


taking place at the same time as many of these countries are making the transition from dependence to independence, and at a time when European influence, on the whole, has been withdrawing from Asia. These countries will have to choose not only their own political systems, but their own international alliances and international trade, and the choice surely is going to be between their own adaptation of the democratic institutions, European and largely British in origin, and the Communist with all its political apparatuses and economic control. We have faith in this country, and in respect of the members of our Commonwealth that the choice will fall fairly and squarely on the side of tolerance and law, justice and freedom, because we believe most passionately that these things are clearly in the wishes of all mankind. These are the principles which we believe to be the basis of a new world order: the rule of law, and the rule of justice, with respect to the rights of the individual.

These things will be won in this new Commonwealth which in September 1954 will have five old and five new members and many of them will be in the neighbourhood of the border, Lord Scarbrough, in the Scottish border close by my own home town. A local Minister of the Church was going to conduct a service of marriage to bring the couple up to the altar and in front of the congregation he would say: "Marriage is a curse to some, a gamble to some, and a gamble to all. Do ye venture?" And this, he would repeat, and when nobody dared to say anything he would add: "Then let us proceed." With all the difficulties that face us in the new Commonwealth, we must bring about a successful marriage between the old and the new. As the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth are concerned, we must offer to Asia something more satisfying than a marriage of convenience, a relationship less cold than co-existence, strings attached to capital which will not be strings that jerk the puppet to the tune, but strings which bind partners together in mutual enterprise. So it is because it is the objective of this Royal Central Asian Society to have partnership and close co-operation with Asian countries that I am so happy to have the honour to propose the toast of "The Royal Central Asian Society."

The toast having been cordially honoured,

The PRESIDENT said: I feel it would be your wish, ladies and gentlemen, that I should, on behalf of the Royal Central Asian Society, thank you for the honour conferred on the Society, in spite of the fact that there were to make such an interesting



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AIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

LUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN GLUBB, K.C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.

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Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on May 29, 1957, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

I feel it presumptuous before so distinguished an audience to give any account of past events in the Middle East, but, to some extent I am obliged to do so as I wish to build upon them in my conclusions. Firstly, it seems to me important always to have perfectly clearly in mind what Britains wants in this particular area. Amongst the uninitiated in this country, I have heard innumerable versions of why Britain should have a dominating position in Middle Eastern countries. My own interpretation is that all Britain wants in the Middle East is the power to be able to cross it, and I have to support me in this assumption no less a person than Lord Palmerston. Many of you may remember reading that on one occasion he made a speech during a debate in the House on the subject of Egypt in the course of which he said: "Britain does not want Egypt, or wish it for herself any more than a reasonable man who owned an estate in the north of England and a residence in London would want to own all the Inns on the Great North Road. All such a man could reasonably require would be that the inns should be there, that they should be reasonably efficient and ready to supply him with mutton chops and post-horses whenever he went through." After all, Lord Palmerston was anything but a pacifist, and I think that summary, given so many years ago, applies as much today as then.

Of course many ask: What about oil? There was not any oil in Lord Palmerston's day. But, as you probably all realize, the chain of oil fields starts in Russia, at Baku, then to the I.P.C. at Kirkuk, on to the Iraq oil field near Basra, then to Kuwait, then to Bahrein Island, and Saudi Arabia proper and so on. The reason why we did not get oil was not because there was not enough there but because we could not pass through the Suez Canal or use the Syrian pipe lines; so that oil itself boils down to transit, as in the case of all other forms of commerce.

I hesitate to say much in regard to war because, in the last few years, so many changes have taken place that I may be completely out of date. There is, however, an interesting sidelight on the war question, because there are two kinds of war: the atomic world war which we hope will never come; also the sometimes quite sizeable war which is part of the main cold war. If we omit nuclear weapons, the characteristic at the moment, in so far as fighting in the Middle East with conventional weapons is concerned, is that men can be moved very easily, whereas the tools they need can only be moved with the maximum amount of difficulty. Conventional weapons become heavier and bigger and their backing becomes more and more com-

PRESENTED TO THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY, SIMLA

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plicated in the way of stores, reserves, spare parts, workshops and such things. Therefore there is the new technique of nominally selling weapons and their backing to other nations, in order to be able to fly your own personnel in when desired. We heard a certain amount of this at the time of Suez. In that connection it was interesting to read a few days ago in a British daily paper that in the recent attempted *coup d'état* to dethrone King Hussein of Jordan it had been planned that the Syrian Army would intervene supported by Russian fighter aircraft. The Russian fighters now in Syria were to be flown by Russian pilots, the machines bearing Syrian markings. Whether this was true or not I do not know; it was in the British press. But this is a new field from the point of view of outside Powers acquiring influence in other countries—that of pre-positioning weapons in the name of a small country with a view to the outside Power flying its own personnel when the moment to do so arrived.

Apart from nuclear warfare, we all now realize, after two World Wars, the vital and absolutely essential importance of this area, at any rate when strategy was as it used to be. Whenever people invent a new missile they always say that soldiers will never get to hand-to-hand fighting again; the enemy will never be seen. I once read a statement written, I think, 400 or 500 years ago at the time of the first appearance of gunpowder, in which a military commander of the time said that in future soldiers would never get hand-to-hand. Nevertheless every development in weapons has always hitherto resulted in soldiers fighting hand-to-hand. Whether, however, the Middle East has lost its strategic importance or not, I feel that, at any rate for our immediate object, the real significance of the area is the power to cross it. In her dependence on trade and trade-routes Britain is peculiarly unfortunately situated vis-a-vis the United States of America and Russia. Britain is a small island, densely populated, and both America and Russia are vast continental powers with enormous territories and able to be self-sufficient if they wish. Thus it is peculiarly difficult for those two countries to appreciate how vital open trade routes are to Britain.

It is interesting to note that although in the past we had interests in India, in the Far East, in Australia and all over the world for, let us say, 250 years, until quite recently, we experienced no trouble in crossing the Middle East. We were always able to come and go without let or hindrance, and we succeeded in doing so because we worked in co-operation with the Ottoman Empire. Not only did we succeed in coming and going across the Middle East but we saved ourselves the cost of garrisoning the area. No attempt was ever made by Britain to keep troops permanently in this vital defile, at any rate until 1882. As you know, co-operation with the Ottoman Empire came to an end before the First World War and as a result we began that war with Germany established in the Middle East. No sooner did Turkey come into the war than Britain commenced negotiations with the Arabs through Sherif Husain who lived at Mecca. In December, 1915, an agreement was concluded with the Sherif according to which a great Arab State was to be established after the First World War, including the whole peninsular of Arabia. That agreement was still-born, firstly because of accusations arising out of the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish home in Palestine; also owing to French action in Syria. It is interesting

to remember what I imagine must have been the intention of the negotiators in 1915, namely to return to the time-honoured system of having a large or reasonably sized local government occupying the defile, with whom Britain could be friendly, as she had been with the Ottoman Empire, and in return for assistance to whom we should always find transit facilities available.

The whole idea came to nought, as you all know, principally owing to the questions I have mentioned, Palestine and Syria. Since then for a considerable period we have endeavoured to keep the trade route open by direct action, that is to say, to keep garrisons in various places to guard the pass.

I mention this because so many people are apt to say that all is now lost. It seems to me we should always keep clearly in mind the fact that our interest is free transit, and if it can possibly be arranged it is surely far easier and more economical to get free transit by friendliness with people on the way than by having to keep forces on the spot, to ensure the corridor remaining open. I said "if it can possibly be arranged." It may not be possible. But merely keeping troops in these countries is no object in itself; the object is to have free and safe transit across the defile.

There are two subjects on which people in Britain usually attack me at this stage: the first group ask: "Why do we go on trying to get an agreement with these Arabs who are so temperamental and so difficult and anyhow, very inefficient? Surely we should go straight out to be allies with Israel?" The answer I always give is that our object is to get through from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. From Persia east-ward the width of the passage-way through Arab territory is about 1,000 miles, bounded on one side by the Persian mountains and on the western side by the Sahara. As most of you are doubtless aware, there are innumerable ways of getting through the area. Britain herself made a trans-desert road to Baghdad and during the last war many different routes were in use. Different pipelines also cross in various directions.

Unfortunately as things are at present we cannot be the allies of Israel and the Arabs at the same time, so the alternatives today are to be friendly with the Arabic-speaking peoples and unfriendly with Israel, or vice versa. Theoretically it is possible to cross the Mediterranean to the top of the Red Sea through Israel territory, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. However, Israel territory at this point is only three miles wide—it is possible to shoot from Jordan into Sinai and from Sinai into Jordan, across Israel. As opposed to this, the width of the belt of Arab territory which extends from Persia to west of Egypt is a thousand miles. If you succeed in crossing Israel territory from the Mediterranean, you are still only at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The exit from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea is through the Straits of Tiran, which as you know is a narrow entrance blocked by an island. Neither U.N.O. nor the U.S.A. have succeeded in establishing the right of ships from Israel to pass through these straits. It will be seen therefore that Israel cannot offer us a corridor from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea as the Arabs can. Incidentally also all the oil is on the eastern side of Arabia, and no oil in commercial quantities has been found in Israel. Whether Britain is an ally of the Arabs or of Israel is not therefore

dependent on which of the two of are the nicest people. It depends on the fact that Israel has nothing which Britain wants, whereas the Arabs control both her requirements, namely transit facilities and oil.

The other group who heckle me—I am trying to answer the arguments in advance—are those who ask: “Anyhow, what business have we to try to dominate the Arabs? Why cannot we leave them alone?” It seems to me that the answer is that we did not invent this trade route. Visualizing the whole map, you will see that the Middle East defile is the only way in which trade can pass to and from the whole of Southern Asia, the Far East and Australia on one side, and Western Europe on the other. That trade route was just as important in the days of the Roman Empire as today. Rome and Persia fought wars against each other to divert the trade into their respective territories. Whole cities and kingdoms were built up by the wealth accumulated through this East and West trade route. Palmyra became so rich that she even challenged Rome and endeavoured to set up an Eastern Empire. It took Rome two years of war to put Palmyra down. The place is in the middle of a desert and produces nothing at all, but it became rich and powerful because the trade route went through it. It was one more Port Said or one more Suez. The same applied to Petra and other cities of the past. For 2,000 years wherever this trade route passed it left prosperity. I do not think it an exaggeration to say throughout those 2,000 years of history the importance and the prosperity of the Arabs has very largely depended on the fact that this trade route crossed their country, or, to put it another way, if it could be completely diverted round the Cape or somewhere else the Arabs would lose more than Britain would.

The same applies to oil. The Arab States who have oil, base their economy entirely on that oil. Britain at a pinch can get oil from elsewhere, but these States cannot get an income equivalent to that from oil royalties from any other source then by selling their oil. If the oil supply were completely cut off, it seems to me that the Arabs would be greater losers than would Britain.

As I have said, the idea of getting a great Arab State with whom Britain could have a transit arrangement went wrong from the word “Go,” or soon afterwards, in 1917. Following the Second World War Britain made another attempt and the group which came to be known as the Arab League was constituted from seven Arab governments. Unfortunately, in 1947 H.M. Government decided to evacuate Palestine, and before the Arab League could get itself going on a reasonably statesman-like basis everything was once more thrown into chaos by the outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews. When the Americans started in the 1950's to take more interest in the area we and they together planned to have a Middle East N.A.T.O. called the Middle East Defence Organization, but that also was still-born owing to the Palestine dispute. The Egyptians said they would have no objection to signing in on M.E.D.O., as it was called, if before that the Palestine questions were solved in a manner acceptable to them.

In the end, in February, 1955, a Pact to prevent Russian infiltration was signed and called the Baghdad Pact, of which Iraq was the only Arab member, the others being Turkey, Persia and Pakistan. I cannot help feeling that the Baghdad Pact, which gave rise to so many complications

afterwards, was in fact rather an unnecessary complication. The idea of having signatures on documents and putting them all in their pigeon-holes makes the whole world seem to be tidy, but, after all, one cannot expect such very small and weak countries to defy a power like Russia. So that if it ever comes to another World War, surely the Arab countries will take the side of the Powers that are strongest in their area at the time. In other words, even if there is a Pact with the West, if the Russians get to the area first, the Arabs will be obliged to submit to them. Admittedly peace-time co-operation is of immense value, but most of it could, it seems to me, have been done without so widely advertised an official agreement. When I was in Jordan, curiously enough, we had extremely efficient co-operation against Communists with all the Arab States except Syria and Egypt. But we had nothing signed. It worked all the better, I think, because there was no official agreement. However, there it was. The Baghdad Pact was signed. As you know, Egypt are rather haunted by the desire to be leaders of this part of the world and the fact that the Iraqis had taken this independent initiative threw the Egyptians into violent opposition. Whether or not Egypt would in any case have contacted Russia or the other Iron Curtain countries, we do not know; at any rate, the ostensible reason for doing so was resentment against the fact that Iraq had come in with the West, without waiting for Egypt to lead.

All these parochial considerations are merely of local significance. If it had not been that Russia had chosen this time to make a "come back" to the Middle East these problems could not have achieved their present notoriety. When I say "come back" I mean that the Czars tried for 150 years to get to the Mediterranean, always without success. But from 1916 to 1946, for thirty years, Russia disappeared from the Middle East; she was so engrossed in her Revolution and counter-revolutions, the rise of Germany and the Second World War that she did not appear in the Middle East or cut any ice there at all until she emerged as a victor from the Second World War.

I suppose it must be indisputable that the rivalry between the eastern and western camps today is more bitter than in previous years or as bitter as any previous European rivalries or jealousies within the last one thousand years. At the same time, everybody is terrified, Russia as much as we in Britain, of starting up something which will develop into another world or nuclear war. So they have developed as a fine art the technique of what we call the "Cold War." Cold war can include some quite sizeable shooting wars, such as the war in Korea. But in this part of the world the Communists resorted almost entirely to psychological methods.

The Russians began somewhere around 1946 or 1947, but they were not working very hard at that time and what they put out was entirely negative—that is critical of the West, but without praising Russia. Since the end of the war in Korea they have turned much of their attention to the part of the world about which I am speaking. Even so, Moscow is a long way away, and it had only been since Egypt, and subsequently Syria, have joined them in their propaganda, that they have produced such revolutionary results. So although it is done directly to a considerable extent by Egypt and Syria, it is basically Russia which has produced the whole situation.

This psychological or propaganda warfare was, I suppose, originated by Mussolini, but it was brought to a much higher state of efficiency by Hitler, Goebbels and now by Moscow. A number of principles have been established which have been worked on and elaborated since. The basic principles are always to appeal to the lowest elements of the public and to work entirely by passion not by logic. Moreover destructive passions like jealousy and hate are easier to arouse and more violent than the positive. That is to say, the method employed is to produce an enemy, who may or may not be a genuine enemy, and to use every possible method to inculcate resentment, jealousy, hatred and all similar sentiments against the particular party. And the propaganda is directed to a low level of the masses. Finally people will believe anything if they hear it said often enough. The fatal aspect of intellectual people is that they do not repeat the same slogan; they will say a different clever thing every day. That produces no effect whatever on the masses. The great thing is to say very simple things and to keep on saying them all the time.

I have mentioned the Baghdad Pact. It was the rivalry between Iraq and Egypt which gave the Baghdad Pact such notoriety and resulted in a position in which the two larger countries, Egypt and Iraq, endeavoured to draw the small Arab countries, such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, into their respective spheres of influence. As most of you may remember, in December, 1955, the Jordan Government declared its intention of joining the Baghdad Pact. That immediately aroused the most violent reactions in Egypt. As a result the whole of the propaganda machine was turned upon Jordan. It is quite extraordinary the number of things they have thought of for these psychological campaigns. Broadcasting, I suppose, is the greater part of it, perhaps 65 per cent., and it is also a thing which in England has been more heard of and it is coming to be considered as an important weapon; but innumerable other instruments were used at the same time. In Egypt the press is obliged to reflect the views of the Government, and Egyptian papers used to be flown up into Jordan. Egypt also produced the best illustrated papers, so that in Jordan, these Egyptian illustrated papers were always very much in demand. In addition to all that, Egypt bribed all the newspapers in Jordan; it only cost about £20,000 a year for Egypt to dominate the whole of the Jordan press, although on rare occasions they used to pay a special bonus for a particular article. I remember an occasion when one of the editors, a very nice chap, came to see me in my office and showed me a draft article presented to him by another Arab Government with £100 pinned on to it, and he said: "You will be cross with what is written in this but after all £100 is £100—unless you have got more!"

A very active, pamphlet war used to be carried on in that part of the world, and doubtless still is. Some of the pamphlets are openly Communist, signed by the Communist Party, but many are either anonymous or bear fictitious names. Rather an interesting operation of this kind was carried out by the Egyptians against the Arab Legion. They invented a disloyal secret society in the ranks of the Arab Legion. It did not exist; they invented it and gave it a name. Then from information supplied from Jordan they wrote seditious pamphlets signed by the fictitious organiza-

tion and these were smuggled into Jordan and posted to all sorts of different people. After a while we spotted this because there were certain military expressions used in Egypt which are not used in the Jordan Army. We noticed that the writer was obviously an Egyptian and not a Jordanian soldier. But they excelled themselves on one occasion because one morning we received at Arab Legion Headquarters a whole series of excited letters from various units all of which were forwarding copies of pamphlets which had been posted to them, and on each of those pamphlets was the rubber office stamp of another Arab Legion unit. So that a unit which received one of these seditious pamphlets saw on it the stamp of, say, the 2nd Infantry Battalion. This was received, we will say, by the 2nd Artillery Regiment. They of course immediately thought the Infantry was getting shaky and were distributing pamphlets. Conversely, the Infantry received copies of the pamphlet rubber-stamped R.E.M.E. or some other unit. There were rubber office stamps on all the pamphlets. We were a bit shaken by this but we immediately called in all the office stamps from the units concerned. Once they were compared, it was immediately obvious that the rubber stamps on the pamphlets were forgeries. The Egyptians had taken the trouble to get the names of the units, to make rubber stamps in Cairo, put them on the different pamphlets and post them back to the units inside Jordan.

Every cinema show in the world begins, I believe, with a news reel and the cinema owner has to pay something to an agency for the use of the news reel. The Egyptian Embassy in Amman distributed news reels to all cinemas in Jordan free of charge, and the result was that the cinemas ceased to deal with the normally accepted news reel distributors and only Egyptian news reels were used in all the cinemas of Jordan.

One of the great difficulties during the last few years in Jordan arose from the influx of Egyptian schoolmasters. In some cases schools were supplied with Egyptian schoolmasters for nothing. The Egyptian Government paid the salary and expenses of the schoolmaster and offered a school a teacher in any subject which the school found difficulty in getting a master to teach. There is a great shortage in the area, particularly of teachers of physics, chemistry and elementary science subjects. The Egyptians were always ready with a teacher. I asked a man who had come up from Egypt: "How is it that Egypt has so many teachers? Not only have we got them in Jordan but they are up and down the Persian Gulf. There must be a tremendous output of schoolmasters in Egypt." "Oh no," he replied, "not at all; there are not nearly enough schoolmasters in Egypt; the Government uses them in other Arab countries for political propaganda work." Whether that was true or not, I cannot say. It is certainly true that the schoolmaster is a tremendous political missionary. That is one of the matters in regard to which we in Britain have been extremely slow. It is not possible to obtain school teachers in these Middle Eastern countries which are so anxious to learn, so anxious to get ahead, and as long as the Egyptian Government is ready to circulate other Arab Governments and offer them any number of teachers they want in chemistry or science, Egypt can make a great deal of political profit.

In the same manner, I believe, in almost every country in the world

books can be bought on Communism in every local language. When I mentioned this recently somebody got up in the audience and asked: "What English books do you think should be circulated?" I think the Government should subsidize and engage people to write books on certain subjects and have them translated and made available for various Middle East countries. Of course at present the whole thing is run at a loss by the Communists; the books in local languages on Communism are sold for a negligible price by Soviet Russia. We should have to subsidize books in Eastern languages, giving the Western viewpoint.

I think to a slight extent the significance of the psychological approach is beginning to be realized, but only on a microscopic scale. Some say to me: "Oh yes, we could not agree with you more. We think there should be a wireless station in Sokotra or somewhere." It is not my view that one more wireless station or one less is likely to produce a revolutionary result. It seems to me that the psychological campaign is a new and revolutionary weapon of war. When a country is threatened with a shooting war the first thing is surely not to buy 50 Bren guns or a few trucks. One starts at the other end. You get the top people together, you write down all the assets, the objectives, the courses open to your possible enemies, and then you write down your own. Then you consider your allies. In other words, you take a comprehensive view of your situation in the light of the threat. It is only when that has been boiled down to a summary or appreciation of what your situation is vis-a-vis the enemy, that you can start thinking what you ought to do about it.

Others say to me: "Yes, we think you are right in saying we should conduct more propaganda in the Middle East." The world is too small today to make it possible to carry on local propaganda. There is no use in saying something in the Middle East if you do not at the same time say it elsewhere. And there is no use in saying something, if the French, the Americans or the Indians are immediately going to contradict it. The world is all one piece today. When drawing up a plan you have to envisage the whole world as your field and whatever you are going to say or do, you have to start with the United States of America. You cannot get anywhere by telling the Arabs something if the Americans are telling them the opposite. So far as I know, such a thing as a successful propaganda in the Middle East alone does not exist. And unless the whole world is taken into consideration in any plan, no good at all will be done.

My view is that we should start by getting the really top people, whoever they may be, not necessarily Government officials, to sit down and give us a picture of world psychological currents. Only when we have that shall we be able to study and see what we can do. You may then start in the Middle East; you may start in the United States of America; you may start in India or in Europe. But whatever your resources, you cannot use them economically and to the best advantage unless you have the whole world picture.

Of course, everybody says at once: "Oh, but this is far too expensive; we cannot afford it." My answer is, firstly, that although it will cost money it is not nearly as expensive as other weapons. You can lose, as we have seen, whole countries and continents, and nations friendly to you can

be turned into enemies by psychological action alone. It is far cheaper to keep people as your friends than to be prepared to fight them once they have become your enemies. Secondly, as far as I can see, the psychological weapon has become a fourth arm of the Services. I can remember, as most of you can, the days when soldiers used to go to war without any aeroplanes at all. That became increasingly unpleasant, and it has now become an axiom that one cannot employ soldiers or ships unless they have air cover. I believe it is not now possible to employ any of the three Fighting Services unless they have psychological cover. Take the Suez operation alone—whether it was right or wrong we need not argue—the fact remains that it was embarked upon with no psychological cover. There was no machinery ready to explain to the world what it was all about, what we thought we were doing and why we were doing it. The whole operation was a fiasco because it was greeted with howls of execration by the whole world; in other words, the troops were sent in with no psychological cover.

I cannot help thinking that before any armed operation is undertaken the psychological arm should be brought into the plan. If you do not do that you save a few million pounds, but I maintain that in future and from now onwards Armed Forces will never be successful in their operations if they have not the psychological arm working with them.

That to me is the moral of the last few years. It is quite incredible what utterly ridiculous and impossible stories will be believed by practically a whole nation if they are put to it by real experts. I do not mean by this that we should resort to the methods used elsewhere. I admit there are two schools of thought on this. There is a strong school which says if the other chaps can lie, we can lie better. I should not like to advocate that. I only had a little experience in this regard and that was not, unfortunately, through using a network of wireless stations, but only through using my own voice to a few Arabs, or Officers or N.C.O.'s in the Arab Legion.

To give one small example on the same lines as I have been mentioning. The Egyptians and the Russians found a certain difficulty in explaining how it was that the British were strangling Jordan, because everybody knew they were paying the Jordanians a large subsidy. The common line was the "The Imperialists are mulcting or milking you of your wealth." That, however, did not quite apply in Jordan. So the Egyptians and the Russians resorted to saying that the British knew there were gold mines underneath the country and one of these days they would open them up. Nobody could understand what the British were really doing. So, as a little example, I used to have a map of the whole world. Again and again talking to a small audience of Arabs I hung that map up and put the pointer across from Britain to Australia. And it was lucky for me that when that is done the pointer goes straight across Jordan. I said: "Now, here you are. You know quite well"—they had seen Australians during the war—"the Australians live here, and the British live there. They of course want to go backwards and forwards. That is why they are interested in keeping this route open; they are prepared to pay you a certain

amount of money in order to keep the route open so that they can go and see their cousins and come back." The best of that was that it was true. Again and again Arabs have come up to me afterwards and said: "Thank you so much. We have never before understood what Britain wanted in Jordan." So I believe that one can produce an effect by telling the truth.

Perhaps I have a bee in my bonnet about this because I saw the active end of the psychological campaign and it was not at all nice. It seems to me one can get to the stage of saying that international psychology should be one of the major weapons. It is a revolutionary development of our time. It is amazing what an effect can be produced on other peoples by skilful projection of ideas. It is possibly easier where the people are simpler, less educated, but it can be done even to advanced nations. Surely it is a science to which the very best people in Britain should devote their brains. There ought to be in all the Universities chairs in international psychology. It is something we should be working out. Why are we leading the world in nuclear power, radar and so many other subjects and yet have not started on this subject? Defeat in a psychological war, although it does not draw one's attention at the time, can be just as disastrous in its results as defeat in a shooting war.

I said that we have come and gone across the Middle East for 250 years. During that time there have been something like five what we should today call World Wars. We were never prevented from crossing the area even in the middle of those World Wars. In 1940-41 we were sending troops to the Middle East when Britain was threatened by invasion. When it was a question of fighting we always hung on to the area, but in one year we have lost the power to cross it just through lack of propaganda on our part and owing to propaganda on the part of others. So I believe that I am right in saying that a propaganda defeat can be just as disastrous as defeat in a shooting war used to be in the past.

Following a short discussion the CHAIRMAN concluded: "Our time is up. We will all agree that we have listened to a most interesting lecture from Sir John Glubb. On your behalf I thank Sir John very much indeed for all the trouble he has taken to give us such an interesting picture of the position in the Middle East and his views on this most important subject. We thank you very much indeed, Sir John. (*Applause.*)

