

WITTGENSTEINIAN
PHILOSOPHY

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STUDIES IN
WITTGENSTEINIAN PHILOSOPHY

OR

Studies in the New Cambridge-Philosophy

BY

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FOREWORD

At Cambridge a new school of philosophical thought has been developed, which is both new and revolutionary in its nature. This school of thought was first started at Vienna University with Ludwig Wittgenstein as its head. During the last war, Wittgenstein wrote his *Logico-Philosophicus-Tractatus*, while in an Italian jail. He sent the manuscripts to his old teacher, Bertrand Russell who wrote a preface for him, and the book was published in the year 1922. Wittgenstein then joined Vienna University and formed the new circle of philosophers. After some time, due to certain reasons, he left Vienna and assumed the role of a wandering preacher. He went from place to place forming Wittgensteinian circles wherever possible.

In the beginning of the last decade he visited Cambridge, (in fact we should say that he revisited Cambridge for he had been a student at Cambridge when B. Russell was a lecturer in Trinity College) where he gave a series of lectures which now go by the name of 'Blue book'. This 'Blue-book' has not been printed, there are a few typed copies of it which are circulated among Wittgenstein's students and friends. He again came to Cambridge in the year 1937 when I had the opportunity to attend his private discourses. In the succeeding year he was appointed as head of the department of

philosophy at the university of Cambridge.

While at Cambridge, I worked for two years under the supervision of Mr. John Wisdom who is supposed to be one of the first and the most brilliant converts to Wittgensteinian Philosophy. When I returned Home in the year 1939, I went on a tour of Northern India. During this tour I had the privilege to make acquaintance with some of the Professors of Philosophy of Aligarh, Allahabad, an Benares universities and had some talks with them about this new philosophy. Last year at the Philosophical Congress held in Hyderabad (Deccan) too I made some more acquaintances with Professors of Philosophy and *formed the impression that the new Philosophy of Cambridge had not yet sufficiently travelled to our universities and colleges.* I therefore thought of publishing a small introduction to this new school of Philosophy. This book is based on my lectures delivered at the Indian Institute of Philosophy Amalner (E. Khandesh,) during November 1939 to March 1940. Here I have made an attempt to expound in a clear and simple style the fundamental tenets of Wittgensteinian Philosophy. *In this book I have given Wittgensteinian Philosophy as I have understood and as I would like to accept it.*

G. N. Mathrani.

12th December 1940

CHAPTER I

Wittgensteinian Philosophy in its General Aspects *

It seems to me that Wittgensteinian philosophy is hardly known in this country. This, I think, is due to the fact that he has not published many books or even articles and as a matter of fact he is against publicity. His mature ideas on philosophy are to be found only in his 'Blue Book' and 'Brown Book' which remain unpublished. There are a few typed copies of them which are circulated among his private students and admirers.

In this chapter I shall say something in general about this new school of thought. But before I proceed I may as well mention something about the important members of this school. Ludwig Wittgenstein is the founder and guiding star, Professor G. E. Moore is more or less a Wittgensteinian philosopher, though he has developed his ideas independently. Mr. John Wisdom and George Paul are Wittgenstein's direct disciples; and then there are so many who have been influenced by him directly or indirectly.

It is a common experience of many students of

* This chapter has already been published in 'Philosophical Quarterly' October 1940.

traditional philosophy not to be able to understand the supposed profound passages of great philosophers. When we read such passages, only verbal images haunt our minds, but we are not able to penetrate into their meaning. Philosophers of course assume that they know exactly what they mean and that readers who do not understand them should polish their wits. Sometimes we find it almost impossible to read philosophy. The great words go round and round in our heads until we become dizzy. Sometimes they make pleasant music, but we can rarely effect passage between them and the real world of experience. One of the American philosophers of Wittgensteinian tendencies in his distressed mood cynically remarks, "William James I could easily translate, but the great classics had almost literally no meaning to me—just a haughty parade of 'truth', 'substance', 'infinite', 'Absolute', 'over-soul', 'the universal', 'the nominal', 'the eternal'. As these works had been acclaimed for centuries as part of the priceless cultural heritage of mankind it seemed obvious that something in my intellectual equipment was seriously deficient. I strove to understand Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Herbert Spencer, Schopenhauer. The harder I wrestled, the more the solemn procession of verbal ghosts, circled through my brain mocking my ignorance."¹ We

1. *The Tyranny of Words* by Stuart Chase. P. 2.

may not whole-heartedly agree with this writer, but I think there is a great amount of truth in his complaint.

Wittgenstein too laboured to understand the great philosophies of the past, but discovered that there is something fundamentally wrong with philosophers; that is, that they have been misled by language. Language is imperfect; it has its own defects and ambiguities. There are many metaphors which cannot explain things properly, many similies which do not make ideas clear, and due to this ambiguous nature of language philosophers have fallen into pitfalls which they think are heavenly springs. They have been misled into thinking that there are great philosophical problems; *but according to Wittgenstein the so called problems are not problems but language puzzles.* So the function of philosophy should be to clarify the confusions in language, to analyse various sub-languages involved in the language; or, to put in Wittgensteinian terminology, the function of philosophy should be to teach "*the correct usage of the language*". "It was Wittgenstein who first exhibited the close connection between the logic of science (or "philosophy" as he calls it) and syntax. Further he has shown that the so-called sentences of metaphysics and of ethics are pseudo-sentences. According to him philosophy is 'Critique of language', its business is 'the logical

clarification of ideas', of the sentences and concepts of sciences (natural science), that is, in our terminology, the logic of science."¹

According to Wittgenstein, before answering any philosophical question, we should try to find out the meaning of the question if it has any. Many philosophers have written books and given long discourses on so many philosophical problems without making clear what the problem is about. Now this sort of method which at Cambridge is called Wittgensteinian method, raises the profound problem of the meaning of meaning. If I ask the question: What is the meaning of such and such sentence? I should know first of all what do I mean by meaning. It may be said that Wittgenstein is not the first philosopher to tackle this problem. Already there exist scores of theories on this point. But what is unique about him is the way in which he has solved it. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their celebrated volume on "The Meaning of Meaning" in ch. IX have discussed various theories of meaning. A few years ago the Mind Association in England had a symposium on this problem, in which thinkers of different philosophical schools participated and vigorously tried to propound their own theories and refute others'. There was a scientific and empirical air about them. Everybody

1. *Logical Syntax of Language*, by Rudolph Carnap.
P. 282.

was trying to show that he had made a new discovery and every one of them was anxious to establish the truth of his own discovery. Wittgenstein hates this pseudo-scientific air of philosophers. According to him the problem of meaning is a verbal problem, that is, we should find out what we do mean by 'meaning' in the ordinary language. There are philosophers who think that the problem of meaning is a problem for philosophers and not for ordinary mortals. Of course that may be so, but do we not find common people asking questions such as, what do you mean by this statement, what does your statement signify?

Wittgenstein says 'Let us find out how we teach the meaning of expressions, words and sentences to children and to primitive people; then we shall know what is meant by meaning.' He contends that the child learns the meaning of a word or a sentence by learning the use of it. By 'use' he does not mean pragmatic usefulness, but the role it plays in a language game. Take an instance. A child comes across the word 'table' in his primer. Let us for the time being suppose that he has seen tables in his father's house, but he has not been taught the word 'table.' Now I want to teach him the meaning of that word. How shall I proceed? I will show him a table and say 'this is a table'. Then in order to avoid confusions, I will show him different kinds of tables, tables with four feet,

tables with three feet, tables brown and black, folding and non-folding. In this way I can teach him, and that is the only way children are taught all kinds of words and expressions.

In his 'Brown Book,' Wittgenstein devotes a large portion to the teaching of various language games. He starts with common words like brick, column, slab, then he proceeds to numerals, then to proper names, then to adverbs like 'here, there, where', etc. His object is to show that when we teach the meaning of an expression, we teach the use of that expression. Wittgenstein does not deny mental experiences and behaviouristic gestures accompanying the use of symbols, but according to him they are unnecessary and irrelevant. If the child is able to use the word 'red' correctly as others do, we do not bother about what happens in his mind, whether he sees what others see or not. The sole ambition of the teacher is that his pupil should use the language according to the rules of language.

To quote from the 'Brown Book' itself, "We think of the meaning of signs sometimes as states of mind of the man using them, sometimes as the role which these signs are playing in a system of language. The connection between these two ideas is that the mental experiences which accompany the use of a sign undoubtedly are caused by our usage of the sign

in a particular system of language. W. James speaks of specific feeling accompanying the use of such words as 'and', 'if', 'or' etc. There is no doubt that at least certain gestures are often connected with such words, as a collecting gesture with 'and' and a dismissing gesture with 'not' and there obviously are visual and muscular sensations, connected with these gestures. On the other hand it is clear enough that these sensations do not accompany every use of the words 'not' and 'and'. If in some language the word 'but' meant what 'not' means in English it is clear that we should not compare the meanings of these two words by comparing the sensations which they produce. Ask yourself "when I said, 'give me an apple *and* a pear *and* leave the room', had I the same feeling when I pronounced the two words 'and'?"

Before we pass on, it is proper to summarize Wittgenstein's position on the question of meaning. According to him, an expression has a meaning only if it has a use in any language system. This is the Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning. But there are philosophers who might accept this criterion and yet seem to differ from him radically. They contend that the criterion of meaning might be 'use' but meaning is not identical with its criteria, in other words meaning is something over and above its criteria. To this Wittgenstein replies that such an objection is nonsensical.

Sec. II. Analysis of Philosophy:—Here the turn 'philosophy' stands for the older Philosophical writings. This Wittgensteinian analysis has passed through two distinct stages.

I. Accepting the above mentioned criterion of meaning Wittgensteinians found out that many philosophical statements were meaningless. Mr. John Wisdom's classification of nonsense will illuminate this point. He has classified sentences according to their sense or nonsense. (a) groups of nonsense syllables *e.g.*, ba, ka, sa; (b) groups of nonsense words, *e.g.* cat up with; (c) Frames without pictures *e.g.* Equations do not attend race meetings; fractions attacked me in the bath room; time and space take tea with sugar; (d) Significant sentences *e.g.* I am writing, I have a pain, I am remembering so and so. This analysis of sense and nonsense is based on the criterion of meaning mentioned in the previous section. The first kind is absolutely meaningless because ba, ka, sa, are not words at all. Of course technically any pronounceable group of letters is a word. But ba ka sa have no 'use' either separately or when put together. In the second case, words have a use in separate contexts, but when combined together they have no 'use'. In what context or situation can any body sensibly utter the sentence, 'cat up with'? The third type is similar and yet dissimilar to the fourth. Syntactically both are correct and yet the fourth has

a 'use' and the third has not. There are no actual or possible situations when sentences of the third type could be uttered without being laughed at.

During this first stage of philosophical analysis, Wittgensteinians thought that philosophical questions and answers were nonsensical, and their nonsense was of the third type of the classification discussed above. Can time have a beginning and an end? Can space be bounded? Can we know what is going on in some one else's mind? Does the material world exist? All such questions were considered nonsensical.

II. During the second stage, Wittgensteinians became less provocative and more pacifying. Their very terminology changed. Instead of saying 'philosophical questions are nonsensical', they began to say 'philosophical questions are really verbal.' This second stage may be summarised in Mr. Wisdom's words, "A philosophical answer is really a verbal recommendation in response to a request which is really a request with regard to a sentence which lacks a conventional use whether there occur situations which could conventionally be described by it."¹

I shall take an instance and give it a Wittgensteinian treatment illustrating both the stages of philosophical analysis. "Can you know what is going on in some

1. 'Philosophical Perplexity' by John Wisdom; 1937 Supp. Vol of Aristotelian Society.

one else's mind?" Compare this to "Can we know what is Hitler doing now?" Syntactically the two questions are similar and yet when analysed, the latter question will be found to be empirical and the former verbal. An answer to the latter can be given by empirical means. But you might ask, surely there is no way to know what Hitler is doing now. I say, of course actually there is no way, but it is possible. If I had transmitting and receiving wireless sets and if Hitler were my friend, I could ask him or his servant's what he is doing now. But no empirical evidence is relevant for answering the first question. Let us take a concrete case. Can you know what is going on in X's mind? A philosopher puts me this question and I answer in the affirmative, and he asks how I can know. I reply, I study his gestures and come to know that X is feeling happy. The philosopher says, 'gestures and facial expressions are no guarantee. Remember the case of Iago.' In order to put my case on firmer foundation, I may get the confirmation from X himself. I ask him, 'Are you not feeling happy?' He says 'yes'. The philosopher may not be satisfied and may say, 'no no that is not knowledge, that is only hearing'. 'You don't know that he is happy, you have only heard from him that he is happy'. As my last effort to satisfy the philosopher, I may say to him, 'Look, if Mr. X were not happy he would not talk jovially, he would not like

others' company.' But the philosopher may prove adamant and may still nod his head and say, 'that is all inference, that is not knowledge'.— Then I may get desperate with the philosopher and ask him, "tell me what would you call *knowing* what is happening in X's mind?" Then he will come out with the following 'non-sense': "you see, I *know* when I am angry, I *know* when I am happy, I *know* when I am in love. But I do not *know* that X is happy or angry in the sense in which I know that I am angry or happy'. Now what does this come to? It just means 'I cannot introspect in X's mind as I can do in my own', and the philosopher thinks that this is a meaningful demand.

According to the established use of 'I can introspect' the expression is used only in connection with one's own mind; but when used in connection with some other mind, it does not make any sense. 'I cannot introspect in X's mind' may be compared to 'equations do not attend race meetings'. If the above statement is meaningful then its contradictory also must have a meaning. Its contradictory will be 'I can introspect in X's mind'. Now can the philosopher describe what it is like for me to introspect in X's mind? Since there is no actual or possible situation which may correctly be described by the sentence under consideration, then according to the accepted criterion of meaning the sentence is meaningless.

Now shall we leave it at that? A few years ago they did it; they only showed the nonsense of philosophical statements. But they have now become more pacifying. According to this second development of Wittgensteinian thought, the philosopher is making a verbal or notational recommendation. He recommends that we should not say that we *know* what is happening in other minds. The use of the word 'know' should be reserved only for our own minds.

Section. III. Function of Philosophy:- "Philosophy is not a theory, but activity. Its function is logical clarification of thought, to make conscious, to specify the unspecified conventions of the usage of language".¹ "The philosopher's purpose is to gain a grasp of the relations between different categories of being, between expressions used in different manners".²

This needs further explanation. In the West, the function of philosophy has passed through three stages: 1. Philosophy as *Scientia Scienturum* or a Super Science. Philosophy as a super science had to solve the cosmic problems of life and death and had to reconcile the contradictions of various sciences, e. g., determinism of Physics and Free will of Ethics etc.; 2. Analysis

1. Dr. Weismann of Vienna; Lectures at Cambridge 1937-38.

2. John Wisdom 'Philosophical Perplexity' Supp.: Vol: of Aristotelian Society 1937.

of propositions and concepts and universals involved in them; 3. Analysis of sentences and words.

At present the function of philosophy is in its third stage, that is, analysis of sentences and words. Analysis of words consists in clarifying different uses of the same word and distinguishing the use of allied words. Lack of this clarification has led philosophers to great many muddles. Dr. C. D. Broad's talk about the epistemological and ontological objects in his 'Mind and its place in Nature' is very likely due to the misuse of the word 'see'. According to the ordinary use of 'see', 'I see a table' entails 'there is a table.' Dr. Broad then says, the drunken man sees pink rats. Since he sees pink rats there must be pink rats; but there are no pink rats in the physical world; therefore they must be what he calls epistemological objects.

Analysis of sentences consists in translating sentences of dubitable nature into simple and clear sentences which leave no ground for puzzlements. Take for instance the puzzling nature of nation statements. 'England invaded France.' This sentence contains the puzzle - what is a nation? Wittgensteinians try to solve such puzzles by translating such sentences into simpler and non-puzzling sentences. If we translate nation-statements into statements about nationals, the puzzle disappears. Here same-level analysis of a puzzling sentence will not give us illumination. It is only when

we analyse the sentence into a sentence of a different level, that the puzzle will to some extent be clarified. For detailed discussion of this, the reader may refer to John Wisdom's article on 'Different Level' in *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. XIII*. Here I shall explain very briefly what is meant by "same and different level analysis." Let us call the sentence that is to be translated as S1 and its translation as S2. S2 will be a same level analysis of S1 if the constituents of S2 are of the same category of being as those of S1; if on the other hand, constituents of S2 belong to different categories of being, S2 may be said to be different level analysis of S1. The expression 'category of being' should not be understood in the Hegelian sense of subsistent entities. Here we are talking about words and not about live entities. By different categories of being we mean words used in different manner. 'Words used in a different manner' may be explained further. If a predicate P makes sense with a word W and does not make sense with another word W1, then W and W1 are differently used and are different categories of being. Let us take a concrete instance. 'Gramophone was invented by Eddison' and 'gramophones were invented by Eddison'. Here the same predicate 'was invented' makes sense with 'gramophone' and does not make sense with 'gramo-

phones'. Take another case. 'I can sit on a chair'. I can sit on sense-data.' The latter sentence does not make sense showing thereby that 'sense-data' and 'chair' are different categories of being. 'Only such treatment of the puzzle as increases a grasp of the relations between different categories of being is philosophical'. And this can be done only through the process of different level analysis and not the same level analysis. It may also be mentioned that this philosophical clarification of language is to be distinguished from some other types of language clarification. Mr. John Wisdom talks of three types of clarification, of a decoder, of a translator and of a philosopher; and here I can do no better than quote him bodily, for one quotation of his will serve the purpose better than any amount of explanations. "Suppose a decoder, though still utterly ignorant of the meaning of both of two expressions 'monarchy' and 'set of persons ruled by the same king' has after prolonged investigation come to the conclusion that they mean the same in a certain code. He will say to his fellow decoder 'monarchy' means the same as 'a set of persons ruled by the same king'. The translator and the philosopher also may say the same. They all use the same form of words because what they say is the same. But the point of what they say is very different. The decoder's point can be got by any one

who knows the meaning of 'means the same as', the translator does what he wants with the sentence only if his hearer knows the meaning either of 'monarchy' or of 'set of persons ruled by the same king'; the philosopher does what he wants with the sentence only if his hearer already uses, i. e., understands, i. e., knows the meaning of both 'monarchy' and 'set of persons ruled by the same king.' This condition makes the case of the philosopher curious; for it states that he can do what he wants with the sentence only if his hearer already knows what he is telling him. But this is true in the required sense. The philosopher draws attention to what is already known with a view to giving insight into the structure of what 'monarchy' say means i. e. bringing into connection the sphere in which one expression is used with that in which the other is". (John Wisdom: Philosophical Perplexity Aris. Soc. Supp Vol. 1937).



CHAPTER II

CRITERION OF MEANING

Synopsis:— Section I. Scope of the question, Section II. Nature of the question, Section III. Method of finding out the answer, Section IV. Criterion, its statement and explanation of certain terms, Section V. Meaning and truth.

In the first chapter I have given a rough but correct account of many important ideas of Wittgenstein and his followers; in the following chapters I shall take every problem separately and give more thorough treatment to it. The present chapter will deal with the most fundamental inquiry of Wittgenstein, the question of meaning. As we shall see later, it is the answer to this question that has revolutionized the philosophical world of Europe. It is therefore of utmost importance to understand very clearly all that Wittgensteinians have to say on this point. I may have to repeat certain things which I have already mentioned in the first chapter, but clarity demands repetition.

Section I. Scope of the question:— Before we proceed to state and explain Wittgenstein's criterion of meaning, to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, it is necessary to specify the scope of his question. In general we may say that Wittgenstein is concerned

with the meaning of propositions or sentences which assert or deny facts.

The whole human language or speech may be divided into two kinds, (i) hard language. (ii) fluid language. Language of the Logician and the mathematician may be called 'hard language'. Language of the common man, of the scientist, of the historian, of the poet, of the philosopher, of the theologian and of the mystic may be said to be 'fluid languages'. In the hard language, symbols do not refer to anything outside themselves, that is, they do not stand for or signify anything other than themselves. Whereas symbols of the fluid language claim to or at least are claimed to refer to something outside themselves.

The fluid language may further be divided into (i) the descriptive, (ii) the emotive, & (iii) the symbolic. These three sub-languages are not separate parts of the fluid language, but are conjunctive or co-existing functions of it. The descriptive sub-language includes propositions and questions and such other allied units. The 'descriptive' expressions involve a representative reference to reality, and the reality does not merely mean external reality; it includes, the physical, the mental and the spiritual reality. 'There are two chairs in my room' and 'I love Amelia' both are descriptive expressions, though the latter contains an emotive word. The difference is that the one states a physi-

cal fact and the other states an emotive fact. Similarly the mystic can make a descriptive statement which may neither refer to physical reality, nor to mental reality. It refers to what may be called 'spiritual reality'. If the mystic has an experience which ordinary people do not have and if he describes that experience through words, he may be said to be making a descriptive statement.

Those expressions may be called 'emotive' which 'express' certain emotive states of mind; such expressions are to be distinguished from emotive propositions or sentences which describe emotive facts. There are pure exclamations, inarticulate words, and there are also apparently articulate expressions or sentences, but whose main purpose is to express feelings and not represent facts. Sentences like 'the country is going to dogs' or 'go to Hell' are emotive sentences, for they express the speaker's feelings. Mace and Ayer hold that every sentence is both representative and expressive, the difference is only in degree. Some are more representative and less expressive and some are more expressive and less representative. In some representative factor is more predominant than the factor of expression, and in some expression is more apparent than representation. They hold that even purely scientific laws are both representative and expressive. "Undue emphasis upon emotive states has encouraged

the tacit assumption that scientific statements are purely representative, and devoid of expressive function. This however is clearly not the case. A scientific statement is an expression of belief or supposition. The peculiarity of scientific discourse is not that it is purely representative but that it expresses only a few of the possible attitudes of mind, these generally being of a pale and diaphanous kind".¹ This point we have already granted when we said that the sub-languages of the fluid language are not separate parts, but conjunctive functions. But it should be recognized that though conjunctive they are distinct.

There are many sentences in the fluid languages which are neither representative, nor expressive, they are what may be called 'symbolic'. But as we have already said, there are no purely symbolic expressions in the fluid language, but it should also be said that symbolic function is not common to all the sentences. Symbols in mathematical sciences are pure symbols, but the fluid expressions are not symbolic in that sense. Take for instance the fluid symbolic expression 'every cause has an effect'. This symbolic expression is not like $x + x = 2x$. They are unlike in so far as we can point out to some thing real or existent as a cause and some thing else as its effect. But they

1. 'Representation and Expression', an article by C. A. Mace, in the 'Analysis'.

are alike because both, the fluid - symbolic expression and pure - symbolic expression is either an 'entailing symbol' or 'an entailed symbol'. That is according to certain rules of symbolism, we can draw out the implied statements. But the rules of symbolism may be different in the two cases.

Wittgenstein, we said, is concerned with the meaning of propositions; in our terminology he is concerned with 'the descriptive part of the fluid language'. To express this diagrammatically.

Human Languages,		
Hard	1	Fluid

(1) descriptive (W is concerned with this part).

(2) emotive

(3) symbolic

Section II. Nature of the question:- What sort of question is the question 'what is the meaning of a proposition?' Obviously 'what is the meaning of a proposition?' is not like 'what is the length of this stick?', 'what is the colour of this pen?' In a sense, length and colour are parts of the thing, in which meaning is not a part of the proposition. Yet in a sense, question about meaning and question about length or colour are similar. Similarity consists in all the three words, 'meaning', 'length' and 'colour' being adjectival expressions. Of course in the school-boy's grammar even 'colour' and 'length' will be

5773j

considered as nouns, but when we designated them as adjectives, what we wanted to say was that they were not generic or proper names, but names of qualities of things. But we shall be saying too much if we thought that the similarity between these questions was any more than the similarity just mentioned. 'Length' and 'colour' are what may be called 'sensible adjectives', whereas 'meaning' is not a sensible adjective. 'Meaning' is more like 'beauty', 'goodness', 'truth' and 'reality' than like 'length' and 'colour'. 'Beauty', 'goodness', 'truth', 'reality' also are adjectives and not generic or proper names. We don't talk of beauty as such, but beauty of a woman, a picture, a statue, of something. We do not talk of goodness as such, but goodness of a man, goodness of an action. Similarly we do not talk of truth and reality as such. We talk of true statements and real things, real lions etc. 'Meaning', 'beauty', 'goodness', 'truth', 'reality' are 'value adjectives' and not 'sensible adjectives'. Sensible adjectives as we said before are parts of things and can be sensibly apprehended, whereas value - adjectives are neither parts of something nor can they be sensibly apprehended. We do not imply that there is any other way of apprehending 'value - adjectives', there is nothing to be apprehended for value - adjectives are not names of any parts of things. Thus we find that 'value - ad-

jectives' are not names of any 'existents', things or their qualities; they are just adjectival words we attach to certain things. The only question we can raise about value - adjectives is why do we attach these names to the respective things? Why do we say, 'this sentence is meaningful', and 'this sentence is meaningless'. 'This picture is beautiful' and so on? These are 'criteria questions', that is, questions about the criteria which determine the use of value - adjectives. So the question 'what is the meaning of a proposition' is a demand for the criterion of meaning, demand for specifying the conditions which should be satisfied in order that a proposition may be said to have a meaning.

Section III. Method of finding the criterion of meaning:- There are two ways to proceed in this matter. First is to give an arbitrary criterion of meaning and then sit in judgment on sentences and say which sentences have meaning and which are meaningless. This sort of method has very little value. Supposing a person says that one of the essential criteria for a man to be called 'a man' is that he should be six & half feet tall. Then according to this definition, many so called men will cease to be called men by him. By doing this he will have done nothing. It only means that he refuses to call something 'a man' even though in everybody

else's eyes that thing is a man.

The second way is to accept 'the criterion in practice'. Then applying that criterion if you pass a judgment on any sentence or expression, your judgment will have a value for others. But it is quite possible that though people may be employing a particular criterion, they may not be aware of that criterion; and that seems to be the case with the criterion of meaning which people in general practice. Wittgensteinians contend that they have not 'prescribed a new criterion of meaning', they have only formulated the criterion which ordinary people and scientists practise in their language.

How can we find 'the criterion in practice?' Wittgenstein suggests 'Let us find out how we learn language & how we teach language'. How does the child learn his own language and how does the adult learn a foreign language? How does the teacher teach his pupils meaning of new phrases and sentences? The earlier part of the 'Brown-Book' is devoted to this inquiry. There Wittgenstein gives us various 'methods in practice' of teaching the meaning of words and sentences to children and others!

Section IV. Criterion of Meaning:-Let us see how do people learn and teach the meaning of words and sentences. (This point has already been touched upon in the first chapter). If the child comes across

a new word, how do we proceed to explain its meaning? The first step is to give a 'verbal definition', that is, to give an otherword for it. But what if he does not know the otherword also? If the child does not know the other word that I give him, I tell him the 'ostensive definition' of that word. Defining an expression ostensively consists in 'referring' to the experiential situation which gives meaning to that expression. 'Ostentation' or 'referring' to the meaning-giving situation is of two kinds, 'demonstrative' and 'descriptive'. 'Demonstrative - ostentation' occurs when we take the child to that situation and use the expression in that situation. Descriptive ostentation consists in merely describing the situation. Demonstrative - ostensive definition may further be divided into the simple and the complex forms. "The simplest form of an ostensive definition is a pointing gesture combined with the pronouncing of the word. In most cases the ostensive definition is of more complicated form; we cannot point to an object corresponding to words like 'because', 'immediate', 'chance', 'again' etc. In these cases we require the presence of certain complex situations and the meaning of words is defined by the way we use them in these different situations". Regarding the descriptive - ostentation, it is very important to note that the ostensive or the meaning - giving situation should be described in terms

which the child knows by demonstrative ostentation. Thus we see that there are three ways to teach the meaning of new words or sentences, 'verbal definition', 'descriptive ostentation' and 'demonstrative ostentation'. Which method will do the trick will depend upon the intellectual growth of the child. But the foundation of all the three is the demonstrative - ostentation. The child learns the first words and sentences through demonstrative ostentation and when he has learnt a little, he is able to learn more through descriptive ostentation and it is only when he has learnt a lot that he is able to understand new words and phrases by mere verbal - definition. The important common factor between these three ways of teaching new words is that unless the child knows the situation (no matter through which way he knows it, demonstratively or descriptively or by mere definition) the expression has no meaning for him.

What then is the criterion of meaning? According to Wittgenstein, as we also mentioned in the first chapter, expression (word or a sentence) has a meaning only when it has *a use* in a language system or what he calls a language game.

This means that an expression has a meaning only if it can be 'used' in some 'situation', actual or 'possible'. In stating Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning we have used terms like 'use', 'situation'

'possible'. It has been found that many people reject Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning because they fail to understand these terms in the Wittgensteinian sense. So we deem it desirable to explain these terms at some length.

Explanation of 'use':- Some philosophers carelessly tell us "well, we use such and such expression in our discourses, therefore according to your criterion it has a meaning". They confuse Wittgensteinian 'use' with mere utterance or writing of that expression. That way any expression may be uttered or written down and even nonsense syllables can be uttered and written down. What is more important is that it should be uttered in regard to a particular situation, that is, in a sense it must describe a situation.

Words have to be in sentences, apart from the sentence words have no meaning, that is, if a word can not be fitted in any sentence, then that word is a mere meaningless combination of letters. But this fittingness should satisfy one condition; that is, that it should not be merely 'a syntactical fittingness', but also the sentence in which it is fitted, should be a meaningful sentence; that is there should be an actual or possible situation in which that sentence may be used.

Explanation of 'situation':- By 'situation is meant a group of objects or events or activities and

their relations. 'I am writing' refers to a 'situation' which is formed by myself and the activity of writing. 'There are two chairs in my room' refers to another situation formed by three objects (two chairs and the room) and a particular relation between the chairs and the room.

Every significant sentence needs a meaning-giving situation, but every significant sentence need not have the same sort of situation. But as we have limited our scope to propositions or the sentences which assert or deny facts, it follows that meaning-giving situation of every proposition should be an 'experiential situation'. But it may be 'external situation' or 'mental situation'; again it may be actual or 'possible'. 'External experiential situation' is that experiential situation which can be observed by sense-organs; 'mental-experiential-situation' is that which can be apprehended only by introspection. 'Experiential situation' is to be distinguished from 'purely-symbolic situation'. Logical and mathematical statements refer to purely 'symbolic-situation'. When we say $(x + y)$ $(x - y) = x^2 - y^2$, we do not refer to any situation in the external world, nor do we refer to a situation in the mental or spiritual world. It only refers to an algebraic system, that is $(x + y)$ $(x - y) = x^2 - y^2$ has a place in an algebraic system. When we say $2 + 2 = 4$, here again we are not

describing any empirical or introspective facts, we are only referring to an Arithmetical system.

We said that the meaning - giving situation may be actual or possible. By 'possible' Wittgensteinians do not mean merely 'empirically possible', but 'logically possible'. Empirically - possible is that which does not come in conflict with the empirically established laws of nature. Logically possible situation is that which may not be permitted by the laws of nature and yet be 'describable' in intelligible terms. If I can describe the situation, no matter whether such a situation can actually occur or not, in which the expression in question be used, then that expression has a meaning.

The phrases 'logically possible' and 'describable', in Wittgensteinian terminology, have meaning other than the ordinary. Ordinarily, 'logically possible' implies the possibility of actual realisation of it. By 'logically possible' people generally mean 'occurrence of that which is empirically unoccurable'. They say 'of course it is not possible at present that such and such should happen, but it is logically possible that it may happen'. Whereas in the Wittgensteinian sense, there is no reference to the possibility of its realisation. Wittgenstein defines 'logically possible' in terms of conceivability and he defines 'conceivability' in terms of describability. But here also, he gives a special

meaning to the terms 'conceivable' and 'describable'. Ordinarily we allow a play of creative - imagination in conceiving or describing things. According to the ordinary use of 'conceiving' we can conceive equations attending race - meetings, but in the Wittgensteinian sense we cannot. In the Wittgensteinian sense, the logically - possible situation should be describable in terms of some true situations, that is situations which we know by acquaintance, or what may be called 'ostensive' situations. But it is important to note here, that not only the constituents or parts of the logically possible situation, but also the connection or relation between the parts should be based on ostensive experience. Mr. Weinberg explains Wittgenstein's meaning of 'logical - possibility' very clearly. He says 'Possibility' can best be understood in this way: Given a set of facts which have some common constituents and some common components, it is seen that a certain constituent, say 'a' occurs in several different facts F1, F2, F3 It is clear then that a fact of the same structure as any one of the set F1, F2, F3, and containing 'a' is a possible fact. "Possibility" is thus a term indicating that a fact is imaginable or constructible because it has the form and constituency of facts which have occurred. For example, it is known that a specific hue q, has occurred as the colour of several different objects and

that a given object is a coloured object. Then although *q*_a may never have occurred, the fact is imaginable i.e. constructible, because all the constituents and the components of such a fact are known to have existed. The 'possible' fact is the subject matter of a proposition perhaps not known to be true, but known to contain names of objects arranged in a way which has been realised in true propositions".¹

This definition of 'describability' has very important consequences for it is this which condemns many sentences of philosophers as meaningless. Take instances like 'Equations attend race meetings', 'Time and space take tea with sugar', 'Fractions attacked me in the bathroom'. Why do Wittgensteinians condemn such sentences as meaningless? They ask 'what is it like for equations to attend race-meeting?', 'What is it like for space and time to take tea with sugar'? 'What is it like for fractions to attack you in the bath room?' The general form of the question is 'what is it like for the sentence (under consideration) to be true?' This peculiarly Wittgensteinian question is supposed to be an acid-test for determining the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of a sentence. This question is peculiarly illuminative way of demanding the description of the meaning-giving situation; for this

1. 'Examination of Logical positivism' by Weinberg P. 175.

way of asking for description already indicates where the nonsense lies.

Above mentioned sentences are condemned as meaningless, because even though the constituents of the sentences may be names of objects in some true situations; but in the reality, those objects are not related to each other as their corresponding names appear to be related in the above sentences. It is not necessary that those particular objects should be known to have been related in that particular way, but what is necessary is that those sort or similar sorts of objects should be known to have been related in the similar sort of way.

Rules of usage:- Mere 'situation' by itself is not enough to give meaning to an expression, there is no intrinsic relation between the expression and the situation. Situation becomes a meaning-giving situation only through a 'rule of grammar'. "The meaning of word or a combination of words is determined by a set of rules which regulate their use and which following Ludwig Wittgenstein we may call the rules of their 'grammar' taking this word in its widest sense". Rules of grammar in the wider sense are to be distinguished from the 'rules of grammar' in the narrower sense. 'Two undergraduates eats breakfast', 'they is angry'. In these cases, rules of grammar in the narrower sense are violated. Rules of grammar in

the narrower sense may be said to be only a part of the rules of grammar in the wider sense. Rules of grammar in the narrower sense are only for avoiding certain technical mistakes in the syntactical construction of sentences. Grammar in the narrower sense does not teach us how to use 'red', how to use 'identify', 'same' etc. The two grammars may be called 'technical-grammar' and 'philosophical-grammar' respectively. Technical-grammar teaches us 'formal construction' of sentences. Philosophical grammar tells us about 'material-use' of expressions, that is, a rule of philosophical grammar will tell us 'in what situation such and such expression be used.' So we should also distinguish technical nonsense from philosophical nonsense. 'Equations attend race-meetings' is not a technical nonsense like 'two undergraduates eats breakfast', but it is a philosophical nonsense because there is no rule of grammar governing its material use.

Emphasising on rules of grammar does not mean minimising the importance of situation. Without situations there cannot be rules, and without rules situations cannot be meaning-giving situations. There are however some people who contend that "meaning is a spiritual function". This expression by itself does not convey anything definite, but we can give a sense to it. It may be a misleading way to point out that rules of usage are made by some mind, and there is no intrinsic

relation between a symbol and the situation to which it refers. The two have been externally related by some mind, expression or symbol gets its meaning from a rule or a set of rules, but the rules themselves get their being from some intelligence. If this is what the above contention means then no body has denied it and there is absolutely no need to emphasise it for it is a tautology. By definition it is true that rules of usage must be made by some mind. It should be noted that language is a social affair. I do not create language or its rules of usage, I learn the rules of language from my teachers and elders and accept them as they are. The question may arise as to who are the makers of these rules. This is a question for sociologists and not for philosophers to solve. We need not inquire into the historical origin of the 'rules of usage'. Studying language as it is we find that every meaningful expression has a rule or a set of rules about its usage and that expression has a meaning in terms of its rules. Apart from rules expression or symbol has no meaning.

But there is another possible interpretation of the theory that meaning is a spiritual function, which needs consideration. According to some people, symbol has no meaning without a 'meaner'. One of the essential conditions for an expression to be meaningful is that some mind must think about that expression,

that is, some body must consciously read or utter it. This interpretation has a very dangerous implication about it, which is, that all the books lying on my table do not contain meaningful words, but mere marks on paper. They do not say that those symbols written on the pages of my books are meaningless, but that they are 'non-meaningful'. It is only when some body opens the book and consciously reads it the symbols become meaningful and they are meaningful only to the reader and the hearer and to no one else.

We must however point out in their favour that like some other philosophers they do not contend that all the possible combinations of words have meaning. Only those combinations of words are meaningful the thought of which can be conceived by some mind. 'Square triangle' & 'round square' are meaningless phrases for them.

Wittgensteinians would reject both these assertions. The first contention is that symbol has no meaning without a 'meaner'. We do not refute this contention by any logical argument. There is nothing to be proved or disproved here. The question 'what is meaning?' is a demand for a definition of 'meaning' or a criterion for an expression to be called meaningful. We have accepted the criterion which is already in practice in both, the common-sense and scientific

languages. But this new criterion is an arbitrary criterion. Nobody in his senses would say that unless somebody reads or hears a sentence, the sentence has no meaning, and this is what the new criterion implies.

The second contention is that only the conceivable has a meaning. If thought were a necessary condition of meaning, then many language symbols which are otherwise called meaningful will have to be called meaningless. Words like 'because', 'for', 'again', 'chance', have no visible thoughts corresponding to them. Much of our reading and understanding will have to be called mere pretension. Often times we read and we say we understand and yet we are not aware of any thoughts corresponding to the symbols we read. Sometimes while we read and understand one set of expressions, there are some irrelevant ideas (coming in and going from) our minds. It is not thoughts but the rules of grammar which give meaning to symbols.

Understanding:- It is necessary to explain what Wittgensteinians mean by 'understanding'. Understanding is not a process in time, it is not a specific mental experience, but a disposition or ability to operate on words correctly, that is according to the rules of grammar. We understand different kinds of things. We understand a passage in poetry, a theorem in

geometry, an equation in algebra, an affirmative sentence, a negative sentence, an indicative sentence, an exclamatory sentence etc. We find different mental phenomena in each case, many different things happen in our minds when we read or hear sentences. Is there any one mental experience which is common to all these and which may be called experience of understanding.

In the Brown-Book, Wittgenstein makes an experiment to find out whether there is any particular mental phenomenon which may be called experience of understanding. Let Wittgenstein Speak. "Consider now the following example, which is of great help in these considerations: in order to see what happens when one understands a word, we play this game; you have a list of words, partly these are words, of my native language, partly words of foreign languages more or less familiar to me, partly words of languages entirely unknown to me (or which comes to the same nonsensical words I invented for the occasion). Some of the words of my native language, again are words of ordinary every day usage; and some of these like 'house', 'table', 'man', are what we might call primitive words, being amongst the first words a child learns, and some of these again, words of baby talk like 'Mama', 'papa'. Again there are more or less common technical terms such as 'carburettor', 'dynamo', 'fuse' etc. All these words are read out to me and

after each one I have to say 'yes' or 'no' according to whether I understand the word or not. I then try to remember what happened in my mind when I understood the words I did understand and when I did not understand the others. And here again it will be useful to consider the particular tone of voice and facial expression with which I say 'yes' and 'no' along side of the so called mental events. Now it may surprise us to find that although this experiment will show us a multitude of different characteristic experiences, it will not show us any one experience which we should be inclined to call the experience of understanding."

According to psychologists there are three kinds of mental operations, cognitive, conative and affective. Obviously when we say 'we understand' we do not refer to the emotive or conative operations in the mind. Cognitively Wittgensteinians would admit percepts and images. When I read a passage, all that I perceive is words, that is, some written symbols. I may be at the same time perceiving other things, but they are irrelevant to my understanding that passage. In the mind there may be some images, verbal or otherwise. But often times we say 'we understand' when there are no images in the mind, or there are images unconnected with what we read or hear. What then is understanding? According to Wittgenstein when some body says 'he understands' it means that he has

a feeling of confidence about the rules of grammar governing those symbols which he is said to have understood. But some times understanding does imply specific experience e.g. in picture study or what Wittgenstein calls learning by pattern - system.

Here the philosopher might raise certain puzzles. He may say 'how can I know that the other person understands a word in the same sense as I do? How can I know that the other person has the same experience as I have?' The latter question is irrelevant for answering the first. The answer to the first question is; 'if we both use the word in the same way, then we are said to have understood the word in the same sense'.

Section V Meaning & truth:- In the previous sections, we have been talking about meaning only, but let us see what according to Wittgenstein is the relation between truth and meaning. Obviously a statement can be false and yet meaningful, but a statement cannot be true and meaningless. To quote from Wittgenstein's Tractatus "The picture (prop) agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false. (2.21) The picture represents what it represents independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form of representation (2.22)." All these quotations go to say that meaning of a statement is independent of its truth or falsehood. But the relation between meaningfulness

and truth or falsity of the statement is quite different. If the statement is meaningless, then it is neither true nor false; in that case the question of truth or falsity does not arise at all. First essential is that the statement should be meaningful and then we can say whether it is true or false. "In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists." (Tractatus 2.222).

In a sense, meaning is dependent on truth. Meaning of a statement is dependent on the truth of some statement though not of itself. Take the instance of 'there are mountains on the other side of the moon'. We do not know and we have no ready means to determine the truth or falsity of this statement; but we take it as a meaningful statement. To say that it is a meaningful statement means that there is a possible situation in which this expression can be correctly used. Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning requires that if we can describe the situation in which the expression in question may be used, then that expression has a meaning. We have to describe the possible situation in terms of some true situations. The possible is a construction out of the true. If I had not seen true mountain situations and if I had not seen other side situations, then I could not have seen any meaning in the sentence 'there are mountains on the other side of the moon'.

CHAPTER III

Associate theories of meaning.

There are some similar theories of meaning with which Wittgensteinian theory has some times been confused. Wittgensteinian theory may be called 'Language-role - theory of meaning'. Richard and Ogden in their celebrated volume 'Meaning of meaning' hold 'referent theory of meaning'. Mr. Ayer and others support what is called 'verification theory of meaning'. Language-role - theory should be distinguished from both these.

Section I. Referent theory:- "Words mean nothing by themselves. It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have meaning. They are instruments; but besides this referential use which for all reflective and intellectual use of language should be paramount, words have other functions which may be grouped as emotive".¹ Richard and Ogden devote one full chapter to the emotive aspect of language. Wittgenstein also, I suppose, recognises the distinction between the emotive and reflective or referential functions of language, but he confines himself to the referential function. In the Tractatus, however, Wittgenstein seems to deny the emotive function of languages for there he thinks that the main function of language is

1. 'Meaning of meaning' by Richard and Ogden.
Pp. 9-10.

to assert or deny facts. At any rate, I do not think, he rejects emotive language as mere nonsense as some American Semantcists tend to do. Mr. Stuart Chase in his book called 'Tyranny of words' translates "The Aryan fatherland which has nursed the souls of heroes, calls upon for the supreme sacrifice which you in whom flows heroic blood, will not fail, and which will echo for ever down the corridors of history" into "The blab blab which has nursed the blabs of blabs, calls upon for the blab blab which you in whom flows blab blood, will not fail, and which will echo blab down the blabs of blabs."¹ This shows to what an extent reaction can go. It should, however be recognised that the emotive aspect of the language has obstructed many of the philosophical and scientific discussions. To quote again from Richard and Ogden "many difficulties indeed arising through the behaviour of words in discussion even among scientists are due to these non-symbolic influences (emotive)."²


Richard and Ogden's analysis of meaning in the reflective sense is illustrated in a diagram which we shall now proceed to explain. There are three factors involved whenever any statement is made or understood. These three factors are named 'words', 'thoughts' and 'things'; or 'symbol', 'reference' and

1, 'Tyranny of words' by Stuart Chase, P. 14.

2, 'Meaning of meaning' by Richard and Ogden, P. 10.

'referent'. These factors and their relations are illustrated by a triangle without a base $\triangle$, the factors being placed at the corners of the diagram and the relations which hold between them being represented by the sides.

Thought or reference.



The first thing to be noted about this triangle is that the relation between a symbol and its referent or that to which it refers, is an indirect relation. It is the mind which relates a symbol with a referent, in themselves they are entirely external to each other. In other words, symbols have no a priori meaning. In the diagram, base is shown as unfilled showing thereby that the two points, 'symbol' and 'referent' are not connected directly, but through the point of 'thought' or 'reference'. On this point, apparently there seems to be an agreement between Wittgenstein and the authors of 'Meaning of meaning'. But this point may be interpreted in two different ways. We have said that it is the mind which relates a symbol with a referent; now the question is which mind relates etc.

We may say that this relation between a particular symbol and a particular referent has been established by convention and convention was made by some mind. Or it may be said that the symbol remains meaningless unless some mind uses it and refers it to some referent. The latter seems to be the implication of 'referent theory'. Now this would mean that it is only when somebody uses the symbol in his speech or writing that the symbol gets a meaning implying there by (as we have already said in some other connection in the previous chapter) that all the books lying on my table contain bundles of mere symbols, symbols which mean nothing; and they will be mere symbols so long they remain unread or unheard. But does the reader or speaker refer symbols to referents arbitrarily or according to certain rules? Surely there are rules of usage of symbols which people follow when they read or utter those symbols.

Wittgenstein would admit that there is no inherent relation between a symbol and a referent, he would say, that though the relation is indirect and external, it has been fixed by rules or conventions and these rules are the product of some mind. So long as there are rules of usage of a symbol, that symbol has a meaning even if no body actually uses that symbol and refers it to a referent.

Second important factor, to make or understand

a statement, is what is called 'thought' or 'reference'. It is contended that every intelligible expression gives rise to a 'thought' or 'reference'. The diagram drawn on page 43 also shows that there is a causal relation between the symbol and the corresponding thought. In a sense it is not true to say that every word causes a thought in our mind. Do we have thoughts corresponding to every word when we slide over sentences while reading a book or a paper? Proper and generic names may cause images of persons and things, verbs may cause images of some activity; but there are many words and sentences which we read and understand without having any corresponding thoughts in our minds. Even proper and generic names, verbs and adjectives do not always give rise to thoughts. Wittgenstein contends that it is possible (some times it is an actual case) to refer a symbol to the right referent without the mediation of a thought. An order is given "Bring me two' apples and three bananas." It is quite possible that the person ordered will bring the required things without any thought mediation.¹ But it may be said that in 'the conscious understanding', there are thought processes corresponding to every expression. So by narrowing down the meaning of 'understand'

1. This point has been discussed at a length in the early portions of the Brown-Book.


we may truly assert that there are thoughts corresponding to every word. Or we may so widen the meaning of 'thought' that every word may have a thought corresponding to it. But in the ordinary language, 'understand' is understood in its wide sense, where as 'thought' is understood in its narrow sense. When Wittgensteinians deny that there are thought-processes corresponding to every word when one understands or makes a statement, they understand 'understand' and 'thought' in their ordinary way. What Wittgensteinians want to emphasise is that thought may be an accompaniment, but it is not a necessary factor in understanding and making statements.

The triangle shows a third factor and that is, 'thing' or 'referent'. Wittgensteinians use the term 'situation' and not 'referent'. If by 'referent' is meant one particular thing, physical or otherwise to which the word refers, then Wittgensteinians would deny this factor. There are many words which do not have referent in this sense and yet they have a meaning in the sense that they are logical - constructions out of some referents. (Logical constructions in Mr. Wisdom's sense. That is, that sentences containing those words can be translated into sentences or groups of sentences which do not contain those or any other words of the same sort). Abstract words like 'goodness', 'beauty',

'triangularity' etc. and Absolute words like 'nation', 'mankind' and such others are instances of logical constructions. But there are words which have neither any referent nor are they logical constructions and yet they have a meaning in the sense that they have a definite use in certain complex situations. Words like 'of', 'again', 'chance' belong to this type.

'Referent' may be taken in a wider sense and in that sense it may be a synonym of the Wittgensteinian term 'situation'. I also believe that the authors of 'referent theory' understand the term 'referent' in its wider sense.

Before we pass on to the next section, we may show the main differences between 'referent theory' and 'Wittgensteinian theory' diagrammatically.



Section II. Verification - theory:- Different verificationists have given different versions of verification-theory and even the same authors have more than once changed their views. Here we shall con-

cern ourselves with the verification theory expounded by Mr. A. J. Ayer of Oxford university, in his book 'Language, Truth and Logic'; and the verification theory of propossor M. Schlick of Vienna stated in his latest article 'meaning and verification' in the Philosophical Review, July 1936. As we shall see, Wittgensteinian theory of meaning is very much different from Mr. Ayer's verification - theory; but Professor Schlick's view as stated in 'meaning and verification' except for the difference in terminology is more or less same as Wittgenstenins'.

Section II (i) Ayer's Theory:- Exposition-

On page 19, he states, "The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of facts is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth or falsehood is consistent with any assumption what so ever concerning the nature of his future experience, then as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him;

but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does". Then he proceeds to distinguish what he calls 'Verification in practice and verification in principle', 'strong verification and weak verification'. For the present, for our purpose this general statement is enough.

In general terms, the above statement may be summarized into "Statement has a meaning if there is a method of its verification"; but some times this doctrine has been very paradoxically expressed as "meaning of a statement is the method of its verification". The later statement shows that even these logical-positivists who claim to clarify language have themselves fallen into language-pits. I believe that the logical positivists, who state their doctrine in this paradoxical manner, have not understood the nature of the question about meaning; or the statement "meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" is not meant to be taken literally, but only as another way of saying "statement has a meaning if there is a method of its verification". If later be the case, then

surely it is a very misleading way of expression.

Some critics¹ have actually taken the statement "meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" in its literal sense and have condemned it as being a false theory of meaning. Take such assertions as "Queen Elizabeth died in 1603" and "The plesiosaurus once lived upon the earth". If we apply the above theory of meaning to statements about the past, we shall get very paradoxical results. In that case statement about Queen Elizabeth's death will be a statement about my present reading of historical records; and statement about the Plesiosaurus will be a statement about my present reading of contemporary records and a statement about a certain zoologist's finding of bones and other remains; for that is the only way we can verify such statements. But surely we cannot equate statement about Queen Elizabeth's death to a statement about our present reading, for the two are different. One is about the past, the other is about the present; one is about Queen Elizabeth and the other is about ourselves; and yet the theory wants us to equate the two statements and this is its paradoxical consequence.

I suspect that people, who talk of meaning of a statement as the method of its verification, are not clear what the question is about. In the previous

1. 'Verification & understanding' by Margaret MacDonald Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 1933-34.

chapter, we discussed the nature of the question 'what is meaning', at some length. We said that the question 'what is meaning' is a criteria question, for, the term 'meaning' is a value - adjective and not a noun or a sensible adjective. The assertion that 'statement has a meaning if there is a method of its verification' may be said to be a criterion of meaning, but obviously the statement "meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" does not look a criterion - statement. It is more a descriptive than a criterion - statement; but it cannot be a description of meaning for meaning is not an entity which needs to be described.

Comparison: We take it that Mr. Ayer's theory of meaning is a criterion of meaning and nothing more than that. Now the question is, whether or not Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning is the same as Mr. Ayer's and if not wherein lies the difference. We want to say that Wittgensteinian criterion is not the same as Mr. Ayer's and the difference between the two is subtle but profound.

The two criteria to be compared are 'statement has a meaning if there is a method of its verification' and 'sentence or any other expression has a meaning if it can be used.' Whether or not, the two criteria are same depends upon what the two criteria mean. We have already explained & illustrated Wittgensteinian

criterion in the previous chapter and now we shall proceed to explain Mr. Ayer's criterion of meaning.

What Mr. Ayer's criterion means depends upon what Mr. Ayer means by 'verification'; and it is about this very term that he has not told us anything explicit. He has distinguished between various kinds of verification, but he has not told us what 'verification' itself means. This term has been taken from science and in science it has two meanings, direct verification and indirect verification. In science, verification is spoken of in connection with hypotheses. There are certain hypotheses which are directly observable such as 'poverty breeds crime' (poverty is a possible explanation or hypothesis for the phenomena of crime); but the hypotheses like "things fall due to force of gravity from the Earth" are not directly observable. We cannot see force of gravity attracting things to itself, as we can see poverty leading people to crime. Hypotheses of the former type are said to be verified by 'direct observation'; hypotheses of the later are verified indirectly, which consists in deducing the implications of the hypothesis and directly verifying those implications. Scientists employ the criterion of verification (direct and indirect) to ascertain the truth or otherwise of scientific hypotheses; where as logical positivists like Mr. Ayer make use of verification as a criterion of meaning and also of the truth of

the statements of fact and not merely of hypotheses. Mr. Ayer at some places seems to be talking of 'direct-verification' and at some places 'indirect-verification'. In his mind there does not seem to be clear cut distinction between the two. But certain logical-positivists¹ by 'verification' understand altogether a different thing, neither direct nor indirect verification.

When Mr. Ayer makes a distinction between 'verification in principle' and 'verification in practice' he has, it seems, direct - verification in mind and not any indirect verification. This is clear from the example he gives to illustrate his point. He says that the statement "There are mountains on the other side of the moon" is a meaningful statement because it is verifiable in principle, though not in practice. Let him state the point himself. "But there remain a number of significant propositions, concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made. A simple and familiar example of such a proposition is the proposition that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon. No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look at the farther side of the moon, so that

1. Eg. M. Schlick in 'Meaning and verification', Philosophical review July 1936

I am unable to decide the matter by actual observations. But I do know what observations would decide it for me, if as it is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them. And therefore I say that the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice and is accordingly significant.”¹ In this passage Mr. Ayer makes a distinction between what may be called ‘practical possibility of direct observation’ and ‘theoretical possibility of direct observation’. It is a distinction between two kinds of direct verification. That he is referring to direct verification is clear from the sentence “But I do know what observations..... if I were once in a position to make them”. This sentence may be paraphrased as “But I do know, that if I could get to the other side of the moon, as it is theoretically possible, what should I observe there to say that it is true or otherwise that there are mountains on the other side of the moon”.

But when Mr. Ayer distinguishes between weak and strong verifications he seems to be in a confusion. He thinks that weak and strong verifications also are kinds of direct verification, but that is not the case. He says that general propositions and propositions about the remote past cannot be conclusively verified. Of course in a sense they cannot be con-

1. ‘Language Truth and Logic’ by A. J. Ayer P. 21.

clusively verified, but the question is whether they can be directly verified at all. There is no general fact corresponding to a general proposition which could be directly observed. In the case of a general proposition, what can be directly observed, is the particular instances which go to make a general proposition; and not any fact corresponding to the general proposition, for there is none. Similarly statements about the past cannot be directly verified, because the past events cannot be directly observed. In fact it is nonsense to talk about direct observations of past events. But Mr. Ayer seems to think that there is no qualitative difference between the verification of general and historical statements on the one hand and other statements like 'there are two chairs in my bed-room' on the other. According to him the difference is only of degree which he expresses by saying that we can have only weak verification for the general and historical propositions. It seems to me that really he is referring to 'indirect-verification' for there can be only indirect-verification of general and historical statements. To talk of direct-verification of general and historical propositions is nonsense,

Thus we see that Mr. Ayer by 'verification' means either 'direct verification' or 'indirect-verification'. Now let us see what his criterion comes to. His criterion is 'statement has a meaning if there is

a method of its verification'. This will either mean 'statement has a meaning if there is a possibility of direct observation of something, which will confirm or confute the truth of the statement; or 'statement has a meaning if there is a possibility of its indirect-verification'. The first interpretation applies to most of the statements and the later to those in whose case direct verification is not possible.

Now it is clear that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning as expounded in the pervious chapter is not the same as Mr. Ayer's. According to Mr. Ayer, it is the possibility of verification, direct or indirect which gives meaning to a statement, whereas according to Wittgensteinian criterion, it is not the possibility or verification but the 'describability of the meaning - giving situation' which gives meaning to a statement. Verifiability theory of meaning implies 'temporality', whereas 'describability' does not. In other words, verifiability - theory implies a temporal possibility of verification; whereas in the Wittgensteinian criterion all that is required for a sentence to be meaningful is the describability of the meaning - giving situation without any implication of its temporal realisation. Technically the difference may be stated by saying that 'verifiability' is an empirical concept and 'describability' is a logical concept.

Strictly speaking, Mr. Ayer's theory demands not

only a possibility of verification, but also knowledge of the method of verification. "We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition....."¹ In the Wittgensteinian criterion, the question about the possibility of verification or the knowledge of the method of verification does not arise at all. Statement may have a meaning even if I do not know how to verify the statement. Even if I do know, my knowledge of the method of its verification is entirely irrelevant to the meaning - aspect of the statement.

This leads to another important difference between the two criteria of meaning. In Mr. Ayer's verification theory meaning and truth seem to 'simulate each other', whereas in the Wittgensteinian theory, meaning precedes truth, as it ought to. It may be contended that even in verification - theory, meaning of a statement precedes its truth or falsity. It is only when the method of verification has been carried out that the statement gets its truth function, but it gets meaning even before the method of verification has been carried out. In order that a statement be meaningful all that is necessary is that there should be a possibility of its verification. This seeming precedence is merely a chronological precedence, but logically or in

1. 'Language Truth and Logic' by A. J. Ayer P. 19.

principle the verification - criteria of meaning and truth are one and the same. It is the criterion of truth which also becomes a criterion of meaning. The two criteria, 'verifiability' and 'verification' are two stages of one and the same inquiry, whereas the question about meaning is both chronologically and 'logically prior' to the question about truth. Inquiry into the meaning of a statement is prior even to the inquiry into the verifiability of the statement.

In the Wittgensteinian theory, the criteria of meaning and truth are not one and the same. Unlike verification - theory, Wittgensteinian theory recognises the logical priority of the question about meaning. The Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning is 'the descriptibility of the meaning - giving situation' and the criterion of truth is correspondence with reality. The two inquiries are not two stages of the same inquiry.

Section II. (ii) Mr. Schlick on 'meaning and verification':- As we shall see, Schlick's version of verification is free from the defects born of the logical identity of the verification - criteria of meaning and truth. He says "Whenever we ask about a sentence, 'what does it mean?' what we expect is instruction as to the circumstances in which the sentence is to be used; we want a description of the conditions under which the sentence will form a true proposition: and of those which will make it false.

equates "describing the situation in which the sentence is to be used", and "describing the method of verification". This is pouring new wine into old bottles, but this will not clear the misunderstanding from the minds of his critics for verification terminology is misleading.



tions about the past and about other minds. It will be clear in due course that Wittgensteinian theory is not subject to such criticisms. In this chapter we have to make good our claims that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning does not condemn any admittedly meaningful propositions as meaningless.

Scope of the criticism:- In chapter II, Section I, we discussed the scope of the question about meaning. We said that Wittgenstein is concerned with the meaning of propositions or descriptive sentences or sentences which assert or deny facts. We distinguished descriptive - sentences from emotive - sentences and also from symbolic - sentences. Now we have to see that within this accepted scope Wittgensteinian criterion does not come in conflict with common - sense judgment, that is, it admits all the admittedly meaningful propositions.

There are different kinds of descriptive - sentences. First of all they may be divided into 'the formal descriptive sentences' and 'material descriptive sentences'. In the formal class, we may put particular propositions, general propositions, affirmative propositions, negative propositions and numerical propositions. In the material class, we may put here—propositions, there-propositions, now-propositions, then-propositions, me - propositions, other minds - propositions, concrete and abstract propositions, real and fictitious propositions.

two forms, puzzle of 'the indefinite general' and the puzzle of 'the universal-general',

Sentences like 'somebody murdered X', 'X was murdered by somebody' 'X murdered somebody', 'somebody was murdered by somebody' raise the puzzle of 'the indefinite general'. Philosophers have persistently asked 'who is somebody'? what is something'? The argument is that 'somebody' does not refer to any one particular person like Smith and John, and therefore 'X murdered somebody' does not refer to any particular-situation and therefore 'X murdered some body' is meaningless. There is no indefiniteness in reality, 'situation' is something particularized, for the constituents of a situation are particular objects or events related in a particular way. Should we therefore say that because 'situations' are always definite and particular, and 'X murdered some body' is an indefinite sentence, therefore there is no situation corresponding to 'X murdered somebody'? Our answer is that there is a situation (which naturally will be something definite), but our knowledge about it is indefinite. 'some body' is neither a proper name like Smith' or 'Harry', nor is it a generic name like 'cat' or 'dog', it is what may be called 'a variable name', that is a name which could be substituted by a generic name or a proper name when the definite knowledge is obtained. 'Somebody' in 'X

murdered somebody' could be variedly substituted in the following ways. 'X murdered a man', 'X murdered a woman' 'X murdered a child'. Or again 'X murdered Smith', 'X murdered John'. So we conclude that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning does not condemn 'indefinite-general sentences' as meaningless.

The other kind of generality-puzzle is the puzzle of the 'universal general'. 'All men are mortal', 'Quinine cures malaria', 'Iron expands when heated' are instances of the 'universal-general' proposition. It may be argued that 'situations' are something 'particular', but 'a universal-general' proposition cannot have a 'particular' situation corresponding to it and it is nonsense to talk of 'general situations', therefore 'universal-general' propositions should be called meaningless. Wittgensteinian answer would be that 'universal-general' propositions are either 'logical constructions' out of some particular proposition, or they are 'verbal definitions'.

To say that a general proposition is a 'logical-construction' out of some particular propositions means, that a general-proposition is translatable into particular propositions. "All men are mortal" is equivalent to 'I am mortal', 'you are mortal', 'so and so is mortal', 'so and so is mortal' and so on. It may be said that no finite number of particular propositions

will give the sense of a universal-general proposition. But that does not prove that a general proposition is not a 'logical construction' for we always understand a general-proposition in terms of particulars.

Another solution of universal-general propositions is that they are 'verbal definitions'. But they are not 'verbal-definitions' in the ordinary sense of the term. 'Iron expands when heated' is not a definition like 'Triangle is a three sided figure' or 'Blue is a colour'. But it is a verbal-definition in the sense that it states a 'rule of grammar' about 'Iron', that is, it tells us something about the use of the term 'iron.' It does not assert anything about external situations, in other words no experience of the external phenomena is relevant to its truth or falsity. In popular terms we say "iron would not be 'iron' if it did not expand when heated". (This point will be explained further in chapter V).

Puzzle of Negation:- This puzzle may be stated as follows. 'Situations' are parts of reality, so they are existent and positive, to talk of 'negative - situations' is self - contradiction. Therefore there can be no situations corresponding to negative propositions and therefore according to Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning, negative propositions are meaningless.

This difficulty also is an apparent difficulty. The term 'negative' or 'negation' gets its meaning from the

'positive'. By itself, 'negation' has no meaning. 'Negation' by definition must be negation of something positive. To put more properly, "significant negative is negation of a possible - affirmative". If it be granted, as it ought to be, that a negative is negation of some affirmative, then it is clear that Wittgensteinian - criterion does not condemn negative propositions as meaningless. If the situation, which is negated, is describable in Wittgensteinian sense of the term, then the corresponding negative statement has a meaning. The reader should note the implication of the previous statement; and the implication is, that only when the negated situation is describable that the negative proposition has a meaning and not otherwise. Sentences like 'There are no square triangles', 'Equations do not attend race meetings' are not significant negatives, that is, the corresponding negated situations are not describable and therefore such sentences are meaningless.

Linguistic - solipsism:- This is the puzzle about other minds - statements. This puzzle has been given the name 'Linguistic - solipsism' by Weinberg in his book called, 'An Examination of Logical positivism', First we shall deal with difficulties raised by Mr. Weinberg. He says, "If the sense of propositions. depends on the possibility that certain empirical facts exist, then no significant statement can be made about inferred entities such as physical objects and other

minds. The significance of language is thus limited to the realm of possible experience. This leads to the astounding result that significant propositions are incommunicable, which is what may be called linguistic-solipsism'.¹ Further on he says, "nothing significant could be said, therefore, about any reality which experience remains outside the limits of possible experience. This is a kind of solipsism. Statements about the 'experience' of another person would then have to be interpreted so as to be statements about experience in the proper sense. If a person A, is said to see a triangular spot of a blue hue at time t_0 , this state of affairs must be described in empirical terms. Consequently, if the statement "A sees a blue triangular spot at t_0 " is made and if I make a similar statement, "There is a blue triangular spot now", the analysis of these statements in terms of my experience will yield quite different results. The former statement will reduce to a statement about the behaviour of A, the later is a statement about immediate data. There is no way to avoid the ultimate difference between these two kinds of propositions. Assertions made by what I call "a human being" occur in my language (i.e. the language of experiential facts) in the form of indirect discourse, and cannot be transformed into direct discourse with-

1. 'An examination of Logical Positivism' P. 200

According to our interpretation, Wittgenstein does not hold 'direct - verification theory of meaning' as Mr. Weinberg supposes him to do. If he did hold 'direct - verification' theory then no doubt linguistic - solipsism will be its consequence. According to us all that Wittgensteinian criterion demands is the describability (in Wittgensteinian sense) of the meaning giving - situation.

Now let us proceed to see whether 'other minds - statements' raise any difficulties for Wittgensteinian theory of meaning as interpreted by us in this thesis. The fundamental question is whether Wittgensteinian criterion condemns statements about other minds as meaningless. This question is to be discussed in relation to statements about our own mind. Statements about other minds may be distinguished into two sorts. (1) Statements about other minds made by some body other than the other - mind. (2) Statements about the other mind made by the other mind himself. Instances of the first sort will be 'Smith is in pain'; and an instance of the second type will be "Smith says 'I am in pain' ." There may be all sorts of statements about other minds. "Smith is perceiving", "Smith is remembering", "Smith is imagining", "Smith is thinking", "Smith is feeling angry or feeling sad", "Smith has desires and ambitions". Here we shall concern ourselves with "Smith is in pain" and "Smith is angry".

These instances are very often discussed in Wittgensteinian circles.

Wittgensteinian criterion does not condemn 'Smith is in pain', or 'Smith is angry' as meaningless, because these sentences have a use in language, that is, they can be used in some 'situation'. In the popular terms, they have a meaning because we know when to use them, when and in what situation should one say that Smith is in pain or that Smith is angry. Further question is whether the 'meaning - giving - situations' of 'I am angry or I am in pain' and 'Smith is angry or Smith is in pain' are same in kind or different. Meaning - giving situation of 'I am in pain' is a mental situation known by introspection; meaning - giving - situation of Smith is in pain' is a behaviouristic situation known by observation. It should be remembered, however, that we do not equate 'Smith is in pain' to 'Smith shows pain symptoms'. All that we want to do, is to point out the difference between the kind of situation which gives rise to the expression 'I am in pain', and the kind of situation which gives rise to the expression 'Smith is in pain'. I do not think anybody will differ from us on this point, controversy will come later.

Let us now consider, statements like "I am in pain" and "Smith says 'I am in pain'". When I say, "I am in pain", the sentence 'I am in pain'

has a meaning for me, because I know its meaning-giving situation which is a mental situation known by introspection. How about the expression 'I am in pain' uttered by Smith? Is it significant or not? This expression also when uttered by Smith or somebody else gets its meaning from a mental situation known by introspection. So far Smith is concerned, it is meaningful to him because he knows its meaning-giving-situation. (It is his own introspective-situation). But I and others are not acquainted with the situation which Smith refers to when he says, "I am in pain"; nor is it possible for us to experience the introspective-situation referred to. Does it mean, therefore, that Smith's utterance "I am in pain" is meaningless to us?

This is not a difficult puzzle for Wittgensteinians, but some critics, e.g. Weinberg, do think that it is. As we said before, their criticism is based on a wrong interpretation of Wittgensteinian theory of meaning. They confuse Wittgensteinian theory with the orthodox verification theory of meaning. No doubt for the verificationist statements about other minds, statements about the past and fictitious statements are thorny puzzles. (This point will be discussed at the end of this chapter).

Wittgensteinian answer to the above question (whether Smith's utterance 'I am in pain' is meaningless

to us) does not go against the common-sense judgment. In other words Smith's utterance is not meaningless to us even though we are not acquainted with his introspective situation that his utterance refers to. To repeat again, all that Wittgensteinian criterion requires is that the meaning-giving-situation should be 'describable' in terms of my true-situations. Though I can not feel Smith's pain, I know what it is like to be in pain and also I know what a human - being is and what it is like for a human - being to be in pain. Thus both the constituents and component of the meaning - giving - situation of Smith's utterance 'I am in pain' are describable in terms of my true-situations. So we find that neither does the Wittgensteinian criterion reject statements about other minds as meaningless, nor does it equate them to statements about behaviour of other bodies.

Before we leave this point, we should make it clear that even though statements about other minds are not meaningless, nor are their meaning - giving situations fundamentally different from statements about our own minds, yet we understand the two kinds of statements differently. But this should not be considered as a difficulty, for this does not make communication impossible. To understand the two kinds of statements, me x other - minds - statements differently just means that I can not feel Smith's pain, I cannot feel Smith's

anger, I cannot think Smith's thoughts and so on. It is important to remember that 'to understand differently' is not the same as 'not to understand at all'; and if 'to understand differently' be called a difficulty then this difficulty occurs in the statements about the past and statements about the distant. As it is not possible for me to feel Smith's pain, similarly it is not possible for me to witness the past or to see the distant. But does it mean that we do not understand statements about the past or the distant at all? What is true is that we do not understand 'then - statements' in the same way as we do 'now - statements', nor do we understand statements about the distant as we do understand statements about 'the Here'. But none the less we do understand them.

It should also be noted that this alleged difficulty is not a difficulty imposed by Wittgensteinian theory of meaning, it is a fact of human life and language. No theory governs language, theories can only explain the facts about language. Sometimes it is alleged that linguistic-solipsism results from Wittgensteinian theory of meaning,¹ whereas in fact there is no linguistic-solipsism. If by 'linguistic-solipsism' you mean 'rejection of other minds-statements as meaningless'

1. 'An Examination of Logical Positivism' by Weinberg. Chapter on 'Linguistic-Solipsism.'

then it is not true of Wittgensteinian theory; and if by 'linguistic-solipsism' you understand 'understanding me-statements and other minds-statements differently' then it is a fact of human speech and Wittgensteinian theory has only pointed out this fact.

Thorns of the verificationist:- So far we have tried to show that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning does not condemn any admittedly meaningful sentences as meaningless; and thus justified our claims that our theory is not imposed from without but is based on the linguistic habits of the common people. But, as we have already said, sometimes critics confuse verification-theory with Wittgensteinian theory. In the previous chapter we showed that Wittgensteinian theory is fundamentally different from verification-theory. Here we have to show that criticisms which are generally levelled against verification-theory cannot be applied to Wittgensteinian theory.

Critics point out certain 'crucial types of sentences' which are considered meaningful by every body except the verificationists showing thereby that verification - theory is an arbitrary theory of meaning. They are, statements about the past, statements about other minds and fictitious statements. Generally by 'verification' verificationists understand 'direct - verification' as explained in the previous chapter, that is, 'direct -

observation' or 'experience'. Verificationist says that statement has a meaning if there is a method of its verification, that is, if there is a possibility of direct observation of what the statement asserts. Now according to this criterion, Smith's utterance "I am in pain" should be meaningless to me for I cannot directly observe his pain apart from his pain - symptoms. Statements like "Queen Elizabeth died in 1603" also are meaningless, because I cannot possibly see Queen Elizabeth dying in 1603. In fact this talk about directly seeing the other person's pain or seeing past events is sheer nonsense. Similarly there is no possibility of direct - verification of fictitious statements. So they are also meaningless. Now either the verificationist should bravely say that such statements are meaningless, or he must find out a way to accomodate them in his theory of meaning. If he says that they are meaningless, he is condemned by his critics, for imposing an arbitrary theory of meaning. "There must be something wrong with a definition of meaning which rules out as meaningless statements which every one in the world except logical positivists, know to possess meaning and clearly understand. Such a theory lays itself open to the accusation of attempting to dictate a priori to the facts instead of following and explaining them." ¹

1. 'Metaphysics & Meaning' by W. T. Stace. 'The mind' October 1935.

Some verificationists have found out or at least pretend to have found out a way to save their position against their critics. The way of escape is as follows. They say that though statements about the past and about other minds are not directly verifiable, they are not absolutely outside the scope of some kind of verification. Here the verificationist is referring to what we have called 'indirect-verification', that is verifying Smith's pain through the pain-symptoms that he displays and verifying Queen Elizabeth's death through historical records and examination of her grave. By doing this the verificationist claims to have saved his position. But has he really succeeded? The critic here would point out a manifest defect in the verificationist's argument. According to the verificationist, the critic would say, unless there is some way to verify a statement about the past, the statement has no meaning. But in fact people do understand statements about the past without raising the question of its verification. In other words, indirect-verification of statements about the past is irrelevant to the question of their meaning. Regarding fictitious propositions, the verificationist can say absolutely nothing, for there is no possibility of direct or indirect verification of their assertions; and yet fictitious propositions are considered meaningful. Consideration of these three 'crucial types of sentences' belittle the value attached to verification theory

of meaning. This consideration also tells us as to wherein lies the fundamental defect of verification-theory. The fundamental defect is that in the verification-theory meaning and truth of a statement simulate.¹ The difficulties regarding the three 'crucial-types of sentences' are the result of this fundamental-defect.

Now, we want to say that neither can the critic accuse the Wittgensteinians of arbitrariness in the criterion of meaning that they hold, nor can the critic trace the above-mentioned defect of 'simulation of meaning and truth' in the Wittgensteinian theory of meaning. We have already shown in the previous chapter that unlike verification-theory, Wittgensteinian theory of meaning recognises the logical-priority of meaning to truth. Here we have to show that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning does not condemn statements about other minds, about the past and fictitious statements as meaningless. Statements about other minds have already been treated in this chapter in the section on 'Linguistic-solipsism'. In that section we said that since statements about other minds are describable, they are meaningful. These statements are condemned by the verificationist as meaningless because they are incapable of direct-verification, but Wittgensteinian does not demand verification at all. Wittgensteinian criterion demands only the des-

1. See Chapter III, Section II

cribability of the meaning-giving-situations and this requirement is satisfied by all the three 'crucial types of sentences'.

So we conclude that Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning as expounded in this thesis is true to the language that common people speak.



CHAPTER V

ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS.

Introduction:- In the preceding three chapters, we worked out in detail the fundamental thesis and the pivot of the whole of Wittgensteinian philosophy, 'the criterion of meaning'; and now we proceed to work out its implications. The first and foremost consequence of this thesis is 'the elimination of metaphysics'.

Wittgensteinian condemnation of metaphysics has passed through two stages, as we mentioned in the first chapter also. We shall deal with each stage separately. At first it was said that metaphysical statements were 'meaningless' and that metaphysicians were talking nonsense; but since lately it has become a fashion to say that metaphysical statements are 'really verbal', though there is a non-verbal air about them; or that the metaphysician is really making a 'verbal or notational recommendation', though outwardly he feigns to have made some 'empirical discovery.'

First stage of condemning metaphysics:- Scope of Wittgensteinian criterion, as we have already said, is 'propositions' or 'descriptive sentences' or 'sentences which claim to assert or deny facts'. Briefly stated, this criterion is 'A sentence has a meaning if it can be used in some situation'. On further analysis we found that this statement means that 'a sentence has a meaning if its meaning giving-situation is des-

criticable in the special Wittgensteinian sense of the term.'

Applying this criterion of meaning to metaphysics, Wittgensteinians claim to have found out that metaphysical statements (statements written or made by the so-called metaphysicians of the past and the present) are meaningless. The question may be raised as to why at all this particular criterion of meaning is applied to metaphysical statements. The answer is 'because metaphysical statements are presented in descriptive form', that is, metaphysical statements look like descriptive sentences or what Mr. Wisdom expresses by saying 'metaphysical statements have an empirical air about them'. So naturally they apply the appropriate criterion, that of 'descriptive sentences'.

Let us explain this by illustration. Take a few instances of metaphysical statements. 'Time is an image of eternity', 'All things are nothing but shadows of eternal ideas which themselves are in spaceless and timeless sphere'. 'This world of perception is really an appearance and not a reality'. All such statements, both 'syntactically' and 'intentionally' resemble ordinary descriptive sentences. 'Syntactically, they are like descriptive sentences' means that in their grammatical construction they resemble empirical statements. 'That they are intentionally descriptive' means that those who make such statements claim to state significant truths. Is not metaphysics an inquiry into

the ultimate nature of things?

That metaphysical statements are claimed to be descriptive, is clearly implied by the claims metaphysicians and their admirers make about the mission of the metaphysician. In the orthodox metaphysics text - books, metaphysics is placed on par with science, except for certain differences which make metaphysics even superior to science. There it is said that object of both is attainment of truth or knowledge. The difference is that the truth attained by science is a partial truth and not a complete truth, the reason being that every science has a limited and special scope for inquiry; whereas it is claimed that metaphysics arrives at the whole truth, that is, truth about the whole universe. Thus we find that it is claimed that 'in principle', the objective and attainment of both, the metaphysician and the scientist are one and the same, difference is only in degree. We may express this in Wittgensteinian terminology by saying that the metaphysician has twofold scientific air about himself, one about his problems, the other about the solution of those problems. He assumes that his problems are of scientific nature and that is why the syntactical form of the metaphysician's questions resembles that of the scientist's. Regarding his answers or solutions also he thinks as if he has made some empirical discoveries.

Thus we find that the syntactical appearance of

metaphysical statements, intentions and declared claims of metaphysicians give sufficient justification for applying Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning to metaphysical statements. Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning is claimed to be the only true criterion of meaning of propositions or descriptive sentences and metaphysical statements are claimed to be descriptive-sentences.

Wittgenstenians condemn metaphysical statements as meaningless for there are no 'describable' situations in which or in reference to which such statements can be sensibly made. In chapter I, we gave a four-fold classification of sentences according to their sense or nonsense¹; and we said that according to Wittgensteinians, metaphysical statements were of the third type which we called 'frames without pictures'. Typical instances of this type are 'Equations attend race meetings', 'Fractions attacked me in the bath room', 'Time and Space take tea with sugar'. Such sentences are condemned as meaningless even though their grammatical form is correct, for their meaning-giving situations are not 'describable' in the special Wittgensteinian sense of the term, that is, both the constituents and the component should be describable in terms of true situations. It is contended that metaphysical statements resemble such sentences and therefore they are also meaningless.

1. See Chapter I, Section II.

Here the reader should note that both 'verifiability theory of meaning' held by Ayer and other Logical positivists and 'describability theory of meaning' held by Wittgensteinians prove the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements. But there is one difference, even here, between Logical positivists and Wittgensteinians. That is, that Logical positivists even now hold that metaphysics is entirely nonsense stuff, whereas Wittgensteinians (specially Cambridge Wittgensteinian school) have given a new turn to their attitude towards metaphysics. Now they seem to hold that in many cases metaphysician is not talking nonsense, but he is making a 'verbal recommendation'.

Second stage of condemning metaphysics:-

Up to the year 1936, Wittgensteinians condemned metaphysics out right, but by the end of that year, it seems, that Mr. Wisdom, one of the staunch and earnest disciples of Wittgenstein got a new light on philosophy. He then developed a new thesis which has been published in the Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 1937. There he speaks in the language of paradoxes; he says that philosophical statements are both 'misleading and illuminating', that the philosopher is both, a victim of language and a reformer of language, that the philosopher is subject to linguistic - confusion, but he also possesses linguistic penetration. Here Mr. Wisdom parts his ways from

Wittgenstein, as he himself says in that paper, "But he (Wittgenstein) too much represents them (philosophical theories) as merely symptoms of linguistic confusion. I wish to represent them as also symptoms of linguistic penetration".¹

Philosophical statements are not meaningless, but they are not also descriptions of the genuine type as philosophers suppose them to be. Philosophical statements are misleading in so far as they have non-verbal or descriptive air about them; and it is this misleading feature of metaphysical statements, which is responsible for the first radical reaction of Wittgensteinians against metaphysics. The fact, that philosophers do think that their questions and answers are scientific or descriptive in nature, is a symptom of linguistic confusion on their part. But at the same time philosophical statements are 'illuminating' because they point out certain incongruities in the 'rules of grammar and make suggestions to amend them, or what Mr. Wisdom calls 'they make verbal recommendations'. To quote Mr. Wisdom "Philosophical theories are illuminating in a corresponding way, namely when they suggest or draw attention to a terminology which reveals likenesses and differences concealed by ordinary language. I want to stress the philosophical usefulness

1. John Wisdom 'Philosophical Perplexity' Proceedings of Arist. Soc : 1937. Words in brackets are mine.

of metaphysical surprises such as "we can never really know the causes of our sensations", "Inductive conclusions are never really justified", "The laws of mathematics are really rules of grammar". I believe that too much fun has been made of philosophers who say this kind of thing".¹

Now we shall proceed to illustrate both the stages of condemning metaphysics, we have talked about. This point has already been illustrated in the first chapter in connection with the puzzle about 'the knowledge of other minds.' Here we shall take some other examples to illustrate the same point. The purpose of this more than one illustration is to bring home to the reader's mind that it is not that only one stray statement of a philosopher can be shown to be nonsensical or verbal, but that many sorts can be treated in this way.

A useful digression:- High sounding language of the philosopher:- Generally philosophers have the habit of putting their questions in too general a form and too grand a manner. But Mr. Wisdom has a peculiar knack of reducing these grand-looking questions of the philosopher to concrete and specific forms to be handled by Wittgensteinian method. We shall give a few examples of this peculiar but useful performance

1. John Wisdom 'Philosophical Perplexity' Proceedings of Arist: Soc: 1937.

of Mr. Wisdom. Philosophers ask "Is knowledge of other-selves possible"? And Mr. Wisdom reduces this to "can we know what is going on in some one else's mind"? He further reduces this question to "can I know what is going on in Simth's minds"? Philosophers ask "Is knowledge of the external world possible"? And Mr. Wisdom turns it into "can I know there is cheese on the table"? Philosophers ask "what is matter"? And Mr. Wisdom translates it into "what is a chair"? It should be mentioned however that this Wisdomian translation of philosophical questions is merely an act of obedience to Wittgenstein's instruction to ascertain the meaning of philosophical questions before attempting to answer them. Professor Moore also has been playing the same game with philosophers and he started the game in his famous essay on 'Conception of Reality' in which he translated Bradley's question about the reality of Time into "Are temporal facts real"?

The reason why we have mentioned this point here is that it is the present writer's experience in India and elsewhere that people say that Wittgensteinians fight against imaginary enemies, that no body asks the questions which Wittgensteinians criticise as meaningless or verbal, that the questions which Wittgensteinians condemn are not really questions raised by philosophers. They say "philosophers do not ask

'can I know what is going on in Smith's mind'? etc." The above paragraph will go to show to such people that they are wrong in thinking that Wittgensteinians criticise imaginary questions. Questions and answers that they criticise are really the questions of the philosopher, only they give them concrete forms.

Now we go back to our proper task. The question that we dealt with in the first chapter to illustrate the two stages of condemning metaphysics was a question about the knowledge of other minds. Before we give further illustrations, in order that continuity be maintained, it is desirable to give a summary of the illustration referred to above. The question was put in a concrete form, which was, "can I know what is going on in X's mind"? We found the philosopher persistently saying that we can never know what is going on in X's mind, the reason he gave was 'because we cannot introspect in X's mind'. The philosopher would call only 'introspective knowledge' as 'knowledge of mind'. Thus the philosopher's answer "we can never know what is going on in X's mind" really meant "we can never introspect in X's mind". To this we said that the philosopher was either talking nonsense; or he was making a 'verbal recommendation' for modifying the use of 'know'. In Mr. Wisdom's terminology, he was drawing attention to 'differences concealed by ordinary language'. In the ordi-

nary language, we say "we know what is going on in our minds", we also say "we know what is going on in so and so's mind". But the two forms of knowledge are different, that is, we use the same word 'know' for two different things. This is what the philosopher was pointing out and he was making a suggestion for improving this imperfection in the use of 'know'. Thus we find the philosopher as a reformer of language, but we find him also a victim of language for he could utter such nonsensical sentences as "We can never introspect in some one else's mind".

Another illustration :- 'Knowledge of the external world':- Certain philosophers complain that knowledge of the external world is not within the range of human achievement, and they go on giving all sorts of arguments in support of their theory as if it were an empirical theory. But we shall see that here also the philosopher is assuming a pseudo-empirical air about his theory and that he is either talking nonsense or making a verbal recommendation, but he is not making any significant statement about reality.

"We can never know that there is cheese on the table" is one of the concrete forms of the philosopher's complaint mentioned above. Now let us see what the philosopher has in his mind. "We can never tell whether there is cheese on the table" apparently

looks like "We can never tell whether tomorrow will be a bright day". The latter statement however is an empirical statement and the difficulty there is about procuring sufficient empirical evidence. If our forecast instruments were more refined we may be able to know definitely what tomorrow's weather will be like. Whereas in the former case no empirical evidence is relevant. Whatever arguments we may forward, the philosopher will go on persisting in saying "We can never know there is cheese on the table". He will say "for aught I know it may disappear as soon as I touch it. For aught I know it may turn into soap when I put it into my mouth. Remember what happens at Madame Tassaüd's,¹ remember what happens in deserts".

There are two points of criticism to be made. Firstly, the philosopher is assuming a pseudo-doubt, secondly his argument is based on the misuse of language.

Pseudo-doubt of the Philosopher:- The philosopher says "aught I know it may disappear as soon as I touch it. Aught I know it may turn into soap when I put it in my mouth." Does he really think that the cheese may disappear as soon as he touches it or that it may

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1. Madame Tassaüd's is a Wax Exhibition in London. Wax-bodies placed in that exhibition are always seen as living bodies even from the nearest distance.

turn into soap when he puts it in his mouth? If he really doubted about such things, he is not a fit person to live in society, he should immediately be packed off to some mental hospital, but in fact no body thinks of sending him to a mental hospital, the reason being that really he is normal, his doubts are only 'pseudo-doubts'. Ordinarily one does not doubt about such things, but there are occasions when one does doubt certain things; and when one does doubt one's activities are affected thereby. If I doubt, whether Aga-Khan's Derby horse will win the race, I will hesitate in putting my stakes on him, but our philosopher without the slightest hesitation stretches his hand to the cheese-plate his wife offers him and quietly takes a piece and eats it without bothering to know whether it turns into soap or not.

Meaningless argument:- Here the philosopher has used, rather, misused the argument of illusion. The word 'illusion' has a definite meaning in the ordinary language; in other words there are 'rules of grammar' which govern the use of 'illusion'.

In the illusion of mirage, I see water in desert when there is only sand. In an illusion of this sort, with the same eyes and at the same location we see two different things at two intervals of time. In the mirage-case, when I am near the object of perception I see sand, when I am farther away I see water.

We may recognise three kinds of illusion, (1) where the illusory knowledge is cancelled by the knowledge obtained through the same sense organ, at the next moment, or when we go near the object of preception. e.g. Mirage. (ii) When the illusory knowledge is cancelled by the knowledge obtained through some other sense-organ. Snake-rope-illusion is an instance of this sort. We seem to see a snake in the dark, but when we touch it or try to hear its sound, we find it is not a snake but a rope. (iii) Where only one man or a group of men under special circumstances suffer from illusion. Drunken men sometimes see 'pink rats;' this illusory knowledge is cancelled by the knowledge of other men.

But in all the cases of illusion, there is 'a possibility of immediate cancellation of the illusory knowledge'. In the ordinary language, illusory object is to be distinguished from genuine object, illusory knowledge is to be distinguished from genuine knowledge. But the philosopher so uses the illusion-argument that 'all the sense - organs of all men are always under illusion'. By doing this, however he makes the illusion-argument empty and the term 'illusion' meaningless. If you call all yours and every body else's experiences 'illusory', then what is it like not to be under illusion? There are people who bring in, the dream-argument; and say 'fundamentally there is no difference between

dream experience and waking experience, so how can we be sure that all that we experience is not a dream'. In the ordinary language, there are criteria to distinguish between dream experience and waking experience. 'Dreaming' implies 'waking up from the state of dreaming'. But if, as the philosopher says, we are always in 'dream', what is it like to wake up from this dream? Thus we find that the philosopher's arguments, in support of this complaint that we can never know there is cheese on the table, are meaningless and therefore his complaint itself is meaningless.

Should we say therefore that the philosopher has merely been a victim of language or that his confusion is partly a product of some linguistic penetration? Ask him "What is it like to 'know' that there is cheese on the table"? According to Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning, if the philosopher fails to describe what it is like to know that there is cheese on the table, then his contention, that we can never know there is cheese on the table, is meaningless. But probably the philosopher has an answer for our question, which may reflect both his confusion and penetration. He may give the following answer. "According to the rules of language, knowledge - statement has many implications about it. The first and foremost implication may be expressed as 'I know X' implies 'X is true'. This implication gives rise to many other

implications, e.g. about my future experiences and about other men's experiences. Take a concrete case. 'I know there is cheese on the table' implies 'there is cheese on the table'. The latter statement further implies 'if I went near it, I will have such and such perceptual sensations etc.' It also implies similar statements about other people. (Provided they are in normal condition) Secondly knowledge-statements are 'irrevocable'. This is only a further consequence of the first implication of 'I know X', that is 'I know X' entails 'X is true'. 'Knowledge statement is irrevocable' means that if my future experience or experience of other people makes me modify or withdraw my 'knowledge-statement', then I would say 'it was not a knowledge-statement at all'. If on going near to the table, I do not get necessary cheese-sensations, then I will have to say 'no, really I did not know that it was cheese, I only thought I knew'. Thus my previous statement 'I know there is cheese on the table' was not a knowledge-statement at all for knowledge-statements cannot be revoked or taken-back". Then the philosopher proceeds and says "since knowledge-statements have implication about my future experience and experience of other people, and since knowledge-statements are 'irrevocable' I cannot make knowledge-statements about physical objects." He gives two reasons for this. (i) Illusion

and dream arguments, (ii) Statements about my future experiences of the physical objects and statements about experience of other people do not logically follow from statements about my present sensations of the object. The first argument has already been considered and shown to be based on misuse of language. His complaint that statements about the future and about other men do not logically follow from statements about the present is an absurd and meaningless demand. It shows that he has not understood the correct use of 'logically follow.'

We can now guess his answer to the question "What is it like to know that there is cheese on the table"? His answer will be "If statements about my present sensations of the cheese logically entail statements about my future sensations and about sensations of other people, then I will say that I know there is cheese on the table". As we said before, this answer shows his linguistic confusion.

Let us see if we can credit him with linguistic penetration also. He says "We can always make knowledge - statements about our present sensations, but we can never make knowledge statements about physical objects". The philosopher has a true penetration into 'the rules of grammar' of 'know', but partly he has misapplied these rules. It is true that we can always make knowledge statements about our present

sensations, because sensation - statements have not got any implications about the future or about other men. But the philosopher is wrong in saying "we can never make knowledge statements about physical objects". It may be said however that some times knowledge-statements about physical objects have to be revoked, but never so in the case of sensations. The philosopher is emphasising this difference too much, but probably his emphasis is a useful one, for often times people make knowledge-statements about things on the meagrest evidence and the philosopher wants us to be careful about the use of 'know'.

Limit to the second form of condemning metaphysics:- Not all philosophical statements reflect linguistic penetration and suggest verbal recommendations. There are certain philosophical propositions which are both similar and dissimilar to the previous two examples which were 'I can never *know* what is going on in some one else's mind' and 'I can never *know* there is cheese on the table.' The other philosophical propositions which we want to discuss in this section are similar to the above mentioned examples in being 'verbal' and in not being meaningless like 'equations attend race meetings'; but their verbality is of a different sort.

(i) **'Same cause always produces same effect':-** This statement and others of its sort

also have an empirical air about them. There is a greater disagreement between Wittgensteinians and orthodox philosophers on questions of this sort than on those of the previous types. Orthodox philosophers contend that such statements state facts about reality. Wittgensteinians of course do not condemn such sentences as meaningless, but at the same time they reject the idea that these sentences state facts about reality.

Take a concrete instance of the general proposition 'same cause always produces same effect'. We take some amount of bursting power P . The law says 'whenever this powder is brought near fire, it will burst'. Now supposing, we take two dry glass tubes, exactly same (same in size, same in shape etc,) and put equal quantity of powder P in each, and then light two matchsticks, putting one in each tube, exactly in the same way. Now suppose that one tube bursts and the other becomes very cool. Then we ask the philosopher to account for this phenomenon. Will he withdraw his statement and say 'probably same cause does not produce same effect' or will he say something in defence of his proposition? It is more probable that he will defend it by saying "no, there must be something wrong with the tube, probably you did not dry it well, probably this, probably that". Howsoever a

large number of instances may be brought before him, he will not be prepared to give up his statement. What does this show? It shows that experience is not relevant for making the statement 'same cause produces same effect'. Thus it is not a statement of fact, but a 'rule of grammar' of the expression 'same cause'.

The philosopher, however has not made a verbal recommendation, he has not given any new use or modified an old use of some term, he has only stated a 'rule of grammar' already in practice. People in general accept this use of 'same cause'; put in popular terms "'same cause' would not be 'same cause' if it did not produce same effect".

I believe there are many philosophical propositions which are not meaningless like 'equations attend race meetings' nor are they verbal recommendations like 'I can never know what is going on in X's mind'; but they are statements of 'rules of grammar' already in practice, or they may be statements of rules of grammar of certain new expressions introduced by the philosopher.

Take for instance Berkeley's famous proposition 'Essi est percipi' or "to be is to be perceived". Some logical positivists have condemned this to be meaningless, which I think is a mistake. Criterion of verifiability has been applied to it because it is presented with empirical pretensions about it. Really it is a

statement like 'same cause produces same effect'; even Berkeley himself, I think, claims his proposition to be a current definition of 'to be', though at some places he also thinks as if he has made an empirical discovery about the nature of existence.

(ii) There is still another kind of philosophical propositions, which may be called 'purely symbolic definitions or implications of symbolic definitions'. Take this case, one from Arithmetic. If 212 416 gives 627, that is, if and whenever we mix 212 things with 416 things and count them again we find 627 and not 628 things, what will be our reactions? In such a case people would say "In nature things may disappear, but Arithmetical entities never vanish". "In Arithmetic $212 + 416$ must give 628". This reaction implies that arithmetical statements also are not about experience of reality, for what happens in nature does not affect the validity of the arithmetical law. Nor are these laws about arithmetical entities of the mysterious sort. According to Wittgenstein arithmetical entities are no other than arithmetical symbols. So we conclude that arithmetical statements are rules of arithmetical symbols.

I believe there are many philosophical propositions which are otherwise condemned as meaningless, but which may be interpreted as 'symbolic definitions or implications of some symbolic definition'. For instance

'one substance can not be produced by another substance' or again 'there cannot be two infinities'. These Spinozistic propositions, if they claim to say things about reality, are meaningless; but they can also be treated like the arithmetical statement discussed above. The words employed do not refer to anything outside themselves and in that sense they are pure symbols. A game is played with these symbols according to certain rules. The above symbolic statements are implications of a symbolic definition, definition of substance.

Four kinds of Philosophical Propositions:- At the beginning of this chapter we said the Wittgensteinian condemnation of metaphysics has passed through two stages, which we described as (1) Philosophical statements are really meaningless. (2) Philosophical statements are 'really verbal'. We then found out that philosophical statements can be verbal in three different ways. (1) Philosophical statements as verbal-recommendations, (2) Philosophical-propositions as statements of rules of grammar already in practice, (3) Philosophical propositions as symbolic definitions or implications of symbolic definitions. Following are the typical instances of these four kinds of philosophical propositions. (1) Equations attend race meetings or virtue is yellow. (2) I can never know what is going on in Smith's mind. (3) Same cause produces same effect. (4) $212 + 416 = 628$.

CHAPTER VI

FOUNDATIONS OF METAPHYSICS

Introduction:- In this chapter, we shall siege metaphysics from a different angle. Wittgensteinians condemn metaphysics because it does not fit in with their criterion of meaning. This may be called an external attack on metaphysics; in this chapter we hope to arrive at the same conclusion, that is, elimination of metaphysics, but not by applying some criterion from without, but by examining metaphysics from within itself, that is, examining the foundations of metaphysics.

By 'metaphysics' we understand the traditional philosophical systems and not the analytic philosophy of the present day. The whole of philosophy may be divided into analytic philosophy and systematic philosophy or what is generally called 'speculative philosophy'. There are different kinds of analytic and systematic philosophy, which we need not mention at present. But the two main divisions, 'systematic' and 'analytic' should be clearly distinguished from each other. Systematic or speculative philosophy is a search after new truths, while the analytic philosophy is a search after the analysis of old truths. Systematic philosopher intends to arrive at new facts, whereas the analytic philosopher wants to get clearer knowledge of the old facts. "Speculating and analys-

ing are operations which differ in kind; the object of one is truth, the object of the other is clarity".¹

Two-fold claim of the Philosopher:- The philosopher claims to be in pursuit of truth and this implies two things. Firstly that his questions and answers are scientific in nature and secondly that his methods are appropriate for his task. In the preceding chapter, we have already shown that his first claim, that is, 'the scientific nature of his problems and their solutions', is a pseudo-claim.² In the present chapter we want to show that the methods the philosopher employs in seeking the ultimate truth about the universe are not genuine sources of knowledge. In other words the foundations of metaphysics, i.e. the methods employed by the metaphysician, cannot hold the superstructure based on them.

Method in Metaphysics:- Metaphysicians never claim that they employ the same method in their inquiries as the scientist does. On the contrary, as we said in the preceding chapter, in respect of the method, they emphatically distinguish themselves from scientists. How is the metaphysician's method different from that of the scientist? Scientists observe, experi-

1. 'Problems of Mind and Matter' by John Wisdom. Introduction.

2. See chapter V, section 'First stage or form of condemning metaphysics' Pp. 80-83.

ment, hypothetise and verify. Metaphysicians do not experiment, nor do they hypothetise, nor verify.

What then is the metaphysician's method? It has been said that different metaphysicians or philosophical system-builders have employed different methods. Historians of European philosophy distinguish three methods, which, they say, have been used by different philosophers in the past. These three methods are named the 'rational method', 'the empirical method' and the 'critical method'. The rational method is said to have been employed in different degrees by Descartes. Spinoza, Leibniz and others of their school. Empirical method is said to have been employed by the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Critical method is the name given to the method employed by Kant.

It seems to us that historians are both right and wrong, that is, in a sense, different philosophers of the past used different methods and in a sense they employed the same method. There is one thing in common between all systems of metaphysics and that is, the object of all is to determine the real as distinct from the apparent or unreal. It is this which distinguishes a metaphysician from a non-metaphysician. It is, therefore, that Kant did not call himself a metaphysician. Kant of course made a preliminary distinction between the real and the apparent, but he said that the rea

was un-knowable. He employed his critical method, not in investigating the nature of the real or the noumenal, but in understanding the apparent or the phenomenal. This leads us to another idea which is more important for our present purpose.

Since all metaphysics is an inquiry into the real as distinct from the apparent, all metaphysics must employ the deductive method to a very great extent. We shall also show that all that goes by the name of metaphysics, does as a matter of fact involve deduction. 'The real' and 'the apparent' are not noun-expressions, they are not generic or proper names, though of course philosophers talk of reality as if it were the name of a thing. 'The real' and 'the apparent' are adjectival expressions, but they are not sensible adjectives like 'blue' or 'yellow', 'tall' or 'short'. One can see the blue of a blue thing, but one can-not see the reality of a real thing. Nor is *the reality* of a real thing a part of the thing as the blue of the blue thing is a part of the blue thing. 'The real' and 'the apparent' are value-adjectives like 'meaning', 'goodness', 'truth', 'beauty', 'Holiness' etc. All the value-adjectives are external designations of the designated, that is, we have to have definitions or criteria of 'the real', of 'meaning', of 'goodness' etc. It is only when we have a criterion of reality that we can say 'this is real and that is not real'. It is

only when we have a criterion of meaning that we can say 'this sentence has a meaning or not', it is only when we have a criterion of goodness that we can say 'this action or this man is good or not', and so with other value-adjectives. No philosopher can talk about the reality or unreality of things unless he has a criterion of reality or unreality. Whether anything is real or apparent, whether world is real or unreal, whether material objects are real or otherwise, whether other minds are real or not, whether Time is real or not, all this is to be deduced from the criterion of reality you accept.

In the last paragraph we said that the accepted definition of metaphysics (which is, 'metaphysics is an inquiry into the nature of the real') necessitates deduction as a method in all metaphysics. Now we proceed to show that all the so called metaphysical systems do make use of deduction and that without deduction no metaphysical system could be possible.

Metaphysical systems may be divided into purely-deductive systems and mixed-deductive systems, that is, deduction coupled with some sort of analysis.

Metaphysical Systems

Following is the detailed scheme of metaphysical systems. With a view to have a better grasp of these, the same is being given in the form of a chart.

Metaphysics

Purely-deductive	Analytic-deductive.
(1) <i>Rationalist school.</i>	(1) Analysing concepts and then deducing.
(2) <i>Hegelian school.</i>	(2) Analysing experience and then deducing.
	(3) Natural investigation and then deducing.

Pure deduction:- Pure and unmixed deduction can be found only in Spinoza and Hegel. In the modern times McTaggart may be said to be a pure-rationalist. In pure-deduction philosopher claims to deduce propositions about reality from certain self-evident axioms and definitions. Spinoza, in every part of his *Ethics*, even in the part on 'Psychology', starts with certain definitions and axioms and the rest of propositions in each book are merely deductive conclusions from the accepted definitions and axioms. Hegel too performs an act of pure-deduction. He starts with the category of quantity (for at first we think of things only quantitatively) and therefrom, by his peculiar method called 'dialectical method' deduces all the rest of his categories, ultimately reaching the concept of the Absolute.

Descartes and Leibniz, though rationalists can not be called pure-deductive philosophers. Their deduc-

tion was combined with some sort of empirical observation. Descarte's dualism was based on empirical observation. First he defined 'Substance'¹ as that which exists by itself and then looking round he found that matter and mind exist independent of one another and then he said 'there are two substances'. Ultimately he also made mind and matter dependent on God. Similarly Leibniz's deduction was combined with observation. The difference between these and the analytic-deductive philosophers is that the former were unaware of the non-deductive element in their philosophy while the latter were unaware of the deductive element in their philosophy.

Analytic-deductive-systems:- No body would question our contention that the Rationalists and Hegelians practised deduction for they themselves professed to practise deduction. Controversy may arise about the analytic-deductive philosophers as we call them, for they were unaware of the deductive element in their philosophy. Here we shall show that each one of the analytic-deductive systems is based on deduction.

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1. In the rationalist philosophy, philosophers talk of 'substance', in the idealistic philosophy they talk of 'reality' and in the empiricist philosophy, they talk of the 'existent'. But all the three terms mean the same.

(i) Different Analytic-deductive philosophers base their deduction on different sorts of analysis. Absolutist philosophers of Bradelyan type analyse certain concepts and then deduce their metaphysical conclusions. Bradley in his 'Reality and Appearance' and Mr. A. E. Taylor, a Bradelyan philosopher, in his 'Elements of Metaphysics' both first formulate the criterion of reality, then analyse concepts and then deduce metaphysical conclusions. We shall explain this by taking concrete instances. Absolutists say that change is unreal. How do they come to this conclusion? Their argument is as follows. 'Real is self-consistent', 'concept of change is self-contradictory', 'therefore change is unreal'. They say, 'Space, Time causality and all other relations also are unreal'. Here also argument is of the same sort. 'Concept of relation involves indefinite regress, but the real is harmonious and therefore definite and therefore all relations are unreal.

This kind of deduction is to be distinguished from the pure deduction practised by Spinoza and Hegel. In the pure deduction directly from certain definitions and axioms philosophical propositions are deduced; whereas in the deduction practised by Bradley and others, from definitions by themselves nothing is deduced. In this latter kind, definitions or criteria along with some kind of analysis give rise to further philo-

sophical propositions. Spinozistic deduction may be called 'geometrical deduction' and the latter kind of deduction may be called 'Syllogistic - deduction'. As we shall see in due course, all analytic - deductive philosophers practise syllogistic - deduction.

(ii) Under the second type of 'Analytic-deductive-systems' we put British Empiricism and Indian Vedanta. It is claimed by Empiricists and Vedantins that deduction plays no part in their systems. We shall here show that they too are not immune from deduction and that without deduction they will not be able to attain their object. We shall first take Empiricists and then Vedantins.

It is said that Empiricism came as a reaction against Rationalism. Let us be clear as to what did the Empiricist condemn in Rationalism. So far their object and aim was concerned both were alike, for both were in pursuit of philosophical-knowledge. The Empiricists' reaction against Rationalism was in respect of the Rationalists' method, and not against the Rationalists' object. We contend that in principle the Empiricists' method was the same as the Rationalists' for both practised deduction; the only difference was that the Empiricist's deduction was based on some sort of analysis.

The implicit criterion of reality in Empiricism is 'the perceivable alone is real'. The main conclusions

of *Empiricism* are *sylogistic-deductions* from the above mentioned criterion of reality. Locke started the Empiricist tendencies, but he could not carry out the programme to its culmination. We shall give a short summary of the development of empirical-doctrines showing that all of them are based on *sylogistic-deduction*.

Locke:- For convenience sake we may divide the universe into the Self, the world and God. He rejected the innate ideas of the Rationalist, for they could not be perceived. He admitted 'Ideas in the mind' to be real. (implicit argument being that ideas are perceived). By 'Ideas' he meant ideas of the external world, (which covers 'percepts', 'images' & 'abstract ideas') and mental operations i. e. feelings, desires etc. But he also postulated 'mind' or 'substratum of Ideas' though it could not be perceived. Regarding the world, he admitted the reality of primary qualities (because they could be perceived), but he denied reality to sensible qualities though they also could be perceived. The reason he gave was that they were mind-dependent. He also postulated material-substance or the substratum in which primary qualities inhere. He also believed in the existence of God, not because God could be seen, but on the ground that contingent existents necessitate some necessary existent. Thus we see that some of the doctrines of Locke are *sylogistic*

deductions from his Empiricist-criterion of reality and some are logical postulates.

Berkeley:- Berkeley took up the weapon which Locke had already used and with that very weapon he rejected some of the doctrines held by Locke, but he also failed to prove himself a consistent Empiricist. He excluded from his system material substance and primary qualities and retained mind, Ideas and God. He rejected material substance because it could not be perceived and he rejected primary qualities because according to him they too were mind-dependent. He admitted mind to be real and his argument was that though we do not have an 'Idea' of the mind, we have what he called 'notion' of the mind. But his belief in God was absolutely unbecoming to an Empiricist.

Hume:- Hume, the most thorough-going Empiricist of all the three, rejected mind and God because they were not objects of perception. He retained only 'Ideas' or what he called 'Impressions'. Hume's doctrine was "All that there is, is the impressions in an eternal flux".

This short summary of Empiricist school is enough to show that Empiricist-philosophy also is based on syllogistic-deduction. But their syllogistic-deduction is based on analysis of experience or empirical observation and not on the analysis of concepts as in the

case of Bradley. The contention that the Empiricist conclusions are based on empirical observation is only partially true. No amount of empirical analysis by itself could entitle them to make propositions about the real. Unless they had a criterion of reality, they possibly could not say 'this is real' and 'that is not real'. Even when Hume found, by analysing his experience, that all that one perceives is his 'impressions', how could he proceed to say 'All that there is, is impressions'? He could make this statement only by employing the criterion that only the perceivable is real.

Vedanta:- It is said by certain Vedantins¹ that the analysis of experience shows or manifests the unreality of the world and that unreality or illusory nature of the world is not a conclusion of any deductive process. Obviously this sort of talk is symptomatic of linguistic confusion. They think as if the unreality of the world is like the colour of my table; as by looking at my table I can see its colour, so also by analysing experience I may see the unreality of the world. We contend that in fact Vedantins also do employ syllogistic-deduction though they may not be aware of it.

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1. this criticism of Vedanta is based on Mr. G. R. Malkani's views expounded in some of his lectures delivered at the Indian Institute of Philosophy, during Jan-March 1940.

Vedantins contend that all that the reason does is to analyse experience into its 'logical types'. For instance reason points out that dream and waking experience belong to the same logical type, which means that there are many qualitative similarities between dream experience and waking experience. Similarly reason finds out similarities between illusory experience and genuine experience.

Even if we accept the above analysis to be the right analysis of experience, does any thing follow from it? The Vedantic conclusion that the world is unreal is based on the following implicit argument. The Real is that which is not cancelled. Dream is cancelled by waking life and therefore dream is unreal. Waking experience is of the same logical type as the dream, dream is unreal and therefore waking world also is unreal. The proposition that the world is unreal is conclusion of a dual syllogism. Similar argument is involved in the case of illusory experience and genuine experience. Without a criterion of reality we do not see how any body could make proposition about reality or unreality of anything.

But Vedantins say 'Surely we do not start with any criterion of reality, we only tell you that if you call dream unreal, you should also call waking world unreal'. This does not prove that the Vedantin has no criterion of reality, this only shows that he does

not give an arbitrary criterion of Reality, but that he employs the same criterion which people in general do. People call dream - world and objects of illusory perception unreal on the basis of some criterion of reality. The Vedantin employs this very criterion, to prove the unreality of the world.

(iii). The third kind of analytic-deductive system is what may be called, 'Scientific-philosophy'. Here the scientist first investigates facts and then claims to find out some philosophical truths about the universe. Now a days some philosophers quote scientists in support of their philosophical theories. This practice seems to be more common in India than any where else. Now let us see whether scientific research as such can help in solving philosophical problems.

Take a crude case of scientific investigation. Take a piece of paper and see it through scientific instruments. You will get different results. Suppose for the time being, that when you look at it through a particular instrument, you do not see a piece of paper at all, you see something entirely different, say you see atoms, dancing. (We are just supposing for the sake of argument that instead of paper you see atoms). Now, does this experiment by itself prove anything? Does it prove that paper does not exist or that paper is not real? Take another case. We see an object through different coloured glasses and every time

we see a different colour. Shall we say therefore that colour is not real as some philosophers do say?

It is when a scientist becomes a philosopher that he makes such statements, as Mr. Stocks of Manchester University in his recent book 'Reason and intuition' says that the controversy is not between a scientist and a philosopher, but between a philosopher and a philosopher. Statements that paper is not real or that colour is not real are deductive conclusions. In the first case, the argument is 'real is that which can be perceived. Scientific instruments are superior sources of perception, therefore, that which we perceive with a bare eye is less real than that which is perceived through a scientific instrument'. In the latter case the argument is 'that which changes with a change in the instrument is unreal. Colour changes with a change in the instrument, therefore colour is not real'. In philosophy this argument is called 'relativity of instrument'. In both the above cases, we start from a verbal definition of 'real' and then we perform a piece of deduction. Mere scientific facts cannot entitle us to make any philosophical propositions.

Thus we conclude that foundation of all metaphysics is deduction. We have shown this to be a necessary implication of the accepted definition of metaphysics and we have also demonstrated it to be

a fact in all the systems of metaphysics.

Value of deduction:- Most of the important metaphysical doctrines in every metaphysical system are deductive conclusions from the criterion of reality implicitly or explicitly accepted in the system. This contention has already been sufficiently illustrated. The source of important metaphysical controversies between different schools of thought also is the criterion of reality. In the history of metaphysical thought, persistent controversies have been between Idealism and realism, and between monism and pluralism or between monism and dualism. The Idealist says 'reality is mind - dependent', the realist says 'reality is mind-independent', the monist says 'reality is one', the dualist says 'reality is two' and the pluralist says 'reality is many'. All these seemingly scientific propositions are in fact deductions from the criterion of reality. The above mentioned difference of opinion between various philosophers is due to the different criteria different philosophers hold. The Idealistic doctrine that reality is mind-dependent is an implication of the Idealistic criterion of reality, which is, 'the perceivable alone is real'. The realist differs on this point, for he holds a different criterion of reality. According to him real is that which exists independently. The monist deduces his conclusion that reality is one from the criterion of reality which he holds, which is 'the real

is comprehensive and harmonicus'. According to me Bradley arrives at his monistic doctrine not by empirical investigation but by a deductive process. He prescribes comprehensiveness and harmony to be the criterion of reality; and then he introduces orders of reality, that is, higher reality, lower reality and absolute reality. More comprehensive and harmonious a thing is, more real it is. From this he reaches to the conclusion that that which is all comprehensive and harmonious is the absolutely real and that is his Absolute.

The Idealistic doctrine, the Realistic doctrine and the Monistic doctrine are conclusions of pure deductive processes. The dualistic and pluralistic doctrines are syllogistic - deductive - conclusions, from the realistic criterion of reality. The realist says 'real is that which exists independently'. The dualist looks round and finds that there are material objects and minds and these two kinds of things seem to him to be independent of each other, so he says 'there are two realities mind and matter'. But the pluralist takes a more common-sense attitude. He finds that material objects are independent of one another, minds are independent of one another, and material objects are independent of minds and minds of material objects. So he concludes that reality is many.

Hence we conclude that basis of all metaphysical deduction is the criterion of reality. We have already

shown that every criterion of reality is a 'verbal definition', for 'real' is not a name of a thing, it is a 'value - adjective'. Since, that from which metaphysical propositions are deduced is a verbal-definition, that which is deduced also will be verbal in nature. Therefore we may say that the metaphysician cannot be in pursuit of knowledge for he employs deductive method and we have proved metaphysical-deduction to be a verbal game.

Inductive reasoning in Metaphysics:- It may be contended that not all metaphysical doctrines can be shown to be deductive conclusions from one or the other criterion of reality, and that there are some metaphysical - doctrines which may be said to be inductive hypotheses. Doctrine of re-incarnation and law of Karma in Indian philosophy, Locke's doctrine of material - substance and various theories of causality may be said to be instances of inductive - hypotheses in metaphysics. Before we accept or reject this claim of our critics, we should make clear to ourselves as to the meaning of 'inductive hypothesis'. This term is taken from empirical sciences. First the scientist studies very critically some special phenomenon, in technical terms he is said to observe and experiment. Then he formulates a hypothesis or hypotheses to explain that phenomenon. For instance when Newton saw an apple falling from a tree, he began to wonder as

to why it fell and not flew. Then he observed and experimented on the phenomenon of falling and found that every thing fell when thrown. Afterwards he formulated a hypothesis, which was, that there was a gravitation force in the Earth which attracted all the things towards the Earth. It may be claimed that the above mentioned metaphysical doctrines are hypotheses like the Newtonian hypothesis referred to above. In a sense this claim may be true. Law of Karma is said to be an explanation, probably the only explanation of the unique differences in character of individuals in the same community and even in the same family. It is said that heredity and environment cannot explain these differences. Locke postulated material substance to explain the phenomenon of togetherness of certain qualities. Theories of causality are said to be explanations of the causal phenomenon which is that certain events always precede certain other events.

The question is 'Are these metaphysical hypotheses genuine hypotheses'? Every hypothesis so long it is a hypothesis has only an 'indirect meaning', that is, it has a meaning in terms of the phenomena it claims to explain. But even 'the indirect meaning' is claimed by a hypothesis only in expectation of 'the direct meaning' that it may get after it is verified directly or indirectly. But a hypothesis which is

incapable of any kind of verification cannot be said to have even the indirect meaning. That kind of hypothesis is a pseudo-hypothesis and not a genuine hypothesis. Further, a statement which claims to express a significant hypothesis is supposed to represent some thing over and above the phenomena it claims to explain; but it gets this significance only in the expectation of some kind of verification. But if the hypothesis is incapable of verification, then the statement which expresses that hypothesis cannot be said to represent anything over and above the phenomena which is to be explained. All that it may be doing is that it gives some sort of satisfaction to the philosopher who formulates that hypothesis. His puzzle seems to be solved. But in itself it is a mere jumble of meaningless words.

We contend that metaphysical hypotheses are incapable of verification. In fact here the philosopher agrees with us, for he more often calls these metaphysical hypotheses, not as 'inductive hypotheses', but as 'logical postulates'. 'Logical-postulate' is a respectable name for what we call 'pseudo-hypothesis'. In philosophy, logical-postulate is a hypothesis which can neither be proved nor disproved but which should be employed for certain purposes. Since metaphysical hypotheses are incapable of verification, they are meaningless. In order that a statement of fact be

meaningful, its meaning-giving situation should be describable, and in order that a statement which expresses a hypothesis be called meaningful, the hypothesis which is expressed should be verifiable.

Conclusion:- Thus we conclude that metaphysics as a pursuit of knowledge is impossible, for the foundations of all metaphysics are deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. And we have shown that metaphysical deduction is a verbal game and metaphysical induction is a pseudo-game. We have hereby eliminated metaphysics not by applying a criterion of meaning from without but by examining the very foundations of metaphysics and showing them to be unsuitable for the objective cherished by the metaphysician.



CHAPTER VII

GENESIS OF METAPHYSICS

Introduction:- So far we have discussed the fundamental thesis of Wittgensteinian philosophy and its adverse consequences for metaphysics. In the chapter on 'Elimination of metaphysics', we said that Wittgensteinians condemn metaphysical statements either as meaningless or as verbal. People ask "If metaphysics is meaningless and verbal, how is it that so far people never thought it so?" They tell us "Surely philosophers of the past were no fools". "They were not fools indeed, but they were dupes of language" is the Wittgensteinian answer.¹ Wittgensteinians contend that all the "traditional philosophical problems and their solutions arose out of an ignorance of the principles of symbolism and out of a misuse of language". In other words, genesis of metaphysics is the misleading nature of language. This is another revolutionary idea in the field of philosophy, the older idea is that philosophy is 'a child of wonder'. In this chapter, we shall first, explain and illustrate the Wittgensteinian genesis of metaphysics and then estimate its correctness.

Section I. Misleading features of language:-
It is an established fact that human language contains

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1. Orthodox logical Positivists like Ayer and others also give the same answer.

many imperfections and defects. The fundamental defect as already pointed out¹ is that it conceals many similarities and dissimilarities between various expressions and it is this aspect of language, which has caused many philosophical puzzles. There are certain sentences which are alike to each other in their grammatical or syntactical construction, but the 'rules of grammar' governing their use are different. In technical terms, they are "syntactically similar and logically dissimilar and their logical dissimilarity is concealed by the syntactical similarity between them".

Mr A. J. Ayer in his article on 'Genesis of Metaphysics'² quotes a passage from an eminent German philosopher, showing how the aforesaid misleading feature of language gives rise to the puzzle about 'nothing'. "The best example I can give of the way in which metaphysics normally comes to be written is a passage from Heidegger's 'Was ist metaphysik'. 'Only Being' says Heidegger, 'ought to be explored and besides that - nothing. Being alone and further - nothing: Being solely and beyond that - nothing. How about this nothing? Is there the nothing only because there is the not - that is Negation? Or is it the other way about? Is there Negation and the not

1. Chapter V. section on 'second form of condemning metaphysics'.

2. The Analysis, Vol: I No. 4.

only because there is the nothing? We assert: the nothing is more fundamental than the not and Negation. Where are we to look for the nothing? How are we to find the nothing? We know the nothing. Anxiety reveals the nothing. That for which and about which we made ourselves anxious was "real" nothing? In fact the nothing itself, as such, was there. How does this nothing? The nothing itself nothings'." Mr Ayer then goes on to say, and very rightly too, "This passage is important not merely because it shows the psychologist what down right nonsense a philosopher, accounted *eminent* will in all innocence produce, but even more because it exemplifies so very clearly the kind of error which lies at the root of almost all metaphysics. For what sustains this rubbish is the single false assumption that the sentences 'there is snow on the ground' and 'there is nothing on the ground' express propositions of the same logical form. It is this that leads the author to inquire into state of nothing, just as he might ask about the state of snow and finally to the introduction of the nonsense verb to nothing with the verb to snow".

Same misleading feature of language is said to have given birth to the puzzles about 'Nobody' and 'the average man'. We ask 'Did Smith Smile?' 'Did John Smile?' 'Did nobody smile?' Apparently the terms 'Smith', 'John' and 'nobody' in the above

sentences look alike, but logically 'nobody' does not belong to the same type as 'Smith' and 'John'. The philosopher is misled, by this apparent similarity, into thinking that the function of 'nobody' is like that of 'Smith' or 'John', and so he asks the question "who is nobody"?

Puzzle about the average man also arises in a similar way. We have sentences like 'height of the average man is 5 feet', 'intelligence - quotient of the average man is 60', 'Smith's height is 5 feet and 3 inches', 'Smith's intelligence-quotient is 70'. The two pairs of sentences have the same grammatical form, but their logical implications are different. The philosopher is again misled by language and asks "who is the average man"? He complains that he can never shake hands with the average man. The philosopher seemingly treats 'height of the average man' as of the same logical form as 'height of Smith Ellis'.

Doctrine of subsistent entities also is traced to the same misleading feature of language, i. e. concealment of logical dis-similarity by syntactical similarity between expressions or sentences. Take for instance the following example. There are sentences like 'I see a table', 'I imagine unicorns'. Syntactically, both the verbs 'see' and 'imagine' look alike. They are placed in the same place in their respective sentences, that is, between the subject and the object. Both have same

word for their subject. This apparent likeness has misled philosophers to raise the same kind of question about objects of both the verbs. They ask "what are tables?" and they also ask "what are unicorns?" McTaggart asked the question about the ontological status of unicorns. People think that there must be tables to see table, similarly there must be unicorns to imagine unicorns. But there are no unicorns in this world of flesh and blood, what they call 'world of existent entities', so they postulate another world which they call 'world of subsistent entities'. Here again the philosopher is trapped by language, for he cannot see the concealed dis-similarity between 'I see a table' and 'I imagine unicorns'. 'I see a table' implies there is a table. But the use of 'imagine' does not have any such implications. 'I imagine unicorns' does not imply there are unicorns. This is how philosophers come to talk of subsistent entities.

Metaphysical questions about the nature of 'Being' also originate from the same misleading feature of language. In the ordinary language sentences which express existential propositions and sentences which express attributive propositions have the same grammatical form. For instance, the sentences "martyrs exist" and "Martyrs suffer" both consist of a noun followed by an intransitive verb. But the philosopher assumes too much. The sentence 'martyrs suffer' implies that

suffering is an attribute of martyrs and the philosopher thinks that the sentence 'martyrs exist' also implies that existence is an attribute of martyrs. So he inquires into the nature of existence as he would inquire into the nature of suffering. But in fact 'existence' is not an attribute, and if the philosopher were aware of this he would not raise the question about the nature of existence.

Section I (ii) The second misleading feature of language responsible for metaphysics is the superstitious belief shared by almost all that all the noun-words function alike, like generic or proper names. Generic and proper names are names of certain things or persons, in general they may be called 'entity-names'. So all noun-words are mistakenly considered to be 'entity-names'.

Philosophers invariably raise the same sort of question about all the noun-words. They ask "what are propositions"?, "What are universals"?, "What is Time"?, "What is goodness"?, "What is an instinct"?, "What is a sentiment"? and so on. Philosophers assume that all the above mentioned questions and others of their sort are 'entity-questions' like "what are Siamese cats"? and it is therefore that they always answer such questions in terms of entities and they would not be satisfied with any answer which is not in terms of entities.

In Indian philosophy, philosophers have made statements like 'surely moon-ness does not exist in jar, it exists only in the moon'. While discussing the problem of the whole and parts people have asked 'where does the whole exist, does it exist in any particular part, does it exist in all the parts simultaneously, does it exist in any part only partially or wholly?' They also ask 'where does the manyness exist?' etc. All such questions arise out of the superstitious belief that all noun-words are names of entities.

Section I (iii) The third misleading feature of language which gives rise to metaphysics is the belief that all subject words i.e. the words which occupy the place of the subject in any sentence are names of individual entities.

It is contended that the problem of substance and attributes originates from the aforesaid superstition. Whenever we talk of attributes or qualities of a thing, the thing becomes the grammatical subject of the sentence, e.g. cat is brown, table is yellow, picture is blue etc. Therefore the philosopher thinks that the subject word stands for an entity other than attributes, for he believes that all subject words are entity-names.

"But from the fact that we happen to employ a *single word* to refer to a thing, and make that word the grammatical subject of the sentences in which we refer to the sensible appearances of the thing, it does

not by any means follow that the thing itself is a 'simple entity' or that it cannot be defined in terms of the totality of its appearances".¹

Section I. (iv) The fourth misleading feature of language which gives rise to metaphysics is, that in many cases different things are called by the same name. In Wittgensteins' *Tractatus*, one name for one thing is said to be a sign of perfection in language.

The two most important problems in speculative philosophy are said to originate from the above mentioned defect in language. They are the problems of matter and mind. All the objects in the external world are called by one name 'material objects', even though there are so many differences among them, and this induces the philosopher to think that all the objects are different appearances or forms of one and the same thing which is given the general name 'matter'. And the philosopher raises the question "what is matter"? It is contended that if the objects of the external world were not given the common - name 'material object', puzzle may not have arisen at all.

Problem of the Self or mind also is said to arise in the same way. In the ordinary language, the same personal - pronoun, 'I', 'you' or 'he' and their plurals, is used for entirely different things. Sometimes we say 'I am walking'. Here the subject word 'I' refers

1. 'Language, Truth and Logic' by A. J. Ayer P.82

to body. Sometimes we say 'I am thinking' or 'I am feeling sad' or 'I am imagining', 'I am remembering' and so on. In the latter group of sentences 'I' refers to something other than body. Or again, we may say 'I am moral' or 'I am immoral' etc. Here 'I' refers to something still different. So the philosopher thinks that these personal prouns refer to or stand for something over and above all these different activities attributed to them, and thus arises the belief in the transcendental ego. Wittgensteinians contend that if in language this common name were not there, and if for every different kind of pronoun-sentence there were a different subject word, the philosopher would not be induced to postulate a transcendental ego.

Section I. (v) The last and not the least source of metaphysics is said to be the misuse of language. Misuse of language may be of two kinds, 'meaningless use' or 'new use'. Often times the philosopher raises a question by using an expression or expressions nonsensically. ("nonsensically" should be understood in the light of Wittgensteinian criterion of meaning). The question about the cause of the universe as a whole or the doctrine of free cause and many other questions and doctrines are said to be the product of meaningless use of language.

Generally 'cause' is understood as a precedent event of a consequent event. To talk about the cause

of the universe is to talk about the precedent event i. e. event preceding the birth of the universe. In 'universe' philosophers include everything, even Time. So to ask for the cause of the universe is to ask for an event before the beginning of the Time; and this is obviously a nonsensical statement. Similarly concept of 'free cause' also is condemned as nonsensical.

But more often the philosopher has in his mind a new use of an expression. For instance when philosophers ask "can I 'know' what is going on in some one else's mind?", "can I 'know' whether there is cheese on the table?", "can I 'know' whether this woman is the 'same' whom I married three years ago?", they are asking whether there occur situations in which one may say "I know what is going on in some one else's mind", "I know that there is cheese on the table", "I know that this woman is the same woman whom I married three years ago" according to the new use of 'know' which they (philosophers) have in their mind. When they ask "can I know what is going on in some one else's mind"? What they mean is "can I know what is going on in some one else's mind as I can know what is going on in my own mind"? When they ask "can I know that there is cheese on the table?", they want to ask whether one can know physical objects in the same sense in which one can know one's own sensa-

tions. So in the third question they want to know whether one can recognise the identity of things and other persons in the same way as one can do one's own.

Thus we find that there are five linguistic sources of metaphysics and they are said to be the only sources of metaphysics. For the convenience of the reader we may briefly state them in one place. (1) concealment of logical-dissimilarity by syntactical similarity between expressions (phrases or sentences), (2) Belief that all the 'noun-words' function like generic or proper names. (3) Belief that all the 'subject-words' are names of entities. (4) One name for different things. (5) Misuse of language (new use or meaningless use). Out of these five, first and fourth are really misleading features of language and logical defects in our symbolism. Second and third imply ignorance of symbolism and for these beliefs partly language and partly philosophers and others are at fault. But in the last case philosopher alone is responsible.

In this section, we have given some illustrations to illustrate the alleged linguistic sources of metaphysics. The reader should not think that these are the only philosophical problems which arise from the misleading nature of language. The contention is about the whole of metaphysics, the puzzles which have been mentioned are only illustrations.

Section II. Experience as a source of Metaphysics:- The orthodox metaphysicians contend that the genesis of metaphysics is 'experience' and not 'language'. They believe that experience and observation suggest philosophical problems and that philosophical problems do not arise out of the misleading nature of language. In this section we shall prove this claim of the orthodox philosopher to be a pseudo - claim.

Section II. (i) The first and fundamental problem in metaphysics is said to be the problem of the real. The orthodox philosophers argue as follows. 'We come across certain contradictions in experience, such as earth looking immovable and really being always on a move, the seeming continuity and sameness of a lump of solid matter with the real discontinuity and variety of its chemicals, the seeming friendliness of the hypocritical self - seeker with his real indifference to our welfare. Such contradictions in experience give rise to the problem of the apparent and the real.'¹

We have discussed this problem at some length in the chapter on 'Foundations of metaphysics'. There

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1. 'Elements of metaphysics' by A. E. Taylor. Intro. duction. (This is not a literal quotation, only the argument is taken from the above mentioned book.)

we found that the question 'what is Real?' is a verbal question and not a metaphysical question in the orthodox sense of the term. What the question 'what is Real?' requires is a criterion of reality and not a description of a metaphysical entity as questions like 'what is matter?' and 'what is self?' do.

A verbal question can be suggested only by the study of language and not by that of experience. The question 'what is Real?' is suggested to us when we see or hear other people using the word 'real'. Even children say 'this is real' and 'that is not real'. There are certain things which in our language are called 'real' and there are others which are called 'unreal'. Philosophical study of language excites our curiosity to know as to why certain things are called 'real' and certain other things are called 'unreal'. Then we proceed to find the criterion of reality practised in language; or we may not find any consistent criterion in practice, so we may suggest a new one.

Even the quotation from Mr. Taylor goes to support our point. In the quotation Mr. Taylor speaks about the apparent immovability and real movability of the earth, seeming continuity and sameness of a solid matter and its real discontinuity and variety and so on. Mr. Taylor then asserts that the question 'what is Real?' is suggested by contradictions in experience. The contradictions in experience which he

relers to are the following. With my bare eyes I see the earth as immovable, but my knowledge of Geography tells me that the Earth is always on a move. Similarly with my eyes I see continuity and sameness in material objects, but my knowledge of chemistry tells me the otherwise. Externally I see a person as very friendly towards me but by my psychological insight I find that he is my enemy. I contend that even if we had these contradictory pieces of knowledge, the problem about the Real will not arise at all. It is only when we call one piece of knowledge 'real' and another 'false', that the question 'what is real?' arises.

Section II. (ii) We shall take two other examples to illustrate our contention that the so called problems which are said to be suggested by experience really originate from language.

Problem of the Substance:- It is said that the problem of material substance is suggested by 'togetherness' of qualities. Always we find the qualities of extension, form, size, thickness etc. together. Locke's postulate of 'material substratum' is said to be an explanation of this togetherness of qualities. The question for Locke was 'why are qualities found together?' He answered 'because they inhere in the same substratum'. The same question bothered Berkeley, but he gave a different answer. According

to Wittgensteinian way of thinking, the question 'why are qualities found together?' originates from a misuse of the term 'together'. The term 'together' has a meaning in terms of the term 'separate'. That is, we talk of things or persons being together and that which can be together with some thing else also can be separate from it. 'Togetherness' and 'separation' logically imply each other. According to this sense of 'together' we cannot talk of togetherness of qualities. What is it like for qualities to be separate?

Section II. (iii) Problem of causality also is said to be suggested by experience? We find certain events following certain other events. Let us explain this symbolically. B follows A. The philosopher asks the question 'why does B follow A?' and different answers have been given to this question. Some say 'there is power in A',¹ some say 'it is God's grace'² and some say 'it is mental association'.³ But Wittgensteinians would say that this question is not a genuine question at all. It originates from the misuse of the term 'why'. There are two senses of 'why', 'causal-why' and 'rational-why', and neither is appropriate in the present case.

The question 'why does B follow A?' cannot be a

1. Locke's view of causality.

2. Berkeley's ,, ,,

3. Hume's ,, ,,

demand for a causal explanation, for the philosopher will not be satisfied with causal explanation. 'Cause' generally means 'a precedent event and 'effect' a consequent event'. To give a causal answer to the above question is to state a precedent event, precedent to A. If I say 'B follows A, because A follows C', the philosopher will again ask 'why does A follows C'? The question is not about any particular event, it is 'about precedence and consequence as such'. The philosopher cannot ask for 'rational explanation' for that demand in the case of cause and effect would be an absurd demand. To give a rational explanation of the question in hand means to give a proposition from which the fact of precedence and consequence should logically follow. But it is nonsense to talk of a fact logically following from a proposition. So we conclude that the question 'why does B follow A?' is a meaningless question and has arisen from a misuse of language.

In conclusion it may be mentioned that the only genuine problems which experience suggests to us are the scientific problems i. e. problems tackled by scientists. Philosophical problems have their source in language.



CHAPTER VIII

ROLE OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHER.

In the preceding chapter, we said that the genesis of metaphysics is 'the misleading nature of language'. If the 'misleading nature of language' be the source of metaphysics, the true task of the philosopher should be to 'study language' so as to avoid the linguistic pit - falls himself and also to show to others where the pit - falls lie.

The critics ask, "what kind of study of language is this"? The question is genuine for many people study language from many different points of view. The philologist studies language, the etymologist studies language, the grammarian studies language, the literary man studies language, the logician studies language. How is the new philosopher's study of language different from all these? We shall now make an attempt to answer this question of the critic.

Various names have been given to the pursuit of the new philosopher. Some say that 'logical clarification of ideas' is the function of the new philosopher, some say that 'Philosophical analysis of language' is the proper function of the new philosopher, some say that 'Ostentation of sentences' is the only pursuit of the new philosopher, some say that 'the study of the rules of grammar' is the sole aim of the new philoso-

pher. But mere names and titles cannot make the matter clear, and that is exactly what the Cambridge Wittgensteinians do. They perform the pranks, but very rarely tell you how they perform them. They practise the new method, but they never preach. Wittgensteinian method of study cannot be learnt so much from books, for there are no books on Wittgensteinian method, as from personal contact with the masters of Wittgensteinian Philosophy.

Mr. Wisdom's account of Philosophical analysis:- If there is any written exposition of Wittgensteinian method, it may be found in Mr. Wisdom's articles on 'logical - constructions',¹ 'Different level',² 'Is Analysis a useful method in Philosophy'?.³ The last mentioned article contains the most systematic account of Mr. Wisdom's idea of Philosophical analysis of language. In the first chapter we made a cursory reference to it, in the present chapter we shall discuss it in greater details.

Mr. Wisdom distinguishes 'Philosophical Analysis' from the scientific analysis of language or the analysis performed by the scientist and also from the logical

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1. 'The Mind' Years 1931-34.
 2. 'Proceedings of Aristotelian Society' Supp:
Vol: XIII. Year 1934.
 3. I bd.

analysis of language or the analysis performed by the logician. He calls the scientific - analysis 'material - same level - analysis', the logical - analysis as 'Formal - same level - analysis' and the Philosophical analysis as 'Material - different level - analysis'.

There are, he says, three different kinds of defects in language, one to be cured by the scientist, one by the logician and one by the philosopher (of the new kind). "These defects are partly due to a desire for brevity. Roughly speaking the first consists in giving symbols double work, the second in using special abbreviating devices and the third in using sentences of small scale".

Distinction between Formal and Material Analysis:- Formal analysis is a clarification of the form, material analysis on the other hand is a clarification of the content or the matter of the sentence to be analysed. The sentence 'Every dog is dangerous' may be formally analysed into 'Something is a dog and dangerous, and it is not the case that something is a dog and is not dangerous'. Formal analysis consists in analysing the relations which terms, constituting the sentence, bear to each other. Whereas material analysis is the analysis of the terms themselves which form the content of the sentence. "The scientist gives material analysis when he begins by 'defining his terms'. To give a material analysis of a term is

to give an analytic definition". The term 'wealth' may be materially analysed into 'that which is useful, transferable and limited in supply'. The term 'interest' may be materially analysed into 'Payment made by a borrower for the use of a loan, for, say, a year'. 'Analytic definition' is to be distinguished from 'verbal-definition'. If 'wealth' were to be defined as 'riches' or 'interest' as 'usury', we would not be said to have given analytic definitions, but only verbal definitions. The verbal definitions do nothing to render explicit the connotation of the terms defined, whereas the analytic or material definitions do.

Distinction between same level and different level analysis:- This distinction has been briefly explained in the first chapter.¹ 'I am *in awe* of you' = 'I *fear and admire* you'. 'The average man is *in awe* of the medical man' = 'The average man *fears and admires* the medical man'. These are examples of same-level-material analysis. On the other hand 'the average man is in awe of the medical man = most men (individual) are in awe of any medical man (individual) whom they meet' is an example of different level - material - analysis. To translate sentences about any abstraction into sentences about what it is an abstraction from is to give a new level or a different level - analysis of the sentences. Thus to

1. Chapter I of this book, Pp 13-15

translate sentences about the biological rabbit, the psychological individual and the economic man into sentences about individual rabbits and men is to give a philosophical analysis or different-level-material-analysis. When the biologist translates sentences about rabbits into sentences about rabbitish-sense-patterns, he is doing new level analysis. When the psychologist is trying to reduce individuals to their experiences, he is doing the same. When the economist translates sentences about the representative firm into sentences about firms and these into sentences about individuals and these into sentences about experiences we have a long process of new level — analysis.

In the light of what has already been said in the first chapter, the reader should be able to understand the above given examples which illustrate the difference between same level and new level analyses of sentences.

Philosophical analysis does not complete the philosophical study:- Philosophical study of language which, we have said, is the role of the new philosopher does not consist merely in performing different level-material-analysis of certain terms or sentences. I believe that even Mr. Wisdom himself does much more than mere philosophical analysis. More proper way to define 'philosophical study of language' as practised by Wittgensteinians is to say that it consists in studying 'the rules of grammar' or 'the rules

governing the usage or operation of symbols', and this study may include philosophical analysis as defined by Mr. Wisdom, but it includes other things also.

Study of rules of grammar cannot be comprehensively described, it can be demonstrated. In fact it may be said that the class-lectures of Wittgensteinian professors at Cambridge are more or less demonstrative performances of the study of rules of grammar. Professor G. E. Moore, to my mind, is the master performer of this art. His lectures are perfect pieces of demonstration of the study of rules of grammar, so much so that any student who has not known him before may take him to be a professor of English rather than of philosophy, for he does nothing except discuss the use of certain expressions. In fact a Chinese philosopher who went to hear Moore said that he went to learn Professor Moore's views about the universe and man's relation with the universe, but he only learned how to speak English correctly.

One of the important forms of the study of 'rules of grammar' is to distinguish between various senses or uses of an expression and their implications and also to distinguish its uses from those of allied expressions. An example from Professor Moore's lectures may make the statement clear.

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1. 'Cambridge-Studies', article on Cambridge philosophy.

Moore's account of Perception:- In lent term of the year 1937-38, he discussed the problem of perception. He started with giving a list of different senses of 'seeing'.

- (1) I saw a man (in waking life)
 - (i) I saw a man (in waking life, from a near distance)
 - (ii) I saw a man (in waking life, from a long distance)
- (2) I saw a man (in a dream)
- (3) I saw a man (in hallucination)
- (4) I saw a bunch of grapes (in a seance)
- (5) I saw my face (in a mirror)

According to Moore, all these uses of 'see' are different because their implications are different, and yet they are all instances of 'seeing' because they are similar in one fundamental factor. The common factor is that all the cases of 'seeing' imply a sense-datum. On the other hand first and fifth cases imply the existence of a real man and a real face respectively whereas second, third and fourth cases do not have such an implication. In the first case, to say that I saw a man but really there was no man, would involve a self - contradiction, but that would not be so in other cases. Objects of perception in Ii & Iii are different. In the first case man would look what he really is, in the other case man would look smaller

than what he really is. Similarly in other cases also there are subtle differences in implications.

Use of 'see' and use of 'know':- Some times, says Moore, we see a thing, but do not know it, some times we know a thing, but do not see it, and sometimes we do both, see a thing and also know it. Suppose that I see at a distance a person and some time after my friend X meets me and in his talk happens to tell me that he passed such and such road at such and such time, then suddenly I say "oh yes I saw you, but I did not know that it was you". This is an instance of seeing and not knowing a thing.

Take another case. I go to an optician to get my eyes examined. He asks me to read a card - board sheet from a particular distance. Suppose that I remember the letters written on the card - board, but actually I do not see exactly what the words are. Then I may be said to know those words and not see them. This is a case of knowing and not seeing a thing.

In this way Professor Moore goes on studying the rules of grammar. The reader should not think that we have exhausted all that Moore has said on the problem of perception. We have discussed this example only to illustrate what study of rules of grammar is like.

Wittgensteinian method, a blind and an empty game:- Wittgensteinian method as such may be accepted to be the best approach to philosophical problems, but the actual practice of it, by Cambridge Wittgensteinians, seems to the present writer to be both empty and blind. It is a blind game for they practise the method with no philosophical end to realise. As we have already said, their performances are merely demonstrative pieces. It is an empty game for the expressions they analyse are not of much interest to those who are puzzled with great philosophical problems. The words and phrases that they discuss are taken more from common man's language than from the philosopher's language. Even when a philosophical symbol is analysed, it is done through the love of demonstration and not to carry out any constructive programme.

Constructive Programme:- Wittgensteinian philosophy, though new and revolutionary, has not been able to attract many followers even in Europe and England. The reason for this slackness on the part of intellectuals probably is that Wittgensteinians have not used their method for carrying out any constructive programme. If the contention is that the genesis of all metaphysics is the misleading nature of language, then Wittgensteinians must undertake to study

the traditional philosophy, tackle various traditional problems thoroughly and *find out where the philosophers of the old were misled*. That should be their sacred duty, but as a matter of fact it is a fashion among Cambridge Wittgensteinians to remain ignorant about the traditional metaphysical schools.

Before this thesis is brought to a close, the present writer humbly submits that unless this constructive programme is taken in hand, Wittgensteinian philosophy may see a quick death and remain only as one of the many historical schools of philosophy, which exist no more.



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