




PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

*An Examination of Logical Atomism and Logical
Positivism in the light of the Philosophies of
Bhartrhari, Dharmakīrti and
Prajñākaragupta*

BY

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With a Foreword by

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
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Dedicated

to the memory of my parents
late Gopal Chandra Ganguli
and late Ksirodasundari Devi
and

to the memory of my teacher
Mahamahopadhyaya
late Haran Chandra Sastri

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एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्येऽर्थे दर्शनं भिद्यते पृथक् ।
कालान्तरेण वैकोऽपि तं पश्यत्यन्यथा पुनः ॥
तस्मान् प्रत्यक्षमप्यर्थं विद्वानीक्षेते युक्तिः ।
न दर्शनस्य प्रामाण्याद् दृश्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

—Vākyapadīya

प्रायः प्राकृतसक्तिरप्रतिबलप्रज्ञो जनः केवलं
नानर्थ्येव सुभाषितैः परिगतो विद्वेष्टप्रसीर्षग्रामलैः ।
तेनायं न परोपकार इति नश्चिन्तापि चेतश्चिरं
सूक्ताभ्यासविवर्द्धितव्यसनमित्यत्रानुबद्धसमूहम् ॥

—Pramāṇa-vārtika

FOREWORD

It is a pleasure and privilege that I have been asked by the author to write a foreword to this work of provocative interest. I look back with pride to the old days when the writer, the author of the book, was my pupil in the Post-Graduate classes. From the very beginning I found in him a brilliant thinker and critic who could not take anything on trust, or out of respect for persons. It is the pity that I could not get Mr. Ganguli close by me as my colleague in Calcutta University when I was the Head of its Sanskrit Department. I dreamt of creating a school of thought and research. For this I wanted some of my brilliant pupils to be associated with me. At this fag end of my life and career as a professor of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy it induces me to take a retrospective view of my achievements. I might have done much more, but a man is the prisoner of circumstances which have a course of their own.

It gives me profound solace to find that Mr. Ganguli did not waste his time. His intellectual acumen and grasp of basal problems, and his capacity for critical assessment have gained more by enforced idleness. He has read the classics of Indian and European philosophy with a penetrating insight. His acquaintance with the modern European thoughts, particularly the philosophical movement called by the name of logical positivism, is deep and extensive. The present-day students of philosophy

ought to be thankful to the author for this comparative study of the philosophy of modern positivism along with the philosophy of Bhartṛihari and Dharmakīrti. His treatment is arresting and occasionally provoking. His mastery of the English language and epigrammatic style will not fail to rouse the interest of unbiassed thinkers. It is neither desirable nor necessary, and is too much to expect that the readers will chime in with his views or with the school of thought represented by him. But I am definite that competent scholars will not fail to be struck by his lively style, original presentation of problems and scathing criticism. Criticism is the birth-right of thinkers. It is by criticism that one understands better the thought of a writer who may be criticized. Regarded from this angle of view the original author should be grateful to the critic. In some places the present author may appear to have used too strong a language. But I am sure every sincere enquirer of truth will agree that he has not been actuated by any personal animus, and that his vision has not been blurred by prejudice. The author's treatment is original and language perspicacious

I have had the opportunity to read this book from end to end. I have scanned every sentence. The modern philosophers of the West, particularly of the British and the American universities, should have the candour to admit the brilliancy of this thought-provoking dissertation. I for my part have been thrilled on several occasions to see how he turns out the flashing sentences in a language which

is not his own. Nobody will feel that the work is not the product of an Englishman. His mastery of the English idiom is admirable. His arguments are forceful, cogent and convincing. There is no lack of consistency. On the whole this work is bound to be ranked as an intellectual treat. His criticism of the inadequacy of modern thinkers who have failed to go to the logical conclusions necessitated by their premisses may irritate a doctrinaire. But the author is nowhere dogmatic. Every assertion is buttressed by strong logic. It matters little whether he succeeds or fails to carry conviction. It is however not too optimistic on my part, or on the part of the author, to entertain the hope and belief that his main thesis, that the ancient thinkers of India are more consistent than their modern counter-parts, will not be capable of being dismissed with flippancy. Indian philosophers in the past had the courage of conviction to deduce conclusions with unswerving boldness from the premisses laid down by them. The conclusions might be shocking to vested interests and partisan spirits. But they had the boldness to incur the displeasure roused in respectable quarters. Mr. Ganguli also runs the same risk. He does not hold brief for any party. His mind is fresh and open and his thought and expression are crystal clear. I am an incorrigible optimist and cannot resist the temptation that this work will be welcomed as an original contribution to the philosophical thought by the academic circles of the East and the West. One may be surprised in places by the boldness of his expression, but

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cannot fail to derive the intellectual entertainment which the logical analysis of the prevailing problems will afford. This will give the author his due reward.

Appreciation, critical and unprejudiced, serves a salutary purpose. It instils self-confidence in the author. One may agree to differ, but must have the sincerity of purpose to acknowledge with thanks the capacity for original thinking displayed by the present writer. It reflects credit on the publishers that they have gathered the courage to publish this work notwithstanding the dwindling prospects of profit. Ultimately a bold venture pays dividends intellectual, if not financial. I wish that the author must not be damped by even hostile criticism, and follow up by similar contributions in the near future.

Satkari Mukerjee

Dhakuria,
Calcutta
26-6-63

Director, Nava-Nālandā
Mahāvihāra
Nalanda, Bihar, India

PREFACE

Much that I might have put in the preface has migrated into the Introduction. I am quite conscious that an attempt to see the present through the past is not the orthodox way of looking at things, since it militates against the academic tradition of viewing the "forward march of philosophy" with prideful sympathy. But I cannot help having a strong feeling that, while Logic has moved miles ahead of Aristotle and Mill, Philosophy has only moved round and round, unavowedly seeking refuge in some well-known thoughts of the past, though avowedly claiming to have taken a revolutionary turn resulting in a complete break with the time-honoured tradition. The present book is an unreserved expression of this feeling which I have sought to fortify with arguments to show that the positivist's claim to have performed a revolution is too inflated to be accommodated.

I have reasons to imagine that in some respectable quarters, I may be accused of lacking the sense of historical perspective for my unconventional attempt to examine the present-day positivism in the light of some Indian thoughts of the past. But if on close examination it is found that an ultra-modern philosophy, committed to killing metaphysics, has not been able to move a bit beyond the much-maligned metaphysical mist of the past, the accusation of losing the historical perspective should better befit the contemporary claimants to revolution than a critic who has no such claim

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to his credit. It is for the readers to judge if the results of my treatment are not sufficient to sanction a breach of 'historical' convention illustrated in this attempt at viewing the present through the past.

With this much as an apology for the book I must take occasion to express my sense of gratitude to those who made it possible for me to write this work, press it into print and present it before the readers. I am overwhelmingly grateful to my revered teacher Professor Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph. D., the distinguished savant and Director of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, whose bold but balanced and unbiassed appreciation has lent me courage to publish this work. I offer my respectful gratitude to my revered teacher, Professor Asutosh Sastri, M.A., P.R.S., Ph. D., Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, to Dr. Janakiballabh Bhattacharya, M.A., Ph. D., Reader in Sanskrit in the same university, and to Pandit Taranath Nyāyātarkatīrtha, Vidyāvācaspati, lecturer, Calcutta University, and Professor of Post-graduate Research in Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for their encouragement and inspiration that never failed me in times of stress. Sincerest thanks are also due to my friend Sri Profulla Chakravartty, lecturer, Maulana Azad College, Calcutta, a brilliant scholar of varied interests, who often did much to rescue my spirit from running down.

To my young friend, Sri Sushil Kumar Chakravartty, I owe more than merely a few words of gratitude. But for his selfless labour of love

this book would have been left to rot for years in a moth-eaten file. In the swelter of summer evenings, or in the showers of the rainy days, after a day's drudgery at office-desk, he used to come straight to my house and go on clicking the type-writer till midnight, and with this incredible amount of ungrudging labour he produced a beautiful type-script out of a hardly legible manuscript. But he is too shy and modest to avoid feeling embarrassed by thanks.

I offer my heartfelt gratitude to Sri Ramkrishna Mazumder for the immense benefit that he rendered me by securing the free service of a good type-writer for more than a month, and also to Sri Sukuinar Mitra, Bar-at-law, for his unusual kindness of agreeing to spare his type-writer for the use of a completely unacquainted person.

My sincerest thanks are due to the young and energetic publisher Sri Syamapada Bhattacharya of Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, who has shown a commendable courage in undertaking this risky publication the limited appeal of which is an obvious limit to prospects of profit. Thanks are also due to the able and efficient printer, Sri Debesh Dutta of Arunima Printing Works, who has spared no pains to make the book as much free from blemish as possible. But despite all possible care, some errors have crept in, since the book had to be hurried through a heavily engaged press, and since the author himself is not at all an adept in proof-reading. At the end of the book a list of Corrigenda has been added correcting as many errors as it has been possible to

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detect I hope the readers will excuse me for this unfortunate defect.

I should not also forget to convey my affectionate thanks to those young friends who used to drop into my study at least once a day eagerly enquiring about the progress of my work, and to my colleagues in profession whose unfailing words of faith and hope saved me from faitzgue of spirit.

To my wife I am more than grateful for her earnest endeavour to keep me away from the exacting cares of the household by offering to shoulder the burden wholly by herself. To my daughter, my little guardian only two years up in her teens, I owe some words of thanks for not teasing me too much with her pranks, but often silently sitting in watch over my work and eagerly hoping for the day when she would understand what I write.

Rahara
24 Parganas.
West Bengal
July, 1963.

Hemanta Kumar Ganguli

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INTRODUCTION

SECTION I

What the Book is About

There are some philosophers who think that, philosophically speaking, a shade of red is more respectable than God. The mark of philosophical respectability is verifiability, a distinction which is reserved for a proposition that can be reduced to a *primary protocol* recording an immediate experience, and which for the same reason is denied to a proposition dealing with God or any such unverifiable 'nonsense'. Whatever is not verifiable belongs to the misty realm of meaningless metaphysics. A philosopher's final court of appeal is the indubitable datum of experience which does not require any further verification.

He who says "God is Good" talks nonsense, for neither God nor Good is 'given' to him. But he who says "It is red" displays an infallible sense of the positive, because the red is incorrigibly 'given' to him, unless he betrays an unpardonable heresy by taking his statement to mean that there is some 'thing' which is red. In positivist philosophy an external material world of things and objects is as much a taboo as God or the 'thing-in-itself'. Mind and matter are equal misnomers. The real is neutral. The 'world' is logically constructed out of the neutral sense-data. This theory of 'Neutral Atomism', which is sometimes called neutral monism,

was suggested and preached by Russell, and developed by Professor Ayer with additions and modifications inspired by his continental preceptors in the Viennese circle. The last chapter of Russell's *Analysis of Mind* and the last two chapters of his *Analysis of Matter* give an account of this philosophy of neutralism. He concludes his *Analysis of Matter* with the following sentence :—
“But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.” One may profitably compare this view-point with the theory of neutral sense-data presented by Ayer in his ‘*Language, Truth and Logic*’. Russell does not see eye to eye with the positivists against many of whom he has had many things to say. But his sympathy with some aspects of positivism and his great influence over many positivists are too pronounced to be mistaken. Thus Wittgenstein was a pupil of Russell, and when he had his turn of influencing his teacher he turned to good account an influence which he received from him.

When logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein was replaced by logical positivism of the Viennese Circle, even the ‘given’ was shorn of its glory for a time. Von Neurath vigorously advocated a form of uncompromising nominalism which bade good-bye to ‘thing’, ‘meaning’ and the ‘given’. His famous statement that statements are to be compared with statements, not with experience, not with the given, not with anything else, has become almost a classical example of nominalistic positi-

vism. In this way, he thought, he succeeded in killing metaphysics. Russell's sharp rejoinder in his 'Meaning and Truth' is equally famous,—“I hear them saying, ‘in the beginning was the Word, not what the word means.’” Carnap came forward with his distinguished distinction between the ‘material mode’ and the ‘formal mode’ of speech. The formal mode of speech is the philosopher's pursuit,—“No reference is made to the meaning of the symbols or to the sense of the expressions, but simply and solely to the kinds and order of the symbols with which expressions are constructed.”

Moritz Schlick, a senior member of the Circle refused to give up the ‘given’. Professor Ayer, the younger English disciple of the continental positivists, also could not dispense with the sense-data. But he too agreed that the principal business of philosophy was analysis of language. The ‘mental’ and the ‘material’ are only two ways of speaking about the same neutral sense-datum. It was felt that a statement to be correlated to some other statements should have a meaning that must ultimately correspond to an indubitable datum of a primary experience.

Carnap's faith in pure syntax became slackened. The nominalist syntax gave way to the empiricist semantics. The philosopher was assigned his task, and the only task :—how to reduce the scientific statements to the elementary statements directly recording an elementary experience beyond which there is either Logic or Metaphysical nonsense. The famous positivist theory of meaning that the mean-

is the method of verification became reinstated in its former glory. The 'given' staged such a triumphant come-back that one feels tempted to say :—when the positivists retired God from philosophy they put His crown on the head of the Given. Thus nominalism and empiricism combined in a concerted claim to have liquidated metaphysics, and ushered in a Revolution in Philosophy.

The claim is too tall not to excite some doubt and invite some rejoinders from competent critics whose number is by no means the few. The author of the present treatise has tried to view the matter from a new angle of vision. It is perhaps the first attempt of its kind to examine some fundamental tenets of modern positivism in the light of some systems of ancient Indian Philosophy. Bhartṛhari was the greatest theoretician of Nominalistic Idealism as it is understood in Indian Philosophy, and Dharmakīrti, the most formidable figure of Yogācāra Buddhism, along with his most competent commentator Prajñākaragupta, was perhaps more enthusiastic about the status of the 'pure given' than many among the modern positivists. Without entertaining any mission for murdering metaphysics, but with an unsurpassed zeal for hair-splitting analysis, they discussed some basic problems which are still plaguing the minds of the modern positivists, such as,—

The relation between language and reality, the role of language in shaping human knowledge, the nature of logical fictions, the status of meaning, the essence of the 'given' and the possibility of its

representation in language, and lastly, the problem of verification and contradiction.

They reached their respective conclusions which received from them a full-throated declaration, but which might have also been announced by the modern positivists had they been less afraid of being called metaphysicans or subjective idealists. These ancient philosophers might have been right or wrong, but they were at least more consistent than most of the modern positivists. This is the matter in the main that I have attempted to show in this book.

SECTION—2

Some Possible Objections

I am not unaware of the possibility that this book may be caught in a climate of controversy when it reaches the hands of critical readers. It is not even impossible that some critics may come to entertain an impression that my book's having a purpose has imported into it a trend of tendentiousness. Tendentiousness invariably involves a lack of objectivity wherewith the resolute pursuit of a purpose clouds the vision of an author, and creates an imbalance which deflects him from the path of an unbiassed criticism. But it is also true that sometimes the borderline between tendentiousness and purposefulness is too mobile to avoid a possible confusion between the two.

My treatise is rather an unconventional attempt

to see the present through the past. This preference for the unconventional has been prompted neither by any blind admiration for the past, nor by any cramping prejudice against the present. Here in this treatise some basic formulations of logical positivism, perhaps the most powerful philosophical movement of the mid-century, have been carefully sized up with a sure reference to the past that we left at least thirteen centuries behind. By turning two ancient lights upon a movement of contemporary thoughts I have come upon some crying contradictions and eloquent inconsistencies in the position taken by the modern positivists. On the positive side I have tried to bring out the logical and epistemic basis of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of symbolism and logical construction, and Dharmakīrti's philosophy of pluralistic empiricism, in relation to a general philosophy of language. It will be seen from what I have shown that sometimes some thoughts which seem too distant are also too near to be ignored, and which seem too new may be too old to justify a claim of 'revolution'.

I have not the least desire to play down the philosophical contributions of the modern positivists. Writings of the modern positivists have given me a pleasant surprise to find how the present can communicate with the past across centuries. If I am in the habit of sharply expressing my thoughts and feelings let not this be construed by any sensitive reader as a lack of academic courtesy. Undoubtedly I have tried to present a case to the best of my ability. But in presenting my arguments I have

not been actuated by the spirit of a professional lawyer espousing the cause of his client. That my book has a purpose is avowedly acknowledged, and it is for the readers to judge if a trend of tendentiousness has vitiated its purposefulness.

Again it may appear that the present book has attempted to give a battle to the positivists while the results of this battle have remained inconclusive. It is not my claim that I have been able to draw a concluding line to a philosophical controversy. But if my arguments are convincing without attempting to establish a rigid and final conclusion I shall consider worth-while the labour spent on this book. What I have tried, in the main, to show in this book is that—while some modern positivists have stopped short of clearly stating some conclusions which inexorably follow from their faith in the fundamental premises of nominalism and empiricism, some ancient Indian philosophers, on the contrary, did not hesitate to embrace the most extreme logical consequences demanded by similar premises of their own. I have tried to present as much faithfully as possible the view-points of Bhartṛhari, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta so far as they have got some bearing upon the philosophy of modern positivism. If my manner of presentation has a strong tone of conviction it is not because I personally subscribe to the views of these great philosophers, but because I felt it to be my duty to underline the spirit of what they have said as sharply and clearly as possible.

It is necessary here to clear some possible misconception about the philosophy of Bhartṛhari.

One may entertain an impression that according to Bhartṛhari sounds as symbols (not as sounds) are eternal. Anybody who has carefully gone through the text of *Vākyapadīya* and its commentaries cannot fail to note that according to Bhartṛhari the symbols and the symbolized, together with the relation between the two, are all logical fictions super-imposed on that one reality which he calls *Śabda-Brahman*. When Bhartṛhari says that *Śabda-Brahman* is eternal he does not mean that a symbol is eternal. Bhartṛhari's *Śabda-Brahman* is the ineffable, incommunicable metaphysical spirit of language which itself cannot be captured in language. This spirit of language is beyond speech, beyond mind—

evaīca Brahmākhyam śabda-tattvam avān-manasa-gocaram
—(Harivṛṣabha's commentary on *Vākyapadīya*, Vkp I/87)

A symbol is meant for use in communication, but *Śabda-Brahman* is not a usable entity—

yattu paramam rūpam tannaiva vyavahārāspadam
—(Helārāja's commentary on Vkp III/3/59)

Sphoṭa in its metaphysical aspect is not a symbol. It is a symbol only in its logical aspect, and as such it is not eternal. A symbol as it is used in ordinary language can be called eternal only in a secondary sense, i.e., in the sense of a primordial pragmatic convention coming down from a time without beginning. Only in that sense the meaning-relation is also called eternal—

pare punar vyavahārānādtvena eṣām nityatvam svataḥ
anityatvam ceti manyante. sambandhopi nityaḥ. ...svabhāva-
siddhaḥ anādiḥ prāptāvicchedaḥ .. . op. cit 1/23

That one Reality of *śabda* does not differ along with the differences in symbols,—in alphabets, words and sentences. In the sense of metaphysical eternity one is not entitled to use *sphoṭa* in the plural number though the word 'symbol' may be freely used in such a way. It is clear from the commentary that Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyadādīya* presents several ancient views about *sphoṭa* which are not always his own. But he does not leave us in any doubt about what he himself thinks about the matter. The interested reader may be referred to the commenttay on the following verse :—

bhedānukāro jñānasya vācaścopaplavo dhruvaḥ I
kramopa-sṛṣṭarūpāyā jñānain jñeya-vyapāśrayam īī

Vkp I/87

In Bhartṛhari's philosophy one may come across such terms as, *Varṇa-sphoṭa*, *Pada-sphoṭa* and *Vākya-sphoṭa*, but one will not get such expressions as *Varṇa-Brahman*, *Pada-Brahman* and *Vākya-Brahman*. So when *sphoṭa*, as the one Perennial Reality is identified with *Śabda-Brahman* or *Śabdātmā* it sheds off its symbolic character, i.e., its logico-epistemic character, and stands out as the supreme metaphysical Spirit of language which is beyond language. Once the phenomenal world is turned into a system of linguistic fictions, it is natural for a metaphysician to look for a metempirical and metalogical back-ground from which the world-fiction emanates. Now, since the world-fiction has been equated with word-fiction or linguistic fiction, the necessary metaphysical back-ground has been conceived as the Spirit of language (*Śabdātmā*)

which is then identified with Absolute Consciousness. This identification also logically proceeds from Bhartṛhari's theory that even in the purely empirical or phenomenal world there is no cognition without being contained in a form of meaningful language.

Again, it may be argued that in a bid to modernize Bhartṛhari I have simply cut off his metaphysical basis. But who am I to cut off the metaphysical basis of an ancient master-metaphysician? On the other hand, I definitely know that there are some modern positivists like Schlick and Ayer who have made an attempt to rediscover Berkley by cutting off his metaphysical moorings and posing him as a champion of "empirical realism." What I have meant to say is this :—

Since the positivists are too touchy about metaphysics, let me not say much on the metaphysics of Bhartṛhari. Even then there remains much in his purely logico-epistemic analysis of the problem of language and meaning that has got an important bearing on the same problem as has gripped the modern positivists.

As regards the Law of Logical Construction I may assure the readers that it is not my law that I have stated. The credit of discovering this law entirely belongs to Bhartṛhari. But it lies dispersed in various verses and commentaries. I have only tried to clearly state it in one place in a condensed and comprehensive form. I am fully conscious that this law is not unrelated to Bhartṛhari's metaphysics.

A philosopher formulates a law of phenomenal

nominalism by virtue of which the phenomenal world is conceived as a system of linguistic fictions. Now this philosopher is not a modern phenomenalist, but an ancient metaphysical idealist. He strongly feels that a cosmic fund of fiction is impossible without reclining against the back-ground of a *meta-fictional* reality. So he furnishes the fiction with a non-fictive metaphysical fountain-head from which, he thinks, the fictive world has found its expression. A modern phenomenalist may say—"I have been led to the law of phenomenal nominalism on the basis of my logico-epistemic analysis of language, meaning and knowledge. What is beyond that is not amenable to my analysis. So I rest content with what I have found and do not feel interested in the Beyond."

There may be some nominalist phenomenologists who would like to accept such a law without embracing a super-phenomenal reality. What should be the logical consequence of Neurath's philosophy? His "re-oriented" behaviourism does not make him a realist, but a nominalist building a system or systems of linguistic fictions. I shall deal with his view in the third section of this Introduction.

There are again philosophers of great repute for whom the world is confined to streams of impressions without reaching out to a reality which imposes these impressions. There are pure 'givens' of the empiricist-positivists who do not bother about any "thing" that gives the 'givens'. For them there *are* experiences without that "something"

which *has* the experiences or that “something” which *is experienced*. There are no *acts* of experience over and above the *facts* of experience. The subject, the object and the empirical relation between the two are one and the same—just a ‘red here’ or ‘joy now’. One may argue that all this is non-sense, but then one should argue with the positivists, but not with my humble self. I have only pointed out that the Yogācāra Buddhists had devoted thousands of pages to drive home this view centuries before the positivist version of the same saw the light of the day. Again Prof. Vaihinger gained reputation for developing a pan-fictional philosophy in his remarkable book ‘Philosophy of As If’ without going for a meta-fictional reality. One may reasonably argue that he is unreasonable.

When I have clearly stated that the law of logical construction is being stated without any reference to the metaphysical position of Bhartṛhari, it will be clear to a critic who cares to follow the drive and direction of my dissertation that I have done so deliberately with an eye to accommodating the positivists’ displeasure at metaphysics. I have felt that there are nominalists among the positivists with a re-edited version of Hegelian coherence, whose premises should have led them to such a conclusion, but who have shied away from declaring the same in a clear-cut manner. In that case, I have argued, the positivist-nominalists should appreciate what Bhartṛhari did for them many centuries ago, though he was miles apart from positivism.

When I used such expressions as “our law” I

did not hope that the personal pronoun would be taken strictly in a personal sense. When I try to bring out the view-point of a certain author, provisionally I should view the matter from his angle of vision *as if* I belong to his school. Otherwise I shall be guilty of tampering his philosophy with the intrusions of my personal beliefs and disbeliefs. I shall be grateful to a reader who would kindly show on the basis of original texts that I have smuggled into the mouths of Bhartṛhari, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara something which they themselves have not said. In the penultimate chapter of the book where I have examined Moritz Schlick's claim to realism I have dropped some hints about my belief in some sort of realism, and in the concluding chapter I have stated that my personal philosophical belief is beyond the compass of the present treatise.

One may again find fault with me that in expounding the theory of Bhartṛhari I have looked more to the teachers of Advaita Vedānta than to *Muni-traya*. The reason is not far to seek. I have dealt with only one aspect of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, namely, his theory of knowledge. I have not shown how he has dissected all the concepts of the Grammatical Science, or how he has analyzed the fine points of Sanskrit syntax. That would have required an encyclopaedic work devoted to Bhartṛhari alone. I have only dealt with his fundamental epistemic position in order to show what new thing he has added to the Advaita theory of knowledge, and how he has transformed the relation between thought and object into the

relation between language and meaning. In this context I have presented in short the idealistic theories of knowledge as they are given in Yogācāra empiricism and Advaita idealism, and have presented the same in a manner that may make explicit the logical steps of transition to the epistemic position of Bhartṛhari. So I have had to deal with the problem of subject-object relation from the standpoint of Indian Idealism. Thus Madhusūdana has come in, along with some other important teachers of the Advaita, as a way to facilitate the explanation of this epistemic relation.

Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini or the *Vārtikas* of Kātyāyana deal with the formation of Sanskrit words without bothering about any theory of knowledge. Patañjali in his elaborate *Bhāṣya* sometimes has touched some points of philosophy without dilating on them, but has nowhere presented a theory of knowledge. Bhartṛhari no doubt refers to Patañjali as the great teacher. But he has developed an independent system of philosophy utilising the grammatical concepts given in the *Bhāṣya*. One can easily compare the concept of the grammatical verb treated in the *Bhāṣya* under the aphorism “*Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ*” with the spectacular definitions of the same concept given by Bhartṛhari and explained by the commentator. Again Patañjali has made many interesting observations while dealing with the concept of the grammatical tense of a verb. But Bhartṛhari’s elaborate discussion and meticulous dissection of the concept of time has gone far beyond Patañjali into the fathomless depths of

philosophy. Has Patañjali clearly stated anywhere that the phenomenal world is a system of Vikalpa super-imposed on the Śabda-Brahman? Has he stated that all philosophical sciences including the science of grammar are deceptions, nevertheless useful deceptions meant for educating the unlight-ended (*bālānām apalāpanāḥ, pratāraṇāḥ*—says Helārāja). Has he developed an epistemic philosophy of Vikalpa to which Bhartṛhari turns again and again. It is not the fact that Patañjali has some gaps which Bhartṛhari has tried to fill in. The fact is that they have two different approaches to the science of grammar. Their purposes and perspectives too are different. Patañjali is pre-eminently a grammarian, perhaps the greatest grammarian the world has ever produced, whereas Bhartṛhari is fundamentally a philosopher, the greatest proponent of the *Śabdādvaita* school of Vedānta. He is undoubtedly a *mahā-vaiyākaraṇa* because he is the profoundest exponent of the philosophy of grammar. He has seized upon the concepts of the grammatical science of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali to build a system of Nominalistic Idealism as an independent branch of Idealistic Monism. Since in my book I am concerned only with a particular aspect of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, namely, his theory of knowledge, I could not derive much help from *Muni-traya*, for which, I hope the critical readers will kindly excuse me.

I may have to face another charge that in dealing with Bhartṛhari's philosophy of symbolism I have "ignored" comparative philology and

experimental psychology. But many more branches of knowledge I have ignored, for example, Anthropology, Sociology and Neurology, which too have got many important things to say about the formation and development of the structure of human knowledge. I do not claim to be a man of encyclopaedic learning. In knowledge of science and mathematics I am lower than a grain of dust in comparison with many positivists. But in commonly accepted philosophical tradition the expression 'theory of knowledge' has a limited sense to which I have limited myself. And it is here that, along with many other more competent critics, I too have found the positivists feeling uncomfortable and trying to wriggle out with a contemptuous fling at 'metaphysics'. Of course, Carnap has deposited metaphysics in a respectable corner by accepting it as "an attitude to life", while debarring it from the domain of truth-values. But it cannot be shown why, from the stand-point of the 'pure given', a mystic's communion with God should be denied a truth-value which is unhesitatingly conferred on a 'red patch'. If the answer, "well, I see it," is considered sufficient for disposing of the question, "how are you sure that you are seeing a red patch?", the mystic way equally say, "well, I feel it," in reply to the question, "how can you know that there is God?"

SECTION—3

Some Preliminary comments on Modern Positivism

What is the status of the given? Is it a purely psychic phenomenon? Is there any difference between sensation and the datum of sensation? How much is logical, how much empirical, and how much metaphysical in the datum itself? Is the red sensum related to a red thing? Is there a table over and above the combination of colour and shape? The positivists are ready with the stock reply :—These are metaphysical questions, and so are nonsense. Our business lies elsewhere in more profitable spheres. We only analyze the propositions and do not say what is or is not.

But unfortunately a problem is not solved if somebody refuses to say something about it. This is a novel way of solving the problem by denying the problem. We may call it “a solution by the vanishing method”. In the Indian tradition of philosophical debate two parties meet under a judge. One party, called *pūrva-pakṣa*, puts a question. The other party, called *uttara-pakṣa*, usually questions the question, and if the opponent can be silenced by showing that he has not succeeded in posing the question, the debate is declared lost to him. But no Indian philosopher recognizes this to be the method of *solving* a problem. It is considered at best to be a display of debating skill and a way of *winning* a temporary debate.

So long we had the idea that metaphysics was the business of philosophers, now we have come to

learn that metaphysics is the common error of the common man who speaks in an ordinary language. The ordinary man uses the material mode of speech which smacks of metaphysics. When he utters the sentence, "It is a fact that the rose is red", he unwarily slips into metaphysics, because he is confirmed in his faith that there is a 'thing' called 'rose' which *has* a red colour. To the enlightened philosopher, however, this sentence would mean:—"The rose is red' is a sentence". It is only this magic of quotation marks which is needed to murder metaphysics. Suppose you enquire if the soup is hot, and are informed with an emphasis:—"It is a fact that the soup is hot", then as a positivist trained in the formal mode of speech, you will translate this sentence into:—"The soup is hot' is a sentence". So, let not a philosopher know that the rose is red. Let him only know that 'rose' is a 'thing-word' and 'red' is a 'quality-word', and that there is a syntactical combination between these two words. Thus the ordinary-language sentence, "Yesterday's lecture treated of Babylon", is translated by Carnap into the following philosopher's sentence:—"In yesterday's lecture the word 'Babylon' (or its synonym) occurred". When Professor Waismann says:—"If I say, 'it is true that I was in America', I am saying that I was in America and no more", we quite understand what he means. But when Carnap claims to have killed metaphysics by turning the objective fact of soup being hot into the sentence "soup is hot" we are too amazed to understand.

Now, this was in the days of nominalistic positivism when the positivists not yet started their transition to semantic positivism. But these were also the days when Neurath found fault with Carnap's trust in primary protocols. "There is no way of taking conclusively pure protocol sentences as the starting point of sciences....we reject Carnap's thesis to the effect that protocol sentences are those 'which require no verification....there are neither primitive Protocol Sentences nor sentences which are not subject to verification'"—so says Neurath in his essay on Protocol Sentences. Neurath is conspicuous for combining behaviourism with nominalism. In his famous essay, *Sociology and Physicalism*, he clearly observes :—"A statement is always compared with another statement, or with the system of statements, never with a reality" In this way he thinks, the traditional problem about the theory of knowledge is liquidated as pointless talks. He goes on to remark that "The views suggested here are best combined with a *behaviouristic* orientation. One will not then speak of 'thought' but of 'speech-thought', i.e., of *statements as physical events*."

But the cardinal point is whether there *are* physical events apart from and independent of the statemants that we may make about them, whether a *behaviour* as a physical event, or a group of physical events, *stands in its own right*, though we may not speak about it. An affirmative answer would at once bring in the question of linking a statement with an *extra-sentential* fact, since it is

absurd to suggest that only a sentential noise is a physical event, and that no other noise, or no other event like red or blue, hot or cold, should be endowed with this distinction. Hence it follows that a negative answer would make any recourse to behaviourism quite irrelevant in this context. A nominalist-behaviourist is strangely silent on this question. If Neurath would have simply said that we all live in a world of 'speech-thinking' without talking about behaviour or physical events, we might have understood him as we understand Bhartṛhari.

Neurath is however conscious that an extreme nominalism may lead to linguistic solipsism. As a remedy against such a possibility he almost suggests a Buddhistic notion of 'inter-subjective' communication. He means to say that the difference between Robinson Crusoe of yesterday and Robinson Crusoe of today is the same as that between Robinson Crusoe and any other person. Thus every person is as much other than himself as than some other person. Hence any two statements of the 'same person' are as much related or unrelated as two statements of two persons. In this sense it is said, language is always '*inter-subjective*'. It is difficult to see how solipsism can be avoided in this way. The matter is only made worse. When persons are dispersed into some discrete points, yet a *system* of *correlated* statements is zealously maintained it logically follows that, either the 'world' should be compressed into each point-person, or any system should be dismissed as a fiction. The Buddhists are

careful enough to notice this consequence. So they have no hesitation to declare that persons and systems, series and wholes, statements and meanings, are all logical fictions. Thus a half of Bhartṛhari and a half of Buddhism have combined to create a philosophy of nominalistic positivism advocated by Neurath. It is this inconsistency of a lop-sided nominalism which led the positivists to look for the empirical meaning as the sure referent of a sentence.

When the positivists began this transition they came to touch the forbidden fruit, because the relation between a proposition and an extra-propositional fact could no longer be avoided. Even Wittgenstein was once criticized for this 'metaphysical' vice which vitiated a long portion of his *Tractatus*. But when this transition is complete, care has been taken that nothing beyond the given may be smuggled into the primitive protocols. The principle of reductive analysis will try to reduce the not-given to the given, the scientific sentences to protocol statements. What is beyond this power of reduction belongs to logic or metaphysics. But logic has sense while metaphysics is nonsense. "The simplest statements in the protocol language are protocol statements, i.e., statements needing no justification and serving as foundation of the remaining statements of science. Protocol statements are of the same kind as : 'joy now', 'here now red', 'there blue'—this is a famous statement of Carnap in his *Unity of Science*.

In our book we have criticized this view from

the standpoint of Indian Philosophy. The Buddhists (and also Bhartṛhari) have convincingly shown that the moment you use any symbol whatsoever you enter a realm of abstraction. Even 'red' and 'blue' cannot escape this fate. 'Red' stands for a class of data. Its application requires an interpretation through a logical fiction of the universal or *sāmānya*, The Buddhists have emphasized times without number that two red data are two. They are as much different from each other as from the blue. On what 'given' right do you classify them or group them ? Is it on the basis of similarity ? Then, is the similarity itself a datum ? Obviously not. If it is so, it is an independent datum demanding a reason for its relation with the other two. Thus you may try to create as many symbols as possible and combine them with as much ingenuity as you command, a symbol can only be related to an abstraction, but never to a datum. There is only one theoretical possibility of direct reference. Suppose there are billions and billions of sense-data, past, present and future, out of which you logically construct *your* world. Now if you can manufacture as many symbols as there are sense-data, only then and then alone you may hope to refer to a sense-datum by a symbol. Even if you could carry this principle of one-to-one correspondence to this absurd length, the purpose and possibility of communication would be lost. You and I have no common plane to meet. Your datum and your symbol have nothing to do with my datum and my symbol. Thus any possibility of commu-

nication must presuppose the medium of a universalized abstraction.

Moreover a symbol itself, as a linear print or a sound-event, will be a further datum demanding another symbol for its representation. Then you will get a new form of 'expanding universe' with an ever lengthening series of quotation marks. Suppose P is the symbol for a sense-datum, then 'p', "p" "P"... to infinity. Thus there is a fundamental truth in the Buddhist contention that no symbol can go beyond the range of a fictive universal or *Vikalpa*. This is the import of the famous Buddhist epigram—"Language is born out of fiction and fiction out of language." (*Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ*). Obviously there cannot be a primary protocol which is a direct record of experience. So the Buddhists do not forget to make it clear that even the term *sva-lakṣaṇa* which is supposed to stand for the purest particular, the purest sensum, cannot really mean the datum as such, that is, the word 'sense-datum' cannot stand for a sense-datum, because a logical class-fiction intervenes as an interpretative abstraction.

As to the new reduction-theorem of the positivists, i. e., the possibility of reducing scientific statements to primitive protocol statements many objections have been raised. One fundamental difficulty may be shown in this context. On what empirical criterion a particular primary protocol is chosen as the confirmation of a particular scientific statement. If the criterion itself is empirical it

must be stated in another primary protocol. If it is not empirical, confirmation takes the character of pure convention. It cannot be said on the basis of the pure datum, why the photograph of the path of an electron is not related to my chicken-soup spilling out and running on the table.

Again, take the oft-quoted example, "The pointer-reading is 5." Now a sense-datum should not differ whether the person in question is literate or illiterate. Should the expression "The pointer-reading is 5" be the primitive protocol of the illiterate person? This protocol can only *deceptively* appear as the direct record of experience of the literate man, because an interpretation has already been unwarily imported into 'pure' experience. So it is not the pure elementary experience as such, but the capacity to *read* the experience that should matter most in a reductive analysis. Thus no reduction is possible without an extra-empirical interpretation, and no principle of interpretation can be reduced to a principle of reduction. Evidently, "The pointer-reading is 5" cannot be a protocol statement recording an elementary experience confirming a scientific proposition.

In the present treatise I have adduced reasons mainly from the repertory of Indian philosophy, and have developed the arguments in the light of what the Indian philosophers have said in relation to similar problems. I may clear my statement by an example. There is the well-known thesis of Wittgenstein that the form of relation between the fact and the proposition cannot be expressed in a

further proposition, because there cannot be a picture of what is common between the picture and the original. I have shown how Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti have put the same thesis in a different but better logical manner which baffles the solution suggested by Russell's hierarchy of language. They have placed the matter in the following way :—We cannot express the relation between language and meaning in a higher language. In a higher language the *relation* embedded in the *primary plane* will be transformed into a *term* of a higher relation *on the secondary plane*. When a relation is turned into a term it loses its logical character. Hence a meaning-relation itself cannot be meant by a new proposition (*sambandhopi sambandhi-rūpatāyāṁ paryavasjati*).

The readers may also be referred to my criticism of the modern concept and definition of proposition, the positivist principle of verification and the theory of basic proposition. When I have attempted to bring out the spirit of Prajñākara's philosophy I have strongly felt that his treatment of the problems of verification and contradiction, of precedence and succession, will be immensely helpful in spotting the logical defects of modern empiricism.

I should make it clear that I have used the term 'logical construction' as an English equivalent of the Sanskrit term "*Vikalpa*". *Vikalpa* is wider than what Russell has meant by 'logical construction.' It is more than an incomplete symbol' such as 'class', 'series' or 'average man'. The terms 'logi-

cal construction', 'logical fiction', 'linguistic fiction' and 'logical abstraction' have been used by me almost synonymously. The reason is this that according to Bhartṛhari and the Buddhist empiricists all constructions are linguistic fictions. There is no abstraction without language. It is the very nature of language to abstract the meaning away from reality, and then to project it into an objective world to which it does not belong. There is the well-known Buddhist view that the 'given' cannot be spoken of. It is almost an anticipatory challenge to the modern positivists who are never tired of preaching that language should be pruned of its plumage to become a primary protocol fit for recording a pure experience.

But according to Bhartṛhari even the 'given' is a linguistic fiction. There is no such 'given' as the empiricists assert. Even the most immediate experience is fed by language. The empirical too belongs to the logical. That one Reality which is beyond language is also beyond logic and beyond experience. The entire cosmic fund of appearances is a system of logical constructions built by an eternally inverted linguistic convention.

We may say that in a sense all symbols are incomplete symbols, unless you can manufacture a separate symbol for every datum of experience. The Buddhists have no such term as 'incomplete symbol', but their analysis of the symbolic situation invariably leads to this conclusion. Thus the proposition, 'Red is a colour', is incorrect. It should be, 'Red is a class of colour'. You may divide 'red'

into as many shades as possible. Even then a particular shade as a pure immediate datum cannot be the same on two occasions. The Buddhists say that no real can be repeated. So properly speaking, there cannot be a proper name ; every name is a class-name. 'This' and 'it' are no exceptions in this respect. All this follows from their demolition of the universal. There is no logical distinction between 'lion' and 'unicorn' ; both of them stand equally for abstractions.

We shall only touch another point before we conclude. Modern philosophers have a good deal to say about the meaning of the verb 'to be', and about the logical status of existence and non-existence. Helārāja, the commentator of Bhartṛhari, has made an interesting observation in this context :— Even non-existence appears as an existent in the apprehended meaning-content of a statement. (*Buddhyā nirūpyamāṇo hi abhāvo bhāva-rūpeṇa avacchidyate*). One may profitably compare this remark with the following from Russell's Principles of Mathematics.

"For what does not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence ; and hence we need the concept of 'being' as that which belongs even to the non-existent." (Para 427)

Here what Russell calls 'being' is called '*abhidheya-sattā*' or '*aupacārika-sattā*' by Bhartṛhari. This 'being' according to the latter, belongs equally to the mountain and the chimera. But the great difference between Bhartṛhari and Russell in this respect lies in the fact that Russell's 'being' bears a

flavour of Plato and Meinong, while Bhartṛhari's *abhidheyā-satta* is a logical abstraction not related to any third realm of existence. *Abhidheya-sattā* is a linguistic construction which is not nonsense, but has a definite logical sense. Only in this sense Bhartṛhari might have agreed with the following statement of Russell :—

“For if A were nothing it could not be said not to be ; ‘A is not’ implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence that A is” (*opcit*)

The interested reader may be referred to an illuminating discussion on this topic in the chapter on *sambandha-samuddeśa* in the Third Book of Bhartṛhari's *Vakyapadīya*. But he adds something more which is important. It may be put in this way—

The fate of the proposition, “A is,” is no brighter than that of the proposition “A is not,” because A itself suffers no internal division between A and existence, or between A and non-existence. There is no existence or non-existence over and above A. The division is only logical, but not existential. Existence and non-existence are equally fictive predicates. From this he comes to a very important conclusion :—The philosophers who say that the world is, and the philosophers who say that the world is not, do not really make for any material difference, since both the groups move in logical fictions, in linguistic abstractions of intelligible meanings.

The modern positivists are proud to say that the question, whether the world is or is not, is

meaningless. Bhartṛhari would have observed,— Yes, the question is meaningless, but only in the sense that it deals with a *meaning* and nothing beyond the *meaning*.

Helārāja's remark that we have quoted above is an echo of similar observations made by Dharmakīrti. In the chapter of *Svārthānumāna* in his *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* he has devoted a long portion to the same topic. In this context he has also dealt with the problem of the so-called negative fact. Professor Ayer has criticized the pictorial theory of Wittgenstein on the ground that there may be a false proposition, but not a false fact. But is there a negative fact? 'False' and 'fact,' are taken to be terms of mutual exclusion. Should not the terms 'fact' and 'negation' receive the same treatment? What is the logical relation between falsity and negativity? These are important problems which I have not been able to discuss for want of space.

I do not feel reconciled to the claim that the logical and epistemic problem of existence can be solved simply by taking the copula away from the subject and fixing it to the predicate. In his famous essay, 'The Elimination of Metaphysics,' Carnap observes :—"What follows from 'I am a European' is not 'I exist', but 'a European exists.' To avoid the logical difficulty with the meaning of the term 'European', an empiricist should better say :—"What follows from 'The rose is red' is not 'the rose exists' but 'a red exists.' This technique may tally with the empiricist's belief that the difference between

a red rose and a red book is the difference between two reds with two different sets of co-ordinates. In this way the 'metaphysical' thing may be abolished, but the problem of 'existence' refuses to be solved until the logico-epistemic meaning of "a red exists" is made clear beyond confusion. The clue to the final solution must be found in the 'old' understanding that neither existence nor non-existence is an *existential* category, but an abstract logical category sustained in a linguistic fiction. That is exactly what Bhartṛhari (and also Dharmakīrti) showed in the distant past. But when Bhartṛhari uses the expression *Maha-sattā* (universal existence) he clearly indentifies it with his One Metaphysical Reality apart from which an existence is considered to be a mere linguistic construction. But in no way an existence, *particular* or *universal*, is accepted as a *real predicate*. It is needless to say that Dharmakīrti is the last person to stand a *maha-sattā*.

That this 'old' solution has an important bearing on the modern endeavours is admitted by Carnap when he says :—"To be sure, it has been known for a long time that existence is not a property (cf. Kant's refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God)." Our book is meant to show that there are many more old thoughts which may be helpful in clearing many more confusions which still beset the modern minds and which they want to resolve with a carriage of conviction.

I regret to state in conclusion that I have had to leave off the recent movement of Philosophical

Analysis initiated by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. This would have added to the bulk of the volume beyond its contemplated limit. Moreover, this young philosophy should have many more fruitful days before a proper assessment can be made with a fuller acquaintance with its spirit.

I appeal to the readers to excuse me for what I have not done, and to judge me for what I have done. It is for them to say if this book justifies my labour being worthy of their patience.

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

The star-marked serial numbers in the body of the text up to Appendix II correspond to the same in Notes and References under Appendix III.

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM ?

Know the name and you know the thing,—it sounds queer indeed, because all are almost agreed that the name is not the thing. “What’s in a name ?”, says a heroine of Shakespeare, “that we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” The Shakespearean maiden may have uttered a practical truth even in her romantic mood. But, despite these sweet words of wisdom put into her mouth by her great creator, there is perhaps more in a name than what is readily conceded by common sense.

A naive realist may even fortify himself by modifying the meaning of a well-known verse of Bhartṛhari, the Prince of linguistic philosophy, who does not shy at giving the devil his due, when he seemingly summarises the spirit of common sense philosophy in the following words :—“A man feels what a burn is like when he is burnt by fire, but the meaning that he gathers from the word ‘burn’ is quite different from his burnful feeling.”*¹ Obviously the word ‘burn’ will not burn him, just as the word ‘cool’ will not cool him.

Of course, this verse has a deep-seated contextual import which is far from being congenial to the seeming concession granted to common sense.

Almost all the philosophers coming after Bhartṛhari, who have quoted this couplet, have taken it as providing a prop to the remarkable Buddhist view to the effect that the name and the thing have not the least relation between them, that a real cannot be named.*² The common man hardly suspects that a fact, that is too obvious to be affirmed, would at last sharply come up against his common sense, and unleash a series of unpleasant surprises culminating in such an unwanted conclusion as that language has no relation with

reality. But to startle the common man is perhaps a part of the philosopher's business, and a philosopher of common sense too is not an exception in this respect. Though an upholder of common sense, he is cautious, since he is conscious of his philosophical responsibility. While the common man feels that something is not so profound as to be philosophised, the philosopher of common sense does not feel satisfied before lending profundity to the obvious. So, as a philosopher of language, he thinks he has scored his point by proving up to the hilt that the name is not the thing. He comes down upon nominalism as an outlandish frame of thought according to which the world has no life and being beyond the fringe of intelligible language. If the thing were absorbed and exhausted in the name, the word 'razor' would have split your face.*³ It is dished up as a telling proof against the epistemic nominalism of Bhartṛhari. But in doing so the coin is turned presenting its other side that bears the stamp of Buddhistic nominalism, which says,—Yes, the name is not the thing, and hence it is that the real, the pin-point particular of the moment, cannot be meant by a name, that language has no way to express the reality. Thus common sense is dragged on to the pit-head of an uncommon danger.

It is now clear that common-sense philosophy does not command as much clarity and possess as much security as it claims to have.

The relation between language and reality is one of the knottiest problems both in ancient and contemporary philosophy. Had the problem been so simple as to deserve such an easy disposal, the great Bhartṛhari might have been left to rot in the dust-bin of history, the giant Dharmakīrti would have slumbered for good in the gloomy mist of Tibetan manuscripts, a galaxy of contemporary western philosophers, including that indefatigable Bertrand Russell, should have better started grocer's shops than talked and taught philosophy, and a serious student of philosophy might have been spared

the pains of a confusing uncertainty with which he pays the price of intellectual honesty. Our naive realist, as the following pages will show, has not placed the problem in its proper perspective. His is the fault of a misplaced finger which has turned on wrong lights in a dense traffic of thoughts. So let us pose the problem first.

The proper poser of the problem is not whether the name is the thing. That will be an over-simplification of a major problem. The most profitable poser should be,—can we speak about a reality which, we believe, lives and moves beyond the domain of intelligible speech ? Can we know something about which we cannot speak in a sensible manner ? If the answer be in the affirmative, how much of that self-sustained reality is captured in our language, and how does it find its way into our speech ? If the answer be in the negative, do we then talk sense when we seem to talk about something ? What is that which we speak about and which makes our speech meaningful ?

If this poser of the problem is accepted we at once come up to an interesting consequence, viz., the whole problem of epistemology, that is, the problem of relation between knowledge and reality, is at once transformed into the problem of relation between language and meaning. The gravity of the problem lies in this transformation which has now invaded the whole range of logic, philosophy and metaphysics (or, want of metaphysics).

One must not stint praises that are due to a great thinker ; and Bhartṛhari must be credited with having effected this spectacular epistemic transformation and anticipated the contemporary logical positivists about thirteen centuries ago, though he was miles apart from being a logical positivist himself. He is perhaps the first philosopher of consequence who clearly feels and formulates the principle that the key to epistemology, the major problem of philosophy, lies in the logical analysis of language.

Dharmakīrti, the formidable figure of Buddhist philosophy, perhaps a junior contemporary of Bhartṛhari, is more subtle, exacting and intricate. That the meaning of language is nothing more than logical fiction (Vikalpa), that the real as such has no place in the realm of meaning, provides a conspicuous meeting ground for Buddhism and Bhartṛhari. The Buddhist would like to say,—there cannot be a statement of fact, because a fact can never be stated. But what is there beyond the field of meaningful language?—"The purest particular of the moment", replies the Buddhist, "The universal principle of eternity, called Sphoṭa, the fountain-head of language and meaning", answers Bhartṛhari. "the metaphysical spirit of language itself cannot be captured by language." Language furnishes an experience with a logical appendage. Is there then any pure empirical knowledge completely stripped of this appendage? "Yes", replies the Buddhist, "that is the most primitive sensation of a pin-point particular of the moment, unadorned by conceptual fiction."*⁴ "No", answers Bhartṛhari, "even the most indeterminate point in a field of experience is not free from language and logical construction, and whatever is touched by language is ultimately absorbed and exhausted by language." But these two seemingly opposite epistemic views are only two sides of the same coin, that is, the commonly held fundamental postulate to the effect that reality cannot be the term of a relation of which language is the other term. That which can be named and meant cannot be more than a logical construction. From the structure of a statement to the structure of a reality there is no passage, but only a blind alley.

A peep into the intractable problems, which commanded the respectful attention of Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti, will rejuvenate a critical interest in the philosophical speculations of the contemporary west. The philosophy of language is the reigning fashion with the contemporary philosophers. Much of the muddle, in which the logical positivists, or the schools of semantics, find themselves today, may be cleared up by an

earnest introduction into the logico-epistemic principles of Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti. This will at least exercise a sobering influence on the over-exuberant students of modern positivism, who will realise with profit that the problems raised by the contemporary philosophers of language were tackled in a more consistent and thorough going fashion by the two philosophical stalwarts of ancient India, with results perhaps not as much unflattering as the philosophical chaos of the contemporary west.

The major purpose of our present discourse is to attempt a modest assessment of modern positivism in the light of the thoughts which guided the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti more than thirteen centuries ago. Hence it is quite relevant here to have a look into the postulates of logical positivism and semanticism which have set a reigning pattern to the philosophy of the modern period.

CHAPTER II

THE MODERN ATTITUDE

The birth and survival of contemporary Western philosophy cannot be separated from a revival of interest in the logic of language. This logic has led the logical positivists to reject all excursions into metaphysics as senseless endeavours and hence to compress the whole business of philosophy into the analysis of propositions. "The philosopher as an analyst", says Professor Ayer, "is not directly concerned with physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.*⁵

Rudolf Carnap, the leader of the Viennese School of modern positivism, in his 'Unity of Science' has propounded the view that "A philosophical, i.e. logical, investigation must be an analysis of language." His colleague and co-thinker-late lamented Von Neurath, pushed this thesis to the extreme and interpreted its implication in the following manner :—

"Statements are to be compared with statements, not with 'experiences', not with the 'world' or anything else. All these senseless duplications belong to a more or less refined metaphysics, and are to be rejected. Each new statement is compared with the totality of existing statements previously co-ordinated. To say that a statement is correct, therefore, means that it can be incorporated in this totality. What cannot be incorporated is rejected as incorrect.

Neurath's
Philosophy of
Language

"..... The definition of 'correct' and 'incorrect' proposed here departs from that customary among the 'Viennese Circle' which appeals to 'meaning' and 'verification'. In our presentation we confine ourselves always to the sphere of linguistic thought".*⁶ The last sentence has been more forcefully translated by Weinberg in his Examination of Logical Positivism as follows :—"In the present theory we always remain within the realm of speech-thinking".*⁷

That we live within the realm of speech-thinking is not by itself a very startling proposition. The initial shock of surprise spent itself long ago, at least in Indian Philosophy, after Bhartṛhari had propounded this theory with a burden of clear emphasis—"There is no thought without a form of speech. If the unfailing pattern of speech had been lost to the pattern of thought, thought itself would have lost itself in darkness. Thought has a form because it is formed in language"*⁸ Even in modern days before the advent of logical positivism the Behaviourists reached out to this theory from the standpoint of physiological psychology. According to them thought is nothing but sub-vocal speech,*⁹ and 'memory' is a name for the retention of verbal habits.*¹⁰ But the Behaviourists are not concerned with the logic of language and are not expected to throw much light on the problem that is posed before us.

In their initial crusading zeal the modern positivists once tried to totally dispense with the factor of meaning or referent of a sentence. They thought that the logical structure of a sentence might be discerned without any referential function, and thus a coherent system of sentences might be built without any excursion into the realm of reality in which the meanings or referents are supposed to rest. Neurath is the most staunch advocate of this view. He clearly states: "Logic and mathematics show us what linguistic transformations are possible without any extension of meaning, independently of the way in which we choose to formulate the facts....."

"Nor may language as a whole be set against 'experience as a whole', 'the world', or 'the given'. Thus every statement of the kind, 'The very possibility of science depends on the fact of order in the universe', is meaningless."*¹¹ Thus the existence of an external world apart from the system of scientific propositions is an unwarranted assumption. The

scientist, who thinks that his scientific propositions deal with a world existing beyond the body of propositions, at once degrades himself into the position of a metaphysician.

The traditional mode of deductive syllogism may be provisionally taken as a fitting instance of this thesis. One can grasp the form of reasoning—"If all S is P and X is an S, then X is a P", without bothering about the 'external values' of S, P and X. The point will seem more forceful if we translate the above reasoning into the pattern of what Russell calls a propositional function—If X is an S, X is a P for all values of X. Your external world either is, or is not, but there is no room for 'if' in it. Yet, 'If so, then so' constitutes the very being and essence of science. The Aristotelian syllogism, despite any possible disclaimer of Aristotle and his disciples, is at its bottom nothing but an extension and elucidation of the formal notion of class-inclusion. If all members of class S are members of class P and if X is a member of class S, X is a member of class P. Thus the Aristotelian Major is not 'a matter of fact', but an epitomised system of co-ordinated statements, and the Minor and the conclusion are simply shown as fitting into the system as a whole. The underlying spirit of the system is just the same—"if so, then so". Seen in this light, the meaning of Mill's objection against deductive reasoning, whether it is valid or not, will be more clear. You cannot expect from a system what it cannot give, and there is no truth beyond the system taken as a totality. Any conclusion drawn from a system cannot be anything more than a display of internal consistency.

Now, the chief task of philosophy, according to the modern positivists, is the "analysis of science", i. e. of scientific language. All the sentences of science and mathematics can be thus brought into a system of mutually consistent sentences without a metaphysical discourse on the states and properties of an objective reality which these sentences are wrongly supposed to deal with. A

system of scientific laws is a committee or comity of coherent statements. A meaningful objectivity is not the precondition of a meaningful sentence. The meaning consists in logical consistency. Hence mathematics, as the Queen of sciences, may express the universe (theoretically at least) in a system of symbols and equations without assuming the existence of such a universe being external to the equational expressions. This has led Sir Eddington, the physicist, to posit an infinitely great Mathematical Mind absorbing and exhausting the whole panorama of the phenomenal world. Professor Neurath would perhaps differ and say,—there is mathematics, but no mathematical mind. Such a mind is the metaphysical hypostatization of the mathematical system.

Thus a sentence need not speak about a reality beyond itself. It is enough for a sentence to be significant, i. e., to make as much sense as to fit itself into a total system of mutually consistent sentences. Hence the correspondence theory of truth is again replaced by the Hegelian theory of coherence, only the method of analysis makes a difference from the Hegelian version. Russell underlines this agreement and difference with the Hegelian theory in the following words—

A new coherence theory of truth replaces the correspondence theory.

“There view is that ‘truth’ is a syntactical, not a ‘semantic’ concept.....the world of words is a close self-contained world and the philosopher need not concern himself with anything outside it.

.....The Hegelian theory however differs from that of Neurath, since it holds that only one body of mutually coherent propositions is possible, so that every proposition remains definitely true or false. Neurath, on the contrary, takes the view of Pirandello : ‘so it is, if you think so.’”^{*12}

If this view of truth is accepted the logical positivists of the coherence-school will find it difficult to explain

the full bearing of a sentence which registers an elementary

What about the experience or sense-datum, i. e., to explain the truth of a perceptual proposition?

Such a sentence, or its logical equivalent, is called an atomic proposition by Wittgenstein, a basic proposition by Ayer and Russell, and a primary protocol by Carnap and his school. The truth or significance of such a sentence apparently does not depend on any other sentence. To compare it with any other sentence you are to go beyond it to *something* you speak about. Suppose I say,—The sentence, "Otto sees a dog" is true (and significant) if it is consistent with some other sentence such as, "Otto hears a bark". We choose here to omit the fact that seeing a dog may be valid even without hearing it bark. Even then, because barking as a physical event is something 'metaphysical', and of no concern to the logical positivist, it is not possible for him to tell us why the sentence, "Otto sees a dog", is consistent with the sentence, "Otto hears a bark", and not with the sentence, "Otto hears a mew." He cannot reply,—"because in experience a dog is co-related with a bark and not with a mew", verily because he firmly holds the view that a sentence is compared neither with an experience, nor with a thing, but only with another sentence. Let us decide not to put such an embarrassing question as whether there are such physical events as a series of sounds or linear prints on a piece of paper which constitute a sentence in its purely physical aspect. Then as a last leg of support the coherence-positivist has to fall back upon social testimony and the matter is made worse. How can you know that there is anybody else to give you a testimony? There is a world of sentences, but nowhere a world of

A social system
or a solipsist's
soliloquy

persons uttering such sentences, because that would be too metaphysical for the positivist to believe in. Thus a positivist is debarred by his own law from dabbling at the truth and consistency of a perceptual proposition. Let us then allow

for the existence of one self at least, i.e., Neurath himself, however, much against his 'anti-metaphysical' conviction, who is busy about building a society of sentences, or a 'unified science' to put it in a more dignified way. The social system of knowledge is then reduced to a perfect system of solipsism which would look somewhat like this :—

Neurath's sentence is his thought that [A's sentence is A's thought that { B's sentence is B's thought that (C's sentence is C's thought that.....to the *n*th limit.

The brackets may be closed only with Neurath ceasing to think, since the world of sentences is compressed into his thoughts. Now, if the existence of Neurath as a person and of the series of sounds as constituting sentences is discarded as a metaphysical assumption, there remains somehow only a system of non-mental non-physical sentences floating in an infinite void. Such a system may be called non-metaphysical only in the sense of being super-metaphysical, and there is no one to decide and no way to decide what is a system and what is not. No escape from this blatant absurdity is provided by the denial of a primary protocol. But when he denies the existence of a primary protocol Neurath must be credited with as much clarity of vision as to see that in the final stage of the positivist's paradise there cannot be any difference between a primary protocol and non-primary one.

Russell's chapter on "Basic Propositions" in his *Meaning and Truth* is an excellent critique of the positivist's attitude towards truth and reality,—“I seem to hear them saying, ‘in the beginning was the Word’, not, ‘in the beginning there was what the word means’. It is remarkable that this reversion to ancient metaphysics should have occurred in the attempt to be ultra-empirical.”*¹³ The hope of building a social system of ‘Unified Science’ has been reduced to the solipsist game of boxing brackets within brackets, and this is not an achievement worth recounting.

Hence reversion to the quest for a meaning was badly needed.

CHAPTER III

CHANGE OVER TO SEMANTICS

So Carnap looked for a channel of change from Syntax to Semantics. In his *Introduction To Semantics* Carnap feels the deficiency of a purely formal analysis of language, i.e., of the logical syntax, and recognizes the paramount need of philosophy for a theory of meaning and interpretation, for a study of the signifying function of language.*¹⁴ The realisation of the fact that the question of truth or falsity of a statement cannot arise apart from the referential function, or the communicative basis of language, is no doubt a step forward from a self-closed system of 'meaningless' syntax.

But we shall presently see that this step forward has not carried the positivist much forward indeed. Carnap has now

Carnap's World
of Designata peopled his world with such designata as
 individuals, properties, relations and proposi-
 tions which he is pleased to call 'entities.'*¹⁵

He is conscious that the term 'entity' smacks of metaphysics, and feels embarrassed enough to offer an explanation,—
"The term 'entity' is frequently used in this book. I am aware of the metaphysical connotations associated with it, but I hope that the reader will be able to leave them aside and to take the word in the simple sense in which it is meant here."*¹⁶

This 'simple sense' is far from the simplicity of the common man. What Carnap probably means is this that these 'entities' do not exist out there in the external world which the common man takes for granted, but stand as the finally reduced residue of a world which is neither within nor without, but somehow is somewhere as a world of referents designated by language. Carnap might have directly said that the world is a logical construction having no being apart from being a body of referents related to a logically immaculate language. In that case he would have clearly said something

which Bhartṛhari, the great Indian philosopher, had attempted to prove more than thirteen centuries ago.

Now, these individuals, properties and relations stand in a certain combination corresponding to which there is a combination of signs having the structure of a sentence. The simplest combination of signs is an 'atomic sentence' to which is co-related a primary proposition. This proposition is again an 'entity' the logical position of which is extremely dubious. It is perhaps imagined as a go-between between the linguistic signs on the one hand and the actual designata on the other. An atomic sentence is true if the signs involved in it and the corresponding 'entities' are combined in similar ways in their respective fields. Shorn of verbiage it simply means,—the sentence "John is bald-headed" is true if John is bald-headed. Apparently, "Bald-headed is John" will not be a true sentence. It does not seem to be a great discovery worthy of laborious pursuit and of ushering in a "Revolution in Philosophy". Perhaps the Revolution belongs to the unsaid which always waited to be said:—The designated entities are not the denizens of an external world, nor of a mental world, but of a logical universe. But the positivists have not the courage to say this in clear terms. Supposing this to be the secret meaning of their revolution, this revolution was done in India with a formidable force of demonstration long before the medieval days. According to the positivists, their revolution rests in their tall claim of doing away with metaphysics. In place of metaphysics they have given us the 'given', the series of sense-data, which no Ocam's Razor can eliminate, and which alone, they think, can logically be spoken about. But the Buddhists have incontrovertibly proved that the 'given' can never be spoken of, that the logically speakable is a logical fiction. Yet the positivists too in deference to their much-paraded premiss of verification should have clearly stated that the entire universe standing beyond the 'just given' is just a fund of fiction.

But, perhaps the positivists themselves are not clear if they should clearly mean this. Let us see what Carnap has done about the notion of truth in his system of semantics. You may collect in imagination all possible atomic sentences and

Theory of True
state-description

combine them in various ways on the basis of logical consistency and you will thus get different groups or sets of atomic sentences. Each of these sets will be called a 'state-description'. Each state-description then obviously gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations which are compressed into the system. Thus the state-descriptions represent "Leibnitz's possible worlds or Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs."^{*17} But, "There is one and only one state-description which describes the actual state of the universe; it is that which contains all true atomic sentences... A sentence of any form is true if and only if it holds in the true state-description." Again "A sentence is logically true if it holds in all state-descriptions." It is akin to 'Leibniz's conception that a necessary truth must hold in all possible worlds'.^{*18}

After the breath-taking solipsist soliloquy of Neurath one feels relieved by the assurance that, after all, of all possible states of the universe there is only one actual state to which a system of true statements must conform. The natural antecedent of such a declaration should be a true belief that such a universe must exist independently of what we speak about and think about it. But the reader's expectation

A critique of
Carnap

is bound to be belied and his feeling of relief short-lived, for in changing over to semantics Carnap has not changed his fundamental position about the nature of the physical world

Solving the ques-
tion by rejecting
the question

from what he upheld in his days of 'Logical Syntax.' "We reject the thesis of the reality of physical world: but we do not reject it as false, but as having no sense, and its idealist antithesis is subject to exactly the same rejection.

We neither assert nor deny these theses ; we reject the whole question."*¹⁹ This wonderful way of solving a question by rejecting it has been beautifully demonstrated by Professor Ayer, the English disciple of Carnap. Modern positivists are always careful about not being taken to be subjective idealists.

In his *Language, Truth and Logic* and *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* Professor Ayer sometimes uses a language which is saturated with a subjectivist flavour that is too pronounced to be mistaken. So, in his *Problem of Knowledge* he puts up a semblance of fight against the phenomenologists who do not find any justification behind the belief in an external world. Professor Ayer labours hard to show that the belief is justified. Is he then a realist? No, his endeavour is to be strictly impartial, and hence to steer clear between idealism and realism. So he goes on to show that that a belief is justified does not make it true. Existence or non-existence of the physical world is only concerned with our ways of speaking about our sense-data. "Accordingly, it does not greatly matter whether we say that the objects which figure in it are theoretical constructions, or whether, in line with common sense, we prefer to say that they are independently real...The sentences which are taken as referring to physical objects are used in such a way that our having the appropriate experiences counts in favour of their truth.....The sceptic is indeed right in his insistence that there is a gap to be overcome, in the sense that my having just this experience is consistent with the statement's being false.....He is wrong only in inferring from this that we cannot have any justification for it."*²⁰

So on the question of the existence of the physical world the logical positivist is as slippery as an eel. But it is not difficult to catch a subjective idealist however he may try to wriggle out. One thing is clear that the logical positivist is clear only about the sense-data. It is no use searching

about anything beyond the sense-data. Hence the existence or non-existence of the physical world is a metaphysical question. Simply you decide not to raise the question and the age-old question is solved. It is the worst form of subjective idealism in the sense that here the problem is solved by shutting the eyes.

Those who are conversant about the history of Indian Philosophy know well how the Advaita Vedāntins of the Śāṅkarite school look upon the problem at hand. Neither existence nor non-existence of the external world can be logically defined. Since the world is logically unspeakable and indefinable (anirvacanīya) it is false and unreal. But, yet Logic demands a real back-ground of our experience. This back-ground is metaphysical, the supreme Brahman, the One Principle of Universal Consciousness, in which all questions are laid at rest. Whether the metaphysical Brahman is a logical necessity or not is certainly a matter of debate. But, that our experience requires a real back-ground which gives us 'the given', is not a metaphysical, but a logical necessity. So the Advaitins do not dismiss the problem as a meaningless question.

So when Carnap takes the physical world neither as real nor as false, but as the subject-matter of a meaningless question he only tries to escape from facing the question squarely and saying in a straight manner that the world is false, and thus vindicates a remarkable remark of Engels to the effect that a sceptic is only a shame-faced idealist or a shame-faced materialist.

Now let us return to Carnap's true state-description and the actual state of the universe. We are debarred by the positivist's decree from positing an actual world lying outside our experience. Thus the actual world is reduced to the universe of sense-data. Then how can one speak about any correspondence between the true state-description and

the actual state of the universe. Suppose a child, not yet accustomed to the affairs of the world, sees a dog in the dark and hears a mew in the same direction, (obviously he does not see the cat crouching there too), and decides,—It is a dog and it is mewling. How can you decide that it is a false statement? As sense-data both the dog and the mew are solid pieces of actual empirical world, and anything beyond the sense-data is meaningless metaphysics. In the child's experience and empirical statement the dog and the mew are combined as faithfully as the dog and the bark are combined in the experience and the empirical statement of a grown-up man. How can you then decree that, in a true state-description and in the actual world, it is barking and not mewling, that must belong to the dog in such a way that, "The dog is barking" is a true statement, and "The dog is mewling" is a false one? In future if the child decides on the basis of a new experience that "the dog barks and does not mew", it will not falsify his previous experience to the contrary, since his previous empiric combination of mewling with the dog stands as a solid fact of experience in the actual state of the empirical universe. Once an experience happens, its membership of the empirical world is accepted for good. As a constituent of the empirical universe it cannot be dislodged without breaking the edifice as a whole. As a pure sense-datum an object of hallucination is as much solid as the object of a normal experience, and no future experience can undo the fact and datum of a previous experience. We shall see more of this problem in a later chapter presenting the view of Prajñākaragupta on the theory of empirical contradiction and verification. Hence, unless positivism is detached from empiricism there is no way to decide the truth of a state-description, and this detachment is impossible because empiricism is the corner-stone of positivism.

Let us grant a possibility that our objection does not touch the theory of state-description. Let all possible

empirical facts, illusions, hallucinations and normal experiences, be the bonafide members of the actual state of the universe, and let there be an atomic sentence corresponding to every piece of possible experience. A combination of all such atomic sentences will then constitute a true state-description corresponding to a combination of empirical facts constituting an actual world. There is no theoretical impossibility in such a bold imagination.

But there are two inconvenient questions which defy any solution. Is the correspondence between such a total state-description and a total world of experience itself a matter of experience? Obviously not, unless you posit an Omniscient Being encompassing the past, present and future in a single sweep of experience. Then it follows that this correspondence is only a theoretical construction, a logical fiction. Again, granted that correspondence itself is a matter of experience, we shall require another atomic sentence to co-relate this new experience and an infinite regress is unavoidable. Hence this co-relation or correspondence itself must be taken as a logical fiction. Only one step more, and one can equally show that the totality of atomic sentences and the totality of experiences are also nothing more than theoretical constructions. Between one atomic sentence and another and between one experience and another there is no real relation, simply because such a relation can never be a sense-datum of any further experience. In that case the two supposedly corresponding totals are at best only numerical constructions. Thus a fictitious state-description is fictitiously co-related to a fictitious state of the universe—that is the net result of this novel attempt at building up a true state-description and an actual world.

Secondly, granted that there is such a system of true state-description, one cannot help raising the question whether this state-description itself is not a part of the actual state of the universe. If it is so, a super state-description will be necessary to represent a duplicated actuality, and an infinite

regress will follow. If it is not so, a fiction will be supposed to represent the reality, and the reality in its turn will be turned into a representative fiction.

An actual state of the universe may be called 'actual' by courtesy alone, since such a state can never be *actualised*; the past, present and future cannot be collected together except in a logical imagination. In such a case the 'actual' world turns out to be a part of the state-description, for its essence and being consists in the logical meaning of the state-description itself. The representative and the represented merge into a comprehensive meaning. There is then no way to decide the doubt if the actual world is not a representative fiction. This is certainly not an encouraging prospect for a much promising philosophy.

Carnap has at last succeeded in presenting the semblance of a non-committed philosophy which seems ashamed to declare its commitment, to pronounce in clear and plainspeaking terms that language and meaning, everything is after all a logical construction. Bhartṛhari, on the otherhand, is perfectly straight-forward in making a full-throated declaration of his conviction—"All that a philosophy can give you is nothing but a fiction. Truth comes to light when philosophical fiction ceases to operate. We are habituated to live in a world of eternal linguistic convention (so that the language that means and the world that is meant are but two facets of a running fiction)...Yet, just as children are sometimes treated to fairy tales in order to put them on the track of truth, so one steps into truth moving along the way of philosophical untruth".*²¹ The following observation of Wittgenstein is illuminating in this respect—"My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it)."*²² The Sāṅkarite school of Advaita and Nāgārjuna's School of Mādhyamika Buddhism also hold a

similar view about the value of their philosophical propositions. The difference lies in the positivists' claim to have dispensed with metaphysics, a performance which the Indian philosophers cannot be credited with, excepting perhaps Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, the prince of Indian agnosticism, and the various schools of Cārvākite materialism. Even then, according to the new conception of metaphysics entertained by the modern positivists, Cārvāka too must be a die-hard metaphysician since he has declared his faith in the reality of the physical world.

What is then the hall-mark of a non-metaphysical philosophy? Possibly something like this,—there is neither matter, nor mind, nor any principle encompassing or transcending these two, but there is only an ever accumulating totality of disconnected sense-data floating in a void. Or, let us avoid the sense data.—There is then a totality of atomic sentences and also a totality of the 'actual' world, neither of which is either mental or material or anything between the two. If it is not metaphysics it is only worse than that. It is a deified fiction blessed with the dignity of reality, an absurdity crowned with the cap of truth.


It is not for nothing that Carnap lends some consideration to the assumption that "there is only one fact, the totality of the actual world, past, present and future."^{*23} Whether he accepts this position or not, if his 'actual world' is blessed with any meaning it must be this. In that case the borderline between fiction and reality is totally erased. Such a totality can only be a construct of logical imagination. In that case you can call it an actual world only as a matter of courtsey. If such a totality is seriously accepted as 'one fact', the one reality, one shudders to think if there is a worse metaphysics. A never-ending total of disjointed items cannot reach itself even in a numerical sense, and no totality can be extracted out of such a total. The Hegelian Absolute is a self-expanding whole, but not an accumulating total. The

A worse type of
metaphysics

Sāṅkarite Brahman is an all-abiding infinite substratum in which nothing else subsists. You may not agree with these assumptions, but you cannot either prove or disprove them ; so you cannot logically debar the faithful from having a faith in them. Even the position of an avowed agnostic is logically understandable. But here is a form of shame-faced agnosticism which, in an attempt to conceal its colour, hypostatizes a fiction into actuality, and thus claims to have dispensed with metaphysics for good, while replacing it with a new type of obscurantist absurdity.

This short critique of Carnap and his school is designed to prepare the mind of a fastidious modern student of philosophy, so that, he should not feel discouraged by the metaphysical postulates of the Indian philosophers of language, and entertain an initial inhibition too strong to recognize the merit of their achievements in the field of semantics and logical analysis. Any possible prejudice of a modern reader against a very important branch of Indian Philosophy may be sufficiently relaxed, when he will find that, while the modern positivists, despite their anti-metaphysical professions, have slipped into a more queer fashion of metaphysics, the Indian philosophers of language, despite their declared faith in metaphysics, have not failed the expectant readers in the domain of semantics and logical analysis of language.

So let us have a look at Bhartṛhari, the Prince of the Indian philosophy of language.



CHAPTER IV

A PREAMBLE TO LOGICAL AND EPISTEMIC BASIS OF BHARTṚHARI'S PHILOSOPHY

SECTION—1.

Idealist Theory Of Knowledge : The Buddhist And The Advaitist

As a metaphysician Bhartṛhari posits a First Principle, the One Reality, which he calls Śabda-Brahman, the metaphysical basis of the phenomenal world that moves in an eternal convention of linguistic meaning. This metaphysical principle is undoubtedly an abstraction out of a logico-epistemic analysis of language. Even without adhering to his first principle one may profitably look for the rationale of his passage from logic to metaphysics. To follow this track it is necessary to remember the fundamentals of the Idealist Theory of Knowledge.

Bhartṛhari is a monist and idealist, and as such is actuated by an attitude which is basically in accord with the Advaita theory of knowledge. His exceptional originality lies in the transformation of Advaita epistemology into the problem of relation between language and reality, or rather between language and meaning.

The essence of an Idealist theory of knowledge may be stated in short as follows. It will not make much difference if we begin with a presentation that is more akin to the Yogācāra Idealism Buddhist idealism of Yogācāra school. One cannot know what an object is when it is not being known. That is, an object-in-itself, independent of our knowing it, cannot be an object of knowledge. What is assumed to be an object of knowledge is really an object *in* knowledge. The 'beyond' of knowledge is beyond proof. An 'independent' reality can only be logically *constructed*

and so its independence cannot be logically *guaranteed*. The real is the immediate sense-content which can only be sensed, but cannot be defined in language. An external world, beyond the sense-content, is only a matter of definition. You define it only to demolish it. Whatever is caught in language exists only as a linguistic meaning (*Vikalpo nāmasamśrayah*). We are so much embedded in a time-honoured pattern of linguistic habit that knowledge and object which are one and the same appear as two, so that what belongs to knowledge as its form and shape appears as the cause external to it.*²⁴ The subject-object relation is a logical fiction born out of our habit of language. That it is a fiction follows from the law of contradiction. If you say, "I know an object-in-itself", you utter a senseless and self-condemned sentence, since an object that is being known is no longer an object 'in-itself'. 'In-itself' is supposed to be a thing which stands out there in its own right whether you know it or not. But the moment you say you know such a thing it is no longer in a state of being unknown. So you cannot say what the thing is at the time of your not knowing it. As a consequence an object of knowledge must be a content of knowledge, and the content of knowledge is always a content *in* knowledge. Thus knowledge cannot have an object beyond its orbit. An object of perception must be an appearance in perception. So says *Prajñākara*.*²⁵

The situation may be put in the following manner. Let x be any object-content of knowledge at any time, and let n be the supposed object-in-itself. Then the reality should be represented in the form $x+n$. Now, since whatever is being known at any time is an x , n is bound to remain an unknown quantity for ever, unless it passes into x (and that is impossible on our definition of n). If you never know the exact value of n you cannot legitimately say that it has a value except as a matter of logical imagination. It is another way of saying that one cannot even infer a thing which none does ever know. It follows then that $x+n$ is a fictitious quantity,

since n cannot be valued in terms of a real. Therefore the residual term x is the only reality as it always represents a concrete value. In terms of reality x is a psychical fact. But there is such a queer and inexplicable universal convention with the epistemic situation as a whole that the fiction is not accepted as a fiction and the fact is not accepted as a fact. The two are inter-locked in such a way that the psychical event, not taken as a fact in itself, is taken to be a thing beyond itself so that the fact appears as the fiction and the fiction as the fact. Thus we get the following false equation : $x = x + n$, which represents our analysis of the epistemic situation. Translated into Dharmakīrti's terminology this equation may be explained in the following way :— x is 'buddhyātmā' (the psychic event) which is 'avibhāga' (a partless single unit), but which appears as two, i.e., $x + n$, the subject and the object ('grāhya-grāhaka-samvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate') before the people who suffer from a primeval inverted attitude (Viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ).*²⁶

The traditional Advaita analogy of nacre-silver may be understood in line of the equational analysis given above. Our habitual linguistic expression of this situation is something like this—"A piece of nacre appears as a piece of silver". But it is doubtful if such an expression does justice to the situation as such. If we remember the fundamental epistemic fact that it is consciousness that appears to have a fictitious objective duplicate beyond itself, the nacre-silver phenomenon too should be analysed in the appropriate manner. Here too it is the event of silver-consciousness, i.e., the silver-percept, which appears to have a duplicate outside itself. If the percept were simply taken in its own right no illusion would have occurred. In other words, in the nacre-silver situation the perceptual proposition representing the illusion is not—"It is a silver-percept", but 'It is a silver-piece.' The first proposition is valid whether there is a

The nacre-silver
illusion analysed in
the Buddhist way

silver-piece or not. The second proposition is invalid, because here the psychical silver-percept projects itself into a non-existing physical duplicate. Hence, again we face the same false equation, $x = x + n$, the mistaken identity between a fact and a fiction.*²⁷

The nacre-silver analogy analysed in this way may be easily extended by a Buddhist idealist to any epistemic relation which is conventionally accepted as a valid case of perception. Yet to bring out the fictitious nature of the subject-object relation in general a Yogācāra Buddhist would prefer the analogy of dream to the Advaita analogy of nacre-silver. The reason is not far to seek. The nacre-silver analogy involves an unnecessary complication in the

fact that in common parlance one *thing* is said to appear as another. In the example of the Advaitin the nacre is assumed to be externally real, tentatively at least, in accordance

with the accepted belief of a man dealing with the practical world. The realist, mistaking this analogy for a final proof, pounces upon the alleged weakness involved in the pre-assumed external reality of the piece of nacre. So the Buddhist idealists try to avoid this complication, as far as possible, by drawing upon the analogy of dream-perception in which even the realists will fail to find the touch of an external reality as eloquent as the piece of nacre. The dream-situation is more or less a convincing case of externalisation of thought about which it cannot be said, at the first breath at least, that here too one external thing appears as another. The Buddhists perhaps feel that, since the purpose of the idealists is to show that consciousness appears as an external world, it is better

to choose an analogy in which an internal percept is admittedly externalised into a physical thing. The Buddhist idealist explains the unreality of the empirical universe by *externalisation* of thoughts into things, while the Advaita Vedāntist does the same by *superimposition* of the unreal on

Buddhist preference for the analogy of dream

Externalisation and Superimposition

the real. The difference between externalisation (Vahir-vadavabhāsaḥ) and superimposition (adhyāsaḥ) is the measure of difference between the Buddhist idealist and the Advaita Vedāntist in their respective attitudes towards the unreality of the phenomenal world.

As long as we confine ourselves to the pure realm of epistemology, in which we are concerned with the relation between the psychic event and its objective duplicate, our analysis would represent the epistemic view of Buddhistic idealism. It is well-known that the Buddhist idealists do not recognize such a metaphysical entity as the permanent universal consciousness, but feels satisfied with the fleeting reality of the psychic fact of the moment. So in the field of pure epistemic analysis, where we do not as yet bring in a perennial super-epistemic principle, the Advaita account of the empirical relation should not differ much from the Buddhist account.

There is definite evidence that the interpreters of the Advaita are well alert that they run the risk of being bracketed with the Buddhists by the realists due to this commonness of basic approach to the epistemological question. Hence they are eager to add that their provision for a permanent metaphysical back-ground constitutes the most distinctive departure from the Buddhist view.*²⁸ This projection of metaphysics into the domain of epistemology is designed by the Advaitins to emphasize their view that there is no illusion without a relatively permanent back-ground, no fiction without some continuing fact, no logic without a stable reality and no cosmic epistemic relation without a Perennial First Principle.

Hence, even at the risk of being misunderstood by the realists the Advaitins, in order to explain the cosmic illusion, would prefer the analogy of nacre-silver to that of dream-experience, because in the hierarchy of existence the nacre

Advaita's stress
on Nacre-silver
analogy

occupies a higher plane than the illusory silver. It is the law of illusion that an existent of the lower plane should be superimposed on that of the higher plane. So an indefinable silver of a pure illusion is superimposed on the clouded back-ground provided by nacre which has a higher existence being a member of the pragmatic world.*²⁹

The Buddhist idealists, feeling no need for a perennial consciousness as the permanent substratum of the phenomenal world, would perhaps advise the Advaitins in the following manner :-

"In final analysis, you too agree that it is always consciousness which appears as the external world. So you should not give a handle to the realists to confuse the issue by bringing in the unfortunate analogy of nacre-silver and thus drawing an injudicious distinction between the pragmatic existence (Vyāvahārika-sattā) of nacre and the illusive existence (prātibhāsika-sattā) of silver. You know fully well that this tentative distinction between two types of existence is itself unreal in respect of your fundamental Reality (Parmārtha-sattā)"

The Advaitins would find it difficult to accept this friendly advice. They would say—"Our very adherence to one Metaphysical Principle of perennial consciousness compels us to reject your advice. On our view, the fleeting psychic instants, which are the only realities for you, are basically as much unreal as their fictitious external duplicates. So, even at the risk of being misunderstood for the time being, we avoid confounding common sense at the first instance, and thus bring in a homely analogy in order to suggest at the next step that the external world is as much indefinable, either as existent or as non-existent, as the illusive silver in the nacre-silver situation.

Now, keeping in mind this difference between the respective epistemic positions of Buddhist Idealism and Śāṅkaraite Advaitism, we may try to show how the epistemic equation of Yogācāra Buddhism may be transformed into an

equation representing the cosmic illusion of Sāṅkarite Idealism. If x be an instantaneous psychic event, Epistemic equation of Sāṅkarite Idealism let x' stand for the Sāṅkarite Absolute. The Absolute here appears as a double duplicate over and above itself, i.e., as the psychic event on the one hand and the external object on the other. Hence the original equation is transformed in the following way :— $x' = x' + (x + n)$. If one feels that this equation does not show the place of an individual self (Jīvātman) which is also basically unreal, the gap may be filled in by adding one more variable on the right hand side. Let x'' represent an individual soul. Then the equation will take the following form :— $x' = x' + \{n'' + (x + n)\}$. This false equation will then finally represent the cosmic illusion of Advaita Idealism. The total fiction has been put within the second brackets and the primary fiction within the first brackets. Hence the residual term x' is the only reality.

Thus the epistemic difference between Advaitism and Buddhist Idealism is measured by the difference between the two equations :— $x = x + n$ and $x' = x' + \{x'' + (x + n)\}$. It is needless to repeat that this difference is determined not so much by purely epistemic considerations as by the metaphysical considerations of the Advaitins.

Keeping in mind this basic approach to the idealist theory of knowledge, we shall try to find our way for a transition to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Specially we shall remember the net result of our findings about the Advaita theory of knowledge :—Brahman, the Absolute, is neither the subject nor the object, but only seemingly subjects itself to a relation with the total subject-object complex which we call the empirical world. Thus Brahman enters into relation with a system of relations. But a system of subject-object relations is a logical construction, for it is necessary as a matter of logical imagination, but not as a pattern of reality outside the supposition. Hence in an ultimate sense the relation between the Absolute and the phenomenal world is an all-

abiding fictitious identity between the Reality and the Fiction.

SECTION—2

Logical Transition To Bhartṛhari's Theory Of Knowledge.

The careful reader must have noted the fact that we reached the conclusion of an idealistic theory of knowledge not on the strength of a syllogistic pattern of argument, but on the basis of the law of contradiction, as it is evident in the analysis of a perceptual proposition. We have done it with a purpose, and do not think that in doing so we have deviated from the spirit of traditional exposition, though there is certainly a difference in the manner of presentation.

The garb of a syllogistic pattern which has been imparted to the argument about the unreality of the objective world by the traditional interpreters of Advaita, and specially the Herculean efforts of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to save the epistemic syllogism of Advaita from the relentless attack of the dualist-realists, have tended to confirm an erroneous view among the students of the Advaita to the effect that this philosophy stands or falls with a particular pet syllogism.*³⁰ We are firmly of the opinion that the logical basis of the Advaita theory does not rest in an impeccable purity of any such syllogism, but it rests in the evidence of self-contradiction involved in any such perceptual proposition as, "It is a pitcher", when the percept-predicate is taken to mean an objective referent apart from the percept itself.

We can call Madhusūdana himself to stand witness in favour of our contention. We would like to refer the reader to a very remarkable but unfortunately neglected chapter of Advaita-siddhi, namely, the chapter on Dṛg-dṛśya-sambandha-bhaṅga (refutation of the subject-object relation). It is this chapter which presents the fundamental principle of

Advaita theory of knowledge. As such it is the key to the understanding of the whole philosophy that has been presented in Advaita-siddhi. This chapter is a confirmation and elaboration of the short treatment done to the same topic by Citsukha in a sub-section of Tattva-pradīpikā.*³¹

Citsukha and Madhusūdana are here concerned to show that knowledge cannot have a real relation with an object which stands independently outside the fold of knowledge. Hence the subject-object relation is an abstraction within the orbit of knowledge itself. What is a unity in fact assumes an appearance of duality in response to the logical demand of phenomenalism. As long as we are bound to move in an empirical world the nature of thinking logically demands that knowledge must have an object. But an object outside knowledge cannot itself be logically defined. The authors of Tattva-pradīpikā and Advaita-siddhi examine all possible realistic definitions of objectivity (Viśayatā) and show that none of them can explain the nature of an object. But the main thing is that an epistemic relation is not logically possible without accepting an object within the fold of knowledge itself, yet phenomenal logic is itself impossible without abstracting the object away from knowledge. This self-imposed self-violation is the logic of phenomenalism. The incompatibility of the realist's proposition, which seeks to posit a real relation between knowledge and an object outside knowledge, is a reflection of the internal incompatibility of phenomenal knowledge itself. It is the law of phenomenal thought which makes the realist's position untenable.

Importance of a neglected chapter of Advaita-siddhi

Refutation of Subject-object relation

Madhusūdana has not said this much in clear terms, but could not have said much less about the significance of what he has said. At the very beginning of the chapter on Drg-dṛśya-sambandha-bhaṅga he has to reckon with the realist's objection that the Advaitin's inference about the unreality of the empirical world falls through, since the

general major of the syllogism, namely, "Whatever is an object of knowledge is unreal", cannot be established, because, being an object of knowledge is quite compatible with the reality of the object independent of knowledge. Hence in this chapter he feels it necessary to demonstrate that the independent reality of an object is incompatible with the subject-object relation, and thus the reality of the epistemic relation itself is negated along with the reality of the object.

He concludes the chapter with the remark, "The epistemic relation is only a superimposed fiction, because if the object is real the relation is impossible." (And if the object is unreal the relation is indefinitely fictitious).*³²

Thus it is clear that Madhusūdana recognizes the need of establishing the major premiss of his syllogism through a non-syllogistic deduction, i.e., from the law of contradiction.

Of course, anybody who has developed a
 Too much love for syllogism nostalgia for syllogism may force a syllogistic pattern even upon such a non-syllogistic argument as—If A is father of B, B is a son of A, or If A is a brother of B, B is a brother of A.

Now, once the general premiss, "Whatever is an object of knowledge is unreal," is established, the pursuit of the syllogistic conclusion such as, "Therefore, the phenomenal world is unreal", is redundant except as a
 Weakness of a syllogistic attempt pet game of technique. The greatest difficulty with such a syllogism is the tautologous nature of the minor premiss—"The phenomenal world is an object of knowledge." The minor term and the middle term are inter-convertible expressions, for the phenomenal world is nothing but "whatever is an object of knowledge." Hence the major premiss and the conclusion are really not two propositions, but the same proposition doubly expressed. Since we want to conclude that the entire phenomenal world is unreal, we cannot think of a major premiss which is more general than the conclusion, except by including Brahman

Itself within the middle term and thus dragging it into the fold of unreality.

To escape from this predicament if we choose to change the minor term from the whole into the parts, i.e., 'this pitcher', 'this piece of cloth' etc., we shall have to take another step to reach our intended conclusion, "The whole phenomenal world is unreal." We cannot rest satisfied simply with such a piece-meal conclusion as "This pitcher is unreal", or "This cloth is unreal." Hence to reach the grand conclusion we must take the further step of an inductive generalisation, and once that is done we reach a conclusion which is only a duplicate expression of the major premiss. Now the circle is complete and we begin anew the merry-go-round.

Inadequacy of a piece-meal inference

Again, what is the utility of the instance of nacre-silver illusion in which our major premiss is supposed to be illustrated. An illusion is considered to be an illusion by virtue of its being contradicted by a subsequent experience expressed in such a proposition as "It is nacre", whose validity we do not doubt. But our purpose is to prove the fundamental invalidity of the entire fund of phenomenal experience which includes in its field the contradictory valid experience itself. In other words, the contradicting proposition, "It is nacre", held to be valid, must itself belong to the cosmic fund of false propositions. Otherwise our purpose is negated. So a very pertinent and embarrassing question crops up in this way:—When the invalidity of an illusive experience is proved by the validity of a contradictory experience, how does this illusive experience itself go to prove the basic invalidity of that contradictory experience? Even the most skilful acrobat cannot climb his own shoulders. Thus our general proposition asserting the unreality of each and every object of knowledge cannot be an inductive generalisation

Utility and non-utility of a traditional illustration

Utility in suggestiveness

based on the instance of illusion. Hence the value of this instance does not lie in its being the illustrative part (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of a syllogistic structure. Its utility lies in its simple suggestiveness. We have the experience of an illusion proving false in future, and who knows, likewise our whole empirical world may not be a wider cosmic illusion including everything which we now take to be valid. May be, the total world-experience will one day be contradicted by a Reality which we are yet to realise. This is at best a suggestion, but never a part of proof. Evidently our general premiss cannot be established on induction.

That is perhaps the reason why Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara have tried to deduce the general epistemic proposition of idealism from the laws of thought, specially from the law of contradiction. Dharmakīrti observes,—“The subject-object relation is inconceivable if the object is a duplicate entity external to knowledge.”*³³

Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara's deduction of the general proposition of Idealism Prajñākara interprets—“The objects, ‘blue’ and the like, do not appear in knowledge except as objects of knowledge. If you say,—“The unknown becomes known”, how can you know,—“there was an unknown real”, when you did not know it ? “A thing known to be unknown is known” is a self-contradictory assertion. If you say, “A thing not perceived is known by inference”, that too is a bad proposition. Inference is also knowledge, and at the time of inference the object cannot be inferred as standing independent of being inferred. Moreover you mean to say that an object need not always be perceptible. But an object of inference does not *radically* differ from a percept, since any object-content of knowledge is always a *direct appearance in* knowledge. The object is invariably *immediate* to knowledge.*³⁴ Yet a few pages later Prajñākara has not been able to stop the temptation of forcing a shape of syllogism upon what he derived directly from the law of contradiction only a few pages before.*³⁵

Now, analyse any empirical proposition such as "This is a pitcher." The subject-predicate relation is a pure logical construction. Ask any common man to narrate his simple pitcher-experience. He will never say that in his experience there are two terms, 'it' and 'pitcher', the former being the

subject and the latter the predicate, so that there is a relation of identity between the two. The philosopher of course can silence the common man by saying, "Well, you do

not know what you know. So hear it from me." A philosopher is perhaps the greatest dupe of his own performance. He creates a logical child by his analytical brain, and at once feels it walking on two legs before his eyes.

So, in final analysis, the subject 'it' stands for the psychic-percept and the predicate 'pitcher' is a fiction in so far as it is supposed to be an object standing outside the percept. Thus the proposition is an identity of fact and fiction. The realist will retort, "Does the common man mean it by his proposition?" No, of course not, but that is the fun of logical fiction. You and I, all of us, say what we do not mean, and mean what we do not say.

Two things are now gradually emerging from our discussion—

(1) The problem of epistemology can be correctly understood only by a correct analysis of empirical propositions. Hence what we say and what we mean, i.e., a semantic analysis of language, is essential for any theory of knowledge.

(2) The problem of epistemology cannot be effectively tackled without recognizing the tremendous role of language and logical construction in the structure of our knowledge.

After bringing out the essentials of an idealistic theory of knowledge, we may now look for the fact how Bhartṛhari has effected a spectacular transformation of the epistemic problem into a problem of relation between language and meaning.

CHAPTER V

NOMINALISM AS A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Now, granted that knowledge cannot have an object external to itself, what is it that imparts a structure to knowledge, or imprints a form and shape on it? "It is intelligible language",—replies Bhartṛhari. Just as we cannot logically think of a thing external to thought, so we cannot logically speak of a thought external to speech. Thought is an expression and an expression is a communication. An object belongs to thought in virtue of being named. If pure sensation is ruled out of the domain of knowledge, thought proper should begin with the stage of perception. Perception involves an element of interpretation through classification, and classification is impossible without the name of the class under which the percept is subsumed. I do not know a tree until and unless I know it *to be a tree*, and to be known as a tree an individual is to be known as a member of the class summed up by the word 'tree.' That means, my

Percept, perception and language knowledge fails to get a form if the name 'tree' does not give a pattern to the percept.

Now, granted that the percept has no being without knowledge, that knowledge has no structure without the percept and that the percept has no pattern without the name, it follows that the structure of knowledge is nothing but the naming pattern of its percept. It is needless to say that the name here is not the physical reality of a succession of sound-waves, or of a spatial series of some black lines on a white sheet. The name here may be the image of a word or a sentence. You may call it a word-thought or sentential thought if you like to put it that way. But if you put it that way you put in more than an image. Even a mental image seems to follow the pattern of a part and whole structure. But the word-thought or sentential thought is a logical unit without any parts. In my perceptual knowledge the name

'tree' does not figure as the image of some successive sound-waves, or of some black marks in a certain spatial position. You may conjure up such an image with some efforts.

What we are driving at may be better understood if we take up a propositional judgment representing a fact of action. I see a boy run. My knowledge of this event is wrapped up in a form represented by the sentence, "A boy is running." My knowledge is not clear and definite even to me without being passed and sieved through by such a silent language. But that does not mean that my perception of the event would take such a long shape as "a-b-o-y-i-s-r-u-n-n-i-n-g", which would be the image of a sound-series. Neither is my perception the simple mental picture of the physical event which does not require the help of any language at all. A pure mental picture of the event is quite possible even in a child who does not know what a boy is, or what running is. This picture is not knowledge because it has not yet taken the shape of a perceptual judgment. It is at best an indefinite 'psychic mass.' This indeterminate mass takes the shape of knowledge only when judgment comes in as a matter of interpretation in the form of meaningful language. In other words, to cognize the event as a boy's running we must cognize the meaning of 'a running boy.' But the linguistic expression does not enter the cognitive judgment either as an image or as physical acoustic events, but as a monolithic logical unit which is inseparable from the meaning-percept. Thus in the cognitive judgment meaning and expression merge in an identity. Hence the percept *as an object of* knowledge is at the same time the meaning of an expression. The unity of thought and percept is identical with the unity of meaning and expression. This cognitive unit is a logical unit, i.e., a meaning-unit, which one may call a gestalt, in which the elements do not come up as some sort of subjective brick and mortar that go to build an imposing edifice of knowledge. When I take

Cognition is
neither an image
of language nor
a picture of fact

Meaning is the
object in thought

a tree to be *a tree* in my perceptual judgment, the class name 'tree' enters the scene only in its logical aspect. There it is a 'unicellular' unit which forms and holds the pattern of the thought-percept *tree*. Thus the tree as an object of knowledge is unthinkable except as the name in its logical transformation. Now, according to the idealistic theory of knowledge an object *of* thought must be an object *in* thought, and Bhartṛhari shows that the object in thought must be the meaning of a name that shapes the thought. Conversely, the meaning of a name is the object *in* thought. (bauddhārthasya eva vācyaṭvam).

Students of Western philosophy are well aware of the distinction which Bradley has drawn between two senses of 'idea', the idea as the mental image and the idea as the logical abstraction. The mental image is a psychic event or a part of the event caught in a fleeting series of psychic moments, while the idea is the universal aspect abstracted out of the image. As such a logical idea has no existence in time and space. It is not a fact, but an abstraction, 'a wandering adjective', ready to be referred to a reality supposed to be standing 'beyond the act' of judgment.*³⁶ It is unfortunate that Bradley, while holding the logical idea to be the meaning of the mental image, should have incautiously stated that the former is a part of the latter. For this indiscrete remark he has been cleverly caught by Professor Cook-Wilson in an interesting chapter of his 'Statement and Inference.'*³⁷

Be that as it may, what we are concerned with is the great importance of Bradley's idea of 'logical idea' as distinct from the mental image. It is very doubtful if this logical idea is the meaning of the mental image. Bhartṛhari has correctly shown that the logical idea is the meaning of language. An abstraction has no shape and form without language that holds it. Hence a logical idea is equivalent to a 'linguistic idea.' The mental image of a tree does not require that one should know it to be a tree. But it is

inconceivable that somebody knows something to be a tree but does not know that it is *called* 'tree.'

A proud father who often feels the pleasure of walking with his child also knows some irritating moments when he is repeatedly assailed by questions like—"Father, what is it?" The child sees a four-wheeled object speeding along the road and asks the question. The father only replies—"A motor car." The name 'motor-car' is the only addition to the child's store of knowledge. But he feels satisfied that he has now *known* the thing. In future when he will see the thing he will know it to be a motor-car. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa

In a sense knowing the name is knowing the thing

has made a pointed reference to this remarkable phenomenon of knowing a thing by knowing its name.*³⁸

Now suppose the child is absolutely innocent of any use of language. He does not know any such demonstrative pronoun as 'it' or 'this', does not know any word corresponding to a 'thing'; no 'wheel', no 'horn', no 'motion'—no word is known to him as standing for anything within the range of his vision. Let him be totally ignorant of any relation between a symbol and the symbolised. His knowledge will be nothing more than a pure indefinite sensation or an image not even defined as 'something.' Even Russell, who like the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas seems to be definite that there may be knowledge without language, has got to admit that sensation is not knowledge.*³⁹

The Indian realists are more clear in one respect. They agree that no determinate knowledge is possible without language; but there is always an indeterminate preamble to a determinate perception. This indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna) does not require the help of language.

Thus the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception (nirvikalpa and savikalpa) is accounted for by the absence or presence of the linguistic form.*⁴⁰ Needless to say that this indeterminate perception is the nearest

Indeterminate and Determinate perception

equivalent of pure sensation, but not the exact equivalent.

But, before you can say even silently unto yourself what you are sensing, your sensation will remain an amorphous mass which you are at liberty to relate to anything and everything on earth. This knowledge of nothing, yet of everything, may be called knowledge only by courtesy. It is quite correct that knowledge proper should begin with some sort of feeling about a subject-object relation. But 'sensing' such a relation is inconceivable without the intervention of an interpretative language.

So it is not without reason that the realists of the later period represented by the new school of Nyāya, did not feel quite comfortable in their analysis of indeterminate perception.

This feeling of discomfort led them to a queer formulation, namely,—An indeterminate perception is an 'extra-sensuous' fact which can be established only by an inference and never by any perceptual introspection.*⁴¹

The history of the whole confusion about the nature of indeterminate knowledge in Indian Philosophy may be traced back to Kumārila, the prince of Indian realists. Some

contradictory remarks of Kumārila have perhaps set in motion a long run of confusion among the realist philosophers coming after him. Kumārila suggests that in an indeterminate perception an object does not appear either as a particular or as a universal, but it appears purely as itself. But the object itself is composed of both these aspects of particularity and universality, yet neither of these aspects is sensed in pure sensation. What is sensed in this stage is the pure and simple individual. Again, he says that the universal and the particular are both known as the constituents of the object even before the in-coming of the linguistic form. The virtue of being meant by a name is the only addition to the knowledge of an object at the later stage of perception. It seems that here Kumārila suggests a third stage of perception

Kumārila's view
on indeterminate
perception

which is marked by absorption of a new entrant, a relation between the word that means and the object that is meant.*⁴²

The confusion, it seems, starts from an implicitly entertained false analogy, i.e., a logical composition is thought of in the likeness of a physical composition. A building is composed of brick and mortar in the physical sense, and of the universal and the particular in the logical sense. Without appreciating the difference between these two types of composition one may be misled into the belief that just as the building may be perceived even without perceiving its physical components, so it may also be perceived without perceiving its logical components. The latter way of perceiving a thing is then defined as indeterminate perception. But define it as you please, it is very doubtful if a situation so defined does exist at all, or, if there is anything of the nature of cognition in it, even if it is imagined to exist.

To say in the same breath that the particular and the universal constitute the very nature of an object which is grasped in an indeterminate perception, and that this perception still somehow misses these constituents, is a contradiction too eloquent to be ignored. Pārthasārathi, the great commentator of Kumārila has noted this contradiction and tries to dismiss it as a mere seeming anomaly.*⁴³ He explains indeterminate perception as a sort of confused cognition in which nothing is distinguished; and, curiously enough, that is called an apprehension of the 'pure individual' (suddham vastu).*⁴⁴ Again the confusion is turned into a chaos when it is declared that even the universal and other distinctive logical marks of an object are apprehended even before the class-name or any language enters the scene.*⁴⁵

This last declaration of Kumārila seems to have exerted a definite influence on Jayanta, the veteran Naiyāyika of the ancient school, and compelled him to make a thorough departure from what Kumārila observed on the nature of 'nirvikalpa' some sixty verses earlier than this. We remember the earlier

Kumārila and
Jayanta

observation of Kumārila to the effect that a 'nirvikalpa' grasps neither the particular nor the universal, but the pure individual, whose distinction, either from other individuals, or from other classes of individuals, does not figure in this primitive stage of perception. Now Jayanta appears to have rejected the significance of this earlier observation of Kumārila in the light of what he has observed later on, and states in the clearest possible language. :—

"A universal, a substance, an activity, or a quality, whatever essence of an object is grasped by 'savikalpa' is equally grasped by 'nirvikalpa.' The remembrance of a meaning-relation of the object with a certain word is the only addition that marks out 'savikalpa' from 'nirvikalpa.' On the objective side there is not the least difference between the two.*⁴⁶

But we think that the New School of Nyāya by some sort of re-thinking on the nature of 'nirvikalpa' has attempted a compromise between these two stalwarts of Indian Realism,

the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila and the Naiyāyika Jayanta. But this compromise formula has taken a surprising form. It is something

The Compromise
formula of Navya-
Nyaya

like this—"In an indeterminate perception we know the substantive particular and the adjective universal, and yet do not know them *as* such, and hence do not know the relation between the two."*⁴⁷

We know tree-ness and know the tree, and yet do not know that tree-ness belongs to the tree. One may equally say—"I see whiteness and see the horse, and yet do not see the white horse. The only escape from such an absurdity may be provided by a frank admission that, in 'nirvikalpa', seeing is not knowing. But the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas insist that 'nirvikalpa' is knowledge. The new school of Nyāya does not feel satisfied in this respect before going to the farthest length of absurdity. Do you ever feel that you possess such a kind of indeterminate knowledge as described above? "There is no hope of catching this knowledge even in a perceptual introspection", thus say the new Naiyāyi-

kas, "but you can know it only by way of a syllogistic inference". It is such a kind of perceptual knowledge in respect of which you can only infer that you perceive (or have perceived).

Thus we stand before this imposing syllogism :—

Whatever is a cognition of a qualified substantive is always preceded by the cognition of a qualifying adjective,—

Just as the cognition of a 'man with club' is preceded by the cognition of the club.

The determinate perception of the pitcher is a cognition of a qualified substantive (i.e. pitcher qualified by 'pitcher-ness').

Hence it is preceded by a cognition of the qualifying adjective (i.e. pitcher-ness).*⁴⁸

Out of this baffling syllogism you are to weave out an inferred fact that once you were the proud possessor of an indeterminate perception. Here again one gets a reminder that, one knows *the* adjective in nirvikalpa, but does not know it *as* an adjective. Vardhamāna, the illustrious son of great Gaṅgeśa, the father of Indian Neo-Logic, notices the weakness of the illustration, 'man with club', in the above syllogism and shows how his father has improved the position by bringing in the analogy of inferential knowledge itself, in order to demonstrate the truth of the universal major premiss.*⁴⁹ All these Herculean abstractions culminating in a formidable figure of syllogism are born out of the logician's brain-waves, and we are asked to believe that all

these really happen to our thoughts and that we do not know what we really know. Thus in the hands of the realists the problem of indeterminate perception has run a course of chequered history. With Kumārila it began as sensing a 'pure individual', and with the Neo-Logicians it ended as apprehending a 'pure universal or a pure adjective.' One may sum up the history of the problem as a flight from the 'pure table' to the 'pure table-ness.'

From 'pure table' to 'pure table-ness'

The followers of Bhartṛhari cannot be reconciled to this historic march of indeterminate perception. It is not that the test of inference or any other type of reasoning should not be extended to a fact of perception. Bhartṛhari himself eloquently admits the need of such a test—"A wise man should examine even an object of perception in the light of reason. He should not take an object as granted or guaranteed simply because it is backed by the proof of perception".*⁵⁰ But it is quite another thing to assert that every body of us undergoes in every case of perception a certain primitive experience which the percipient man has no chance of ever being aware of, except through an elaborate syllogism.

Sometimes a fact may be stranger than a fiction, but more often the logicians turn a fiction into a fact, and feel the thrill of discovering a 'new truth.' Such an adventure would evidently go against the very attitude of realism which

Kumārila's attitude of Realism has been very excellently summed up by Kumārila in the following words—"Philosophical critics should only try to understand through rational analysis the accepted facts and principles sanctified by universal convention, but should not manufacture some definitions which would go to demolish the universally accepted truths.*⁵¹ Perhaps Kumārila here does not literally mean that a philosopher must agree to be commanded by common sense and convention. He probably means to say that a breach of convention should not be permitted unless it involves a contradiction in thought. Navya-Nyāya's conception of indeterminate perception definitely involves such a contradiction. It is inconceivable that one perceives pure treeness and the pure tree, but does not perceive the percept to be a tree.

The strongest argument against the view of Bhartṛhari that there is no cognition without expression has been supplied by Kumārila, and has been approvingly quoted by many a philosopher of later days. It relates to the possible experience of

an infant or a dumb person. You can add the deaf to the dumb to fortify the argument. Quite in consonance with common sense Kumārila points out that just before a determinate perception there is an indeterminate stage which may be likened to the experience of an infant or a dumb man.*⁵² If one chooses to be a die-hard dogmatic and deny the very possibility of knowledge and perception without the help of language, one must accept such an awkward position as to deny that an infant or a dumb person may perceive or know anything.

Bhartrhari anticipates this objection and remarks that the linguistic pre-dispositions of the previous birth silently work in the mind of an infant who has not yet learnt to speak (one may extend this assumption to the case of a deaf and dumb person).*⁵³ Such an assumption may appear to the modern mind as too bold to be rational. But an Indian philosopher believing in the cycle of births should be the last person to raise an objection.

An anticipatory
reply by
Bhartrhari

CHAPTER VI

THE LOGIC OF SYMBOLISM

Part I

For the time we may suspend the metaphysical context of the question and concentrate on the logical principle working behind the view of Bhartṛhari. This logical principle is the principle of symbolism operating in the emergence and sustenance of thought and knowledge.

Sign And Symbol

As long as an infant moves in a pure sign-situation his reaction to a sign is not a matter of thought, but an instinctive behaviour towards a sign-stimulus. When a child, who has not yet learnt to speak, responds in a particular way to a bottle of milk in mother's hand, his pattern of behaviour has not that structure of understanding which moves a grown up boy to some sort of intelligent inference like this,—“Mother has come with a bottle of milk to assuage my hunger, so I take it and drink it.” In case of the infant it is a reflex action conditioned by the sign-stimulus. The sign is not yet a symbol for the child. A sign becomes a symbol when one not only responds to it, but can consciously use it to evoke responses from others. Thus a symbol has a universality or a common fund of meaning in a field of communication the understanding of which is necessary before it can be applied in a particular situation. The grown up boy who *knows* that the bottle of milk is *meant* to assuage hunger, also knows, in a mood of expectation, that his infant brother, if hungry, will react in an *expected and expecting* manner to the bottle held before him. Hence to the bigger boy or his mother the bottle of milk is a symbol, to the infant it is a sign, because the mother

and the elder boy know how to use the bottle to evoke an expected response from the infant who only knows how to respond, but not how to make others respond. Thus this difference between instinctively making a response and consciously evoking a response is the difference between a sign-situation and a symbolic situation. Hence symbolism starts with a communicative consciousness or consciousness of communicability.

The deaf and dumb beggar who approaches you for alms, gesticulates to make you understand his need and act accordingly. He cannot expect his gesticulations to arouse the expected behaviour

What about the deaf and dumb?

in you, unless his own behaviour, previously linked up with similar gesticulations from others, would have taught him to 'think' that his own gesticulations too would make others behave in a similar way. But as long as his experiential behaviour was confined to a simple reaction to some gestures, his 'knowledge' was on no higher plane than the instinctive behaviour of an infant. He comes to 'know' that gestures have some *meaning* only when he comes to learn that similar gestures, if applied by him, will arouse a similar response in others. It is this apprehension of meaning which transforms a sign into a symbol, an instinct into knowledge. So when we say that there is no knowledge without language we extend the term 'language' to cover all symbolic expressions. Thus, in an ultimate sense, it is quite

Knowing begins with meaning

proper to say that knowing begins with meaning. Let us take another example.

Mother brings some interesting thing to the notice of her child by pointing her finger to it, and soon the child learns to point it himself by his own finger and bring it in turn to the notice of his mother. Here knowledge for the child is not simply 'a taking notice of', but an interpretation of the symbol of finger-pointing. Even the infant, who has become naughty enough to utter a habitual cry in order to draw the attention of the mother, has entered the precincts of

symbolism from a pure sign-situation. Hence an interpretation of a symbol involves an implicit capacity for its application. If one carefully observes the growing behaviour of a child in order to trace the growth of his consciousness, one will be convinced that the beginning of the child's knowledge cannot be separated from his beginning to understand a symbol, i.e., learning how to use it, be it a verbal symbol, or a non-verbal one.

This slight modification or extension of Bhartṛhari's theory of symbolism does not defy but fortify his logical foundation, not only accommodates the modern mind, but also liquidates an old objection of Kumārila which issued from an insufficient understanding of the Logic of Symbolism.

But the crude non-verbal symbols cannot go far enough. As these are more and more replaced by verbal symbols knowledge becomes more and more clear and defined in its outlines. When the child passes from *pointing out* a thing by finger to *meaning* it by uttering a word, he undergoes a revolution in the growth of his consciousness. It is not a 'silent' revolution, but a 'noisy' one in the literal sense.

The child who has just known a thing to be a tree, will henceforth not only interpret the word 'tree' for himself, but also will utter it in an appropriate situation with the expectation that the hearer will mean the same as he has meant. Thus an interpretation of a symbol, specially a verbal symbol, presupposes the fact that the speaker and the hearer must be leaning on a common *plane of meaning*, without which a communication is impossible. Now, can any body show you this common plane of meaning as a solid piece of the physical world, or even as a moving event of the mental world? A physical thing is supposed to stand in its isolated glory. But we seem to mean it all the same whether it is there or not, whether it is a past thing or a future fact. It is obvious then that this physical object cannot be the meaning

as such. The case of a mental event is equally obvious. A mental event is a fleeting fact, and my mental event has nothing to do with yours. It is completely a 'private affair.' Hence the meaning cannot be a mental event. The meaning cannot be a private reserve, since it is meant for communication ; and communication is impossible without having our meaning as a public property in which the speaker and the hearer, the writer and the reader must have a common share. So the only course open to us is to admit that this common plane of meaning is nothing but a logical construction, an indispensable fiction, an all-powerful 'vikalpa,' without which knowledge cannot begin, consciousness cannot grow, the society cannot exist, the world of communicating humanity cannot move.

Now if we combine the idealistic theory of knowledge with this Logic of symbolic-situation as a whole, we shall attain the Nominalist Theory of knowledge as it is propounded by Bhartṛhari. Only one step further, and the whole phenomenal world, both mental and physical, will be merged in the world of meaning, an all-comprehensive realm of logical abstraction. But before taking that step, before showing how the epistemic relation is finally transformed into the relation between language and meaning, it will be necessary to find out the nature of language in its logical aspect.

CHAPTER VII

LOGIC OF SYMBOLISM

Part II

What is a word? We shall assume that the reader has already gone through the first chapter of Russell's *Meaning and Truth*, entitled, "What is a Word?" The obvious reply

Word as a physical fact. would be,—a word is a series of sounds which are represented in writing by some

lines that we call alphabets. But a sound as a physical existent is a fleeting phenomenon. Our ancient philosophers excepting the *Mīmāṃsakas* are at one with the modern scientists in maintaining that the sound made by the speaker is not the same as that which strikes the ear-drum of the hearer. The hearer only hears the last member of a series of sound-waves. The apparent sameness is an illusion begotten by an unperceived and unrecognized similarity. It is the same pattern that persists, but not the same individual sound. If it is true that you cannot hear the same word 'dog' as that which I utter, it is truer still that you and I cannot utter the same word, but only similar words with the

Word as a universal same pattern, and also that we cannot utter the same word twice. This persistence of a common pattern in similar words has been beautifully expressed by Russell—"The word 'dog' is a universal, just as dog is a universal."*⁵⁴

In this respect Russell might have nearly concurred with the Indian *Naiyāyikas* except for one small but important difference. The *Naiyāyikas* too maintain that our

Russell and Naiyāyikas impression of hearing the same word twice proceeds from confusing the particular with the universal. As a universal the word,

Gau (cow), is one, but as particulars there are as many

instances of the word as there are utterances of it. But, while for Russell the universal word is nothing but a *class* of similar sounds placed in the same order, for the Naiyāikas the universal is an ontological existence, having a reality as good as that of the individuals to which it comprehensively belongs. The Mīmāṃsakas on the other hand would not recognize a 'universal word' either in the class-sense or in the ontological sense. For them a word is particular and permanent; this follows from their theory of permanence of sound. In two utterances the same physical 'entities', i.e., the alphabetical sounds in the same series, may appear twice, and so it happens that the same word is uttered twice. A permanent sound is only revealed by the motion of air, but not created thereby (Vāyunā nityaḥ śabdaḥ abhivyajyate, na tu niṣpādyate). Undoubtedly the theory of a permanent word-sound smacks of a mysticism which others have thought it wise to reject.

Again, the Buddhists, and the idealists including the school of Bhartṛhari, do not accept the 'universal' as an ontological existence. They take it to be a logical construction, but not in the class-sense of Russell. A class is a summation of all the members comprehended under a class-name.

A class-notion is backed by a denotative sense of exclusion or inclusion. But the Buddhists and the idealists take the so-called universal in the connotative sense of a logical idea which does not correspond to any reality beyond itself. Thus it is a non-class logical abstraction. In the last chapter of his 'Meaning and Truth' Russell concludes, not without some hesitation, that there are universals apart from mere general words. He is ultimately sure about only one universal, i.e., 'similarity' which, he thinks, one cannot help admitting.

Now let us demarcate the logical aspect of a word from its physical aspect. Some one utters the word 'dog'. We

take it to be a single word, but why and how? The letter-sounds *d*, *o* and *g* cannot be uttered except in a succession, and they are three distinct sounds. Yet as a bearer of meaning the word is accepted as a monolithic structure. The Naiyāyikas would explain that the memory-impressions of the earlier auditory percepts *d* and *o*, together with the last auditory percept of the letter *g*, create an impression of oneness, since the succession of utterances is too rapid to be recognized in cognition. Thus the 'one-word-dog' is an illusion. The Naiyāyikas fail to note that it is a totally unwanted explanation which is quite wide of the mark. It is this very 'illusion' which is logically necessary for a word to bear a meaning. The Naiyāyikas have only offered a *physical expalnation* for the formation of a word-sound. This explanation is valid for any sort of quickly succeeding noises, but any noise is not a word. The question is what sort of noise bears a meaning and why so. An illusion in itself is no less stubborn a fact than what we call a reality. No explanation of an illusion can obliterate the fact of an illusion. When an illusion of 'one-word' becomes necessary for bearing a meaning, it is no longer to be taken as a series of mental or physical events, but as a *logical fiction*.

The Naiyāyikas would like us to believe that it is the particular succession of letter-sounds which is the word that means. Let capital *G* stand for the auditory percept *g*, and let small *d* and *o* stand for the memory-impressions of two successive *d* and *o* sounds. Then according to the Naiyāyikas, $d+o+G$ = "dog" = the bearer of the meaning *dog*. Now that is impossible. A psychic series representing an acoustic series in itself bears no sign of meaning whatsoever. A time-honoured convention seizes a factual series of sounds, or

Word in its
logical aspect

Nyāya view

Evading the
question by
a physical
explanation

From an illusion
to a logical
abstraction

A critique of the
Nyāya view

their psychic counterparts, strips it of its 'factive' character, elevates it into an illusion of 'one-word', Logical word, a monolithic unit sublimates this illusion into the logical fiction of a monolithic unit, only then and then alone we take *the word* as meaning something. Ask any body, when he uses the word 'dog' to mean the canine quadruped, whether he is using the 'serial togetherness' represented by $d+o+G$ to mean what he means. He will look at you with an eye of suspicion which will be far from flattering to your mental health. 'Thus 'dog' has a meaning, Only a logical construct has a meaning but $d+o+G$ has none of it. The latter is a sum of elements found in an analytical introspection done in the logician's parlour, while the former is a logical abstraction sanctified by an immemorial convention.

You hear the word 'dog', but train your mind not to take it as 'a word', but as a sequence of acoustic events, and see the effect. You will never reach a meaning that way and form a thought. A word is logical, a noise is physical You will get only a sequence of noises. The reason why some noises have meaning and some have none is that some noises are not taken in themselves, but are used as logical abstractions.

Hence only those noises which are made to act as logical fictions can hope to carry any meaning. Thus meaning which is itself a fiction belongs to another fiction which we call 'a word' (or 'a sentence' in the ultimate sense). Hence we conclude that between 'dog' and $d+o+G$ there is no logical equivalence, because the former is a logical construction, while the latter is a physical or psychical analysis. Meaning-relation as a double abstraction. So as a carrier of meaning language too is only a logical construction. That is the secret behind Bhartr̥hari's theory of Sphoṭa The logical secret of Sphoṭa *understood in its logical aspect*. If you are too keen on having a metaphysical principle you may furnish a spiritual back-

ground to this fiction and hypostatize *the logical feeling of a spiritual need* into a metempirical substance, and thus reach the Reality of Śabda-Brahman which is supposed to appear in a fictitious relation of language and meaning, the terms of the relation being as much unreal as the relation itself.

Towards
metaphysics

As the eyes that see are not the object of the same sight, so the fountain of the cosmic meaning-fiction is not the object of the same meaning. The Spirit of language is beyond language.*⁵⁵ But here we are concerned with the logical basis of Bhartṛhari's theory of knowledge, and not with his metaphysical assumption as such. We shall see presently that the fact that language and meaning both are logical constructs has a tremendous significance for the epistemic theory of Bhartṛhari.

Before bringing out this significance we shall draw upon a Kantian example of 'synthetic a priori' in order to help our understanding about the position of Bhartṛhari regarding the logical nature of language. Kant observes—"All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic", i.e., $7+5=12$ is a synthetic proposition. Professor Ayer feels baffled at this, and says that here Kant simply means that "the subjective intension of '7+5' does not comprise the subjective intension of '12'." But, "from the fact that one can think of the sum of seven and five without necessarily thinking of twelve, it by no means follows that the proposition, $7+5=12$, can be denied without self-contradiction."*⁵⁶

An example from
Kant

But Kant himself begins the elaboration of his point with a definite warning—"We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition, $7+5=12$, is a merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from the concept of the sum of 7 and 5"....."But", he continues, "The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 5; and I may analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please, still I shall never

find the 12 in it."*⁵⁷

Apparently what Kant here takes to be a logical concept is understood by Professor Ayer to be a mere subjective intension. Does Professor Ayer then mean that the logical concept of 12 should comprise all possible combinations of the mathematical world which go to make 12, such as, $4+8$, $2+10$, $6\frac{1}{2}+5\frac{1}{2}$ and so on ad infinitum. That is a sheer absurdity. The logical concept is here the logical idea. Logically speaking, the idea of 12 is not at all equivalent to the idea of $7+5$. Had it been so, an auditor examining a balance-sheet might have simply looked at the total and spin out of this 'total concept' all the different expenditures on different heads.

A child just learning to count may know the meaning of 12 without knowing it to be $7+5$. Even the greatest mathematical wizard, given millions of years for counting, will not be able to give us all possible combinations which may go to produce 12. So Kant is quite correct in thinking that, " $7+5=12$ " is a synthetic a priori proposition, since it can be denied without any self-contradiction in thought. Now apply this Kantian principle, mutatis mutandis, to what constitutes a logical word, and you will find that the followers of Bhartṛhari are quite right in observing that *the word* 'dog' is not at all the logical equivalent of $d+o+g$. The former is a logical unit carrying a meaning, while the latter is a meaningless series of successive noises, (or memory-impressions of two earlier noises together with the auditory percept of the final letter-sound *g*).

Now it follows that the word 'dog' as a bearer of meaning i.e., as a logical construct, is a universal in a double sense.

First, different persons on different occasions utter different instances of the *same word* as bearing the same meaning. Secondly, even in the single instance of an utterance, the word as a logical unit is different from the summation of the articulated

alphabets. The articulations only manifest a universal logical fiction. Hence the metalogical principle of the manifested logical abstraction is called 'Sphoṭa' (from $\sqrt{\text{sphuṭ}}$ —to manifest). The Naiyāyikas would take a word to be a universal in the first sense, but not in the second. Even then, since they accept a universal to be a real existent over and above the particulars, it is difficult to see why they should insist that a word bearing a meaning is equivalent to a series of physical

or mental events. For this irrational insistence they invite a further difficulty. The physical acoustic events of articulated letters cannot

A difficulty for
the Naiyāyika

be gathered together, because they always fleet fast in succession. To circumvent the difficulty they suggest that the memory impressions of earlier articulations should be joined with the last auditory percept. Now, if the memory impressions are held to be conterminous with the last auditory

percept our cognition of the word 'dog' should have retained the impression of *togetherness* as it is symbolised by the plus-signs in $d + o + G$

No percept of
'togetherness'

But the word-percept does not seem to contain any such internal combination. It appears as a complete pattern, a gestalt without any component parts. Yet there is no denying the fact that there is a series of articulations constituting a

physical word. Hence there is no other way than to admit that *a word* as a bearer of meaning is nothing but a logical abstraction.

Meaningful logical
construction and
meaningless physical
composition.

The bearer of meaning is never a physical composition of sound-waves.

CHAPTER VIII

LOGIC OF SYMBOLISM AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

SECTION—1

A Recapitulating Summary

Let us now briefly state our findings. Pure sensation is not knowledge. Knowledge proper begins onwards from the stage of perception. Perception involves an interpretation of sensation or the 'just-given sensum.' There is no interpretation without an operation of a symbol. Thus perception is a process of representation through symbolic operation. The process of transformation of a sensation into perceptual cognition is at the same time a process of a sign-situation developing into a symbolic situation. A sign is a sign so long as it is only reacted against. It becomes a symbol when it is interpreted as capable of evoking a reaction if it is applied in an appropriate situation. Thus only a symbol has a meaning while a sign has none.

Primitive symbols are non-verbal, and therefore crude and inadequate. As the crude symbols are replaced by verbal symbols knowledge tends to become clear and definite, and the role of language in knowledge begins to be felt. Hence any perceptual knowledge must bear the burden of a name. Thus Bhartṛhari should be accepted as generally correct when he says that all knowing is naming and meaning. Even in an elementary form of perception which is nearest to sensation the object strikes us as a 'this', 'that' or 'it' Try to take away even these demonstrative pronouns from the form of perception, you will find your cognition too diffuse to be discovered. Harivṛṣabha has made it beautifully clear in his commentary on Vākyapadīya.*⁵⁸

Since the operation of a symbol is the essential requirement of cognition, the object-content of cognition must be

the meaning of a symbol. In a cognitive judgment such as "this is a tree" the predicated meaning is the universal logical idea symbolised by the predicate, and "This" is the demonstrative name for the percept. The logical idea is a logical construction attended by a feeling of extension into a supposed external world. The percept too must be held in a name even as a 'this'. Thus a propositional expression

of a perceptual judgment represents a fictitious situation in a double sense. In the first sense, there is an identity between fact and fiction, between the subject-percept and the predicate-fiction.

A double-decker abstraction.

This is the real purport of the Nominalists' contention that a perceptual judgment is an expression of the identity of the name and the percept (*nāmārthayoḥ tādātmyam*). Curiously enough, almost all the critics of nominalism distort this theory by taking it to mean that the object is identified with the predicate word-sound. So Vācaspati in his *Tātparya-tīkā* reminds us—"The proposition, 'it is a cow' means that 'cow' is the name of this object. It is not a proposition of identity." Our discussion will show that this criticism is wide of the mark, since it puts into the opponent's mouth what he has not said.

In the second sense, the percept too is a nominal concept being formed as a 'this,' and thus there is an all round identity between one fiction and another. In other words, one grand abstraction fictitiously bifurcates itself into a subject-predicate relation. Thus the total perceptual situation is transformed into a total meaning-situation which is expressed in a statement that is taken in the logical sense of a construction, not in the physical sense of a sound-series.

SECTION—2

The Law Of Logical Construction

A logical construction may be equated to a conceptual existence. But we think this equation is not strictly valid. A

concept is generally considered to be an intellectually abstracted essence of the reals existing apart from it. In this sense even the realists should not grudge to admit a conceptual existence to be the direct meaning of a word.*⁵⁰ A logical construction is not abstracted out of reals. It is the most fundamental schema that pervades the very possibility of thought. It lends an objectivity to thought which has no object beside itself. The law of construction is a super-comprehensive principle by virtue of which the phenomenal world is transformed into the meaning-content of cognition.

As we have said before, we accept 'logical construction' to be the English equivalent of the Sanskrit word 'Vikalpa'. The meaning of the term 'Vikalpa', as it is defined by Patañjali, as it is understood by the Buddhists and as it is often used by Bhartṛhari and his commentators, is quite distinct from what we understand by the word 'concept'. Vikalpa is that type of abstraction which exists merely as the meaning of a name without any counterpart in an external world. According to Patañjali's definition a Vikalpa is a conscious abstraction, i.e., in this case even the common man using a word knows its meaning to be an abstraction. For example, the mythological demon Rāhu consists of a head alone. Yet a man uses the expression 'Rāhu's head', as if 'Rāhu' stands for the whole body and 'head' for a part. He is conscious all the same that the meaning of the total expression is nothing but an abstraction,—'as if it were so'.

But in philosophy we mostly have got to deal with unconscious abstractions, i.e., in such cases something is generally taken to be existing in reality, though in ultimate analysis it is nothing but the meaning of a linguistic expression. Here the meaning is unconsciously projected into an assumed reality. As the nominalist idealists would like to say, the phenomenal world exists only as the meaning of language, which is unconsciously hypostatized into a reality. So the

word 'Vikalpa' in a comprehensive sense is used to mean the meaning of a linguistic expression which is a logical fiction, not factually co-related to any reality beyond itself. It is this linguistic abstraction which is the back-ground of a world of 'As If'.

But a concept, being the extracted essence of a body of particulars, is not devoid of a certain co-relation to some counter-parts in reality. Hence when we use the term 'concept' for 'construction', we should be taken as using the term loosely.

In conformity with our analysis of the cognitive situation and our understanding of the logic of symbolism, we are now in a position to raise 'Vikalpa' to the status of a comprehensive principle, the most fundamental Law of Thought which operates as a sovereign in the domain of epistemology. In accordance with the spirit of Bhartṛhari we may formulate the Law in the following manner :-

The Law of Logical Construction *"The phenomenal world exists only as the apprehended meaning of a system of intelligible language."*

(The reader should be reminded that we are framing the Law without any reference to the Metaphysical Principle of Bhartṛhari. It should be taken as a pure epistemic law).

Let us remember the idealist theory of knowledge—"The world exists in thought". Bhartṛhari adds—"Thought exists in the cognized meaning of language." And thus we get at the statement of our Law. The modern positivists would like to say something like this, but they do not know how to get at what they mean to say, and also do not know what Bhartṛhari did for them more than thirteen centuries ago.*⁶⁰

The doctrine of Sphoṭa or Śabda-Brahman, though fundamentally presented as a matter of metaphysical necessity, must have an epistemic co-ordinate which should provide the logical basis of a metaphysical assumption. How far this

flight to metaphysics from epistemology is logically necessary is of course a matter of debate. But as the thing stands, the Law of Logical Construction encompasses the pure epistemic aspect of the doctrine of Sphoṭa. As an epistemic co-ordinate the Law of Logical Construction is related to Śabda-Brahman in the same way as the Law of Avidyā is related to Sāṅkarite Absolute.

The epistemic co-ordinate of a metaphysical principle

In its metaphysical aspect Sphoṭa is a hypostatized First Principle, a primordial entity which projects itself into the phenomenal world of cognition, meaning and language. The Metaphysical Reality of Bharatṛhari is an integration of these three in one, and is conceived as the Final Substance which is the metempirical basis of the empiric world. Because the role of language reigns supreme in his logic and epistemology, and because his metaphysics is derived from the logical analysis of thought, as it is shaped and sustained in intelligible language, it is quite in the fitness of things that Bharatṛhari, feeling the need for a metaphysics, should call his First Principle Śabda-Brahman or the Primordial Word. It is called Sphoṭa because our epistemic universe gets its expression and emanation from it.

From logic and epistemology to metaphysics

In most of the writings of our ancient masters logic and metaphysics are welded together in a manner which makes it difficult to pursue the passage from one to the other. We think we shall be failing in our duty to do justice to a great ancient thinker if, ignoring the need for a clear understanding which is likely to enlighten a modern mind, we do not make a painstaking attempt to disentangle the logical from the metaphysical aspect of Bharatṛhari's theory. In the body of his work Bharatṛhari does not tell us how much is logical and how much is metaphysical in his doctrine of Sphoṭa. But the distinction between the two may be brought out by bestowing a careful thought on the original texts and by reconstructing an interpretation without deviating

from the spirit of the ancient teacher as it has been understood by his authoritative commentators.

In a similar way the Śāṅkarite principle of Avidyā or Nescience loses much of its mystery if it is taken as a comprehensive Law in the light of the Law of Logical Construction. There is reason to believe that Avidyā, in the sense of a mysterious Indefinable, quite other than existence and non-existence, yet somehow a positive something, is a later construction, a device for demarcating the Advaita position from the Buddhist position even in the epistemic field. Indefinability has two aspects, logical and metaphysical. The orthodox interpreters of Śāṅkara seem to have laid utmost emphasis on the metaphysical aspect even at the cost of the logical. When it is said that something cannot be defined either as an existent or as a non-existent, it logically follows that this indefinable 'something' is not a *'thing' other than* existent and non-existent, (that is, not *'something'* sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa), but a mere logical, or conceptual construction in respect of which the question of existence or non-existence does not arise at all.

But if the external world is held to be unreal in this purely logical sense of indefinability there is the danger of embracing the position of a Yogācāra Buddhist for whom the phenomenal world is a body of externalised concepts. Hence the sectarian Advaitists, in order to demonstrate that even on the pure empirical plane their position is quite different from the Buddhists, fall back on the metaphysical aspect of indefinability. Accordingly, when it is stated that the world is neither existent, nor non-existent, it should mean that the world is 'something' *other than* existent and non-existent (Sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa). Thus even Avidyā, the principle of cosmic illusion, is thus an *indefinable positive something*, not in the sense of a logical concept, but

Śāṅkarite
Avidyā

Two aspects of
Indefinability,
Logical and
Metaphysical

Metaphysical
aspect of indefinability.

in a mysterious metaphysical sense. If you ask, "well then, is your Avidyā 'something' over and above the Brahman?"—at once a reply will be given:—No, Brahman is the only existent, the only Reality, but Avidyā is something, though positive, yet unreal, since it is neither existent nor non-existent. Hence there is no question of duplicating the reality of Brahman. This Avidyā is neither mental nor physical, neither conceptual nor external, neither logical nor empirical (i.e., not a percept *in* experience), and hence it is unreal, yet 'something', positively strong enough to kick up the whole row of the phenomenal world. Thereby it is turned into a mystery worse than metaphysics, since it eludes all efforts of logical understanding.

This zeal for obscurantism, born out of a desperate effort to demarcate the Advaita position from Buddhist idealism even in the epistemic field, of course, has to run its 'logical' length. As a consequence the interpreters of Advaita have got to assume that, even in the case of nacre-silver-illusion, an indefinable silver is produced (do not say, "comes into existence"), which is neither existent nor non-existent, yet 'something' *other than* either of the two. This silver is not the silver-percept which is a psychic fact and exists as such, nor a physical piece of silver, which is out of the question in a 'silvery' illusion, but yet somehow it is something being the corresponding co-ordinate of the silver-percept. This is the doctrine of "anirvacanīya-khyāti" as distinct from 'ātma-khyāti' and 'asat-khyāti' of the Buddhist idealists.

Śrī Harṣa is perhaps the one great interpreter of *Advaita* who seems to have a definite leaning towards the 'logical' concept of 'Indefinability.' In reply to a possible query of the realist such as—"When you say, the phenomenal world is neither *existent nor non-existent*, do you mean it is 'something' *other than* existent and non-existent?"*⁶¹ Śrī Harṣa observes,—“Well, I am defining 'Indefinability' just in your line of logic. Indefinability follows from negation of

definability by the Law of Excluded Middle. How can a person, who takes everything (except Bhahman) as indefinable, at the same time say that there is *something* indefinable which is neither existent nor non-existent (i. e. neither *is*, nor *is not*), since 'Indefinability' itself belongs to the fold of 'indefinables?'

"As for ourselves, we, the Advaitins, simply desist from establishing the existence of the phenomenal world, and remain satisfied relying on only one self-evident existence, the Brahman, the Absolute consciousness."*⁶²

Purport of the above observation may be stated thus:— You, the realists, say that the world exists. We show you that you cannot finally define it in terms of existence. Then you ask us,—Is the world then non-existent? Again we show that you cannot define it either in terms of non-existence. That does not mean that *we* are *positing* 'something' which is *other than* existent or non-existent. For us the problem of existence is finally laid at rest by accepting the One self-existent, i.e., Absolute Consciousness. About the existence or non-existence of any thing other than the Absolute none can logically say anything. So basically we are indifferent to that.*⁶³

It is quite evident from this that Śrī-Harṣa here takes 'Indefinability' in its logical aspect, but not in any metaphysical sense as it is definitely the case with many other interpreters of Advaita. Nāgēśa is astute enough to mark this remarkable attitude of Śrī Harṣa towards the problem of indefinability, and so, while refuting the metaphysical sense

of indefinability, he has quoted just the portion from Śrī Harṣa that we have quoted above.*⁶⁴ It is in conformity with this

attitude that we shall have to interpret the expression, "sad-asadbhyāṁ vilakṣaṇam," which Śrī Harṣa has used when he demarcates the Advaita stand-point from the Buddhist one. If by that expression we take him to mean,—“Something that somehow is without being either existent or non-existent”, we cannot explain his use of the

Nāgēśa cites Śrī
Harṣa in his
support.

term 'anirvacanīya' to express what the Mādhyamika Buddhists think of the world and everything.*⁶⁵

It goes without saying that the Buddhist idealists can take the world to be 'anirvacanīya' only in the sense of logical construction, but never in the mysterious sense of '*something*', neither existent nor non-existent, as it is entertained by most of the Advaitins. So it is clear that Śrī Harṣa draws only a metaphysical distinction between Advaitism and Buddhist idealism and not any empirical or epistemic distinction whatsoever. It is to be noted that the portion quoted before in which Śrī Harṣa gives his explanation of indefinability follows his metaphysical demarcation of the Advaita view from the Buddhist view only a few lines back.

Just after drawing this line of demarcation he faces a fling from the realists,—“If you lack the capacity to define the world, better learn the definitions from proper preceptors.” Śrī Harṣa gives the retort.—“You, who suppose that the world can be defined, better try to define it, and you will fail, because every definition can be shown to be logically defective.”*⁶⁶ After that he goes on to show,—“We say, the world is turned into an indefinable only following your line of argument, from your failure to define it. As for ourselves, we simply cannot accept the existence of the world and we feel quite satisfied with the acceptance of one self-evident existent, the Brahman.”

It is clear from the above that Śrī Harṣa's conception of indefinability is distinct from the traditionally accepted meaning of 'sad-asad-vilakṣaṇatva.' It is one thing to say simply that the world cannot be defined either as existent or non-existent and quite another thing to mean that 'the world is *something* which cannot be defined either way.' In the latter case one means something more than what has been said. The former case gives us a pure logical sense of indefinability, while the latter puts in a meaning too mysterious to be conceived.

SECTION—3.

Avidyā Converted into the Law of Logical Construction

Now, if in accordance with the sufficient hints dropped by Śrī Harṣa and the powerful support rendered by Nāgēśa,*⁶⁷ we accept the “Indefinable” in its logical sense, it is possible to convert the principle of Avidyā into the Law of Logical Construction. Whatever metaphysical considerations one may bring to bear on the nature of Nescience (Avidyā), logically speaking, in an idealistic theory of knowledge Avidyā must be accepted as the Sovereign Law of Thought. When an Idealist philosopher, on the basis of his line of investigations, discovers that the phenomenal world is fundamentally unreal, yet is always taken to be real, the only explanation behind this eternally inverted attitude of humanity is that it is the law of thought that human thoughts have got to operate on the assumed reality of an unreal world. The same thing may be stated in another way,—It is the law of thought that a body of logically constructed concepts is accepted as a real and external world which does not exist in reality. Provided the idealists have moved along a correct rail of investigations, there is no other way than to accept such a law.

Avidyā as the
Law of Thought

When a fundamental law is discovered it is meaningless to ask why it should be there. When the scientists have discovered and proved the law of gravitation, it is senseless to ask why there should be a law of gravitation, just as it is meaningless to ask why light should travel at the rate of 1,86,000 miles per second. Similarly if it is discovered and proved that it is the nature of thought to construct some concepts and then to accept those constructs not as themselves but as a real world external to thought, it is absurd to ask why such a law of thought should be there.

A meaningless
question.

A law is only a statement of the general pattern of

behaviour on the part of a thing or things. The more comprehensive is the subject of our enquiry, the more general is the law. The idealists' enquiry is about the nature of the world-appearance as a whole, so when its nature is discovered, it is found to be the very nature of thought itself. Hence the Law of the phenomenal appearance is at the same time the most comprehensive law about the general pattern of behaviour of thought in relation to the world-appearance as a whole. Thus when the Advaitins speak of "anādi Avidyā," or the Buddhists of "anādi vāsanā," it is to be taken in the sense of an all-comprehensive law of thought which has been operating from eternity behind the universal phenomenal appearance.

It is strictly as such that Avidyā should be called the Indefinable per-excellence, because a law is after-all a logical abstraction, a necessary interpretative fiction.

"Indefinability" is more appropriate in respect of a comprehensive Law of thought.

A law as a logical construct cannot be valued in terms of existence or non-existence in reality. It is senseless to ask whether the Law of gravitation exists or not like a mountain or a sea-nymph. So the Law of Avidyā as a super-comprehensive abstraction interpreting the world-appearance as the apparent behaviour of thought, is beyond the pale of existence or non-existence; and yet it is indispensable as the widest possible logical fiction from which the phenomenal world is deduced as a construct donning the cap of reality.

Hence it follows that the phenomenal world too is beyond the question of existence or non-existence, since it is a construction out of the super-construct that is called the Law of Avidyā. Interpreted as the supreme Law of thought and appearance Avidyā loses much of the mantle of mystery with which it is traditionally wrapped up. If the Aristotelian Laws of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle have nothing mysterious about them, it is difficult

Conceived as a law Avidyā is no longer a mystery

to see why the Law of Avidyā, interpreted as the sovereign interpretative principle of thought, should strike the note of an esoteric music.

Now it is easy to see how the Nominalistic theory of knowledge, propounded by Bhartṛhari, can make a great contribution towards reducing Avidyā to the Law of Logical Construction. Avidyā is said to be the principle by virtue of which the unreal is imposed on the real. But we cannot say that something is unreal without bringing it into the realm of meaning. Whatever is unreal must be at least understandable as the meaning-referent of an intelligible language taken in its logical aspect. Hence the phenomenal world, if unreal, must be deposited in the domain of logic and epistemology as the meaning-content of a comprehensive system of conscious statements. This is equivalent to our statement of the Law of Logical Construction that we have mentioned before.

When we formulate this sovereign Law of Thought and reduce Avidyā to this Law we do not do this without a hint and direction from some ancient leaders of thought. It is well-known that Maṇḍana Miśra, a staunch follower of Bhartṛhari, is a leading thinker of the pre-Śāṅkarite school of Advaita. He clearly states :—"Thought is nothing but the power of speech. Our knowledge of objects is always subservient to the form of speech, and so all objects are cognized in so far as they are captured in the form of speech. Thus they are either transformations or fictions sustained in language."*⁶⁸

Only one page after this he unequivocally advocates the view that the phenomenal world is nothing but a fiction in the form of an intelligible meaning. The illustrations that he uses to suggest this view directly cut across his earlier protestation to the effect that Avidyā cannot be a pure fiction, since in that case the world, like a 'sky-flower,' could not have

Bhartṛhari's

contribution

towards framing
the Law.

Maṇḍana Miśra's
powerful support

Maṇḍana virtu-
ally contradicts
his earlier protest
against fictio-
nalism

been the object of our pragmatic behaviour.

To demonstrate that the world is a conceptual construction out of a meaningful language Maṇḍana observes :—
 “There are certain objects which we all admittedly use only as linguistic abstractions ; their essence is nothing apart from being a form of speech-fiction. All other objects of the world may like-wise be reduced to such fictions.”*⁶⁹ Then as an example of an object which is admitted on all hands to be nothing but linguistic fictions, he mentions among other things the ‘rabbit-horn’ which is exactly at par with the ‘sky-flower.’ He then suggests that those analogies should be extended to all the objects of the phenomenal world which should be reduced to fictions in the like manner.*⁷⁰

Maṇḍana is an ardent disciple of Bhartṛhari, and so it is quite understandable that in this interpretation of Advaita he has rightly and clearly captured the spirit of his master.

SECTION—4

The Merger of Language and Meaning and the Universal Law of Symbolism.

To understand the full implication of the Law of Logical Construction it is necessary to bring out a very important aspect of Bhartṛhari’s theory of knowledge and symbolism, namely, the merger of language and meaning into one logical unit. We have seen before how in the constitution of thought both language and meaning figure as logical constructs. We also remember the fact that a thought is not a brick-and-mortar structure which can be really broken into its elements. Hence it logically follows that the relation between language and meaning in a unit of thought is itself a ‘fictive’ construction, and not a real connection between two really separate terms.

An important
sub-law of
symbolism.

A very important sub-law of symbolism is deduced from this remarkable fact :—

"A word while meaning an object-content of thought also means itself."

Bhartrhari originally formulates this deduction in a technical way. He says that a word conveys meaning in a double capacity of "grāhya-śakti" and "grāhaka-śakti." Its capacity for self-meaning is "grāhya-śakti," and the capacity for meaning an object-content of thought is "grāhaka-śakti.*⁷¹ In cognition the two enter into an unbreakable coalescence. This is deduced from the fact that thought cannot grasp the meaning of a word without grasping the word itself. And since according to our premiss the object of thought must be the meaning of a term, it follows thence that the term itself must partake in the nature of the object. Meaning is nothing if it is not the meaning of language. So it cannot enter into cognition leaving behind the term which means it. The total construct, "meaning-of-term" is both the form and object-content of thought.

Grāhyatva and Grāhakatva in a name

The self-meaning name and the rule of merger

In other words, a name can convey a meaning, which is seemingly other than itself, only in so far as it itself is involved in the meaning. It may be put in an epigrammatic manner, :—

"A name while meaning a meaning must mean itself."

It is needless to remind again that the name here is not an acoustic physical fact, but the logical unit as shown before. Thus the two logical constructs, name and meaning, merge in a higher construction which we call the object of thought. The name transfers itself to the meaning-referent and the meaning-referent to the name itself and thus a total

The significance of eternal relation between name and meaning

merger of the two constitutes the object-content of thought, the percepts table, tree and the like. It is in view of this law of the merger of name and meaning in thought that Bhartrhari calls it an eternal 'fictive' relation between the two. This relation of mutual merger is technically called Sāmānādhikaraṇya by Helārāja.*⁷²

It is the secret of Bhartṛhari's theory of epistemic adhyāsa. His theory of epistemic superimposition cannot be separated from this law of 'Self-meaning Name.' That is a point which has been forcefully brought out by Nāgeśa.*⁷³

Now we recall the fundamental position of the Nominalistic Theory of Knowledge :—"The thing is basically *in* thought and thought is sustained in the logical form of language." As a consequence, the percept 'pitcher' is the concentrated expression of this final merger of name, thought and thing.*⁷⁴ Thus our epistemic field is constituted by this fundamental form of adhyāsa,—The Three as One, and One as Three. As an epigram we may call our empiricist universe 'the game of the Double Rule of Three and One.'

In Advaita theory thought is considered to be self-revealed. We may add on behalf of Bhartṛhari that,—*Thought reveals itself along with revealing its object in so far as the name means itself along with meaning its meaning.* We may call this the Universal Epistemic Law of Symbolism.

It is easy to show that this Law is only a deduction from the Law of Logical Construction. In ultimate analysis an 'object-of-thought' is equivalent to the 'thought-of-an-object', and the 'thought-of-an-object' is the 'meaning-of-a-name' (the Law of Logical Construction). Now the 'meaning-of-a-name' is turned into the "name-of-a-meaning" (The rules of Merger and Self-meaning Name). And hence we get the Epistemic Law of Symbolism as stated above.

SECTION—5

A Remarkable Comment Of Helārāja

Helārāja offers a very illuminating comment which has got an excellent bearing on the problem that we have discussed just

above. His observations may be paraphrased as follows :—

“There are some causal conditions which operate as means to understanding, but yet keeping aloof, do not enter the body of understanding. The sense-organs cause a perceptual cognition, but themselves do not migrate into the content of perception.

“Again, there are some causes which produce a cognition, enter into the content of it, but yet maintain a difference as the sustainer of the content. In our inference from smoke to fire a causal relation is readily apprehended. It is a total apprehension in which both the cause and the effect are cognized as related terms, but yet the cognition of the effect retains its independence as the causal basis of the cognition of the cause.

“But a word, while causing the apprehension of a meaning, does not carry this causal relation into the body of the apprehended meaning. Here the meaning as a referent appears in the form of the word itself. It is the way of thought. The sense of succession from the auditory perception of the word to the cognition of the meaning-content is virtually lost, because the meaning is fixed in the form of the word itself. Now you may object :—‘If the meaning were fixed in the form of the word, how is it that we do not cognize the articulated alphabets in the structure of the meaning-referent ?’ Well, you are too much of a block-head to grasp our philosophy. We do not mean that the word as a series of sounds carries a meaning. The principle of consciousness operates in a symbolic way. The real bearer of meaning is the symbol in its logical behaviour. The symbol functions silently in cognition as a logical unit and not as the object of an auditory perception.....

“In the structure of the cognized meaning the symbolic representation is not a matter of separate cognition. In the self-same cognition the referent is revealed being wrapped up in the representative symbol. Thus the symbol speaks of a meaning through speaking of itself. Hence our knowledge

takes the form,—“This object is a cow.” So it is a case of *adhyāsa* or identity between the meaning and the word. The word as a logical construct imposes itself on the meaning-construct in cognition. (Metaphysically we may say the same in a converse order—The meaning-construct is an imposition on the Word-Reality, the *Śabda-Brahman*).’’*⁷⁵

Now, provided that the Law of Logical Construction together with the Law of Universal Symbolism is a correct representation of the phenomenal behaviour as a whole, and provided that, as a way of escape from a total universal fictionalism and consequent solipsism, we feel the need of a substantial metaphysical principle to serve as the perennial back-ground of a universal fiction, it is then quite pertinent to posit a Primordial Reality, the *Śabda-Brahman*, which is then assumed to manifest itself in a supposed duality of thoughts and objects, names and meanings, that constitute the panoramic procession of the phenomenal world.

CHAPTER IX

BHARTṚHARI AND WITTGENSTEIN

SECTION—1.

Introduction

The critical reader is justified in assuming that, if the metaphysical reality is totally dispensed with, the above account of nominalistic idealism is bound to slip into an uncompromising solipsism.*⁷⁰ It would not perhaps be unkind to think that Bhartṛhari's flight to metaphysics is prompted by a determined bid to avoid solipsism. This is understandable from the fact that in his acceptance of the external world as a logical construction he is almost at one with the Buddhist idealists of the Yogācāra School.

In his second Book of Vākya-paḍīya Bhartṛhari has advanced twelve different views about the meaning of meaning. The tenth view-point is stated in a highly significant verse which Puṇjarāja explains in a manner that has an unmistakable flavour of Yogācāra Buddhism.

A significant but
controversial
verse

Bhartṛhari says therein :—

“According to some thinkers the meaning of a word is the internal thought-content which arises depending on an external object, and which itself at the same time is accepted as the object standing outside.*⁷⁷

Nāgēśa takes this verse as representing the view of Bhartṛhari himself.*⁷⁸ Śāntaraksita, the Buddhist philosopher, quotes this verse in Tattva-Śāṅgraha, and Kamalaśīla, his commentator, explains that this verse presents a view which is different from that of the Buddhist idealists.*⁷⁹ It is

certainly a matter of debate whether Bhartṛhari presents his own view in this verse, and if so, whether the translation given above does proper justice to the great philosopher. The controversy centres round the expression “Vāhyavastu-

Kamalasila's
interpretation of
the verse

nibandhanāḥ” which literally means ‘depending on the external object.’

Kamalaśīla in his commentary on Tattva-saṁgraha explains that the doctrine advocated in this verse presupposes the fundamental reality of external objects.*⁸⁰ Puṇjarāja, while explaining this verse in his commentary on Vākyapadīya, uses a language which, except in respect of the term “Vāhyavastu-nibandhanāḥ,” might as well have been an extract from any philosophical text of Buddhist idealism. It is to be noted that Puṇjarāja does not state that the verse in question reflects the opinion of Bhartṛhari himself. One thing is quite clear that, if Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of the verse is correct it can never be accepted as reflecting the view of Bhartṛhari. The chapter on “Sambandha-samuddesa” (dissertation on

The importance
of “Sambandha-
samuddes’a”

meaning-relation) in the Third Book of Vākyapadīya, together with the penetrating commentary of Helārāja, gives us the clearest and profoundest account of Bhartṛhari’s

philosophy and theory of knowledge. Herein one shall unmistakably find a theory of knowledge which is a grand combination of Yogācāra idealism and Advaita metaphysics reclining on the background of an all-comprehensive Nominalism which is Bhartṛhari’s singular contribution to the world of philosophy. It is interesting to note that the

Liberal use of
Buddhist termino-
logy by Helārāja

commentator, Helārāja, apart from his very liberal employment of Buddhist terminology, (specially, the constant use of the term ‘Vikalpa’), quite approvingly quotes the

famous Buddhist epigram—“Language is born out of fiction and fiction out of language.”*⁸¹

Bhartṛhari declares his definite metaphysical conviction in the following words :—

“The subject, the object and their mutual relation,—every thing is a construction. The wise

The definite view
of Bhartṛhari
himself

Vedic seers accept only That as the Real on which all these fictions are super-imposed.*⁸²

As regards the nature of the empirical world Bhartṛhari never leaves us in any doubt about his own view of it :—

“The entire pragmatic behaviour of humanity is related to an ‘existence’ which, in fact, is born out of a Logical Fiction, and yet is accepted as if it were a reality.”

Helārāja’s interpretation of this verse is very liberally stuffed with the terminological flavour of Yogācāra Buddhism.*⁸³

Now, after clearing any possible doubt about the position of Bhartṛhari, it is quite relevant to have a look at the philosophical face of Wittgenstein, a leading figure of modern positivism.

SECTION—2

Wittgenstein’s Positivism

If you now apply the Occam’s Razor to eliminate that One Real, which for Bhartṛhari serves as the metaphysical background of a universal fiction, you become a proud fellow-traveller of Wittgenstein at his best. We use the expression ‘at his best’ with a definite purpose. After going through his latest ‘Philosophical Investigations’ we are thoroughly convinced of the correctness of Russell’s observation to the effect that the latest Wittgenstein is a philosophical degeneration of his former self.*⁸⁴ So here we take the earlier Wittgenstein of Tractatus-fame for the purpose of our assessment of his view.

Therein he has the following remarkable observation to his credit :—“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. Logic fills the world ; the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in Logic ; This

My language is the limit of my world,	and this there is in the world, that there is not ... That the world is my world shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.”* ⁸⁵ This is the essence of Wittgens-
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tein's linguistic solipsism. He proceeds further to show that his "solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism". This he does by liquidating the metaphysical subject popularly termed 'I' or ego. "The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world." For a thorough-going empiricist the world of experience (better say, 'in experience') is the only world we are concerned with. In this world the 'I' is as much an experience as any other. It is no more and no less real than any other. The feeling of a continuous self, qua feeling, is just *an* empirical event in a series of events. Hence this 'I-feeling' as an experience offers no guarantee for a real continuant which comprehends the fleeting experiences within itself.

Thus from the standpoint of pure empiricism the 'I' is as much impersonal as 'you' or 'he' or 'the table'. So it is senseless to ask—whose experience? We understand this to be the intended drive of Wittgenstein when he says :—"The thinking presenting subject, there is no such thing" or "The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point." Just as from the field of sight one cannot conclude that there is an eye that sees, because one does not see the eye in one's visual field, so from the field of experience one cannot conclude that there is a subjective ego that experiences, because one does not experience such a subject in his empirical field. This simile has been put forth by Wittgenstein himself.*⁸⁶

We are ready to admit that this *depersonalisation* of personality is undoubtedly an impressive achievement of Wittgenstein. We are here tempted to point out that Yogācāra idealism, with its 'self-less' doctrine of streaming moments of empirical events, should have found its logical culmination in this philosophy of Wittgenstein. But when these empirical events are arranged, stored and bundled in different distinct streams (*santati*), primarily for explaining the cycles of birth and rebirth, and secondarily for explaining the illusion of a continuant

Depersonalisation
of the person.

Wittgenstein and
the Yogācāras

As for the doctrine that the limits of language are the limits of the world, it strikes us as a distant echo of Bhartṛhari's theory of knowledge (provided we choose to forget the metaphysical aspect of his theory).

We cannot help noting another interesting point of contrast and comparison. Wittgenstein's doctrine of depersonalisation is an outcome of pure empiricism resulting in the elimination of metaphysics. But the theory of Advaita Idealism, the very opposite of empiricism, has effected just another kind of depersonalisation resulting in the reinstatement of Metaphysics. Thus you can depersonalise the 'person' in two opposite ways, either by dispersing all persons into the floating dust of atomic experiences, or by collecting and compressing all persons into the gaseous glory of an all-abiding consciousness. So it is a curious fact that depersonalisation may be done either by metaphysics or by negation of metaphysics.

SECTION-3

A Critique of Wittgenstein

But let us see if the pure empiricist has fared any better than the pure metaphysician. The first difficulty that confronts Wittgenstein has been noted by Professor Weinberg in his *Examination of Logical Positivism*.^{*87} The self is gone and the psychic events are nothing but atoms of experience. The physical world is a logical fiction. The world is not a system (because a system, as an internally consistent totality, is a metaphysical concept), but a plurality of an indefinite number of experiences which are separate and discrete, and any relation among them is unwarranted and

unaccountable. If that is so, language is no longer a means of communication. Communication is an inter-subjective relation which depends on a community of meaning. But there is neither an 'I' nor a 'You', nor a 'He', but there is only a plurality of 'Its', which are non-physical and non-mental atoms floating in a void. Every 'it' is a self-closed "monad" of the moment. There is nothing to pierce its secluded privacy ; and it now does not matter whether you call it a neutral atomic event, or a "person" of the instant. Any way the pure privacy of this neutralised "person" is incompatible with any possibility of communication. There is none to hear and none to speak, and nothing to hear and nothing to speak ; there are only some totally disconnected atomic facts called hearing and speaking. You cannot say that a preceding fact causes a following fact, because the causal relation has already been dismissed by Wittgenstein as a rank superstition, and rightly so, since that is the inescapable consequence of an uncompromising empiricism :—

"Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus" and "from the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another."*⁸⁸

(The reader may note that our account of Wittgenstein's difficulty is not just the same as Professor Weinberg has shown, but is more serious in some respects).

The only way to escape this uncomfortable position is to make a full-throated declaration like Bhartṛhari that even the fact of communication is an eternally superimposed fiction (*adhyastah sambandhaḥ*).

We shall here however present another difficulty that would strike at the very root of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. We shall try to show that his empiricism and theory of meaning cancel each other,

Impossibility of communication

An atomic fact, a monad of the moment

Causal relation a superstition.

A more serious difficulty

According to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning a proposition is the picture of a fact. Again, "the picture is a fact" (op. cit. 2.141); "The propositional sign is a fact," "The proposition is articulate" (3.14, 3.141). This means that one fact means another fact and that this meaning-relation is a pictorial relation between two facts. Now, as a fact a proposition is an auditory experience. The visual experience, tree, and the auditory experience, "It is a tree", are two independent facts, as much independent as the "table" and the "moon". So how can one assert that there is a pictorial relation between the two? (We leave aside the fact that the auditory experience "It is a tree" is not one experience, but a series of experiences).

The pictorial theory

A critique of the pictorial theory

There is no fact other than experience, and one fact is completely independent of another. So it is difficult to see how one experience can become the picture of another.

According to Wittgenstein there is a structural commonness between the proposition and the fact. What is common between the two cannot be expressed in a further proposition, since that would involve an infinite regress. What is common can only be "shown" (2.16, 2.161, 4.022, 4.121). This non-propositional perception (or intuition) of the common structure (i.e., the logical form) between the proposition and the fact is just another addition to the dump of facts, since it is also an experience. Let the propositional fact be called *a*, the fact pictured by the proposition be called *b* and the intuition of the common structure be called *c*. Now *a*, *b* and *c* are three distinct discrete and independent empirical facts. Hence the existence of *c* is no guarantee that there is a common structure between *a* and *b*, because—"from the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another" (2.062). In other words, there is the fact of an intuitive experience of

Theory of unspeakable structural commonness

A critique of the above theory

commonness, which has nothing to do with the two other experiences between which the commonness is supposed to exist. Moreover, had there been any such commonness beyond the intuitive experience itself, that would have been a fare-well to empiricism.

The matter is made hopelessly worse by the assertion that "the representing relation which makes it a picture also belongs to the picture" (2.1513). What is this representing relation except the structural commonness between the proposition and the fact? It is then strange to say that something is common between the two, but the commonness belongs to one. Or is it intended that, just as there is a "representing relation," so there is also another "relation of being represented." That is too absurd to be admitted, and Wittgenstein does not intend that, for he observes that "The representing relation consists of the co-ordination of the elements of the picture and the things." (2.1514).

In the light of what we have shown so far the following assertion of Wittgenstein does not seem to carry much sense :—

"In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality" (2.223)

In pure empiricism according to which the world is nothing but a composition of self-closed, disjointed experiential events, the question of truth or falsity, or comparison with reality, does not arise at all. The comparative

experience is nothing but the verifying experience. Hence it is a third experience over and above the two earlier experiences, i.e., the propositional fact and the fact that is supposed to be pictured by the proposition. Whatever be the findings of our verification, the verifying experience, as a completely independent unit of experiential event has no connection whatsoever with the earlier experiences which it is supposed to verify. The proposition, the fact allegedly pictured by the proposition,

How the matter
is made worse

Truth and veri-
fication are miser-
able misfits

and the verifying experience itself, all are equally stubborn facts and components of the empirical universe. Hence the verifying experience finally 'verifies' nothing but itself. Since there is no inferential passage from one experience to another, the so-called verifying experience has no right to see the face of the experience to be compared and verified, and pass any consequent judgment on them.

Every bit of experience shining in its secluded glory is equally true (or equally false). The picture and the pictured and the comparative experience are cursed with equal blindness, or blessed with equal vision. Hence in the parlour of a consistent empiricist comparison and verification are uninvited guests. Truth and falsehood are equal casualties of a pure empiricism.

If you like to be a true empiricist, take a leaf out of the books of Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara who are bold enough to face the logical consequence of their doctrine and do not hesitate to declare that, in an ultimate sense, all categories of relation like truth and falsity, verification and contradiction, causality and comparison, are only abstract fictions. We shall be introduced to these two masters in the next chapter.

In a charitable mood of interpretation Professor Weinberg suggests that a proposition as a series of sound-events, or printed lines, is only a sign, but as a symbol which bears a meaning it is to be considered as a unit, as one fact.*^{8 9} If that is so, the proposition in itself is no longer a fact, but an abstraction, a logical unit, a constructed concept. In that case we think it enough to refer the reader to Bhartṛhari's Logic of Symbolism, and ask him to draw the legitimate conclusion that the philosophy of Tractatus should have then developed in the line of Bhartṛhari.

To do justice to Wittgenstein we cannot help taking into consideration the graceful interpretation which Russell

has brought to bear on the philosophy of *Tractatus*. It is interesting to note how Russell can change his opinion even within the compass of two pages. He begins on the correct rail when he says that the statements such as "A doubts P", "A desires P" etc., make it appear as though we were dealing with a relation between a person and a proposition. This cannot of course be the ultimate analysis, "since persons are fictions and so are propositions, except in the sense in which they are facts on their own account...The proposition as a fact on its own account, for example, the actual set of words the man pronounces to himself, is not relevant to logic". This is a beautiful vindication of what Bhartṛhari had elaborately demonstrated in the sixth century.

But within a single page Russell has begun his shift, and then, strangely enough, goes just the opposite way :—"The problem is simply one of a relation of two facts, namely, the relation between a series of words used by the believer and the fact which makes these words true and false....The real point is that in believing, desiring etc. what is *logically fundamental* is the relation of a proposition *considered as a fact* to the fact which makes it true or false." *⁹⁰ It is for the reader to judge whether a proposition *considered as a fact*, i.e., as a series of sound-waves, may be called true or false. A fact is a fact. It is absurd to say that there is a false fact, and also a true fact. A 'false alarm' is not false because the sound itself is a 'false fact', but because the situation does not demand the creation of the noise.

Russell has done well to put a special emphasis on an important thesis of Wittgenstein, namely, the common structure shared by the propositional picture and the fact that is pictured cannot itself be put in a proposition.*⁹¹ Wittgens-

Russell's interpretation of Wittgenstein.

Approaching Bhartṛhari.

A strange shift in Russell's position.

A fact is neither true nor false.

An important thesis of Wittgenstein.

tein himself has put it this way :—

“Propositions cannot represent the logical form : This mirrors itself in the propositions.

That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent.

That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language.

The propositions show the logical form of reality.

They exhibit it.” (4.121)

As we have noted before, the common structure, the logical form, is nothing but the form of relation between the proposition and the fact. But the manner in which Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti have presented the same thesis is more straight and clear, and is free from the touch of metaphorical mysticism which very often has clouded the language of Wittgenstein. Let us see how Bhartṛhari has expressed the same view.

“The relation (between language and meaning) cannot in itself be exactly meant by another language—A relation is complete dependence (on the related terms) and so as such cannot be independently expressed by a new term.”*^{9 2}

Helārāja’s illuminating explanation of this verse completely coincides with what Dharmakīrti and Kaṇvakagomin think about the problem :—

“A word means an object by virtue of the meaning-relation. Thus the word and the object meant are two terms of a relation. A relation in itself is not a term, since its very nature is to bring two terms together. So, when a word attempts to mean a relation, that relation belies its character and appears as the predicative term of the meaning-relation. Hence no word can mean a relation as it is, since in the very process of meaning, the relation meant is turned into a term.”*^{9 3}

An illuminating explanation.

But Wittgenstein has nothing to offer like this as a way
 of explaining the reason why the form of
 The weakness of Wittgenstein's thesis relation between the proposition and the fact
 cannot itself be expressed in a new proposition.

That Wittgenstein's presentation of the problem suffers from
 a serious defect is evident from Russell's
 Russell's solution attempt to solve it in the following manner :—

“Every language has, as Wittgenstein says, a structure
 concerning which nothing can be said *in the*
 Hierarchy of languages *language*, but....there may be another language
 dealing with the structure of the first language
 ...and to this hierarchy of languages there may be no
 limit.”*⁹⁴

But it is easy to see that the problem, as it is presented
 by Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti, cannot be
 But that is no answer to Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti solved in the way suggested by Russell.
 With this much for Wittgenstein we leave it
 to the reader to judge who has fared better
 with a philosophy of language, the uncompromising empiricist,
 or the confirmed metaphysician.

One thing is clear from our critique of Wittgenstein,
 namely, pure empiricism is inconsistent with a consistent
 theory of meaning.

It is necessary in this context to have a look into Dharmakīrti's Theory of Relation. But before that it will be relevant to say something about the modern theory of sense-datum.

CHAPTER X

DHARMAKĪRTI AND MODERN POSITIVISM

SECTION—1

The Modern Theory of Sense-datum

In their crusade against metaphysics the modern positivists are unfortunately blind to the fact that they have ushered in a new metaphysics which is worse than what they have sought to eliminate. According to them any belief in an external physical object is a metaphysical assumption, so is also a belief in any mental object. What is real is the sense-datum alone. The world is a world of sense-data. *The act of experience, the fact of experience, and the object of experience are not different but the same.* (But that is exactly what the Buddhists idealists had pointed out in the distant past).

The Identity
of Three

The sense-data are neither physical, nor mental, but neutral. The physical and the mental are only logical constructions, only different ways of speaking about the same reality. A sense content or sense-experience only occurs, but does not exist.*⁹⁵ (Note the distinct flavour of Buddhist Idealism).

Sense-data are
Neutrals

A lot of neutral sense-contents, or 'eventuated' neutral particles, just coming to pass away and floating in a vacuum for a moment,—if that be the world, let it be so. But then it is irrational to speak of any relation between any two such neutral atoms of experience. The Buddhist idealists have this much consistency that finally they have refused to recognize the logical possibility of any such real relation. But the modern positivists do not like to dispense with relations, lest they earn the infamy of being die-hard subjective idealists.

Following the famous Berkleyan thesis which the sense-

datum positivists faithfully accept, a relation is to be perceived so that it may come to be. But, according to the positivists, there is neither an observer nor the observed, yet there is only an observation. Or, better say, these three are not different members of a happy 'get-together', but an unspeakable identical X. From the positivist postulate it follows that the relation and 'the cognition-of-relation' are not two but one and the same. It then further follows that this 'cognition-of-relation' is a third sense-datum over and above the first two between which the relation is supposed to hold. Then these three sense-data are quite distinct and independent facts of experience, and there is no way to infer one fact from another. So from the third sense-datum, 'the cognition-of-relation,' there is no way to infer that the first two are related in any way. We have met this uncomfortable position in our examination of Wittgenstein's theory of relation between the fact and the proposition. It cannot be said that experiencing the first two sense-data is at the same time experiencing their relatedness, since in that case perceiving the book *and* the table would have been the same as perceiving the book *on* the table.

If the third experience had anything to do with any relation between the first two experiences, you would have to admit some sort of a continuant subject or self which contains and experiences its own contents. But that would be embracing a metaphysics which the positivist is determined to eliminate. Yet if it is still insisted upon that a third independent experience can experience a relation between two earlier independent experiences, that would not be metaphysics, but worse than that, an obscurantism without a peer.

The theory of sense-datum is open to serious objections from a variety of considerations. What is the relation between a sense-datum and an experience? It is often said that a sense-datum is experienced. According to Ayer that is only a loose way of talking about a fact, an example of

how our common-sense language often falsifies a fact. The act of experience and the object of experience are one and the same.

But whence do you get a sense-datum? "From experience," would be the obvious reply. Yet that would be absurd from the position of a positivist. Experience is not just a magic-cave which opens up to show you a sense-datum in it. Let us then say that we get the sense-datum from the brain

and the sense organs, for example, a colour-percept from the eyes and optic centre. My eyes and brain are not my sense-data, but may be yours; similarly your eyes and brain are not your sense-data, but may be mine. Then we come to the absurd position of deriving my colour-percept from your eyes and brain.

From where do you get the sense-data?

The only way to escape from this absurdity is to admit that a sense-datum is a self-evident fact standing in its own right, such that there is no way to derive one-sense datum from another. That is just what the Yogācāra Buddhists call "Svasamvedana-sva-lakṣaṇa" (self-defined-self-experience). But, then all talks of relation should be accepted as 'mere talks', as the Buddhists have consistently declared. Is this self-evident sense-datum much removed from the Then a priori? much-maligned a priori? And that would be the death of empiricism, because what is considered empirical turns to be a priori.

A self-revealing self-happening

Secondly, let us consider another important point, namely, the possibility of any difference between illusion and reality. I see a serpent wriggling on the ground, stop for a while to mark it more carefully, and see a piece of rope swayed by the wind. My first experience is called an illusion, and the second one is called true. But how is that possible at all in the theory of sense-data? The snake and the rope are only two successive and independent sense-data. The

No possible difference between illusion and reality

'serpentine illusion' as an atomic fact is as much solid and stubborn as the 'ropish reality.' What is then wrong in the former and right in the latter?—None at all, because there is nothing in the world beyond the sense-content. It is senseless to suggest that the rope-percept negates the snake-percept, since the latter stood steady in its own right just as the former stands now. There is nothing to choose as right or wrong, true or false, between these two happenings. We shall see how Prajñākara has not hesitated to embrace this extreme consequence of empiricism. But the sense-datum theorists are never tired of speaking about truth and falsity, verification and contradiction.

It is easy to see that any theory of meaning is a pitiable misfit in such a world of completely secluded, yet fully liberated, atoms of sense data. To say that a word means a thing is the same as to say that one sense-datum means another, but then why should there be any bar to saying that my percept of the ink-pot on the table means your percept of of the Pole-star in the heavens?

We may try to obviate this difficulty by suggesting that the sense-data are found in different definite groups. The relation between any two sense-data is nothing but a certain way of this grouping. And so, there is such a particular way of grouping two sense-data that we feel entitled to say that the sound 'red' means the red-colour. Apart from all other complications involved in this escapist suggestion, there is one fundamental question: Is there a fact which may be called "grouping of sense-data"? If the answer be in the affirmative, since there is no fact beyond the sense-datum, this grouping must be a third sense-datum over and above the sense-data which are supposed to be grouped. And again we slip into all the old difficulties that we met before.

We may say in fine that in a sense-datum theory it is senseless to say that a fact is known. A fact simply happens.

Knowing is nothing different from this happening, and happening is not other than knowing. There is neither a subject nor an object, but only a self-revealing occurrence.

Knowing and happening are the same The universe is stuffed with nothing but such isolated 'verbal nouns', each of which you may call a knowing or a happening as you please. If it is not metaphysics, it is not so because it is mysticism at its worst.

Indeed it is difficult to say what the modern positivists mean by metaphysics. Russell has the following comment to offer in respect of these ambitious eliminators of metaphysics:—

"The accusation of metaphysics has become in philosophy something like the accusation of being a security risk in the public service. I do not for my part know what is meant by the word 'metaphysics.' The only definition I have found that fits all cases is : 'philosophical opinion not held by the present author.'"⁹⁶ To the modern positivists we may fittingly apply a very clever observation of Bradley. Speaking of a philosopher who is out to liquidate metaphysics Bradley remarks : "He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles."⁹⁷

With this short critique of sense-datum-positivism the ground is now prepared for our transition to Dharmakīrti. As a thorough going subjective pluralist he has thrown overboard the reality of all relations, internal or external. He accepts relations only as fictitious bonds of a make-believe world.

SECTION—2

Demolition of the Structure

Dharmakīrti is a pluralist. Basically he is a subjective pluralist, belonging to the Vijñānavāda School of Buddhism. But his refutation of the reality of relation proceeds not so much from his ultimate subjectivism as from his remarkably consistent pluralism. His arguments are such that, if one is

a consistent pluralist, whether subjective or objective, idealist or realist, one is bound to admit that a relation has no room in the domain of reals. That may be a bleak prospect for those who are pleased to call themselves realists, but Dharmakīrti is not ready to please them. He is not prepared to admit that reality of relation is a logical corollary of realism, and that relation and its terms can comfortably go together as the stuff of a real world within or without.

In his *Sambandha-Parīkṣā* (A Critique of Relation)*⁹⁸ Dharmakīrti has made a powerful drive mainly against the reality of causal relation in particular, and against the structure of relation in general. Once this structure is demolished the meaning relation too is bound to quit the realm of reality. Hence before entering into Dharmakīrti's treatment of relation between language and reality it would be paying to probe into his refutation of relation in general. His arguments against the reality of relation may be briefly summed up as follows :—

Relation entails some sort of dependence of one term on another, of both the terms on the relation itself, and of the relation on the terms themselves. But if the terms are not already established in themselves how can they be related to each other? Relation implies that there must be two terms at least, otherwise what should it relate? But if the terms are self-established, they are born independent, and have no need of accepting a bond of dependence. It does not carry any sense to say that it is the relation which establishes the terms. In that case the relation itself turns to be a pre-established self-sufficient term, and that is absurd. Nor can it be said that the terms and the relation are born together, live together and die together. Let it be said that the objects are born independent, and afterwards enter into relation with each other and become 'terms' of the relation. Primarily, that is not possible if we accept the theory of momentariness. But there is something more than that. Even when the

A three-storey
dependence.

relation persists between two terms, the terms themselves must remain completely distinct from each other, that is, in themselves they must remain as independent objects, otherwise they would have become *one* thing negating the relation itself. Thus a relation is cursed with a burden of contradiction. It must grant an intrinsic independence to the terms at the time of holding them in mutual dependence. Hence a relation not only relates, it also does just the opposite, it also alienates its terms. Once you grant this independence to the terms the chain of dependence is broken, and relation, losing the job it is expected to do, becomes only a logical appendix to the reals, only a way of looking at the things and speaking about them. Thus relation conceived as a real contains an irreconcilable contradiction between dependence and independence, alienation and rapprochement.

Relation, a self-contradiction

Again when we say a relation is real what do we really mean? Do we mean that the relation is some how a real over and above the relata? Suppose the two related terms are reals nos. 1 and 2; then do we assert that the relation itself is a real no. 3? In that case an infinite regress in inescapable, and there is no way to find a relation before running the full course of infinity. None can run it without making the finite of an infinite.

Infinite regress.

It does not improve the position by suggesting that the relation is real in '*this sense*' and not in '*that sense*.' A real is a simple real, and has no '*this*' or '*that*' sense in it. The expressions '*this sense*' or '*that sense*' speaks nothing about the reality as such, but at best expresses a psychological attitude or a logical conjecture. Hence if a relation is held to be real a consistent realist must say:—It is a *real*, that is, the terms and the relation are *three distinct reals*. Then it is only a logical fiction that mixes the three in a proposition. A proposition only *proposes*, does not stand for a reality, and is far from being a picture of the fact. A proposition is a fiction.*⁹²

The reader may profitably compare Dharmakīrti's rejection of the reality of relation with what Śāṅkara and Bradley have done in this respect.*¹⁰⁰ Bradley's weakness lies in his main concern being concentrated on showing up the infinite regress involved in the reality of relation, and has evoked a sharp rejoinder from Professor Cook-Wilson.*¹⁰¹ As regards Śāṅkara, it may be safely said that, so far as the problem of relation is concerned, he hardly added anything new to what Dharmakīrti had already done in this respect. We may not agree with the Buddhist idealists, but cannot help being impressed by the unrivalled excellence of analysis and penetration which Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara have brought to bear upon the problems they have chosen to handle. Even an opponent who is too cautious to be convinced will not fail to admire the profound insight and the exquisite skill with which Prajñākara has dissected and dismantled the whole structure of causal relation.*¹⁰²

Dharmakīrti, Śāṅkara and Bradley undoubtedly differ in their method of treatment. This difference is determined by three distinct purposes which these three philosophers are out to serve. By uprooting the reality of relation Dharmakīrti wants to show that the real is the pure and unmixed particular of the moment. Śāṅkara wants to establish the Absolute One as the only Reality which cannot allow any scheme of relation either within or outside itself. Bradley's concern is to prove that only the *whole is* the Real which cannot be dissected into terms and relations.*¹⁰³

Thus, be it pure pluralism or pure monism, relation is a miserable misfit in either way. The Buddhist Dharmakīrti and the Hegelian Bradley perhaps constitute a partial confirmation of the Hegelian Dialectics that two opposites pass into each other. For Bradley the whole is the only reality and the constituents as such are not worthy of existence. For Dharmakīrti

Dharmakīrti,
Śāṅkara and
Bradley

Three different
purposes unite
against relation

Hegelian Unity
of Opposites

on the other hand only the constituents are reals, verily because they do not constitute anything other than themselves. If the parts do not make a whole, no relation need relate them at all. Again if the parts do make a whole, they need not be real themselves, but may rest content with the reflected reality of the whole. In either case a relation as a real is an unwanted and dismissible intruder.

SECTION—3

A Critique of Naive Realism—Alexander on Relation.

To the naive realists Dharmakīrti's account of relation at a first glance would appear to be a much accustomed sophisticated abstraction. Hence the full implication of Dharmakīrti's drive and direction may be better brought out by an examination of naive realism in respect of the problem of relation.

Among the British philosophers of the recent period Alexander is perhaps the most faithful follower of naive realism. For him it is not enough to say that a relation is as much real as the terms. He quotes William James approvingly to the effect that relations are as elementary features of the universe as the substantive things.*¹⁰⁴ He goes to the farthest extreme asserting in full faith that all possible relational words in a language have definite meaning-counterparts in an objective world of physical space-time. Thus, according to him, even such purely logical words as 'and', 'but', 'or', 'still' and 'however', have some objective counterparts in the external world.*¹⁰⁵ But the more he tries to explain his faith the more he reveals a rich fund of confusion and contradiction. Take the following, for example:—

Alexander on
Relation

Every relational
word means an
objective reality.

"The relations and the things they relate are equally elements in *one reality* and so far are *separate realities*" (our emphasis).*¹⁰⁶ But again, "conceived in this concrete fashion

a relation may be described as the *whole situation* which its terms enter in virtue of that relation." (Emphasis ours).*¹⁰⁷

In the first observation it is plainly asserted that the constituents of the one reality are separate realities. The contradiction may be resolved by taking Alexander to mean that the whole and the parts are equally real, as it has been asserted also by many schools of Indian Realism. Yet, when he asserts that a relation is as good an element of reality as the terms, that "The terms and the relations are distinguishable elements in one and the same empirical fact which is spatio-temporal,"*¹⁰⁸ he inevitably invites an infinite regress. While going to criticize Bradley he admits this infinite regress, but holds it to be a case of *good infinity*. and cites Russell to his rescue.

'Good infinity'
and a citation
from Russell.

But what Russell exactly says in this :—

"When a relation holds between two terms, the relations of the relation to the terms, and of these relations to the relation and the terms, and so on ad infinitum, though all are implied by the proposition affirming the original relation, form no part of the meaning of the proposition."*¹⁰⁹ In other words an infinite regress is harmless so long it belongs only to the analytical implication of a proposition, but not to the primary meaning of a proposition. The meaning is that which is directly asserted by the proposition, while the implication may be a many-storeyed logical abstraction. (This does not debar the fact that meaning itself may be a logical construction).

What Russell
really says,

But Alexander is here dealing not with the logic of relation, but with the ontology of relation. According to his thesis the infinite hierarchy of relations that we logically construct must have solid counter-parts in the physical world itself. But Russell nowhere asserts such a thing. So Russell cannot come to his rescue.

What is more damaging is the dreadful contradiction

between the first and the second observations of Alexander that we have quoted above. To say in the same breath that the terms and the relation are equally real elements or *separate realities* which *together* constitute the one reality, and also that the relation itself is the *whole situation in which* the terms enter to constitute that situation, should take one's breath away. The second observation would mean that the terms are the elements of the relation which is itself the whole reality.

Now again, since space-time continuum is the ultimate stuff of the universe, and since according to Alexander this continuum is ready to suffer an infinite series of fragmentation, "it is clear that in the end all relation is reducible to spatio-temporal terms."*¹¹⁰ Ultimately a spatio-temporal term is a point-instant; and if all relations are reducible to terminal point-instants, how is a relation to be distinguished from a term except as one term from another? Yet, against such an adventure into abstraction Alexander does not forget to issue a note of warning. Perhaps he forgets the fact that he is warning himself against what he says himself.

We conclude this section on Alexander after showing up another crying contradiction to his credit. Alexander thinks that—"A is the mother of B," and "B is the child of A" are two distinct propositions which stand for two really different

relational situations, but describe the same fact.*¹¹¹ Now, we have heard before that the relational situation is the one reality. Is it not then a very awkward situation that

the two relational situations are two distinct realities in addition to the fact which is a different reality, but is yet common between the two? What is the reality of the either of the relational situations except that it is the fact itself. Here the two relations, if distinct from the common fact, may at best be logical abstractions which do not touch the fringe of factual reality. This uncomfortable position of the naive realist resonably suggests that perhaps Bhartṛhari and

Dharmakīrti are more consistent in their opinion that terms and propositions represent only logical fictions, that Language and Reality have no real bridge between them.

It is here important to note that even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of Indian Philosophy has not thought it wise to have such an adventurous faith in 'realism.' Professor Stecherbatsky's interesting remark that "whosoever resolves to remain a realist to the end, must unavoidably people the universe with such a wealth of objective realities that life in such a realistic home must become quite uncomfortable,"*¹¹² should better befit Alexander than the Indian realists like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas.

Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the greatest enthusiasts among the Indian realists, sometimes get tired of too many reals, and find it necessary to usher in the concept of *Svarūpa-Sambandha*, which, they admit, are nothing but logical abstractions. They are not as much good realists as to posit some external objective counter-parts of such relational words as 'or', 'still' 'and' and 'however.'

SECTION—4

Professor Moore on External Relation

Professor Moore is highly acclaimed for his remarkable clarity and brilliant power of analysis. In his 'Philosophical Studies' he has presented an important study on the problem of external relations. He has selected for his criticism some representative remarks of Bradley and Joachim, remarks which attempt to show that all relations are internal and intrinsic, and that none is external. We shall try to examine if Professor Moore's answer to Bradley and Joachim is also a sufficient answer to Dharmakīrti and Bhartṛhari.

According to Moore, the most eloquent evidence of an external relation is the fact that in some cases we have a certain feeling that a case might not have been so, though

in fact it is so. "It seems quite obvious," he says, "that in the case of many relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter of fact : that the things in question might have existed without having them."*¹¹³ "The proposition that Edward VII was father of George V is a mere matter of fact."*¹¹⁴

"To maintain external relations you have to maintain such things as that though Edward VII was in fact father of George V, he might have existed without being father of George V."*¹¹⁵

Thus there are two propositions—one is false and the other true, which are so confused that the false proposition seems to follow from the true one.

For example, the true proposition =

(I) "If A has P and X has not, it does follow that X is other than A."

And the false proposition =

(II) "If A has P, then from the proposition with regard to any term X that it has not got P, it *follows* that X is other than A."

The difference between these two propositions have been shown by Moore in the following manner :—

The first proposition asserts that if A has P, then any term which has not, must be other than A, and the second proposition asserts that if A has P, then any term which has not, *would necessarily be* other than A. It is in fact the case that any person who was not father of George V must have been other than Edward VII. But from it it does not follow that any person who was not father of George V *would necessarily have been* other than Edward VII.*¹¹⁶ The second proposition would imply that, had not George been a son of Edward, necessarily Edward would not have existed as Edward. This second proposition is definitely wrong because the factual sense of "must" is different from the logical sense of "would necessarily be."

In other words the propositions like "Edward VII was

father of George V" are different in type from such propositions as "A red thing is coloured" or "A right angle is an angle." Thus "Edward VII was father of George V" is an example of external relation, while the other two propositions give us instances of internal relation.

In our examination of Moore's theory of external relation, to make the matter simple, we shall replace his example by some other example such as "The book is on the table." Moore's example is unfortunate since it conceals a difficulty which is dangerous to his own thesis. According to Moore, a proposition like "A is father of B" means—A has the *relational property* of "being father of B." But what does this phrase stand for? "Being father of B" stands for a bio-physiological process involving both the parents and ending with the birth of B. A was once a partner in the process that is past for ever. How is it that A still carries that property with him? Take another example, "A went to London." Will A bear the 'property' of "having once gone to London" for all his life. By virtue of a series of events that are long past, a 'person', who is believed to be a continuum that has out-lived that series, still carries the *apellation*—"father of B." This apellation is not a 'property', not what the Indian logicians call a *viśeṣaṇa* (a present adjective), but only an '*upalakṣaṇa*' (an absentee adjective),*¹¹⁷ Similarly, by virtue of a past event which happened to be a constituent of a flowing continuum called A, the person A is still supposed to be carrying with him the property of "having once gone to London," though in fact he is only carrying an appellation. Just as the past event of "having gone to London" cannot constitute a present property in possession of present A, so the past process of 'father-hood' cannot continue to be a present property of 'being a father' as belonging to A.

Moreover when an event was actually happening it was *then* not a *past*, but a "*now present*." It is past only in the present context. If the past is present in this sense it is clear

that what is past can only be a *logical property* of the present, but never a *factual property*.

Now, you may say,—“But, it *is* a fact that A went to London.”

But a bit of thinking will assure you that, *it is not* a fact, only *that was* a fact. When we say, a fact is a fact, that is, when we say,—‘The proposition “A went to London” is true for past, present and future’ we are speaking of ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ only as logical abstractions.

We say that it *is* a fact that Alexander invaded india ; and we really mean that such an event happened in the past, not that the same is still happening in our days. But the unfortunate “*is*” in the expression ‘it is a fact’ endows the fact with a perennial sanctity by virtue of which it somehow seems to outlive the long past event, as if it is destined to reign over eternity.

The philosopher who thinks himself free from superstition, but likes to stuff the world with such *solid facts*, should pause a little to think over this small question :—If the fact of Alexander’s invasion of India could have objectively survived the event of invasion itself, and somehow were still here to this day, it might have equally survived that event in the reverse order also, that is, might have had been there even before the event took place. If the fact may be *now here* in the *present absence* of the event, it might have had been then there in the *past absence* of the event, that is, before the event took place.

Truth or falsity of a ‘past-referring’ proposition does not extend beyond the domain of logic. Such a proposition itself must stand for an abstraction, because *in fact* it *does not* correspond to a fact. A present *proposition* can correspond to a *past fact* only in Logic, but never in reality. If you say that a proposition is timeless, and so also is a fact, that will only go the way of turning both into logical abstractions. That is why traditional logic teaches us that in the proposition, “All men are mortal”, “all men” stands for all men

past, present and future, and "*are*" signifies a timeless present which should not be taken as an interval between past and future.

Mr. Russell is annoyed by "occurrence of tense in verbs which is an exceedingly annoying vulgarity due to our pre-occupation with practical affairs." So he continues, "when I say, 'the so-and-so exists', I am not going to mean that it exists in the present, in the past, or in the future, but simply it exists without implying anything involving tense." *¹¹⁸

Russell's feeling
of annoyance

But this is the way how Logic escapes into the realm of fiction after trying to flirt with reality and then condemning it as the annoying vulgarity of practical affairs. If "Socrates exists", "without any implication of tense*,"¹¹⁹ it may only mean some thing like this—the proposition "Socrates exists" is equivalent to the proposition, 'It is a fact that Socrates once existed*'. Again we come to the same old confusing distinction between the event and the fact, namely, the event is a fleeting moment or a bundle of moments, while the fact is somehow a permanent member of the world. It is needless to show again that such a permanent fact is not a point of reality, but a packet of logical abstraction.

The genesis of
the fact-event
confusion,

This fact-event confusion flows from a self-forgetful moment of empirical philosophy. Even an empiricist would like to build a "world" out of the momentary events (or sense-data ?) of the past, present and future. Even an atomic pluralist would like to think of a world constituted by such streaming events. But can something be constituted if the constituents are not there ? Hence the fleeting events must, in some way or other, be caught and kept in the total stream. Yet, the event as such does not persist beyond the moment or moments of happening. So the only way open for the empiricist who believes in a "world of sense-data" is to elevate the momentary empirical event into a permanent fact. The event may be lost for good, but once it happens,

its membership of the empirical world is fixed for ever.

Thus one comes to the conclusion that, that Alexander invaded India *was* an event, but *is* a fact. But an empiricist, who believes in all seriousness that there is an empirical "*world*", may do so only forgetting the fundamental tenet of empiricism, namely, nothing is real beyond the sense-datum of the moment. The totality of the sense-data past, present and future, does not exist and cannot be a matter of experience. It follows hence that such a total world is only a construct of logical imagination.

In this imaginative collection of all possible empirical events, that we call the world, the fact of Alexander's invasion of India *has* a permanent place fixed and assigned by our logical sense of order and sequence. Except in this sense it is senseless to talk about anything existing in a tenseless time. Very often we use the word "fact" in such a way that the event somehow seems to have outlived itself and have come down to an endless posterity as an undying member of the world. Thus Alexanders and Caesars have gone for good, but the "fact" that they once lived seems to live even to-day and will seem so for all time to come. Any student of Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti will tell you that such a fact is not more honourable than a fiction, that it is necessary to have it as a *Vikalpa*, a logical abstraction, as the intelligible meaning of a usable language.

The Buddhists are more consistent than most of the modern empiricists. They declare that the stream of evanescent events is itself not a reality. An event cannot outlive its life to become a fact for the future. So there cannot be a real world stuffed with such facts. A modern student may benefit himself by a very stimulating suggestion from Bhartṛhari's definition of the grammatical verb. "A verb is the name for an imaginative collection of events which flow in a series of succession and which (in response to the demands of a pragmatic world) submerge their individualities in an intellectually constructed oneness (i.e., appear as *one*

action. *¹²⁰

Bhartṛhari is not a Buddhist. But his definition of the verb may be appropriately extended to cover the construction of our entire empirical world quite in line with the Buddhists and in conformity with those modern empiricists who take the world as a series of fast-flowing sense-data or empirical events. So a consistent empiricist may get good help from an ancient philosopher who himself was miles apart from empiricism.

Once you concede that the world is a plurality of discrete fleeting events, which are conceptually caught in a number of series flowing in cross-currents, such that a series of similars is logically taken to be a unity, you will have better reason to see why, according to the Buddhists, language cannot be moulded on reality. Dharmakīrti observes :—

Words are said to have meanings by virtue of a convention which is necessary as a matter of practical convenience. When you go to apply a word in practice, the original object which was intended to be the meaning of a word is already past, and *that* word is also no longer there. It is a new word and a new referent, and between these two fresh particulars no meaning relation was ever sanctioned by any convention. So you cannot say—“*this* word means *this* thing,” or, “the same word means the same thing as before.” Hence, since the instantaneous particulars are the only reality, no word can mean a real.*¹²¹

Let us take another observation of Dharmakīrti which should always be remembered as furnishing the back-ground of his theory of meaning.

“A particular in one space-time cannot be repeated in another space-time, since two point-instants cannot be the same. The sense of sameness is born out of a logical construction that is called the universal. The universal imparts a fictitious unity to diversity. Apart from this fiction there is no objective unity of evanescent moments.”*¹²²

Prajñākara's
exposition

The cardinal points of Prajñākara's brilliant exposition of the above may be summarised as follows :—

The thing that *was* cannot be the thing that *is*. The real is the particular determined by the point-instant. Perceptual cognition grasps the percept that is present and cannot expand itself into the past and the future. Otherwise a person should have been omniscient. Every cognition including the verbal cognition is a psychic event of the moment and as such cannot stretch out to an object that is outside the moment. Language is fixed by convention in order to compress into its meaning an object past, present and future, far, near and everywhere. But what is not present cannot be made present by language. So language does not touch the real, but only manufactures a fiction. The real is the discrete and unrelated particular of the point-instant and language has no power to grasp it.*^{1 2 3}

Karṇakagomin reiterates the same thing when he observes that two properties of "had been known" and "is being known," cannot belong to the same point of reality. But exactly that is sought to be done by a recognitive proposition like "That is this", which fictitiously indentifies the past "*that*" with the present "*this*." Moreover here the past is also distorted. In that very moment itself which we now seek to refer to as being past, the thing was not a "*past that*" but a "*present this*." The "*this present*" character of the thing is now lost beyond recovery and is replaced by a fictitious property of "*thatness*", through which a non-existent "*this-of-the-past*" is sought to be identified with an existent "*this-of-the present*."*^{1 2 4}

Prajñākara and Karṇakagomin have made these observations while refuting recognition as a proof of identity and continuity. But what they have said throws a flood of light on the nature of such propositions as "A is father of B", and the allied problem of external relation. Seen in this light it is clear that Edward VII could not carry the relational pro-

perty of "being father of George V" unto his death. An event cannot create a relational property that is to be carried by a person or thing. That real ceases with that event. A relational property is a linguistic fiction just like a personal continuant, a fiction, that is necessary for logical thinking, but is not itself substantiated by any logic of reality.

Let us now return to our examination of Moore's doctrine of external relation, and let us also replace his unfortunately complicated example, 'Edward VII was father of George V', by a more simple example, such as, "The book is on the table." Moore would argue that, that the book is on the table is a mere matter of fact but not of necessity. It would not necessarily follow from this fact that book would not have existed without being on the table. Hence this proposition expresses an external relation. The book might not have been on the table and yet have remained what it is. To common-sense realism this argument undoubtedly has an irresistible appeal. The difference of the above proposition from such a proposition as "A right angle is an angle" is very obvious. A right angle has no way to be there without being an angle. Logic compels it to be an angle, but cannot compel the book to be on the table. But let us pause and think :—

When we say that the book might not have been on the table and still would be what it is,—do we mean that the book has a relational property called "might not have been on the table", or "might have been elsewhere now as well?" Just as the book is held to be a solid piece of reality of the external world, is there also a real quality in the book corresponding to the subjunctive expression—"might not have been there?" Even the boldest realist would hesitate to reply in the affirmative. But suppose there is such a bold realist. Then he should say that the book at the same time holds two properties which may be described by two phrases, "is on the table" and "might not have been on the table", and that these two properties are not mutually contradictory. Let us call the

Return to
Moore's External
Relation.

first property a positive property, and the second a subjunctive property. The book's being on the table submits to perceptual evidence, but the subjunctive property is too elusive to submit. Then how and wherefrom do you hope to catch this ethereal damsel in the subjunctive mood. The book is on the table at this moment as a matter of fact. A subjunctive property to be a real property must be derived from a fact and be a part of the fact as well.

But, that the book was *in fact* on the floor in the last moment, cannot impart to the book, which is *in fact* on the table in this moment, a factual quality called "might not have been on the table" at this same moment. In other words the subjunctive property cannot be a real property of the book. It is only a logical property which does not lie in the object itself. That is why the "positive property" does not seem to be in contradiction with the "subjunctive property" of the book. The first is a fact while the second is a mere logical attitude, and so the one need not contradict the other.

Now the reality of the external relation has been sought to be derived from the logical feeling of "might not have been". If you seriously believe in such a derivation you are driven to the awkward position of deriving a fact from a fiction. There is such a word as "rabbit-horn" (Śaśa-viṣāṇa) which serves a very useful purpose in Indian Philosophy. It has a definite meaning with a high logical significance. But nobody goes to derive a real rabbit-horn from the logically abstracted meaning-fiction furnished by the word.

In the same way it may be shown that in case of two mental events also there cannot be a relation over and above the terms which it seeks to relate. Here also a relation, to be external to the terms, say, a percept and its memory-image, should be an additional mental reality involving a relational property that would correspond to the logical feeling, "the percept might not have produced the image." But one does not get such a mental object beyond that logical attitude itself, Any way there is no evidence of the percept having such a

subjunctive property attached to itself.

Let us again look at the matter in the converse order, i.e., let us take the relational proposition—"This memory-image is the product of that percept." Can we say here that the memory-image might have been there without being the product of the percept? Obviously not. Then, is it a case of internal relation? If so, we have got to admit that there are two relational propositions—(i) "That percept produces this memory-image" and (ii) "This memory-image is the product of that percept," and that the first is a case of external relation, while the second is a case of internal relation. This would give rise to serious complications in the form that one relational fact is being expressed through two relations, external and internal, of which the former is an additional reality over and above the terms, and the latter is an abstraction in the structure as a whole. Reverting to Professor Moore's example we may make the matter more clear by asking the following question :—

When you say that Edward VII might not have been father of George V and remained what he was, can you say in the same way that George V might not have been a son of Edward VII and remained what he was? Does it carry any sense to say that George V might have been any body else's son and remained that George whom you knew to be so? An answer to this question will make it clear that Moore's advocacy of external relation proceeds from a confusing definition.

Now we shall come to a more fundamental objection against Moore's theory of external relation. We shall try to show that once an event happens it is logically senseless to presume that it might not have happened.

In modern days under the impact of the theory of Relativity distinguished philosophers have found it necessary to replace the old notion of substance by the new notion of event, because in the domain of science space and time have been replaced

A more fundamental objection.

The "event-ful" universe

by a four-dimensional space-time continuum. In his "present view of the world" Russell contents himself "by treating as fundamental the notion of event."^{*125} He is at the same time conscious that "there is a possibility of a further stage of analysis in which the events are no longer the ultimate raw-materials."^{*126}

In course of this further stage of analysis he ushers in the notion of a "complete complex of compresence" as a fundamental principle of individuation, and thus philosophically reforms the notion of event by interpreting it in terms of such a "complete compresence" which as an ultimate raw-material of the world takes the place of "a pin-point particular."^{*127} But despite this novel attempt at reformation, the former notion of event has managed to maintain its position by creeping into the composition of relational facts, which according to Russell, are stubborn stuff of reality, and not mere work of the mind.^{*128}

Now whatever may be the fate of Russell's theory, and in whichever way we may try to interpret it, it is evident that as yet an event stands as an ultimate constituent of the world of facts. It does not matter much to our present discussion whether Russell's new theory of complex particular is a better substitute for the Buddhist theory of pin-point particular. For the present it will serve our purpose if an event is accepted as a constituent of the world.

We shall show how the acceptance of an "eventful" reality militates against Moore's notion of external relation.

An event that happens is logically unshakeable in the sense that it at once becomes a real element of our

An event is logically fixed in a constructed world not be what it is. The World is a logical construction, but not so are the elements out of which it is constructed. The events belong to the past, the present and the future, and cannot be gathered together in a bundle; and hence the bundling of events into the world as

a whole is done by logical imagination. Thus it follows that an event is logically fixed as a definite member of a series to which it belongs.

The event of Alexander's invasion of India is an inseparable constituent of our constructed world. If you drop this event (which you cannot really do), the world obviously cannot be what it is, because it is then bound to be always an n minus one. In the same way if Edward's being father of George was an event that really happened, it has become logically fixed as a constituent of the "biographical series" which we designate by the proper name "Edward". So if you somehow knock out this event (which you cannot really do), the "personal series", called Edward, must be less by one.

Hence without being father of George Edward would not have been what he was even in the logical sense. Thus

Edward's being and not being father of George, both really and logically, make a difference, not only to Edward and George,

An event cannot be banished either logically or physically.

but also to the constructed world from which an event that happens cannot even be logically exiled. So, in a theory of consistent pluralism which seeks to construct an 'eventful' universe gathering together all the discrete and dispersed events, an expression like "might not have happened," used in respect of an event that has really happened, does not carry any sense except as a matter of pure imagination. In other words, any attempt to deduce an objective external relation from the subjunctive feeling of "might-not-have-been" is bound to fail as a faulty step of logic.

CHAPTER XI

PRAJÑĀKARAGUPTA ON CONTRADICTION AND VERIFICATION

This deeper implication of an unmixed pluralism underlies some important observations of Dharmakīrti and some spectacular deductions of Prajñākaragupta. In course of a detailed refutation of the reality of universals Dharmakīrti significantly remarks :—

“All existents are self-complete and self-exhaustive, and as such do not reach out of themselves to get mixed with anything other than themselves. If a real could pass into a being beyond itself it would have lost its being and become the other thereby (and that is an impossibility).”^{*129}

This remark of Dharmakīrti not only directly demolishes the reality of relation, but also entails some important implications which cut at the root of Moore's main argument in favour of external relation. The event that has really happened cannot be that which might not have happened, since which would not have happened is not an event at all. The real of the instant does not mix its being with another being or with a non-being. Between two reals there is always a fissure and never a fusion. Falling apart is the very nature of reality. The instantaneous real is what it positively is, and so it cannot exist in anything other than itself, nor in the negation of itself. Negation does not confer any relation on the real, but is only an interpretative abstraction by which logical intellect tries to analyse the unanalysable.

Prajñākara has brought this thesis to its logical conclusion and has worked out a spectacular deduction for which even

Prajñākara's deduction the modern positivist is not fully prepared, and yet from which he has no way of escape. Prajñākara's remarkable corollary to a consis-

tent empiricism may be thus put in an epigram :—"Nothing

Jayarāsībhadda's
agnosticism " can be contradicted, nothing can be verified."
The same conclusion has been reached by
Jayarāsībhadda from the stand point of absolute
agnosticism.*¹³⁰

But Prajñākara's deduction follows from pluralism and empiricism. These two philosophers no doubt stand far apart in their fundamental premises. But the very fact that the same conclusion may be deduced from two different premises should make us pause and think and suspect that an uncompromising pluralistic empiricism is perhaps the nearest neighbour of absolute agnosticism. Pure empiricism, the nearest neighbour of agnosticism That our suspicion is not unfounded has been shown in a previous chapter on Wittgenstein.

In this section it is not our purpose to show how Prajñākara's philosophy, pushed a little further, would precariously perch on the brink of agnosticism. Here is an encyclopaedic philosopher with a great farsight, who anticipated the modern predicament more than eleven centuries ago, and declared from the house-top that, in a philosophy of pure empiricism and pluralism, contradiction, verification, and Truth-function is a logical fiction correspondence, all these oft-repeated favourite terms of contemporary thought, should bear no reference to the land of reality, but should belong to the nebular field of logical fiction.

In course of a long and stubborn battle against the sturdy realism of Kumārila Prajñākara poses a very significant

Fundamental question question :—What is contradicted by a contradictor, an experience, or an object of experience ?*¹³¹

It is generally accepted that a dream-experience is contradicted by the experience of the wakeful stage. But what is the meaning of contradiction in this case ? Does it mean that your wakeful

What is contradicted—the cognition, or its object experience removes the fact and object of your dreaming ? That is absurd, since as a cognitive event in itself a dream has as much claim

to reality as a wakeful cognition. No subsequent event can unhappen the happening of the previous event.*¹³² Moreover a dream has also an object whose presence is undoubtedly felt at the time of dreaming. Nothing can happen in the post-dream situation which can unhappen the object of a dream. No subsequent cognition can grab the object of a previous cognition and bundle it out of the cognitive field to which it once belonged as its birth right. "To grab and remove other's property is the grand virtue of a king, but not of a cognition", so says Prajñākara.*¹³³

An experience does not come in with a festoon on its forehead declaring to the world :—"Hereby I contradict my predecessor." Suppose there are two successive perceptual judgments expressed in two propositions, viz. (i) "This is a snake" and (ii) "This is a piece of rope." So far as the pure cognitive event is concerned the predicate of the second proposition is simply the "piece of rope," and not "a piece of rope which contradicts my previous experience". In other words the percept rope is the form and figure of a self-absorbed perceptual fact, and as such does not carry a mark of contradiction on its face. Contradiction does not belong to the field of perception. The preceding snake-percept of that instantaneous perceptual event is lost beyond recovery with the instant itself. The succeeding rope-percept cannot project a hand unto the past, grab its predecessor by the neck, make it stand beside itself in its own cognitive field, and thus announce to the world—"see you all, here I am contradicting my companion who preceded me."

The logical feeling of contradiction is whipped up by a psychological process of contrast and comparison,—a process which involves a complicated interlude of memory, recognition and introspection. This psychological process itself is only a historical cross-section of the psychic series which constitutes the biography of an Ego. So, as such it is a group of

events coming after the two original successive events which

Meaning of contradiction it is supposed to compare and contrast. Of these two contrasted events the nearer one is declared to be valid and the farther one

invalid. This is what is meant by the over-simplified expression :- "The experience of rope contradicts the experience of snake." Now since one *fact* cannot contradict another *fact*, my "ropish cognition" as an event in my biography cannot contradict my "serpentine cognition" as such. The subsequent process of contrast and comparison, as a separate group of events, has no means to drag the preceding events into

Contradiction is only a logical concept, not a factual quality its field of operation and subject them to an execution of truth-function. Thus contradiction is a denizen in the paradise of logical abstraction, but not an accredited citizen of the pluralistic state of pure empiricism.

In this context Prajñākara defies the whole world of philosophers by flinging in a baffling and embarrassing question which turns overboard the entire problem of contradiction and verification. This is the question which he poses

An unanswerable challenge before the philosophers—"Well, you say, the dream world is unreal, because the experience of awakened stage contradicts the dream

experience. Then why do you not look the other way round, and say—"The wakeful world is unreal, because the dream experience contradicts the wakeful experience?" Contradiction is a reciprocal operation and should not be the special prerogative of the wakeful stage. You may say that a wakeful

Between dreaming and awakening no decision and choice in truth-value experience is validated by subsequent operations and verified by social testimony. But the dream-world has too its own society. It is not uncommon that in a dream also many

shared object of experience. A dream-man quenches his dream-thirst by dream-water. Hence if you insist on contradiction, dreaming is as much a contradiction of awakening as

awakening is of dreaming. So nothing can logically decide the truth between dreaming and awakening.

The logic of contradiction teaches us that there is no logic in contradiction. There is a series of similar percepts which we call a snake, and another series of similar percepts which we call a rope. The two series are mutually dissimilar. The fact is that very often, one series of similars is crossed by another dissimilar series of similars. The snake-series is crossed by the rope-series, and thus there is a break in the former. Contradiction is nothing but a breach in such a series of similars. But we forget that in this inter-crossing of two series the breach is not one-sided, but common to both. Yet, when the rope-percept in the rope-series appears subsequent to the snake-percept in the snake-series, we at once jump to the conclusion that the former contradicts the latter and not vice-versa. There is no logical guarantee behind this dogmatic assertion which is nevertheless undoubtedly backed by a time-honoured convention.

In a similar way there is no logical difference, that is, difference in truth-value, between the dream-tiger and the 'real tiger.' The contradiction between a dream-percept and 'a real percept' is no more eloquent than that between the table and the chair, or between any two percepts whatsoever.*¹³⁴

In pure empiricism verification is as good a casualty as contradiction. The so-called verifying experience is only another experiential event in the history of the psychic series which one is pleased to call an ego, and as such it is not born with a bannerful declaration to verify its predecessor. Moreover the object of verification, that is, the previous experience, is past and lost for good in the rush of history. So the verifying experience shall have to face all the insuperable difficulties that have baffled the contradicting ability of the so-called contradictory experience.

That is how Prajñākara understands the spirit of Dharmakīrti's famous definition of *pramāṇa* (the means of valid Knowledge). Dharmakīrti's pragmatic definition of *Pramāṇa* defines *pramāṇa* in the following words:—
 "Pramāṇa is uncontradicted knowledge itself, and uncontradictedness is verification in practice" (through the subsequent experience of the commonly expected behaviour-pattern of the object in question—*arthakriyā-sthitir avisambādanam*)*¹³⁵

In his long and penetrating interpretation of this definition Prajñākara observes that this definition has come forth in deference to the conventional common-sense conception of validity. In the subsequent experience there is no cognition of a verification. When a flame burns your finger the burnful experience itself does not give you anything else than a percept or sense-datum. Your perceptual proposition is simply—"It is a burn," and not that, "so what I touched before was a flame of fire." The feeling of burn is not the feeling of verification.*¹³⁶

If one incorrigibly insists on verification a brother logician may reasonably exclaim—"Physician, heal thyself". The verifying experience itself should be verified before one can confer on it the certificate of power to verify its predecessor. Thus merrily you may dance unto eternity chasing the golden deer. In Indian Philosophy the Advaitins and the Mīmāṃsakas hold out this uneasy prospect of a wild-goose chase to the realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, according to which a subsequent experience should validate a preceding experience.

A wrong impression has persisted among the Brahminical philosophers to the effect that, according to the Buddhists, validity of a cognition is vindicated by a subsequent verifying experience (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). This is due to their misunderstanding of the Buddhist position vis-a-vis the pragmatic verification of cognition. As for the Yogācāra

Buddhists the only reality is the self-cognizing moment of cognition. Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara leave no doubt about this that a cognitive event of the instant is self-evident and self-validated.*¹³⁷

Prajñākara is thus more consistent in his profession than most of the modern empiricists. On pure epistemic questions he is a pure empiricist-pluralist, and is ready for the remotest consequences of his uncompromising philosophy. He eloquently declares and owns up the logical consequences of his epistemic position :—

In ultimate analysis nothing is contradicted, nothing is verified, nothing is negated, nothing is affirmed. Contradiction, verification, affirmation and negation, all belong to the logical abstracts of meaningful statements. They do not tell anything about the reality which cannot be captured in the meaning of language. The real is the cognitive event of the moment, that is self-valid and self-evident.*¹³⁸

A modern positivist also should have said this, but it seems he is ashamed of the consequences of his conviction.

A perception has its own percept which is its limit. So it cannot overstep its own content and pronounce judgment upon another perception. The process of validation is not the process of reality, but a process of logical interpretation

which is necessary for guiding the behaviour of the people in respect of an object of future. He who feels the burn will not need this feeling for verifying a past proposition,—

“it is fire,” but for withdrawing his finger from the flame when he sees a fire in future. The present burning sensation is imaginatively transferred to the past or the future fire. This unity of past, present and future, though impossible in reality, is nevertheless made possible through a comprehensive abstraction which is logically called a universal.

So I get two propositions with two subordinate clauses attached to the predicate :—

Verification
is a guide for
future.

(1) "It is a burn which I got from a fire just now" (ii)
 "It is a burn which I shall get from a fire in future." Thus
 the problem of validation is a problem of pragmatic logic.
 In the so-called verifying experience itself one will not find

Validation is a pragmatic concept. the least trace of the two subordinate clauses shown above. No percept in itself is ever plagued with a problem. Fire and burn are two

distinct percepts having nothing in common by virtue of which they may be bound up in a relation of verification, or nothing antagonistic by virtue of which they may stand in mutual contradiction. A cognitive event as such is indifferent to verification or contradiction, since it is indifferent by nature to anything else than itself. But

A real has no problem. we, in response to the demands of pragmatic logic, or even of a higher logic, always impose

a problem on reality and at once begin to "see" that the reality itself is infested with problems. But a problem is unintelligible without being formulated in an intelligible language. We make statements and form propositions making the real a relative term of the same. We are then so much carried away by our zeal for abstractions that we do not pause to think that the reality stands in cold isolation far out of the net-work of problems and statements, propositions and relations. Ultimately it turns out that we have been moving endlessly in a circle of meaning and language which cannot contain the reality as such.

CHAPTER XII

THE PROPOSITIONAL PREDICAMENT

After an acquaintance with Prajñākara's position as regards the problem of verification and contradiction, it is necessary to turn our attention to the modern predicament.

Modern predicament is the propositional predicament. The modern predicament may be roughly defined as the propositional predicament, since the relation between a proposition and a fact is still the sore point of philosophy. Moving round and round every philosophy in one way or other, comes down to the problem of relation between fact and proposition, and feels the impact of a ship-wreck.

It is now generally accepted that truth-value is the property of a proposition and not of a fact. In other words a fact is that which makes a proposition true or false and it is senseless to say that a fact is true or false. It follows hence that a proposition as the bearer of truth-value is not a fact. But what is then a proposition? That is a thing which, we think, contemporary philosophy has not yet been able to say. For the time being we shall postpone the consideration of the problem as to what a proposition is, and begin our examination from the other end, that is from the end of 'fact' which is supposed to make a proposition true or false.

A 'fact' too is a very complicated affair and is not at all easy to define. Let us take the proposition "It is a building." What sort of fact is represented by this proposition?

The building is an objective thing, but is the fact something more than the thing? The proposition has two terms "It" and "building"; but it cannot be said that the fact is constituted by an 'it' and 'building'. On the objective side

you will not find an 'it' which is over and above the building itself, nor you will find a building which is over and above the 'it' that is present before you. If that is so, the subject-predicate form of the proposition is not at all a true representation of the fact in question, which is nothing but the thing present as the percept. But Wittgenstein has taught us that the proposition and the fact should have a common structure. Obviously the common structure is missing here.

Then let us replace the proposition, "It is a building," by the proposition, "The building is". Does the second proposition serve the purpose of the first? Suppose a person entertains a doubt about the existence of an old building which he happened to see many years ago. He inspects the spot and finds the building, and reports back to his friend—

"It is a building" and "The building is" are not the same proposition. "The building is." This proposition is not at all the same as "It is a building". In the latter case the predicate "building" is nothing but an interpretation of the subject, i. e., the sense-datum demonstrated by the "it". The present percept is interpreted as a member of the class called 'building.' The statement expressing the proposition is a response to the question—"What is it?" As we have seen before, this has already been demonstrated by Nāgārjuna in his interpretation of Bhartṛhari's nominalism.

Then should we say that the proposition, "The building is," properly represents the fact. In common logical parlance it is said that such a proposition asserts the existence of the building. Now will it be proper to say that the fact is constituted by two elements, the building and its existence? That is plainly absurd, since the building does not show its existence as it shows its redness or tallness. The building standing there in front of me is the existence itself. Hence the verb "is" in the proposition is an irrelevant adjunct so far as the pure fact is concerned. So the proposition, "The

An existential proposition does not 'show' the fact

building is," cannot 'show' the structure of the fact. Now if you drop the verb the proposition melts away, because the proposition here is nothing if it is not an assertion, and one does not assert a building but asserts its existence. So the proposition in question analyses something, which is factually unanalysable, into two elements, the thing and its existence, and then fictitiously asserts one element of the other. Thus the so-called atomic proposition, supposed to stand for an atomic fact, finally rests in a fiction.

Even an atomic proposition confers a fiction on a fact

Bhartṛhari has elaborately shown how existence and non-existence both are merely logical categories, how language, knowledge and object, everything moves in a realm of fiction, so that the difference between existence and non-existence is itself a fictional abstraction.*¹³⁹ From this Bhartṛhari has made the remarkable deduction that the issue between Realism and Idealism is ultimately a fictitious issue. The philosophers who assert that the world exists and the philosophers who assert that the world does not exist do not go for making any material difference between themselves, since both of them are dealing with fictions, because non-existence is as much a logical existent as existence itself.*¹⁴⁰

Existence or non-existence, neither is a real predicate

Hence the issue between Realism and Idealism is a fictitious one

We remember how Carnap and Ayer have dismissed the issue between realism and idealism as a senseless question. They have "solved" the problem by denying it and have refused to be dragged into it. But Bhartṛhari in his penetrating dissertation on existence and non-existence has not dismissed the problem, but has convincingly demonstrated why and how the problem is fictitious.

Let us now take up a pure atomic proposition such as

A pure atomic proposition does not reflect the pure atomic fact.

"It is red." Does it fare any better than the earlier ones? Again it can be shown that the preceptual fact "red" is not composed of two elements "it" and "red" together with

a relation between the two. As a unique fact it does not suffer any logical surgery. The sense-datum is simply a red, but not "It is red." In the perceptual fact itself one will not find a subject and a predicate, and a "red" predicated of an "it." The action of predication belongs only to the logician's brain which dissects the sentence "It is red." Helārāja has shown that the same is the case with any proposition wherein the subject and the predicate appear as a substantive and an adjective, such as, "The lotus is blue." The sense-datum itself is a unique fact which cannot be divided into a blue *and* a lotus and then again bound up into a whole. But yet these division and reunion are done by logic. Hence the adjective-substantive relation is *not a matter of fact*, but a logical abstraction imposed upon a monolithic fact.*¹⁴¹

This is enough to show that a so-called atomic proposition has no power to represent an 'atomic fact.' Yet modern positivism began with Wittgenstein with a declaration of the power and possibility of such a representation.

When it is found that a fact cannot be mirrored in a proposition, some philosophers with positivist sympathy have discovered that the best way to safeguard the representative power of propositions is to derive a fact from a proposition, and to stuff the world with such manufactured facts as may fit into the forms of propositions. So Russell in his latest view of the world has discovered what he calls "Clear Relational Facts."

CHAPTER XIII

RUSSELL'S "CLEAR RELATIONAL FACTS"

Take the following from Russell :—

"It is relational words that are the most stubborn of words of which the meaning is in some sense universal....."

"It is quite clear that there are relational facts.....for my part, I think it as certain as anything can be that there are relational facts such as 'A is earlier than B.'"^{*142} Russell asserts that "relational facts are complex wholes which have a structure," and the obvious conclusion follows that a relational proposition is a representative of the relational fact. The fact and the proposition must have a common structure by virtue of which the latter can stand as the representative of the former.

The first difficulty that one encounters emanates from the theory of asymmetrical relation which Russell himself has done so much to define and develop. Let us take a pair of asymmetrical propositions, "A is earlier than B," and "B is later than A." By definition these two are quite distinct propositions, yet the one is translatable into the other.

Now the question is whether there are two asymmetrical facts corresponding to two asymmetrical propositions. Russell himself has spoken against such an absurdity even in cases other than asymmetrical propositions. Thus he says "It would be a mistake to think that, corresponding to every true judgment of perception, there is a separate fact...There is not, outside language, a fact, 'that there is a square in a circle,' and another fact 'that there is a red figure in a blue figure.'"^{*143}

Does a pair of asymmetrical propositions stand for a pair of "asymmetrical facts"?

Russell's own disclaimer

Now, if it is assumed that a fact and a proposition must participate in a common structure, how is it possible that quite distinct propositions should correspond to the same fact? In cases of the square in a circle and the red figure in a blue figure, the difficulty may be reasonably obviated by pointing out that the two propositions are only partial representations of the same fact. But the same cannot be said of the two asymmetrical propositions, "A is earlier than B" and "B is later than A." The proposition, "There is a square in a circle," cannot be translated into the proposition, "There is a red figure in a blue figure," since they refer to two different aspects of the same fact.

But an asymmetrical proposition is completely translatable into its counterpart. Hence it cannot be said that two asymmetrical propositions represent two different aspects of the same fact. Then it should be said that two such asymmetrical propositions are only two ways of speaking about the same fact. But in that case the two cannot be said to be two proposition, but one proposition expressed in two ways, just as "It is a cat" expresses the same proposition as "Ayam mārjārah." Yet, that is not possible without violating the definition of asymmetry and its concomitant implications.

Theory of correspondence and common structure comes to grief

Thus the correspondence theory of truth comes to grief, together with the implied theory of common structure between fact and proposition. To save the situation two courses are open for us: either the notion of relational fact is to be abolished, or the theory of asymmetrical proposition is to be suitably amended. Let us choose to retain the relational fact and examine the consequences of this choice.

Here we shall face a difficulty which is intimately connected with Russell's philosophy of Logical Atomism. Take the proposition, "Alexander preceded Caesar." According to Russell this proposition stands for a relational fact which belongs to the stuff of the objective world. If this fact is a complex whole having a complex structure, it is evident

that the corresponding proposition also is not atomic but complex. In view of the method of analysis ardently advocated by Russell in response to the demand of his logical atomism, this proposition may be analysed in the following manner :—
There are two “biographical series” such that one is termed ‘Alexander’ and the other ‘Caesar,’ and such that the former

Analysis of the
fact represented
by the proposition
‘Alexander prece-
ded Caesar’
precedes the latter. In this way we may avoid the grammatical complication raised by the past tense in the expression “preceded.” We assume that the present tense forms of

“are” and “precedes” do not indicate any grammatical time or tense, but stand as the mark of a tenseless fact. It would mean that the fact has become tenseless and timeless the moment it has happened, and has become a permanent member of the world timelessly continuing into an endless future. But the verb “to precede” is itself meaningless without any definite reference to a temporal relation which confers on the fact in question the title of relational fact. A fact which is free from any grammatical tense is also logically free from time.

But the fact itself is constituted by a temporal relation. We are then dragged down to a very odd consequence of tenselessness, namely, that which is itself constituted by a

A timeless and
tenseless fact,-a
type of mystic
realism
relation of time is at the same time a timeless member of an objective world. If the grammatical tense is an annoying vulgarity, a tenseless fact constituted by a temporal relation is a metaphysical absurdity. It almost smacks of a mystic realism.

Yet, this mysticism is not in conformity with Russell's usual way of looking at things. Let us have a look into a few observations in his “Philosophy of Logical Atomism.”¹⁴⁴

“What I know is that there are a certain series of appearances linked together, and the series of those appearances I shall define as being a desk. In that way the desk is reduced to being, a logical fiction, because a series is a logical fiction.”

It is a beautiful vindication of the Buddhist view which unequivocally asserts that a series (Santāna') is only a logical abstraction (Vikalpa).

Russell is more emphatic when he says—"A table or chair will be a series of classes of particulars and therefore a logical fiction. Those particulars will be on the same level of reality as a hallucination or a phantom.*¹⁴⁵ In his latest phase of development Russell is not perhaps ready to go so far. But we shall have reason to see that his shift from this position is not so fundamental as it may look in his latest development.

Russell recognizes the difficulty which you face when you go to buy a chair, since you cannot buy a phantom. The solution that he gives in his philosophy of Logical Atomism is not only surprisingly simple, but also simply surprising. When you buy a chair you do not buy any particular appearance or appearances, but a whole co-related system of appearances, which includes also the future appearances that the chair will present when you go home.*¹⁴⁶ Thus the real is a co-ordinated system of unrels. Nothing is more surprising than such a queer solution of the age-long problem of appearance and reality. It is very difficult to see why Russell should find any difficulty in buying a chair.

According to his philosophy of logical atomism, the act buying a chair is also no more than a presentable series of appearances. The buyer and the seller are likewise two series of appearances. Then we arrive at this beautiful conclusion :—

"One series of appearances appears as 'buying' a second series of appearances from a third series of appearances."

The Buddhist idealists, true to their logic, reached this conclusion two thousand years ago and declared their acceptance of this remarkable consequence without any hesitation. But Russell's hesitation to own up such a consequence of his philosophy comes from an irresistible call of common sense.

His latest development consists in a strong affirmation of faith in the existence of a real and objective external world independent of its presentation to a percipient mind. But he

Russell's latest development has not forgotten his gratitude to Berkley and Hume, since he is conscious that the affirmation of his faith lacks the necessary confirmation of his logical analysis. So he concludes his "present view of the world" with the following words :—

"The whole of what we perceive without inference belongs to our private world. In this respect I agree with Berkley.

The external world is inferred The starry heaven that we know in visual sensation is inside us. The external starry heaven that we believe in is inferred.....The causal lines which enable us to be aware of a diversity of objects.....are apt to peter out like rivers in the sand.*¹⁴⁷

That the external world is never perceived but inferred is not a new thesis. The Sautrāntika Buddhists of India

A vindication of Sautrāntika Buddhism advanced this proposition twenty centuries ago, and the criticisms unleashed against them may be equally applied to Russell. If that which is perceived cannot exist beyond the process of preception, one cannot make out how that which is inferred can exist outside the process of inference.

If perception presents the percept alone, an inference on the same ground presents only the inferent. In either case what one knows is inside oneself. Prajñākara has brought forth this thesis with devastating effect. As objects of

Prajñākara's criticism of Sautrāntika view thought both the percept and the inferent are the end-products of two processes of thought and as such are contents contained in consciousness. Hence as a content of thought

an inferent is as much immediate as a percept. So if you stick to the premiss that you never can perceive the external world, you never can hope to distinguish between perception and inference as processes of knowledge. The whole distinction becomes a matter of pragmatic convention, and cannot

be substantiated by logical and epistemic analysis.

An inference of anything external and unperceived might have been possible if at least something at sometime were conceded to be externally perceived. If pure deduction were not possible in such a case, some sort of analogical deduction might have furnished some ground, however clumsy, of such an inference. We take it for granted that we perceive one side of the wall, and infer that it has an unperceived other side, because we feel sure that if we go round it just now, the other side may be easily perceived. Drawing upon this

At least an analogy from a perceived fact is required

analogy it is not irrational to imagine that the moon has an invisible side, because one of her sides is open to our view and the other too might have been visible if we could only go round her for once. We feel certain that we perceived a thing yesterday and perceive it to-day, and make sure that it must have persisted during the interval between two perceptions. We extend this analogy to the formulation of a general belief :—An object can exist externally, unperceived by a percipient mind. How far such inferences are logically justified is a separate question. We are here primarily interested in showing that the very possibility of inference, whether right or wrong, of an unperceived external object must fulfil a minimal requirement such that something must be granted to be externally perceived somewhere at sometime by somebody at least. This in short, is the spirit of Prajñākara's irresistibly forceful argument against the Sautrāntika view that the external world, undoubtedly real, is never perceived, but always inferred.*¹⁴⁸

In our formulation of the minimal requirement for the possibility of inference we have been less unsparing and more liberal than Prajñākara. We have not been so rigid as to

The minimal requirement of an inference to the external world

demand like him that the general premiss of a deduction must presuppose a previous perception of the two terms of the same premiss standing together once at least. We have conceded much

elbow-room to the operation of analogy. What we have virtually said is this: "Grant us the right of perception of any external object at anytime by anybody at any spot on the earth, and we shall grant you the right of inference to any unperceived external object at any point of the universe. But you choose to remain hide-bound by your thesis of a never perceivable but ever-inferable external reality. We have shown how such an inferability is an absolute impossibility. So only two courses are open for you:— Either be a thorough-going empiricist and go all the way with Prajñākara to boldly face all the consequences of empiricism, or, go with the common man to affirm your faith that it is an external world that you normally perceive in your act of perception. A midway compromise in this case is not the golden mean, but is the banner of logical insincerity.

With all that is involved in this intervening discussion let us go back to the proposition "Alexander preceded Caesar." The two terms here are two series of biographical events, and so are logical fictions. Thus a fiction preceding a fiction becomes a relational fact.

Let us then drop the expression 'logical fiction' in cases of Alexander and Caesar. Let us only say this much that some events happened earlier and some later, and those which happened earlier preceded the rest. The events are individually real, and in the successive flow of events we choose two cross-sections such that there is an interval between the two. We agree to ignore the rush of events during the interval and fix our mind on the two chosen cross-sections alone. Whether those cross-sections are called Alexander and Caesar is a choice in nomenclature. Thus a rationale may be found for proposing that the proposition, "Alexander preceded Caesar" represents a stubborn fact of the world, since in a stream of events one section may completely precede the other, provided that the sections are so chosen that there may not be any overlapping, that is, there is no event which is a common member of both the sections.

To avoid all these cumbersome manipulations, let us take a simpler proposition, "An event A precedes an event B." Here the problem is not about the reality of the events, but whether there is a fact of preceding over and above the events.

The external objectivity of spatio-temporal relational facts is not a new proposition asserted by some western philosophers. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of Indian Philosophy proposed such a type of reality many centuries ago. They designate the objective qualities of such facts by the terms "*Paratva*" and "*Aparatva*" which are supposed to cover such "external," relations as, "farther and nearer" (Daiśika paratva-aparatva), and "Older and younger" (Kālika paratva aparatva). Vallabhācārya, the famous author of the Nyāya-līlāvati, asserts that these spatio-temporal relations are not only objective qualities of reality, but are also direct objects of perception. *Paratva* and *Aparatva*, according to him are more comprehensive than the relation of "earlier and later," and so he rejects the view of Bhāsarvajña to the effect that these two relations are only a variation of, or a deduction from, the relation of "earlier and later." *¹⁴⁰ It is interesting to note that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the father of the Bengal School of Neo Logic, has rejected *Paratva* and *Aparatva* as additional objective qualities of reality, of course, for reasons other than those which may be consistently advanced by a thorough going empiricist. *¹⁵⁰

An empiricist, true to his profession, cannot accept the reality of spatio-temporal relations like "farther and nearer" and "earlier and later" as being independent of the corresponding concepts. An event simply happens. When the event

A comes to be, it is not born with a birth-mark declaring to a percipient observer,— "Here I am, the forerunner of B that will follow me in future." The event B is not born as yet.

So the event A cannot bear any objective relational pro-

An event in itself does not carry the mark of a temporal relation

perty of preceding B. The unborn B cannot be the constituent of a property which is presently borne by A. When you look at A you do not see any act or fact of precedence. You may try to infer a future B from a present A. In that case B is a constituent of your logical imagination, but not of the property of the percept presented by A. You may decide to wait for B to be born (provided you can infer B from A). But then your previous proposition, "A precedes B," should be replaced by its asymmetrical co-ordinate, "B follows A." You may say, now that B has happened I observe B following A. But that is quite impossible, because A is lost beyond recovery when B is born. For you A and B are two percepts of two instants, one following the other. Verily because one percept follows the other you have no means to perceive the one following the other. That would then require a third percept which would cover both A and B. It is an absurdity and a denial of pure empiricism. The third percept can only come in the third instant when both A and B are gone for good.

Succession cannot
be perceived

We know that Russell is not ready to accept pure empiricism. His remarks are bold and significant in this respect :—

"Absorption in language sometimes leads to the neglect of the connexion of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connexion which gives meanings to words and significance to sentences...The conclusion is, that *uncompromising empiricism is untenable*. From a finite number of observations no general proposition can be inferred to be even probable unless we postulate some general principle of inference which cannot be established empirically."*¹⁵¹

But the question is how far we should go in accepting this connexion between language and non-linguistic facts. Should we rush to the extreme like Alexander and accept the thesis that, whenever there is a linguistic fact there is also a non-linguistic fact corresponding to the statement and conferring meaning and significance on it. That is indeed far from Russell's intention. Yet, in asserting the 'relational facts'

as the stubborn stuff of the world, Russell seems to have set his unsure foot on the road to the extreme.

So let us proceed to examine our proposition on its merit. What we have said in respect of the proposition, "A precedes B," may be applied *mutatis mutandis*, to the proposition "B follows A." B cannot bear any relational property of following A. Since A is gone for good when B is born, the past A cannot be the constituent of any property presently belonging to B. As an event B simply happens; it has nothing in itself which looks like 'following A.' You may conjure up a picture of A and B in your memory or imaginative expectation, and may relate a manufactured percept to such a picture in your logical imagination. That is the way of interpreting, but not of perceiving, a reality. You cannot turn a logically imagined relation into the stubborn stuff of a world of facts. What is only logically conceived cannot be logically *guaranteed* to have an existence apart from logic.

When Russell advances his illustrative proposition, "Alexander preceded Caesar," the matter becomes inextricably complicated. It stirs up a whole hornet's nest of historical testimony. Perception is here out of the question, and inference, if ever possible, will be stretched along so long a line that it would snap at a thousand undetected points.

Moreover, if relational facts are asserted to be real constituents of the objective world, it is not only useless but wrong to affirm events or "complexes of compresence" as reals over and above the relational wholes. Let us take three propositions:—"A precedes B," "B precedes C" and "A precedes C." According to the theory of reality under review

Events and relational facts, these three propositions represent three separate relational facts, in which the events

A, B and C are each repeated twice. Now if the three facts are three completely different sets of realities, pluralistic conception demands that each of the three events must undergo a real process of duplication. Again, an event is supposed to be spatio-temporally related with an

infinite number of events, even with events which are yet to be born, thus producing an infinite number of relational facts. Since every fact is totally different from others, every event must be multiplied infinite times corresponding to the position of its duplicates in every other fact. Thus perhaps you get at a new theory of expanding universe which you may logically extend in any spatio-temporal direction as you like. Yet, it is quite understandable that no half-hearted empiricist (and no half-hearted realist for that) can be so much swayed by his zeal for "relational facts" as to assert that the infinite number of copies, which may thus be miraculously manufactured out of a single event, are also as much real as the original. Yet the logic of relational facts exactly leads to this unsolicited absurdity.

A new theory of
expanding
universe

If one asserts that an accumulation of facts does not necessarily involve an accumulated reduplication of the constituent events, that the same event may be the terminus of a net-work of relational facts, one should leave off the path of pluralism and embrace the reality of a unitary system, in which no events or facts are real by themselves, but are real only in so far as they participate in the structure and behaviour of the system as a whole. In such an over-all system it is not permitted to say that an event or a fact might have been other than what it is, where it is, and when it is, since that would have altered the system itself.

Or, better
embrace the
Hegelian whole

CHAPTER XIV

PRAJÑĀKARA AND KARNAKAGOMIN ON PRECEDENCE AND SUCCESSION

An evident corollary of a thorough going empirical pluralism is the self-definability of an event. That a real is self-definable means that it is not definable by anything other than itself. Hence the Buddhist term for a real is "*Sva-lakṣaṇa*," that of which it itself is the definition (*Svarūpaṁ lakṣaṇam asya iti*—Prajñākara).

Sva-laksana, or
the self-definable
—a corollary of
consistent
pluralism

In a philosophy of consistent pluralism this corollary of self-definability cuts straight across the admittance of relational facts. Once it is admitted that an event is the real terminus of an infinite net-work of real relations expanding into past, present and future, it inevitably follows that an event cannot be defined or fixed in its logical position until and unless you can exhaust the entire network in which the same event is enmeshed. Thus every single event is to be defined by the totality of all other events, a totality that is ever un-formed, for the future is always unborn. Surely enough, that is not the way of Logical Atomism. The moment you get prepared to embrace a total system, all events and relations are bound to shake off their individuality and externality, in as much as every event and relation derive their reality and definability from an ever receding total which is always busy about completing itself, but never can complete. That is how the admittance of relational facts would finally drive a pluralist into the fold of a Hegelian whole, verily against which Russell has turned a good deal of witty sarcasm in his History of Western Philosophy.

An inconsistent
pluralist pushed
into the Hegelian
whole.

To hear the voice of a consistent pluralist let us once

more turn our ears to Prajñākara. When two things are completely different, Prajñākara justifiably holds that the one cannot define the other. But when you affirm the reality of relation the two terms enter into each other's definition,

Definition involves relation and each in turn becomes the constituent of the other. It is then difficult to maintain any logical gap between the terms of a relation.

Pluralism as a result is dispersed into the structure of a monistic whole. But exactly speaking, there cannot be any definition without relating the definable term to some other term or terms, for definition is the location of logical position of a term; and you can locate it only in virtue of its relation to other terms. Moreover, if it is true that two terms cannot

The paradox of a relational facts be totally different when they are commonly held in a relational structure, it is also equally true that they cannot either be completely

identical as terms of a real relation. Thus it is the fate of relation to be caught in an inescapable paradox, namely, the very possibility of definition depends on a self-contradiction. Hence if one is a confirmed pluralist and accepts a real to be a discrete individual totally distinct from others, the only way to save pluralism is to assert that relation is a logical abstraction, that definition is a superimposition of this interpretative fiction on the real which by itself defies all relations

The self-definable is indefinable and definitions. Strictly speaking, the real is neither self-definable nor definable by any other terms, it is simply indefinable. That is exactly what Prajñākara asserts. He is fully conscious that self-definability is another name of indefinability.*¹⁵²

One should not miss Prajñākara's special emphasis on the unreality of temporal relation, specially the relation of succession. A special attempt for refuting the relation between the earlier and the later is necessary for establishing the sole reality of the discrete, discontinuous and instantaneous particular. If the words "earlier" and "later" could represent something more than mere logical construction, and if the

terms were really held together in an objective bond of relational fact, they should have shed off their pure and isolated particularity and lost their dignified discreteness in a flowing continuity.

The proposition, "Alexander preceded Caesar," cannot be the picture of a reality for the simple fact that the terms of this relation cannot be really brought together except in a logical imagination. Pictorial representation of reality may be an artist's endeavour, but should not be a logician's pursuit. So Wittgenstein utters the most illogical thing when he says that a proposition is the picture of a fact. We cannot even

There cannot be a picture of precedence	logically think of a proposition, not to speak of stating it, without somehow bringing together its constituents in thought. But if
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the supposed real counterparts of the terms could be really brought together in a real relation of precedence, (which is impossible by the meaning and definition of precedence), our proposition in question would have directly contradicted the reality it claims to represent. The relation of precedence or succession is just the opposite of being together, but a proposition is impossible without getting the terms at least logically together. Hence no proposition can faithfully picture a fact of precedence. You cannot grasp

The paradox of precedence and succession	the relation without getting the terms together, but if you get them together you lose the relation. It is the paradox of the relation of precedence or succession which is reflected
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in a paradox of proposition.

Prajñākara's way of demolishing the relation of succession is derived from his theory of perception. An instantaneous perception grasps an instantaneous percept.

A percept or sense-datum is only present and never stamped with a mark of being earlier or later. A single unit of perception has no means to cover two successive perceptions. Hence succession is never an object of perception, since it is never a part of the percept. As a last resort you are to fall

back on memory and inference. The matter becomes more complicated thereby. Memory is supposed to be the retained impression of a percept. But when the percept happened to be, it was presented as "something present" and not as something past or being earlier. Yet memory seems to give you a sense of being past or happening earlier, and so it constructs something new that did not belong to the percept as such.

For the same reason inference has no right and scope of operation in this case. First, "being earlier" could not be the property of the percept when it was present. It is senseless to say that it has now become the property of the percept which is no longer present. Secondly, an object to be inferred must have at least the logical likelihood of being perceived, and there must be some perceivable indications providing a basis for inference. Thus on the basis of some perceivable indications present on this earth it is possible to infer the existence of life on a distant planet, since there is at least the logical likelihood that if a person could go there he could have perceived the existence of life. But it has already been shown that it is not even logically possible for the so-called fact of succession to become an object of perception. No perceivable indication of such a fact is ever present before a percipient observer. Hence inference has no chance to grasp the relation of succession. For Prajñākara the demolition of this temporal relation₂ has been specially necessary as a sure method of showing up the constructional nature of causal relation and the fictitious nature of identity and continuity involved in recognition.*¹⁵³

But one can hear the halting steps of a shyfaced empiricist in the half-hearted efforts of Karnakagomin to impart reality to the relation of succession. He does not feel at ease with Prajñākara's demolition of causal relation. Evidently he has Prajñākara in mind when he puts the point to be refuted in the following manner :—

"Somebody else says that a single perception cannot

Karnakagomin's
half-hearted
support to the
fact of succession

grasp the causal relation since the cause and the effect belong to two different instants. So nobody does perceive that something is *produced by* something else. Hence memory too is ineffective in this respect, for it is not backed by an appropriate previous perception.”*¹⁵⁴

Then he goes on to meet this objection and explain his own understanding of the causal relation. He is certainly conscious of Dharmakīrti's critique of relation (Sambandha-parīkṣā), and so is not bold enough to directly espouse the cause of causality. He declares that there is no reality of causal relation between two successive events. When we say that something is the cause or effect of something else we simply impose a logical abstraction on reality.*¹⁵⁵

But the next moment he starts saying something which is clumsy and confusing. The effect, he goes on, is nothing but *deriving* its existence from the cause, and the cause is nothing but happening prior to the effect. Some confusing observations. Now, the consequent coming into existence is not different from the instant that we call the effect, and the fact of happening earlier is not different from the instant that we call the cause. Since both these instants are objects of perception, how can you say that the causal relation cannot be grasped by perception? It is of course true that we use the terms 'cause' and 'effect' after the succeeding event comes to be.

It is evident that this line of argument involves both confusion and contradiction. To say in the same breath that the causal relation is a logical construction, and also, that the effect *derives* its becoming from the cause (hetuḥ sakāśāt svarūpalābha eva kāryatvam) has an accent of contradiction too pronounced to be ignored. The confusion starts from the fact that what has been posed as the problem is itself being paraded as the answer. How do you perceive that the effect *derives* its existence from the cause? Exactly this is the problem of causation. But Karṇakagomin asserts the same without

the note of interrogation, as if, the question itself is the answer to itself.

Again, the manner of his argument seems to suggest that there is some sort of relational reality such that the effect comes from the cause, only that we *call* it a relation between cause and effect is a matter of nomenclature. Thus the logical abstraction, involved in this case, consists in naming alone, and not in the absence of a reality which somehow seems to gain a presence through receiving a name. Yet the essence of Vikalpa or logical construction is more than merely having a name. It is an object of pure logical understanding passing for an extra-logical reality by virtue of being the referent of a name.

Karnakagomin seems to have realised the weakness of his interpretation of causality that he has advanced so far. So he proceeds to the conclusion that the causal relation is nothing but a relation between the antecedent and the consequent. The suggestion is apparent that other factors, such as *necessity* and *act* of causation, are mere logical appendages added to the relation of succession, and that the perceivable relational reality is nothing but the process of succession.

Now the cardinal problem remains to be answered:—how do you perceive succession? Karnakagomin has a very clever way of circumventing the difficulty. Suppose the antecedent is really the antecedent, and the consequent really the consequent. So we perceive the antecedent when we perceive the preceding instant, and perceive the consequent when we perceive the following instant. We may go a step further and say that perceiving the antecedent and the consequent is the same as perceiving *antecedence* and *consequence*. In Karnakagomin's language, since the earlier instant is the cause and the later instant is the effect, perceiving the

two instants is the same as perceiving the cause and the effect. Now the causal relation, that is, succession, is not something different from the terms themselves. Hence two perceptions of the two successive instants are together equal to *the* perception of causal relation or succession. Once you grant the perceivability of succession such that "this follows that," you easily explain why and how memory retains a correct impression of succession.*¹⁵⁶

One can easily discern the fallacy in this train of arguments if one pauses to consider the following case. Suppose

The fallacy of
karnakagomin

A is father B. Now, it would follow from Karnakagomin's line of thought that seeing A and B is the same as seeing father and son. Such is the illusion engineered by common usage of language. Our linguistic convention very often leads us, quite unsuspectingly, to such an erroneous belief as,—"I have just seen B's father in the shop." A little thinking would make it clear that I cannot see a father or a son, since father-hood or son-hood forms no part of my visual percept of A or B. Take a man who does not know that A is father of B, and another man who knows it all right. The former will not say—"I have seen father and son," while the latter will freely use such an expression.

But the pure percepts of A and B belonging to two percipient persons will not differ in the least on account of this difference in their knowledge. The perceptual image of the second percipient does not contain an introductory tablet bearing such an inscription as "father of B" or "son of A."

When better
knowledge turns
to a disadvantage.

With all the advantage of his better knowledge than the first, the second percipient will also have the disadvantage of easily entertaining an illusion to the effect that he is *really seeing* father of B or son of A.

It is clear from the example that we have just considered that the proposition, "The man whom I see is father of B" is not the same as the proposition, "I see father of B." The

second proposition is worse than wrong, it is absurd, while the first proposition may be true. The matter will not improve if you even try to equate the second proposition with a third proposition, "I see the man who is father of B." The adjective clause in this third proposition is not a part of the perceptual object, though it is a property of the grammatical object. We can tolerate the proposition "I see father of B" only in so far as it serves as a clumsy contraction of the proposition "The man whom I see is father of B," knowing fully well that the two are not logically equivalent. But, if it is taken to be a significant proposition in its own right it is bound to expose a colossal absurdity covered by a time-honoured linguistic convention.

Karnakagomin's fallacy is exactly of the type that we have shown above. Because two perceivable events are *asserted* to be cause and effect, it is argued that we *perceive* "the cause and the effect." Because two perceivable events are asserted to be antecedent and consequent, it is argued, we perceive "*the* antecedent and *the* consequent,"—just as, because two perceivable persons are asserted to be father and son, it is argued, we perceive "*the* father and *the* son." After this critique of Karnakagomin's position vis-a-vis causality and succession, it is perhaps clear that, within the domain of pure empiricism, Prajñākara's arguments against the reality of relational facts stand solid and unshaken. A modern disciple of Prajñākara may easily throw overboard the whole lot of relational facts entertained by Russell. It is once more a demonstration of the unbridgeable gap between language and reality, so far as it is proved that a propositional statement, supposed to stand for a non-linguistic relational fact, has no means to communicate such a fact, since that "fact" itself is nothing more than an interpretative abstraction.

With this much for a fact that is supposed to be pictured by a proposition, we shall begin to examine the more complicated problem, :—what is a proposition ?

CHAPTER XV

WHAT IS A PROPOSITION ?

SECTION 1

Professor Moore's Earlier View.

Indian Philosophy, significantly enough has no such term as corresponds to "proposition" in its modern sense. The theory of proposition in contemporary philosophy has an interesting career. The interest is excited by the fact that the history of proposition is a passage from clear beginning to progressive confusion.

Professor Moore in his essay on "Propositions" began in the right way when he equated the meaning of the term "proposition" with the apprehensible meaning of a sentence.

"It is quite plain, I think," says Professor Moore, "that when we understand the meaning of a sentence, something else does happen in our minds besides the mere hearing of the word of which the sentence is composed...And it is no less plain that the apprehension of the meaning of one sentence with one meaning differs in some respect from the apprehension of another sentence with a different meaning...There certainly are such things as two different meanings apprehended. *And each of these two meanings is what I call a proposition...* When we hear certain spoken words and understand their meaning, we may do three different things, we may believe the proposition which they express, we may disbelieve it, or we may simply understand what the words mean, without either believing or disbelieving it...This sense in which we apprehend a proposition, in all these three cases equally, is obviously one sense of the word apprehension.*¹⁵⁷

It is here clear that according to Moore a proposition is the apprehensible meaning of a significant sentence. That this meaning is quite different from the *fact* is also evident

from the fact that one clearly grasps the meaning of a sentence even when there is no fact to back it up. Hence there is such a thing as a false proposition, but no such thing as a false fact. Again different sentences in different languages are often found to be equivalents by virtue of bearing the same meaning. So sentences may differ without any difference in the proposition they express. Even in the same language there may be different sentences having the same meaning, for example, "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Caesar was killed by Brutus" express the same proposition.

Proposition as the apprehensible meaning of a sentence

If a proposition is thus taken to be equivalent to an intelligible meaning of a sentence, it is quite understandable why Indian philosophers have not felt it necessary to coin a special term corresponding to "proposition." The coinage of a special term does not confer any particular dignity on the intelligible meaning of a sentence. Apprehension of a sentential meaning is commonly called Śābda-bodha or verbal cognition in Indian Philosophy.

Why Indian Philosophy does not recognize a "proposition"

Bhartr̥hari has brought forth with a force of conviction that meaning, properly speaking, should belong to a complete sentence, and not to the isolated word-constituents of a sentence. The sentence and its meaning are both monolithic wholes which cannot be dissected and dispersed into parts (akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa and akhaṇḍa vākyaṛtha). As to the status of an intelligible meaning, the Buddhists and Bhartr̥hari are equally agreed that it is a Vikalpa or logical construction. It is a configuration of logical understanding and has the status of an ideational existence superimposed on consciousness. So Bhartr̥hari uses various terms which are designed to convey this logical character of meaning, such as, bauddhārtha (ideational meaning-content), abhidheya-sattā (meaning-existence) and 'adhyāropita' or 'upacarita-sattā' (super-imposed secondary existence).

Thus what Moore calls a proposition is the monolithic

ideational meaning-content of a sentence (akhaṇḍo bauddho vākyaārtha). It is then very difficult to see that special advantage one should get from the term "proposition" except as providing a fertile ground for confusion. When a proposition is defined as the apprehensible meaning of a sentence, and such a meaning is defined as a proposition, one does not feel particularly enlightened except as satisfying a fad for profundity.

If you cannot explain the term "proposition" without using the expression "meaning of a sentence", it is necessary that you should be able to explain the expression "meaning of a sentence" without using the term proposition. Otherwise reciprocal definitions will lead to indefinability. It is significant that every system of Indian Philosophy contains a long discourse on the logic of meaning, without coining a special term like "proposition" to mean the meaning.

Fondness for a term may unwarily lead us astray. Professor Moore is sometimes a champion of commonsense and is entrapped by the term he is fond of. When he goes on to explain the nature of a proposition he avowedly explains the nature of a logical fiction. But his fondness for a time-honoured term has wrapped up a fiction in the mantle of an ontological entity. Professor Moore boldly asserts—"The fact is that absolutely all the contents of the universe,

Proposition as an entity absolutely everything that is at all, may be divided into two classes, namely propositions on the one hand, and into things which are not propositions on the other hand...the sort of thing that I mean by a proposition is certainly one of the things that is ...certainly absolutely everything in the universe either is a proposition or is not."*¹⁵⁸ When the hearer hears a sentence, he, apart from hearing, performs a second act of consciousness, that is apprehends the meaning of the sentence. This meaning, "then, is the sort of thing that I mean by a proposition...There certainly are things which are propositions in this sense."*¹⁵⁹

Thus the meaning-content of a sentential apprehension is

for Moore not a logical abstraction, but something like a substantive entity over and above the sentence and the objective fact it refers to. Accordingly, if you follow Moore's view to its logical climax, there should be as many entities as there may be sentences in the past, the present and the future. This way every logical fiction may be hypostatized into a metaphysical entity. This is only a reiteration of Alexander's view to the effect that there are at least as many things as there are words in the world.

SECTION 2

Moore's Revision of His Former View

But in this context it would be quite unfair on our part if we forget to acclaim the refreshing open-mindedness which Professor Moore has commendably displayed in the revision of his former view in a subsequent essay on "Beliefs and Propositions."^{*160} As an example of clarity of understanding about the problem of proposition this essay of Professor Moore stands still unsurpassed. As regards his former view that there are such things as propositions, Moore observes—

Propositions are not existential entities "But yet I do not now believe that it is true though I did formerly."^{*161} "It is an objection to the supposition that there are such things as propositions at all, and that belief consists merely in an attitude of mind towards these supposed entities."^{*162} "The whole expression, 'I am believing in the existence of lions' is of course a name for a fact. But we cannot analyse this fact into a relation between me on the one hand and a proposition called the existence of lions on the other. This is the theory as to the analysis of belief which I wish to recommend. It may be expressed by saying that there simply are no such things as propositions."^{*163}

Latter on we shall make full use of Moore's reasons for revising his opinion. The term proposition has come to stay

in philosophical use, and there is no harm in using it, provided we are conscious of the meaning we attach to it. Whether a proposition is true or false, there is always a conceptual content in understanding a sentence. This conceptual content in its logical nature is an abstraction and not an entity, and this abstraction is the meaning of a sentence. There is no crying need for calling it a proposition, and there is also no particular harm in calling it so, provided it is not turned into a substantive entity, and no barricade is raised against the customary use of the term "proposition" as a synonym for a sentence in its logical aspect. Hence it should be admitted in all fairness that the Indian philosophers were rather wiser in not inventing any special term such as 'proposition' to stand for the intelligible meaning of a sentence. For them such expressions as *Vikalpa*, *Bauddhārtha*, *Abhidheya-sattā*, *Upacarita-sattā* and *Akhaṇḍa vākyārtha*, are enough and more significant, since they directly convey the logical value and status of this sentential meaning and save it from the false dignity of a confusing hypostatization.

CHAPTER—XVI

THE MODERN DEFINITION OF PROPOSITION

SECTION 1

Russell's Definition

Evidence of confusion about the nature of proposition starts with the attempts to redefine it, and, as a result of these new modes of treatment, it is not perhaps too much metaphorical to say that proposition has become the "sick child" of contemporary philosophy. Let us take a text book definition of proposition. Following the lead of Russell and others Professor Stebbing observes,—“Thus the unit of logical thinking is the proposition. This must be precisely defined :—

A proposition is anything that is believed disbelieved, doubted or supposed.”*¹⁶⁴

To understand full implications of this definition one should turn to Russell's important treatise, “An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth” wherein he has raised and discussed the problem of proposition in two chapters—“ Analysis of Problems Concerning Proposition (Ch. XII), and “The Significance of Sentences (Ch. XIII). Let us hear Russell's own words :—

“It is obvious that, if beliefs have objects, what I believe when I believe that snow is white is the same as what I doubt when I ask ‘Is snow white.’ This, whatever it is, is, on this hypothesis the significance of the sentence, ‘Snow is white’. If we can decide what is meant by ‘significance’ of a sentence, we shall say that it is the significance that is to be called a proposition, and that is either true or false.”*¹⁶⁵ Again, further on, “If this sentence begins with ‘I believe that’, what follows the word ‘that’ is a sentence signifying a proposition, and the proposition is

The same proposition may be expressed by an assertion and an interrogation

said to be what I am believing. Exactly similar remarks apply to doubt, desire."*¹⁶⁶ "I conclude, from this long discussion, that it is necessary to distinguish propositions from sentences, but that propositions need not be indefinable. They are to be defined as psychological occurrences of certain sorts, complex images, expectations etc.....the only thing essential to our enquiry is that sentences signify something other than themselves which can be the same when sentences differ. That this something must be psychological (or physiological) is made evident by the fact that the proposition can be false."*¹⁶⁷

Proposition as the significance of a sentence

Proposition as a psychological occurrence

This is a theory of proposition, which in one way or other, has remained as the sovereign in contemporary theory of knowledge. But it is exactly this theory which, under a network of analytical subtleties, has covered a deep-seated confusion, which should be exposed and cleared up, in order to save much that is right and throw out much that is wrong in the notion of proposition.

First, it should be considered whether a proposition, whatever it is in itself, should necessarily be believed, disbelieved or doubted. Secondly, it should be examined whether it is the proposition itself that is believed, disbelieved or doubted.

Two crucial questions

When Russell deals with the proposition "It is raining" in his lecture on "Logical Atomism," does he believe, disbelieve or doubt it? He does nothing of the sort. He simply considers the logical meaning of the sentence. Neither it is a case of suspended belief, because it is not at all an occasion of belief or disbelief. It may be argued that what Russell deals with here is not a real proposition, but only an 'imitation-proposition.' The real proposition you get only when and where a man utters the sentence, "It is raining", with a definite belief that it is raining, or with a purpose to make the hearer believe so though it may not be raining outside.

In a speculative dissertation we cannot directly get the original proposition, but only use an imitative model of the original.

But the question arises—*which original?* Thousands of people might have seen it raining at thousands of places and articulated their percepts on thousands of occasions separated by centuries. The crucial question is whether all the people uttering different instances of the sentence, "It is raining," in different perceptual situations believe and express the same proposition. According to one part of Russell's dissertation the answer should be a definite 'Yes', while according to the other part it should be a definite 'no.' If the proposition would have differed with every utterance of the sentence, "It is raining," communication would have been impossible in a community, and the purpose of language would have been lost. So it is quite understandable why Russell goes so far as to suggest that the assertive sentence "Snow is white" means the same proposition as the interrogative sentence "Is snow white?" Otherwise, "Yes, Snow is white" cannot be an answer to the question "Is snow white?"

Hence you cannot help feeling bewildered when Russell asserts in the same breath that propositions are to be defined as psychological occurrences like images, expectations etc. Evidently the same proposition cannot be a psychological occurrence, simply because a psychological occurrence cannot be the same with two persons or even with the same person on

The same proposition cannot be a psychological occurrence. two occasions. The sameness of a proposition presupposes participation by different members of the community in a common fund of meaning which is abstracted out of socially developed linguistic expressions.

Russell deserves credit for emphasising the importance of an obvious fact that the word 'dog' is as much a universal as dog itself. In the same way, for the purpose of saving the very possibility of a proposition, a sentence too must be taken in its universal aspect. Other-

wise the speaker and the hearer, the writer and the reader, could not have meant the same thing by the 'same' sentence. The sentence in order to mean the same thing on many occasions should be as much depersonalised as the meaning itself. The sentence too must figure in the meaning as a universal.

Hence the apprehension of meaning is a telescoping process in which language, meaning and thought pass into one another being universalised into a single whole. This much of Hegelianism must be admitted in order to ensure the very possibility of a commonly shared meaning. Herein also lies the secret of Bhartṛhari's theory of *Svarūpa-Vācya*tā, or the self-meaning operation of language.

You cannot define a proposition without understanding this telescoping process of a triple universalisation. Hence the definition of a proposition as a psychological occurrence of image or expectation is a self-defeating proposal.

A psychological occurrence is an atomic fact in which no second person has any means to participate. Proposition as the commonly understood meaning of a commonly accepted sentence is totally incompatible with such an atomistic definition as Russell has proposed. This meaning

A sentential meaning is logically neutral is logically neutral, i.e., is not necessarily the object of a belief, disbelief, doubt or supposition. I can easily entertain the meaning of a statement without necessarily entertaining a belief or disbelief in it. This is just so because the meaning is a depersonalised universal, a neutralised logical construction. This is further evident from the fact that the

The meaning of neutrality same proposition may be simultaneously an object of your belief, my disbelief and a third man's consideration. When you say and believe, it is raining, I may equally disbelieve it, and a third man may simply apprehend the meaning of your statement without entertaining either belief or disbelief.

SECTION 2

A Fallacy of Modern Positivism.

Modern Positivists are very fond of saying that a metaphysical proposition is meaningless ; but perhaps they do not know what they mean. Strictly speaking there cannot be a metaphysical proposition, since whatever may be proposed belongs to logic. What the positivists might have said is this :—A proposition which affirms or implies the existence of a metaphysical object is *metaphysically meaningless*, but not *logically* so. The phrase “metaphysically meaningless” is a tautologous expression. It means that meaning and metaphysics are terms of mutual exclusion. Thus the proposition, “God is good,” is not at all a meaningless or nonsensical expression. It has a definite understandable meaning without grasping which you could not have even deciphered it as “meaningless”.

What the positivists mean to say is this :—‘God’ does not belong to the ‘given’, the immediate datum of experience, and as such the proposition “God is good” is not verifiable ; so it is meaningless. They do not realise that the ‘given’ can never be spoken of. In their zeal to do away with God and metaphysics they have raised the ‘given’ to the esoteric glory of a metaphysical God. The Buddhists have shown a greater and more consistent zeal for the “given”. They have the penetrating insight to see that the “given” and the “spoken” live leagues apart. As soon as you try to push the ‘given’ into the framework of a significant sentence you strip it of its givenness and make it a configured constituent of a logical construction. This is so because the ‘given’ cannot be communicated. Your ‘given’ is totally distinct from mine, and the sentence that you utter is physically different from the sentence I hear. Hence, my auditory perception, and the meaning that I may attach to it on the basis of what may be

given to me, cannot enable me to get at what is given to you. What is communicated is "the universally given," which is neither yours, nor mine, but common between us, and which, accordingly is not the datum given to you. The "universally given" is only a logical abstraction which alone can be meant and spoken of. The delicate datum of your particular moment is a far cry from the comprehensive universal of the intercommunicating community as a whole.

SECTION 3

The Difference Between Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists.

It is necessary here to bring out in short the points of agreement and difference between Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists. We have very often used the expressions "empirical world" and "phenomenal world" as synonymous terms. The phenomenal world is not an empirical, but a logical world. But, strictly speaking, according to Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists, the phenomenal is not the empirical, but the logical. The phenomenal world is a logical construction, a world of intelligible meanings sustained in significant language. According to the Buddhists, the empirically real is the only reality. It is the given sensible, the pure, unrelated, unadorned particular of the moment that cannot be captured and communicated in language. Language has no power to violate its self-enclosed privacy and make it stand in public exposure. Hence it is *Sva-lakṣaṇa*, the self-definable. The Yogācāra Buddhists add that it is also *Sva-samvedana*, the self-sensible moment of cognition. The ineffable is not logical, and what is logical is communicable. The real is beyond logic and language.

Bhartṛhari quite agrees that logic and language cannot touch the fringe of reality. But he is in clear disagreement with the Buddhist view that the real is empirical. According

to him the real is both *metempirical* and *metatological*. The empirical is also a logical construction, since there is no cognition whatsoever that is not formed and shaped in an intelligible language. Because the phenomenal world as a logical construction is equated to the world of meanings, it is not necessary to create a third realm, as it has been done by Plato, Husserl and Meinong, in order to find a habitation for meanings, concepts and propositions. A logical construction is an interpretative fiction, and as such it is senseless to ask whether it exists or not. In an ultimate sense, the interpreter and the interpreted, the constructor and the constructed, everything is a fiction. So it is needless, senseless and pointless to ask whether this universal fiction has a habitat where it can rest its weary limbs.

This seeming digression into some important findings of Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists will clear up much of the confusion which haunts the contemporary notion of proposition. The very possibility of meaning, apprehension and communication depends on the fact that both the significant sentence and the proposition that is signified are to be universalized, depersonalised and converted into abstractions. Our phenomenal world is the apprehensible meaning of intelligible language, and as such is nothing more than a body of propositions. The proposition as the communicable meaning cannot be defined as a psychological occurrence belonging to a personal biography. The term "proposition" is an unfortunate coinage creating a fertile ground for confusion. But, since it is a time-honoured term, we may accept it in use provided we are conscious of the meaning we attach to it.

CHAPTER—XVII

BELIEF, DISBELIEF, ASSERTION AND DENIAL

SECTION 1

Do We Believe In A Proposition ?

Let us now turn to the second question, namely, whether it is the proposition itself that is believed, disbelieved or doubted. The problem may be presented in another way—whether the two sentences, “One’s belief *has* a content” and “One believes *in* a content,” convey the same meaning, or express the same proposition. That there is some sort of feeling or attitude that goes by the name of “belief” is undeniable. This unique feeling must have a content. But the question that we are posing is this :—whether a person’s belief having a content is the same as his believing *in* that content. To understand the full implication of this question we shall take two other sentences, “It is raining” and “I believe it is raining.”

Is the first sentence translatable into the second ? Evidently not. The first sentence, though it may be prompted by a believing attitude, is not a statement about my belief. The belief is here not a constituent of the meaning-content. Belief in the sense of a believing attitude belongs, in this case, to the inciting subjective *context*, but not to the objective *content*. It stands as a prompter in the background. But the second sentence is a statement about my belief itself, and the objective clause defines the belief by making explicit its form and content

Here the belief itself is the pronounced principal part of the total meaning-content of the sentence. The sub-ordinate content, i.e., the object-content of belief, is not by itself the meaning-content of the total sentence. Without a content a belief is unbelievable. But it is not self-contradictory to have a belief without this particular content. Whether it is

raining or snowing, anything like this might have been an object-content of my belief without imposing any burden of self-contradiction.

One may think that the sentence "I believe it is raining" may be restated in the form "That it is raining is the object of my belief" or "My belief has as its object,—it is raining." But this restatement is definitely not an equivalent of the original. The new statement is undoubtedly also a statement about my belief, but only in a new sense. It is an introspective analysis of the form and content of my belief *on the subjective side*, but does not bear an immediate concrete reference to the *objective side* as a happening in the external world, which is inherent in the original statement. When

A belief has a reference external to itself.

sombody says "I believe it is raining" he does not intend to convey simply the information that he entertains such a sort of belief in his mind, whether it is raining there or not.

He does something more than that. He also wants to inform that something *is* happening outside corresponding to his belief. Whether the second information is right or wrong, he believes it all right. His belief has unmistakably this external reference beyond the fact of believing, or the psychological content of belief. Otherwise the act of believing itself would become a self-contradictory attitude, a self-negating feeling, a self-condemning mental fact, an impossible phenomenon.

A believer is not a neutral analyst who simply says—"Well, I entertain such a belief and do not bother about whether there is anything beyond this fact of entertaining." Hence the speaker of the sentence—"My belief has for its

A believer is not a neutral and introspective analyst

object—it is raining" is not a believer, but a *logically neutral* introspective analyst, who, at least at the moment of his *utterance*, is not concerned if there is an external factual content corresponding to the psychological or logical content of his belief.

Here you get a *logical analysis* of a factually unanalysable

psychological unit into an act of believing on the one hand, and an object-content of belief on the other. When you force this analysis to figure in the sentence, "I believe it is raining" you disfigure it beyond recognition.

This want of equivalence between two sentences, "I believe it is raining" and "My belief has for its object,—it is raining" has a very important consequence, namely, *it is not the proposition that one believes*. A proposi-

tion, as we have seen before, is the meaning-content of a sentential expression. When this meaning-content is the same as the object-content of a belief, the fact that one's belief has a content is not the same as that one *believes in* the content. A belief is not a belief without the inevitable sense of feeling about something beyond the content. The *content* is not the *referent* of a belief. The referent is the target of the sense of the beyond. This target is logically there, though it may not be factually so. It is this confusion between the

content and the referent of a belief that is primarily responsible for the confused definition of the proposition as the object of belief, disbelief or doubt. The absurdity of such a

definition becomes particularly pronounced when a proposition is looked upon as a mental fact. When a person says, "I believe it is raining," evidently he does not mean to say that

he believes in a mental fact of raining. Even when it is not really raining, he who believes falsely so does not believe it to be a mental

fact. That would be the very negation of his avowed belief. Since the mental fact is there whether it is raining or not, his belief in that case could not be called false at all. Hence if the proposition were the mental fact, and if a believing man would have always believed in such a proposition, there could have been no false belief and false proposition.

The matter cannot be better explained than by showing up an eloquent contradiction in the statements of Russell, who

hits upon a right point a few pages earlier, and recoils back to a wrong notion a few pages later. When, according to

An eloquent contradiction in Russell Russell, a proposition is a mental fact, there is such a fact as an image which he calls an "image-proposition". Suppose a boy believes in a winged horse, and expresses his belief by the sentence, "There are winged horses." The boy conjures up an image of the winged horse in his mind. Then Russell correctly observes :—"The belief is not in the image, but in something else that is indicated (or, in logical language, described) by the image. This is specially obvious in such a case as memory. When we remember an event by means of present images, we are not believing in the present existence of images, but in the past existence of something resembling them. It is almost impossible to translate what is occurring into words without great distortion."*¹⁶⁸ But only a few pages later we come to the penultimate paragraph of his essay —"We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition and a disbelief true when it is a disbelief in a false proposition...."*¹⁶⁹ How can you talk of belief or disbelief *in a proposition* when you have already concluded that the proposition is a *mental fact, or image*, and that the boy believing in a winged horse does not believe in the image, but in something else indicated by the image ?

SECTION 2

Can We Assert A Proposition ?

We are now in a position to finally distinguish between the sentences, "It is raining" and "I believe it is raining." The first sentence *may* have at its back-ground an *unasserted* belief, but what is asserted is beyond the act or fact of belief. The second proposition is a case of *asserted* belief, but the sub-ordinate objective clause is really not a *sub-assertion*, but an *objective definition* which lends a concrete

content to the belief. Yet, since, in case of the belief in question, it cannot be formed without a sense of external reference, *the form and content of the belief cannot assert the belief itself*, but must show a *sense* of reaching out to something other than itself. In both the sentences an external reference does not necessarily depend on *having* an external referent in the world of facts, for one can sincerely entertain either of the propositions, or simply *consider* the case, whether or not it is really raining as a matter of fact.

Not necessarily
an external fact,
but a concrete
sense of
externality.

In other words, what is involved *is not an external referent as such, but a concrete sense of externality*. In case of all empirical propositions the meaning-concept is imbued with this sense of externality.

By "externality" we are not necessarily referring to an external world as distinct from the mental world. We are here speaking of a world of facts, be it mental or material. Our observations will hold equally true of such propositions as "I feel a toothache." Whether I really feel it or not the hearer of the sentence will take it as meaning something beyond its pure conceptual meaning.

"External" here
does not mean
"non-mental"

Thus the *meaning over-reaching itself is a process of completing and concretising a logical construction*. Since there must be a referential process whether there is a real referent or not, the process itself is bound to work within the bounds of logical construction.

Even when I utter a lie you cannot catch me lying without projecting the meaning of my utterance beyond itself. You must feel that my sentence to be true should have had a referent outside the referential function, and that

A lie presupposes
a truth.

my sentence is false because there is a referential process without any target of reference existing in reality. Thus even in a false proposition externalisation must be an unfailing adjunct of the abstraction which is the meaning-content of a sentence.

Logical construction has this unique virtue of externalising a target of reference which may not exist as a matter of external reality. It seems to bifurcate itself and present unto itself an objective counterpart which is a part of itself, yet seems to be something apart, an internal destination to be reached by an act of seemingly external reference.

An important consequence that follows from this analysis is that, *no speaker can really assert a proposition.*

In the sentence "It is raining" what is asserted is neither the belief, nor the logical construction (i. e. the proposition),

neither the belief, nor the fact, nor the propositional fiction is asserted. nor the external fact of raining. He who utters the sentence does not assert that he entertains a belief. Again, the proposition is the constructed meaning of the sentence.

Evidently then the speaker does not assert the proposition, since he does not mean that he entertains a unitary logical idea expressed by the sentence. The hearer too does not take him as meaning such an abstraction. Neither it is the external fact that is asserted. Firstly, because, the assertion may be there quite in its own right, though it may not be raining at all. If there is no raining *in fact* how can one assert or believe *a fact of raining*?

Secondly, because, a fact, or event is not a matter of belief or assertion, but simply a matter of being or happening, which no belief or assertion can touch, re-touch or alter. Belief or assertion is a psychological fact, while a shower is an external material fact. The two do not meet. You may insert the word "about" between the words, "belief" (or "assertion") and "shower", but that will not give a belief or assertion about shower in the sense which you like to extract from it. The Buddhists and Wittgenstein have taught us that no fact can be "about" some other fact. Two facts are two independent happenings, rigid, solid and cold in their unbreakable isolation. Your insertion of the word "about" will not make them turn about and kiss each other's face. You may entertain a belief about a shower, and

utter a phrase or sentence to express your belief, but this *shower* will at any rate, remain a part and content of your belief, no matter whether there is, or not, a fact of shower outside your belief. In other words, you can only entertain a "belief-about-shower," but not "belief" about a shower.

Thus to find a proposition you are to move in a maze of fiction, since you can assert neither a fiction nor a fact. It may be assumed that, though a proposition cannot be asserted by itself, it can be asserted by another wider proposition on a higher plane of hierarchy. Thus the proposition, "It is raining", is asserted by the second-order proposition, "I assert that it is raining." Here too it can be easily shown that the proposition of the second order does not assert *the proposition* of the first order. When a person says, 'I assert that it is raining,' he does not assert that there is a proposition called "It is raining." The matter has already been discussed in connection with the allied proposition—"I believe it is raining." So it is more reasonable to admit that a proposition cannot be asserted or believed, but can only be *brought out* by a logical analysis.

Just as a person who suffers from an illusion, cannot at the same time assert his illusion, so a person moving in a logical fiction cannot at the same time assert his realm of fiction. When the illusion is past, an introspective analysis may inspire a person to observe that he laboured under an illusion. In a similar way when a person is already past his "propositional attitude," he may observe that he entertained some proposition, (provided he is logically equipped with sufficient power of analysis.) One need not be a logician to realise that one entertained an illusion. But not so is the case with a proposition. A proposition can be believed or asserted only by a logical analyst in his professional parlour, but not by a worldly man in his common parlance,—
 "Paikṣakāṇām iyaṁ pratipattiḥ, na tu sāmvyavahārikāṇām,"
 —so says Dharmakīrti.

SECTION—3.

Can We Deny a Proposition ?

We are then led to the conclusion that a proposition, as it has been sought to be defined by the modern logicians, cannot come up to the demands of their definition. The definition also envisages the possibility of a proposition being denied or disbelieved. In ordinary usage of language there is certainly an important difference between denial and disbelief. A disbelief is a denial but the converse is not necessarily true. A real thief may deny having committed a theft. His denial is not a disbelief at all. But when an innocent man, caught by mistake, denies the same, his denial is certainly a disbelief. He does not believe that he has committed the crime. So a disbelief may be defined as an honest denial. But for the logical purpose, what we shall say here about denial may be equally applied to disbelief.

We shall now go to show that it is not possible to deny a proposition, and that the propositional predicament, is best reflected in the paradox of denial. When a person denies that it is raining he certainly does not deny what the modern logicians are pleased to call a proposition. If the proposition is admitted to be the expressed meaning of a sentence, it is apparent that none does deny that the sentence, "It is raining" has an apprehensible meaning. The meaning is equally entertained whether it is really raining or not. The same is the case if, following Russell, we equate the proposition to some psychological feeling. We cannot say that the person denies the psychological occurrence, since that would mean denying the denial itself.

Again the object of denial must be somehow a part of the denial itself. A denial is inconceivable without that which is denied being a component of the fact of denial. The grammatical object of denial must be at the same time a logical object.

The difference
between denial
and disbelief.

The object of
denial is a consti-
tuent of denial.

Denial implies a certain relation in which the object must stand as a term. In denying that it is raining what is denied must be at the same time entertained at least as a logical abstraction. One cannot deny this abstraction without denying the denial itself. Thus we fall

The paradox of denial. in a paradox—to make any denial possible or conceivable at all one must entertain the very thing which is sought to be denied. So it is clear that it is not the proposition that can be denied.

Do we then deny the fact of raining? Either there is a fact of raining or not. If the fact is there, denial would have nothing to do with it. A fact that is present cannot in itself be *related* to its denial. As we have seen before the

The fact cannot be denied. object of denial must some how be a part of the fact of denial. But the fact of raining cannot be a constituent of the fact of denial, since that would negate the denial itself. Again, if the fact is not there at all, how can it *stand* there as the object of denial? If you insist that what you deny is the *fact* itself, and if the fact is not there at all, your denial loses its object and itself gets lost. Hence it is neither the fact nor the propositional fiction that is denied.

One possible way of escaping this paradox is to turn every denial into an affirmation, and every object of denial into a negative expression (in case where the object is an affirmative clause).

Thus the sentence, "I deny that it is raining," should be changed into, "I affirm that it is not raining." If the object

Should we change a denial into an affirmation? of denial is a negative clause, it should be turned into an affirmative one. For example, the sentence, "I deny that it is not raining" should be changed into, "I affirm that it is

raining." Such a transformation may seem logically impeccable. But apart from the reasons which we have already advanced to show in the previous section that neither a fact nor a propositional fiction can be asserted or believed, there

are more fundamental objections to such a course of transformation.

First, in the psychic field, the feeling of negation cannot be equated to the feeling of affirmation. The very fact that, in the process of transformation, we are also compelled to transform the sub-ordinate clause from the affirmative to the negative and vice-versa, points to the impossibility of equating a negative attitude to an affirmative attitude. Otherwise merely replacing the word, "deny", by the word "affirm", should have done the job. Hence the attempted equation between denial and affirmation is logically contradicted by the psychological difference between the two.

Secondly, the complex sentence, "I affirm that it is not raining," is psychologically inverted and logically absurd. Suppose you like to go out, and so ask your servant to see if it is raining or not. The servant goes out, and coming back makes the statement, "It is not raining." Here the principal feeling that he wants to convey is a feeling of negation, and not one of affirmation. You too take it that way. Hence to do justice to the most pronounced feeling of your servant you should logically translate his sentence into, "It is not a fact that it is raining." Negation here gets the upperhand and affirmation lies low in a sub-ordinate position.

Again it is logically outrageous to suggest that your servant means to say that there is a fact of not-raining. He who says, "I have not seen any book on the table," does not mean to say, "I have seen some 'not-book' on the table." He only denies having seen any book on the table.

It is thus clear that the paradox of denying a proposition cannot be resolved by way of transforming a denial into an affirmation.

The paradox can be stated in the following manner:—
There is no way of defining what one seeks to deny and no way of denying what one cannot define.

This paradox of denial is fundamentally the same as what

Dharmakīrti has presented as the paradox of negation.

Dharmakīrti observes in an epigrammatic manner :—"There cannot be a negation of the thing that *is*, nor of the thing that *is not*.
 Dharmakīrti on the paradox of negation.

Caught in this paradox the meaning of negation is lost in the world."*¹⁷⁰ Prajñākara explains :—If it is held that pure non-existence is the meaning of negation, the use of the negative particle is useless and incongruous. The negative particle cannot be *related* to pure non-existence [Since non-existence is inconceivable without *holding on to that very something* which is held to be not existing ; and again, it is not the non-existence itself that is negated by the negative particle.] Again, if it is assumed that the negative particle negates that which does not exist, that too is impossible, because, that, which *is not* cannot *be* the object of negation.*¹⁷¹ (How can it be said that something, which *is* the object of negation, *is not* at the same time ?)

The only way out of this paradox is to realise that, by virtue of a *Vikalpa* or logical abstraction, a psychological feeling or attitude of denial is fictitiously split into two parts which appear as an act on the one hand and an object of the act on the other.

The fictional construct is not something external to the feeling or attitude itself ; Yet it seems so, as if, it were something towards which an attitude is entertained. A *Vikalpa* by its peculiar virtue of externalisation configures a constructed meaning into an objective target. The grammatical form of a sentence has a long arm in helping this configuration so much so that which is psychologically one gets logically doubled. The act and the object, and the relation between the two, all are logical fictions.*¹⁷²

CHAPTER XVIII

RUSSELL ON THE "DINNER-PROBLEM"

(*And How Bhartṛhari Would Have Looked At It*)

If our discussions above have generally proceeded on the correct rail, or even if it is conceded that we are building up a case that is at least worth consideration, we should do well not to take the following observation of Russell without some necessary modification. While criticising Neurath Russell observes with his characteristic clarity and sharpness—

"If I go into a restaurant and order my dinner, I donot want my words to fit into a system with other words, but to bring about the presence of food."*¹⁷³ Bhartṛhari too exactly raises this logical "problem of food."*¹⁷⁴ It will

Bhartṛhari raises
a similar problem

be paying to know what he thinks about it.
A person utters the sentence, "I eat rice."

On the objective side there is a fact characterized by a relation between a person and a thing, and this relation is expressed by the verb. Now if the meaning of a word is a conceptual construction (Vikalpa) does it follow that a person eats a logical abstraction? That is plainly absurd. Such a confusing question arises from a misunderstanding of the problem at hand.

In the sentence as such the abstraction does not belong to the word "rice" alone, independently of the other constituents of the sentence. A person does not eat a logical construction, verily because, in the total sentential meaning, the person and his eating too are not self-sustained realities outside the fold of construction. Those who fling the question at Bhartṛhari (or the Buddhists), in a bid to show up the absurdity of his position, conveniently splits the meaning of the sentence in such a way as that one portion of it is taken as a construction and the other as an unconstructed reality ;

and then the absurdity is brought out by playing off the real against the unreal. This is impermissible because the meaning

of a sentence is not a piece-meal construction.
 Take the senten- The sentence as a whole has the meaning as
 tial meaning as a whole
 whole

a whole. The logical construction is the sentential meaning-concept, and not a collective structure of separate word-concepts acting as brick and mortar. Hence the meaning of the sentence, "I eat rice," is not that "a construction constructs a construction," not to speak of a person eating a construction. You cannot abstract away a word from the sentence and take it as an abstraction, and keep the rest sparkling in the realm of reality. Nor can you build separate constructions corresponding to separate words, and then join them together in a string of meanings. Hence Helārāja aptly remarks :—"We, who take the meaning as a total abstraction out of the total sentence, do not find it possible to have an understanding of the meaning by taking a word piece-meal out of the sentence as a whole."*¹⁷⁵

The sentence is intelligible and the meaning is entertainable whether the fact happens or not. The supposed fact must pass into the domain of construction, before it can be meant. You must accept this truth about the meaning-situation whether you are a realist or an idealist, whether you posit a fact beyond your construction or not. Helārāja is very emphatic on this point. The epistemological battle between the realist and the idealist will then be fought on the plane of problematic relation between this constructed meaning on the one hand and the fact supposed to stand beyond that meaning on the other.

Whatever may be the outcome of this struggle, it must be admitted that a linguistic expression has no way to reach out to a reality standing away from the meaning-concept. The secluded glory of a reality standing by itself does not shine upon the face of language. The world may be real or unreal,

a fact may pass in or press out, language is invariably linked with a constructed meaning, which is permanent in the sense that it stands there intact amidst the fleeting stages of a psychic life, or the fast moving facts of an external world. This permanent fund of meaning is

The meaning is
logically per-
manent

abhidheya-sattā or *aupacārika-sattā*, which is but another name for the meaning as a Vikalpa or logical fiction. It has only a

logical reality, nothing more or nothing less.*¹⁷⁶ It is needless to repeat that the phrase "logical reality" is a metaphorical expression, and is not intended to convey the implication of a *third realm* of existence as it is suggested by Plato, Husserl, or Meinong.

Let us now return to Russell's problem of ordering for his dinner. Suppose the hotel boy is ordered thus—"Bring my dinner" and suppose he replies, "Dinner is not yet ready, Sir." The fact of bringing dinner to the table is evidently delayed in happening. The fact is not there. Yet the boy understands his customer well enough, otherwise he could not have given an appropriate reply. Thus whether the food is brought to the dinner table or not, the host and the guest must participate in a common pool of meaning, which is not an external fact, but a conceptual construct. Moreover even when there is a fact of bringing one's dinner, there is no external fact called, "Bring my dinner." The realist or a half-hearted positivist will still persist in saying that he has not ordered the boy to bring a logical construction to the dinner table. Certainly not, and the reply to this contention we have already given, following Bhartṛhari and Helārāja, in the preceding paragraphs. Take the total sentence in its total meaning. The food and its "being brought to the table," all these belong together to an indivisible total meaning-concept, so that, you cannot bifurcate the meaning, and take "bringing" as a fact and "food" as a construction.

Suppose the client is informed that the dinner time is over for the day. Then how does your language mean (or

indicate) a fact that never happens. You will say that your linguistic expression still bears a relation to a "might-have-been-fact." Exactly so, because a "might-have-been-fact" is not a member of the world of facts, but of a constructed world of logical concepts. The same problem

There is no
"absentee fact"
in the world
of facts.

crops up again :—There is nothing in the world called an *absentee-fact*. How can you "indicate" the fact that is not there at all ? If you say that, in ordering for your dinner, you order for the *presence of an absentee fact*, the matter is irretrievably complicated thereby. There is no such fact in the world as the *presence of an absentee fact*, since the qualifying phrase "of an absentee fact" does not indicate a real property which really and properly belongs to *the presence*. Such a real property would have at once negated the presence itself. Again, if "the presence" were there on the table, your order for the dinner would have been senseless ; and if, "the presence" is *not* there as a fact, your order cannot touch or reach out to a *fact* that has not yet come to be. A fact that is *not yet* a fact is *not* a fact.

When you utter the sentence "Bring my dinner", you expect some familiar response, a certain well-known pattern of behaviour on the part of the hotel-boy. The response is not yet a fact at the time you expect it, and hence your uttering the sentence is justified. Yet this response is an

The paradox
of expectation

objective part of your expectation which may be fulfilled or not. An expectation must *have* an object, otherwise you cannot expect at all. But again, if the object is already there as a *fact*, there is nothing to expect at all. Thus you get a queer case—an object of expectation must be present and absent at the same time. That is only another way of admitting the case that an expected object is a fiction. But you do not expect a fiction when you expect your dinner to be served. That means,—the object of expectation is a *Vikalpa*, i. e., an *externalised* fiction, not taken as a fiction but as a *coming*

fact. Plainly speaking, one cannot *define* what one expects except *in terms* of an abstraction, since one expects neither a fact nor an abstraction.

The boy who has been ordered to bring the dinner does not take your language as referring to a "settled fact," but to a fact that is yet to come about. Now, there is no such thing as a "fact that is yet to come about." Again, had it been a settled fact it would have passed the stage of being an object of expectation, and your order for dinner then would have been senseless and pointless. The boy understands you all right without participating in your private expecting attitude. But yet he participates in a fund of meaning common between you and him. This meaning is a "public fund" not yet backed by a fact. Even if the boy does not make the expected response, that is, if the fact fails to happen, the meaning stands intact. Fact or no fact, nothing is added

to or subtracted from the meaning. Otherwise the boy cannot belie your expectation by an appropriate negative answer—"Dinner time is over for the day, Sir." This common pool of meaning, which stands unimpaired and unaltered, can only be a logical construction. Language can reach only upto this and has no logical means to go beyond and *indicate* a fact. The fact that does not happen, but still somehow becomes an *indicated* object of a linguistic expression, can only belong to this domain of abstraction.

If you forget this peculiar character of the meaning-situation, you may fall in difficulty. Once you are confirmed in your faith that your sentence must anyway indicate a fact, you must have a fact to honour the indicative power of your sentence. So you may refuse to accept the boy's reply that the dinner is not ready, and claim that the dinner must be there. You will create a row in the hotel, and, in obedience to your "logic of fact-finding," you may slip from the softer fiction of a "coming fact" into the sterner fact of a police lock-up. Hence, acceptance of the meaning as a Vikalpa is the meeting

ground, not only of the hotel boy and his customer, but also of the realist and the idealist who cross swords with each other. This is the deeper implication of Helārāja's profound commentary on the verse of Bhartṛhari quoted before (fn. 174).

Neurath's Neo-Hegelianism no doubt should share the portion of blame that it deserves, but Russell's easy way of disposing of the matter by simply saying, "I want to bring about the presence of food," is too carefree to be permissible. To ride slipshod over the role of logical construction in conferring meaning on language, and to insist that language indicates *facts* through the meaning, may bring one dangerously near to speaking non-sense, since there is no sense outside an intelligible speech.

With so much for the relation, or want of relation, between fact and proposition, and for wisdom, or lack of wisdom, in defining proposition in the modern way, we shall go for what they call the "basic proposition," the "incorrigible" proposition, as Professor Price has called it. It is assumed to be an irreducible atomic proposition having a position nearest to the fact.

CHAPTER XIX

BASIC PROPOSITION WITHOUT A BASE

SECTION—1.

Professor Ayer On Basic Proposition

A basic proposition is the irreducible minimum which refers to the "just given", the immediate datum of experience. We take the following from Professor Ayer's essay on "Verification and Experience" :—

"A piece of gold is a material thing ; and to test the validity of propositions referring to material things we must ascertain the truth and falsehood of propositions referring to sense-data...Now at last we have reached propositions which need not wait upon other propositions for the determination of their truth and falsehood, but are such that they can be directly confronted with given facts. These propositions I propose to call basic propositions."

Professor Ayer's
definition of basic
proposition.

Again, towards the end of the article. "If the words 'I am angry' are used to say that I am angry, then it does not seem in anyway mysterious that my being angry should verify the proposition that they express. But how do I know that I am angry ? I feel it. How do I know that there is a loud sound ? I hear it. How do I know that this is a red patch ? I see it. If the answer is not regarded as satisfactory, I do not know what other can be given."*¹⁷⁷

But these are not the questions to which answers are due. We ask the positivist :—Where does lie the basic 'proposition' which is supposed to be verified by experience. When I sense a black patch, do I simultaneously entertain a proposition expressible in the sentence "I see a black patch' ? Do I simultaneously compare the meaning of the

Where do you get
the basis of a
basic proposition ?

statement with my experience and simultaneously feel a satisfying verification? Ask any common man with a sufficient power of introspection, but not of enough logical sophistication. He will say—I see black something, but do not see or feel a “proposition” alongside my experience, and do not also feel like comparing the two and verifying the proposition. Of course, when you ask me the question if I see something black, I understand the meaning of your interrogative sentence, look at the object again, and reply, “Yes, I see black something.”

By definition, a basic proposition directly involves an immediate experience, nothing more, nothing less. Now it seems that an experience involves a basic proposition. If this proposition is what the elders called judgment, is there then an act of judgment simultaneous with, and over and above the fact of experience? No positivist will ever think so. Is the proposition that which we have called the total meaning of a sentence? Then, follow the guidance of Bhartṛhari and admit that every piece of immediate experience is thoroughly mixed up with an inarticulate speech so much so that language, meaning, experience, and the object of experience are one indivisible unit. In that case it is senseless to say that a proposition is compared with experience and thus verified.

If it is said that accepting the given is the same as accepting the proposition, no question of verifying a proposition does arise, except in the sense of comparing it with a further experience. That would lead to an infinite regress, and that also is not in line with the positivist’s way of verification. We should specially note the following observa-

A basic proposition cannot be doubted or denied.

tion of Professor Ayer, “what is subsequently doubted or denied is always a different proposition. What I accept now is the proposition, ‘This is red’. What I may doubt or deny in thirty seconds’ time is the proposi-

tion—‘I was seeing something thirty seconds ago.’*¹⁷⁸

In the same way it should be said that the proposition, which was accepted thirty seconds before the moment of the given, is also not "It is red," but "it *will* be red thirty seconds *after*." The proposition, "It is red", and the experience of the red must then belong to the same moment.

Experience and basic proposition belong to the same moment.

Does that moment give us two things together, the "given" and the proposition, *the red* and "It is red", and a feeling of comparison and verification at the same time? We do not think that a positivist will give an affirmative answer, since he would not like to be placed in the unique position of enjoying a unique experience the like of which none else in the world is ever fortunate to feel. If the answer be negative, the sense-impression and the proposition become the same, and the positivist has got to accept the view of Bhartṛhari to the effect that every cognition, mediate or immediate, is sustained in an intelligible speech, articulate or inarticulate. That too is a position not congenial to the positivist, since in that case comparison and verification are mere meaningless misnomers. Hence the positivist cannot *show* where and when he has his "basic proposition".

Then better be a follower of Bhartṛhari

It may plausibly be argued against our criticism that it is not necessary that the "given" should always be an instantaneous flash. Even then, it should follow from Professor Ayer's explanation that an instantaneous flash of a red signal cannot be translated into a basic proposition,

If the event of experience is not a momentary flash, what then?

since the proposition can only come at least an instant after the flash in the form, "There was a red flash just before", and not in the form, "There is a red flash." But leave aside the 'given' of the instant and take a "continuous" sense-impression. We take the word sense-impression not in the literal and narrow sense of an experience born out of the operation of five sense organs, but in the sense of an imme-

diate experience which may be "internal" too, like pain, pleasure, anger and sorrow.

A patient suffering from a continuous pain goes to the doctor and says "I am in pain". We suppose that his pain

has not subsided when he utters the sentence.

A likely example
of a continuous
experience,

Here we get hold of a basic proposition at last. "My being in pain", says Professor

Ayer, "will verify the proposition, 'I am in pain'...How do I know that I am really in pain? Again the answer can only be 'I feel it.'"^{*179}

If the patient is not a liar, there is a causal connexion between his feeling the pain and expressing the proposition. But the cause precedes the effect. My beginning of the utterance of the sentence such as, "I-a-m...", is not referentially related to that stretch of my painful feeling which is

Even here, experience and proposition do not belong to the same moment.

conterminous with the utterance itself, but

only to that portion of the feeling which was there just before my utterance. When

a cause partially overlaps the effect in time, the beginning of the effect is not causally related to the overlapping portion of the cause, but to the portion that goes just before the beginning of the effect.

This is apparent also in the case of our patient. A feeling of pain generally undergoes changes in degrees of intensity. The doctor asks the patient, "Do you still feel the pain." The patient often *feels* his feeling at least for an instant and answers, 'Yes, I do feel even now.' Evidently this answer is related to the feeling of the preceding instant. But then it would not be the basic proposition propounded by Ayer, since in this case the proposition *really* should be of the form "I was in pain an instant before" and that is not strictly a "basic" proposition. Yet Professor Ayer would maintain that the feeling of pain verifies the proposition.

But, by assumption, an 'in corrigible' basic proposition

can be verified only by a conterminous experience. Since no such proposition can be found, should we then modify the definition in this way: an antecedent or preceding experience verifies a consequent or following basic proposition? The matter would then become inextricably complicated; you are then to define how much gap between the antecedent and the consequent may be allowed to make a proposition basic.

Does a preceding
experience verify
a following
proposition?

such proposition can be found, should we then modify the definition in this way: an antecedent or preceding experience verifies a consequent or following basic proposition?

The matter would then become inextricably

complicated; you are then to define how much gap between the antecedent and the consequent may be allowed to make a proposition basic.

SECTION 2

Some Serious Implications

Granted that there may be basic propositions as the positivists like to have, their definition entails some implications which many positivists may feel diffident to accept.

First, it follows by implication that a basic proposition cannot be false. It does not need any correction, and so is

A basic proposition cannot be false.

'incorrigible.' That is another way of saying,

though Professor Ayer may protest, that it does not need any verification; it is self-

evident. If our patient lies to the doctor,

his sentence does not express any basic proposition, for it has no basis in his immediate experience. The immediate experience is the basic stuff of the empirical world (the act or fact of experience is not something different from the datum itself). We have seen how Prajñākara has vigorously pushed through the thesis that verification and contradiction have no room in pure empiricism.

An experience qua experience is an undeniable fact, and the object of experience is an indubitable and indisputable datum in itself. A false pain is as much 'real' as the real pain. The objects of illusion and hallucination are there intact in their own right. There is nothing *basically* wrong in them. If that is so, no question of verification does arise

at all, because verification involves an assumed possibility of falsification. A false basic proposition is impossible, since there cannot be a *false fact* of experience. A basic proposition is beyond truth-value. There is no *false fact* as the basis of a liar's statement, so he cannot express a *basic* proposition that is false. Properly speaking, a basic proposition has no truth-value, it is beyond the logical categories of truth and falsehood.

Secondly, obedience to empiricist logic will confront the theory of basic proposition with a fatal possibility, namely, on the strength of the definition, there is nothing to distinguish between the basic and the non-basic (with the possible exception of a liar's proposition). Either, Nothing to distinguish between the basic and the non-basic there is no basic proposition, or every proposition, except that which is expressed by a liar, is a basic proposition. This follows as an implication from the notion of an immediate datum. An anger that is felt is as much an immediate datum as the flash of red. Hence no positivist should put any premium on the prefix "sense" in sense-datum. It can be equally shown that every object of every type of cognition is as much immediate to that cognition as the sense-datum is to experience. We remember how Prajñāṅkara has made the profound observation that, as an object of cognition, an inferential object is no less immediate than an object of perception. Once we admit that (and there is no reason for not admitting), remembrance, introspection, inference, intuition, feeling, volition, abstract thinking, every sort of psychic event is as good an immediate fact as what they are pleased to call a sense-experience.

You do not *see* that your sight comes from the sense of sight. You feel so or infer it. Similarly, I feel like logically thinking. Since I feel it you cannot question my fact of feeling unless you take me to be a liar. My feeling, along with what I feel, is as solid and basic a fact to me as the red patch is to you. After some hard thinking a mathe-

matician solves a problem and feels a deep sense of satisfaction. His thought is a fact just as his feeling of satisfaction ; and the "abstract" conclusion, that figures in his thought, is no less immediate to his thought than the red patch is to your so-called sense-experience. A child just beginning his lessons in arithmetic may count with easy complacency that $5+7=13$, and may feel quite sure about his conclusion. You cannot question his conclusion which figures as a fixed and definite datum of his smug certitude any more than you can question the yellow datum of a jaundiced vision. Similar is the case with aesthetic, moral and religious feelings. Show me a single reason on pure empirical basis why your favourite red patch is more basically immediate to your cognition than a mystic's God is to his feeling of communion.

That is why Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara have the brilliant insight to see that, in the light of *Sva-samvedana*, or self-cognizing cognition, even a vikalpa, or logical fiction, is not a fiction in itself, but a definite datum in so far as it is entertained in thought.*¹⁸⁰ It is a fiction only when we abstract it away from its mooring, wilfully or unwarily manage to forget that it is also an objective datum of thought, and consider it only in its aspect of referential function and externalisation. A fiction is also a fact just as the datum of an illusion or a dream is a fact in itself. In final analysis, as a *Sva-samvedana* there is no difference between sense-experience and other types of cognition, or between concrete thought and "abstract" thought. The prefix "sense" in sense-experience is an unwarranted preamble permitting an unwanted limitation. The modern positivists have no courage to face this consequence of their theory, though they fail to show on what right, the word "sense" should intrude as a prefix to "experience." Since there is no possibility of having a sense-experience of the fact that

All cognitions
are valid, since
object of
cognitions are
always there as
the indisputable
data of thoughts

Important
observations
of Dharmakīrti
and Prajñākara.

these cognitions are derived from sense and those are not, none has any logical right to say that *this* is a sense-experience and that is not. Every object of every cognition is a datum here and now. Self-evidence of a cognition follows directly from the theory of *sva-samvedana*. As a datum of sense-experience cannot be questioned as a fact, so no object of cognition can be doubted as an objective datum of the cognitive fact.

Among the Indian Philosophers the Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is the nearest approach to this extreme Yogācāra theory of self-evident cognitive event. They do not accept the idealistic position of Yogīcāra Buddhism, but concur with the view that every cognition is self-evident and self-validated in the sense that as a fact in itself the question of its invalidity (or validity for that) does not arise at all. Thus Śālikanātha the disciple of Prabhākara, boldly declares that no future contradiction can remove the fact and object of a previous cognition and make it unhappen as such. Every cognition is valid in this sense, since the object of cognition is that alone which is evident in cognition.*¹⁸¹

A concurrent
view of the
Prabhākara School
of Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

SECTION—3

The Positivist Sense of Verification

It is to be noted that the question of verification, as it has been sought to be applied in the case of a so-called basic proposition, is not the same as with which we are normally concerned. We do not generally look upon the problem of verification in a way in which every cognitive proposition is valid as standing for a *cognitive fact*. We take the problem in the way in which it can be reasonably asked whether the cognitive fact itself is warranted by another fact standing outside the pale of cognition. The theory of basic proposition very cleverly

An unusual sense
of verification

evades this normal conception of verification but makes a loud fuss about verification in respect of a situation which does not demand it in any way.

It may be objected that we are distorting the letter and spirit of positivism. Has not Professor Ayer made his position amply clear in the first excerpt that we have quoted from him at the beginning of the chapter? There it is clearly implied that a proposition about a material thing is to be first translated into a proposition about the sense-data. Then we get the basic proposition. This proposition directly confronts

The final confirmation the datum of experience, and is verified by it. An experience cannot *itself* be verified, it is the final confirmation. Thus a "physical" proposition is verified by a "sense-datum proposition" which in its turn is verified by experience, but not by any other proposition. This looks very innocent on the surface, but our reply to it will contain much that we have already said before. "Gold is yellow" is a "physical proposition." What will be the confirmatory proposition? Something like this:—"I see a yellow patch.

But, as we have shown, such a proposition may come in only after the experience happens or begins to happen. But then, according to Ayer, our assumed proposition should be replaced by a different proposition, "I saw a yellow patch just before." Ayer has not stated this much. But he has stated that the proposition that I doubt and deny thirty seconds after the experience is not the basic proposition, but a

A basic proposition is more elusive than a ghost completely different proposition such as "I saw a yellow patch thirty seconds before." If it is true for doubt and denial, it should be equally true for an affirmative assertion.

What I assert thirty seconds after must be the proposition "I saw a yellow patch thirty seconds before" and not "I see a yellow patch." Thus the basic proposition is more elusive than a ghost. This is only a reiteration of what has been said before.

But a very grave and fundamental objection may be raised against the assumption that a "physical proposition" may be verified by an "empirical" proposition. Suppose, somehow there is a basic proposition like "I see a yellow patch" or "this is a yellow patch." How can you know that it is *the* proposition, "Gold is yellow", that is being verified by the second proposition? Until and unless it can be proved that the sense-datum referred to by the term "yellow patch" in the second proposition, and the term "gold" in the first proposition together refer to the same physical thing beyond the sense-datum, how is it possible for you to say that the physical proposition is verified by the empirical proposition (or by the experience involved in it)? If my yellow patch refers to a piece of yellow cloth, will it verify your proposition? Does my sense-datum possess anything in itself by virtue of which it may be said that your proposition and my proposition are speaking about the same thing? Evidently not. Gold is something more than yellow. If I cannot attach my yellow patch to this *something* which is more than yellow, and cannot know whether you are attaching your yellow patch to this very thing or very sort of thing, it is preposterous to assume that my basic proposition has any right to verify your non-basic proposition. But on definition a basic proposition is debarred from attaching the sense-datum to anything more than the "given sensible" itself, not to speak of sensing the meaning of anybody else's sense-datum.

Then let us come to a new position:—My basic proposition verifies *only my* non-basic proposition; and the positivists finally do take this position. It is to be noted how the theory of basic proposition pushes the positivists into solipsism, that extreme brand of subjective idealism. Even then the situation does not improve a whit. It is non-sense to say that

A more fundamental objection

How can you know what is common between the verified and the verifier?

Do I verify my own proposition?

my non-basic proposition, "Gold is yellow," is verified by *my* basic proposition, "I see a yellow patch," verily because, *my* verifiable proposition in this case can only come after *my* *verifying* proposition. I must see a yellow patch, learn to *fix* it to *something* which is *more* than mere yellow, know that *this something* with all the constituents of its definition is called 'gold' by other people, and then come to *my* non-basic proposition "Gold is yellow." It is to be noted that long before coming to the conclusive proposition I began to cross the bounds of *my* basic proposition. The most important thing here is not to see a yellow patch, but to learn to refer this patch to something which is definitely taken to be more than a mere yellow patch. The positivists may reply that "gold" is a bundle of inter-connected sense-data. Be it so, but *my* 'yellow' is always less than the bundle, then how do I refer this less to the more? When I see the yellow patch, I do not get the whole bundle as *my* data. Thus "The bundle of data" proves to be the *thing* beyond your datum, but the basic proposition is debarred by definition from referring its datum to anything beyond.

Let us then evade such a complicated general proposition as "Gold is yellow" which it is a hopeless task to try to verify on the basis of a "purely" basic proposition. Let us consider this easy situation: You see a flash of light in the clouded sky and come to the non-basic proposition "I shall soon hear a thunderous sound." Of course, no basic proposition can answer why and how you do come to such a non-basic proposition. Anyway, let you come to it somehow. You hear a thunderous sound and entertain a basic proposition such as "I hear a thunderous sound," and at last feel the grand satisfaction of confirmation, as Moritz Schlick has put it.

If this is paraded as the profound vision of sense-datum philosophy, let us tell you why we find many a fly in the ointment. How do you know that it is your verifiable propo-

An easier example
of possible veri-
fication

sition, "I shall soon hear a thunderous sound," that is exactly verified by your basic proposition, "I hear a thunderous sound?" How do you know that *these* two are *connected* by way of verification? Remember that light and sound as physical events, causality as a real relation, and the 'I' as

No relation
between expect-
ation and ful-
filment

a continuant ego, do not figure anywhere in the sensory field. The question is, whether the *connexion* between the two propositions is itself a datum of experience. If you rely on memory, the matter does not improve. The object of memory is only another datum of another experience. How do you know that this intermediate datum is really connected with the expectative attitude of the previous proposition and the confirmatory feeling of the subsequent proposition? The only answer that you can give at last is:—Well I feel it so.

But a man believing in a ghost expects a ghost and often sees it. It is there all right as a datum. His visual experience confirms his expectation. He too feels so. How do the two situations differ in truth-value? The sense-datum philosophy of positivism has no answer to it.

No rationale of
truth-value

CHAPTER XX

POSITIVISM AND SOLIPSISM

Moritz Schlick's "Faith" In The External World.

That the sense-datum philosophy of Positivism directly leads to solipsism is emphatically denied by Moritz Schlick, one of the most respectable founder-members of the Viennese Circle. In his essay on "Positivism and Realism," he emphatically denies the charge of solipsism and idealism levelled against the positivists: "I must confess that I should repudiate and consider absurd any philosophical system that

involved the assertion that clouds and stars, mountains and seas were unreal, that the chair by the wall ceased to exist whenever I turned my back."¹⁸² He assures us that a

Schlick affirms his faith in the external world.

positivist is not so unfortunate as "not to feel the sublimity of the starry heavens." None should nourish such a strange belief that the "positivist cannot be a good parent because according to his theory his children are merely complexes of his own sense-impressions and it is therefore senseless to take measures for their welfare after his death. No, the world of the non-metaphysician is the same world as that of all other men."¹⁸³

But these strong affirmations seem to lose much of their strength when it is asserted that Berkley has so long been gravely misunderstood in being taken as a champion of idealism. Schlick observes: "It would surely be quite a perverse interpretation of Berkley's philosophy to see in it such a system. He too did not deny the reality of the world of

bodies, but merely tried to explain what we mean when we ascribe reality to it. He who says that unperceived ideas exist in God's mind does not thereby deny their existence, but seeks to understand it."¹⁸⁴ Similarly also, "John Stuart Mill himself

Berkley re-discovered?

did not wish to deny the reality of physical bodies, but to clarify it, when he declared them to be "permanent possibilities of sensation."*¹⁸⁵

There is no philosopher, not even a hard-boiled subjective idealist, who does not nourish a faith in the physical world in his practical life. Bhartṛhari, the prince of nominalistic

idealism, has stated with clearest emphasis that the child and the philosopher are alike in this respect. ("sadṛsau bāla-panḍitau").
Declaration of a faith is not enough in philosophy.

Even the Buddhist idealists including Nāgārjuna, the leader of universal nihilism, have not forgotten to affirm their practical faith in a practical world.*¹⁸⁶ But the question is one of "philosophical faith."

Even that is not the exact question. Mere protestation of one's philosophical faith, however strong, is not enough. The question is how you do arrive at your faith, whether the faith logically follows from the way you explain the reality of the world, whether the manner in which you understand the reality of the world justifies one in

believing you to be a realist. It cannot be said that the manner in which Berkley has understood and explained the reality can reasonably make any one claim or acclaim

him to be a realist. Moritz Schlick seems to dismiss the charge of denying the physical world levelled against the positivists by a simple affirmation of faith. But Carnap refuses to entertain the question at all and attempts to banish it from consideration as a senseless enquiry. Again, Professor Ayer, as we have seen him even in his "Problem of Knowledge," does not clearly commit himself to the acceptance of a physical existence of the external world. Hence it is more profitable to see how far the declared faith of Moritz Schlick follows from his way of looking at the reality.

Schlick has the following statements to his credit in his article, "The Foundation of Knowledge," (which appeared

after his "Positivism and Realism" in which he declared his faith in the physical world) :—

"I start by assigning a special place to those (statements) that I make *myself* (original emphasis). Again, 'one's *own* statements in the end play the *only* decisive role" (the first emphasis original).

Further on, "my own observation-statements would always be the ultimate criterion. I should, so to speak, exclaim 'what I see, I see'."*¹⁸⁷

If these statements are not considered as bearing enough evidence of solipsism, we shall presently probe into his view of "confirmation". The choice of his examples is also significant. I expect some fact to happen. The fact happens, that is, I experience the fact. The fact is now my experience. This is a confirmation of my earlier proposition that expressed my expectation, such as, "I expect X". The description of the confirmatory experience is the "observation-statement". The confirmation is final if there is an accompanying feeling of 'fulfilment' and "satisfaction". The importance of this confirmation lies in the immediate present. A confirmation "has no duration". What follows a moment after is not a continuity of the confirmation, but only a memory-trace that has only a "hypothetical value." It may sound strange, but it is a fact that Schlick (and Carnap too) wants to

The feeling of fulfilment and the finality of confirmation.

reduce all scientific propositions to such a triumphant stage of confirmation. It is to be noted that if you have a feeling of fulfilment, the confirmation is final.

Any second confirmation is out of the question.

This is then the implication of the famous positivist statement that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification—"The meaning of every proposition is completely contained within its verification in the given,"—thus says Schlick in his earlier essay on "Positivism and Realism." A believer in ghost, a victim of hallucination, a dreamer

and a somnambulist, all of them may have such indubitable feelings of fulfilment in their confirmations of respective expectations. For them too the confirmations are final in their fields of experience. Not only that, sometimes these abnormal visions come upon us with a greater vividness and a keener feeling of fulfilment. Then why should it not be said that these abnormal confirmations *have* at least an equal, if not greater, force of finality in comparison with the normal or scientific confirmations? It is evident that such a theory of verification and confirmation cannot provide any basis for a decisive choice between illusion and reality.*¹⁸⁸

Such a theory should have stated in a straightforward manner:—"The illusion is the reality, when you feel so," which is only another way of expressing the same thing,— "the reality is the illusion, if you think so."

In this earlier article Schlick left much elbow room for realistic manoeuvres. There he talked not only of verification, but also of verifiability; not only of practical verifiability, but also of *logical* verifiability. That the castle existed unperceived during the interval between two perceptions is logically *verifiable*, and so is the existence of the trees before our birth. Of course finally it is reduced to the Berkleyan hypothesis:—Had there been a percipient he would have perceived it. It may be easily stretched to an absurd length—Had I been born before I was born, I would have seen the trees existing before my birth. One may widen this "possibility of perception" and say—Had there been a man before man was born on earth he would have noticed the flora and fauna of pre-human days. We know how Bertrand Russell has beautifully brought out this humorous absurdity in his "Human Knowledge."

This notion of logical verifiability is an effective weapon which may be cleverly employed both by a realist and an idealist. We know how Berkley has pressed this weapon into service of idealism and come to the conclusion:—To be

is to be perceived. If anyone logically infers the existence of an unperceived thing, it would only mean that it would have been perceived by a logically possible percipient. Thus the unperceived too cannot step out of the orbit of perception, since it is inconceivable without being *perceivable*. Thus Berkley has turned logical verifiability into the category of perceivability. Schlick too has done the same, for he unwaveringly declares that every existential proposition (and every scientific proposition too) must be finally reduced to a proposition involving the "given", that is, what is given to *me* as *my* 'sensible'. In that case, in the normal sense of idealism, Schlick and Berkley are both idealists, despite the former's protestation of realism in favour of Berkley and himself. This attempt to show Berkley (and Hume too) in a new light is also remarkably evident in Ayer's "Language, Truth and Logic."*¹⁸⁹

Schlick no doubt observes that it is a mistake to suppose that, for a positivist, only the given is real. But that is not enough. The path of realism is certainly not to explain the passage from the given to the non-given as a passage from the percept to perceivability, from the sensum to "sensibility".

A physical existence beyond the percept does not possess any real *property of perceivability*. It is self-contradictory to assume that a vast part of the universe, both the microverse and the macroverse, will remain ever unperceived, but ever perceivable at the same time. A star lost before the birth of the earth is unsensed and unsensible by man, and so are the flora and fauna before the birth of man. To say that, being "sensible" means that it might have been sensed had there been a man before the birth of mankind, is logically absurd. Schlick remarks that Mill's expression, "permanent possibility of sensations," is correct in spirit, though "ill-chosen" in letter.¹⁹⁰ Indeed what he himself has tried to bring out as the meaning of his notion of logical verifiability

Verifiability
turned into
perceivability

"Perceivability
is not a *property*
or reality.

is not something different from the notion of Mill. It is logically fallacious to attach sensul verifiability to a thing which has *no chance* of being directly verified by sensation. The spirit of realism demands a logically plausible faith in the existence of physical things, even when we do not perceive them, where we do not preceive them, and if we have no chance of preceiving them.

So it is not insignificant that at the end of his essay on "Positivism and Realism", while he summarises his conclusions, he easily omits the notion of "verifiability," and speaks only of "verification". But some curious things have happened there as a result of this omission. He observes :—"This principle (of verification) does not mean and does not imply that only the given is real ...consistent empiricism does *not* deny the existence of the external world ; it merely points out the empirical meaning of this existential propositions.....what is correct is only that propositions concerning bodies are transformable into propositions concerning occurrence of sensations in accordance with laws."

The expression, "the empirical meaning of this existential proposition," should be specially noted. That means that the positivist is interested in an existential proposition only in so far as it can be reduced to an empirical proposition, that is, the "basic proposition" in positivist nomenclature. But a faith in the physical world demands an existential meaning of an existential proposition, and not merely an empirical meaning. The belief, that it is a snake, is not the belief that it is a sensation. Otherwise a physical existence would only mean : "It exists in the sense of my seeing it," and not, "It exists in the sense of an external cause that causes my seeing." The principle of empirical reduction gives the former proposition, and not the latter. Positivists like Schlick, in the name of bringing out the empirical meaning,

really entertain the former proposition *at the cost* of the latter, despite their loud protestation of faith in the external world.

Then the expression, "Occurrence of sensations in accordance with laws," should also be specially marked, for it conceals a queer contradiction. Schlick observes, in agreement

How do you
derive the laws of
sensation ?

with Carnap and others, that "the subject-matter of physics is not sensations, but laws."

The question of questions is :—Is the knowledge of these laws "sensational" too ; or is it fully derived from sensation ?" A negative answer would definitely imply that there is a more fundamental means of knowledge than sensation. An affirmative answer would involve a circular argument which may be stated thus :—
"I know by means of sensation alone that there is a law which really connects a non-sensational external object with my internal sensation."

The pure sensum as such does not bear any inscription of a law such that there *must be* an object *outside* my sensation which *causes* my sensation. To have a rational faith in the existence of external objects would mean that such a law must be the *unquestioned* presupposition of the very possibility of sensations. It is no use saying that the sensation comes first in the historical order. When we pass from an effect to the cause, the effect *appears* first in the historical order. But that does not mean that my inferential passage to the cause is derived from the effect itself. It must be derived from the presupposition of a higher principle which regulates the relation between cause and effect. In other words, you cannot

As a pre-condition
of sensation a law
must be non-
sensible

accept the position that your sensations give you correct informations, without accepting the pre-supposed validity of some "non-sensible" laws by which the sensations are regulated and connected with physical things. If you accept the laws you must admit that there are means of knowledge more fundamental and more trustworthy than sensations. An admission of such a possibility will pull down the whole theory

of "final confirmation" by sense-impression, and a non-admission will tie down a positivist to sense-impressions, with no possible way out to that which impresses his senses from outside. Hence a consistent empiricist, even if he feels shy of denying the existence of the external world, has no rational right to affirm it at all. At best or worst, he can be a sceptic who is ashamed and afraid of owning up the consequences of his conviction.

A rational realist should be a Sautrāntika Buddhist, or some one like Russell in his latest development who affirms a firm faith in existence of the external world on the basis of *inference from* sense-impressions, but who at the same time has enough insight too see that this inference itself cannot be grounded or logically based on sense-impressions, but on a higher principle of non-demonstrative inference that cannot be grasped by senses. The common charge against the Sautrāntika Buddhist may be formulated in this way:—You say you infer the external world, but when did you perceive it? To infer it *now* you should have at least perceived it once *before*. If you could have perceived it once before you can perceive it now too all right.

The Sautrāntika may retort, "You say there is no inference without previous perception. But show me a perception without previous inference. If you are a pure empiricist do not speak of seeing *red*, or feeling *hot*. A pure sensation cannot have a name. You can *fix* something *as* red or hot only because you *liken* it to something that you already knew to be red or hot before. This concealed process of assimilation is also a submerged pattern of inference. You see a four-legged table, but do not expect it to be hopping and barking a minute after. Whence do you get your confidence? It comes from an assimilation of the present with the past experience. So you cannot move from pure sensation to perception without some form of inference

Sautrāntika
Buddhist is a
rational realist

No inference
without previous
perception

Sautrāntika's
possible retort,—
no perception
without,
inference.

in between the two. As a pure *sensum* your datum is neither red, nor white, not even an "it". If you feel it *to be red*, you must know it as having a name and fix it so in likeness of a previous knowledge. We the Buddhists, who believe in pure non-descript sensations, recognize this requirement for the passage from sensation to perception. If you are a naive realist, as a corrective to your thought, it is more necessary for you to realize this impossibility of even a primary perception without the help of a more primary inference.

Indeed, Dharmakīrti, while championing the *pragmatic* validity of inference, seems to have suggested this mode of defence to Sautrāntikas:—"You say, there is no guarantee for the validity of inference. Well, what is the guarantee for the validity of perception. It must be uncontradictedness in experience (and that involves inference). Such also should be the case with inference.*¹⁹¹

Our reference to Dharmakīrti in this context is not prompted by any purpose to show any particular aspect of his own philosophy. His observation has a very important implication which we may develop to our purpose. The suggestion that perception itself involves an inference should set us rethinking about the relation between perception and inference. It shows that there must be some fundamental and congenital principle of inference which cannot be demonstrated by grounding it in any other source of knowledge. This is neither a deduction nor an induction as it is understood in a developed stage of consciousness. It has no syllogistic structure, nor any conscious form of applied analogy. It is perhaps finally grounded in the physiological structure of the brain and the nervous system. It is the ground of all knowledge by virtue of which the child naturally begins to believe in the existence of the external world, and learns to concretize his pure and non-descript sensation by an instantaneous reference to a thing

A possible
congenital
principle of
inference.

outside. This reference is so automatic that it is not possible to discern the gap between sensation and a rudimentary belief in "something" that causes the sensation.

Russell, Ryle*¹⁹² and Bhartṛhari are perhaps correct in denying the status of knowledge to pure, non-descript sensation. Knowledge proper should begin with an accepted difference between knowledge and the thing that is known. That means that sensation must out-strip its non-descript character and bear a believing reference to an external cause, and thereby pass into the stage of primary perception. This passage is impossible without some principle of congenital inference the operation of which is excited by a few repeated contacts with the external world.

That is why our real belief in the existence of the external world appears to be the presupposed precondition of our possible behaviour and knowledge learnt and gathered in this world. That is the reason why even the most uncompromising idealist, who proclaims from his philosophical tower that he does not believe in the existence of the external world, cannot move an inch in his earthly life without such a real belief. His practical life contradicts his philosophical profession at every step. It may be stated as an epigram that :—His "belief" in his professed philosophy is intellectual but his faith in the external reality is real. Only in this sense his practice does not contradict his profession, since a consciously created fiction is beyond the pale of contradiction or confirmation.

Intellectual faith
and real faith.

CHAPTER—XXI

CONCLUSION

To develop this suggestion of a fundamental principle of congenital inference, on the strength of which a *real* belief in the existence of the external world becomes a precondition of our possible existence in the world, is not within the scope of our present dissertation. It only gives an inkling of what the author of this dissertation thinks about the world.

It has been our primary purpose to examine some fundamental tenets of modern positivism in the light of the thoughts of some great Indian philosophers, principally, of Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti.

The modern positivists, despite their important contributions to the method of logical analysis of philosophical problems, show an eloquent inconsistency in not accepting the logical conclusions of their philosophical professions. Contemporary philosophy is primarily a philosophy of language. It is a beautiful blend of nominalism and empiricism with various shades of difference. The basic findings of this philosophy got some remarkable retrospective confirmations in anticipations of the Indian philosophers who flourished thirteen or fourteen centuries ago. They brought into play an astonishing power of analysis in dissecting the epistemic problems which are still plaguing the minds of philosophers.

Bhartṛhari by a thorough philosophical analysis of the entire structure of Sanskrit grammar has convincingly showed the way how the problem of relation between knowledge and its object is finally transformed into the problem of relation between language and meaning. On the basis of an unsparing examination of all the concepts of grammatical science he comes to the startling conclusion that the phenomenal world is a logical construction constituted by apprehensible meanings of intelligible language.

Positivists like Neurath who replace the Hegelian system of coherent ideas by a new system of coherent statements, should have stated that all this talk of coherence and comparison is also just a fiction like the logical construct of a meaningful statement, and that the statement itself is as good a fiction as its meaning. When experience and object of experience are equally banished from the field of language there is no way to decide why some statements are mutually coherent and some are not, why my two statements, "I shall go to the shop," and "I shall buy a shirt" are coherent, and my other two sentences, "She is my wife" and "She is now a widow" are incoherent. Any such coherence is logically unwarranted except as an inexplicable and immemorial convention. A system of conventions is no less unreal than the conventions themselves. Thus the phenomenal world is a pan-fictional system of logical abstractions in respect of which all talks of truth and untruth, coherence and incoherence are finally irrelevant. As an epistemic conclusion Bhartṛhari has no hesitation to declare this, once he feels that this follows from his premiss. The epistemic conclusion of Neurath on the strength of the nominalistic premiss which he zealously entertains, should have nearly coincided with the non-hesitant decision and declaration of Bhartṛhari.

Bhartṛhari has a further realisation that language turns even a cognition into a fiction, though nobody doubts the reality of his cognition in itself. The structure of our language imposes on our cognition a fictitious division into subject and predicate, knowledge and object, substantive and adjective ; yet this shapeless cognition is itself uncognizable without the shape and form it borrows from language. Whether there is an external object or not, the meaning of language has always an external projection ; and it splits an object into terms and relations which are not there.*¹⁹³ A nominalism, faithful to its profession, cannot but observe this peculiar linguistic transformation of the world of ideas and objects.

Again, positivists like Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap and Ayer, with any concern for consistency of their empiricism, should have unhesitatingly lined up behind the conclusion of Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara and declared to the "metaphysically minded" man of the world :—

"There is neither an 'I' nor a 'he', nor a 'you', nor even an 'it' ; neither the thing, nor the not-thing ; neither a law, nor a system ; neither the terms, nor the relations. But there are only the cognitive events of colourless sensations which have forms but no names. They are caught for a moment in a stream and then rush to naught. Even the stream is a fiction, That sensum of the moment, the purest particular, that "advaya," the indivisible unit of cognition, that is the sole reality, the rest are all fictions, stirred up by time-honoured convention of language which is itself a grand fiction."*¹⁹⁴

We have not the least desire to play down the merits of contemporary contributions to philosophy. But we think it to be a matter of enormous interest to point out how almost all the fond tenets of modern positivism found an unusually busy home in the analytical thoughts of some ancient stalwarts of Indian Philosophy. Without a power of deep insight even a skilful analyst may be carried away by his zeal for analysis. But these ancient philosophers had the insight to see that the elements brought out by hair-splitting analysis might not be real adjuncts of the reality itself. Rays of light may reveal the unrevealed, but also may confuse the credulous. A cup of golden tea often looks green under a mercury lamp. A correct seer is not he who does not see it green, but it is he who sees it green but knows it golden at the same time. To achieve this power of distinction is not easy in science and philosophy. Knowing well that I am labouring under an illusion is not the same as entertaining the illusion. In the world of common sense an illusion is very often *known* when it is past. But the task of an analytical philosopher is made doubly difficult by the fact.

that he is to *know* the illusion when it persists. An unwary philosopher may impose his own intellectual children on the reality which he is busy scanning about.

It seems that Alexander, and Russell in some aspects of his latest development, and also the Navya Nyāya of Indian Philosophy are victims of their own creations. But Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti, and the modern positivists are conscious, rather over-conscious, that their powerful analytical apparatus may always bring to light newer concepts and categories which do not belong to the real as such, but to the world of logical analysis itself. It is not unlikely that they have erred on the side of over-caution, being too much obsessed with the idea of keeping the reality at a safe distance from the stainful touch of their intellectual children. To strike a balance is not an easy art in speculative philosophy.

We have now come to the end of our dissertation. Our labour will bear some fruits and find some joy of fulfilment, if it can excite a judicious interest among the critical readers for a careful study of the modern movements of philosophy, balanced by an unbiassed consideration of the philosophical disciplines of Ancient India, with the modern scientific outlook acting as a sufficient guarantee against any uncritical adulation of the past or the present.

In our dissertation we have turned two ancient lights, coming across thirteen centuries, upon some contemporary thoughts.

What the lights have revealed is more for others to see than for the operator himself. Our eyes do not see a thing that is either too near or too far. In a sense what the thing is depends on where it is in relation to our sight. It is perhaps more so in the field of speculative philosophy. The locus of Truth and the focus of our vision enter into mutual definition. There is no escape from this primordial limitation so long as we choose to live in the realm of pure speculation.

APPENDIX—I

THEORY OF LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION AND SOLUTION
OF SOME LOGICAL PARADOXES

Students of modern philosophy are aware of some typical logical paradoxes which have been suggested and sought to be solved by Russell and others. Among these paradoxes the two most wellknown ones are “the paradox of the liar” and the paradox of “the class of all classes which is not a member of itself.”

We think, it would be a matter of absorbing interest to note some important paradoxes which face the Indian philosophers, particularly the idealists, who have attempted to solve them in their own ways. We shall try to show how the theory of logical construction can solve them in an easier, and perhaps more conclusive way.

1. *Nāgārjuna and the Paradox of “Void.”*

The earliest record of such a paradox in a purely philosophical treatise and the earliest attempt to solve it in a convincing manner are found in Nāgārjuna’s *Vigraha-Vyāvartanī*.^{*195}

Nāgārjuna, the leader of Pan-Nihilism, presents the proposition :—“All is void.”

The opponent now places a clever trap :—“Tell me whether your proposition itself is void or not.” The intention is clear. An affirmative answer will give the following new proposition :—

“The proposition that ‘All is void’ is void,” and that easily invalidates the original proposition.

Again, a negative answer will mean the following new proposition :—

“All is void except the proposition ‘All is void,’” and that

clearly defeats the meaning and purpose of the original proposition.

Nāgārjuna's answer is remarkable for its clear-sightedness:—The situation here is not like that in which a class-teacher himself makes a noise by shouting out to the students 'do not make a noise.' It is not my proposition that *creates* the void. Whether everything is void or not does *not depend* on my entertaining a proposition in either way. I do not accept my proposition to be *a real existent*, and *this non-acceptance* does not *make* the world a real existent.

This reply of Nāgārjuna has deep logical implications. Let the first proposition, "All is void" be called P, and let the second proposition, "The proposition that, 'All is void,' is void," be called Q. Now Q does not assert the *logical falsity* of P, but denies its ontological reality. The word "void" in both P and Q is used in the same sense of unreality. But the opponent takes the word 'void' in Q in the sense of *logical falsity*, and then shows that the contradictory of P is true. This is logically impermissible. Let us take the proposition, "A nymph is unreal." Now suppose, in past, present and future, there is no man to make such a statement or entertain such a proposition. Does that mean that there is a nymph? Evidently not. Similarly, that all propositions about the world are logical fictions cannot lead to the conclusion that the world is not a fiction.

If the opponent seriously believes in his argument, he is then an extreme type of nominalist idealist with his concealed pre-supposition that it is some statements that make and unmake the world. The proposition Q asserts that the proposition P is as good a fiction as the world to which it belongs, and thus Q cannot turn the world into a fact.

2. *Madhusūdana and the Paradox of Idealism.*

Madhusūdana's solution of the paradox is intimately connected with the concept of hierarchy of existence. There are three planes of existence, namely, (1) The primary or basic, i. e., the Absolute Brahman (2) The secondary or conventional i. e., the pragmatic and phenomenal world (3) The tertiary or purely empirical, such as the objects of illusion, dream and hallucination. Remembering this hierarchy of existence we shall go to examine the paradox presented by the realists in accordance with the method of Madhusūdana.

The idealist proposes the proposition :—"The world is unreal." Now he must admit that this unreality of the world is itself unreal, otherwise something over and above the Brahman turns out to be real, and the basic tenet of Advaita comes to grief. But again if the unreality of the world is unreal the world becomes real by the law of contradiction. Let the unreality of the world be represented by the proposition :—"S is not-P." Then the unreality of unreality will be represented by the second proposition, 'S is not-(not-P)', which is equivalent to, 'S is P,' i. e., the world is real.

Now Madhusūdana goes on to show that such a pure Law of Contradiction is incompatible with the notion of the hierarchy of existence that we have shown before. The same thing may be simultaneously existent and non-existent on two different planes of existence. In the nacre-silver illusion the silver is existent on the tertiary plane as a purely empirical object, but at the same time non-existent on the secondary and the primary planes. Similarly the world is existent on the secondary plane but non-existent on the primary plane. It is clear then that the law of contradiction cannot operate in this case on the basis of the traditionally accepted equation, $\text{not}(\text{not-P}) = P$, because existence and non-existence are no longer a pair of contradictories.

A new law of contradiction is to be introduced as a logical corollary to the metaphysical postulate of Advaita. Once it is admitted that there is a primary plane of existence, the final realisation of which will finally negate the secondary and tertiary planes, it can be shown that the traditional law of contradiction cannot encompass this final negation.

When the world is finally negated, it is negated along with the realm of logic. The world with all its propositions of logic and philosophy are lost beyond recovery in that one primary Existent. Then my proposition denying the reality of the world is also gone for good along with the world itself. This is exactly what the Advaitin means by the unreality of unreality of the world. In such a case there is no logical possibility for the world to stage a come-back through the negation of negation of its reality. Hence the equation, $\text{not}-(\text{not-P})=P$, does not hold in such a case. To facilitate an intellectual appreciation of this ultimate stage which means the cessation of all logic and philosophy, a new type of equation, representing the final contradiction of the world as a whole, is called for. Let S stand for the world, 'not-P' for its unreality and Q for the Absolute. Then the logical representation of this metaphysical law of contradiction will take the following form of equation :—

$\text{not}\{S(\text{not-P of } S)\}=Q$, that is, only the Absolute Q remains as the irreducible residue of existence when the world is negated along with the proposition that asserts its negation.

The non-equational statement of the law is given by Madhusūdana in the following way :—

“When a thing and its denial both are on the same plane of existence, it is possible to deny the denial along with the thing denied, in respect of a more primary plane of existence.” (eka-bādhaka-bādhyaṭvaṁ sama-sattākatve prayojakam).

The proposition denying the reality of the world belongs to the total world existing on the same secondary plane of existence. So the world and its denial are equally negated

by the realisation of the One Existence on the primary plane. In such a case negation of negation does not lead to the affirmation of the world, but to the affirmation of the Absolute which is logically equivalent to the negation of both the world and its negation.

When the Advaitins assert that the world is unreal, they deduce it from the more fundamental premiss that whatever is an object of cognition is unreal (*yat kiñcid-cidviṣayatvam dṛśyatvam, yat kiñcid dṛśyam tan mithyā*). The proposition that denies the world is as much an object of cognition as the world that is denied by it. The virtue of being an object of cognition is the common factor which determines both the negation of the world and the negation of the proposition that denies the world (*niṣedhyatā vacchedakam ekam eva dṛśyatvam*). Hence the world and its unreality are equally unreal in the fundamental sense. Thus the unreality of unreality does not lead to the reality of the world.

Madhusūdana's method of solving the paradox as it is shown here, despite his profound insight into the nature of the problem, is particularly complicated by linking its solution with the notion of a three-tier hierarchy of existence. We think that the paradox may be more easily solved with the help of the theory of logical construction and without the notion of an existential hierarchy. How this can be done has already been shown in our discussion about Nāgārjuna's method of solution. We can develop the hint dropped by Nāgārjuna and apply it to the paradox of Advaita.

The world and all propositions about the world are logical abstractions. Let the first-order proposition of the idealist, "S is not-P," be represented by X. Then X itself entails the second order-proposition, "X is not-P," since X itself is an S. Now the realist very cleverly turns "X is not-P" into "S is not-(not-P)."

The trick of the realist is easily seen though, if we place the following two propositions side by side :—

(i) (S is not-P) is not-P/ (ii) S is not-(not-P). The realist's

contention would mean that these two propositions are logically equivalent, thus :—(S is not-P) is not-P = S is not-(not-P) = S is P

It is quite evident that the first two propositions are not logical equivalents since both the subjects and the predicates of the two propositions are quite different

We can show up the absurdity of the realist's contention by bringing in a humorous hypothetical case. If the realist is serious in his contention he should admit that,—the world before the advent of man either was crowded with things like horse-eggs and rabbit-horns, or, did not exist at all.

Before man was born there was none to make the statement and entertain the proposition, such as "Horse-eggs and rabbit-horns are unreal." Hence the very proposition was then unreal. Thus it would follow from the realist's logic that horse-eggs and rabbit-horns were then real. Otherwise how can the unreality of the proposition "The world is unreal" can lead to the reality of the world.

Again before man was born there was none to entertain the realist's proposition, "The world is real." Thus the proposition was then unreal. Hence the world was unreal before man was born to grace it. If the unreality of a proposition asserting the unreality of the world can lead to the reality of the world, on the same line of argument, the unreality of a proposition asserting the reality of the world should lead to the unreality of the world.

We can now sum up our solution of the paradox with the reiteration of an observation that we made before. The ontological value of a proposition in itself is not equivalent to its logical truth-value. That a proposition is ontologically unreal does not entail its logical falsity. So the proposition, "The world is unreal" is a logical fiction in-itself, but is not logically false. That is, "(S is not-P) is not P" is not logically equivalent to "S is not-(not-P)."

That the realist is really perpetrating a trick has been shown by Gauḍa-Brahmānanda, the famous commentator of

Advaita-Siddhi. The realists themselves have made a rule of debate to the effect that such a trickery is not to be applied against an opponent. The rule is this :—

“When somebody entertains a subject-predicate proposition, it is not permitted to ask whether the predicate is predicable of itself or not, and then to show that in either case the predicate cannot be predicated of the subject. Thus the realist Nyaiyāyika states his proposition :—“Sound is impermanent.” Now you ask whether impermanence is impermanent or not. In the first case sound becomes permanent by the law of contradiction. In the second case too sound become permanent, otherwise how can the property of impermanence *permanently* belong to sound. A property cannot be permanent without the “propertied” being permanent.

This trick is technically called “Nityasama.”*¹⁹⁶ It is apparent that the realist applies the same trick against the Advaitin as he does not like to be applied against himself. The trickery of the argument which the Nyaiyāyika himself faces may be easily exposed by our method of analysis.

3. *The Paradox That Faces Ānandabodha**¹⁹⁷

As we have seen before, Avidyā or Nescience is the Law of Indefinability such that the world is indefinable either as existent or non-existent. Now the law itself is indefinable too in the sense that it is senseless to speak of a law itself as existent or not. The Advaitins believe that the final emancipation is the “negation” of the law of Nescience itself. (Avidyānivṛttiḥ Mokṣaḥ). The paradox is this :—Tell me if this negation of Avidyā is itself indefinable or not. An affirmative answer will make Avidyā definable by the law of contradiction in the sense that something whose negation cannot be defined should itself be accepted as definable. Again a negative answer would invalidate the law of Avidyā, since at least something at last is found, namely, the negation of Avidyā, which is definable.

The easiest way of solving this paradox is this : The negation of Avidyā is not a negative *fact* ; but a logical fiction, and that too, only so long as it belongs to our universe of discourse. When we speak of this negation of Avidyā we do not posit it even as such a fiction. We thereby envisage such a stage in which this very universe of discourse ceases for good. Then there is neither a problem nor its solution ; everything is set at rest. In such a situation negation, affirmation, negation of negation, definability, indefinability, contradiction, confirmation, truth and falsity—all these logical categories vanish into nothing. It is then senseless to ask if this final cessation itself is a fact or fiction.

When the whole universe of discourse is lost it does not logically follow that the logical fictions of that universe somehow drop back and keep standing as fictions, or are turned into facts. In this final sense negation is no longer a logical category having any truth-value. It is the final halt of all logic and facts. Hence this seeming paradox results from taking this ultimate negation to be either a fact, or a category of truth-value, while it is neither of the two. Whether such a stage is possible or not, is not a problem of logic, but a matter of mystic faith. But assuming that such a stage is possible, the paradox does not hold.

4. *Ānandapūrṇa's Handling of the Paradox of Idealism.**¹⁹⁸

Ānandapūrṇa in his *Nyāya-candrikā* refutes the realist by turning the table against him :—

You the realists too make a pre-statement of your conclusion, "The world is real", as a matter to be proved. When you *consider* this statement, i.e. go to establish its truth, you do not in the same breath consider whether the very statement, "The world is real", is real or not. While making a statement in which a predicate is predicated of a subject one does not at the same time think of predicating the predicate of the statement itself (Just as, when somebody makes the statement, "the boy is running" he does not consider whether this statement itself is running).

Similar should be the case of my statement "The world is unreal". You may reply, to say that a statement is running is patently absurd, but not so is the case when somebody asks whether the statement is real or not.

In other words, it is possible to make further statements of the second order such as, "The statement that, 'The world is real (or unreal)', is real (or unreal)." But in that case I shall push you into an infinite regress ; since in such a case a statement of the third order, the fourth order...an infinite order, is theoretically possible.

If you think that the truth of an existential statement of the first order *depends* on the truth or falsity of an existential statement of the second order, I shall demand from you statements of an infinite order. For example the first statement of the realist is "The world is real." His second-order statement is, "The statement, 'the world is real', is real", and so on.....to an infinite order. Until and unless you can exhaust this infinity I shall not accept your statement "The world is real" to be established. Hence you

should not force me too to make a statement of the second-order such that—"The statement, 'the world is unreal' is unreal."

We may further develop the implications of Ānandapūrṇa's reply in the following manner :—

If you insist that this second-order statement makes my first-order statement false, I may, in consistency with the logic into which you push me, make a third-order statement such as,—“The statement that [the statement that (the world is unreal) is unreal] is unreal.” This statement will negate (according to your logic) the second-order statement and establish my original statement. If you now go to a fourth-order statement, I shall go to a fifth-order one. In this way neither the unreality nor the reality of the world will be established, and that exactly will serve my purpose, because I am ready to accept the position that the world cannot be defined either as real or unreal (i. e. as existent or non-existent). My concept of unreality is exactly this indefinability as real or unreal.

5. *Bhartrhari's Paradox of the Liar.**¹⁹⁹

As to the Paradox of the Liar, Bhartrhari suggests a solution that is almost similar to what Russell shows in his *Meaning and Truth*. The proposition "All that I now say is a lie" (*Sarvaṃ mithyā bravāmi*), neither affirms nor denies itself, since no proposition does speak about itself. Its referential function is related to some other proposition of the first order. This solution may be easily developed in the manner of Russell,*²⁰⁰ with the following as an additional note :—

—If the speaker is a habitual liar and does not make any other statement just before or after this statement, the proposition is false, and he is an unmitigated liar. If he really makes some other false statements referred to by this statement, then at least this statement is true being a confession of his sin. If he makes some other true statements, then this statement is false, but he is not a habitual liar.

APPENDIX—II

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF ‘ANYĀPOHA’

(*The Concept of Meaning as Negation of Negation*)

Indian Philosophy has witnessed a great battle between the Buddhists and the rest on the theory of *apoha*. The Buddhist conception of meaning as a negation of negation has met with a stiff and relentless opposition mainly from the Brāhminical schools of realism, specially, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. Kumārila must be credited with leading the attack in a powerful manner and he has been followed by Vācaspati, Jayanta and Udayana. The last great battle on this score had been fought between the Yogācāra Buddhist Jñānaśrīmitra and the Naiyāyika realist Udayanācārya. As in other spheres of philosophical speculation, here too it cannot be said that the issue has been finally decided. Indeed this permanent openness of philosophical questions constitutes both the strength and weakness of philosophy. On the one hand, thoughts are ceaselessly spurred on to a limitless pursuit, on the other, in some cases at least, either a tired feeling like giving up the task, or a premonitional feeling like not beginning at all, displays a frustrated sense of profitless endeavour. Whatever may be the fate of philosophy, for those who are concerned with the nature of logical thinking, the Buddhist theory of *apoha* should provide a matter of unsagging interest.

We shall, in this short compass, attempt to bring out what lies at the basis of this interesting theory, so that an interested reader may not find it very difficult to follow the course of the philosophical battle which has been fought on this score between the Buddhists and the rest. The Buddhists, we have seen, do not think that language reflects the reality.

The real is the pin-point particular of the moment, while the linguistic meaning is always a fictional construct which is called a universal. At one end there is the self-closed privacy of a pure particular, at the other end there is the communicative publicity of a pure universal, and there is not even a common borderline between the two. Assuming that this position is correct, the correctness of defining meaning as a negation of negation will follow as a corollary.

The Buddhists think that the meaning of the word "cow" is "not-not-cow," i.e., a negation of anything which is other than a cow. The moment you admit that a word or its meaning has no way to reach the real which is always of a positive value, there is no other way but to define meaning in terms of a double negation, since whatever is real is necessarily positive.

Anything which is defined *only* as other than not-cow can *only* be *the cow in general*, for a particular cow is not only other than not-cow, but also other than other cows.

The greatest difficulty with such a purely negative definition of meaning is that it does not reflect *the real process* of "meaning-attitude." When we hear a word such as "cow", our understanding of its meaning does not begin with and end in such a negation. We have a definite positive feeling of a positive meaning. When any body says,—“Please take away the cow”, I do not mean that I have been asked to take away a negation of negation. I mean that I have been asked to make a positive approach to a positive object. Let us take a more telling example. Somebody points his finger to somebody else and says to me—“He is Devadatta.” Devadatta is grammatically a proper name and not a common noun. Here the finger of the speaker and the word uttered by him equally point to the same object standing before me, and not to a not-not-Devadatta. The name and the person become associated in my mind in such a way that henceforth when I shall see the person I shall remember the name, and

when I shall hear the name I shall recall a memory-image of the person within myself.

It is thus clear that the psychological process of meaning does not follow the track of a double negation. At the same time, I am sure that the person does not bear his name just as he carries his head on his shoulders, or just as a brick is supposed to bear its redness. The psychological law of association or conditioned response only describes what *actually happens* in me when I hear the name and see the object. It only describes a situation, but does not give a definition. In final analysis the Buddhist position seems to be that the *meaning-situation is not the meaning-definition*.

I hear a word and recall the memory-image of the object, but what I mean is not the memory-image itself. By the sentence, "A burglar broke into the house", I certainly do not mean that an image broke into another image. Suppose now, the burglar is dead and the house is demolished. It is certainly not possible here to reach the physical objects which are supposed to be meant by the terms, or the physical event supposed to be meant by the sentence. Yet the realists think that the words and the sentence *really mean* the objects and the event. It is here difficult to see how even the image, recalled by the word, can be really related to the particular objects or the particular event. If I try I will only conjure up more and more images, and go on relating one image to another, but shall never find the "thing" to which I can relate the image and the word. Moreover, if I have neither seen that burglar nor that house, it is not possible for me to have any particular image of the particular person or thing. Again, I easily apprehend the meaning of the sentence, even if no such fact of burglary did really happen, or even if I know that the speaker is telling a lie.

In such a case the only rational suggestion about the nature of meaning is that I am really entertaining a logical fiction. When I believe the speaker this fiction *appears* being imbued with a pronounced sense of externality. In no case,

however, apprehension of the meaning takes the form—"I am entertaining a fiction." The fiction is not accepted *as a* fiction, but it stands unavowed and operates from an unnoticed background. This fiction is a universal in the sense that my *logical* imagination of the burglar, the house, or the event of burglary is applicable to *any* burglar, *any* house and *any* such event, the word "any" being a variable without any concrete value.

Now take the meaning-situation in which the speaker introduces Devadatta to me by announcing—"He is Devadatta." The situation as a whole comprises the history of how the word Devadatta acquires a meaning for me. But the meaning that is acquired is not the person that stands before me at the time of his first introduction, when the word is associated with a percept. For the meaning to be *the* meaning it is necessary that the word will convey it when Devadatta is not present. The word bears the meaning without carrying the person on its back. Thus the meaning must be *logically fixed* as a universalised fiction which is equally applicable not only to all possible appearances of Devadatta, but also, and more so, to all cases which do not involve any appearance of the person at all, but do involve an utterance of the word all the same. Hence even the proper name Devadatta does not mean a particular "personal" object, but a universalised fiction.

When the word acquires a meaning for me I *eliminate* all things other than Devadatta. The phrase "other than Devadatta" too, likewise means a logical fiction. It is not possible to grasp the infinite number of objects which are not Devadatta and eliminate them one by one with the help of an infinite series of negative judgments such that, "This is not Devadatta," "This is not Devadatta," and so on...

Yet the expression, "other than Devadatta," carries a comprehensive logical meaning in the form of a single negative valuation. Then, the elimination or negation of this comprehensive negation is *logically equivalent* to the

meaning of the word "Devadatta". This elimination is not a real or psychological process of reaching the meaning. It only expresses the nature of logical understanding of the problem at hand. There is no other way to *logically fix* the meaning except through this double negation. The meaning, we have seen, is always a logical category. Its psychological aspect does not figure in the definition. Psychologically, even a fiction is a positive element of the psyche, just as an idea of negation is not itself a negative factor, but a positive element of cognition (*abhāvopi bhāvarūpeṇa avacchidyate*).

It is the confusion between these two aspects of meaning, psychological and logical, that is responsible for the protracted battle on the problem of meaning. Prajñākara in his uncompromising adherence to the logical aspect alone, seems to have totally ignored the psychological aspect. He strongly asserts that since no language can ever define the object as it is, the positive factor can never enter the structure of meaning.*²⁰¹ Even when a person comes to know the name for the first time in presence of the corresponding object, the meaning is acquired not in a positive manner, but in the way of a doubly negative abstraction. He suggests that what is directly involved in this meaning-situation is not the object itself, but its perceptual image (*Prativimbaka*). Even then, the image in itself as a psychic existent cannot be the direct object of meaning. It is involved only as a causal factor making possible the first acquisition of meaning as a negation. The image as such does not figure in the meaning itself.*²⁰²

Later on, this extreme view underwent an important modification in the hands of Karpakagomin and Jñānaśrīmitra. Of course, the suggestion for this modification is supplied by Dharmakīrti himself in his own commentary on the first chapter of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. Hence Śaṅkara Miśra's observation (in his commentary on Udayana's *Ātma-tattva-viveka*) to the effect that Jñānaśrīmitra should be alone credited with this innovative re-orientation in the Buddhist theory of meaning, perhaps flows from the fact that he had

not before him either the text of Dharmakīrti's own commentary on his magnum opus, or the text of Karṇakagomin's sub-commentary on it.*²⁰³

Karṇakagomin observes that the meaning is undoubtedly a universalised fiction, but it is definitely attended by a positive feeling. The negation of negation follows as a logical implication of this positive meaning. In other words,—if you try to define it you can do it only as a negation of negation. This double negation is not a real property of the meaning-fiction, but only a definition of it.*²⁰⁴

Jñānaśrī clearly asserts that it is not possible to build a theory denying what exists as a cognitive reality. So it is not possible to suppress the positive feeling which we definitely have as the leading aspect in the meaning-fiction. But this positive aspect is logically inconceivable without defining it as a negation of negation. In entertaining the meaning of the word, "cow," we definitely make a positive approach, but we can logically fix the meaning only by eliminating everything that is not cow.*²⁰⁵

But it seems that Jñānaśrī opposes Karṇakagomin's understanding to the effect that first we begin with meaning as a positive factor, and then, as a next step, we go to interpret it through its logical implication of double negation. Jñānaśrī means, and correctly so, that the logical implication is not a consequent process, but the logical counterpart of the positive meaning-feeling. In other words when we positively entertain the meaning of the word, "cow," we logically *imply at the same time* that it is other than not-cow.*²⁰⁶ "Fixation of a meaning somewhere is at the same time its withdrawal from elsewhere," so says Dharmakīrti, "affirmation and negation of negation are not two separate operations of a word, since the one is logically equivalent to the other by way of mutual implication."*²⁰⁷

But all the Buddhist philosophers are equally uncompromising in their fundamental position, namely, language can never mean the real object itself, and meaning as a logical

category is always a negation of negation. Hence the opponents, who think that a word means the object itself, and that the universal is as much real as the particular, are not satisfied with the Buddhist theory of meaning even as it has been modified later on making provision for a positive meaning-feeling. It seems that the realistic opponents of Buddhist philosophy have set a great store by the positive feeling of a positive object that seemingly figures in the meaning-situation. They think that the logical interpretation of reality should grasp the reality itself, and that the elements brought forth by an interpretative analysis are elemental properties without which the real cannot be what it is.

APPENDIX III

Notes and References

Explanation of Abbreviations

A.S.	—Advaita-siddhi
B.S.	—Brahma-sūtras
B.S.B.	—Brahma-sūtra-śāṅkara-Bhāṣya
P.V.	—Pramāṇa-vārtika
P.V.B.	—Pramāṇa-vārtika-Bhāṣya
P.V.S.V.	—Pramāṇa-vārtika-svavṛtti
P.V.S.V.T.	—Pramāṇa-vārtika-svavṛtti-tīkā
Slv.	—Sloka-vārtika
Tpk.	—Tattva-pradīpikā (citsukhī)
T.S.	—Tattva-saṁgraha
T.S.P.	—Tattva-saṁgraha-Pañjikā
Vkp.	—Vākya-padīya

(The serial numbers in the notes correspond to the same in the body of the text from Chapter I to Appendix II)

CHAPTER I

- *1 anyathaivā-gni-sambandhād dāhaṁ dagdho-bhimanyate I
anyathā dāha-śabdena dāhādy-arthaḥ pratīyate II
Vākya-padīya
Book II verse 425

*2 This verse has been quoted as giving support to the the Buddhist view in the following works :—

Vyomavati on Praśastapāda—p 584 ; Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta—p 29 (Benares ed.) ; Prabhācandra's Nyāya-Kumuda-candra p 553, and Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa p 447 ; Hari-bhadra's Anekānta-jaya-patākā p 396, and Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, verse 667 ; Saṁmatitarka-Tīkā pp 177, 260.

Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* quotes this verse of Bhartṛhari in order to substantiate the Buddhist position which Śāntara-kṣita presents in another verse with similar import. See *Tattva-saṅgraha* (Text p 280 v 879) and *Pañjikā* thereon. Puṇyarāja in his commentary does not expressly mention that Bhartṛhari in this verse is presenting the Buddhist view-point, but no doubt is left when the connected verse preceding it is gone through along with the commentary.

- *3 *Śābara-bhāṣya, Tarkapāda* p. 43 (*Ānandāśrama Edition*) :
 Syāced arthena sambandhaḥ kṣura-modaka-śabdoccāraṇa
 mukhasya pātana-pūraṇe syātām, yadi saṁśleṣa-lakṣaṇam
 sambandham abhipretya ucyeta 1.

That the target of this attack is the Grammatical School of Nominalism is expressly recognized by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha (see *Brhatī* and *Rjuvimalā*, pp 106-107, Benares edition), and is hinted at by Sucarita Miśra in his *Kāśikā* (See *Śloka-vārtika-Kāśikā* pp 222-224, Vol. III, Trivandrum).

Also see *Anekānta-jaya-patākā* of Haribhadra, Vol. I (G. O. S.) pp 366-382

- *4 *tasmād viśeṣa-viśayā sarvaivendriyajā matih I*
na viśeṣeṣu śabdānām pravṛtte-rasti sambhavaḥ II
ananvayād viśeṣānām saṁketasyā-prvṛttitah I
viśayo yaśca śabdānām saṁyojyate sa eva tatiḥ II
 —*Pramāṇa-vārtika ; Pratyakṣa-pariccheda*—v 127-128

One may be forgiven if one is tempted to say that the major portion of Dharmakīrti's magnum opus, *Pramāṇa-Vārtika*, is a dissertation on the role of logical construction in philosophy, with the paramount purpose of proving that reality *par excellence* is not a construction, but an unspeakable momentary particular untouched by language and meaning. The purport of the above quoted verse from *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* may be explained as follows :—

The pure particular is grasped by pure sensory knowledge

alone. The particulars are not connected with one another. They are reals of the moment existing and fleeting away in a sequence. Thus a single particular has no continuity. Hence it cannot be the meaning of a name. A name for its referent requires a continuant or a pervasive concept. Such a concept or a continuant is a logical construction, and as such is the meaning of a name (*Vikalpo nāma-samśrayaḥ*). Thus a real cannot be named or meant.

See Prajñākara's Bhāṣya on the above verses and a few more that follow.

This logical construction or *Vikalpa* is called *aupacārikī sattā* by Bhartṛhari who also thinks that this constructional existence is the direct and invariable meaning of a word or a sentence.

The concept of *Vikalpa* is beautifully defined in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*—*Śabda-jñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ*,—"Vikalpa is that which is logically abstracted out of the understanding of a verbal expression, but which has no corresponding counter-part in reality.

Our dissertation will show that the shadow of this definition pervades the whole field of speculative philosophy.

CHAPTER II

*5 A. J. Ayer—*Language, Truth and Logic*—p. 57.

See further on the same page—"In other words the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character—that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or, even mental objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions."

*6 Neurath—*Sociology and Physicalism*,
p. 291 of *Logical Positivism*.

*7 *An Examination of Logical Positivism*—p 277.

- *8 na sosti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte I
 anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāṣate II
 vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī I
 na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī II
 Vkp Bk I v 124-125

We have translated the spirit of these verses.

*9 See Watson—Behaviourism, Ch X. Talking and Thinking, and Ch. XI. Do We Always Think in Words ?

*10 That memory is a retention of verbal habits is recognized by Haṭṭiśābha in his commentary on the above-quoted verses :—

ata eva kecid ācāryāḥ, suptasyāpi jāgradvṛttyā
 sadṛśo jñāna-vṛtti-pratibandhaḥ, kevalaṁ tu
 śabdabhāvanā-vijāni tadā sūkṣmāṁ vṛttiṁ bhajante...
 smṛtikālepi ca tādrśānāṁ upalabdhi-vijānāṁ
 ābhimukhye...buddhau viparivartate I

*11 Neurath—Sociology and Physicalism, Logical Positivism. pp. 284-285.

*12 Meaning and Truth. p. 140.

*13 Meaning and Truth. p. 149.

CHAPTER III

- *14 See Carnap's Preface to Introduction to Semantics.
 *15 Introduction to Semantics p. 6
 *16 Meaning and Necessity p. 22.
 *17 Meaning and Necessity pp 9-10
 *18 Ibid.
 *19 Philosophy and Logical Syntax p. 20.
 *20 Problem of Knowledge pp. 132-133.
 *21 We have translated the spirit of the following verses of Bhartṛhari.

śātṛeṣu prakriyā-bhedai ravidyaivo-pavarṇyate I
 anāgama-vikalpā tu svayaṁ vidyo-pavartate II
 yathābhyāsaṁ hi vāgarthe pratipattiṁ samīhate I
 svabhāva iva cānādir mithyābhyāso vyavasthitaḥ II
 upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānāṁ bālānāṁ apalāpanāḥ I
 asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṁ samīhate II

—Vkp Bk II v 235, 237, 240.

The commentator explains the word

“apalāpanāḥ” in the last verse as “pratāraṇāḥ”

(deception)—upāyāḥ śāstrāṇi...apalāpanāḥ pratāraṇāḥ
 eva boddhavyāḥ (All philosophies are deceptions).

*22 Wittgenstein—Tractatus 6.54.

*23 Meaning and Necessity—p. 29.

CHAPTER IV

*24 darśanopādhi-rahitasyā-grahāt, tadgrahē grahāt I

darśanaṁ nīlanirbhāsam, nārtho bāhyosti kovalāḥ II

Pramāṇa-Vārtika v 3/336

This verse of Dharmakīrti carries the same import as is implied by the more famous and more ancient verse—

“sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīla-taddhiyoḥ I”

Again,

tasmād dvirūpam astyekaṁ yadevam anubhūyate I

smaryate cobhayākārasyāsyā samvedanaṁ phalam II

PV v 3/338

yadā sa viśayaṁ jñānaṁ jñānānśertha-vyavasthiteḥ I

tadā ya ātmānubhavaḥ sa evārtha-viniścayaḥ II

PV v 3/340

avibhāgopi buddhyātmā viparyāsita-darśanaḥ II

grāhya-grāhaka-samvitti-bhedavāniva lakṣyate II

PV v 3/354

*25 See Prajñākara's commentary on these verses—
Pramāṇa-Vārtika-bhāṣyam. pp. 389-399.

Specially,

“yadeva drśyate tadevābhyupagamyate I
tathā hi pratibhāsat tadgatam eva nīlam avabhāṣate,
nāparam I

tataḥ pratibhāsa-vyatirekeṇa na pramāṇam I...
vyatiriktasya sadbhāve na nīlasyāparokṣatā I
svarūpenāparokṣatvān na tasyanyā aparokṣatā II

PVB p 389

*26 See PV v 3/354 quoted in note No. 24.

*27 This mistaken identity between fact and fiction is expressed by Śaṅkara as, satyānrte mithunīkṛtya *adhyāsaḥ*, and by the Buddhist idealists as, drśya-vikalpau ekīkṛtya mithyāabhāsaḥ. The difference between these two expressions will be brought out a few pages later.

That this Buddhistic way of analysing the nacre-silver situation is not totally foreign to the Advaita view is indirectly admitted by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his review of dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-bāda in Advaita-siddhi.

*28 See Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra 2/2/28.

sākṣiṇo-vagantuaḥ svayaṁ-siddhatām upakṣipatā svayaṁ
prathate vijñānam ityeṣa eva mama pakṣas tvayā
vāco-yuktyantareṇa āśrita iti cen, na, vijñānasya
utpatti-pradhvamsā-nekatvādi-viśeṣavattvā-bhyupagamāt t

Also see Bhāmatī on the same :—

nanu sākṣisthāne astu asmadābhimatam eva vijñānam,
tathā ca nāmni eva vipratipattir nārthe iti śaṅkate...
bhavatā hi vijñānasya utpādādayo dharmā abhyupetāḥ
tathā ca asya phalatayā nāvagantr̥tvam, kartr̥-
phala-bhāvasya ekaṭra virodhat I

—Bhāmatī-Kalpataru-Parimala

—p. 555 (N. S. Second Edition)

*29 See Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya on B. S. 2/2/31 in which Śāṅkara's contention also seems to imply that an instantaneous psychic event cannot serve as the background of an illusion.

Also see Bhāmatī on the same :—

apica āropitaṁ niṣedhanīyam, āropaśca tattvādhiṣṭhāno
dṛṣṭo yathā śuktikādiṣu rajatādeḥ I
na cet kiñcidasti tattvaṁ kasya kasmin āropaḥ I

Here Vācaspati's argument is explicitly directed against the Mādhyamika Buddhists (Nihilists), but implicitly against the Yogācāras also.

As regards the law of illusion and the hierarchy of existence see Advaita Siddhi of Madhhsūdana—the introductory portion upto mithyātva-mithyātva-nirukti-prakaraṇa.

We think that an Advaitin, in order to demarcate the Śāṅkarite stand-point from Buddhist Idealism, should set no great store by the difference between pragmatic existence (vyāvahārika-sattā) and illusory existence (prātibhāsika-sattā). The Buddhist idealists of both the schools (e.g. Nāgārjunā, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara) have stated in no uncertain terms that, as regards the pragmatic existence of the empirical world, they have no dispute with the realists and the common man, and that their difference crops up only in respect of the final or fundamental existence (pārmārthika-sattā).

It is not without reason that the great Advaita dialectician Śrīharṣa, while going to mark out the difference between Advaitism and Mādhyamika Buddhism, has not thought it wise to bring in the question of difference between vyāvahārika-sattā (pragmatic existence) and prātibhāsika-sattā (illusory existence). He notes the difference between Mādhyamika Idealism and Upaniṣadic Idealism in the following words—

“Saugata-Brahmabādinō rayam viśeṣo yad
ādimah sarvam eva anirvacanīyam varṇayati...

vijñāna-vyatiriktam punaridam viśvam sad-
 asadbhyām vilakṣaṇam brahmabādināḥ saṅgīrante”
 (*Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍyam, with Vidyāsāgarī*
Commentary—p. 125).

When it is asserted by the Advaitin that on the eve of the final realisation of the Absolute the whole phenomenal world is totally negated, it follows hence that from this final stand-point there is no substantial difference between pragmatic existence and illusive existence. Our dream is a dream within a wider cosmic illusion. With the final negation of the entire empirical universe the difference between vyāvahārika-sattā and prātibhāsika-sattā is also bound to vanish, because this difference itself ultimately turns out to be only relative and pragmatic. Hence in respect of the basic unreality of the external world it is difficult to see how the Advaitins basically differ from the Buddhist Idealists. The difference between the dream-world and the phenomenal and empirical world as a whole is only this that the former is a short-term dream within the orbit of the latter which is a long-term dream. It is logically senseless to say that a long-term dream being longer, is less of a dream than a short-term one. So it is the metaphysical difference, and not the epistemic difference, which should finally mark out Advaitism from Buddhist Idealism. The reader is again referred to the chapter on dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi in Advaita-sidhi. There Madhusūdana accepts dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi as a correct representation of the Advaita theory of knowledge, and admits that on this view there is no difference between vyāvahārika-sattā and prātibhāsika-sattā. On this view it is the silver-percept, and not the nacre, that appears as the external piece of silver.

See note No. 35

*30 We refer to such a syllogism as with which Madhusūdana has opened his masterly debate in Advaita-siddhi ;—

“Whatever is an object of knowledge is unreal, as it is the case with nacre-silver ; the phenomenal world is an object

of knowledge ; therefore it is unreal.”—vimataṁ mithyā, drśyatvāt, śukti-rupyavat.

*31 Tattvapradīpikā—pp. 44-47 N. S. edition.

Advaita-siddhi—pp. 453-58 N. S. edition.

The reader may profitably compare the elaborate and penetrative interpretation of Vijñaptimātratā by Prajñākara.

PVB pp 349-404 (Tibetan-Sanskrit Works series).

*32 tasmāt satyatve sambandhānupapattēh

ādhyāsika eva drg-drśyayoh sambandhah

A. S. p. 458.

That the epistemic conclusion of Advaita is finally derived from the law of contradiction is implicit in the following observation of Citsuka,—

“tadevaṁ viṣaya-viṣayibhāvā-nirūpanāt, ātmani
adhyastatayā cāsidbahu, prapañcasya satyatve
drśyatvānupapattir bādḥikā”

Tpk. p. 47.

(Thus when the unreality of the subject-object relation is established in view of the indefinability of such a relation, and of its consequent super-imposition on consciousness, the reality of the phenomenal world is *contradicted* by the fact that the very phenomenon of being an object of knowledge is impossible on the assumption of such a reality).

*33 tasyā-ścārthāntare vedye durgḥatau vedya-vedakau I

P. V v 3/331.

*34 samvedyātirekeṇa na nīlādi pratīyate I

asamvedye pratītiścet tadabhāve katham bhavet II

asamvedyam eva pratipannam iti vyāhatam I

tathā cāyam arthaḥ syād apratītaṁ pratītam iti I

atha apratīyamānaṁ pratyakṣeṇa anumānena

pratīyate I tdapi asat I pratīyamānatā-vyatirekeṇa

nārthaḥ para iti pakṣaḥ, na tu pratyakṣa-pratītatā eveti I

anumāna-pratītirapi svarūpe pratyakṣa-pratītireva

grāhye I... ..

svarūpeṇa pratītaṁ cet sākṣātkaraṇam eva tat I
svarūpeṇāpratītaṁ cet sarvathāsyāpratītataḥ II

P. V. B. p. 354.

*25 ata eva, sarve pratyayā anālambanāḥ,
pratyatvāt, svapna-pratyayavat |

P. V. B. p. 359.

The reader may profitably compare the chapter on *drṣṭi-srṣṭi* in Advaita-siddhi, Madhusūdana's ungrudging support to *drṣṭi-srṣṭi* is interesting. He is conscious how dangerously he is close to the Buddhist position. He attempts an escape at once by pointing out the metaphysical difference from the Buddhists. The matter becomes more interesting when one finds Gauḍa-brahmānanda clearly recognizing the fact that *drṣṭi-srṣṭi* is a form of solipsism or subjective idealism—

“*drṣṭi-srṣṭi*-pakṣe puruṣāntarīya-
sukhādikaṁ na jñāyate, kintu puruṣānta-
rīyatvena asmin eva kalpyate iti bhāvaḥ”

Madhusūdana unequivocally observes that according to *drṣṭi-srṣṭi* the identity of a pitcher as perceived by two persons at the same time, or by the same person at different times, is an illusion. He declares that *drṣṭi-srṣṭi* is quite in consonance with the letter and spirit of Advaita Vedānta. The nacre and the nacre-silver are equally false. When it is stated by the teachers of Advaita that in the nacre-silver illusion a comparatively real nacre is needed as a background on which the false silver is to be super-imposed, that is only a provisional statement aimed at helping the understanding of the people of sluggish intelligence. In the false proposition —“It is silver”, no nacre is needed as the background of illusion. Consciousness circumscribed by “itness” (the psychic-percept of the Buddhists) is a fact with which the fictitious silver is falsely identified. That is enough for *adhyāsa*. Madhusūdana says this much in clear terms.

A careful perusal of this chapter on *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi* will go a long way to convince a sectarian Advaitist that in the pure epistemic position there is no fundamental difference between Yogācāra Buddhism and Advaita Idealism. The difference is on the metaphysical plane alone.

CHAPTER V

*36 Bradley—Logic Vol. I, Ch. I.

*37 Cook Wilson—Statement and Inference Vol. I, Ch. XIII.

*38 Nāgēsabhaṭṭa—Laghumanjūṣā p. 353.

ata eva cakṣuṣā dr̥śyamānam api ajñāta-bodhakam
padārtham "kimidam iti na jñāmi" iti vyavaharanti.
tadupadeśe ca jñātam iti vyavaharanti".

*39 Russell—Human Knowledge p. 74 —

"It is sometimes maintained that there can be no thought without language, but to this view I cannot assent : I hold that there can be thought, even true and false belief, without language."

But see again, (Ibid—p.440)—"But although sensation is a source of knowledge, it is not itself, in any usual sense, knowledge. When we speak of 'knowledge' we generally imply a distinction between knowing and what is known, but in sensation there is no such distinction".

It obviously means that in the stage of knowledge proper the knower himself must be able to distinguish between knowing and what is known. It is difficult to see how such a distinction can be made without the help of language. The distinction between knowing and the known requires a higher degree of abstraction than between black and white.

- *40 idam śabdānusandhāna-mātram abhyadhikam param I
 viṣaye na tu bhedosti savikalpāvikalpayoh II
 —*Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī*
 Pt. I p. 92 (Benares ed.)

Also *śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila—

samjñitvaṁ kevalam param

—*Pratyakṣa-Sūtra*

Verse 175.

- *41 Nīlakaṇṭha on Dīpikā—

“nirvikalpakasya atīndriyatayā pratyakṣa-pra-
 māṇāsambhavād anumānam pramāṇayati” !

—*Tarka-saṅgraha* — *Bhāskarodayā* — p 76-77 (N.S)

It is called ‘atīndriya’ (extra-sensuous) not in the sense of not being begotten by sense, but in the sense that no trace of it can be found in the perceptual introspection.

“indriya-janya-jñānāviśayatayā ityarthah
 .. vyavasāyātmaka-jñānasya
 anuvyavasāyātmaka-pratyakṣa-jñāna-viśayatvāt I

—*Bhāskarodayā on Nīlakaṇṭhī* p 76.

- *42 yathā rūpādayo bhinnāḥ prāk śabdāt svātmanaiva tu I
 gamyante tadvad evaitat samjñitvaṁ kevalam param II
 —*Slv—v 175—Pratyakṣa*.

- *43 See Parthasārathi's commentary on the following verse of Kumārila—

na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate I
 tayoṛ ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvaśīṣyate II

Again,

nirvikalpaka-bodhepi dvayātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ I
 grahaṇam lakṣaṇākhyeyam jñātrā suddham tu grhyate II
 Slv. v173 and 118, *Pratyakṣa*.

- *44 avivikta-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vibhagaṁ
sammugdha-vastumātra-gocaram ālocana-jñānam
—*Śāstradīpikā*—p109 (Chowkhamba ed.)
- *45 See Siv. Pratyakṣa—v 172-176 and Pārthasārathi's
commentary on the same.
- *46 kvacij jātiḥ, kvacid dravyam, kvacit karma,
kvacid guṇaḥ I
yadeva savikalpena tadevānena grhyate II
iha śabdānusandhāna-mātram abhyadhikaṁ param I
viśaye na tu bhedosti savikalpāvikalpayoh II
—*Nyāyamañjarī*—p 92 (Pt. I) Benares ed.
- *47 viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhānavagāhi jñānam
—(*Dīpikā of Annaṁbhaṭṭa*)
viśeṣyādi-vidhaya viśeṣyādyānavagāhi jñānam
ityarthah I tathā ca jñānatva-ghaṭitam viśeṣyatā-
sūnyatvam, viśeṣaṇatā-sūnyatvam, saṁsargatā-
sūnyatvam ceti lakṣaṇa-trayaṁ paryavasitam iti
bhāvaḥ I
(*Nīlakaṇṭhī* on the above)
tathā ca idaṁ viśeṣyam, idaṁ viśeṣaṇam,
ayaṁ saṁsarga ityevaṁ tattad-dharma-prakāreṇa
ghaṭa-ghaṭatva-tat-saṁsargāṇāṁ anavagāhyatvāt I
(*Bhāskarodayā* on the above)
—*Tarkasaṁgraha-Bhāskarodayā*—p 76.
- *48 Gauriti viśiṣṭa-jñānaṁ viśeṣaṇa-jñāna-janyam,
viśiṣṭa-jñānatvāt, daṇḍīti jñānavat I
—*Annaṁbhaṭṭa's Dīpikā*.
- *49 atra asmat-pitr-caraṇāḥ :—prāthamikaṁ gauriti
pratyakṣaṁ janya-viśeṣaṇa-jñāna-janyam, janya-
viśiṣṭa-jñānatvāt, anumitivat I
—*Vardhamāna-Nyāya-Līlāvatī-prakāśa*—p 484

CHAPTER VIII

*57 Critique of Pure Reason—Introduction—IV-i

*58 yopi prathama-nipātī bāhyeṣvartheṣu prakāśaḥ sa
viśeṣa-nimittāparigrahepi vastu-mātram *idaṁ tad*
iti pratyavabhāsayati—Comm. on Vkp. Bk I/125

*59 That the meaning as a concept may be equally admitted
by the realists and the idealists has been forcefully brought
out by Helārāja

“abhyupagama-bādaścāyam. bāhya-nayopi śabdārthasya
buddhi-parivartinaḥ pratīteḥ. kriyā-kāraḥ bhāve
dṛṣya-vikalpayo-rabhedādhyavasāyād vyavahāra-siddhir
bhavatyeva ... vināpi tu bāhyārthān śakyato
vijñānamātra-darśaneṣu tannirbhāsa-vaśena kriyā-
kāra-sambandho melayitum ityeva upanyastam I

Comm. on Vkp. Bk III/33.

*60 The Epistemic Law of Logical Construction is the
abstracted essence of the following verses of Bhartṛhari :—

śabdeṣevāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsyā nibandhanī	I
yannetraḥ pratibhātmāyān bhedarūpaḥ pratiyato	II
na sosti pratyayo loke...	I
... ..	II
... ..	I
na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī	II
yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastu-nibandhanāḥ	I
sa bāhya-vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyato	II
anityeṣvapi nityatvam abhidheyātmanā sthitam	I
vikalpotthāpitenaiṣa sarvo bhāvena laukikāḥ	I
mukhyeneva padārthena vyavahāro vidhīyate	II
vyavahāraśca lokasya padārthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ	I

Vkp Bk I/119, 124, 125 ; Bk II/134 ; Bk III/3/34 ;

Bk II/3/80, Bk III/3/86.

See Helārā/a on III/3/80

evam anyopi yaḥ kaścid vyavahārah sa sarvaḥ
vāstavataḥ *abahir-vidyamānasya vastunaḥ* abhinnasya
tāvad *anādi-mithyābhīyāsa-vāsanā*-vaśopajāta eva
sāmṛta stathā adhyavasāyād *asānvṛta* iva
avidyā-pravṛtti-rūpe jagati prarūḍhaḥ I

Note the unmistakable Buddhist flavour of the emphasized expressions.

The printed edition of the text has some obvious mistakes which have been corrected here.

These lines, taken in themselves, are concerned with the pure epistemic aspect of the problem, and as such, cannot be differentiated from the Yogācāra position. Even the term "Avidyā" has been equated to Vāsanā by Nāgeśa in his *Laghu-Maṇjūṣī* (*Laghu-Maṇjūṣā*—pp 283-319).

While elaborately refuting "anirvacanīya-khyāti" of Advaita-Vedānta, Nāgeśa is conscious that he is fast approaching the Buddhist position. So he demarcates his own view from the Buddhist one in this way.

etena asato bhāne bauddha-mata-praveśa
iti apāstam, tena tatra āropita-satyasyāpi
anaṅgikārāt, ātmana stena anityatvāṅgikārācca.

The first line of demarcation, intended to be an epistemic distinction, is too weak to stand, because the Buddhist idealists have mentioned times without number in no uncertain terms that they recognize a "samvṛti-sat" (a relative, pragmatic, constructional existence) as distinct from "pārmārthasat" (the fundamental existence). The second line of demarcation is metaphysical and as such stands valid.

Helārāja, in a few lines just next to those quoted above, has brought the metaphysical aspect of Śābdādvaita to bear upon the epistemic problem at hand, in order to introduce the next verse of Vākya-pāṇīya.

*61 kim sad-asatva-pakṣa-bahirbhāvā-bhyupagamah ?

—*Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhāḍyam*

p 129 (Benares ed. with
Vidyāsāgarī)

*62 yo hi sarvam anirvacanīya-sadasttvaṁ brūte
sa katham anirvacanīyatā-sattva-vyavasthitau
paryanuyujyeta I...parasya eva tu vyavasthaya
evaṁ paryavasyati, nirvacanīya-pratikṣopād
anirvacanīyatvaṁ I...tataḥ parakīya-rītyā idam
ucyate,—anirvacanīyatvaṁ viśvasya paryavasyati
iti I vastutaśca vyaṁ prapañca-sattva-
vyavasthāpana-vinivṛttāḥ svataḥ siddhe cidātmani
brahma-tattve kevale bhāram avalambya
caritārthāḥ sukham āsmahe.

Ibid—p. 121.

*63 tat-sattvāsattvayo raudāsīnyālambane
satya-nirvacanīyatvaṁ pariśeṣa-siddham ityarthah I

Ibid—*Vidyāsāgarī* p. 133.

*64 Laghu Mañjūṣā—p. 273.

*65 Khaṇḍana—p. 125.

*66 nirvaktum asāmarthyē gurava upāsyantān
yebhyo niruktayaḥ śikṣyante ... yastu
bādī niruktyabhimānaṁ dhatte sa tu nirvaktu
na tu śakṣyati, vaktavya-doṣāt I

Khaṇḍana p. 117-118.

*67 Laghu-Mañjūṣā—pp 266-320.

*68 Vāk-śaktireva vā citih ... sarvathā
vāgrūpādhīno jñeyabodha iti sarvaṁ
jñeyaṁ vāgrūpānviṭam gamyate iti
tad-vikāro vivarto vā—

Brahma-siddhi—p 19.

*69 api ca santyarthā vyāvahārikāḥ ; yeṣāṁ
na śabda-vivartād anyat tattvaṁ ; tatsāmānyād

itarepi tathā avasātavvyāḥ, yathā... ...
śāśa-viṣṇāṇādayaḥ I

Brahma-siddhi—p. 18.

*70 Contrast an earlier remark of Maṇḍana about the nature of *Āvidyā*—

atyantāsattve kḥapuṣpa-śadṛśī na vyavahārāṅgam ;
tasmād anirvacanīyā. I

But note that in the above quotation (note no. 69) he uses the very example of śāśa-viṣṇa to emphasize the fictitious nature of the world.

*71 Vkp. I/55

*72 tathā śabdopi vācakaḥ artham abhidhīya-
mānatayā prakāśayan ātmānam api abhidheyatayā
prakāśayati iti ucitam I na tu śrotrendriya-
viṣaya-bhāvopagameṇa...
evaṅca kṛtvā sarva-ghaṭa-śabda-śādhārāṇaṁ
sāmānya-rūpam arthapakṣa-nikṣiptam *artha-*
samānāṭhikarāṇaṁ svarūpam asya vācyam,
arthavat-tatsāmānādhikarāṇyāt atrāpi
tathā pratīteḥ I

—Comm. on Vkp. III/2 (*Sambandha-*
Samuddeśa).

Also Vkp I/50 :—

ātma-rūpaṁ yathā jñāne jñeya-rūpaṁ ca dṛśyate
artharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁ ca prakāśate

*73 *bauddhārthasya bauddheno śabdena avibhāgāt*
tanmūlābhedādhyavasāyena śabdād arthākara-
vṛttau jāyamānāyāṁ svākārasyāpi samarpaṇam
iti śabdasyāpi viṣayatā, ata eva śabde grāhya-
grāhakatva-rūpa-śakti-dvaya-svīkāraḥ I

—*Laghu-Maṅjūśā*—p 352.

- *74 lolībhūtāni śabdārtha-jñānāni
'ghaṭa' ityevam avagamyante I
Helārāja on Vkp III/2
(Sambandha-Samuddeśa).
- *75 Commentary on Vkp III/2 Sambandha-Samuddeśa
p. 97 (C.S.S)

CHAPTER IX

- *76 cf. Tractatus—5.62, 5.63, 5.64.
- *77 Vkp II/134 and the comm. thereon.
See note no. 59—Yo vārtho, etc.
- *78 Laghu-Mañjūsā—pp 344-345.
- *79 Tattva-Saṅgraha (Text and comm. G.O.S.
Vol. I v/891.)
- *80 ayaṁ hi buddhyākāra-bādī bālye vastuni
abhrāntaṁ saṁśayaṁ dravyādiṣu
pāramārthikeṣu adhyastāṁ buddhyākāraṁ
paramārthataḥ śabdārtham icchanti. I
—Comm. on T.S. v/891.
- *81 vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ I
—quoted by Helārāja under
Vkp III/54 (Sambandha-Samuddeśa)
The second half of the verse is—
teṣāṁ anyonya-sambandho, nārthān śabdāḥ
sprśantyamī II
(The relation is between language and fiction ; the words
have nothing to do with real objects.)
- *82 yatra draṣṭā ca drśyaṇca darśanaṁ vā vikalpitam I
tasyaivārthasya satyatvaṁ śritā stravyanta-vedinaḥ II
Ibid 70.
- *83 Ibid. v. 80. Read “mukhyeneva” for “mukhyenaiva”
in the printed text of the verse. Similarly, in the commentary,

read “abahir-vidyamānasya” for “bahir-vidyamānasya”, and “abhinnasya” for “bhinnasya”. In both the cases ‘a’ is to be considered dropped by *sandhi* in the commentary.

See note no. 59 where the verse is quoted—

“Vikalpotthāpitenaiṣa...etc.

*4 Bertrand Russell—My Philosophical

Development—pp 216-217.

*85 Tractatus—5.6, 5.61, 5.62.

*86 For all the above quotations and the simile see Tractatus—5.631, 5.634 and 5.64.

*87 An Examination of Logical Positivism—Ch.VII.

*88 Tractatus 5.1361 and 2.062.

*89 Weinberg—Examination of Logical

Positivism—pp 41 and 47.

*90 Introduction to Tractatus—pp 19-21.

*91 Ibid.—p. 21.

*92 nābhidhānam svadharṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam I
atyanta-paratantratvāt rūpam nāsyāpadiśyate II

Vkp III/34 (*Sambandha. Samauddeśa*)

*93 See Helārāja’s commentary on the just-quoted verse.

Also, Dharmakīrti—

sambandhasyāpi svarūpeṇa anabhidhānam uktam.
abhidhāne hi sambandhitvena buddhyupasthānāt
yathābhiprāyam apratītaḥ I

PVSV (Gnoli’s ed. p. 92)

And, *Karṇakagomin* too :—

sambandhastu svarupeṇa grhyate, nābhidhīyate.
sambandhi-rūpāpannasya eva viśyīkaraṇāt I

Commentary on the above

p. 345.

*94 Introduction to Tractatus—p. 23.

CHAPTER X

- *95 For the Theory of Neutral Sense-data see Prof. Ayer—*Language, Logic and Truth*—pp. 122-124.
- *96 *My Philosophical Development.* p. 221.
- *97 Appearance and Reality—Introduction p. 1.
- *98 22 verses of Sambandha-parīkṣā have been quoted by Prabhācandra in his *Prameya-Kamala-Mārtanda*. These verses fully tally with those that have been given by Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyana in his introduction to *Prajñākara-Bhāṣya*.
- *99 tau ca bhāvau tadanyaśca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ I
ityamiśrāḥ svayam bhāvā stān miśrayanti kalpanāḥ II
Sambandha-Parīkṣā, v.5.
- For an unbiased explanation of this verse see *Prabhācandra—Nyāya-kumula-candra* Vol. I. p. 306.
- *100 Bradley—Appearance and Reality—Ch. III and
Appendix, Note B.
Logic—Vol. I Bk II Pt. 1, Ch. II.
Śāṅkara—B.S.B. 2/2/13 and 2/2/17.
- *101 Statement and Inference. Vol. II, Pt. V, Ch. VI.
- *102 PVB pp 183-185.
- *103 Logic—Vol. I p 297 Note 3, also p. 113 Note 50.
- *104 Space, Time and Deity—Vol. I. p. 238.
- *105 Ibid.—p. 246.
- *106 Ibid. p. 249.
- *107 Ibid. p. 240.
- *108 Ibid. pp. 258-59.
- *109 Principles of Mathematics, p. 51.
- *110 Space, Time and Deity—Vol. I. p. 239.
- *111 Ibid. pp. 242-43.
- *112 Buddhist Logic—Vol. 1, pp. 48-49.
- *113 Philosophical Studies—p. 289.
- *114 Ibid. p. 307.

- *115 Ibid. p. 220.
- *116 Ibid. pp 289-290.
- *117 “vidyamānaṁ sad vyāvartakaṁ viśeṣaṇam,
avidyamānaṁ sad vyāvartakaṁ upalakṣaṇam”
Gadādhara in Vyutpattibāda
- *118 Logic and Knowledge—p. 249.
- *119 Logic and Knowledge—p. 245.
- *120 guṇabhūtai-ravayavaiḥ samūhaḥ krama-janmanām I
buddhyā prakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate II
—Vkp. Bk. 111 Kriyā-samuddeśa—v.4.
- *121 śabdāḥ saṁketitāṁ prāhur vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ I
tadā svalakṣaṇaṁ nāsti saṁketa sthena tatra na II
PV. 1/54.
See Dharmakīrti's own gloss on the above.
p. 194.
(Kitab-mahal ed.)
- *122 ekatra dṛṣṭābhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛśyate I
na tasmād bhinnam astyanyat sāmānya-
buddhyābhedataḥ II
PV. 3/126.
- *123 PVB pp 246-247.
- *124 PVSVT pp 93-95.
anyohi dṛṣṭa-svabhāvaḥ anyasā dṛśyamānaḥ I
... .. nāpi pūrvakāla-sambandhitvaṁ
dṛśyamānasya, idanīn pūrvābhāvāt ...
- *125 My Philosophical Development—p. 20.
- *126 Ibid. p. 21.
- *127 Human Knowledge—Ch. VIII (Pt. IV)
“A complete complex of compresence counts as a space-
time point-instant” p. 322.
- *128 My Philosophical Development. pp. 172-73.

CHAPTER XI

- *129 sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ svarūpa-sthitayaḥ I
te na ātmānam pareṇa miśrayanti I
tasya paratva-prasangāt ... tac ca ātmani
vyavasthitam amiśram eva...

—PVSV – Gnoli's edition—

pp. 24-25.

- *130 Tattvopaplava-siṃha (G.O.S.)

pp. 13-17.

- *131 PVB p. 376—

bādhako bādhyā-pratyayasya abhāvaṃ
karoti, tadā lambanasya vā”?

- *132 PVB p. 374—

yadi jātosau bhāvāḥ kena tasyābhāvāḥ kriyate?
(once an event comes to be, its being cannot be blown
out of the instant in which it is)

- *133 PVB—

“na tāvaj jñānāntareṇa abhāvāḥ
svapna-jñānasya anyasya vā kenacit kriyate I
... anyena na hi jñānena tasya
viśayāpahāraḥ asattā-lakṣaṇo bādhaḥ.....
para-viśayāpaharaṇantu narādhipa-dharmaḥ I

—pp 4-5.

- *134 PVB pp 259-387.

tasmād idam eva tasya bādhakāḥ yad anya-
rūpa-grāhakatvam I tacca sarva-pratyayāpekṣayā
sarva-pratyayānām I nanu jāgrat-pratyayārthaḥ
sambādi, tat katham tasya anyena agrahaṇam I
svapna-pratyayānām api tat-svapna-darśinā tadanya-

svapna-pratyaya-grahanād avisambādanam eva I
 tat kathāṁ bādhyatvam I jāgrat-pratyayena
 bādhyatvād it icet I jāgrat-pratyayopi tena iti
 samānam etat. pp. 359-360.
 paraspara-parihāreṇa avasthitayoḥ kathāṁ bādhya-
 bādhakabhāvaḥ...dvayo-rapi bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvaḥ I
 na prāpakatvād ekasya bādhakatvam eva I p. 365.
 kathāṁ tarhi bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva-pratītiḥ,
 tatkalāmadhye eva yadā apara-svarūpa-nirūpaṇa-
 paraḥ pratyayo bhavati, tadā tena vicchinnaṁ
 pūrvakam ālambanam...tena sa bādhako vyavas-
 thāpyate I p. 375
 kathāṁ tarhi bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvaḥ ?
 na kathāñcit...vyavahāra-mātram evedam
 svapnāsvapnabhedo nāma I tathā pramāṇa-
 pramāṇa-bhedaḥ... p. 5,

- *135 pramāṇam avisambādi jñānam, artha-kriyā-sthitiḥ I
 avisambādanam... .. II
 PV. 2/1.

*136 PVB—p. 5.

na khalu svarūpa-samvedanād aparam atra artha-kriyā-
 jñānaṁ kvacid upalabhyate I rūpādayoḥ svarūpa-
 samvedana-parā eva I na tadviṣayaḥ pratyayaḥ
 paratra pramāṇam ... iti naḥ sāmvyavahārika-
 pramāṇāvatūrah I ... adhyāropeṇa hi tadekatā
 viṣayāntarasyāpi I tata staddvāreṇa sambādanam
 uktam jñāne.

- *137 yathā nivīśate sortḥa stathā hi sa prakāśate I
 arthasthite stadātmatvāt sva-vid apyarthavin matā II
 tasmād viṣayabhedopi na, sva-samvedanaṁ phalam I
 uktam svabhāva-cintāyām tādātmyād artha-samvidoḥ II
 —PV v/350-51.
 PVB—pp. 394-95.

Again—

pramāṇam sva-samvedanam I

—PV 3/367.

Also see the chapter on *Sva-samvedana-cintā*

—PVB pp. 425-448.

- *138 sāmvyavahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā
paramārthata ekam eva sva-samvedanam
pratyakṣam ityuktam bhavati I

PVB—p. 25.

sva-samvedanam eva ekam pratyakṣam
pramāṇam nāparam" I

PVB p 31.

CHAPTER XII

- *139 evam arthasya śabdasya jñānasya ca viparyaye I
bhāvābhāvāv-abhedena vyavahārā-nupātinau II
Vkp. Bk. III *Sambandha-Samuddeśa*
—v. 59.

tathā ca bhāvasyāpi śabdena abhidhīyamānasya jñāya-
mānasya vā paropādhirūpatayā abhāva-sama-kakṣatā I
abhāvopi hi ... paropādhir-eva śabda-pratyayāv anu-
patatīti ... buddhyā nirūpyamāṇo hi abhāvo
bhāva-rūpeṇa avacchidyate.

—Helārāja on the above.

- *140 tasmāt sarvam abāvo vā bhāvo vā sarvam iṣyate I
na tvavasthāntaram kiñcid ekasmāt satyataḥ sthitam II
tasmān nābhāvam icchanti ye loke bhāvabādinah I
abhāvabādino vāpi na bhāvaṁ tattva-lakṣaṇam II
Vkp Ibid v 62-63

yataś-caivam sarvaṁ saṁvṛti-sat tataḥ pracārita-
darśana-vikalpāḥ tatra abhimāna-mātram I

—Helārāja on the above.

- *141 See Helārāja—
nīlotpalādaḥ... viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-viśaya-

nīlotpalādi śabdai rapī upāśritam ityāha I
tatrāpi pravibhajya melanam upacāra-sattāyān
yujyate I anyathā saṁsakta-vastuni neyam
kalpanā ghaṭate ityuktam I

Vkp. III/3/pp. 121-122.
on v. 49-51.

Also,—

viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyam ca sambandham laukikīm sthitim I
grhītva saṁkalayaitat tathā pratyeti nānyathā II
—*Dharmakīrti*—PV—3/145.

CHAPTER XIII

- *142 My Philosophical Development—p. 172.
- *143 Meaning and truth—p. 153.
- *144 Logic and Knowledge—pp. 273.
- *145 Logic and Knowledge—pp. 274—75
- *146 Ibid.—P. 275
- *147 My Philosophical Development—p. 27.
- *148 PVB—pp. 354-355.

A possible reply from the Sautrāntika standpoint is given in the penultimate chapter of the present dissertation.

- *149 Nyāyalīlāvatī—pp 401-406 (Chowkhamba edition)
- *150 Padārtha-Tattva-Nirūpaṇa—
pp 29-30 (Benares Edition)
- *151 Logic and Knowledge—p. 381

CHAPTER XIV

- *152 natu, svarūpeṇa katham lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhāvaḥ ? I
na, lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhāvasya kālpanikatvāt I...

svarūpam eva lakṣaṇam yuktam, nānyat I
 anyena anyasya paramārthato lakṣyayitum
 aśakyatvāt I pararūpeṇa hi lakṣaṇam
 pararūpatādhyāropa eva, na svarūpa-lakṣaṇam tat I
 PVB. p. 211

Again,

bhinno vā bhavati abhinno vārtha statra
 buddhiparikalpita eva sarvatra sambandhaḥ I
 vastu vastuno yadi vyatiriktam, kaḥ sambandhaḥ ?
 vyatireka eva iti cet, yadi nāma vyatiriktaḥ
 tasya kaḥ sambandhaḥ ? vyatirekasya sarvatra
 samānatvāt asambandha eva na syāt I
 Ibid. p. 242.

*153 na khalu pratyakṣataḥ pūrvāpara-vastu-grahaṇam I
 na ca smaraṇam ananubhūte, na ca kāraṇatvasya
 anubhavaḥ, katham samaraṇam ?...yadi tāvad anumā-
 nam, katham pratyakṣam antareṇa I na hi
 pratyakṣeṇa prāk-pūrvatā-parigraho, vartamānatā-
 grāhi sakalam eva adhyakṣam I... pūrvakam hi
 pratyakṣam svakālam parigṛhṇat katham paroḥkṣam
 ātmānam vijānīyat I tathā param api pratyakṣam I
 PVB—p. 292.

Again—

atīta-rūpatā anumānenā katham pratīyate,
 pratyakṣā-pratīpanne anumānāpravṛtteḥ I
 pratyakṣaṇ ca nātitarūpatāyām pravṛttam I
 na yadāsau pratyakṣeṇa pratīyate tadā atītarūpatā,
 idanīm atītarūpatā iti ced anyad eva tarhi jātam I
 tatra ca na pratyakṣam iti katham anumāṇam ?
 —Ibid. p. 182.

*154 anyastu āha, bhavatu agni-dhūmayoḥ kārya-
 kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ, tathāpi na tayo rekeṇa jñānena
 grahaṇam, bhinna-kālatvāt I...tena idam asmād
 utpannam iti na kenacid grhītam, ata eva

na smaraṇenāpi gr̥hyate, anubhavābhāvāt I

PVSVT. p. 97.

For Prajñākara's view on causal relation see PVB pp. 180-185—

etat-sadbhāve etad bhavati iti na evamprakāra-
vyāpāraḥ pratyakṣam.

p. 183.

Also see Manoratha's commentary on PV 2/4.

*155 kevalam asya idam kāryam kāraṇaṁ ca iti
kalpitōyam vyapadeśaḥ

—PVSVT. p. 97.

*156 Both the strength and the weakness of Karmakagomin's position are reflected in the following. (The reader may discern the confusing contradiction which attends his observation).—

PVSVT pp. 97-98. :—

atrocyate, kāryasya tāvad anutpannāvasthāyām
asattvād eva na kāraṇa-sambandhitvaṁ, niṣpannā-
vasthāyām api evam, nirapekṣatvāt I...kevalam
asya idam kāryam kāraṇam cā iti kalpitōyam
vyapadeśaḥ I tena hetoḥ sakāśāt svarūpalābha eva
kāryatvam I kāryam prati prāgbhāva eva
kāraṇatvam I sa ca ātmalābhaḥ prāgbhāvaśca
bhāvasya abhinnatvāt pratyakṣa-gr̥hīta eva ceti
katham na pratyakṣa-grāhyaḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ ?
kevalam kārya-darśane sati idam asya kāryam
kāraṇaṁca iti vyavahriyate I...tena pūrvake
vastuni gr̥hyamāṇe kāryam prati ānantaryam
kāraṇātmakam gr̥hītam eva I tadānantaryasya
tadabhinna-svabhāvatvāt I ata eva asmād anantaram
idam bhavati iti smaraṇam api bhavati,
ānantaryasya anubhūtatvāt I

CHAPTER XV

- *157 Some Main Problems of Philosophy
—pp 58-60 (Emphasis is ours)
- *158 Ibid. pp. 56-58.
- *159 Ibid. p. 58.
- *160 Ibid. pp. 252-269.
- *161 Ibid. p. 262.
- *162 Ibid. p. 263.
- *163 Ibid. p. 265.

CHAPTER XVI

- *164 A Modern Introduction to Logic. p. 33.
- *165 Meaning and Truth—p. 176.
- *166 Ibid. p. 180.
- *167 Ibid. p. 189.

CHAPTER XVII

- *168 Logic and Knowledge (On Propositions)
—pp. 313-314
- *189 Ibid. p. 320
- *170 śatāñca na niṣedhosti, sosatsu ca na vidyate I
jagatyanena nyāyena nañarthah pralayaṁ gataḥ II
—pp. 4/226.
- *171 Prajñākara on the above.—PVB—p. 614.
yadyabhāva-mātraṁ viśṣyī-kriyate, vyarthaka eva
prayogo nañah I anirūpita-viṣayasya nañah

aprayogāt I prayoge vā na prayojanam I
 atha yasya abhāvaḥ sa viṣayī-kartavyaḥ I
 tathā sati katham pratīyamānasya eva abhāvaḥ ?

It is significant that this verse of Dharmakīrti has been quoted with approval by Helārāja (Vkp—III/3/42) and by Nāgeśa in Laghu-maṅjūṣā (P. 652).

Also see Vkp III/14/v 250-282, pp. 571-585,

*172 tasmād āśritya śabdārtham bhāvābhāva-
 samāśrayam I
 abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭam
 sarvaṁ vidhi-niṣedhanam II

PV 4/228.

—tato vikalpa-buddhi-nirūpyamāṇo viṣayo
 vidhi-niṣedhayoḥ I vikalpānām vastu-
 vṛtti-niyamābhāvāt

—*Prajñākara* on the above

—PVB. p. 614.

CHAPTER XVIII

*173 Meaning and Truth—P. 148.

*174 bhojanādy abhimanyante buddhyarthe yad asambhavi I
 buddhyarthād eva buddhyarthe jāte tadapi dṣyate II
 Vkp—III/3/v 33.

*175 vākyārtha-bādinah padamātrāt pratīte rapari-samāpteh I
 —Helārāja's commentary on the verse quoted before.

*176 anityeṣvapi nityatvam abhidheyātmanā sthitam I
 —Vkp Bk. III p. 113 (Benares Edition)

See Helārāja's commentary on the above.

CHAPTER XIX

*177 Logical Positivism, p. 229, and p. 241-42.

*178 Logical Positivism. p. 242.

*179 Logical Positivism. p. 242.

*180 Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara observe that the fiction of a universal is not a fiction as a thought-content. There it is a real. A fiction is a fiction as an external referent.

jñānarūpatayā sva-lakṣaṇatā pariṣphutākāratā ca
sāmānyasya vidyate eva

PVB p. 191 on PV 3/9-10.

Again—PVB—p. 248 :—

nahi pratīyamāṇam eva pratiṣedha-viśayaḥ,
vikalpikā pratītir asatyā iti cet, tadasat I
asātyatvaṁ kutaḥ siddham, vikalpatvāt,
pramātra kū I nirvikalpaka-bodhepi
tadasatyatvaṁ ucyatām II

*181 atra brūmo ya evārtho yasyāṁ saṁvidi bhāsate I
vedyaḥ sa eva, nānyaddhi vedyāvedyasya lakṣaṇam II
jñānasya vyabhicāre hi viśvāsaḥ kiṁ-nibandhanaḥ I
jñānasya vyabhicāre pi jñānaṁ yat satyam eva tat II
yatnenā nviṣyamāṇepi rūpaṁ tac cen na dṛśyato I
tadā pūrvaiva saṁvittir nāstitveno-padiśyate II

—*Prakaraṇa-Pāñcikā, Naya-Vīthi*

vv.23, 69, 71.

CHAPTER XX

*182 Logical Positivism—p. 97.

*183 Ibid. p. 105.

*184 Ibid. p. 97.

*185 Ibid. p. 97.

*186 See Nāgārjuna's Vighraha-vyāvartanī.

*187 Logical Positivism—pp. 218 and 219.

*188 cf. Russell—Human Knowledge : “Or, to speak more exactly, there is no evidence that there are illusions of the senses”. —P. 182

*189 pp. 53-54, 126, 141.

*190 Positivism and Realism—p. 97.

*191 *pratyakṣasyāpi hi arthāvyabhicāra eva prāmāṇyam,
tadabhāve bhāvinah tad-vipralambhāt.*

PV p. 3 (Gnoli's edition)

PVSVT p. 25 (Rahul's edition)

—We have interpreted the spirit of Dharmakīrti's observation.

*192. Gilbert Ryle—Concept of Mind.

CHAPTER XVI

*193 *darśanasyāpi yat satyam na tathā darśanam
sthitam I
vastu saṃsarga-rūpeṇa tad arupam nirūpyate II
sampratya-yārthād bāhyārthah sannasan vā
vibhajyate I
bāhyīkr̥tya vibhāgastu śaktyapoddhāra-lakṣaṇah II*
Vkp II/vv 429, 449.

*194 Prajñākara very often uses the terms "advaya" and "advaita" to mean the indivisible unit of an instantaneous cognitive event.

Appendix I

*195 Vighraha-vyāvartanī—pp 24-29.

An edition of Vighraha-vyāvartanī with an excellent explanatory translation in English has been brought out by Professor Satkari Mookerjee, Director, Nava-Nālandā Māhāvihāra in Nālandā Research Publications—Vol. I.

*196 *dharmasya tadatatad-rūpa-vikalpānupapattitah I
dharmaṇa tad-viśiṣṭatva-bhaṅgo nityasamo bhavet II*

—*Tārīkika-rakṣā* quoted by *Gauḍā-Brahmānanda*

—*Advaita-siddhi* (N. S p. 223-225)

Also, *Nyāya-darśana*—

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya and Viśvanāthavṛtti

pp. 501-503 (Chowkhamba edition).

- *197 Nyāya-Makaranda—pp. 356-359 (Benares ed.)
- *198 Nyāya-candrikā—pp. 444-445.
- *199 Vkp. Bk. III/3/25, 27, 28.
- *200 Meaning and Truth—pp. 62-63.

Appendix II

- *201 tasmān na kiñcit svena rūpeṇa abhidheyaṁ
śabdasya, iti na vidhiḥ śabdārthaḥ I
PVB. p 363.
- *202 yastu punaḥ vyavahārāt sañketaṁ pratipannavān
tasya niyameṇa sañketa-kālarūpādhyavasāyaḥ
prativimbarūpaḥ I ... tasya ca prativimbasya
vyāvṛtti-pratipādanam eva phalam, na svarūpa-
pratipattiḥ I svarūpasya arthe abhāvāt
Ibid. p 264
- *203 See Kalpalatā on Ātmatattva-viveka—p. 344
(Benares edition)
- *204 PVSVT—
vidheḥ śabdārthasya, arthād anya-niṣedhasya
abhyupagamāt I tathā vṛkṣa ityukte arthād
avṛkṣa-nivartanaṁ pratiyate I etāvanmātreṇa
ca anya-vyāvṛtti-viśiṣṭatvam uktam I na tu
paramāρθato viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvaḥ I
—p. 248-249.
- *205 Jñānaśrī—Apoha-prakarana :—
na khalu śāstram anubhavaṁ paribhūya bhābituṁ
kṣamam iti vidhirūpam āmukhayan eva vikalpa
upajāyate iti tāvan na śakyam apahnotuṁ
prathama-pādārthaḥ I
—p. 203 Collected works

*206 Jñānaśrīmitra—Apoha-prakaraṇa—p. 206 of
the Collected Works.

*207 “niveśanam ca yo yasmāt bhidyate vinivartya tam I
—PV 1/126 Rahul's edition.

ata eva śabde tadanya-vyāvṛttilḥ svārthābhidhānaḥ
ca na vyāpāra-dvayaḥ, svārthasya abhidhānād eva
tadanya-vyāvṛtti-gatiḥ, svārthasya bheda-rūpatvāt I
na hi anvayaḥ avyāvṛttimataḥ, nāpi ananvayino
vyāvṛttilḥ I

P. V. S. V. p. 256.
(Rahul's edition)

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

(*Abbreviations are shown within brackets*)

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	—Nyāya-candrikā
Annambhāṭṭa	—Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā
Bhartṛhari	—Vākyapadīya (Vkp)
	—Commentary on Vākyapadīya (Harivṛṣabha's Commentary)
Citsukhācārya	—Tattva-pradīpikā (Tpk)
Dharmakīrti	—Pramāṇa-vārtika (PV)
	—Pramāṇa-vārtika-sva-vṛtti (PVSV)
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Kamalaśīla	—Pañcikā on Tattva-saṅgraha (Tsp)
Karṇakagomin	—Pramāṇa-vārtika-sva-vṛtti-tīkā (PVSVT)
Kumārila	—Śloka-vārtika (Ślv)
Lakṣmī-nṛsiṃha	—Bhāskarodayā
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī	—Advaita-siddhi (AS)
Maṇḍana miśra	—Brahma-siddhī
Manoratha-nandin	—Commentary on Pramāṇa-Vārtika
Nāgārjuna	—Vigraha-vyāvartanī
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- Nīlakaṇṭha —Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa
 Patañjali —Yogasūtras
 Patañjali —Mahābhāṣya
 Pārthsārathi miśra —Nyāya-ratnākara on Śloka-Vārtika
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 Prakāśātma-jati —Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa
 Puṇyarāja —Commentary on Vākyapadīya
 Raghunātha-śiromaṇi —Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa
 Śaṅkarācārya —Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya (BSB)
 Śaṅkaramiśra —Kalpalatā on Ātma-tattva-viveka
 Śabara-svāmin —Mīmāṃsā-Bhāṣya
 Śālikanātha —Prakaraṇa-pañcīkā
 —Rju-vimalā on Bṛhatī
 Śāntaraksita —Tattva-saṅgraha (TS)
 Śrīharṣa —Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya
 (Chowkhamba)
 Stcherbatsky —Buddhist Logic
 Sucaritamīśra —Kāśikā on śloka-vārtika
 Udayanācārya —Ātma-tattva-viveka
 Uddyotakara —Nyāya-vārtika
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 Vācaspati-miśra —Bhāmatī
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 Vātsyāyana —Nyāya-bhāṣya
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 —Siddhānta-muktāvali
 Vyomaśivācārya —Vyomavatī on Prasastapāda-bhāṣya

II Western Philosophy

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|----------------|--|
| Alexander, S | —Space, Time and Deity |
| Ayer, A. J | —Language, Truth and Logic |
| | —The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge |
| | —The Problem of Knowledge |
| | —Verification and Experience (<i>Essay</i>) |
| Bradley, F. H | —Appearance and Reality |
| | —The Principles of Logic |
| Carnap, R | —Logical Syntax of Language |
| | —Philosophy and Logical Syntax |
| | —The Unity of Science |
| | —Meaning and Necessity |
| | —Introduction of Semantics |
| | —The Elimination of Metaphysics
(<i>Essay</i>) |
| Cook Wilson, J | —Statement and Inference |
| Cornforth, M | —Science versus Idealism |
| Hempel, C. G | —The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning
(<i>Essay</i>) |
| Hicks, G. D | —Critical Realism |
| Husserl | —Ideas—Pure Phenomenology |
| Kant, E | —Critique of Pure Reason |
| Moore, G. E | —Philosophical Studies |
| | —Some Main Problems of Philosophy |
| | —A Defence of Commonsense (<i>Essay</i>) |
| Neurath, O | —Foundations of the Social Sciences |
| | —Protocol Sentences |
| | —Sociology and Philosophy } <i>Essays</i> |
| Passmore, J | —A Hundred Years of Philosophy |
| Plato | —The Theaetetus and The Sophist |
| Russell, B | —The Principles of Mathematics |
| | —An Analysis of Mind |
| | —An Analysis of Matter |
| | —Our Knowledge of the External World |

- Russell, B
- An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth
 - Human Knowledge—its Scope and Limits
 - Logic and Knowledge
 - A History of Western Philosophy
 - My Philosophical Development
 - Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (*Essay*)
- Ryle, G
- The Concept of Mind
 - Philosophical Arguments (*Essay*)
- Schlick, M
- Essays* {
- The Turning Point in Philosophy
 - Positivism and Realism
 - The Foundation of Knowledge
- Stebbing, L. S
- A Modern Introduction of Logic
- Urban, W. M
- The Intelligible World
 - Language and Reality
- Urmson, J
- Philosophical Analysis
- Vaihinger, H
- Philosophy of As If
- Waismann, F
- How I See Philosophy (*Essay*)
- Wallace, W
- The Logic of Hegel
- Waston, J. B
- Behaviourism
- Weinberg, J. R
- An Examination of Logical Positivism
- Wisdom, A. J
- Problems of Mind and Matter
- Wittgenstein, L
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*
 - Philosophical Investigations

Compilations

- Ayer, A. J and others
- Logical Positivism
- Ayer, A. J and others
- Revolution in Philosophy

CORRIGENDA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>
xv	25	an	am
xvi	26	way	may
4	10	Buddhists,	Buddhists.
7	20	though	thought
9	25	there	their
28	13	n"	x"
42	7	qualyfiing	qualifying
66	15	per excellence	<i>par excellence</i>
73	14	explnins	explains
137	8	waich	which
146	7	comlex	complex
146	34	"It is a raining"	"It is raining"
149	29	communicated	communicated
165	1	prss	pass

Read 'Puṇyarāja' for 'Puñjarāja' wherever the latter occurs



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