any city at all nor served it, etc. The reading of B has been followed. Al-Fārābī has just distinguished between the king who rules cities and the statesman who serves, and it is appropriate that he should retain the distinction. Elsewhere he identifies the two, but his point of view varies slightly. Cf. [3] "the statesman by the political art and the king by the royal art", where the identification is not complete.

[13]

The distinction discussed in this *faṣl* is the same as that between the continent man of Aristotle (ὁ ἐγκρατής) and the temperate man (ὁ σώφρων). See *Eth. Nic.* VII, 2=1146a.

He does good deeds, yet suffers in doing them. The same word for "suffers" (*ta'adhbhā*) is used of the virtuous man forced to do the actions of the ignorant states, *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, ed. Dieterici, 68.

The virtuous man practically=the temperate man; cf. below. Al-Fārābī follows the Platonic classification of the virtues as temperance, justice and courage, in addition to wisdom. This is nowhere explicit in the present work, but cf. [71].

[16]

The doctrine of the mean is of course Aristotelian (cf. especially *Eth. Nic.* II, 6 and 7). Most of the examples in the present section are already in Aristotle, *loc. cit.* Al-Fārābī adopts the doctrine elsewhere; see *Kitāb at-Tanbīh 'alā Sabīl as-Sa'ādah* (Hyderabad, 1346 A.H.), 11-12 and 14. In the latter passage a number of the same examples as here are given.

[17]

That is also the case of the moderate and mean in foods and medicines, etc. Cf. *Tanbīh 'alā Sabīl as-Sa'ādah*, 10, where the medical parallel is drawn.

the object, Arabic *alladbī ilaihi al-fi'l*, cf. *Tanbīh*, *ibid.*, *man ilaihi al-fi'l* immediately following *man minhu al-fi'l*, i.e. the agent.

the circumstances of the action, *al-ashyā' al-muṭīfah bil-fi'l*. The same expression comes in [26]. Cf. *Tanbīh*, 10, *al-aḥwāl al-muṭīfah bihā* (sc. *al-af'āl*).

[20]

*dwelling*s... (of) *wool and hair*. It is natural that al-Fārābī should think of the tents of the nomads, though these are hardly envisaged by the ancient authors, as he states.

[21]

Al-Fārābī elaborates Aristotle's view (*Pol.* 1, 3=1253b) of the constituent relations of the household as master and slave, husband and wife, parent and child, by adding the "property and owner" relation. The Arabic version of the *Oikonomikos* of Bryson mentions wealth (*māl*) as one of the essentials of the household, with servants, wife and children (cf. Martin Plessner, *Der Oikonomikos des Neupythagoräers Bryson* (Heidelberg, 1928), p. 214), but we do not know that al-Fārābī had access to this work. The same fourfold analysis as in al-Fārābī comes later, in the thirteenth-century *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* of Naṣir ad-Dīn Ṭūsī (Plessner, *op. cit.* p. 60).

[25]

The city is sometimes "indispensable," etc. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, II, 369D: ἡ ἀναγκαῖοις πόλις. Here the "indispensable" city (*al-madīnah aḍ-darūrīyah*) seems to be contrasted absolutely with the ideal (*al-madīnah al-fāḍilah*), but this is in appearance only. Al-Fārābī regarded at least three classes of states as opposed to the ideal (see the *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, ed. Dieterici, 61-3; *Kitāb as-Siyāsah al-Madanīyah*, ed. Hyderabad, 57-74), viz. the "ignorant" city (*al-madīnah al-jāhiliyah*; according to *Siyāsah*, 57, *al-madīnah al-jāhilah*, cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 71, *al-mudun al-jāhilah*), the "unrighteous" city (*al-madīnah al-fāsiqah*), and the "misguided" or "deluded" city (*al-madīnah aḍ-ḍāllah*; *aḍ-ḍārrah* in Dieterici's text of *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 61 and 63, is a mistake, corrected in his list of variants, p. xiii). Of these, in principal, the "ignorant" city, not knowing the true good, puts false goods in its place; the "unrighteous" city knows the true good, but does not follow it; and the "misguided" city has a distorted view. It is quite plain from the relatively large amount of space assigned to it that the "ignorant" city is the most important, and, unlike the others, it includes a number of distinct types (cf. [87]). In *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (ed. Dieterici, 63) al-Fārābī admits a fourth class, not very important, *al-madīnah al-mubaddalah*, the "altered" city, (also, *ibid.* 61, *al-madīnah al-mutabaddalah*) which formerly held the true view but has abandoned it. Of this fourth class and of the third, the "misguided" city, there is no trace in the *Fuṣūl*, but the existence of the "unrighteous" city is implied in [73]. On the other hand, several types of the "ignorant" city are mentioned or clearly indicated (cf. [28], [73], and [88], with the notes), though the classification is not shown. When therefore al-Fārābī here in [25] speaks of the "indispensable" city in contrast with the ideal, he is simply introducing one—the first, cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 62; *Siyāsah*, 58—of many varieties of city which according to his theory, expounded elsewhere, are opposed to the ideal. To all these the general term "corrupt polities" (*as-siyāsāt al-fāsidah*) in [88] may evidently be applied, and we are doubtless to see in the allusive character of the remarks on the different types of city in the *Fuṣūl* another indication of late date. Cf. *Introd.* 4 (a).

the enjoyment of pleasures...riches...the combination of both. Cf. [28].

the last perfection. Cf. [91].

not truly justice, but only something resembling justice, not being so. Cf. [71] end, [89].

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

[26]

must make happiness the mark for his eyes. Cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 47, and [27] here.

[28]

Some think that the end and purpose in kingship and the rule of cities is greatness and honour and domination, etc. This is in effect a characterization of the rulers of the “honour” city (*madīnat al-karāmah*), one of the types of “ignorant” city according to al-Fārābī, cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 62; *Siyāsah*, 59 (there *al-madīnah al-karāmīyah*), and equivalent to the timocracy of Plato. Though domination (*ghalbah*), which is the leading characteristic of another kind of “ignorant” city, viz. the “conquest” city (*madīnat at-taghallub*, *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 62; *al-madīnah at-taghallubīyah*, *Siyāsah*, 58; according to *Siyāsah*, 64, *madīnah taghallub*), is mentioned here, it is only incidentally, and there is no possibility of confusion. (For the “conquest” city or polity, cf. [88].)

Some of them attain it by...bringing them to the good things which in the opinion of the people of the city are goods...These are...the most excellent of chiefs. Al-Fārābī, following Plato, regarded the “honour” city or timocracy as the best of the “ignorant” polities (*Siyāsah*, 63), and he here uses for its leaders an expression similar to that in [54] for the leaders of the aristocracy. Cf. also *Siyāsah*, 62.

for descent alone. Cf. *Siyāsah*, 61.

Others seek to obtain it by forcing the people of the city, etc. This is conduct proper to the rulers of the “conquest” city (cf. *Siyāsah*, 64), and the idea is in line with al-Fārābī’s view that the “honour” city passes into the “conquest” city, when the love of honour is excessive (i.e. the best passes directly into the worst, cf. last note but one and [88]).

Yet others of the rulers of cities think that the aim in the rule of cities is riches, etc. Here al-Fārābī characterizes the rulers of the “exchange” city (so Dieterici renders *al-madīnah al-baddālah*, *Mad. Fād.* 62 (Verwechslungsstaat); *madīnat an-nadbālah*, the “contemptible” city, *Siyāsah*, 58, 59 seems as likely to be correct), which according to his theory is another type of the “ignorant” city and corresponds to the Greek oligarchy.

the laws of the people of the city. So both MSS., but perhaps “the laws of the city” is right, cf. above.

people of base headship, abl khasāsāt ar-riyāsah. Cf. al-Fārābī, *Iḥsā’ al-‘Ulūm* ed. ‘Uthmān Amīn, Cairo 1350/1931, 65 [=ed. Gonzalez Palencia (2nd ed.), Madrid-Granada, 1953, 94]: *fa’in kānat taltamisū al-yasār summiyat ri’āsāt al-khissah*. Dr S. Afnan, to whom I owe this reference, tells me that in the Paris MS. of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* ὀλιγαρχία is rendered (1365 b30) *madīnat (siyāsāt) al-khissah*. Elsewhere (cf. next note) baseness is ascribed to another type of city, and this introduces a certain confusion.

Others of the rulers of cities think that the end in the rule of cities is the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the characteristic of the rulers of the “base and wretched” city (*madīnat al-khissah wal-shaqwah*, *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 62; cf. *Siyāsah*, 58–9,

al-mudun, *al-madīnah al-khasāsah*), and al-Fārābī's equivalent of the Greek democracy, in one of its aspects. According to his theory, developed elsewhere, it is a special type of the "ignorant" city.

[29]

The king is king by the kingly craft, etc. As already mentioned in Intro. 4 (b), this repeats a famous sentiment in the *Politics* of Plato, 259B: Τάυτην (sc. τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην) δὲ ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἂν τε ἄρχων ἂν τ' ἰδιώτης ὦν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθήσεται; Δίκαιον γοῦν. "The possessor of the kingly craft or science then, whether he is in fact in power or has only the status of a private citizen, will properly be called royal, since his knowledge of the art qualifies him for the title whatever his circumstances? Yes, he is undoubtedly entitled to that name." (Translation of J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman*, London, 1952, p. 125, slightly modified.) Cf. *Tahsīl*, 46.

[30]

Al-Fārābī has already ([7]) given a provisional list of the rational (intellectual) virtues, and now within the larger class distinguishes between speculative and reflective or deliberative virtues (cf. [89], [90]). The following *fuṣūl* deal with the rational virtues in detail, first the speculative (31-4), then the deliberative (35-41), and may be compared with *Eth. Nic.* vi, 3-11.

The rational speculative part . . . and the rational reflective part, etc. Cf. [6], where the reflective is a subdivision of the practical.

practical wisdom. The Arabic *ta'aqqul* has to be distinguished from *'aql*, but it will not serve to render "intelligence" and reserve for *'aql* the translation "intellect". As will be seen from the passages where it is used, the meaning of *ta'aqqul* in the *Fuṣūl* is neither intelligence, nor "act of intellection", as elsewhere, but Greek φρόνησις rendered by Sir David Ross "practical wisdom", which has been adopted here. *'Aql*, on the other hand, has been rendered "intellect", occasionally "intelligence", throughout. The fifth form of this root to render φρόνησις is well chosen (literally "to make oneself intelligent, to display intelligence").

[32]

first principles (awā'il). These are evidently the same as the "principles" (*mabādi'*) mentioned in the previous *fuṣūl*, where the identification is in effect already made.

[34]

The sober lyricism of this description of the hierarchy of existence is striking. Cf. [89], where the subjective aspect is treated (the ascent through the lower degrees of knowledge to the highest).

certainty of their existence, etc. Cf. [32].

significance, shai'iyah, an abstract from *shai'*, "thing". Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne)*, Paris 1938, 172. But perhaps the reading of the Hebrew is preferable, implying *sababīyah*, "causality".

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[35]

what should be chosen and avoided in the individual things within our power. Cf. [50], “The possible things which are to be chosen and avoided”. “Within our power” here represents the Arabic *fa‘lubbā ilainā*, literally “their doing is to us”, cf. [54] *wahadbā ilaihi an yudabbira*, “it is for this man to rule”. This is quite different from the expression in [17], *alladbī ilaihi al-fi‘l*, “he towards whom, that towards which the action is”, i.e. the object of the action.

[36]

Practical wisdom, ta‘aqqul. See note on [30].

excellence of deliberation, jandat ar-rawīyah, cf. *Tanbīh*, 16.

[37]

they conceive a thing to be wholesome when it is not, etc. Literally, “they conceive what is wholesome in the form of what is unwholesome”, etc.

the man of practical wisdom must be virtuous with the ethical virtues, cf. [80].

and so the clever man, the astute and the deceitful man being wicked and vicious.

Al-Fārābī refers back to the classification of faculties or “powers” in [36].

[46]

Readiness of wit, listed as a rational (intellectual) virtue in [7] but omitted in [30] seems here out of place (at the end of the account of intellectual defects, and before resumption of the discussion of the virtues already mentioned).

[47]

there come into existence, instead of practical wisdom, astuteness, dissimulation and trickery. These are the qualities spoken of above, [36] and [37].

[48]

This and the following *faṣl* are closely connected with Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* vi, 7 (= 1141a and b).

the most excellent knowledge of the most excellent existents. According to *Eth. Nic.*, *loc. cit.*, wisdom is not indeed, but includes, “scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion” (Ross), ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.

unless indeed man is the most excellent thing in the world. This is Aristotle practically verbatim: εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν (*Eth. Nic.* vi, 7, 3).

[49]

every last existent. Cf. [34] for “last existents”.

the ultimate end on account of which man exists is happiness. Cf. [69].

the end is one of the causes. A reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes.

[51]

Excellence in producing an imaginative impression is employed, etc. Al-Fārābī’s account here obscures the fact that the imaginative impulse is from within, not without.

[52]

For an account of poetry evidently much nearer to Aristotle than what is said here see A. J. Arberry, "Fārābī's Canons of Poetry", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, xvii (1937-8), 266-78.

[53]

the bearers of religion, cf. [62].

the measurers, cf. Introd. 4 (b).

[54]

In this important *faṣl* al-Fārābī's views on the question of the source of authority in the state seem to have evolved, not only beyond Plato's, but beyond his own expressed elsewhere in other, presumably earlier works. According to Plato, in the *Republic*, Book iv, there is one form of right government, monarchy or aristocracy, with four degenerate forms, discussed in Book viii, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Al-Fārābī consistently regards these four as the main types of his "ignorant" city or state, and, as we have already seen, this view is implicit in the *Fuṣūl* (cf. especially [28] and the notes there). But his conception of the ideal form of government varies.

The chiefs and rulers of this city are of four descriptions. It is to be noted that al-Fārābī is speaking of his ideal state (cf. [53]), in which he admits four possible sources of authority. In the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* he had admitted only three (cf. Introd. 4 (a) for the view that the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* is earlier than the *Fuṣūl*), the ideal ruler, a second best ruler, and rule by a group (two or more). Cf. below.

the first chief. The ideal ruler is so called *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 57, 59; *Siyāṣah*, 49. Cf. [88], [91].

in whom are combined six conditions. In the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (ed. Dieterici, 60) al-Fārābī speaks somewhat indistinctly of six, or at least five conditions (*sharā'if*) which are fulfilled in the ideal ruler. These are at least different from twelve qualities (*khaṣṣah*) which the "first chief", or ideal ruler, must possess (*Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 59-60), and they do not simply form part of the list of the latter given by al-Fārābī, since the qualities are innate (*qad fūṭira 'alaiha*, 59), while the conditions do not supervene till after maturity (*ba'd an yakbura*, 60). The conditions, al-Fārābī tells us, have been mentioned already, and are apparently five, not six, in number, when abstraction is made from what he calls "their imaginative counterparts" (*al-andād min jibat al-qiwāwāh al-mutakhayyilah*). All this must refer to what is laid down in *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 57-9, viz. that the ideal ruler must possess an inclusive art (the art of ruling); that he must be perfect, in the sense of being at once philosopher and prophet (i.e., as al-Fārābī explains, both intellect and imagination are taken into account); that he must have the power of representing in words what he knows; that he must have the power of guiding men to happiness; and that he must have the power of carrying out actions. Unfortunately al-Fārābī does not mention these conditions so clearly as his "twelve

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

qualities" (actually thirteen, as was noted by the authors of the French translation), and there is room for difference of opinion as to what in fact they are. Thus at one point he states that to be able to attain happiness is the *first* condition of the ideal ruler ([59]). This, however, appears simply to round off his discussion of the second condition listed above (the attainment of happiness is the prerogative of the perfect man) and "first" presumably means no more than "most important". If "first condition" is taken strictly, we are left with only this and the following three, instead of five or six. Again, he says ([57]) that the ruler of the ideal city is so in virtue of *two* things, his being adapted for the rule, first, by natural disposition and temperament (*bi'l-fīṭrah wa't-ṭab'*) and, second, by external condition and the state, or quality, of his will (*bi'l-hai'ah wa'l-malkah al-irādīyah*). These two qualifications are taken by Dr Umar Farrūkh in his exposition of the passage (*Al-Fārābīyān*, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1369/1950), 28) together with the conditions listed above, i.e. as among the six, or five, conditions which, as we have seen, are mentioned by al-Fārābī later. It would seem, however, that they are in the nature of general considerations set out by al-Fārābī at the head of his argument, and developed in the course of the discussion into his innate qualities and external or acquired conditions, respectively. The six conditions in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* may thus be taken to be as given above, perfection of intellect and imagination counting as two, but the imaginative or prophetic endowment not being indispensable. These conditions, being unsystematically expressed, are somewhat overshadowed by the tabular list of natural qualities, though the description of the ideal ruler which emerges is clearer than in the *Siyāsah* (cf. there on the "first chief" 49, and on the "ruler of the city, who is the king" 54-55). It has to be added that in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* the innate qualities and conditions are not apparently kept quite separate, and that there and here the six conditions are somewhat different.

The second case is when no man is found in whom all these (sc. conditions) are united, but they are found separately in a group, etc. Al-Fārābī in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* distinctly realizes the possibility that no one man will possess all the requisite conditions for ruling, in which case authority will have to be shared: "And if no one man is found in whom are united these conditions, but two are found, one of whom is wise, and the other possesses the remaining conditions, they will both be rulers in this (sc. the ideal) city. If these conditions are shared among a group, one possessing wisdom, a second possessing another of the prerequisites, and so on, and they are in mutual agreement, they will be the most excellent rulers (*Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 61). He does not, however, make clear whether rule by a group may be a substitute for the rule of the ideal king, as is explicitly stated in the *Fuṣūl*. The context rather suggests that it is a substitute for the rule of the "second chief" (see below), but no doubt the two cases are not differentiated. In the *Siyāsah* also he envisages the rule of a group of "virtuous, good and happy people" (*an-nās al-fāḍilīn wal-akhyār wal-su'adā'*) in the following

passage (50): "And when it happens that of these kings (*mulūk*) at one time there is a group (*jamā'ah*) either in a city or a nation or several nations, all their group is like a single king (*malik*), because of the agreement of their plans and aims, their will and lives", etc. But in neither work is aristocracy distinctly represented in the same way as in the present passage, viz. as the next best alternative to the rule of the ideal king and called into existence by his not being available.—Al-Fārābī in the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (62) speaks of the "group" city (*al-madīnah al-jamā'iyah*) as one of "ignorant" cities, and in the *Siyāsah* deals with the type at considerable length (69–71). He has developed a characteristic of the Platonic democracy into a separate state (cf. [28]): the purpose of the inhabitants of the "group" city is freedom; and it is of course clear that it has nothing to do with the aristocracy which he speaks of in the present *faṣl*.

*The third case is when these are not available either. The chief of the city is then the man, etc. This is the "second chief" of the Madīnah Fāḍilah (60–1), for whom "after he is of ripe age" (ba'da kibarihi) six conditions are laid down (in addition, apparently, to the twelve qualities, which he seems to share with the "first chief") closely resembling those mentioned here in the Fuṣūl. The principal difference is that the "second chief" in the Madīnah Fāḍilah, like the "first chief", must possess wisdom (cf. above), whereas nothing is said about wisdom in the Fuṣūl, where the third alternative is concerned. The circumstance that here jihād, specifically the holy war against infidels, replaces war simpliciter has already been commented on (Intro. 4 (a)). But perhaps the most significant feature in the present passage of the Fuṣūl is the naming of the man who represents the third alternative as malik as-sunnah, "the king of, i.e. according to, the law, lawful king". This naming apparently comes nowhere else in al-Fārābī, and the explanation of its appearance in the Fuṣūl seems undoubtedly to be looked for in the Politicus of Plato. In the Republic it is characteristic of the right government of monarchy and aristocracy alike that the laws of the city are maintained (Book IV, end). It is otherwise in the Politicus, where the rule of the philosophic statesman is above all laws (cf. J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman*, p. 211). In particular, we read (301 B) "But when one man rules according to the laws, imitating him who knows (sc. the philosophic statesman or ideal king) we call him king, making no difference in name between him who rules alone by knowledge and him who rules alone by opinion according to the laws". It is the latter who is the original of al-Fārābī's "lawful king". The idea is adumbrated, we may say, so far as al-Fārābī is concerned, already in the Madīnah Fāḍilah, according to which (60), in defect of the ideal ruler, "the laws and traditions which this chief (sc. the ideal ruler) and his like laid down, if such succeeded one another in the city, are taken and confirmed", and the "second chief" is appointed, and it evidently had a place in Arabic philosophy afterwards (cf. Intro. 4 (c)).*

he should be able to go on the holy war. Cf. above, a condition of the "king in reality", and Intro. 4 (a).

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This group are called the chiefs according to the law. This seems to be a development original to al-Fārābī. Cf. above, “the king of, according to the law”.

[57]

agreement of their opinions about God and spiritual beings. Cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 69:

“The things in common which all the people of the ideal city should know are, first, knowledge of the First Cause and all its attributes, then the things separate from matter, and the special attributes and grade of each, till one comes (*sc.* in descending order) to the active intellect”, etc. The whole passage is illustrative of the present *faṣl*. The “spiritual beings” or immaterial things, of which the “active intellect” (*al-‘aql al-fa‘āl*) is the type, are called in [65] “spiritual bodies”.

This is the beginning. We have here the reason why al-Fārābī treats at length of metaphysics in his political works. It is necessary for the inhabitants of the ideal city to have the right views on these metaphysical matters, and especially for the ideal king, whose first prerequisite is wisdom (cf. [54]), i.e. knowledge of precisely this kind ([34]). Without such knowledge the end for which man exists remains unknown ([49]), and the ideal city cannot be realized.

the opinions of the inhabitants of the city, ārā’ abl al-madīnah, cf. the book-title *Ārā’ Abl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* (Introd., p. 8, n. 1).

[58]

the preservation of what is divided among them. Cf. below. Al-Fārābī has already mentioned the conservation of good things as part of the function of the ruler of the household ([21]). Even in the “ignorant” city spoken of first in [28] (i.e. timocracy, the “honour” city) “the good things which in the opinion of the people of the city are goods” are preserved for them.

PART II

[62]

the bearers of religion, the secretaries, etc. Both categories are mentioned in [53], as belonging to the second class in the ideal state. A similar collocation (secretaries and priests) comes in the *Politicus*, 290A–E.

[63]

to acquire a good to which the city is entitled. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 8, 12 = 1256b: διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἔσται.

or (e) *war with men*, etc. See Hebrew variants.

[65]

the creation from matter; the heavenly bodies; the spiritual bodies. The existents are here listed in ascending order, cf. note on [57].

[66]

The metaphysical categories have been given in [64] as three. Now in the light of the discussion in the preceding *faṣl*, where a distinction has been drawn between what cannot not exist at a particular time and what cannot not exist at all, they are given as four in number.

- [67]
insufficient for that existence... a portion of that existence, i.e. reading *muǧūd*, "existence" for *maǧūd*, "existent".
- [69]
either to the highest or the least or an intermediate degree. For the phrase cf. [66].
- [71]
misery is not the penalty for giving up virtuous actions, etc. Like its contrary, happiness, misery is an end, as al-Fārābī has already stated, [69].
Therefore if anyone believes this of happiness, etc. In the following passage the Platonic virtues of temperance, justice and courage are clearly envisaged, though al-Fārābī here speaks of those who are not truly temperate, etc. Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 68 D-E.
- the brave man among them*, i.e. in the imperfect cities, the rulers of which have just been mentioned.
- what they suppose to be virtues are nearer to being vices*, etc. Cf. [25] end, for pseudo-virtues.
- [73]
the people of the ignorant cities and the unrighteous. Cf. note to [25]. Al-Fārābī's "ignorant" city is of several types, hence "ignorant cities" here and elsewhere. "The unrighteous" are evidently the inhabitants of his "unrighteous" city.
- the thought that by his death he will lose happiness. The last causes him more pain than is felt by the ignorant, for the ignorant know nothing of happiness after death*, etc. Cf. *Madīnah Fāḍilah*, 61, 62 (The people of the "ignorant" city do not know happiness, and it has not occurred to them to direct themselves towards it, whereas the people of the "unrighteous" city have the opinions of the ideal city and know happiness, the existence of God, and other matters, but their actions are those of the people of the "ignorant" cities), and similarly *Siyāsah*, 73 = Dieterici's translation, *Die Staatsleitung*, 88.
- what they have previously done* (lit. "sent forward") *in their lives*. The idea and expression are Qur'ānic, cf. *Sūrah*s 2, 89; 3, 178; 36, 11; 78, 41, etc.
- [74]
The virtuous warrior, al-mujāhid al-fāḍil. Cf. *jihād* [54] and *Introd.* 4 (a).
- [76]
Some people think that the man who is not wise becomes wise only by the separation of the soul from the body, etc. Al-Fārābī or rather Ibn al-Ṭaiyib elsewhere criticizes the view, based on the *Phaedo* of Plato, that philosophy is the study or practice of death (cf. μελέτη θανάτου *Phaedo*, 81 A), Arabic *mu'ānāt al-mawt*, if by that is meant natural death, which is "separation of the form from the matter, I mean of the soul from the body". See D. M. Dunlop, "The Existence and Definition of Philosophy, from an Arabic text ascribed to al-Fārābī", *Iraq*, XIII (1951), 86, 88-9; S. M. Stern, 'Ibn al-Ṭaiyib's Commentary on the Isagoge', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XIX (1957), 419-425.

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kill themselves and kill the soul. The sense seems right, cf. above "the separation of the soul from the body, the body remaining devoid of soul" with the expression below "the soul perishes and the body remains devoid of soul".

the walīs (i.e. the friends) of God are in effect the Muslim saints. It is noteworthy that they are several times mentioned in this work of al-Fārābī, cf. [81], [82].

We must wait for the loosing of Him who joined them, and not take the loosing upon ourselves. Cf. Dunlop, "The Existence and Definition of Philosophy", 88-9, "it is not permitted to us to loosen this bond, I mean the bond of the soul with the body, but we should trust its loosing to Him who tied it".

is not defrauded in the seeing Him. Al-Fārābī here makes use of a tradition (*ḥadīth*), cf. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 1817a.

[80]

excellence of discrimination with reference to the actions which should be chosen or avoided. Cf. [35], etc.

The man of practical wisdom is he who possesses excellence of deliberation, etc. Cf. [36], [38].

when he is at the same time excellent with ethical virtue. Cf. [37].

[81]

Hermes, i.e. Trismegistus, whom al-Fārābī evidently regarded as a historical character. For views of Hermes Trismegistus among the Arabs cf. Ibn abī Uṣaibi'ah, 'Uyūn al-Anbā', ed. Müller, I, 16 ff.

Alexander, sc. the Great.

Zaid. Here, as commonly, for "so-and-so", without specific reference.

The holders of this view resort to ugly, hateful deeds, etc. If the First Cause knows "the partial existences perceived by the senses" at all times, all things are in effect predestinated, e.g. that Zaid becomes rebellious, and if Zaid believes this, he will make no effort to remain obedient.

[82]

The doctrine of special providence is for al-Fārābī even more pernicious than that of God's foreknowledge, for it involves his participation in wicked acts.

Some maintain, etc. This represents more or less the orthodox Muslim view, and since the only alternative given is decisively rejected, it is probably al-Fārābī's.

without connection between him and partner or wife. Cf. *Qur'ān*, *Sūrah*s 6, 163; 17: 111; 72, 3, etc.

by appointing for the task one, etc., i.e. on the orthodox view the Caliph, but as al-Fārābī had presumably by this time broken with the authorities at Baghdad (cf. *Introd.* 4(a)), what is meant should rather be any legally constituted Muslim authority.

THE FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ

he is exalted above the need for partners and helpers. Cf. *Qur'ān*, *Sūrah*s 6, 100; 7, 190, etc.

[87]

some whose harm is slight, etc. The "honour" city is the best of the "ignorant" cities according to *Siyāsah*, 63, as mentioned in the note to [28], and in the "group" city (cf. note on [54]) it is even possible in the course of time that the ideal type of man should appear (*Siyāsah*, 70-1).

[88]

the rule of the ideal cities. Cf. the end of the *faṣl*. A plurality of ideal cities is also admitted [27].

the lowest of the ignorant polities, the conquest polity, i.e. tyranny. Cf. the note to [28]. Aristotle had said the same (*Eth. Nic.* VIII, 10 = 1160b): καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης (sc. τῆς τυραννίδος) ὅτι χειρόστη, following Plato (e.g. *Republic*, IX, 576E; cf. *Politics*, 302E).

the reflective faculty, cf. [90]. This is not a synonym for the "experiential faculty" of which al-Fārābī has been speaking, but a term covering the activity of the whole of the reflective part of the soul ([30]).

the corrupt polities, as-siyāsāt al-fāsīdah. A general term, cf. note on [25].

he must emigrate. This is the opposite process to the one al-Fārābī has already mentioned, the banishment of the bad man from the cities ([11], [14]). The expression used is noteworthy (*wajabat 'alaihi al-hijrah*). "*Hijrah*" is of course the term constantly applied to the flight of Muḥammad from Meccah to Medinah, and could not fail to suggest the religious event to readers. The effect is doubtless intentional, and the passage serves to mark some crisis in al-Fārābī's life, of which we are imperfectly informed. Cf. *Introd.* 4(c) for the present passage as the starting-point of Ibn Bājjah's (Avempace's) theory of the "rule of the solitary" (*tadbīr al-mutawahhīd*).

[89]

The kernel of this *faṣl* (from "For he who desires to learn speculative philosophy, begins from numbers", in the second paragraph, to "all the things by which man reaches that perfection" near the end of the fourth paragraph) is an abbreviation of several pages of al-Fārābī's *Kitāb Tahṣīl as-Sa'ādah* (cf. *Introd.* 3, p. 7, n. 7), in the Hyderabad edition of A.H. 1345 pp. 10-15. While this is an advantage for establishing the text of the *Fuṣūl*, in so far as the more complete text provides one or two improvements (duly noted in the apparatus) to the readings of MS. A, on which we principally depend for the whole of Part II of the *Fuṣūl* (cf. *Introd.* 5) except here and the following *faṣl* ([90]), the positive gain is not great, for the abbreviation (eked out by paraphrase) appears to have been somewhat carelessly done, and the truncated form of the text is unusually difficult to follow. This and the following *faṣl*, also based on the *Tahṣīl*, scarcely formed part of the original *Fuṣūl*. See *Introd.* 4(a).

the virtues which are thought to be virtues, but are not so. Cf. [25], [71].

reflective virtues. Cf. [90].

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till he comes to the heavenly bodies. Apparently there is repetition, since al-Fārābī has just told us that the enquirer considers the heavenly bodies along with perspectives, music, etc. In fact, as is clear from intervening lines in the *Tahṣīl* after “understood and represented” which have been omitted in MS. A, he means that the heavenly bodies are now to be considered in a different way, viz. along with matter, i.e. not mathematically but physically.

the introduction of principles other than the principles What? and By what? and How?”

This is the reading of the *Tahṣīl* and is virtually certain. It has been modified in MS. A to “the introduction of the principles of What? and By what? and How?”, in order, apparently, to give the semblance of coherence to the passage. But “the principles of What? and By what? and How?” correspond to the formal reasoning of mathematics (cf. note below), which is the first business of the enquirer, and to make sense of the passage should already have been mentioned. In the complete form of the text in the *Tahṣīl* they have in fact so been mentioned (p. 10, line 2), a little before the quotation in the *Fuṣūl* begins (from line 7).

into a region midway between the genus which has no principles of existence except What? and the genus for whose species exist the four principles. The passage is taken verbally from the *Tahṣīl*, but in its context in the *Fuṣūl* appears incomprehensible. The “four principles of existence” have not previously been mentioned. At most three principles have (What? and By what? and How?). As in the previous case, the difficulty is met by recourse to an earlier, unquoted passage in the *Tahṣīl* (ed. Hyderabad, p. 5): *wamabādi’ al-wujūd arba’ah mādhā wabimādhā wakaif wujūd asb-sbai’*, *fa’inna hadhibi yu’nā bibi* (leg. *bihā*) *amr wāhid, wa ‘ammādhā wujūdubū walimādhā wujūdubū: fa’inna qaulanā ‘ammādhā wujūdubū rubbamā dulla bibi ‘alā al-mabādi’ al-fā’ilah warubbamā dulla bibi ‘alā al-mawādd, fataṣīru asbāb al-wujūd wamabādi’ bi arba’ah*, i.e. “The principles of existence are four: What and By what and How is the existence of the thing? (these mean a single thing) and From what is its existence? and For what is its existence? Our saying From what is its existence? sometimes signifies the active principles and sometimes signifies the materials, so that the causes and the principles of existence are four.” This analysis gives in fact the four causes of Aristotle (formal, efficient, material and final) and it is these that are the “four principles of existence” in the *Fuṣūl* passage. Further, “the principles of What? and By what? and How? are not three principles but one, cf. *Tahṣīl*, p. 10, line 2 (referred to in the previous note): *wayasta’milu min mābādi’ al-wujūd mādhā wabimādhā wakaif dhā wujūdubū dūna ath-thalāthah*, i.e. “And he employs of the principles of existence What and By what and How is its existence? to the exclusion of the (other) three”. This single principle is referred to in the present *Fuṣūl* passage simply as What? It is evidently the formal cause, and what al-Fārābī means is the passage of the enquirer from mathematics, where the formal cause alone is investigated, to natural phenomena, where all four causes, material, efficient and final, as well as formal, have to be taken into account, if they are to be understood.

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and he investigates thoroughly the natural existents. . . he passes again to another grade.

This passage is not clarified by the *Taḥṣīl* (pp. 11–12) and contains several expressions not found there.

the First Existent and the First Principle of all. Cf. [34] (First Existent), [76] (First Principle).

As for the man who is given the practical part by a revelation, etc. The contrast in this paragraph is between the philosopher whose progress has just been traced and the non-philosopher who is in receipt of revelation. The other pair, the natural scientist and the diviner, are introduced to illustrate the difference. Each of the latter in a sense knows: the diviner has knowledge of certain possibilities, but only the natural scientist knows the nature of the possible. So the inspired man knows what to do in guiding the affairs of a community, but the wisdom of the philosopher knows the nature of the good which is to be aimed at (explicitly, [49]). Though the position of the inspired legislator, e.g. Muḥammad, is thus safeguarded, it cannot be doubted that the implied superiority, in the field of theory if not of practice, of the philosopher might easily give offence, and so also the claim brought forward in the concluding words of the paragraph that the philosopher also, no less than the inspired man of religion, receives a revelation. Cf. in this connection the last sentence of [76]. The views here expressed do not differ greatly from what al-Fārābī says elsewhere in other, presumably earlier, works. In the *Madīnah Fāḍilah* (52) he tells us that prophecy of divine things is the most perfect stage which the *imaginative* faculty can attain and the most perfect stage which man can reach by his *imaginative* faculty, and again (58–9) that revelation comes through the agency of the active intellect. By the operation of the active upon the passive intellect a man becomes wise, a philosopher and possessed of practical wisdom in the fullest sense, while by its operation on the imaginative faculty he becomes a prophet, a warner of what is to come and an announcer of the present position of the partial things (perceived by the senses and distinct from the intelligibles, cf. *ibid.* 50–1). (In the *Siyāsah*, 49 and again 50, revelation is said to come through the agency of the active intellect but its operation is not differentiated, hence the distinction between philosopher and prophet is not drawn.) In the *Taḥṣīl* (40–1) understanding of a thing (*tafḥīm ash-shai*) is said to come either by its essence (nature) being intellected, or by a likeness of it being represented to the imagination. The two kinds of knowledge thus gained are given the names *falsafah*, ‘philosophy’, and, apparently, *malakah*, “*habitus*, (induced) condition”. Both give an account *inter alia* of the First Principle and First Cause, and the ultimate end for which man was created (contrast *Fuṣūl*, [49]). But *falsafah* alone provides proofs (*barhān*), and the inferior status of *malakah* in al-Fārābī’s view seems clear when we read that *malakah* represents as ends instead of the true good, happiness, “other goods which are thought to be the ends” and “imitates the happiness which is truly happiness by what is thought to be happiness”, i.e. in effect makes the same kind of mistake as the rulers of the ignorant cities (cf. [28] and

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

notes). The views suggested rather than developed in the present *faṣl*, though their orthodoxy may have been suspect, remained influential, and determined a significant part of the work of the "Spanish school" of Arabic philosophy—the *ḥukamā' al-Andalus*, as Ibn Khaldūn called them (*Muqaddimah*, 414 = transl. F. Rosenthal, II, 371)—notably Avempace (Ibn Bājjah) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). See E. I. J. Rosenthal, "The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Al-Fārabi", *Islamic Culture*, XXIX (1955), 161, n. 5 for a similar statement.

[90]

This *faṣl* is found practically entire in al-Fārabi's *Tahṣīl* (ed. Hyderabad, 21-2), but the arrangement is altered in the *Fuṣūl*. Cf. [89].

Reflective virtue, etc. This involves practical activity, see [6] end and 30, also [88], [89].

[91]

the last perfection, viz. happiness. Cf. [25].

[92]

This *faṣl* is headed in the MS. "Section by Abū Naṣr (*sc.* al-Fārabi) found noted down in the handwriting of al-Khaṭṭābī on the outside of a book". It appears to be additional to the original *Fuṣūl*. Ḥamd (Aḥmad) b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Khaṭṭābī, (Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, I, 165), author of *Ghārib al-Ḥadīth*, *al-Bayān fī I'jāz al-Qur'ān* (ed. Dr. 'Abd al-'Alīm, Aligarh, 1372/1953) and other works, was a younger contemporary of al-Fārabi who in later life withdrew to a religious community at Bust in Sijistān, but there is nothing to show that he is intended by the *nisbah*.

No man is apt to exist endowed by nature from the first with perfection. Cf. [10].

[93]

This *faṣl* is headed in the MS. "And of the doctrine of Abū Naṣr—may God be pleased with him".

first sight. Cf. *Tahṣīl* 37, for the phrase (already *supra* [80]) and for the opinion that the *khāṣṣah*, i.e. the most excellent or virtuous, are not restricted to what in effect is "common sense", the "first chief" least of all.

[94]

Headed "And of the doctrine of Abū Naṣr also—God's mercy upon him".

These with their analogy also, etc. I.e., apparently, the aim and way of one of the associates with their counterpart, the aim and way of the other, which are no longer the same. The translation of the rest of the sentence assumes a parenthesis ("and the second association . . . business affairs"), with the words "because each of the participants", etc. depending on "mischievous and wrong" in the first part of the sentence. This is a little awkward, but the alternative seems to be more, not less, objectionable: with a full-stop at "excellent things" it becomes necessary to assume a lacuna, in both A and Heb., after "business affairs".

[95]

Headed again simply "*Faṣl*", like the great majority of the fore-going *fuṣūl*, but it is doubtful if it belongs to the original form of the work.

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ARABIC TEXT

FUṢŪL AL-MADAN

PART I

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وعلى نبينا محمد وآله السلام
كتاب فصول المدنى لأبى نصر الفارابى

A fol. 1b
B fol. 91b

هذه فصول منتزعة تشتمل على أصول كثيرة من أقاويل القدماء فيما
ينبغي أن تدبر به المدن وتعمّر وتصلح به سير أهلها ويسدّدوا به نحو السعادة.
[I] فصل . للنفس صحّة ومرض كما للبدن صحّة ومرض فصحة النفس أن تكون
هيئاتها وهيئات أجزائها هيئات تفعل بها أبداً الخيرات والحسنات والأفعال
الجميلة، ومرضها أن تكون هيئاتها وهيئات أجزائها هيئات تفعل بها أبداً
الشُرور والسيئات والأفعال القبيحة . وصحة البدن أن تكون هيئاته وهيئات
أجزائها هيئات تفعل بها النفس أفعالها على أنم ما يكون وأكله، كانت
تلك الأفعال التي تكون بالبدن أو بأجزائه خيرات أو شروراً . ومرضه أن
تكون هيئاته وهيئات أجزائه هيئات لا تفعل بها النفس أفعالها التي تكون
بالبدن أو بأجزائه أو تفعلها أنقص مما ينبغي أو لا على ما من شأنها أن تفعلها.
[2] فصل . الهيئات النفسانية التي بها يفعل الانسان الخيرات والأفعال
الجميلة هي الفضائل، والتي بها يفعل الشرور والأفعال القبيحة هي الرذائل
والنقائص والחסائس .

15

فصول منتزعة من أقاويل القدماء في تدبير المدن وما
تصلح به للشيخ الامام ابى نصر محمد بن محمد الفارابى رحمة الله عليه
B ويسدّدوا B وتعمّر به A ter بها [به B يدبر 4
A وتفعلها] أو تفعلها A بأجزائها 12 B تدل [تلك 10
B يفعل بها 14

[3] فصل . المعالج للأبدان هو الطبيب والمعالج للنفوس | هو الانسان المدنى B fol. 92a
ويسمى أيضًا الملك غير أن الطبيب ليس قصده بعلاجه للأبدان أن يجعل
هيئاتها هيئات تفعل بها النفس خيرات أو سيئات بل إنما يقصد أن يجعل
هيئاتها هيئات تكون بها أفعال النفس الكائنة بالبدن وأجزائه أكل ما
5 تكون، كانت تلك الأفعال سيئات أو حسنات. فإنّ الطبيب الذى يعالج الأيدي
إنما يعالجها ليجود بطش الانسان بها سواء استعمل | ذلك البطش الجيد A fol. 2a
في الحسنات أو السيئات . والذى يعالج العين إنما قصده أن يجود بها الإبصار
سواء استعمل ذلك فيما ينبغى ويحسن أو فيما لا ينبغى ويقبح . فلذلك
ليس للطبيب بما هو طبيب أن ينظر في صحة النفس ولا في مرضها على هذا
10 الوجه بل للمدنى والملك . فإنّ المدنى بالصناعة المدنيّة والملك بصناعة الملك
يقدّر اين ينبغى أن تستعمل وفيمن تستعمل وفيمن لا تستعمل وأى صنف
من الصحة ينبغى أن يفيدها الأبدان وأى صنف منها ينبغى أن لا يفيدها .
فلذلك صارت صناعة الملك والمدينة حالها من سائر الصناعات التى فى المدن
حال رئيس البنائين من البنائين، لأنّ سائر الصناعات التى فى المدن إنما
15 تفعل وتُستعمل ليتمّ بها الغرض بالصناعة المدنية وصناعة الملك كما أن
الصناعة الرئيسة من صناعات البنائين يُستعمل سائرُها ليتمّ مقصودها .

- A omits [تفعل . . . هيئات 3-4] A omits [ليس 2] A للأففس 1
B الابدان [الأيدي B وان 5] B omits [ما تكون 4-5] ed. [بها 4]
B فكذلك 8 A قصد 7 B omits [ذلك B فيجود 6]
A الملك B المدينى [المدنى B بل 10] B صحة البدن وفى مرضه 9
[الأبدان . . . يفيدها B الصحة ان 12] B يستعمل B ان [اين 11]
B الرئيسة 16 B وبصناعة [وصناعة A به 15] A omits
A صناعة [صناعات B تستعمل

[4] فصل . كما أن الطبيب الذي يعالج الأبدان يحتاج إلى أن يعرف البدن بأسره وأجزاء البدن وما هي من جملة البدن وما يعرض له ولكل واحد من أجزائه من الأمراض وماذا تعرض ومن كم تعرض من شيء وما الوجه | B fol. 92b في إزالتها وما الهيئات التي إذا حصلت في البدن وفي أجزائه كانت الأفعال الكائنة في البدن كاملة تامة، كذلك المدنى والملك الذي يعالج الأنفس يحتاج⁵ إلى أن يعرف النفس بأسرها وأجزاءها وما يعرض لها ولكل واحد من أجزائها من النقائص والرزائل وما يعرض ومن كم شيء يعرض وما الهيئات النفسانية التي بها يفعل الانسان الخيرات وكم هي وكيف الوجه في إزالة الرزائل عن اهل المدن والحيلة في تمكينها في نفوس المدنيين ووجه A fol. 2b التدبير في حفظها عليهم حتى لا تزول ، ولكن انما ينبغي أن | يعرف من¹⁰ أمر النفس مقدار ما يحتاج اليه في صناعته ، كما أنّ الطبيب انما يحتاج أن يعرف من أمر البدن مقدار ما يحتاج اليه في صناعته ، والنجار من أمر الخشب والحداد من أمر الحديد مقدار ما يحتاج اليه في صناعته فقط .

[5] فصل . أنّ الأجسام منها صناعية ومنها طبيعية ، فالصناعية مثل السرير والسيف والزجاج وما أشبه ذلك ، والطبيعية مثل الانسان وسائر¹⁵ الحيوان . وكل واحد منها يلتئم من شيئين أحدهما مادة والآخر صورة المادة ، فالمادة مثل الخشب في السرير والصورة مثل الشكل في السرير وهو

B (omits second) يعرض A وما [وما 3 B وما يعرض لجملة البدن 2
B كم من شيء [كم شيء يعرض 7 B تعرف B omits [أن 6 (تعرض
B بكتبتها [في تمكينها 9 omit? [وكيف... المدن 8- B يفعل بها 8
[والنجار... فقط 12-13 B يزول B ذلك وحفظها [حفظها 10
B وأشبه 15 B omits [أن 14 B من : ed. [في 13 A omits
B الشكول B omits [المادة 17 B يلتأم B الحيوانات 16
B للسرير [في السرير

تربيعة أو تدويره أو غير ذلك . فالمادة هي بالقوة سرير وبالصورة
تصير سريراً بالفعل .

[6] فصل . الأجزاء والقوى العظمى التي للنفس خمسة الغاذى والحاس
والتخيّل والنزوعى والناطق . فالغاذى بالجملة هو الذى يفعل فى الغذاء
5 أو به أو عنه فعلاً ما . والغذاء ثلاثة أضرب ، أول وأوسط وأخير ، فالأول
مثل الخبز واللحم وكل ما لم يبتدى بعد أن ينفهم ، والأخير هو الذى
انهضم انهضاماً | تاماً حتى صار شبيهاً بالعضو الذى يغتذى به ، إن كان
B fol. 93a العضو لحمًا فبأن يصير ذلك الغذاء لحمًا وإن كان عظمًا فعظمًا . والأوسط
ضربان ، أحدهما الذى انطبخ فى المعدة والأمعاء حتى صار معداً لأن يكون
10 منه الدم ، والثانى الدم . ومن الغاذى القوة الهاضمة والنمّية والمولّدة
والجاذبة والماسكة والمميّزة والدافعة . وأحق ما سُمى الغاذى هو الذى يَنْضِجُ
الدم الحاصل فى عضو عضو حتى يصير شبيهاً بذلك العضو . والهاضم هو
الذى ينضج الغذاء الأوّل فى المعدة والأمعاء حتى يصير معداً لأن يكون
منه دمٌ ، ثم الذى يطبخ هذا المعدّ فى الكبد مثلاً حتى يصير دمًا . والنمّية
15 هى التى تزيد بالغذاء كمية العضو فى أقطاره | كلّها عند النشوء إلى أن تبلغ
به أقصى ما يمكن أن يبلغه كلّ عضو من العظم . والمولّدة هى التى تفعل
من فضلة الغذاء القريب من الأخير ، وهو الدم ، جسماً آخر شبيهاً فى
النوع للجسم الذى من غذائه فضلت الفضلة . وهذه صنفان أحدهما يعطى
مادة المولود ، وهو الأنثى ، والآخر يعطى صورته ، وهو الذكر ، وعن هذين

1 أو B و [A] 2 يصير B 3 [العظمى] A omits 4 والتخيّل B
5 وبه A 6 يتبدّل B 7 طبخ A 8 المعدة [المعدة] A
11 وحق B يسمى B 14 مثل الدم [منه دم] 15 فى الغذاء B
A و هذان 18 B يبلغ A النشئ

يكون الحيوان الكائن عن آخر شبيه به في النوع . والجاذبة هي التي تجذب
الغذاء من مكان الى مكان إلى أن يصل الى الجسم المغتذى حتى يماسه
وخالطه . والماسكة هي التي تحفظ الغذاء في الوعاء الذي حصل فيه من
البدن . والمميزة هي التي تميز عن الغذاء فضلاته وتميز أصناف الغذاء
لتنفذ إلى كل عضو ما يشاكله . والدافعة هي التي تدفع أصناف فضلات 5
الغذاء من مكان الى مكان .

B fol. 93 b والقوة الحاسة هي التي تدرك بإحدى الحواس الخمس | المعروفة عند الجميع .
والتخيّلة هي التي تحفظ رسوم المحسوسات بعد مغيبها عن مباشرة الحواس
لها ، فتركب بعضها إلى بعض تركيبات مختلفة وتفصل بعضها عن بعض
تفصيلات كثيرة مختلفة بعضها صادقة وبعضها كاذبة ، وذلك في اليقظة 10
والنوم جميعاً . فهذه والغاذية قد تفعّلان عند النوم دون سائر القوى .
والقوة النزوعية هي التي بها يكون نزاع الحيوان الى الشيء وبها يكون
الشوق إلى الشيء والكراهة له والطلب والهرب والإيثار والتجنب
والغضب والرضى والخوف والإقدام والجبن والقسوة والرحمة والمحبة والبغضة
والهوى والشهوة وسائر عوارض النفس . وآلات هذه القوة هي جميع القوى 15
التي بها تتأق حركات الأعضاء كلّها والبدن بأسره ، مثل قوة اليدين على
البطش وقوة الرجلين على المشي | وغيرهما من الأعضاء . A fol. 3 b

والقوة الناطقة هي التي بها يعقل الانسان وبها تكون الرويّة وبها يقتنى

A المتغذى العضو proposed [الجسم] 2 A شبيهه [شبيه به] 1
A صادق... كاذب 10 B غيبها 8 B الخمسة B باحد 7 B فينفذ 5
A omits [الى الشيء] A يكون بها 12 AB يفعّلان ed.: [تفعّلان] 11
B [والجبن] A omits [والخوف] 14 B omits [له] 13 B وبه [وبها] omits
B تبأدى? 16 omits

العلوم والصناعات وبها يميز بين الجميل والقبيح من الأفعال . وهذه منها
 عملٌ، ومنها نظريٌّ . والعملُ منه مهنيٌّ، ومنه فكريٌّ . فالنظريُّ هو الذي
 به يعلم الإنسان الموجودات التي ليس شأنها أن نعملها نحن ونغيّرها
 من حال إلى حال ، مثل أن الثلاثة عددٌ فردٌ والأربعة عددٌ زوجٌ . فإنّا لا
 5 يمكننا أن نغيّر الثلاثة حتى تصير زوجاً وهي ثلاثة باقية ، ولا الأربعة حتى
 تصير فرداً وهي أربعة ، كما يمكننا أن نغيّر الخشبة حتى تصير مدورة
 بعد أن كانت مربعة وهي خشبة في الحالين جميعاً . والعملُ هو الذي به
 تميز الأشياء التي شأنها أن نعملها نحن ونغيّرها من حال إلى حال . |
 B fol. 94^a والمهنيُّ والصناعيُّ هو الذي به تقتنى المهن مثل النجارة والفلاحة والطب
 10 والملاحة . والفكريُّ هو الذي به نروى في الشيء الذي نريد أن نعمله حين
 ما نريد أن نعلم هل يمكن عمله أم لا ، وإن كان يمكن فكيف ينبغي أن
 نعمل ذلك العمل .

[7] فصل . الفضائل صنفان ، خُلُقِيَّةٌ ونُطْقِيَّةٌ ، فالنُطْقِيَّةُ هي فضائل الجزء
 الناطق مثل الحكمة والعقل والكيس والذكاء وجودة الفهم ، والخُلُقِيَّةُ هي
 15 فضائل الجزء النزوعي مثل العفة والشجاعة والسخاء والعدالة . وكذلك
 الرذائل تنقسم هذه القسمة .

[8] فصل . الفضائل والرذائل الخُلُقِيَّةُ إنما تحصل وتتمكّن في النفس
 بتكرير الأفعال الكائنة عن ذلك الخُلُق مراراً كثيرةً في زمان ما واعتياد

B عن [من] A تمييز 8 B وهو باقٍ لثلاثة 5 B omits [به] 3
 B يريد B يدبّر [نروى] 10 B يقتنى A omits [والصناعي] 9
 B عليه [عمله] B يعمله : A نعلمه : ed. [نعلم] B يريد 11 B يعتمله حتى
 12 B يعمل 14 B omits [هي] 15 A omits [والشجاعة] 18-1 B واعتيادنا [واعتياد لها]
 18 B بتكريرنا للأفعال

لها . فان كانت تلك الأفعال خيرات كان الذى تحصل لها هو الفضيلة وان
 كانت | شرورا كان الذى يحصل لها هو الرذيلة على مثال ما عليه الصناعات A fol. 4a
 مثل الكتابة، فإننا بتكريرنا لأفعال الكتابة مراراً كثيرةً واعتيادنا لها يحصل لنا
 صناعة الكتابة وتتمكّن فينا ، وان كان ما نكرّره ونتعوّده من أفعال الكتابة
 أفعالاً رديئةً تمكّنت فينا كتابة سوء ، وان كانت أفعالاً جيّدة تمكّنت فينا 5
 كتابة جيّدة .

[9] فصل . لا يمكن أن يُفطر الانسان من أوّل أمره بالطبع ذا فضيلة
 ولا ذا نقيصة، كما لا يمكن أن يُفطر الانسان بالطبع حائكا ولا كاتباً ولكن
 يمكن ان يكون بالطبع معدّاً نحو أحوال فضيلة أو رذيلة بأن تكون أفعال
 تلك أسهل عليه من أفعال غيرها ، كما يمكن أن يكون بالطبع معدّاً نحو 10
 أفعال الكتابة أو صناعة اخرى بان تكون أفعالها أسهل عليه من أفعال
 غيرها فيتحرّك من أوّل أمره الى فعل ما هو بالطبع أسهل عليه ، متى لم
 يحفزه من خارج الى ضده حافزٌ . وذلك الاستعداد | الطبيعى ليس يقال B fol. 94b
 فيه انه فضيلة ، كما أن الاستعداد الطبيعى نحو أفعال الحياكة ليس يقال
 فيه انه حياكة ، ولكن متى كان استعداد طبيعى نحو أفعال فضيلة وكرّرت 15
 تلك الأفعال واعتيدت وتمكّنت بالعادة حتى تصير هيئة في النفس تصدر

وان كانت B omits لها هو B كانت تلك 2 B لنا [لها second 1
 : ed [بتكريرنا لأفعال 3 الرذيلة A adds after صناعات كانت
 B omits [فيها 4 تحصل B بتكرير أفعال : A بتكرّرنا أفعال
 [أن يُفطر... بالطبع 8-9 B bis فيها [فيها 5 B فان كان بما تكرره
 أفعال proposed : A omits [أحوال 9 A الانسان ان يفطر
 B omits [فيه 14 B omits [من أفعال... عليه 11-12 B omits [بان 11
 B omits [حتى تصير 16 B تكررت بدل 15-16 B omits فيه انه 15

عنها تلك الأفعال بأعيانها ، كانت الهيئة المتمكنة عن العادة هي التي يقال لها فضيلة . ولا تسمى الهيئة الطبيعية فضيلة ولا نقيصة وان كانت تصدر عنها أفعال واحدة بأعيانها . وتكون الطبيعية لا اسم لها ، وان سماها مُسَمَّ فضيلة أو نقيصة فانما يسميها باشتراك الاسم فقط ، لا بان يكون معنى 5 هذه معنى تلك . فالتى هي بالعادة هي التي عليها يُحمد الانسان أو يُذمّ وأما الاخرى فلا يحمد عليها الانسان ولا يذمّ .

[10] فصل . عسيرٌ وبعيدٌ أن يوجد من هو معدّ بالطبع للفضائل كلّها A fol. 4b الخلقية والنطقية إعداداً تاماً ، كما انه عسيرٌ أن يوجد من هو معدّ بالطبع نحو الصنائع كلّها . وكذلك عسيرٌ وبعيدٌ أن يوجد من هو معدّ بالطبع 10 لأفعال الشروع كلّها إلا أن الأمرين جميعاً غير ممتنعين . والأكثر أن كلّ واحد معدّ نحو فضيلة ما أو فضائل ذوات عدة محدودة ، أو صناعة ما أو عدة صنائع ما محدودة ، فيكون هذا معدّاً نحو شيء أوّل وآخر معدّاً نحو شيء آخر وثالث معدّاً نحو شيء ثالث من فضيلة أو صناعة .

[11] فصل . الهيئات الطبيعية والاستعدادات نحو الفضيلة والرذيلة متى 15 انضافت اليها الأخلاق المشاكلة لها وتمكّنت بالعادة ، كان ذلك الانسان في ذلك الشيء أتمّ ما يكون وما تمكّن فيه من الهيئات يكون زواله عن الانسان ، خيراً كان | الذي تمكّن فيه أو شراً ، عسيراً . ومتى وجد في B fol. 95a

[ولا نقيصة المتمكنة adding A الهيئات 2 B بعينها B بدل [تلك 1 B والتى 5 B نسميها 4 B الطبيعة 3 B كان يصدر A omits B without او بدوم [أو يُذمّ B يحمد عليها A repeats [هي بالعادة 8 B omits [انه 8 A عدد 11 A بالطبع من هو معدّ B omits [انه 8 A omits [عدة 12 B آخر 13 B ذا [شيء أوّل B mg. Omit? [ما 12 A omits [والتى... شيء 16 B يمكن 16 A omits [والتى... شيء 16

وقت من الأوقات من هو معدّ بالطبع نحو الفضائل كلّها إعداداً تاماً، ثم
 تمكّنت فيه بالعادة، كان هذا الانسان فائقاً في الفضيلة للفضائل الموجودة
 في أكثر الناس، حتى يكاد يخرج عن الفضائل الانسانية الى ما هو أرفع
 طبقة من الانسان. وكان القدماء يسمون هذا الانسان الالهى والمضادّ
 له، وهو المعدّ لأفعال الشرور كلّها الذى تتمكّن فيه هيئات تلك الشرور 5
 بالعادة، يكادون يُخرجونه عن الشرور الانسانية الى ما هو أكثر شراً
 منها. وليس له عندهم اسم لإفراط شروره، وربما سمّوه السّبع وأشبه ذلك
 من الأسماء. وهذان الطرفان وجودهما في الناس قليل، والأول متى وجد
 كان عندهم أرفع مرتبة من أن يكون مدنياً يخدم المدن، بل أن يدبّر المدن
 كلّها، وهو الملك في الحقيقة. وأما الثانى إذا اتفق أن يوجد لم يدبّر مدينة 10
 أصلاً ولم يخدمها بل يُخرج عن المدن كلّها.

[12] فصل. الهيئات والاستعدادات | الطبيعية نحو فضيلة أو رذيلة A fol. 5a
 منها ما يمكن أن يزال ويغيّر بالعادة زوالاً تاماً وتتمكّن في النفس بدّلها
 هيئات مضادة لها، ومنها ما يكسر ويضعف وتنقص عزّته من غير أن
 يزول زوالاً تاماً، ومنها ما لا يمكن أن يزال ويغيّر ولا أن تنقص قوته 15
 ولكن يمكن أن يخالف بالصبر وضبط النفس عن أفعالها والمجاذبة والمدافعة

ed. : [الالهى 4 B يكاد ان 3 B بالطبع مع [معدّ بالطبع 1
 B واما المضاد له والمعدّ [والمضادّ... المعدّ 4-5 B الالهى : A الالهى
 B والى... منه : A omits : ed. : [الى... منها 6-7 A يخرجونه ؟ 6
 A يخرج A يحلّ فيها [يخدمها 11 B يروس [يدبّر 10
 B without B وكمن الخ : A omits : [وتتمكّن... زوالاً تاماً 13-15
 A يقصر دونه [تنقص قوته A يزول ولا يتغيّر 15 punctuation

حتى يفعل الانسان أبداً أضراراً أفعالها . وكذلك متى كانت الأخلاق
 رديئة وتمكنت في النفس بالعادة ، فانها تنقسم أيضاً | هذه القسمة . B fol. 95b
 [I3] فصل . بين الضابط لنفسه وبين الفاضل فرقاً ، وذلك أن الضابط
 لنفسه وإن كان يفعل الأفعال الفاضلة بأنه يفعل الخيرات ، فهو يهوى
 5 أفعال الشرور ويتشوقها ويجاذب هواه ويخالف بفعله ما تنهضه اليه هيئته
 وشهوته ويفعل الخيرات وهو متأذٍ بفعلها . والفاضل يتبع بفعله ما تنهضه
 اليه هيئته وشهوته ويفعل الخيرات وهو يهواها ويشتاها ولا يتأذى
 بل يستلذها . وذلك مثل الفرق بين الصبر على الألم الشديد الذي يجده
 انسان ما والذى لا يتألم ولا يحس بالألم . وكذلك العفيف والضابط لنفسه ،
 10 فإن العفيف انما يفعل ما توجبه السنة في المأكول والمشروب والمنكوح من
 غير أن تكون له شهوة وشوق الى ما سوى ذلك غير ما توجبه السنة .
 والضابط لنفسه شهوته في هذه الأشياء مفرطة وعلى غير ما توجبه السنة ،
 ويفعل أفعال السنة وشهوته ضدها ، غير أن الضابط لنفسه يقوم مقام
 الفاضل في كثير من الأمور .
 15 [I4] فصل . الشرور تُزال عن المدن إما بالفضائل التي تُمكن في نفوس
 الناس ، وإما بأن يُصيِّروا ضابطين لأنفسهم ، وأى انسان لم يمكن أن يزال
 الشر الكائن عنه لا بفضيلة تُمكن في نفسه ولا بضبط نفسه أُخرج عن
 المدن .

- B اضداداً 1 A omits [فانها] 2 B اخلاق ردية تمكنت 1-2 B وهو A omits [الأفعال... يفعل] 4 B ويتشوقه ويجاذب B الشر 5 B ينهضه الى شهوته وهيئته 6-7 B بفضله [بفعله] 6 B ينهضه B بالـ A omits [انسان ما] 9 B الصبور 8 A omits [ولا... يستلذها] 7-8 B يمكن 15 B هو زائد على [سوى ذلك غير] 11 B الضعيف 10

[I5] فصل . عسيرٌ وغيرٌ ممكن أن يوجد انسان مفطور على استعداد
 نحو أفعال ثم لا يمكنه أن | يفعل أصداد تلك الأفعال ، لكن أى انسان | A fol. 5 b
 فطر على هيئة واستعداد نحو أفعال فضيلة أو رذيلة فإنه قادرٌ على أن يخالف B fol. 96 a
 ويفعل الفعل الكائن عن ضد ذلك الاستعداد ، لكن يعسر عليه ذلك إلى
 أن يتيسر بالعادة ويسهل ، على مثال ما عليه الأمر فيما يتمكن بالعادة . 5
 فإن ترك ما قد اعتيد وأن يفعل ضده ممكنٌ ، إلا أنه يعسر حتى يتعود ،
 على ما قلناه .

[I6] فصل . الأفعال التى هى خيرات هى الأفعال المعتدلة المتوسطة
 بين طرفين هما جميعاً شراً ، أحدهما إفراطاً والآخر نقصٌ . وكذلك الفضائل
 فإنها هيئات نفسانية وملكات متوسطة بين هيئتين وكتاتهما رذيلتان ، إحداهما 10
 أزيد والأخرى أنقص ، مثل العفة فإنها متوسطة بين الشره وبين عدم
 الإحساس باللذة ، فأحدهما أزيد وهو الشره والآخر أنقص ، والسخاء متوسط
 بين التقير والتبذير ، والشجاعة متوسطة بين التهور والجبن ، والظرف متوسط
 فى الهزل واللعب وما جانسهما بين المجون والخلاعة وبين الفدامة ،
 والتواضع خلق متوسط بين التكبر وبين التخاصس والحرية ، والكرم متوسط 15
 بين البذخ والصلف والطرمذة وبين النذالة ، والحلم متوسط بين إفراط
 الغضب وبين أن لا يغضب على شيء أصلاً ، والحياء متوسط بين الوقاحة

B repeats [لكن أى انسان] A omits [ثم] 2 B مفطوراً B بل غير 1

B والمتوسط [متوسط] B والآخر 12 B احدهما 10 B ايضا [على ما قلناه] 7

ed. : [وبين الفدامة] A omits [المجون و] A omits [وما جانسهما] 14

A والتخاصس [وبين... والحرية] 15 B وبين القدامة : A والفدامة

A والكرم متوسط بين البذخ والنذالة والطرمذة متوسط بين الصلف والنذالة 15-16

وبين الخَفَر والخَجَل ، والتودّد متوسط بين التَمَقّت وبين التملّق ، وكذلك سائرهما .

[I7] فصل . المتوسط والمعتدل يقال على نحوين ، أحدهما متوسط في نفسه والآخر متوسط بالقياس والإضافة الى غيره . فالمتوسط في نفسه مثل متوسط

5 الستّة | بين العشرة وبين الاثنين ، فإنّ زيادة العشرة على الستّة مثل زيادة B fol. 96b

الستّة على الاثنين ، وهذا متوسط في نفسه بين طرفين ، وكذلك كلّ عدد

يشبه هذا . وهو المتوسط | لا يزيد ولا ينقص ، فإنّ ما هو متوسط بين A fol. 6a

العشرة وبين الاثنين لا يكون في وقت من الأوقات غير الستّة . والمتوسط

بالإضافة يزيد وينقص في الأوقات المختلفة وبحسب اختلاف الأشياء التي

10 إليها يضاف ، مثل الغذاء المعتدل للصبي والمعتدل للرجل التامّ الكدود ،

فانه يختلف بحسب اختلاف حال بدنيّهما ، والمتوسط في أحدهما غير المتوسط

في الآخر في مقداره وعدده وفي غلظه وإملاقه وثقله وخفّته ، وبالجملة في

كيّته وكيفيّته . وكذلك الهواء المعتدل ، فهو بالإضافة إلى الأبدان . وتلك

حال المعتدل والمتوسط في الأغذية والأدوية ، فانها انما تزداد وتنقص في

15 كيّتها وكيفيّتها بحسب الأبدان التي تعالج بها وبحسب عاداته المتقدّمة

وبحسب زمان السنة وبحسب قوة الدواء نفسه حتى في العليل الواحد يخالف

B وبين الحصر : A والخفر الخجل : ed. [وبين الخَفَر والخَجَل 1

A والاثنين 5 B بالإضافة والقياس 4 A omits [والتودّد... التملّق

A ينضاف 10 A omits [اختلاف 9 B فانما B اشبه 7

: ed. [إملاقه 12 B المتوسط [المتوسط A omits [حال 11

B من [في 14 B في كيفيّته وفي كيّته 12-13 A B اطاقته

تزداد وينقص في كيّته : A يزداد وينقص في كيّتها وكيفيّتها : ed. [تزداد... كيفيّتها 14-15

عاداته... 15-16 B omits [بها 15 B without punctuation B كيه B كالهني [يخالف B وبحسب نفسه [نفسه 16 B قوتها زمان سنة [السنة

في كَيْتِه دواءً واحدٌ بحسب اختلاف الزمان من السنة . وهذا المتوسط هو الذي يستعمل في الأفعال وفي الأخلاق فإن الأفعال ينبغي أن تقدر كَيْتِها في العدد والمقدار وكَيْفِيَّتِها في الشدة والضعف بحسب الاضافة الى الفاعل والذي اليه الفعل والذي لأجله الفعل وبحسب الوقت وبحسب المكان ، مثل الغضب ، فإن المعتدل منه هو بحسب حال مَنْ يغضب عليه 5 وبحسب الشيء الذي لأجله الغضب وبحسب الوقت أو المكان الذي هو فيه . وكذلك الضرب والعقوبات مقدرة في كَيْتِها وكَيْفِيَّتِها بحسب الضارب والمضروب | وبحسب الجناية التي عليها الضرب وبحسب الآلة التي بها الضرب ، وكذلك في سائر الأفعال . فالمتوسط من كل فعل هو ما قُدِّر بالاضافة الى الأشياء المطيفة بالفعل والأشياء التي اليها تقاس الأفعال 10 المختلفة فتقدر ، ليست هي واحدة في القدر في كل فعل بل يتقدر | هذا الفعل بالاضافة الى خمسة أشياء مثلاً وفعل آخر بالاضافة الى أشياء أقل من خمسة أو أكثر .

[18] فصل . كما ان المتوسط في الأغذية والأدوية يكون متوسطاً معتدلاً لأكثر الناس في أكثر الزمان ، وربما كان معتدلاً لطائفة دون طائفة في 15 زمان ما ، وربما كان لبدنٍ بدنٍ في وقتٍ وقتٍ ، إما طويل وإما قصير ،

A والاخلق 2 هو B adds after المتوسط B زمان [الزمان من 1
A ما [مَنْ 5 A المكان من [الوقت... مثل 4-5 B انما ينبغي
A: مقدرة في كَيْتِه وكَيْفِيَّتِه : ed. [مقدرة... وكَيْفِيَّتِها 7 A له [لأجله 6
B without المطه 10 B الخيانة 8 B مقدر في كَيْتِه وكَيْفِيَّتِه
و فعل... 12-13 B العدد [القدر A omits [هي 11 punctuation
B وقد اخر بالاضافة الخ : A وفعل اخر من من خمسة أشياء أو أكثر : ed. [أكثر
A أو [وإما 16 B repeats [وربما... ما 15-16 B متوسط [متوسطاً 14

كذلك المتوسط والمعتدل في الأفعال قد يكون منها ما هو معتدل لجميع الناس أو أكثرهم في أكثر الزمان أو جميعه ، وقد يكون منها ما هو معتدل لطائفة دون طائفة في زمان ما ، وقد يكون منها ما هو معتدل للإنسان في وقت دون وقت .

5 [19] فصل . المستخرج والمستنبط للمتوسط والمعتدل في الأدوية والأغذية ، على أى نحو كان ، هو الطبيب ، والصناعة التى يستخرج بها ذلك هى الطب . والمستنبط للمتوسط والمعتدل في الأخلاق والأفعال هو مدبر المدينة والمالك ، والصناعة التى بها يستخرج ذلك هى الصناعة المدنية والمهنة الملكية .

10 [20] فصل . المدينة والمنزل ليس يُعنى به عند القدماء المسكن وحده ، لكن انما يعنى به المسكن الذى يحوى ناساً والناس الذى تحويهم المساكن ، كيف كانت المساكن ومن أى شىء كانت وحيث كانت ، تحت الأرض أو فوقها ، B fol. 97^b كانت من خشب أو طين أو صوف وشعر أو غير ذلك من سائر الاشياء التى تعمل منها المساكن التى تحوى ناساً .

15 [21] فصل . المنزل انما يلتئم ويَعمر من أجزاء واشتراكات محدودة ،

- | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 2 B و [أو 2 | 3 B ويكون | A لانسان انسان | 4 A omits [دون 4 |
| 5 A المتوسط | B الاغذية والأدوية | B هو [هى 6 | 7 A المتوسط |
| 8 B المدن | A يستخرج بها | A omits [المدنية | 10 عند [|
| B غير | added by B after ينبغي ان 11 | انما | ed. : [به المسكن |
| A : بالمسكن | B به | B omits [الذى . . . والناس | B يحتوى بهم المسكن |
| B repeats [كيف | B omits [أو فوقها 12 | 13 | [أو طين . . . وشعر 13 |
| ed. : B | A أو طين أو صوف أو شعر | B | B أو من طين أو من صوف وشعر |
| 15 B يلتام | | | |

وهي أربعه : زوج وزوجة، ومولى وعبد، ووالد وولد، وقنية ومقتنى .
 والمدير لهذه الأجزاء والاشتراكات والمولف بعضها الى بعض والذي يربط كل
 واحد بالآخر حتى يكون منها جميعاً اشتراك في الأفعال وتعاون على تكميل
 A fol. 7a غرض واحد وعلى تميم عمارة المنزل | بالخيرات وحفظها عليهم ، هو رب
 المنزل ومديره وهو يسمى المنزل، وهو في المنزل مثل مدير المدينة في
 5 المدينة .

[22] فصل . المدينة والمنزل قياس كل واحد منهما على قياس بدن
 الانسان . كما ان بدن الانسان مؤلف من أجزاء مختلفة محدودة العدد
 بعضها أفضل وبعضها أخس متجاوزة مرتبة، يفعل كل واحد منها فعلاً ما
 فيجتمع من أفعالها كلها التعاون على تكميل الغرض ببدن الانسان، كذلك
 10 المدينة والمنزل يأتلف كل واحد منهما من أجزاء مختلفة محدودة العدد بعضها
 أخس وبعضها أفضل، متجاوزة مرتبة مراتب مختلفة يفعل كل واحد على
 حياله فعلاً ما فيجتمع من أفعالهم التعاون على تكميل الغرض بالمدينة أو
 بالمنزل، غير أن المنزل جزء مدينة والنازل في المدينة فالأغراض إذاً
 مختلفة، إلا انه يجتمع من تلك الأغراض المختلفة، اذا كملت واجتمعت
 15 تعاوناً على تكميل غرض المدينة . وذلك أيضاً على قياس البدن، فإن |
 B fol. 98a الرأس والصدر والبطن والظهر واليدين والرجلين قياسهم من البدن كقياس

[وعلى 4 B أفعال B منهما A omits [حتى 3 B الأحوال [الأجزاء 2
 [في المدينة 5-6 B mg. ويسمى بالمنزل 5 A omits [عمارة A على
 B البدن [بدن الانسان 7-8 B omits [على 7 A omits
 B without punctuation B مجتمع 13 B تعاون 10 A منهما B مجاورة 9
 B omits [على 16 B باغراضها منها أيضا 14 B والمنزل [أو بالمنزل 13-14
 B قياس [كقياس B والرجلين واليدين 17 B بان [فان قياس before

منازل المدينة من المدينة وفعل كلّ واحد من الأعضاء الكبار غير فعل الآخر وأجزاء كلّ واحد من هذه الأعضاء الكبار تتعاون بأفعالها المختلفة على تكميل الغرض بذلك العضو الكبير، ثم يجتمع من الأعضاض المختلفة للأعضاء الكبار إذا تكاملت ومن أفعالها المختلفة تعاوناً على تكميل 5 غرض جملة البدن، كذلك حال أجزاء المنازل من المنازل وحال المنازل من المدينة، حتى تكون أجزاء المدينة كلّها باجتماعها نافعة للمدينة ونافعة في قوام بعضها ببعض، مثل ما عليه أعضاء البدن .

[23] فصل . كما ان الطبيب انما يعالج كلّ عضو اعتلّ بحسب

قياسه إلى جملة البدن وإلى الأعضاء المجاورة له والمرتبطة به بأن

10 يعالجه علاجاً يفيد به صحّة | ينتفع بها جملة البدن وتنتفع بها الأعضاء A fol. 7b

المجاورة له والمرتبطة به، كذلك مدبر المدينة ينبغي أن يدبر أمر كلّ جزء

من أجزاء المدينة كان جزءاً صغيراً مثل انسان واحد أو كبيراً مثل منزل

واحد ويعالجه ويفيده الخير بالقياس الى جملة المدينة وإلى كلّ جزء

من سائر أجزاء المدينة، بأن يتحرّى أن يجعل ما يفيد ذلك الجزء من الخير

15 خيراً لا يضرّ به جملة المدينة ولا شيئاً من سائر أجزائها بل خيراً تنتفع

به المدينة بأسرها وكلّ واحد من أجزائها بحسب مرتبته في نفعه للمدينة .

[من المنازل A جملة غرض 5 B متفاوت 2 B omits] غير... الكبار 1-2

B يعتل B لكل 8 B وتابعة [ونافعة] B تابعة [نافعة] 6 A omits

A يفيد [يفيده به 10 A omits] بأن يعالجه 9-10 A والأعضاء 9

B وكبيراً 12 B without punctuation بفع ، وسفع [ينتفع ، وتنتفع

من A only, with [وإلى كلّ... المدينة 13-15 B منزل [منزل واحد 12-13

B without بفع [تنتفع B شى 15 (line 14) المدينة بأن before

A المدينة ed.: للمدينة A only بأسرها... للمينة 16 punctuation

فكما أن الطبيب متى لم يحتفظ بهذا وقصد أن يفيد عضوا من الأعضاء
صحة وعالجه بما لم يبال معه كيف كانت حال سائر الأعضاء المجاورة له ،
أو عالجه بما يضرب سائر الأعضاء الأخر وأفاده صحة يفعل بها فعلا لا ينتفع
به البدن بأسره أو ما يجاوره ويرتبط به من الأعضاء ، تعطل ذلك العضو
وتعطلت الأعضاء المرتبطة به وتأدت المضرة منه الى سائر الأعضاء حتى 5
يفسد البدن بأسره ، كذلك المدينة .

[24] فصل . لا يستنكر أن يكون انسان له قدرة على استنباط |

المتوسط في الأفعال والأخلاق بحسبه هو وحده ، كما ان الانسان لا يستنكر B fol. 98b
أن يكون له قدرة على استنباط المتوسط والمعتدل من الاغذية التي يغتذى
بها هو وحده ، ويكون فعله ذلك فعلا طبييا وتكون له قدرة على جزء من 10
صناعة الطب ، فالذى يستنبط المعتدل من الأخلاق والأفعال بحسبه وحده
انما يفعل ذلك بان له قدرة على جزء من الصناعة المدنية ، غير أن
الذى له قدرة على استنباط المعتدل لعضو من أعضائه متى لم يحتفظ فيما
يستنبطه أن يكون غير ضار لسائر أجزاء البدن ولا يجعل نفعاً لجملة
وأجزائه ، كان استنباطه ذلك بجزء | من صناعة طبية فاسدة ، كذلك 15 A fol. 8a
الانسان الذى له قدرة على استنباط المعتدل له خاصية من الأخلاق

1	A يتحفظ	A بها [بهذا]	2	B ينال	B without صعه [معه]
	punctuation	3	B يضر [يضر]	B افاده	B ينفع
4	A يفعل ذا [تعطل ذلك]	5	A وبادرت [وتأدت]	7	B يستذكر
	B الانسان	8	B يستذكر	9	A يتغذى
	A omits	11	B وكان [وتكون]	12	B كذلك الذى [فالذى]
12	B حرر [جزء]	13	B بعضو	15	B حرو [بجزء]
	A الطَّب	16	B على [من]		

والأفعال إن لم يتحرّ بما يستنبطه من ذلك نفع المدينة ولا سائر أجزائها، بل كان لا يشعر بذلك أو يشعر به ولا يبالي بمضرته لها، كان استنباطه ذلك بجزء من صناعة مدنيّة فاسدة .

[25] فصل . المدينة قد تكون ضروريّة وقد تكون فاضلة . فأما المدينة

5 الضروريّة، فهي التي تتعاون أجزاؤها على بلوغ الضروريّ فيما يكون به قوام الانسان وعيشه وحفظ حياته فقط . وأما المدينة الفاضلة، فهي التي يتعاون أهلها على بلوغ أفضل الأشياء التي بها يكون وجود الانسان الحقيقيّ وقوامه وعيشه وحفظ حياته . فقوم رأوا ان ذلك الأفضل هو التمتع بالذات، وآخرون رأوا انه اليسار، وقوم رأوا انه الجمع بينهما . | فأما

B fol. 99a

10 سقراط وافلاطن وارسطوطاليس فانهم يرون ان الانسان له حياتان إحداهما قوامها بالاغذية وسائر الأشياء الخارجة التي نحن مفتقرون اليها اليوم في قوامنا، وهي حياتنا الأولى، والأخرى هي التي قوامها بذاتها من غير أن يكون بها حاجة في قوام ذاتها الى أشياء خارجة عنها، بل هي مكتفية بنفسها في أن تبقى محفوظة وهي الحياة الآخرة، وان الانسان له كمالان، 15 أول وأخير، فالأخير إنما يحصل لنا لا في هذه الحياة ولكن في الحياة الآخرة متى تقدّم قبلها الكمال الأوّل في حياتنا هذه . والكمال الأوّل هو أن يفعل أفعال الفضائل كلّها، ليس أن يكون الانسان ذا فضيلة فقط من غير أن

- A فالمدينة [فأما المدينة 4 B استنباط B أو 2 B يختبر بها 1
A omits [الحقيقي B بكونها [بها 7 B التي انما يتعاون 5
A وفلاطن 10 B واما B ان الجمع بينهما هو أفضل 9 B omits [وعيشه 8
[بذاتها B الحيوة [حياتنا 12 B احدهما 11 B وارسطوطاليس
B omits B كمال لا ؟ B [الحياة 14 B omits B بما [أنما
A illegible [حتى 16 B omits [في الحياة A omits [لا B

يفعل أفعالها وأنّ الكمال هو أن يفعل الانسان لا في أن يقتنى الملكات التي
 بها تكون الأفعال ، كما أنّ كمال الكاتب أن يفعل أفعال الكتابة ، لا أن
 يقتنى الكتابة ، وكمال الطبيب أن يفعل | أفعال الطبّ ، لا أن يقتنى الطبّ A fol. 8b
 فقط ، وكذلك كلّ صناعة . وبهذا الكمال يحصل لنا الكمال الأخير ، وذلك
 هو السعادة القصوى ، وهو الخير على الإطلاق ، فهو المؤثر المشتبه لذاته ،
 وليس يكون ولا في وقت أصلاً مؤثراً لأجل غيره ، وسائر ما يؤثر إنما يؤثر لأجل
 نفعه في بلوغ السعادة ، وكلّ شيء فأنما يكون خيراً متى كان نافعا في بلوغ
 السعادة وكلّ ما عاق عنها بوجه ما فهو شرّ . فالمدينة الفاضلة عندهم هي التي
 يتعاون أهلها على بلوغ الكمال الأخير الذي هو السعادة القصوى ، فلذلك
 يكون | أهلها خاصّة ذوى فضائل دون سائر المدن ، لأن المدينة التي قصد أهلها 10
 أن يتعاونوا على بلوغ اليسار والتمتع بالذات ليس يحتاجون في بلوغ غايتهم
 الى جميع الفضائل ، بل عسى أن لا يحتاجون ولا الى فضيلة واحدة ، وذلك
 أن الائتلاف والعدل الذي ربّما استعملوه فيما بينهم ليس بالحقيقة عدلاً ،
 وإنما هو شيء يُشبه العدل وليس بعدل ، وكذلك سائر ما يستعملونه فيما
 بينهم ممّا يجانس الفضائل . 15
 * [26] فصل . الأفعال المعتدلة المتوسطة المقدّرة بالقياس الى الأشياء

B وكما ان كمال 3 A يقتنى الانسان B omits [الانسان A هو في ان 1
 A omits [ولا A omits [لذاته A وهو [فهو 5 B وهذا [وبهذا 4
 B omits [بلوغ second 7 B فأنما يكون مؤثراً [إنما يؤثر B مؤثر [مؤثراً 6
 B فذلك يلزم ان B omits [القصوى 9 B omits [ما second 8
 B فضيلة [عدلاً A في الحقيقة 13 A يحتاجوا 12 B وعلى التمتع 11
 A الفضيلة A ليس ممّا 15

* This *faṣl* omitted in A

المطيفة اللائقة بها ينبغي أن تكون مع سائر شرائطها نافعة في بلوغ
السعادة وينبغي أن يجعل المستخرج لها السعادة نصب عينيه ، ثم يتأمل
كيف ينبغي أن يقدر الأفعال حتى تصير نافعة ، إما لأهل المدينة بأسرهم
أو لواحد واحد منهم ، في بلوغ السعادة كما أنّ الطبيب يجعل الصحة نصب
5 عينيه عند ما يقصد الى استنباط المعتدل في الأغذية والأدوية التي يعالج
بها البدن .

* [27] فصل . الملك في الحقيقة هو الذي غرضه ومقصوده من صناعته
التي يدبر بها المدن أن يفيد نفسه وسائر أهل المدينة السعادة الحقيقية ، وهذه
هي الغاية والغرض من المهنة الملكية . ويلزم ضرورة أن يكون ملك المدن
10 الفاضلة أكملهم بسعادة اذ كان هو السبب في أن يسعد أهل المدينة .

† [28] فصل . قوم يرون أن الغاية والمقصود بالملك وتدير المدن الجلالة
والكرامة والغلبة وإنفاذ الأمر والنهي وأن يطاع ويعظم ويمجد ، ويؤثرون
B fol. 100a الكرامة لذاتها لا لشيء آخر ينالون بها ويجعلون الأفعال التي يدبرون بها
المدن أفعالا يصلون بها الى هذا الغرض ، ويجعلون سنن المدينة سنناً
15 يصلون بها من أهل المدينة إلى هذا الغرض . فبعضهم يصل الى ذلك بأن
يستعمل الفضيلة مع أهل المدينة ويحسن اليهم ويوصلهم الى الخيرات التي
هي عند أهل المدينة خيرات ويحفظها عليهم ويؤثرهم بها دونه ، فينال
بذلك | الكرامة العظيمة ، وهؤلاء هم رؤساء الكرامة وأفضل الروساء .
A fol. 9a

B والمقصود	A omits [فصل 11	B المهبة 9	B به : ed. [بها 1
B without	و يؤثر بالكرامة 12-13	B ونفاذ الامور	A omits [والكرامة 12
B omits [هم 18	B سببا 14	B يريدون 13	punctuation
			B أفضل

* This *fasl* omitted in A.

† This *fasl* in A follows on § 25, without a new heading.

وآخرون منهم يرون انهم يستأهلون الكرامة باليسار ويتحروون أن يكونوا
 أيسر أهل المدينة وأن يتوحدوا هم باليسار ليفوزوا بالكرامة . وبعضهم
 يرى أن يُكرّم بالحسب فقط . وآخرون يفعلون ذلك بقهر أهل المدينة
 وغلبتهم وإذلالهم وترهيبهم . وآخرون من مدبري المدن يرون أن الغرض
 في تدير المدن اليسار ويجعلون أفعالهم التي يدبرون بها المدن أفعالاً يصلون⁵
 بها الى اليسار ويجعلون سنن أهل المدينة سننا يصلون بها من أهل المدينة
 الى اليسار، وإن أثروا خيراً ما أو فعلوا شيئاً من ذلك فانما يؤثرونه
 ويفعلونه ليحصل لهم اليسار . ومعلوم أن بين من يؤثر اليسار ليكرّم عليه
 وبين من يؤثر الكرامة وأن يطاع ليترى ويصل الى اليسار فرقاً عظيماً
 وهؤلاء يسمّون أهل خسارة الرئاسة . وآخرون من مدبري المدن يرون¹⁰
 ان الغاية | في تدير المدن التمتع بالذات . وقوم يرون جميع هذه
 الثلاثة كلّها، وهي الكرامة واليسار والذات، ويستبدّون بها ويجعلون
 أهل المدينة أشباه آلات لهم في أن ينالوا الذات واليسار . وليس واحداً من
 هؤلاء يسمّى ملكاً عند القدماء .

[29] فصل . الملك هو ملك بالمهنة الملكية وبصناعة تدير المدن وبالقدرة¹⁵
 على استعمال الصناعة الملكية أى وقتٍ صادف الرئاسة على مدينة سواء

A : المدينة : ed. [المدن]⁴ B without punctuation وسجرون¹
 B الأشياء [first] المدن B omits [فى]⁵ B أهل المدن
 B سبياً cf. p. 122, l. 14 أهل, proposed omit first⁶ B ويجعلوا أفعالها
 B without بثره ويفعله⁷⁻⁸ B فعل A omits [ما] B أثر⁷
 B omits [بها]¹² B omits [عليه] B له⁸ B punctuation
 B مالكا¹⁴ B ولا احد من لا¹³⁻¹⁴ A شبه B omits [أهل]¹³
 B رئاسة¹⁶ B الملكة بصناعة B مبدا [ملك]¹⁵

اشتهر بصناعته أو لم يشتهر بها ، وجد آلات يستعملها أم لا ، وجد قوما
يقبلون منه أم لا ، أطيع أم لم يُطع ، كما أنّ الطبيب هو طبيب المهنة
A fol. 9b الطبية ، عرفه الناس بها أم لم يعرفوه ، تأتت | له آلات صناعيّة أم لا ، وجد
قوماً يخدمونه في تنفيذ أموره أم لم يجد ، صادف مرضى يقبلون قوله أم لا ،
5 وليس ينقص طبّه إن لا يكون له شيء من ذلك ، كذلك الملك هو ملك
بالمهنة والقدرة على استعمال الصناعة ، تسلّط على قومٍ أم لم يتسلّط ، أكرم
أم لم يُكرم ، موسرا كان أم فقيرا . وقومٌ يرون أن لا يوقعوا اسم الملك على
مَن له المهنة الملكيّة دون أن يكون مطاعاً في مدينة مكرماً فيها . وآخرون
يضيفون الى ذلك اليسار ، وآخرون يرون أن يضيفوا الى ذلك التسلّط
10 بالقهر والاذلال والترهيب والتخويف ، وليس شيء من هذه من شرائط
الملك ولكن هي أشياء ربّما نفعت المهنة الملكيّة فيُظنّ لذلك أنّها هي
الملك .

[30] فصل . الجزء الناطق النظريّ والجزء الناطق الفكريّ لكلّ واحد
منهما فضيلةٌ على حيالها ، ففضيلة الجزء النظريّ | العقل النظريّ والعلم
B fol. 101a والحكمة ، وفضيلة الجزء الفكريّ العقل العملي والتعلّل والذهن وجودة
15 الرأى وصواب الظنّ .

- [تأتت 3 B يطاع 2 B يشهر A B بصناعة B اشهر 1
B مفيد أفعاله [تنفيذ أموره 4 B صناعته ? B without punctuation 5
B وقوم آخرون A او [أم B لا 7 B وكذلك B هذه [ذلك 5
A omits [يرون ان B bis اليها [الى ذلك 9 B مرتبته [مدينة 8
A ولكن في [ولكن هي 11 A omits [والاذلال 10 B البسائط [التسلّط
[الملك 12 B الملكيّة يظن [المهنة الملكيّة فيُظنّ B اسباب بها [أشياء ربّما
B الذهن [الظن 16 B العقل [العقل 15 B الفطريّ [النظريّ 14 A omits

[31] فصل . العقل النظرى هو قوة يحصل لها بالطبع لا ببحث ولا بقياس العلم اليقين بالمقدمات الكلية الضرورية التي هي مبادئ العلوم . وذلك مثل علمنا أن الكل أعظم من الجزء ، وأن المقادير المساوية لمقدار واحد متساوية ، وأشياء هذه المقدمات ، وهذه هي التي منها يتبدى الانسان فيصير الى علم سائر الموجودات النظرية التي شأنها أن تكون موجودة لا 5 بصنع الانسان . وهذا العقل قد يكون بالقوة عند ما لا تكون هذه الأوائل حاصلة له ، فاذا حصلت له صار عقلاً بالفعل ، وقوى استعدادهُ لاستنباط ما هي له معدة . وهذه القوة لا يمكن أن يقع لها خطأ فيما يحصل لها ، بل جميع ما يقع لها | من العلوم صادق يقينى لا يمكن غيره . A fol. 10a

[32] فصل . اسم العلم يقع على أشياء كثيرة ألا أن العلم الذى هو 10 فضيلة ما للجزء النظرى هو أن يحصل فى النفس اليقين بوجود الموجودات التي وجودها وقوامها لا يصنع الانسان أصلاً وما هو كل واحد منها وكيف هو عن براهين مؤلفة من مقدمات صادقة ضرورية كلية أوائل تُيقن بها وحصلت معلومة للعقل بالطبع . وهذا العلم صنفان ، أحدهما أن يتيقن بوجود الشيء وسبب وجوده وانه لا يمكن أن يكون غيره أصلاً لا هو ولا 15 سببه ، والثانى أن يتيقن بوجوده وانه لا يمكن ان يكون غيره من غير أن يقف على سبب وجوده .

1	A تحصل لنا	2	B الا ضطرابية	3	A ببحث القياس والعلم	4	B تبدي فتصير
5	B بها [منها]	6	A وهي [وهذه هي]	7	B كان [صار]	8	B العقل [العلم]
9	B بقى [هى له معدة]	10	A omits [يقينى... غيره]	11	B عن [من]	12	B العقل [العلم]
13	A repeats كل واحد... هو	14	B انسان	15	B العقل [العلم]	16	B العقل [العلم]
17	B يولف [يقف]	18	A هو	19	B العقل [العلم]	20	B العقل [العلم]

[33] فصل . العلم الحقيقي | ما كان صادقاً يقينياً في الزمان كله لا في B fol. 101b

بعض دون بعض وما كان موجوداً في وقت وأمكن أن يصير غير موجود
فيما بعد . فأنّا إذا عرفناه موجوداً الآن، فانه إذا مضى عليه زمان ما أمكن
أن يكون قد بطل فلا ندري هل هو موجود أم لا، فيعود يقيناً شكاً وكذباً،
5 وما أمكن ان يكون كذلك فليس بعلم ولا يقين . فلذلك لم يجعل القدماء
إدراك ما يمكن أن يتغير من حال الى حال علماً، مثل علمنا بجلوس هذا
الانسان الآن، فانه يمكن أن يتغير فيصير قائماً بعد أن كان جالساً، بل
جعلوا العلم هو اليقين بوجود الشيء الذي لا يمكن أن يتغير، مثل الثلاثة
هو عدد فرد، فإنّ فردة الثلاثة لا تتغير، وذلك أن الثلاثة لا يمكن أن
10 تصير زوجاً في حال من الأحوال ولا الأربعة فرداً، وإن سمي هذا علماً
أو يقيناً فهو بالاستعارة .

[34] فصل . الحكمة علم الأسباب البعيدة التي بها وجود سائر
الموجودات ووجود الأسباب القريبة للأشياء ذوات الأسباب، وذلك | أن A fol. 101b
يتيقن بوجودها ونعلم ما هي وكيف هي وانّها وإن كانت كثيرة فانّها
15 ترتقى على ترتيب الى وجود واحد، هو السبب في وجود تلك الأسباب
البعيدة وما دونها من الأسباب القريبة، وإنّ ذلك الواحد هو الأول في
الحقيقة وقوامه لا بوجود شيء آخر، بل هو مكتفٍ بذاته عن أن يستفيد

B عرفنا 3 A فامّا [وأمكن B موجود [موجودا 2 B يقينا B بالحقيقة 1
B يكذب [يكون كذلك 5 B يقينياً B مفقود [لا B يدري 4
B omits [يمكن ان A omits [هو... ان الثلاثة 9 A only [هو 8
B ويعلم 14 A بان الموجودات B adds after كله 13 A فان 10
A فانّ B الأشياء [الأسباب 16 B الأشياء : A الأسباب [الأسباب 15
B غير [عن 17

الوجود عن غيره، وإنه لا يمكن أن يستفيد الوجود أصلاً عن غيره وإنه
لا يمكن أن يكون جسماً أصلاً ولا في جسم وإن وجوده وجوداً آخر خارج
عن وجود سائر الموجودات ولا يشارك شيئاً منها في معنى أصلاً بل إن
كانت مشاركة ففي الاسم فقط، لا في المعنى المفهوم من ذلك الاسم، |
B fol. 102a وإنه لا يمكن أن يكون إلا واحداً فقط وإنه الواحد في الحقيقة وإنه هو 5
الذي أفاد سائر الموجودات الوحدة التي بها صرنا نقول لكل موجود أنه
واحد، وإنه هو الحق الأول والذي يفيد غيره الحقيقة ويكتفى بحقيقته عن
أن يستفيد الحقيقة عن غيره، وإنه لا يمكن أن يتوهم كمال أزيد من كماله
فضلاً عن أن يوجد، ولا وجود أتم من وجوده ولا حقيقة أكثر من حقيقته
ولا وحدة أتم من وحدته. ونعلم مع ذلك كيف استفاد عنه سائر الموجودات 10
الوجود والحقيقة والوحدة وما قسط كل واحد منها من الوجود والحقيقة
والوحدة وكيف استفاد عنه سائر الأشياء الشئئية، وإن نعلم مراتب
الموجودات كلها وإن منها أولاً ومنها أوسط ومنها أخيراً، والأخيرة لها
أسباب وليست هي أسباباً لشيء دونها، والمتوسطة هي التي لها سبب
فوقها، وهي أسباب للأشياء دونها، والأول هو سبب لما دونه وليس له 15
سبب آخر فوقه. ونعلم مع ذلك كيف ترتقى الأخيرة إلى المتوسطات

A في [ففى] 4 A وجوداً [وجود] 2 B omits [أن... لا يمكن] 1-2
B omits [بها] 6 B وهو B هو الواحد [الواحد] B واحد [واحد] 5
A omits [ولا وجود] B omits [عن] 9 A توهم كمال 8 B الذي 7
الأسباب : ed. [الأشياء الشئئية] 12 A omits [والحقيقة والوحدة] 11
[أوسط] B أول 13 B الأشياء الشئئية : A, cf. Heb. variants (sic) السئية
آخر A adds after هو 16 A omits [فوقها... سبب] 15-16 A وسطا

والتوسّطات كيف ترتقى بعضها الى بعض إلى أن تنتهى الى الأوّل ، ثم كيف
يبتدئ التدبير من عند الأوّل وينفذ في شيء شيء من سائر الموجودات
على ترتيب الى أن ينتهى الى | الأواخر . فهذه هي الحكمة في الحقيقة ، A fol. 111a
وقد يستعار هذا الاسم فيسمّى الذين حذقوا في الصنائع جدّاً وكلّوا فيها
5 جدّاً حكماء .

[35] فصل . العقل العملى هو قوة بها يحصل للانسان عن كثرة
تجارب الأمور وطول مشاهدة الأشياء المحسوسة مقدّمات يمكنه بها الوقوف
على ما ينبغى أن يؤثّر | ويجتنّب في شيء شيء من الأمور التى فعلها
الينا . وهذه المقدّمات بعضها تصير كلفةً ينطوى تحت كلّ واحد منها أمور
10 مما ينبغى أن يؤثّر ويجتنّب وبعضها مفردات جزئية تستعمل مثالات لما
يريد الانسان أن يقف عليه من الأمور التى لم يشاهدها . وهذا العقل انما
يكون عقلاً بالقوة ما دامت التجربة لم تحصل ، فإذا حصلت التجربة
وحفظت ، صار عقلاً بالفعل ويزيد هذا العقل الذى بالفعل بازدياد
التجارب في كل شيء من أسباب الانسان في عمره .
15 [36] فصل . العقل هو القدرة على جودة الرويّة والاستنباط للأشياء
التي هي أجدود وأصلح فيما يعمل ليحصل بها للانسان خير عظيم في

[وينفذ... شيء شيء 2 A omits] الى (p. 127, l. 16) ... ترتقى 1
[فيها 3 B فسمى 4 A فهي هذه 3 A أواخرها 3 A omits
[بها 7 A الأمور] الأشياء 7 B يحصل بها 6 A omits
B يوقف 11 B أو يتجنب [ويجتنب 8, 10 A omits
B ويزيد 13 B التجارب محفوظة 12-13 A omits] انما 14 A omits
واستنباط B وجود [جودة 15 B سنّ من اسنان الانسان وعمره 14
B التحصّل [ليحصل بها 16 B الأشياء

الحقيقة وغاية فاضلة شريفة كانت تلك هي السعادة أو شيء ما له غناء
عظيم في أن ينال به السعادة . والكيس هو القدرة على جودة استنباط ما
هو أفضل وأصلح في بلوغ خيرات ما يسيرة . والدهاء هو القدرة على
صحّة الرويّة في استنباط ما هو أجود وأصلح في أن يتمّ به شيء عظيم مما يظنّ
انه خير من ثروة أو لذة أو كرامة . والخبّ والحريزة والخبث هو جودة
استنباط ما هو أبلغ وأجود في أن يتمّ به فعل شيء خسيس مما يظنّ خيراً
من ربح خسيس أو لذة خسيصة . وهذه الأشياء كلّها انما هي الأشياء التي
تودى الى الغاية وليست هي الغاية . وكذلك كلّ رويّة ، فإنّ الانسان
انما ينصب الغاية | التي يهواها ويشاقها نحو فكره ، ثمّ بعد ذلك يروى في
الأشياء التي ينال بها تلك الغاية كم هي وما هي وكيف هي .

10

[37] فصل . كما أنّ مرضى الأبدان يُخَيَّل لهم فسادُ جِسمهم فيما هو حلو
أنّه مرّ وفيما هو مرّ أنّه حلو فيتصوِّرون الملائم بصورة ما هو غير ملائم
وغير ملائم بصورة ما هو ملائم ، كذلك | الأشرار وذوو النقائص إذا
كانوا مرضى الأنفس يُخَيَّل لهم فيما هي شرور أنّها خيرات ، وفيما هي خيرات

- B بها B وان [في أن] 2 B مما لها B شريفة فاضلة 1
B ما يسر ؟ : A omits : ed. [ما يسيرة] 3 A omits [جودة]
B خيرا [انه خير] 5 B omits : A له : ed. [به] 4 B اليها [والدهاء]
او لذة 7 B وجود [جودة] B والحريزة : A والحريزة A شرور [ثروة]
: ed. [وليست هي الغاية] 8 A هي في A omits [خسيصة]
B without punctuation B مجد [نحو] 9 B وليس في الغاية : A omits
B مرض 11 B omits [وما هي] 10 A ثمّ من
B فيتصوِّروه 12 B لفساد جسمهم وتخيلهم ما [فساد... فيما]
B only, with صورة for في صورة (cf. line 12) [وغير ملائم... ملائم] 13
B هو شرور 14 A اذ A وذو

انها شرور. وأما الفاضل بالفضائل الخلقية فانما يهوى ويشتاق أبداً
الغايات التي هي خيرات في الحقيقة ويجعلها غرضه ومقصوده. والشرير
يهوى أبداً الغايات التي هي في الحقيقة شرور ويتخيلها لأجل مرض نفسه
خيرات. فلذلك يلزم أن يكون المتعقل فاضلاً بالفضائل الخلقية، وكذلك
5 الكيس، ويكون الداهي والخب شريرين ذوي نقائص، حتى يكون المتعقل
يصحح الغاية بالفضيلة التي فيه ويصحح ما يودى الى الغاية بجودة الروية.
[38] فصل. التعقل أنواع كثيرة، منها ما هو جودة الروية فيما
يدبر به أمر المنزل، وهو التعقل المنزلي، ومنها جودة الروية في أبلغ ما
تدبر به المدن، وهو التعقل المدني، ومنها جودة الروية فيما هو أصلح
10 وأفضل في بلوغ جودة المعاش في أن تنال الخيرات الانسية مثل اليسار
والجلالة وغير ذلك بعد أن يكون خيراً وله غناء في نيل السعادة.
فمن هذه ما هو مشوري، وهو الذي يستنبط لا يستعمله الانسان في نفسه
بل ليشير به على غيره، إما في تدبير منزل أو مدينة أو غير ذلك.
ومنها ما هو المخصوص، وهو القدرة على استنباط رأى صحيح فاضل فيما
15 يقاوم به العدو والمنازع في الجملة أو يدفعه به. فيشبه أن يكون
الانسان يحتاج في كل ما يعانيه الى تعقل ما، إما يسير وإما كثير.

- A الغاية 2, 3 B فانه انما B التفاضل [الفاضل] 1
ذو B only, with A omits : [فاضلاً... المتعقل 4-5 B ويستحلها 3
B اجاله الراى [الروية 7 B للغاية [الى الغاية 6 ذوى for
[تدبر به 9 ما هو B adds ومنها 8, 9 B يدبره [يدبر به 8
B الانسانية B ينال 10 B أفضل وأصلح و 9-10 B يدبره
B مسرورى 12 B عنا A : (غنى = غنى) : ed. [غناء B او له 11
A يدبغه 15 B المخصوص 14 A omits [لا

وذلك على حسب الامر الذى يزاوله فإن كان كثيرا أو عظيما احتاج الى
تعقل أقوى وأتم | وإن | كان قليلا أو يسيرا اكتفى باليسير من التعقل .
والتعقل هو الذى يسميه الجمهور العقل ، وهى قوة إذا كانت فى الانسان
سمى عاقلاً .

B fol. 103b
A fol. 12a

[39] فصل . الظنّ الصواب هو أن يكون الانسان كلّما شاهد أمراً
يصادف أبداً ظنّه الصواب بما لا يمكن أن يكون الأمر المشاهد الآ
عليه .

[40] فصل . الذهن هو القدرة على مصادفة صواب الحكم فيما تتنازع
فيه الآراء المعتادة والقوة على تصحيحه ، فهو جودة استنباط لما هو صحيح
من الآراء . فهو إذاً نوع من أنواع التعقل .

[41] فصل . جودة الرأى هو أن يكون الانسان ذا رأى أو جيّد
الرأى ، وهو أن يكون الانسان خيراً فاضلاً فى أفعاله ، ثم أن يكون
الانسان ذا رأى قد جربت أقاويله وآراؤه ومشوراته مرّات كثيرة فوجدت
سديدة مستقيمة ينهض بها الانسان إذا استعملها الى عواقب
محمودة ويكون قد صار لذلك مقبول القول ، أعنى لأجل الصدق الذى قد
شوهده منه كثيراً حتى صار ما اشتهر عنه من الفضيلة ومن سداد الحكم
والمشورة مغنياً عن أن يحتاج فى شىء يقوله أو يشير به الى حجة ودليل .

1	B فان [فان كان	2	B فان	3	B وهذا القوة	B	يسمى
6	B بطنه الصوت بما	A omits	لا	6-7	A : دالاً عليه ؟	B	الا غلبه
8	A الحكمة	8-9	B يتنازع فيه من	9	ed. : [المعتادة	A	: المعتاضة
	B المعتاضة	11	A omits [هو	B omits	[الانسان	12	A هو [وهو
	B فاضلا خيرا	13	B omits [الانسان ذا رأى	B	مرارا	14	ستهى
	B without punctuation			16	B به [عنه		

وظاهر أنّ الرأى الذى يصحّحه ويقف على الصواب منه انما يقف ويصحّح بالتعقل . فهذا إذا نوع من التعقل .

[42] فصل . الأصول التى يستعملها المروى فى استنباط الشئ الذى يروى فيه اثنان ، أحدهما الأشياء المشهورة المأخوذة عن الجميع أو عن الأكثر ، والثانى الأشياء الحاصلة بالتجارب والملاحظة .

[43] فصل . الغمّر هو الذى تخيّل للمشهور بما ينبغى أن يؤثّر ويحتبّ سليمٌ غير أنّه ليست له تجربة ما سبيله من الأمور العمليّة أن يُعرف بالتجربة، والانسان | قد | يكون غمراً فى صنف من الأمور، غير غمر فى صنف آخر .

B fol. 104a
A fol. 12b

[44] فصل . الحيران هو الذى يكون تخيّل دائماً فيما ينبغى أن يؤثّر ويحتبّ أصداد الأشياء المشهورة وأصداد ما قد جرت به العادة . وربما عرض له مع ذلك أن يتخيّل أصداد المشهور فى سائر الأمور الموجودة فى كثير من المحسوسات .

[45] فصل . الحُمق هو أن يكون تخيّل للمشهورات سليماً وعنده تجارب محفوظة وتخيّل للغايات التى يهوى ويتشوّق سليماً وله رويّة ، ولكنها رويّة تخيّل له أبداً فيما ليس يودى الى تلك الغاية أنّه يودى اليها ، أو تخيّل له

ed. cf. §§ 3 و 6 [ويحتبّ 6 B omits] فيه 4 A فهذه إذا أنواع 2
B عنده [له 7 B without punctuation] وتحب : A أو يحتبّ : 44
B الحور [الحيران 10 A omits] من الأمور 8 B بسيله B بما [ما
B without punctuation] وسحب 11 B ان [الذى
A omits] له 12 B العادة به A omits] قد
A الحق 14 B المشهورة B without punctuation
محيل
A ويخيّل [أو تخيّل 16 B لكنها روايه 15 B سليمة 14, 15

فيما يودى الى تلك الغاية انه لا يودى اليها ، فيكون فعله ومشورته على حسب ما تخيل له رويته الفاسدة . ولذلك يكون الأحق في أول ما يشاهده صورته صورة عاقل ويكون مقصده مقصدا صحيحا ، وكثيرا ما توقعه رويته في شيء لم يتعمد الوقوع فيه .

[46] فصل . الذكاء هو جودة حدس على الشيء بسرعة بلا زمان أو 5
في زمان غير مهمل .

* [47] فصل . التعقل والكيس يحتاج كل واحد منهما إلى استعمال طبيعي يفطر الانسان عليه ، ومتى فطر الانسان معدا للتعقل التام ثم عود الرذائل ، استحال وتغير فصار بدل التعقل دهاء وخبط ومكر .

[48] فصل . قوم من الناس يسمون المتعقلين من الناس حكماء والحكمة 10
هى أفضل علم لأفضل الموجودات ، والتعقل إذا كان انما تدرك به الأشياء الانسانية ، فليس ينبغي ان يكون حكمة الله إلا أن يكون الانسان هو أفضل ما في العالم وأفضل الموجودات . فاذا لم يكن الانسان كذلك فالتعقل ليس بحكمة إلا بالاستعارة والتشبيه .

[49] فصل . | الحكمة إذا كان يخصها انها تعلم الأسباب القصوى التى 15
لكل موجود متأخر وكانت الغاية القصوى التى لأجلها كون الانسان هى

B fol. 104b

[له رويته A omits] حسب 2 B omits [لا B ضد تلك 1 تلك 1
[مقصدا B omits] تشاهد 3 A وكذلك A لرويته
[من الناس 10 B مهمل 6 A حس 5 B الشر [شيء 4
B الفهم [الله 12 B يدرك [تدرك A omits [انما A اذ 11
B كانت B مثل جز [متأخر 16 B وان [فاذا B omits [ما فى 13
B فى حلها ؟ [لأجلها

* This *fasl* omitted in A

السعادة ، والغاية أحد الأسباب ، فالحكمة هي إذاً التي توقف على الشيء
الذى هو السعادة في الحقيقة . وأيضاً فإنّ الحكمة إذ كانت هي وحدها تعلم
الواحد الأول | الذى عنه استفاد سائر الموجودات الفضيلة والكمال وتعلم A fol. 13a
كيف استفاد عنه وكم مقدار ما نال كلّ واحد من قسط الكمال وكان
5 الانسان احد الموجودات التي استفادت الكمال عن الواحد الأول ، فهي
إذاً تعلم أعظم الكمال الذى استفاده الانسان عن الأول ، وذلك هو
السعادة . فالحكمة إذاً هي التي توقف على السعادة في الحقيقة ، والتعقل هو
الذى يوقف على ما ينبغي أن يفعل حتى تحصل السعادة . فهذان إذاً هما
الموجودان في تكميل الانسان حتى تكون الحكمة هي التي تعطى الغاية
10 القصوى ، والتعقل يعطى ما تنال به تلك الغاية .

* [50] فصل . الخطابية هي القدرة على مخاطبة التي تكون بها جودة
الإقناع في شيء من الأمور الممكنة التي شأنها أن تؤثر وتجتنب ،
غير أن الفاضل من أصحاب هذه القوة يستعملها في الخيرات ، وكذلك
يستعملها المتعقل في الخيرات والشور ويستعملها الدهاة في الشور .
15 [51] فصل . جودة التخيل هي غير جودة الإقناع ، والفرق بينهما

- A أفضل [أعظم] 6 B استفاد 5 B بعلم 2 B إذاً هي 1
: A, cf. Heb. [الموجودان] 9 B omits [التي] B والحكمة اد 7
B omits [تكون] . . . القدرة 11-9 المتعاضدان B ? for المتصعدان
[شيء] second 12 B وجوده [جودة] B adds after B بالاقاويل 11
A تُستعمل 13 A فهذه A omits [غير] . . . أصحاب 13 B omits
A only وكذلك . . . والشور 13-14 الخيرات A adds after وفي الشور
B التخيل 15 B without punctuation السر omit? [والشور] 14
B omits [هي]

* The heading of this *fasl* falls in the lacuna in MS. B.

أن جودة الاقناع يُقصد بها أن يفعل السامع الشيء بعد التصديق ،
 وجودة التخيل يُقصد بها أن تنهض نفس السامع الى طلب الشيء
 المخيل والهرب عنه أو النزاع اليه والكراهة له وإن لم يقع له به تصديق
 كما يعاف الانسان الشيء الذي إذا رآه يشبه ما سبيله أن يعاف على
 B fol. 105a الحقيقة وإن تيقن الذي | يراه انه ليس هو ذلك الشيء الذي يعاف . 5
 ويستعمل جودة التخيل فيما يسخط ويرضى وفيما يفرّج ويؤمن وفيما
 يلين النفس وفيما يشدها وفي سائر عوارض النفس . ويُقصد بجودة التخيل
 الى أن يحرك الانسان لفعل الشيء وينهض نحوه وإن كان علمه بالشيء
 A fol. 13b يوجب خلاف ما يخيل له | فيه ، وكثير من الناس انما يحبون ويغضون
 الشيء ويؤثرون ويحتبون بالتخيل دون الروية ، إما لأنهم لا روية لهم 10
 بالطبع أو يكونون أطرحوها في أمورهم .

[52] فصل . الأشعار كلها انما استخرجت ليجود بها تخيل الشيء .
 وهي ستة أصناف ، ثلاثة منها محمودة وثلاثة مذمومة . فالثلاثة المحمودة أحدها
 الذي يقصد به الى صلاح القوة الناطقة وأن تسد أفعالها وفكرها نحو
 السعادة وتخيل الأمور الالهية والخيرات وجودة تخيل الفضائل وتحسينها 15
 وتقبيح الشرور والنقائص وتخسيسها . والثاني الذي يقصد به الى أن تُصلح

B والنزوع والقرب منه 3 B omits [السامع... تنهض 2-1 B عقل 1
 B بسيله A omits [الذي 4 B يعان 4 B يقع به تصديق
 A omits [الذي يعاف B راه | يراه انه تيقن B adds after ان 5 B في | على
 B التخيل 7 B وفيما تامر النفس [وفيما يلين... عوارض النفس 6-7 الذي
 B omits [فيه B تخيل 9 B لقول B يتحرك A omits [الى 8
 B او ان يكونوا 11 B انهم A B ويتجنبون : ed. [ويتجنبون 10
 A omits [منها B وهو 13 B without punctuation B ليحوبها B تخيل 12
 B adds after وتقبيحها B تخيل 15 A omits [صلاح... به الى 14-16

وتعتدل العوارض المنسوبة الى القوة من عوارض النفس ويكسر منها الى
 أن تصير الى الاعتدال وتنحط عن الإفراط ، وهذه العوارض هي مثل
 الغضب وعزة النفس والقسوة والقحة ومحبة الكرامة والغلبة والشهه وأشباه
 ذلك ، ويسدّد أصحابها نحو استعمالها في الخيرات دون الشرور . والثالث
 5 الذي يقصد به الى أن تُصلَح وتعتدل العوارض المنسوبة الى الضعف
 واللين من عوارض النفس ، وهي الشهوات واللذات الخسيسة وزور النفس
 ورخاوتها والرحمة والخوف والجزع والغم والحياء والترّفه واللين وأشباه ذلك ،
 لتكسر وتنحط من إفراطها الى أن تصير الى الاعتدال ، ويسدّد نحو
 استعمالها في الخيرات | دون الشرور . والثالثة المذمومة هي المضادة للثالثة
 10 المحمودّة ، فان هذه تفسد كلّ ما تُصلّحه تلك وتخرجه عن الاعتدال الى
 الإفراط . وأصناف الألحان والأغاني تابعة لأصناف الأشعار وأقسامها
 مساوية لأقسامها .

[53] فصل . المدينة الفاضلة أجزاؤها خمسة : الأفاضل وذوو الألسنة
 والمقدّرون والمجاهدون والماليّون . فالأفاضل هم الحكماء والمتعلّقون وذوو
 15 الآراء في الأمور العظام . ثم حملة الدين وذوو الألسنة ، وهم الخطباء
 والبلغاء والشعراء والملحنون والكتّاب ومن يجري مجراهم وكان في عدادهم .

- B والشهه B ومسحة [ومحبة] 3 B ويلحظ [وتنحط] 2 B ويعدل 1
 B omits [الى] B ان [الذي] 5 B وتسدد A : ويسدّوا ed. : [ويسدّد] 4
 ed. : [لتكسر] 8 B ودقه [وزور] B الحسيه 6 B ويعدل ان before
 : B المرامة ? [المذمومة] 9 B وتسدد B ويحط B ليكسر A : لتلين
 وأصناف والاحاز 11 B omits [كلّ] 10 B margin مدسه
 B [أجزاؤها] A omits [الفاضلة] 13 B without punctuation الاعاي
 [ثم حملة] B العظام 15 A B المتعلّقون ed. : والمتعلّقون 14 احدها
 A ومن كان [وكان] 16 B هم B من جملة

A fol. 14a والمقدِّرون الحُساب والمهندسون والأطباء والمنجِّمون | ومن يجرى مجراهم .
والمجاهدون هم المقاتلة والحفظة ومن يجرى مجراهم وعدّ فيهم . والماليون
هم مكتسبو الأموال في المدينة ، مثل الفلاحين والرعاة والباعة ومن جرى
مجراهم .

[54] فصل . روساء هذه المدينة ومدبروها يكونون على أربعة أصناف ، 5
أحدها الملك على الحقيقة ، وهو الرئيس الأول وهو الذى تجتمع فيه ستّ
شرائط : الحكمة والتعلّل التامّ وجودة الإقناع وجودة التخيل والقدرة
على الجهاد ببدنه وأن لا يكون فى بدنه شىء يعوقه عن مزاوله الأشياء
الجهادية . فمن اجتمعت فيه هذه كلّها فهو الدستور والمقتدى به فى سيره
وأفعاله كلّها والمقبول أقاويله ووصاياه ، وهذا اليه أن يدبّر بما رأى وكيف 10
شاء . والثانى أن لا يوجد من اجتمعت فيه هذه كلّها ولكن توجد متفرقة |
B fol. 106a فى جماعة بأن يكون أحدهم يعطى الغاية والثانى يعطى ما يودى الى الغاية ،
والثالث تكون له جودة الإقناع وجودة التخيل ، وآخر تكون له القدرة على
الجهاد ، فتكون هذه الجماعة باجمعها تقوم مقام الملك ويسمّون الرؤساء
الأخيار وذوى الفضائل ، ورئاستهم تسمّى رئاسة الأفاضل . والثالث أن لا 15
يوجد أيضا هؤلاء فيكون رئيس المدينة حينئذ هو الذى اجتمع فيه أن كان

احد اربعة 5 B الفلاحون 3 B والمائلون 2 B والمفردون 1
A omits [ست A ان [الذى B فى [على B احدهم 6 B أوصاف
B omits [كلّها 10 B يعرفه 8 A والقوة B التخيل 7
A متفرقة B انسان [من A omits [أن 11 B يأتى [رأى A انسان [اليه أن
A والثالث ان 13 A ما [يعطى ما احدهم after يعطى B معطى 12
B هؤلاء ايضا 16 B الفضل 15 A القوة [الجماعة 14

عارفا بالشرائع والسنن المتقدمة التي أقرّ بها الأولون من الأئمة ودبروا بها المدينة، ثمّ أن يكون له جودة تمييز الأمكنة والأحوال التي ينبغي أن تُستعمل فيها تلك السنن على حسب مقصود الأولين بها، ثمّ أن تكون له قدرة على استنباط ما ليس يوجد مصرّحاً به في المحفوظة والمكتوبة من |

5 السنن القديمة محتذياً بما يستنبط منها حدوماً تقدّم من السنن، ثمّ أن A fol. 14b تكون له جودة رأى وتعقّل في الحوادث الواردة شيئاً شيئاً مما ليس سبيلها أن تكون في السنن القديمة مما تحفظ به عمارة المدينة، وأن تكون له جودة خطابة واقناع وتخيل ويكون له مع ذلك قدرة على الجهاد. فهذا يسمّى ملك السّنة ورياسته تسمّى ملكاً سنيّاً. والرابع أن لا يوجد انسان واحد 10 تجتمع فيه هذه كلّها ولكن تكون هذه متفرّقة في جماعة، فيكونون بأجمعهم يقومون مقام ملك السّنة، وهؤلاء الجماعة يسمّون رؤساء السّنة.

[55] فصل. كل جزء من أجزاء المدينة فيه رئيس لا رئيس فوقه من أهل تلك الطائفة وفيه مرؤوس ليست له رئاسة على انسان أصلاً، وفيه من هو رئيس لمن هو دونه ومرؤوس لمن هو فوقه.

15 [56] فصل. المراتب في المدينة الفاضلة تتقدّم بعضها على بعض |

بأنحاء، منها أن الانسان إذا كان يعمل عملاً ليبلغ به غاية ما ولكن B fol. 106b

B والاخوان B لهم 2 B اتا بها A : أقرّتها : ed. [أقرّ بها 1
B منهاجه وما B يستنبطه B مجتذباً 5 A بها من [به في 4
B omits A : خطاب و : ed. [خطابة و 8 B السير المتقدمة 7
B omits [ملك 11 A ويكونون 10 B omits [لا 9 B مع ذلك له
A second, third 14 A ففيه B السنة [المدينة 12 A رؤساء المدينة
B [به 16 B without punctuation B تقدم [تقدّم 15 B omits [هو
B فكان [ولكن A omits [ما omits

يستعمل شيئاً مما هو غاية لفعل ما . . . يتولاه انسان ما آخر، فإنّ الأوّل
 رئيس ومقدّم على الثانی فی المدينة . مثال ذلك الفروسیّة، فإنّ غایتها جودة
 استعمال السلاح ، وهو فارس وهو يستعمل اللجم وأدوات الفرس التي هي
 غاية صناعة عمل اللجم ، فهو رئيس يتقدم على من عمل اللجم وكذلك على
 رائض الفرس ، وكذلك فی سائر الأعمال والصناعات . ومنها أن يكون 5
 اثنان غایتها واحدة بعینها وأحدهما أتمّ تخيلاً لتلك الغاية وأكل فضيلة
 وله تعقل يستنبط به جميع ما يوصله الى تلك الغاية وأحسن تأتٍ
 لأن يستعمل غيره فی أن يحصل تلك الغاية ، فان هذا هو رئيس على
 A fol. 15a الثاني الذي | ليس له ذلك . ودون هذا من يتخيّل الغاية من تلقاء نفسه
 ولكن لا تكون له رويّة كاملة يوفّي بها جميع ما ينال به الغاية ، غير انه 10
 كان اذا أُعطِيَ مبدأ الرويّة بأن يرسم له بعض ما ينبغي أن يعمل
 احتذى بما أعطى من ذلك حذو ما رسم له واستنبط الباقي . ودون هذا
 من لا يتخيّل الغاية من تلقاء نفسه ولا يكون له أيضاً رويّة ، ولكن كان
 اذا أُعطِيَ الغاية وخيّل له ثم أعطى مبدأ الرويّة قدر على أن يحتذى في
 الباقي حذو ما رسم له ، فيعمل أو يستعمل غيره فيه . ودون هذا من لا 15

1 B ما [ما] 1
 B omits after some words appear to have
 fallen out, cf. Heb. 2 المرتبة [المدينة]
 3-4 هي غاية B مثل
 A يعمل B omits [من] A omits [يتقدم] 4 A عليه و
 A في أن يعقل ما [وله تعقل] 7 B واخرهما B وحدة 6 B omits [على]
 B يستعمله 8 B وحسن ان لا [واحسن تأتٍ لأن] 7-8 B يوجد به [يوصله]
 A يكون يرسم A omits [كان] 11 B في ان [من] 9 B له [تلك]
 B على قدر B اليه [له] 14 B واستنتها [واستنبط] 12 B يريد [ينبغي]
 B فيه دون غيره 15

يتخيّل الغاية ولا له رويّة ولا أيضًا اذا أعطى مبدأ الروية قدر على
استنباط الباقي ، ولكن كان اذا أوصى بما ينبغي أن يعمل في بلوغ تلك
الغاية ، حفظ الوصايا وكان أبدًا مذلّ النفس منقادا لان يسارع الى فعل
كلّ ما يوصى به ، وان كان لا يعلم الى أى غاية ينتهى به ذلك | الفعل B fol. 107a
5 ويكون له حسن تأتٍ لأن يفعل الشيء على ما أوصى به ، فان هذا هو
خادمٌ في المدينة أبدًا ولا يكون رئيسًا بل هو بالطبع عبدٌ ، وأمّا أولئك فهم
مرؤوسون ورؤساء . وكل شيء كان العبد والخادم حاذقا بعمله فينبغي أن
يكون الرئيس حاذقا باستعمال غيره فيه . والثالث أن يكون اثنان يفعل
كلّ واحد منهما فعلا يستعمل فعلهما ثالثٌ في تميم غاية ما ، غير أن أحد
10 الاثنين يفعل الشيء أشرف وأعظم غناءً في تميم غاية ذلك الثالث ، فان
الذى فعله أشرف وأعظم غناء مقدّم الرتبة على الذى انما يتولى فعلا ما
هو أخس وأقلّ غناء في تلك الغاية .

[57] فصل . أجزاء المدينة ومراتب أجزائها تأتلف بعضها مع بعض
وترتبط بالمحبة وتتماسك وتبقى محفوظة بالعدل وأفاعيل العدل . والمحبة قد

15 تكون | بالطبع مثل محبة الوالدين للولد ، وقد تكون بالإرادة بان يكون A fol. 15b

- B omits [الروية] أيضا B adds after كان A روية له ايضا [له روية 1
B وكان منقادا B omits [أبدًا] B الوصاية 3 B بكل ما A وصى 2
A فانهم 6 B بان لا [تأت لأن 5 ذلك B adds before الى 4
A : يفعل شيئا : ed. [يفعل الشيء 10 فعلهما A adds after به 9
فعل : ed. [فعلا B يقدم مرتبته 11 B يعقل الشيء
A تُلفى B اخر [أجزاء 13 A omits [ما هو 11-12 A B
B without اراده [بالإرادة 15 A omits [وتتماسك... العدل 14
punctuation

مبدؤها أشياء إرادية تتبعها المحبة . والمحبة التي بالارادة ثلاثة ،
أحدها بالاشتراك في الفضيلة ، والثاني لأجل المنفعة ، والثالث لأجل اللذة ،
والعدل تابع للمحبة . والمحبة في هذه المدينة تكون أولاً لأجل الاشتراك
في الفضيلة ويلتزم ذلك الاشتراك في الآراء والأفعال . والآراء التي ينبغي
أن يشتركوا فيها هي ثلاثة أشياء ، في المبدأ وفي المنتهى وفيما بينهما . 5
واتفاق الرأي في المبدأ هو اتفاق آرائهم في الله تعالى وفي الروحانيين وفي
الأبرار الذين هم القدوة ، وكيف ابتدأ العالم واجزأؤه وكيف ابتدأ كون
الانسان ، ثم مراتب أجزاء العالم ونسبتها بعضها الى بعض | ومنزلتها من
الله والروحانيين ، ثم منزلة الانسان من الله تعالى ومن الروحانيين ،
فهذا هو المبدأ ، والمنتهى هو السعادة ، والتي بينهما هي الأفعال التي تنال 10
بها السعادة . فاذا اتفقت آراء أهل المدينة في هذه الأشياء ، ثم كمل ذلك
بالأفعال التي بها ينال السعادة بعضهم من بعض ، تبع ذلك محبة بعضهم
لبعض ضرورة . ثم لأنهم متجاورون في مسكن واحد وبعضهم يحتاج الى بعض
وبعضهم نافع لبعض ، تبع ذلك المحبة التي تكون لأجل المنفعة . ثم لأجل
اشتراكهم في الفضائل ولأن بعضهم نافع لبعض يلتد بعضهم ببعض ، 15
فيتبع ذلك أيضاً المحبة التي تكون لأجل اللذة ، فبهذا يأتلفون ويرتبطون .
[58] فصل . العدل يكون أولاً في قسمة الخيرات المشتركة التي لأهل

A وفي [والمحبة في] B نافع 3 B والتي [والمحبة التي] B يتبعها 1
A والمنتهى 5 B بالاشتراك B ويلتام 4 B المرتبة [المدينة]
B omits [تعالى] 9 B ونسبه 8 B عز وجل [تعالى] A رأيهم 6
ينال 12 B كان [كمل] 11 A omits [تنال] هو A for second 10 هي
B من اجل B يتبع B تابع [نافع] 14 B omits [ثم] 13 B يتبع B بها
B أولاً يكون 17 A omits [أيضا] 16 B لبعض [ببعض] A B تابع 15

المدينة على جميعهم ، ثم بعد ذلك في حفظ ما قسم عليهم . وتلك الخيرات
 هى السلامة والأموال والكرامة والمراتب وسائر الخيرات التى يمكن أن
 يشتركوا فيها ، فإن لكل واحد من أهل المدينة قسطاً من هذه الخيرات
 مساوياً لاستئصاله . | فنقصه عن ذلك وزيادته عليه جوراً ، فأمّا نقصه
 5 فجور عليه وأمّا زيادته فجور على أهل المدينة ، وعسى أن يكون نقصه أيضاً
 جوراً على أهل المدينة . وإذا قسّمت واستقرّ لكل واحد قسطه ، فينبغى
 بعد ذلك أن يحفظ على كلّ واحد من أولئك قسطه إما بأن لا يخرج عن
 يده وإما إن خرج بسرائط وأحوال لا يلحق لأجلها من خروج ما خرج
 عن يده من قسطه ضرراً لا به ولا بالمدينة . وما يخرج عن يد
 10 الإنسان من قسطه | من الخيرات فهو إما بإرادته مثل البيع والهبة
 والعوض وإما بغير إرادته مثل أن يُسرق أو يُغصب وينبغى أن يكون
 فى كلّ واحد من هذين شرائط يبقّى بها ما بأيدي أهل المدينة من الخيرات
 محفوظاً عليهم . وأنما يكون ذلك بأن يعود بدل ما خرج عن يده بإرادته
 أو بغير إرادته ومساوٍ لذلك الذى خرج عن يده إما من نوع ما خرج وإما

B اما [فأما] 4 B على [عليه] 3 B بان [فإن] 1 A ثم من بعد 1
 B وان [واذا] 6 A omits [وعسى...أهل المدينة 5-6 B زياده 5
 A omits [وأحوال] 8 B يخرج [خرج خرج 8 B قسط B اقسمت
 B ما [إما] 10 B قسمه 9 B خرج [خروج B omits [لأجلها
 يُغصب B بلا [بغير B والقرض [والعوض 11 A omits [والهبة
 ما بأيدي B يبقا : يبقّى A corrected to يتبقى 12 A أو يُسرق
 A يخرج A يفوّض أحدهم [يعود B واما B محفوظ 13 B [أهل
 [إما...خرج B يديه B كذلك 14 A omits [إرادة...يده 13-14
 B omits

من نوع آخر. ويكون ما عاد من ذلك إما عاد عليه في خاصّة نفسه وإما عاد على أهل المدينة. وبأى هذين عاد عليه المساوى فهو العدل الذى تبقى به الخيرات المقسومة محفوظة على أهل المدينة، والجور هو أن يخرج عن يده قسطه من الخيرات من غير أن يعود المساوى له لا عليه ولا على أهل المدينة. ثم ينبغى أن يكون ما يعود عليه في خاصّة نفسه إما نافعا 5 للمدينة وإما غير ضارّ لها. والمخرج عن يد نفسه أو عن يد غيره في الخيرات قسطه، متى كان ضارّا بالمدينة كان أيضا جائرا ومنع منه، وكثير ممن يمنع يحتاج في منعه الى شرور توقع به وعقوبات. وينبغى أن تقدّر الشرور والعقوبات حتى يكون كلّ جور مجذائه عقوبة ما تعرض مساوية له. فاذا نيل الفاعل للجور بقسطه من الشرّ كان عدلا، وإذا زيد كان جورا 10 عليه في خاصّة نفسه وإذا نقص جورا على أهل المدينة، وعسى أن تكون الزيادة جورا على أهل المدينة.

A fol. 16b [59] فصل. بعض مدبرى المدن فى كلّ جور يقع | فى المدينة يرى انه جور على أهل المدينة، وبعضهم يرى انه جور يخصّ ذلك الذى وقع به الجور وحده، وبعضهم يقسم الجور صنفين، صنف هو | جور يخصّ واحدا 15

- B وإما على المدينة 1-2 A خاصّته عليه B adds after هو A عن ذلك 1
B omits لا B تعود المنافع المساوية 4 B بان : A وأى : ed. بأى 2
[فى الخيرات قسطه 6-7 B هو [فى 5 B على به ؟ [عليه له after
B وكثيرا B جائر A omits [أيضا 7 B هو قسطه من الخيرات
تعرض B adds before مقدره B جزء [جور 9 B ويوقع 8
A خاصّ 11 A بها فقط من البين [بقسطه من الشرّ 10 A omits [له
يرى فى موضع كل جور نفع [فى كلّ... يرى 13 A omits [وإذا... المدينة
الذى وقع به الجور وحده وبعضهم يقسم B نصفين صنف 15 B فى المدينة
B واحد [واحد واحد 15-1 هو B adds after الجور نصفين نصف هو

واحدا ويجعله مع ذلك جورا على أهل المدينة، وصنف يجعله جورا يخصه لا يتعداه الى أهل المدينة. فلذلك قوم من مدبري المدن لا يرون أن يعفى عن الجاني وإن عفا عنه الذي وقع به الجور، وبعضهم يرى أن يعفى عن الجاني إذا عفا عنه الذي وقع به الجور، وبعضهم يرى أن يعفى عن بعض ولا يعفى عن بعض، وذلك أن الذي يستوجب الجاني من الشر إذا جعل حقا يخص الذي وقع به الجور دون أهل المدينة، فعفا عنه ذلك الانسان، لم يكن لأحد غيره عليه سبيل. وإذا جعل ذلك حقا لأهل المدينة وللناس كلهم لم يلتفت الى عفو من وقع به الجور.

[60] فصل. العدل قد يقال على نحو آخر أعم وهو استعمال الانسان أفعال الفضيلة فيما بينه وبين غيره أى فضيلة كانت. والعدل الذى فى 10 القسمة والعدل الذى فى حفظ ما هو قسم هو نوع من العدل الأعم، والأخص يسمى باسم الأعم.

[61] فصل. كل واحد ممن فى المدينة الفاضلة ينبغى أن يفوض اليه صناعة واحدة ينفرد بها وعمل واحد يقوم به إما فى مرتبة خدمة وإما فى 15 مرتبة رئاسة لا يتعداها ولا يترك أحد منهم يزاول أعمالا كثيرة ولا أكثر من صناعة واحدة، لأجل ثلاثة أسباب، أحدها أنه ليس كل انسان يكون أبدا يصلح لكل عمل ولكل صناعة، بل قد يوجد انسان دون انسان يصلح

B من يرى [من مدبرى B وذلك إلى B omits after B ولا 2
B فإذا B لأجل [الأحد 7 A omits [من الشر B يستوجب 5
A omits [أعم B اجزا [آخر B والعدل 9 B عليه [به B غير [عفو 8
A ما [ما هو B والذى [والعدل الذى 11 B التى A بأى 10
B احدا 15 B ينفرد 14 A يعرض [يفوض 13 A سمي 12
B يتفق أبدا ان يكون كل انسان [كل... أبدا 16-17 B omits [من 16

لعمل دون عمل، والثاني أن كل انسان يقوم بعمل أو بصناعة، فأنما يكون
 قيامه به أكل وأفضل ويصير به أحذق وأحكم | عملاً متى انفرد به ونشأ A fol. 17a
 عليه | منذ صباه ولم ينشأ على شيء آخر سواه. والثالث أن كثيراً من B fol. 109a
 الأعمال لها أوقات متى أخرت عنها فانت، وقد يتفق أن يكون عمالان وقتها
 واحد وان تشاغل بأحدهما فاته الآخر ولم يلحق في وقت ثانٍ. فذلك 5
 ينبغي أن يفرد لكل واحد من العاملين انسان واحد حتى يكون كل واحد
 من العاملين يلحق في وقته ولا يفوت.

PART II

A fol. 17a

[62] فصل. عُدّة المدينة هي الأمور المعدّة للطوائف الذين ليس شأنهم
 أن يكتسبوا مالاً، والذين هم كذلك وتعدّ الأموال لهم أولاً وعلى القصد
 الأول وعلى رأى جميع مدبري المدن، هم أقسام المدينة الذين غايات مهنتهم 10
 على القصد الأول ليس اكتساب أموال، مثل حملة الدين والكتاب ودونهم،
 فإن هولاء في المدينة من أجزائها العظمى ويحتاجون الى الأموال.

A غيره [آخر سواه] 3 B فانه A صناعة عمل B adds after ولكل صناعة 1
 B فان واحد B adds after بعينه 5 B باتت B افات [أوقات] 4
 آخر فصل المديني (sic) لابي نصر الفارابي 7 B تقدر [يفرد] 6 B ثاني
 تمت : colophon in B فالحمد لله رب العالم وصلوته على سيدنا محمد واله أجمع
 الفصول الاولى (sic) المنتزعة من أقاويل القدماء فيما ينبغي أن تدبر به المدن
 للشيخ الإمام ابي نصر محمد بن محمد الفارابي رحمة الله عليه والحمد لله رب العالمين
 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله 8 Heading in A colophon in A
 على سيدنا محمد وآله والنبيين والمرسلين والملائكة المقربين. الفصول الثانية المنتزعة من
 أقاويل القدماء للشيخ الإمام ابي نصر محمد بن محمد الفارابي رحمة الله عليه
 A وذويهم [ودونهم] 11

وأما على رأى قوم من مدبرى المدن فالزمناء والذين لا مئة فيهم أن
يكتسبوا الأموال . وقوم رأوا أن لا يترك زمن في المدينة ومن لا يمكنه
بوجه ما أن يقوم لشيء من الأعمال النافعة فيها . وقوم من مدبرى
المدن رأوا أن يجعلوا في المدينة من الأموال عدتين، عدة للذى غايات
5 مهنهم ليست على القصد الأول اكتساب الأموال ، وعدة للزمناء | ومن
جرى مجراهم . فهذه يجب أن ينظر من أين ينبغي أن تؤخذ وعلى أى
الجهات .

[63] فصل . الحرب تكون إما لأجل دفع عدو ورد للمدينة من خارج،
وإما لا اكتساب خير تستأهله المدينة من خارج ممن في يده ذلك ، وإما
10 لأن يحمل بها قوم ويستكرهوا على ما هو الأجود والأحظى لهم في
أنفسهم دون غيرهم ، متى لم يكونوا يعرفونه من تلقاء أنفسهم ولم يكونوا
ينقادون لمن يعرفه ويدعوهم اليه بالقول ، وإما محاربة من لا ينقاد
للعبودية والخدمة ممن الأجود له والأحظى أن تكون رتبته في العالم أن
يكون عبداً ، وإما محاربة قوم . . . وهذا شيء مشترك لأمرين جميعاً، أحدهما
15 اكتساب خير المدينة ، والآخر أن يحملوا على إعطاء العدل والنصفة .
وأما محاربتهم ليعاقبوا على جناية جنوها لئلا يعودوا الى مثلها ولئلا يجترأ
على المدينة غيرهم ويطمع فيهم ، فهو داخل في جملة اكتساب خير ما لأهل
المدينة ورد لأولئك القوم الى حظوظهم والأصلح لهم ودفع عدو بالقوة .
وأما محاربتهم ليبادوا بالجملة وتستأصل شأفتهم لأجل أن بقاءهم ضرر على أهل

A 8 أما الذين proposed [لدى] A 4 راو ان A 2 راو ألا
after A 14 وأما A 12 وأما A 11 يعرفونها A 9 bis وأما 9
[جميعاً أحدهما some words have dropped out. See Hebrew variants
A 18 لئلاويك A 16 وأما A, but cf. Heb ed.: هما جميعاً من

المدينة، فذلك أيضا اكتساب خير لأهل المدينة . فمحاربة الرئيس لقوم
 ما ليذلوا له وينقادوا فقط ويكرمونه من غير شيء سوى نفاذ أمره فيهم
 وطاعتهم له أو سوى أن يكرمونه من غير شيء سوى أن يكرمونه فقط أو
 ليرأسهم ويدبر أمرهم على ما يراه ويصبروا إلى كل ما يحكم به في كل ما
 يهواه أي شيء كان، فذلك حرب جور. وكذلك إن حارب ليس شيء 5
 سوى أن يجعل الغاية الغلبة فقط، فذلك أيضا حرب جور. وكذلك إن
 حارب أو قتل لشفاء غيظ | أو للذة ينالها عند ظفره لا شيء آخر سوى
 ذلك، فذلك أيضا جور. وكذلك إن كانوا غاظوه أولئك بجور وكان ما
 يستأهلونه في ذلك الجور دون المحاربة ودون القتل، فإن المحاربة والقتل
 جور لا شك فيه. وكثير من يقصد بالقتل شفاء غيظ لا يقتل من 10
 غاظه بل يقتل من ليس هو من الغائط له بسبب أنه يقصد إزالة الأذى
 الذي به من الغيظ.

[64] فصل . الأقسام الأول ثلاثة، ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد، وما لا
 يمكن أن يوجد أصلاً، وما يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد . فالأولان هما
 الطرفان والثالث متوسط بينهما، وهو مجموع ينقض الطرفين . والموجودات 15
 كلها داخلة تحت اثنين من هذه الثلاثة، فإن الموجودات منها ما لا يمكن أن
 لا يوجد أصلاً ومنها ما يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد .

* [65] فصل . ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد هو في جوهره وطبيعته كذلك .
 وما يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد هو أيضا في جوهره وطبيعته كذلك، فإنه

3 dittography? Cf. Hebrew variants. [من غير شيء سوى أن يكرمونه 3

4 A ويصبروا ? 15 ينقض ed. : A, cf. Hebrew variants.

* The Arabic text of this and the following *fasl* is corrupt in several places.

لا يمكن أن يكون ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد صادرا وانما صار كذلك لأجل
أن جوهره وطبيعته غير ذلك وعَرَضَ له أن صار كذلك، وكذلك ما يمكن
أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد. وأجناس الموجودات ثلاثة: البرية من المادة
والأجسام السماوية والأجسام الروحانية. وما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد
5 ضربان، أحدهما في طبيعته وجوهره أن يوجد حيناً ولا يمكن فيه غير ذلك،
والثاني ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد ولا في وقت أصلاً. فالروحانية لها الصنف
الثاني من أصناف ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد، والسماوية لها الصنف الأول،
والهيولانية لها القسم الذي يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد. والعوالم
ثلاثة، روحانية وسماوية وهيولانية. |

10 [66] فصل. الأقسام الأول أربعة، ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد أصلاً، A fol. 18b

وما لا يمكن أن يوجد أصلاً... وما لا يمكن أن يوجد حيناً فهو أيضاً
يمكن وجوده في حين ما، فالأول طرفان متقابلان، وما يمكن أن يوجد
فهو يمكن أن لا يوجد... والموجودات من هذه ثلاثة أقسام، ما لا
يمكن أن لا يوجد أصلاً، وما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد في حين ما وأن يوجد
15 في حين ما، وما يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد. وأفضلها وأشرفها وأكملها
ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد أصلاً، وأخسها وأنقصها ما يمكن أن يوجد وأن
لا يوجد. والذي لا يمكن أن لا يوجد في حين ما فقط متوسط بينهما

1 supplied from Hebrew ed., cf. Hebrew variants [ما لا 1

A, cf. Hebrew variants 4, 6 [أن لا 4, 6 A الهيولانية [الروحانية 4

A 6, 7 [الصنف 6, 7 11 after أصلاً some words have fallen out,

cf. Hebrew variants 13 two words apparently omitted after لا يوجد

[وأن... حين ما 14-5 A [ان لا 14 second A [ان لا 14-5

A mg. proposed أن يمكن 17 A, see Hebrew variants [أن لا 17

فإنه أنقص من الأول وأكمل من الثالث . وما يمكن أن يوجد وان لا يوجد ثلاثة أضرب ، على الأكثر وعلى الأقل وعلى التساوى ، فأفضلها الكائن على الأكثر وأخسها الكائن على الأقل ، والذي على التساوى متوسط بينهما .

[67] فصل . إن يكون للشيء عدمٌ فهو نقص في وجوده ، وإن يكون 5 في وجوده محتاجا الى غيره فهو أيضا نقص في الوجود . وكل ما كان له شبيه في نوعه فهو ناقص الوجود ، من قبل أنه إنما يمكن ذلك فيما لم تكن له كفاية في أن يوجد في نوعه وحده وفيما كان غير كافٍ في أن يتم ذلك الموجود به وحده ، حتى يكون إنما تمّ به قسطٌ من ذلك الموجود ولم تكن فيه كفاية في أن يتمّ به كليّة ، مثل ما في الانسان . فانه لما لم يمكن أن 10 يحصل وجود الانسان بواحد بالعدد ، احتيج الى أكثر من واحد في زمان واحد . فإذا كلّ ما فيه كفاية في أن يتمّ به شيء ما لم يحتج فيه الى أن يكون له ثان في ذلك الشيء ، وإن كان ما لشيء كفاية في أن يتمّ به وجوده وماهيته وجوهره لم يمكن أن يكون من نوعه آخر غيره ، وان كان ذلك كفعله لم يشاركه في فعله آخر غيره . 15

[68] فصل . كلّ ما له ضدّ فهو ناقص الوجود لأنّ كلّ ما | له ضدّ ففيه عدمٌ ، لأنّ معنى الضدّين هذا المعنى ، وهو أن يكون كلّ واحد منهما يبطل الآخر إن التقيا أو اجتمعا . وذلك أنه مفتقر في وجوده الى زوال ضده . وأيضا فإنّ لوجوده عائقا فليس إذا نفسه وحده كافيا في وجوده . فما لا

A omits, cf. Hebrew variants 5 الشيء A

A وفي ما 8 الوجود proposed [الموجود 9

15 فعل [فعله A bis, cf. Hebrew variants

عدم له فلا ضدّ له ، وما لم يكن محتاجا الى شىء أصلاً سوى ذاته فلا ضدّ له .

[69] فصل . الشرّ غير موجود أصلاً ولا فى شىء من هذه العوالم ،
وبالجملة فيما وجوده ليس بإرادة انسان أصلاً ، بل كلّها خير . وذلك ان
5 الشرّ ضربان ، أحدهما الشقاء المقابل للسعادة ، والثانى كلّ شىء شأنه أن
يُبلّغ به الشقاء . فالشقاء شرّ على أنّه الغاية التى يُصار اليها من غير أن
يكون وراء ذلك شرّ أعظم يصار اليه بالشقاء ، والثانى الأفعال الإرادية
التي شأنها أن تودّى الى الشقاء . وكذلك المقابل لهذين الشرّين خيران ،
أحدهما السعادة ، وهى خير على أنها الغاية من غير أن يكون وراءها
10 غاية أخرى تُطلّب بالسعادة . والخير الثانى كلّ ما نفع بوجه ما فى بلوغ
السعادة . فهذا هو الخير الذى يقابله ، وهذا طبيعة كلّ واحد منهما ،
وليس للشرّ طبيعة أخرى غير هذه التى ذكرنا . فالشرّان إذاً إراديان
وكذلك الخيران المقابلان لهما . فأما الخير فى العوالم فالسبب الأوّل وكل
ما لزم عنه وما لزم وجوده ممّا لزم عنه الى آخر اللوازم على هذا الترتيب ،
15 أى شىء كان ، فإنّ هذه كلّها على نظامٍ وعدلٍ فى الاستئْهال وما كان
حصوله عن استئْهال وعدل فهو كلّهُ خيرٌ . وقد ظنّ قومٌ أنّ الوجود كيف
كان فهو خير ، ولا وجود كيف كان فهو شرّ ، فصاغوا من تلقاء أنفسهم
وجودات متوهّمة فجعلوها خيراً ولا وجودات جعلوها شروراً . وآخرون |
A fol. 19^b ظنّوا أن اللذات كيف كانت هى الخيرات وان الأذى كيف كان هو الشرّ
20 وخاصّةً الأذى اللاحق لحسّ اللمس . وهؤلاء كلّهم غالطون ، وذلك أن
الوجود انما يكون خيراً متى كان باستئْهال ولا وجود متى كان بغير

لزم A adds after first عمّا لزم 14

استئْهال، وكذلك اللذات والأذى . وأما الموجود ولا موجود بغير استئْهال فهو شرٌّ . وليس شيء من هذه موجودا في شيء من العوالم الروحانية، فإنَّ الروحانية والسموية ليس أحدٌ يظنُّ فيها شيئا جرى على غير استئْهال... متى احتُفظ بالاستئْهال فيها وليس يطلب فيها الاستئْهالات الارادية، فإنَّ الاستئْهالات الطبيعية الممكنة إما بالصورة وإما بالمادة . وما يستأْهله كلُّ 5 شيء فإما على الأكثر وإما على الأقل وإما على التساوى، وما ينالها من ذلك فلا يخرج عن هذه، فهي إذاً كلّها خير . فالخير إذاً ضربان، ضرب لا يتأْبله شرٌّ أصلاً، وضرب تقابله شرورٌ، وكذلك كلُّ شيء طبيعيٍّ كان مبدؤه فعلاً إرادياً، فانه قد يكون خيراً ويكون شرّاً . وانما الكلام هاهنا 10 فيما كان طبيعياً محضاً لا يشاركه إرادىٍّ أصلاً .

[70] فصل . وقومٌ ظنّوا أنّ عوارض النفس كلّها، وهو ما يكون عن الجزء النزوعى من النفس، هي شرور، وآخرون رأوا أن القوة الشهوانية والغضبية هما الشرور، وآخرون رأوا ذلك في القوى الأخرى التى بها الانفعالات النفسائية مثل الغيرة والقسوة والبخل ومحبة الكرامة وأشباه ذلك . وهؤلاء أيضا غالطون، وذلك انه ليس ما صلح أن يستعمل من 15 الخير ومن الشرّ جميعا هو خير أو شرّ، فانه ليس بأحدهما أولى منه بالآخر... وإما أن يكون ولا واحدا منهما، بل انما يكون كلٌّ من هذه شرورا إذا استعملت | فيما ينال به الشقاء، وأما إذا استعملت فيما تنال به السعادة، لم تكن شرورا بل تكون خيرات كلّها . A fol. 20a

[71] فصل . إنّ قوما يقولون إنّ السعادة... ولا هي عوض مما ترك 20

3 after استئْهال words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants 17 after

فلم 19 proposed words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants

20 after السعادة words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants A عرض

من الأفعال التي ليس شأنها أن تنال بها . . . ، ولا عَوْضٌ من الراحة التي
 كان يكون عليها لو لم يكن يتعلّم فتركها وآثر الكدّ مكانها ، ولا أيضًا لو تبع
 العلم الحاصل عن التعلّم لذّة كانت تكون تلك اللذّة جزاءً على التعلّم . . .
 وترك الراحة حتى تكون هذه اللذّة عوضاً من لذّة أخرى تركها ليعوّض
 5 منها هذه الأخرى ، بل السعادة غاية شأنها أن تُنال بالأفعال الفاضلة على
 مثال حصول العلم عن التعلّم والدرس وحصول الصنائع عن تعلّمها والمواظبة
 على أعمالها ، ولا الشقاء عقوبة عن ترك الأفعال الفاضلة ولا جزاءً على
 فعل النقائص . فلذلك كلّ مَنْ اعتقد هذا في السعادة ورأى مع ذلك أنّ ما
 يعوّض مما يتركه هو من جنس ما يتركه ، كانت فضائله قريبة من أن
 10 تكون نقائص . وذلك أن العفيف الذي انما يترك اللذات المحسوسة كلّها
 أو بعضها انما يكون ليعتاض مكان ما ترك لذّةً أخرى من جنس ما ترك
 أعظم مما ترك فيكون شرّه وجِرْصه على توفير اللذّة يحمله على ترك ما
 ترك . ومع ذلك فانه ينبغي أن يكون رأيّه أن اللذّة التي تركها كانت معه
 وانما تركها ليصير الى مثلها وزيادة ربح يربحه ، وإلّا فكيف يعوّض على
 15 ترك ما ليس له ؟ وكذلك الحال في العدالة التي يستعمل بأن ترك ما لاً
 فلا يأخذه ، انما هو أيضًا شرّه وجِرْصٌ على ما يناله ويعتاض منه بتركه
 إيّاه ، فهو انما يتركه حرصاً على الربح والعوض مما يتركه بشيء زائد زيادة
 عظيمة على ما يتركه . فكأنّه يرى أن الأموال | كلّها له ما عنده وما عند
 غيره من جميع الناس ، ولكن يتركها عليهم إذا قدر وتمكّن من غصبهم

1 after بها words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants

3 after التعلّم

words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants

7 عقوبات A

9 يفوته [يعوّض A

13 الذي [اللذّة التي

A omits [معه

14 يعرض A, but cf. Hebrew variants

17 يترك A

عليها ليصير له أضعافها من الأجر، وذلك مثل ما يفعله . . . فليس إذاً يقتنى العدالة والعفة على أنّهما خير لذاتهما ولا يترك ما يتركه من فعل الشرّ والنقائص لذاته لأنّه قبيح بمقتته . وكذلك الحال في الشجاع من هولاء يرى انه تفوته اللذات التي لها يريد الحياة العاجلة ليعتاض من ذلك لذات من جنس ما يفوته أعظم مما يفوته كثيراً ويقدم على الشرّ 5 الذي يكرهه خوفاً من شرّ أعظم منه . فهو يرى أن الإقدام على الموت هو شرّ إلا انه يخاف شرّاً أعظم منه . فلذلك تجد هذه التي يظنون أنّها من الفضائل هي إلى أن تكون رذائل وخسائس أقرب منها إلى أن تكون فضائل ، وذلك لأن ليس جوهرها وطبيعتها طبيعة الفضائل في الحقيقة ولا قريبة منها ، بل هي من جنس النقائص والخسائس . 10

[72] فصل . الفاضل انما يفوته بالموت أن يستكثر من فعل ما يزداد به سعادة بعد موته ، ولذلك يكون جزعه من الموت ليس جزع من يرى انه يناله بالموت شرّ عظيم جداً أو جزع من يرى انه يفوته بالموت خير عظيم ، كان قد حصل له فخرج عن يده ، بل يرى انه لا يناله بالموت شرّاً أصلاً ، ويرى أن الخير الذي كان قد حصل له الى وقت موته 15 هو معه ولا يفارقه بالموت ، بل انما يكون جزعه جزع من يرى أن الذي يفوته . . . ليس رأس ماله بل ربح كان يقدره ويرجوه . فلا يفزع أصلاً ، بل يحبّ البقاء ليزداد من فعل الخير الذي يزداد به سعادة .

[73] فصل . ليس ينبغي للفاضل أن يستعجل الموت بل انما ينبغي ان يحتال في البقاء ما أمكنه ليزداد من فعل ما يسعد به ولئلا يفقد أهل 20

1 after يفعله two words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants 3 بمقتته A

7 يخلف [يخاف] A 17 after يفوته words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants

المدينة | نفعه لهم بفضيلته ، وانما ينبغي أن يقدم على الموت إذا كان نفعه A fol. 21a
 لأهل المدينة بموته أعظم من نفعه لهم في مستقبل حياته . فاذا حلّ به
 الموت كرهًا فليس ينبغي أن يجزع بل أن يكون فاضلا ، فانه لا يجزع منه
 أصلاً ولا يفزعه حتى يذهل . وانما يجزع من الموت أهل المدن الجاهليّة
 5 والفساق ، أما الجاهليّة فلما يقوتهم من الخيرات التي يخلقونها من دنياهم
 بالموت ، وهى إما اللذات وإما الأموال وإما الكرامات أو غير ذلك من
 خيرات الجاهليّة ، وأما الفاسق فلأجل شئين ، أحدهما ما يفوته مما يخلف
 من دنياه ، والثاني لأنه يرى أن السعادة تفوته بموته . فهو في ذلك أشدّ
 جزعاً من الجاهليّة لأنّ الجاهليّة لم يعلموا بسعادة أصلاً بعد الموت فيروا أنّها
 10 تفوتهم ، وهؤلاء علموا فلحقهم عند موتهم من الجزع والأسف على ما يظنون
 أنّه يفوتهم ندامةً عظيمةً على ما قدسوه في حياتهم ، فيموتون وهم مغتمون
 من جهات كثيرة .

[74] فصل . المجاهد الفاضل إذا خاطر بنفسه فليس يخاطر وعند نفسه
 أنّه لا يموت بفعله ذلك ، فإنّ هذا أحق ، ولا أيضاً لا يبالي إن مات أو
 15 عاش ، فإنّ هذا تهوّر ، بل يرى انه عسى أن لا يموت وعسى أن
 يتخلّص . ولكن لا يجزع من الموت ولا يجزع اذا حلّ به ، ولا يخاطر
 بنفسه وهو يعلم أو يظنّ أن الذى يلتمسه يناله بلا مخاطرة ، بل انما
 يخاطر بنفسه متى علم أن الذى يلتمسه يفوته ولا يناله اذا لم يخاطر ،
 ويرى أنّه اذا خاطر عسى أن يناله ، أو يرى انه سينال ذلك أهل المدينة
 20 لا محالة من فعله ذلك ، مات أو عاش ، ويرى انه إن سلّم شاركهم ، فان

A fol. 21b مات نالوه أولئك ويفوز هو بالسعادة بفضيلة متقدمة | ولما بذل الآن من نفسه .

[75] فصل . اذا مات الفاضل أو قُتِلَ فلا ينبغي أن يُنَاح عليه بل ينَاح على أهل المدينة بمقدار غنائه فيها وَيُغَبِّط بالحال التي صار اليها على مقدار سعادته ، ويخصّ المجاهد الذي قتل في الحرب أن يمدح مع ذلك على 5 بذله نفسه دون أهل المدينة وعلى إقدامه على الموت .

[76] فصل . قومٌ من الناس يرون أن الانسان الذي ليس بحكيم انما يصير حكيمًا بمفارقة النفس البدن بأن يبقى البدن غير ذى نفس ، وذلك هو الموت ، فإن كان حكيمًا قبل ذلك ازدادت حكمته لذلك وتمّت وكمّلت أو صارت أكمل وأفضل . ولذلك يرون أن الموت كمال وأن مفارقة النفس 10 البدن قسراً . وآخرون يرون أن الانسان الشرير انما يكون شريراً بمقارنة النفس البدن وبمفارقتها يصير خيراً . فيلزم هؤلاء أن يقتلون أنفسهم وأن يقتلوا النفس ، فيلتجئون بعد ذلك الى أن يقولوا نحن مدبرون بالله تعالى والملائكة وبأولياء الله ونحن فلا نملك ذلك من أنفسنا لا مقارنة النفس ولا مفارقتها ، فينبغى أن ننتظر حلّ من قرن بينهما ولا نتولّى نحن حلّها ، 15 وذلك لأنّ الذين يدبروننا أعلم بمصالحنا . وآخرون يرون أن مفارقة النفس البدن ليست مفارقة بالمكان ولا مفارقة بالمعنى ولا أن يتلف البدن وتبقى النفس أو تتلف النفس ويبقى البدن غير ذى نفس ، بل معنى مفارقة النفس هو أن لا تحتاج في قوامها إلى أن يكون البدن مادّة لها وان لا تحتاج في شيء من أفعالها الى أن تستعمل آلة هي جسم ولا أن تستعمل 20

A وبمفارقته 12 A بمفارقة [بمقارنة] A; hardly قسراً 11 A يستعمل [تستعمل] 20 A هي [هو] 19 A خيراً

قوة في جسم أصلاً، فانها ما دامت محتاجة الى شيء من هذه فليست مفارقة. وذلك | انما يكون للنفس التي تخص الانسان، وهو العقل A fol. 22a النظرى، فانه اذا صار الى هذه الحال صار مفارقاً للبدن سواء كان ذلك البدن لحى يكون يغتذى ويحس أو كانت قوته التي بها يغتذى ويحس قد بطلت، فانها اذا صارت غير محتاجة في شيء من أفعالها الى الحس ولا الى التخيل فقد صارت الى الحياة الآخرة، وحينئذ يكون تصوّره لذات المبدأ الأول أكل اذا كان انما يهجم العقل على ذاته من غير حاجة به إلى أن يتصوّره بمناسبة أو مثال، وليس يصل الى هذه الحال إلا بالحاجة المتقدمة التي كانت له الى أن يستعين بالقوة الجسمانية وبأفعالها في أن يفعل أفعالها. وهذه هي الحياة الآخرة التي يرى فيها الانسان ربّه ولا يضام في رؤيته.

[77] فصل . كلّ ما كان وجوده تركيب وتأليف على أى جهة كان ذلك التركيب والتأليف، فهو ناقص الوجود من قبل أنّه يحتاج في قوامه الى الأشياء التي منها رُكّب، كان ذلك تركيب كم أو تركيب مادّة وصورة أو غير ذلك من أصناف التركيب.

[78] فصل . أن يفعل الشيء آخر هو أن يلزم ذلك الآخر عن الشيء، وفعل الشيء آخر هو لزوم ذلك الآخر عن الشيء، والشيء يكون فاعلاً للآخر متى كان يلزم عنه الآخر، والفاعل الشيء هو اللارم عنه ذلك الشيء، وما يفعل الآخر به ما لا يمكن أن يلزم عنه ذلك الآخر ما لم يتحرّك. وذلك كلّ ما يستفيد بحركته حالاً يفعل بها وحدها أو حالاً تنضاف الى ما كان له قبل ذلك، فيفعل ذلك الآخر باجتماع

الثانية الى الاولى فيكون مجموعهما يفعل ذلك الآخر . وذلك انما يكون
 فيما كان يوجد له أولاً غير كافٍ في أن يفعل به دون أن ينضاف اليه |
 الشيء الآخر، وما كان إنما يفعل آخر بأن يتحرك فهو محتاج غير كافٍ A fol. 22 b
 بجوهره في أن يلزم عنه شيء آخر مما شأنه أن يلزم عنه وأن يحدث عنه ما
 شأنه أن يحدث عنه وأن يفعل ما شأنه أن يفعل . فإذا كل ما هو كافٍ 5
 بجوهره وبما له من الموجود في أن يفعل آخر فليس يفعل ما يفعل ولا
 يلزم عنه ما يلزم عنه بأن يتحرك أصلاً .

[79] فصل . أى فاعلٍ شيئاً ما علم أن فعله ذلك الشيء في وقت ما
 أصلح أو خير أو فعله ذلك الشيء ليس بأصلح أو شر . فأنما يؤخر فعله
 ذلك العائق له عن فعل ذلك الشيء ، فإن الفساد الذى يراه ويعلمه انه 10
 يعرض لذلك الشيء إن فعله في ذلك الوقت هو العائق له . فينبغى أن
 يعلم ما سبب الفساد في ذلك الوقت وما سبب الصلاح بعد ذلك ، فإن لم
 يكن للفساد سبب فليس أن لا يكون أولى من أن يكون فكيف لم يقع ؟
 ومع ذلك هل ذلك الصانع له قدرة على إزالة الفساد الواقع في فعله في
 ذلك الوقت أم لا ؟ فان كانت له قدرة فليس وقوعه أولى من أن لا يقع 15
 وليس كونه في وقت من الأوقات ممتنعاً على صانعه . فان لم تكن له قدرة على
 إزالة ذلك الفساد ، فسبب الفساد أقوى ، فليس للصانع من نفسه كفاية
 تامة في أن يكون ذلك الشيء على الإطلاق له ، وله مع ذلك ضد في فعله
 وعائق عنه . وعلى كل وجه فليس هو إذاً كافياً وحده في أن يتم ذلك
 الفعل بل هو زوال سبب الفساد وحضور سبب الصلاح . فأنه ان كان 20
 بذاته وحدها هو سبب الصلاح فالصلاح من الفعل كان ينبغى أن يكون

غير متأخر في الزمان بل يكونان معاً ، فلذلك يلزم أن يكون الفاعل متى
كان مكتفياً في نفسه وحده في ان يحدث | عنه شيء ما لم يتأخر وجود ذلك A fol, 23a
الشيء عن وجود الفاعل .

[80] فصل . يقال في الانسان انه عاقلٌ وانه يَعْقِلُ متى اجتمع له
5 شيآن ، أحدهما أن يكون له جودة تمييزٍ لما ينبغي أن يؤثر أو يجتنب من
الأفعال ، والثاني أن يستعمل الأفضل من كل ما وقف عليه بجودة تمييز ،
فانه إذا كان له جودة تمييز . . . وقد يستعمل قولنا ان فلاناً له عقل
الآن مكان قولنا تنبه على ما كان غافلاً عنه ، ويستعمل بدّل قولنا فهم ما
دّل عليه عبارة المخاطب له ، أو ارتسم في نفسه . وقد نقول انه عقل ،
10 نريد حصلت فيه العقولات متصورة مرتسمة في نفسه ، ونقول فيه انه عاقل
ونحن نريد بقولنا حصلت العقولات في نفسه هو أن يعلم العقولات ، فانه لا
فرق هاهنا بين أن يقال عقل وبين أن يقال علم ، وبين العاقل وبين العالم
وبين العقولات وبين المعلومات . والمتعقل هو أن يكون له جودة روية في
استنباط ما ينبغي أن يفعل على رأى ارسطوطاليس من أفعال الفضيلة في
15 حين ما يفعل في عارض ، إذا كان مع ذلك فاضلاً بالفضيلة الخلقية . فأما
ما يعنيه الجدليّون في قولهم ان هذا يوجب العقل أو ينفيه العقل ، فانهم
يعنون به المشهور في بادی الرأي عند الجميع فانّ بادی الرأي المشترك
عند الجميع أو الأكثر يسمّونه العقل .

[81] فصل . إنّ قوماً من الناس يقولون في السبب الأول انه ليس
20 يعقل ولا يعلم غير ذاته . وآخرون يزعمون انّ العقولات الكلية كلّها
حاصلة له دفعةً واحدةً وانه يعلمها ويعقلها معاً بلا زمان وكلّها مجتمعة في

7 After تمييز a blank in A, cf. Hebrew variants

A هذه 16

ذاته معا معلومة له بالفعل دائما لم يزل ولا يزال . وآخرون يزعمون أنه
 مع ما أنّ العقولات حاصلة له | يعلم الجزئيات كلها المحسوسة ويتصورها A fol. 23b
 وترسم له وأنه يتصور ويعلم ما هو الآن غير موجود وسيوجد فيما بعد وما
 كان فيما مضى وتصمّ وما هو الآن موجود . وهؤلاء يلزمهم أن يكون
 الصدق والكذب والاعتقادات المتضادة تتعاقب على معقولاته كلها وان
 تكون معقولاته غير متناهية وما كان منها موجبا يصير سالبا وكذلك
 السالب يصير في وقت آخر موجبا ، وأن يعلم فيما مضى أشياء بلا نهاية
 فمنها ما يعلمه أنه يكون في المستقبل ومنها ما يعلم انه موجود الآن وما
 يعلمه انه قد كان ثم يوجد في أوقات بلا نهاية قبل ذلك الآن ، وهو
 الوقت المفروض ، وبعده في أوقات بلا نهاية يعلم تلك المعلومات على ضروب
 مختلفة لما يعلمه منها هي بأعيانها في وقت آخر . وذلك ان وضعت مثلا
 لذلك تبين لك وظهر ، فضع المثال على ذلك زمان هرمس أو زمان
 الاسكندر ، فإن ما كان يعلمه في زمان الاسكندر كائنا في الزمان الحاضر
 الذي بقرب من الآن في ذلك الوقت ، قد كان يعلمه قبل ذلك بأحقاب
 كثيرة أنه سيكون ، ثم هو يعلمه بعد ذلك بزمان آخر أنه قد كان . فهو
 يعلم ذلك الشيء في الزمان الذي كان في زمان الاسكندر موجودا في ثلاثة
 أزمنة بثلاثة أحوال من العلم . وذلك يعلمه قبل زمان الاسكندر بأنه
 سيكون ويعلمه في زمان الاسكندر نفسه بأنه كائن حاضر ويعلمه بعد ذلك
 انه قد كان وفرغ وانقضى . ثم كذلك إذا فتشت حال زمان زمان أو حال
 سنة سنة أو شهر شهر أو يوم يوم على كثرة عدد ذلك واختلاف أحواله ،
 وكذلك حال الأشخاص وما يتعاقب على شخص شخص من أصناف

A ومنه [وبنها 8

يعلمه proposed [يعلم

A وفي زمان الاسكندر 16

التغاير، مثل أن يعلم أنّ زيداً وليّاً لله طائعاً نافعاً لأوليائه، ثم يعلمه
عدواً | لله عاصياً ضاراً لأوليائه، وكذلك من أحوال البِقَاع وحركات A fol. 24a
الأجسام المكانية واستحالة بعضها الى بعض. وهذا الرأى يؤول أصحابه
الى شناعات قبيحة وتتفرّع عنه آراء سوء تكون سبباً لشُرور عظيمة مع
قبحه وما يلزم عنه من أنحاء التغاير والاستحالات في نفس العالم وتعاقب
الحوادث وما أشبه ذلك.

[82] فصل. قد اعتقد خلق كثير في عناية الربّ تعالى بخلقه اعتقادات
مختلفة، فمنهم من زعم أنّه يعنى بخلقه كما يعنى الملك برعيّته وبمصلحتهم
من غير مباشرة لأمر واحد منهم ولا تؤسّل بينه وبين شريكه أو زوجته بل
بأن يجعل لذلك من يتولّاه ويقوم به ويفعل في أمره ما يوجب الحقّ 10
والعدل. وآخرون رأوا أن ذلك غير مقنع حتى يتولّى لهم هو تدبير واحد
واحد منهم... الى غيره وإلا كانوا أولئك شركاءه في تدبيره الخليقة
ومعاونته، وهو يتعالى عن الشركاء والمعاونين. فيلزم من ذلك أن يكون
هذا المتولّى لكثير من الأفعال التي هي نقائص ومذمومات وقبائح وغلط
من يغلط وفحش القول والفعل. ومتى قصد كلّ واحد من خلقه الى الحملة 15
على بعض أوليائه — إبطال قول حقّ على سبيل الاحتجاج — كان هو
المعين له والمتولّى لتسديده وإرشاده ويطرّد هذا في الزناء والقتل والسرقة
وأقبح من أفعال الصبيان والسكران والمجانين. فان نفوا بعض ذلك عن
أن يدبّره أو يعين عليه وجب نفى جميعه، وهذه أصول لآراء سوء وسبب
لما ذهب رديئة فاحشة. 20

1 proposed أن وليّ لله طائع نافع or omit 4 اشناعات A 12 after
some words are omitted, cf. Hebrew variants 20 المذهب A

- [83] فصل . ليست السياسة على الاطلاق جنساً لسائر أصناف السياسة
 A fol. 24^b بل هي كالاسم المشترك لأشياء كثيرة تتفق فيه وتختلف في ذواتها | وطبائعها ،
 فلا شركة بين السياسة الفاضلة وبين سائر أصناف السياسات الجاهليّة .
- [84] فصل . السياسة الفاضلة هي التي ينال السائس بها نوعاً من
 الفضيلة لا يمكن أن يناله إلا بها ، وهي أكبر ما يمكن أن يناله ⁵
 الانسان من الفضائل ، وينال الموسون من الفضائل في حياتهم
 الدنيويّة والحياة في الآخرة ما لا يمكن أن ينال إلا بها ، أمّا في حياتهم
 الدنيويّة ، فان تكون أبدانهم على أفضل الهيئات التي تمكن في طبيعة واحد
 واحد منها أن يقتنيها ، وتكون أنفسهم على أفضل الأحوال التي تمكن في
 طبيعة نفسٍ نفسٍ من أنفس الأشخاص وفي قوتها من الفضائل التي هي ¹⁰
 سبب السعادة في الحياة الآخرة ويكون عيشهم أطيب عيش وألذ من جميع
 أصناف الحياة والعيش الذي لغيرهم .
- [85] فصل . عسيرٌ وبعيدٌ أن تلزم أفعال رئيس من رؤساء الجاهليّة
 صنفاً من أصناف السياسات الجاهليّة خالصاً لا يشوبه شيء من غير ذلك
 الصنف ، اذ كان كلّ واحد منهم انما تصدر أفعاله عن رأيه وظنونه ودواعي ¹⁵
 نفسه لا عن علم وصناعة مقتناة . فلذلك صار الموجود انما هو سياسات
 ممترجة من هذه السياسات الجاهليّة أو من أكثرها .
- [86] فصل . انما قنّون المتقدّمون هذه السياسات الجاهليّة لان العلم
 انما يحيط ويضبط القوانين الكليّة وإن كان الموجود من السياسات الجاهليّة
 كثيراً سياسات مركّبة ، لأنّ من عرف طبع سياسةٍ سياسةٍ أمكن أن يُقرطس ²⁰
 ويعرف السياسة الموجودة ومن ما ذا هي مركّبة ويحكم عليها بحسب ما يجد

6 A الموسين 7 proposed omit في الحياة after 10 cf. Heb. [وفي قوتها 10

من تركيبها وبحسب ما عرف من طبيعة كل صنف من الأصناف البسيطة .
وكذلك الحال في جميع الأشياء العلمية والعملية . . . علم بها وانما | يظنّ
ويحسب انه يستعمل البرهان كثيراً ما يوجد يستعمله مختلطاً اختلاطاً
مختلفاً .

5 [87] فصل . انّ كل صنف من أصناف السياسات الجاهلية يشتمل
على أصناف مختلفة متباينة جداً ، فمنها ما هو في غاية الرداءة ومنها ما
ضرره يسير ومنفعته كثيرة بحسب قوم بأعيانهم . وذلك أنّ حال
السياسات ونسبتها الى الأنفس كحال الأزمان ونسبتها الى الأبدان ذوات
الأمزجة المختلفة ، وكما أنّ الأبدان بعضها يصلح في مزاجه وحاله في
10 زمان الخريف وبعضها يصلح في زمان الصيف وبعضها يوجد الأصلح له
والأوفق في زمان الشتاء وبعضها توجد حاله صالحة جداً في زمان الربيع ،
كذلك حال الأنفس ونسبتها الى السياسات ، على أنّ الأبدان تكاد أن
تكون أصولها التي تركبت عنها أشدّ انحصار من أصول الهيئات والسير .
وذلك أنّ الهيئات والسير تتركب على أشياء إرادية وطبيعية تكاد أن
15 تكون بلا نهاية وبعضها بالاتفاق ، وكثير من أهل السير يتقلب في
الشقاء وهو لا يعلم بذلك . فأما المرضى وذوو الأمزجة الرديئة فيكاد أن
لا يخفى ذلك عليهم ولا على من تفقّد أحوالهم .

[88] فصل . انّ أصناف القوة التجريبية تختلف بحسب اختلاف المواضع
التي تستعمل فيها وبحسب الصنائع التي تقترن بها وبحسب المستعملين
20 لها ، كما تختلف صناعة الكتابة بحسب الصنائع التي تستعمل فيها وبحسب
المستعملين لها . وذلك أنّ الذي يستعمل من الصنفين جميعاً في تدبير

2 Some words are omitted, see Hebrew variants

3 يستعملها A

14 عن [proposed على

20 [الصنائع proposed

المدن الفاضلة فاضلٌ جدًّا، أمَّا في القوة التجريبيَّة فإنَّ المتعلِّق يستعملها في
 نشوئه وتصرفه بين يدَي الرئيس الأوَّل وتدرُّبه في السياسة الفاضلة،
 فتحدث عن ذلك | قوة شريفة جدًّا نافعة في السياسة الفاضلة وتبلغ بالنتهى A fol. 25b
 للرئاسة والذي فيه الرئاسة الفاضلة بالقوة إلى أن تصير رئاسته بالفعل .
 وأشرف أصناف الكتابة هو ما يستعمل منها في خدمة الرئيس الأوَّل والملك 5
 الفاضل، إلا أنَّه في الشرف والفضل دون القوة التجريبيَّة التي يستعملها
 الرئيس الأوَّل، والشريف على الإطلاق من القوة التجريبيَّة أشرف من
 الشريف من صناعة الكتابة . فأما ما يستعمل من القوة التجريبيَّة في أدون
 سياسات الجاهليَّة وهي سياسة التغلُّب، أحسَّ وشرَّ من جميع ما يستعمل
 منها في سائر المواضع . وكذلك ما يستعمل من الكتابة في سِرِّ التغلُّب 10
 شرَّ وأحسَّ من سائر أصناف الكتابة المستعملة في سائر السياسات
 والصناعات، وما يستعمله السوق أشرف مما يستعمل من الكتابة في خدمة
 التغلُّب، كما أن يكون شرف ما يستعمل من الكتابة في خدمة الملك
 الفاضل والرئاسة الفاضلة على سائر ما يستعمل في المدينة من سائر أصناف
 الكتابة، كذلك تكون خساسة ما يستعمل من الكتابة في خدمة التغلُّب 15
 وضرره وزيادة شرِّه وبِلاؤه على سائر أصناف الكتابة، وبحسب شرف ما
 يستعمل من القوة التجريبيَّة المتعلِّق والرئيس الأوَّل على ما يخدم به من
 الكتابة تكون خساسة ما يستعمله التغلُّب من القوة التجريبيَّة على ما
 يخدم به من الكتابة . وبالجملة فإنَّ كلَّ شرف يفضل على ما هو دونه من
 نوعه إذا استعمل في الرئاسة الفاضلة، هو خسيس ضارٌّ يزيد في الخسَّة 20

A هي 5 A الرسول [الرئيس] A نُشيه 2 A المتعلِّق 1

ed., cf. Heb. [التغلُّب... خدمة 13 فأخسَّ proposed [أخسَّ 9

والصزر على سائر ما كان من نوعه إذا استعمل في السياسة التغلّبية .
 وكذلك سائر القوى النفسانية التي يشرف بها | الانسان ، مثل التمييز وما A fol. 26a
 يتبعه ، فهو في الأخيار من الناس سبب لكل خير ، فهو شريف جداً فاضل ،
 وفي الانسان الشرير سبب لكل شرّ وفساد ، وهى في الملك المتغلب سبب
 5 لأضعاف الشرور التي تكون سبباً لها فيمن ليس له رئاسة . ولذلك لم يسمّوا
 القوة الفكرية التي يستنبط بها ما هو نافع في غاية هو شرّ فضيلة فكرية ،
 بل سمّوها بأسماء آخر مثل خُبث وحيلة ومكيدة . ويكاد أن تكون
 الأشياء الانسانية التي هي أعظم الخيرات الإرادية والصنائع في المدينة
 التغلّبية شروراً أو آفات وأسباباً لآفات تحدث في العالم . فمن أجل ذلك حرّم
 10 على الفاضل من الناس المقام في السياسات الفاسدة ووجبت عليه الهجرة
 الى المدن الفاضلة إن كان لها وجود في زمانه بالفعل . وأما إن كانت
 معدومة فالفاضل غريب في الدنيا وردى العيش ، والموت خير له من
 الحياة .

* [89] فصل . في منافع الجزء النظري في الفلسفة وأنه ضروري في الجزء
 15 العملي من وجوه ، أحدها أن العمل انما يكون صواباً وفضيلة متى كان
 الانسان قد عرف الفضائل التي يُظنّ بها انها فضائل وليست كذلك حقّ
 معرفتها ، وعود نفسه أفعال الفضائل التي هي في الحقيقة فضائل ، حتى
 صارت له هيئة من الهيئات واستئهلالاتها وأنزل كلّ شيء منها منزلته
 ووفّاه حقّه الذي هو ورتبته في مراتب الوجود وآثر ما ينبغي أن

a هو after 19 repeated in A [الجزء first 14 A رئيس [رئاسة 5
 blank in A A margin [مراتب 19

* This *fasl*, not in the Hebrew version, contains an abbreviation of part of the *Tahsil* of al-Fārābī (ed. of Hyderabad, pp. 10–15). Passages of the *Tahsil* in the text are overlined.

يُؤَثَّرُ واجتنب ما ينبغي أن يُجْتَنَّبَ . وهذه حال لا تحصل ولا تكمل إلا بعد الحُنْكَه وكال المعرفة بالبرهان واستكمال العلوم الطبيعيَّة وما يتبعها وما بعدها على ترتيب ونظام حتى يصير آخرًا الى العلوم بالسعادة التي هي بالحقيقة A fol. 26b سعادة . وهي التي | تطلب لذاتها ولا تطلب في وقت من الأوقات لغيرها .

وقد تكون الفضائل النظرية والفضائل الفكرية سببا ومبدأ لكون⁵ الفضائل العملية والصنائع العملية . وهذا أجمع لا يكون إلا بمُماَسَّة النظر والانتقال من درجة الى درجة ومن منزلة الى منزلة ولا يمكن غير ذلك .
وذلك أن الذي يروم أن يتعلَّم الفلسفة النظرية يبتدئ من الأعداد ، ثم يرتقى الى الأعظام ، ثم الى سائر الأشياء التي تلحقها الأعداد والأعظام بالذات ، مثل المناظر والأعظام المتحركة التي هي الأجسام السماوية¹⁰ والموسيقى والى الأثقال والحيل وهذه أشياء تُفْهَم وتتصوَّر بلا مادَّة ، ويرتقى قليلاً قليلاً في الأشياء التي تحتاج في أن تفهم وتتصوَّر الى مادة الى أن يصير الى الأجسام السماوية . ثم يصل بعد ذلك الى ادخال مبادئ آخر غير مبادئ ما ذا وبما ذا وكيف ذا ليكون معيناً له على استعمال الأشياء التي يعسر أن تصير معقولة أو لا يمكن دون أن تصير في موادٍ فيصير¹⁵ متأخراً في الوسط بين الجنس الذي ليس له من مبادئ الوجود إلا ما ذا وجوده وبين الجنس الذي يوجد لأنواعه المبادئ الأربعة . فتلوح له المبادئ الطبيعية فيما رسمها ويستقصى النظر في الموجودات الطبيعية ومبادئ

A وترتقى¹¹ ثم الى : Tahṣil [التي هي¹⁰ العلم³ proposed

[مبادئ آخر غير¹³⁻¹⁴ Tahṣil : A omits [الى مادة¹²

A without¹⁶ Tahṣil : A omits متأخراً و [متأخراً¹⁶ Tahṣil : A omits مبادئ آخر غير

Tahṣil : A omits [من Tahṣil الجنس الجنس (متأخراً ?) out punctuation

التعاليم لها إلى أن يصير إلى مبادئ الوجود . فيصير ما يستفيدة من
مبادئ الوجود له سُلماً ومبادئ تعليم ، وإنما تصير مبادئ الوجود التي
استفادها مبادئ تعليم بالإضافة إلى شيئين . . . ثم ينتقل إلى العلوم بأسباب
وجود الأجسام الطبيعية والبحث عن ذاتها وجواهرها وأسبابها . وعند ما
5 ينتهي إلى الأجسام السماوية وإلى النفس الناطقة | وإلى العقل الفعّال A fol. 27a
ينتقل أيضاً إلى مرتبة أخرى فيضطره النظر في مبادئ وجودها إلى أن
يطلع على مبادئ ليست هي طبيعية فيصير ما استفاده من مبادئ وجود
تلك الرتبة الثالثة أيضاً مبادئ تعليمية لهذه الموجودات التي هي أكمل
وجوداً من الطبيعية . فيصير أيضاً إلى الوسط بين علمين ، علم الطبيعيات
10 وعلم ما بعد الطبيعيات في ترتيب الفحص والتعليم ، ويطلع أيضاً على
مبادئها التي من أجلها كوّنت وعلى الغاية والكمال التي من أجلها كوّنت
الانسان ، ويعلم ان المبادئ الطبيعية التي في الانسان وفي العالم غير كافية
في أن يصير الانسان بها إلى الكمال الذي لأجل بلوغه كوّن الانسان
وان الانسان محتاج فيه إلى مبادئ عقلية يسعى الانسان بها نحو ذلك
15 الكمال . فيكون الانسان قد قارب البلوغ إلى المنزلة والدرجة من العلم
النظري الذي ينال بها السعادة ويبلغ به النظر من الجهتين جميعاً إلى أن
ينتهي إلى موجود لا تمكن أن يكون له مبدأ أصلاً من هذه المبادئ بل
يكون هذا الموجود الأول والمبدأ الأول لجميع الموجودات التي سلف ذكرها ،
ويكون هو الذي به وعنه وله وجودها بالأنحاء التي لا يدخل عليها

شيئين 3 apparently a lacuna after A الذي 2 A بما 1 ما
Taḥṣīl الغايات والكمال الاقصى 11 A ويطلب : Taḥṣīl [ويطلع 10
A به 16 Taḥṣīl : بها 13 Taḥṣīl التعليم [العالم 12
A omits

نقص بل بأكمل الأنحاء التي بها يكون الشيء مبدأ للموجودات . وتحصل
 له معرفة الموجودات بأقصى أسبابها ، وهذا هو النظر الالهي في الموجودات .
 ومع ذلك فهو دائما يفحص عن الغرض الذي لأجله كَوْن الانسان ، وهو
 الكمال الذي يلزم أن يبلغه الانسان ، وعن جميع الأشياء التي بها يبلغ
 الانسان ذلك الكمال . فحينئذ يقدر أن ينتقل الى الجزء العملي ويمكنه ⁵
 أن ينتهي فيعمل ما ينبغي له أن يعمل . فأما مَنْ أعطى الجزء العملي
 بوحى يسدده | نحو تقدير شيء شيء مما ينبغي أن يُؤثر أو يُجتنب ، فإن
 ذلك نحو آخر ، فإن سَميًا عاليين فإن اسم العلم مشترك لهما ، مثل ما هو
 مشترك لصاحب العلم الطبيعي والكاهن الذي يخبر بالكائن من الممكنات .
 وذلك أن الكاهن ليست له قدرة على العلم بجميع أشخاص الممكنات لأن ¹⁰
 أشخاص الممكن بلا نهاية ومن المحال احاطة العلم بما لا نهاية له ، وانما
 له القدرة على ايقاع العلم بما يكون من الممكن الذي اتفق أن خطر بباله
 أو ببال مَنْ سأل عنه . ولأن العلم بما يكون من الممكن علماً مضاداً
 لطبيعة الممكن ، فلذلك ليس لكاهن علم بطبيعة الممكن بل انما العلم بطبيعة
 الممكن لصاحب العلم الطبيعي ، فلذلك صار علمهما ليس من جوهر واحد ¹⁵
 بل هما متضادان . وكذلك حال من قد استكمل العلم النظري وحال مَنْ
 أوحى اليه بتقدير أفعال أهل مدن أو مدينة من أن تكون له معرفة
 بشيء من العلم النظري ، ولا يَنْ مَنْ يوحى اليه وهو مستكمل العلم
 النظري ويَنْ مَنْ يوحى اليه وليس هو مستكمل العلم النظري نسبةً ولا
 اتفاق في الحقيقة بل الاتفاق انما هو في الاسم فقط . ²⁰

علم مضاد proposed ¹³علمها ¹⁵ Aمن غير أن proposed [من أن ¹⁷

* [90] فصل . الفضيلة الفكرية هي التي بها يقدر الانسان على جودة الاستنباط لما هو أنفع في غاية فاضلة مشتركة لأمم أو لأمّة أو لمدينة عند واردة مشترك، ومنها ما يستنبط بها ما يتبدّل في مدد قصار، وهذه تسمى القوة على أصناف التدبيرات الجريئة الزمنية عند ورود الأشياء التي 5 ترد أولاً فأولاً على أسمى وعلى أمة أو على مدينة، فأما القوة الفكرية التي يستنبط بها ما هو أنفع في غاية هي شرّ فليست هي فضيلة فكرية .

[91] فصل . كما أنّ | في الأبدان أبداناً لا يمكن فيها جميع أصناف A fol. 28a الصحة بأمزجتها أو خلقها أو عاداتها أو حال الذي يخصّها أو الصناعة التي يتعيشون بها وما أشبه ذلك، وهذه حال أكثر الأبدان، وفي المواضع 10 مواضع لا يمكن في أهلها أن يقتنوا من أصناف الصحة إلا اليسير، كذلك حال الأنفس بأن يكون فيها ما لا يمكن فيه أن تقتنى الفضائل أو أكثرها ولا يمكنها أن تقتضى منها إلا اليسير. وليس على السائس الفاضل والرئيس الأول أن يكمل فضائل من طبع نفسه وجوهرها أن لا تقبل الفضائل، وإنما غايته أن يبلغ بأمثال هذه الأنفس أكثر ما يمكن فيها وفي أن تبلغ 15 من الفضيلة بحسب النافع لأهل تلك المدينة، كما أنّه ليس على الطبيب الفاضل أن يبلغ بالأبدان التي حالها الحال التي وصفنا إلى أكمل منازل الصحة وأعلى درجاتها، وإنما عليه أن يبلغ بها من الصحة إلى أكثر ما يمكن في طبعها وجوهرها وبحسب أفعال النفس، فإنّ البدن من أجل النفس والنفس من أجل الكمال الأخير، وهو السعادة، وهي الفضيلة، 20 فالنفس من أجل الحكمة والفضيلة .

5 supplied from Tahṣīl, cf. Hebrew variants [أو على مدينة

8 وأمزجتها A 11 يقتنى A 12 [تقتضى] proposed

* Most of this *faṣl* (overlined) is also in the *Tahṣīl*, pp. 21–22. Cf. *faṣl* 89.

* [92] فصل لأبى نصر وُجد معلقاً بخط الخطّابى على ظهر كتاب .
قال : لا يكاد يوجد انسان مفطوراً من أوّل أمره على الكمال حتى لا
يوجد فيه تفاوت أصلاً وان تكون سائر أفعاله وسيرته وأخلاقها تجرى على
العدل والانصاف من غير ميل الى أحد الأطراف أو غلبة من بعض
الأضداد على بعض . وذلك لأنّ الفطرة مصنوعة من متضادات قسرها 5
التأليف على الاجتماع ولو خلّيت وسوّيت طبائعها لم يقع منها اتّلاف البتّة
لبعد ما بينهما من المشاكلة وتفاوت ما يشتمل عليها من المبالغة ، ومع
اجتماعها قسراً فلا تؤمن منافرة يسيرة وكثيرة يكون من أجلها عدم |
الاعتدال فى الخلقة ، وكل فطرة قلّت المنافرة فى عناصرها كانت الى الاعتدال A fol. 28 b
أقرب وكلّما كثرت المنافرة كانت من الاعتدال أبعد ، حتى يجرى الخلق على 10
نسب متساوية من التنافر والاعتدال بتنافر الطباع واعتدالها .
[93] فصل . ومن كلام أبى نصر رضى الله عنه : نزل انسانين
أحدهما قد علم ما فى كتب ارسطوطاليس كلّها من الطبيعىّة والمنطقية
والالهية والمدنية والتعاليم وكانت أفعاله كلّها أو جلّها مخالفة لما هو جميل
فى بادى الرأى المشترك عند الجميع ، والآخر كانت أفعاله كلّها موافقة 15
لما هو جميل فى بادى الرأى المشترك للجميع ، وإن لم يكن عالماً بالعلوم
التي علمها الأوّل ، فإنّ هذا الثانى أقرب الى أن يكون فيلسوفاً من الأوّل
الذى أفعاله كلّها مخالفة لما هو جميل فى بادى الرأى المشترك عند الجميع ،

A, تنزّل [نزل] supplied by ed. 12 فصل 11 proposed الطباع
cf. Hebrew variants 13 كتاب A 16 لما (in l. 14) A لمّا
A mg. corrected to موافقة [مخالفة] 18

* This *fasl* is not found in the Hebrew version.

وكان أقدر على أن يحوز ما قد حازه الأول من الأول على أن يحوز ما قد حازه
 الثانى . والفلسفة فى بادى الرأى وفى الحقيقة هى أن يحصل للانسان
 العلوم النظرية وان تكون أفعاله كلها موافقة لما هو جميل فى بادى الرأى
 المشترك وفى الحقيقة ، والذى يقتصر على العلوم النظرية دون أن تكون
 5 أفعاله كلها موافقة لما هو جميل فى بادى الرأى المشترك تصدّه عاداته
 المتمكنة فيه عن أن يفعل الأفعال التى هى جميلة فى بادى الرأى المشترك
 عند الجميع ، فلذلك هو أخرى أن تصدّه عاداته عن أن تكون أفعاله
 موافقة لما هو جميل فى الحقيقة . والذى أفعاله التى قد اعتادها موافقة لما
 هو جميل فى بادى الرأى المشترك عند الجميع لا تصدّه عاداته عن أن يتعلّم
 10 العلوم النظرية ولا أن تصير أفعاله موافقة لما هو فى الحقيقة جميل ، اذ كان
 بادى الرأى يلزمه أن يفعل ما هو فى الحقيقة جميل وواحِبُ فعله أكثر من
 أن يفعل ما هو فى بادى الرأى | رأى لم يتعقّب ، وما هو فى الحقيقة رأى
 هو رأى قد تُعقّب وُصّح بعد التعقّب ، وبادى الرأى يوجب أن الرأى
 المتعقّب هو أصحّ من بادى الرأى .

A fol. 29a

15 [94] فصل . ومن كلام أبى نصر أيضا رحمة الله عليه : الاجتماع
 على الفضيلة لا يقع فيه تباين أصلاً ولا تفسادٌ لأن الغرض فى الفضيلة
 واحدٌ ، وهو الخير الذى يُراد لنفسه لا لشيء آخر غيره . فاذا كانت
 الشهوة من الاثنين والقصد منهما انما هو لذلك الغرض الذى هو الخير
 بعينه ، فطريقهما اليه واحد ومحبّتهما للشيء بعينه واحدة . فلا يتفاسدون
 20 أبداً ما دام غرضهما واحداً ، وانما يقع التفساد باختلاف الشهوات وتباين
 الأغراض ، فيكون حينئذ هو التصرف الذى لا اجتماع معه ، لأن كلّ واحد

i second يجوز [يجوز A

cf. Hebrew variants

A, أن يفعل فى الحقيقة ما هو واجب ii

15 supplied by ed. [فصل

غرضه غير غرض الآخر وطريقته غير طريقته . وهى مع قياسها ايضا فاسدة وشرّ، ليست خيراً كالغرض الأوّل والاجتماع الأوّل على طلب الحقّ وبلوغ السعادة ومحبة العلم والأشياء الفاضلة . والاجتماع الثانى هو الاجتماع على التكسب والتعاقد فى التجارة والمعاملات ، لأنّ كلّ واحد من المتعاملين والشريكين يريد أن يسلب صاحبه نصيبه ليتوفّر عليه ، 5 وكذلك صاحبه أيضاً يريد منه ذلك ويعتقده فيه ، فيكون حينئذ التباين . والاثنان الأوّلان ليس يجتمعان على شىء خارج عن نفوسهما ولا على شىء يحتاج اليه فى غيره ولا يكون وُصلة الى سواه ، فلا يقع بينهما تباينُ البتّة ما دام غرضهما واحداً كما لا يقع بين هذين الآخرين اجتماع البتّة ما دام غرضهما متبايناً . وأيضاً فإنّ الحقّ هو الغرض المقصود فى كلّ شىء وكذلك 10 الخير والفضيلة ، فالطالبان الحقّ قد وقفا على مطلوبهما | وعَلِمَاهُ وليس يختلفان فيه ، وغير الحقّ والفضيلة هو الطريق الذى لا يسلك عليها ، فإذا سلكتها الانسان ضلّ وتحيّر . ولم يقعا على غرضهما فتباينا لاختلاف غرضهما وأنّهما قد سلكا غير الطريق الذى يودّى الى مطلوبهما وإن كانا لا يعلمانه ، لأنّ فى النفس طلب الحقّ طَبْعاً وإن كانت تقصر عنه . ألا ترى 15 أنّك لو قرّرت كلّ واحد منهما بفضيلة الحقّ والعلم لكان مُقَرّاً بها عالماً بها وإن كان لا يستعملها لنقصه والعوارض اللاحقة له ؟

[95] فصل . محصول الغافل والمتغافل واحدٌ ، لأنّ الغافل تودّيه الغفلة الى الفساد والمتغافل يودّيه تغافله الى الفساد ، فقد اتّفقا فى المحصول الذى هو الفساد . وليس ينفع المتغافل معرفته بما تغافل عنه اذا لم يستعمل 20

فيه ما يجب ، ولا يضرّ الغافل ذهله بما لم . . . يعمل فيه ما يجب ،
لأنّهما قد اتّفقا بالاضافة وتباينا في العلم والجهل .

¹ after بما لم words omitted cf. Hebrew variants ² colophon in A

كملت الفصول المنتزعة عن أقاويل القدماء في تدبير المدن وما تصلح به للشيخ
الامام أبى نصر محمد بن محمد الفارابى رحمة الله عليه على يد الفقير الى عفو
الله سبحانه ابراهيم بن محمد بن يحيى عفا الله عنه بمدينة دمنهور من أعمال البحيرة
في يوم الاثنين الحادى عشر من شهر ربيع الأول سنة أربع وسبع مائة

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- (نجم) منجمٌ 53
- (نحا) أنحاءٌ plur. 17, 19, plur. أنحاءٌ 56
- (ندم) ندامةٌ 73
- (نذل) نذالةٌ 16
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- (نزل) منزلةٌ: 21, 38; منزليٌّ: 21, 38; منزلٌ 20, 21, 22, 23, 38; أنزلَ 89; نزلَ 93; نزلَ 57, 89
- (نسب) مناسبةٌ 76; نسبةٌ 57
- (نشأ) نشوءٌ 6, 88
- نصبٌ 94 نصيبٌ 26; نصبٌ 36
- (نصف) إنصافٌ 92; نصفةٌ 63
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THE FUṢŪL AL-MADANĪ OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ

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ى

- 29 مَوَسِّرٌ 28: أَيْسَرُ elat. 36 يَسِيرٌ 38, 29, 28, 25 يَسَارٌ 15 تَيْسَرُ (يسر)
33, 31 يَقِينُ: 32, 31 يَقِينُ 32; تَيَقَّنَ 32, 34, 31 يَتَقَنُّ (يقن)

VARIANTS AND READINGS IN THE HEBREW VERSION

פרקים לאבו נצר חלוקים מקיפים על שרשים רבים ממאמרי : א Heading in
הקדמונים במה שראוי שתהיה הנהגת המדינות ובמה שיתישרו ויצליחו בו אנשיהן
ויתישרו אל מול ההצלחה

פרקי אבו נצר אלפראבי פרקים נבדלים מקיפים על שרשים : ב Heading in
רבים ממאמרי הקדמונים במה שראוי שתהיה הנהגת המדינות בו ובמה שתתישבנה
ותצלחנה הנהגות אנשיהן ויתישרו בו אל מול ההצלחה

- | | | |
|-------|--|---|
| [4] | في تمكينها 9 | בהתישבות והעמדת אותן הטובות |
| 12-13 | والنَّجَّار من أسِر الخشب والحدَّاد
من أسِر الحديد مقدار ما يحتاج
اليه في صناعته فقط | Heb. omits with A |
| [6] | الأجزاء والقوى العظمى 3
يبتدئ 6
من الأخير وهو الدم 17 | A = العظمى omitting החלקים והכחות
A = התחיל
من الأجزاء i.e. מן החלקים והוא הדם
الخ |
| 3 | الوعاء (page 107) | כלים ובתי הקבול |
| 14 | والخوف | Heb. omits with A |
| 15 | وآلات هذه القوة | וכלי וגו' for וכל אלו הכחות |
| 17 | البطش | פשוט הידים |
| 10-11 | حين ما نريد أن نعلم (page 108) | Heb. omits |
| [7-8] | تنقسم هذه القسمة . 16-17
فصل . الفضائل والرزائل
الخلقية إنما تحصل | Heb. omits (i.e. including heading
of <i>fasl</i> 8) |
| [9] | لا يمكن أن يخطر الانسان من 7
أول أسره الخ | (Job) ועיר פרא אדם יולד : margin א
xi. 12) |

- 14-15 فضيلة كما أن الاستعداد الطبيعى نحو أفعال الحياكة ليس يقال فيه انه
 Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
- 2 ولا نقيصة (page 110)
 Heb. omits with A
- [11] 6 عن الشرور الانسانية
 מגבול האנושות
- 6-7 الى ما هو أكثر شرا منها
 Heb. omits with A
- 11 ولم يخدمها
 = A ולא ישכון בה
- at end of *faṣl* يخرج عن المدن كلها
 Heb. continues ובהלם אל תחד נפש
 cf. Gen. xlix. 6
- [12] 13-15 وتتمكن في النفس بدلها
 Heb. omits with A
- هيئات مضادة لها ومنها ما
 يكسر ويضعف وتنقص عزته
 من غير أن يزول زوالاً تاماً
- 15 ولا أن تنقص قوته
 ולא שימלט האדם מהם
- [13] 7-8 ولا يتأذى بل يستلذها
 Heb. omits with A
- 10 العفيف
 הירא חטא
- [15] 5 يتيسر
 יתמיד
- [16] 12 وهو الشره
 Heb. omits
- 15-16 والكرم متوسط بين البذخ
 והכבוד אמצעי בין היהרא (sic) ובין
 والصلف والطرمدة وبين النذالة
 ההתנבל והנוחות (sic) אמצעי בין
 cf. A הפריצות והחלול או ההדיטות (sic)
- [17] 4 والآخر متوسط بالقياس والاضافة
 Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
- الى غيره . فالتوسط في نفسه
 הכדוד 10
- Heb. omits
- 4-5 وبحسب الوقت (page 115)
 = A וכפי המקום מן
 وبحسب المكان مثل

HEBREW VARIANTS

המדינה והבית הנרצה בהם אצל הקדמונים המשכן	10-11 [20] المدينة والمنزل ليس يعنى به عند القدماء المسكن وحده لكن انما يعنى به المسكن الذى يحوى ناساً والناس الذى تحويهم المساكن
in error פעולה טובה	10 [24] فعلا طيباً
A = מציאות האדם	7 [25] وجود الانسان الحقيقى
ושאר הדברים	11 وسائر الأشياء الخارجة
lacking in Heb. and A	[26-7]
Heb. omits	14-15 [28] المدن أفعالا يصلون بها الى هذا الغرض و يجعلون سنن المدينة سنناً يصلون بها
ויבחר אותם להם למעלה ממנו	17 ويؤثرهم بها دونه
שיהיו עשירים אנשי המדינה וייטיבו להם	1-2 (page 123) أن يكونوا أيسر أهل المدينة وأن يتوحدوا
only (homoioteleuton) בעלי המדינה	6 الى اليسار ويجعلون سنن أهل المدينة سننا يصلون بها من أهل المدينة
in error אלו התענוגים כלם	11-12 هذه الثلاثة كلّها
Heb. omits	12 ويستبدلون بها
אם אין עם אין margin comments מלך	7 [29] وقوم يرون الخ
Heb. here = B ואחרים ראו לצרף	9 وآخرون يرون أن يضيفوا
وفضيلة i.e. ומעלת השכל המחשבי العقل الفكري	15 [30] وفضيلة الجزء الفكري
بطبع i.e. בטבע האדם	6 [31] بصنع الانسان
ותראה הכנתו	7 وقوى استعدادهُ
numbered in error 30 in Heb. instead of 29 (=32-3)	[32]
كَلِمَة أو أوائل i.e. כוללות או ראשונות	13 AB كَلِمَة أوائل

- ומה שיהיה נמצא בעת מה אם שלא יהיה وما كان موجودا في وقت وأمكن 2 [33]
 cf. A נמצא أن يصير غير موجود
 Heb. omits in error حال after علمًا 6
 ידיעה הוא האמתה علمًا أو يقينًا 10-11
 Heb. omits, again = B (cf. [29]) أن يستفيد الوجود أصلاً عن 1-2 [34]
 غيره وانه لا يمكن كيف استفاد عنه (page 127) 10
 איך קנו שאר . . . ממנו سائر
 Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) والوحدة وما قسط كل واحد 11
 منها من الوجود والحقيقة الأشياء الشيئية 12
 perhaps rightly הסבות הסביות القدرة على جودة استنباط 2 [36]
 i.e. omits היכולת על המצאת في بلوغ خيرات ما يسيرة . 3-4
 with A والدهاء هو القدرة على صحة
 Heb. omits الروية في استنباط ما هو أجود
 وأصلح
 ضرور cf. A הרעות ثروة 5
 והגורה והקלקול والخبّ والخريزة والخبث
 A = אמנם הם בדברים انما هي الأشياء 7
 Heb. omits الكيس ويكون 5 [37]
 העריץ الداهي
 (בوجه ?) על צד העצה بجودة الروية at end
 והוא מה שלא יהיה הענין הנראה אלא بما لا يمكن أن يكون الأمر 6-7 [39]
 עליו المشاهد الآ عليه
 Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) ذا رأى أو جيّد الرأى وهو 11-12 [41]
 A = והנה אלו גם כן מינים מן ההשכל أن يكون الانسان
 فهذا اذّا نوع من (page 132) 2 المتعقل

HEBREW VARIANTS

[43] 7 تجربة ما	A = נסיון מה
[47]	lacking in Heb. and A
[49] 9 الموجودان	A i.e. הנמצאים
[50] 11 الخطابة	in error (mg. ההשערה) ההשרה for ההלצה Cf. [53], [54], [86].
14 الدهاة	(cf. [37]) الداهى for העריץ
[51] at end أو يكونون أطرحوها في أمرهم	או שהם מן המשליכים אותה אחרי גוים (cf. Neh. ix. בעיניהם (בעניניהם) leg. 26).
[52] 7 والترفة واللين	והבדיחות והחלקות
8 لتكسر	A = שיתרככו
[53] 15-16 الخطباء والبلغاء	אנשי ההלצה והצחות
[54] 8, 14 الجهاد	ההשתדלות
8-9 الأشياء الجهادية	הדברים הצריכים השתדלות וחריצות
14 فتكون هذه الجماعة	A = ויהיה זה הכח
14-15 ويسمّون الرّساء الأخيار	ויקראו האנשים הטובים
1 (page 138) الأئمة	الأئم = האומות
7-8 جودة خطابة	(for ההלצה) טוב ההצלחה
8-9 فهذا يسمّى ملك السنّة ورياسته	והנה זה יקרא מלך הנימוס וראשיהם
تسمّى ملكاً سنّياً	יקראו מלכיים נמוסיים
11 مقام ملك السنّة	B = במקום הנימוס
روساء السنّة	A = ראשי המדינה
[56] 16-1 (page 139) ولكن يستعمل	cf. B וישתמש
1 A, B omit	ואותו התכלית הוא טוב יסדר
3 استعمال السلاح	עשיית הקרב והמלחמה
3-4 التي هي غاية	only 1 . .
6-7 (page 140) وأما أولئك فهم مرؤسون وروساء. وكلّ شيء كان العبد	ואמנם הראשונים הנה הם מקבלי ראשיות וראשי כל דבר יהיה העבד

8 (masc.) باستعمال غيره	בעשיית מה שזולתו
[57] 14-15 وتتماسك وتبقى محفوظة بالعدل وأفاعيل العدل	Heb. omits with A
3 والعديل تابع (page 141) للمحبة والمحبة في هذه المدينة	והיושר הנמשך אל האהבה בזאת המדינה (haplography)
10-11 والتي بينهما هي الأفعال التي تنال بها السعادة	Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
[58] 5-6 وعسى أن يكون نقصه أيضًا جوراً على أهل المدينة	Heb. omits with A (homoioteleuton)
8-9 وإما إن خرج خرج بشرائط وأحوال لا يلحق لأجلها من خروج ما خرج عن يده	Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
13-14 بارادته أو بغير ارادته ومساوٍ لذلك الذي خرج عن يده	Heb. omits with A (homoioteleuton)
10 (page 143) نيل بقسطه من الشر	יהרג
11 وإذا نقص جوراً على أهل المدينة	cf. A לבדו הנה הוא מן המבואר
[59] 1-15 (page 144) على then صنف أهل المدينة وصنف يجعله جوراً	Heb. omits with A
1-2 يخصه لا يتعداه الى لا يتعداها [61] 15	Heb. omits
	מיוחד לא ינצלו ממנו ולא יתעלמה i.e. ולא ילמדו אותם
	לא נצחני אלא בעל חכמה אחת margin:
	איש איש על עבודתו ועל margin:
	משאו (Num. iv. 49)
	end of Part I and beginning of Part II not indicated
[63] 14 A omits	שאינם מאנשי המדינה שיש למדינה עליהם דבר חקוק ומנעו אותו מהם
14-15 جميعاً أحدهما	יחד האחד הוא

HEBREW VARIANTS

- 1 (page 147) فذلك أيضا Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
 اكتساب خير لأهل المدينة
- 2-3 سوى نفاذ أمره فيهم وطاعتهم
 له أو سوى أن يكرموه من غير
 شيء سوى أن يكرموه فقط
- 15 [64] A وهو مجموع يقتضى
 the (השלישית sc.) מקובץ סותר
 last word apparently for יתקן
- 19-1 (page 148) 65] [65] فانه لا يمكن
 A أن يكون يمكن أن لا يوجد
 better כי אי אפשר שיהיה מה שאי אפשר שלא
 better ימצא
- 4 الروحانية
 A = but the sense is
 against it
- 4, 6 ما لا يمكن أن يوجد
 A
 better מה שאי אפשר שלא ימצא
- 6-7 فالروحانية لها الصنف الثاني
 من أصناف ما لا يمكن أن لا
 يوجد
 Heb. omits
- 7 والسموية لها الصنف
 והגרמים (הגשמים leg.) השמימיים להם
 המין
- 8 والهولانية لها
 Heb. only ולהם
- 11 [66] A omits
 ומה שאי אפשר שלא ימצא בעת מה
 ומה שאפשר שימצא ושלא ימצא
- 13 أن لا يوجد . . .
 Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
- 13-15 والموجودات من هذه ثلاثة
 أقسام : ما لا يمكن أن لا
 يوجد أصلاً وما لا يمكن أن لا
 يوجد في حين ما وأن يوجد في
 حين ما
- 17 والذي لا يمكن أن لا يوجد
 ואשר אי אפשר שלא ימצא
- 1-2 (page 149) 2-1 وما يمكن أن
 يوجد وأن لا يوجد
 ומה שאפשר שימצא ושלא ימצא

לו סבה	له شبهه 6-7 [67]
באשר ימצא אליו סבה במינו	فى أن يوجد فى نوعه 8
הנמצא . . . המציאות	الموجود . . . الموجود 9
ואין הרע	وليس للشر 12 [69]
ואמנם הדברים האפשריים הטבעיים במה שהם טבעיים הנה לא ירוץ בהם הענין על זולת מה שראוי	3 (page 151) A omits
blank כאשר ישמר בראיות אשר	متى احتفظ بالاستئصال فيها 4
Heb. omits	جميعا 16 [70]
או הוא טוב ורע יחד	17 A omits
אינה גמול הפעולות אשר מדרכם שתגיע בהן ההצלחה	20 A omits [71]
אשר מדרכם	التي ليس شأنها (page 152) 1 A omits
כמו שהחכמה המגעת מהלמוד אינה גמול הלמוד הקודם לפניה	3 A omits
ולא שכר הטורח והעמל והצער אשר השיג אותו כאשר בחר הלמוד	وذلك أن العفيف 10
שהירא חטא for וזה שיהיה חטא cf. [13]	أن يكون رأيه أن الذى تركها 13 A كانت
שיאמר שדעתו אשר עזב אותו היה עמו	A فكيف يعرض 14
يعوّض = איך יקבל גמול	من الأجر (page 153) 1 A omits
من الآخرة = מן העולם הנצחי מנהיגי המדינות	فليس إذا يقتنى العدالة 1-2 يمقته 3
והנה אם כן אין קיום והשארות היושר ומנע ממנו	من هولاء يرى أنه تفوته 4
ומאלו מי שיראה שיהיה תמורתו אשר בהם יוסיף (= يزيد) בחיים אשר מיד	التي لها يريد الحياة العاجلة

HEBREW VARIANTS

6-7	فهو يرى ان الاقدام على الموت هو شرّ الا انه يخاف شرّاً أعظم منه	Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
7-8	تجد هذه التي يظنّون أنّها من الفضائل	נמצא אלו הסברות אשר
[72]	فخرج عن يده بل يرى انه لا يناله بالموت شرّاً أصلاً ويرى أن الخير الذي كان قد حصل له	Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
16	ولا يفارقه بالموت	והוא ירא שיפרד ממנו במות
17	A omits	הוא רִינח מה היה מגיע אליו אלו (leg.) אלא) היה כשאר יוסיף אליו על מה שהגיע לו מן הטוב והוא קרוב מיראת מי שיחשוב שאשר יבצר ממנו
[73]	أهل المدن الجاهلية والفساق أما الجاهلية فلما يخلفونها . . . يخلف 7, 5	אנשי המדינות הסכלות למה
[74]	سينال ذلك 19	שיגו אותם . . . ישיגהו
20-1	فان مات نالوه (page 155) أولئك	סבה לזה ואם ימות ישארו הם
[76]	11 قَسْرٌ A بمفارقة	הכרח rightly בהתחברות
12-13	وان يقتلوا النفس	ושיהרגו האנשים
14	فلا نملك	ולא נבחר
20-1	من أفعالها الى أن (page 156) تستعمل آلة هي جسم ولا أن تستعمل قوة في جسم	מפעולותיה מפעול כח בגשם (sic i.e. dittography)
7	يهجم العقل على ذاته	ישלם השכל עם עצמותו

- ואלו הם החיים האחרים אשר יקוה
i.e. avoids the anthropo-
morphism
- והזה היא החיאה האחרת الخ 10
- הרכבת דבקות
- Heb. omits
- תרכיב כמ 14 [77]
- وفعل الشيء... عن الشيء 17 [78]
- אי זה פועל שיהיה כאשר לא ידע
- Heb. omits
- أى فاعل شيئاً ما علم 8 [79]
- סבת הסרת ההפסד
- فسبب الفساد أقوى 17
- עם ההאותות מהפועל
- زوال سبب الفساد 20
- מסיר אותו בזמן
- فبالصلاح من الفعل 21
- Heb. omits
- متأخر في الزمان (page 158) 1
- بل يكونان معاً فلذلك يلزم أن 1-2
- יكون الفاعل متى كان
- A omits 7 [80]
- ויעשה ממה שיהיה בוחן ומכיר מה
שהוא יותר רע ויותר פחות יאמר בו
שהוא מתלוצץ או בעל רמאות או
מקולקל
- הלצת המדבר עמו
- عبارة المخاطب له 9
- الحزئيات كلها المحسوسة 2 [81]
- החושים המוחשים כלם
- intrans. يصير... يصير 7, 6
- ישיב אותו... ישיבהו
- في نفس العالم (page 160) 5
- בנפש היודע
- منهم 12 [82]
- מנבראיו בדבר דבר מפעולותיהם
ותקונם ולא יעזוב אחד מנבראיו
- ومعاونته 13
- ומעשיו
- قول حقي 16
- מאמר מי שהוא חסר ומקולל
- وأقبح من أفعال الصبيان
والسكارى والمجانين. فإن نفوا
بعض ذلك عن أن يدبره أو
يعين عليه وجب نفى جميعه 18-19
- ומה שהוא יותר מגונה מזה כמו פעולות
הנערים השכורים ובעלי העברות ומה
שהוא יותר חסר מזה על שהוא המנהיג
והעוזר בחיוב השארותם

HEBREW VARIANTS

- المسوس = המונהג [84] 4 السائس
- Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) والحياة في الآخرة ما لا يمكن 7-8 أن ينال الا بها أما في حياتهم الدنياوية
- Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) واحد واحد منها أن يقتنيها 8-10 وتكون أنفسهم على أفضل الأحوال التي تمكن في طبيعة
- וזה כפי מה שבכחם להשיג בין המעלות ופי قوتها من الفضائل 10
- אמנם נפל החלוף בין הקדמונים באלו אפשר שייטיב העיון
- כמו ההלצה וההטעאה והנצוח ומלאכת השיר כי המתעסק במ אשר אין לו
- כפי קהל אנשים בעינם
- Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) كما تختلف صناعة الكتابة 20-21 [88] بحسب الصنائع التي تستعمل فيها وبحسب المستعملين لها
- המתפעל 1 (page 163) المتعقل
- Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) أشرف من الشريف من صناعة 7-8 الكتابة . فأما ما يستعمل من القوة التجريبية
- ומה שיעשו אותו הסגנים והשרים וכפי חשובות מה שיעשה מהספרות בשרות המלך המעולה
- 12-14 وما يستعمله السوقه أشرف مما يستعمل من الكتابة في خدمة الملك الفاضل A
- Heb. omits (homoioteleuton) خير فهو شريف (page 164) 3-4 جدًا فاضل وفي الانسان الشريّر سبب لكل
- גר ונכרי במדיניים 12 غريب في الدنيا

- [89] lacking in Heb. א and ב
- [90] 5 A omits cf. *Tahṣīl*, 22 או על מדינה
- [91] 8 A ואמרזתה ומזגם
- 10 فی أهلها בהן
- 10-11 من أصناف الصحة ألا اليسير Heb. omits (homoioteleuton)
- كذلك حال الأنفس بأن يكون
- فيها ما لا يمكن فيه أن تقتنى
- [92] lacking in Heb. א and ב
- [93] 12 ومن كلام أبي نصر رضى الله عنه Heb. omits
- A تنزل غיח
- 18 مخالفة מסכימות
- 11 في الحقيقة ما هو (page 170) A واجب فعله أكثر מה שהוא באמת יפה ופעולתו ראוייה יותר
- [94] 15 ومن كلام أبي نصر أيضا رحمة الله عليه Heb. omits
- 2-3 والاجتماع الأول (page 171) Heb. omits
- على طلب الحق وبلوغ السعادة
- ومحبة العلم والأشياء الفاضلة
- 12 الطريق الذي لا يسلك عليها הדרך אשר ילכו בה
- [95] 1 A omits ידעוהו כאשר אינו

נשלם מאמר אבו נצר אלפראבי בפרקים אשר הוציא אותם ממאמרי : ends א
and so הקדמונים והפילוסופים והשבח לאל יתברך ויתעלה אין עוד מלבדו
בעשור ראשון לאייר שנת alone has : ויתעלה ב, omitting
(ברוך יי לעולם אמן ואמן 53 (= Ps. lxxxix. 5) אברך את יי' בילאו

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Cambridge University Press

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London, N.W. 1
American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York