

PAPERS FROM THE ERANOS YEARBOOKS

Man and Transformation

Ernst Benz · Henry Corbin · Jean Daniélou
Mircea Eliade · G. van der Leeuw · Fritz Meier
Adolf Portmann · Daisetz T. Suzuki · Paul Tillich
Lancelot Law Whyte · Heinrich Zimmer

EDITED BY JOSEPH CAMPBELL

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TRANSLATED BY RALPH MANHEIM

The papers assembled here were selected by Olga Froebe-Kapteyn, the founder of the Eranos conferences at Ascona, Switzerland, to represent the spirit of the meetings. Man's ideas of his own spiritual transformation, immortality, regeneration, consciousness, and intellect are examined from various orientations, and these are set in perspective by a survey of biological change in animals. *Man and Transformation* contains all of *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 1954 with the addition of two essays from previous years by Henrich Zimmer and G. van der Leeuw; it continues the presentation in English of the main themes discussed by leading scholars since 1933 at the Eranos meetings.

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
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edited by Olga Froebe-Kapteyn

VOLUME 5

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
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
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RALPH MANHEIM

The papers by D. T. Suzuki and
L. L. Whyte were written in English

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a New Consciousness in Zen"

following page 202

The Ten Oxherding Pictures by Kaku-an
From the originals in the Zen monastery
of Shōkokuji in Kyoto, Japan.

A secure sense that in the tumult and agonies of our age creative forces are at work inspired the annual call of Olga Froebe-Kapteyn to the great creative scholars of her time; for she conceived of scholarship as the mirror—the medium—through which the processes of history and of nature were to be disclosed in depth; and in the knowledge of that depth the mind should be enabled both to achieve accord with its own self-created destiny and to control the rendition of that destiny with reason—in the sense of Seneca's Stoic aphorism, *Ducunt fata volentem, nolentem trahunt*. The life and thought of Dr. C. G. Jung lay close to the sources of this idea, and during the first years of the Meetings, from 1933 to 1951, his presence at the Eranos Round Table gave support as well as continuity to the broadly ranging searches of the many-faceted Occidental mirror. In his opening words to the first meeting of the long and fruitful enterprise he announced what proved to be the prophecy of its course, which in that year had commenced with a comparative study of the Oriental and Occidental mystic ways.

"The European comes seeking the perfumed air of the Orient: disagreeable, a pirate, conquistador, dripping with his 'Religion of Love,' an opium dealer, disoriented, poverty-stricken in spite of his wealth of knowledge and intellectual pretension. That is the picture of your Western Man. That is the reason I have set a certain motto as the foundation of my talk. You must not expect a neatly rounded lecture. Only the Orient has achieved completion: the West is a concatenation of inadequacies. My motto is to be found in Chapter 20 of the *Tao Tê Ching*. There Lao-tse wrote:

"Give up your learning; then you will be free of anxiety!
Between 'yes' and 'yea,' what is the difference?
Between good and evil, what is the difference?
However, what all revere cannot with impunity be set aside.
O Solitude! Have I not yet attained to your heart?"

The people of the crowd are joyful, as at the celebration of a feast,
As though, in Spring, ascending the festival tower:

I alone am uncertain, as yet with no sign of my task,
Like a child who cannot yet laugh,
A weary voyager with no home.
The people of the crowd live in plenty:
I alone am as though abandoned!
Indeed, mine is the heart of a fool!
Chaos, oh chaos!

The people of the world are bright, so bright:
I alone am dull!
The people of the world are so eager for knowledge:
I alone am sad, so sad!
Restless, alas, as the sea!
Tossed about, like one with no place of repose!

The people of the crowd all have something to do:
I alone am idle, like some good-for-nothing!
I alone am different from the rest.
For I cherish the Bestowing Mother.

"You see," Dr. Jung continued, "even so, I must borrow from the Orient;
for European Man has not yet formulated the problem here contained.
The answer is in Lao-tse's next chapter:

"The Form of the Great Life accords completely with the Tao.
The Tao moves things invisibly, impalpably!
Impalpable, invisible,
Images are within it!
Invisible, impalpable,
Things are within it!
Unfathomable, obscure,
Seed-stuff is within it!

The seed is truth:
In it resides faith.
From the beginning until now
Its name has been essential
To the understanding of the origin of all things.

And how do I know this to be
The nature of the origin of all things?
From this itself."

Dr. Jung went on: "This confession of the Master gives utterance to a state of mind that is characteristic also of the White Man when he takes thought of himself. However, he is filled with unrest and aware only of the premise, not of the conclusion as well, only of the surface, not of the depth from which the answer would arise. We cannot reach for and borrow anything from outside, from the world, from history; what is significant can only grow from out of ourselves. Consequently, when the White Man is true to his instincts, he reacts with instinctive resistance to everything that others can say to him or advise. And what he has already swallowed, he must eject again as an alien body; for his blood rejects what has grown upon alien soil.

"I have learned, therefore, to avoid advising or saying anything to the White Man. The best things cannot be told and the second best do not sink in. One has to be able to let things happen. I have learned from the Orient the lesson expressed in the words *wu wei*: 'not-doing'; not 'doing nothing,' but 'allowing.' Others have known of this too, as, for instance, Meister Eckhart when he speaks of 'yielding oneself.' The dark spot upon which one stumbles actually is not empty but is the Bestowing Mother, the Images and the Seed. When the surface is cleared, it can grow from the depth. People always think they have erred when they hit upon it. But if they then cannot think further, the only answer, the only word of advice that has sense, is 'Wait and learn what the unconscious has to say to the situation.' The only way that can be *the* way (the Tao) is the one that one makes oneself and goes alone."¹

The announced aim of the Eranos Round Tables at that time was "to mediate between East and West,"² and indeed, the first five years of the meetings were devoted to a grandiose comparative survey, by a company of master scholars, of the mystic and symbolic legacies of the Orient and Occident. Heinrich Zimmer, J. W. Hauer, Paul Masson-Oursel, Swami Yatiswarananda, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Erwin Rousselle, and Jean Przyluski were the chief representatives of the Hindu-Buddhist-Taoist orders. Ernesto Buonaiuti, Friedrich Heiler, Martin Buber, Robert Eisler, Henri-Charles

¹ "Zur Empirie des Individuationsprozesses," *EJ* 1033, pp. 201-4. Dr. Jung's rendition of the *Tao Tê Ching* is from Richard Wilhelm, *Laotze: Taoteking* (Jena, 1921), pp. 22-23. I have turned the entire passage into English. (The version of Jung's paper tr. in the CWJ 9, i, as "A Study in the Process of Individuation," was based on a revision of the Eranos lecture and omits this passage.)

² Olga Froebe-Kapteyn, "Vorwort," *EJ* 1033, p. 6.

Puech, Louis Massignon, and Boris Vysheslawzeff lectured on aspects of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Dr. Jung developed from year to year his theory of the unconscious "seeds" (invisible and impalpable) of the imageries of myth, fairy tale, mystic vision, and religion, demonstrating the relevancy of comparative studies on the one hand to individual self-discovery and enrichment and on the other to the general Occidental task of touching and awakening to speech the spirit of contemporary man. Contributions were added, also, by scholars of modern art, primitive and pre-Columbian mythologies, and alchemical and astrological symbols. And then, in 1938, the sixth Round Table of the series, a new theme in depth was sounded with a discussion of the archaic, as well as more recent Oriental and Occidental, forms and cults of the Great Mother: Isis, Ishtar, Cybele, and Astarte, as well as Kali, Mary, and the mother figure of our troubled modern dreams.

The second World War broke out the following year, and in the relatively peaceful, pivotal land of the Swiss Confederacy, where for centuries the German, French, and Italian modes of thought and life had been flourishing in accord, the annual Round Table meetings continued with an intensified sense of urgency, concentrating now rather on the various Occidental strains of heritage—Gnostic, primitive Christian, Greco-Roman, Hebrew, and archaic—than on the earlier theme of an East-West mediation. The meeting of 1939, advancing from the topic of 1938, was devoted to a broad survey of the Symbolism of Rebirth; and thereafter we find the following sequence of themes:

- 1940 and 1941: The Trinity, Christian Symbolism, and Gnosis
- 1942: The Hermetic Principle in Mythology, Gnosis, and Alchemy
- 1943: Ancient Sun Cults and Light Symbolism in Gnosticism and Early Christianity
- 1944: The Mysteries
- 1945: The Spirit
- 1946: Spirit and Nature
- 1947: Man

Among the new contributors were the classical scholars Carl Kerényi and Walter Wili, Islamic scholar Fritz Meier, Roman Catholic theologian Hugo Rahner, physicist Erwin Schrödinger, and biologist Adolf Portmann. 1948, Erich Neumann joined the company; 1949, Gershom G. Scholem, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Henry Corbin, and Paul Radin; 1950, Mircea

Eliade; 1951, Gilles Quispel, Lancelot Law Whyte, Erwin R. Goodenough, Max Knoll, and Hellmut Wilhelm; 1952, Herbert Read; and 1953, Jean Daniélou, Ernst Benz, and Daisetz Suzuki. By 1954—the year that forms the base of the present volume of translations, with the addition of Zimmer's article from 1930 and van der Leeuw's, 1950—a substantial sense of continuity and direction can be recognized in the sequence of the meetings, which remained for the following decade largely in the charge of a nuclear group of collaborating scholars: Eliade and Portmann, Scholem, Neumann, Corbin, Benz, Wilhelm, and Read, to whose number occasional visitors were joined—as Dr. Paul Tillich in the present volume, Walter F. Otto in 1955, Laurens van der Post 1956, and Chung-yuan Chang 1958. The last contribution of Dr. Jung was in 1951; he died June 6, 1961. Meanwhile, most of the earliest sharers of the feast also had fallen still; and yet, the sense of continuity never changed.

For the guiding as well as activating force of the enterprise had been neither Dr. Jung nor any one or more of the other participating scholars, but the absolutely dedicated spirit of Olga Froebe-Kapteyn (1881–1962), who had devoted to it her estate as well as her spiritual energy and thought. No one who ever attended the meetings in the lecture hall on her property, on the shores of Lake Maggiore, can have failed to remark her presence, seated to one side, motionless, among her friends: silently absorbing all—and brooding, as all knew, the rising sequence of topics for the Eranos years to come.

"Like all spiritual manifestations of an age," she declared in her opening words to the Meeting of 1954, which yielded most of the papers of the present volume,³ "Eranos, too, is the response to an inward summons and necessity. Such a response entails a process, together with all those transformations that a process of this kind involves. For in life's becoming, everything is in transition. Nothing is static, rigid, or final. From its start, Eranos has been integrated by virtue of the force that C. G. Jung once termed 'the sympathy of all things.' And though such a phrase may sound very strange, on close thought and with unremitting attention to life's course, it is greatly illuminating.

"Only this 'sympathy' can explain the manner and way in which our

³ Only Erich Neumann's essay "Creative Man and Transformation" has been omitted, in view of its previous publication in Neumann, *Art and the Creative Unconscious: Four Essays*, tr. Ralph Manheim (New York and London, 1959), pp. 149–205.

speakers have been brought to us. It has each time been something like a providential coming together of scholars who were intuitively moving in the same direction and open to the same ideas. Through a deep election by affinity, as it were, each appeared here at the right time and discovered before him an appropriate task to accomplish. . . . The extraordinary continuity of their labors, the mutual supplementation of the lectures, the inward relationships of the speakers, which have so often amazed us—all of this can be clarified only by the concept of 'sympathy.' From the moment a scholar was invited to participate (yes, apparently even long before!) he was drawn into the field of sympathy operative in Eranos, in which the integrative center of Eranos rests."⁴

The sense of a destiny operative through herself and all the great scholars whom her inspired invitations drew from every quarter of the civilized world to the lecture hall on her estate—year after year—was characteristic of the absolute dedication to her self-imposed task of this extraordinary, nunlike Muse. In the words of Dr. Adolf Portmann, who, after her death on April 25, 1962, at the age of 81, assumed charge of the continuing momentum of her legacy:

"The foundress of Eranos lived so strongly in the certainty that we are more than we comprise in our consciousness of ourselves! She lived in the conviction that precisely in this deeper being we stand related to the mystery of life in ways that extend far beyond our individualities. Olga Fröbe always found her strength in her belief in these forces of existence; she acted in the knowledge that her best hours of achievement were the products of a power that not even such supreme words as 'Nature' and 'Spirit' can embrace.

"Her innermost connection with what is more than our conscious life gave to the deceased the strength, in spite of all challenges and misinterpretations, even malice and envy as well, to go undistracted on the way that her inward voice appointed, undistracted by any of the mere fashions of the hour, heeding the signs of her hidden loom of thought and feeling—a rich and secret event beyond calculated understanding. It was by virtue of this powerful belief that Eranos came into being and became for many an inward support, and in darkest days a place of light, of significant encounter."⁵

⁴ "Vorwort," *EJ* 1954, pp. 5-6.

⁵ "Zur Erinnerung an Olga Fröbe," *EJ* 1962, p. 7.

In a more than superficial sense, it is possible to compare the fateful role of the foundress, directress, and messenger of the Eranos Round Table—through thirty years of world crisis—to that of the fabulous Maiden Messenger of the Grail, who, in the mythic European age of the Table Round of King Arthur, appeared to spiritually eligible knights to appoint them to the world-renewing task of renovating the Waste Land and healing the Maimed Fisher King. By what spiritual nudge she would know which scholars to summon to her next festival banquet—from the forests of the world both near and far—we cannot know. But the noble series of her thirty annual volumes testifies both to the felicity of her choices and to the wonderful manner in which her knights were inspired to extend themselves, and so carried to her table the best trophies of their lives.

The sympathy of all things and a sense of accord in spontaneity were the ever-present waters of her garden of thought. And in her presence there she assumed the role of a personification, so to say, of the bearing earth itself: the dark "Bestowing Mother" of the Chinese mystic way. It was by no means inappropriate, therefore, that in the sorrowful, modest ceremony, interring the urn of her ashes in the garden of her life work, the following lines were read from the old Chinese "Book of Changes," which she had particularly cherished. They are from the chapter known as "K'un—The Receptive":

The Receptive is mild. — Yielding, devoted, furthering through perseverance: thus the superior man has a direction for his way of life. — Following with devotion—thus does one attain his permanent place. — The Receptive in its riches carries all things. Its nature is in harmony with the boundless. It embraces everything in its breadth and illumines everything in its greatness. Through it, all individual beings attain success. — Perfect indeed is the sublimity of the Receptive. All beings owe their birth to it, because it receives the heavenly with devotion.⁶

The present volume—the first of this English series to appear following her death—is one that she herself selected to represent the spirit of her venture. The authors excellently represent both the range and the quality

⁶ These words, quoted from Dr. Portmann (*ibid.*), are drawn from the commentary to chap. 2 of the *I Ching* and were pronounced by Rudolf Ritsema at the memorial service for Frau Froebe at Casa Gabriella on the day after her death; cf. *The I Ching*, tr. Cary F. Baynes from the German version of Richard Wilhelm (New York and London, 1950; 2d edn., 1961), II, 19–21.

of her choices, while the way in which their papers turn from all quarters to the single significant theme, supplementing and even supporting each other (none of the authors having known beforehand what the others were to say), illustrates perfectly that mystery of sympathy which has been characteristic of Eranos from its inception to the present.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL

Mystery and Spiritual Regeneration
in Extra-European Religions¹

1. *Australian Cosmology and Mythology*

The mysteries of the Karadjeri—that is to say, their secret initiation ceremonies—are bound up with cosmogony, as is indeed the entire ritual life of this people. In the *burari* times (“dream times”), when the world was created and human societies were established in the form that they have retained down to our time, the rites were also inaugurated; and since then they have been repeated unchanged, with the utmost care. As in other archaic societies, history, in the eyes of the Karadjeri, is reduced to a few events that took place in mythical Time, *in illo tempore*: to the acts of the divine beings and the culture heroes. Men do not believe themselves entitled to intervene in history, to make a history of their own, an “original” history; in general, they lay no claim to originality; they repeat the exemplary deeds that were enacted at the dawn of time. But since these exemplary deeds were the work of gods and divine beings, their periodic and implacable repetition reveals archaic man’s desire to remain within the sacred atmosphere of the cosmogony. His rejection of originality is actually a rejection of the profane world, a lack of interest in human history. Archaic man’s existence consists ultimately in an eternal repetition of the exemplary models revealed at the beginning of Time. The purpose of the mysteries, as we shall see in a moment, is a periodic reactualization of these primordial revelations.

This is what the Karadjeri know. In the “dream times,”² two brothers named Bagadjimbiri emerged from the ground in the form of dingoes; they later became two human giants, so tall that their heads touched the sky. Be-

¹ Also published in the author’s *Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries*, tr. Philip Mairet (New York, 1960), pp. 190–228.

² Cf. Ralph O’Reilly Piddington, “Karadjeri Initiation,” *Oceania* (Sydney), III (1932–1933), 36–87; id., *An Introduction to Social Anthropology* (Edinburgh and London, 1950), I, pp. 91–105.

fore the appearance of the Bagadjimbiri nothing existed—neither trees, nor animals, nor human beings. They issued from the ground just before the dawn of the “first day.” A few moments later they heard the cry of a little bird (*duru*) that always sings at dawn, and they knew that it was dawn. Before that the Bagadjimbiri knew nothing. Then the two brothers saw animals and plants, and gave them names, and from that moment on, because they had names, the plants and animals began *really* to exist. One of the Bagadjimbiri stopped to urinate; his brother, curious, also stopped and imitated him. That is why the Karadjeri stop and take a special position when they wish to urinate: they imitate the primordial gesture.

Then the Bagadjimbiri headed northward. They saw a star and the moon, and gave them the names of “star” and “moon.” They met men and women: their relations of kinship, their divisions into clans were defective, and the Bagadjimbiri organized them into the system that is still in force. These human beings were imperfect, they had no genital organs: the two Bagadjimbiri took two kinds of mushroom and so gave them the organs that are still theirs today. The brothers stopped and ate a certain kind of raw grain, but at once they burst out laughing, for they knew that it should not be eaten in this way; it had to be cooked, and since then men have imitated them in cooking this grain. The Bagadjimbiri cast a *pirmal* (a kind of thick stick or ritual pole) at an animal and killed it—and human beings have done so ever since. A great number of myths relate how the Bagadjimbiri brothers established all the customs and even all types of behavior. Finally they introduced the ceremonies of initiation, for the first time utilizing the mystery instruments that have become sacred: the stone knife, the bull-roarer, and the *pirmal*. But a man, Ngariman, killed the brothers with a lance. Their mother Dilga (for other myths relate that they had a mother, though their gestation was extrauterine), who was not far off, caught the smell of corpses in the wind. The milk began to surge from her breasts, fell to the ground, and flowed like an underground stream toward the place where the two dead heroes lay; there it sprang up like a torrent, resuscitated the two brothers, and drowned the murderer. Later the Bagadjimbiri turned into water snakes and their spirits rose to heaven and became what Europeans call the Magellanic Clouds.

2. *The Karadjeri Initiation*

All this is the mythological foundation of the life of the Karadjeri. The mystery of initiation re-enacts the ceremonies instituted by the Bagadjimbiri brothers, although the meaning of certain rituals is not always clear. The initiation includes a considerable number of ceremonies that are performed over a period of several years. Hence it is not a rite of passage from adolescence to maturity but rather an initiation in the strict sense, a progress by degrees, in which the boy is not only instructed in the mythical traditions and the social customs of the clan but is formed in the strict sense of the word. In this process he not only becomes physiologically an adult but is at the same time rendered fit to enter into the estate of manhood as proclaimed by the two mythical Bagadjimbiri.

Since the rites are rather complicated and difficult to summarize, we shall restrict ourselves to describing the most important of them. The first, *milya*, marks the break with childhood: toward the age of twelve, the boy is led into the bush and rubbed from head to foot with human blood. About two weeks later, his nose is pierced and a feather is inserted in the hole; at this time the boy is given a special name. The second and most important rite, circumcision, takes place two or three years later. It is a mystery in the strict sense. The boy is mourned by his family and the entire clan as though he were dead. In a sense he is dead, for he is carried at night into the forest where he hears the sacred songs for the first time. The forest is a symbol of the beyond, and we shall meet with it in numerous initiatic rites and mysteries of primitive peoples. But there are other indications that the boy is dying, that his mode of being is undergoing a radical change. Next day each of a number of men opens a vein in his arm and lets his blood flow into a vessel. Completely naked, blindfolded, his ears stuffed with grass, in order that he may see nothing and hear nothing, the boy sits beside the fire in the midst of the smoke and is made to drink a large quantity of blood. He is convinced that the blood will kill him, but happily he perceives after a while that the kinsmen conducting his initiation are also drinking the blood. As the boy remains seated on the grass, with a shield on his knees, the men approach one after another and let the blood gushing from their open veins fall on his head. One of his relatives then gives him a belt made of human hair. The entire group returns to the camp where the women and relatives mourn him again. After the ritual meal, the neophyte is given a fire stick

already lighted, and he is told that this stick will enable him to kindle a fire in which his genital organs will be consumed. The next day there begins a journey that will last twenty-four days and involve a large number of ceremonies on which we shall not dwell. The boy is accompanied by some of his male kinsmen. During this ritual journey he must not talk, but may at most emit a special sound to attract attention and then suggest what he needs by gestures. During the whole time of his novitiate (that is, as long as he is a *malalu*, a boy being initiated), he cannot move unless he is led by the hand; his head is always lowered, and according to the reports of observers, his face is totally devoid of expression. "If it were not for the readiness with which he responds to instructions," writes Piddington, "the impression created would be that of a low-grade mental defective."

Returning to the camp, the neophyte is visited by all the clans he has encountered on his journey. As they approach the camp, the women receive them by throwing vegetables at their heads, and the visitors reply with their boomerangs. It is a ritual, sham battle, but sometimes a boomerang strikes one of the women and then a veritable riot ensues. The neophyte, whose return to the camp has given rise to new lamentations and voluntary mutilations on the part of his parents, does not attend the festival that follows at nightfall and consists in songs and dances representing various mythical events. Before dawn the boy is led into the bush to be circumcised. He remains seated, his eyes blindfolded, his ears stuffed. Several operators take turns, making use of flint knives. The circumcision is quite complicated and extremely painful: the operators make an incision at the base of the genital organ and remove the entire epidermis from it. While the operation is in progress, the parents weep in the camp.

When it is all over, the operators, themselves weeping, pass in front of the initiate, who remains seated, his head bowed, his eyes closed. The operators cast boomerangs in the guise of presents and reveal their true names to him. A group of young men recently initiated shake bull-roarers, which they then show the neophyte; like the women and the noninitiated, he had hitherto believed the sound of the bull-roarers to be the voice of a divine being. When the blood of his wound is dry, the operators show him the flint instruments. This ceremony is the end of the initiation, strictly speaking, but the boy spends several nights more in the bush. On the day of his return to the camp, his whole body is rubbed with blood, and he is preceded by young men incessantly shaking bull-roarers. In the camp the

women and children hide behind branches and do not dare to emerge before the men have finished burying the bull-roarers. The women lament as they receive the initiate and offer him food.

For two or three years, the young man remains at this stage of initiation and is named *mianga*. Then he undergoes a new operation, subincision, a less important rite taking only one day, to which few neighbors are invited. Some time later, there is a new ceremony, called *laribuga*: in the forest the initiate climbs a tree while the men sing a sacred song. Piddington tells us that the subject of the song is related to a myth about the tree, but that the Karadjeri have forgotten its meaning. However, we can surmise the meaning of the ritual: the tree symbolizes the cosmic axis, the Tree of the World; in climbing it, the initiate enters Heaven. We have then a symbolic ascension to Heaven, such as is attested by a great number of Australian myths and rites.³ But the initiatic progress is not yet complete. At various intervals other ceremonies occur, which we cannot describe here. After several years, the ceremony known as *midedi* is performed: the initiate is led by the elders who show him the place where the *pirmal*, the ritual pole, is buried. It is a long journey, almost an expedition, and the revelation is effected by means of songs and, above all, dances symbolizing the voyages of the Bagadjimbiri. Finally he is told how the Bagadjimbiri invented the ceremony of the *pirmal*.

3. *Mystery and Initiation*

We have dwelt at some length on the Karadjeri initiation because it is always instructive to study in detail at least one rite of the type under investigation. Then we need speak only briefly of the other initiations. But the example of the Karadjeri shows us that things are not as simple as too succinct an account might have led us to believe. We shall better understand the profound meaning of the Karadjeri initiation when we have examined a few similar ceremonies among other peoples, but even now we can discern certain specific characteristics. As we have said, the initiation is something more than a simple rite of passage from one age class to another. The initiation lasts long years and the revelations are of several types. There is, above all, the first and most terrible revelation: that of the sacred as *tremendum*. The adolescent is first terrorized by a supernatural reality

³ Cf. Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, tr. Willard R. Trask (New York and London, 1964), pp. 45ff., 125ff., etc.

whose power, autonomy, incommensurability, he experiences for the first time—and in consequence of this encounter with divine terror, the neophyte dies: he dies to childhood, that is, to ignorance and irresponsibility. That is why his family weeps and laments for him: when he returns from the forest, he will be another, he will no longer be the child that he was before. As we have just seen, he passes through a series of initiatic trials which force him to withstand fear, suffering, torture, but which, above all, oblige him to assume a new mode of being, that of the adult, a mode of being conditioned by the almost simultaneous revelation of the holy, of death, and of sexuality.

It should not be supposed that the Australians are conscious of all this, or that they have invented the mystery of initiation consciously and voluntarily as one invents a modern pedagogical system. Their behavior, like all archaic human behavior, is existential: the Australians reacted in this way when in the depth of their being they felt their special situation in the Universe, that is, when they realized the mystery of human existence. This mystery, we have just said, attaches to the experience of the sacred, to the revelation of sexuality, and to the consciousness of death. The child is ignorant of all these experiences: the adult man takes them on himself one after another, and integrates them into his new personality, the personality that he acquires after his ritual death and resurrection. We shall repeatedly encounter these motifs—*tremendum*, death, and sexuality—in the course of our investigation. We may say at the outset that, if the neophyte dies to his infantile, profane, unregenerate life, to be reborn into a new, sanctified existence, he is also reborn into a mode of being that makes knowledge, consciousness, and *wisdom* possible. The initiate is not only newborn: he is a man who *knows*, who knows the mysteries, who has had metaphysical revelations. During his period of "training," he learns the holy secrets: the myths concerning the gods and the origin of the world, the true names of the gods, the truth about the bull-roarers and the ritual knives, etc. The initiation is equivalent to spiritual maturation, and in the entire religious history of mankind we encounter the same theme: the initiate, he who has known the mysteries, is *he who knows*. But, as we have seen, the initiation of the Karadjeri is only a faithful reproduction of the exemplary deeds of the Bagadjimbiri. And these deeds constitute a cosmogony, for it is the Bagadjimbiri who established the world as it is today. By repeating the deeds of these mythical brothers, the Karadjeri periodically re-enact the creation of the world; they repeat the cosmogony. In short, a new cosmogony

occurs with the initiation of each adolescent. The genesis of the world serves as a model for the "formation" or education of the man.

We find mysteries of initiation everywhere, and everywhere, even in the most archaic societies, they contain the symbolism of a death and a new birth. Here we cannot undertake a historical analysis of initiation, a study that would have enabled us to clarify the relations between cultural structures and types of initiation, but let us at least point out certain characteristic traits that are common to most of these secret ceremonies.⁴

1. Everywhere the mystery begins with the neophyte's separation from his family and withdrawal into the woods. Here there is already a symbol of death: the forest, the jungle, the darkness symbolize the beyond, Hell. In certain localities it is believed that a tiger appears and bears the candidates into the jungle on his back: the wild beast incarnates the mythical Ancestor, the master of initiation, who leads the youths to Hell. Elsewhere the neophyte is thought to be swallowed up by a monster, and we shall have more to say of this motif in a little while; for the moment, let us stress the symbolism of the darkness: in the monster's belly dwells the cosmic Night; this is the embryonic mode of existence, on the cosmic as well as on the human plane.

2. In some regions there is an initiation hut in the forest. Here the young candidates undergo a part of their trials and are instructed in the secret traditions of the tribe. The hut symbolizes the womb.⁵ The death of the neophyte signifies a regression to the embryonic state, not merely in terms of human physiology but also and, above all, in a cosmological sense: the fetal state signifies a temporary regression to the virtual, precosmic mode, to the state of things before the "dawn of the first day," as the Karadjeri say. We shall have occasion to return to this polyvalent symbol of a new birth formulated in terms of gestation. For the moment, we need only say

⁴ Cf. Heinrich Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin, 1902); Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies* (New York, 1908); James G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy* (4 vols., London, 1910), III, pp. 457-550; Edwin M. Loeb, *Tribal Initiations and Secret Societies* (University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, XXV, 3, 249-88; Berkeley, 1920); Adolf E. Jensen, *Beschneidung und Reifezeremonien bei Naturvölkern* (Stuttgart, 1933). See also *Semaine d'ethnologie religieuse: Compte-rendu analytique de la III^e session, 1922* (Enghien and Moedling, 1923), esp. pp. 329-456. Cf. Richard Thurnwald, "Primitive Initiations- und Wiedergeburtssitten," *EJ* 1930, 321-98.

⁵ Thurnwald, p. 393. See also Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn*, I, pp. 225ff.

that the purpose of the candidate's regression to the prenatal state is to render him contemporaneous with the creation of the world. He dwells no longer in the maternal womb as he did before his biological birth, but in the cosmic Night in expectation of the "dawn," that is, of the Creation. To become a new man, he must relive the cosmology.

3. Other rituals cast light on the symbolism of initiatic death. Among certain peoples, the candidates are buried or laid in freshly dug graves. Or else they are covered with branches and remain immobile as dead men. Or else they are rubbed with a white powder to make them resemble ghosts. The neophytes then imitate the behavior of ghosts: they do not make use of their fingers in eating but take their food directly in their teeth, as the souls of the dead are believed to do. The tortured, mutilated neophyte is held to be tortured, dismembered, boiled, or roasted by the demons who are the masters of the initiation, that is, by the mythical Ancestors. His physical sufferings correspond to those of him who is "eaten" by the animal-demon, who is ground to pieces in the maw of the initiatic monster and digested in his belly. The initiatic mutilations are also charged with a symbolism of death. Most of the mutilations are related to lunar gods. And the moon vanishes periodically—dies, that is—to be reborn three days later. The lunar symbolism emphasizes the idea that death is the first condition of all mystical regeneration.

4. In addition to the specific operations such as circumcision and subincision, and in addition to the initiatic mutilations (extraction of teeth, amputation of the fingers, etc.), there are other outward signs marking death and resurrection: tattooing, scarification. As for the symbolism of mystical rebirth, it takes on a number of forms. The candidates receive other names which will henceforth be their real ones. Among certain tribes, the young initiates are supposed to have forgotten all about their previous life; immediately after the initiation they are fed like little children, led by the hand, and again taught how to walk and talk. Usually they learn a new language while in the bush, or at least a secret vocabulary accessible only to the initiate. As we see, everything begins anew with the initiation. *Incipit vita nova*. Sometimes the notion of a second birth is symbolized by concrete actions. Among certain Bantu peoples, the boy, before circumcision, is subjected to a ceremony known as "being born again."⁶ The

⁶ Maurice Canney, "The Skin of Rebirth," *Man* (London), XXXIX:91 (July, 1939), 104-5; cf. C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic* (London, 1922), pp. 78ff., 98ff.

father sacrifices a ram, and three days later he wraps the child in the stomach membrane and skin of the animal. But before being wrapped, the child must climb into bed with his mother and cry like a newborn babe. He remains for three days in the ram's skin, and on the fourth day the father cohabits with his wife. Among the same people, the dead are buried in a ram's skin and in the embryonic position. We shall not dwell on the symbolism of mystic rebirth through the ritual donning of an animal's skin; this symbolism is attested both in ancient Egypt and in India.⁷

5. Lastly, we must say a few words concerning another motif that appears in numerous initiations, although not always in the most primitive societies. I am referring to the injunction to kill a man. Here, for example, is what happens among the Koko, in Papua.⁸ The candidate must undergo trials similar to those of any other initiation: prolonged fast, isolation, tortures, revelation of the bull-roarer, traditional instruction. But at the end he is told: "Now you have seen the Spirit and you are fully a man. To prove yourself, you must kill a man." Head-hunting and certain forms of cannibalism form a part of the same initiatic pattern. Before passing moral judgment on such customs, we should remember this: to kill a man, to eat him or keep his head as a trophy, is to imitate the conduct of the spirits or gods. Considered in this light, the act is a sacral act, a ritual. The neophyte must kill a man because the god did so before him; better still, he, the neophyte, has already been killed by the god during the initiation; he has known death. He must repeat what has been revealed to him: the mystery instituted by the gods in mythical Time.

We have alluded to this type of initiation because it has played a great part in military initiations, particularly in protohistoric Europe. The warrior hero is not only a killer of dragons and other monsters, he is also a killer of men. The heroic duel is a sacrifice; war is a degenerated ritual in which innumerable victims are offered up as a holocaust to the gods of victory.

Let us go back to the primitive mysteries of initiation. Everywhere we encounter the symbolism of death as the foundation of all spiritual birth, that is, of regeneration. In all these contexts, death signifies the transcend-

⁷ Cf. E. A. Wallis Budge, *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt* (Oxford, 1934), p. 494; S. Stevenson, *The Rites of the Twice-born* (London, 1920), pp. 33, 40, etc.

⁸ E. W. P. Chinnery and W. N. Beaver, "Notes on the Initiation Ceremonies of the Koko, Papua," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (London) XLV (1915), 69-78, esp. 76ff.

ing of the profane, unsanctified condition, the condition of the "natural man," ignorant of religiosity, blind to the spirit. The mystery of initiation gradually discloses to the neophyte the true dimensions of existence: by introducing him to the idea of the holy, the mystery obliges him to assume a man's responsibility. Let us remember this, for it is important: for all archaic peoples, access to spirituality is translated by a symbolism of death.

4. "Men's Societies" and Secret Societies

In addition to the ceremonies practiced on the occasion of puberty, there are other mysteries reserved to adults. These are the "men's societies," the *Männerbünde*, or secret societies, to which the adult can be admitted only after a new series of initiatic tests. There are many forms of *Männerbünde*, and we cannot here go into any length about their structure and history.⁹ As to their origin, the most widely accepted hypothesis is that put forward by Frobenius and taken up by the historicultural school.¹⁰ According to this hypothesis, the secret men's societies are a creation of the matriarchal cycle; their object was to terrify the women, particularly by leading them to believe that the masks were demons and spirits of the dead. Thus they were a weapon in the men's struggle to shake off the feminine domination created by the matriarchy. For reasons that we cannot develop here, this hypothesis does not strike us as sound. It is possible that societies of masks played a role in the struggle for masculine supremacy, but there is no proof that the general phenomenon of the secret society was an outgrowth of the matriarchate. On the contrary, we observe a perfect continuity between the rites of puberty that we have just analyzed and the initiatic tests for admission into the men's secret societies. Throughout Oceania, for example, both the initiations of boys and those required for admittance to the secret societies include the same symbolic ritual of death by engulfment in a monster, followed by resurrection—which proves that the forms derive from one and the same center.¹¹ It seems to us that another conclusion must be drawn, namely, that the men's secret societies, the *Männerbünde*, derive from the mysteries of tribal initiation.

⁹ See the works cited above, n. 4. Cf. also Camilla H. Wedgwood, "The Nature and Functions of Secret Societies," *Oceania*, I: 2 (1930-31), 129-45; Will-Erich Peuckert, *Geheimkulte* (Heidelberg, 1951).

¹⁰ Cf. *Semaine d'ethnologie religieuse*, 1922, III, pp. 335ff.

¹¹ Cf. Loeb, *Tribal Initiations and Secret Societies*, p. 262.

What then are the origin and aim of these new secret associations? First of all, it should be noted that there are also women's secret societies, although they seem to be limited in number. One might be tempted to account for them by a desire on the part of the women to imitate the masculine societies, and it is possible that such a process of imitation occurred in certain regions. But as we shall see further on, the secret women's societies, the *Weiberbünde*, derive from the feminine rites of initiation into puberty, associated with the first menstruation. Hence there is no reason to suppose that the men organized into secret societies as a reaction against the matriarchate and that the women in turn organized *Weiberbünde* to resist the terror of the men. It is not impossible, we repeat, that such phenomena of reaction and counterreaction between the two sexes occurred here and there in the religious history of mankind—but they do not constitute the primordial phenomenon. The primary phenomenon is the mystery of initiation that is enacted among young men as well as young girls at the age of puberty. All the other forms of mystery derive from this primordial revelation which every individual must receive in order to become a *man* or a *woman*. And the only plausible reason for the appearance of secret mystery societies is to be sought in a desire to experience as intensely as possible the sacrality specific to each of the two sexes.

That is why the initiation into the secret societies so resembles the initiatic rites of puberty: we find the same trials, the same symbols of death and resurrection, the same revelation of a traditional and secret doctrine—because this initiatic scenario constitutes the condition *sine qua non* of a new and more complete experience of the sacred. Still, there is a difference in degree: in the *Männerbünde*, secrecy plays a greater role than in the tribal initiations. There are rites of puberty that are not absolutely secret (this is the case, for example, among the Tierra del Fuegians), but there is no mystery society without an oath of secrecy—or, more accurately, there was none as long as the natives preserved their ancestral traditions intact. There are two reasons for this reinforcement of secrecy. The first is that membership in secret societies implies a selection; all those who undergo the tribal initiation are not admitted to the secret society, although all would like to be. The second reason is more historic in nature: even among the “primitives,” the world changes, and certain ancestral traditions are exposed to the danger of change; the doctrines are protected from degeneration by increasing secrecy. The occultation of doctrines in a rapidly chang-

ing society is a familiar phenomenon. We find it, for example, in Europe after the Christianization of urban society: outside the cities the pre-Christian religious traditions were preserved in disguised or superficially Christianized forms; but, above all, they were practiced occultly in closed circles of sorcerers. Thus it would be a mistake to suppose that we know the true traditions transmitted in the secret mystery societies. Most frequently, observers have been able to note only certain secondary traditions and a few songs. Nevertheless, their symbolism is evident and this is what enables us to penetrate the meaning of the ceremonies.

Here, for example, is the initiation into the secret cult of Ngoye (Ndsasa), a brotherhood found among the Kuta "so exclusive that only the chiefs of clans can join it."¹² The adepts are lashed with a strap of panther skin; then they are tied to a horizontal pole placed approximately one yard above the ground. And we are told that "in the course of this rite many neophytes are seized with terror and make desperate efforts to flee."¹³ From the account at our disposal, it is hard to understand the reason for their terror, and this leads us to suppose that the actual rite is more drastic, and that the ethnographers have not been able to observe it. The neophytes are then rubbed with "stinging leaves," and their bodies and hair are smeared with a plant that induces a frightful itch. We may note in passing that whipping or rubbing with nettles is a rite symbolizing the candidate's initiatic dismemberment, his death at the hands of demons. We find the same symbolism and the same rites in the shaman initiations.¹⁴ Still another trial "consists in making the adept climb a tree fifteen to twenty feet high, and drink a medicine preserved in a *mukungu*. Returning to the village, the neophyte is received by the women in tears: they weep . . . as though the neophyte were going to die."¹⁵ Among other Kuta tribes, the neophyte is beaten violently, and it is said that his old name is "killed" in order that he may be given another.¹⁶ There is no need to comment further on these rites: just as in the initiations of puberty, we have to do with a symbolic death and resurrection followed by an ascension to heaven.

Among the Mandja and the Banda, there is a society known as Ngakola. "According to the myth that is related to the neophytes at the time of

¹² Efraim Andersson, *Contribution à l'ethnographie des Kuta*, I (Uppsala, 1953), p. 211.

¹³ Ibid., p. 219.

¹⁴ Cf. Eliade, *Shamanism*, pp. 35ff., 45ff., 55ff.

¹⁵ Andersson, p. 213.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 214.

initiation, Ngakola once lived on the earth. His body was very black and covered with long hair. No one knew whence he came, but he lived in the woods near a marshy watercourse. . . . He had the power to kill a man and then to breathe new life into him; he could even make a better man of him." And so he spoke to men: "Send me people, I shall eat them and shall vomit them up renewed." His advice was followed, but since Ngakola only vomited up half of those whom he had swallowed, the men decided to avenge themselves: they gave him "great quantities of manioc to eat, in which they had mixed stones; in this way they succeeded in weakening the monster to such a degree that they could kill him with knives and assegais."¹⁷ This myth is the foundation and justification of the secret society. A sacred flat stone plays an important role in the initiatic ceremonies: according to the tradition this stone was taken from Ngakola's belly.¹⁸ The neophyte is placed in a hut that symbolizes the body of the monster. In this hut he hears the mournful voice of Ngakola; he is whipped and subjected to tortures; he is told that "he has now entered the belly of Ngakola" and that he is in process of being digested. The other initiates sing in chorus: "Ngakola, take our entrails from all of us, Ngakola, take our livers from all of us!"¹⁹ After he has withstood other trials the master initiator finally announces that Ngakola, who had eaten the neophyte, has just vomited him up.

Here we find again the symbolism of death by engulfment in the belly of the monster, the same symbolism that plays so great a role in the puberty initiations. We note once again that the rites of admission into a secret society correspond point for point to the tribal initiations: seclusion, tortures and trials, death and resurrection, imposition of a new name, teaching of a secret language, etc. This appears still more clearly from the description given us of the secret society of the Bakhimba, in Mayumba (Gabon) by Léo Bittremieux, a Belgian missionary.²⁰ The initiatic trials last for two to five years, and the most important consists in a ceremony of death and resurrection. The neophyte must be "killed."²¹ The scene takes place at

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 264.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 266, n. 1.

²⁰ Léo Bittremieux, *La Société secrète des Bakhimba au Mayombe* (Brussels, 1936). A very important African secret society is the Poro of Sierra Leone and Liberia; see K. L. Little, "The Poro Society as an Arbiter of Culture," *African Studies* (Johannesburg), VII (1948), 1-15.

²¹ Bittremieux, p. 44.

night, and the old initiates "sing to the rhythm of dance drums the plaint of the mothers and relatives of those who are going to die."²² The candidate is flagellated and for the first time drinks a narcotic brew known as the "potion of death,"²³ but he also eats calabash seeds which symbolize the intelligence—a significant detail, indicating that one accedes to wisdom through death. After having drunk the "potion of death," the candidate is seized by the hand by one of the old initiates, who spins him around until he falls to the earth. Then the old initiates cry: "Oh, So-and-So is dead!" A native informant relates that "the dead man is rolled on the ground, while the chorus intones a death dirge: 'He is good and dead! Ah, he is good and dead! I will never see the Khimba any more!'"

And in the village his mother, his brother, and his sister also weep for him.²⁴ Then the "dead men" are carried away on the backs of their relatives, who have already been initiated, to a sacred enclosure called "the court of resurrection." They are laid naked in a ditch shaped like a cross, where they remain until the dawn of the day of "commutation" or "resurrection," which is the first day of the native four-day week.²⁵ The neophytes then have their heads shaved; they are beaten, thrown to the ground, and finally resuscitated with a few drops of a spicy liquid sprinkled in their eyes and nostrils. But before their "resurrection" they must swear absolute secrecy: "I will tell no one what I shall see here, neither woman, nor man, nor a profane, nor a White man; if I do, make me swell up, kill me."²⁶ *What I shall see here*; hence the neophyte has not yet *seen* the true mystery. His initiation, that is, his ritual death and resurrection, are only the necessary requirement before he can attend the secret ceremonies on which we are ill-informed.

We shall not be able to speak of other men's secret societies, those of Oceania,²⁷ for example, particularly the Duk-duk, whose mysteries and the

²² Ibid., p. 45.

²³ Ibid., p. 47.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 50.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

²⁷ On the Duk-duk, see the classical description of Hugh Hastings Romilly, *The Western Pacific and New Guinea* (London, 1886), pp. 27-33, reproduced by H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, pp. 111ff., and by O. E. Briem, *Les Sociétés secrètes de mystères*, tr. from Swedish by E. Guerre (Paris, 1941), pp. 38ff. Cf. also R. Piddington, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, pp. 208-9. The Arioi, secret societies of the Society Islands, represent another type of brotherhood without initiation rites; cf. R. W. Williamson and R. Piddington, *Essays in Polynesian Ethnology* (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 113-53.

terror exerted on the noninitiate have so deeply impressed observers, nor of the men's brotherhoods of North America, famous for their initiatic tortures. We know, for example, that among the Mandan, of Dakota—with whom the rite of tribal initiation was at the same time the rite of entrance into the secret confraternity—the torture exceeded anything that can be imagined: two men pierced the muscles of the chest and back with knives, plunged their fingers into the wound, passed a strap under the muscles, attached ropes to it, and hoisted the neophyte in the air. But before he was hoisted, pins were affixed to the muscles of his legs and arms, and heavy stones and buffalo heads were attached to the pins. The way in which the young men endured these tortures, says Catlin,²⁸ bordered on the fabulous: not a muscle in their faces contracted as the torturers mutilated their flesh. Once the neophyte was suspended in the air, a man began to spin him like a top, faster and faster until the unfortunate lost consciousness and his body dangled as though lifeless.

5. *The Initiatic Meaning of Suffering*

What can be the meaning of such tortures? The first European observers spoke of the innate cruelty of the natives. But this is not the explanation. The natives are no more cruel than civilized men. But for all traditional societies, suffering has a ritual value; the torture is held to be administered by superhuman beings, its aim being the spiritual transmutation of the victim. And the torture is also an expression of initiatic death. To be tortured signifies to be cut in pieces by the demon masters of initiation, or, in other words, to be put to death by dismemberment. We remember how St. Anthony was tortured by the demons: he was lifted into the air, smothered under the earth; the demons cut his flesh, dislocated his limbs, cut him in pieces. The Christian tradition calls these tortures "the temptation of St. Anthony"—and this is true to the extent that temptation is identified with initiatic trial. By victoriously withstanding all these trials, that is, by resisting all "temptations," the monk Anthony became a saint. This means that he "killed" the profane man that he was and was resuscitated as another, a regenerated man, a saint. But in a non-Christian perspective, this

²⁸ George Catlin, *O-Kee-Pa* (London, 1867), pp. 13ff., 28ff.; id., *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1885* (Washington, 1886), Part II, pp. 309ff. Cf. the résumé given in O. E. Briem, *Les Sociétés secrètes de mystères*, pp. 94-95.

also means that the demons have succeeded in their task, which was precisely to "kill" the profane man, thus enabling him to be regenerated. By identifying the forces of evil with the demons, Christianity divested the demons of all positive function in the economy of salvation. But before Christianity the demons were, among other things, the masters of initiation. They seized the neophytes, tortured them, subjected them to a great number of trials, and finally killed them in order that they might be reborn with a regenerated body and soul. It is significant that they play the same initiatic role in the temptation of St. Anthony: for in the last analysis, it is their tortures and their "temptations" that enabled Anthony to accede to sainthood.

These considerations have not carried us away from our subject. We have wished to stress the fact that the initiatic tortures of the Mandan were not inspired by any innate cruelty of the American Indians but had a ritual significance, dismemberment by initiating demons. This religious evaluation of physical suffering is confirmed by other facts: certain grave diseases, particularly of a psychic nature, are regarded by the primitives as a "demoniacal possession," in the sense that the sufferer has been elected by the divine beings to become a shaman, a mystic, and that in consequence he is being initiated—that is, tortured, dismembered, and killed by the "demons." We have elsewhere noted numerous examples of such initiatic disorders among future shamans.²⁹ We must therefore conclude that sufferings both physical and psychic are identified with the tortures necessary to any initiation. Disease was interpreted among the primitives as the consequence of a supernatural election; hence it was regarded as an initiatic trial. It was necessary to "die" to something in order to be reborn, that is, to be cured: one died to what one was before, to the profane condition; he who recovered was another, a man newborn, in our case a shaman, a mystic.

On different levels and in varying contexts, we shall encounter the same initiatic pattern, comprising trials, tortures, ritual death, and symbolic resurrection. We have observed this scenario of spiritual regeneration both in the so-called initiations of puberty (which are obligatory for all the members of the clan) and in those of the men's secret societies, which constitute a more closed circle within the clan. But we also find that individual mystical callings, as well as the initiatic diseases of future shamans, follow the same scenario: sufferings, tortures, death, and resurrection. And this

²⁹ Eliade, *Shamanism*, pp. 33ff.

leads us to conclude that the mystery of spiritual regeneration involves an archetypal process that is enacted on different levels and in numerous contexts whenever a man must transcend one mode of being to arrive at another, higher one, or, more precisely, whenever there is a question of spiritual transmutation.

This perfect homogeneity and continuity between the mystery of the initiations of puberty, the rituals of the secret societies, and the intimate experiences that among the primitives determine the mystical calling strikes us as highly significant; we shall have more to say of it.

6. *The "Mysteries of the Woman"*

What we might call the Mysteries of the Woman have been less studied, and we are still poorly informed regarding the content of the feminine initiations. Nevertheless, there are striking resemblances between the two categories of mystery, the masculine and the feminine. The rites of passage from one age class to another have their counterpart in the segregation of young girls after their first menstruation; the initiatic rites underlying the male societies (*Männerbünde*) recur in the exclusively feminine mysteries of the women's societies (*Weiberbünde*). Of course, these correspondences are of a general nature. One must not expect to find in initiatic rites and mysteries reserved for women the same symbolism, or more accurately, the same symbolic expressions as we have just found in the male initiations. There is, however, a common element: all these rites and mysteries are based on a profound religious experience. The focal point both of the feminine initiatic rites of puberty and of the secret feminine societies is the access to sacrality conferred by the onset of womanhood.

The initiation begins with the first menstruation. This physiological symptom demands that the young girl be torn away from her familiar world: she is immediately isolated, separated from the community. We need not concern ourselves here with the myths invoked by the natives to explain the appearance of the first blood and its maleficent character. We may also disregard the theories by which modern ethnologists and sociologists have sought to explain this strange behavior. It suffices to point out that the segregation takes place immediately, that it takes place in a special hut, in the woods or in a dark corner of the dwelling, that the young menstruant must remain in a special, rather uncomfortable position, and must take

care not to be seen by the sun or touched by anyone at all. She wears a special garment or a sign and a color that is, in a manner of speaking, set aside for her, and she must live on raw food.³⁰

We are struck at once by certain details: the segregation in the shadow, in a dark cabin, in the bush. This reminds us of the symbolism of the initiatic death of boys isolated in the forest, shut up in huts. But there is this difference: among the girls the segregation takes place immediately after the first menstruation, hence it is individual; while among the boys the initiation is practiced in groups. But the difference is explained by the physiological aspect of the end of childhood among girls. The individual character of the segregation, which takes place as soon as the menstrual symptoms appear, accounts for the rather small number of feminine initiatic rites. Nevertheless they exist, among people as primitive as the Aranda of Australia, and in certain regions of Africa.³¹ But we must not forget one thing: the length of the segregation varies from one culture to another; from three days (as in India) to twenty months (New Ireland) or even to several years (Cambodia). In other words, the girls ultimately come to constitute a group, and then their initiation is conducted collectively by old women who serve as monitresses. As we have said, little is known about the initiations of girls. But we do know that they receive a rather thorough education,³² bearing both on certain traditions of the tribe (among the Basuto) and on the secrets of sexuality. The period of initiation ends with a collective dance, a custom that we already find among the *Pflanzervölker*.³³ In many regions the young initiates are exhibited and feted,³⁴ or else they form a procession which goes from house to house receiving gifts.³⁵ And there are still other

³⁰ Cf. H. Ploss, M. and P. Bartels, *Das Weib in der Natur- und Völkerkunde*, I (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 454-502, English tr. Eric J. Dingwall, *Woman* (3 vols., London, 1935); Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Part II: *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul* (London, 1911), pp. 145-57; Robert Briffault, *The Mothers* (3 vols., London, 1927), II, pp. 365-412; Wilhelm Schmidt and Wilhelm Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen*, I (Regensburg, 1924), pp. 273-5 (diffusion of the custom).

³¹ W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1899), pp. 92ff., 269; id., *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1904), pp. 133ff.; C. H. Wedgwood, "Girls' Puberty Rites in Manam Island, New Guinea," *Oceania*, IV: 2 (1933-4), 132-55; Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, p. 45 (Africa).

³² Cf. e.g., Hehaka Sapa, *Les Rites secrets des Indiens Sioux* (Paris, 1953; orig.: *The Sacred Pipe*, ed. J. E. Brown [Norman, Okla., 1953]), pp. 146ff.

³³ Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, p. 258.

³⁴ Ploss and Bartels, I, pp. 464ff.; Evel Gasparini, *Nozze, società e abitazione degli antichi Slavi* (Venice, 1954, lith.), Appendix I and II, p. 13.

³⁵ Gasparini, p. 14.

signs to mark the end of the initiation, such as tattooing or blackening of the teeth.³⁶

Here we need not go into further detail regarding the rites and customs attending the initiations of young girls. However, it is worth noting the ritual importance of certain feminine trades which are taught the neophytes during the period of seclusion. Most important of these are spinning and weaving, the symbolism of which plays an essential role in numerous cosmologies.³⁷ It is the Moon that spins Time, it is the Moon that spins human existences, and the goddesses of destiny are spinners. On the one hand, creation or re-creation of the world, spinning of Time and destiny; on the other hand, nocturnal labor, woman's work that must be carried out far from the sunlight and in secret: we may surmise the occult relation between these two orders of mystic reality. In certain places (Japan, for example³⁸) we may still discern the mythological memory of a permanent tension, even a conflict between the secret societies of girls and the men's societies, the *Männerbünde*. During the night, the men and their gods attack the spinning women, destroy their work, their shuttles and looms. In other regions, it is during the period of segregation that the old women teach, along with the art of spinning, the ritual feminine dances and songs which are usually erotic and even obscene. When the period of segregation is ended, the girls continue to meet and spin together in the house of an old woman. We must insist on the ritual character of this woman's work: spinning is very dangerous and that is why it can be done only in special houses, during certain periods, and up to certain hours; in some regions of the world, spinning has been abandoned and the art even forgotten because of its magical danger.³⁹ Similar beliefs still persist in Europe (cf. Percht, Holda, Frau Holle, etc.). In short, there is a bond between feminine initiations, spinning, and sexuality.⁴⁰


36 Cf. the bibliographical references in Gasparini, pp. 15ff., in which we also find an analysis of similar Slavonic customs.

37 Eliade, *Images et symboles: Essais sur le symbolisme magico-religieux* (Paris, 1952), pp. 120ff.; English tr. Philip Mairet, *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism* (New York and London, 1961), pp. 92ff.

38 Cf. Alex. Slawik, "Kultische Geheimbünde der Japaner und Germanen," *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik*, IV (Salzburg and Leipzig, 1936), 675-764, pp. 737ff.; Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, p. 253.

39 Robert Heine-Geldern, *Sudostasien*, in Georg Buschan, *Illustrierte Völkerkunde*, II (Stuttgart, 1923), p. 841; Gasparini, pp. 18ff.

40 Marcel Granet, *Chinese Civilization* (London, 1930), pp. 344ff.; Gasparini, pp. 20ff.; on the "demon of the spinning" in popular Slavonic beliefs, cf. Gasparini, p. 40.



The young girls enjoy a certain premarital freedom, and the meetings with boys take place in the house where they gather to spin. At the beginning of the twentieth century the custom was still attested in Russia.⁴¹ It is surprising that in cultures where virginity is held in high esteem the meetings between girls and young men should not only be tolerated but actually encouraged by the parents. For Western observers—and in Europe particularly for the clergy—such customs denoted a moral decadence. But this is not the case, morality has nothing to do with it. The custom is much more serious, for it is essential to life. It centers round a great secret: the revelation of feminine sacrality; it touches on the sources of life and fecundity. These premarital liberties accorded to girls are not of an erotic but of a ritual nature: they constitute the fragments of a forgotten mystery and not profane pleasures. We cannot otherwise account for the fact that in societies which insist on modesty and chastity the girls and women behave at certain sacred intervals, and particularly on the occasion of weddings, in a manner that has greatly shocked observers. In the Ukraine, to cite but one example, the women lift their skirts waist-high to jump over the fire, and it is said that they are “burning the bride’s hair.”⁴² This total reversal of behavior—from modesty to exhibition—pursues a ritual aim and consequently concerns the entire community. The orgiastic character of this feminine mystery is explained by the need to abolish periodically the norms governing profane existence, or in other words, suspend the law that weighs like death on the people’s customs and restore a state of absolute spontaneity.

In certain regions, the feminine initiation comprises several degrees. Among the Yao, of southeast China, for example, the initiation begins with the first menstruation, is repeated and amplified during the first pregnancy, and is completed only with the birth of the first child.⁴³ The mystery of childbearing—that is, the woman’s discovery that she is a creatrix of life—constitutes a religious experience that cannot be translated in terms of masculine experience. Thus it is understandable that childbearing should have given rise to secret feminine rituals that sometimes take the form of veritable mysteries. Traces of such mysteries have been preserved even in

⁴¹ Dimitrij Zelenin, *Russische (ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 337ff.; see also Gasparini, pp. 22–23.

⁴² Theodore Volkov, “Rites et usages nuptiaux en Ukraine,” *L’Anthropologie* (Paris), II, 160–84, 408–37, 537–87, III, 541–88 (1891–1892), summarized by Gasparini, pp. 42ff.

⁴³ R. P. Heckel, “Miscellanea,” *Anthropos* (Salzburg), XXX (1935), 875; Gasparini, p. 27.

Europe. In northern Schleswig, the women of the entire village behaved like madwomen at the news that a child had been born. They made for the mother's house, dancing and shouting on the way; if they met a man, they tore off his hat and filled it with dung; if they saw a cart, they broke it to bits and set the horse free (here we suspect a feminine reaction against the work of the men). When all the women were gathered at the house of the mother, there began a frantic race through the village: the women ran in a group, like maenads, shouting and crying hurrah; they entered the houses, took all the food and drink they wished, and if they met any men, forced them to dance.⁴⁴ It is highly probable that in olden time certain secret rituals were enacted in the house of the new mother. A thirteenth-century record tells us of the following custom in Denmark. The women gathered in the house of the new mother and, singing and shouting, fashioned a straw dummy which they called the Ox. Two women took it between them, danced with lascivious gestures, and in the end cried out: "Sing for the Ox." And another woman began to sing in a low, hoarse voice, with terrible words.⁴⁵ But this account, transmitted by a monk, tells us nothing more. It is highly probable that the ritual was more complex and that the dialogue with the Ox had a "mystery" significance.

7. *Secret Feminine Societies*

The secret meetings of women are always related to the mystery of birth and fertility. In the Trobriand Islands, when the women plant their gardens they have the right to attack and knock down any man who comes too close to their work. Several types of women's secret societies have been preserved down to our time: their rites always involve a symbolism of fertility. Here, for example, are a few details concerning the women's secret society among the Mordvins, of central Russia. The men, unmarried girls, and children are strictly excluded. The emblem of the society is a wooden horse, and the women who accompany it are called "horses." Around each woman's neck is hung a bag full of millet, ornamented with bands; the bag represents the belly of the horse, and little balls are added to suggest testicles. The society's ritual banquet takes place each year in the house of an old woman. As they enter, the young brides are struck three times with a whip by the old

⁴⁴ Richard Wolfram, "Weiberbünde," *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* (Berlin), XLII (1933), 143ff.

⁴⁵ Wolfram, p. 144; Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, p. 230.

women, who shout at them: "Lay an egg!" whereupon the brides take a hard-boiled egg from their blouses. The banquet, to which each member of the society must contribute food, drink, and money, quickly becomes an orgy. At nightfall, half the society pays a visit to the other half (for each village is divided into two parts). It is a carnival procession: drunken old women ride on the wooden horses and sing erotic songs. When the two halves of the society unite, the hubbub is indescribable. The men are afraid to go into the street. If they do so, they are attacked by the women, are undressed and maltreated, and must pay a fine in order to be set free.⁴⁶

For a few particulars concerning the rites of initiation into the women's secret societies, let us turn to certain of the African societies. The specialists have been careful to tell us that these secret rites are little known, but we can nevertheless gain an idea of their general character. Here is what we know of the Lisimbu society among the northern Kuta (Okondja). A large part of the ceremony takes place beside a river or even in the river. It should be noted that an aquatic symbolism exists among nearly all the secret societies of this region. A hut of branches and foliage is built in the river itself. "It has only a single entrance and the peak of the roof is scarcely a yard above the surface of the water."⁴⁷ The candidates, whose ages vary from twelve to thirty-two, are led to the bank. Each is under the supervision of an initiate, who is called her "mother." They advance together, marching in the water, stooped over, only their heads and shoulders emerging. Their faces are painted with *pembe*, and in their mouths they each hold a leaf. The procession moves down the river. Arrived at the hut, they rise up suddenly and rush into the opening. Once in the hut, they undress completely and once again rush out. Crouching, they place themselves in a semicircle and begin to perform the "fishing dance."⁴⁸ One of the "mothers" then steps out of the river, tears off her loincloth, and totally naked performs an exceedingly obscene dance. When she has finished, another takes her place.⁴⁹ After this dance the candidates must enter the hut, and it is there that their first initiation takes place: the "mothers" take off their clothes, "plunge their heads in the water to the point of suffocation," and rub their bodies with rough leaves. The initiation is continued in the village: the "mother"

⁴⁶ Uno Harva, *Die religiösen Vorstellungen der Mordwinen* (Helsinki, 1952), pp. 386ff.

⁴⁷ Andersson, *Les Kuta*, I, p. 216.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 217.

beats her "daughter," holds her head close to a fire in which a handful of pepper has been thrown, finally takes her by the arm, guides her in a dance, and makes her pass between her "mother"'s legs. The ceremony includes other dances, including one that symbolizes the sexual act. Two months later, a new initiation takes place, again on the riverbank. In the huts the neophytes undergo the same trials and, on the bank, their hair is cut in the form of a circle, this being the distinguishing mark of the society. Before returning to the village, the leader of the "mothers" breaks an egg on the roof of the hut. "This is supposed to provide an assurance that the hunters will take much game." Returning to the village, each "mother" rubs the body of her "daughter" with *kula*, divides a banana in two, gives one piece to her "daughter," keeping the other, and the two eat the fruit together. Then the "daughter" bends down and passes between her "mother"'s legs. After a few dances, some of which symbolize sexual union, the candidates are regarded as initiated. "The Lisimbu ceremonies are thought to exert a favorable influence on the entire life of the village: the plantations will thrive, the hunting and fishing expeditions will be fruitful, the inhabitants will be free from epidemics and quarrels."⁵⁰

We shall not go into detail about the symbolism of the Lisimbu mystery. Suffice it to say that the water symbolizes chaos while the hut represents cosmic creation. To enter the water is to return to the precosmic stage, to nonbeing. The "daughter" is reborn in passing between the legs of the "mother," that is, she is born to a new spiritual existence. The motifs of cosmology, sexuality, new birth, fecundity, and good fortune go hand in hand. In other feminine secret societies of the same African region, the rituals show still more striking initiatic traits. In Gabon, for example, there are associations called Nyembe or Ndyembe which also perform their secret ceremonies beside a watercourse. Among their initiatic trials, let us note only these: a fire must burn continuously, and to feed it the novices must go alone into the forest to gather wood, often at night or in the midst of a storm. Another trial consists in staring into the blazing sun while singing a song. In the end the novices must slip their hands into holes and catch snakes, which they then carry to the village, twined around their arms. During the whole initiation, the women who are already members of the society dance naked and sing obscene songs. But there is also a ritual of death and resurrection that forms part of the last act of the mystery;

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

this is the dance of the leopard. This dance is performed by the women who direct the initiation. They dance two by two, one representing the leopard, the other representing the mother. Around the mother are gathered a dozen young girls who are attacked and "killed" by the leopard. But the mother in turn attacks and kills the leopard. It would seem that when the animal dies the girls are freed from its belly.⁵¹

Our account of these *Weiberbünde* and feminine secret societies reveals a few salient traits. We are struck by the initiatic character of these societies. To belong to them, one must have successfully withstood a trial— and this trial is not of a physiological nature (first menstruation or first childbirth) but of an initiatic character, that is, it affects the whole being of the young woman. The initiation takes place in a cosmic context. We have noted the ritual importance of the forest, the water, the darkness, the night. The woman receives the revelation of a reality that transcends her although she is part of it. It is not the natural phenomenon of birth that constitutes the mystery; it is the revelation of feminine sacrality, that is, of the mystical bond between life, woman, nature, the godhead. This revelation is of a transpersonal character, and that is why it is expressed in symbols and rites. The young girl or woman initiated achieves awareness of a sacrality that emerges from the depths of her being, and this awareness—obscure as it may be—is experienced in symbols. It is by "realizing," by "living," this sacrality that the woman finds the spiritual meaning of her own existence; she feels that life is *real* and *sanctified*, that it is not an infinite series of blind, useless, and ultimately absurd psychophysiological automatisms. Thus for the women as well as the men the initiation is tantamount to a change of level, a passage from one mode of being to another: the young girl is brutally separated from the profane world, she undergoes a spiritual transformation which like all transformations implies an experience of death. We have just seen how closely the trials to which the young girls are subjected resemble those symbolizing initiatic death. But this death is always *a death to something that must be transcended*, and not a death in the modern, desacralized sense of the word. One dies to transform oneself and accede to a higher level of existence. In the case of the young girls, they die to the indistinct amorphous state of childhood, to be reborn to personality and fecundity.

Among women as among men we find different forms of association,

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 219-221.

in which the secrecy and mystery increase progressively. There is, to begin with, the general initiation through which every young girl and bride passes, and which culminates in the institution of the feminine secret societies (*Weiberbünde*). Then there are the feminine mystery societies, as in Africa or in antiquity (the Maenads). We know that such feminine mystery societies have been slow to die out. We need only recall the witches of the European Middle Ages, with their ritual gatherings, their "orgies." Although the witch trials were usually inspired by theological prejudices, although one must often distinguish between the true rural magico-religious traditions, with their roots in prehistory, and collective psychoses of a highly complex character, it is nevertheless probable that the witches' "orgies" did exist—not in the sense given them by the ecclesiastical authorities but in the older, authentic sense of secret gatherings with orgiastic rites, that is, ceremonies bearing on the mystery of fertility.

We are told that the witches' sabbaths did not consist entirely of sexual rites—which is readily understandable since the principal aim was to assure the fertility of the earth—but that human beings and particularly children were also sacrificed and that cases of cannibalism occurred.⁵² This information is probably accurate, for the secret societies of European witches preserved an archaic tradition in which human sacrifice and more or less symbolic cannibalism were regarded as essential to the fertility of the earth. Volhard and Jensen have thrown light on the relations between ritual cannibalism and the myths of the origin of nutritious plants and of the appearance of sexuality and death in the world.⁵³ What seems horrible and satanic to our rationalistic, moralistic judgment is, all in all, only an audacious attempt to assume the responsibility for sacrifice and death as revealed in the myths: for the myths show us precisely that nothing can be born, that nothing can be created without bloody sacrifice. We know that most men interpret these myths in a symbolic sense. But there was also a certain

52 The problem still remains quite obscure; see the dossiers collected by Joseph Hansen, *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Hexenwuns und der Hexenverfolgung im Mittelalter* (Bonn, 1901), pp. 627ff.; cf. also Margaret A. Murray, *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921); id., *The God of the Witches* (London, 1933), particularly pp. 130ff.; Arne Runeberg, *Witches, Demons and Fertility Magic* (Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, XIV, 4; Helsinki, 1947), pp. 15ff.; Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, pp. 129ff.

53 Cf. Ewald Volhard, *Kannibalismus* (Stuttgart, 1939); Adolf E. Jensen, *Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur* (Stuttgart, 1948); id., "Die mythische Weltbetrachtung der alten Pflanz-Völker," *EJ* 1949, 421-73.

number who took the mythical traditions directly and literally. These men thirsted for the sacred, they wished to participate fully in the glorious life of the gods and goddesses. The witches, like the shamans and mystics of other primitive societies, merely concentrated, intensified, deepened the religious experience revealed in the course of their initiation. Like the shamans, the witches were marked by a mystical vocation which impelled them to live the revelation of the mysteries more profoundly than other women.

8. *Engulfment by a Monster*

We find then, among women as well as men, a bond between the first revelation of the sacred—the revelation effected by the initiation of puberty—and the more advanced revelations achieved in more restricted circles (*Männerbünde* or *Weiberbünde*) and even the personal revelations which in certain elected individuals constitute the syndrome of their mystical vocation. We have seen that the same initiatic pattern—involving tortures, death, and resurrection—was repeated whenever there was question of a mystery, that is, of a process of spiritual regeneration. To gain a better idea of the permanence of such initiatic scenarios and at the same time of their capacity for actualization in different situations, let us examine one of these archetypal themes at some length. In other words, instead of presenting ritual systems classified according to their object—tribal rites of initiation, rites of admission to the *Männerbünde* or *Weiberbünde*, etc.—we shall concentrate our attention on an isolated symbolic theme and attempt to see how it is integrated with all the ritual systems and how it enriches their meaning.

We have several times encountered the initiatic trial that consists in engulfment by a monster. There are innumerable variants of this rite, which can be related to the adventure of Jonah—and we know that the symbolism implicit in the story of Jonah has aroused lively interest on the part of depth psychologists, particularly Professor Jung and Dr. Neumann. This initiatic motif has given rise not only to a great number of rites but also to myths and legends which are not always easy to interpret. We have to do with a mystery of symbolic death and resurrection. Let us look at it more closely. In certain regions, the initiatic rites of puberty involve entrance into a dummy resembling an aquatic monster (crocodile, whale,

big fish). But this custom had already fallen into disuse when it was studied by the ethnologists. Thus the Papuans of New Guinea,⁵⁴ for example, construct a monstrous dummy from raffia, which is called *kaicmunu* and is kept in the men's lodge; at the time of his initiation, the child is introduced into the monster's belly. But the initiatic sense of the rite has been lost: the novice goes into the *kaicmunu* while his father is still making it. Since the significance of the rite has been lost, no initiatic terror takes hold of the novice. Nevertheless, the natives continue to introduce him into the *kaicmunu*, because they have preserved the memory that their tribal ancestors did so.

In other regions, we only know that the neophytes are swallowed up by a monster,⁵⁵ but the ritual introduction into its belly is no longer practiced. Thus among the natives of Sierra Leone and Liberia, the future members of the secret society called Poro⁵⁶ are supposed to be swallowed up by the monster Namu: the monster remains pregnant for four years and then gives birth to the initiates in the manner of a woman. Among the Kuta, the Mungala secret society practices the following rite. A kind of dummy four yards long and two yards high, "looking vaguely like an animal," is made from fiber cloth painted white. A man enters into the dummy and during the ceremonies strides about the forest to terrify the candidates. Here again, the original meaning has been lost. But we have seen that the mythological memory of a monster that swallows and vomits up the candidates has been preserved among the Mandja and the Banda (the Ngakola secret society).⁵⁷

The myths are more eloquent than the rites: they reveal the original meaning of the entrance into the monster. Let us begin with the celebrated Polynesian myth of Maui. At the end of a life rich in adventures, this great

54 F. E. Williams, "The Pairama Ceremony in the Purari Delta, Papua," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIII (1923), 361-87, pp. 363ff. Cf. also Hans Neumann, *Masken und Geheimbünde in Melanesien* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 51ff.

55 Cf. Hans Schäfer, *Die Gottesidee der Ngadju Dajak in Süd-Borneo* (Leiden, 1946), pp. 102ff.; the disappearance of the man in the crocodile symbolizes the initiation. On the same motif see Carl Hentze, *Bronzegerät, Kultbauten, Religion im ältesten China der Shang-Zeit* (Antwerp, 1951), pp. 176ff. and passim. On the *soxom* of the Marind-anim, which swallows up children, see Paul Wirz, *Die Marind-anim von Holländisch-Süd-Neu-Guinea* (2 vols. in 4 parts, Hamburg, 1922-5), III, pp. 36ff. A map of the distribution of the "Jonah motif" has been published by Leo Frobenius, "Das Archiv für Folkloristik," *Paideuma*, I (Frankfurt a. M., 1938), 9, and reproduced in Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, p. 338.

56 Andersson, *Les Kuta*, I, pp. 297ff.; Peuckert, pp. 355ff.

57 Andersson, pp. 263ff.

Maori hero returns home to his grandmother Hine-nui-te-po, the Great Lady (of the Night). He finds her sleeping. Quickly casting off his clothes, he prepares to enter the body of the giantess. But the hero is accompanied by birds: he takes the precaution of telling them not to laugh before they see him emerge victorious from his adventure. And indeed, the birds keep silent as long as Maui is traversing the body of his grandmother, but when they see him emerge, with half his body still in the maw of the giantess, the birds burst out laughing and the Great Lady (of the Night) wakes up suddenly, closes her jaws, and bites the hero in two. And that, say the Maori, is why man is mortal; if Maui had succeeded in emerging unharmed from the body of his grandmother, men would have become immortal.⁵⁸

In this myth we discern another meaning of the entrance into the body of a monster: it is no longer death followed by resurrection—a theme common to all initiations—but the quest of immortality by a heroic descent into the belly of the grandmother-giantess. Here, in other words, the hero endeavors to face death without dying, to descend into the Realm of the Night and the Dead and to return alive—as the shamans of our day still do in their trances. But while the shaman enters the Realm of the Dead only *in spirit*, Maui undertakes a descent in the material sense of the word. This is the well-known difference between the ecstasy of the shamans and the heroes' adventures in flesh and blood. We find the same differences in the northern and Arctic regions where religious experience is dominated by shamanism. According to certain variants of the Kalevala, the sage Väinämöinen undertakes a journey to Tuonela, the land of the dead. The daughter of Tuoni, Lord of the Beyond, swallows him up—but on reaching the stomach of the giantess, Väinämöinen builds himself a boat and, as the text says, rows vigorously "from bowel's end to bowel's end." The giantess is finally compelled to vomit him into the sea.⁵⁹

During their trances, the Lapp shamans are supposed to enter the intestine of a big fish or whale. A legend tells us that the son of a shaman awakened his father, who had been sleeping for three years, with these words: "When will my father come from the bend of the pike's bowels, from the

58 William Drake Westervelt, *Legends of Ma-ui, a Demi-god of Polynesia* (Honolulu, 1910), pp. 128ff.; John Francis Stimson, *The Legends of Maui and Tahaki* (Honolulu, 1934), pp. 46ff.

59 Martti Haavio, *Väinämöinen, Eternal Sage* (FF Communications, No. 144; Helsinki, 1952), pp. 117ff.

third curve of the entrails?"⁶⁰ Here we have an ecstatic journey in spirit into the belly of a sea monster. Why does the shaman remain for three years in the "third curve of the entrails"? This we shall try to understand in a little while. For the moment, let us consider a few other adventures of the same type. Again, according to the Finnish tradition, the blacksmith Ilmarinen was courting a young girl; she agreed to marry him on condition that he "walk along the teeth of the old hag of Hiisi." Ilmarinen goes out in search of the witch. At length he finds her and she swallows him. Thereupon she asks him to come out by way of her mouth, but Ilmarinen refuses. "I'll make my own door," he replies, and with blacksmith's tools, which he has fashioned by magic, he bursts the old witch's stomach and comes out. According to another variant, the young girl's condition was that Ilmarinen should capture a speckle-backed pike. But the pike swallows him. Descending into its stomach, Ilmarinen begins to toss about and the fish asks him to go out by the backside. "I won't go out that way," replies the blacksmith, "because of what they will call me." Then the fish suggests that he leave by the mouth, but Ilmarinen replies: "I won't, they will begin to call me vomit." And he continues to toss about until the fish bursts.⁶¹

The story has numerous variants. Lucian of Samosata relates in his *True History* that a sea monster swallowed up a ship with its whole crew. The men lighted a great fire that killed the monster and to escape they opened its gullet with poles. A similar tale is current in Polynesia. The bark of the hero Nganaoa is swallowed up by a kind of whale, but the hero takes the mast and thrusts it into the whale's mouth to hold it open. Then he descends into the stomach of the monster where he finds his two parents, still living. Nganaoa lights a fire, kills the whale, and comes out through the gullet. This motif is widely diffused in Oceania.⁶²

The sea monster plays an ambivalent role. There is no doubt that the fish that swallowed up Jonah and the other mythical heroes symbolizes death; his belly represents Hell. In medieval visions, Hell is frequently imagined in the form of an enormous sea monster, perhaps having its prototype in the Biblical Leviathan. Thus, to be swallowed up is equivalent to dying, to entering Hell—and this is clearly indicated by all the primitive

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 124.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 114ff.

⁶² Cf. L. Redermacher, "Walfischmythen," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (Leipzig), IX (1906), 248ff.; Robert Fritz Graebner, *Das Weltbild der Primitiven* (Munich, 1924), pp. 62ff.

rites of initiation that we have discussed. But on the other hand, entrance into the belly of the monster also signifies return to a preformative embryonic state. As we have already said, the darkness reigning within the monster corresponds to the cosmic Night, to the chaos preceding the creation. In other words, we have to do with a double symbolism: the symbolism of death, that is, the end of a temporal existence, and hence of Time, and the symbolism of a return to the germinal modality that precedes all form and all temporal existence. On the cosmological plane, this double symbolism relates to *Urzeit* (primordial time) and *Endzeit* (final time).

9. *The Symbolism of Initiatic Death*

Now we understand why engulfment by the monster has played so important a role both in the rituals of initiation⁶³ and in the hero myths and mythologies of death. We have here a mystery which involves the most terrible initiatic trial, namely, death, but which also constitutes the only possible means of doing away with temporal duration—in other words, historical existence—and of restoring the primordial situation. Clearly this return to the germinal state, to the “beginning,” is also equivalent to a death: actually one “kills” one’s own profane, historical, worn-out existence, in order to return to an immaculate, open existence, unsullied by Time.

From this it follows that in these initiatic contexts death has not the meaning that one is generally inclined to give it but signifies principally this: one liquidates the past, one puts an end to an existence that like all profane, historical existence is a failure to begin another, regenerate existence. Hence initiatic death is always a beginning, it is never an end. In no rite or myth do we encounter initiatic death solely as an *end*; it is always a condition *sine qua non* for a transition to another mode of being, a trial indispensable for regeneration, that is, for the beginning of a new life. The symbolism of return to the womb has always a cosmological significance. Along with the neophyte, the entire world returns symbolically into the cosmic Night, in order to be created anew, that is, regenerated. And as we have said elsewhere,⁶⁴ a great number of archaic therapies consist in the

⁶³ For a psychological interpretation of this symbolism see also Charles Baudouin, *Le Triomphe du héros* (Paris, 1952).

⁶⁴ Cf. our article, “Mythes cosmogoniques et guérisons magiques,” *Proceedings of the VIIIth Congress for the History of Religions* (1950) (Amsterdam, 1951), 180–1, and our *Patterns of Comparative Religion* (London and New York, 1958), pp. 410ff.

ritual recitation of the cosmogonic myth: to cure the patient, in other words, one must cause him to be *born again*—and the archetypal model of birth is the cosmogony. One must abolish the work of Time, restore the auroral instant before the Creation. On the human plane, this amounts to saying that one must restore the “blank page” of existence, the absolute beginning, the time when nothing was sullied, when nothing had as yet been spoiled.

To enter the belly of the monster signifies a regression to an indistinct primordial past, to the cosmic Night—and to emerge from the monster is equivalent to a cosmogony, a passage from Chaos to Creation. Initiatic death reiterates this exemplary return to Chaos in order to make possible a repetition of the cosmogony, that is, to prepare for the new birth. The regression to Chaos is sometimes fulfilled to the letter; this is the case, for example, in the initiatic disorders of future shamans, which have often been regarded as true cases of madness. For there is actually a total breakdown, sometimes leading to a disintegration of the personality.⁶⁵ In terms of the psychology of Jung, we have to do with an invasion of contents of the collective unconscious. In archaic religious conceptions, the “psychic chaos,” which for C. G. Jung represents the invasion of consciousness by contents arisen from the collective unconscious, is a replica of the “precosmogonic chaos,” the amorphous, indescribable state that preceded all cosmogony. But we know that for archaic and traditional cultures a symbolic return to the chaos is indispensable for all new creation of every kind: every new sowing and every new harvest is preceded by a collective orgy that symbolizes a return to the “precosmogonic chaos”; every New Year is the occasion of ceremonies that signify a repetition of the primordial Chaos and of the cosmogony. And the same symbolism can be deciphered in the “madness” of the future shamans, in their “psychic chaos”: it is the sign that the profane is “dissolving” and that a new personality is about to be born.⁶⁶

From a certain point of view, we can liken the initiatic “madness” of the shamans to the dissolution of the old personality that follows the descent into Hell or the entrance into the belly of a monster. Every initiatic adventure of this type ultimately creates something, establishes a world or a new

65 Cf. Eliade, *Shamanism*, pp. 24ff. See also our article, “Expérience sensorielle et expérience mystique chez les primitifs,” *Études Carmelitaines: Nos Sens et Dieu* (Bruges, 1954), 70–99.

66 On this symbolism, see our *Patterns of Comparative Religion*, pp. 358f., 398f., and *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York and London, 1955), pp. 19ff., 65ff.

mode of being. We recall that in entering the body of his ancestor the hero Maui sought immortality: which amounts to saying that by his initiatic exploit he hoped to establish a new human state, similar to that of the gods. We also recall the legend of the Lapp shaman who had remained for three years in the intestine of an enormous fish—in spirit. Why did he undertake this adventure? Perhaps an old Finnish myth will give us the answer. By magic, that is, by singing, Väinämöinen creates a boat, but he cannot complete it for the lack of three words. To learn them, he goes to see a famous sorcerer, Antero, a giant who has remained motionless for many years, like a shaman in his trance. A tree has grown from his shoulder and the birds have built their nests in his beard. Väinämöinen falls into the giant's mouth and is soon swallowed. But once in Antero's stomach, he forges an iron suit and threatens to remain where he is until he has obtained the three magic words with which to complete his boat.⁶⁷

Here we have an initiatic adventure undertaken with a view to obtaining secret knowledge. One descends into the belly of a giant or monster to obtain *science, wisdom*. That is why the Lapp shaman remains for three years in the stomach of the fish: to learn the secrets of Nature, to decipher the enigma of life, and to learn the future. But if entrance into the belly of a monster is equivalent to a descent into Hell, amid the darkness and the dead—that is, if it symbolizes regression both into the cosmic Night and into the shades of “madness,” where all personality is dissolved—if we bear in mind all these correspondences between Death, Cosmic Night, and Chaos—madness-regression to the embryonic state, then we shall understand why death also symbolizes wisdom, why the dead are omniscient and also know the future, why the visionaries and poets seek inspiration over tombs. And, on another plane of reference, we shall understand why the future shaman, before becoming a sage, must know “madness” and descend among the shades, why creativity is always related to a certain “madness” or “orgy” bound up with the symbolism of death and darkness. Professor Jung explains all this by revival of the contact with the collective unconscious. But to remain within our own field, we shall understand, above all, why, for the primitives, initiation is always related to a revelation of sacred science, of wisdom. It is during the period of segregation—that is, while they are supposed to be engulfed in the belly of the monster or in hell—that the neophytes are instructed in the secret traditions of the tribe. The true

⁶⁷ Haavio, *Väinämöinen*, pp. 106ff.

science, that transmitted by the myths and symbols, becomes accessible only through the process of spiritual regeneration realized by initiatic death and resurrection.

We are now in a position to understand why the same initiatic pattern of suffering, death, and resurrection occurs in all the mysteries, in the rites of puberty as well as in those that give access to a secret society, and why the same scenario can be deciphered in the shattering personal experiences that precede the mystical calling. Above all, we understand this: the man of primitive societies endeavored to conquer death by according it such importance that it ultimately ceased to be a *stopping* and became a *rite of passage*. For the primitives, in other words, one always dies to something that was not essential: one dies, above all, to the profane life. In short, death comes to be regarded as the supreme initiation, that is, as the beginning of a new spiritual existence. And moreover, generation, death, and regeneration were understood as the three moments of one and the same mystery, and the entire spiritual effort of archaic man went to show that there must be no caesura between these moments. One cannot stop in one of the three moments, one cannot settle down in one of them, in death, for example, or in generation. The movement, the regeneration continues perpetually: indefatigably one re-enacts the cosmogony in order to be sure of doing a thing well; and this goes for the making of a child or a house, or for the exercise of a spiritual vocation. That is why the rites of initiation have everywhere a cosmogonic significance.

Wisdom itself and, by extension, all sacred and creative knowledge are conceived as the fruit of an initiation, that is, as the result both of a cosmogony and of an obstetrics. It is not without reason that Socrates compares himself to a midwife: he helped man to be born to awareness of himself. Still more clearly, St. Paul speaks in his Epistle to Titus of "spiritual sons," of the sons he has engendered by the faith. And the same symbolism is to be found in the Buddhist tradition: the monk abandoned his family name and became a "son of Buddha" (*sakya-putto*), for he was "born among the saints" (*ariya*). As Kassapa said in speaking of himself: "Very son of the Exalted One, born of his mouth, born of the *dhamma*, created by the *dhamma*," etc.⁶⁸ But this initiatic birth implied death to profane existence. The pattern has been preserved in Hinduism as well as in Buddhism. The

68 *Samyutta-Nikāya*, II, 221, in *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, Part II, tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward (London, 1922), p. 150.

yogi "dies to this life" to be reborn to another mode of being, the mode of being that is represented by deliverance. The Buddha taught the way and the means of dying to the profane human condition—that is, to slavery and ignorance—to be reborn to liberty, beatitude, and the absolute of *nirvāṇa*. The Indian terminology of initiatic rebirth sometimes recalls the archaic symbolism of the "new body" obtained by the neophyte. The Buddha himself proclaims: "I have shown my disciples the way whereby they call into being out of this body [constituted by the four elements] another body of the mind's creation (*rūpim manomayam*), complete in all its limbs and with transcendental faculties (*abhinindriyam*)."⁶⁹

All this proves, it seems to me, that the archaic evaluation of death as the supreme means of spiritual regeneration constitutes an initiatic scenario that extends into the great religions of the world, including Christianity. This is the fundamental mystery, resumed, relived, and reinterpreted in every new religious experience. But let us consider more closely the ultimate consequences of this mystery: if we already know death here below, if we die innumerable times, continually, to be reborn to *something else*, it follows that man already sees, here below on earth, something which does not belong to the earth, which partakes of the sacred, of the godhead; he sees, let us say, a beginning of immortality, he obtains a greater and greater share of immortality. Consequently, immortality must not be conceived as a survival after death, but as a situation which one creates continuously, for which one prepares oneself, and in which one even participates here and now, in this world. Nondeath, immortality, must then be conceived as a limit, an ideal situation toward which man tends with his whole being, and which he strives to capture by dying and coming back to life continuously.

⁶⁹ *Majjhima-Nikāya*, II, 17, in *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. Lord Chalmers, Vol. II (London, 1927), p. 10; cf. our *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (New York and London, 1958), pp. 165ff.

The Transformation of Man in Mystical Islam

I

As we know, living organisms up to a certain level in the zoological hierarchy can replace parts of the body that have been lost; if, for example, a water newt's leg is cut off, it grows again. The higher animals and man lack this gift. But in man a psychic phantom may, in a manner of speaking, replace a lost limb, leading one to suppose that it is still present. Ninety-five out of one hundred leg amputees are said to develop phantom limbs of this kind, and Max Mikorey has shown that this phenomenon sometimes occurs in individuals born lacking a limb. He concludes that living creatures are governed by an "entelechy," a project of wholeness, which in one case (man) produces an imaginary new growth and in the other (certain lower animals) an actualized phantom.¹

However, it is not only the amputated whose lives seem to be damaged; it is man in general, all of us. I am referring not only to deficiencies in health, wealth, knowledge, or skill, but above all to our falling short of the perfection and completeness (words that may here be taken as synonymous) of the human being—our falling short of the imaginary origin and ideal goal of human self-realization. Many of the great religions have explained this unquestionable one-sidedness and inadequacy, which are the heritage of every man, by the myth of a fall from grace, and in their religious message they have endeavored to hold out a hope of cure. Here religion was abetted by spiritual guidance, which took over a part of the religion's mission, attempting to convince unbelievers that at least the existential message of religion was sound; and it went further, helping the religious man to gain a deeper understanding of the problems, teaching him above all to dis-

¹ Max Mikorey, *Phantome und Doppelgänger* (Munich, 1952).

tinguish better between the reality and the appearance of his own situation, and promising him practical help as well.

The medical healer can form an approximate image of his desired goal, the healthy man; a certain number of individuals are not too far removed from it. But what of a healing process which, like that undertaken by religion and spiritual guidance, starts from the assumption that all mankind is afflicted with a universal sickness or deformity? Where is the model toward which the healing, refashioning, whole-making should aim? Setting aside a possible classification of religions according to their belief that man is wholly, partially, or not at all perfectible, and taking the word "perfectibility" in a broad sense, we are bound to reply that the religions themselves provide such a model. Herein precisely lies their transcendence: the model cannot be found in any earthly reality, it cannot be arrived at inductively; it stems from a higher spirit, and it is only through vision or faith that man can understand or feel the soundness and necessity of the plan to which he submits. But a historian of religion also observes that the model is not the same for all religions, that the image of wholeness need not even be complete, and that it may be expressed in different ways. The picture cannot always be the same, because in every religion transcendence is interwoven with immanence; the model varies with the situation and attitude of the group, sometimes to favor and sometimes to oppose it. As to the incompleteness of such models, I need only refer to the work of the theologians, which is often nothing other than an attempt to fill in the gaps in the system; and here I am thinking particularly of Christianity, a religion whose whole character suggests that there should not be gaps in its model of perfection. But Christ, who stands before all eyes as a model and image of perfection, is "completed" by the Holy Ghost, which supplies everything that does not stand in Scripture and cannot be disclosed by learning—the Holy Ghost, which in some mysterious way is identical with Christ. In a sense, Scripture and learning are the deposit of this same Holy Spirit, whose mission is to take account of the development and the leaps of the human spirit and to see to it that the model is understood even in the most remote future. An example of how the ways in which man is guided may vary despite certain common traits is provided by a comparison between Islam and Christianity.

Christianity sets Christ, a man of flesh and blood who is at the same time God, before man as a model which he should seek to resemble (*homoiosis*,

imitatio). This is a model that can be copied directly. And since Christ is the Son of God, those who are illuminated by the Holy Ghost should also become sons (if only adoptive sons) of God. God Himself is in a sense defined with Christ; He is no longer, as in the Old Testament, perceptible only in the Word, but can be seen in the life and acts, indeed in the person, of Christ. God's Word, as the saying is, has become flesh.

Islam, which came into being at the beginning of the seventh century A.D. in a region inhabited by Judaism, Christianity, and Mazdaism, and which by and large took over the Judeo-Christian myth of the fall, categorically rejects the possibility of a bond between God and man; it denies that God can be defined through a man, even through a second Adam. For Islam, God is perceptible only in His words, hence without falsification only in the Koran. Again God's Word has become Scripture—a trait that places Islam closer to the Mosaic religion than to Christianity. There is no doubt that for Islam God and man are farther apart. Only in the Prophet does man come one step closer to the godhead, but he remains a man. Moreover, prophecy was concluded with Mohammed, so that for Islam mankind has its greatest proximity to God behind it. Nevertheless, God sends certain heavenly beings to man; these are the angels who, however, never become real men.² According to Islam, mankind and the godhead meet halfway between prophet and angel, but they never wholly coincide as in Christianity. Man's mission can therefore not be an imitation, but it is obedience to the decrees and acceptance of God's utterances as revealed in the Koran.

Yet, sharp as this distinction seems, it has little practical importance. What from our point of view seems to make things so much simpler in Christianity makes them more difficult when seen from another point of view, and a Moslem might say the same. For the presence of two or three gods who are all supposed to be one (particularly when the God who became a man almost obscures the God who remained in heaven) is more complicated than the clear distinction between God and man drawn in Islam. On the other hand, Islam too knows of a point where God and creature intersect (as in Christ) and where, consequently, very similar problems arise; that point is the Koran. And in certain sects Mohammed himself was raised to

² Here we need not dwell on such episodes as Gabriel appearing in the form of *Diḥya al-Kalbī* or Satan in the form of *Surāqa al-Mudlijī*; on these, see Julius Wellhausen, *Muhammed in Medina* (Berlin, 1882), pp. 41, 43, 54ff.

this category as an object of speculation on the *logos*.³ In both religions, moreover, the founder appears in roughly the same situation: man and yet unattained prototype; somehow God's right hand, yet not God Himself. In both religions the believer regards God primarily as the distinct opposite of himself; in both Islam and Christianity he feels that as the highest among creatures he is turned toward God in a special way; but for this very reason he is an "I" with his own strivings, and, as such, he is permanently separate from God. This can best be shown in the self-observation and the monuments of profane literature, for here God is naïvely invoked whenever man has come to the end of his own wisdom and strength. Where the godhead is taken as all-encompassing, man looks upon himself as an infinitesimal zone excepted from this omnipotence; and it is up to our finer discernment, it is the object of theological and philosophical thinking, to distinguish the seraphic from the diabolical currents in this ocean of divinity. Many a man may have arrived at a neat division on paper, and yet in distress, or in supposedly sacred fury in God's name, he may have succumbed to the devil. Here we are not concerned with these distinctions, although they are of the utmost importance. Let it suffice to say that in general the power and will of man are experienced as counterpoles to the power and will of God.

Even the naïve believer, and to a still greater extent the mystic, finds this opposition, this exceptional position and isolation of the human ego over against God painful, and he endeavors to transcend the tension between the two poles. Mysticism is actually an attempt to tear open the ego, in which man marks himself off from God, and to let the godhead flow in, or even to eliminate the ego altogether. The Islamic mystics found in the Islamic creed the injunction to do just this; they related the words "There is no god but God," which in their primary sense deny the existence of more than one God, to the dualism of I and God. According to them, it is above all man's self-will, his volitive soul, his I which demands the divinity, the obedience, the prestige that are due only to the one true God. Islam calls upon mankind to refuse obedience to this illegitimate godhead, to destroy it, to honor only God on earth. And the step from a merely theoretical dethronement to a practical annihilation of the pseudo godhead that the ego represented in their eyes seemed all the more commendable because

³ Tor Andrae, "Die person Muhammeds in lehre und glauben seiner gemeinde," in *AEO*, XVI (1918), passim; Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Idea of Personality in Sūfism* (Cambridge, 1923), pp. 43, 58.

the Arabic word for "profession of the unity" of God could easily be interpreted as "realization" of this unity; for the second root form of the word *tawḥīd*, derived from the numeral *wāḥid* ("one"), has a declarative as well as a factitive meaning.

Naturally the way in which the Islamic mystics describe the result of the transcending of duality is extremely contradictory. A mysticism that starts from the conception (whose leading ancient advocate was Empedocles) that like always seeks like was bound to arrive at the notion that a part of the godhead, a divine spark, was hidden in man, and that this part must be brought home to the whole. Yet even a Najm ad-dīn al-Kubrā (d. 618/1221),^{3a} who pursues this line of thought at length and assumes the existence of a mutual force of attraction between God and man, never dares to speak of an actual "union" (*ittiḥād*). This contradiction runs through almost all Islamic mysticism; the harmless "attaining to" (*waṣāl*) occurs hundreds of times, but the ominous "union" is strictly avoided, since God has no equal and because of this incommensurability can unite with nothing and no one. The notion that man can receive God into himself, that God thus takes a dwelling (*ḥulūl*) in him, was also rejected, in view of the impossibility of leaving God attached to any one place and in view of the related doctrines of the Christians concerning Christ. The Islamic mystics preferred the idea that the human person becomes nothing in the presence of God or is destroyed by Him, so that in the end only God exists. Kubrā even tortures the language to avoid offending this conception. He writes: "There are two persons (or subjects), His (God's) person and thy (human) person. If thy person is made to die away, His person remains. . . . First the attributes of thy person die away, the praiseworthy as well as the blameworthy. Hence it is necessarily the attributes of His person that cover thy person. . . . Thereupon thy being dies away, and His person covers!" Here he purposely omits the pronoun "thee" (His person covers thee) in order to indicate that a human subject is no longer present.⁴ Others looked upon this dying away not as a direct negation but only as a forgetting of the individual's own existence. 'Abdal'azīz ibn Zaydān of Fez, for example, came one day to Ibn 'Arabī (d. 638/1240) and said to him that he now knew

^{3a} [Double dates indicate, first, the year in the Mohammedan calendar (A.H.), which reckons from A.D. 622, the year of the hegira, and, second, the year in the Christian calendar. Single dates are A.D.—ED.]

⁴ *Fawā'id al-jamāl wa-fawā'id al-jalāl*, ed. Fritz Meier (Wiesbaden, 1957), § 141. Cf. also Nicholson, *The Idea of Personality in Sūfism*, p. 13.

that the mystics were right about their dying away, for he had just experienced such a state.

You know that the Caliph from Spain came to our city today. I left my house to enjoy the spectacle with the other people of Fez. The battalions of the army marched up one after another. . . . But when the Caliph himself appeared and I gazed at him, I died away to myself; the soldiers and everything that a man perceives with the senses vanished from me. I no longer heard the rumbling of the kettledrums, although they were very numerous. I heard neither the trumpets nor the cries of the people; nothing of this kind touched my ears, and with my eyes I saw no one in the whole world except for the Caliph. And no one pushed me away;⁵ I remained standing in the way, amid the passing horses and the crowd. I no longer saw myself and was not even aware that I was looking at him (the Caliph); in gazing at him I was absent from myself and from those present. Then, when he withdrew from my sight and I came to myself, the horses and the crowd carried me along. They tore me from my place, and only with difficulty could I free myself from the crush. My ears now perceived again the cries and the tones of the kettledrums and trumpets. I recognized that there is such a thing as dying away and that it is a state which makes him who is in it immune to the influence of that which has vanished from him.⁶

So much for Ibn Zaydān. But even this dying away is weakened or annulled, as it were, by the so-called "subsistence" (*baqā'*), which gives the dissolution into God the character of an identification, a resurrection in God.

The contradictions and extremes are reconciled in a mid-point which even orthodoxy could recognize. Here Islam and Christianity meet: in the intention of making oneself wholly into an instrument of God and of doing solely what He commands. From here it is an easy leap to the feeling or speculative idea of being wholly identical with God or of being totally extinguished in Him.

Nevertheless, such exclamations of the mystics as "Praise be to me, Praise be to me! How great is my glory!" and "I am God!" could only give offense both outside and inside of Islamic mysticism, and people wondered wherein such men as Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/874-75 or 264/877-78), to whom the first of these exclamations is attributed, and Ḥallāj (d. 309/922),

⁵ Corr.: *mā azāhanī* in place of *mā zāhanī*.

⁶ Ibn 'Arabī, *Al-futūḥāt al-Makkīyya* (Cairo, 1293/1876), Vol. II, pp. 676f.

who is responsible for the second, differed from Pharaoh who, according to the Koran, laid claim to divinity and for this very reason incurred the curse of God. Bistāmī was defended on the ground that he must, while in a state that defies description, have spoken in the name of God. In such states, it was said, it is no longer the man who speaks, but God through the man.⁷ Concerning Hallāj there is the report of 'Alā' ad-dawla as-Simnānī, a mystic of the eighth-fourteenth century. It runs as follows:

Hallāj, who in Baghdad
Was a worker of wonders,
Who showed the people
Summer fruits in winter
And winter fruits in summer,
And when he stretched forth
His hands toward heaven,
Brought forth silver drachmas
On which was printed
Qul Illāhu aḥad,
Say God is one!
Whom in the end
Those learned in the law
Saw fit to execute,
Because he said
That it takes the place
Of a pilgrimage to Mecca
If a man have in his house
A quiet, well-kept room
Where he says all the prayers
That a man can pray
On the pilgrimage to Mecca,
And thereupon gathers
All the orphaned children
That he can find in his quarter,
And feeds them and clothes them
And gives them money
And sends them away —
This man, who boasted
That in ecstasy
He had become one with God,
A man once saw in ecstasy and asked:

⁷ Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāj, *Al-Iḥwā' fi'l-taṣawwuf*, ed. R. A. Nicholson (E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, Vol. XXII, Leiden and London, 1914), p. 390, 12ff.

O God! Why was Pharaoh
 Condemned to the flames
 For crying out
 I am God, and Ḥallāj
 Is rapt away to heaven
 For crying out the same words:
 I am God!—Then he heard
 A voice speaking:
 When Pharaoh spoke those words,
 He thought only himself,
 He had forgotten me.
 When Ḥallāj uttered them
 He had forgotten himself,
 He thought only of me.
 Therefore the I am
 In Pharaoh's mouth was a curse to him;
 In Ḥallāj the I am
 Is the effect of my grace.⁸

II

The first question that arises at present is this: did the Islamic mystic believe that he himself could accomplish the *opus magnum* of casting off his self and dissolving his will—in short, the destruction of the ego? Did he believe that man could redeem himself? To formulate this question is to answer it in the negative. The religious law, the Islamic creed, prescribes that every expression of intention, even if it be merely to perform some small service or to cross a street, should be followed by the restrictive clause “if God wills” (*in shā’ Allāh*), and today this formula has been so worn by constant use that it has become a kind of future particle; if a man is asked if he will do this or that, he does not answer “yes,” but “if God wills.” The meaning is not half consent but an unequivocal yes; still, the success of the undertaking is represented as depending on God's will. The mystic also holds that he must bring his own powers to bear if he is to attain his goal; but at the same time he admits that all his efforts will be fruitless unless God gives His blessing. The mystic Abū Sa’īd al-Kharrāz (probably died

⁸ Iqbāl ibn-i Sābiq-i Sistānī, *Chihil majlis* (= *Malfūzāt-i shaykh ‘Alā’ ad-dawla as-Simnānī*), Ms. of E. G. Browne, Cambridge, D 8, fol. 9a-b, and D 21, fol. 92b; Friedrich Rückert, *Sieben Bücher morgenländischer Sagen und Geschichten* (Stuttgart, 1837), Vol. II, pp. 139-41 (after d’Herbelot’s *Bibliothèque Orientale*, s.v. Ḥallāj); Jāmī, *Nafahāt* (Calcutta, 1859), p. 511.

in 286-800) coined this maxim: "He who believes that he can reach God by his exertions hurls himself into an endless torment; and he who believes that he can reach Him without exertions, hurls himself into an endless wishful dream."⁹ Another of his sayings runs: "(Mystical) knowledge comes from the source of the divine bounty and from human exertion."¹⁰ Bistāmī said: "One must do everything in spiritual struggle, but (in success) one must see the grace of God and not one's own act."¹¹ "I have never seen anything come of ritual prayer but the upright posture of the body, nor of fasting anything but hunger. All (else) that I have comes from His (God's) grace, not from my action. A man can produce nothing by exertion and activity [*kasb*]. . . . The happy man is he whose foot, as he walks along, stumbles suddenly on a treasure so that he grows rich."¹²

The interplay between human action and divine grace already becomes evident in the event of conversion (*tawba*, *ināba*, etc.) with which transformation usually begins, in the turn of the worldly man, who professes Islam only outwardly, to mystical piety, to God. "Repentance means that thou shouldst be unto God a face without a back, even as thou hast formerly been unto Him a back without a face."¹³

In general the theoreticians of Islamic mysticism count conversion among the so-called virtues or "places" (*maqām*, pl. *maqāmāt*), that is, the inner attitudes that one can and must achieve by effort. However, a number of examples show that frequently a man does not provide the impetus toward transformation, but receives it. And actually we possess explicit statements by a number of mystics to the effect that conversion in general is the work not of man but of God. "Man has nothing to do with conversion; for it comes to him but not from him."¹⁴ When asked by a grievous sinner whether God would incline toward him if he were converted, the woman mystic Rābi'a (d. 185/801) replied: "No, it is just the opposite; if He should incline toward you, then you can be converted."¹⁵ Even the carrying out of the

⁹ Farid ud-din-i 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkirat ul-awliyā*, ed. R. A. Nicholson (London and Leiden, 1905-7), Vol. II, 44, 9-11.

¹⁰ Abū'l-Qāsim 'Abdalkarīm al-Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla* (Cairo, 1346/1927), 143 (*bāb al-ma'rifa bi'llāh*).

¹¹ 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkira*, I, 164, 20-21.

¹² *Ibid.*, 155, 10-14.

¹³ Ibrāhīm ad-Daqqāq, in Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Kalābādjī, *At-ta'arruf*, ch. 35, ed. A. J. Arberry (Cairo, 1934), pp. 64-65; tr. in Arberry, *The Doctrine of the Sufis* (Cambridge, 1935), p. 83.

¹⁴ Abū Ḥafṣ al-Haddād (d. 264-67/877-81), in Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 48 (*bāb al-tawba*).

¹⁵ Qushayrī, 48.

conversion may be experienced as something removed from man. A former blacksmith said: "I gave up my work so-and-so many times, but I always returned to it. Then at last the work gave me up and since then I have returned to it no more."¹⁶ If the power to carry out the decision is lacking or if it flags, the new impulse can forcibly make way for itself. When Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) could not resolve to give up his professor's chair in Baghdad and go the way of mysticism, which he had recognized to be the right way, his tongue suddenly refused to serve him; he became physically unable to continue his lectures.¹⁷

It should also be mentioned in this connection that conversion cannot be calculated. Instrumentalities which, as far as one knows, have never sufficed to bring about the turn, and which have failed in hundreds of cases, might unexpectedly accomplish the impossible. Abū Sulaymān ad-Dārānī (d. 215/830) was converted by a simple teller of moralizing stories. A sparrow has caught a crane, said a later mystic on this subject.¹⁸ Another, who had waited the whole of a cold winter night outside the house of his beloved, said to himself when day dawned: "You ought to be ashamed of yourself! In a night as blessed as this you stand all night until morning for the sake of your pleasure, but if the prayer leader recites one of the longer sūras, you go out of your mind." A sorrowful feeling crept into his heart, and he was converted.¹⁹ A man's trade or social status provides no indication of whether he will find the way. Highwaymen (Fuḍayl ibn 'Iyād), slaves (Khayr an-Nassāj, a Negro), peddlers (Sarī as-Saqāṭī), peasants (Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Kharaqānī), money lenders (Ḥabīb al-'Ajāmī), merchants (Shaqīq al-Balkhī), sons of princes (Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, Abū Shushā' al-Kirmānī), and scholars (Junayd, Ruwaym, Shiblī, Ghazzālī, Ibn 'Arabī) have found the way to mysticism. Here we encounter the mystery of the individual, which casts doubt upon the causality of history.

The theoreticians of Islamic mysticism often distinguish two types,

¹⁶ Ḥaddād, in Qushayrī, 46.

¹⁷ M. C. Barbier de Meynard, "Traduction nouvelle du traité intitulé 'Le préservatif de l'erreur etc.'," in *Journal Asiatique* (Paris), 7th ser., IX (1877), 58; Hellmut Ritter, *Al Ghasali, Das Elixir der Glückseligkeit* (Jena, 1923), p. 10; W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali* (London, 1953), p. 57. This passage retains its force even if fear of the Ismailians did have something to do with Ghazzālī's resignation and departure: Farid Jabre, "La Biographie et l'œuvre de Ghazali reconsidérées à la lumière des Ṭabaqāt de Sobkī," in *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales* (Cairo) I (1954), 91-94.

¹⁸ Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 46.

¹⁹ 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkira*, I, 179, 15-22.

those who are "drawn upward" (*majdūb*) and those who "stride" (*sālik*). By "drawn upward" they mean a mystic who is raised up passively into a higher sphere, without any move on his part; a "strider," on the other hand, must make his way arduously, surmounting every obstacle by reflection and effort. This did not imply that the "strider" was forsaken by God and had to (or could) achieve his goal alone; his slower progress was also held to be contingent on God's help. And there were also mixtures of the two.

In the light of the conceptions thus far described and the fundamental conception which we have taken as our starting point, the spheres of man and God would seem to be mutually exclusive. On the one side stands the will of God, on the other the will of man; man strives, but it is God who grants success. But Islamic mysticism also conceived the idea that God stands behind man's own will; that even man's striving toward God is induced by God. Kalābādī (d. 380 000, 384 004, or 385 005) writes:

The willer [a technical term for the mystical novice] is in reality a willed one, and the willed one (i.e., God) is the willer; for he who strives toward God has this striving only by virtue of a previous striving of God toward him. . . . Thus God's striving toward them (the mystics) is the cause of their striving toward Him; for His act is the cause behind all things, but this act itself has no cause.²⁰

Quite consistently, to be sure, Ash'arī (d. 324 /935), the theologian who first advocated this view, held that God was behind man's evil as well as his good strivings; for nothing happens without the will of God. But this could not detract from the joy of a mystic who thought as Kalābādī. On the contrary, for if this was so, God's action in him was enhanced by the grace that had elected him for a good striving. This idea of the divine background of mystical striving is accentuated and concretized in those mystics who believed that there is in man a divine spark, which through his transformation is freed and carried back to its source. Kubrā begins one of his works with the fine sentence: "Know, my friend, that the object of striving is God and the subject of the striving is a light out of Him."²¹ Here, it is true, one might almost speak of a self-redemption, yet not of man but of God. One might say that God is striving to free Himself once more from

²⁰ Kalābādī, *At-ta'arruf* (n. 13, above), ch. 63.

²¹ Najm ad-dīn al-Kubrā, *Faṭāwīḥ al-jamāl wa-faṭāwīḥ al-jalāl* (n. 4, above), § 1.

all mixture with the world. But this formulation exceeds the boldest flights of the Moslems.

The second question we shall consider is that of self-education. Even if we acknowledge that God grants success or is at work behind human striving, can the novice mystic take his own education in hand or does he require a teacher? The answer of the Islamic mystics is clear: a teacher is necessary, and this is easy to understand if we bear in mind the mystic's initial situation and goal. Every man brings with him his intellectual apparatus and other intrinsic qualities; left to himself, he would be bound to understand everything that crosses his path in his accustomed way. For the same reason he would inevitably go astray if awareness of this should lead him to turn all the decisions he would naturally make into their opposite. Hence all mystical education in Islam is governed by this maxim, which occurs in several variants: "He who has no teacher—his guide is Satan."²² Or: "A tree growing wild²³ which no one has cultivated produces leaves but no fruit, and if it does produce fruit,²⁴ it is tasteless. So is it with man. If he has no teacher, nothing (good) comes out of him."²⁵ "He worships his pleasure and accomplishes nothing."²⁶

One might interpret the interpolation of a second man, a teacher, between man and God as a lack of confidence in God. This heretical objection, which seems to cast doubt on the omnipotence and character of God, has neither been emphasized nor refuted in Islam. But there is in Islam a tale which might have appeased this misgiving and which has been invoked in response to related questions. It is the tale of Mohammed, upon whom God miraculously bestowed milk in the desert, from the udder of a sheep that was not yet fully grown.²⁷ The point of the story is that God does not send the Prophet milk out of the air, but through the udder of a sheep; in other words, in performing a miracle He holds as close as possible to natural conditions. Actually the master, the shaykh, does not, in the consciousness of the mystics, stand as a foreign body between God and man; but he is a channel

²² Bistāmī, in Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 181 (*bāb al-waṣiyya lil-muridin*); Richard Hartmann, *Al Kuschairis Darstellung des Sufitums*, in *Türkische Bibliothek* (Berlin), XVIII (1911), 183.

²³ Corr.: *khwadroyī* instead of *khwadrost*.

²⁴ Corr.: *bar* or *bār* instead of *barg*.

²⁵ Abū 'Alī ad-Daqqāq (d. early in the 5th/11th century), in 'Aṭṭār, *Taḥkika*, II, 188, 14-16.

²⁶ Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 181; Hartmann, *Al Kuschairis Darstellung des Sufitums*, p. 183.

²⁷ At the moment only the version of Ibn Sa'd, *Al-ṭabaqāt*, I, 1, 155, 10ff., is available to me.

through which God sends man what he needs. The shaykh who has attained the goal, who has overcome his "I," is regarded as God's mouthpiece and in this function is likened to the angel Gabriel. "For the novices the master is the faithful messenger of divine inspiration, just as Gabriel was the faithful messenger of revelation (to the prophets). As Gabriel did not falsify revelation, so the master does not falsify inspiration."²⁸ Or to the Prophet: "The master to his disciples is as the Prophet to his congregation."²⁹ Thus, for the Islamic mystic God clarifies and defines Himself in the person of the shaykh, in so far as He can be present in a man.

It seems perfectly consistent that the shaykh should tend to attract the same projections as an image of God and to make the same demands. These include undivided love and veneration, and total obedience, the "obedience of the corpse." Without hesitation the novice must carry out all the shaykh's commands, even those that seem utterly absurd. Ibn-i Khafīf (d. 371/982) of Shīrāz had two disciples named Abū Aḥmad.³⁰ When their companions reproached him for favoring Abū Aḥmad the Younger, although Abū Aḥmad the Elder had done all manner of things and diligently accomplished his exercises, Ibn-i Khafīf demonstrated the reason for his preference as follows. He sent for Abū Aḥmad the Elder and ordered him to carry a camel that lay in front of the convent up onto the roof. Abū Aḥmad replied: "Master, how can one carry a camel up on the roof?" "Very well," replied the shaykh. "Let it be!" Thereupon he called the younger. "Carry that camel up on the roof of the convent." At once the novice rolled up his sleeves and set to work. "That is enough," said the shaykh, and turning to the disciples he continued: "Abū Aḥmad the Younger did his part; he followed the order and made no objection. He had in mind only the command and not whether its object was possible or not. But Abū Aḥmad the Elder began to argue and embarked on a discussion for and against."³¹ All criticism of the shaykh's actions, whether open or secret, was also forbidden the novice, and in case such thoughts should arise in him, he was enjoined to recall the story of Moses and Khidr told in the Koran (Sūra 18), according to which Moses, though a prophet, was unable to understand the seem-

²⁸ Abū Ḥafṣ as-Suhrawardī, *ʿAwārif al-maʿārif*, ch. 51 (Cairo, 1939), 282.

²⁹ ʿIzz ud-dīn Maḥmūd-i Kāshānī, *Miṣbāḥ ul-hidāya wa-miftāḥ ul-kifāya* (Persian adaptation of Suhrawardī's *ʿAwārif*), ed. Jalāl ud-dīn-i Humāyī (Teheran, 1323/1905), p. 219.

³⁰ After Junayd ash-Shīrāzī: *Shadd al-izār fi ḥaḥ al-awṣār ʿan zuwār al-masār*, ed. M. Qazwinī and ʿA. Iqbāl (Teheran, 1328/1910), pp. 46-48. ʿAṭṭār calls him Aḥmad.

³¹ *Tadhkira*, II, 129, 2-14.

ingly absurd actions of his holy companion.³² Furthermore, the novice must not keep the slightest thought secret from the shaykh—in so far as the clairvoyant shaykh has not previously seen through him—but must tell him everything, though he must await the moment when the shaykh is ready and in general, in all his dealings with the shaykh, must observe the greatest respect. He must undertake nothing without the shaykh's approval or command; his will must be totally submerged in that of the shaykh.³³

It is in keeping with the same context that the shaykh has taken his place in legend as the "divine child," the "divine guide," etc. in short, as one endowed with all possible divine powers. The difference between these legends and those about Mohammed and Christ is only that the shaykh does not claim to found a new religion but represents the "lesser" tradition within the "great tradition." The theology of Islamic mysticism has repeatedly stressed this subordination of the lesser to the great tradition and at danger points makes the dividing line clear by a special nomenclature. In general only inspiration (*ilhām*) and not revelation (*wahy*) is imputed to the mystic, although in both cases the process is the same; similarly, the miracles of the Prophet bear a different name from those of the mystics, although for practical purposes they accomplish the same thing, except that those of the Prophet are directed toward a different ultimate purpose, which concerns mankind as a whole.

It is without relevance for our investigation to what extent the ideal of the shaykh or the novice has been transgressed. Our inquiry deals not with the failures but solely with the intentions of Islamic mysticism.

³² Suhrawardī, *Awārif*, 286; Kāshānī, *Miṣbāḥ*, pp. 220f.

³³ I am well aware that there are certain limitations and that even the Ṣūfis warned against belief in the infallibility, etc., of the shaykh. But here I am concerned with the psychological position of the shaykh. In support of my contentions I should like to quote an excerpt from the "Présents dominicaux" ou Règle des Rahmania," cited by Louis Rinn in *Marabouts et Khouan* (Algiers, 1884), p. 90: "In the hands of thy shaykh thou wilt be as the corpse in the hands of the washer [of corpses]. Obey him in everything he has ordered, for it is God Himself who commands by his voice; to disobey him is to incur the wrath of God. Do not forget that thou art his slave and that thou must do nothing without his order. The shaykh is the man beloved of God; he is superior to all other creatures and takes rank after the Prophets. Therefore see only him, him everywhere. Banish from thy heart every thought other than that directed toward God or the shaykh." Abu'l-Ḥasan ash-Shāiḍī (d. 656/1258) is quoted as having said: "Obey thy shaykh before obeying the temporal sovereign" (ibid., p. 227). Particularly 'Ayn al-quḍāh al-Hamadānī goes very far, directly quoting the words "The Ṣūfī is God." *Tamhidāt*, MS of the Basel University Library, M III 45, 135b f.

III

In the following we shall speak of a few ways in which the novice strove to induce the transformation we have been discussing. Again we are not interested in asking to what extent the individual fulfilled the requirements, carried out the measures, or stressed one at the expense of another. The origin of the whole process and of its particular features, the articulation of these features with the already existing routine, the historical development of the method and the variations of the different schools—all these questions must also be set aside; an answer to them, moreover, would demand a knowledge which today no one possesses. We shall concern ourselves solely with the typical. And for the same reason we shall not attempt to distinguish between authentic and apocryphal utterances, between fact and legend; for the typical is expressed also in legend.

The material that has come down to us might be classified according to any number of principles. Here the work of the Islamic mystics will be considered from the standpoint of the four functions of consciousness described by C. G. Jung: sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition. Obviously this approach will compel us to disregard many of the phenomena of mystical life, and it is equally clear that we can make no claim to completeness either of documentation or detail.

The shaykh then is the model, and **everything** that is not consonant with this model must be withdrawn from the disciple's functions of consciousness. In principle no function is suppressed or excluded; they are merely directed, and here, as we might expect, the way is primarily inward

though this may not always have been the case. The functions are withdrawn from outward objects and directed toward inner ones. For the world is the whore in whose embraces man has forgotten his calling and has created and nourished that complex of the instinctual soul, of the fallen ego. Even a mystic who did not share Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's view that God hated the world, but regarded it as His successful creation or even as the concretely manifested outward side of God, did not call men to the world but to what he saw behind it.

The turn inward first becomes evident in the realm of *sensation*. Here the Islamic mystic inherited above all the tradition of Christian asceticism. The hair jacket, which marked his voluntarily chosen calling, gave him the name *Ṣūfī*: "man with the hair garment," from *ṣūf*, "wool." Ṣūfī asceticism

consisted in a number of measures of continence, which all served the purpose of closing up man's doors and windows to the world, of restricting his perception of the world and the body, and hence of limiting his intercourse with his fellow men and his interest in outward things. The rule provided for withdrawal from life, for poverty, and for abstemiousness in matters of clothing, food and drink, sleep, and sexuality. Sleep, it is true, would have withdrawn man from the world, but it would also have added to the body's well-being; hence it was curtailed. All these restrictions were carried out only up to a certain degree and not with a view to extinguishing perception, but in order to divert it from its former objects. The aim was twofold: on the one hand, a "transformation of the senses" (*tabdil al-hawāss*) into inner senses or, as was also said, the creation, the acquisition of inner organs of perception. The mystic would learn to see, hear, smell, and touch inner objects. On the other hand, the road outward and the objects of the outside world were to be closed to a second function, that of feeling.

For it is clear that while we associate pleasure and its contrary with *feeling*, feeling is closely connected with sensation and will be affected by the above-mentioned measures in respect to feeling. The Ṣūfī called man's organization of pleasure *nafs*, "soul," or to put it more clearly, "instinctual soul"; in so far as the subject of action has entered into the concept, we may go so far as to translate the term as "ego," provided we do not lose sight of the metonymy. The Ṣūfīs called only exceptionally for the "killing" (*imāla*) of the instinctual soul, and when they did they clearly meant it in a sense that does not run counter to what we have said above. Ordinarily they speak only of a "combating" (*mujāhada*), meaning a defense against its excesses, or of a "training" (*riyāda*). For they distinguished between justified (*ḥuqūq*) and unjustified stirrings of desire (*ḥuṣṣāṭ*). Only the unjustified were combated, those which exceeded either the limits of the religious law or the measure of pleasure necessary for the preservation of life. When asked when the Ṣūfī transgressed, Jalāl ud-dīn-i Rūmī (d. 672/1273) replied: "When he eats without being hungry."³⁴ Even the preservation of the species was taken into consideration. The restriction of sex life by no means signified celibacy or a renunciation of sexuality. When Ṣūfīs did not marry there were special reasons. In the case of Bisṭāmī and Abū Ishāq

³⁴ Jāmī, *Nafahāt ul-unns* (Calcutta, 1859), p. 533 (below); Georg Rosen, *Mesnevi*, ed. Friedrich Rosen (Munich, 1913), p. 52.

al-Kāzarūnī (d. 426/1035), the reason seems to lie in an indifference bordering on our asceticism; to them women as sexual partners meant no more than "walls."³⁵ As for love, it goes without saying that in Ṣūfī education it was directed toward God, and the same is true of fear, hope, etc. The Ṣūfis borrowed the antithetical vices of lust and anger from the Aristotelian psychology and regarded them as forms of feeling that must be overcome. But they could also be sublimated and placed in the service of God. After 'Alī-i Hamadānī (d. 786/1385) had striven in vain for years to master his choleric disposition, he learned through divine inspiration that his rage was God's, that it was God who grew angry within him.³⁶ In such cases, to be sure, anger takes the name of "zeal" (*ghayra*). In general it was believed that the soul could be raised by education from a soul "commanding evil" to a "blaming" soul (blaming man in his attachment to the world), thence to a soul "receiving inspiration," and finally to an "appeased" soul, "pleasing" to God. This last was sometimes identified with the heart.

In the program of Ṣūfism an important place was allotted to the redirection of *thinking*. The instruments were the reading of the Koran, the litanies, and above all the general commandment to "think of God." The Ṣūfī theoretician Qushayrī (d. 465/1072) stresses that thinking of God is superior to all other religious exercises in that it is confined to no time and is in no way limited. Even fasting is forbidden on specific days by Islamic law, and ritual prayer is prohibited at certain times. "But under all circumstances," he says, "we may think of God in our hearts."³⁷ And another, older theoretician, Sarrāj (d. 378/988), even holds that to think of God so much as a jot less than one is able is an offense against the Koranic commandment to honor God as much as one can (Sūra 64, 16).³⁸

Strange as it may seem, *intuition* too is guided in certain ways, chiefly toward introversion; for at the center of all Ṣūfī intuition stands faith. The concentration of the mind on faith induces a state of expectancy which may be followed by appropriate intuitive experiences. In this way faith can be raised to the point of certainty, as is stated in a fine passage by 'Izz ud-dīn Maḥmūd-i Kāshānī (d. 735/1335):

35 Maḥmūd ibn-i 'Utmān, *Firdaws ul-murshidiyya*, ed. F. Meier, in BI XIV (1948), Introduction, p. 36. Rābī'a, the woman mystic, also remained unmarried.

36 Nūr ud-dīn Ja'far-i Badakhshī, *Khulāṣat ul-manāqib* (biography of 'Alī-i Hamadānī), Berlin MS (Pertsch), No. 6, 8, Fol. 94a = Bodleian MS (Ethe), No. 1264, 12b.

37 Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 102 (*bāb ad-dīkr*).

38 Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāj, *Al-luma' fi't-taṣawwuf* (see n. 7, above), p. 87, 8-9.

Certainty means this: the light of truth appears and at the same time the veils of humanness (i.e., the carnal) are lifted, and this through experience, not through understanding and tradition. As long as this light shines only through the veil, we call it the light of faith. But if it emerges from behind the veil, we call it the light of certainty. In reality both are one. If this same light of faith attains directly to the heart and the veil of humanness does not intervene, then it is the light of certainty. As long as human nature endures, the black cloud of human attributes rises up constantly from the ground of humanness and covers the face of the sun of truth. But sometimes it is uncovered and peers out through the clouds. Then the heart directly experiences the effulgence of that light, comparably to a man trembling with the cold, upon whom the sunlight suddenly shines and who, thanks to its rays and its warmth, feels joy and well-being. Imagine the sun as a metaphor for the highest truth, and its light, when it shimmers through a veil, as the light of faith, but when it is uncovered, as the light of certainty, and consider that the man trembling with the cold is a figure for him who is shrouded in human attributes; then you will know that the light of faith is always present, but that the light of certainty glitters and shines only from time to time. And so says the Prophet Mohammed: "Faith is enduring, but certainty consists of momentary illuminations of consciousness [*khaṭarāt*]." ³⁹

Intuition is, in particular, mystical "knowledge" (*ma'rifa*; Greek, *gnosis*). Like certainty it is compared with the sun,⁴⁰ and like certainty⁴¹ it gives the heart *shekḥinah* (*sakīna*),⁴² which appears to mean the feeling of being sheltered in God's presence. Mystical knowledge is contrasted with the knowledge acquired by learning: "Knowledge comes from learning, cognition from instruction. Cognition comes from instruction by God, knowledge from instruction by one's fellow men. And the results are what might be expected."⁴³ Another maxim runs: "To the knower lying in bed God reveals things that He does not disclose to another standing in ritual prayer."⁴⁴ This includes the education of inner senses and the resulting

³⁹ Kāshānī, *Miṣbāḥ* (see n. 29, above), p. 75.

⁴⁰ Kalābādī, *At-ta'arruf*, ch. 60.

⁴¹ Kāshānī, *Miṣbāḥ*, p. 76.

⁴² Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 141 (*bāb al-ma'rifa*).

⁴³ Abū 'Abdarrāḥmān Muḥammad as-Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-ṣūfiyya*, MS British Museum 96r, Fol. 51b (ed. Cairo, 1953; p. 230, 9-10).

⁴⁴ Abū Sulaymān ad-Dārānī (d. 215/830), in Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 142 (*bāb al-ma'rifa*); 'Aṭṭār, *Taḍkira*, I, 234, 21-23.

state of expectancy toward inward manifestations of a visual and auditory nature, as well as attentiveness to dreams. But intuition is also trained, and this is accomplished largely through the credo and the faith. Since inspirations, as the Ṣūfīs well knew, do not all come from God and the good forces, the angels, etc., and since the novice at the beginning of his career could not possibly distinguish the good from the bad, the desirable from the harmful, he was instructed to reject all inspirations without exception (*nafy al-khawāṭir*) and moreover to submit them to the judgment of the shaykh.

So far we have considered the training of the novice's functions of consciousness as a process of introversion. But an unbiased observer must admit that transformation may also be interpreted as a shift of emphasis, as a favoring of one function at the expense of another. The disfavored function is of course sensation, the favored one intuition; what is taken from one is given to the other. By sensation we mean ultimately the experiences of the body, by intuition those that reach beyond it. The training of inward senses may be identified with intuition, while sensation as a whole is done away with. Thus we may say that Ṣūfism strives not only toward introversion but also toward a lowering of the function of sensation and a compensatory heightening of the intuitive faculties. Probably—it is not a question of principle but of documentation—it is demonstrable that feeling is favored over thinking.

But be that as it may, the ascetic measures to which the novice had to subject himself attained their climax, their unity and supreme concentration in solitary confinement (*khalwa*, pl. *khalawāt*). At certain times appointed by the shaykh, the pupil had to withdraw into a dark cell and close himself off completely from all sense impressions. Typologically there is no doubt that the cell may be classified with the cave of Trophonius, the caves and cells of the Christian ascetics, and the tombs in which the mystics of late antiquity, as well as one pre-Islamic Arab, had themselves buried from time to time. Just as the Greek descended into the cave of Trophonius in order to re-emerge as a *hypophetes autangelos*, "a proclaimer of his religious experiences,"⁴⁵ just as Khālīd ibn Sinān had had himself buried in order that he might afterward report on the life after death,⁴⁶ so the Ṣūfīs

45 Gerhard Radke, in PW, s.v. "Trophonios"; Ugo Enrico Paoli, *Die Geschichte der Neaira* (Bern, 1953), pp. 39ff.

46 See my article in *Spiritual Disciplines* (PEY 4, 1960), pp. 268–69.

went into confinement for forty days in order at last to break through the partition dividing them from God. Of course it was not enough just to shut themselves off from the impressions of the outside world. The Ṣūfī had brought a whole edifice of his own thoughts and conceptions with him into his confinement, and this now had to be shattered. This he did by "thinking of God" in the strict sense, a method which had been employed by the Christian monks of late antiquity, which would later serve the Hesychasts, and which is known in a different form in India and Japan.⁴⁷ With the Ṣūfīs, this "thinking of God" (*dīkr Allāh*, or simply *dīkr*) consisted in concentration on the first words of the Islamic credo, "There is no god but God" (*lā ilāha illa'llāh*), which was taken in the sense described above, or on the simple word "God" (*Allāh*), or on the pronoun "He" (*huwa*), or other similar words. The Ṣūfī had to recite the formula day and night and concentrate on it uninterruptedly. The comfortable sitting position with the legs folded under and rhythmic movements of the head were customary; though not permitted in ordinary religious worship, this posture and these movements were thought to encourage concentration and enhance its effect. The Ṣūfī had to forego sleep as much as possible and could eat only as much as was absolutely indispensable. The Ṣūfīs often compared this confinement to the grave.

Here we have before us the most drastic and effective method of Ṣūfī introversion. What appeared inwardly to the mystic, once his sensations and representations had been excluded, he looked on not as a product of himself but as "disclosures," so to speak, and for him the "disclosure" had the nature of a dream.

The Ṣūfī theories of visions and dreams are essentially the same, except that the dreamer sleeps while the visionary wakes, or, as they say, is in a state "between sleeping and waking." Visions may be symbolic or they may be "direct," "obvious" (*ṣarīḥ*). Here it should be borne in mind that visions of paradise and hell, or of angels and devils, are not usually interpreted symbolically as referring to states of the soul, but are taken literally, as glimpses of the beyond and its inhabitants. This can hardly surprise us, for the Ṣūfī (like all Moslems) believed in a life after death and had to situate it somewhere. He believed that in dreams and visions he could enter into two worlds, which, it should be added, were constantly mingling: a

⁴⁷ Rudolf Otto, *Sünde und Urschuld* (Munich, 1932), pp. 140ff.; Louis Gardet, in *Revue Thomiste* (Paris), 1948, 101; 1953, 197ff.

world of images in which his own being was reflected, and another, detached from himself, a self-subsisting, transcendent world, the actual beyond. The novice had to submit all dreams and visions to the shaykh, who from them judged the progress of his education, formulating his further instructions accordingly, and interpreting the phenomena to the pupil in such a way as to forestall a dis-integration of his personality and prevent him from falling a prey to evil powers.

But the way to an *unio mystica*, to union with God, to negation of the opposition between subject and object, led beyond these apparitions. We see the Ṣūfī in his confinement striving even to transcend these inward "signs." The three degrees of immanence, transcendence, and God are already present in the Koran, but it was the mystics who first interpreted them as an itinerary. While the Koran still clearly employs hell as a deterrent and paradise as a lure, in order to lead worldly men to a religious life, and sets before the faithful the prospect of paradise as a last abode, the Ṣūfīs often declared that the fear of hell and hope of paradise should not be used as spurs to religious endeavor. A legend that attained wide currency tells how Rābī'a once hurried along with a firebrand and a pail of water and when asked what this meant explained: "I am going to cast fire into paradise and water into hell, in order that these two partition walls for the wanderer to God should cease to exist."⁴⁸ Often we encounter the injunction to sacrifice "both worlds," that is, the here and the hereafter, in order to inherit God. Thus the inner image world of which we have been speaking passed only as a preliminary goal. In the course of a mystical journey to heaven, Bistāmī rejected everything that was shown him with the stereotyped words: "What I desire is not what thou showest me." On another occasion when his house was suddenly illuminated, he turned to God and prayed: "If it is the Devil, I am too holy and my striving is too holy that he hope in me, and if it is from Thee, so let it pass, that from the house of servitude I may enter into the house of Thy grace."⁴⁹ We know from St. Paul (II Cor. 11, 14) that the devil can appear in illuminations, and just

48 Louis Massignon, *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam* (Paris, 1929), p. 8. The legend reached Europe at the time of the Crusades: see Emile Dermenghem, *L'éloge du vin* (Paris, 1931), p. 30. The legend probably attaches to a saying of Rābī'a recorded in Abū Tālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, and in 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkira*, I, 73, 3-6; see Margaret Smith, *Rābī'a the Mystic* (Cambridge, 1928), p. 102.

49 *Tadhkira*, I, 149, 11-13.

as Diadochus of Photike, invoking St. Paul, warns the faithful to take the path of asceticism because of such apparitions;⁵⁰ the Šūfi is called upon to "direct his striving higher";⁵¹ for to undertake the mystical journey for the sake of the mere vision and the miracles was like undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca for mere business or pleasure.⁵²

This bitter and almost hopeless struggle against visions was first described by Najm ad-dīn al-Kubrā. According to Kubrā, outward and inward visions surround the mystic like the walls of a prison, from which he seeks in vain to escape. Sometimes they mock him, crying: "Upward, to God!" Sometimes they lure him to himself. Sometimes they ape him in his mood; weep with him, and laugh with him. The ground beneath his feet begins to totter, and when he looks at it, the spirits that dwell in the earth emerge and seek to overpower him. The mystic combats his visions with a cudgel and a bucket of tar, until it is given him to strike the decisive blow against the specter.⁵³ Here the difference between the mystic who is drawn upward and the mystic who strides is once again made clear. For Kubrā the experience of dissolution in God is the greatest of all gifts of grace; ⁵⁴ it could be of varying duration.⁵⁵

Here introversion has attained its highest goal. Yet this was not the only direction that the Šūfi took, but only the direction in which he sought strength with which to live in the world and, as we should say in Christian terms, to build the kingdom of God. For even in the training of the novices an equally radical extraversion went hand in hand with this introversion. In this connection the imperative was: "Serve thy neighbor," and again absolute self-abnegation was demanded. When the Šūfi suffered wrong from his fellow men, he had to seek the error in himself; he must look upon no man as less virtuous than himself; he must be prepared to extend a helping hand to all men in the most humble ways; and he must also sympathize with and care for animals. There is no need to look into the work and ideals of the Šūfis in this field; they accord essentially with those of the Christians.

⁵⁰ *Capita centum de perfectione spirituali* (Leipzig, 1912), ch. 40.

⁵¹ Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 183 (*waṣīyya*); Hartmann, *Al Kuschairī's Darstellung des Sufismus*, pp. 193-94.

⁵² 'Alā' ad-dawla as-Simnānī, *Ṣafwat al-'Urwa*, MS Laleli Efendi (Istanbul), 1432, 113a.

⁵³ *Fawā'id al-jamāl* (see n. 4, above), §§ 182-85.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, § 79.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

IV

It follows from what has been said that Islamic mysticism does not strive for an accumulation of knowledge; it aims rather to elevate man from the darkness of a life confined to nature and natural capacities to the light of a contranatural reality. The Ṣūfīs sometimes call this reality "morality." "Ṣūfism is all morality," says Ibn-i Khafīf. "The more morality a man has, the more Ṣūfism he has."⁵⁶ And Abū'l-Ḥusayn an-Nūrī (d. 295 008) defines this morality in very high-flown terms, but quite in accord with the Church Fathers, as a concentration in man of the ethical attributes of God, a concentration that may be construed as a direct embodiment of divine attributes in the man, or merely as a copy, a duplicate of them. "Ṣūfism," says Nūrī, "is not ceremonial and not knowledge, but morality; if it were a ceremony, one might acquire it through practice, and if it were a knowledge, one would acquire it through instruction. But it is morality in accordance with the dictum: acquire the moral attributes of God. And it is not possible to attain the morality of God by ceremonial or by knowledge."⁵⁷

Christianity is often accused of withdrawing from the world. And there may be some justification for this criticism. But precisely in this withdrawal, in this experience of a higher reality it has repeatedly found the strength to transform the existing world. The same may be said of Ṣūfism. There have been Ṣūfīs who devoted themselves almost exclusively to service in the world. They did not seek to attain worldly aims, but, sustained by an inner life, they shared the sufferings of their fellow men, fed the poor, founded hospices, cared for the sick, etc. In many cases this charity was not limited to those who shared the same belief. Ṣūfīs often took part in holy wars or promoted and organized them. They even founded states.

If we consider Ṣūfism as a whole we must admit that introversion was predominant and that this excess of introversion was largely responsible for its downfall. This is its weak point, and it is here perhaps that we must seek one of the causes of the decline of Islamic culture in the modern era.

⁵⁶ *Tadhkira*, II, 123, 3.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 54-55; Hujwiri, *Kashf ul-mahjūb*, tr. R. A. Nicholson (2nd edn., London, 1936), p. 42; Louis Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (2nd edn., Paris, 1954), p. 17.

In speaking of a "decline," we take the word both with and without quotation marks. On the one hand, we cannot help wondering whether the extraverted culture of the West has necessarily been a progress; on the other hand, it is true that the failure of Islam to follow the West in its relative progress has brought about deplorable conditions, especially in the social sphere. Characteristic of the idealistic, introverted character of Šūfism is its judgment of "reality." For Šūfism "reality" and "truth" coincide in a single concept (*ḥaqīqa*), which the outside world does not possess. "Real or true" means "spiritual, otherworldly, divine"; in contrast to it, the earthly is "transferred" (*majāzī*)—a term which the widespread influence of Šūfism carried into the profane language: A "real love" is a mystical love, a love of God; an earthly love is "transferred."

Of course the Šūfī has no interest in the life of his fellow men as such. He does not recognize every life form, but measures himself and all men according to the degree in which they approach the ethical ideal to which he has subordinated himself and which he regards as universally binding. Hence he cannot take pleasure in the mere authenticity of an action, in the vital truth of an expression; he cannot, like the modern Westerner with his joy in things, regard the simple, unadorned self-expression of men as they are as a virtue and content himself with it; he must demand that men change. Only when this striving is established is it considered important that the expression be authentic, that the outward correspond to the inward. Characteristically, even knowledge is regarded as external. Hence all purely theoretical knowledge, that is, a knowledge which is merely acquired by study and is not born from one's own experience (*taḥqīq, taḥaqquq*), or which is not acted upon (*'amal*), is for the Šūfī a breach in the truth of life. The novice is instructed never to let his knowledge run ahead of what he himself experiences in his soul (*munāzala, mu'āmala*),⁵⁸ and a Šūfic knowledge that is not translated into deeds is said to be nothing more than a "little tale," one that is soon forgotten.⁵⁹ Above all one should not speak about what one has experienced, for this is better expressed by examples, and it was absolutely forbidden to divulge teachings that one did not follow oneself. When Ibn al-Jallā' (d. 306/918) was asked to speak of poverty, he disappeared, and when he returned, he reported that he had had four silver obols in his possession; he had first to give them to the poor before he could

⁵⁸ Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 185; Hartmann, *Al Kuschairis Darstellung des Sufitums*, pp. 202f.

⁵⁹ *Tadkira*, II, 59, 18-22.

speak of poverty.⁶⁰ The Ṣūfī did not even transmit confirmed holy tradition until he felt morally equal to its prescriptions. Bishr al-Hāfi buried his seven chests of notebooks on the Prophet's sayings and ceased to divulge the tradition, because he sensed inadmissible stirrings of lust within him; he would continue to communicate the tradition, he said, only when these were brought to silence.⁶¹ The Ṣūfī was allowed to express inner states by his manner of dressing. The very coat he wore was intended as a sign of this sort,⁶² and the Ṣūfis related it in one way or another to a basic attitude of the mystic. Modifications of form and color were permitted, in keeping with the inner state of the wearer.⁶³ But those who exhibited such symbolism had to be prepared to demonstrate its authenticity. When a Ṣūfī clad wholly in black appeared before Ibn-i Khafif and declared that his attire was an expression of the fact that his (former) gods, the instinctual soul and desire (*hawā*) were dead, Ibn-i Khafif had him thrown out and brought in again; this was repeated forty times. Then he kissed him on the head and said: "You have the right to wear black: for when you were treated disgracefully forty times, you did not grow angry."⁶⁴

But even if the Ṣūfī does not attach himself to the world, it can take on a metaphoric significance for him. He can find his own problems, his knowledge of the higher reality, mirrored in the events of ordinary life and in his physical environment; or he may feel that God calls to him indirectly through outward happenings. A few examples will give us an idea of the traditions in this connection.

For Abū Ishāq al Kāzarūnī the relation between the evergreen myrtle and the rose symbolized the relation between the enduring and the transient. Accordingly he said: "I am no friend of the rose but a friend of the myrtle."⁶⁵ Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī'l Khayr (d. 440/1048), all yellow and parched with yearning for God, or at least feigning such a state, is said to have sat under an autumnal tree and uttered the following untranslatable play on words: "Thou art yellow with *mīhr*, and I am yellow with *mīhr*, thou from

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 63, 22-24.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, I, 108-9.

⁶² Cf. the attempt of G. Widengren to trace the Ṣūfī's patchwork coat back to an old peasant dress, which was also reflected in the costume of the ancient mime and in the garb of the Syrian ascetics: "Harlekintracht und Mönchskutte, Clownhut und Derwischmütze," in *Orientalia Suecana* (Uppsala), II (1953), 41ff.

⁶³ Kubrā, *Ādāb ul-muridīn*, ch. 1, on the mss.; see *Der Islam*, XXIV (1937), 24f.

⁶⁴ *Tadhkira*, II, 129, 14-23.

⁶⁵ *Firdaws ul-murshidiyya* (see n. 35, above), 150, 1ff.

the *mihrmāh* (i.e., the autumnal month) and I from *mīhr-i māk* (i.e., the love of the beautiful, God).”⁶⁶

Irrational creatures speak to the mystic, as for example when Bistāmī let a dog pass through a narrow gate in advance of him and afterward explained that the dog had asked him in his mute language: “What offense did I commit in pre-eternity and what did you do that was so good that I should have been covered with the skin of a dog and you should have been given the garment of a prince of the knowers of God?”⁶⁷ On another occasion Bistāmī gathered up his cloak in the presence of a dog, whereupon the dog reportedly said to him: “If I am dry, to touch me will do you no harm, and if I am wet seven washings with water and earth will reconcile you with me (according to the religious law). But if you withdraw your cloak from me, you will not become clean (since your fault is an ethical one) even if you perform the complete ablution with seven seas.” Bistāmī answered: “You are only outwardly unclean, I am inwardly unclean; come, let us put the two together, perhaps cleanliness will come into being through the union.” The dog: “You are not worthy to walk with me and be with me; for I am chased away by men, while you are welcomed. He who meets me, casts stones at me; he who meets you says, Hail to thee, O prince of the knowers of God. I have never set aside a bone for the morrow, but you have a whole barrel of wheat set aside for the future.” Bistāmī: “I am not even worthy to be the companion of a dog; how then shall I be the companion of the Eternal One? Praise be to the Lord who educates the best of creatures⁶⁸ through the lowliest!”⁶⁹ Even inanimate things are made to speak in this way. In a sermon, Kāzarūnī pointed to the mosque lamps and quoted the water in them as saying to the oil: “Why do you sit above me (in the lamp) when all things have need of me?” And the oil replies: “I am cut, broken up, beaten, burned, crushed under a heavy stone, and after all this I have to burn and in burning I give men light; that is why I am placed so high.”⁷⁰ Kāzarūnī was referring to himself, the Ṣūfī, who, in contrast to the mere theologian, had taken on himself the hardships of the inner way, of service to his fellow men.

⁶⁶ Jāmī, *Nafahāt ul-uns*, ed. Nassau Lees (Calcutta, 1859), 345, 2-5 (= lith. Lucknow, 1915, 281, 1-3).

⁶⁷ *Tadhkira*, I, 145, 8-17.

⁶⁸ Or the best of men (= Bistāmī)?

⁶⁹ *Tadhkira*, I, 145, 17ff.

⁷⁰ *Firdaws ul-murshidiyya*, 152, 1ff.

Experiences with men, particularly unpleasant ones, are related to the Ṣūfī's inner situation and his relation to God. When someone unintentionally emptied a tub full of ashes on the head of Abū 'Uṣmān al-Ḥīrī (d. 208 911) and his companions wished to revile the careless offender, the shaykh forbade them with the words: "We should give a thousand thanks that with one who deserved fire he settled for ashes."⁷¹ Or in such misfortunes the Ṣūfī might directly recognize the hand of God. When a Turk, presumably a soldier, who had given Abū'l Ḥasan-i Būshanjī (d. 348 950) a box on the ear, learned whom he had struck and begged his forgiveness, he received the answer: "Be of good cheer, friend. I did not regard it as an act of thine; whence it came there are no errors."⁷²

From this point of view the love of men could also take on a new meaning. It might be interpreted as a preliminary exercise or symbol for the love of God, as "a bridge to the real."⁷³ Or human beauty might be interpreted as a symbol of God or as the place of His manifestation.⁷⁴ In connection with this conception of human beauty we might in passing recall a Buddhist homily, which has no historical connection with our Islamic documents but which throws light on this kind of symbolism. When Mara, lord of the sensory world, the tempter and adversary of Buddha, appeared disguised as Buddha to the patriarch Upagupta, Upagupta fell down before him, but declared: "I have not bowed to thee. . . . It is as though one were to fashion a Buddha of clay and worship him, thinking only of Buddha and not of the clay. And so, when I saw thee now, I thought only of Buddha and not of (thee) Mara."⁷⁵

It is possible that the Ṣūfis may have set up their inspirations against the holy scriptures of Islam, the Koran, and the fluid corpus of the sayings of the Prophet. Aḥmad al-Ḥawārī of Damascus (d. 230 844-45) is said to have thrown all his theological books into the sea, saying: "The books, by God, were my guides to God; but now that I have attained the goal, I need no more books."⁷⁶ But this act was attributed to mystical intoxication.⁷⁷

⁷¹ *Tadkira*, II, 58, 7-10.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 90, 5-9.

⁷³ Muḥammad Sharif Kāshif (11th/17th century; see *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, II, 330): *Sirāj ul-munir*, 8th lum'a, MS of the Basel University Library, M II 42.

⁷⁴ Hellmut Ritter, "Philologika VII," in *Der Islam*, XXXI (1933), 89ff.

⁷⁵ Ernst Waldschmidt, *Gandhara Kutscha Turfan* (Leipzig, 1925), p. 14.

⁷⁶ Friedrich Rückert, *Sieben Bücher morgenländischer Sagen und Geschichten* (Stuttgart, 1837), Vol. II, pp. 319ff.

⁷⁷ *Tadkira*, I, 286, 12-17.

What normally happened was the exact opposite: he who had attained knowledge read the Koran with far greater interest and from a far superior point of view than before. Ibn 'Atā' (d. 309/921) is quoted as saying: "Formerly I recited the Koran through twice in twenty-four hours. Now I have been reciting it for fourteen years and I have only just come to the eighth Sūra." ⁷⁸ Characteristic of the way in which the Šūfis read the Koran is above all their reinterpretation of it; not merely the fact that they reinterpreted it, but the way in which they did so. For just as the Christians infused the New Testament into the Old and their religious insights into both of them, so the entire spiritual history of Islam can be gleaned from the diverse interpretations of the Koran. While the Alid legitimists read their theology of the Caliphate into the Koran, the Šūfis interpreted the Koran as the story of the soul. The brief Sūra 111 reads:

May the hands of Abū Lahab be destroyed! He has already found destruction. Nothing have his wealth and gains availed him. He will burn in a blazing fire, as will his wife, the carrier of faggots, whose neck is adorned with a rope of palm fiber [an indication of her lowly estate].⁷⁹

These words, characteristic for the character of Mohammed's revelation, have no further content than a curse directed against one of Mohammed's adversaries in Mecca and his wife. 'Alā' ad-dawla as-Simnānī (d. 736/1366) finds a profound and typically Šūfic truth in them: Abū Lahab, whose ruin is here invoked, is the human instinctual soul and his wife is lust. He interprets the historic record that Abū Lahab sent out his wife at night to lay thornbrush around the Ka'ba, and so impede the Prophet in his religious devotions, as alluding to the attempts of the instinctual soul to lay obstacles in the path of the man who desires to circumambulate the Ka'ba of his heart. Abū Lahab's two hands, his fortune and acquired wealth, as well as the flames in which he would roast, are interpreted as references to the attributes of the inner man.⁸⁰ There is no doubt that just as Mohammed, by his adaptation and reinterpretation, gave a new aspect and new impetus to the ancient pagan rites in Mecca, the Šūfis were able to give the Koran a

⁷⁸ Ibid., II, 68, 6-9.

⁷⁹ August Fischer, "Der Wert der vorhandenen Koran-Übersetzungen und Sure 111," in *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Kl., 89 (1937), Vol. II.

⁸⁰ Simnānī, *Tafsīr*, MS of the Basel University Library, M II 14, 68b.

new face and new life. And in so doing they, like the Alids, were shrewd enough to let the outward interpretation stand side by side with the new, inward one. Ibn 'Aṭā'allāh as-Sikandarī (d. 700/1309) characterized the Ṣūfī reinterpretation as follows: "The interpretation which the Ṣūfīs put on the word of God and of His emissary . . . is not a change of the external sense of the word into a nonexternal one. The external sense of the Koran verse shows only for what purpose the verse has been invoked and what it expresses in the ordinary linguistic usage. But there are inward possibilities of understanding Koran verses and sayings of the Prophet, which are given to him whose heart God opens. . . . If men who wish to discuss and oppose you say it is a modification of the word of God and His emissary, this should not deter you from accepting the interpretations of the Ṣūfīs; for it is no change. It would be only if the Ṣūfīs were to maintain that the verse had no meaning other than this. But this they have never maintained." ⁸¹ Along the same lines, utterances in the Koran concerning the other world and the fate of man after death may also be interpreted in reference to psychic states, as occurs for example in 'Ayn al-quḍāh al-Hamadānī (d. 523/1131).⁸²

The same treatment is given to Biblical history, as it is known to Islam, and to religious geography. One and the same name can have several meanings, or several names can have the same meaning. Often we read of the Pharaoh of the sensual soul. But this same soul may be designated as Eve (in this case the spirit is Adam)⁸³ or as the fallen angel Hārūt, held prisoner "in the Babel of nature" (or of existence).⁸⁴ The Jewish-Christian-Manichaean gnostics' conception of Egypt as the physical body, from which the spirit must liberate itself through an exodus, is reflected also in Islam. Even the Iranian hero-saga provides persons and places which we find again among the Ṣūfīs. The Afrāsyāb (a hostile king) of the instinctual soul shuts you up like Biḡān in the well shaft of the body, and the Dēv Akwān sets a stone over it, so that you require a Rustam (namely, a shaykh), in order to get out and find your way from the Turkestan (Turan) of earthly nature

81 *Laṭā'if al-minan fī manāqib ash-shaykh Abī'l-'Abbās al-Mursī*, etc., at the end of the fifth chapter (Cairo, undated), 93 = in the margin of the *Laṭā'if al-minan* of Sha'rānī (Cairo, 1357/1938), 170.

82 *Tamhīdāt*, MS of the Basel University Library, M III 45, 123b ff. (tamhīd 10).

83 Suhrawardī, *Awārif* (see n. 28, above), ch. 56, 313.

84 Kāshānī, *Mīṣbāḥ* (see n. 29, above), p. 83.

to the Iran of religion, to the Kaykhusraw of the spirit, etc.⁸⁵ We have already mentioned the Ka'ba of the heart. And the pilgrimage to Mecca has become a familiar image of the inner way for the Ṣūfis.

In the field of poetry, reinterpretation developed into a whole technique. Beginners were not admitted to the evening gatherings that the Ṣūfis sometimes organized; or else, as the books prescribed, they were admitted only when they were capable of reinterpreting the songs that were recited, in a religious, mystical sense. With this proviso not only love songs, but drinking songs as well, were permitted. As for example:

Even though thou measure two thousand *rafl* of wine,
As long as thou dost not drink the wine, thou dost not know drunk-
eness.

Ghazzālī interprets this song as meaning that the essential is to practice the religious virtues and the love of God and not only to speak learnedly of them.⁸⁶ Vocabularies were even drawn up showing what words occurring frequently in poetry, such as curl, cheek, beauty mark, etc., may mean for the Ṣūfis. But in general each reader was his own master. The most appropriate meaning was that which produced the greatest resonance in the spirit of the listener. Thus, listening to music (*samā'*) was a means of producing ecstasy.⁸⁷

Closely related were the extraordinary misunderstandings whereby the Ṣūfī transposed sounds and words that fell upon his ear to meanings having relevance for him. Thus Abū 'Uṭmān al-Maghribī (d. 383/983-84) heard the words *Allāh Allāh* in the sound of the water wheel,⁸⁸ and Jalāl ud-dīn-i Rūmī (d. 672/1273), in the cry of a Turk in Konya, who had a fox (*dil kū*) to sell, heard the Persian *dil kū*, "Where is thine heart?" and fell into a faint.⁸⁹ In extreme cases a word was heard as its exact opposite. Ibn-i Khafīf once spent the whole night tending a sick man whom he had taken into his mon-

85 'Attār, *Ilāhī-nāma*, 94, 9ff. (*Ilāhī-Name. Die Gespräche des Königs mit seinen sechs Söhnen. Eine mystische Dichtung von Fariduddin Attar*, ed. Hellmuth Ritter, Leipzig and Istanbul, 1940; BI XII).

86 *Kīmīyā-i sa'ādāt* (lith. Lucknow, 1333/1914), 223.

87 See my "Der Derwischentanz" in *Asiatische Studien* (Bern), VIII, 1954.

88 Majd ad-dīn al-Baghdādī, *Tuḥfat al-barara*, ch. 10, MS Aya Sofya, 1696; Kāshānī, *Miṣbāḥ*, 194.

89 Clément Huart, *Les Saints des derviches tourneurs* (2 vols., Paris, 1918-22), Vol. I, p. 290. Examples of this kind are numerous and cited in as early a writer as Sarrāj, *Luma'*. See my article in *Asiatische Studien*, VIII, 1954.

astery. When he closed his eyes for a moment, the ungrateful guest snapped at him: "Where are you? A curse upon you!" The next morning, when Ibn-i Khafif's pupils expressed their displeasure at the man's insolence, Ibn-i Khafif declared: "I have understood. A blessing on you!"⁹⁰

V

We have seen that the transformation of man in mystical Islam aimed at the realization of the ideal shaykh. But this aim was infinitely remote. Though a student could project perfection or completeness—I use the words as synonyms—upon his teacher, each individual in his striving for fulfillment was bound to discover that, as Kubrā says, there is no state behind which there is not a still higher state.⁹¹ that man, in relation to God, is never anything but a "pseudo knower" (*muta'arīf*), and that only God can have true knowledge.⁹² Thus, in principle, a transformation oriented toward perfection could have no end. But, setting aside this reservation for the moment, even if we think of the mystic who has reached a certain stage as perfect or complete and go on to ask whether he has thereby found peace, the Ṣūfī's reply is only a conditional affirmative. According to Muḥammad ibn al-Faḍl al-Balkhī (d. 310/931), mystical knowledge is a "life of the heart with God."⁹³ Thus the mystic finds peace only in the sense that he surrenders his person (*huwiyya*) to that of another, namely God, or, as Bisṭāmī says, ceases to have any state of his own.⁹⁴ But at the same time, the mystic who has achieved this degree of elevation is open to all the impulses that come from a higher will and to higher thoughts; he becomes a useful and highly mobile instrument. Du'n-nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 245/859) says accordingly: "The knower is not confined to a single state: for at every moment a new state descends upon him from the suprasensory world, so that he is in reality a vehicle of states, not of any one state."⁹⁵ Junayd (d. 298/910) employs the metaphor: "The color of the water is the color of the vessel";⁹⁶ that is to say, the knower changes his state according to what the moment gives him or asks of him. He is, as is often said, a "man of the moment"

90 *Taḍkira*, II, 130, 9-15.

91 *Fawā'id al-jamāl* (see n. 4, above), § 60.

92 Ibid.

93 Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 143 (*ma'rifa*).

94 Ibid., 141.

95 *Taḍkira*, I, 126, 22-24.

96 Kalābādī, *At-ta'arruf*, ch. 62; Qushayrī, *Ar-risāla*, 142.

(*ibn al-waqt*). Hence mystical knowledge has also been compared to waves that carry him whom they seize upon upward and downward.⁹⁷

Thus the Ṣūfī was inevitably aware that he was always in the middle, between two modes of immutability—the immutability of the lifeless thing which, devoid of thought, feeling, or will, remains what it is, and the immutability of God which, even if he were to strive for it, he could never attain.

I shall close with two traditions that express this awareness. The first: Ruwaym (d. 303/915-16) had for twenty years used the same brick as a pillow in the Shūnīziyya mosque in Baghdad. When after an absence of twenty years he returned to the mosque and found the brick unchanged, he smashed it to pieces and said: "Since I left you, I have died and returned to life so and so many times, but you show no sign of change." Each of the others present in the mosque is said to have taken a piece of the shattered brick for the sake of the blessing attaching to it by its having served as Ruwaym's pillow for so many years.⁹⁸ The second tradition is as follows: one night when all were asleep and the path leading round the Ka'aba in Mecca was deserted, Abu'l-Ḥusayn an-Nūrī availed himself of the opportunity to effect the holy circuit, and every time he passed the Black Stone built into the eastern corner, he uttered the prayer: "O God, grant me a state and a mode of being in which I shall no longer change." Thereupon he heard a voice crying out from the Ka'aba: "O Abu'l-Ḥusayn, wouldst thou enter into competition with me? Indeed, I do not change my state, but I keep men in constant change, in order that divinity (*rubūbiyyat*) should be distinguishable from humanity (*'ubūdiyyat*). I always have the same mode; man undergoes transformation."⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Kalābādī, ch. 62.

⁹⁸ Daylamī's Persian vita of Ibn-i Khafīf, ch. 6, MS Köprülü (Istanbul), 1589, 394a.

⁹⁹ *Tadhkira*, II, 52, 3-9.

Divine Epiphany and Spiritual Birth in
Ismailian Gnosis

1. *The Metamorphoses of Theophanic Visions*

In the Acts of Peter, a book belonging to those so-called "apocryphal" collections which were particularly esteemed and meditated upon in Gnostic and Manichaean circles, we read a narrative that provides an exemplary illustration of theophanic vision. Before a gathering of people the apostle Peter refers to the scene of the Transfiguration that he had witnessed on Mount Tabor. And essentially all he can say is this: *Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui* ("I saw him in such a form as I was able to take in"). Now in this gathering there are several widows, afflicted at once with physical blindness and incredulity of heart. The apostle speaks to them in a tone of urgency: "Perceive in your mind that which ye see not with your eyes." The assemblage begins to pray, and thereupon the hall is filled with a resplendent light; it does not resemble the light of day, but is an ineffable, *invisible* light such as no man can describe. And this radiant "invisible light" shines into the eyes of these women, who alone are standing in the midst of the prostrate assemblage. Afterward, when they are asked what they have *seen*, some have seen an old man, others a youth, still others a little child who lightly touched their eyes and made them open. Each one has seen in a different form, appropriate to the capacity of her being; each one may say: *Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui*.¹

The occurrence of perceptions possessing, like this one, a personal character is attested by a number of other passages in these "apocryphal" Acts. In the Acts of John, in the narrative of the calling of the Apostles, when John and his brother James return in their boat after a night spent on the

¹ Cf. Acts of Peter xx-xxi; tr. M. R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 321-22.

sea, both of them behold on the shore a being who beckons to them. But their visions differ: one has seen a little child, the other a pleasant and comely man of noble bearing.²

Perhaps we shall find the key to these visions, the basis of their reality and their variations, in a few striking pages of these same Acts of John. On the evening of Good Friday the Angel Christos, while the multitude below, in Jerusalem, imagines that it is crucifying him, causes the apostle John to go up the Mount of Olives and into the grotto illumined by his presence; and there the angel reveals to John the mystery of the "Cross of Light." This cross is called sometimes Word, sometimes Mind, sometimes Jesus and sometimes Christ, sometimes Door, sometimes Way, sometimes Son, Father, Spirit, sometimes Life, and sometimes Truth. It separates the things on high that *are* from the things below that *become* (the things of birth and of death), and at the same time, being one, streams forth into all things. "This is not the cross of wood which thou wilt see when thou goest down hence: neither am I he that is on the cross, whom now thou seest not, but only hearest his voice. I was reckoned to be that which I am not, not being what I was unto many others. . . . Thou hearest that I suffered, yet I did not suffer; that I suffered not, yet did I suffer; . . . and in a word, what they say of me, that befell me not. But what they say not, that did I suffer."³

This brief quotation from the sublime discourse will suffice for our purposes. This mystery of the Cross of Light, which was one of the favorite themes of Manichaean piety, recurs explicitly in Shiite Ismailian Gnosis. The texts we have just cited from the so-called "apocryphal" Scriptures (like many others from the same source) give us the right tonality and may serve here as a prelude. If we reflect on the scene recorded in the Acts of Peter, we shall come to conclusions that will serve us as premises. We are dealing with visions, theophanic visions. There is actual perception of an object, of a concrete person: the figure and the features are sharply defined; this person presents all the "appearances" of a sensuous object, and yet it is not given to the perception of the sense organs. This perception is essentially an *event of the soul*, taking place *in* the soul and *for* the soul. As such its reality is essentially *individuated* for and with each soul; what the soul really sees, it is in each case alone in seeing. The field of its vision, its horizon, is in every case defined by the capacity, the dimension of its own being:

² Cf. Acts of John 88-89; James, p. 251.

³ Acts of John 97-102; James, pp. 254-56.

Talem cum vidi qualem capere potui. The community of vision will be established not by reference to an external object, an evidence uniformly and fully given to all, but by reason of a dimension of being that is common to this or that group or family of souls. This adequation of vision to the dimension and capacity of the soul in which it takes place is the foundation of what we may call the *metamorphoses of theophanic visions*. We find a distinct formulation of these metamorphoses in Origen, where, speaking precisely of the Transfiguration, he declares that the Saviour existed not only in two forms—the one in which he was commonly seen, the other in which he was transfigured—but that in addition “he appeared to each one according as each man was worthy” (*sed etiam unicuique apparebat secundum quod fuerat dignus*).⁴ This statement is in keeping with the conception of the metamorphoses of the Logos, no doubt derived from Philo and frequent in the works of Origen, according to which the Saviour appears to men as a man and to the angels as an angel.⁵ It fits in with the vision of the steps of the Temple, in which the Saviour is, by reason of his humanity, the first and lowest step and, by reason of his angelic nature, the uppermost step dominating all the others, so that all the steps are the Saviour.⁶ In Ismailian Gnosis we find a similar image: the Temple of Light of the Imām, who is constituted by all the degrees of the esoteric hierarchy, to each of which the divine Epiphany is manifested in the measure of its capacity.

We can dwell only on a few essential elements which have already been noted in the various schools of Gnosis and which reappear in this as yet little-known and scarcely studied form, Shiite Ismailian Gnosis. Among

4 “... non solum duae formae in eo fuerunt (una quidem secundum quam omnes eum videbant, altera autem secundum quam transfiguratus est coram discipulis in monte . . .) sed etiam unicuique apparebat secundum quod fuerat dignus.” In *Commentaria in Matthaeum*, quoted with reference to parallel texts in Joseph Barbel, *Christos Angelos* (Theophaneia, 3; Bonn, 1941), p. 202, n. 450.

5 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 200-01 (on the creation of the Gods, Thrones, and Dominations, and on the theophanies as proofs of the Saviour's angelomorphosis): “καὶ σαφῶς γέγονεν ἀνθρώποις ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἀγγέλοις ἀγγελος.” In *Ioan.* I, 31. Compare the parallel texts of Melito of Sardis and Irenaeus (*ibid.*, p. 204) as well as the verses of the poet Commodian, for whom there is only one sole God originated by himself, who is at the same time Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, God of the eternal light, who “in primitiva sua qualis sit, a nullo videtur, Detransfiguratur, sicut vult ostendere sese, Praebet se visibilem angelis juxta formam eorum” (*ibid.*, n. 405); and lastly, the text of Philo commenting on Gen. 31 : 13: “I am the God who hath shown himself to thee in the place of (instead of) God”—Philo, *De somniis* I, 220-32 (*ibid.*, p. 293); cf. our *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital* (New York and London, 1960), p. 153.

6 *Commentaria in Ioannem* XIX: 6, quoted in Barbel, p. 292, n. 457.

these the one element that determines all the rest is at once postulated and announced by the very nature of an event such as John's secret colloquy with *Christus impatibilis* on the Mount of Olives. In brief, it is the attitude that has been designated by the term Docetism, a conception which itself admits of numerous variants that are sources of no less numerous misunderstandings. What is of capital importance for our purposes is this: not only is the Christology professed by the Koran expressly Docetic (cf. 4: 156),⁷ but moreover the doctrine of the Imām, the Imāmology peculiar to Shiite Gnosis is, in its broad outlines, conceived in Docetic terms. We know, moreover, that Mahāyāna Buddhism also conceived its Buddhology after a Docetic fashion.⁸

The conception with which Docetism contrasts is that of the hypostatic union, that is to say, the official dogma of the Incarnation as it was finally formulated by the Councils. In setting itself up against this dogma of the Incarnation, the Docetic conception consequently opposes the idea of a divine Incarnation occurring like a "material" fact which enters into the process of history and becomes its center and which may be invoked as an external and objective *datum*. We should probably gain a good deal by taking the term *δόκησις* not in its too current acceptance of "simulacrum" or "phantasm" but in its etymological sense of "apparitional" reality, that is to say, as an "appearance" or rather as a "real apparition" corresponding in every case to the faith, the mode of being, one might say the "a priori subjectivity" that is its foundation. Just this is the source of the metamorphoses of theophanic visions. It is implicit in the Docetic conception that the theophany is in every case proportionate to the theophanic dimension of the soul, that is, its aptitude for being shown a divine Figure (such is the meaning of the *qualem capere potui*). The dominant intuition is that the soul is not the witness of an external event but the medium *in which* the event takes place. In our days, too, phenomenology declares that knowledge does not bear upon Being, but it *is* Being, aware of itself. In this sense the Docetists may be regarded as the first phenomenologists.⁹ But the term

⁷ Our Koran references are given according to the type of edition adopted in Iran; the numbering of the verses differs from the Cairo edition and accords with the Flügel edition. [The translator has quoted from and added references to *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, an explanatory translation by Marmaduke Pickthall (London, 1930)].

⁸ *ERE*, IV, 839ff.

⁹ Commenting on the passage from the Acts of John already quoted (n. 3 above), which states the mystery of the Cross of Light, C. G. Jung also observes that the teaching

is ambiguously broad: Docetism is not a set doctrine but a tendency.¹⁰ Thus it can be reconciled with formulations which literally contradict one another: it can go hand in hand with a complete affirmation of human reality because what it perceives is at the same time not this reality; or it can—and prefers to—volatilize this reality (thus going from Nestorianism to extreme Monophysitism); or, lastly and better still, it can conceive of the reality of a body intermediate between the sensible and the intelligible.¹¹ Docetism can equally well accept or reject the virgin birth of the Saviour; it can also conceive of the Virgin Mother as having been an Angel, sent in advance of the Angel who was to “appear” to men as her son, their Saviour.¹²

of the Acts of John is far more subtle than the crude and current Docetic conception (or at least than the summary interpretation that is uniformly given of it), namely, that Christ possessed only the simulacrum of a body, which suffered only in appearance. Far from this, the Acts of John proceed in the manner of a critique of consciousness. “The historical facts are real enough, but they reveal no more than is intelligible to the senses of the ordinary man. Yet even for the knower of divine secrets the act of crucifixion is a mystery, a symbol that expresses a parallel psychic event in the beholder. In the language of Plato it is an event which occurs in a ‘supracelestial place,’ i.e., on a ‘mountain’ and in a ‘cave’ where a cross of light is set up, its many synonyms signifying that it has many aspects and many meanings. It expresses the unknowable nature of the ‘Lord,’ the supraordinate personality and *τέλειος άνθρωπος*, and since it is a quaternity, a whole divided into four parts, it is the classic symbol of the self. [Cf. the end of section 3 below, the Ismailian interpretation of the symbol of the Cross and of the *four* words of the Islamic profession of faith.] Understood in this sense, the Docetism of the Acts of John appears more as a completion of the historical event than a devaluation of it. It is not surprising that the common people should have failed to appreciate its subtlety, though it is plain enough from a psychological point of view.”—“Transformation Symbolism in the Mass,” in *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (CWJ, 11; 1958), p. 283.

¹⁰ *ERE*, IV, 832ff.

¹¹ According to Apelles, the disciple of Marcion, Christ did not have the simulacrum of a body, but neither did he have the substance of a “real” body as the Gospel teaches. Rather, in his descent from the higher regions, he wove himself a body of sidereal and aerial nature (Adolf von Harnack, quoted in Barbel, p. 305, n. 502).

¹² Cf. a fragment of the Gospel According to the Hebrews, quoted in James, p. 8; according to Pseudo-Cyril (of Jerusalem) an investigation revealed that a monk had in his possession a Gospel to the Hebrews, in which it was said that a heavenly Power, Michael, was sent from heaven to earth, where this Power was called Mary and bore Christ for seven months in her womb. After a solemn interrogation the poor monk’s book was, of course, burned. On this same conception of Mary as a celestial Angel sent in feminine form to give birth to another Angel (Christ), cf. Hans Söderberg, *La Religion des Cathares* (Uppsala, 1940), pp. 183, 203; Henri-Charles Puech and André Vaillant, eds., *Le Traité contre les Bogomiles de Cosmas le prêtre* (Paris, 1945), pp. 207ff. (cf. below, the partial survival of this motif in the celestial origin of Fâtima). Compare the Philomarianites, or Collyridians, a group of women who came to Arabia from Thrace and called themselves the priestesses of Mary as “goddess”—J. J. Herzog, *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* (3rd edn., 1896-1913), X, 649, and XII, 315.

These diverse tendencies can be distinguished in the Islamic forms of Gnosis.

What we perceive at once is that all Christology of this type moves against a background of angelology. This is the determining force in the "Angel Christology" or "Christo-angelology" (*Engelchristologie*), a thorough exposition of which by a historian of dogmas recently provoked some nervousness among certain theologians.¹³ To tell the truth, such nervousness is quite comprehensible when we consider that the Christological dogma of the Church goes hand in hand with a certain anthropology that is shaken to its foundations by an "Angel Christology." Here we have an idea whose consequences are far graver even than Origen's "a man to men, an Angel to the Angels"—the idea, namely, that the divine anthropomorphosis as such, the theophany, occurs at the angelic level. On the one hand we have a simple "messenger" carrying divine orders: in his very person the Angel is "annunciation," that is to say, revelation of the divine mystery, since all theophany is in essence an angelophany.¹⁴ Correlatively we have an exaltation of humanity in the sense that human nature ceases to be a "nature" as such and becomes a wholly transitory state: man is called, by right of his origin and if he consents, to an angelomorphosis (such is the doctrine also professed in the *Shepherd of Hermas*), his acceptance of which precisely regulates his aptitude for theophanic visions. All these features are sharpened and accentuated in Ismailian Gnosis. They presuppose the thesis that the human form perceptible to the senses cannot be the form of a divine Incarnation (*ḥulūl, tajassud*); at the very least it must undergo a transmutation by the internal organ of the soul in order to be perceived at the theophanic level, that is to say, as a *mazhar*, an epiphanic Form (in the manner of a mirror in which the image is suspended). It goes without saying that this epiphanic relation,

¹³ We are thinking here of Martin Werner's important work, *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas* (Bern and Leipzig, 1941), and the polemic raised by Werner Michaelis, *Zur Engelchristologie im Urchristentum* (Basel, 1942), which provoked "refutations" that were far from always being convincing. Cf. a first reply by Werner, "Christus Angelus" in *Schweizerische Theologische Umschau* (June, 1943), pp. 62ff. (containing, among other things, a comparison between Barbel's book cited above and that of Michaelis). Werner's work has just been republished (summer, 1954), too late for us to make use of it here; we expect, however, to return to it at a later date, for it is of the utmost significance for the relationships we are treating here.

¹⁴ Cf. in Dionysius and Proclus, the antithesis no longer of *σιγή-λόγος*, but of *σιγή-ἄγγελος*: the Angels as the interpreters of the divine "silence," announcing and revealing the Unity from which they issue. Cf. René Roques, *L'Univers dionysien* (Paris, 1954), p. 135.

like the metamorphoses which it makes possible and evokes, cannot be conceived or defined in terms of a hypostatic union.

If now we extend this law of essence which commands the succession of visions given to one and the same soul, just as it commands the variety of visions given simultaneously to several souls (as in the narrative of the Acts of Peter), if we extend it not in the dimension of our linear time but according to the curve of a cyclical time carrying back the past to its origin, we obtain the concept of a *cycle* of theophanies and their metamorphoses. If to this we add the notion of degrees of dignity or aptitude correlative to these metamorphoses which the law of an identical rhythm orders in *simultaneity* (to constitute a mystical Temple of Light) and in *succession* (to constitute a Cycle of Epiphanies), we possess the essential ideas by which to penetrate the heart of Shiite Gnosis and, most particularly, of Ismailian Gnosis.

Ismailian Gnosis— and this is one of its chief points of interest—presents both an actual extension (in history) and a virtual extension (for purposes of meditation or psychological analysis) of a Christianity that had long returned to the paradise of the archetypes. Not only Gnostic Christianity but eminently the Christianity that is designated as Judaeo-Christianity or Ebionism—a Christianity fundamentally hostile and alien to Paulinism, recognizing the primacy and presence not of Peter but of James, bishop of Jerusalem. We must not forget that Epiphanius, writing at the end of the fourth century (375), describes it as still existing at that time in southern Syria, only a little more than two centuries before the birth of Islam.¹⁵ In general the historians and theologians who have dealt with the Christianity of the Ebionites have suggested and developed at greater or lesser length the idea that it was extended or amplified in Islam;¹⁶ what they had in mind was essentially the conception of the prophetic mission, the Islamic prophetology as such. Here I cannot enter into details, but it is my belief that, if there are common traits, it is not so much in the general prophetology of Islam as in the doctrine of the Imām—the Imāmology peculiar to Islamic esoterism, to Shiism, and most particularly to Ismailian Shiism. Perhaps this thesis might be illustrated on the basis of the idea of the "True Prophet"

¹⁵ Cf. the remark of Wladimir Ivanow, *The Alleged Founder of Ismailism* (Bombay, 1946), p. 86.

¹⁶ See in particular Oscar Cullmann, *Le Problème littéraire et historique du roman pseudo-clémentin* (Paris, 1930), p. 260, and H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judentums* (Tübingen, 1949), pp. 337-42.

in Ebionism and of the Ebionite doctrine in regard to Adam, the essential features of which recur in the Ismailian Adamology. This Adamology is itself the consequence of an anthropology which goes hand in hand with a fundamental angelology; its keystone is an Imāmology which reveals an inherent "Angel Christology" and Docetism. We find, then, at the height of the Ismailian meditations the idea of a vision whose metamorphoses are correlative with the mode of "consociation" with the eternal Imām, consequently a perfect illustration of the formula *unicuique secundum quod dignus est*.¹⁷

Here we recall Harnack's proposed definition of Islam as "a transformation on Arab soil of a Jewish religion that had itself been transformed by Gnostic Judæo-Christianity."¹⁸ Like all such formulas, this one somewhat misses the mark and moreover has the drawback of embodying the type of causal reduction peculiar to historism (the concrete spiritual *fact* of "transformation" itself cannot be causally deduced). Nevertheless it has the merit of invoking not Ebionism pure and simple but Gnostic Ebionism, specifically the Elkesaism which has been called a pre-Manichaean Manichæism.¹⁹ And indeed we never cease to observe the importance of Manichaean ideas in the growth of Islamic Gnosis, for the Koranic revelation did not by itself institute a Gnostic religion but was, in fact, meditated and interpreted as the exoteric (*ẓāhir*) aspect of a Gnosis—of the Gnosis that concerns us here. The characteristic *theologoumenon* of Ebionite Christianity consists in the idea of the True Prophet and in a unique myth of Adam. For the Ebionites, the support of Revelation is the True Prophet (*προφήτης ἀληθής*) or the Prophet of Truth (*προφήτης τῆς ἀλήθειας*) and not a God incarnate, a God-man. "Running through the ages since the beginning of the world, he hastens toward the place of his repose" (*Nam et ipse Verus Propheta ab initio mundi per saeculum currens festinat ad requiem*).²⁰ Consequently the

¹⁷ Here we cannot even briefly describe the historical circumstances of the burgeoning of Shiism at the very beginnings of Islam, or the spiritual motivations that led to the formation of Septimanian or Ismailian Shiism and of the Duodeciman Shiism which for the last four and a half centuries has been the official religion of Iran; for Iranian Ismailism, cf. our *Étude préliminaire pour le "Livre réunissant les deux sagesse" de Nāsir-e Khosraw* (BI, 3a; Teheran and Paris, 1953); see also W. Ivanow, "Isma'iliya," *EI*, Supplement, and *Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ismailism* (Bombay and Leiden, 1952). Some of the problems treated in the present study are broached in our essay "Cyclical Time in Mazdaism and Ismailism," *PEY* 3, pp. 115-72.

¹⁸ Adolf von Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, II¹, p. 537 (quoted in Schoepps, *Theologie*, p. 334).

¹⁹ Cf. Schoepps, *Theologie*, p. 332.

²⁰ *Recognitiones* 2, 9, 22; Schoepps, *Theologie*, pp. 98, 108-9.

question which the Jews asked the Ebionites was whether Jesus was the True Prophet foretold by Moses, he who is *Christus aeternus*.²¹ This is all that separated the Jews from the Ebionites.

The True Prophet begins *ab initio creaturae* with the prophetic dignity conferred upon Adam. The first man was the first epiphanic Form of the True Prophet, that is to say, of *Christus aeternus*; he possessed τὸ ἅγιον Χριστοῦ Πνεῦμα, he was Adam-Christos.²² This typology in itself puts us at the antipodes of the Pauline typology. This impression is intensified by a tenet that turns the Biblical narrative upside down, namely that of Adam's impeccability. For the True Prophet, having within him the breath of the divine nature (πρέων θεότητος) cannot sin: he is ἀναμάρτητος. To say that Adam sinned is to say that the divine Spirit sinned in him and by him.²³ Similarly the Ismailian theosophy will speak to us of a primordial, universal Adam (*Adam atwal kullī, πανάνθρωπος*) initially invested with the Imāmate and, as such, "immunized" (*ma'ṣūm*) against all impurity, all sin, as were all the Most Pure Imāms after him. And just as the Ebionites qualified Adam as *Anima generalis*, receptacle or treasure of souls, of all *his* souls, so the Ismailian Adam and after him all the Imāms sustain a Temple of Light built out of all the souls of their adepts.²⁴

Now it is this Adam-Christos who is revealed through a succession of epiphanic forms, the "hebdomad of the mystery": Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus. These are the Seven Pillars of the World, the Seven Columns of the House of Wisdom, the Seven Pastors, and (with Adam himself) the eight *Christs* among the men mentioned by the Prophet Micah, that is to say, the epiphanic forms of Adam-Christos for men.²⁵

²¹ "Si ipse (Jesus) erat propheta quem Moyses praedixit, qui est Christus aeternus," *Recognitiones* 1, 43 (quoted from Schoeps, *Theologie*, p. 87).

²² Schoeps, *Theologie*, pp. 100-101. In view of the perspective opened by this speculative Adamology, tending to express the rigorous unity of the prophetic Revelatory Principle in history, we may observe with Harnack that the dilemma of classical apologetics—"Is Christ God or man?"—gives way to an entirely different definition of his essence (*Christus praesens-vicarius Christi*, quoted in Schoeps, p. 108, n. 1).

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 102, 103.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99. *Anima generalis*, as the divine Treasure House of the souls, should be confused neither with the collectivity of the souls nor with the logical universal; cf. among the Catharists, the *Spiritus Adae* or *Anima* from which descend *omnes animae* (Söderberg, p. 157), the Angel Christ who is called *Anima* (pp. 186ff.), the distinction between *Spiritus* or *Anima principalis* and the *Spiritus sancti* as tutelary spirits (p. 174).

²⁵ Schoeps, *Theologie*, pp. 104-6 (Micah 5 : 4, ἑπτα ποιμένες καὶ ὁκτὼ χριστοὶ—ὁκτὼ χριστοὺς ἀνθρώπων = *Christos hominum* in St. Jerome).

Manichaeism professes a similar succession but includes figures from outside Semitic prophecy: Adam, Seth, Noah, Jesus, Buddha, Zoroaster, Mani. As for the Koran, it also has a succession of prophets, but the number of those it expressly names is very different from the number mentioned in the Traditions.²⁶ The idea of an exact periodicity is formulated only in Ismailian Gnosis with its Cycle of seven periods, the last Prophet of which will be the last Imām, the *Qā'im al-Qiyāmat* or Resurrector, corresponding to him in whom the True Prophet finds at last his "repose." And precisely this Figure enables us to point out the true nature of the correspondence. We know that Ebionism distinguished between the case of Moses and Abraham, to whom the True Prophet appeared, and that of Adam and Jesus, in whom the True Prophet was present and who in their person were the very foundation of the theophany.²⁷ The prophet Muḥammad may be likened to those to whom theophanic visions were given but whose person itself may not be called theophanic, whereas this epithet applies to the person of the Imām. That is why we have said that it is not Islamic prophethood in general but Shiite Imāmology in particular which prolongs and amplifies the Ebionite Christology as the summit of prophethood.

In this same connection, the idea of theophanic (*maṣḥar*) persons and of their succession must be preserved in its original form. It would be quite incorrect to conceive of this succession as a series of reincarnations, as a metempsychosis. The ἡγεμόνες τῆς προφητείας are neither reincarnations of the True Prophet nor simple receptacles of the Spirit, to whom the True Prophet appeared.²⁸ The guiding idea is the idea of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις,²⁹ a recapitulation or, more exactly, an integration or reintegration into the whole. Just as all the Prophets since Adam are "recapitulated" in Christ, so all the Imāms, all the partial *Qā'im*, are recapitulated or integrated in the

²⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 335. Here it may be well to recall certain aspects of Islamic prophethood: the distinction made between the *nabi* (the preacher with the divine mission) and the *mursal* (the Envoy who becomes the leader of a people). The *Bihār al-Anwār* (Encyclopedia of Shiite Traditions) counts 124,000 *nabi* (including a great number of Biblical figures but many non-Biblical figures as well), among whom only 313 have the quality of Envoys; cf. our *Avicenna*, p. 312, n. 9.

²⁷ Cf. Schoeps, *Theologie*, pp. 106-7, and *Aus frühchristlicher Zeit: Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (Tübingen, 1950), p. 32.

²⁸ Schoeps, *Theologie*, pp. 106-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 104, n. 6, in which the author expresses the belief that Neander went too far in regarding this conception as a specifically Docetic Christology; one might well reconsider the question, taking into account what has been suggested above concerning the true meaning of Docetism (n. 9 above and related text).

last among them (whose *majma'* is the Temple of all their Temples of Light). It is then as a progressive integration that one must conceive the growth of an epiphanic Figure whose unity and totality imply a number of theophanies without confusion of persons. Further, if the last Imām, still to come, is called the Perfect Child (*al-walad al-tāmm*), he is so named in respect to the Angel of the pleroma, who is here the homologue of *Christus aeternus*. But "adoptionism" does not mean here that the Adopted One is exalted, or purely and simply metamorphosed, into the celestial person who adopted him; he is that person's ultimate, concluding Form. If he draws toward him in an ascending movement the entire pleroma of his souls, the adepts of the sodality down through the centuries, if he is enthroned as the substitute and successor of the Angel, it is because the Angel himself consequently rises into the celestial pleroma and from Cycle to Cycle continues to draw all those who follow him to ever higher abodes. Such are the consequences of a mighty dramaturgy to which we shall have occasion to return. Everything happens as though all the consequences of the rejection of the hypostatic union were preserved, down to the distinction of two persons: Christos Angelos and Jesus the prophet. And indeed Ismailism distinguishes a three-fold notion of the Anthropos: there is the celestial, or spiritual, Adam (*Adam rūhānī*), the Angel corresponding to Christos Angelos; there is the original, universal Adam (*Adam al-awwal al-kullī*) at the beginning of the Cycle of Cycles; and finally, there are the partial Adams (*Adam al-juz'ī*) at the beginning of each Cycle, our own for example: the Adam mentioned exoterically by the Bible and the Koran. Ultimately, then, the decisive interest is concentrated upon the person and the figure of Angelos Christos and his correspondences: in Ismailian Gnosis, the celestial Anthropos, the spiritual Adam; in Avicennism, the Tenth Angel, identified with the Holy Spirit and the Archangel Gabriel of the Koranic text.

The pattern of Ebionite Christology as contrasted with the official Christology of the Church is well known.³⁰ Adoptianist like that of the *Shepherd of Hermas*, this Christology considers Jesus as having first been a man among men. It looks on the scene of the Baptism as the Epiphany: a supernatural light descended from heaven, illumining and transfiguring the place (as in the narrative of the Acts of Peter), and the words of the Holy Spirit were heard: "Thou art my beloved son, *today* I have engendered thee" (words

30 Ibid., pp. 73-75, 78.

which are echoed by those of Jesus recorded in the Gospel According to the Hebrews: "*My mother the Holy Spirit seized me by the hair and carried me up to Mount Tabor*").³¹ The consequences of this Christology are incommensurable: what interest now has the earthly genealogy of Jesus? Only Angelos Christos pre-exists, and all that need be meditated upon is his eternal birth in the pleroma. For beyond any doubt we find here a trace of the early hesitation to distinguish between Angelos Christos, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the repercussions of which may be found in all Islamic theology (in the identification between the Holy Spirit and Gabriel the Archangel, who in Christian Gnosis was also Gabriel-Christos). But we know that this recognition of Christos as an Angel (who confers not his essence or his "person," but his name and his quality upon Jesus) was bound up, among the Ebionites, as may be seen in I Enoch,³² with the idea of the Son of Man as originally a celestial Archangel and of Christos as one of the Archangels, at once prince of all the other Angels and celestial archetype of mankind.³³ And we also find Christos as an Archangel among the Seven, or identified with the Archangel Michael (as in Hermas or among the Catharists), and this identification becomes all the more comprehensible

31 Cf. James, pp. 2-5. (Here we have before us a third Judæo-Christian gospel, the "Egyptian" Gospel according to the Hebrews. Cf. Schoeps, *Theologie*, p. 31.)

32 I Enoch 46: 1, and text of Tertullian quoted in Schoeps, *Theologie*, pp. 80-81: "(Ebion) . . . non dei filium constituit Jesum . . . ut ita in illo angelum fuisse edicat, quemadmodum in Zacharia." Yet the difference is more profound than the author (alluding to the polemic mentioned above, n. 13) supposes, and the analysis should be carried further. It does not amount to the same thing whether an Angel acted in Jesus or whether Jesus was an Angel. Not Jesus is in question, but Christos Angelos and no one else. The union of the Angel Christos and of Jesus remains, then, to be considered; here the *unus ambo* is assuredly not equivalent to a hypostatic union; perhaps the old habits of thought that have decided otherwise do not at once provide us with the necessary categories in which to apprehend this mode of being in *duality*. It is fundamentally the problem of the mode of man's relation with his Angel, a problem which demands precisely to be reconsidered as soon as the pattern of an Angel Christology is put forward (that of Hermas, the Gnostics, Theodotus, etc.). It is also the problem raised in philosophical terms by Avicennism, where the figure of the active Intelligence as Gabriel-Holy Spirit dominates the theory of knowledge and of salvation by knowledge; it is under this aspect that we must analyze the reasons for the failure of Latin Avicennism, whose position in relation to orthodox Scholasticism was similar to that of Angel Christology in relation to the official Christology; see on this essential question (not hitherto considered) our *Avicenna* and the analysis outlined below of the notion of *mazhar*, or "epiphanic form."

33 Cf. Schoeps, *Theologie*, p. 81 (quoted from Epiphanius: *ὡς ἐν αὐτῶν ἀρχαγγέλων* and *Homilies* 3, 20, *Recognitiones* 1, 45, in which God, deliberating with his Angels on his decision, institutes "princes" for all creatures—*Statuit angelis angelum principem . . . hominibus hominem, qui est Christus*).

in view of the contrast stated in one of the Clementine writings between the Demon as prince of the world and the Archangel Christ who will rule over the world to come.³⁴

In all these variants, Angel Christology develops a soteriology that contrasts no less strongly with the orthodox soteriology. As the passage from the Acts of John regarding the mystery of the Cross of Light has solemnly told us, no soteriology attaches to the death of Jesus on the cross made of material wood. If he has been enthroned as a messianic Lord, it is not because his death effected a redemption; it is because the community was waiting for the Epiphany of the Son of Man, for Angelos Christos, the *παρουσία τοῦ διδάσκαλου*, the return of him who dispenses the Knowledge that delivers and who will thereby establish a supraterritorial kingdom, a kingdom of Angels.³⁵ It is not by shedding his blood that he saved the world (*Christus impatibilis* does not die); he is the Saviour because he has kindled for mankind the torch of perfect Knowledge.³⁶ The Clementine Homilies never speak of the Passion: redemption is effected by the Knowledge of the Truth. Jesus, the prophet of the Truth, is essentially an Illuminator, not a Redeemer in the Pauline sense. The traditional objection³⁷—if Christ were an immortal Angel, he could not have become a true man and have suffered and died as a Saviour—always elicits the same reply: why should it have been necessary? And indeed this is a wholly Pauline objection. And although it is true that certain evangelical texts as well as the Apocrypha and certain Manichaean notions are known to Islamic theology and Ismailian Gnosis, there is no doubt that, like Mohammed himself, they know nothing of St. Paul.

34 Ibid.; on Christ as one of the Seven Archangels, cf. Barbel, pp. 192ff. Observe that the archangelical heptad so clearly represents an archetype that we encounter an extraordinary *revival* of the cult of the Seven Archangels, starting in Italy in the sixteenth century and spreading as far as Flanders and Russia; cf. Emile Mâle, *L'Art religieux après le Concile de Trente* (Paris, 1932), pp. 298ff.

35 Schoeps, *Theologie*, p. 76.

36 Cf. the quotation from Siouville in *ibid.*, p. 111, n. 3.

37 This is one of the questions cited by Adolphine Bakker in an important article: "Christ an Angel? A Study of Early Christian Docetism," in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (Giessen), XXXII (1933), 255-65. The article's point of departure is an observation by Rendel Harris, the English theologian: from the Slavonic translation of Josephus it results not only that a collection of *Testimonia* quoted by Josephus forms the oldest document of known date that may be regarded as a source of Christology, but that in it Christ is constantly designated as an Angel; precisely the polemic in the Epistle to the Hebrews presupposes this Angel Christology, which it attacks and which is attested in the *Testimonia* (cf. also Werner, p. 60).

We have suggested above that an Angel Christology goes hand in hand with an angel anthropology;³⁸ the entire Adamology is affected, and the Ismailian vision concentrates on this theme. The dramaturgy embraces the events that befell the angelic, celestial Adam and the terrestrial Adam, or rather *Adams*. The traditional identification among the philosophers between Gabriel, the Holy Spirit, and the active Intelligence, which among the Ishrāqīyūn is the Angel of humanity and in Ismailism is *Adam rūḥānī*, or the Spiritual Adam, is only a commentary on the Koranic texts, where the identification Gabriel-Holy Spirit itself exemplifies a Gnostic Christology in which Angelos Christos assumes more particularly the features of Gabriel-Christos. Here I shall briefly set forth a few points: they will serve us as an introduction to the dramaturgy that has its source in this angel archetype of mankind—a dramaturgy in which our own history today is simply a phase, the crucible of the metamorphoses which must either lead humanity back to its celestial and angelical origin or consummate its demoniacal fall.

The identification of Christos with the Archangel Gabriel is the dominant trait of an entire Gnostic Christology.³⁹ If we consider at the same time the

³⁸ Among other consequences, consider that mentioned in n. 22 above.

³⁹ On Gabriel-Christos see Barbel, pp. 225–62. In the *Epistola Apostolorum* (p. 236) Christ tells how he took the form of the Archangel Gabriel in order to appear to the Virgin. Thence follows the idea that it is the Logos which “gives itself form in the Virgin” (p. 240), and we have a double equation—on the one hand between the Son and the Holy Spirit, on the other between the Son-Holy Spirit and the Angel Gabriel, as is suggested by this passage from the Pseudo-Ambrose: *Vides ergo Spiritum Sanctum, id est Filium Dei, venisse ad Virginem et inde Dei et hominis filium processisse* (p. 240, n. 282). It is texts of this kind (and particularly those concerning the Angels of the Holy Spirit) that should be systematically restudied if we are to interpret in depth the assimilation of the Angel Gabriel to the Holy Spirit in Islamic theology. The idea that the conception is accomplished by and with the annunciation of the Angel Gabriel brings up particulars that withdraw the Mystery from all physiological explanation: e.g., the idea that by the voice of the Archangel the *lógos* of the Logos penetrates the Virgin; or, rather, that the *voice* of the Archangel is itself a hypostasis of the Logos (p. 248); or that the conception did not last several months *sed ipsum per uterum ipsius instar aquae per canalem transiisse* (ibid.). Among the Gnostics (Book 8 of the Christian Sibylline Oracles), the Angel Gabriel acts “as God” (p. 254); the Angel Gabriel is the very form of Iao Sabaoth Adonai, the true Force that strikes down the demons, Christos (cf. section 5 below, Salmān the Pure, terrestrial typification of Gabriel, as well as the Veil, *ḥijāb*; the little known sect of the *Ahl-e Haqq*, which still exists in Iran, possesses a book that is extremely rare though of recent composition, the *Shāh-Nāmā-ye Ahl-e Haqq*, or “Royal Book of the Gnostics,” in the prologue of which the Angel Gabriel assumes the rôle of *protoktistos*). In the *Pistis Sophia*, Christ in the form of the Archangel descends with the twelve Saviours of the Treasures of Light, whom he projects into their mothers’ wombs (p. 256), an image that we shall have occasion to remember in connection with the twelve Imāms in the Gnosis of Duodeciman Shiism.

primitive identification between the Holy Spirit and the Son of God (the "magnificent Angel" of the *Shepherd of Hermas*), we shall understand the contention that it is the Holy Spirit itself that is sent to Mary, that inspires her with its own breath and "takes body" in her with a reality which is not that of a material body but of a subtle celestial body. *Eo ipso*, this equation (Gabriel-Christos-Holy Spirit) that is discernible in Angel Christology, becomes an aspect of what has been called "Spirit Christology" (*Geisteschristologie*). The great majority of the *tafsīr* (Koran commentaries) are in agreement on this point (an entire book ought to be devoted to this pneumatology). The very details of the mental visions recur both in Christian Gnosis and in certain of our *tafsīr*,⁴⁰ for example the role attributed to the Archangel's *voice*, which is represented as being itself the hypostasis of the Logos. Hence the fine symbol of a virgin conception "by the ear," which means *by faith, ex auditu*, and suggests that the reference is to a theological dogma and not to a physiological problem. In other words, the miracle of the virginal conception is not the main point (as in the context of the dogma of the Incarnation); rather, it becomes a necessary correlate as soon as the vision is concentrated on the central problem, which is to elucidate the superior constitution of the celestial Aeon united with the man Jesus and the manner of their union. Correlatively certain *tafsīr*, amplifying the Koranic verses on the annunciation, disclose a relation between Gabriel and Jesus which would be expressed in Mazdean terms as a relation between

⁴⁰ The equation, stemming from the Koran, between the Angel Gabriel and the Holy Spirit (*Ruh al Quds*) and the correspondence (among the Avicennan philosophers) between Gabriel and the Angelos Christos of Angel Christology, is deserving of an entire study that would require a methodical analysis of the *tafsīrs*, or Koran commentaries. We hope to undertake such a study, for it would have the greatest consequences for an understanding of the differentials (and their sources) between a "philosophy of the Spirit," as conceived by a body of speculative thought developing in an Islamic world, and that "philosophy of the absolute Spirit," a secularization of several centuries of philosophical speculation, at which the Occident arrived in the nineteenth century. On Gabriel as Holy Spirit, cf. among others, Mullā Fathullāh Kāshānī, *Tafsīr* (Teheran, 1310 A.H.), I ad 2 : 81 and III ad 97 : 1-4; Muhsen Fayz, *al-Šāfi* (Teheran, 1282 A.H.), p. 253 (ad 16 : 104), pp. 264, 486; Maibodī, *Kashf al-asrār* (Tafsīr-e Khwāja Anšārī) ed. Hekmat (Teheran, 1331 A.H.), I, pp. 258-63. Here again (cf. n. 30) Gabriel acts "like God" (Mullā Fathullāh, *Tafsīr* ad 4 : 169, mentions the exegesis that makes the *Ruh* cosubject of the verb *alqā-hā*: the Spirit, that is to say, Gabriel, who projected the Word, Jesus, into Maryam). Here we find the same conceptions as in Christian Gnosis: the voice of the Archangel as hypostasis, the time of conception in complete defiance of physiological laws (three hours!), the idea of the psychic, spiritual body, etc. (ibid., ad 2 : 254; 4 : 169; 5 : 109; 19 : 17-10, etc.). It goes without saying that to appreciate the Docetism of the *tafsīrs* one must bear in mind the remark made above (n. 9).

the Fravarti, the tutelary angel, the celestial archetype, and the terrestrial soul.⁴¹

Gabriel, the Angel of the Annunciation and the Revelations, is the Angel of the theophanies that were given to the prophet Mohammed. The Koran verses (53 : 3-4; 81 : 19-29) preserve the memory of the first grandiose visions when the Prophet, emerging from his tent, contemplated the majesty of the Angel whose outspread wings covered the whole horizon. In certain traditions invoked by the commentators these sumptuous angelophanies even recalled by contrast the memory of the refusal suffered by Moses on Mount Sinai when he asked to be favored with a direct vision and the Lord answered: "Thou shalt not see me" (*lan tarānī*). Mohammed also expresses the fervent desire to see the Angel in his real form. Although warned, he insists. The vision is not refused him, but he is thrown into a swoon by the beauty and majesty of the Angel in his superhuman form of Glory; henceforth a terrestrial human Form will be the epiphanic figure (*maẓhar*) of the Angel.⁴² And marking the contrast with the dramatic episode experienced by Moses, a tradition establishes the angelic "numinosum" in a sense that is perhaps paradoxical if we compare it with the current acceptation of the term. Here it is far from being a *tremendum*, for it is in his form of Majesty, which nevertheless causes the Prophet to swoon, that the Angel reveals to him the imperatives and prohibitions of the Law.⁴³

41 In agreement with the type of Gnostic who distinguishes between Jesus the man and the celestial Christ and who looks on the earthly phenomenon as a hidden image of the higher world but does not absolutely exclude all idea of a "corporeal" birth, cf. Barbel, p. 257, n. 316 (text of Carl Schmidt); cf. Maibodi, pp. 263-64. It is the Angel Gabriel who saves Jesus from death (Mullā Fathullāh ad 4 : 156, the Docetic verse par excellence of the Koran; the situation of the Angel corresponds here to the situation presupposed by the colloquy on the Mount of Olives in the Acts of John; and the application of this same verse came to be extended to all Imāmology, cf. section 4 below). Here we only arrive, by a different path, at the thesis of Rudolf Otto, *Reich Gottes und Menschensohn* (Munich, 1934), p. 146 (*The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man*, tr. F. V. Filson and Bertram Lee-Woolf [London, 1938], p. 182), showing the Mazdean idea of the Fravarti to be an exact prefiguration of the relations between Enoch and the celestial Man, between Jesus and the Anthropos. The present essay will show later on that the relation between the Imām-Anthropos and Salmān (the Gnostic True Believer) embodies a situation similar to that of Enoch when it was revealed to him: the Son of Man is *himself*.

42 Cf. Muhsen Fayz, pp. 432-33 (ad 53 : 3-5), p. 474 (ad 81 : 19ff.; on the two aspects, or "forms," of the Angel, cf. Mullā Fathullāh, ad 35 : 1; with this compare Abū'l-Futūḥ Rāzī, *Tafsīr* (the oldest Shiite *tafsīr* in Persian), ad loc., with certain variants of the narrative insisting on the Angel's feeling of compassion and tenderness.

43 Cf. Maibodi, pp. 301-2.

Mohammed, however, has only the vision of the Angel. Here, as we have pointed out, the distinction which the prophetology of the Ebionites makes between the cases of Adam and Jesus on the one hand and Moses and Abraham on the other will find a parallel in the transition from prophetology to Imāmology. A Koranic verse (33 : 33, *āyat al-taḥlīr*) rich in exegetic virtualities constitutes one of the Scriptural foundations of Shiism. I am referring to the scene in which the Prophet, having spread out his mantle over the members of his house (Fāṭima, his daughter; 'Alī, his son-in-law; the two child Imāms Ḥasan and Ḥusayn), asks God to immunize them against all impurity (*taḥlīr*). These are the Five "Companions of the Mantle" (*Aṣḥāb al-Kisā'*), earthly epiphanies of the Five Pre-eternal Persons of the divine Mystery (*ashkhāṣ azaliyūn*), whose theophanies succeed one another on different planes of being and from period to period.⁴⁴ Thereupon the Angel Gabriel makes himself visible, proclaiming: "I am the sixth of you five" (*anā sādisukum*), which means the distinct personal unity that is also their totality; then he reveals the verse.⁴⁵ The vastness of theological meaning found in this scene by Shiite meditation may be measured by the fact that the *tafsīr* attributed to Imām Ḥasan 'Askarī, the eleventh Imām of the Duodeciman Shiites, expressly establishes a typological relation between the Koranic verses evoking the Annunciation and the conjunction of the Holy Spirit with Jesus, and this scene in which Gabriel the Holy Spirit joins the five hypostases of the original Imāmate. It is precisely here that Shiism inaugurates the transition from Angel Christology to Imāmology.⁴⁶ Finally, the Angel Gabriel achieves his earthly typification, his theophanic person (*maẓhar*), in the person of Salmān the Persian, or Salmān the Pure, as the companion who initiates the Prophet into his vocation, and the figure of Salmān will indicate to us the ultimate and profound signification of personal experience that Imāmology can contain.⁴⁷

44 On the metamorphoses of their theophanies (on the plane of the divine Throne, on the plane of the Five Archangels, on the plane of their earthly typifications), cf. particularly *Umm al-Kitāb* (proto-Ismailian treatise in Persian), ed. W. Ivanow, Questions 3 and 5.

45 Cf. Mullā Faṭḥullāh, II ad 33 : 33; Muḥsen Fayẓ, p. 363; Muḥammad Bāqir-e Majlisī, *Bihār al-Anwār* IX, pp. 39, 180-97.

46 Cf. *Tafsīr* attributed to the eleventh Imām (Ḥasan 'Askarī) (lith., Teheran), pp. 150ff. and pp. 185ff. (for Gabriel and Salmān).

47 See particularly Louis Massignon, "La Mubāhala," in *Annuaire de l'École des Hautes-Études, Section des Sciences religieuses* (1944), pp. 19ff., in which it is the mission of Salmān as earthly homologue of Gabriel, Angel of the Annunciation, to make the

It is to this Angel of Revelation as Angel of Knowledge, of all knowledge, that the Avicennan philosophers "led back," by way of their own peculiar *ta'wil*, the representation of the active Intelligence (*'Aql fa'āl*, Νοῦς ποιητικός) which they took from Aristotle and which Avicenna identifies with the tenth Cherub of the first celestial hierarchy. It is this active Intelligence that is worshiped as Madonna Intelligenza in the meditation of the *Fedeli d'amore*.⁴⁸ Among the Ishrāqīyūn it is the Angel of humanity, the celestial archetype of the human creature (*rabb al-nūr-e insānī*). All these variants merely define and amplify the original features of one and the same Figure: Angel, Holy Spirit, Gabriel, Christos, Sophia. In Ismailian Gnosis, to be sure, this Figure has its homologue in the tenth Angel of the pleroma, who is the celestial Adam, but here something more enters in: this tenth rank is not originally his. He must regain his original rank with the help of all mankind which issues from him, and he must draw all this mankind of his upward in his ascent. Here we have a dramaturgy of pre-cosmic origin, made explicit by the phases of Adamology. It is this Adamology that one must have in mind in order to conceive the Cycle of Divine Epiphanies, which is also the Cycle of the soul's metamorphoses.

2. Ebionite and Ismailian Adamology

It has been observed more than once that the Ebionite Adamology is characterized by a doctrine which is considered unique in Christian, Jewish, or Gnostic literature: the doctrine which absolves Adam of all sin and affirms

stupefied Christians recognize, in the theophany of the Five Mohammedans sitting haloed in Glory beneath the Mantle, a new manifestation of the Divine Spirit "which hath anointed the Messiah for the kingship," and pp. 25ff. (*nusayri* liturgy) recounting the theophanic vision in which the Messiah (= Mohammed), his "Father" (= Salmān), and his Mother (Fāṭima = Maryam) are recognized beneath the Mantle. We might mention in passing that this would lead us to read the ideogram XIM as Christos, Gabriel, Maryam, rather than Christos, Gabriel, Michael (according to the usually accepted hypothesis). On the "perpetual presence" of Salmān from Christ down to Mohammed, cf. our study "Le Livre du Glorieux de Jābir ibn Ḥayyān," *EEJ*, XVIII (Jung Festschrift, 1950), 105; cf. section 5 below on Salmān as archetype of the perfect Gnostic, "Salmān of the microcosm."

⁴⁸ Cf. our *Avicenna*, p. 267. To complete the mental image of Gabriel-Sophia-Holy Spirit, we may observe in passing that in Eastern Christian iconography, which traditionally represents the three persons of the Trinity by three Angels, the Angel seated on the right (i.e., to the left of the Central Angel) discloses more distinctly feminine features (e.g., in the famous icon of Andrei Rublev). [Cf. Rublev's "Old Testament Trinity" (c. 1410-20), in G. H. Hamilton, *The Art and Architecture of Russia* (Pelican History of Art, 1954), pl. 48 and p. 87f.—Ed.]

his impeccability.⁴⁹ Not only was Adam created in the image of God, but he was called Christos because God had anointed him with the Holy Spirit; the Spirit of the godhead dwelt in him and he possessed the Holy Spirit of prophecy, so that, if he had not dominated all the temptations of evil, the Holy Spirit would have had to sin within him. But in this case it becomes all the more urgent to ask: what, then, is the catastrophe that has *changed* man's original, celestial state and brought him sickness and old age, violence and death? The answer will be provided by a completely original exegesis of the famous motif known as the *descensus angelorum*, the fall of the angels, a dramatic episode conceived not as a second fall—as would appear from the letter of the Biblical narrative—but as a fall pure and simple of mankind. Down to the eighth generation (that is, according to the chronology of the Septuagint, down to the fortieth year of Jared, father of Enoch, or to the end of the first millennium) man had lived in Paradise. Then came the drama of the revolt and descent of the Angels upon Mount Hermon, the memory of which attaches chiefly to I Enoch 7.

But this drama itself may be interpreted in at least three different ways. One interpretation involves heavenly Angels who, led by two of their princes, descend from Heaven with the intention of uniting with the daughters of men. This interpretation suggests a certain malicious pleasure, a triumphant jealousy toward the Angel, who has at last fallen from his superiority to man. This Satanic depreciation is attenuated by another interpretation of the episode, that given in 2 Enoch, the Slavonic Enoch: the Angels descend to the earth, drawn not by human seductions but by indignation over the ingratitude of men, whom they plan to bring back to dignity and justice; but in their overgenerous boldness they merely succumb to the impossible task. Finally, there is a third form of interpretation, that of the Ebionites, which has no bearing on the heavenly Angels: the authors and actors of the drama are righteous men, the children of Seth as opposed to the posterity of Cain; up to that time the children of Seth had been leading the life of the Angels and for this reason are called the "sons of God."⁵⁰

49 Cf. Schoeps, *Aus frühchristlicher Zeit*, pp. 7-10.

50 Ibid., pp. 10-13. The traces of this exegesis may be followed down to the traditions of Islamic Iran, where we find the children of Seth, a people of pious nostalgic foreigners, gathered together on Mount Hermon and identified with the Angels of Enoch, the Wakers, then with the antediluvian Chaldaean kings, and lastly with the first dynasty of Iranian mythohistory, founded by the Primordial Man, Gayōmart. Cf. the text of Jūzjānī's *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣiri* in Sven S. Hartman, *Gayōmart* (Uppsala, 1953), pp. 151-50.

It is this last interpretation that foreshadows the traits of the Ismailian Adamology, in which we encounter a conception of Adam's fault as radically different from the traditional exegesis of the Biblical narrative as is the Ebionite conception. In regard to the episode corresponding to the Mount Hermon episode, this conception results in an interpretation involving not heavenly but earthly Angels, that is to say, the "Angels *in potentia*" that are those human beings who correspond to the children of Seth. The drama itself will be seen to consist in the passage from a Cycle of Epiphany or Unveiling (*dawr al-kashf*) to a Cycle of Occultation (*dawr al-satr*). But this cyclical metamorphosis (corresponding to the Ebionite idea of the completion of the first millennium) does not imply the responsibility of Adam (that is, of the episodic Adam who is the only one known through the exoteric letter of the Bible and the Koran). It has far earlier causes.⁵¹

Far earlier, we have said. On the perspective opened up to us by the continuous presence of the True Prophet—Holy Spirit and ideal Anthropos—through the metamorphoses of his theophanies, Ismailism superimposes the perspective of a drama in heaven, the outcome of which is already decided but whose consequences will carry through the successive Cycles. The hero of this drama is not the "historic" Adam, he who is mentioned exoterically in the Bible and the Koran, but the Angel of the pleroma, the spiritual Adam or celestial Anthropos. In the hierarchy of the ten archangelical hypostases he originally occupied the third rank, that in which he was directly awakened into being by the original dyad of the First and Second Intelligences, *Noûs* and *Πνομή*. What was his fault? In the Ismailian conception it was a retard in his own accomplishment of the Attestation or Unification of the Unity (*tawhîd*), which constitutes the intimate being of the First Intelligence, the primordial Archangel who is the primordial Epiphany of the divine Mystery. Thus we can only gain an intimation of the meaning of this fault in the light of this initial *tawhîd*, which orders the entire structure of the pleroma as a hierarchy of divine Epiphanies. We shall have more to say of it below.⁵² But the decisive aspect of this dramaturgy is that its outcome is already decided, preoccurred. Shaking himself from his stupor, from the vertigo that had immobilized him and engendered this

51 On the beatific conditions prevailing in a Cycle of Epiphany and on the transition to a Cycle of Occultation, cf. our study "Rituel sabéen et exégèse ismaélienne du rituel," *EJ* 1950, pp. 201ff.

52 Cf. section 3 below, and for a more detailed analysis see our study "Cyclical Time," *PEY* 3 (1957), pp. 151-57, "The drama in heaven."

"retard over eternity," which is gradually absorbed by the cycle of the Times, the Angel tears out from himself his Iblīs, his "demon." All those of his pleroma who refused to follow him in his resurrection constitute throughout the Cycles the posterity of Iblīs. All those who have followed him carry on with his help the combat which finally, after innumerable Cycles, will destroy the progeny of Shadow and Negation. For far from being the evil archon of other Gnostic systems, the Angel whose "retard" sent him back from the third to the tenth rank of the pleroma becomes the creative demiurge of our world only out of compassion, only in order to help his followers in their combat. And thus, at the end of a very slow cosmic alchemy, a being of marvelous beauty and stature burst forth among beings who were still prehuman.

This being makes his appearance in a region of the Earth where the best climatic and astronomical conditions are fulfilled, namely on the island of Ceylon; here he appears simultaneously with twenty-seven other persons who resemble him--the total number of twenty-eight being related to the number of the lunar stations.⁵³ But this being is again not our "historical" Adam, who, like many of the Adams to initiate Cycles, was only a "partial" and episodic Adam. He is the original and universal Adam (*Adam al-awwal al-kullī*), a term recalling the *Anima generalis* and whose Greek equivalent would be *πανάθρωπος*. For actually this original Adam, like the celestial Adam, Angel prince of a pleroma, is a receptacle of souls; and it is precisely as such that he became the "First Imām," that is to say, was invested with the primordial Imāmate. From the outset we have an essential reduplication, reflecting a form of consciousness that wishes to avoid any suggestion of an incarnation. The celestial Anthropos, the Angel, cannot be conceived as "incarnated" on earth: the initial Adam who represents him is his *maḡhar*, his epiphanic Form. Our texts tell us that he was his angel's first thought (*awwal fikrihi*), the end of his knowledge (*ākhir 'ilmihi*), the substance of his action: he was the project that concentrated (*maḡrah*) the radiation of his

53 Among these twenty-seven persons the primordial earthly Adam shines like the Sun amid the other heavenly bodies (the Brothers of Purity designate him as the Rising Sun, *shams ḡali'a*), like the red *yāqūt* amid the other precious stones. He was among them the *Sābiq* (the Precursor), just as the First Intelligence is the *Sābiq* of the spiritual world; he was the quintessence (*zubdat*) of all physical creation, the second *Nihāyat* (term, limit), just as the world of the *Ibdā'* is the first *Nihāyat*. First of the receptacles or repositories (*maqāmāt*) of the Imāmate, he was the Imām of the Imāms, their precursor in purity and innocence; cf. Idrīs 'Imādaddīn, *Zahr al-Ma'ānī* (unpubl. MS), XII, pp. 72-75.

Lights; he is also his supreme *Veil* (*ḥijābuhu l-a'ẓam*), he through whom he shines (*tajallā bihi 'inda zuhūrihi*). Each of these terms is carefully weighed: They show how with the primordial Adam, original repository of the Imāmate, Imāmology exemplifies an epiphanic relation, similar to that maintained in Angel Christology and precluding any idea of hypostatic union such as would be required by an Incarnation.

Here I can mention only very briefly the characterology of this primordial Adam whose figure appears at the dawn of mythohistory. Just as the Adam of the Ebionites is ἀναμάρτητος, so he too is immunized against all impurity, all sin (*ma'sūm*, exact equivalent of the Greek term). And he will transmit this prerogative to all the Imāms from Cycle to Cycle. The first repository of the Imāmate, he institutes on earth the hierarchy of the esoteric sodality after the example of the celestial hierarchy. His Cycle was a cycle of Epiphany, of contemplative beatitude, of total spiritual freedom, in which man, even in his physical features, enjoyed a paradisiacal state. At the end of this cycle, set at fifty thousand years, he was "transferred" with all his followers who made up his Temple of Light, that is to say, he "emigrated" by means of a beatific death into the zone of the tenth Angel whose rank he took, while the tenth Angel rose one degree higher toward his original rank. Thus the primordial Adam, in inaugurating the Imāmate, is also the first Imām to accomplish the work which from then on will be the work of each final Imām in a Cycle, and particularly of the final (*Qā'im* or Resurrector who, following his example, will lead all his adepts back to their Angel, so that the esoteric Church is drawn onward from Cycle to Cycle in a continuous ascending movement toward higher realms of the Pleroma.⁵⁴

This cycle of Epiphany was followed by a cycle of Occultation, and so on; the alternation continues at a dizzy pace down to the Resurrection of Resurrections (*Qiyāmat al-Qiyāmāt*). Certain calculations of our Ismailian theosophers go so far as to evaluate the Grand Cycle (*Dawr a'ẓam*) at three hundred sixty thousand times three hundred sixty thousand years.⁵⁵ Each

54 Cf. Idrīs. If the initial cycle inaugurating the mythohistory of our world was a cycle of Epiphany, it is because the drama in Heaven had ended in the victory of the Angel; thus this cycle was truly what the Brothers of Purity call, in their ritual, the Morning Sun, the festival of the springtime of the worlds.

55 The Persian book of *Taṣawwūrāt*, attributed to Naṣiraddīn Ṭūsī, speaks in this sense of eighteen thousand worlds: it is impossible to say that there was "a time when the world did not exist," any more than that *our* Adam was the first man of the first

cycle of Epiphany marks a new triumph. But the passage from a cycle of Epiphany to a cycle of Occultation marks a fall which is the repercussion of a drama enacted in the Pleroma, and opens a new phase of the combat necessary to absorb its consequences. It goes without saying that the only case of which our theosophers can speak at length is the cycle of Unveiling, immediately preceding ours, including the vicissitudes which determined the transition to our actual cycle. It is in this sense that the Biblical narrative of the Creation is not the story of a beginning but actually deals with a state of affairs following terrible catastrophes. The cycle preceding them, during which mankind lived in a paradisiacal state, here corresponds to the millennium which among the Ebionites preceded the drama on Mount Hermon.

All our authors agree in their allusions to the catastrophes which afflicted the last three millennia of the cycle of Epiphany preceding ours. The high spiritual sciences were reduced to silence; abdicating their angelical condition, men turned away from that "religion of resurrection" (*dīn-e Qiyāmat*) which is the religion of the Holy Imāms. These last foresee the necessity of re-establishing the discipline of the arcanum; since mankind has become unworthy of the divulgence of the mysteries, a new religious Law (*sharī'at*) must be instituted, whose *ta'wīl* will liberate only those who pass through a new birth. This radical change is the fall that is designated as the "expulsion from Paradise."⁵⁶ Henceforth there will be only the "Paradise in *potentialia*" constituted by the esoteric sodality, the Ismailian *da'wat*.

It is in this context that our Gnostics consider two episodes of pre-Adamic "history" recorded in the Koran. The first (2 : 28): "And when the

world, unless the meaning of the word "world" is restricted exclusively to the world of the present cycle, which is only a period in the ages of the world (*adwār-e 'ālam-hā*, an idea corresponding to that of the *Zeitalter* in Schelling); each change of period (*dawr*) signifies the coming of a world. Cf. *The "Raḥdatu't Taslim," Commonly Called "Taṣawwurat,"* ed. and tr. W. Ivanow (The Ismaili Society Series, A 4, Bombay and Leiden, 1950), XVI, pp. 48-49 of the Persian text.

- 56 Our authors already analyze this "expulsion from Paradise" in phenomenological terms as a change of consciousness: in upsetting the angelical state in which they had been living, men radically pervert the perception and direct contemplation of the essences which gave them the pure knowledge of gnosis, transforming them into a knowledge of material things adjusted to material things and seeking to dominate them. This gave rise to the "practical" sciences (arithmetic, surveying, astrology, etc.). The Adversaries (the posterity of Iblis), held prisoner in the world of the Mothers (the Elements) during the Cycle of Epiphany, are liberated: they multiply, corrupting beings and things. Thus the divine Epiphany (*ẓuhūr*) is weakened and effaced; Idris, pp. 78-79; cf. *Taṣawwurat* XVI, pp. 48-49 of the Persian text.

Lord said unto the Angels: Now I am about to place a *khalifa* (viceroy) on the earth, they said: Wilt thou place therein one who will do harm therein and shed blood?"⁵⁷ He who speaks in this verse is not, as the literalists suppose, the supreme God, the "All-Powerful." According to the Ismailian hermeneutics, it is the last Imām of the Cycle before our own who speaks to his "Angels," that is, to his dignitaries, to the purest members of his Temple of Light. He replies to them with grave melancholy, foreseeing the downfall to which humanity aspires: "Surely I know that which you know not." This Imām was named Hunayd; he was the father of the young Adam, our "historical" Adam, who was then enthroned on an Earth menaced by Darkness.

In the second episode (15:30-35),⁵⁸ known also to our Christian Apocrypha, the "Angels" are ordered to bow down to the youthful Imām, whose enthronement will transform him into the first Prophet (*Nāfiq*) of our Cycle. But our Ismailian theologians are unanimous in repeating that the order was addressed to the "terrestrial Angels," that is, the members of the esoteric sodality, and definitely not to the celestial Angels of the pleroma. Thus Ebionism and Ismailism agree even in their profound intuition of Adamology and angelology; the Ismailian feeling for the hierarchy of the worlds would have been outraged by the degradation of the Angel involved in the literal interpretation of the book of Enoch. We gain an idea of the grave implications of such an interpretation if we consider the somewhat childlike satisfaction of certain Church Fathers who declared that by the Ascension of Christ mankind had been raised above the Angels, and this to punish them for having refused to worship Adam!⁵⁹

Moreover, only Iblīs and his followers refused. The malicious joy of the pious doctors would ultimately lead to a confusion between angelology and demonology, a confusion against which our Ismailians, it goes without saying, are "immunized." This Iblīs is actually the manifestation, at the beginning of our Cycle, of the spiritual Iblīs already conquered by the spiritual

⁵⁷ Pickthall, p. 27 (Sūra 2:30).

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 263.

⁵⁹ For the exegesis of these two episodes, cf. Idrīs, pp. 79ff.; *Taṣawwūrāt* XVI, pp. 46-51 of the Persian text. The episode of prostration before Adam (if not the Ismailian detail, relating it only to the earthly Angels) occurs in our Apocrypha: cf. "Vita Adae et Evae," pars. xii ff., in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (Oxford, 1913), II, p. 137, and the Gospel of Bartholomew IV: 52ff., in James, p. 178.

Adam, the Angel demiurge of our cosmos and our humanity. "At that time" he bore the name of Hārith ibn Murra; this is a dignity belonging, like Adam himself, to the end of the previous Cycle of Unveiling. In his passionate refusal he is conscious of himself as a "terrestrial angel," initiated and initiating others into the gnosis of Resurrection; he knows that his nature is of *fire*, while the nature of Adam, appointed to teach men a religious Law whose truth is hidden beneath symbols, is of *clay*. By way of vengeance, he makes this suggestion to Adam: "Indeed, thou hast been given precedence over the Angels who have been commanded to bow down to thee and over whom thou hast been instituted as an initiator to initiate them into the names of all beings. Thou art still wanting only in the knowledge of one thing; if thou knewest it, thou wouldst be one of those higher Angels who have not been ordered to bow down, because they are beyond thine obedience." Then Adam cried out: "What then is this knowledge that *God* has hidden from me, although he knew that I need it and cannot do without it?" And the Adversary explained: "It is the knowledge of the Resurrection (*'ilm al-Qiyāmāt*) and of the last things, and the knowledge of how the spiritual Forms, divested of their material envelopes, rise up free to the world of Eternity."⁶⁰

Iblīs then attempted to stir Adam's compassion and generosity: why withhold from the mankind of his own Cycle what had constituted the glory and angelical condition of those of the preceding Cycle? And the young Adam yielded. He committed the error, the great error, of divulging the secret that should not have been revealed in his Cycle, so surrendering to the unworthy what must be reserved for "those who know." But our authors insist that his error was neither the fruit of obdurate pride nor a negation, nor a challenge to those whose superiority to himself he knew. Adam ceded rather to a nostalgia (*ishtiyyāq*) for the Epiphany (*iḡhār*) of those higher celestial Powers, a nostalgia both for Resurrection and for the celestial Paradise,⁶¹ as though all human beings shared in this nostalgia, whereas among most of them the mention of it provokes only demoniacal sarcasm. Here again the Ismailian intuition is close to that of the Ebionite Chris-

⁶⁰ Idrīs, pp. 81-82; cf. *Taṣawwūrāt* XVI, p. 50 of the Persian text.

⁶¹ Idrīs, p. 83. That is why, after Adam's fault, his wife Eve represents the hidden and salutary meaning of the positive religion (*Taṣawwūrāt* XVI, p. 50) just as the nostalgia of the tenth Angel is his "eternal Eve," the "bride of the spiritual Adam returned to his paradise" (Idrīs, ch. X).

tians: Adam is not responsible for the fall, that is to say, for the "expulsion from the earthly Paradise." We have seen what far anterior causes necessitated this "expulsion." Adam's error was that by an excess of generosity he anticipated, we may even say usurped—he, a mere initial Prophet—the task reserved for the last Imām of his Cycle, the Resurrector (*Qā'im*). Up until then, up to the end of our Cycle, the knowledge of the Resurrection may be divulged only in symbols and always proportionally to the adept's degree of dignity and capacity. That is why Adam surpassed his "proper limit," his *ḥadd* (*ὄρος*).⁶²

And here we encounter a term highly characteristic of the Ismailian lexicon (*ḥadd*, plural *ḥudūd*) and expressing a very complex notion. An analysis of this term will bring us close to the secret of Ismailian hierarchism, the principle which dominates the structure of the esoteric sodality, widening the field of theophanic vision as the adepts pass from degree to degree. Simultaneously, the same law of progression imposes the rhythm of the Cycles of Prophecy and, with each of these Cycles, the succession of Imāms which is its necessary complement, since the Imām is the repository of the esoteric meaning of the Revelation, that is to say, of saving Gnosis. Thus both the foundation and the meaning of Imāmology may be disclosed to us and disclose to us in turn a metamorphosis of "Angel Christology."

3. Hierarchies and Cycles:

The Fundamental Angelology of Ismailism

In the principle by which the Ismailians deduced the degrees of Being and of revelation of Being in beings, we may apprehend a twofold axiom. On the one hand, he who knows himself (*nafs* = the soul, *anima*, and the self) knows his Lord (*man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu*). *Who* is this Lord? Each of the degrees of the esoteric sodality, whose correspondence recurs in the different planes of being, in the angelic pleroma as well as in the astronomical cosmos, is designated as a *ḥadd*—in the literal sense a limit, a term, a definition. The word corresponds to the Greek *ὄρος*, or better still, one might render it literally by *ὀρίζων*, "that which limits or defines" the field of vision, hence the horizon. Each of the archangelical degrees is a *ḥadd* (the lower *ḥudūd*, those of the terrestrial world, correspond to the upper *ḥudūd*, those of the celestial world). The word is often conveniently trans-

⁶² Idris, pp. 85-86.

lated as "dignitary," although this term in fact connotes an idea extrinsic to its etymology. The *ḥadd* defines for each degree the horizon of its consciousness, the mode of knowledge proportionate to the mode of being realized by the adept. The notion of *ḥadd*, or "limit," implies correlatively that of *maḥdūd*, or "limited." Each lower *ḥadd* is the *maḥdūd*, the "limited," of the *ḥadd* immediately above it, which is its "horizon." For every "limit," to know oneself is to know the *ḥadd* — the limit, the horizon — of which it is itself the "limited," the *maḥdūd*. The next higher *ḥadd* is, then, the Lord — that is to say, the *Self* — of its own *maḥdūd*, the *Self* of that which it limits, that whose horizon it is. But at the same time each higher *ḥadd* is the *maḥdūd*, the limited, of the *ḥadd* that is higher than itself. For each *maḥdūd*, to accede to the knowledge of the *Self* (i.e., of its *ḥadd*) is, then, simultaneously to rise toward the knowledge of the *ḥadd* which is the Lord both of *ḥadd* and *maḥdūd*.⁶³

At each degree the mode of consciousness rises with the new mode of being. Each *ḥadd* is bound to its *maḥdūd* by a companionship of initiatory brotherhood; it must draw it along, lift it to its own rank, in order to raise itself to a higher *ḥadd*, or rank. The heavens of the esoteric Church are made in the image of the astronomical heavens, each encased in the next; here lies the secret of that perpetual ascending movement which draws the entire hierocosmos of the initiate from base to summit. Of course we are not speaking of empirical perception. At each degree the *horizon*, or limit, defines for the adept the measure of his being and of his perception; his knowledge of himself, like his knowledge of his Lord, rises from horizon to horizon, from Angel to Angel, that is to say, from metamorphosis to metamorphosis. It is the law of essence measuring its own field of theophanic vision, the same law expressed in the Acts of Peter by the attestation: *Talem cum vidi qualem capere potui*.

Up to what limit, it might be asked, will these ascensions and metamorphoses continue? Here we encounter a second axiom of Ismailian Gnosis: The supreme godhead is unknowable, inaccessible, ineffable, unpredicable — "that to which the boldest thought cannot attain."⁶⁴ The question is then transformed into this other question: at what *ḥadd*, or limit, at what horizon, does the godhead rise from its abyss of absolute incognoscibility? Or in other

⁶³ Ibid., ch. XIX, p. 211.

⁶⁴ Cf. Rudolf Strothmann, *Gnosis-Texte der Ismailiten* (Göttingen, 1943), p. 55 (*man lā tatajāsara nahwahu'l-khawāḍir*).

words, what is the limit at which it is personified, revealed as a person, eternally hypostatized, so that a definite personal relation of devotion and love toward it becomes possible? In Ismailian terms, this *ḥadd*, this absolutely original limit, is the primordial divine Epiphany, and as such the initial angelophany. Its mystery is that of an eternal liturgy, accomplishing in pre-eternity the Unification of the Unique (*tawḥīd*) that is reproduced in the Islamic profession of faith, the "*shahādat*": *Lā Ilāha illā'l-Lāh* (= *Non Deus nisi Deus*). It is to be feared that no translation into our languages can express the relation between two distinct phases disclosed by the Arabic sentence—these two phases to which Ismailian speculative meditation has applied the entire effort of its penetration, because in them it perceives the mystery which at once accomplishes the being of the First Archangel and is accomplished in his being as divine Ipseity.

First comes the absolute negation (*lā Ilāha*): the divine, unknowable abyss leaves no possibility of apprehending a divine person and of giving him predicates. This negative universal proposition is followed by a particular affirmative *exception* (marked by *illā* = *nisi*, except), or an absolute affirmation following from no logical premise. Between the two passes the fine line that the true Gnostic must follow without faltering: between the *ta'ṭīl*, or agnosticism which "evacuates" the godhead from the world, and the *tashbīḥ*, which "assimilates" it to an already given form. For him, the ideal realm whence burgeons eternally the dyad or syzygy of the First and Second Intelligences, *Noūs* and *Ψυχή*, overhangs this twofold abyss. The negative phase of the *tawḥīd* is that the godhead cannot take form (be theomorphosed) without limiting itself, that is, without an autonegation. The First Intelligence, as divine primordial Epiphany, constitutes the divine Ipseity itself,⁶⁵ the "theomorphosis"; but *eo ipse* it also limits it. It is the *ḥadd* or limit (the supreme *ḥadd*), because in it the godhead becomes its own *maḥdūd*, its own *limitatum*, and can know itself in this archangelic Ipseity only as a self-negation: *lā Ilāha* (= *non Deus*). And by this negation the Angel, worshiping his own Mystery, simultaneously refuses for himself that

65 On the idea that the divine Ipseity consists in the knowledge which the First Intelligence has of the Originator (*Mubdī'*) and that this knowledge, which is its Epiphany, is negativity (a negation excluding from the *Mubdī'* all ipseities and nonipseities), cf. also Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī, *Kitāb al-Yanābi'*, *yanbū'* II (unpubl. MS): "On the pure Ipseity of the Originator" (*fī huwiyyati' l-Mubdī'i' l-maḥqda*). Hence there is no divine Ipseity (*al-Lāh*) to be sought beyond the *Sābiq*, who is the Archangel of the highest rank (*al-Malak al-muqarrab*).

divinity of which he is precisely the limit. But the negation is followed directly by the affirmation that absolves itself eternally from this negativity: *nisi Deus* (and yet . . . *this* God). Now this affirmation, which rises like a challenge, is the Calling-into-Being of the second Intelligence, the universal Soul; the being of this Soul concludes the liturgy of the primordial *tawhīd*, attesting the divinity of the soul which precedes it (*Sābiq*), which is its limit, its horizon, *the* horizon to which the *personal* godhead raises itself. Thus the "origins" are seen in terms of phenomenology of the angelic consciousness; this phenomenology takes the form of a liturgy by which the divine Epiphany is eternally accomplished. The consequence is that all the affirmations concerning the personal divinity (*Al-Lāh* of the Koran) are taken in Ismailian Gnosis as referring to the Most Holy Archangel (*al-Malak al-muqaddas*) who *is* this divine Epiphany, that is to say, the *Deus determinatus*; it is to him alone that "divinity" (*ilāhīya*) can be imputed as a predicate.⁶⁶

This dyadic relation constituted by the two first Intelligences and expressed in the two phases of the *shahādat* will be repeated from degree to degree of the esoteric hierarchy. Intelligence and Soul are called *Sābiq* and *Tālī* (Precedent and Successor); and each *ḥadd* will be the *Sābiq* of its *maḥdūd*, which is its *Tālī*. In the succession of these dyads is expressed a kind of kathenotheism whose "each instance" (*καθ' ἑνα*) is defined by each horizon, or *ḥadd* (here we have a kind of transcendental motivation of the *unique secundum quod dignus est*). The meaning and scope of the drama inaugurated in the Pleroma by the responsibility of the third Angel, the spiritual Adam (*Adam rūḥānī*), are then to be considered in the light of disintegration of the *tawhīd*, brought on by his stupor, his retard in negativity on the level of his own being. Inversely our authors insist on the

66 Cf. Strothmann, IX, 1, p. 80 of the text (*lā yaqū'u'l-ilāhīyat illā 'alā'l Mubda'-i 'l-awwal*); cf. *ibid.* p. 80, lines 12-13, the strange etymology deriving the name of God (*Ilāh*) from the root *alw*, conveying the idea of being stricken with stupor or sadness, with fearful sadness (like a traveler in the desert or a child separated from his mother). Doubtless there is here a pathetic presentiment proper to the divine Mystery, the idea precisely that the divine Ipseity is essentialized in negativity, in the stupor (or sadness) of the First Archangel, who recognizes his inability to attain the ipseity of the godhead which he becomes by refusing it for himself. Cf. the passage in which Ibn Ḥazm (*Fīṣal*, Cairo, I, p. 35), recording the doctrine of the Magi, speaks of the vertigo of sadness in the solitude (*istawḥasha*) that invades the godhead, Zervān or Ormazd, or in Ismailian terms, the Third Angel who has become Tenth (cf. our "Cyclical Time," pp. 153-54), a sadness which "corporealizes" the corporeal world of non-light.

words attributed to the Prophet: "He who pronounces the *shahādat* in its purity and truth has entered into Paradise."⁶⁷

In this sense Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī, for example, calls the *shahādat* the *Key to Paradise*.⁶⁸ He believes that the four words that compose it typify the two principles, or Sources (*aṣl*), of the angelical *hudūd* of the upper world (designated as *Sābiq* and *Tālī*, Calamus and Tablet, Sun and Moon) and the two *ḥadd*, or "limits," which are the earthly correspondences of the principle of the *hudūd* of the hierocosmos—the Prophet and the Imām (*Nāfiq* and *Asās*). The first Intelligence is the *key* to all spiritual and corporeal existence; the second Intelligence, or Soul, is the *key* to the composition and the "symphony" of beings. The Prophet (*Nāfiq*, Enunciator) is the *key* to the utterances expressing the perfections of the Intelligence and the compositions of the Soul. His *Wāṣī*, or spiritual heir, foundation of the *ta'wil* (etymologically the *exegesis* which "causes to return" to the origin), is the key to "that to which return" (*mā āla ilayhi*) the meanings of these Utterances and the existents that have emanated from the Intelligence. And furthermore, an ecumenical feeling that seems quite appropriate in an esoteric leads him to proclaim that the four branches of the Christian Cross have the same meaning and the same symbolical significance as the four terms composing the *shahādat*.⁶⁹

On the other hand, all those who cling to exoteric and literal understanding—that is to say, all those who reject Ismailian Gnosis and its Imāmology—remain in the negative phase of the *tawḥīd*.⁷⁰

Through fear or ignorance of angelology the simple monotheism which affirms the predicates of the *Deus determinatus*, professing them to be valid as attributes of the supreme godhead, is indeed, whether consciously or not, a disguised theism. All these divine Names⁷¹ refer not to the "originating"

⁶⁷ Idrīs, ch. XIV, p. 109.

⁶⁸ For all these considerations on the *shahādat* and the analysis reproduced here, cf. particularly Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī, *Kitāb al-Yanābī'* (The Book of the Living Sources), *yanbū'* 30–32; see also the fine chapter 54 of Nāṣir-e Khusraw in *Khwān al-Ikhwān* (The Table of the Brothers), ed. Y. al-Khashshāb (Cairo, 1940), pp. 137–39, on the cosmic liturgy of the First Archangel.

⁶⁹ Sejestānī, the whole of *yanbū'* 32: *fī ittifāq al-ṣalīb wa'l-shahādat* (On the Concordance [of the symbol] of the Cross and of the *shahādat*).

⁷⁰ Idrīs, p. 109.

⁷¹ Ibid. The Prophets of our Cycle preceding the period of Mohammed gave God divine Names which veiled him successively beneath their Veils. God, to be sure, is existent where his Names exist: in so far as there is Wisdom, he is the Wise; in so far as there is Power, he is the Powerful. However, the divine Names refer not to the Prin-

Principle (*muḥlī*), which is unknowable, but to the *ḥudūd* – that is to say, the “horizons” to which the theophanies rise. The First of all (*Sābiq*) is both the supreme Veil and the supreme Name of the godhead, and this name is none other than *lā Ilāha illaʾl-Lāh* (this is why, symbolically, in the *Miʾrāj Nāmah* commented on by Avicenna, the Prophet sees the words *lā Ilāha illaʾl-Lāh* in letters of flame on the forehead of the Archangel, on the diadem of light enclosing his hair).⁷² It is, then, through knowledge of the spiritual *ḥudūd* – that is, of the Archangelical hypostases which are theophanies – that the worship of the unique Worshipped One (*maʾbūd*) is accomplished; it is by knowledge of their correspondences, the terrestrial *ḥudūd*, that knowledge is gained of these spiritual *ḥudūd*. Hence the importance of the fundamental angelology that determines the succession and correspondence of these hierarchies, which find their closest Christian analogy in the work of Dionysius the Areopagite, though Dionysius cannot be said to have carried the parallelism between celestial and earthly hierarchies as far as, for example, Ḥamidaddīn Kirmānī (eleventh century).⁷³

As in Avicennism, there are, in all, ten higher *ḥudūd*, that is to say, archangelical Intelligences; their existence flows from the first among them, each being the immediate cause of the one next following (as a torch kindles another torch).⁷⁴ This decad is divided into two distinct groups, the Three and the Seven, a *triad* and a *heptad*. The primordial dyad gives rise to the third Intelligence, the spiritual Angel Adam, protagonist of the drama in Heaven. Whereas the vertigo of his stupor immobilizes the accomplishment of his *tawḥīd*, seven Cherubim designated as the Seven Divine Words,

ciple, to the Originator, but to the Archangelical hypostases which are the “horizons” of the Pleroma – the *ḥudūd*, or degrees, to which the theophanies rise (cf. the procession of divine Names as hypostases in *3 Enoch, or The Hebrew Book of Enoch*, ed. and tr. Hugo Odeberg (Cambridge, 1928), Part II, pp. 123ff., 160ff.

⁷² See our *Avicenna*, p. 172.

⁷³ Each Intelligence comprises a multitude of celestial Angels composing its own pleroma; the structure accords with the hierarchy of the Ten Cherubic Intelligences that dominate the system of Avicenna (cf. his *Risālat al-Malāʾika* (Epistle on the Angels) *ibid.*, p. 62). In studying the parallel, one should consequently remember that the entire Avicennan pleroma has been made to correspond with the Dionysian hierarchies (*ibid.*, pp. 112–13). However, the characteristic feature of the Ismailian angelology remains the parallelism between celestial and terrestrial hierarchies, verified point for point; these correspondences both ground and express what we might, as a parallel to *Engelchristologie*, call an *Engelanthropologie*, so close is the connection (here as in Christology) between one's idea of the Angel and one's idea of man.

⁷⁴ Cf. Idrīs, XIX, pp. 211ff., which quotes at length the *Kitāb Raḥat al-'Aql* of Ḥamidaddīn Kirmānī (passage corresponding to pp. 134ff. in the edition of K. Ḥusayn).

come into being.⁷⁵ These seven Cherubim mark the ideal distance which the Angel, the celestial Anthropos, who by his "retarded eternity" has become the tenth in the Pleroma, must reconquer for his followers and with their help—that is to say, with the help of the angel-souls, today those among humankind who follow him in his glorious conversion against Iblīs. But they mark also the degrees of the higher aid (*ta'yīd*) which helps him to attain this victory. Just as the spiritual Adam, the Angel of our mankind, received aid and compassion from their heptad, so this heptad will command the rhythm of the cycles of Prophecy and Imāmology. The same rhythm of three and seven determines "vertically" the structure of the esoteric sodality—that is, the organization of the degrees into which the companions in one and the same combat, the members of one and the same spiritual chivalry (*javānmardī*), are drawn up—and also determines in time the order of succession of the cycles of Salvation.

Ḥamīdaddīn Kermānī schematizes as follows the correspondences determined by the repetition of the same rhythmic law:⁷⁶

1. The first of the three higher degrees involves the prophetic mission (*risālat*). The Envoy (*rasūl*) inaugurates a new religious period; he is the Enunciator (*Nāṭiq*) of a new Law (*sharī'at*) which he receives from a celestial Angel as *tanzīl*, "revelation," dictated from a revealed text; he enunciates the letter of this text in exoteric (*zāhir*) form as positive religion. It is his mission to establish the rules of the practical, active cult—we should say the "religion of works" (*'ibādat 'amaliya*)—thanks to which the souls open up to their *first birth* as souls and receive their *perfectio prima*. Just as the First Intelligence governs the uppermost Heaven (*ṣalak al-aflāk*) which his thought originates, so the *Nāṭiq* presides over the uppermost Heaven which embraces all the other Heavens or "horizons" (*ḥudūd*) of the esoteric religious cosmos (hierocosmos, *'ālam al-Dīn*).

2. The spiritual successor of the Prophet, the *Waṣī* or "diadochos" (*διαδόχος*), is also designated as *Asās*, "foundation," that is to say, foundation of the Imāmate. His proper function as repository of the spiritual secret of the positive religion is the *ta'wīl*, the esoteric exegesis which "carries back" the exoteric (*zāhir*) to its hidden interior (*bāṭin*) meaning. It is his mission to establish the esoteric spiritual cult (*'ibādat bāṭinat 'ilmīya*) whereby the souls are molded in the image of the eternal Forms; for the adepts

⁷⁵ Strothmann, XIII, 1.

⁷⁶ Cf. Idrīs, pp. 211ff., and Kermānī, pp. 134ff.; cf. the recapitulatory table below.

this is the *second*, or spiritual, *birth*. His rank corresponds to that of the second Intelligence, who governs the Heaven of the Fixed Stars.

3. Next comes the Imām (the *Asās* is actually the first Imām, but as "foundation" he remains distinct from the series).⁷⁷ He assumes authority over the community, essentially in the esoteric and spiritual sense—and actually, in exceptional cases, in the exoteric and temporal sense. In the course of the Cycle he must perpetuate the balance and indispensable connection between *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*, the necessary transmutation of literal facts into symbols, which conditions the spiritual birth of the adepts. His rank is similar to that of the Third Intelligence, and here lies the secret of Imāmology: the Imām is the Perfect Man, the epiphanic (*maẓhar*) Form of the celestial Angel Anthropolos. Just as the third Angel, having become Tenth by his "retard," must as Saved Saviour lead his own pleroma back to its original rank, so the last Imām, the Resurrector (*Qā'im*) in whom is recapitulated the entire line of the Imāms, leads their Temple of Light back to the realm of the Angel, of which he is the diadochos.

The three figures of this triad—sometimes placed in correspondence with the theophanic designations of Seraphiel, Michael, and Gabriel,⁷⁸ which

77 This contrasts with Duodeciman Shiism where 'Alī ibn Abī-Tālib, foundation of the Imāmate, is designated as the first Imām and causes a discrepancy throughout the series (for example, the sixth Imām, Ja'far Ṣādiq, so important for Duodeciman Shiism, will appear here as the fifth Imām; cf. also n. 85 below). Thus to consider the "foundation" of the series as a unit distinct from the whole and added to its component parts typifies a method of calculation that is specifically Iranian but well known elsewhere (cf. the six Amahraspands of which Ormazd is the seventh! By analogy, as we have seen above, the Angel Gabriel says to the Personages of the Mantle: I am the sixth of you five).

78 The homology between the celestial functions of the three first Intelligences and the sacral functions of the three highest degrees of the religious cosmos resides in the fact that in both cases the first function produces the original archetypal Forms, the second creates the concrete Forms, and the third composes them and orders them; each gives rise to the Heaven that it governs, Heaven of the physical cosmos or "Heaven" of the initiatory religious cosmos. "He is the Creator, the Shaper out of naught, the Fashioner. His are the most beautiful Names" (59 : 24; Pickthall, p. 577). While literalist exegesis naïvely relates this Koran verse to the supreme God (thus committing the error of *tashbīh*), our theosophers meditate on it as enunciating the functions and prerogatives of the supreme archangelical Triad, the "most beautiful Names" referring to these Intelligences (cf. Kermānī, p. 136). To them correspond on earth the three supreme *ḥadd*; now in the order of priority between them there will be variants which abstruse discussions represent symbolically by the letters 'AIN, SIN, MIM (on which the entire concept and destiny of the Imāmate depend. Cf. section 5 below). It is this same triad which in Nāṣir-e Khusraw (but within a pentadic and not decad scheme) corresponds to the theophanic designations of Seraphiel, Michael, Gabriel; cf. our *Étude préliminaire*, pp. 91ff.

further emphasizes the parallel between the Imām and Gabriel-Christos-Holy Spirit—are followed by the heptad of degrees considered as a homology to the Seven Cherubim intermediate between the third and tenth rank of the Angel, just as the terrestrial *ḥudūd* are intermediate between the Imām from whom emanates their spiritual quality and the Resurrector for whose assumption they prepare the way.

4. The *Bāb* or "Threshold" of the Imām. The capital importance of his role follows from the features in which Imāmology reveals its affinity with Angel Christology, principally in the late Ismailism that has become once more a personal religion of mystical salvation; here, assimilated to the following degree, that of the *Ḥujjat* or "Proof," it becomes the epiphanic Form of the Imām, the sign of his Invisibility. This eminent rank of mediator, on which rests the articulation of the visible with the invisible, is expressed in his function as *faṣl-al-khiṭāb*, a technical term which in Arabic grammar designates the moment of the "entrance into matter," articulated according to the exordium.

5. The *Ḥujjat* or "Proof" of the Imām, whose responsibility is great. We know the principle of Balance (*mīzān*), particularly essential in the alchemy of Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, in so far as it permits the universal application of the law of correspondences.⁷⁹ It is incumbent on the *Ḥujjat* to see that proper use is made of it, that is, to see that the operations of the *ta'wīl* ("to reveal the occult, to occultate the apparent") conform to the equilibrium, the correspondence of beings (*muwāzanat al-khalq*); in this sense he must decide (*ḥukm*) between the authentic (*ḥaqq*) and the inauthentic (*bāṭil*).

6. The two preceding degrees (4 and 5) form a transition or mediation between the upper triad (1-3) and the group of the last five ranks (6-10) headed by the *Dā'ī al-Balāgh* (*dā'ī*: literally, "he who calls, invites"; *da'wat*, the term designating the Ismailian sodality, signifies literally "call, vocation"). To the *Dā'ī al-Balāgh* falls essentially the task of preaching (we shall see below in section 6 that this does not consist of sermons in public places); the great Nāṣir-e Khusraw was invested with this function for Khurāsān. He must provide the adept who has been admitted to initiation and has received the teaching of the first *ḥudūd* with all the proofs and arguments regarding the higher *ḥudūd* (that is to say, the secrets of angelology) and *ma'ād*, individual eschatology, the posthumous development of the human being.

79 Cf. our study on "Le Livre du Glorieux," pp. 75ff.

7. Below him come two "dignitaries" who have the same title but modified by an adjective. First, the *Dā'i muṭlag*, who has full, "unrestricted" authorization. The level of initiatory knowledge corresponding to this degree is expressed in his task: to *initiate* into the higher *ḥudūd*, that is to say, into angelology; to initiate in the *ta'wīl*, that is to say, in esoteric exegesis; to initiate in the spiritual cult (*'ibādat 'ilmīya*).

8. Below him is the *Dā'i mahṣūr*, or *Dā'i* with limited, "restricted" authority. He must initiate the adept into the lower *ḥudūd*, that is, into the secrets of the hierarchy of the sect.

9. The *Ma'dhūn akbar*, literally, the "higher master"; it is he who receives the neophyte's oath and concludes the pact of initiation with him.

10. Lastly, the *Ma'dhūn mahṣūr*, literally, the "limited master" with "restricted" authorization. His function is to attract the souls capable of "responding to the Appeal" (*mustajīb*) of the esoteric Church. Though restricted, his function is extremely delicate: it consists in provoking a break⁸⁰ with social and religious conformism, in asking disturbing questions, in observing their effect on the individual selected, etc.⁸¹

The correspondences between the terrestrial and celestial hierarchies are summed up in the following table:⁸²

80 Cf. Strothmann, p. 57 of the Arabic text, in which the word *mukāsarat* is associated with *al Iksir* (the elixir).

81 Just as the Tenth Intelligence marks the lower limit of the archangelical pleroma, below which begins the world of *physis* and change, and just as no other Intelligence emanates from it as there does from those above it in the hierarchy, its function being to send out into the cosmos the Energies from which result the corporeal births, so similarly from the last degree of the esoteric hierarchy there emanates no lower degree; below it there is only the profane world consisting of the ignorant and of literalist believers. Like the Tenth Angel, the Tenth *ḥadd* must cultivate the spiritual births that may blossom in this world (those who respond to the Appeal, *mustajīb*) by drawing souls to the Temple of the Spiritual Cult (*Bayt al-'Ibādat*) (cf. Idris, p. 216, and Kermānī, pp. 137-39). The Tenth Angel corresponds to the active intelligence of Avicennism, identified, as we have said, with the Archangel Gabriel as Holy Spirit. It is here the celestial Anthropos, the spiritual Adam (for the *Isrāqiyūn*, the Angel of mankind), and assumes the role of Saved-Saviour, homologous to Gabriel-Christos. This homology does not appear as such in the vertical structure of the hierarchies. One must bear in mind that the Tenth Angel originated in the third rank and must regain this rank. This is precisely what creates the homology between him and the Imām; the drama enacted in Heaven between the third and the tenth rank (descent and reascent) becomes visible by homology in the relation between the Imām and the *Qā'im*, that is to say, in the cyclical schema of a period of prophecy; cf. the schema below.

82 Cf. Idris, ch. XIX, p. 215, and Kermānī, p. 138.

<i>Ḥudūd</i> or degrees of the angelical world	Their function	<i>Ḥudūd</i> or degrees of the terrestrial world	Their function
1. First Intelligence	Uppermost Heaven (<i>ḥalak al-aflāk</i>)	1. Nāṭiq	<i>Tanzil</i> . Literal or exoteric (<i>ẓāhir</i>) statement of positive religion (<i>sharī'at</i>).
2. Second Intelligence	Heaven of the Fixed Stars	2. Asās	<i>Ta'wīl</i> . Exegesis of the esoteric (<i>bāṭin</i>) meaning. The spiritual cult.
3. Third Intelligence	Heaven of Saturn	3. Imām	Personal mastery over the community: <i>ẓāhir-bāṭin</i> .
4. Fourth Intelligence	Heaven of Jupiter	4. Bāb	<i>Faṣl al-Khiṭāb</i> .
5. Fifth Intelligence	Heaven of Mars	5. Ḥujjat	<i>Ḥukm</i> (authority of decision; cf. <i>Mizān</i> , principle of Balance in <i>ta'wīl</i>).
6. Sixth Intelligence	Heaven of the Sun	6. Dā'i al-Balāgh	Preaching. Initiation into the <i>Ma'ād</i> .
7. Seventh Intelligence	Heaven of Venus	7. Dā'i al-Muṭlaq	Initiation into the celestial <i>ḥudūd</i> and the esoteric cult.
8. Eighth Intelligence	Heaven of Mercury	8. Dā'i maḥṣūr	Initiation into the earthly <i>ḥudūd</i> and the exoteric cult.
9. Ninth Intelligence	Heaven of the Moon	9. Ma'dhūn muṭlaq	To receive the undertaking of the new adept (<i>'ahad wa mithāq</i>).
10. Tenth Intelligence	Sublunar World	10. Ma'dhūn maḥṣūr	To attract neophytes.

Particular attention must be paid to the homologous relations that recur at every degree of this vertical structure. As we have already indicated, every dyad or pair of degrees within the hierarchy exemplifies a relation analogous to that between the first and second Intelligences forming the original dyad. Every "precedent" (*sābiq*) stands to his "successor" (*tālī*) in the same relation as the Noūs, or Intelligence, to the Soul; each is the *Sābiq* of his *Tālī*. It follows that each "preceding" (*sābiq*) *ḥadd* is the *Imām* for him who follows; in other words, it is the horizon of his "theophanic vision," progressively proportional to the metamorphosis of his being and to the new mode of knowledge attained in each instance; each horizon

realizes the *individuation* of the relation with the godhead, which is the function of angelology and which, as we shall see, is experienced as the relation of a "one to a one" (*wāḥid li-wāḥid*) (cf. section 6 below). Already we gain an intimation of how, at all the stages of the theophanies, the concept of the Imām can be analyzed as a symbol of the Self in so far as each of these degrees defines the relation that was expressed in the *qualem capere potui* of the Acts of Peter. This *qualem* is amplified from individuation to individuation with the ascent of degrees that mark the spiritual career of the adept, the Cycle of his Resurrections: the attainment of each higher degree, or "horizon," is indeed called a *qiyāmat*, a "resurrection." This is the esoteric meaning meditated upon in the saying attributed to the Prophet: "He who dies, his resurrection is already risen."⁸³

Now if we consider this same rhythmic law no longer in the vertical structure of the esoteric hierarchy but as it operates in the unfolding of time, we shall see a periodization which knows none of the difficulties with which historians struggle in their attempts to establish the chronology of the Holy Imāms. But here precisely we are dealing neither with positive history nor with a chronology of material facts; here we can have only the temporalization of time, which is itself a hierophany, because it is the order of succession in which the sacral persons appear to the visions of the soul. Each cycle of Prophecy will be in its turn inaugurated by three Figures homologous to the three first archangelical Intelligences of the pleroma; they are followed throughout the Cycle by a heptad of Imāms, or several heptads of Imāms (homologous to the Seven Cherubim), who find their completion—their "recapitulation"—in an eighth, who is Tenth among the Figures taken as a whole, namely the *Qa'im*, or Resurrector.⁸⁴ The esoteric representation of the cycle of the Islamic religion established by the Prophet Muḥammad will yield the schema shown on page 106.

This schema makes quite clear the homology noted above according to which the Imām is *maẓhar*, the "epiphanic person" of the third Angel. Just as there are the Seven Cherubim between the third rank to which the spiritual

83 Cf. the idea of these "resurrectional" metamorphoses as set forth by Naṣīraddīn Ṭūsī in our "Cyclical Time," pp. 107–09. In Idrīs, p. 222, we also find a schema of twelve degrees resulting from the addition at the bottom of the ladder of the *mū'min bāligh* (the major believer) and of the *mustajīb* (the neophyte, he "who responds to the Appeal"). Both represent the world of "spiritual births"; the schema of correspondences indicated above is not affected by this modification.

84 Cf. Idrīs, p. 216, and Kermānī, p. 137.

1st Intel- ligence	2nd Intel- ligence	3rd Intel- ligence	4th Intel- ligence	5th Intel- ligence	6th Intel- ligence	7th Intel- ligence	8th Intel- ligence	9th Intel- ligence	10th Intel- ligence
Nāṭiq	Waṣī (Asās)	1st Imām (= 2nd)	2nd Imām (= 3rd)	3rd Imām (= 4th)	4th Imām (= 5th)	5th Imām (= 6th)	6th Imām (= 7th)	7th Imām (= 8th)	Qā'im
Muḥam- mad	'Alī ibn Abī- Ṭālib	Ḥasan	Ḥusayn	'Alī Zayn ul- 'Ābidīn	Muḥam- mad Bāqir	Ja'far Ṣādiq	Ismā'il	Muḥam- mad ibn Ismā'il ↓ ...	— ... ↓

Angel Adam must remount and the tenth rank to which he has descended, so similarly a heptad of Imāms measures the unfolding of the Cycle from the third rank, which is that of the first Imām, to the tenth, which is that of the Qā'im, the Imām Resurrector who closes the Cycle. From one term to another, without confusion of persons, extends the unity of an Epiphany whose completion will be the full divulgation of the *ta'wīl*, that is, the resurrection of the souls whom the last Imām will lead triumphantly to the pleroma of the Angel, whose diadochos or *khalīfa* he in turn will become in order that the Angel may raise himself one more degree toward his original rank. It is in this anticipation that the visions of Imāmology culminate.⁸⁵

Such is the schema of one of the cycles of Prophecy. The sum of the cycles composing our present cycle of Occultation (*dawr al-satr*) has again a seven-fold rhythm. There are seven successive cycles, each inaugurated by a Prophet: Adam (the "partial Adam"), whose *Waṣī-Imām* was Seth; Noah, whose Imām was Shem; Abraham, whose Imām was Ishmael; Moses, whose Imām was Aaron; Jesus, whose Imām was "Sham'un al-Ṣafā," under which name we read "Simon bar Kepha," but under which our Ismailians, guided

⁸⁵ According to the computation of the Duodeciman Shiites, the Imām Ḥasan ibn 'Alī is actually the second Imām; on the discrepancy that runs through the heptad (or ogdoad) when the first Imām as Foundation (*Asās*) is counted separately, cf. n. 77 above.

by the Gnostic traditions that had come down to them, also read other names, among which we may note particularly Mary of Magdala.⁸⁶ Lastly, Muḥammad, whose *Ḥaṣī-Imām* was 'Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib. Under each one of these cycles our authors' ecumenism leads them to comprise allusively one of the great religious groups of mankind (respectively, Sabaeans, Brahmans, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, Musulmans). These six periods represent the hexameron, the six days of the creation of the religious cosmos or hierocosmos.⁸⁷ As for the seventh day, it will be precisely the day of the *Qā'im*, the final Imām (who occupies tenth position in the cycle outlined above). Just as each of the partial cycles, when a religion has exhausted its spiritual potentialities, is closed by a *qiyāmat*, a resurrection that marks the passage from one Revelation to another, so the totality of the Cycles will be closed by the Grand Resurrection (*Qiyāmat al-Qiyāmāt*): this will be the completion of a world, the dawn of a cycle of Epiphany (*dawr al-Kashf*) which will succeed ours.⁸⁸

Here two observations come to mind: this advent of the *Qā'im*, the Imām who will even have the power to abrogate the *sharī'at*, is a belief common to all the Shiites (Duodeciman and Ismailian). To Sunnite orthodox Islam

86 "*Sham'un al-Ṣafā al-mu'arrab 'anhu bi-Maryam al-Majdalāniya*," Idrīs, p. 100. This transference becomes understandable if we consider the prominent role played by Mary Magdalen in certain earlier Gnostic texts, such as the *Pistis Sophia*. Cf. certain variants (*Kalāmi Pir*, p. 67 of the text): the Imām of the period of Adam is also called Malik Shālim, i.e., Seth; that of Noah is called Malik Yazdaq; that of Abraham Malik al-Salām (another name for Ishmael; *ibid.*, p. 40), etc. Each Nāṭiq has as his "awakener" (*muqim*) the last Imām of the period of Epiphany which closes the religious cycle preceding his own. Our Adam, as we have seen, was "awakened" and enthroned by his own father, the Imām Hunayd, last Imām of the cycle of Epiphany which preceded our present cycle of Occultation. Noah had as his *muqim* Lamech, grandson of Idrīs or Enoch, whom our authors identify traditionally with Hermes; Šāliḥ was Abraham's *muqim*; 'Adnān was that of Moses; Khuzayma that of Jesus. Here we find the key to an esoteric exegesis of the Annunciation: Maryam, as *Hujjat*, receives the *Rūh* (Spirit) from Khuzayma (Strothmann, XII, 12, p. 117 of the text). A special study ought to be devoted to this conception which invests feminine figures with the eminent dignity of the *Hujjat* who "initiates" the future Prophet: Maryam for Jesus, Khadija for Muḥammad, Fāṭima for 'Alī (cf. below, n. 115ff.). Finally, Abu Ṭālib, 'Alī's father, was Muḥammad's *muqim* (Idrīs, p. 210). Here again we have an eloquent indication of the priority of the Imāmate over prophecy (*nubuwwat*); it is the father of the *Ḥaṣī*, foundation (*Asās*) of the Imāmate and repository of the esoteric *ta'wīl*, who enthrones the Prophet Enunciator of the exoteric Law (*sharī'at*).

87 Cf. *Kalāmi Pir*, pp. 64-65 of the text. Compare the fine chapter devoted to this hexameron by Nāṣir-e Khusraw, *Jāmi'al-Ḥikmatayn*, ed. H. Corbin and M. Mo'in (BI 3a; Teheran and Paris, 1953), sections 104ff., and our *Étude préliminaire* to this book of the "two wisdoms," pp. 81ff.

88 Idrīs, ch. XX, p. 230.

it represents an outrage, for in one way or another it offends against the dogma according to which Muḥammad is the "seal of the Prophets." And a good many philosophers and mystics have been included in this reprobation.⁸⁹ Our second remark concerns the whole of the triple schema that we have considered. The systematization and rhythm are so strict that Ismailian meditation might provide a system of co-ordinates, on the one hand, for the Ebionite Epiphanies of the True Prophet "running through the centuries" to his place of rest and, on the other hand, for the ladder of spiritual metamorphoses by which each initiate's capacity for theophanic vision is enhanced—up to the summit which is the Imām of his time. Only here the True Prophet has not yet attained his place of rest, as he had in the person of Jesus for Ebionite Christianity and of Mohammed for Islamic prophetology. And this difference, this opening of the schema toward the future, is precisely Imāmology. Here the Seven Imāms, or the heptads of Imāms, are the Seven Pillars of the House of Wisdom. For the final "repose" will be more than a Prophet *Nāṭiq*; it will be an Imām, and the Imām is a *Ṣāmiṭ*, a Silent One: he does not proclaim a new Law; rather he liberates by disclosing the symbols.⁹⁰ But the Imām as *mazhar*, that is to say, as epiphanic Figure, exemplifies a mode of presence analogous to that of the Angelos Christos in Jesus. And it is precisely this that led us to say that the fulfillment of Ebionite prophetology is to be sought not in orthodox Islamic prophetology but in Shiite Imāmology.

It is indeed in the person of the last Imām that the idea of the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, the "recapitulation," the "reunion into a whole," is realized. This is expressed in numerous symbols. It is said, for example, that the *Qā'im*, the aim and goal of all the *ḥudūd*, the degrees or "horizons," is the Grand Cycle (*al-Dawr al-a'zam*) of which the Imāms are the periods or partial

89 Such was the case of Suhrawardī, the master of "eastern philosophy" (*Ishrāq*), to judge by his trial in Aleppo, in which he was condemned to death at the age of 38 (1191) on the strength of the concept of the Imām set forth in the prologue of his basic work *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*.

90 On the "absolute Silent One" (*Khāmūsh-e muṭlaq*) who is at the same time the "absolute Speaker" (*Guya-e muṭlaq*), cf. *Taṣawwūrāt* XXV, p. 100 of the text (Persian *Khāmūsh* = Arabic *Ṣāmiṭ*). Cf. our study "Le Livre du Glorieux": whereas the official doctrine of the Fātimids upholds the priority of the *Nāṭiq* over the *Ṣāmiṭ*, Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, in agreement with the underlying tendency of Ismailism (which achieves its full flowering in the Iranian Ismailism of Alamūt), professes the priority of the *Ṣāmiṭ* over the *Nāṭiq* (pp. 57ff.); and this contrast supports our thesis that, from the spiritual point of view, the political and official triumph of the Fātimids can only be regarded as a regression. On the *symbol* that is both word and silence, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 69ff.

cycles, just as each Imām is himself a cycle in relation to his *ḥudūd*: each *ḥadd*, each "companion" or member of the initiatory sodality, is himself a "period" of the Imāmate; in other words, he himself *is his own* time, posited and defined by the elevation of his horizon.⁹¹ It is also said that the *Qā'im* is the "coalescence" (*majma'*), the *corpus mysticum* of all the *ḥudūd*; each of the Imāms has his own *corpus mysticum*, his Temple of Light, and all are gathered together and integrated in the Sublime Temple of the Resurrector.⁹² In this sense, as seal of the Imāmate, the *Qā'im* is termed "the second breath of the Trumpet of Resurrection," the first breath having been emitted by the first Imām, foundation and origin of the Imāmate.⁹³ This first breath was the blowing of the Spirit (*Ruh*) into the letter of the positive legalist religion (*shari'at*), the Calling (*da'wat*) of the souls to Religion in spirit and truth, made possible by the *ta'wīl*, the esoteric exegesis of the Spirit to which the Imām is the Key. The last Imām announces the consummation of the positive religions: he is the full Epiphany of what had been alluded to in the letter of the Revelations uttered by the prophets, namely, a "return" to the pure spiritual sense. He is the "Perfect Child" (*al-walad al-tāmm*), who was the initial project of the celestial Adam, Angel of our mankind, just as he will be the final fulfillment of his demiurges.⁹⁴

91 Cf. Idrīs, ch. XIX, p. 223, and XX, p. 226: at every epoch there is a unique individual (*fard wāḥid*) to whom falls the humanity, the reality of the Anthropos in the absolute sense (*al-insāniyat 'ala'l-muṭlaq*). The Imāms of the posterity of the *Wāṣi* are, each in his turn, the absolute Anthropos (*al-insān al-muṭlaq*), the Adamic in the true sense (*al-Adami al-muḥaqqiq*). The closer an adept is to the Imām—this is not a material proximity (*qurbat al-jism*) but a proximity of faith and gnosis (*qurbat dīnihi wa 'ilmīhi*)—the closer he is to the full reality of the Anthropos; cf. section 4 below, on the Imāmate as *lāhūt*, divinity of the Imām, and compare among the Brothers of Purity the notion which crowns the anthropology that we are here setting forth, namely, the *insān malakī* (*homo angelicus*), in *Rasā'il* (Cairo, 1928), IV, p. 280.

92 Idrīs, p. 226.

93 Regarding the two breaths of the Trumpet of Resurrection, cf. the *shaikhī* (Gnostic school of Duodeciman Shiism) exegesis in our "Terre céleste et corps de résurrection d'après quelques traditions iraniennes," *EJ* 1953, pp. 181ff.

94 Idrīs, p. 230; in a way, the designation *al-walad al-tāmm* (Strothmann, p. 154, lines 14ff. and p. 176, lines 5ff.) recalls the "youth" Enoch-Metatron (in 3 *Enoch*). Here, as last of the demiurges (*ākhir al-ṣanā'i'*), this figure points to the relation conceived by Ismailism between the celestial Angel Anthropos and the terrestrial Anthropos who finds his completion in the Perfect Child, or *Qā'im*. There is neither confusion nor identification, but rejunction: at the advent of the Perfect Child, the Angel, *Adam rūḥānī*, who in the Pleroma was himself the *Qā'im in potentia* in relation to the higher degrees, becomes *Qā'im in actu*; through this "angelomorphosis" the Perfect Child, the *Qā'im al-Qiyāmat*, once transferred to the Pleroma with the entire *corpus mysticum* of his *ḥudūd*, succeeds him in his regency over the sublunar world, while the Angel, celestial

This fulfillment marks what Ḥamīdaddīn Kermānī also calls the "rejunction" or "conjunction of the two extremes," namely, of the original archangelical dyad and of that Perfect Child for whose advent the seven Cycles—thanks to the efforts of the spiritual Angel Adam—are a preparation. Thus the total Cycle closes: the celestial Angel Adam—back to whom the final Imām, his "Perfect Child," his terrestrial Epiphany, leads his followers—rises one step closer to his initial rank and to the archangelical dyad in which he originated. As a Yemenite *dā'ī* remarks, the entire edifice of Ismailian Gnosis rests on the idea of this rejunction.⁹⁵

It is reflected in the most sumptuous symbolic descriptions of Paradise, with its Seven Gates, its castles of light, its innumerable lofty halls, each containing twelve assemblies, its gardens and its streams of running water, its Angels and its houris. The *ta'wīl* takes all these symbols in a threefold sense: eschatologically they refer to the coalescence of all the souls of light that have realized their "second perfection," that is, their Angelic state.⁹⁶ The Sublime Temple is the celestial City the Most Pure Imāms are said to

Archetype of mankind, rises from his tenth to the next higher rank (the ninth, eighth, etc.), drawing along the entire Pleroma in his ascending movement and also summoning all the "Angels" of future mankind to this ascent toward the "lotus of the limit" (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 26 and 113).

95 The "second blast of the trumpet," the final triumph of Gnosis revealed *in actu*, the appearance of the souls emerging liberated from the fetters of initiatory pedagogy—this is the conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) of the Energies of the First Limit (*al-nihāyat al-'ūlā*), which is the dyad of the First and Second Intelligence (cf. above, Seraphiel and Michael), with the Second Limit, which is the completion of the Anthropos (the *Qā'im*, the Perfect Child), and this last depending on the completion of the seven Cycles as the work of those who were commissioned and assisted (*mu'ayyadūn*) by the Third (> Tenth) Intelligence (Gabriel, Adam Rūḥānī). This conjunction is the new and final Creation, which contains and gathers together all the souls that have been called into being from the beginning to the end of the Aeon (*dahr*), those who, having achieved Gnosis, are able, by separating themselves from their mortal envelope, to resuscitate in the *corpus mysticum* of the eternal Imām; cf. Idrīs, p. 230, and Kermānī, p. 367. Sayyid-nā Ḥātīm b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥusayn was right in saying that Kermānī's whole book, from beginning to end, rests on this chapter!

96 The descriptions of Paradise agree (1) that all the Angels *in actu* are gathered in the Temple of Light of the Soul of all the worlds, which is the Second Intelligence; this is the Paradise *in actu*, the Paradise of the Haven "by the lotus of the utmost boundary, nigh unto which is the Garden of Abode" (53 : 14-15; Pickthall, p. 548); (2) that all the souls which have achieved their second perfection, i.e., the Angelic state, coalesce to form the Temple of Light of the *Qā'im*, the Resurrector; (3) that the "Paradise *in potentia*" (*jannat fi'l-quwwat*) is formed by the *da'wat*, the Ismailian sodality, in which each adept achieves through the *ta'wīl* his spiritual birth, the fulfillment of his "angelicity *in potentia*." Cf. Idrīs, ch. XX, pp. 234-36 (citing at length the Yemenite *dā'ī* Ibrāhīm b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥamīdī, d. 537/1162). Here it is impossible for us to discuss at length the *ta'wīl* that determines this topology of Paradise.

have built from time immemorial "out of their souls by their souls," the celestial City whose *risio smaragdina* will rise at the end of the mysterious Night, the Night of Destiny (*laylat al-Qadr*) celebrated in three Koran verses (97 : 3-5) for which the Ismailian Gnostics have a special predilection—a Night which "is better than a thousand months," a Night in which "the Angels and the Spirit descend. . . . That night is a peace which endures until the rising of the dawn." This Night is said to be the typification of "our sovereign Fāṭima" (*mawlātunā Fāṭima*), daughter of the Prophet, mother of the line of Holy Imāms, who, endowed with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mother, gave birth to the succession of Epiphanies of celestial beings "until the rising of the dawn," that is to say, until the advent of the Perfect Child who will lead mankind back to its celestial archetype.⁹⁷

The person of Fāṭima is indeed the basis of a whole Shiite sophiology. But here the motif takes on an unsuspected scope. It is not without surprise and emotion that we discover how Ismailian meditation on the Night of Destiny explicitly utilizes an essential motif of pre-Islamic Gnosis, namely the mystery of the Cross of Light set forth in the above-cited passage from the Acts of John. We have already heard one of our Ismailian theosophists, Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī, declare that the four branches of the Christian Cross have the same symbolic content as the four words composing the Islamic *Shahādat*. This same writer, meditating on these same symbols, mentions a sacred tradition concerning the Night of Destiny.⁹⁸ "In this Night," says the tradition, "the Light pours forth and spreads over Earth. Before this Light the stone walls, trees, all material things bow down and pray. Jesus announced to his people that the Resurrector would have the power to bring

97 Cf. Idris, ch. XVI, p. 127, and ch. XX, p. 227; Strothmann, XII, 7, p. 114. The "descent of the Angels" in this Night which is Fāṭima is the Epiphany of the Imāms to whose line she gives birth, of those Imāms upon whom it is incumbent to safeguard the pure spiritual meanings, to activate the symbols which inspire life to the positive religion (*shari'at*). The "Spirit" is the inspiration and the celestial assistance which descend from each and all the Sublime Archangelical Intelligences to join them to the Most Pure Imāms "until the coming of the dawn," i.e., the parousia of the Resurrector. Thus the Night of Destiny, at the end of which mankind finds its redemption and apotheosis, is not simply one of the last nights in the month of Ramaẓān; it is the whole of our present Cycle of Occultation. And the Niche of Lights (*Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* = *Lampas luminum*) that illumines this Night is Fāṭima, the Virgin-Mother (*Fāṭima Batūl*) of the Holy Imāms; cf. our "Rituel Sabéen," pp. 236ff.

98 *Kitāb al-Yanābi'*, *yanbū'* 31: *fi ma'na'l-ṣalīb li-millat 'Isā* (On the Meaning of the Cross for the Religion of Jesus).

out the spiritual meaning of all things,⁹⁹ even of a religion in which there had been no idea of this exegesis of the Spirit; similarly, it is possible to say that all the *ḥudūd* are gathered together in the inert wood of the Cross. Yes, in this Night of Destiny, whose mystical *Light* has power to transfigure all things, it is given to the *Qā'im*, the Resurrector, to metamorphose this inert wood, to transfigure the apparent, exoteric evidence of the crucifixion. Then it becomes a prodigious Sign for the totality of the *ḥudūd*, the companions of the esoteric sodality from Cycle to Cycle down to the consummation of our Aeon."¹⁰⁰

These lines disclose a perfectly conscious Gnostic assertion, which bears witness to the extraordinary continuity of Gnosis. The gathering of all the *ḥudūd*, discernible in the transfiguring light, is a vision similar to that of the Acts of John. We are entitled to say that the symbol of the Cross, as understood by our Ismailian, is and can only be the mystery of the Cross of Light of Gnostic Christianity, the Christianity which the Angel Christos revealed to John in the secret colloquy on the Mount of Olives. And if we were to speak here of a "speculative Good Friday," it would be in a sense totally alien to our theological and philosophical habits, those habits which are still at work in the thinking of Hegel.

This is an aspect of Ismailian Gnosis that has gone entirely unnoticed up to now and concerning which there is assuredly a good deal to be learned. We shall again encounter this mystery of the Cross of Light in the very heart of Imāmology, precisely at the point where the union of the divine and the human in the Imām will, in its own special way, explicate the true meaning of Docetic Christology. Here precisely is the source of the feeling of the Imām's priority over the Prophet, a priority generally accepted in Duodeciman Shiism and accentuated in the reformed Ismailism of Alamūt. We can already measure its importance by the correspondence between the pairs *Nāṭiq*-Imām and First Intelligence-Soul, symbolically designated also as Sun and Moon; thus the Imām corresponds to the feminine principle; and he is also called the "spiritual mother" of the adept.¹⁰¹ Thus the affirma-

⁹⁹ Here, no doubt, we have an echo of the Gospel of St. John (14 : 26): "The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost . . . shall teach you all things."

¹⁰⁰ For, as an anonymous glossator adds in the margin of the manuscript, it is the *ḥudūd* which the *ta'wil* discovers and identifies in these trees and stone walls that begin to pray in this Night; all are gathered together and transfigured in the Cross of Light. Cf. n. 123 below.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Nāṣir-e Khusraw, *Jāmi' al-Ḥikmatayn*, section 341, pp. 298-99.

tion of his priority reflects a slow transformation of consciousness which is at the heart of the adept's spiritual birth and of the cycle of his soul's metamorphoses.

4. *Imāmology and Docetism*

Any study of the different forms taken by Christology presupposes, as we have said, an inquiry into the anthropology that goes hand in hand with it. Any attempt to discover how Shiite Imāmology in general, and Ismailian Imāmology in particular, reproduces certain traits of Angel Christology must begin with an inquiry into the relations between anthropology and angelology. And the very nature of the question leads us to accord to angelology, not the minor significance attributed to it by a schema of the world in which the Angel is all in all only a kind of metaphysical luxury, but the primary significance ascribed to it in a world where it assumes a twofold—theophanic and soteriological—function. The Ismailian indications are precise; they carry us back to certain traits common to all varieties of Gnosis, traits which put us in the presence of an anthropo-angelology, that is to say, an anthropology which is itself only a phase of angelology. In other words, there are no Angels separate both from Matter and from the Souls destined by nature to animate a material organic body. Both are *substantiae separatae*: there are Angels who have remained in the pleroma, and there are Angels who have fallen to the earth, Angels *in actu*, and Angels *in potentia*. Or this cleavage may refer to a single being, an *unus ambo*: the *πνεῦμα*, the Spirit or Angelos (Spiritus Sanctus or Paracletus in the Manichaean sense),¹⁰² is the person or Angel who has remained in Heaven, the "celestial twin," while the soul is his companion who has fallen to the Earth, to whose help he comes and with whom he will be reunited if he issues victorious from the contest. But for a Gnostic the idea, conforming to Aristotelian anthropology, of a soul made by nature to animate a material body can only constitute an offense against the Creation of Light. Correlatively, the soul is not the unconfigurable entity generally assumed by a philosophical dualism for which the incorporeal is reduced to an abstraction or concept. If etymologically the soul (*anima*) has as its function to *animate*, if it is a complete substance independent of the organic material body which temporarily holds it, it is because this soul has left in the world of Light its

¹⁰² Cf. H. Söderberg, *La Religion des Cathares* (Uppsala, 1949), pp. 132, 174, 208ff.

"real body," the celestial body of a pure, still "immaterial" matter, or the "garment of light" which it must don once again.¹⁰³ In short our authors, Nāṣir-e Khusraw for example, conceive the human lot—the "horizon" that we call by this name—as a transitory status. What we call "man" is only a Not-yet: *either an Angel or a demon in potentia*.¹⁰⁴

Now—and here again we shall encounter the premises opposed to the idea of an Incarnation realizing a hypostatic union—how is this potential angelicity of the human being fulfilled? The intermediary can only be an angel or else a being or beings in whom angelicity *in actu* is in one way or another already present. And these beings are the Most Pure Imāms.

Two Koran verses that have been meditated conjointly show one of the bases from which Imāmology arose. Here we shall follow Idrīs 'Imādaddīn (a Yemenite *dā'i* of the fifteenth century), who in turn refers to Ja'far al-Manṣūr (*dā'i* for Yemen in the middle of the tenth century of our era).¹⁰⁵ The Ismailian exegesis of these verses already discloses the priority of the Imām. The basic idea is this:¹⁰⁶ the Prophet as Envoy is entrusted with the mission of proclaiming the exoteric aspect of the Revelation; like those believing souls to which he addresses himself, he shares in the condition of an angelicity *in potentia*. But this potentiality can flower only through the revelation of the esoteric sense; this revelation is the condition of the second

¹⁰³ Cf. Söderberg, pp. 135ff., *Anima as corpus spirituale*, pp. 243ff., 261; Acts of Thomas (motif of the "robe") in James, pp. 411-15, and Hans Leisegang, *La Gnose*, French tr. J. Gouillard (Paris, 1951), pp. 249ff.; cf. our *Avicenna*, pp. 157ff., and "Terre céleste," pp. 176ff.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. notably Nāṣir-e Khusraw, ch. XI, and our *Étude préliminaire*, pp. 120-22.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Idrīs, ch. XIII, p. 84, citing a long passage from the *Ta'wil al-Zakāt* of Ja'far ibn Manṣūr.

¹⁰⁶ Just as the heavenly bodies are the visible aspects intermediate between the invisible Angels and humans (Nāṣir-e Khusraw, *loc. cit.*), so the Prophets and Imāms are intermediaries between the Angels *in actu* of the Pleroma and the earthly Angels, or Angels *in potentia*, who, captive in material bodies, can receive knowledge of the angelical world (*malakūt*) only through an intermediary and gradually (Idrīs, p. 83). But between the Prophets and the divine Mystery, the *hudūd*, or spiritual Angels, stand as intermediaries. Hence the name of "Messenger" (*rasūl*), which may fall to both ("Allāh chooseth from the angels messengers, and [also] from mankind" [27 : 74]; Gabriel is the *Rasūl Karīm*, the Noble Messenger). Similarly in Manichaeism, Mani is designated as *fereshtag rōshn*, messenger of light, and this epithet is current both among the Khorramdinān and the Ahl-e Haqq. This does not mean, however, that the Pehlevi term *fereshtag* has two different meanings, or that it designates a function rather than a nature. Actually the Persian *fereshtag* is equivalent to *Izad* (Avestan *Yazata*, "adorable," just as *Angelus* is equivalent to *Spiritus*, spiritual being). And the quality of *nuntius*, messenger, presupposes precisely the *nature* of the (celestial or terrestrial) Angel as fulfilling, par excellence, the theophanic function; cf. n. 14 above.

birth and the work proper to the Imām, master of the *ta'wil*. The Prophet's impeccability is not total; even immunized against "sin," he can commit an error. This was the case with Adam, as we have seen (not the Adam-original Imām, but the "partial" Adam of our Cycle); it was the case with Moses and even Muḥammad.¹⁰⁷ The idea of the "impeccable" (*ἀραμάρτητος* = *ma'ṣūm*) is applied in the full and proper sense to the Imāms, who are the earthly typifications, the epiphanic Figures of the Angels of the highest degree, those who are called the "bearers of the Throne." From a Koran verse (6 : 9) which taken literally would signify only a hypothesis, our exegetes have constituted a fact, giving it the following sense: if ever God sent an Angel as messenger, he assuredly assumed earthly, human form; hence only this disguise was visible to the eyes of men, who hastened to say: he is only a man like ourselves.¹⁰⁸ Such precisely was the case of the Holy Imāms.

But this is not all. In the same context our authors refer to the verse (4 : 156) which explicitly states the Docetic Christology of the Koran. Since this verse is immediately transposed to the case of the Holy Imāms, we have here an explicit grounding of Imāmology in Docetic Christology. The verse in question is the vibrant reply to the contention that Christ was really crucified: "They slew him not nor crucified, but it appeared so unto them, and lo! those who disagree concerning it are in doubt thereof; they have no knowledge thereof save pursuit of a conjecture. They slew him not for certain."¹⁰⁹ The association of the two verses is immensely significant. On the one hand the disguise, the *dissimulation* (*talbīs*) which *dissimulates* the

¹⁰⁷ Muḥammad's fault (Idris, ch. XIV) was to have laid claim to the Imāmate, to have believed himself *mustaqarr* (titular Imām), whereas he was only *mustawda'* (depository; on this distinction, cf. *Taṣawwurrāt*, introduction by W. Ivanow, p. lvii). He understood only later that he had thus laid claim to a spiritual power that belongs to the *Qā'im*, the Resurrector, whose precursor was the Imām 'Alī. However, like that of Adam, his fault was not a deliberate "sin" nor a revolt. He repented, and commanded his *hudūd*, to reveal, each in its place, the high position of the *Qā'im*, the "seventh *Nāṭiq*." Here we have a specifically Shiite locus which would call for thorough study; we shall see its crucial importance.

¹⁰⁸ The exegesis of the verse, without contradicting the general idea, modifies the current interpretation and translation which, in view of the immediate context, take it as an unrealized hypothesis; cf. *Taṣawwurrāt* XV, p. 44 of the text.

¹⁰⁹ Idris, p. 84; this is a key verse for our discussion. An extensive comparison of its *tafsīr* would be in order (cf., among others, Mullā Fathullāh, *Tafsīr* ad 3 : 48 and 4 : 156; Muḥsen Fayz, *Šāfi*, pp. 82 and 119). On their indications (attesting the contribution of highly varied pre-Islamic sources) depends the nuance given to the passive locution (*shubbiha lahum*).

spiritual Angels who came down to Earth for the salvation of men; on the other hand the *tashbīh*, the mental act which for our theosophers is the great sin of the literalist theologians, the *assimilation* of this *dissimulation* to what it dissimulates (corresponding to the assimilation of the attributes to the divine essence, which is a deviation from the line that passes between *tashbīh* and *ta'īl*). But the *talbīs*, the dissimulation, is a trap only for those who commit the *tashbīh*, the assimilation.¹¹⁰ Here the conditions of the *phenomenon* are lucidly set forth, and that is why we said a few pages back that our Docetists deserve to be regarded as the first phenomenologists. To anyone who might argue: "Are we not then dealing with appearances?" they have the ready answer: this *appearance* must become *apparition*; and this it will never do if precisely we assimilate it to the reality it veils, if we do not make it *transparent*—in short, if instead of thinking in terms of "*zuḥūr*," or *epiphany*, we think in terms of "*ḥulūl*," or *incarnation*.

Here we may set forth the contrast in a very few words: on the one hand Angel Christology, which coincides with Imāmology; on the other hand the ideal of Incarnation, invoking a Christology of hypostatic union. Indeed, the differential is constant. What we have agreed to call "Docetism" constitutes a mode of perception, a fundamental intuition, which for oriental spirituality in general has the value of a "category" (its recurrences may be ascertained in Christianity as well as Islam or Buddhism). It corresponds to a mode of being so fundamental that we find its whole "style" in the Iranian Šūfīs, those *Fedeli d'amore*. The Beauty that is the object of their adoration is not exterior to the human Form in which it is epiphanized (since it is here that it shows itself), and yet it is extrinsic to it, for it is other than this Figure which can show it only in veiling it, just as the First Archangel is at the same time the supreme Name and the supreme Veil—just as the mirror is the "place" where the Image shows itself but is not its substrate. Rūzbehān Baqlī, the great twelfth-century mystic of Shīrāz, developed the psychological analysis of this epiphanic sense of love in great detail and with infinite delicacy.¹¹¹ It is disclosed in the attitudes common to the Shiite devotion to the Holy Imāms and to the adoration of Beauty among the *Fedeli d'amore*: in every case those whose devotion takes a person as its object and support are conscious of addressing themselves to a person

¹¹⁰ Idrīs, p. 83: *Fa'l-talbīs huwa'l-tashbīh lahum*.

¹¹¹ In his Persian book *'Abhar al-Āshiqīn* (The Jasmin of the Faithful of Love; BI 8, Teheran, 1958).

who transcends the empirical individuality that is subject to empirical conditions; what they perceive in this person is rather an eternal individuality. This presupposes the conviction (allowing of variable degrees of consciousness) that what constitutes the *maẓhar*, the epiphanic Form as such, is an event that takes place in the soul, which is its scene and organ, and whose mode of perception is entirely different from that of sensible or logical evidences that may be apprehended by everyone indifferently; otherwise, its perception would belong to every man alike.

And precisely because the soul is the "place" of metamorphoses, the plurality of Epiphanies by no means involves the idea of "reincarnations" (*tanāsukh*, expressly rejected by our Ismailian thinkers); on the other hand, statements which an "incarnationist" would regard as contradictory can coexist. The Koran verse relative to the person of the Prophet is extended to all the Imāms: "Thou seest them looking toward thee, but they thee not" (7 : 107).¹¹² All regard the same being, but do not see the same being. It is not even necessary to deny the reality of the carnal body in order to affirm that the perception of this being is in every case *qualem capere potui*.¹¹³ And this is not all. We have indicated above that the person of Fāṭima is the source of an entire Shiite sophiology. As an object of common perception she was the spouse of the first Imām, 'Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib, and the mother of the two young Imāms Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. This representation does not infringe on the "natural laws." But simultaneously epiphanic faith endows her person with prerogatives equivalent to an Immaculate Conception, or to the Gnostic intuition of the Angel sent to Earth ahead of Christ to be the Virgin Mother.¹¹⁴ Fāṭima was indeed born from

¹¹² Cf. Idrīs, ch. XVI, p. 131.

¹¹³ For what changes and varies is the appearance, the *phainomenon*, of this body as object of the vision which shows it to itself. This accounts for the coexistence among the Duodeciman Shiites of what has been called their "dolorism"—their extraordinary cult of the Passion of the martyrs of Kerbalā—with the clearest Docetic statements. In one of the books devoted to the martyrdom of the Imām Ḥusayn, for example, we find the following literal quotation from the Koran: "No, they did not kill you; a *semblance* of your body was made for them, O son of the heroic night" (quoted in Strothmann, p. 121). The material body is restored (or raised) to the level of a likeness or image of the Temple of Light. Accordingly, the Imām Muḥammad Bāqir (Idrīs, p. 131) declares that the sufferings, trials, and misfortunes of the Holy Imāms were apparent, *'alā'l-khayāl*, which is the literal equivalent of *δόκησις* (as of the corresponding term *putative*, which occurs among the Cathari; cf. Söderberg, p. 204); cf. also Massignon, p. 21, where, in the Nuṣayri poems of Khaṣībī, the Imām Ḥusayn is presented as a reappearance of *Jesus impatibilis*.

¹¹⁴ Cf. n. 12 above.

a fruit of Paradise, which the Angel gave the Prophet to taste in the course of his celestial ascension.¹¹⁵ She is called *Fāṭima-Batūl*, that is to say, the Virgin Fāṭima; on the plane of theophanic vision, she is really the mother of the divinity (*lāhūt*) of the two young Imāms; she has the power to bear them to the Imāmate.¹¹⁶ These traits that I briefly outline suffice, no doubt, to show us how in Imāmology thought operated very differently from the Christian speculation which was to culminate in the Christological formulas of the Councils.

Our authors, we may say, bear witness to the simultaneity of a twofold plane of vision corresponding to a twofold plane of happening: the whole question changes the moment one passes from one plane to another. And that is why, when it comes to understanding the humanity (*nāsūl*) of the Imām, that is, to translating Imāmology into anthropological terms as an event lived by the soul, the data of the problem will not partake of the physiology that imposes itself on sense perception and ordinary consciousness. It is an archetypal Image which will function as an organ of perception, replacing the faculties of sense perception and making perceptible an object that might correspond to the "body of transformation" in Mahāyāna Buddhism—and yet the humanity of the Imām is not reduced to what our "realist" exigencies would qualify as a "hallucination" and does not fit in with the idea of a hypostatic union. The problem is, then: how can a humanity that is the *mazhar* of the godhead be constituted, to what order of

115 Idris, ch. XVI, p. 128: "Let him who wishes to breathe Paradise in the manner of Muḥammad breathing his daughter's perfume turn his mind upon her and upon what she reveals of the Secret hidden in her person; for she is the *Hujjat* of 'Alī, she establishes the esoteric sense of his Knowledge and guides those who attain to it. Through her, then, Paradise is breathed, as the essential sense (*ḥaqīqat*) of the *da'wat*."

116 Because the fruit of Paradise from which Fāṭima was born signifies the reunion of the two functions of the Imāmate (*istiqrār* and *istidā'*). In the person of Fāṭima the two functions of the Imāmate are combined, but they separate once more in her sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn (Idris, p. 130). The two little Imāms were not born of her as other children of men are born, or rather they were the children of Fāṭima in the physical sense and in the most concrete spiritual sense (*fi'l-jismāniya wa'l-rūḥāniya*). Ḥasan issued from her *left side* because he is the *istidā'* and also the exoteric law to which the *ta'wil* must apply. Ḥusayn issued from her *right side* because he is the *istiqrār* and the esoteric *ta'wil*, the essential sense (*ḥaqīqat*). In this sense (and not by virtue of a physiological process), Fāṭima is the *mother of the divinity* of the Imāms (their *lāhūt*, cf. below) for she herself possesses a Temple of Light, she is a repository of *lāhūt* (cf. Idris, pp. 127-32). These are brief indications suggesting the research that remains to be done; the image of Fāṭima, Virgin-Mother and mother of the divinity of the Imāms, shows that a parallel study of Imāmology and Angel Christology should have as its prelude an analysis of this aspect which corresponds in Shiism to a Mariology and Sophiology.

reality must it belong, that is to say, what *transfiguration* of it is presupposed in order that the epiphany (*ẓuhūr, iẓhār*) of this epiphanic Figure (*maẓhar*) may be produced not to the eyes of the body but to the soul's "eyes of light"?¹¹⁷ Clearly we are dealing with something very different from an attempt to define some sort of somatic reality. Here the active Imagination is at work, producing the "body of metamorphosis" that is the support of its theophanic vision.

Now the active Imagination is the organ par excellence of the alchemical operation.¹¹⁸ This is no incidental remark, for the meditations that our authors elaborate with a view to composing a mental representation of the humanity of the Holy Imāms will develop a vast operation of cosmic alchemy, which, moreover, offers the extreme interest of being only a variant of Manichaeian conceptions.

We know that according to the Manichaeian conception of man's posthumous development, the purified souls, having become once more pure lights, rise toward the Column of Glory that is the Perfect Man, then toward the Heaven of the Moon that is the Vessel of the Night, inhabited by the Primordial Man, then toward the Vessel of Living Fire, the Sun, which is the vessel of the Day and the abode of the Third Messenger.¹¹⁹ The entire scheme of this process recurs in the Ismailian representations, with this particularity, that there is a duplication. Manichaeism had no need to worry about the ulterior destiny of the body of flesh, which was produced by demons; similarly for Ismailism, since the angel-souls are complete substances in themselves, the vicissitudes of the mortal remnants are without importance for the triumphant return of the souls of light to the angelic pleroma. Here cosmic alchemy responds to another preoccupation; to it we owe the notion of the subtle body, the delicate, pure, already angelic humanity, which is the only "true appearance" that the "apparition" of the Most Pure Imāms can assume. This alchemy must sublimate the mortal remains of the adepts, the true Gnostics. Its initial phases are a repetition

¹¹⁷ This is also the problem eminently represented for Shiite Gnosis by the scene of the Mantle: this Mantle that is a veil before the Knowledge that sees the "Five Persons," because they themselves are the Veils closest to God; common mortals regard only the Veils; what is at once veiled and manifested by the veils remains hidden to them (under the Mantle that is the *Shari'at*, positive religion); Idris, p. 129 (for Koran 33 : 33); cf. also Louis Massignon, pp. 24ff.

¹¹⁸ Cf. C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy* (CWJ, 12; 1953), pp. 243ff.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Manichäische Handschriften* . . . Vol. 1, *Kephalaia* (Stuttgart, 1940), p. 20.

of those which punctuate the Return of the souls in Manichaean soteriology. The subtle aerial and igneous elements of the adept's body, the vital spirits, sources of vital heat, rise like a diaphanous vapor drawn by the Moon's force of attraction; refined and sublimated, they are transmitted to the Sun, and after rising from Heaven to Heaven, they fall back to earth like a celestial dew that settles on certain of the most exquisite fruits or on the surface of an absolutely pure body of water. Through the providence of the Angel demiurge, the Imām and his consort will taste of these fruits and drink of this water; thus the humanity (*nāsūt*) of the future Imām, the subtle envelope of his Temple of Light, will be made of this subtle substance elaborated in the secret heights of the Heavens.¹²⁰ Our theosophers admit that the child will then be born like all other children of men; however they have opened a field of vision that enables the True Believer to perceive this humanity as not homoousian, or identifiable with common humanity; and yet the eyes of the flesh discern only this latter humanity, "even though a flash of light may shine through, a beauty and a purity defying all description."¹²¹

The humanity (*nāsūt*) of the Imām is thus conceived as the result of a cosmic process exemplifying an archetypal Manichaean representation. And it is in accordance with another Manichaean archetype that Ismailian Gnosis conceives the divinity (*lāhūt*) of the Imām. The conjunction of these Manichaean motifs in the heart of Imāmology is truly striking if we consider how little we still know about the sources of Ismailism. We have noted in Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī a distinct allusion to the mystery of the Cross of Light proclaimed in the Acts of John. In Manichaeism this conception goes hand in hand with that of the Pillar of Light or Pillar of Glory; the two motifs typify the two phases, the *descensus* and *ascensus*, of the souls of Light. And here this Pillar of Light is presented as the mystery of the Imāmate.

For the Manichaeans the Cross of Light is the mystery of the descent of the souls of Light, of the energies and particles of Light held captive in the prison of Darkness, in the Gehenna of material bodies.¹²² Twice a day, this

¹²⁰ For a description of the process, cf. Idrīs, ch. XVIII, pp. 207–8, and Strothmann, I, 2, pp. 6–7 of the Arabic text.

¹²¹ Humanity so pure and subtle that, when the Imāms die, the body evaporates like *jism kāfūrī* (a body having the whiteness of camphor), so subtle that the celestial alchemy renders it fit to be united with the souls of the Bāb, the Hujjat, and the Dā'ī; cf. *ibid.*, I, 1.

¹²² Cf. *Kephalaia*, p. 177; cf. also ch. LXXXV, pp. 208ff.

mystery is announced: at dawn and at dusk.¹²³ The ascent of the Pillar of Light, leaving the darkness to itself, is the triumphant response to the descent of the Cross of Light: it is the ascending procession of the elements of Light, of the angel-souls saved from their captivity, returning to their original world. Let us examine the details of this conception, for we shall meet with them again in Imāmology.

This Pillar of Light that is formed of all the souls of Light returning triumphantly from affliction to their original world is called the *Pillar of Glory*, or more precisely, the *Pillar of Glories*; the plural stresses the multiplicity of the individual souls that compose it, while the souls themselves are designated by a term that carries us back to the old Iranian notion of *Xtarnah*, "Light-Glory."¹²⁴ However, the representation of this Pillar of Glory does not coincide purely and simply with that of the *collectivity* of souls that composes it. Thanks to a specifically Iranian mode of thought, it is *also* a Person, a personal unity distinct from the totality whose parts are thus considered as the Person's members. This Person is the great *Noṽs* of Light, he whom the Iranian texts call the Great Vahman (name of the first archangel after Ormuzd in the Zoroastrian heptad), or Manvahmed.¹²⁵ This Person is also designated as the Perfect Man¹²⁶ who transfers the elements of light from the earthly Church to the celestial pleroma. This action in itself individualizes the Person and distinguishes him from his own souls which he saves; and moreover, the Person is invoked in a hymn which

¹²³ When the sun rises at dawn and the creatures begin to move on earth to break the Cross of Light that stands there in silence, the same thing happens as happened to the primordial Man; when from the heights of Light he rose up against the sons of Darkness, the sons of Darkness mounted from the depths and strove to corrupt the body of his sons in which his body was clothed (his "armor"). And at dusk, when men return to their abodes, it is the mystery of the end. All the purified light rises once more in a last *column* toward the Aeon of Light; never again will the word Light be uttered over those who have so hated it and so much loved the Darkness (*Kephalaia*, pp. 164-65). This *Pillar of Light*, the mystery of which is the triumphal answer to that of the Cross of Light, is therefore the ascending procession of the elements of light, the angel-souls delivered from their captivity. And Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī had an intimation of precisely this (above, section 3, end) when, in the symbol of the Cross transfigured at the end of the Night of Destiny, he discerned the multitude of the *hudūd* of the Esoteric Church.

¹²⁴ Cf. E. Waldschmidt and W. Lentz, *Manichäische Dogmatik* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 27-28 (the hymn, and commentary p. 123); *Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus* (1926), p. 57; on the *Xvarnah* as *Imago Glorificae*, see our "Terre Céleste," pp. 121-35.

¹²⁵ Cf. George Widengren, *The Great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God* (Uppsala, 1945), pp. 12-34.

¹²⁶ See texts cited in *ibid.*, p. 14.

addresses him as Srōsh (the Zoroastrian Angel Sraosha), who is the homologue of Gabriel just as the Noūs of Light is identified with Christ. This central figure of Gabriel-Christos brings us back once more to Angel Christology. And indeed this Noūs of Light, the Great Manvahmed, a total Person, yet distinct from the totality of its souls, is designated as Angelos Christos, or as Sophia, the personal Angel of Mānī, who conferred his prophetic mission upon him at the age of twenty-four¹²⁷ and remained his eternal companion even after death.

Thus we may first of all note that the Pillar of Light has a twofold aspect; it is the collectivity of the souls of Light, *and* it is also a Person distinct from this Totality. Thus distinct, it appears to Mānī as an individual person in a strictly individuated relation, that is, as a personal Angel, Manvahmed, appearing to *his* terrestrial soul. And this relation is reiterated for every soul. It is grounded in the very relation which posits the great Noūs (Srōsh, the Perfect Man) *and* the Column of Light as two distinct terms: here is born the idea of "geminity," the idea that every earthly soul has a celestial "twin."¹²⁸ We have, then, an analogy of relations presupposing four terms: the great Noūs of Light is to the totality (the Pillar) of the souls of Light as every Noūs or Angel is toward its Soul. And it would not be sufficient to say that the souls of Light are each one of them a part of the Great Noūs of Light. We may speak neither of fragmentation nor of incarnation, but only of an individuation, an individuation of relations: a perfect homology of structure between the *each* and the *All*, so that the *All* is present in the *each*.

All these features recur in Ismailian Imāmology. Idrīs 'Imādaddīn¹²⁹ repeats that the Imāmate is the coalescence (*majma'*) of all the souls of Light, who have been dyed with the precious spiritual Dye, substantialized by the teachings of Gnosis, and carried to the degree of subtlety of the spiritual world, and who have migrated from the material body and been drawn to join the Pillar of Light (*'amūd al-Nūr, al-'amūd al-nūrānī*), the summit of which reaches into the pleroma of the Archangels.¹³⁰ With a

¹²⁷ Cf. Widengren, pp. 26 and 27n.

¹²⁸ Sharing the name of "Angel" by reason of their common origin (cf. Söderberg, p. 120, n. 1).

¹²⁹ Idrīs, ch. XVIII, pp. 206-7, and ch. XX, pp. 240-42.

¹³⁰ Cf. also Strothmann, p. 53 of the Arabic text; the same representation occurs in the "oriental theosophy" of Suhrawardī; cf. our edition of *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, p. 233, and our *Prolegomènes* in French, p. 52.

lyricism equal to that of the Manichaeans, our texts describe the power of this Pillar of Light, whose prodigious magnetism reaches down to the last ranks of the initiatory sodality to raise them upward from degree to degree, reaches down even to the neophytes (*mustajīb*, the "hearers" of the Manichaean hierarchy) and gathers them together in the Bāb, the "Threshold" of the Imām.

Such is the Imāmate, the Pillar of Light that constitutes the divinity (*lāhūt*) of the Imām. This highly complex conception is elucidated by its homology to Manichaeism. To understand the relation of the Imām with his divinity, that is, with the Pillar of Light constituting his Imāmate—a relation that is very different from an incarnation—let us turn to the Ismailian conception that is the homologue of the Perfect Man: the conception of man in the true sense (*insān ḥaqīqī*) and in the absolute sense (*'alā'l-i-illāq*). We are told, for example, that the archangelical Forms of the celestial pleroma (*dār al-ibdā'*) have human form, "for it is the most beautiful of forms"; but it is made clear that this refers to Man in the true and absolute sense, that is to the Imāms, and most particularly to him who completes their line, the "Perfect Child," the Resurrector (*Qā'im*).¹³¹ Here it is implied that the celestial pleroma is not limited to ten archangelical Figures; each Archangel is an acon, and his person stands in the same relation to the Angels of his own pleroma as the Perfect Man, that is the Imām, to the souls of light constituting his Imāmate. Perfect, divine humanity, that of the Imām, corresponds to the archangelical archetype in the sense that it is the earthly support, the receptacle of a coalescence of souls of light, which is his *lāhūt*, his divinity, his Temple of Light (*ḥaykal nūrānī*). Thus the conjunction of the divine and the human in the person of the Imām follows the example of the pleromatic relation between the Angel of humanity and the race of celestial humanity issued from him, because the Imām is precisely this Angel's terrestrial support. And that is why, in his individual person—that is to say, in that subtle superhumanity which alchemy, as we have seen, meditated upon and elaborated—the Imām is the *maṣḥar*, the epiphanic Form (not the Incarnation) of the celestial Angel Adam.

In this exemplification we also find the process of individuation repeated in multiple geminations analogous to those which joined Mani and the

¹³¹ Cf. Strothmann, I, 1, p. 6; also Kermānī, p. 145 (the second term of the creation, the perfect human being, resembles the first, the Angel of the pleroma, as a child resembles his parents).

Angel Christos, each soul with its Angel or "Holy Spirit." The Sublime Temple of Light (*Haykal nūrānī sharīf*) of the last Imām gathers together, integrates, all the Prophets, *Waṣī*, Imāms, all the *ḥudūd* and true Gnostics who have preceded him in the course of the Cycles. He contains each of the Temples of Light of each Imām (*Haykal imāmī sharīf*), progressively erected by the Angel demiurge to constitute the resurrective Form (*ṣūrat qā'ima*), the Temple of the Resurrector (*Haykal al-Qā'im*).¹³² Without fusion or confusion of persons, in the image of the Heavens encased one in the other, *each* Form subsists as a member in the *Whole*, just as each *ḥadd* subsists in the Temple of Light of its Imām, and each Form is preserved in its perfect living individuality that is all life, all power, all knowledge. What the Temple of each Imām is to the Sublime Temple of the *Imām Qā'im*, each *ḥadd* is to the Temple of his Imām; what this Imām is for the *ḥadd*, the *ḥadd* himself is for his own *maḥdūd*, the "companion" who follows him. In these individuations and their law of homology, the presence of the *All* in the *each*, we once again encounter the principle that we found at the source of the maxim: he who knows himself knows his Lord. This verification of homologies, defining the dyadic height of each soul in the *Corpus mysticum* and hence, with the horizon of its being and its knowledge, the rhythm of its metamorphoses, is carried so far that we should have difficulty in finding a parallel except perhaps in Swedenborg, where, for example, he says: "Each soul is the whole Church; to each angelical consociation the Lord appears as an Angel corresponding to the very form of this consociation."¹³³ And such words are perhaps the most satisfying commentary on the sentence "Whoever knows himself (= knows his soul), knows his God."

In this very brief sketch we have indicated the structure of the Pillar of Light that constitutes the Imāmate, the *lāhūt* or divinity of the Imām. Now, we may ask, what is the event that brings about the conjunction of the

¹³² See n. 129 above.

¹³³ Swedenborg, *Heaven and Hell*, 52 and 72. The Swedenborgian idea that every heaven or company of Angels has the form of a human being (*homo maximus = insān muṭlaq*) may be compared to the Ismailian parallel between the progress of the soul rising from degree to degree of the hierarchy and the phases of embryology (Idrīs, ch. XVIII, p. 207), or better still the idea that in the Temple of Light that is the *lāhūt* or divinity of the Imām the souls are disposed in a certain order, in function of their rank, their knowledge, their activity: some are in the heart, others in the brain, others in the limbs, etc., according to their degree of maturity and elevation. All together form the sublime and luminous Imāmīc Temple, each one rejoicing in his fellows (ibid., p. 209).

Imāmate with the Imām, of the *lākhūt* with the *nasūt*, of the divine with the human? When the young Imām attains a certain age,¹³⁴ the Imām his father confers on him the investiture (*naṣṣ*), a solemn act that does not make him an Imām—this he already is potentially by virtue of his birth—but enables the adepts to recognize in him the mystical presence of the Imāmate. The mystery is accomplished: the Temple of Light assembled in the Bāb, the “Threshold” of the previous Imām, is transferred invisibly to the young Imām in the manner of the Angel Christos descending upon Jesus on the *dies natalis* of his baptism. The young Imām is henceforth the epiphanic Form, the *maḥzar* of the celestial Angel Adam, because he is the terrestrial support of the Pillar of Light whose summit rests on this Angel’s Heaven.¹³⁵

When the Imām departs from this world,¹³⁶ he draws with him this entire Pillar of Light. All together its component souls dwell in the realm of the Tenth Angel, the celestial spiritual Adam, the Angel Gabriel-Holy Spirit of the philosophers. Here, according to our theosophers, they live in an expectation of still new spiritual upsurges, new burgeonings of light and perfection—until the total Cycle is consummated, that is, until Man in the true sense, the last Imām of the Cycle, the *Qā’im* or Resurrector, having completed the work of the Seventh Day and erected the Throne that he himself is “in person,” also rises to that realm in which all the Temples of Light of the Imāms who have preceded him are awaiting his apotheosis. Then there occurs in Heaven an Event as inscrutable to our imaginations as the prologue of the drama, the stupor that “retarded” the Angel of our humanity. And yet this Event is the response to that other Event, its denouement. The Resurrector, support of the Sublime Temple of Light, the Perfect Man after the example of the archangelical Forms of the Pleroma, so totally exemplifies the Image of the Angel that he is worthy to succeed him. He is enthroned as his *khalīfa*, his successor, while the tenth Angel rises to the next higher degree (the ninth, eighth, etc.), thus reconquering the “retarded eternity,” the rank lost in pre-eternity—not as though reconquering it over the other Archangels of the Pleroma but raising them too in this vertiginous ascent which draws the entire universe of being

¹³⁴ There are variants: when the child has attained the age of education (*tarbiyat*), that is, the age of four (Idris, p. 208), or when the Angel demiurge recalls the Bāb to him (Strothmann, p. 8).

¹³⁵ Idris, ch. XVIII, p. 208.

¹³⁶ For this whole paragraph, cf. *ibid.*, ch. XII, pp. 75–7, and ch. XVIII, pp. 209–10; cf. n. 94 above.

toward the "lotus of the limit," that is, to the threshold of the primordial Archangel whose Form of Light emerges eternally from the inscrutable night of the deity, in the sublime self-abnegation of the "No God outside of Him," that abnegation which makes *Ilīm*, precisely, the one and primordial theophany.

I hope that this brief sketch of a very complex doctrine will suffice to suggest how Imāmology both extends and modifies an Angel Christology. We have pointed out that the Docetism of our theosophers was situated in the context of an affirmation of the Imām as an Angel *in actu*, *dissimulated* beneath the garment of a body. We have just examined the relation between the *nāsūt* and the *lāhūt*, in other words, the "how" of the angelicity that has the power to unfold the angelicity of those souls whose Saviour (through the Imām) is the Angel, because their own nature is originally and eschatologically also that of the Angel. The Saviour need not assume an alien *nature* inferior to his own; on the contrary, he saves his followers by awakening them to their primitive nature that is also his. In this sense we may say that the divine Epiphany as anthropomorphosis is accomplished on the level of the Angel (the Archangels of the *pleroma* have the perfect human Form). And if it is on the level of the Angel that the divine becomes *man* and that the divine and the human meet, it is precisely because the human being by his origin is an Angel *in potentia* and because such a theophany presupposes the "opening" of this very dimension in the soul, the realization of its angelical potency, which is the measure of its *qualem capere potui*. Here the *descent* of the divinity is conceivable only through a simultaneous *assumption* of man, a bursting of the human condition that passes as "natural." Anthropomorphosis and *theōsis* (our authors say "angelomorphosis," in Persian *be-fereshtagi rasūdan*), are here correlative terms. *Eo ipso* such an Angel Christology, either in itself or in the Imāmology that is its extension, marks the sharpest contrast with the Christological dogma of the Councils: the godhead incarnated in man, assuming all the miseries of the human lot in order to save mankind, inspiring a cult of human suffering, the contemplation of the "outraged Christ." The contrast throws a blinding light on what was—and perhaps remains—a crossroads in the destiny of each man, in the destiny of humanity, in the destiny that mankind has prepared for itself according to the manner in which it has understood itself.

It is perhaps at this point that Imāmology discloses the degree and form

of spiritual energy which dominates it and shows how it absorbed and surpassed simple prophetology. It has already gone beyond Ebionite prophetology; we no longer have merely the one True Prophet "running through the centuries" and through his metamorphoses to his repose which is already at hand. Rather we must note the *plurality* of the persons of the Imāms and the *unity* of Imāmic epiphany or existence (*ʿenjūd* as *ẓuhūr* and *ishrāq*). This unity is the Sublime Temple of Light of the Imāmate, with which these Persons are integrated each in his turn while still preserving their individuality. But the dome of the Temple will rise only in the dawning light of the Seventh Day! The predominance of Imāmology, of the figure of the Imām over that of the Prophet, did not result from phases comparable to the exhausting controversies which led in Christianity to the formulation of the Christological dogma. Since the idea of an eternal Imām imposes itself upon the horizon of the soul, it is in its own secrecy that the soul verifies his theophanies. The process rather resembles the transfer of interest in Mahāyāna Buddhism from lived religion, from the "historical" Buddha perceived in his "body of transformation," to the Buddha meditated upon in his "body of the law" (Dharmakāya).

5. *The Eternal Imām*

It would even be difficult to consider this idea of the priority of the Imām as the result of a historical process. The idea is discernible at the very beginning of Shiite Gnosis and is no doubt the most compelling force in its development. On August 8, 1104, the Great Resurrection was proclaimed at Alamūt (the Ismailian "commandery" erected in Iran, in the chain of mountains southwest of the Caspian Sea). In settling the statute of the Law (*ḥukm-e sharīʿat*) against the statute of Resurrection (*ḥukm-e qiyāmat*)¹³⁷ and in proclaiming itself a religion of Resurrection (*dīn-e qiyāmat*), Ismailism merely returned to its origins after the closing of the Fāṭimid episode, the political success of which was a paradox doomed to failure on the spiritual plane, since it presupposed the accomplishment of an eschatology. Reformed Ismailism established once and for all the priority of the Imām and the Imāmate, since the Resurrection is the application of the *taʾwīl*, the spiritual exegesis that carries every exoteric figure back to its tran-

137 Cf. *Taṣawwūrāt* XXIV, pp. 79-80 of the Persian text.

scendent origin,¹³⁸ and since the Imām is the key to Resurrection. Here precisely is the paradox, the permanent challenge of this Shiite Gnosis: to experience the religion of Resurrection, the religion of the Imām, is to penetrate the hidden sense of the positive religion and at the same time to surpass it. And yet the positive religion must be retained, precisely in order to constrain men to exceed it, to call forth the resurrection of the adepts.

Such is the meaning of the six periods of the exoteric revelation of the Prophets, which one of the rare Persian texts in Alamūt tradition to have survived the Mongol tempests describes as the "Night of the True Religion" (*shab-e Dīn*¹³⁹), a Night that is the veiling (*ḥijāb*) of the Imām just as in the physical world the night is the hiding of the Sun—and we already know that it is the "Night of Destiny." Is then a Moon not necessary to illumine this night with the True Faith? In response to this question, a distinction is made between two Epiphanies of the Imām: one Epiphany that we may designate as corporeal and plastic (*ẓuhūr-e shaklī*) and which has always been exceptional in our Cycle, and another spiritual or mental Epiphany (*ẓuhūr-e ma'nawī*), that of his true hidden (*bāṭin*) meaning, visible only to the soul of the initiate, forever invisible to the profane, even when the corporeal Manifestation is present to his eyes. And an Ismailian poet, Gharizī, asks: "If the spiritual Epiphany today is without profit, what will the corporeal Epiphany avail tomorrow?"¹⁴⁰ In the foreground of this spiritual Epiphany the figure of the *Iḥujjat*, the "Proof," the "Witness" of the Imām, will stand out, assuming the role that previously fell to the Bāb, the "Threshold." This promotion is of inestimable importance for the re-junction of Ismailism and the mystical religion.

To understand its repercussions in the individual being of each adept, let us consider the ontological aspect in which the concept of the Imām is now perceived. With great psychological subtlety a treatise attributed to Naṣīraddīn Ṭūsī observes that the measure of a True Believer, what he is in his innermost being, can never be understood by others. And he goes on to infer: "How then will it be with him in whom the True Believer puts his

¹³⁸ Definition of the *ta'wīl*: (Arabic) "*raddu shay'yn ilā awwalihī*" (*Yanābī'* 30-31) = (Persian) "*chizi be-aṣl-e khwōd rasūnīdan*" (*Kalāmi Pīr*, 57).

¹³⁹ Cf. the little treatise on Imāmology published in Persian by W. Ivanow under the title *Faṣl dar bayān-e shanākht-e Imām* (Leiden, 1949); *On the Recognition of the Imām* (Bombay, 1947), pp. 1^b-2 of the text (abbrev. here = *Shanākht*).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 2^b.

faith?"¹⁴¹ Concerning the object of this faith, the Imām, we are told that knowledge must avoid both his *tashbīh* and his *ta'īl*; one can neither affirm nor deny the resemblance of the Imām to creatures.¹⁴² The Imām as Imām is unknowable for men; he is knowable only in his being that is relative to the creatures, to each according to his rank in being (*unicuique secundum quod dignus est*, to cite Origen's formula). But have we not here the entire problem concerning knowledge of the godhead? Assuredly; and the thesis is precisely that knowledge of the Imām is knowledge of God.¹⁴³ Thus a decisive change has been made in the system of correspondences that we have found established among the thinkers of the Fāṭimid tradition, such as Ḥamīdaddīn Kermānī. The Imām is no longer the epiphanic Figure (*maḡhar*) of the second Intelligence or universal soul, but, extending over the entire hierarchy of the pleroma, it is the Epiphany of the existentiating Word (*Kalimat*), the creative Fiat (KN)¹⁴⁴ of eternal existentiation (*ibdā'*), the being in the imperative and the imperative of being that vibrates in every being. In his essence he is essentially this Epiphany, that is, the possibility of giving attributes to the godhead; concretely, he is the godhead itself clothed in these attributes,¹⁴⁵ that is to say, not Epiphany of the divine Essence but Epiphany of those attributes that are entirely relative to men. There is a saying in which Imāmology coincides literally with Christology: "He who knows me knows God";¹⁴⁶ here it is not this or that Imām who speaks in his own name, but an eternal Imām. And as primordial Epiphany it is, in proto-Ismailism, the Five Pre-eternal Persons (*ashkhāṣ azaliyūn*), who are epiphanized in the successive stages of the cosmology (the Five Archangels, the Five "Persons of the Mantle")¹⁴⁷ as Manifestations of the godhead (*ṣūrat-e ḡāhir-e Khodā*), as his Attributes, his eternal theophanies. "We are the beautiful Names of God and his supreme attributes, that is to say, the supreme Name and the concretized and hypostatized Attributes."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ Cf. *Taṣawwūrāt*, p. 87.

¹⁴² Ibid.; cf. Shihābaddīn Shāh Ḥusaynī, *The True Meaning of Religion or Risāla dar Haqiqat-e Din*, tr. W. Ivanow (2nd edn., Bombay, 1947), pp. 20-21 (hereinafter abbreviated as *True Meaning*).

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁴⁴ [The consonants of the Arabic word *kun*, "Let there be," from *kāna*, "to be."—Tr.]

¹⁴⁵ *Taṣawwūrāt*, p. 88: "His word, his action, his knowledge, his face can be called the word, action, knowledge and face of God."

¹⁴⁶ *True Meaning*, p. 20: *Hār Kūs mārā shanākht, Khodā-rā shanākhtah*. Cf. Gospel of St. John 14 : 7 and 9: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

¹⁴⁷ Cf. nn. 44, 47, 117 above and the end of section 6 below.

¹⁴⁸ *Taṣawwūrāt* XXIV, pp. 88ff.: "I knew God before the Heavens and the Earth were

The Prophets pass away and change, while "We are an eternal people" (*naḥnū anās šamadīyūn*).¹⁴⁹

We must take note of this *plural*. It marks the plurality which from the outset attaches essentially to the very notion of a theophany. Yet we must take care not to interpret it as indicating quantitative fragmentation, as though each Imām were a fragmentary Imām. Here we see at work the notion of individuation, having as its corollary the homology between the *each* and the *All* that we stressed above. Each Imām is the Epiphany of a degree, a mystery, a beneficence,¹⁵⁰ a gradation relative to him to whom he "shows himself," but each one homologically contains the totality. To make it clear that he is not speaking of the fragmentation of a species into individuals differing numerically (and only numerically) among themselves, Naṣīr, drawing on the lexicon of Avicennan angelology, points out that the individual person of the Imām is itself his entire *species*, that his *species* is his *person*.¹⁵¹ The plural refers to what we have called above the "metamorphoses of theophanic visions"; it is the basis of the distinction that we have just remarked between plastic or corporeal Epiphany and spiritual or mental Epiphany.

Now this fundamental distinction encompasses another: the modes of manifestation (or theophanic visions) vary according to the modes of knowledge, which vary according to the mode of consociation (*payrastagī*) with the Imām. This consociation itself presents a threefold variety, determining a threefold mode of being which differentiates human beings and to which corresponds a threefold mode of perception or knowledge of the Imām.

There can be a purely physical bond with the Imām (as in the case of those of his lineage who have not been invested with the Imāmate); there can be a purely spiritual bond (this will eminently be the case of Salmān the Pure); and lastly, there can be a consociation realized at once on the physical and spiritual plane and on the plane of Essence (this in general is

created. . . . We stand in such a relation to God that being with Him, we are He. I am he who raises the Heavens and he who lays out the Earth. I am the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden. I am cognizant of all things." In such texts we gain an intimation of the figure of eternal Sophia through the eternal Imām.

¹⁴⁹ *Taṣawwūrāt*, p. 90.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 94. Through the unity of the *obscia* (*ḥaqīqat*) of the Eternal Imām, the persons (*shakhs*) of the Imāms are conceptually and ontologically (*dar ma'nawīyat wa ḥaqīqat*) both distinct; it is in this sense that one may speak of the "return" (*raj'at*) of the Imām.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 89.

the case with the twelve Imāms of Duodeciman Shiism, who comprise the first heptad of Imāms recognized by Ismailism).¹⁵² To the threefold mode of consociation corresponds a threefold division of human beings: there are the Exoterists (*ahl-e ṣāḥir*) who require a material presence and attach themselves to the genealogy of the Imām, to his carnal lineage. There are the Esoterics (*ahl-e bāṭin*), who discern and examine hidden meanings and forms; they are open to the mental Epiphany, and what they perceive in the genealogy of the Imāms is a spiritual perpetuation. Finally, there are the Gnostics of the Essence (*ḥaqīqat*), the esoterics of esoterics, for whom the Imām is *himself* this Essence, the eternal Imām. To the three modes of being correspond, then, three modes of knowledge: there is a perception of the Imām in his physical person (but of this animals are also capable), or in his common name, his carnal genealogy (but of this his enemies and negators are also capable); there is the knowledge of his Imāmate, corresponding to the Self (*dhāt*) of the Imām, or rather of the Self that is the Imām, of the Essence which creates the truth of his attributes (*ḥaqīqat-e ṣifāt-e ū*), that is to say, which is the foundation of his very being as primordial Epiphany, *Deus determinatus*. Only the *Hujjat* possesses this knowledge.¹⁵³

All these functional relations between modes of consociation with the Imām and modes of being and knowing, combine to determine the very concept of Epiphany, to define what may be meant when it is said that an "Imām has come to this world." Of course, this coming cannot (any more than in the case of Angelos Christos) be an incarnation into this world nor an entrance into becoming. This "coming to the world" is essentially an Epiphany, a Manifestation, which is equally present in the three worlds (the physical world, the psychospiritual world of the *da'wat*, the spiritual world of the heavenly Angel), a Manifestation that is the cause of their being, of their revelation to being.¹⁵⁴ This means that his coming consists in his making himself visible in the Form in which he is contemplated and that the eternal Imām epiphanizes himself *to* this world without coming *into*

¹⁵² Here, of course, we leave out of account the divergence concerning the person of the Seventh Imām (the successor of the Imām Ja'far Ṣādiq).

¹⁵³ *Taṣawwūrāt*, pp. 89-90, 93; *Shanākht*, p. 22. This law of essence that defines the relation between the subject's mode of being and his mode of perception of the Imām may be compared with the discussions on the Light of Tabor among the Byzantine Hesychasts: an animal, an unbeliever, would not have perceived this light.

¹⁵⁴ *Taṣawwūrāt*, pp. 90-92, 95; *Shanākht*, pp. 28 (= 6 of the text), 29; compare the admirable phenomenology in Naṣīraddīn Ṭūsī (*ibid.*) of "coming into this world" and "departing from this world"—"Cyclical Time," pp. 171-72.

this world; his epiphany does not reveal his essence—it is always “relative to” (that is to say, relative to the capacity for vision of) him who contemplates it.¹⁵⁵ Thus, so far as the eternal Essence (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqā'iq*) is concerned, the Imām has never come and never does come *into* this world; but in regard to the relation of which we have been speaking, he has had and will have, down through the ages, his Epiphanies *to* this world. Thus he is at once father and son, sometimes a youth, sometimes an old man. Trait for trait, we recognize the theophanic visions of the Acts of Peter and the doctrine they imply: *qualem capere potui*. Such and such a vision is the relation *in actu* with such and such a divine attribute “in person”; the Imāms are the Manifestation, the hypostasis of these attributes (“We are the beautiful Names of God and his attributes”). In short, each being to whom he epiphanizes himself *is* the coming of the Imām into this world. Of course our familiar consciousness of the “real” will mobilize our anti-Docetic instinct to utter the objection: but what guarantees the *truth* of this vision *relative* to myself? Our Gnostics foresaw this objection and answered it: it is the truth of the Imām that makes the vision true and not, inversely, some external criterion that makes the vision of the Imām true. The setting up of a relation between the two terms, the contemplator (or, him who contemplates) and the contemplated, results from an individuation, the truth of which does not arise from the contemplant alone but also from the Figure individually contemplated. The only criterion, the Imām, formulates this by declaring: “He who recognized me in pre-eternity will recognize me.”¹⁵⁶

Once we have taken together these considerations regarding the plurality of theophanies as individuations of the eternal Imām, the functional relations that condition them, their nature as spiritual events—not as visions of

¹⁵⁵ *Shanākht*, p. 26.

¹⁵⁶ *Taṣawwūrāt*, p. 96, going as far as the paradox “Without him, the truth itself is impious error (*kufṛ*); with him even pluralism (*shirk*) is Truth and True Faith.” With this idea of pre-eternal recognition we may connect the motif of an Epiphany of the Imām which is consonant with the Christology of Origen (Christ an Angel for the Angels, a man for men): “Thou appearest a man among men, an Angel among Angels” (*Shanākht*, p. 26 = 5^b of the text, dealing with the distinction between the world of the *khalq* and the world of the *Amr*). Cf. the names of the Five Persons written in letters of light on the Throne (Idrīs, ch. XIII) and the Angels contemplating ‘Alī (which is only the kyriological name of the eternal Imām, *Excelsus*) in the form of an Angel (*Kalāmī Pīr*, p. 88, and *Ta’wīl al-āyat* of Sharafaddīn ‘Alī Astarābādī, *in fine*); compare also the idea of the *personal* form of every Epiphany (Paradise is a person, Prayer is a person, etc.) and the idea of *maḥzar* among the *Fedeli d’amore* (*Rūzbehān*).

the Imām in his epiphanic *essence* (which would be to penetrate the mystery of the creative Fiat) but as epiphanic *relations* constituting, as such, the only coming of the Imām into this world—it becomes possible for us to gain an intimation of the meaning of the *Hujjat*, the Witness, the Proof of the Imām, and the reasons which impose this Figure on Imāmology carried to this speculative height.

Two characteristics define the *Hujjat*. This Moon, we are told, "illuminates the Night of Faith"¹⁵⁷ just as the Moon illuminates the world in the measure in which it receives from the Sun a light proportional to its capacity: in itself it is nothing and has nothing, but the radiant brightness of the Imām makes it incandescent, and it is his substitute (*khalīfa*, diadochos) during his "occultation." The *Hujjat* is described to us as the person who from pre-eternity is the perfect homologue of the Imām; their concepts are one.¹⁵⁸ It is the true kyriological name (*ism ḥaqīqī*) of the Imām; it is the "Door of Compassion" (*dar-e Raḥmat*), the "Threshold of Knowledge" (*Bāb-e ma'rifat*) of the Imām. By virtue of the identity of their concept (*ma'nā*), the *Hujjat* is the mental or spiritual Epiphany (*zohūr-e ma'nawī*) of the Imām; in other terms, his person is not an Incarnation of the Imām but is the form of his "coming to this world." That is to say, that since the Imām, as epiphany of the divine attributes, is knowable only *relatively* to human creatures, the *Hujjat*, the "Threshold of Consciousness," is precisely this *relation*.¹⁵⁹

The second trait that completes the characterization of his person brings us to the striking convergence of Imāmology and Angel Christology. The mode of "consociation" which places the person of the *Hujjat* in respect to the Imām is by no means the mode of carnal descent, of genealogical legitimacy. He is the Spiritual Child (*farzand-e ma'nawī*), the Adopted Child of the Imām.¹⁶⁰ It is no accident that this term should remind us of the adoptianism of the Christology of the Ebionites and of the *Shepherd of Hermas*; indeed, the convergence of which we have just spoken becomes clear as soon as we give the *Hujjat* his archetypal proper name, the name of

¹⁵⁷ *Taṣawwurat*, p. 97.

¹⁵⁸ *Shanākht*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37 (= 10-10^b of the text). To enter by the Threshold is to enter the house, but it is by the Threshold that one must enter. God cannot be known by the creature, and the knowledge of the Imām cannot be realized in this Night of the Faith without the *Hujjat*, who is the spiritual or mental Epiphany (*zohūr-e ma'nawī*) of the Imām (*ibid.*).

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23 (= 4 of the text).

Salmān the Persian or Salmān the Pure (Salmān Fārsī, Salmān Pāk). The Imām may be said to stand in the same relation to Salmān, his Adopted Child, his Spiritual Child, as the Angel Christos to Jesus. If we recall the equivalence between Gabriel and Christos professed by an entire Angel Christology, we shall not be far from the secret of the enigmatic figure of Salmān, in whom our texts show us the earthly typification of the Angel of Revelation, and as such the Angel of initiation. The intervention of Salmān inaugurates a process that will make esoteric Imāmology a paradox in Islām, for Salmān will outrank the Prophet himself, and this priority will derive from his quality as *Ḥujjat*, as Witness and Spiritual Child of the Imām. Since in this capacity he will be presented as the archetype of the Gnostic, of the True Believer, he may be said to mark the most personal spiritual experience to which Ismailian Imāmology can lead.

Who is Salmān? A dominant figure of this Islamic esotericism: the Expatriate, the Exile, he who comes from a distant horizon: he is the Orphan (*yalīm*) and also the Adopted One, the Spiritual Child of the Imām.¹⁶¹ Historically an Iranian, son of a Mazdean knight of Fārs; after attending a liturgy he became a Christian and set out on a pilgrimage in quest of the True Prophet, in the course of which he came into contact with Mohammed. Magnified to the gnostic dimensions of the Ismailian consciousness, his Person rose to an extraordinary rank. Salmān is he who initiated the Prophet, who helped him to gain awareness of the scriptural antecedents of his Revelation. He is the "epiphanic form" of the Angel Gabriel, his human, earthly form, since the Prophet could not sustain the brilliance of the Angel's original form.¹⁶² Thus he was the Prophet's companion of initiation, the *ḥadd*, whose *maḥdūd* is the Prophet, the exegete of the esoteric meaning of the words "dictated" by the Angel—in other words, he to whom it is given to demonstrate the recurrences and correspondences in the Revelations communicated by the Angel. Accordingly he alternates with the Angel Gabriel as "sixth" by the side of the Five Persons of the Mantle.¹⁶³

161 Cf. Louis Massignon, *Salmān Pāk* (Paris-Tours, 1934); our study on "Le Livre du Glorieux," pp. 60ff.; on the motif of the Expatriate, cf. also our *Prolegomènes II* to the Works of Suhrawardī, pp. 87ff., 97ff.

162 Cf. n. 42 above (the two forms of the Angel): Thus the story that Mohammed received the initiation (*ta'lim*) from Gabriel, the Angel in human form, is to be referred to the *Ḥujjat* of the Imām; cf. also n. 86 above: Maryam, as *Ḥujjat* of Jesus, receiving the *Rūḥ* from the Imām, or from the *Ḥujjat* of the Imām of the preceding period.

163 Cf. nn. 43-47 above; Massignon, *Salmān Pāk*, pp. 16ff.; our "Le Livre du Glorieux," pp. 64ff.

All these indices of superior rank are alluded to in enigmatic *ḥadīth*,¹⁶⁴ but above all they are motivated by the solemn attestations of Salmān's adoption, given by the Prophet and, with still more weight, by the first Imām. Such attestations are known in many variants, pointing to different sets of circumstances. This variant, for example, emanates from the Imām: "Salmān is one of us, the members of the House (*Salmān minnā*, *Ahl al-Bayt*), a Sun of the divine Light, an integral part of ourselves. The heart of the True Believer is the Light of God; no one measures his measure, for the True Believer is forever living in the two universes."¹⁶⁵ Or yet again: "Salmān is part of myself, and I myself am part of Salmān."¹⁶⁶

In primitive Shiism, or more precisely in proto-Isma'ilism, this assumption of Salmān is reflected in the speculations developed around the three symbolic letters 'AYN, SĪN, MĪM, typifying respectively the Imām, Salmān the Adopted One (his Spiritual Child), and the Prophet. The "Book of the Glorious One" of Jābir ibn Ḥayyān starts from these highly abstruse speculations.¹⁶⁷ The order in which the three symbolic letters have just been enumerated corresponds to the order of rank adopted by the reformed Isma'ilism of Alamūt, which thus returned to its primitive inspiration. Considered on the plane of hierarchical archetypes, according to the law of homology that we have discerned in the basic angelology, this order of rank introduces a radical and highly meaningful change into the schema of correspondences established by the thinkers of the Fāṭimid tradition.¹⁶⁸ And indeed this modification is the direct consequence of the promotion of the Imām, who is now meditated upon as a typification not of the second

164 "If Abū Dharr knew what there is in the heart of Salmān, he would hurl the anathema against him" or even (in an alternative reading) "would wish to kill him." The Imām explains: "If Salman declared to Abū Dharr that his own rank is superior to that of the Prophet (priority of the *Sin* over the *Mim*, n. 78 above and n. 107 below) and that the Imām is the Creator and Former of the World, Abū Dharr would regard him as an infidel and would wish to kill him" (*Shanākht*, p. 7^a b). Thus the Ismailian exegesis of this *ḥadīth* makes it a witness attesting the superiority of the 'Ayn and the *Sin* over the *Mim* (see references in preceding note). I shall also mention the exegesis given me recently by an Iranian friend (a Duodeciman Shiite): the secret of Salmān is the secret of *each* believer: each believer has secretly *his* own Imām; perhaps if he divulged his secret, he would pass as an infidel! This exegesis strikes me as characteristic of Iranian individualism; it amply justifies the idea of Salmān as archetype of the True Believer (cf. also n. 170 below).

165 *Shanākht*, p. 7^b.

166 Ibid., p. 6^b.

167 Cf. the references given in nn. 163 and 164 above and n. 169 below.

168 See section 3 above, the table of hierarchies.

Intelligence but of the creative Logos which dominates the entire hierarchy of the Emanations to which it gives rise. The entire doctrine of epiphanic Forms (*maẓhar*) is thus reformed from the top down: the Imām is the *maẓhar* or epiphany of the creative Logos; the *Ḥuǧǧat* (or Salmān as human correspondence of Gabriel) that of the first Archangel; the Prophet (who is initiated by Gabriel-Salmān) that of the second Intelligence, the universal Soul. Thus the *Ḥuǧǧat* stands in the same relation to the Imām as the first Archangel to the creative Logos: he is the *Factum* (*mubda'*) of this *Fiat* (*ibdā'*). As for the Prophet (*Nāṭiq*, Enunciator), he now takes his rank simply among the *Dā'ī*, the Preachers: "Each time that the *Dā'ī* ('he who calls') is mentioned, we are told, it is an allusion to the Prophet, as for example in this Koran verse: And as a *Summoner* unto Allah, by his permission, and as a lamp that giveth light" (33 : 45).¹⁶⁹

We need hardly point out that we are far from Islamic orthodoxy. To follow the road opened up by Ismailian Gnosis to its end, we must now compare the texts celebrating the apotheosis of Salmān with those which show him as archetype of the True Believer, as the Adopted One, the Spiritual Child, exemplifying the bond between the True Believer and the Imām. The "Glorious One," the hero of the alchemist Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, already gives an intimation of this Glory: he is the Expatriate, come from afar, who required no master nor any long initiation and familiarity with the Imām, as did the Prophet, but who learned everything from the presentiment of his Quest, from the direct magnetism of the Imām upon his person.¹⁷⁰ But let us now consider the significance of declarations such as this: "Salmān is the Threshold of Paradise. . . . Since the Threshold of Paradise is a human being, the place of Paradise must also be a human being." And elsewhere: "I am with my friends wherever they seek me, sometimes on the mountain, sometimes on the plain, sometimes in the desert. He to whom I have revealed my Person, that is, the knowledge of myself, has no need of proximity in

¹⁶⁹ *Shanākht*, pp. 1^a and 8^b. This little treatise on Imāmology begins with a theory of the "epiphanic Forms" (*maẓhar*) in accord with that put forward by *Taṣawwurat* XXIV, p. 82; the Imām is eternally the Throne, and the "pillars of this throne" are the *Ḥuǧǧat*; the Angel-princes (Gabriel and Michael, Seraphiel and Azrael) named in the positive religion have their earthly typification in these figures (*Shanākht*, p. 7^a). The four other ranks (*Dā'ī*, to which rank is assimilated that of the Prophet, the two "licentiates," the Auditor) are the epiphanies of the universal Soul and stand in the same relation to the *Ḥuǧǧat* as the Second Intelligence to the First (*ibid.*, p. 1^a).

¹⁷⁰ Cf. our "Le Livre du Glorieux," pp. 66-67, 74, 103ff.

space; this is the Great Resurrection." And lastly, this sentence in which Imāmology offers the decisive fulfillment: "Consecrate to me thy devotion and thy knowledge,¹⁷¹ and thou wilt become, *as Salmān, like unto me.*"

"To become as Salmān" is to become oneself a *Hujjat*, the Imām's Proof and Adopted One, and thereby to become "like unto the Imām"; such is the ultimate metamorphosis to which the initiate will aspire. Now we may understand the resonance of these verses by Ra'īs Ḥasan, an Ismailian poet:

Thou art He whose *Hujjat* is the Threshold in this world;
In a symphony of a hundred thousand voices,
Wisdom proclaims in the Kenoma and the Pleroma,¹⁷²
His rank is symbolized by the distance of the "two arrows"
flights."¹⁷³

Thus Salmān the Mazdean, then the Christian, the Exile in "Quest" of the True Prophet, then the Spiritual Child of the Imām who solemnly attests his "adoption," has become the "Threshold"; so will it be with all the "Salmāns," with every soul that exemplifies his case; each one, as a very ancient text declares, becomes the "Salmān of the microcosmos."¹⁷⁴ We have already pointed to the homology of this adoptianist relation: the Angel Christos is to Jesus as the Imām is to his *Hujjat*. To "become like unto the Imām" corresponds here to an *Imitatio Christi*, no longer in the context of an incarnation Christology, but in the only sense that this "imitation" implies for a Gnostic: as exemplifying a similar relation with Angelos Christos, which Theodotus's Gnostics also expressed as a conjunction of the soul with its Angel.¹⁷⁵ And this essentially is the conception and vision of the Imām attained by Shiism at the limit of its spiritual maturity. Mullā Ṣadrā of Shīrāz, one of the greatest philosophers of seventeenth-century Duodeciman Shiism, gives us this edifying definition: "There is in the human being a reality of the angelic world, a divine thing, which comes to it from God and is absolutely proper to it; this thing that is absolutely proper

¹⁷¹ *Farmān-e man bar*, obedience which is at once 'ibādat and ma'rifat (ibid., p. 9^a).

¹⁷² *Shanākht*, p. 9^b.

¹⁷³ Allusion to Koran 53 : 9: the distance from Muḥammad at which the Angel descending from heaven stands at the time of the first revelation, and the distance from the divine mystery to which the Prophet (and in imitation of him the mystic, here the *Hujjat*) approaches. This verse represented a particular challenge to the sagacity of the *tafsīr*.

¹⁷⁴ *Salmān-e 'ālam-e saghīr*; technical term in *Umm al-Kitāb*, question 34.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *Extraits de Théodote*, ed. F. Sagnard, pp. 137-39, 187; Söderberg, p. 249.

to the human being is *the Imāmale*.”¹⁷⁶ In meditating this message we shall discover the ripened fruit of that other maxim that has guided us from the start: “He who knows himself (*nafs*, his *Anima*) knows his Lord.”¹⁷⁷

Illustrations might be drawn from all the surviving Ismailian literature and from Shiite literature in general. In these illustrations the same constants are confirmed: nostalgia for the vision refused and at the same time granted by the epiphanic meaning of the symbols, the nostalgia whose premises and fulfillments we have attempted to analyze here; and dominating the whole, the sense of the incommunicable, of the intransmissible personal secret. We still find it in a little book composed at the end of the last century, by a man whose premature death was an inestimable loss for the Ismailian community: Shihābaddīn Shāh Husaynī.¹⁷⁸ Certain traditional sayings, or logia, which our author recalls and enchases in his own text, propagate the same flame of intrepid devotion. This one, for example, attributed to the first Imām: “I would never worship a God whom I did not see.” And this other, which comes as an answer to the challenge of the impossible vision: “He who does not know *his* Imām does not know God.”¹⁷⁹

But we must take care: this vision is given not to the eyesight (it does not even reside in the material “data” of the past) but to the vision of the heart: what the heart sees is pure Light,¹⁸⁰ it is not an object that one can point to with the finger, that one can find, identify, impose on others, not even by invoking the materiality of what we call a “historical fact.” To attain to this vision which others do not see, to this audition that others do not hear, a long, very long struggle is needed. “How might one say these

176 Quoted in Shaykh Āgā Bozorg, *Zarī'a* (Shiite Bibliography) II, 1325. In the course of our conversation about Abū Dharr's *ḥadīth*, the same Iranian friend to whom I have referred above (n. 164) also said to me apropos of this definition of Mullā Ṣadrā: “So you see, each one of us has indeed *his* Imām. Basically the Imām is for us what the Fravartī was to the ancient Iranians.” Any commentary would weaken this testimony to a lived religion, which in its conciseness expresses what is perhaps the most original spiritual message that Iran has ever given to mankind.

177 *Kalāmi Pīr* (p. 73 of the text), citing this verse of Nāṣir-e Khusraw (*Dīwān*, Teheran edition, p. 528, line 7): “Become conscious of thine own being and then hold thy head high among the multitude (or else: take the head of the multitude),” adds: “The knowledge of the Imām is then achieved.”

178 Died in 1885 at the age of 40. He left a short treatise which he had composed not for the higher initiates but for the Ismailian community in general. Its Persian text along with an English translation was published by W. Ivanow, *True Meaning* (Bombay, 1933; 2nd edn., 1947) (cf. n. 142 above).

179 *True Meaning* (2nd edn.), p. 21.

180 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

things to the firstcomer, and how might the firstcomer see them, hear them, and understand them? No, only those who see with the eye that sees the truth can do so."¹⁸¹ And so the enigmatic allusions are illumined for us too in the transparency of a wholly interior light; such allusions, for example, as those referring to Adam's Paradise, Noah's Ark, Abraham's vision, the Mount Sinai of Moses, Maryam mother of Jesus, Gabriel Angel of the Prophet, as so many forms of the *Hujjat*.¹⁸² For in the context of the Ismailian spirituality that repudiates all purely abstract or anecdotic significance, these are all metamorphoses of theophanic visions, always perceived as personal presences (Paradise is a person, Hell is a person, Prayer is a person, etc.).¹⁸³ And it is precisely as such that they can neither be communicated nor made comprehensible to the firstcomer, any more than they can be rationally demonstrated or dogmatically imposed. The discovery of the *Hujjat*, or epiphany of the eternal Imām, remains the most intimate of secrets in the depths of the heart, the secret which the True Believer discloses to no one; here the "Docetic" consciousness attains its profound truth through the sentiment of its essential individuation. Witness also this tale upon which our author invites us to meditate:

The Imām Ja'far Ṣādiq replied one day to a man who asked him whether it was true that on the day of the Resurrection God would be visible to all: "Yes," said the Imām. "He is visible even before that day; he has been visible since the day when he asked, 'Am I not your Lord?'"¹⁸⁴ The True Believers have seen him even in this world. Dost thou not see him?" And the man replied: "O my Lord, I see *thee*. Permit that by thy authority I go and announce it to the others." But the Imām said: "No, say nothing to anyone, for the people are stupid and ignorant, they will not understand; they will disavow you and hurl the anathema at you."

And our author comments:

Know, O my brother, that this subject was always kept hidden from the unworthy and the incompetent; it has been confided only to a small number. If one of the True Gnostics (*Ahl-e ḥaqīqat*)

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁸² *Shanākht*, p. 8^a (translation, p. 31).

¹⁸³ Ibid., translation, p. 47; cf. our "Rituel Sabéen," pp. 232ff., 239ff.

¹⁸⁴ Allusion to the pact concluded in pre-eternity, in the Night of the Covenant, when God asked future humanity, present in its archetypes: "Am I not your Lord?" (Koran 7 : 171).

is somewhere, the people slander him and mock him. . . . Each thing, whether it be exoteric or esoteric, can be for you yourself a form of worship (*'ibādat*). Worship, assuredly, is identical with Knowledge (*ma'rifat*), but worship in every case forms a thing in itself, different from every other thing. Knowledge by the organ of your eyes means that you know this human Form that guides you, which is proper to the person who bears outwardly all the features of simple human reality (*insānīyat*). But it is not with the eyes that you can obtain a representation of the heart. The Knowledge of the heart is different from that of sight: it is pure luminescence, shining for itself. And neither have I the power to tell you more nor you the capacity to hear more.¹⁸⁵

Theophanic vision is experienced by each man alone; it is revelation and pure luminescence of the "Alone for the Alone," a full spiritual event the evidence of which is incommensurable with the norms governing common evidence, that which imposes itself on the senses and on common reason, or that which is recorded in history and profane chronology. The only transitive action that is conceivable and effective is that of helping each man to encounter *his* Imām, and this is eminently the role of Salmān the Pure, the "companion of initiation," who in his dealings with the Prophet typifies the ministration of the invisible Angel. "No more than this?" it may be asked. But "this" alone is perhaps the total encounter to which every soul aspires.

6. *The "Quest of the Imām"*

We may thematize the search for this encounter as the "Quest of the Imām." Since the reasons and the vicissitudes of this Quest are the same as those which motivate and guide all the doctrinal expositions of Ismailism, the aspects we have so far considered will suffice to provide the foundation of an inquiry into it. At this point a brief recapitulation may suggest the main lines of such an inquiry. One of the questions raised by an initiatory sect such as Ismailism is this: Is there any trace of an experimental spiritual pedagogy, of a "psychagogy," that is specifically Ismailian, leading the soul to "birth," to metamorphosis, making it apt for theophanic visions, as the widows in the Acts of Peter are made accessible to the story of the Transfiguration? Unfortunately, few documents relating to such a pedagogy, and

¹⁸⁵ *True Meaning*, pp. 23-24, 48 (Persian text, pp. 38-40, 73-74).

particularly to the reformed Iranian Ismailism that most interests us here, have come down to us.

We do, however, have a little romance of initiation, dating from a remote period, preceding the Fāṭimid era. It retraces the phases which put the neophyte upon the "way of the Quest" and lead him to final membership in the esoteric sodality. Its possible author is Maṣṣūr al-Yaman, the first Ismailian Dā'ī sent (in 269-874) to southern Arabia, where his mission was to be crowned with great success. Its title is simply *The Master and the Disciple* (*Risālat al-'ālim wa'l-ghulām*).¹⁸⁶ Here I cannot undertake to summarize it, but shall merely point out certain of its characteristics. The essential is that it is not an anecdotic history but an archetypal narrative.¹⁸⁷

In the Iranian province of Fars (Persis), amid general ignorance, there lived a man who attained True Knowledge (that is to say, an Ismailian). Endowed with a sensitive heart, a penetrating intelligence, and a lofty moral sense, he understood the illusion and the emptiness of the mirage of life. He abandons his home and his people, becomes a pilgrim wandering through the world, among the Persian populations and the Arab tribes. Directly our protagonist, Abū Malik, becomes the type of the spiritual Exile, the Expatriate after the manner of Salmān the Persian or Jābir's "Glorious One," or the hero of Suhrawardī's *Recital of the Western Exile*; he is the Stranger, the *Allogenos* of the Sethian Gnostics (the children of Seth). He enters a town unnoticed or unrecognized; this incognito is an essential condition of his *mission*—a mission totally different from what the history of the Christian Churches has accustomed us to understand under this word, implying a different aim and different triumphs. His mission is neither to speak in the public square nor to convert the crowds. Abū Malik mingles with a group of pious Moslems who are conversing; of course he does not say who or what he is; he presents himself as a pious foreigner on a journey and contents himself with seizing the opportunity, between sentences, to inject discreetly a question, edifying perhaps, assuredly disturbing, if only his interlocutor were capable of grasping it. But soon, called back to their affairs, all arise and disperse except for a single one, a youth who, like

¹⁸⁶ W. Ivanow has given a summary of this little spiritual romance in his *Studies in Early Persian Ismailism* (Bombay and Leiden, 1948).

¹⁸⁷ The names of the two principal heroes are also those of archetypal characters: the master is called Abū Malik (*Pater regis*) and the disciple Ṣāliḥ (*Idoneus*).

Parsifal, asks in his turn the question which none of the others has even thought, or will ever think, of asking. This is the "disciple," the second protagonist of the romance.

Then there opens a series of dialogues which progressively awaken the young man's curiosity, arousing a desire to know ever more, to enter upon the path of the "Quest." These dialogues reveal the entire Ismailian art of pedagogy, or let us rather say "psychagogy," which awakens the meaning of symbols, the desire for a spiritual *exegesis* (*ta'wīl*) as the necessary *exodus* from the letter. But the first decisive step is taken only after a conversation full of pathos, in the course of which the *Dā'i* receives from his disciple the first solemn promise not to reveal to anyone what he will learn in the course of their ensuing conversations. And these conversations initiate him gradually into the fundamental questions, some of which we have discussed here. They dazzle the youth; from now on he is dominated by the attraction of an unsuspected dimension that opens up access to spiritual liberation. It is not only the opposition between the exoteric and the esoteric (*ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*) that is revealed to him; this is known also to the Ṣūfīs. For there is more, namely, the esoteric of the esoteric (*bāṭin al-bāṭin*), that is to say, that which underlies the organic connection between *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*, that which, in Ismailian terms, is its key—to wit, the third world, the cosmos of the esoteric Church, the hierocosmos, a world intermediate between the physical and the spiritual cosmos: this is the "Paradise in *potentia*," "the potential angelical world," structured in imitation of the celestial hierarchies. Then the metamorphosis of the disciple is announced; this potentiality is awakened in him too; he asks to see and to know more concerning the "person" who symbolically holds in his hands the keys of Paradise, i.e., the Imām.¹⁸⁸

188 The knowledge of the exoteric, our author points out, corresponds to the degree of the animal; that of the esoteric, to the degree of human beings: to possess it is to be a True Believer, that is to say, a man in the true sense. Lastly, that of the esoteric of the esoteric is an attribute of the Angels. To acquire it is to become a spiritual being in respect to knowledge, while remaining a human being in respect to physical appearance. It is thus that the Envoy of God is called the Veil which dissimulates the Angels (*ḥijāb al-Malā'ika*, *ibid.*, p. 96). The angelomorphosis toward which initiation starts the young adept presupposes an anthropology whose conclusions are perfectly clear. In this world there are only two types of men in the real and true sense: (1) *'ālim rabbānī* (corresponding to the *ḥakīm muta'allih* of the *Ishrāqīyūn*, the "theosophianic Sage"), who has attained the summit of religious knowledge and whose spirit has experimentally realized the Spirit of certainty, and (2) the *muta'allim*, the disciple who seeks the Way and progresses, an angel in *potentia*. All the rest are human only in a purely metaphoric sense (*ibid.*, p. 97).

At this moment the master vanishes. He has gone to consult the youth's "senior parent" (*ʿaliduhu'l-akbar*),¹⁸⁹ that is to say, the *Dā'ī* of the next higher degree. Soon he returns in haste to inform his disciple that the "gates of Compassion are wide open to him." The two depart together, like Gurnemanz and Parsifal, toward the "Threshold of Compassion," taking good care to tell the youth's blood father nothing about the journey.

Here begins the scene of the "Transformation," the ritual of the initiation proper. Admitted one evening to the presence of the Shaykh, the senior *Dā'ī*, and of his assembly, the two pilgrims soon withdraw; they pass the night with their companions in friendly and edifying discussions; at dawn they return to the house of the Shaykh. The assembly takes place and after a solemn sermon by the Shaykh, there opens a dialogue that lays the groundwork for the liturgy of initiation. In the course of it the neophyte learns that the name which he bears by virtue of his earthly genealogy is not his real name, that for the moment he has no name—a situation corresponding to his status as a spiritual "newborn babe." It is the Shaykh who must give him his *real* name, his initiatory Name, the Name which will be his God and which he will serve.¹⁹⁰ This investiture in his real Name, marking his *dies*

189 Cf. in Suhrawardī's *Récit de l'Exil occidental*. In revealing to his adept the existence of the Angels or Intelligences preceding him, the Angel Gabriel-Active Intelligence speaks, despite their eternal youth, of their *parentes seniores* (*jadd, ajdād*). In addition, we have here the homology between Heaven and Earth required by the parallelism between the Ismailian hierarchies.

190 Fragment of the dialogue (Sh = the Shaykh, D = the disciple): "Sh: O young man, thou hast been favored by a friend come to thee as an Envoy, beloved of a Messenger come to visit thee. What is thy name? — D: 'Ubaydallah ibn 'Abdallah (little serf of God, son of the serf of God). — Sh: This name describes thy qualities and we have already heard tell of them (here an unspoken question is implied). — D: I am a *free* man, son of the *serf* of God. — Sh: Who, then, has freed thee from thy servile state, that thou hast become a free man? — D: (pointing his finger at him who initiated him) This Sage. — Sh: But dost thou not see that he is himself a serf, not the owner? How can he have freed thee? — D: No, indeed, he cannot have done so. — Sh: Then what is thy true name? — D: (vainly seeks the answer.) — Sh: O young man, how shall a thing, any more than a newborn babe, be known if it has no name? — D: It is to thee that I have been born. It is then incumbent on thee to give me a name. — Sh: I will do so when seven days have passed. — D: Why delay? — Sh: For the profit of the newborn babe. — D: And if the newborn babe should die before the seven days have passed? — Sh: Nothing will befall; he will receive his name once the time has gone by. — D: But will this name that thou art preparing to give me remain mine? — Sh: As long as it is thy God. — D: How can one speak thus? — Sh: Thy Name is thy Lord and thou art its serf. Do not engage in discussions out of turn. Go now, until the appointed day." (Ibid., pp. 101, 102.) The closing words of the dialogue, which seem strange at first (D is surprised at them), become clear if we compare them with the teaching of Qusṭā ben Lūqā cited below (in response to the question "Who is my

natalis, will take place seven days later. The ceremony does indeed take place at the end of the week: in the midst of the Assembly the Shaykh and the new adept stride solemnly toward one another. Then, says our text, "the Shaykh begins to say the things that the pen cannot write, that the imagination cannot invent, the things that cannot rise to the consciousness of the profane."¹⁹¹ The text does not divulge this great secret, for fear, no doubt, that the book may fall into the hands of an orthodox adversary. But the "sacrament of the proper Name" gives us an intimation of what it is. This decisive moment of the "Quest for the Imām" is the awakening of consciousness to the secret of the motto: "He who knows himself knows his Lord."¹⁹²

God?"). Cf. the initiatory names (*ism farīqat*) composed of an Imām's name and of a substantive or adjective expressing a relation of personal devotion to the Imām; for example, in Iran (notably since the restoration of Šūfism at the end of the 18th century by Nūr 'Alī Shāh) the names composed with 'Alī (= *Excelsus*) Shāh (= *Rex*): Nūr 'Alī Shāh (*Lumen Excelsi Regis*), Mast 'Alī Shāh (Intoxicated with King 'Alī), Majzūb 'Alī Shāh (Filled with ecstasy by King 'Alī), etc.

¹⁹¹ The Quest for the Imām is now at its end (of course we cannot interpret the revelation of the secret to mean that the new adept is given the secret "address" of the hidden Imām; we have already quoted more than one text showing that the relation to the Imām cannot be reduced to any local or physical proximity). To make it clear that he is speaking of an inward *Quest* and pilgrimage, the author presents its phases in terms of the *ta'wil*, that is, the spiritual exegesis of the rites observed in their literal sense by the pilgrims to Mecca. The *ta'wil* of these rites corresponds exactly to the spiritual metamorphosis of the adept: he is able to don the *iḥrām* which the pilgrims don to enter the sacred territory. He is able to accomplish the "circumambulations" round the Ka'aba, to perform the prescribed rites, and to recite the usual prayers; he completes his pilgrimage by reciting the *Āyat al-Kubrā*. Now all this accords with what we know of the Ismailian *ta'wil* of the rites of pilgrimage; to undertake the pilgrimage to the Ka'aba is gradually to abandon the beliefs that one professed by custom and conformism and to advance from the degree of *Mustajīb* to that of the *Ḥujjat*. To don the *iḥrām* is to break away from the practices and the society of those who cling to the letter (*ẓāhir*) of religion. The "circumambulations" signify haste to reach the Imām, etc. (cf. *Kalāmi Pir*, p. 96 of the text). This Quest might be illustrated by the biographies of famous Ismailians, such as Nāṣir-e Khusraw (cf. our *Étude préliminaire*, pp. 28-33), or Ḥasan Šabbāh (founder of Alamūt, converted to Ismailism at the age of seventeen after a grave illness, at Ray, his birthplace). One might also point out the analogies with the ritual of initiation practiced in Šūfism: special ablutions, change of raiment, imposition of a new name, sharing in the mystical chalice (a custom mentioned in the *Futuwwat-Nāmah*, or manuals of "spiritual chivalry," e.g. that composed in Persian by 'Abdurazzāq Kāshānī), attesting this coalescence of Ismailism and Šūfism which, after the Mongol invasions, gave Iranian Šūfism, or Shiite Šūfism, its special stamp.

¹⁹² Here I have not the space to comment on the stages of initiation as described by the orthodox apologists in their irreducible hostility to Ismailism: nine stages from the "hurling of the javelin" and the "physiognomic trial" by the *Dā'i* (*zarq wa tafarrus*) to the final stage in which the adept sheds his scales and molts (*insilākh*). We are not entitled, merely because it is only the malicious accounts by the adversaries of

Indeed, the phases of our little spiritual romance present successively all the themes which, generally speaking, our texts group around the concept of "spiritual birth" (*ta'wiladat-e rāḥānī*). The *Kalāmi Pīr*, for example (one of the principal records of the reformed Ismailism of Alamūt to have come down to us), declares that "physical birth" takes place in the world of the *tanzīl* (the letter of the revealed Religion), while "spiritual birth" takes place in the world of the *ta'wil*, that is to say, the world of inward or esoteric exegesis. And here our author, following the Ismailian predilection for exegesis of the New Testament whether authentic or "apocryphal," sets a quotation from the Gospel of St. John: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."¹⁹³ This transition from the *tanzīl* to the *ta'wil* seen as a new birth depends essentially on "knowledge of the Imām," which thus becomes an absolute necessity;¹⁹⁴ this *transitus*, the *exodus* of this *exegesis*, is this knowledge itself. Simultaneously this knowledge of the Perfect Man (*Insān Kāmil*) depends essentially on knowledge of one's Self. "He who does not achieve the knowledge of the Imām of his time and the knowledge of himself will die in ignorance."¹⁹⁵ The "Imām of *his* time": this should be taken not in the sense of an inoffensive chronology but rather in the sense according to which, as we have seen, every adept is a "period" of his Imām, who for him is his Aeon. To attain to this knowledge is, therefore, to take one's place among the Angels of the highest degree, the *muqarrabān*, to achieve beatitude in the two universes, which is knowledge of oneself. The Persian text is explicit: "He who knows himself, knows *his* God," and *that* is the knowledge of the Imām.¹⁹⁶ We are now in a position to say that the figure of the Imām presented itself to Ismailian Gnosis, at the height of its spiritual maturity, as a symbol of the Self, in a sense implying that far from opposing itself to a personal God (an opposition to which some of our writers on comparative mysticism incline), the Self can manifest itself only through this personal Figure which is its *maẓhar*, its epiphanic Form. In the presence of this epiphanic Form the situation re-

Ismailism that have come down to us, to deny the value of this initiation. Ismailism can justify itself without laying claim to orthodoxy; see résumé in Browne, I, pp. 411-15, and the remarks of Bernard Lewis in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* (1938), p. 696.

193 *Kalāmi Pīr*, p. 114 of the text, and Gospel of St. John 3 : 3; it is quoted almost literally.

194 *Ibid.*, p. 114.

195 *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 114-15. For the Duodeciman Shiites, the Imām of the time is the Twelfth Imām, the "hidden Imām," whose parousia will transfigure the world.

196 *Ibid.*, p. 73; cf. n. 177 above, the distich of Nāṣir-e Khusraw.

mains essentially *dialogical*. But it does not occur at the level of the community; it presupposes an authentic individuation, rising to repeat itself at each successive degree, like an increasing integration and proportional to this individuation.

This situation and this exigency of the "self alone with itself" delineate what it means to the True Believer to say "my God"; the *Deus revelatus* does not belong to all but to each according to his capacity for vision; and what this vision mentally visualizes is a *real* divine individuation as theophany. This situation is brought out by an admirable text attributed to the Christian physician Quṣṭā ibn Lūqā (Constantine, son of Luke, 10th century),¹⁹⁷ which Ismailism seems to have appropriated by channels that are still unclear. With admirable precision this text sums up everything that we have here attempted to bring out regarding the meaning and theophanic functions of the Ismailian hierarchies:¹⁹⁸

'Amalāq the Greek questioned his master, Quṣṭā ibn Lūqā: "Will you teach me to know my God (*ma'būdī*)," he asked him, "so that I may approach only Him and take refuge only in Him?" The Sage said to him: "Do you know him who causes you to know yourself (*nafsaka*, your *Anīma*), you who were ignorant of yourself? Him who shows you the advantages and the injuries that flow

¹⁹⁷ Quṣṭā ben Lūqā, a native of Baalbek, was of Greek descent; he was a Melkite, i.e., Orthodox Christian. According to the dedications of his works, he must have been born about 820 A.D. and have lived from 70 to 80 years (cf. *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, art. s.v.). Famed as a physician, he was no less expert in philosophy, astronomy, geometry, and music. His profound knowledge of Greek, Syriac, and Arabic place his activity as a translator on a par with that of Hunayn ibn Isḥāq. Islamic culture assimilated a considerable portion of classical science through his translations. As a philosopher he is famed chiefly for his little work on the difference between soul and spirit (the *πνεῦμα* as a subtle body). His originality is shown in his attitude toward the occult sciences; he admits all the data (enchantments, conjurations, etc.) but explains them as psychic realities. From this point of view he deserves the full attention of psychotherapists. It is this aspect of his work that would seem to account for his presence in Ismailian esotericism.

¹⁹⁸ This extremely important text is cited at length in Idris, ch. XIX, p. 225. No more than I can explain the "appropriation" of Quṣṭā by the Ismailians, can I account for the presence of 'Amalāq, his disciple; so far only Paul Kraus had referred to an Ismailian text containing a narrative that must be identical with our own (cf. his *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān*, II, n. 1 on pp. 47-48). Kraus also pointed out that two treatises from among Jābir's "CXII books" bear the title "Book of the Amalekites" and that there seems to be no good reason for this name; however, "the Amalekites play a considerable role in the legendary history of ancient Egypt," and a book of *jafr*, attributed to the Sixth Imām, Ja'far Ṣādiq, mentions the 'Amāliqa side by side with Daniel, Solomon, and the philosophers.

from it for your life, when you took no heed of them? Him who causes you, on condition that you conform to his law, to know what will make you forget fear if you are menaced by it? Him who delivers you from sadness, who produces in you something whose inner sweetness you savor and whose power you sense at the same time, something that makes you independent of everything that is not himself? If you know him," he added, "it can only be as a part of yourself. Then indeed you have found your God (*faqad wajadta rabba-ka*); then you are a True Believer." And 'Amalāq asked: "(O Source of the light of the Mystery! What is there beyond my God, in order that I may be among those who have obtained all?" And the Sage said to him: "*Beyond him there is he who is to him what he himself is for thee, a One for a One (wāḥid li-wāḥid)*, and so forth up to the Threshold of Him in whom are contained all the Ones who are situated below him, of Him who can be attained neither by any Sage of his epoch nor by the people of his time, Him whom all those of his Aeon (*dahr*) need. That is the Lord of the Lords of this time, a Defender with a rank in creation which permits him to ask help of his exalted Lord and to be heard by his invisible protector; his invisibility in turn hides him from him who is below him, his elevation conceals him in its height; and so forth up to the ultimate One, the Lord of the world of the beginning, the Holy Spirit, he who is the primordial Archangel and the First Existent, from whom issues the Beginning and in whom culminates the Accomplishment. As for what is beyond him, it is Mystery without name, grace without number.

"Meditate, O my brother, the positions of the Sages and the symbols configured by those who know. Be faithful to the promises and oaths that have been received from you. Maintain your obedience to the *ḥudūd*. Know your *ḥadd* in gnosis (*ḥadduka'l-'ilmī*), then you will know your beginning and your end (*mabda'uka wa muntahāka*), and you will know *your* Imām, and you will attain to the *taḥḥid* of your originator (*mubdi'uka*). May God help you and guide you! May he raise you through the degrees of Deliverance. Glory be to him for having gratified us with the knowledge of the *ḥudūd* by which the Adored One is epiphanized. May he confirm us in obedience to his Friends by whom being is epiphanized in the hierocosmos."

It seems to us that throughout these pages we have merely been commenting on this text, so remarkable for its density. We have spoken of the theophanic function of the Ismailian hierarchies as shown us by the correspondence between the *ḥudūd* and the celestial hierarchies, in view of the

sense of "horizon" implicit in the word *ḥadd*. And it is precisely there that we find the connection between knowledge of Self and the knowledge of *thy* God: "A One for a One" (*kath'hena = wāḥid li-wāḥid*). And this means: *thy* God is the mysterious Figure that appears at *thy* "horizon," *thy* *ḥādd*, which is *thy* "limit" and also *thy* companion of initiation (as Salmān-Gabriel for the Prophet), the horizon of *thy* transconsciousness. *Thine* Angel is the Angel of this theophany of *thine*, which is in the measure of *thy* being. But, as Quṣṭā ibn Lūqā reminds us, *thy* God is also *his* God, that is to say, *thy* *ḥadd* also has its own *ḥadd*. To raise *thyself* to this *ḥadd* is to perceive a new theophany at a new level. And *thy* companion of initiation raises himself to a still higher horizon when he raises thee to his own horizon, and when simultaneously thou too raisest to *thy* horizon the companion who follows thee. This is the profound meaning of the sentence attributed to the Imām al-Mu'izz: "The True Believer is a true Believer only when he has raised up a True Believer like unto himself."¹⁹⁹ A "One for a One"—this is the formula for what we must here call a kathenotheism which goes hand in hand with angelology and the *Imitatio angeli*: a turning upside down of all the mystical hierarchies from the bottom to the summits of the pleroma. Thus we see that the invisible unity at the summit of these summits is not the unity of an "All-powerful" in an immediate and equidistant relation with *all* the Ones: there are successive and repeated integrations

199 Strothmann, pp. 61, line 3; 114, line 11; cf. Idris, ch. XX, p. 236; deliverance comes to the souls through their adherence to the *ḥudūd*; they ascend through the knowledge of those which precede him. Then they rise in the company of their *ḥudūd* toward the ranks of the Imāms, with whom the ascension of the Noble Temple of the *Qā'im* is completed. This ascension and this raising-up toward the Sublime Temple of the Intelligence, the First Emanation (= Soul), are unceasing. This adherence is for each soul its *taḥwīd*; it is the knowledge of the spiritual world in which consists the attainment to existence in the true sense, *perfectio secunda*. This ascension from degree to degree of the esoteric "Heavens," promoted by the help that each *ḥadd* gives to the next following, reminds us of two curious passages published by M. T. d'Alverny in "Les Pérégrinations de l'âme dans l'autre monde d'après un anonyme de la fin du XII^e siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age*, 1940-1942, pl. pp. 268-69, though these figurative allusions do not permit us to establish a material filiation between the anonymous Avicennan and Ismailism; it should be noted, however, that both the indications *socīi omnes* on the circle of Nature and *cetera turba* in the tenth sphere just below (ibid., p. 273) rather suggest the hierarchical distribution that we have noted above. With this ascension toward the Imām-Qā'im, the substitute for the Tenth Angel, one may also compare the interpretation given by the Ishrāqiyūn of the Koranic allusion to the "cleavage of the moon," as signifying the conjunction of the mystic with the Active Intelligence (since the Angel of the Sphere of the Moon is also called Ismael).

of *dyadic unities* or bi-unities. The idea that governs the gradation of these "horizons" is the axiom that we have found at the beginning of Ismailian theosophy: the *Deus absconditus* is not the personal, revealed God; and it is an attribute of this latter, the only God with whom a personal relation is experienced, to be "unique for every unique individual," that is to say, uniquely revealed and visible at each theophanic horizon. At the highest accessible horizon the figure of the Imām who is the primordial Epiphany conditions and epiphanizes these epiphanies, unifies each One for each One.

Now we may understand the ideas of our authors on the hierarchy of their sodality. We have already mentioned some of them; the essential is the idea of homology repeated from degree to degree. We recall that all the *ḥudūd*, all the spiritual ranks, mark as many *qiyāmāt*, Resurrections; each of the "companions" rises, "resuscitates" to the spiritual Forms which he attains when they rise to his "horizon," that is, when he gains awareness of them. That is why each *ḥadd* is a Resurrector, a *Qā'im*, for his own *maḥdūd*—that is to say, for the *ḥadd*, or companion, immediately below him.²⁰⁰ Each *ḥadd* is an Imām for him who is next below, and he is the *Imāmate* for him whose *maḥdūd* he is (by whom he is "contained," as the Temple of Light supported by the Imām).²⁰¹ The esoteric sense (*ta'wīl*) of death is this transfer from degree to degree, from metamorphosis to metamorphosis, each time amplifying the dimension of vision.²⁰² We now understand why for each *degree* adherence to the preceding *ḥadd* who raises it up toward him is its *tawhīd*—as Qusṭā ibn Lūqā also declares—its unification of the Unique (*its* God), homologous to the *tawhīd* that the second Intelligence accomplishes toward the first Archangel. The Ismailian profession of monotheistic faith thus escapes the trap of monism as well as the unconscious dualism of orthodoxy by becoming a kind of "monadism." The Cycle of the "eight resurrections" (which consists in traversing the eight Thresholds of "Para-

²⁰⁰ Cf. the text of Idrīs, quoted in Ivanow, *The Rise of the Fatimides*, pp. 54-55 of the Arabic text.

²⁰¹ Idrīs, ch. XVI, p. 210; here there is a long development, which I can only mention here, in which the work of the *ta'wīl* is compared to the elaboration of the *nāsūt* (subtle humanity) of the Imām (cf. section 4 above); just as the divinity of the Imām is epiphanized by the *nāsūt*, so the theosophic Verities (*ḥaqā'iq 'ilm al-dīn*) are gathered together in the Initiators, the Perfect assembled in the *ta'yīd* (the celestial congregation), just as *tāhūt* or divinity is concentrated in the Imām, and can be manifested only by the subtle teachings of the *ta'wīl*.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 223.

dise"²⁰³ to the Threshold of the Imām) is the "Quest for the Imām" within the sodality seen as the "spiritual career" of the Ismailian adept.²⁰⁴

This Quest which raises each adept, which metamorphoses him from resurrection to resurrection, from degree to degree of the Temple of Light which is the Imāmate, the *lāhūt* of the Imām, is itself the ascension of this Pillar of Light which has enabled us to recognize in Ismailian Gnosis one of the most characteristic motifs of Manichaean Gnosis. We find this motif once again in the no less characteristic aspect of what has been called the *theologoumenon* of the "members." Here again we are indebted to Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī—in this instance, to his personal interpretation of a text from the Gospel. But—and this is a highly remarkable detail—the lesson known to our Ismailian theosopher brings to the text, which we read today as authentic, a change which accords strikingly with a certain lesson from the Sermon on the Mount as read by the Gnostic Carpocrates (second century). Where our Bibles read: "First be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift" (Matthew 5:24), our Gnostic's text reads: "If thou seest that thou art not at peace with *thyself*, go first and be reconciled *with thyself*."²⁰⁵ Now here is the version that we read in Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī of a passage from the Gospel according to St. Matthew (25:40 and 45):²⁰⁶ when "the Lord shall gather the just and the wicked in the same

203 Idris, ch. XVI, p. 236; these eight "thresholds" are the "eight resurrections" (*qiyāmāt*) marked by the degrees of the esoteric hierarchy (*ibid.*, p. 221).

204 Cf. also a text of Mu'ayyad Shīrāzī quoted by Idris, p. 238; it lies in the fundamental structure of the human being that, having achieved his subtle Form, he becomes an Angel (*al-insān lā budda lahu 'an yaṣīra Malakan*). This growth is comparable to that of the physical body. The Noble Form must resemble more and more his "celestial parents" if he is to return to his origin, and he acquires this resemblance by adherence to the *hudūd* which draw the soul higher and higher toward them. He who separates from his material body, fulfilling this condition, is metamorphosed into the form of the *hudūd*, or celestial entities: he recognizes them and they recognize him; he joins them, taking his place in their company and in their abode.

205 My attention was called to this fundamental variant, as well as to the questions that will be raised below in conclusion, by one of C. G. Jung's seminars, "Psychological Aspects of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*," Part 7 (multigraphed, 1936).

206 *Kitāb-al-Yanābī*, *yanbū* 38, in which Abū Ya'qūb asks himself how one can accept the absurdity of an outcome that would be identical for the good and the wicked after their passage to the other world, the absurdity of an indefinite production of individuals, century after century, if the result were not, after death, a different status in their very being? Shall we suggest that there exists an Author of this world who seeks to acquire some gain or to avoid some harm by producing this world? The proposition is absurd if it is taken in the sense of utilitarian relations founded on the exteriority of the parts to each other, but its significance changes entirely if it is taken in the sense of the Gospel text as commented on by Abū Ya'qūb.

place, he will say unto the just: how well ye have wrought and acted toward me! I was an hungred and ye gave me meat. I was thirsty and ye gave me drink. . . . The just will reply to him: When wast thou hungry and thirsty, when wast thou captive, that we should have given thee food and drink, clothed thee and delivered thee? And the Lord will say to them: Ye speak the truth, but what ye have wrought *for yourselves* (*bi-anfusikum*, for your own "souls"), ye have done it for me."²⁰⁷ But our Bibles do not read "what ye have done *for yourselves*" but "unto one of the least of these my brethren." The profound motivation underlying the variant bears witness to a striking continuity between Christian and Ismailian Gnosis.

Abū Ya'qūb's passage calls for two remarks. The first is that his exegesis of the Gospel text shows us in all clarity to what degree he was aware of the profound relation between the two concepts of the *Self* and the *Soul* designated by the one word *nafs*. "It is the Soul of the World," he says, "which converses here *with its souls*, the individual souls that it needs to attain to what its rank implies--which means that it needs the intelligible gifts which the individual souls acquire in this world through the intermediary of sensible things."²⁰⁸ Now as we have several times pointed out, to know one's Self, one's "soul," one's "total being," is to know one's personal God, that is to say, one's Imām. Hence it follows that the Imām is the figure of this Self, of this Soul whose epiphany progresses by way of the souls that work and act for it and with whom it carries on a dialogue. The second remark is that we have here the Ismailian version of the Manichaean theologoumenon of the "members," just as we had above the Ismailian version of the motif of the Cross of Light and of the Pillar of Light. There we stressed that this representation was based on the homology between *each* and *All*, a homology which finds a striking expression in the fact, among others, that each *ḥadd* is thought of as a "period" of the Cycle, of the Aeon which *is* its Imām. Let us further recall the celestial City which from time immemorial the Imāms have built "out of their souls by means of their souls." Then, indeed, what

²⁰⁷ The quotation ends as follows: "Then he will say to the wicked: how wickedly ye have wrought toward me! I was an hungred and ye gave me no meat. I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink. . . . Then they will say unto him: Lord, when hast thou been so? And he will reply to them: Yes, ye speak true, but all ye have omitted to do *for yourselves*, it is as though ye had omitted to do it *for me*."

²⁰⁸ To this identification of Christ with the Soul of the World we may compare the phenomenological identity analyzed by Widengren, pp. 82-83, between Christ as "Great Mind" in the work of the Syriac mystic Stephen bar Sudhaili and the Iranian and Manichaean conceptions that have already been mentioned here.

each individual does "for his soul," what each "period" does *for itself*, is done for the celestial City, for the entire Cycle.

At the same time this homology forms the foundation of the only strict ethic, the ethic that makes a man responsible to himself. For if you must first reconcile yourself with yourself, this implies that the form of your love (for any of your brothers) is yourself, and "your love is equivalent to what you *are*" (Nietzsche). Hence you must first do right by yourself; all the rest merely follows from this. In other words: you are responsible, that is, you *answer for*, the vision that is given to you of your God; the form of your vision and your worship, like the form of your love, are equivalent to what you *are*. And it is precisely this priority of *being* over *doing* that forms the foundation of the reciprocity presupposed both in the Gospel lesson of our Gnostics and in the Manichaean theologoumenon of the "members." "What you have *done* for yourselves, you have done for me." Since *doing* is a form of *being*, this implies that each soul has the responsibility by *being* to *make to be* the very entity that it exemplifies and of which it is a "member." We have spoken of a homology between the *each* and the *All*. This Gnostic feeling, carried to the limit, finds a powerful expression in a passage of the *Pistis Sophia*: "Amen I say unto you (it is Christos Angelos who speaks), *every* man who will receive that mystery of the Ineffable and accomplish it in all its *types* and all its *figures* is a man in the world, but he towereth above all Angels. . . . He is a man in the world, but he is king in the Light. . . . Amen I say unto you, *that man is I and I am that man*."²⁰⁹

Here we have a supreme metamorphosis by a typological identification which, however, does not presuppose a confusion of persons. It is equivalent to the solemn declaration of the Imām in regard to Salmān. Each soul has the vocation to become Salmān. But to become Salmān is to have a theophanic vision of the Imām, to be the Witness of his transfigurations, to perceive the Person hidden beneath the Veil of the empirical figure. And for this one must realize toward the Imām the individuation of a relation to which the vision will be proportional. That is why the scenes of Transfigura-

209 Cf. *Pistis Sophia, A Gnostic Miscellany*, tr. G. R. S. Mead (London, 1947), pp. 191-92; cf. 3 *Enoch*, 1, ed. H. Odeberg, p. 179: ἄγγελος = δαίμων = ψυχή. The identity in kind between the spirit of the human being and the angelical nature is the necessary presupposition for the metamorphosis of this human being into an angel or celestial being (e.g., that of Enoch into Metatron). The "garment of glory," the "luminous garment," represents the higher celestial nature, the angelical nature (the reader is invited to meditate on the meaning of the words: I was naked and ye did not clothe me). The difference between man and Angel is only one of degree of perfection.

tion perceived in the "alone to the alone" have all the importance of experimental psychospiritual facts, marking the highest mode of "consociation" with the Imām, the degree of "spiritual Epiphany" (*ẓuhūr-e ma'nawī*). We have mentioned one of these above: by imposing secrecy the Imām Ja'far Ṣādiq taught the validity of strictly personal experience. There is another tale concerning the Imām Muḥammad Bāqir, who was the father and predecessor of the Imām Ja'far. We should like to cite it in conclusion, for it condenses everything that we have attempted to analyze here concerning the connections between the theophanies and the metamorphoses of the soul, the interconnection between the "thou *seest*" and the "thou *art*," as signs of the individuation that accomplishes the "alone for the alone."

The story comes to us from a familiar of the Imām, Jābir ibn Zayd al-Jū'fī (who is not to be confused with Jābir ibn Ḥayyan).²¹⁰ Entering the Imām's house, he finds him in a state of meditation, his rosary in hand, reciting these verses: "Glory to Him before whom every Veil that I lifted discovered a closed Door to me. Every closed Door that I encountered discovered to me a Veil!" A transmission of thought occurs. Mentally addressing his Imām, the visitor thinks: "Yes, thou art a sublime being." And the Imām raises his head and says: "The Sublime is he who has constituted the sublime. He who knows is he who has constituted someone who knows, through what emanated from Him into me. I am the serf of God, to whom he revealed himself. Worship no one but God." (The Imām thus warns against any temptation to attach oneself to his person as to a divine *Incarnation*. But immediately there follows the theophany that transfigures.) Jābir thinks inwardly: "This man is the Veil. What then will be he whom he veils?" (The question is comparable to that which was later asked of the Imām Ja'far; and the answer will be the same spiritual event.) Having mentally heard this question as well, the Imām raises his head again:

I saw an extraordinary splendor gleaming in him, a dazzling light that my eyes could scarcely sustain or my intelligence contain. And the Imām said: "Here is one of Thy Saints whom thou hast heaped with thy favors." And to me he said: "Should I show thee still more?" "No," I said, "that is my measure." [In this reply Jābir already shows an awareness of the *qualem capere potui*.] "O Jābir!" he said to me, "rejoice at the good tidings. God has

²¹⁰ Cf. the relation developed throughout by Idrīs, text quoted in Ivanow, *The Rise of the Fatimides*, pp. 62-63 of the Arabic text.

purified thee too,²¹¹ in order that His Shadow may descend on thee, and that *through thee* may be manifested His Threshold, the most noble *Ṣalṣal*." [*Ṣalṣal* is the Gnostic name for Salmān. This attestation of Jābir's "purification" by an allusion to the Five Companions of the Mantle, of whom Salmān is the "sixth," means that Jābir too is adopted among the "members of the Household," Ahl al-Bayt. The Shadow, that is, the divine Protection descending upon him, engenders Salmān in him, just as the Holy Spirit descended on Maryam who bore Jesus and upon Jesus on the *dies natalis* of his Baptism.] "O Jābir! Salmān is one of us, the members of the Household. His exterior (*ẓāhir*, his exoteric self as he appears to the noninitiate) typifies the exterior of a closed Door. His interior (*bāṭin*, esoteric self) is a light from the veil of the Merciful and Compassionate. When a veil hides thee from the eyes and thy person shines through the heart of his splendor of Light, thou seest how much of it thou art capable of assuming, and the creatures see what in thee is its receptacle: it is He who utters what He utters in thee, it is He who says what He says by thee. As for us, we are on the other side of the Veil. He is for us the Manifested One (*ẓāhir*). And so when thou assumest that part of it which is precisely the part that thou assumest *of us*, we are *by thee* what we are in relation to Him. Hasten then to discover the true relation between us and him; thou wilt find then what was hidden from thee."

These are abstruse words, concise and charged with meaning. The scene of transfiguration, the theophanic event, is followed by a lesson that shows its conditions and implications. Like Salmān, Jābir can become (or rather, becomes) the *ʾIujjat*, the mirror in which is revealed (*maẓhar*) the Imām. For this the Imām must be epiphanized to him, must become "manifest" (*ẓāhir*) to him in a vision which is not that of the senses. But *to have* this vision is to assume in oneself the light of the Imām, it is *to become* oneself the mirror in which he reveals himself. Thus the circle is closed. For what thou seest is the part that the measure of thy being can assume, *carry, conceive*.²¹² The text gives us an almost literal equivalent of the *Talem cum vidi qualem capere potui*, for indeed we have here an archetypal situation. Then, too, the Imām becomes "through thee" what he is in relation to the *Deus absconditus*: he is the mirror that reveals (*maẓhar*) him, because God is *for* him and *through* him the Manifested One *for* and *through* Salmān, in the

²¹¹ Allusion to the *Āyat al-taḥhīr* (33:3), or verse of Purification, singling out the members of the Household, the Five Persons of the Mantle to whom the Angel Gabriel—or Salmān—is added as sixth; cf. nn. 44-47 and 161-166 above.

²¹² As is suggested by the use of the root *ḥml* in our text.

measure in which Salmān-Jābir, as he to whom the Imām manifests himself (*zāhir*), is thereby the place and form of his Manifestation (*maẓhar*): he is his "coming into this world" (cf. section 5 above). In other words, the hidden goi-head stands in the same relation to the Imām as the Imām to Salmān. And this is the epiphanic mediation of the eternal Imām. To achieve the capacity for this vision is the supreme metamorphosis: it is to become the pure mirror in which the epiphanies are accomplished. It is to be the "Salmān of the microcosm," to be at the end of the "Quest for the Imām"—and it is to keep his *personal* secret inviolable.

Here we have verification of the spiritual experience to which we were led by Imāmology as a metamorphosis of Angel Christology. What we might call its "Docetism" is theophany lived as a theopathy, and vice versa, which amounts to saying that every transfiguration is accomplished correlatively for the two terms, or that the figures are transfigured only for the soul which is itself transfigured. And that is why the event is accomplished on the level of the superhuman, of the Angel, in the solitude of the "One with his One."

This presence of the *totality* in the *each* is a fundamental category of kathenotheism: it modalizes another vision of which the Imām Muḥammad Bāqir is again the hero. Here the theophany occurs after a scene which closely repeats a scene from the Childhood Gospels. Only the name has changed: the child Imām is substituted for Jesus.²¹³ His master makes it his duty to teach him the letters of the alphabet, but the little Imām interrupts him, takes the initiative, and formulates questions which transpose the lesson to the plane of the philosophical (*jaḥr*) alphabet. The master is dumfounded; it is the child Imām who ceases to be the pupil and becomes the master. His preceptor loses consciousness and in this state has five times a vision of each of the Five Pre-eternal Persons composing the divine Pentad (typified on earth by the Five of the Mantle); *each* one expresses himself in the first person singular as though he were at once *alone* and *all* the others. This is one of the most significant records of primitive Ismailian experience.²¹⁴

²¹³ This direct exegesis, from the Gospel of Thomas (in James, ch. VI, pp. 50 and 51, ch. VII, p. 56) to the *Umm al-Kitāb*, suddenly proves to be charged with unsuspected meaning if we observe that in this Gospel the Apostle is called "Thomas the Ismaelite, the philosopher." The same episode is mentioned in the *Epistula Apostolorum*, *ibid.*, p. 486. We intend to come back to it.

²¹⁴ Cf. *Umm al-Kitāb*, ed. W. Ivanow, fol. 19^b-22. The master ('Abdallāh Šabbāh) ceases to see the little Imām and instead sees the Prophet transfigured, his face haloed in

Our inquiry begins with theophanic visions, and in theophanic visions it culminates. The circle has closed. We have seen why it could not but exclude any idea of Incarnation such as that which has been professed for many years by the official Christology of the Church. It seemed to us that we should elucidate the reasons for this exclusion by comparing the diverse forms assumed by Christology with the anthropology that goes hand in hand with it. From this point of view Ismailian Imāmology has shown us certain traits it possesses in common with the Angel Christology of Christian Gnosticism. We have seen the outlines of an anthropology which is a phase of angelology and which, as such, permits us to understand the metamorphoses of the theophanic visions; it is under this aspect that we have here developed the theme of *Man and Transformation*.

In analyzing the pure spiritual event of these theophanies, we have seen how a correlation takes form between the mode of the theophanic person's *real apparition* and the mode of the *seeing soul's consociation*, which varies with this person himself. This consociation, as postulate of the spiritual event, is confirmed in the secret dialogue with Christos Angelos in the evening solitude of the Mount of Olives, as it is confirmed in the instances of transfiguring vision individually attained by the devotees of this or that Imām. In this same correlativity, phenomenology discerns a situation and a mode of being contrasting in the extreme with those which ultimately prevailed in the spiritual history of the Occident. Very briefly, the postulates and implications of Angel Christology and Imāmology considered as one of its extensions contrast sharply with the doctrine of homoousia formulated by the Councils. As we know, this technical term of Christian theology bears within it grave psychological and sociological consequences, the remote echoes of which have long evaded a criticism whose own postulates hardly predisposed it to an analysis of the positive data of the soul and the connections between them. To affirm homoousia, that is, the consubstantiality of the Logos as second person of the Trinity, with the "Father"—to affirm

tresses of light: "I am the pure Lord, transcending all attribute and all description." Successively, he sees 'Alī, then Fāṭima. Dressed in silk and gold brocade, a green veil on her hair, Fāṭima declares: "There is no God beside me, neither in divinity nor humanity, neither in the Heavens nor on earth, outside of me, who am Fāṭima-Creator (in the masculine: *Fāṭima-Fāṭir*), it is I who created the spirit of the True Believers." In the end there appear the Imām Hasan, then the Imām Ḥusayn, who declares: "I am Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, I am Hasan ibn 'Alī, I am Fāṭima the Radiant (*Fāṭima Zahrā*); I am 'Alī al-A'lā (*Excelsus excelsissimus*); I am Muḥammad the Elect."

the homoousia of the incarnate Logos, as true God and true man, with *our* actual and present humanity—is, in both cases, to postulate the definite concept of a divine “nature” and of a human “nature.” To define their relation by the term *homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος) is precisely what Angel Christology and Imāmology refuse to do. *Christos Angelos* is not consubstantial with the *Deus absconditus*; he is, for example, the first of the Seven Protoktistes, or first-created Archangels, or the “magnificent Angel” of the *Shepherd of Hermas*. Similarly, neither the primordial Archangel nor the Imām as Epiphany of the creative Logos is consubstantial with the godhead “whom the boldness of thought cannot attain.” Moreover, their Epiphany is accomplished only by transfiguring at the outset the soul in which and to which it “shows itself,” i.e., in whom the potentiality of the angel has already flowered. This potentiality itself excludes what our anthropology posits and defines as “human nature,” and thereby it deprives the idea of an incarnation within the frame of this anthropology of any possible meaning. Consubstantiality would presuppose that the potentiality of the Angel were fully realized; for an Angel Christology, homoousia has and can have only an eschatological meaning.

The repetition of a single device (“he who knows *himself* knows *his* God,” that is to say, his Imām) and its confirmation at the homologous degrees of the corresponding hierarchies have led us to recognize in the Imām the symbol, or *personal* Figure, of the Self and in this symbol to see the source and organ of the soul’s metamorphoses. It is here that we discern the extreme gravity of the consequences that follow from the decision in favor of homoousia, that is, of consubstantiality (one substance), or else in favor of the position with its numerous shadings by which a pluralist monotheism attempted to consolidate and save its intuitions. One cannot, on the pretext that an authentically religious utterance necessarily implies a challenge to the demands of rational thought, maintain that such a pluralist monotheism is deficient in “religious meaning.” For the adversaries of homoousia were not preoccupied with satisfying the exigencies of rational thought, and in the eyes of philosophical rationalism, adversaries and defenders of homoousia are doubtless equal in regard to passion for the irrational. In any case their opposition marks a profound struggle in the history of Christian dogmas. Perhaps its traces are discernible even in iconography—in the contrast between the primitive type of adolescent Christos (Orphic type, the Young Shepherd, etc.) and the type of Christos Pantokrator, the “Omnipotent.” To pass

from one to the other the active Imagination must traverse the entire distance that separates the representation of the incarnate Logos, consubstantial with the Father, and that of the celestial Angel in his theophanic and soteriological function. The idea of the Pantokrator suits only the former. But then, as we have seen, a very different conception of the *Imitatio Christi* is decided upon. If the guiding vision is that translated by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, "One for the One," perhaps the practical implications of an Angel Christology recur in certain Ismailian attitudes that we have analyzed. It is, for example, the *mission* of the *Dā'ī* who calls a single soul and not a multitude, a soul which is not to be convinced of a dogma but—far from it—in which there must be awakened the meaning of the *ta'wil*, of the spiritual exegesis which frees it from ready-made facts and "leads it back" to its "horizon," its own *ḥadd*, its Imām. To the homoeousic conception affirming as a fact of universal history that "God made himself man" is opposed the personal theophanic vision which no man can either communicate or demonstrate. That is why the Imām Ja'far, far from allowing his adept to go and "convince" the others, imposes secrecy upon him. And Mullā Ṣadrā admirably defines the Imāmate as an angelical and divine reality in man. Here the idea of the Imāmate comes close to the "inner Christ" of our mystics. But it is difficult to constitute any sort of a Church with this "inner Christ"; it is still more difficult for secular thought to take possession of it in order to substitute the idea of a "social Incarnation" for the religious idea. For it would seem that angelology and sociology must remain forever alien to one another.

And here, no doubt, is one of the characteristic implications of Gnostic anthropology. By arousing the human being to the vocation of a potential angel, it causes him to move in this world as a Stranger, a "prince of the other world" on his way back to his native home. Hence this extreme gentleness, this appreciation of the derisory character of any exercise of the will to power, of any appetite for kingship, or for conversion tending to bring about a monolithic Unity. The Gnostic lessons of the apocryphal Gospel texts which recur in the writings of our Ismailians have given us this teaching: The form of your vision and of your worship bear witness to what *you are*, *you answer for* the vision you have of your God. And what God *becomes* is revealed in the mode of relation attested in man's mode of understanding Him.

Here it is not our task to apprehend in terms of pure phenomenology the

consequences, *a parte Dei*, of homoousia and incarnation. God has ceased to be the Eternal in Heaven. Incarnated, He is buried in the flesh until the time comes for Him to be buried in the grave. And this Incarnation was the full Revelation of the godhead. Hence there is no more mystery; the mystery has been proclaimed on the housetops, it has been "profaned." Still, in terms of pure phenomenology this signifies identification to the point of perfect coincidence between consciousness and transconsciousness, a coincidence that was to have incommensurable consequences for the spiritual history of our Occident.

The mystery of the Cross of Light was the mystery of *Christus impatibilis*, saving his own through the love born of their common origin; it was this love of the heavenly angel that acted as a magnetism upon "His" terrestrial soul, *His* "member," to make it reascend toward him, to recall it to their common angelicity (here a homoousia as eschatological anticipation). The form of love thus lived and meditated upon was wholly different from that meditated upon and "realized" in the divine Incarnation, in compassion with the sufferings of the God incarnate, with the death of the Redeemer who was "true God and true man." But consciousness would fully "realize" the event that had here taken place, and Nietzsche would cry out: "God is dead, he has died of his pity for men." That is to say, in the context of consciousness, God has died of this homoousia, of his consubstantiality, his identity with his Incarnation. But what *meaning* would Nietzsche's words have had for Gnostics who knew the true meaning of "the coming of God into this world," the meaning of the epiphanies of the "One for the One," the meaning of the Angel? In the opposition between epiphanic Figure and Incarnation, *maṣḥar* and *ḥulūl*, we can perceive, both in Gnostic Christology and in Ismailian Imāmology, the same demand for Mystery and the same protest against the violence done to this mystery by a conception implying that the godhead can have suffered death. We are compelled to note that the facts of the problem are mutilated if we content ourselves with opposing the Christian idea of the divine Incarnation and the strict transcendence of orthodox Islamic monotheism. Between the two there is a middle term, and this is the entire meaning of Shiite Islam, eminently of Iranian Shiism, and most particularly of Ismailian Imāmology. It is impressive that we should find here certain traits characteristic of a Christianity that has vanished from the historical scene, for this modifies the meaning of our encounter as men of the West with an Orient that is, to be

sure, very different from the "modern" Orient. We perceive a kind of protest against a form which has become constitutive of our consciousness, which dominates our Christian theology of history as well as the secularized philosophies of a post-Christian era. And this protest, coming from the part of spiritual Islam in which Imāmology assumed the features of an ancient Christology, *also* brings to our ears the voice of a vanished Christianity. It comes to us like a question, perhaps urgent and imperious, and at the same time it rises up as an answer, the answer of those who know the mystery of the Cross of Light and who reply to the "God is dead" with the protest uttered in the Koran verse: "No, they have not killed him, they have not crucified him! They have been caught in the trap of the assimilation (*tash-bih*) committed by themselves."

The Importance of New Being for Christian Theology

Those speakers who have had the advantage of dealing with historical material make me feel somewhat an outsider. Unlike them, I have come here to set forth philosophical ideas for which no concrete data can be adduced. My only hope is that some of those who have spoken here in terms of history may to some extent recognize themselves in the outsider's words, for there is no historian who is not—at least in secret—a philosopher. What I should like to do is to bring out the hidden philosophy in order to see how far we can agree.

My title might suggest that I take the belief in New Being to *be* the central concept of theology. Such an assertion would be untenable. At most I can say that New Being *should become* the central concept of theology, and try to explain why I think so. Systematic theology can be developed on other foundations, but I believe that the possibility I wish to set forth here has the special advantage of providing an answer to our present situation.

Every theology includes three elements. The first is *theos*, God, or rather God in so far as he makes himself manifest, the element of revelation. The second is *logos*, rational discourse about what God communicates when he communicates himself. And the third is *kairos*, the proper moment in time, the time when a theologian must speak to his own age. No systematic theology can dispense with these elements. If the element of *theos*, the element of revelation, is lacking, we are not dealing with theology, though perhaps with the philosophy of religion. If *logos*, the rational word, is lacking, we no longer have theology but ecstasy or nonsense, or both. If the third element, the *kairos*, is lacking, we have merely a dead tradition, and indeed that is often the case with systematic theology.

I shall first explain the two concepts "Being" and "New," and, what is

more important, defend them. For the attempt to build a theology on a central concept such as New Being is bound to incur a good deal of opposition and criticism. In a second section I shall briefly suggest—I can do no more in the time at my disposal—how these two concepts can be developed within systematic theology.

Whenever a theologian mentions the concept of Being, he is raising a universal question, the question of the relation between theology and philosophy. From the theological point of view, the concept of Being can be attacked on the basis either of method or of content. The methodological attack is this: Being is a philosophical concept, created by men, by thinkers, and not revealed through the ecstatic experience that is God's way of manifesting himself to human consciousness. In brief, God cannot be attained through the work of man, and concepts are the work of man.

To this my answer is that theology is the *logos* of revelation, rational discourse on what appears in revelation. The *logos* is a rational work, and this rational work is a part of theology, even of antiphilosophical theology.

My second answer goes deeper. God communicates himself through the *logos*, and this, it seems to me, implies fundamentally that his self-revelation can be expounded rationally. *Logos* is reason, not understanding. The understanding analyzes, reason apprehends. True, where the relation is reversed, where the understanding tries to approach God by arguments, the idea of the *logos* is perverted. And for this reason all theology is a venture and subject to error—even when its findings are confirmed by synods and other authorities. And yet we may use rational concepts, we must use them, even at the risk of misusing them. This is the human element in the situation, and it is inevitable.

But the concept of Being can be rejected on the basis not only of method but of content. Being transcends things and persons. But Biblical religion, all revealed religion, is personalistic, based on a relationship between the I and the Thou, between man and God. The concept of Being makes the understanding of such a relationship impossible. This criticism is particularly stressed by Biblical theologians.

Here my answer is as follows: The personalism of Biblical religion always implies an ontological concept of Being and an ontological concept of the world. Biblical religion must also say that God is. What is meant when we say that God is, that the world is? Is it permissible to employ the little word "is," which encloses within it the ontological mystery, with respect to God

and the world, to ourselves and things? This question is implicit in every religious statement. And no theologian, however antiphilosophical an attitude he may take, can side-step it. The only alternatives are to answer it unconsciously or in full awareness. But since every theologian must give an unconscious answer to this question in any case, it is his duty to achieve awareness of it. The moment a theologian says "God is," he becomes an ontologist. He can never understand God otherwise than as One who is.

There is a mistake that philosophers often make in this connection. In the Old Testament we find the famous definition of the name of Yahweh: "I am that I am." A number of philosophers and mystics have referred to it and said: Here we have a conscious ontological statement; here we have Parmenides the Greek in the Old Testament. This is nonsense. The words mean, "I shall be who I shall be. I am He upon whom you can rely, who does not change." And that indeed is the Old Testament concept of truth. The truth, in the Old Testament, is not the unconcealed, the Greek *alētheia*, that which emerges from concealment; rather, it is that which stands fast, which fulfills a commitment, which carries out its threats, and in the end keeps its promise.

In speaking of ontology in the Old Testament, we have no intention of proving our point by exegesis. On the contrary, we admit that the Biblical religion is personalistic through and through and that the Greek concept of Being does not occur in it as such. However, one cannot fail to see that it is implicitly present and must be borne in mind if we wish to use *logos*, the rational word, in connection with *theos*. But since the question of Being is unavoidable, we should not only answer it but make the concept of Being our central concept, as it was in the Middle Ages.

There is also a philosophical criticism of the concept of Being, with which we must deal. It is made by those who take a different view of Being from that which I have just formulated. Those who put forward a nominalist criticism of the concept of Being seek, by way of philosophy, to exclude it from theology. They say: Being is a name (*nomen*) that designates something common to all things, but that itself has no ontological reality.

In answer to this, I say that the nominalist criticism is justified if Being is conceived of as the supreme abstraction, if we say that when we abstract all the attributes of things, only Being remains. But to take such a view of Being is precisely the error of nominalism. Being is not the highest class of existent, but is what makes existents possible to begin with. Conse-

quently, Being cannot be defined but only paraphrased. And I paraphrase it as the power of Being, as the primal positive force, which is opposed to the negative principle, to the possibility of non-Being. This concept of the power of Being is not arrived at by abstraction, and hence it is not subject to the nominalist criticism. Rather, it is thought of and experienced in the fear of possible non-Being. Only if the concept of Being is understood through the fear of possible non-Being does it have force. And this is the concept of Being that was always used in classical theology for essential Being, for the divine.

Philosophical criticism can also come from another side. The concept of Being can be confronted with the concept of becoming. The question is raised: Why should Being come first, why should we not begin with becoming? The concept of becoming, it is asserted, is the more powerful, the more dynamic concept. The theologians might be glad to agree: When we speak of the living God, it is better not to speak of Being but of becoming.

Here again I should like to give an answer. Being, the power of being, is beyond statics and dynamics. Being is what in the Middle Ages was called "transcendental," that which surpasses all abstract concepts. Essential Being (*Sein-Selbst*) implies the static element in so far as it must be conceived of as that which endures eternally; and it implies the dynamic element in the perpetual manifestation of its power to overcome non-Being. To put it in mythical terms, becoming is younger than Being, just as Being is older than value. (And with this insight, just in passing, the whole philosophy of values can be discredited.) This concept of Being and its affirmation amount to a question of courage.

Thus, despite theological and philosophical criticism, the concept of Being remains the loftiest of concepts, the concept that is more than a concept and as such fit to become the central concept of a theology.

Now I come to the second concept, that of the New. The question is not whether the concept of the New is possible in religion—for it is a very real religious concept—but whether it is philosophically permissible. Myth is full of categories of the New. In it the New appears in three aspects: as creation, as restoration, as fulfillment.

The New as creation can be meant in two ways. One meaning is "first creation," in opposition to which chaos is called "the old night," an image beautifully expressed in *Faust*. The night is older than the day, the day is the new, and since the night comes again and again, each day is new. This

leads us to the second idea, that of continuous creation. The New is what is produced anew in the life process. This may be species or it may be something individual and unique. An individual thing or situation may be called "unique." Being may be understood as a process in which a sequence of changing, unique situations is produced, as Whitehead, for example, has said. From all this it follows that the creative New is what is new in process, and that process is nothing else. The form of process is time, and remembered time is history. Therefore we may call process in the most general sense history. The New in the sense of the creative makes the universe historical, and this is what happens in all myth. But this is only an extended conception of history. The basic concept of history must be related to man.

This leads us to the second aspect of the New, the New as restoration. Man has freedom of decision and freedom to plan. This means that his decision and his planning can be wrong. Wrong means contrary to essence, contrary to our own essence and to that of the situation and its requirements. True and good are merely words for fulfillment of essential need; false and evil merely mean that the essential need has not been met. Human history is a constant mixture of fulfillment and non-fulfillment of essential needs in thought and action. In this mixture it is never really possible to separate the one from the other. Every reality is ambiguous, and there is no life process which we can represent in simple terms of black and white. This mixture of essential fulfillment and non-fulfillment is what constitutes existence and gives it its character of ambivalence.

In contrast to it, we speak of the New as restoration. This sounds paradoxical: to restore—why, that means "back to the old." But that is just what it does not mean. We have analogous concepts for the same phenomenon: redemption, liberation of the captive essence; *redemptio*, the buying-free of the essence that has fallen into slavery; *salvatio*, which originally meant healing. These symbols designate the limits to the newness of the New. It is not absolutely new—there is something old that does not grow old, there is something old which first makes the New possible. And this "something" old which makes the New possible is essence. But essence itself is not the New. The New, like that which has grown old, is situated in history. Essence participates in history; however, it is not situated in history but makes history possible. Now we can understand what is new in restoration. It is the historical factor that has transcended the non-fulfillment of essence. It is *in* history, it is new in the sense of restoration and it

has transcended that which signified non-fulfillment. To transcend non-fulfillment is not to restore the historically old. The historically old *is* obsolete, for it was part of a process that always includes non-fulfillment of essence, for not a moment in the process is free from non-fulfillment of essence. This disposes of all retrospective utopias. Paradise, the Golden Age, are symbols for essence that has not yet become reality. Only if it does not become reality does essence remain pure, but then it will never be actuality but always potentiality. The New that is created in history is not a return to a possibility. Restoration is not return, for the New that is accomplished in history has actuality; it contains transcended non-fulfillment.

A striking symbol for this is the symbol of rebirth. *Anakainosis*, regeneration, new creature, renaissance, rinascimento, reformation— all these words mean one and the same thing. What for example is the meaning of renaissance, this concept that we use so often? It was originally synonymous with reformation and meant rebirth from the sources, but not repetition of the obsolete. It signifies exactly the same as what I mean by the New as restoration. The men who effected the Renaissance as well as those who carried out the Reformation did so with the feeling that the times had been reborn. They used this concept of rebirth in order to explain the event they were experiencing. Rebirth in this sense is the New history, which is determined on the one hand by preceding history and on the other by essential need.

The New as restoration involves a problem: although it is restoration, it is in process; thus, it is always ambivalent, a mixture of essential fulfillment and non-fulfillment. A new reality is proclaimed, a New Being is at hand, but the old seems to be unshaken, in individual life as well as in historical and cosmic life. That is why our thoughts reach out to the New as fulfillment; we dream of a new heaven and a new earth as the state of unmingled fulfillment. Here the essential structure, which was hitherto mere potentiality, has become real, but without falling away from itself. The ultimate, eschatological expectation is expectation of a complete union of the essential and the existential. But how are we to conceive of such a thing? We cannot conceive of it; all attempts to give concrete content to the new heaven and the new earth end in wild fantasy. The trouble is that they express nothing but an intensification of antiquated desires and have nothing to do with the New.

Up to this point we have described more or less what the idea of the New means in religious myth: the New in the creation of the individual and of everything that springs up anew on the ground of Being; the New as a restoration that does not merely go backward; and the New as fulfillment which goes out beyond the limits of time and space.

The concept of the New, like that of Being, has come in for sharp criticism. I shall begin with the mystical criticism. Mysticism in all its forms speaks of the New as restoration, but regards this as a negation of the New as Creation. Creation is identified with passing away. This conception has the great advantage of freeing the mind from fantastic, otherworldly utopias. But this is not the theology that made the Western world. Obviously a theology centered in the concept of the New is at variance with all forms of mysticism. And nothing is more crucial for an appreciation of the relationship between East and West than the concept of the New, the New Being, whether we accept or reject it, whether—what amounts to the same thing—we affirm or deny the historicity of history. I regard this concept of New Being as so important because it clearly excludes the mysticism which rejects the very process of Being and finds restoration in the negation of process.

The concept of the New, like that of Being, is also subject to philosophical criticism. There is first of all the determinist criticism which says that the New is a constellation of elements that are already given, whose motion is determined by their initial situation and the laws of motion. This motion is ultimately cyclic.

To this we reply that determinism is essentially sleight of hand. It says that everything "new" was present in an initial situation—but this initial situation is completely imaginary. Everything is said to be potentially present in the initial situation. But thereby determinism has tacitly taken up the old schema of potentiality and actuality and in so doing refuted itself. Through the indispensable symbol of the initial situation, the New is smuggled in. Once that is done, it is an easy matter to derive everything that comes afterward by strict determinism and treat all relations among things as calculable. In this way an abstraction, the abstraction of calculable relations, is cast over reality like a net which ostensibly encloses all concrete facts. But the concrete facts tear the net, and this has happened even in physics.

Other attacks on the concept of the New are made by naturalism and

idealism. They are directed against the New as restoration and fulfillment. Both naturalism and idealism deny the alienation of existence from essence, the fundamental and universal non-fulfillment of essence, and hence the fundamental nature of restoration. Naturalism regards non-fulfillment of essence as natural and so negates the very concept of non-fulfillment; idealism recognizes partial non-fulfillment of essence but regards history as a process by which non-fulfillment of essence is overcome. In theology as well as philosophy we are deeply indebted to existentialism—that movement which begins roughly with Pascal, which in the nineteenth century was represented by such prophetic figures as Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx, and in the twentieth century has dominated all literature, art, and philosophy. Existentialism like theology regards the human situation as alienation of existence from essence. With the help of the concept of the New, as formulated in the radical concept of freedom, and with the existentialist vision of man in his finiteness, absurdity, and guilt, theology has the possibility of reformulating the questions, or of taking over the new formulations of the questions to which religious concepts provide an answer.

What must be done in theology today—and this is a structural element of my own work—is simply this: We must take over the existential analyses contained so abundantly in existentialist literature (in which I include depth psychology), considering them as the questions to which the theological symbols provide the answers. Thus it is the duty of a theological system today to correlate the questions that occur in every existential analysis. Actually these questions are far older even than the “existentialist” thinkers I have just mentioned—I refer you to Platonic myth and to myth in general—but today they are raised in a new form. It is up to theology to make use of this situation and once again to make it clear that religious symbols and their theological formulation were originally answers to real questions asked by men. Just as the discovery of mathematics, according to Kant, was a stroke of luck for reason, I believe that the discovery of existential analysis is a stroke of luck for theology.

II

Now that the concept of Being and the concept of the New have been explained and, as I hope, justified, I should like to consider their application within the system of theology. Here of course I must limit myself to a few hints, for even a four-hour course covering a whole year could not hope to

deal with the whole problem of a systematic theology. And at the very outset I must make an admission, implicit in any existential analysis that I as a finite man make of a finite situation, that I am speaking here not of theology in general but of Protestant theology and more specifically of my own Protestant theology.

My remarks on the application of the concept of New Being will fall into three parts: its application to the idea of God, to the idea of redemption, and to the idea of fulfillment. Thus I shall be following the threefold sense in which myth employs the concept of the New.

We have spoken of Being as the power of Being in order to prevent this central concept from being taken as the supreme abstraction and demolished by the nominalists. But according to a classical formulation, which I accept, Being is beyond essence and existence, beyond potentiality and actuality. Being is the first statement that a theology must make about God. Once we say, "God is," we can no longer raise the question of God's existence. For such a question suggests that God is an existent. But the fundamental statement about God, that he is essential Being or the power of Being, excludes the possibility of his being an existent. And in so doing it excludes a great deal, namely, idolatry. Idolatry can occur just as well in monotheism as in Protestant theism and in Judaism and everywhere else. It is not confined to polytheism. There can also be *one* God who is an idol, a God who is an existent side by side with other existents, and not essential Being, adumbrated as the power of Being or the ground and meaning of Being, or however else we wish to adumbrate it.

This is the first and fundamental statement about God. Without this fundamental statement everything else loses its theological quality. My whole effort at the beginning of this lecture to defend the concept of Being against theological and philosophical attacks was based on this theorem that God is essential Being and not an existent, and that this is what gives everything else we may say about him its "numinous" quality. Otherwise we are merely making a statement about one cosmic thing beside others. This means then that God is beyond essence and existence, that he is the ground of both and as such related to them both, not in the form of identity but in the form of participation. This concept of participation, which occurs in Plato when he speaks of the relation of ideas to individual things, seems to me to be one of the concepts which help us to escape from the nominalism which is our common heritage and which makes the act of knowledge, the

act of community, the act of love, unintelligible. For this reason it is all-important to stress the concept of participation and to reintroduce it in philosophical discussion. When we say: God as the ground of essence and existence participates in both, it is clear that he is the creative ground of all essential structure, of everything that essentially or potentially is; but he also has a relation to existence and participates in existence not only in its potentiality but also in its actuality, in the contradiction into which man has fallen with himself and with his source. But if we think this through, we must add another theorem. If what is beyond essence and existence participates in existence, it can only do so in so far as it overcomes the duality of essence and existence. The mode in which the divine participates in existence is the transcending of alienation, the creation of New Being. This brings us back to our central concept. The possibility of God's participation in existence is the creation of New Being. God cannot participate in it in any other way, for he does not participate in alienation. And he also cannot *not* participate, because he is the ground which first makes existence as such possible. When we say that God is the ground of Being, we are saying at the same time that he, as the power of New Being, is what creates the New as restoration.

From this a further theological statement follows, namely, that New Being as restoration is the origin of the history of salvation, the New in the sense of healing, liberation, buying-free, redemption. But on the other hand, history is always concrete and totally so, and, as Aristotle knew, the goal, the *telos* it seeks, is the individual, not the universal.

With this we come to the heart of the Christian message, namely, that Being can be universal in the concrete. The name for the concrete universal which was expected and is still expected in Judaism, and which in Christianity is held to have already come, is Messiah or Christ. From the standpoint of New Being it is possible to eliminate a good deal that is absurd and a good deal that is shallow—these are always the two extremes—from the idea of Christ. Every myth taken literally is absurd and here I subscribe wholly to the famous program of demythologization put forward by my friend and colleague Bultmann. The three-part world of the Biblical conception, divided into divine, demonic, and human spheres, a world in which gods and demons move perpetually up and down, into which God by a solemn act sent his son, and in which the Devil is combated—all this is absurd when taken literally. But when understood, it becomes a symbol of

New Being. Today, indeed, I believe it to be the urgent task of theology to arrive at a new understanding of what the symbols mean. My criticism of Barth's theology—from which I learned a good deal in its prophetic beginnings—is that it found no systematic way of freeing the mythical from its literal absurdity. This is the fundamental difference between my theological effort and his. But on the other side, we must also reject flatness in christological thinking. Every legal or dogmatic interpretation of the phenomenon of Jesus is shallow. This is the point that led me to the idea of New Being, which began with an attempt to think christologically. If we look on Christ as a new teacher or lawgiver, we can accept or reject him. There is no law to which I must submit, even if it comes from a God whose existence is accepted. A God who is an existent is a tyrant who can destroy me perhaps but not demand obedience. However, if the central event of existence is New Being, then it is no alien commandment that confronts me but the very reality of New Being, in which I stand. And that is something entirely different.

Then the New appears as the center of history and as the center of the history of salvation, and in this paradoxical form: the essence of humanity appears under the conditions of alienated existence and transcends this alienated existence. Consequently Being is not His words, not His actions, not His suffering; it is, precisely, Being, and these three aspects are its expression and manifestation. This gives us a possibility of understanding a phenomenon which has been obscured by the history of the Church. The concept of New Being can throw light on this phenomenon, which must remain unintelligible as long as it is interpreted on the basis of myths taken literally, or of liberal theology as a new law, a new doctrine, a magical blood sacrifice, or something of the sort—wherever, in short, interpretation oscillates between the poles of absurdity and shallowness. The aim of theology must be to do away with both. When I say, it is Christ's Being and not anything he does, suffers, or says, what I mean by Being is the whole; I am not, like certain liberal theologians, referring to a psychological inner life, but to the whole Being, including the so-called unconscious, the physical, the social, and everything else that constitutes the Being of a complete man. The image that impressed itself on his followers—as to its historical accuracy we know nothing and have no need to—is the image of a real personal life which renews those who participate in it, which draws them into the sphere of the New.

The only argument for the truth of this Gospel of New Being is that the message *makes itself* true. Historical criticism can neither refute nor confirm this certainty. Those who participated in it were enabled to testify that the New Being was manifested, and thus it has always been in the history of the Church.

This, then, is an indication and, I believe, a very important one. I freely admit that for me Christology became possible only after the concept of New Being gave me the key. Until then I wavered, like all the younger theologians in the years of my development, between the shallowness of an ostensibly liberal theology and the absurdity of the prevailing orthodoxy. The concept of New Being—and this is one of its essential functions—is the key to Christology.

But what does participation mean? I participate not because I am commanded or taught, but because I am carried away, enraptured. Rapture pertains to Being. To receive and follow commands, to receive and recognize doctrines—these are matters of obligation. Here the concept of New Being takes on a crucial importance. It frees us from the strictures of the ought and so frees us altogether. The law is not a demand imposed on us from outside, but our own essential structure from which we are alienated and which, because we are alienated, confronts us as the law. But since we are alienated, we cannot fulfill it, for we are subject to the negative structures of existence. Here we have another decisive consequence of the concept of New Being. We understand that religion is primarily concerned with Being and that the ought is secondary. The latter is not excluded—and I shall point out in a moment where it must enter in—but it must never be primary. When it is, it gives rise to a psychological process in which injunctions arouse resistance and do not give release.

Participation, rapture—these are concepts in which Protestantism and mysticism can concur. A moment ago, in connection with the idea of creation, the creation of the New, I pointed out wherein the theology of New Being differs from certain largely oriental forms of mysticism. But I can include the mystical element in a description of what I would call participation or rapture. St. Paul's doctrine of spirit, the center of his theology, combines the personal and the mystical. When Paul clearly implies the concept of participation—by saying that we must be "in Christ"—he means that we participate in New Being, and this once again is not a relation of obligation. What then is spirit? For Paul, for the Christian Church,

it is the presence of God under the conditions of existence, breaking through the alienated structure of existence and restoring its essential structure. Another formulation that points to relations of Being and not of obligation occurs in the fourth Gospel when it is said of Christ that he is the truth—not he *has* the truth, but he *is* the truth. And other men, being “out of the truth,” have the possibility of participating in it. This idea of the truth is ontological through and through and not an ethical relation in which the true structure of Being is something outside us which we *ought* to accept. Rather, we participate in a reality which in itself *is* the truth, namely, true Being in which alienation is transcended. If with this key of New Being we approach the Bible, we shall be surprised to see how few ethical relations and how many ontological relations we find in it, and how, even when ethical relations are present, they prove to be derived, while the ontological relations must be regarded as fundamental.

New Being in this sense is restoration. This restoration is rebirth, birth of the New. This phenomenon can be described in three steps. The first is the certainty that the essential and the existential in us, which are alienated from one another, are reconciled in New Being. That is to say, each man's first step toward New Being is the recognition that he is accepted. This I call “accepting acceptance,” acceptance of the fact that he is accepted. Here is the first step, a fundamental step toward healing. Without it there can be no healing or salvation. Here, once again, I invoke the insights of depth psychology. The analyst must not confront his patient with demands, but must “accept” him; it will not suffice to give the impression that he accepts the patient, while in reality he is full of demands. That is not yet adequate; what is needed is an attitude of acceptance “although.” *Although* there is alienation, *although* existence is in contradiction to essence, man is accepted and so becomes capable of accepting himself. Here we come to a central point in all processes of salvation, of religious healing: the need for self-acceptance. There is one very simple kind of self-acceptance, namely, self-satisfaction. But there is another possibility, and that is more difficult: to see yourself in an inner mirror and nevertheless to say “yes” to yourself. If you can do that, New Being is at work and that is the first step.

And now the second step. In Hebrew it is called *shub* and in Greek *metanoia*, both of which mean “change of direction.” It is misleadingly translated by “repentance” or something of the sort. In reality, what is at stake is more fundamental than any emotion. Often there is no emotion at all,

and indeed it is not desirable that emotions of this kind be artificially induced for purposes of conversion. The important thing is a fundamental change of direction toward something that is present in all of us, namely, the original unity of essence and existence. It is not a turning away from existence—herein it differs fundamentally from asceticism—but a turning toward what in all living creatures transcends the cleavage between essence and existence, toward essential Being, which at the same time bears the predicates “good” and “true.” These are not values, but essential Being and the power of Being, and only in a secondary sense can they become values for us.

What concrete gain have we made by speaking of such a change of direction? To this there is only one answer, which seems to be easy and yet is infinitely difficult—the word love. The change of direction is the re-creation of the relation of love, which is present in our essence, but only potentially, or, as I sometimes say, as dreaming innocence. That is the second step.

Let me say a few words about love, because it is so much a part of the concept of New Being that New Being can be characterized as the Being of Love. Love is the drive toward reintegration of what has been alienated. If love is taken in this sense, it becomes an ontological phenomenon and no longer an emotional one. The emotional factor is present as an accompaniment; it ceases to be fundamental. This is the first statement that must be made about love from the standpoint of New Being: emotion is present as an overtone, but the fundamental, rooted in essential Being, is the drive or will to overcome alienation. Since we all belong to the same Being, and through the process of alienation have become alienated from one another and from the ground of Being, this means that we all essentially belong together. Therefore, when we come to another man or to God or to ourselves, it is not as though one stranger were finding another; rather, we are finding our way back to something from which we have been alienated but with which, in our essential structure, we are one. This concept of love goes beyond the false division that certain Protestant theologians make between *eros* and *agape*, “earthly” and “heavenly” love. An *agape* in which there is no *eros* has no warmth. *Eros* without *agape* lacks discrimination. They belong together and cannot be severed. We must oppose any separation between them just as we reject any separation between theology and philosophy.

And now I come to the third point, the ecstasy that extends to the center

of the personality. This is the crux of all the problems that can be considered in connection with healing in the widest sense. One such problem, which is today very much under discussion in America and elsewhere, and which has taken many forms, is that of the relation between the healing effected in depth psychology and religious healing. The process of healing has a psychological and an ontological aspect. The center of the personality can incur processes of disintegration which, no less than processes of physical disintegration, require treatment by a physician. Psychological healing can liberate the center of the personality from the limited assaults of certain compulsion mechanisms. Psychology, depth psychology, can liberate, but psychological therapy as such cannot save the center of the personality; it cannot cure or save in an absolute sense. It cannot overcome alienation because it has its source in finite relations. In the healing of the personality itself, psychology and ecstasy must go hand in hand.

I have spoken of love, and here, once again from the standpoint of ontology, I should like to speak briefly of "self-love." There is hardly a word that has been more misused. St. Augustine distinguished two kinds of self-love, one of which he calls "ordered," the other "disordered." I suggest that we avoid the word self-love, because it is beyond rescue—some words are so sick they cannot be saved. Instead, I should like to break down into three concepts the factors that are so confusingly intermingled in the word self-love. The first is the natural self-affirmation of every living being (love thy neighbor as thyself), which is nothing other than the natural courage to Be and hence the root of all life. The second is selfishness, though the German word *Selbstsucht* (lit., craving for self) is more expressive, for to crave is to suffer a compulsion. And selfishness always implies contempt or even hatred of oneself, and is by no means self-love. And then the third concept: self-acceptance, to accept yourself although you have seen yourself in the mirror, although you have known disgust or even hate for yourself. These three concepts—if employed in the place of "self-love," a term that has been so very much abused (and most of all in sermons)—would bring out the meaning of New Being in a wholly different way.

But New Being is a reality not only in the individual but also in the community, and as community it is what we call "Church." Occasionally we hear it said that someone is "not against religion or theology," but "only against the Church." Here once again the concept of New Being can help us. Church meant originally "congregation of God" or "congregation of

Christ," that is to say, assembly of those who have been gripped by New Being. This congregation can be everywhere, it can take any form. It can be latent or manifest. In the organized Church it is manifest; in the unorganized groups of men who have been moved by New Being, it is latent. But the two aspects are interdependent. The latent Church is the perpetual critic and judge of the manifest Church, and the manifest Church is the aim toward which the latent Church is always implicitly striving. When we say that the Church in this widest sense is the community of New Being, we mean what Augustine said, that it is the community of love in the sense that wherever there is really a Church, whether manifest or latent, there is a restoration, a recovery of what has been alienated.

How then is this latent or manifest realization of New Being in a community related to history, how is it related to the great groups, organizations, and nations that make up history? Is there any such thing as salvation of nations?—an expression that comes from Biblical literature. The answer is: first of all the analogy between personal and social life should not be exaggerated. A social group cannot be treated like a person, for every social group lacks what a person possesses, unity of decision. When we say that the government did so and so, we are using a vague metaphor and nothing more. For the government is not merely the representative of the group; it is at the same time a particular group, which can be and often is opposed to the group as a whole. Consequently we must reject the myth of the personality of groups—it was a dangerous weapon of Fascism. But if this is so, something very essential follows: the salvation of a social group is not possible in the same sense as the salvation of an individual; that is, as a fundamental change of direction, a fundamental consciousness of guilt, a fundamental consciousness of reconciliation.

It follows from this that forward-looking utopias—up until now I have spoken only of backward-looking ones—are an absurdity, that it is impossible to speak of a social condition in space and time, where New Being will determine historical reality. We must always think of New Being in history as embattled. And a profound ontological law decrees that the more powerful New Being is, the more potentially powerful become the distortions, that we call demonic, of New Being. From this we can infer that, historically speaking, a future state of fulfillment is not possible. We might be destroyed the day after tomorrow by the weapons in our possession, and yet the meaning of history would not be lost. For everything that happens

has an immediate eschatological relation to what stands beyond space and time.

Now I am coming to the end, and here I can only throw out a few hints. We can speak of fulfillment of the individual and of the community (though never in a progressive but only in a fragmentary sense), and also of a kind of cosmic fulfillment in which individual and historical fulfillment are encompassed. This brings me back to the question that I set aside in the first part of this lecture. What does it mean that religious myth, inclusive of Biblical myth, should speak of cosmic fulfillment; that in it the universe is regarded as historical, hence directed toward a goal, which is designated symbolically as new heaven and new earth? There is scarcely any theological question that is so hard to treat in America, because of the Calvinist and Cartesian cleavage between man and nature. This cleavage is so radical in America that any attempt to explain the myth of the participation of the universe (and that means nature) in New Being, is almost hopeless. Nevertheless I shall attempt it; perhaps some success can be achieved with the help of certain aspects of modern thinking. Perhaps depth psychology with its concept of the collective unconscious, perhaps psychosomatic medicine and various other disciplines which make it possible to see nature in man and hence once again to see man in nature, will help to provide a new basis for this symbolism. That is my hope. I know that it involves a struggle against two powerful traditions, Calvinism and Cartesianism. Unless we are victorious in this struggle, New Being will never be fulfilled in any sense more significant than that once suggested to me by a representative American theologian. According to this theologian, New Being means that our immortal souls will go right on doing social work. This remark is a joke, of course, but there is a meaning behind it, a meaning that is antagonistic to all myth or to any profound understanding of body and soul, individual and nature. For this reason I take New Being in a mythical, universal sense.

Perhaps we can make this positive statement (and we can say so very little that is positive): History runs forward, it runs on inexorably and cannot turn back. But the "forward" is not a forward in time; this forward is like a curve which, though realized in time, tends always upward in the direction of eternity. Eternal does not mean timeless, nor does it mean repetition in time. But once we start talking about time and eternity, we can only say what we should *not* think, not what we should, for any attempt to do so involves us in irresponsible fantasies. I can say: New Being as ful-

fulfillment is the eternal dimension of history, in which the ambiguity of history is transcended. This eternal dimension influences history and creates New Being in history, but is repeatedly distorted by the demonic forces in history. The Christian hope is not the hope of a continuation of life after death—that is not New Being, but an infernal repetition of old Being. Eternity means: to take things into another dimension, concerning which we must speak symbolically because we can only speak “temporally.” In this unity I see the fulfillment of history, of history not only in the human but also in a cosmic sense. Not only forward—the “forward” must time and time again be converted into an “upward.” And not solely upward as the mystics would have it, but at the same time forward, as New Being asserts itself over and over again, so carrying out the design of Eternity. Or perhaps we can put it like this: Eternity, or the Kingdom of God, the Biblical symbol, is the unity of the truth, the unambiguousness of all the elements in history. Nothing can be fulfilled that is not in history, but the fulfillment is never in history itself.

And now, in conclusion, a few words about the situation of our own time. I believe the concept of New Being to be an answer to our situation both in the psychological and in the historical sense. Old Being proves to be old—even in a new country like America the things that gave life meaning for generations are losing their psychological value. The immense resonance that depth psychology has found in this supposedly new continent shows that there has been a loss of meaning, that the old has proved to be old and that nothing new is at hand. And the New cannot come to us horizontally. Unless the eternal, the essential, bursts in upon us from above, the New cannot be fulfilled. The same applies historically. The tellurian schizophrenia in which we live, the tension between East and West, gives rise to endless schizophrenias in individuals, in peoples, in the structure of nations. Consequently the question of New Being arises here too, and perhaps not only considerations of theory but also the needs of the present situation justify our hope that New Being may become the central concept of a new theology.

The Awakening of a New Consciousness in Zen

I

My position in regard to "the awakening of a new consciousness," summarily stated, is as follows:

The phrasing "the awakening of a new consciousness," as it appears in the title of this paper, is not a happy one, because what is awakened in the Zen experience is not a "new" consciousness but an "old" one which has been dormant ever since our loss of "innocence," to use the Biblical term. The awakening is really the rediscovery or the excavation of a long-lost treasure.¹

There is in every one of us, though varied in depth and strength, an eternal longing for "something" which transcends a world of inequalities. This is a somewhat vague statement containing expressions not altogether happy. "To transcend" suggests "going beyond," "being away from," that is, a separation, a dualism. I have, however, no desire to hint that the "something" stands away from the world in which we find ourselves. And then "inequalities" may sound too political. When I chose the term I had

1 Cf. "The Ten Oxherding Pictures," IX, entitled "Returning to the Origin, Back to the Source." In the *Lankāvatara Sūtra*, reference is also made to visiting one's native town where every road is familiar. "A new consciousness" is not at all new. Hakuin (1685-1768) refers to Ganto, an ancient master of the T'ang dynasty, while Kosen (1817-93) brings out Confucius as a witness to his *satori* experience. In Zen literature we often come across such expressions as "Back at home and quietly sitting," "Like seeing one's family in a strange town," etc.

The term "new" may be permissible from the point of view of psychology. But Zen is mainly metaphysical, and it deals with a total personality and not parts of it. Rinzai talks about "the whole being in action" (*zentai sayū*). This is the reason why beating, slapping, kicking, and other bodily activities are an aspect of Zen. Concrete experiences are valued more than mere conceptualization. Language is secondary. In Zen, consciousness in its ordinary scientific sense has no use; the whole being must come forward. The whole elephant is needed and not its parts as studied by the blind. This will be clearer later on.

This lecture was written in English.

in mind the Buddhist word *asama* which contrasts with *sama*, "equal" or "same." We may replace it by such words as "differentiation" or "individualization" or "conditionality." I just want to point out the fact that as soon as we recognize this world to be subject to constant changes we somehow begin to feel dissatisfied with it and desire something which is permanent, free, above sorrow, and of eternal value.

This longing is essentially religious and each religion has its own way of designating it according to its tradition. Christians may call it longing for the Kingdom of Heaven or renouncing the world for the sake of divine love or praying to be saved from eternal damnation. Buddhists may call it seeking for emancipation or freedom. Indians may understand it as wishing to discover the real self.

Whatever expressions they may use, they all show a certain feeling of discontent with the situation in which they find themselves. They may not yet know exactly how to formulate this feeling and conceptually represent it either to themselves or to others.

I specified this obscure feeling as a longing for something. In this, it may be said, I have already a preconceived idea by assuming the existence of a something for which there is a longing on our part. Instead of saying this, it might have been better to identify the feeling of dissatisfaction with such modern feelings as fear or anxiety or a sense of insecurity. But the naming is not so important. As long as the mind is upset and cannot enjoy any state of equilibrium or perfect equanimity, this longing is a sense of insecurity or discontent. We feel as if we were in the air and trying to find a place for landing.

But we do not know exactly where this place for landing is. The objective is an altogether unknown quantity. It can nowhere be located and the fact adds a great deal to our sense of insecurity. We must somewhere and somehow find the landing.

Two ways are open: outward and inward. The outward one may be called intellectual and objective, but the inward one cannot be called subjective or affective or conative. "Inward" is a misleading term, though it is difficult to designate it in any other way. For all designations are on the plane of intellection. But as we must name it somehow, let us be content for a while to call it "inward" in contrast to "outward."

Let me give you this caution here: as long as the inward way is to be understood in opposition to the outward way—though to do otherwise is impossible because of the human inability to go beyond language as the means of communication—the inward way, after all, proves to be an outward way. The really inward way is when no contrast exists between the inward and the outward. This is a logical contradiction. But the full meaning of it will, I hope, become clearer when I finish this paper.

The essential characteristic of the outward way consists in its never-ending procession, either forward or backward, but mostly in a circular movement, and always retaining the opposition of two terms, subject and object. There is thus no finality in the outward way, hence the sense of insecurity, though security does not necessarily mean “standing still,” “not moving anywhere,” or “attached to something.”

The inward way is the reverse of the outward way. Instead of going out endlessly and dissipating and exhausting itself, the mind turns inwardly to see what is there behind all this endless procession of things. It does not stop the movement in order to examine what is there. If it does, the movement ceases to be a movement; it turns into something else. This is what the intellect does while the inward way refuses to do so. As soon as there is any kind of bifurcation, the outward way asserts itself and the inward way no longer exists. The inward way consists in taking things as they are, in catching them in their isness or suchness. I would not say, “in their oneness” or “in their wholeness.” These are the terms belonging to the outward way. Even to say “isness” or “suchness” or “thusness,” or in Japanese “*sono-mama*,” or in Chinese “*chih-mo*” is not, strictly speaking, the inward way. “To be” is an abstract term. It is much better to lift a finger and say nothing *about* it. The inward way in its orthodoxy generally avoids appealing to language though it never shuns it.

The inward way occasionally uses the term “one” or “all,” but in this case “one” means “one that is never one,” and “all” means “all that is never all.” The “one” will be “a one ever becoming one” and never a closed-up “one.” The “all” will be “an all ever becoming all” and never a closed-up “all.” This means that in the inward way the one is an absolute one, that one is all and all is one, and further that when “the ten thousand things”

are reduced to an absolute oneness, which is an absolute nothingness, we have the inward way perfecting itself.

Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism as it developed in China, is rich in expressions belonging to the inward way. In fact, it is Zen that has effected, for the first time, a deep excavation into the mine of the inward way. To illustrate my point read the following—I give just one instance:

Suigan at the end of the summer session made this declaration: "I have been talking, east and west, all this summer for my Brotherhood. See if my eyebrows are still growing."²

One of his disciples said, "How finely they are growing!"

Another said, "One who commits a theft feels uneasy in his heart."

A third one without saying anything simply uttered "Kwan!"³

It goes without saying that all these utterances of the disciples as well as of the master give us a glimpse into the scene revealed only to the inward way. They are all expressions directly bursting out of an abyss of absolute nothingness.

Now we come to the psychometaphysical aspect of the inward way. Buddhists call this "abyss of absolute nothingness" *kokoro* in Japanese. *Kokoro* is *hsin* in Chinese and in Sanskrit *citta*, or *sarvasatvacitta* to use the term in Aśvaghoṣa's *The Awakening of Faith*. *Kokoro* is originally a psychological term, meaning "heart," "soul," "spirit," "mind," "thought"; it later came to denote the kernel or essence of a thing, becoming synonymous metaphysically with "substance" and ethically with "sincerity," "verity," "faithfulness," etc. It is thus difficult to give one English equivalent for *kokoro*.

² An old Indian tradition states that if a man utters an untruth all his facial hair such as beard and eyebrows will fall off. Suigan has spent his summer talking about things that can never be talked about, hence his allusion to his eyebrows still growing.

³ Language deals with concepts and therefore what cannot be conceptualized is beyond the reach of language. When language is forced, it gets crooked, which means that it becomes illogical, paradoxical, and unintelligible from the point of view of ordinary usage of language or by the conventional way of thinking. For instance, the waters are to flow and the bridge is to stay over them. When this is reversed the world of senses goes topsy-turvy. The flowers bloom on the ground and not on rock. Therefore, when a Zen master declares, "I plant the flowers on rock," this must sound crazy. This crookedness all issues from language being used in the way not meant for it. Zen wants to be direct and to act without a medium of any kind. Hence "Katz!" or "Kwan!"—just an ejaculation with no "sense" attached to it. Nor is it a symbol, it is the thing itself. The person is acting and not appealing to concepts. This is intelligible only from the inward way of seeing reality.

Out of this *kokoro* all things are produced and all things ultimately go back to it. But this must not be understood in relation to time. The *kokoro* and all things are one and yet not one; they are two and yet not two. A monk asked Chao-chou (Jōshu in Japanese), "I am told that the ten thousand things all return to the One, but where does the One return to?"

Chao-chou answered, "When I was in Ching-chou, I had a robe made which weighed seven *chin*." This *mondo*⁴ demonstrates eloquently the difference between the outward way and the inward way. If this sort of question is asked of the philosopher, he will go on writing one book after another. But the Zen master who thoroughly knows the inward way does not stop to think and instantly gives his answer, which is final, with no going on and on.

The *kokoro* is not to be confused with the *ālayavijñāna* of the Yogācāra, one of the Mahāyāna schools. The *kokoro* reveals itself only when the *ālaya* is broken through. The *ālaya* may be considered as corresponding to "the Unconscious" or to "the Collective Unconscious," but the *ālaya* is more than mere Unconscious as distinguished from the Conscious, for it comprises both. The *kokoro*, however, is not the *ālaya*, in which, I would say, there is still something savoring of intellection. The *kokoro* is thoroughly purged of all sorts of intellection, it is an abyss of absolute nothingness.

And yet there is something moving in the midst of the *kokoro*. From the point of view of the outward way, this will be incomprehensible, because how could "absolute nothingness" be made to "move" at all? That such a thing should actually take place is a mystery. Some may call it "the mystery of being." As if from the unfathomable depths of an abyss, the *kokoro* is stirred. The *kokoro* wants to know itself. As long as it remains in itself all is quiet: the mountain remains a mountain towering to the sky; the river flows as a river singing its way to the ocean. But as soon as a tiny speck of cloud appears in the blue, it in no time spreads out, enveloping the whole universe, even vomiting thunders and lightnings. The *kokoro* is in all this, but human intellectuality loses sight of it and would go on bewildered and annoyed and full of fearful thoughts. The *kokoro* is lost in the maze of perplexities.

4 "Question and answer."

In Western terminology, the *kokoro* may be regarded as corresponding to God or Godhead. God also wants to know himself; he did not or could not remain himself eternally absorbed in meditation. Somehow he came out of his isness and uttered a mantra, "Let there be light!" and, lo, the whole world leaped into existence. From where? Nowhere! Out of nothing! Out of the Godhead! And the world is God and God is the world, and God exclaims, "It is good!"

According to Āsvaghoṣa, "In the midst of the *kokoro* a *nen* is spontaneously awakened." A *nen* (*nien* in Chinese, *cittakṣaṇa* in Sanskrit) is a moment of consciousness coming to itself; it is, one might say, a consciousness rising from the unconscious, though with a certain reservation. The Sanskrit, *ekacittakṣaṇa*, literally means "one-mind (or thought)-moment." It is "a thought-instant" or "a consciousness-unit," a measure of consciousness as a second or a minute is a unit measure for time. "Spontaneously" (*kotsunen* in Japanese) describes the way a *cittakṣaṇa* rises in the *kokoro*. God uttered his fiat just as spontaneously. When the *kokoro* is said to have raised a thought to know itself, there was no conscious intentionality in it; it just happened so—that is, spontaneously.

But what we must remember in this connection is that when we say "no intentionality" we are apt to understand it in the outward way along the intellectual line and may find it difficult to reconcile it with the idea of human consciousness. It takes a long series of discussions to make this point clear, and as it does not directly concern us here, let it pass with this remark that with God as with the *kokoro* freedom and necessity are one.

When Buddhists make reference to God, God must not be taken in the Biblical sense. When I talk about God's giving an order to light, which is recorded in Genesis, I allude to it with the desire that our Christian readers may come to a better understanding of the Buddhist idea of the inward way. What follows, therefore, is to be understood in this spirit.

The Biblical God is recorded as having given his name to Moses at Mount Sinai as "I am that I am." I do not, of course, know much about Christian or Jewish theology, but this "name," whatever its original Hebrew meaning, seems to me of such significance that we must not put it aside as not essential to the interpretation of the God idea in the development of Christian thought. The Biblical God is always intensely personal and concretely intimate, and how did he ever come to declare himself under such a highly

metaphysical designation as he did to Moses? "A highly metaphysical designation," however, is from the outward way of looking at things, while from the inward way "I am that I am" is just as "spontaneous" as the fish swimming about in the mountain stream or the fowl of the air flying across the sky. God's isness is my isness and also the cat's isness sleeping on its mistress's lap. This is reflected in Christ's declaration that "I am before Abraham was." In this isness, which is not to be assumed under the category of metaphysical abstractions, I feel like recognizing the fundamental oneness of all the religious experiences.

The spontaneity of isness, to go back to the first part of this paper, is what is revealed in the "eternal longing" for something which has vanished from the domain of the outward way of intellectualization. The *kokoro*'s wishing to know itself, or God's demanding to see "light" is, humanly expressed, no other than our longing to transcend this world of particulars. While in the world, we find ourselves too engrossed in the business of "knowing," which started when we left the garden of "innocence." We all now want "to know," "to think," "to choose," "to decide," "to be responsible," etc., with everything that follows from exercising what we call "freedom."

"Freedom" is really the term to be found in the inward way only and not in the outward way. But somehow a confusion has come into our minds and we find ourselves madly running after things which can never be attained in the domain of the outward way. The feeling of insecurity then grows out of this mad pursuit, because we are no more able to be in "the spontaneity of isness."

We can now see that "the awakening of a new consciousness" is not quite a happy expression. The longing is for something we have lost and not for an unknown quantity of which we have not the remotest possible idea. In fact, there is no unknown quantity in the world into which we have come to pass our time. The longing of any sort implies our previous knowledge of it, though we may be altogether ignorant of its presence in our consciousness. The longing of the kind to which I have been referring is a shadow of the original *kokoro* cast in the track of the inward way. The real object can never be taken hold of until we come back to the abode which we inadvertently quitted. "The awakening of a new consciousness" is therefore the finding ourselves back in our original abode where we lived even before our

birth. This experience of home-coming and therefore of the feeling of perfect security is evinced everywhere in religious literature.

The feeling of perfect security means the security of freedom, and the securing of freedom is no other than "the awakening of a new consciousness." Ordinarily, we talk of freedom too readily, mostly in the political sense, and also in the moral sense. But as long as we remain in the outward way of seeing things, we can never understand what freedom is. All the forms of freedom we generally talk of are far from being freedom in its deepest sense. Most people are sadly mistaken in this respect.

That the awakening of a new consciousness is in fact being restored to one's original abode goes in Christianity with the idea of God's fatherhood. The father's "mansion" can be no other than my own home where I was born and brought up till I became willful and left it on my own account. But, really, however willful I may be, I can never leave my original abode behind and wander away from it. I am always where I was born and I can never be anywhere else. It is only my imagination or illusion that I was led to believe that I was not in it. To become conscious of this fact is to awaken a new consciousness so called. There is nothing "new" in this, it is only the recovery of what I thought I had lost; in the meantime I have been in possession of it; I have been in it, I have been carrying it all the time; no, I am it and it is I.

The Shin Buddhists are quite emphatic in asserting this idea of restoration or rather of identification. They go further and say that Amida is always pursuing us and that even when we have wanted to run away from him he would never let us go, for we are held firmly in his arms. The harder we struggle to get away from him the tighter he holds us, just as the mother holds a baby who tries to assert his self-will.⁵

⁵ It may interest you to know that there is no word in European languages, as far as I know, equivalent to the Japanese word *oya*. *Oya* is neither father nor mother, it means both and applies to either of them. *Oya* is the quality to be found in each and both of them. It has no sex; therefore, its relationship to us is not that of progenitor; it is love pure and simple, it is love personified. Cannot we say that in the Jewish and Christian conception of God as father he seems somewhat cold, distant, and critical; and for this reason Mary with the Christ child in her arms is needed to occupy an important niche in the Christian hierarchy? In Shin, Amida as *oya-sama* has nothing to do with the business of forgiving. We simply find ourselves in his grip when a new consciousness is awakened in us. Amida is neither father nor mother, he is *oya*, he is above sex, he is love itself.

In Zen the idea of restoration or re-cognition may be gleaned from Yeno's reference to "the original (or primal) face" which he wanted his disciples to see. This "face" is what we have even prior to our birth. In other words, this is the face of "innocence," which we have before our eating of the fruit from the tree of knowledge. "The tree of knowledge" is the outward way of intellection. When it begins to operate, "innocence," which is the inward way, hides itself and becomes invisible. Most people take the "innocence" in a moral sense, but I would interpret it symbolically. "Innocence" corresponds to Āśvaghoṣa's "Original (or primal) Enlightenment" in which we were or are. It has never been lost even when "knowledge" is in full operation, because without it our existence has no significance whatever, and "knowledge" itself of any kind would be altogether impossible. In this sense, "the inward way" is at once inward and outward. When it is separated and considered in opposition to "the outward way" it ceases to be itself.

Incidentally, Zen is often criticized as not having any direct contact with the world of particulars, but the critics forget that Zen has never gone out of this world and, therefore, that the question of contact has no sense here.

Āśvaghoṣa's great work on the Mahāyāna is entitled *The Awakening of Faith*, but Zen generally does not use the term. The reason is that faith implies a division and Zen is emphatic in denying it in any sense. But if it (faith) is used in its absolute sense—which is in accordance with the inward way of seeing things—faith may be regarded as another name for *satori* and is no other than the awakening of "a new consciousness" though, as I have repeatedly said, there is really nothing "new" in Zen. Whatever this may be, "the awakening of a new consciousness" is the awakening of faith in Āśvaghoṣa's sense, that is, in its absolute sense. Then, faith corresponds to becoming aware of "Original Enlightenment," in which we are all the time. Faith is coming back to ourselves, to our own isness, and has nothing to do with the so-called objective existence of God. Christians and other theists seem to be unnecessarily busy in trying to prove God as objectively existing before they believe in him. But from the Zen point of view the objectivity of God is an idle question. I would say that those who are so engrossed in a question of this sort have really no God whatever, that is, subjectively as well as objectively. As soon as they have faith, they have God. Faith is God and God is faith. To wait for an objective proof is the proof—the most decisive one—that they have no God yet. Faith comes first and then God.

It is not God who gives us faith, but faith that gives us God. Have faith and it will create God. Faith is God coming to his own knowledge.⁶

When the Zen man has a *satori*, the whole universe comes along with it; or we may reverse this and say that with *satori* the whole universe sinks into nothingness. In one sense, *satori* is leaping out of an abyss of absolute nothingness, and in another sense it is going down into the abyss itself. *Satori* is, therefore, at once a total annihilation and a new creation.

A monk asked a Zen master, "Does 'this' go away with the universe when the latter is totally consumed by fire at the end of the kalpa?" The master answered, "Yes." When the same question was proposed to another master, he said, "No." From the inward way, "Yes" and "No" are one; destruction and construction are one.

The awakening of a new consciousness is the awakening of faith, and the awakening of faith is the creating of a new universe with infinite possibilities.⁷ It is a new universe, yes, but in reality an old, old universe, where beings, sentient and nonsentient, have been dreaming their dreams, each

6 Cannot I say that Christians wanted Christ and so they have him? And that they also wanted his mother Mary and therefore they have her? Being Christ's mother, she could not stay on earth, so she was made to go up to Heaven. Where Heaven is, is immaterial. In our religious experience, what we in our logical way think to be the law of causation is reversed, the effect comes first and then the cause. Instead of the cause proceeding to the effect, the effect precedes the cause.

When a Shin Buddhist was asked, "Can Amida really save us?" he answered, "You are not yet saved!" Christians may have the same way of expressing their faith. They would tell us to have faith first and all other things will follow. Is it not a somewhat futile attempt on the part of the Christian theologian to try to prove the historicity of Christ and then to proceed to tell us that for this reason we must believe in him? The same thing can be said of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection.

One may ask: If it is faith that is needed first, why so many different expressions of it? One faith goes out to Christ, another to Krishna, and still another to Amida, and so on. Why these variations? And why the fighting among them as we actually see in history?

I do not know if my interpretation of the phenomena is sufficient, but a tentative one is that faith, as soon as it goes out to express itself, is liable to be conditioned by all accidental things it finds around it, such as history, individual temperaments, geographical formations, biological peculiarities, etc. As regards the fighting among them, this will grow less and less as we get better acquainted with all these conditioning accidents. And this is one of our aims in the study of religion in all its differentiations.

7 The statement that faith creates God may be misconstrued. What I mean is that faith discovers God and simultaneously God discovers the man. The discovery is mutual and takes place concomitantly. To use Buddhist terms, when Amida is enlightened all beings are enlightened, and when we are enlightened we realize that Amida attained his enlightenment, whereby our rebirth into the Pure Land is assured. The objective interpretation betrays that the critic has not deeply delved into the matter.

in his way, ever since "Let there be light" came to work out its destiny. Here the Biblical time has no meaning.

II

One or two examples from the history of Zen in China and Japan may help one to understand how the awakening of a new consciousness takes place in Zen. To tell the truth, Zen literature does not give us any detailed account of a personal experience gone through by the masters who came to have a *satori*. We have to supply much to complete the account from our own experience. First, let me tell you how Rinzai Gigen (Lin-chi I-hsüan, d. 867) came to his *satori*.

Rinzai Gigen is the founder of the Rinzai school of Zen. He flourished in the later middle part of the T'ang dynasty. In his younger days he was interested in the study of the Vināya (Buddhist precepts) and of the sūtras and shāstras (doctrinal and discursive texts of Buddhism). This, however, did not give him a spiritual satisfaction and he went to Obaku Ki-un, one of the greatest Zen masters of the day, to discipline himself in Zen.

Let me remark here that those who come to Zen generally do not come to it directly; they spend some time in the study of the moral and the philosophical teachings. The Vināya give a detailed course of moral discipline. No doubt Rinzai must have gone through all those disciplinary measures. That he failed to find here food sufficient for his inner needs shows, as in the case of Buddha himself, that morality does not penetrate into the core of a religiously-minded person who is, after all, a spiritual being. As we all know, the spiritual life can never be realized by just observing all the rules prescribed for one's daily behavior. Morality is concerned with our social and political and, therefore, superficial aspect of our existence. However righteous a man may be in his moral conduct, he can never be a religious man for that reason. We cannot reach religion through morality, for religion has a life of its own and must be reached by another approach; in my terminology, religion belongs in the inward way; morality and intellection are closely related. A man may not steal a bamboo shoot from his neighbor's yard, but that will not make him a religious being. On the other hand, a man may be pious enough to go to church on every "religious" occasion and assiduously perform all that is required of him as a church member, and yet he may be far from being a religious personality. He may be called

moral inasmuch as he is conscientious enough, but he is not a religious man. Spirituality which constitutes the religious life has nothing to do with all these superficialities belonging to one's outward way.

I cannot tell whether Rinzai started with the Vināya first and then came to philosophy. We cannot generally make such a sharp division between morality and knowledge and trace stages in a man's spiritual progress. That philosophy is not at all conducive to one's spiritual welfare may be seen from Kierkegaard's parable of a palatial mansion built by the philosopher.⁸ He constructs all kinds of fine architectural specimens but refuses to live in them and instead would spend his life in a hovel next to the palace. A spiritual man, on the other hand, never builds a house of his own. He finds himself in any sort of dwelling he may come across and turns it into a magnificent residence. This is the difference between the philosopher and the religious spirit. Rinzai like other men of his type must have started to construct a fine house by ardently applying himself to the study of philosophy. When he found that the house of his construction was not, after all, meant for himself he gave up being further engaged in this unprofitable enterprise.

The intellect is not meant to lead a man to a life of spirituality. It may point to the path, but the pointing is not an actual walking on it. Of course, the finger is needed to show where the moon is, but the finger is not the moon itself, and how frequently we are led to commit this kind of error!

What is needed in Zen is the inward way, the builder himself, and not the house. However splendid the palace may be, it does not belong to him, it is not he himself. The reason the philosopher does not live in a residence of his construction is that what he constructs, after all, does not belong to him, is not his; he may look at it but is not allowed to live in it. He and the house are two separate objects. It is the philosopher's destiny that he can-

8 From the point of view of the experience itself, its conceptualization, one may say, is an unnecessary luxury. But as long as we are human beings given to the habit of intellectualizing, philosophy is inevitable, I believe. For one thing it is entertaining anyway. It is like dressmaking. The first utilitarian object was to keep the body warm. But as soon as we have what we call a dress, it assumes an independent existence; it asserts itself and demands to develop itself regardless of its primary purpose. We now have all kinds of dress. Its chief object is no longer practical but altogether decorative, not only showing individual tastes but marking social distinctions with various purposes which have nothing to do with the utilitarianism of its origin. Philosophy or theology may not be so bad as the art of dressing or dressmaking, but there is something in it which reminds us of a similarity between the two.

not enjoy the fruit of his labor. He always contrives for objectification. He splits himself into two. Zen does the reverse.

Zen is concerned with a person, a living person, who acts and does not spend his life in mere thinking. With him thinking and acting are one. He builds a house and the house is he. With him the house is not an object erected beside him. He is the builder and the building when he is engaged in building. The builder is never away from the building, he is building himself. Zen wants us to take hold of this builder in the building—the building not as an object but as the subject himself, as the one who is engaged in the act of building.

The philosopher is the planner; he draws up his plan on paper and wants to see somebody else work on it. He can never build a house himself, much less live in it. He does not know how to use the hammer or the saw. He is doomed to be an onlooker, an outsider. Zen, on the other hand, takes up at once all the necessary implements for the building. Every stroke of the hammer is himself, so is every movement or act that goes into the building. The whole structure is not as an object to look at but is the person standing here. The structure is not his work, but he himself.

Later, when Rinzai became a full-fledged Zen master, he gave a sermon to the following effect: "Over a mass of reddish flesh there sits a true man who has no title; he is all the time coming in and out from your sense organs. If you have not yet testified to the fact, Look! Look!" A monk came forward and asked, "Who is this true man of no title?" Rinzai came right down from his straw chair and taking hold of the monk exclaimed: "Speak! Speak!" The monk remained irresolute, not knowing what to say, whereupon the master, letting him go, remarked, "What worthless stuff is this true man of no title!" Rinzai then went straight back to his room.

Rinzai's search for "the person" naturally could not be accomplished by going through the philosophical lore of Buddhism, however edifying in other respects it may be. Whatever "person" he may come across here would be a painted one, an objectified one always busy in reconstruction work and not in creation. Rinzai had to come to a Zen master.

He stayed under Obaku for three years, but did not know what to ask him. This eloquently proves that his mind was, at the time, in a state of utter confusion. Morality failed him, intellection failed him, and his resources were now exhausted. What could he do? How would he proceed now? Those three years must have been for him days of excruciatingly

painful spiritual torture. Zen is not just a kind of psychological exercise, nor is it a discipline in meditation, considered an art of mental tranquilization. Zen is very much more than that.

Fortunately, there was a man in the monastery, who had much experience, and seeing Rinzai silently struggling over a problem which had never yet been articulately formulated, he felt great sympathy with his younger fellow disciple. One day, he approached Rinzai and wanted to know if Rinzai ever asked the master any question in regard to his inner struggle. When Rinzai gave a negative answer, the kindhearted monk, who was known as Chin the Elder, told Rinzai to ask the master: "What is the ultimate principle of the Buddhist teaching?"

The question suggested is quite a common one, there is nothing unusual about it, innocent enough, one might say. But the point is not the intellectual content of the question, but the questioning itself. What Rinzai wanted was not anything of intellectual nature; he was already full of it; he had no desire to go back to his old "outward way." Chin the Elder knew exactly the position in which Rinzai was, for Chin had passed the same state of mental impasse. The experience is not limited to those ancient masters of Zen; anybody, modern as well as ancient, knows very well that there is a certain critical moment in his life when he is about to start his arduous career of spiritual turmoil. When he faces this moment and goes on struggling for some years, he finds himself in a peculiar state of mentality, which borders on an utter feeling of despondency. He is sinking lower and lower, yet he knows no way to stop it or to recover himself from it. The feeling has various degrees of intensity according to different temperaments. From the point of view of *satori* experience this is a good sign showing that the mind is prepared to turn away from its old way, that is, from its outward way of seeing things. What is needed here is to have a certain pivotal point around which the mind may begin to work out its own salvation; Chin the Elder gave it to Rinzai.

With something new to turn his attention upon, Rinzai came to Obaku and asked, "What is the fundamental principle of the Buddhist teaching?" Obaku lost no time in giving Rinzai several hard blows of a stick even before the latter finished his question. Whatever sense there was in Obaku's striking Rinzai so hard and apparently so mercilessly and so unreasonably, we can be sure of one thing—that there was nothing on either side, Rinzai's or Obaku's, which might be designated as intellectual. The question had

nothing to do with "principle" or with "the Buddhist teaching." If there were anything in it approaching what we call "sense," Obaku would never have resorted to the stick. All that was imperative in this moment of mental crisis was to awaken Rinzai from his spiritual torpidity or stagnation. Something corresponding to an electric shock was what Rinzai needed. This came in the form of the stick-beating from the master's hand. Rinzai, however, failed to respond to it. He reported the incident to Chin the Elder. Chin did not say anything to help Rinzai out of his quandary. He simply made Rinzai go again to Obaku with the same question. Rinzai obediently followed the advice, but the same treatment from the master was the reward.

The report was made as before and the same advice came again from the elderly adviser. Rinzai saw the master for a third time with the same question. The master was relentless. Rinzai did not know what to do with himself. He expressed his desire to Chin the Elder to go somewhere else where he might have an opportunity to open up a new passway.

Chin the Elder was quite an expert Zen psychologist, as he thoroughly understood Rinzai's perplexity. He saw Obaku and suggested that when Rinzai should come for advice Obaku might tell him where to go. Rinzai called on Obaku, expressing his deep regret that he was unable to comprehend anything in regard to all that passed between the master and himself. Obaku told him to go to Daigu, a friend of his who might help Rinzai in his perplexity.

Daigu's first question concerned Obaku's treatment of Rinzai when the latter asked, "What is the fundamental principle of the Buddhist teaching?" Rinzai told Daigu all about the experience he went through under Obaku. Daigu simply remarked, "What a grandmotherly person Obaku is!"

This comment, casual and nonchalant in all appearance, suddenly awakened Rinzai from the depths of an inexpressible despondency and made him exclaim, "After all, there is not much in Obaku's teaching!"

When Daigu heard this, he at once seized Rinzai by the shoulder and demanded, "What is the matter with you? A moment ago you tearfully complained about your inability to understand Obaku. What makes you now utter such a bold challenge? Speak! Speak!"

Thus pressed, Rinzai did not say a word, but poked Daigu's sides softly three times.

Daigu pushed Rinzai away, saying, "Obaku is your teacher. I have nothing to do with you. Go back to him!"

When Rinzai returned, Obaku said, "What keeps you so busy going and coming all the time?"

Rinzai then narrated to Obaku all that had happened. When he finished, Obaku said, "That stupid fellow Daigu! When I see him I will give him a hearty blow of my stick!"

"What is the use of waiting for him?" Rinzai exclaimed. "You have one yourself right this moment!" So saying, Rinzai gave Obaku a slap on his face.

Obaku's certification of Rinzai's *satori* experience came out in the following utterance, quite appropriate to a Zen master of his type: "What arrogance! What impudence!"

Let us ask: What was really the change that had taken place in Rinzai? As they say, he was a most miserable sort of cur when he was under Obaku, not being able to ask even a question, and when told to ask, bearing meekly all the harsh treatment from the master. But as soon as he threw away the burden under which he had been moaning and groaning, he turned into a golden-haired lion whose one roar would frighten away every feeble-minded animal around him. What is the meaning of this sudden transformation?

Christ would need three days to restore the temple once destroyed. The crucified Christ also waited for some time to get resurrected. Rinzai apparently needed no time to achieve his *satori* performance. In a twinkling of an eye all the miracles that were there were performed. The Buddha's teachings, which were given out for forty-nine long years after his enlightenment, were completely swept away by one blow of his breath. There was not much not only in Obaku's teaching but in all other Buddhist fathers' and saints' teachings. And Zen does not seem to be proud of the accomplishment. What is, after all, the meaning of all this?

Neither psychology nor logic nor metaphysics can explain it as long as they are on the outward way of intellectualization. Because Zen is on the other side where nothing of the outward way can reach. This of course does not mean that there is another way beside the outward way, which is to be called the inward way. To objectify the inward way as such is to treat it in the outward way; the inward way will never be understood in this way. Follow the way Rinzai went on, weigh the treatment Obaku gave him,

notice Daigu's comment on Obaku, and contrast Rinzai's later behavior, including his sermons and *mondo*?⁹

Psychologically, we may say that here is a sample of a new consciousness awakened in the Zen man's mind, or a new consciousness awakened in the Unconscious. But from the point of view of an advocate of what might be provisionally designated as the "inward way" school, I should like to state that "the Unconscious" belongs in the outward way of thinking or viewing things and is inadequate to give us the key to the whole field of Rinzai's spiritual experiences.

While I do not feel like making any reference to metaphysics so called, I fear I have to introduce something of it here in order to make Rinzai more "intelligible" to those who are not familiar with Zen. Instead of identifying *satori* with "a new consciousness" awakened from "the Unconscious," cannot we say that here human consciousness itself is becoming conscious of itself?

- 9 While revising this lecture, I feel I must add a few words here. This question with its intellectual contents must have been asked by Rinzai ever since he began his study of Buddhism. Why then this suggestion by Chin the Elder and Rinzai's blind acceptance? An explanation will naturally be demanded.

When Rinzai began his Buddhist study, his mind must have been moving along the outward objective way, and the question had no more interest to him than a conceptual understanding of it. The sūtras and especially śāstras offer enough material to that end. But no religiously-minded people will find anything satisfactory here. A discursive understanding is not a spiritual experience, it is not the inward way of seeing into reality. If it were, Rinzai would never have come to Obaku.

When Chin the Elder offered this question he wanted Rinzai to see into its inward meaning, that is, to get a glimpse into the inward way of things. This comes to one only when there is no more bifurcation between subject and object, between the questioner and the question. Buddha had his enlightenment when this identification took place. This is the awakening of "a new consciousness," the turning away from objectivity, the going back to one's original source, the seeing of one's own face which he has even before his birth. Therefore, Obaku's beating has no meaning as long as we stand outside the inward way. Even after a third beating, Rinzai failed to grasp what was behind the beating, he could not get into the inward way. He was still an outsider.

The beating has nothing to do with the idea of giving one a warning or of expressing a disapproval. It is one of the means the Zen master uses to make the questioner turn in a new direction he has never yet experienced. Language may sometimes be resorted to and its effect is often electrifying. There are no fixed pre-established methods whereby the Zen students are brought to a *satori* experience. It depends upon the situation the master finds himself in. His decision flashes into his mind the moment the questioner approaches him. Sometimes he strikes him, sometimes harsh words are given, sometimes a senseless cry comes out of his mouth, as we read in the records of Zen history. The main point is to lead the students to the inward way.

The inward way will dawn upon one when Rinzai's question and Obaku's beating are "inwardly" related independent of their conceptual contents. Daigu's "grandmotherly" comment too will come to light.

We ordinarily talk of self-consciousness as if we knew all about it, but in reality we have never come to a full knowledge of what self-consciousness is. Consciousness has always been conscious of something other than itself. As to "the Self" it has never even attempted to know, because the Self cannot be conscious of itself in so far as it remains dichotomous. The Self is known only when it remains itself and yet goes out of itself. This contradiction can never be understood on the level of the outward way. It is absolutely necessary to rise above this level if the meaning of self-consciousness is to be realized to its full depths.

The awakening of a new consciousness so called, as far as the inward way of seeing into the nature of things is concerned, is no other than consciousness becoming acquainted with itself. Not that a new consciousness rises out of the Unconscious but consciousness itself turns inwardly into itself. This is the home-coming. This is the seeing of one's own "primal face" which one has even before one's birth. This is God's pronouncing his name to Moses. This is the birth of Christ in each of our souls. This is Christ rising from death. "The Unconscious," which has been lying quietly in consciousness itself, now raises its head and announces its presence through consciousness.

We humans have the bad habit of giving a name to a certain object with a certain number of attributes, and we think this name exhausts the object thus designated; whereas the object itself has no idea of remaining within the limit prescribed by the name. The object lives, grows, expands, and often changes into something other than the one imprisoned within the name. We who have given the name to it imagine that the object thus named forever remains the same, because, for the practical purposes of life or for the sake of what we call logic, it is convenient to retain the name regardless of whatever changes have taken place and might take place in it. We become a slave to a system of nomenclature we ourselves have invented.

This applies perfectly to our consciousness. We have given the name "consciousness" to a certain group of psychological phenomena and another name "unconscious" to another group. We keep them strictly separated one from the other. A confusion will upset our thought structure. This means that what is named "conscious" cannot be "unconscious," and vice versa. But in point of fact human psychology is a living fact and refuses to observe an arbitrary system of grouping. The conscious wants to be unconscious and the unconscious conscious. But human thinking cannot allow

such a contradiction: the unconscious must remain unconscious and the conscious conscious; no such things as the unconscious conscious or the conscious unconscious must take place, because they cannot take place in the nature of things, logicians would say. If they are to happen, a time agent must come in and make consciousness rise out of the unconscious.

But Zen's way of viewing or evaluating things differs from the outward way of intellection. Zen would not object to the possibility of an "unconscious conscious" or a "conscious unconscious"—therefore, not the awakening of a new consciousness but consciousness coming to its own unconscious.

Language is used to give a name to everything, and when an object gets a name, we begin to think that the name is the thing and adjust ourselves to a new situation which is our own creation. So much confusion arises from it. If there is one thing Zen does for modern people, it will be to awaken them from this self-imposed thralldom. A Zen master would take up a staff, and, producing it before the audience declare, "I do not call it a staff. What would you call it?" Another master would say, "Here is a staff. It has transformed itself into a dragon, and the dragon has swallowed up the whole universe. Where do you get all these mountains, lakes, and the great earth?" When I became acquainted with Zen for the first time, I thought this was a logical quibble, but I now realize that there is something here far more serious, far more real, and far more significant, which can be reached only by following the inward way.

I now finish with Rinzai. I thought I would give you another example of "the awakening of a new consciousness" so called. But as I have no time I would refer you to my books already published, though there are many things I wish to rewrite in them.

Before concluding the second part of this paper, one important thing is needed in the study of modern Zen. By this I mean the *koan* system, which has opened a new way to Zen but which, as we know, is also doing a great deal of harm to Zen unless we are careful about its handling. As in the case of language, all human creations tend to produce good and bad indiscriminately. The innovation of the *koan* system or *koan* methodology, which was needed for the propagation and preservation of a special spiritual discipline called Zen, has created a new psychological study which I am sure

will interest students of the psychology of religion as well as those of psychology in general. I have touched on the subject in my books, but there are still many points I wish to clarify. The study naturally requires the co-operation of specialists not only of the West but of the East. This has, so far, never been attempted by anybody anywhere in the methodical way. Here is a field of religious study of the greatest import. I am not speaking just from the point of view of scientific interest, but mainly from the point of view of a world culture which is taking shape more or less tangibly in spite of the fact that we are at present facing a great confusion of thought, political and otherwise. The world is becoming one, as it should, and the distinction of East and West is disappearing, though slowly. Prejudices of all sorts are giving way to an age of illumination.

III

One last thing remains, which is to explain what are known as "The Ten Oxherding Pictures." The Chinese term for "ox" or "cow" is *niu*, and *ushi* in Japanese. *Ushi* designates the bovine family generally; it can be either a cow or an ox or a bull. It is sexless. The *ushi* is a sacred animal in India. It is compared here to the mind or heart or the Self. It is somewhat hard to get a precise office of the animal which is made to illustrate the progress of one's spiritual life. In the first parts of the pictures, it is something worthy of seeking as a treasure. But in Pictures IV, V, and VI, the animal is represented as unruly and requiring a great deal of training. In point of fact, what requires the training is not the animal but the man himself. He is not yet worthy of the treasure and the latter constantly shows its readiness to go away from him. As long as the man is conscious of his "Self" in connection with the prize, there is the dualistic separation of the possessor and the possessed. This consciousness, which may be compared to the Christian idea of pride, hinders the man's perfect identification with the thing he has been in search of for so many years. These pictures, therefore, may better be regarded as stages of training for the man and not for the animal. The author's symbolization shows a confusion here.

The pictures are said to have been painted by a Zen master of the Sung dynasty known as Kaku-an Shi-en. He is also the author of the poems and introductory remarks attached to the pictures. Kaku-an was not, however, the first one who tried to illustrate stages of Zen training by means of pic-

tures. There was one who made use of the *ushi*'s gradually growing white to visualize the progress of spiritual life in Zen. There are some indications that a number of Zen masters made use of the *ushi* to demonstrate their ideas of Zen. But most of their work is now lost. The pictures here reproduced are the most popular and accessible in Japan and perhaps the only ones that have survived the vicissitudes of history in coming over from China. The painter is Shūbun, a Japanese Zen priest of the fifteenth century. The original pictures are preserved in Shōkokuji, one of the principal Zen temples in Kyoto.

The remarks with Picture I concur with my view of the original home which we have never left, but which, owing to our intellectual delusions, we are led to imagine has disappeared from our sight. Searching for the lost is a great initial error we all commit, which makes us think we are finally awakened to a new consciousness.

The idea of "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained" seems to be well-nigh universal all over the world. The psychologist may explain it by alluding to our prenatal abode in the mother's womb, but Buddhists would go further back to the womb of Tathagatahood (*tathāgatagarbha*), as is done by Aśvaghōṣa. The *tathāgatagarbha* is no other than the *kokoro*, and the *kokoro* is not something to regain. We are always in it, we are it. In fact, as the Shin followers would say, Amida, who is the *kokoro* personified, is ever pursuing us, and however much we try to run away from him, we can never succeed, because all our running can never be outside the *kokoro* itself.

This idea is hinted at in the poem with Picture II. Everywhere and anywhere we may ramble, we see the traces of the *kokoro* or, in this case, of the *ushi*, not only by the streams, among the trees, on the sweet-scented grasses, but among the hills, in the wild fields. His horns or rather nose is said to reach the heavens, and there is nothing that can hide him. It is we who shut our own eyes and pitifully bemoan that we cannot see anything.

Picture III is the awakening of "a new consciousness"; it is the finding of the precious animal which is no other than the man himself. There is no new finding. The sun is warm as before, the breeze is soothing, the willows are green, the flowers are red: the whole universe is the man. "Heaven above, heaven below, I alone am the honored one." No painter can ever reproduce him.

Pictures IV, V, and VI are misleading. It is really not the animal but the man himself that needs training and whipping. He has now what he has

been looking for, or, it may be better to say, he finds himself that he has never gone out of his original abode. But he is not used to the new situation, and the karmic taint of the infinite past tenaciously clings to him. That is to say, his habit of intellectualization or conceptualization, which has been going on ever since his loss of "innocence," is extremely difficult to get rid of. The identification is something altogether new in his life. The adjustment will naturally take time. Picture VI shows that the struggle is finally over.

Picture VII completes the process of self-discipline; it marks the culmination of a struggle that has been going on even after the awakening of a new consciousness. The man is coming, we may say, to experience a second awakening, for "the man," the consciousness of the Self, is still left, and this must go with the rest. We all—including the man (or boy) and the animal, plants and fields, mountains and rivers—have come from the abyss of absolute nothingness, and we are once more to return to it. The idea is symbolized by a circle (VIII) here. But really the circle is not circumscribed; it has no limits, no boundary lines, and therefore it is centerless, which means that the center is everywhere. The second awakening takes place here.

With this we enter into the realm of ontology. The mystery is that the inward way is, in spite of its eternally being empty (*śūnya*), in possession of infinite values. It never exhausts itself.

The remarks and poem attached to Picture IX may give us a somewhat distorted idea of the Origin or Source. The man is here said to be "watching the growth of things while he abides in the immovable serenity of non-assertion." We may take this as a sort of dualistic statement: here is the man unattached by the *māyā*-like transformations of things whereas outside his hut the streams are flowing—whither nobody knows—and the mountains are changing from the green in spring to the multicolored in autumn. This may remind us of Sankhya philosophy in which the Purusha quietly sits unmoved and unconcerned with the Prakrit going through an infinite series of antics. Zen would, however, never espouse this way of interpretation. For the man will never be found "sitting in his hut." Not only does he take cognizance of things going on outside, but he is the things, he is the outside and the inside. Nor is he deaf and blind. He sees perfectly well even into the interior of an atom and explodes with it wherever it may fall regardless of its effects. But at the same time he sheds tears over human ignorance, over human follies and infirmities; he hastens to repair all the damages he

produced, he contrives every possible method to prevent the recurrence. He is forever kept busy doing this, undoing that. This is what "daubed with mud and ashes" (Picture X) means.

We now come to the final stage of the drama. "His thatched cottage gate" is not just shut, the gate and cottage are all gone, and nobody can locate where he is. Yet he is ubiquitous; he is seen in the market place, he is seen on the farms, he is seen with the children, with men and women, he is seen with the birds and animals, among the rocks and mountains. Anything he touches grows into full bloom, even the dead are awakened.

To conclude: I wish to direct your attention to the "bare-chested and barefooted" figure in Picture X, and to contrast this to the Christ in the Last Judgment scene painted by Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel at the Vatican. How energetically, how vigorously, how majestically, he gives out his judgments all around! It is almost impossible to approach him, much less touch him; for if you come near him, you would surely be torn to pieces and thrown into eternal fire. The Bodhisattva in Picture X is such a genial fellow, his smile is captivating, his "belly"¹⁰ swallows the whole universe.

¹⁰ In reference to "the belly," I am reminded of what Dr. Jung said (in his lectures, "The Fundamental Psychological Conceptions," given under the auspices of the Institute of Medical Psychology, London, 1935, issued in mimeographed form), speaking of some primitive people who "do not think." According to them, a man who thinks in the head is "crazy," whereas they think, if they at all do, in the heart or in the belly and not in the head. Jung comments: "They are just about in the Homeric age, when the region of the diaphragm was considered the seat of psychical activity." [Cf. Dr. Suzuki's *Zen and Japanese Culture* (New York and London, 1959), p. 185, n. 30.—Ed.]

It may be primitive, but to locate "thinking" in "the belly" or "the heart" or the "diaphragmic region" is quite significant. There is a sort of "thinking" which is done with the whole body or the whole "person," and this "thinking" is beyond conceptualization. If we do this thinking, it is transferred into the ordinary plane of consciousness which we locate "in our most dignified head." The diaphragmatic thinking is not an "emotional thought," it does not belong in the psychological categories we usually use in our textbooks. If we are to find a place at all for it, we would call it psychometa-physical. When Rinzai poked Daigu's sides it was not accidental, it was an instinctive response and there is a deep meaning in it.

Kanzan (Han-shan), a great Zen poet of the T'ang dynasty, has this:

A soft breeze passes through the pines remote in the mountains;
The nearer I approach the sweeter the sounds are!

A master asks, "How best do you hear them?" A disciple answers, "Hear them with the belly."

Avalokiteśvara is the Bodhisattva of Great Compassion, with one thousand eyes and arms. A Zen man asks, "What will he do with so many eyes and arms?" Another answers, "It is like hunting for a pillow in the dark night."

The Bodhisattva is supposed to see wherever help is needed and to act immediately. But the questions will be, "How does he use so many eyes and arms, all at once or

The bag he carries on his back is a cornucopia and will never be exhausted however freely he bestows his bliss upon anybody who comes to him. He looks somewhat untidy, but this is to show how free he is, not "following the steps of the ancient sages."

"The Ten Oxherding Pictures" may be interpreted in connection with the *koan* methodology. It is likely that the author of the pictures lived after or about the time the *koan* began to be used as the quicker method of attaining *satori* in the Sung dynasty, when Goso, Yengo, and Daiye were flourishing. The *koan* method probably developed under these great teachers of Zen. The pictures are explainable as illustrating stages of the psychological process the Zen student goes through when he endeavors to solve the *koan*. A full psychological explanation is omitted here.

each at a time? If they are used all simultaneously, how could they be co-ordinated? If each acts independently, what will the rest be doing in the meantime?"

The Zen man naturally did not answer in the manner such questions are generally answered; he had his inward way of answering.

NOTES ON THE PICTURE DESCRIPTIONS

VIII: "... Gone Out of Sight": It will be interesting to note what a mystic philosopher has to say about this: "A man shall become truly poor and as free from his creature will as he was when he was born. And I say to you, by the eternal truth, that as long as ye desire to fulfil the will of God, and have any desire after eternity and God; so long are ye not truly poor. He alone hath true spiritual poverty who wills nothing, knows nothing, desires nothing."—From Meister Eckhart, as quoted by Dean W. R. Inge in *Light, Life, and Love* (London, 1919).

X: The gourd is a symbol of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). As to the staff: no extra property he has, for he knows that the desire to possess is the curse of human life.

THE TEN OXHERDING PICTURES
BY KAKU'AN



Searching for the Ox

The beast has never gone astray, and what is the use of searching for him? The reason the oxherd is not on intimate terms with him is that the oxherd himself has violated his own inmost nature. The beast is lost, for the oxherd has himself been led out of the way through his deluding senses. His home is receding farther away from him, and byways and crossways are ever confused. Desire for gain and fear of loss burn like fire; ideas of right and wrong spring up like a phalanx.

Alone in the wilderness, lost in the jungle, the boy is searching, searching!

The swelling waters, the faraway mountains, and the unending path:

Exhausted and in despair, he knows not where to go,

He only hears the evening cicadas singing in the maple woods.



Seeing the Traces

By the aid of the sūtras and by inquiring into the doctrines, he has come to understand something, he has found the traces. He now knows that vessels, however varied, are all of gold, and that the objective world is a reflection of the Self. Yet, he is unable to distinguish what is good from what is not, his mind is still confused as to truth and falsehood. As he has not yet entered the gate, he is provisionally said to have noticed the traces.

*By the stream and under the trees, scattered are the traces of
the lost;*

*The sweet-scented grasses are growing thick—did he find the
way?*

*However remote over the hills and faraway the beast may
wander,*

His nose reaches the heavens and none can conceal it.



Seeing the Ox

The boy finds the way by the sound he hears; he sees thereby into the origin of things, and all his senses are in harmonious order. In all his activities, it is manifestly present. It is like the salt in water and the glue in color. [It is there though not distinguishable as an individual entity.] When the eye is properly directed, he will find that it is no other than himself.

*On a yonder branch perches a nightingale cheerfully singing;
The sun is warm, and a soothing breeze blows, on the bank
the willows are green;
The ox is there all by himself, nowhere is he to hide himself;
The splendid head decorated with stately horns—what painter
can reproduce him?*



Catching the Ox

Long lost in the wilderness, the boy has at last found the ox
and his hands are on him. But, owing to the overwhelming
pressure of the outside world, the ox is hard to keep under
control. He constantly longs for the old sweet-scented field.
The wild nature is still unruly, and altogether refuses to be
broken. If the oxherd wishes to see the ox completely in
harmony with himself, he has surely to use the whip freely.

*With the energy of his whole being, the boy has at last taken
hold of the ox:*

But how wild his will, how ungovernable his power!

At times he struts up a plateau,

*When lo! he is lost again in a misty unpenetrable mountain
pass.*



Herding the Ox

When a thought moves, another follows, and then another – an endless train of thoughts is thus awakened. Through enlightenment all this turns into truth; but falsehood asserts itself when confusion prevails. Things oppress us not because of an objective world, but because of a self-deceiving mind. Do not let the nose string loose, hold it tight, and allow no vacillation.

*The boy is not to separate himself with his whip and tether,
Lest the animal should wander away into a world of defile-
ments;*

*When the ox is properly tended to, he will grow pure and
docile;*

*Without a chain, nothing binding, he will by himself follow
the exherd.*



Coming Home on the Ox's Back

The struggle is over; the man is no more concerned with gain and loss. He hums a rustic tune of the woodman, he sings simple songs of the village boy. Saddling himself on the ox's back, his eyes are fixed on things not of the earth, earthly. Even if he is called, he will not turn his head; however enticed, he will no more be kept back.


*Riding on the animal, he leisurely wends his way home:
Enveloped in the evening mist, how tunelessly the flute van-
ishes away!
Singing a ditty, beating time, his heart is filled with a joy
indescribable!
That he is now one of those who know, need it be told?*



The Ox Forgotten, Leaving the Man Alone

The dharmas are one and the ox is symbolic. When you know that what you need is not the snare or set net but the hare or fish, it is like gold separated from the dross, it is like the moon rising out of the clouds. The one ray of light serene and penetrating shines even before days of creation.

*Riding on the animal, he is at last back in his home,
Where lo! the ox is no more; the man alone sits serenely.
Though the red sun is high up in the sky, he is still quietly
dreaming.
Under a straw-thatched roof are his whip and rope idly lying.*



The Ox and the Man Both Gone Out of Sight

All confusion is set aside, and serenity alone prevails; even the idea of holiness does not obtain. He does not linger about where the Buddha is, and as to where there is no Buddha he speedily passes by. When there exists no form of dualism, even a thousand-eyed one fails to detect a loophole. A holiness before which birds offer flowers is but a farce.

*All is empty - the whip, the rope, the man, and the ox;
Who can ever survey the vastness of heaven?
Over the furnace burning ablaze, not a flake of snow can fall;
When this state of things obtains, manifest is the spirit of
the ancient master.*

[See note on p. 202. -Ed.]



Returning to the Origin, Back to the Source

From the very beginning, pure and immaculate, the man has never been affected by defilement. He watches the growth of things, while himself abiding in the immovable serenity of nonassertion. He does not identify himself with the *māya*-like transformations [that are going on about him], nor has he any use of himself [which is artificiality]. The waters are blue, the mountains are green; sitting alone, he observes things undergoing changes.

To return to the Origin, to be back at the Source – already a false step this!

Far better it is to stay at home, blind and deaf, and without much ado;

*Sitting in the hut, he takes no cognizance of things outside,
Behold the streams flowing – whither nobody knows; and the
flowers vividly red – for whom are they?*



Entering the City with Bliss-bestowing Hands

His thatched cottage gate is closed, and even the wisest
know him not. No glimpses of his inner life are to be caught;
for he goes on his own way without following the steps of
the ancient sages. Carrying a gourd he goes out into the
market, leaning against a staff he comes home. He is found
in company with winebibbers and butchers, he and they are
all converted into Buddhas.

*Bare-chested and barefooted, he comes out into the market
place;*

Daubed with mud and ashes, how broadly he smiles!

There is no need for the miraculous power of the gods,

For he touches, and lo! the dead trees are in full bloom.

[See note on p. 202. — ED.]

Theogony and the Transformation of Man
in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

The previous papers given at this Eranos Conference have been devoted principally to the transformation of man in the various religions. Tacitly or explicitly they have dealt with the pious individual who strives for perfection through renewal and rebirth. With Lancelot Law Whyte¹ the question takes on a wider aspect, for behind the individual in search of perfection he considers the transformation of mankind as a whole and asks: Might not the transformation of the individual be a prototype and model for the transformation of mankind? This is the question I propose to take up in reference to two different modes of transformation: first, the transformation of human consciousness in the course of history; second, the transformation, embracing the very root of man's corporeal being, which we call death. It is a problem implicit in the general subject of this conference, and its actuality is further enhanced by an outward event: the centenary of the death of Schelling, who died on August 16, 1854, at Bad Ragaz. For this very theme—the transformation of human consciousness in the history of religions—was the center of Schelling's philosophical reflection.

The last years of his life were wholly taken up with his thoughts concerning the transformations of mankind in the course of its history or, as he put it, concerning the transformation of the human consciousness from the earliest beginnings of mankind. Indeed, he was possessed by them. They are set forth in his *Philosophy of Mythology* and his *Philosophy of Revelation*.²

¹ See "The Growth of Ideas," *infra*, pp. 250–69.

² *Philosophie der Mythologie* in *Sämmtliche Werke* (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), XI and XII; *Philosophie der Offenbarung* in *S. W.*, XIV. [Titles of German works in the text have been given in English whether or not the work has been translated into English.]

The great tragedy of his life was that with these late works he surpassed his age and met with no understanding among his contemporaries. In 1834 King Friedrich Wilhelm IV called him to the Prussian Academy in Berlin. On the occasion of his inaugural lecture the event was prematurely celebrated as a turning point in the intellectual and religious life of the age. But this climax of Schelling's fame was followed by an inexplicable decline.³ While Schelling was busy with his lectures on the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation, tirelessly meditating and working out the final formulation of his ideas, his enemy, Paulus, advocate of a long obsolete rationalistic theology, had the lectures secretly transcribed and published them with bitterly ironic introductions, commentaries, and postscripts in which he did his best to cover Schelling's most secret thoughts with ridicule.⁴ In an environment increasingly preoccupied with materialistic science and positivist philosophy, Schelling felt rejected. His lecture hall emptied, and he gave up teaching. The two most significant works of his late years were published only after his death, by his son.

At this point I should like to say a word about methods of studying Schelling. I do not think highly of the method of splitting up Schelling's lifework into several distinct parts, each marked by a pronounced difference of content. It is true that Schelling produced a number of systems; but they are all held together by the manifest unity of his fundamental intuitions, which made their appearance early in his development and are closely bound up with the essential character of his thinking, molded as it was by the religious experience and religious instruction of his youth.⁵ The notion of dividing Schelling's philosophy into supposedly unrelated and radically different systems springs from a misguided apologetics on the part of his students. Precisely because his contemporaries, under the influence of the positivist philosophy and science of their age, were unable to understand the philosophy of Schelling's old age, his students attempted to explain it away as an isolated phase of his development and so "save"

³ Documentary evidence of this is assembled in Helmut Pölcher's highly informative article "Schellings Auftreten in Berlin (1841) nach Hörerberichten," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, VI (1954), 193-215.

⁴ Ernst Benz in "Schwäbische Gigantomachie," *Schelling: Werden und Wirken seines Denkens* (Zurich, 1955; *Albae Vigiliae*, n. s., XV), pp. 57ff.

⁵ Robert Schneider, *Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesahnen* (Würzburg, 1938), and Ernst Benz, "Schellings theologische Geistesahnen," *Schellingdenkschrift der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie* (Zurich, 1955).

Schelling for his contemporaries and for posterity. Their argument was that in his younger days he had been quite a different sort of thinker, directly engaged in a timely discussion of the philosophical problems raised by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Today this form of apologetics is quite unnecessary; moreover, it beclouds, where it does not utterly impede, a knowledge of Schelling and the inner organic unity of his ideas.

And whereas Schelling's contemporaries felt that in his late works he had lost all contact with his time, today we must accord these works a prophetic character, because they give an intimation of problems and solutions for which men were not, until very recently, spiritually ripe. In this philosophy of mythology and revelation, Schelling attempted to encompass the whole development of mankind in metaphysical terms. A view of the primordial history of man and the various transformations of his consciousness is combined with a prophetic glimpse into the era of his perfection in a realm of spirits. The metaphysical, psychological, religious, and historical insights which Schelling, in the course of an industrious life, had gathered in friendly association with the greatest thinkers of his time are woven into a universal whole.

He speaks of two forms of human transformation: first, the transformation of the consciousness of historical man as a transformation from mythical to historical thinking; second, the transformation of man which leads, through death and resurrection, from man's carnal and earthly mode of being to his corporeal existence in a spiritual world. The history of the first transformation deals with the development of human consciousness from the earliest beginnings of mythical thinking to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, while the second embraces human history from the moment of God's birth in our midst down to the transfiguration of man. The first deals with man's consciousness, while the second penetrates to the root of his corporeal being.

Here it should be borne in mind that what Schelling meant by consciousness was not what we mean by it today, the realm of rational acts of thinking and cognition. His "consciousness" embraced the whole realm of psychic and spiritual life including imagination and intuition, the entire realm of which the rational is only a small segment and from a genetic point of view merely the last part of it to be activated.

What gives Schelling's account of the origins and transformations of human consciousness a particular significance for our day is that he based his stages of transformation on the history of mythology, which to his mind was the book of hieroglyphics from which the primordial history of mankind could be deciphered.

In the era of German Romanticism intensive study was devoted to the mythological tradition of the pre-Christian and extra-Christian religions. Particular attention was given to the mythology of the ancient Greeks and Romans, though it must be owned that the combination of philology and speculation sometimes opened up fanciful perspectives. In his *Theory of the Gods, or Mythological Poetry of the Ancients*,⁶ which appeared in 1791, Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-93), Goethe's companion on his journey to Italy, defined mythology as poetry, "as a language of the fantasy." In a highly fruitful controversy on mythology Gottfried Hermann (1772-1848) and Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858) propounded two other views which were in turn diametrically opposed. Creuzer maintained that "mythology as a whole supplies a complete panorama of man's religious intuitions."⁷ It was, he declared, an eternally valid, divine revelation. And he went on to say: this "original idea, engendered by a divine flash of lightning in the innermost spirit of man and couched in an eloquent image, can never die. . . ."⁸ Gottfried Hermann, as a Kantian, considered myth from a philosophical and critical point of view. Its symbols, he held, were merely disguises for concepts and philosophical ideas. A systematic interpretation of mythology, he believed, cannot be "historical; it must be philosophical or, if you will, critical, endeavoring to investigate the origin and meaning of the material, as well as the contradictions contained in it, partly on the basis of indications provided by history and partly through the nature of the material itself."⁹

Schelling worked with the results of these studies, but he was the first to arrive at a new and crucial insight, namely, that the inner development of the myths, the process of their emergence in the course of history, reflected and indeed embodied the inner spiritual development of man.

⁶ *Götterlehre, oder Mythologischen Dichtung der Alten*.

⁷ Max Wegner, *Alttertumskunde* (Freiburg and Munich, 1951; *Orbis Academicus*, I, pt. 2), p. 182.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 182f.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

Only a few of Schelling's spiritual heirs have remembered this insight of his. Today we are beginning to attach more and more importance to mythology. Academic philosophy, it is true, still takes little account of the problems raised by mythology and the philosophy of mythology. But in modern psychology mythology has assumed an immense importance. Here, of course, mythology is no longer associated, as in Schelling, with the development of human consciousness, but rather with that of the subconscious. Sigmund Freud has pointed out that the subconscious is mythogenous, i.e., that it creates mythological images in which certain constantly recurring psychic conflicts and tensions find their symbolic expression. The myth of Oedipus presents an image of a conflict which recurs in the human life of all epochs and cultures and which at some time in the course of every man's development endangers his relationship with his parents. Thus myth represents, in metaphoric form, the psychic tensions and conflicts which are a part of the experience of every man. Freud also disclosed a direct connection between the images of dream and the images of myth. Every man's subconscious is mythogenous; his psychic tensions condense into symbolic figures and actions, in which the symbolisms of the whole history of religions can be recapitulated.

Freud, however, evaluates myths exclusively as symbols. He accepts the identity between myth symbolism and dream symbolism as a psychological fact and neglects to investigate the basis of the identity. For him myths are an important key to the understanding of dream symbols. In his introductory lectures on psychoanalysis, he declares, for example:

How do we profess to arrive at the meaning of these dream-symbols, about which the dreamer himself can give us little or no information? My answer is that we derive our knowledge from widely different sources: from fairy tales and myths, jokes and witticisms, from folklore, i.e. from what we know of the manners and customs, sayings and songs, of different peoples, and from poetic and colloquial usage of language. Everywhere in these fields the same symbolism occurs, and in many of them we can understand it without being taught anything about it. If we consider these various sources individually, we shall find so many parallels to dream-symbolism that we are bound to be convinced of the correctness of our interpretations.¹⁰

10 Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, tr. Joan Riviere (London, 1922), p. 133 (orig., *Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, Vienna, etc., 1922; U.S. edn., *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1935).

In practice, however, Freud seldom bases his interpretation on a candid examination of the actual myths. In general, he takes it as his premise that mythical symbols are sexual in nature and injects this preconceived idea into all myths, so arriving at an extremely one-sided and uniform interpretation of the most diverse material. Mythology does not, as Freud maintains, confirm the soundness of the psychoanalytical interpretation; rather, as he himself tells us in the following passage, Freud *subjects* mythology to his interpretation. "A science of psychoanalysis," he writes, "is characterized by the methods with which it works, not by the subject-matter with which it deals. These methods can be applied without violating their essential nature to the history of civilisation, to the science of religion, and to mythology as well as to the study of the neuroses."¹¹ Here we have a clear admission that psychoanalysis comes to mythology with a preconceived interpretation. This inevitably gives rise to distortion and falsification.

C. G. Jung takes a deeper and more many-sided view of mythology. How does it come about, he asks, that the images and symbols of the earliest mythologies recur in the dreams or artistic production of contemporaries? He finds an answer in the theory of archetypes. Myths, he contends, are archetypes of psychic experience which found its symbolic expression at the dawn of mankind and, in this symbolic form, entered into the collective unconscious of mankind. In the course of individual development the archetype can be reactivated in an individual when a related experience occurs in the course of his development. Thus every man carries on the mythogenic process, for in the psychic experience of the individual, the collective unconscious speaks time and time again in the same primordial images. "An image is to be regarded as archetypal when it can be shown to appear in identical form, and with the same significance, in the documents of human history. . . . For that purpose the investigator must have recourse to those periods in man's history when symbol-formation was as yet uninhibited, that is to say, when there was as yet no epistemological criticism of the formation of perceptions, and when, in consequence, facts that in themselves were unknown were expressed in definite, perceptual forms." Accordingly, myths are "first and foremost psychic phenomena that reveal the nature of the soul."¹²

¹¹ *Introd. Lectures*, p. 325.

¹² C. G. Jung's fundamental statements on myth and mythology have most recently been set forth in *Von den Wurzeln des Bewusstseins: Studien über den Archetypus* (Zurich,

The whole history of religion becomes an arsenal of such primordial images, in which characteristic archetypes of the psychic experience of mankind are objectified. To reverse the picture in a paradox, one might say that, if the documents and records of all religions were to be destroyed by a cosmic catastrophe which only a few men survived, the survivors might reproduce the great archetypes of mythical and religious tradition on the basis of the images springing from their own collective unconscious whether expressed in dreams or in works of creative art.

Schelling's approach to mythology takes on a special significance in the light of this rediscovery of myth by modern psychology. Consideration of his philosophy of mythology contributes to the modern discussion of the subject something that was previously lacking, namely, the historical factor, an awareness of the relation between the development of mythology and the history of mankind. Modern psychology treats the mythological tradition essentially as a storeroom in which a vast number of mythical archetypes are lined up side by side; according to the psychological or psychopathic state of the individual case, the psychologist picks out this or that archetype as the times or circumstances may require, and employs it as a means of clarifying and overcoming certain psychic tensions and conflicts. The choice of the archetype to be taken from the storeroom is determined largely by the taste and educational level of both physician and patient. But in the storeroom all manner of archetypal variants are jumbled together. Tibetan, Cabalistic, Manichaeic, and Christian symbolisms must all pay to psychology their tribute in archetypes and help the psychologist fathom the secret of the psyche beset by the collective unconscious. The mythological tradition of the various nations and religions is, in the words

1954). The first passage cited above occurs on p. 380 ["Der Philosophische Baum," to be tr. in *CWJ*, 13, as "The 'Arbor philosophica'"; tr. here specially by R. F. C. Hull]; for the second, see "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," in *CWJ*, 9, 1, p. 6. On p. 7 (*ibid.*), we read: "He [primitive man] simply didn't know that the psyche contains all the images that have ever given rise to myths, and that our unconscious is an acting and suffering subject with an inner drama which primitive man rediscovers, by means of analogy, in the processes of nature both great and small." In "On the Nature of the Psyche," in *CWJ*, 8, p. 227, Jung observes: "Because it is a question of characteristically human modes, it is hardly to be wondered at that we can find psychic forms in the individual which occur not only at the antipodes but also in other epochs with which archaeology provides the only link." And he goes on to say (p. 227) that our knowledge of folklore and mythology serves primarily "to demonstrate the uniformity of psychic events in time and space."

of the New Testament, a "treasure" from which the psychological "householder" brings forth "things new and old" as he needs them (Matt. 13 : 52).

In this situation the utmost importance must be accorded to Schelling's insight that mythology has its history, that the history of mankind and its spiritual and psychic development is the history of myths or, more accurately, of mythmaking, mythogenesis, the mysterious process by which the mythical archetypes grew. Each individual myth has its necessary place within this history. The epoch when a myth made its appearance, when a mythical archetype rose to consciousness, when a god was born and died, is no accident or matter of indifference, for the history of myths, the mythogenic process, is the history of human consciousness. Ultimately, so Schelling believed, this history—and that is what gives it paramount importance—is identical with the history of God himself. The pages of the history of myth are the records of the true theogony.

The mythological traditions of mankind present us with mountains of data that seem to defy all orderly classification. Yet by dint of intense study and an admirable speculative intuition Schelling derived from them a history of myth which to his mind represented the surest index of the history of human consciousness. He believed it to be the history of man's prehistoric development and at the same time of the theogony.

Let us now attempt to enter into Schelling's principal ideas on mythology.

1. In Schelling's view—and to this he attaches the utmost importance—mythology is not theology, but a history of the gods. It presupposes and follows mythogenesis; and theogony, which is a form of mythology, already implies reflection on mythogenesis. In addition to the reigning gods, every mythological system includes some notion of previous gods whom they dethroned. Every polytheistic religion conceives of itself as the outcome of a history, a process of succession: there is always a supreme god who is known to be the successor of another god. After Uranos comes Kronos, after Kronos Zeus. Thus mythology is fundamentally related to history. Myths mark strata in the millennial development of the human spirit; their succession forms a spiritual analogy to biological phylogenesis.

In his very first statement of this relation between myth and history, Schelling invokes the Judaeo-Christian conception of the revelation of God in history: "In so far as revelation sets even the true God in a historical relation to mankind, it seems conceivable that the divine history, given

with revelation, had become the substance of polytheism, that its elements had been distorted. A development of mythology from revelation in this sense might have offered a good many noteworthy insights."¹³ Here Schelling suggests the possibility that the mythological history of the gods may be a decomposition and distortion of the historical revelation, in which the true God enters into a historical relation with mankind. Thus, at the very beginning of Schelling's study, he attempts to understand the history of mythology on the basis of a Christian history of mankind.

2. How does mythology come into being? What gives rise to "successive polytheism"? When does the history of mythology begin? What brings about the transformation that occurs in the emergence of mythology, of successive polytheism? To these questions Schelling gives the following answer: The origin of mythology cannot be explained "unless we presuppose a definite removal of man from his original standpoint." Man was removed from his original standpoint and only then did mythology come into being. This brings us to Schelling's view of the original condition of man, a conception in which he was strongly influenced by the mystical anthropology of Jakob Boehme and above all by Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, the Swabian theosophist. "Man," writes Schelling, "was created at the center of the godhead, and it is essential for him to be at the center, for that alone is his true place. As long as he is there, he sees the things that are in God, not with the usual outward vision bereft of spirit and unity; he sees them, rather, as they gradually coalesced, in man as their head and through him in God."¹⁴ Here Schelling is describing Oetinger's "Adamic insight," or Jakob Boehme's "Central Vision," but he puts a new interpretation on it in line with the idea of development characteristic of his own philosophy: the original man in his initial form sees all things as they are in God, and that means in their inherent order, as they are ultimately epitomized in man as the universal creature and through him are taken up in God. The world in its gradual unfolding is summed up in the consciousness of man, who is its head: man is the medium which communicates the world to God, through which the world is taken back into God. A true communication occurs only where man is wholly at the center of God, where he wholly fulfills his function as the head and integration of Creation. In this state

¹³ Schelling, *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 85.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 206. Here Schelling expressly invokes the "very ancient opinion which derives paganism and all human corruption from original sin alone."

there is no room for mythology, for man is essentially at the center of the godhead; he sees only the one God and all things in Him.

Mythology results from a fundamental change in the relation between man and God: man departs from his essential being in the center of the godhead. "Once man moves away from the center, the periphery becomes confused for him and the divine unity is distorted, for he himself is no longer divinely above things, but has sunk down to the same level with them. But when, once moved, he strives to assert his central position and the view connected with it, his striving and struggle to hold fast the original unity in a world already shaken and shattered gives rise to the *middle world* which we call a world of the gods and which is, as it were, a *dream of a higher existence*, that man dreams for a while after he has fallen away from it. This world of the gods arises in his mind involuntarily, born of a necessity imposed on him by his original relationship, and endures until his *final awakening*, when, come to self-knowledge, he betakes himself to this extra-divine world, glad to be released from the immediate bond which he is unable to maintain, and all the more eager to replace it with a *mediate* relation which at the same time leaves him free."¹⁵

Thus the removal of man is a removal from the center of God to the periphery of things. Through it he is reduced to the same level as things; he enters into a world where things are no longer one with God, but dispersed in their particularity, and he himself becomes a thing among things. Banished to the periphery, however, he yearns for the original unity with God and in God and attempts in his alienation to hold the lost unity fast. Alienated from his center, man dreams of his higher lost existence. His dream is mythology.

This sounds like a repetition of the Old Testament doctrine of Adam's fall from grace, and indeed in Jakob Boehme the doctrine of the original man and his loss of Central Vision is developed by allegorical exegesis from the Biblical story of Adam's fall. What distinguishes Schelling from Boehme is that he does not put the accent on man's voluntary transgression. "The world of the gods," he declares, is an "involuntary consequence of a necessity imposed on him by his original relation to God, and the effect of this necessity endures until his awakening." Thus man's original removal from the center of the godhead was itself a necessity, rooted in his own imperfection, in a fundamental deficiency. What was this deficiency?

¹⁵ *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 206.

Schelling replies on the basis of his idea of freedom. In his original immediate relation to God, man was not yet free; he had not yet exercised his freedom; he had to take the step from the center to the periphery in order to transform his immediate, that is to say, unfree relation to God into true love. Mythology is for man the way to freedom and true self-knowledge, to the true knowledge and love of God.

3. Schelling draws a connection between the genesis of mythology and the genesis of peoples, an insight that takes on the utmost importance in the light of modern discoveries concerning prehistoric times. History starts from the unity of mankind, grounded in a unitary principle. "Such a principle, which left room for no other in the consciousness of man, which admitted of no other beside itself, could only be something infinite; it could only be a God, one God, who completely filled man's consciousness and was common to all mankind, a God who drew man into His own unity as it were, denying him . . . all movement or deviation: only a God of this kind could give permanence to such absolute immobility, to such an absence of development. But just as there was no force better calculated to maintain mankind in a state of unity and perfect rest than the unconditional unity of the God by which it was governed, so, on the other hand, we can conceive of no mightier and more profound upheaval than that which was bound to result when that which hitherto had been unalterably One was itself set in motion, and just this was inevitable once another, or several other, gods appeared in, or emerged from, man's consciousness. This polytheism—however it began . . . — made impossible an enduring unity of the human race. And so polytheism is the ferment of disintegration that was cast among mankind."¹⁶

Thus the peoples rose not from physical causes but from spiritual movements connected with the first great "removal of mankind." The peoples did not first come into being and then create their myths, but the other way round: it is the mythology of a people that determines its character and history, "or rather, mythology does not determine, but *is* that people's fate (just as a man's character is his fate), its destiny that was allotted to it in the very beginning. Who will deny that the entire history of the Indians, the Greeks, etc., was given them with their theology?"¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., 104.

¹⁷ Ibid., 65.

In the connection between the origins of peoples and of languages Schelling finds confirmation of his view that the peoples emerged from a spiritual movement. The diversification of the one language, which had hitherto been common to all men, meant that the spiritual power which had held mankind in a state of perfect equality was shaken. This power, which dominated man's consciousness, was the one God. Its breakdown into successive polytheisms was the spiritual cause of the differentiation of the one language into many languages. Once removed from the center of God, the peoples saw things from their various positions on the periphery; seeing them differently, they designated them differently, just as they saw their God in different ways and gave Him different names.

Thus a people is, and develops after the manner of, its mythology. "A people exists as such only after defining itself and making its decision in its mythology."¹⁸ Mythology cannot come into being once a people has defined itself and completed its separation from mankind; nor can mythology arise as long as a people is an invisible part, encompassed in the whole of mankind. No, mythology arises in "the transitional stage, when a people has not yet defined itself but is in the process of separating and closing itself off from mankind."¹⁹

It is, then, the decision for a particular mythology, a particular God, that creates a people. Not an outside force, but an inner unrest, the feeling that it is no longer all mankind but only a part of it, that it no longer belongs to the absolute One, but has devolved to a particular god or gods—this is the feeling that drives peoples "from land to land, from coast to coast, until each one has found itself alone, separated from all alien peoples, and has found its own appropriate and allotted place."²⁰

4. But before we follow the process further, we must cast another glance at the removal of man from the center. Originally, Schelling writes, "mankind was at the center of God, had its being at the center of God," but this state was not a state of perfection, for man was captive; he had not yet exercised his freedom. Mankind was in a state of absolute rest, it had not begun to develop. Though Schelling describes the loss of this condition, the step from the center to the periphery, as a loss of the middle, as an entrance into a dreamlike state, nevertheless, he regards the new state as a step

¹⁸ *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 100.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

forward, the first step toward true and complete knowledge.²¹ Despite appearances to the contrary (and although it is impossible to explain this from our present standpoint), polytheism was truly a transition on the way to a better state, toward the liberation of mankind from a power, in itself beneficent, which, however, repressed its freedom, impeded all development, and so stood in the way of the highest knowledge. Here we see the essential connection between Schelling's philosophy of mythology and his idea of freedom. Removal from the center and dispersion were necessary steps toward freedom; mythology, polytheism, was a necessary path to the liberation of mankind, which is the end of the mythological development.

The process here described has a direct parallel in the theological speculations developed by Schelling in *The Ages of the World*.²² In this work he attempted nothing less than a history of God, an account of His inner movement before He manifested Himself with the creation of the world. Schelling's theology, like his anthropology, is influenced by the speculations of Jakob Boehme and of Oetinger, the Swabian theosophist, who both conceived of a development within God Himself leading from an inner cleavage to the full unfolding of the divine essence. "If primal nature were in harmony with itself, it would remain; there would be an abiding one and never a two, an eternal immobility without progress. As certainly as there is life, there is contradiction in primal nature. . . . Without contradiction there would be no motion, no life, no progress, but eternal immobility, a deathly slumber of all powers."²³ A contradiction lies at the base of the movement toward unity.

In his theory of potency Schelling described this inner movement of God in greater detail. "There can therefore be no doubt that, if there is to be a succession among the primordial powers of life, only that which encloses and forces back the essence can be the first. What is first in God after the decision, or, since we must assume this decision as having *happened* from all eternity (and hence as still happening), that which is absolutely first in God, in the living God, the eternal beginning of himself in himself, withdraws his essence from without, and retires into himself. . . . But the divine

²¹ Ibid., 139.

²² Schelling, *Die Weltalter*, in *S. W.*, VIII, 207ff.; tr. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr.: *The Ages of the World* (New York, 1942).

²³ Ibid., 219; tr., p. 105. [In the German the last sentence precedes the first.—ED.]

nature does not suffer God to be merely eternal No, eternal denial of himself; it is likewise his nature to be an essence of all essences, the infinitely self-giving and self-communicating. Thus, while he hides his essence, by virtue of the eternal necessity of his nature, the eternal affirmation of his nature opposes that negation (which is certainly not to be annulled, but remains, although now retreating into the negative). On the other hand, the eternal affirmation thus represses the negating power and precisely thereby develops into an independent being."²⁴ But the primal essence as such "remains in a state of perpetual desire, as an incessant seeking, an eternal, never quieted passion to be."²⁵

But the first state is not perfection. "To be infinite is by itself no perfection; rather it is the token of the imperfect."²⁶ So long as the first nature remains nothing but an irresistible urge, so long as "it is not lifted out of this involuntary movement," no freedom is conceivable in it. "It cannot itself avoid this movement; it can only be removed from this movement by something else, and, unquestionably, by something higher,"²⁷ namely, the eternal freedom to be. "God, with respect to his highest self, is not a necessarily real being, but the eternal freedom to be."²⁸ His development leads from the first nature, which is pure life, pure urge, to eternal freedom. "But in that eternally beginning life there lies the desire to escape from involuntary movement and urgency; and by its mere presence, without any movement (for it is still pure willing itself), as if magically, what is higher awakens the longing for freedom in it. Passionate urge softens into longing, wild desire dissolves into yearning to ally itself, as with its own true or highest self, with the will which wills nothing, with eternal freedom."²⁹

Thus there is an intimate connection between God's way to Himself and the way of mankind. The way of man is the way out of the center of God, out of the state of untried freedom, through an existence on the periphery of things, where he tests things in their intrinsic being, and then, endowed with the experience of freedom, back to the center of God. This way of mankind is at the same time the way of a true theogony. In the history of human consciousness, the mysterious history of the gods is enacted,

²⁴ *Weltalter*, in *S. W.*, VIII, 225; tr., pp. 111f.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 231f.; tr., p. 119.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 212; tr., p. 98.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 233; tr., p. 120.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 238; tr., p. 126.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 239; tr., p. 128.

and in the history of the gods there arises the true God, who in the development of human consciousness comes to consciousness of Himself.

The original monotheism of mankind before its entrance into history was no true monotheism, but a henotheism. Its object was not the true One, but a one-sided one, a merely relative monotheism. The elements of the true One, which enters into history only at the end of the mythological development, unfold in successive polytheism; thus mythology is the true genesis of God.

Schelling sums up this idea in a passage that forms the very core of his *Philosophy of Mythology*. This passage provides the key to his interpretations of particular myths, to his view of the history of mythology, and also to his conception of revelation:

Mythology comes into being through a necessary process (necessary in respect to consciousness), the origin of which loses itself in a suprahistorical realm. Consciousness may resist the process in certain particulars, but cannot impede, much less reverse, it as a whole. . . . Mythological ideas are neither invented nor voluntarily accepted.—Products of a process independent of thought and will, they were unequivocally and undeniably real for the consciousness subjected to them. Peoples and individuals are only *instruments of this process, which they do not perceive as a whole, which they serve without understanding it*. It is not in their power to cast off these ideas, to accept them or not to accept them: for these ideas do not come from outside but are within the mind and men never know how they arise: for they come from the innermost consciousness, on which they imprint themselves with a necessity that permits no doubt as to their truth. . . . Mythology is not allegorical but tautegorical. For it the gods are really existing beings; they are not something else and do not mean something else, but only what they are. . . . The process that creates mythology has its ground and beginning in the first real consciousness of mankind. . . . The succession [of gods within the mythological process] is a movement to which consciousness is actually subjected, a movement *that really takes place*. Even the particulars of the sequence, the fact that this god is followed by that god and not by another, is not arbitrary but necessary, and even when the events and circumstances that make up the history of the gods seem very strange to us, it will always be possible to show from what state of consciousness these representations naturally flowed. . . . Objectively considered, mythology is what it claims to be, true theogony, a history

of the gods: but since only those gods who are grounded in God are true gods, the ultimate content of the history of the gods is the Creation, *the real genesis in consciousness of God* to whom the other gods are related only as generative factors.

Subjectively or genetically, mythology is a theogonic process. It is a *process* that consciousness really effects; in so doing it is compelled to stop at each successive stage which encompasses the preceding stage. Thus it is a movement in the truest sense. It is a real theogonic process, that is, one that is prescribed by an essential relation of the human consciousness to God, a relation grounded in its substance, for in substance the human consciousness is that which naturally (*natura sua*) postulates God. Because the original relationship is a natural one, consciousness cannot depart from it without inaugurating a process that leads back to it. Thus the human consciousness cannot help manifesting itself as that which produces God, as theogonic.³⁰

To the process taking place in the human consciousness there corresponds a real theogonic process, which, according to Schelling, goes back to an objective process in God Himself. And so, speaking of the origin of the peoples, he writes: "When the very same God, who maintained unity as long as He remained undeviatingly identical to Himself, became unlike Himself and variable, it was inevitable that He should disperse the human race just as He had formerly held it together. And just as in His identity He had been the cause of its unity, so in His multiplicity He became the cause of its dispersion."³¹

5. In saying that the mythological process is governed by a necessity of which the peoples and individuals caught up in it are unaware, Schelling is already implying that the whole process of human development is guided by a plan of salvation. Schelling's idea recalls Hegel's "artful device"³² of reason, which makes use of individuals and peoples in order to carry out its higher plan.

His conception of a necessity inherent in the mythological process leads Schelling to conclude that the process as a whole is both meaningful and beneficial. He expressly rejects the purely negative evaluation of polytheism put forward by the orthodox apologists of the Church. "The usual lamenta-

³⁰ *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 212.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

³² Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. J. B. Baillie (2nd edn., London and New York, 1931), p. 114 (orig., Introduction to *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1921; Philosophische Bibliothek, CXIV, p. 47).

tion about the decline of pure knowledge and its degeneration into polytheism is consequently no more appropriate to the religious standpoint than it is to philosophy or to any true history." Of course polytheism reveals innumerable aberrations, but "false religion as such is never anything more than a dead and hence meaningless vestige of a process which as a whole is grounded in truth."³³ Here again it is clear that he regards the mythological process in the last analysis as part of a general development of mankind toward salvation.

Here we cannot go into the particular degrees and phases of the mythological process as Schelling saw it. It must be remembered that he had only the mythological knowledge of his time to work with. In the past hundred years, research in the history of religions has made great advances. At Schelling's time inquiry, generally speaking, had been limited to the myths of Greek and Roman antiquity. The study of Indian and Egyptian religions was at its beginnings, and only the barest fragments of the religious lore of the ancient Orient had become known. For his time Schelling was amazingly well versed in the religious history of mankind, but since then his knowledge of the mythological material, as well as the interpretation at which he arrived by combining the available data, has long been superseded. Nevertheless, his reflections on the development of mythology are full of profound insights, which, with all our advances in knowledge, retain their significance for anyone who wishes to interpret myths. And such a work as Schelling's treatise *On the Gods of Samothrace*³⁴ will surely meet with far more understanding today than at the time of its appearance. It is very easy to criticize the details of Schelling's interpretation of ancient myths on the basis of our new knowledge. Criticism of this sort, however, detracts in no way from the value of Schelling's general conception of mythological development as a theogonic process. It would be more accurate to say that a good many of our students of comparative religion—of varying tendencies—are to blame for their failure to recognize Schelling's insights into the genetic development of myths. For today it is a matter of fundamental necessity that, with our wider knowledge of the history of religions, we resume Schelling's efforts to work out a genetic history of religion which will also be the story of man's earliest development.

33 Schelling, *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 212.

34 Schelling, *Über der Gottheiten von Samothrake*, in *S. W.*, VIII, 345ff. (a paper delivered before the Prussian Academy on October 12, 1815).

Schelling's interpretation of the development of mythology as the pre-history of the human consciousness is still of the utmost relevance to many of the cultural sciences. First of all, there is its bearing on the modern study of mythology and comparative religion. One cannot simply compare everything with everything else. The various myths and religions bear witness to different stages in the development of the human consciousness, to different levels in man's psychic development and knowledge. In the living religions of today we have before us a symbiosis of representations rooted in the most divergent epochs, reflecting the most diverse dimensions of vision and strata of psychic experience. A theogonic conception of the history of religion takes on a particular importance in the light of the discovery that men have inhabited the earth for at least 600,000 years. For aside from the cave paintings of the ice age, the mythical tradition is our only source of information about man's spiritual and religious development during the greater part of this long, obscure period.

A genetic conception should also clarify the psychologist's understanding of the archetype. There is surely a close connection between the development of the individual and that of mankind. Every individual draws on the treasure of images that mankind has assembled over the thousands of years in which it has been viewing the universe, and each one of us is as old as the world. Our primordial ancestors of the Tertiary period are still alive in our darkest depths; the image-creating power of those ancestors who laid the foundations of our cultural heritage is still at work. Our intellectual culture derives from the Greeks and Romans, from Aristotle and the *corpus juris*, but the formation of our deeper strata goes back to the innumerable generations of older ancestors who wrote no books, who achieved their first form of expression in the symbolic art of the cave paintings and in myths. But these myths were recorded in fragments by men of a far later age, who often misunderstood them completely, and only the scientists of a later day learned to interpret them as records of a primordial history of the human soul, as the story of its endeavors to know its essence, origin, and goal.

Schelling's ideas become particularly significant in connection with the relation of Christianity to the non-Christian religions. A new conception of this relation is one of the vital needs of our time. For three reasons: For one thing, the attitude embodied in the old apologetics has become obsolete. Today great demographic movements and the global character of economic and political life have created an entirely new form of coexistence and en-

counter between the great world religions. Furthermore, the non-Christian religions have embarked on a missionary activity which not only competes with Christianity in what has hitherto been its exclusive preserve but has even made inroads on the secularized society of the Christian mother countries.

The existence of great economic and political blocs demands and indeed necessitates an entirely new form of solidarity among the members of different religions who share the same living conditions. It was possible to condemn a foreign religion totally and fundamentally only so long as Christians had no occasion to become personally acquainted with its adherents; such an attitude became utterly untenable once the Christian was compelled to live with them for better or worse and put his old dogmatic judgments to the test. An experience that was formerly the privilege of a few courageous scholars who investigated foreign religions and, regardless of dogmatic judgments, were not afraid to elucidate their positive religious content is today shared by many. I am speaking not only of educated men who through reading and travel have gained a personal impression of foreign religions but also of numerous members of Christian Churches who live in predominantly non-Christian countries and are obliged to form a community with their neighbors.

A final reason why a purely negative evaluation of non-Christian religions is no longer tenable is that a significant change has set in on the part of the non-Christian religions. Their spiritual leaders have also begun to examine the attitudes and doctrines of their faith with the methods of comparative religion and to criticize the spiritual development of Europe from their own point of view. Such a work as Radhakrishnan's *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*,³⁵ in which the author critically examines the cultural and religious history of the Christian Occident from the standpoint of the Hindu, with a view to disclosing the points in which a true understanding between Christianity and Hinduism is possible, opens up a new epoch in the relations between the two great religions, an encounter far more appropriate than the old dogmatic monologues to the actual social and cultural structure of our time. In this connection Schelling's ideas take on a new relevance.

With his philosophy of mythology and revelation, Schelling—and herein

35 London, 1951. By the same author, *East and West in Religion* (London, 1933).

perhaps lies the greatest significance of this work for our time—laid the foundation for a new view of the relation of Christianity to the non-Christian religions. He was determined not simply to take over or renew the traditional theological opinions and evaluations of this relation. He took a purely scientific point of view toward Christianity as well as other religions and declared expressly: "I intend to consider Christianity just as I have considered mythology; that is to say, I shall try to explain it as far as possible on the basis of its own premises or, in the last analysis, to let it explain itself."³⁶ He made it very clear that his method has nothing in common with dogmatic theology: "My aim is not agreement with any dogma of the Church. I have no interest in being what is termed orthodox, and indeed I should experience no difficulty whatsoever in being quite the opposite. To me Christianity is merely a phenomenon that I am trying to explain. As to its meaning, its true significance, we must appraise them according to the authentic documents of Christianity, just as we have sought, for example, to determine the significance of the religion of Dionysos or of some mythological idea through the utterances of the most reliable authors."³⁷

Thus Schelling qualifies his view of all religions including Christianity as purely scientific, the reverse of dogmatic. And he concludes his discussion of Christianity with the remark: "Moreover, we have merely explained Christianity by itself, just as our explanation of mythology was drawn from mythology itself. Christianity, and the same is true in the last analysis of all significant phenomena, contains the key to our understanding of it: that key is to be sought above all in indications of a divine plan prescribing an order of succession among the highest causes."³⁸

This approach carries an all-important consequence. Schelling sharply rejects the view held by many orthodox Protestants in those days—and today further reinforced by "dialectical theology"—to the effect that all non-Christian religions are heathen, hence the diametrical opposite of Christianity, and that all of them, whether primitive or highly developed, are purely and simply the work of demons, so that there can be no question of any continuity between Christianity and other religions. In consequence of this conception, the dialectical school of Protestant theology has taken a hostile attitude toward the scientific study of religions, so breaking off

³⁶ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 34.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 201.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 234.

the great tradition of scholarship established by Protestant theologians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And the consequences for the idea and practice of the Christian mission have been equally disastrous.

Schelling points out that the attitude in question is not only historically illogical but fundamentally blasphemous as well: "If Christianity is nothing other than what it is ordinarily taken for, a mere negation of paganism . . . if Christianity has nothing positive in common with paganism, history falls into two separate halves with no point of contact; the whole continuity of history is broken, Christianity ceases to be the eternal religion it is, which being eternal must also be present in paganism, and becomes something that has been in existence only for a limited time. This is to disparage Christianity." ³⁹

Schelling held that to tear history apart in this way was to reduce Christianity to an episode and so to blaspheme against God. The history of religions, he stated clearly, is a continuous unity from beginning to end. Even dogmatic theology finds a historical continuity between the Old and the New Testament. But this was not enough for Schelling. Considering the whole history of religions as a theogonic process in which mankind achieves self-awareness, he was bound to draw the entire religious development of the ancient world into the process.

At the very beginning of his *Philosophy of Mythology*, Schelling suggests (as we have seen just above) "that a development of mythology might offer much that is worthy of our attention concerning revelation." ⁴⁰ By this, as he goes on to say, he means that "the divine history given us in revelation became the substance of polytheism and its elements were distorted into mythological elements." ⁴¹ This might sound as though, in comparing it to the Christian revelation, Schelling took a wholly negative view of pagan mythology, judging its contents to be distortions, cast-off shards, *dissecta membra* of revelation. Actually, his whole protracted discussion of the matter argues against a purely negative evaluation of mythology. On the whole, when man enters into a mythological movement and is carried along by it, he is "on the way to the truth; indeed, the mythological movement is itself the way to the truth." ⁴²

³⁹ Ibid., 77.

⁴⁰ Schelling, *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 85.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 211. He continues with a remark which is highly significant for his judgment of the religions which are still living in the realm of mythological thinking: "Only in

In relation to Christian revelation, the mythological process may be regarded from two points of view:

a) Seen in itself, every mythological element in a religion may be an error, just as every particular polytheistic religion may in itself be regarded as an error; but the general mythological movement is truth. "No particular element in mythology, but only the process as a whole, is truth. The various mythologies themselves are only different elements in the mythological process. To this extent, of course, each particular polytheistic religion is false—but polytheism, considered in the sum of its successive elements, is the way to the truth and thus itself the truth. From this it might be inferred that the last religion, the religion which combines all the contents of mythology, must be the true one. And this is true in a certain sense, in so far as the truth is attainable by the process we have assumed, which always has as its beginning alienation from the divine self: for though the divine self is not present in mythological consciousness, its image is present."⁴³

This insight, however, should not be taken abstractly but in a historical sense: since the mythological process is a historical process, the divine truth is in every epoch manifested most purely by the last and actual stage of it. As the truth progresses, one religion after another becomes false. "False religion as such is never anything but a dead and hence meaningless vestige of a process which in its totality is truth."⁴⁴

b) Viewing the whole process from the standpoint of its conclusion, i.e., the coming of Jesus Christ, Schelling believes that the later stages of development are preformed in the earlier ones. Thus an early stage becomes false only if, after being transcended by a later one, it lives on in a fossilized state, so impeding the process of development. In its proper time and place, the very same stage constitutes a necessary step on the road to truth, indeed a stage of the truth itself. Thus Schelling, in opposition to the Church dogmatists who restrict the divine history of salvation to the narrow path constituted by the Old and New Testaments, preaches a universalism in respect to the history of religions, which he equates with the history of salvation.

seceding from this movement and relinquishing its part in the continuation of the process to another people does a people begin to be in error and false religion."

⁴³ *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XI, 212.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

But the content of all true religion is eternal and hence cannot absolutely be excluded from any epoch. A religion that is not of all time, as old as the world, cannot be the true one. Christianity must therefore have been in paganism, which had the same substantial content. . . . It would have been impossible for human nature to live in sheer error for thousands of years: a human consciousness filled solely with vanities could not have endured. It is inconceivable that mankind should have remained for thousands of years without any bond with the principle in which alone there is salvation. . . . No one who considers the manifestations of God in the Old Testament, and does not regard them as mere fable, can deny the pagan theophanies all reality. The pagans were banished as it were from the sight of the Father, but precisely to them He gave Christ as their Lord, even though Christ acted among them only as a natural potency. Paganism—just because Christianity is not its absolute negation but its truth—also contains a relative truth. . . . Christianity did not issue solely from Judaism, but is likewise rooted in paganism: this is what makes its coming into being the great historical event it has always been held to be.⁴⁵

Here Schelling goes back to a conception of the relation between the Christian and non-Christian religions that had already been developed by the early Christian apologists. Once Christianity had been taken up by cultivated strata of Hellenistic society, it was thought desirable to give its claim to universality a historical as well as a dogmatic foundation. In the apologists of the second and third centuries we already find an endeavor, on the one hand, to find a positive relation between the Christian doctrine of salvation and certain related positive insights of pre-Christian philosophy and religions and, on the other hand, to explain the striking and sometimes astounding analogies between Christian and pre-Christian beliefs and sacraments as an anticipation of Christianity by older religions.

The apologists had explained the presence of true insights in pagan philosophy and religion, particularly in regard to good and evil, through the doctrine of the *logos spermatikos*. The one Logos-Christ, they declared, had also been at work in the pre-Christian religions, for the truth is one. Where there is truth and a knowledge of good and evil there is also Christ, even among pagans. To this extent not only the Old Testament law but pagan philosophy as well was a preceptor (*paidagogos*), teaching mankind to be ready for Christ, and such men as Socrates and Plato, no less than Isaiah

⁴⁵ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 77f.

and Jeremiah, prepared the way for Christ.⁴⁶ Not only the Jewish people but all peoples and their spiritual, religious, and ethical development were drawn into the "economy" of the kingdom of heaven. In his theology of history, so early a thinker as St. Augustine had developed this idea, formulated in the daring words which Schelling also cites: "Christianity is as old as the world."⁴⁷

This idea of the ancient apologists has been given a new meaning by Schelling's philosophy of mythology and his understanding of the history of salvation as a process leading by way of mythology to revelation. Thus Schelling sometimes speaks quite in the language of the early apologists, as when he says, for example: "Christ is present also in paganism, but not as such; this does not mean that he was not there, but that he was not understood as such: for the pagans, Christ is merely a natural potency, a mere natural light."⁴⁸ Just as in the apologetic view of history, the divine logos which created the world was embodied in a general way in the pre-Christian era and then emerged in personal form in Jesus, so Schelling, in regarding the whole of history as a history of the revelation of the Son, also distinguishes between the general and the personal actions of Christ. "The sphere of his general action (that he does not exert as Christ) is paganism; his personal action is that of revelation, and for this very reason he is at the same time the personal cause of all revelation."⁴⁹ Translated into Schelling's own language, this lofty idea of the apologists takes the following form: "The true Son, the personality hidden in the mere natural potency, the personality which from the very beginning—in accord with the Father—had the will to restore the Being that had fallen away from God, was the cause of all revelation, just as in the form of a mere natural potency it was the cause of all mythology. . . ." ⁵⁰

Schelling explains this view at length in his theory of potencies; by "Son"

⁴⁶ See Ernst Benz, "Christus und Sokrates in der alten Kirche," in *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* . . . , XLIII (1951-52), 195-224.

⁴⁷ Ernst Benz, *Augustins Lehre von der Kirche* (Wiesbaden, 1954; Abhandlung der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse, No. 2), p. 61. See Augustine's *Retractationes* I, xiii, 3: "*res ipsa quae nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, erat et apud antiquos nec defecit ab initio generis humani, quousque Christus veniret in carne, unde vera religio, quae iam erat, coepit appellari Christiana.*" (Cf. Migne, *PL*, XXXII, 603.)

⁴⁸ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 114.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.

he means the second potency in God, the potency in which the divine will collected itself and inaugurated both the Creation and the process of salvation which would find its fulfillment in His incarnation.

Solely the will of the second personality, conceived since the Fall, to follow Being into duality, but only at the end to raise itself up as a personality outside of God along with Being. . . . this will alone caused the Father to give the Son power over blind God-hostile being, the power which he already exerted at the time of prevailing darkness, in paganism. Only in respect to this will could the Father consent to let the mediating potency transcend the primal principle which He was otherwise constrained to uphold as an organ of His displeasure. Thus even paganism was made possible only by the prospect of that will. In it, to be sure, the mediating personality acted only as a natural potency, but since the true Son, the authentic Christ, is also in this potency, Christ, too, was in mythology, though not as Christ. Hence, though the heathen were cut off from Christ (Eph. 2 : 12), that is, from Christ as such, it was the same truth that illumined them and took mercy on them alone. For the Father, who made Himself inaccessible to this extraordinary Being, withdrew externally as well into the consciousness of a small, inconspicuous nation that had been driven into a corner of the world . . . and here He appeared only as one in need of perpetual atonement. Christ, however, was—though still in his merely natural guise—the light of the heathen. He was the actual potency of paganism.⁵¹

On this basis Schelling attempted to examine the relation to one another of paganism and the Old and New Testaments more closely, by differentiating the ways in which the Son was present in the three different religions. "But if we distinguish two points of time, that of the mere resolve and that of the actual deed, he who was to be incarnated was the principle of Revelation even before the time of the deed, though indeed of a veiled revelation speaking only in signs and prophecies as in the Old Testament. . . . Since the personality is inseparable from the natural potency, Christ is already implicit in paganism, though not as Christ. In the Old Testament Christ is already Christ, but still in the process of emerging. In the New Testament he is manifest as Christ. Thus previously he was not everywhere

51 Ibid., 74f. He continues: "In it he (Christ) prepared the soil which would one day receive the seed of Christianity, for which Judaism would have been far too small. Paganism and Judaism were two separate economies, which would merge only in Christianity."

absent; he was present, but veiled—in paganism as it were by a twofold curtain, in Judaism by a single one.”⁵²

And in a similar view Schelling wrote: “If we take paganism, Judaism, and Christianity as the three great forms of all religion, the Revelation of the Old Testament is merely the revelation that runs through mythology; Christianity is the revelation which has broken through this husk (paganism), and so transcends at once and in equal degree paganism and Judaism. . . . Christianity was the future of paganism no less than of Judaism, and Judaism was not the only prototype: paganism as well contained prototypes of the relationship which manifested its truth only through Christ. Indeed, the truly typical part of the Mosaic religion is precisely the pagan element.”⁵³

Here Schelling suggested still another idea that is also anticipated in the early Christian apologists. If Christianity is as old as the world, that is to say, if the way of mythology is also the way of the truth, then there is already a prophetic force and significance in mythology. The future stages and fulfillment of the truth are preformed at least in germ and in plan. Paganism has its prophecy which points to the coming perfection of the truth in the incarnation of Christ.

It is no sacrilege to prove that the truths, which even in the Old Testament are still partly cloaked and only enter into full light in Christianity, were present in paganism, if only in a distorted reflection. This has been done from time immemorial, first of all by the Church Fathers, although they lacked the true and ultimate concepts by which to explain the relationship. In our view, it is this very relationship which proves the necessity and eternity of the ideas of Christianity. If this relationship, as was ordinarily done in the past, were given a historical explanation based on the corruption of a prophecy that came also to the pagans in primordial times—for example, the prophecy that the Messiah would be humbled—then these truths which are as old as the world, whose foundations were laid along with the founding of the world, would appear to be mere contingent truths which had come to mankind by accident.⁵⁴

For this reason Schelling calls prophecy “a necessary element in the mythological movement.” “It is true that that consciousness which creates

⁵² *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 88.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 124 and 142.

⁵⁴ Schelling, *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, 320f.

mythology advances through definite phases. But from the beginning, from the very first awakening of consciousness, a tension is posited which can be resolved only successively, and with the first tension everything else (the whole sequence) is posited as well. The different phases of consciousness do not differ in their absolute content, but just as the content of all epochs is actually the same, just as one epoch or phase differs from another only in that what is future to one is present or past to another . . . so the content of the mythological consciousness is always the same, and what becomes present only in the later phase is not for that reason nonexistent in the earlier one, but also exists, only posited as future. . . . For the gift of prophecy is also given with the tension that is posited in the mythological consciousness. Revelation itself is mediated by it. Christ is the end of paganism as of Revelation.”⁵⁵

Here Schelling rejects the view, which he himself had at first intimated, that the pagan mythologies should be regarded merely as a corruption of the Christian truths; they become a corruption only in the light of the historically posterior incarnation. In their own time they were a necessary and highly representative form of the mythological, that is to say, theogonic process.

First I should like to remind the reader of the original thoroughgoing unity of all true religions. Since true religion cannot differ from true religion, and since mythological religion is true religion, there cannot be in it any other powers or potencies than in revealed religion: but they are present in the two in a different way. When we say, Paganism is false religion, we are implying not that it is devoid of truth but only that it is a corruption of the true religion. Mythological representations contain concepts whose truth, whose true form and essence, are first given in the New Testament. For just as paganism—considered in its whole course and context—is only a Christianity that naturally produces itself (how otherwise could the transition from one to another have often occurred so easily and among such great masses of people?), so Judaism is merely undeveloped Christianity. The same personality who appeared to the Gentiles, i.e., the pagans, as a Saviour and Redeemer occurs in the Old Testament as the Messiah. The beings of mythology are not merely imagined, they are at the same time real beings. . . . The truth of mythology in this sense was made fully manifest by Christianity. The Messiah of the Old Testament

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 347f.

may at first have seemed to be a purely imaginary personality, but the outcome showed that he was a real being, who really appeared at the end of the whole process, appeared as the Father's only begotten Son.⁵⁶

Schelling not only made use of these ideas for his interpretation of the relation between pre-Christian paganism, Judaism, and Christianity but also drew on it frequently for his understanding of the general history of religions. A glance at the more important non-Christian religions, some in process of transformation, that still exist side by side with Christianity showed him that the world of mythology was not yet dead. His interpretation of the history of religion in India is of particular interest. The persecution of Buddhism in India, he noted, occurred at the time of the first propagation of Christianity, and this, it seemed to him, confirmed the inner organic law which lends cohesion to the entire history of religion. Schelling interpreted the spread of Buddhism in China as a reaction of the mythological principle against the Christianity which had elsewhere transcended it. "It is as though the principle of mythology, assaulted and shaken in its innermost core by Christianity, had felt the need of opposing it in a new and powerful form. When we consider the sudden rise and spread of the doctrine of Buddha in India at this very time, this conclusion becomes inescapable."⁵⁷

Thus the antimythological attitude of Christianity was reflected in India, the original home of Buddhism, in a persecution of that religion, though the persecution did not emanate directly from the Christianity of the time. Threatened in its existence, the mythological principle strove, by means of the Buddhist mission in China and a vast movement of emigration, to create a new nucleus of resistance against the Christian mission that was soon to come.

Some of the most recent Schelling scholars⁵⁸ have accused him of merely repeating the old orthodox dogmas concerning the absolute divinity of the Christian religion. "Christianity is taken by Schelling and the Christian theologians as a divine and absolute religion, while only a limited and relative truth content is attributed to the extra-Christian religions."⁵⁹

⁵⁶ *Phil. der Myth.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 316.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 564.

⁵⁸ Particularly Christel Matthias Schröder in *Verhältnis von Heidentum und Christentum in Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung* (Munich, 1936).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

But this does not strike at the core of Schelling's views. Actually he took a far more positive view of the non-Christian religions than any of the Christian dogmatists who asserted the absolute character of Christianity. In his *Philosophy of Mythology* and *Philosophy of Revelation*, he endeavored precisely to substitute a new and positive view of other religions for the traditional negative view; he hoped that his *Philosophy of Mythology* would convince Christians that the non-Christian religions embodied a positive truth content and formed an essential part of the general movement of mankind toward the truth.

This is made particularly clear by Schelling's new demands on the Christian mission. Like Hegel, who on his deathbed characterized the great missionary movement of his time, which led to the worldwide dissemination of Christianity, as the greatest historical event of the century, so Schelling gave close attention to the missionary movement. He reflected on how Christians might best approach the non-Christian religions, and he resolutely rejected the belief, then current in most of the Protestant missionary societies arisen from the Pietist and Revivalist movements, that the pagan religions were mere delusion and diabolical deception. He showed that if several major religions, each with its absolute claim, could seemingly exist side by side, it was because these religions actually represented different stages in the development of the theogonic process. He expected a true prophet of the Gospel to show a deeper insight into the positive contents and truths of the non-Christian religions, for this alone, he believed, could provide a basis for close ties among the religions and for a true justification of the Christian mission.

Schelling also pointed expressly to the great danger inherent in a negative attitude toward the highly developed religions of Asia, and wrote: "One of the remarkable moral phenomena of our time is undeniably the great universal favor shown the missions, i.e., the attempts to guide the still pagan nations to Christian ideas and convictions. But we might expect far greater results from this meritorious undertaking if it were supported by deeper insights into the source of mythology and hence of paganism than is quite evidently the case among the great majority of missionaries today. Most of them, as some admit, are quite unable to transpose themselves into the soul of a pagan, e.g., into the thoughts of an Indian Brahmin. Since they see only delusion, only lies, in the pagan conceptions, they can find no access to the imagination of these men, to whom, on the other hand, the

*mere literal and formal content of ecclesiastical orthodoxy must be and must remain something absolutely alien. In particular, one does not take it amiss if the astute and perspicacious Indians will not pretend to lend credence to formulas in which they find no connection with their own faith, their own view of the world, their own philosophy and wisdom."*⁶⁰

The destinies of the Christian religion in Asia, which at the world missionary conferences of recent years have provoked profound self-criticism on the part of the Christian missionary Churches and missionary societies, have fully confirmed Schelling's critique. Today missionary leaders who assuredly have no knowledge of Schelling are making the exact same demands precisely on the non-European, native theologians and missionaries of the so-called young Churches of Asia, declaring that a better knowledge of the positive values of the non-Christian religions is indispensable for a more effective mission.

Schelling's remarks on missionary activity are significant because they show that his concern with mythology was not limited to the pre-Christian pagans but took in the whole religious development, including the non-Christian religions of today, and that his horizon was as broad in matters of religion as in philosophy. That is what makes Schelling's philosophy of mythology so important not only for our understanding of the ancient world but for our approach to the living non-Christian religions of today as well as the dead religions of the past.

II

But in Schelling the transformations of man are not limited to the transformation of human consciousness that takes place in the theogonic process and finds its conclusion in man's encounter with the true historically incarnated God. In his view man's encounter with the true God is only the beginning of a more profound transformation that will lead him out of his earthly-material corporeality to the spiritual-corporeal existence of the kingdom of heaven.

Here it is significant that Schelling's philosophical insight culminates in a theology of corporeality. This is the point in which the influence of Jakob Boehme and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger is most clearly discernible, and it is in this connection that the mechanical inclusion of Schelling among the

⁶⁰ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 21f.

"idealist philosophers" has made for a total misunderstanding of his philosophy. For on the basis of his theology of corporeality Schelling criticized idealism and left it far behind. Oetinger had found in idealism a "shy-horse terror of materialism,"⁶¹ but at the same time he had criticized materialism for its abstract concept of the spirit and had seen in Cartesian dualism the beginning of a disastrous division between modern natural science and modern idealistic philosophy and theology. With his own theology of corporeality he had striven to overcome this division. Similarly Schelling rejected a purely idealistic interpretation of being, with its contempt for physical existence, while at the same time he criticized the materialism of his time for its purely abstract notion of the spirit. He hoped with his system of ideal realism to restore unity to man's knowledge of nature and of the spiritual world. To him such unity was the goal of scientific development, and he felt himself to be its herald.⁶²

It was Schelling's fundamental belief that there can be no spirit without a body, just as matter cannot exist without an inner life spirit, and that there is a continuous and essential bond between the realm of the spirit and that of nature. The kingdom of God, which is the goal of all movement and development of Being, is not a realm of bodiless immortal souls, but a realm of free spiritual-corporeal personalities who serve God freely out of love. They live not in an abstract sphere but in a transfigured yet bodily nature. At the end of God's paths stands the embodiment of that which in the beginning was a spiritual potency latent in the primal ground and which is manifested in the course of an immeasurable process of revelation, the essence of which is the *manifestatio sui*.

Characteristically, Schelling, in setting forth these ideas in his *Ages of the World*, goes back directly to Oetinger's formulation, though he does not mention him directly by name: "That divine power, integrating the whole, embraces not merely nature, but also the spirit world, and the soul dwelling above both. Therefore these also receive a spatial reference by that integration; the old belief in a place, an abode, of spirits again receives meaning and truth.

61 Oetinger, *Die kabbalistische Lehrtafel der Prinzessin Antonia*, 1765, ed. K. C. E. Ehmann, in *Sämmtliche Schriften* (Stuttgart, 1858-64), Abt. II, 1, § 9c, vi, 75: "Betrug der Idealisten"; cf. the critique of idealism in Schelling, *Die Weltalter*, VIII, 341f.; tr. Bolman, pp. 232f.

62 Ernst Benz, "Schellings theologische Geistesahnen" (cited in n. 5), and Schelling, *Die Weltalter*, VIII, 205f.; tr. Bolman, pp. 90ff.

"This is the ultimate design, that every thing as much as possible take shape and be brought into visible, bodily form. Corporeality is, as the ancients expressed themselves, the aim of the ways of God (*finis viarum Dei*), who wants to reveal himself spatially or in a particular space as well as time." ⁶³

Fundamental here is the distinction between corporeality and physical materiality, a distinction that is very hard to express in the Romance languages. The two are not identical, for physical materiality is only a particular form of corporeality. It is secondary and first arose through a contraction away from the primal ground of being. Corporeality also had its fall; indeed—as Jakob Boehme taught—it came into being only with the original Fall, the contraction of Adam's being, which had been brought about by his self-will in opposition to God, whereas the paradisiac body of Adam was still of a spiritual-corporeal nature.

Schelling's philosophy of corporeality stands out most clearly in his view of death, and it is here that his link with Oetinger is most apparent. In the thirty-second lecture of his *Philosophy of Revelation*, Schelling develops his view of death as an "essentification," a concept generally regarded as one of Schelling's very own formulations. "The death of man," he writes, "is not so much a separation as an essentification, in which only the contingent is destroyed, while the essence, that which is most truly man, is preserved. For no man in his life appears wholly as he is, but after death he remains purely himself; therein lies the gratifying part of death for the one, the terrible part for the other. The contingent good which here conceals evil, the contingent evil that here conceals the good; both vanish. This essentified being, in whom the physical is also preserved, must be an extremely real being; yes, in truth, it must be far more real than the actual body, which, because of the reciprocal exclusion of its parts, can only be composite and for this very reason is merely a fragile and destructible whole. There are in all languages terms which express our first unreflecting feeling about a thing. Such is the case when we refer to an apparition of a departed being as a spirit and not, e.g., as a soul. We think of the whole man, but spiritualized, essentified." ⁶⁴

Schelling did not invent this concept of essentification but took it over

⁶³ Schelling, *ibid.*, 325; tr., pp. 214f. Cf. Oetinger, "Leib," *Biblisches Wörterbuch*, ed. Julius Hamberger (Stuttgart, 1848), p. 315: "Bodiliness is the end of the works of God." This was already quoted by Oetinger's contemporaries as "ways of God."

⁶⁴ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 207f. Schelling also speaks of death as essentification in a letter to Beckers, Munich, June 8, 1833; G. L. Plitt (ed.), *Aus Schellings*

from Oetinger. In Oetinger we find a whole complex of concepts developed from the word "essence": to essentify, essentiation, essentification, essentiator. By "essence" Oetinger meant something's whole being and not merely an image or idea. As he says in his *Biblical Dictionary*: "God understands

Leben in Briefen (Leipzig, 1809-70), III, 68. In the Licealbibliothek at Dillingen, Beckers had found an extremely rare book bearing the title *Auserlesene Sammlung der besten und neueren Schriften vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode, ans Licht gestellt von Dr. Ernst Löscher* (A Choice Selection of the best and most recent writings concerning the state of the soul after death, brought to light by Dr. Ernst Löscher) (Dresden: Saueressig, 1735, cap octavo, 700 pp.). In a letter of May 26, 1833, he informed Schelling that there was a passage on p. 605 of this book which would no doubt be of interest to him because it suggested the idea, expressed in Schelling's lectures, of an essentification of the whole man in death, as well as Schelling's comparison of the effect of death with the process in which the spirit or essence of a plant is sucked out. The passage runs: "Because scarcely any examples are found in nature, it is hard for us weak mortals, too much accustomed to sensuous images, to understand that the soul, which is a real part of the man, can subsist alone without him. But I offer feeble reason the following comparison which may clarify the matter. The rectified spirits which are drawn from dense bodies by artifice are after all a part of those bodies: yet they exist by themselves and have all manner of power and effect. If this is possible with subtle corporeal things, how much more so will it be possible with the soul, which is an essence of a very different order and immaterial. But just as such spirits must be maintained by force in their separate existence, similarly the state of departed souls is in a manner of speaking an interim state and cannot last forever; they are maintained in this state by the higher power of their Creator to the end that they may be reunited with bodies. This they term *incompletam, inadaequatam subsistentiam*: and so this is no mere school expression, no mere sound without meaning, as some scoffingly maintain."

Schelling replies to Beckers: "I am truly thankful to you for the passage from Löscher. It aroused my admiration and astonishment. Hitherto I had supposed that my similar opinion had *aliquid heterodoxi* about it; but now I see that it was long ago put forward by well-known theologians without prejudice to their orthodoxy. The striking part of it is that Löscher not only cites the example of spirituous (distilled) liquids (if I am not mistaken, I myself used the example of wine in this connection) but that he adds: just as these material spirits are maintained in their separate state only by a kind of compulsion, so comparably the state in which true spirits find themselves after death is not a voluntary one and they must be maintained in it by a higher power. But in adding: 'this they term *incompletam, inadaequatam subsistentiam*,' he presupposes that this view was relatively common at or before his time. I should therefore like to know whether he cites any authors in connection with his 'they.' I should altogether like to pursue the idea back to its source; it is certainly not in the ancient theologians: the question is, then, from what particular school it comes. Are there any other mystical or Rosicrucian elements in Löscher?" In a subsequent letter Beckers answered both questions in the negative and on the basis of the Scholastic sources at his disposal informed Schelling of all he knew on the subject. The passage is significant because it shows that Schelling regarded his doctrine of essentification as his own, as an idea which, because of its "heterodoxy," no orthodox theologian could have formulated. In this letter he seems to have forgotten completely that he himself had taken the concept, the doctrine, and even the explanatory example from the writings of Oetinger, the Württemberg prelate.

the image not, in the manner of Schwenkfeld, as a perishable image but as an essence in which everything potentially lies and from which everything can come into being." ⁶⁵ Thus the essence contains not only the form but also all the potentialities of a thing. That is why Oetinger repeatedly calls God the Essentiator. Thus, e.g., in his "Treatise on the Connection between the Articles of Faith and the Last Things": "The composition must deceive no one, for Jehovah, the Essentiator, does not compose; He essentiate the forces and brings them to unity." ⁶⁶

This actuation, or essentification, by God applies above all to the soul and is the work of the divine word. Thus Oetinger writes in his "Of the Sin against the Holy Ghost": "The soul is not material, for it is of divine origin; it is essentified, not composite. The essentification or essentiation of the soul is accomplished by the derived word of God that flows into it." ⁶⁷ Concerning the word of God, Oetinger speaks in his *Lessons for Princess Antonia*. In reply to the question "How do representations arise from the will?" he writes: "This cannot happen without the derivation of the eternal word in the soul: this derivation simplifies everything that can be materially thought. It brings unity into the soul. However, this unity can be maintained by no crude composition of forces, but only by an essentiation; in other words, the forces *in fieri* at first resist, but then penetrate, and finally merge in a purely actuated spiritual element. Then, from a volatile diffuse element, there arises a fixed and concentrated one in which many forces together pass through intermediate stages from antagonism into unity." ⁶⁸

Oetinger goes on to distinguish "the material composition of separate atoms" explicitly from "essentiation," which he defines as a "mutual in-existence of one force within another." "Essentiation is an intensification of forces which interpenetrate, whereas they were formerly antagonistic to one another: this is accomplished by the assistance and penetration of the eternal word. Through it the conflicting forces all together take on the force of sensations and representations. . . . Different forces cannot co-operate as *partes extra partes* to the soul, much less think or operate independently and afterward reflect one another *speculariter*; but all together, fired by the will, can double, triple, quadruple, the power of the will and

⁶⁵ Oetinger, "Sabbath," *Bibl. Wörterbuch*, p. 397.

⁶⁶ Oetinger, "Abhandlung von dem Zusammenhang der Glaubenslehren mit den letzten Dingen," in *Sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. Ehmman, Abt. II, vi, 265.

⁶⁷ Oetinger, "Von der Sünde wider den heiligen Geist," in *ibid.*, 454.

⁶⁸ Oetinger, *Die kabbalistische Lehrtafel der Prinzessin Antonia*, in *ibid.*, I, 129.

thereby acquire representations in the simplification of the eternal word that is infused in them." ⁶⁹

Here the concept of essentiation or essentification is related to a number of other concepts which recur in Schelling in the same context, above all the concept of "inexistence," which does not mean nonexistence but the concentric existence of different forces. This concentration of forces is further described as a "simplification" and an "intensification."

Oetinger calls the product of this simplification intensification, and concentration an "*intensum*." Concerning this *intensum* he says in his *Earthly and Heavenly Philosophy*: "An *intensum* is no composite being, but one supremely essentified and simplified by the eternal Word, since the whole is one and all in each and each in all: *essentiare* means *ad intensitatem et inexistentiam potentiae redigere*, which signifies much more than the incomprehensible *simplicitas* of the philosophers." ⁷⁰ The nature of the *intensum* is then clarified by the example of the wheels within wheels in Ezekiel's vision of God:

It is clear from Ezekiel, chapters 1 and 10, that the forces are one within the other, like one wheel in another, like one Ζῶον in another. They are not separated like the *simplicia monadum*, but are raised by God to mutual inexistence, that is, intensity. This bond of forces is the life of God and the life of the creature himself. In God it is indissoluble; in the creature, according to Plato, dissoluble. ⁷¹

All these basic concepts of Oetinger's philosophy recur in Schelling with the same meanings.

Oetinger illustrates the nature of essentification by a scientific experiment which made a deep impression on him, and to which he returns in nearly all his works, namely, his experiment with the balm plant. He describes it in detail in the second part of his *Philosophy of the Ancients*:

When I was still pastor at Waldorf near Tübingen, someone gave me a large number of balm (Melissa) plants. I laid them in the attic in the shade, where at first they were suffused with gentle warmth. During the winter and spring they lay untouched. But in the summer, curiosity impelled me to cut them up, since they were completely dried out, and to pour water on them in a retort. There

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Oetinger, *Swedenborgs und anderer irdische und himmlische Philosophie*, 1765, in *ibid.*, II, 335.

⁷¹ Ibid., 260f.

was so much water that a sort of dough formed. This I distilled into a large flask. The water all passed and filled up one-third of the flask: at last, with the same distillation, the yellow oil of the balm plants passed into the flask and floated on top of the water in the form of balm leaves, so clearly that I could see all the lines of the balm leaves and showed the sight to my wife, who looked at it for quite some time. The oil presented many balm leaves, without confusion; only they were not green but yellow and the taste was not tart. . . .

This taught me what Boerhaave had discovered in a different way but had not seen in this form, namely, that the *oleum primi generis* in plants can easily be separated out of them, in mixture with humidity, which, however, evaporates. In these I saw the formative, generative power of the oil, which beyond a doubt governs the growth of the whole plant and contains in itself the true nature of the plant, so that we may safely conclude that the *regeneratio plantarum* can be brought about from the ash through an oily but more universal spirit of this kind.

What is to be inferred from this? Answer 1. The question is: How does this form, this idea, enter in growth into perishable matter? I infer that God is present at the very center, but overgrown by the earthly, in all instruments and births. He directs the ideal influence in all seeds. I further infer that from the beginning of growth God maintains an invisible image in it. Therefore Paul says that one can feel the presence of God in these formations (Acts 17 : 27). God infuses the model of all forms into all manner of things, not by preformation but by a real, continuous operation. The primordial powers of God are in conflict and bring the substance and figure into being through the direction of the divine Ideas. The origin of all things is in the foresight of God, not as something already formed but in perpetual formation, since the forms of glory and judgment are already present in the eyes of God. There is no preformation. . . . The organism of the innumerable little canals, before being consistent, is present without preformation at the beginnings of life in a fluid image as in the balm oil. It generates itself into an ethereal, subtle corporeality, in a fluid mobile way, and at length draws to itself the elements of consistency, in order that a substance may rise from the fluid essences. In all creatures the Supreme Former generates first a sensitive and then, through the further operations of God, an intellectual soul.⁷²

⁷² *Die Philosophie der Alten, wiederkommend in der goldenen Zeit* (Frankfurt a. M. and Leipzig, 1762), Theil II, pp. 2f.

Oetinger explains Jakob Boehme's doctrine of the tincture on the basis of this experiment. The tincture is the essence, the oil, the extract of a plant; it contains the form, i.e., not only the outward image but also its powers of formation and development.⁷³ Thus in his article on the "Resurrection of Jesus" in his *Biblical Dictionary*, he connects the balm oil experiment with the Resurrection. The passage runs:

Now Paul asks (I Cor. 15 : 35): How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? And he replies that he who asks thus should examine the seeds; for those who do not are fools. That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die.—But what dies has previously lived. To die is only to cast off the things that conceal life, to cast off the coarse husk: the driving, living essence is always alive. That is what gives the grains of dust their form and the flowers their shape. This I can demonstrate by a chemical experiment with balm oil, which I set forth in the solution of the soul at Berlin (namely, in the little book *Thoughts about the Two Faculties of Feeling and of Knowing . . .*). The earthly husk remains in the retort, the formative oil passes over into the receptacle as complete form without matter. Although everyone will not understand this experiment, everyone has an intimation of its purport (I Cor. 15 : 37, 38; Rom. 8 : 22f.), originating in the secret longing and yearning to be recreated in the first essence and freed from vanity or vain endeavor. Paul demands such insight of every layman, for without it he will be lazy, unattentive, uncomprehending, soulless, without salutary introversion.

The body is twofold: the coarse husk and the substance of the spiritual body. The latter is already present in the formative life spirit, which takes the enduring grains of dust back into itself when it is sowed in the earth. So far we can reflect, and Job confirms it. (See in my little book my explanation of Job 17 : 16.) In Job a man's own body is called *minlah*. Accordingly Paul says (I Cor. 15 : 37): And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be—but only the outer husk, which does not belong to the basic substance. Out of this basic substance God gives to each man his body, as He wills, to each seed its own body. The spiritual subtle body is concealed from the natural body, but it does not emerge without God's power of resurrection. And of this we know very little. We cannot go beyond the action by which Christ makes all things subservient to him.

Now in Ezekiel (37 : 9-10) it is shown that the grains of dust

73 "Öl," *Bibl. Wörterbuch*, pp. 463ff. and 384f.

come back from the four winds through the word of God. And in Isaiah (26 : 19) it may be noted that the dew by which this resurrection occurs is a dew of light, whence certain inferences are drawn in my little book *On Births (Von den Geburten)*, pp. 29-30). The philosophers draw many lessons from the rebirth that occurs when the flower is raised from the ashes, and Job also must have known (29 : 3-4) what Cortolassaeus and other philosophers have written about the representation of the six days of the Creation. With this, however, we do not see into God's power of resurrection, but must venerate it in silent awe, until God in remote times reveals what is hidden in the creatures. Job 19 : 25-27.⁷⁴

This understanding of corporeality is characteristic of Oetinger. Corporeality and materiality are not the same. The idea is that every body, in addition to the crude material husk, contains the substance of the spiritual body, a subtle spiritual body that is hidden in the natural body but that can be brought back to life through God's power of resurrection. The same idea recurs in the article "The Eating of the Flesh and the Drinking of the Blood of the Son of Man." Here again Oetinger refers to the same experiment. "The outer flesh," he writes, "is a tissue of juices, tubes, and fibers, for the most part subject to corruption. The flesh which is the temple of the Holy Ghost is also an invisible tissue of fibers, tubes, and incorruptible oil. This is what Jesus calls spirit. Here no commentary is needed, one need only take the words together as they stand. A layman is quite capable of understanding them. The flesh is also spirit. Spirit is a tissue of effective forces, since many different things subsist in one form, and therein lies an image of the truth, just as the image of the balm plant lies inscribed in the balm oil, as I have set forth in other works. I have seen it, it rose up as a spirit and yet remained matter or flesh. But even without this experiment one can understand from Jesus' words that flesh is also spirit."⁷⁵ What Oetinger in a previous passage terms essentification is here adumbrated with the words: "Spirit is a tissue of effective forces, since many different things subsist in one form, and therein lies an image of the truth."

He speaks similarly in his article on the "Image and Likeness of God," once again in connection with the problem of death and resurrection: "I can prove by a chemical experiment that the image with all its lineaments lies

⁷⁴ "Auferstehung Jesu," *Bibl. Wörterbuch*, p. 37.

⁷⁵ "Essen des Fleisches und Trinken des Blutes des Menschensohnes," *Bibl. Wörterbuch*, p. 151.

in the generative oil of plants before the flower reveals its form. Palingenesis likewise proves it. Accordingly, such an image must also lie hidden in men, even the most godless of them, as it is written (Prov. 20 : 27): The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord. . . . Accordingly it is hidden in all men." ⁷⁶

Surprisingly enough, this story about the balm oil is also cited by Schelling in justification of his idea of essentification. In his thirty-second lecture he starts out by saying that there are two different conceptions of death. According to one, death is a separation of body and soul; according to the other, life and death are two different modes of being, that in which man appears during his present life and that in which he endures. In Schelling's opinion this second conception is more in keeping with the facts, because the notion of a separation between body and soul presupposes that man endures only in part and not as a whole man, whereas in the second the whole man endures first in one, then in another mode of being.

Concerning this second conception of death, Schelling says: "The other conception would tend rather to liken the effect of death to the process in which the spirit or essence of a plant is distilled. The entire force and life of a plant passes into the oil that is drawn out of it. That indeed the life of the plant resides in this extract may be seen from the fact that the volatile oils, and the wine sap as well, become viscous or heavy when the mother plant begins to flower again. Some supporters of the doctrine of universal palingenesis even maintain that when drops of balm oil are poured on water they take the shape of the balm leaf. I myself have not seen this and leave the matter open, although the well-known behavior of camphor and other volatile oils when they come into contact with water likewise reveals that these oils have a peculiar inner life and proves that in them life has not been destroyed but only spiritualized. Thus the death of man is probably not so much a separation as an essentification. . . ." ⁷⁷

Here as usual Schelling conceals his source with his very general reference to "some supporters of the doctrine of universal palingenesis." But the very mention of palingenesis shows that he had Oetinger in mind, for Oetinger expressly connects his experiment with the doctrine of palingenesis.

It is not surprising that Schelling in connection with his doctrine of essentification (like Oetinger in the same context) should defend the Christian view of resurrection against all "merely rational and sterile doctrines

⁷⁶ "Bildnis, Bild Gottes," *Bibl. Wörterbuch*, p. 65.

⁷⁷ Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 207.

of immortality," and in so doing should invoke Oetinger's idea that a spiritual corporeality is already present in our material corporeality. It is absolutely necessary, says Schelling, "that nature, having been obscured and beclouded for man, should be transfigured in a future state."

This confirms our view that Schelling's conception of death as essentialization is part of the general complex of his theology of corporeality. In every corporeal thing there is a spiritual-corporeal image that is the nucleus of its essence; this nucleus strives for a higher potency, and this high potency is spiritual corporeality.

It is self-evident that the general condition of nature cannot be a fixed and static one during this occurrence, but only an eternal becoming, a continual development. Yet this development has its goal, and for nature this goal is that it attain a perfect spiritual-corporeal status. But although nature can only attain its highest development in the last stage of unfolding, it is in each moment of the process, within and of itself, not a corporeal but a spiritual-corporeal being which, indeed subsiding and completely yielding to the higher, becomes matter in relation to this higher substance, but a matter which is like pure spirit and life with respect to present matter.⁷⁸

This idea helps Schelling to an understanding of the unfolding of life in all its stages in the realms of nature and the spirit. Even matter is not dead but, as a principle of formation, has that inner life spirit to which Schelling never wearies of referring. The philosophy of his time, which strides about on its idealistic cothurni despising everything that is material and all concern with it, must be shorn of its pride, and the physical world must be restored to the place and rank which are its right.

The intercourse between the corporeal and the spiritual, upon which human wit has so often been exercised, is and remains explicable only by the assumption that one and the same substance on the one side, namely, the lower, assumes corporeal properties, but above or on the side turned to the spirit, passes into a spiritual being. All other systems, however ingeniously conceived, allow the thorn of doubt to remain. The only notion conformable to natural thought is that despised idea of so-called *influxus physicus*, which of course had to be deserted as soon as matter and spirit were placed in that fatal (incurable) Cartesian dualism.

The whole life process depends on this double-sidedness of what we call matter, whose inner side, averted from our senses, we indeed

⁷⁸ Schelling, *Die Weltalter*, VIII, 281.

divine but do not discern. From the corporeal itself there continually arises an image or inner spirit of life which is embodied again and again by a reverse process.⁷⁹

Thus Schelling becomes the eloquent champion of corporeality against the arrogance of the idealists.

What is there, moreover, in corporeality that offends spiritual arrogance, which regards it as of such mean descent? In the end it is after all only the humility and external lowliness of corporeality which so offends. But just what is lowly is highly esteemed in the eyes of him according to whose judgment alone the worth and worthlessness of things is determined. And just that [corporeal] imperturbability shows perhaps that something of the properties of that primal matter is still inherent in incorporeality, of that matter which is outwardly passive but in itself is spirit and life.⁸⁰

The inner life spirit, the "image" that dwells in all things, is itself the higher potency which, hidden in the materiality of things, forms the foundation of a future sublimated mode of being, the "*materia prima* of the future world of spirits." Thus Schelling sees the whole universe carried along in a vast process of transfiguration in which all things strive to represent their innermost being in a pure spiritual corporeality.

The language of the people considers earth as the place where what is essential is suppressed and fettered, and calls that region where the essential dwells freely, and in its own essentiality, heaven. Therefore, if that potency of the beginning, reduced to being and brought to stability, is the original germ of future, visible nature, we would not err in asserting that the higher potency, in which, on the contrary, the essence is evident and the negating power hidden, when reduced to being, is nothing but the element of pure, heavenly substance, the foundation and, as it were, the primal matter of the future spirit world. For even that higher potency, although like pure spirit and life with respect to the lower, indeed like the revealer of all wonders, can yet sink in comparison with a higher one, become matter, and assume passive attributes. And strange as it may sound to say that even the spirit world has a matter, a basis on which it rests, nothing can truly be outside of God which was not created of a substratum different from the highest self.⁸¹

79 Ibid., VIII, 284; tr. Bolman, pp. 172f.

80 Ibid., VIII, 286; tr. Bolman, p. 174.

81 Ibid., VIII, 248; tr. Bolman, pp. 136f.

The core of this view is in Schelling the Christian doctrine of the resurrection in the flesh. It was the foundation of Schelling's ideas of the transformation of man and of the whole universe. Thus it is quite characteristic that his ideas on the resurrection should form the conclusion and culmination of his theology of corporeality as developed in his *Philosophy of Revelation*.

The Apostle says that Christ will one day transfigure our vile body and make it like unto his glorious body (Phil. 3 : 21). Thus we should first ask wherein the future transfiguration of our own body consists, or what this body should become. Any statement on this, however, must be preceded by questions concerning the relation of matter to the higher potencies, and for this there is not space enough in the present disquisition. The past is known—the future believed. But this much is certain: Once the external, extradivine world is admitted and granted in Christ—according to the intention of the first Creation, everything was to be encompassed in God—the ultimate purpose can only be that the entire inner world as it must originally have been should be represented visibly in the external world, but because that which was to be originally can never be forsaken, so the ultimate purpose can only be that . . . man, who is inwardly a purely spiritual essence, should also become externally a purely spiritual essence.

The Christian view differs from all the sterile rationalist doctrines of immortality in that these latter, even though they may grant or even assert a survival and a future existence of man, nevertheless know of no true goal, no truly appeasing end of this existence, particularly those that conceive of this future existence as totally divorced from nature, whereas it is absolutely necessary that nature, having been obscured and beclouded for man, should be transfigured in a future state, that the inside and outside should one day be set in harmony, that the physical thus be subordinated to the spiritual, that the body should take on the nature of a spiritual body, a *soma pneumatikon*, as the Apostle calls it (I Cor. 15 : 44), involving a trial far greater and far more appropriate to human nature than would have been possible in the original unity. A man who had withstood the first trial and maintained himself in the place where he was created, would—compared with what we now call man—have been superhuman. But since he has become a man in the present sense, it is the divine purpose that he, as a man and without abjuring the humanity to which he is attached by so many indissoluble ties, should partake of all the joys and beatitudes which were intended for him in his original existence. Only in such a future, such an end to human existence, can the

human consciousness find peace. This hope, too, we owe to Christ, whose promise entitles us to hope for a new heaven and a new earth after the last crisis (which usually means the Last Judgment).⁸²

In his second Munich period, Schelling concerned himself more and more with the problem of death and the spirit world, partly no doubt under the influence of his friends Gotthilf von Schubert and Franz von Baader, who took a profound interest in the dark side of existence and were engaged in the first systematic attempt to explore the world of the unconscious, of visions, somnambulism, and dreams.⁸³ Even at this early date, Schelling was planning to give special attention to the relation between nature and the spirit world in *The Ages of the World*. This he communicates to his friend Schubert in a letter which discloses his profound inner kinship with that great explorer of the soul:

Nature and revelation have filled you with a fervent and ever-present certainty of a higher state to which death is only a passage, and toward which, when we think of it intensely, our entire soul is drawn with longing. How often have I found consolation, not over the departed but in regard to myself at times when I felt the pressure of life heavy within me, in the old German verse:

Bitter indeed is death, and yet it seems to me
There is no greater bliss than to have died.

These experiences are merely a new bond between us.

If I am fortunate enough to complete the work on which I have been busy so long—though, to be sure, amid so many disturbances, obstacles, and interruptions—I hope I shall be able to reveal to man a few things that were previously hidden, at least from science, about the spirit world and the hereafter.⁸⁴

Schelling devoted himself still more intensively to these problems after the cruel loss of Caroline, who died of cholera in the fall of 1809 while visiting Schelling's parents at Maulbronn. Schelling's letters show that in view of this shattering experience two questions took on paramount urgency for

82 Schelling, *Phil. der Of.*, in *S. W.*, XIV, 221f.

83 Schelling quarreled with Baader over this. He found fault with Baader for using his daughter in his experiments with somnambulism and his attempts to conjure up the Devil. According to Schelling, Baader, in disregard of the deplorable effects the experiments were having on the young girl, boasted that the Devil was finally responding to his efforts.

84 G. L. Plitt, *Aus Schellings Leben in Briefen*, II, 307.

his philosophical thinking: Does the human personality survive after death? Can human love endure beyond the grave?

After Caroline's death, his philosophical interest turned more and more to the spirit world, which never again released him. The relation between nature and the spirit realm is also the theme of his dialogue *Clara*,⁸⁵ which he wrote under the immediate impact of his loss. Now that his beloved was living there, the Beyond had become a pressing reality for him. His reflections on death and resurrection on the occasion of Caroline's death provided a profound personal impetus to revive the theosophical ideas of Oetinger, which we find again in a different form, adapted to the general tenor of his speculative philosophy, in the work of Schelling's old age.

In *Clara*, the reflections on death and resurrection form the conclusion of the third dialogue. They may well serve as a conclusion to our remarks concerning theogony and the transformation of man in Schelling, for in supremely poetic language they express Schelling's ideas on the ultimate transformation, man's entrance into the spirit world, and at the same time elucidate the deepest religious ground of his theology of corporeality.

Then, said Clara, death is the liberation of the inner life form from the outward one that holds it captive?

Excellent, I said.

And is death necessary because these two life forms must be successive, since they cannot coexist once nature has descended into the realm of the purely external?

Perfectly right, I said, and you have put it splendidly. [P. 68.]

Just then the doctor came in . . . after hearing the essentials and reflecting for some time, he said:

Then a parting occurs in death?

In what sense? I replied.

Why, obviously, from the body.

Of course, I said; though not from the inner essence of the body, but from the body in so far as it is external and a part of mere external nature.

But during our present life, he said, was the spiritual essence of the body already present in the mere outward body?

In germ at least, I answered. [P. 70.]

[Here the conversation turns to the question: To what extent is

⁸⁵ *Clara, oder Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt: Ein Gespräch*, ed. Manfred Schröter (Munich, 1948).

the physical nature of man susceptible of transfiguration and spiritualization?]

When you consider yourself, I said after a time, as yourself and consequently as a person different from all others, do you not feel that at the bottom of your consciousness there is something that no concept can think away, something dark that sustains your personality, as it were?

Yes, I feel something dark, said Clara, but this darkness is just what I should like to be rid of; it interferes with the purity of the essence.

But once it is aroused, my love, I said, it cannot be dispelled, nor should it be, because with it the personality would vanish, too; but it can be transformed, so that it becomes Light, namely, a silent receptacle of the higher Light, preserving its identity not for its own sake but for the sake of this higher Light alone, so that it takes root and foundation from this Light.

Just as the diamond, she asked, seems to exist only for the light, in order that the light may be refracted and mirrored in it, and collect itself?

Just so, I said.

Should we then say, I continued, that this intrinsically dark element comes from nature or from elsewhere?

Undoubtedly from nature.

That, accordingly, every man bears within himself that dark seed, or should we perhaps say that it is a wholly fortuitous growth?

That is inconceivable, she said.

And that this seed is susceptible of endless transformation but not of destruction, or that it is subject both to transformation and destruction?

We must necessarily assume the former, she said.

But has it something physical about it? I asked.

Of course, she said, if it comes to us from nature.

Then something physical must also follow us in death?

Beyond a doubt, if the seed follows us. . . .

. . . And if, I added, the consciousness of ourself as ourself remains with us?

Again she assented.

But then, I asked, might not precisely the spiritual essence of our corporeality be the seed that follows us?

It would seem so, she said.

But it always preserves its relation to the physical?

Yes indeed, she replied, for it is still the essence of corporeality.
[P. 82.]

I continued in this manner and said: Then the spiritual essence that develops from our corporeality and is, as it were, the seat of divination, an organ by which we gain intimation of the future, is our faithful companion in this life and follows us into the future life; but woe to him who looks upon it as his genuine self, which dwells only in the spirit. [P. 89.]

[The rest of the exchange leads to the insight that even God Himself has a dark ground of this kind, namely, nature.]

If, then, God raises us up or creates us from this lesser part of His essence that is not He Himself, then our initial essence is fundamentally different from God?

Of course.

And for this very reason can, by its spontaneous activity, exalt itself either to become spiritually transfigured in Being or else to oppose it? Somewhat in the manner of a flower, which springs from the dark ground thanks to the life-giving power of the sun, but also to an independent impulse of its own, and at last transfigures its inborn darkness into light, yet remains something different from the light and the sun, something stemming from a different root, which is reconciled with the light but is not the light itself.

I understand, she said.

So that, even though after death, immersed in spiritual bliss and wholly imbued with the divine presence, we should not wish to leave this world of beatitude, even if we were able to, there still remains in us something that is different from God, something which lies dormant but lives eternally, namely, the original possibility either of parting from God's Being or of attaining independent Being in Him.

That seems to follow, she said.

And only now, with the complete transfiguration of the innate darkness in us, do we rise to the clearest and deepest consciousness of our self and of our entire state of being, past as well as present; and far from melting away like ice in water, it only now becomes perfect consciousness, beside which our present consciousness, forever obscured and limited by an antagonistic unconsciousness, is only as dream and twilight.

Here again she assented. [P. 90.]

[Concerning the gradual process of spiritualization he continues:] Yes, is it not conceivable that just as the spiritual in this external life is increasingly vanquished, so the power of the underworld over the dead is gradually broken? Or should we regard the words about Christ's victory over the age-old realm of death as mere empty generalities? My belief is this: Death had indeed become a power. When man, as you say, fell back into external nature and suspended his development toward spiritual nature, he aroused that terrible power which God had intended as the mere support of the creature, and awakened it to reality. It could not destroy him, but it held him fast, even in death, except for those whom God called to Himself. Only when He, through whom all things were made in the beginning, condescended to enter into corrupt, mortal, and perishable nature, in order to become, here too, a bond between the spiritual and the natural life, then heaven, the true spirit world, was opened again to all, and for the second time a covenant was concluded between earth and heaven. When He came to die, the light of external nature, the only light that remained to man, was extinguished as a sign of the supreme power that death had just wielded; but no sooner was He Himself entered into the dark region than the earth trembled, and the veil of the Temple—image of the cleavage between this world and the Holy of Holies into which we may now hope to enter after death—was rent, and many saints, awaking from their last sleep, appeared to show the whole holy city that the power of death had been broken. And this, my dears, brings us back to the blessed festival we have celebrated today, which is the true birthday of all nature and of man, on which they were born to eternal life; with the consequences of this day begins the spiritual age of the earth, for it too must pass through all the ages.

But now, children, let us cease and not linger after midnight, for already I fear that some who might have listened to us would say we have stirred up thoughts that only the night can condone. Even though that is not so, let us stop now. [P. 101.]

The Growth of Ideas

Two years ago at Eranos I outlined a scientific view of the creative imagination,¹ suggesting how the constructive or inventive process in the human mind may be the expression of a special kind of activity in the fine structure of the cells in the brain. I know of no reason why man's supreme faculty should be neglected by the methods of science, and certainly no scientific view of man, whether biological or psychological, can be adequate which omits his powers of imagination, construction, and invention.

My theme today is closely related: how ideas, which are one of the products of the imagination, develop and change. Here I use the term "ideas" in the widest sense. And I shall again adopt those general assumptions which I believe to be the indispensable condition of advancing clarity in any realm of scientific thought today: that everything that happens should be viewed as far as possible as a special case of one universal type of process; that this universal process is ordering or formative in character, leading toward the simplification and clarification of forms; that disintegrative processes are the by-products of a concealed formative process; and that the properties which we describe in material-objective language on the one hand, and mental-subjective language on the other, are complementary aspects of this one underlying process.

The human species has survived a long time without troubling itself greatly about the growth of ideas. So why should we now? Because it is interesting, and because it is important. The theme is interesting because it is a process about which little is yet understood. And it is important because it is central for all human beings, in no vague or abstract sense.

¹ "A Scientific View of the 'Creative Energy' of Man," *EJ* 1952.

This lecture was written in English.

If you are a parent it is sensible to try to understand the development of the mind of your child. If you wish to be a citizen of the world, it is necessary to discover what is common to all humanity beneath the conflicting prejudices of our traditional religions, and the contrasts of our various ideals. The valid foundation of our common human interests can only be found, I suggest, through the study of the historical development of the human mind. That is why our topic, the growth of ideas, is of social significance.

There has recently been considerable discussion in the schools and universities of the West of the need for a general education overcoming specialization and providing a satisfactory basis for personal and social life in the world community which we wish to create. It has been suggested that scholars concerned with the traditional humane studies, mainly the philosophers, historians, and priests, should get together and produce a Western or world manifesto, proclaiming certain universal values and ideals.

Such a notion must surely evoke the laughter of the gods and the scorn of the Marxists, and leave the great masses of Asia and Africa indifferent. Philosophy, history, and religion, in the narrower traditional meanings of these terms, display not the unity but the disunity of the race. We must look deeper to find the basis of a general education which can be universal in its appeal.

There is a sense in which human wisdom is unchanging. Beauty, truth, and goodness may in some sense remain invariant under all the transformations which man can undergo. But new centuries and new cultures develop new modes of speech, and I have no doubt that the language in which the old wisdom must be re-expressed for the coming generations is that of a matured and deepened biology of man. The brotherhood of man is a hypocrisy and an illusion unless we interpret it biologically to mean that we are all part of one history: the development of man and the growth of his mind; that we share certain universal biological capacities, needs, and potentialities; and that underlying all the prevailing conflicts, diseases, and psychoses we each and all experience certain aspirations which are rooted in our constitution as members of one species. No other approach goes sufficiently deep to overcome our personal and social conflicts.

The biological and historical study of the human story thus has a unique social justification, entitling it to some priority. But it would be misleading to suggest that that is why it interests me, or that I believe this argument alone would be effective in influencing others. The history of mankind is

too far away to hold our attention much of the time. More important is the fact that one has only a superficial and untrustworthy understanding of the traditional human values until with Marx and Freud and Jung, with Dostoevski and Nietzsche, one has looked deeper into human character and experience, and then, with the aid of the developing biology of man, has seen *everything*, good and evil, harmonious and destructive, as an expression of organic vitality at work in that special kind of organism which is characterized by human hereditary constitution and potentialities. This organic understanding of man sheds a new light on beauty, truth, and goodness and also on much that we regard as evil. For these qualities or experiences grew as man developed. They came into existence as part of the story of man. Nothing could be more remarkable than that fact. The recognition of these values came about as part of a biological process, a fact which does not make man any less, but surely makes biology more. The mind of man grew under organic laws on the surface of this planet. There was a time when there were no ideas, and then a few generations later ideas acquired a pervasive influence on human behavior. This is one of the most extraordinary features of the known universe. Mind grew out of non-mind.

The study of ideas is as old as philosophy. Ideas have been considered from philosophical, logical, and linguistic points of view. But remarkably little attention has been paid, until very recently, to considering their *genesis*.

This is curious, for this century is well aware of the significance of origins and of history. Our processes of thought are deeply influenced by the sense of historical development and the experience of rapid and profound social change. Moreover, this concern with development, which may be called the *genetic attitude*, is older than we sometimes think. Consider this quotation: "The great progress of modern thought has been the substitution of the category of *evolution* for that of *being* . . . At present everything is considered in process of formation."² That is not Bergson or Whitehead, but Renan writing in 1849, ten years before *The Origin of Species*. In our own West European culture this genetic attitude is evident in Vico as early as 1700, and it strongly marked the philosophical and biological thought of the eighteenth century. Thus in our own tradition this attitude is well over two hundred years old.

² Ernest Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme* (Paris, 1852), p. ii.

We might therefore expect to find an extensive literature dealing with the growth of the human mind and the developmental history of ideas. I remember discovering Dilthey around 1930, and being fascinated by his "Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation,"³ with its brilliant studies of the developing human consciousness, illustrated by such figures as Bruno, Spinoza, Shaftesbury, and Goethe. I imagined that scholars must have treated other periods similarly, and that by piecing their studies together I would be able to build up for myself a comprehensive history of human consciousness, or at least an outline sketch of the developing content of human awareness, so that I would have an idea of what it was like to live and think in different periods, from the earliest urban settlements to the present day. I have been questioning scholars on this ever since. There is Burckhardt on the Renaissance,⁴ Huizinga on the end of the Middle Ages,⁵ Spengler⁶ (whom I do not trust), and not very much more. But there is as yet no philosophical anthropology, no history of human consciousness, no adequately grounded natural history of ideas. At one time John Middleton Murry planned a history of the human mind, but he did not achieve it. Art, not school philosophy, is the most revealing expression of the state of mind of a period, and art historians have traced the development of painting, sculpture, and architecture as the expression of a changing emphasis of human attention during the history of different communities. Here and there a tentative attempt has been made to trace the history of key or unit ideas, such as causality, dualism, the concept of nature, and I have recently attempted a sketch of the history of the idea of the unconscious mind. The works of the American philosopher, A. O. Lovejoy, in particular one book, *The Great Chain of Being*,⁷ give a hint of what is possible in this field.

But no one has yet even attempted what I hope will be achieved in the next fifty or hundred years: a reasonably comprehensive outline of the primary factors, biological and other, resulting in the general development of the human mind, in the changing direction of attention, and in the growth and transformation of key ideas through the major cultures up to our own

3 In Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1929).

4 Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, tr. S. E. C. Middlemore (Oxford, 1944).

5 Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, tr. F. Hopman (London, 1924).

6 Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, tr. C. F. Atkinson (London, 2 vols., 1934).

7 Cambridge, Mass., 1936.

time. Clearly all the partial essays in this direction, for example works on "the History of Ideas," offer little more than a calendar of dates and quotations, and fail to portray the changing context of thought as a response to the prevailing biological and social conditions. What is needed is a synthesis of the relevant material from human biology, anthropology, pre-history and history, philosophy and science and ethics, showing why the human mind paid attention to particular problems at certain times and how it grew and was transformed.

This is far from being a new conception. In the decades from 1780 to 1800 in Germany alone Lessing, Herder, Kant, and Schiller were all seized by the idea of a universal history of man, and by that they certainly did not mean a history of technology. Indeed, it is extraordinary how much lip service has been paid during the two hundred years since Pope to the idea that the proper study of mankind is man, and to the fact that here the historical approach is indispensable. Yet two centuries of interest both in man and in origins and development have not yet led to the establishment of a mature branch of scholarship dealing with the growth of the human mind. There are encouraging signs of an objective interest in early modes of thought, such as Paul Radin's *Primitive Man As Philosopher*.⁸ But there is still no attempt to trace the development of the mind, drawing material from every relevant source.

However, the Maoris have a theory of the development of consciousness, which I take from Radin. Here are the first five lines of a Maori chant:

From the conception the increase,
From the increase the swelling,
From the swelling the thought,
From the thought the remembrance,
From the remembrance the desire.⁹

It is instructive to consider what certain vigorous branches of contemporary science—mathematical logic, information theory, language theory, and psychology—have to say about the genetic aspect of ideas.

Mathematical logic is a discipline of great power and precision, which is concerned with formal relations assumed to be given or already in existence, either in the mind, or as symbols on paper, or exemplified elsewhere

⁸ New York and London, 1927.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

in nature. But it has nothing to say regarding the genesis or meaning of the relations in question. Indeed, for both mathematics and mathematical logic *existence* is a necessary but obscure conception, which seems to require some other branch of knowledge to explain it.

The position is similar in information theory. This young branch of science is concerned with the amount of information, the number of units of information, that can be expressed, or coded, or transmitted in various ways. But the information theory specialist is not concerned with the meaning of any item of coded information, why it was selected, or how it came into existence. He is concerned, like the mathematical logician, only with existing systems of relationships.

Notice that neither of these two sciences can account for its own starting point: the existence of certain relationships. From one point of view this is natural and inevitable, for no branch of knowledge can account for the existence of its own fundamental elements. That is always the task of some other neighboring science. What is significant is that even mathematics appears to have reached the point where it requires—if further clarity is to be gained on fundamentals—the support of a non-abstract, historical or genetic science. The foundations of mathematics may indeed become clearer only when mathematics is viewed as part of man's response to his environment. In other words the genuine theoretical basis of knowledge may not be formal or abstract, but identical with the story of the historical origins of knowledge. The incomplete but developing theory of mathematics, of science, and of all knowledge, may after all be part of the history of man's development. There may be no valid fundamental theory, other than genetic theory. All theory may be historical theory. This suggestion may appear commonplace, but in fact it is a revolutionary idea, for the exact sciences are still seeking to describe nature without using an adequate principle of development.

From this point of view mathematical logic and information theory are anachronisms: the last abstract sciences appearing in a period where the genetic or historical approach is becoming indispensable for any fundamental clarification. It is indeed doubtful whether the operations of formal logic—formal deductive inference, for example—correspond to anything in the actual processes of human thought. Since about 1900 the sciences of logic and of psychology have diverged, and there does not exist at the present time any satisfactory theory of the actual processes of human

reason, or reasoning. They may bear little resemblance to formal deductive inference, being—as I shall suggest—essentially *processes of ordering*.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, probably the last genius of abstract logic, revealed the limitations of this science in the first sentence of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*¹⁰: "The world is everything that is the case." He did not mean my world or your world, but the world of logic as conceived by himself. There is the anachronism: a twentieth-century logic excluding genesis from the start: "everything that is the case." Another logician in the years to come may say, "The world is everything that becomes the case," thereby achieving two benefits at one stroke: a more comprehensive and a less abstract world of logic. When abstract clarity has been carried as far as possible, the next step must be toward clarity of meaning, and that can only be approached by a concrete historical analysis, showing how we have got to where we are. We must therefore expect in the coming decades a dramatic transformation: the surrender by the abstract sciences of their assumed autonomy, and their restoration as what in truth they are: part of the human story.

In searching for clarity on the genesis of ideas it would be reasonable to hope for assistance from the students of language, for language is clearly a changing phenomenon which can only be understood in terms of its development. However, if we put the crucial question: how did symbolic articulated speech arise, we discover not only that we do not know the answer, but worse than that, that the conceptions necessary for the correct description of the symbolizing process which underlies speech are still lacking. We have not yet created the words with which to describe the creation of words. We speak, and have done so probably for more than two thousand generations, without knowing what it is to speak.

When we turn to the psychologist we find the genetic attitude already being applied with great vigor. During the last fifty years increasing attention has been paid by psychologists to the study of mental development, particularly in the infant and child, the origins of rational thought, of logical processes, and so on. But if we make the problem more specific and ask for information about the sequence of events in the development of the child's mind of a particular conception—such as space, time, number, causality, etc.,—then we find only one living psychologist who has devoted himself seriously to the problem: Jean Piaget of Geneva.

¹⁰ London, 1922. See p. 31.

One may honor the scholars who exploit to the limit some restricted field, the semanticists who explore meaning in general, the modern logicians deploying their symbols, and the mathematician exploring the realms of abstract order and equivalence. But knowledge only remains alive by advancing. And today that means ceasing to rely on these deceptively clear abstract methods, and considering how the idea, the symbol, or the form of order came into existence, either in external nature or in the human mind. The genetic attitude is two hundred years old, but still immature. One must therefore give Piaget's studies a special welcome.

It is now time to ask: What is an idea? I hope my mode of using the term will display the meaning I intend, but an attempt at a definition may be useful. An idea may be regarded as a mental schema capable not only of determining a human response to the environment, but also of activation by itself, in absence of the customary stimulus and without any immediate response. Human thought, probably unlike animal cerebration, can work itself out at leisure without sense perception or motor action. The idea-scheme is not a static pattern, but a mode of transformation, a process originally transforming stimulus into motor patterns, but capable of operation by itself as pure thought. An idea is a mental transformation which lies behind the use of figures or symbols.

Now we are ready to ask: Where do ideas grow? The answer is, I believe, simple and important: ideas grow in single human minds and they never grow anywhere else. The individual mind must be matured in a human community and it must be shocked into doing its work by the challenges of experience, but the actual process of mental growth, the working of the imagination, goes on in single minds. The growth of an idea is a progressive ordering of experience, and all thinking consists in such ordering within the mind of one person. This is perhaps the chief dignity of the human person, for in no other part of nature can ideas grow. The vast spaces of the cosmos and the complex pageantry of organic nature contain nothing to rival the single human cortex in the intensity of its formative power. Here only is the term "creative" fully justified: man and man alone is creative in the richest sense, and he is this by himself as an individual alone with his creative imagination. Nature gives birth to all things but she has given to man the task and the capacity of shaping and accumulating novelty.

But since the lives of individuals, taken together, form a historical community, it is convenient to consider the growth of ideas from two points

of view: *first*, as a process in the development of the individual from birth to maturity, including the creative processes of the adult; and *secondly*, as an extended historical process in the development of a community. Notice that these are not two distinct processes. What we call the evolution of ideas in the race is no more than the cumulative result of all the growth and transformation of ideas that has occurred in many successive generations of individuals.

The individual, while a child, matures only because he or she is part of a community, and the community is transformed only through the contributions made by individuals when adult.

The significance of this cumulative interplay of individual and community becomes clearer when we examine two aspects of the basic growth process in the individual: the *imitative* and the *creative*. The child absorbs the social tradition by imitating; he may add to it when mature by creating. Viewed biologically, these two faculties are on a par; both are essential, and the two together make up our lives.

It was once thought that the mental development of the infant recapitulates the corresponding development of the race. For example, an early student of the psychology of games classified games from 0-7 years as games of movement corresponding to animal behavior, those from seven to nine years as games of hunting and hiding like savage behavior, those from nine to twelve years as games of rivalry and collecting like nomad behavior, and those from twelve years as gardening and building like agricultural and tribal behavior. We may speak of children as little savages, but such analogies are basically misleading, and miss an essential fact: contemporary children mature within a contemporary family which starts impressing its habits on the infant from the day of birth, so the individual of the twentieth century cannot possibly recapitulate in his own mental development the step-by-step advance of the species, which occurred without the guidance of more developed individuals. In fact, the historical and the personal development only meet in the adult creative personality, whether inventor, thinker, or artist, in whose efforts the community moves on.

Very little is known about human origins. It is possible that the major stages in the evolution of species cannot be understood without new ideas. It seems doubtful whether the *élan* which led the earliest human types toward the use of complex abstracted symbolisms, such as language, and

of fabricated tools can be accounted for as a by-product of natural selection operating on random variations, unless it is assumed that all organic processes and mental processes *par excellence* are formative.

But when we turn from speculation regarding evolutionary origins to the social history of man, and ask what is the dominant characteristic of human history, the feature which most strikingly distinguishes it from all other biological histories, I suggest that it is the progressively increasing influence of ideas on behavior. At one time human activities were determined by organic tendencies, habits, and rituals in which verbally expressed ideas played a negligible role; today language and symbolism influence every realm of behavior. From this point of view human history may be roughly divided into five periods, as shown in the chart on page 260.

This fact of the increasing social importance of ideas over long periods of human history does not justify any of the intellectualist fallacies: that behavior is motivated by reasoning, that the conscious mind is free or autonomous, that the spoken or written word is ever as clear as it pretends to be. All language, philosophy, and science are monstrously inadequate on certain basic points.

The root of the difficulty is that ideas grow very, very slowly, that ideas will only grow at all in the right kind of person. So a community may easily destroy itself by its attachment to exhausted ideas. The new, and more appropriate, idea may have to wait for a new generation or another historical period. Each philosopher, or school of thought, carries on the tradition, as it were, for one spring and summer only, and must die in order that there may be another spring.

There is deadly enmity between alternative ideas, each demanding its own *Lebensraum*. No one who believes in the importance of the continuing growth of ideas could possibly want the individual life to last longer than it does. If most scholars died at fifty the advance of intellectual understanding would be more rapid than it is now.

When one is twenty one imagines an idea comes in a flash like love at first sight, without preparation. At thirty one realizes that ten years' work may be necessary to mature a single idea. Then later one may recognize that behind the ten years' work lies a century or ten centuries of preparation by others. Behind the ecstatic moment of new insight lies a continuity of growth, slow and majestic.

The conception of *divinity* is perhaps a hundred thousand years old, but

THE PERIODS OF HUMAN HISTORY

PERIOD	DATE (VERY APPROXIMATE)	ROLE OF IDEAS
1. Prior to articulate speech.	Very uncertain ? before 200,000 B.C.	Ideas wholly absent. Behavior entirely determined by inborn tendencies and habits acquired by mimicry without use of words.
2. Progressive development of articulate speech and later of script.	Say from 100,000 or 50,000 B.C. to 3000 B.C.	Ideas begin to play a part, but their relative importance remains small, though increasing as the first civilizations are established.
3. Beginnings of rational systematic thought, and of deliberate intellectual inquiry.	Mainly after 1000 B.C.	As early civilizations come into mutual contact, the clash of contrasted traditional ideas is experienced, conscious inquiry is stimulated, and rational systems of thought are developed.
4. Development of exact science.	After A.D. 1600	With the establishment of an objective criterion for the progressive improvement of ideas in one field (by rejecting those which are quantitatively incorrect) exact science is created, and scientific ideas begin to disrupt earlier habits and less rationalized traditions.
5. Period of universal ideologies.	Twentieth century	Scientific and quasi-scientific social ideas are incorporated in great systems of thought, and affect the entire field of human behavior.

clearly not yet dead, for it is still visibly changing. The idea of *atomism* is over two thousand years old, and is now going through a critical transformation. More specialized scientific ideas may require fifty years of preliminary preparation, and more than a century to achieve their greatest influence. Here is an example:

No single achievement of the human mind has exercised such influence as Isaac Newton's formulation and exposition of the inverse square law of gravitation. This task, the mathematical development of the law and its publication in the *Principia*, occupied Newton for *three* years, from 1685 to 1687. But during *forty* years prior to this, from 1645 to 1685, no less than seven workers (Bullialdus, Borelli, Huygens, Newton, Hooke, Wren, and Halley) had been concerned with the general conception of a central law of force, either the inverse square law or some near equivalent. One wonders whether any of these mathematicians were aware that through them the human tradition was approaching one of its greatest achievements. Surely there must have been some discussion of the consequences which might result from the discovery which was already potentially in the air. But even with this long preparatory phase a similar period was necessary after the publication of the *Principia* before Newtonian principles were generally accepted in the main centers of learning, for this only occurred after Newton's death in 1727. Thus the lifetime of a special scientific idea may easily cover a period of the order of a hundred years.

This slow process of unconscious germination, hesitant preparation, concentrated effort, achievement, and subsequent spread contains many curious features. The natural history of a great idea is a chain of paradoxes, the truth being in many respects the reverse of what is commonly assumed. A new idea is useless, for no one yet knows how to use it. By the time an idea is universally acclaimed it is almost certainly dead. When an idea is revolutionary it is neglected; only commonplaces are generally recognized. The schoolrooms, the press, and the air are always a generation behind; the front line is alone protected by its strangeness from the baying of publicity. Fame is regrettable, for it implies that a thinker is no longer ahead. The leading thinkers of a current period are those who are no longer leading. One example: Einstein completed his authentic work in 1916.

But these are relatively superficial aspects of the process: the significant paradox of creative activity lies deeper: *each phase occurs before it can be justified*. Here is the apparently non-rational aspect of the growth of ideas:

each phase in the development of an idea occurs in advance of the factors which would provide its justification on any ordinary causal or utilitarian view.

This principle is most strikingly illustrated in its application to scientific ideas. The semi-conscious formative processes in the mind of the creative thinker start shaping the idea *before* it appears clearly in his conscious mind. The scientific thinker has a sense of the value of his intuition *before* he can prove it by logic, mathematics, or experiment. The act of publication has to be undertaken *before* a receptive audience for it exists. (Did ten persons read and understand either Newton's *Principia*, or Whitehead and Russell's *Principia* ¹¹ during the first year after publication?) Someone has to study the idea *before* anyone can know that it is worth the effort to do so. Finally the theoretical interest of an idea is often evident long *before* its practical or social value is established.

We have here a key principle in the biology of ideas: at each stage there seems to be no appropriate prior cause for what is happening! The unconscious processes do their work as if they knew what they were up to: the thinker cannot at first justify his intuition to others; people buy the new book mainly for irrelevant motives, and most never read it; those that do study it do so because they know or value the man, not his idea; and this social process goes on irrespective of whether the ideas may later prove to possess any biological or social value. And yet the result is often satisfactory: the idea unfolds and the tradition benefits.

Each successive stage in the life history of an idea appears to be directed toward an end in the future, as though an Aristotelian final cause were guiding it. It might seem that the process requires a teleological interpretation. Yet this is not so.

Ideas are not produced "because" they are going to be of value to the human organism or community. The truth is the reverse. The ideas which are produced in human minds are often of value, and this is so because the process which produces them is of such a character that its products are likely to be useful. The process of production is prior to the utility, and the utility is a consequence of the characteristics of this process. To be more precise: the mental process by which ideas are produced has a formative or ordering character, and it therefore results automatically that the ideas it produces tend to be of value in ordering processes; in particular creative

¹¹ A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1910-13).

thought is an ordering process; therefore the products of creative thought are useful to the human organism in ordering its affairs. *Ideas are effective because they are ordered experience.* Indeed, thinking is simply a process of ordering.

Each phase in the life history of an idea necessarily occurs before its practical justification, just as a seed has to be formed before it can grow, and a plant grow before it can bear fruit. The idea has to acquire form in the plastic matrix of a human mind before it can spread out to reorganize his systematic knowledge, and this reorganization has to be accomplished before the idea can be communicated to, and accepted by, others.

There is no impenetrable mystery here, no transcendental teleology. The magic of the process is entirely natural and intelligible. For once the formative, ordering character of thought processes is recognized, the fact that their fruits display ordering properties requires no further explanation.

Though little is known as yet regarding the exact factors and conditions of the growth of ideas some general principles are fairly clear. For example, in order to understand the developing mind of a child, he must be viewed as an organic unity developing in, and in response to, his environment. Here the seemingly abstract word "unity" means that behavior, emotion, cognition, and speech—like conscious and unconscious—are to be treated as inseparable aspects of one maturing person. In the human child ideas develop first as modes of ordering and transforming sensorimotor patterns, and later as the independent transformations which constitute true thought. What has first flowed into action is later stabilized as thought. There are no innate ideas, but there is an innate potentiality or tendency first to imitate old patterns and then to form new patterns of behavior and orderings of experience.

Thus we return to an earlier thought, that activity is made up of imitation and creation. Through imitation we learn to understand what already exists. Through creation we come to understand something new.

But no idea grows in isolation. The growth of an idea is an aspect of the growth of a person. It is always a part of the person which does the growing, a whole complex system of ideas becoming gradually more rational, more systematic, and more comprehensive—in relation to the experience of the person as thinker, artist, inventor, discoverer. Thus systems of ideas are never closed or complete, even when they seem to be, there is always some weak point which will one day become a growing point. Each stage

in the unfolding of a system of ideas represents a temporary equilibrium in the processes of mental development. As Piaget suggests, intelligence is a form of equilibrium toward which all cognitive processes tend. At such special moments when a new clarity is gained and a new equilibrium reached, a system of ideas may become simpler and more elegant. At other moments a new insight is not associated with a state of equilibrium, but rather initiates a new phase of development and growth. Indeed, many human achievements spring from an original moment of insight, and the justification of a moment of vision during a long period of successful development is one of the most precious experiences that man can enjoy.

One of the most striking cases of an extended period of germination and preparation culminating in complete fulfillment is provided by Kepler, who labored for seventeen years to justify one compelling intuition. His passionate but reverent love of harmony and order fused with his curiosity regarding the exact motions of the planets to form an unprecedented ambition and determination: to discover, to the greater glory of his God, a natural harmony, not in the timeless realm of number, but in the arithmetic of movement. Kepler searched, loyally and patiently and objectively, for seventeen years and then found what he had been looking for and communicated it to his fellows. This superb example should receive more attention from students and teachers; there is everything here, *except failure*. We see the growth of an idea, beginning as the expression of the subjective desire for order and ending as one of the most firmly based and objective group of scientific laws, that of planetary motion.

Notice that the process of growth moves from privacy toward publicity from lonely dreaming toward active communication. The moment when the first intimation of a new idea colors a human mind is profoundly secret nature is in no hurry to announce her pregnancies. The earliest rhythms of conception are so sensitive and unstable, their significance so uncertain that if we are wise we prefer not to think of them, far less to speak. All that we know is that something irrevocable, delicious, and slightly alarming has happened, which will change our ways of thinking or living in a manner which we cannot foresee.

Perhaps it was this intensely subjective and incommunicable quality of the first germination of an idea which led Dostoevski to open *Criminals and Punishment* a whole month after the first occasion on which the idea of murdering Alyona Ivanovna, the old woman pawnbroker, had floated

through Raskolnikov's brain like a vague dream. From the point of view of a novelist concerned with psychological dramas which are only partly conscious it is appropriate that the story begins with the early days in which the conception of the desperate deed was acquiring power over his will, and the terrible question was crying irresistibly for solution, until finally "he felt that all liberty of action and free will were gone, and everything was irrevocably decided." The will to murder had taken possession of Raskolnikov. The floating, barely conscious idea had grown and taken root, and was on the way to fulfillment.

There is another realm in which the growth of an obsessional idea can be traced from the start, and this has actually been done by another novelist concerned with the drama of the human mind. I mean the process of falling in love, as described by Stendhal¹² from the man's point of view. As you may remember, he discerns the following stages: the first admiration, the prospect of pleasure, the experience of hope, the emergence of the state of being in love, the first crystallization (in which imagined perfections are ascribed to the beloved), the birth of doubt, and the swing from doubt into the second crystallization (in which it is imagined that she indeed loves me).

I am not here concerned with the validity of this analysis. There are many forms of love. But Stendhal's analysis of the process of falling in love with a romantic idea of a woman throws light, both by analogy and by contrast, on the process of falling in love with an idea. A genius is a man who is capable of falling in love with an idea, and the intensity of his passion measures his greatness. But we are all geniuses in some measure, and no idea can grow at all in our minds, unless we are a little in love with it. We must be ready to be blinded and accept the risk of deception, disillusion, and failure if there is to be a chance of accomplishing anything. The worthy carrier of an idea seeks to nourish it, not at all costs—that is madness—but at the cost of many mistakes and much frustration provided only that the idea is truly alive. And that we can only find out by experience, by seeing whether under our care it does in fact grow.

But the human carrier of an idea does not always know that he is himself continually seeking to nourish and extend it. He may do that unconsciously, by innocent selection of every opportunity which his unconscious intuition recognizes as possibly offering food for the idea. Raskolnikov

¹² *On Love*, tr. Vyvyan Holland (London, 1928).

unconsciously put himself in the situation where he learned the decisive circumstance that "at seven o'clock precisely the old woman would be left alone," and thus her fate and his were decided. Similarly Stendhal's lover nourishes the fascinating, flattering idea that has brought a new warmth and color to his life by feeding it with imaginary justifications. And the schizophrenic, having failed in certain crucial respects to assimilate life to himself and to adapt himself to life, relapses into nourishing, also with invented justifications, some conception whose magnitude flatters his frustrated ego or whose symmetry so fascinates the aesthetic roots of his mind that he can think no further. And even the greatest scientists, or most of them, have at some moment fallen for an idea which possessed less justification than they imagined. Mistakes are necessary to creation.

More than that. Downright failure is also indispensable. The economists tell us that the great industrial expansion of the nineteenth century, for example in Britain, was built on financial failures, more than two companies going bankrupt for every one that succeeded. The successful financier buys for a song patents on which others have already wasted a fortune, only the fortune has not been wasted. Certainly in the world of the mind, failures are never mere waste. Every possibility must be explored, and something can be learned from the most abortive effort. Every tragedy is shot through with necessity. Every apparently negative result can be forced to yield a drop of positive truth. The emphasis which the West has laid on the successful development of the individual is most bizarre, indeed, it is a monstrous hoax, since most of our ambitions are necessarily frustrated. Moreover, the higher the ambition the greater the likelihood of failure. Most great ideas are great failures, for the constellation of success is rare. To be too successful is damning, and yet there are exceptions: the few mortals who are immortal because all their creations are touched with perfection. Failures can never be valued at their actual worth. It is psychologically inevitable that manifest failure should shock and even revolt the healthily normal mind whose measure is a day or a year or a lifetime. Since intellectual failure is often reasonably dignified, I will choose a less easy example from another field, one of the most shocking examples of waste which has occurred in Britain since the last war, in the sense that it shocked most people.

Here is the story of the growth and failure of an idea. One day early in 1946 Mr. Frank Samuel, the British Managing Director of the United

Africa Company, was flying over Tanganyika, where only 3 per cent of the land is under cultivation, and the poverty extreme. He saw the wasteland below him and wondered whether it could not grow oil crops to provide margarine for the British housewife. This was the birth of an idea, the Groundnuts Scheme, into which the British Government put £25,000,000, and to which many civil servants, technicians, and specialists devoted years of loyal and idealistic effort. It was a great conception: the British state was to initiate it, the local governments would then take over, and it was ultimately intended to lead to the co-operative development of the land by the African communities.

One can read in Alan Wood's fascinating book *The Groundnut Affair*¹³ how after nearly four years of effort the enterprise ended in disaster and was brought to a close. The failure was complete; no groundnuts were produced; the £25,000,000 was wasted. On a superficial view it was a dead loss. But there is likely to be a world food shortage in the coming decades, and I have little doubt that in 1970, or '80, or '90, the Groundnuts Scheme will be looked on as a brilliant and timely idea, unfortunately rendered abortive by mistakes, an experiment from which much can be learned by the peoples of the earth in their struggle to feed themselves.

But let us pass from such public disasters to a private example of what it is common to call failure. I have made a private game of keeping a calendar of the growth of ideas. One day about four years ago I had the idea of initiating a particular physical experiment. I knew the idea was not very clear, but I believed that it was new and significant, well worth some time and energy and patience. No warning caution arose in my mind, so the idea crystallized and became part of my will: a determination to act as midwife to the idea, to bring it to fruition. I was well aware what was happening, having experienced it often before, so I took a sheet of paper and wrote down a heading "The X Experiment," and under that "11 A.M. March 11th, 1950, had the idea of an experiment to test X."

This recording of the determination was not a playful gesture, but part of a useful technique, an act of conscious initiation, a signal from the conscious to the unconscious. The existence of the blank sheet haunts the unconscious mind waiting to be filled in with notes of things to be done, people to talk to, calculations to make, books to consult, money to be found, and so on. In the particular case I have in mind it took about four years to

13 London, 1950.

initiate and complete the experiment, which successfully *disproved* my idea. In this case experimental observation liberated me from a mistaken conviction. I was lucky to have been the instrument of an idea which could be disproved so soon, for otherwise I might have spent the rest of my life chasing a chimera.

In retrospect that calendar makes interesting reading. The enterprise took twice as long as I had anticipated. Yet aid had come from unexpected quarters. I could name the day from which the idea had acquired a life of its own and would clearly move on to its culmination whatever happened to me. It was my child, but it needed me no longer.

My last example is hypothetical. Imagine an early male member of our own species, one of our ancestors some thousands of generations back, perhaps a hundred thousand years ago, or more or less, trying to convey to his child his own dim knowledge that the setting sun will rise again tomorrow. These are my words and ideas, not his, for he has not yet the articulated or distinct ideas: "sun," "rise," "tomorrow," or words to convey them. So he must employ gesture and cry to communicate his dim awareness of a cyclic process, an eternal return by which night follows day, but then again day follows night. We can conceive this ancestor by a stroke of insight tracing out with his pointed finger the anticipated progress of the sun, from its present setting in the west through the underworld to its expected rising in the east, his symbolic gesture demonstrating to his child in swift miniature the slower motion of the sun, and in so doing achieving for himself a clearer awareness of the continuity of one particular process, a dawning sense of time. He and the thousands of others who perhaps did likewise and invented a first dance-song ritual of the setting and rising sun were the forerunners of the creators of language. And when some man had the extraordinarily daring idea of performing this ritual at some *other* hour of day, either to express for himself or convey to others the fact that he was then *thinking* about sunset, night, and dawn, then a truly human idea had come into existence, even if articulated speech still lay tens of thousands of years ahead. He had created the enchanted world of thought. From that moment, or more accurately, from that phase of development, whether it first appeared in *Homo sapiens* or some other ancestral or parallel type, to our meeting today there has been a steady chain of growth, sufficiently continuous to carry forward the achievements of the past as a developing human tradition of symbolic activities.

As I have said, we do not yet understand the growth of ideas. This is scarcely surprising, for the growth of plants and animals, a much more accessible process, is still mysterious.

But insight into these growth processes may not be very far off. For if biology comes to recognize that all organic processes are *ordering processes*, then thought itself may be understood as a special kind of ordering process. Thinking may be the process of arranging experience, assimilating it to our own condition. Ideas may be ordered experience. The purpose of this paper is to try to convey a hint of this dawning understanding.

The Dove and the Darkness
in Ancient Byzantine Mysticism

What we mean here by Byzantine mysticism is the stream of Christian mysticism which originated with the Pachomian and Basilian monasticism of the fourth century and which has continued down to our own day in the Greek and Slavonic Christian Near East. The great names that mark its history are Evagrius Ponticus, Maximus the Confessor, Simeon the New Theologian, and Nicholas Cabasilas. As Vladimir Lossky has shown in his little book on the mystical theology of the Eastern Church,¹ the idea at the source of this mysticism is the twofold fact of the transfiguration of man by the divine energies and the inaccessibility of the *οὐσία*, the divine essence. In the fifteenth century Gregory Palamas became the theorist of this conception, whose features, it might be mentioned, he considerably hardened.

In an important book, Werner Jaeger has established that the founder of this mysticism was Gregory of Nyssa.² His brother Basil had given monasticism its organic structure, but Gregory was aware that this was insufficient and that an inner vision, a mystical structure, was also needed. This structure, as we shall see, consisted precisely in the opposition between participation and transcendence, between Tabor and Sinai. But Gregory of Nyssa interests us not only because he originated this tendency, but also because he brought out one of its salient characteristics. This characteristic is *epektasis*, the notion that the mystical life is essentially a perpetual transformation, an eternal *Wandlung*, since the soul's participation in the

¹ Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (London, 1957).

² Werner Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius* (Leiden, 1954).

godhead can never exhaust the infinity of the divine essence. Accordingly, it is he who of all the Byzantine mystics most eminently stated the theme of transformation.

1. *The Wings of the Dove*

A feature of oriental theology is the close bond between mysticism and anthropology. The mystical life is the first stage of man's return to his true nature, of Adam's restoration to Paradise. To understand this restoration, we must therefore define the present state of man. In Gregory man's present state is to be clothed in "coats of skins" (δερμάτινοι χιτῶνες). This theme, borrowed from Genesis (3 : 21), has a long history in exegesis prior to Gregory. In Philo and the Gnostics it designates the body itself. Origen had adopted that meaning. Basil and Theodore of Mopsuestia had returned to the purely literal sense. Methodius of Olympus, while rejecting Origen's interpretation, admitted a figurative signification: to him the coats of skins meant "mortality borrowed from irrational nature and given to man."³

Our author follows this line. He expounds his doctrine in three principal passages. It appears first of all in his oldest work, "On Virginité," which dates from 370-371. In Chapter XII, Gregory tells us "that man's nature (φύσις) in his first creation did not include the passions and mortality."⁴ And he continues a few lines further on: "What was the first man originally? He was not clad in coats of skins."⁵ Here two points are already established: the coats of skins signify mortality and the passions—and these were alien to the first man. Why was this so? Gregory explains himself in the first chapter: "God made man in his image. And it would not be possible to preserve the idea of an image, if the beauty of the imitation contradicted the model. Hence the passions were added later."⁶ Consequently the coats of skins are foreign to the nature of man.

Gregory returned to the question in his treatise "On the Soul and Resurrection," which was written in 381. Here he speaks of the state of the resuscitated body: "When we take off this dead and hideous coat made of

³ Methodius of Olympus, *De resurrectione*, I, 39 (ed. Nathaniel Bonwetsch, *GCS*, 1917, p. 283). [All quotations are translated from the author's French renderings, unless otherwise noted.—TR.]

⁴ See the edition of "De Virginitate" by J. P. Cavarnos, in Werner Jaeger et al., *Gregorii Nysseni Opera* (Leiden, 1952), VIII, Part 1, 298, lines 3-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 302, lines 9-10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 298, lines 5-9.

animals' skins, with which we were clothed for having become caught up in the passions—we shall, along with this coat, strip ourselves of everything in us that belongs to the animal nature, sexual union, conception, childbearing, the taking of nourishment, growth, maturity, old age, sickness, death.”⁷ Here the meaning of the coats of skins is set forth in detail. To death and the passions are added sexuality and growth. All these are proper to the animal world, to biological existence. And they will be foreign to resuscitated man as they were to the first Adam.

A last text occurs in the “Catechetical Oration,” which is probably of 383. Gregory writes:

After the first men had fallen into what was forbidden and had been stripped of beatitude, the Lord gave coats of skins to the Protoplasts. I do not think that these should be interpreted as ordinary skins. Of what species indeed were the animals who were killed and skinned to provide the garment thus contrived? But since all skin removed from the living creature is dead, I believe that the meaning is the aptitude for death, borrowed from the animal world, which was subsequently given to man in a providential design, but not forever. It covers him outwardly, but does not extend to his inwardness; it penetrates the sensory part of man without touching the divine image itself.⁸

Here we see the exact sense of the “coats of skins” in Gregory. He is speaking not of the body itself, but of animality, of biological existence. Essentially this animal life implies sexuality, mortality, and the passions. In themselves they constitute a good. Thus the passions are the instincts by which the animals preserve themselves.⁹ But they are foreign to the nature (*φύσις*) of man, which is to be the “image of God” and hence implies *ἀφθαρσία*, incorruptibility, over against mortality, *ἀπάθεια*, which is the absence of passions, *παρθενία*, virginity, which excludes the animal mode of reproduction. Man has been clothed in coats of skins, not as punishment for original sin, but on the contrary as a means of escaping its consequences. Thus mortality, by making possible the dissolution and reconstruction of the human composite, prevents sin from being immortally united with our nature.¹⁰

⁷ Migne, *PG*, XLVI, 148 D – 149 A.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XLV, 34 C–D.

⁹ XLIV, 192 C.

¹⁰ XLV, 33 D.

What, in this perspective, is the justification of the passions? This is the point that interests us, for it concerns not eschatology but present existence. Gregory explains himself on this point in a last text that is to be found in his treatise "On the Dead," which is later than the works mentioned above. He writes:

In order that freedom should remain in nature and that evil be eliminated, God's Wisdom devised the idea of letting man go in the direction he wished, to the end that after he had tasted the evils he desired, his desire would bring him back to his initial beatitude. . . . That is why the good and kind Father of our nature conceived the idea of seeming to encourage man's bent by the coats of skins in which he clothed him. This coat, bearing the traits of animal nature, lust, anger, gluttony, gives human freedom the choice of aiming at virtue or at vice.¹¹

Thus the coats of skins, seen as passions, animal instincts, serve to enable man, once he turns toward pleasure, to know the experience (*πείρα*) of sin, and having suffered its bitterness, to turn freely toward God. To Gregory, he will necessarily weary of evil; "for the desire for what is alien to nature does not persist indefinitely."¹² Here we encounter ideas that come from Origen: the educational character of the consequences of original sin, satiety with sin as an instrument of conversion.¹³ But Gregory integrates them with a more general and remarkably coherent conception of the coats of skins.

But what interests us directly is the point that Gregory indicates in conclusion. The purpose of the coats of skins is to give human freedom the opportunity to incline (*ῥοπή*) in one direction or another, toward vice or toward virtue. In themselves, the "coats of skins" constitute a foreign body in man. They do not affect his real being, the image of God, which resides essentially in his freedom. But this will not be so if his freedom inclines toward the animal passions and indulges them. The image of God, which for Gregory does not reside in freedom as such, but in its adherence to the good, will then be modified and replaced by the animal aspect. Thus man's freedom is a "mirror" (*κάτοπτρον*). It takes its form from the reality toward which it inclines.

¹¹ XLVI, 524 B-D.

¹² XLVI, 525 C.

¹³ *De principiis*, III, 1, 12-13 (ed. Paul Koetschau, *GCS, Origen*, V, 214ff.).

Let us cite a text that makes this point clear:

Human nature has been endowed with free will, and it transforms itself (*ἀλλοιοῦται*) into that toward which the inclination (*ρόπή*) of its will leads it. If it welcomes the passion of wrath, it becomes wrathful. . . . It is in its power to shape itself (*συστηματίζεσθαι*) into what it wishes. . . . In reality human nature resembles a mirror (*κάτοπτρον*) and transforms itself (*μεταποιηθείς*) according to the images (*εἰκόνες*) that the will receives. If it is something ugly that appears to it, this ugliness impresses its likeness on it. Thus it masks itself (*ὑποκρινόμενον*) in the form of a toad, a frog, a salamander, or whatever appears before it.¹⁴

The end of this passage introduces a new symbolism, in which the passions are assimilated to the animals. Gregory shows man becoming a tiger through anger, a toad through lust, a vulture through cruelty.¹⁵ We know that this symbolism goes back to Plato.¹⁶ Like the symbolism of the "coats of skins," it designates the presence in man of a share of animality, whose aspect his freedom takes on in inclining toward it. The mention of animal masks should also be noted. It is possible, as Robert Eisler has suggested,¹⁷ that this is an allusion to the custom of wearing such masks during certain ceremonies, such as the Roman Lupercalia. Gregory finds here the symbol of the man who when dominated by passion no longer has a human face, but that of an animal.

The same idea is also expressed in reference to the metamorphoses that we find in the myths: "When someone has inclined toward passion and metamorphosed himself (*μεταμορφώθη*) into vice, he loses his natural form (*μορφή*) and is changed into a wild beast."¹⁸ The allusion to myth occurs explicitly: "Just as myths (*μῦθοι*) show us nature changed into the form of animals by a magic potion, so you will suddenly see this man transformed by anger into a wild boar, wolf, or panther."¹⁹ And elsewhere: "By the spells of Balaam we mean the various illusions by which men, as though they had drunk some philter akin to that of Circe, depart from their own nature to take on the forms of animals."²⁰

¹⁴ Migne, PG, XLIV, 832 D - 833 A.

¹⁵ See my *Platonisme et théologie mystique* (Paris, 2nd edn., 1953), pp. 76ff.

¹⁶ *Republic*, 589 A.

¹⁷ R. Eisler, *Orphisch-dionysische Mysteriengedanken* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1925), pp. 296ff.

¹⁸ Migne, PG, XLIV, 588 A. See also XLIV, 945 A; XLVI, 245 B.

¹⁹ XLIV, 1216 C.

²⁰ XLIV, 428 C.

Thus when the mirror of freedom is turned toward the animal world, alien to his nature, which man bears within him, he takes on its shapes and himself becomes animalized. But he can turn away from it toward the spiritual world, and so come to resemble that world. Thus freedom, according to one of Gregory's favorite terms, becomes *μεθόριος*,²¹ a border zone between two universes, susceptible of belonging to either one or the other. In the text just cited, Gregory describes this second configuration: "Human nature has been endowed with free will, and it transforms itself into that toward which the inclination of its will carries it. It has the power to take the shape it wishes. Thus in approaching inaccessible beauty, it becomes beautiful, as a mirror informed (*ἐμμορφωθεῖσα*) with its image (*χαρακτήρι*)." ²²

This theme of the soul as a mirror in which divine Beauty is reflected, sounded by Plato and Plotinus,²³ was developed above all by Saint Athanasius.²⁴ It is related to the idea of catharsis. In order to reflect the image perfectly, the surface of the mirror—ancient mirrors were of metal—must be perfectly polished: "Just as a well-fashioned mirror," writes Gregory, "reflects on its polished surface the features of him who is set before it, so the soul, purified of all terrestrial taints, reflects in purity the image of incorruptible Beauty."²⁵ This reflection of the image in the mirror is to be interpreted as a true participation in the reality reflected and as a veritable transformation.²⁶ It is through this transformation in the mirror of the soul that man can know God, who is otherwise inaccessible.²⁷

Let us examine the nature of this transformation more closely. The terms we have encountered so far, "inaccessible beauty," "incorruptible beauty," are rather general. Sometimes there is reference to the Logos. But this is not the essential line, which is disclosed in another text:

The mirror (*κάτοπτρον*) of human nature was not beautiful, but when it approached the beautiful, it was informed (*ἐνεμορφώθη*) with the image (*εἰκὼν*) of divine Beauty. Just as it had the form of a serpent when it lay on the earth and was turned toward the

²¹ See XLIV, 457 B, 504 C, 872 D, 1009 B; XLV, 608 D, 797 C; XLVI, 377 C, 972 A.

²² XLIV, 833 A-B.

²³ "Grégoire de Nyssa et Plotin," *Bulletin Guillaume Budé*, Association Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers, Sept. 1953 (Paris, 1954), pp. 259-62.

²⁴ R. Bernard, *L'Image de Dieu chez Saint Athanase* (Paris, 1952), p. 75.

²⁵ Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1093 D.

²⁶ Daniélou, *Platonisme . . .*, pp. 210-22.

²⁷ Migne, *PG*, XLVI, 1272 C.

serpent, so once it arose and turned its face toward the good, it took the form of that toward which it was turned. It turned toward the archetype of Beauty. And Beauty is the dove (περιστέρα). Thus the beauty of the dove was reflected in it. I am referring to the dove whose form signifies the presence (παρουσία) of the Spirit (πνεῦμα).²⁸

This text is crucial both for Gregory's mysticism and for the symbolism in which it is expressed. In regard to Gregory's mysticism, it brings out two facts to which Werner Jaeger has called attention in his masterly book on Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius.²⁹ One of these is that Gregory is a Semi-Pelagian in so far as he regards the conversion of freedom as prerequisite to the action of grace. And this has a historical significance, since it is an expression of the ascetic movement in monasticism to which Pelagius himself belonged. This Semi-Pelagianism stands out clearly in the theme of the mirror. Only in so far as the mirror is turned toward God will it receive his image, that is, participation in Him. But on the other hand—and that is the aspect that interests us here—Gregory stresses the action of the Spirit in sanctification. And this too has a historical significance, for he is the great doctor of the Council of 381, which defined the divinity of the Spirit. And in our text, the Spirit appears as the principle of the divinization of the soul, since it is the Spirit whose image the soul reflects.

Gregory expresses this transformation by the Pneuma in the symbol of the wings of the dove. We have noted the allusion to the dove in the text cited above. I should like to dwell on this for a moment, as it is important for what we shall have to say later on. In his *Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles*, Gregory comments on verse 6 : 5 [D.V. and LXX, 6 : 4], which in the Septuagint runs: "Turn away thine eyes from me, for they have given me wings." With this he compares various texts from the Old Testament, containing references to the wings of God, in particular Psalm 16 : 8: "Protect me under the shadow of thy wings"; and 35 : 8: "Thou shalt set thy hope in His wings."³⁰ But he writes, Scripture says that man was created in the image of God. "If then the archetype is winged (ἐπτέρωται), human nature must be so too."³¹

²⁸ XLIV, 868 D - 869 A.

²⁹ Pp. 70-114.

³⁰ D.V.: "Protect me under the shadow of thy wings."

³¹ XLIV, 1101 A.

But what do these wings mean?

It is evident that the word wings should be interpreted in a metaphoric sense if it is to be applicable to God. The wings of God are power, beatitude, incorruptibility, and other things of the same kind. . . . Therefore, since these qualities were in man as long as he resembled God in all ways, and since the inclination (*ρόπή*) toward evil has despoiled (*ἀπεσύλησεν*) us of these wings, the grace of God hath appeared in order that, denying ungodliness and worldly desires,³² we should have wings again (*πτεροφυήσωμεν*) through piety and justice and that our soul might be winged once more (*ἀνεπτέρωθήμεν*) in accordance with primordial (*ἀρχαία*) grace; that the soul which had lost its wings (*πτερορρυήσασα*) through the disobedience of the Protoplasts should regain the wings of the dove through virtues.³³

Let us note the various elements that make up this text. The first and most evident is the Platonic theme of the wings of the soul from the *Phaedrus* (246 B-D). Several terms, which I have emphasized by reproducing the Greek word, have been borrowed literally. And this text from the *Phaedrus* is explicitly cited elsewhere by Gregory,³⁴ who goes into great length refuting its Platonic meaning. He knows it well and borrows from it, notably the expression "to soar aloft" (*μετεωροπορεῖν*), which is a favorite with him.³⁵ The identification of the "wings" with the "virtues" is Neoplatonic. We find it in Hierocles.³⁶ But the Platonic idea is transferred to a Christian context. The wings are the transfigured characteristics of man, incorruptibility and beatitude, or the Pauline virtues of piety and justice. This identification designates the state in which the Protoplasts were created in the beginning, which they lost by sin, and which the coming (*παρουσία*) of the Word restores.

The transposition is expressed by the fact that the wings become "the wings of the dove." The image is borrowed from Psalm 54 : 7: "Who will give me wings like a dove and I will fly and be at rest?"³⁷ But the dove of the Psalm is assimilated to the dove of the Jordan, as was the dove of the Canticle, and becomes the symbol of the Pneuma: "How will a man fly

³² Titus 2 : 12.

³³ Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1101 A-C.

³⁴ XLVI, 113 C - 117 A.

³⁵ Daniélou, *Platonisme . . .*, pp. 151-53.

³⁶ *Commentaries in Aurea Carmina*, 144, 5.

³⁷ See Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1140 B.

heavenward if he be not winged (*πτερωθείς*) with celestial wings, and if he become not without weight and aerial (*μετέωρος*) through a celestial life? And who is so ignorant of the mystery of the Gospel as not to know that the human soul has but one vehicle (*ὄχημα*)³⁸ by which to journey heavenward, that is to make itself like unto the flying dove, whose wings the Prophet David longed for (Ps. 54 : 7). It is thus that the grace of the Holy Spirit is usually designated in Scripture."³⁹ Thus the Platonic theme of the "wings" and the Gospel theme of the "dove" are brought together by way of the Psalmist's "wings of the dove."

Can we determine when this theme began to take form? In the second century Tatian established a relation between the wings of the soul and the primitive state of man, and compared the fall of man to the loss of wings.⁴⁰ Here Tatian seems to have echoed the Gnostic speculations on the fall of man, which they compare to the myth from the *Phaedrus* criticized by Plotinus.⁴¹ This theme is taken up again by Origen:

The statement that the man who was cast out of the garden with the woman was clothed with "coats of skins," which God made for those who had sinned on account of the transgression of mankind, has a certain secret and mysterious meaning, superior to the Platonic doctrine of the descent of the soul which loses its wings . . .⁴²

We have encountered this theme in Gregory of Nyssa. We note the contrast between the wings of the soul and the coats of skins.

There is another approach, according to which the "wings of the soul" symbolize the "lightness" that is necessary if one is to rise toward God. This sense is developed at length by Methodius of Olympus: "The souls which have good wings (*εὐπτεροί*), that are not heavy, raise their heads (*ὑπερκυψάσαι*) above life toward the hypercosmic realm; beholding from afar what no man has seen, they concentrate on these things."⁴³ The wings are identified with virginity. Essentially they signify unheaviness, detachment from the weight of the flesh. Gregory of Nazianzus indicates this

³⁸ This use of *ὄχημα* comes from *Timaeus*, 69 c.

³⁹ Migne, *PG*, XLVI, 265 c-d.

⁴⁰ *Oratio adversus Graecos*, 20 (Migne, *PG*, VI, 851).

⁴¹ *Enneads*, II, ix, 13. See A. Orbe, "Variaciones gnósticas sobre las alas del alma," *Gregorianum* XXXV (Rome, 1954), pp. 24ff.

⁴² *Contra Celsum*, IV, 40, tr. H. Chadwick (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 216f.; *GCS*, Origen, Vol. I, 313-14. See A. D'Alès, "Les Ailes de l'Âme," *Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses* (Louvain), X (1933), 65-66.

⁴³ *Symposium*, VIII, 2; *GCS*, Methodius, 82.

meaning.⁴⁴ It is also found in Evagrius⁴⁵ and in Gregory of Nyssa. Or the wings may designate prayer, whereby the soul rises "above the back of the celestial vault."⁴⁶ More frequently they signify detachment from things terrestrial.

But all this does not show us the connection between the "wings of the soul" and the dove of the Jordan. Yet there is a connection, and our oldest record of it carries us back to Gnosticism. Hippolytus, describing the system of Basilides, writes: "The [second] sonhood (*υἱότης*) wings itself with some such wing as that wherewith Plato, Aristotle's teacher, equips the soul in the *Phaedrus*, and Basilides calls the same not a wing but [the] Holy Spirit."⁴⁷ Here we need not go into the Basilidian doctrine of the three filialities.⁴⁸ The essential for our purposes is that the wings designate the grace of the Holy Spirit, which enables the soul to rise, and that they are thus assimilated to the dove. Clement of Alexandria employs the same image outside of any Gnostic context,⁴⁹ and shows us the soul "winged by the Holy Spirit." The relation between the "wings of the dove" of Psalm 54 and the Holy Spirit also appears in Origen,⁵⁰ and we find it again in Gregory of Nazianzus.⁵¹

But these ideas are not fully formed. Gregory of Nyssa seems to have been the first to develop fully the theme of the "wings of the dove" as a symbol of the grace of the Holy Spirit. And the reason for this no doubt is that in him several traits favorable to this development were combined. He was saturated with Platonism; and, as we have seen, some of his favorite motifs were inspired by the myth of the *Phaedrus*. For another thing, it is in him that the role of the Holy Spirit in the transfiguration of the soul assumes its full importance. Hence it is understandable that he should have taken up the traditional theme of the wings of the soul, provided him by his masters Origen and Methodius, but that he should have modified its meaning.

44 *Oratio XVII*, 2, Migne, *PG*, XXXV, 965 c.

45 R. Draguet, "L'Histoire lausiaque, une œuvre écrite dans l'esprit d'Évagre," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XLII (Louvain, 1947), 30-31. J. Muyldermans, *Evagriana Syriaca* (Bibliothèque du Muséon, XXXI, Louvain, 1952, p. 163).

46 Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1209 A. See also XLIV, 465 c, 1265 D.

47 Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*, VII, 22 (tr. F. Legge, London, 1921, II, pp. 69f.).

48 See Orbe (n. 41, supra), pp. 37-41.

49 *Stromateis*, I, 1, 4, 3; *GCS*, Clement, Vol. II, 5.

50 *Fragments from the Lamentations of Jeremiah*, 83; *GCS*, Origen, Vol. III, 267.

51 *Oratio XVII*, Migne, *PG*, XXXV, 965 c.

2. *A Philosophy of Change*

Up to this point we have sought to establish the nature of the fundamental transmutation effected by the Spirit, the Pneuma. In this second part I should like to take up another question, which is a continuation of the first, by showing how, for Gregory of Nyssa, this transmutation is not only a decisive factor, but is constitutive of man's very being. For him the φύσις, the "reality" of man is not to *be* spiritual, but continuously to *become* so. In this sense *Wandlung* is the very reality of man.

This implies a positive conception of change that is a capital acquisition of Christian anthropology. For Platonism change (ἀλλοίωσις) is regarded with distrust. The intelligible world as opposed to the sensible world is characterized by immutability. Origen's Christian Platonism does not surmount this difficulty. Change is conceived as a degradation from an initial perfection. The object of the transmutation effected by Christ is solely to restore immutability, hence to destroy change. But change is a constitutive factor in man's essence; it is that which distinguishes him from God. We see the consequence—and Gregory of Nyssa was well aware of it: if change is a constitutive factor of man's existence, and if change is essentially degradation, the possibility of a degradation is constitutive of man's existence and the good can never be guaranteed. God's action will consist in ceaselessly restoring to its primordial immobility a mankind which tends ceaselessly to break away from it. Movement becomes a perpetual coming and going, a series of falls and resuscitations. "The soul," writes Gregory, "is always unstable where it is. There will be a kind of cycle in which the same things come and go."⁵²

To surmount this difficulty, it was necessary to go beyond the equations: good = immobility, evil = change, and to show the possibility of a change that is not merely a return to immobility, hence a negation of change. This is the real revolution brought about by Gregory of Nyssa. He starts by affirming with Origen that change is constitutive of all that is created: "We are by necessity of a mobile (τρεπτή) nature. For it is not possible that what was initiated by a change (ἀλλοίωσις) should not itself be changing. But the passage from nonbeing to being is a change, in which that which is without consistency acquires consistency through the power of God."⁵³

⁵² Migne, *PG*, XLVI, 113 B.

⁵³ XLV, 57 D.

And again: "Who does not know that all those beings that are in becoming (*γένεσις*) do not remain identical with themselves but pass continuously from one state to another? And this change is a perpetual birth (*γέννησις*)."⁵⁴ This change, as we have said above, can be effected in two different directions.⁵⁵

The new point is that these two movements differ in nature.⁵⁶ Let us first consider the lower movement. It consists in a repetition, a cycle, a marking time: this is the motion that characterizes the biological world; it recalls our comparison of human types to animals. It is the movement of nature: the sea is the "receptacle of the waters that come from everywhere, and neither does the flow cease nor the sea grow larger. What is the aim of this flow of waters forever filling what they fill? Why does the sea receive it, yet never increase?"⁵⁷ Similarly, the sun "rises in the East and pursues its course toward the West. And then on the other side of the earth it continues on its way. And thus perpetually pursuing its cyclical movement, it repeats the same orbit: *Gyrat in orbem*, says the Scripture."⁵⁸ Such is the cycle of the human generations. And such is the cycle of all biological life.

The man who is immersed in biological existence knows only this cyclical movement. "The pleasure of drinking ceases when our thirst is quenched and food extinguishes the appetite. Every desire fades with possession and when reborn fades once more."⁵⁹ The man who applies himself to such satisfaction of his desires is comparable to the Hebrews when they were prisoners of the Egyptians, figures of the demon, and reduced to manufacturing bricks:

Those who avidly seek this form of pleasure may glut themselves as they will, never can they keep the receptacle (*δοχεῖον*) of their pleasures filled, for no sooner is it filled than it is emptied again by a new flow: just as the molder of bricks must keep putting new clay into his mold as it empties. Thus as the desire for one thing is satisfied, it becomes empty for the next, and this never ceases in us as long as we are subjected to this material life.⁶⁰

54 XLIV, 328 A.

55 XLV, 60 A.

56 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée* (Paris, 1952), p. 11.

57 Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 624 D - 625 A.

58 XLIV, 695 C.

59 XLIV, 648 D.

60 XLIV, 344 A.

Thus man, like the animals who turn a mill wheel, is enclosed in the prison of eternal return. "Like the beasts who turn a mill wheel we turn round and round, our eyes blindfolded, in the mill of this life. I will tell you what this cycle (*κυκλικήν περίοδον*) is: hunger, satiety, sleep, waking; one follows the other and the other follows the one, and never does the round come to an end until we escape from this mill."⁶¹ The same words indicate the cyclical movement of the sea that empties and refills, and the movement of desire: man is a captive in the prison of the cosmos.

But ultimately the cosmos is inconsistency, illusion. There is motion, but no progress. This is expressed in another image, the image of the sand: "All the effort of the man involved in earthly cares is a child's castle in the sand; the pleasure ceases with the effort devoted to it. The castle collapses and there remains no trace of it."⁶² And still more clearly: "Those who climb a dune may take long strides; all their trouble is in vain, for the sliding sand keeps bringing them back down. There is expenditure of movement but no progress."⁶³ Thus we arrive at the paradox that what the Platonist calls motion is really immobility: all his agitation leaves man in a state of absolute identity and brings with it no spiritual change.

Wherein then consists the other kind of motion? Gregory has summed this up in a remarkable text:

Man does not employ motion (*τροπή*) only in the direction of evil. It would be impossible for him to be in the good if his natural leaning were only toward its opposite. Actually there is an admirable (*κάλλιστον*) operation of movement consisting of growth in the good, change (*ἀλλοίωσις*) toward the better, perpetually transforming (*μεταποιούσα*) that which changes beautifully into something more divine. We shall show that what seemed terrible (*φοβερόν*)—I am referring to the fact that our nature is changing—is a kind of wing (*πτερόν*) in flight (*πτῆσις*) toward the better and not to desire change for the better would for us be a loss. Therefore let him who sees the propensity for change in our nature not be grieved; rather let him also change thus, let him change perpetually for the better and metamorphose (*μεταμορφούμενος*) himself from glory to glory, becoming forever better by daily growth, perfecting himself unremittingly, and never attaining th

61 XLVI, 888 D.

62 XLIV, 628 C-D.

63 XLIV, 405 C-D. See also XLVI, 500 D - 501 D.

limit of perfection. For this indeed is perfection: never to stop increasing in the good, and to set no limit to perfection.⁶⁴

Let us note some of the elements of this text. First, there is man's anguish in the face of change, which may be said to be a characteristic of all nature religions. This anguish is bound up with the purely negative conception of change that can operate only in the direction of evil. But actually, as Gregory repeatedly points out, there is also an admirable (*κάλλιστον*) kind of motion, a good change (*ἀγαθὴ ἀλλοίωσις*).⁶⁵ In a Greek environment such a dissociation of the concepts of "beauty" and "change" represents a revolution. This good change is the "transformation from glory to glory" of which St. Paul speaks. It is a perpetual growth in the good. Thus it is an error to conceive of perfection as immobility in the recovered good. Perfection is progress itself. The perfect man is the man who progresses. And this progress can have no limit. The wing, finally, is transformation into the Pneuma, into the dove. But this wing is a principle of motion and not merely the cessation of bad motion. In other words—and this is the answer to our question—once the good has been acquired and the soul transformed into a dove, the good is no longer regarded as a possession that need only be defended against change, which can only be a fall. The good that has been acquired is only a starting point toward new goods; and accordingly the change that is constitutive of man can take on a purely positive meaning.

While the instability of the sensory world has been disclosed to us as an actual immobility, here, by a kind of reversal, fixity in the good becomes the principle of a true motion:

It is the most paradoxical of all things that stability and mobility are here the same thing. For ordinarily he who advances is not immobile, and he who is immobile does not advance. Here he advances by virtue of his immobility. Those who climb a dune may take long strides, but their trouble is in vain, for the sand keeps sliding and carrying them downward. But if a man has withdrawn his feet from the bottom of the abyss and given them a firm hold in the rock, the firmer he is in the good the more rapid becomes his progress. His stability is for him like a *wing* in his journey toward the heights; his flight is winged by virtue of his stability in the good.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ XLVI, 285 B-C.

⁶⁵ XLIV, 460 B-C; 500 B.

⁶⁶ XLIV, 405 C-D.

Here we have come to the basic intuition of Byzantine mysticism. The wings of the dove are the participation in the divine life, the entire positive aspect of the energies that have really transmuted the soul. These wings enable it to mount ever higher, for the heavens to which it ascends are a bottomless gulf. God is both alien and familiar, forever more alien and forever more familiar, familiar as the dove and alien as the darkness, known to the little child and unknown to the greatest mystic. Thus the soul both seeks Him and possesses Him. It is both *immobile and mobile*: "This is the most paradoxical of all things: all wells contain stagnant water. But the well of the Bridegroom is a well of living water. It has the depth of a well and the mobility of a river."⁶⁷

This twofold aspect is constitutive of man's nature. We have just said that it is man's nature to be transfigured by the Pneuma, but it is equally essential that the transfiguration be always a becoming. This is the very meaning of the term "God's image," which comports both the reality of divinization and a distinction from the godhead.

It can be shown that change is a necessary part of man as an imitation of the divine nature. If the imitator were not changing, he would be absolutely identical with what he imitates. Herein lies the difference separating the creature made in the divine image from the archetype; the one is subject to change, the other is not. Change is a movement of continuous progress from what one is toward something else. And there are two kinds of movement: the one toward the good develops perpetually and knows no end, because that which is in process of transformation has no limit.⁶⁸

This brings us to the second major theme of Gregory's mysticism, the darkness, that is to say, the incomprehensibility (*ἀκατάληπτος*) of the divine essence (*οὐσία*).⁶⁹ This element is first brought out in a passage in the *Contra Eunomium*, relating to Abraham:

And he went out, not knowing whither he went (Hebrews 11:8). But he did not even seek to know the name of Him whom he loved and felt neither grief nor shame at this ignorance (*ἀγνοία*). On the contrary, it was his surest pledge of his resolution not to be

⁶⁷ XLIV, 977 c.

⁶⁸ XLV, 57 D - 60 A.

⁶⁹ See Daniélou, "Contemplation chez Grégoire de Nysse," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, ed. M. Viller et al. (Paris, 1950), Vol. II, cols. 1873-76.

guided in his thoughts on God by any familiar thing, and not to let his spirit stop at any of the things which make the intelligence waver in its march toward what is beyond (ἐπέκεινα) the grasp of the intelligence. That is why, having purified his mind of every idea and his faith of every representation, he regarded it as a sign of a secure knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of God that he believed Him above all determination.⁷⁰

But it is in the *Life of Moses* that the theme is developed in all its breadth. We shall quote only a single passage:

The more the spirit in its march forward perfects its endeavor to understand what the grasp of reality (ἡ τῶν ὄντων κατανόησις) is and the closer it comes to contemplation (θεωρία), the more it sees the invisibility of the divine nature. Thus Moses, having left the world of appearance (τὸ φαινόμενον), not only what the sensibility grasps but what the intellect (διάνοια) believes it contemplates, progresses more and more inward, until by the activity of his spirit he penetrates the invisible (ἀθέατον) and the incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτον), and sees God. For the true knowledge and vision of God consist in not seeing (ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἰδεῖν), because He transcends all knowledge, being cut off on all sides by His incomprehensibility as by a darkness (γνόφῳ).⁷¹

Gregory did not invent this theme of the darkness. The first author in whom we find it is Philo,⁷² from whom Gregory certainly derived it. In Philo it results from the convergence of two elements, the Biblical doctrine of the invisible God and the Platonic conception that the good transcends being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).⁷³ We shall see that these two elements recur in Gregory's texts. Philo's doctrine was adopted by Clement of Alexandria. But it was developed above all in the gnosticism of Valentinus.⁷⁴ It was no doubt because of these Gnostic exaggerations that it lost ground in the theology of the third century. In the fourth century Cyril of Jerusalem revived it on the occasion of the anti-Arian controversy. But it is in

⁷⁰ Migne, *PG*, XLV, 940 C - 941 A.

⁷¹ XLIV, 376 D - 377 A. Here I translate from the still unpublished critical text that I have established. The text in the *Patrologia Graeca* is defective.

⁷² See H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), pp. 111ff.

⁷³ *Republic*, 509 B.

⁷⁴ F. M. M. Sagnard, *La Gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de Saint Irénée* (Paris, 1947), pp. 331-33.

Gregory and John Chrysostom⁷⁵ that it assumed its full breadth before being systematized by Pseudo-Dionysius.⁷⁶

As in the case of the wings of the soul, the Platonic theme from which the vocabulary is borrowed undergoes a profound transformation in the Biblical context. The divine darkness does not, as Puech observed, signify only "the inadequation by reason of eminence between ignorance and ordinary knowledge, but also the inadequation by reason of privation between this same ignorance and its aim which it is incapable of attaining."⁷⁷ In other words, it is not only because the spirit is obscured by the flesh or conditioned by the categories of space and time that the spirit does not wish to contemplate the divine essence, but because the divine essence remains absolutely transcendent in relation to the created spirit, even when this spirit is totally detached from the senses and the imagination.⁷⁸ God is darkness even for the angels.⁷⁹

It follows—and this is the essential point for our purposes—that whatever may be the soul's participation in God, its transformation into a dove, God remains always beyond it (*ἐπέκεινα*), and the soul must always progress:

God is infinite in the good and knows no limit. When He draws the human soul to participation (*μετουσία*) in Him, He always, by the transcendence (*ὑπεροχή*) of His perfection, transcends this human soul in the same measure. The soul becomes perpetually greater than itself through its participation in the transcendent, and does not cease to grow. The good in which it participates remains equal, for it is perpetually discovered by him who participates increasingly in it, in a transcendence that is always equal.⁸⁰

Now we understand why Moses, having seen God face to face, nevertheless asks Him to manifest himself still more.

And indeed He would not have shown himself to His servant if this vision had been such as to quell his desire. For such is the true

⁷⁵ See the introduction by Ferdinand Cavallera and Jean Daniélou to John Chrysostom, *Sur l'incompréhensibilité de Dieu*, French tr. Robert Flacelière (*Sources chrétiennes*, XXVIII; Paris, 1951), p. 18.

⁷⁶ See H. C. Puech, "La Ténèbre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys," *Études Carmélitaines*, XXIII : 2 (Paris, Oct., 1938), 33-53.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷⁸ See V. Lossky, "La Théologie négative dans la doctrine de Denys l'Aréopagite," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Paris), XXVIII (1939), 204-221.

⁷⁹ Migne, *PG*, XLV, 932 D - 933 A.

⁸⁰ XLIV, 873 D - 876 A.

vision of God that he who is turned toward Him never ceases to desire Him. He who thinks that God is something determinate passes Him by and grasps only the activity of his own spirit. For if God transcends knowledge, what is grasped by the spirit is not He. Hence what Moses desires is fulfilled by the very fact that his desire remains unquenched and never ceases to tend forward. For never to achieve satiety in this desire is really to see God.⁸¹

These texts carry us into the heart of Gregory's thinking. We see that the darkness is not a negation of the knowledge of God. For God is really known through the soul's participation in Him. Thus knowledge in the mirror and knowledge in the darkness are not, as Gabriel Horn has said,⁸² two distinct experiences but two aspects of the same experience. But since this understanding of God is always deficient in relation to what He is, it will always be oriented toward a better understanding. Thus mystical knowledge is always a synthesis of knowledge and ignorance, of possession and quest, of inwardness and transcendence, it is luminous darkness. This always incomplete understanding is the only legitimate knowledge of God, because it maintains the infinity of ignorance in the finiteness of knowledge.

In formulations that run through Gregory's work this spiritual attitude is characterized as a perpetual growth: "To find God is to seek Him without cease. For seeking is not one thing and finding another; the profit of the quest is the quest itself."⁸³ And again: "He who wishes to see God sees what he desires by following him always, and the contemplation of His face is the incessant march toward him in the train of the Word."⁸⁴ And yet again: "To progress always in the quest, this is the true joy in the Beloved."⁸⁵ Thus *Wandlung* becomes the very structure of spiritual being.

3. *The Dove and the Darkness*

We have seen that through a rigorous affirmation of both participation and transcendence, motion can become a constituent element in the created spirit. As long as we clung to the Platonic perspective in which the intelligible (*νοητόν*) was identified with the divine (*θεῖον*), motion could only

81 XLIV, 399 A - 404 D.

82 "Le Miroir et la nuée," *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* (Toulouse), XVIII (1937), 37ff.

83 Migne, PG, XLIV, 720 C.

84 XLIV, 1028 A.

85 XLIV, 1037 B.

be fall, since the divine is immutability. But as soon as the divine is declared to transcend the intelligible, another motion becomes possible, that of perpetual ascension. This motion tends toward the motionless, and in this sense it is at the opposite extreme from the agitation of the sensuous world. It is concentration, unification: he who sees the One (*μονοειδής*) is synonymous with him who sees God (*θεοειδής*). But this stabilization, this unification is never complete. The soul is conceived as a spiritual universe eternally expanding in the infinite darkness.

Gregory describes this growth, which he calls *epektasis*:

Just as a heavy body, once the first impulsion is given, does not stop in its fall if nothing interrupts its motion, so the soul delivered from its earthly bonds soars lightly and swiftly aloft [we are reminded of the wings of the dove]. If nothing comes from below to interrupt its flight, since the good has the property of drawing to itself those who raise their eyes toward it, the soul rises farther and farther above itself, carried forward (*ἐπεκτεινόμενος*) by the desire for celestial things. Its determination not to renounce the summits beyond for what it has already acquired lends it an ascending motion that never ceases, and in what is already realized it finds a new impulsion to mount still higher. For only spiritual activity has the property of nourishing its power as it expends it and of increasing its vigor through exercise. Thus once Moses has set foot on the ladder, he mounts continuously to a higher rung, continuing always to rise, because each rung leads to something beyond.⁸⁶

In this text we note the appearance of the word *ἐπεκτεινόμενος* which Gregory borrows from St. Paul (Philipp. 3 : 13).⁸⁷ It excellently expresses the perpetual forward movement of the soul, which forgets what is behind and is forever open to new graces. Gregory defines the word as follows:

After communicating his great visions to the Corinthians, after saying that he hesitated to speak of the state in which he was at the time of his initiation (*μυσταγωγία*) into Paradise, Paul adds: I do not count myself to have apprehended. But one thing I do: Forgetting the things that are behind [I stretch forth] (*ἐπεκτείνωμαι*) to those that are before. Even after this experience of the third heaven, which he is alone in having known, since Moses does not speak of it in Genesis, even after he has heard the ineffable words

⁸⁶ XLIV, 400 D - 401 B.

⁸⁷ Daniélou, *Platonisme* . . . , pp. 291-307.

of Paradise, he strives upward and does not interrupt his ascent (*ἀνάβασις*), never considering what he has obtained as a limit to his desire, and thereby teaching us, I believe, that in the beatific reality of goods what one discovers is abundant, but that which is above what one grasps at each instant is infinite. And this goes on forever, the participants growing perpetually through a perpetual increase of goods for all the eternity of the aeons.⁸⁸

The word *epektasis* lends itself admirably to expressing the twofold aspect of the progress. On the one hand there is a grasp (*ἐπί*), a real participation in God, a *theopoiesis*. We have insisted on this aspect in connection with the mirror. The soul is really transformed (*μεταστοιχείωσις*) into something divine. It participates really in the Pneuma. But at the same time God is beyond; the soul must perpetually go out of (*ἐκ*) itself, or better still, surpass the stage it has reached in order to turn toward a new discovery. So Abraham: "More and more he builds on what he has discovered in order to reach out toward what is before him, surpassing what he has grasped by himself as inferior to what he is seeking."⁸⁹ Thus each stage has its validity. It is a glory. But before the new glory that is rising its radiance is obscured. The sun of the new creation obscures the radiance of the first sun, the New Testament obscures the Old Covenant. The laws of collective history are the same as those of individual history. There is no depreciation. All the stages are perfections and are admirable. The mistake would be to attempt to appropriate them, to hold them, and so to immobilize the movement of the soul. Sin is a refusal of growth.

Gregory expressed this by the image of the successive cloaks. "The soul which had cast off its old coat and which was stripped of all clothing feels clothed in comparison with the new purity that arises within it, but after having stripped off every cloak, finds something more to take off. Thus the ascent to God always reveals some heaviness by comparison with what is discovered. That is why, in view of the present purity, the nakedness previously described must be cast off in turn by those to whom this purity is uncovered."⁹⁰ The soul was indeed denuded, but this nakedness becomes a cloak in comparison to a greater purity that is revealed to it. But this it could not know before. It was right in thinking itself denuded, because it did not know a purer nakedness.

⁸⁸ Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 940 D - 941 A.

⁸⁹ XLV, 941 B.

⁹⁰ XLIV, 1029 B-C.

Thus man is made up of concentric circles of reality. The successive stripping of the superimposed outer garments permits a progressive entrance into the inner man. All these deaths and resurrections carry the soul closer to the God who lives in its center, but who there remains inaccessible; the circles of inwardness are infinite in number, and perfection consists in this perpetual inward movement, which is a perpetual discovery of God.

Here we touch on the very heart of the attitude described by Gregory. Man always has a tendency to try to fixate the perfect moments to which he attains, to regard time as a threat to his fragile joys, to seek to recapture his past ecstasies and bring back the time that is lost. For Gregory on the contrary the future is better than the past. But to surmount the natural inclination of the soul, one requires the support of faith, which is loyalty to the promise. This is the transition from poetry to prophecy, from Platonic anthropology to Biblical anthropology. Paradise is a future, creation is a future. The essential is no longer a remembrance but hopes. Forgetfulness, which is the prime sin for the Platonists, becomes a virtue. One must leave the known and advance toward the unknown, toward "the open," as Rilke would say. This, in the truest sense, is the adventure of Abraham going forward into the night: "The archetype of the Christians," Jean Héring has written, "is not the princess sent into exile, who aspires to return, but Abraham who sets out for an unknown country that God will show him."⁹¹

But a question arises. Is this quest not a suffering, if the soul is never to be sated? Gregory brings up this objection in a number of passages where he speaks of the despair of the soul, disappointed that what it is seeking always recedes before it. So Moses.⁹² And so the Shulamite in the Cantic: "Having gone forth at the word of the Bridegroom in quest of him whom she does not find, she learns from the watchmen of the city (the angels) that she loves the inaccessible and desires the unattainable. This fills her with despair (*ἀνελπιστία*), for she thinks that her desire for the Other is without end (*ἀτελῆ*) or fulfillment. But the veil of sadness is removed from her when she learns that to progress and rise without cease is the true enjoyment of the Beloved, since desire fulfilled (*πληρουμένη*) engenders at every moment a new desire. She sees the heartbreaking, unencompass-

⁹¹ Jean Héring, *Le Royaume de Dieu et sa venue* (Études d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, publiées par la faculté de théologie protestante de l'Université de Strasbourg, fasc. 35 (Paris, 1937), p. 150.

⁹² Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 399 A.

able Beauty of the Beloved revealed perpetually more perfect throughout the eternity of the aeons, and is consumed by a more burning desire."⁹³

Here the essential is that the soul's desire is fulfilled at every moment. The soul, as we have shown in our first section, is a vessel that is filled by its participation in God and so attains a perfection, a completion. But this participation dilates it, making it capable of a higher participation:

Such is the participation (*μετουσία*) in the divine goods that it makes him in whom it is accomplished greater and more capable, bringing him an increase of strength and greatness, so that, thus nourished, he increases and never ceases to grow. Indeed, since the source of the good springs without interruption, the participant, because nothing he receives is useless and everything that flows into him produces an increase in his greatness, becomes forever more desirous and at the same time more spacious, each of these two being a function of the other, for the nourished potency increases with the afflux of goods and the nourishing source overflows as the goods increase. And we see to what greatness this leads, since no limit arrests the growth.⁹⁴

We note the analogy of expression between what is said here of spiritual nourishment and what we have said above about corporeal nourishment. But the movement of the latter is cyclical: as the brick mold fills, it empties; its capacity does not increase. It is the scene of a continuous passage. But spiritual nourishment increases the capacity of him who receives it.⁹⁵ All of it is assimilable. Nothing is lost. And accordingly the spiritual being grows perpetually, perpetually filled in the measure of his capacity, so that he becomes capable of new goods. Thus perpetual growth implies no dissatisfaction. In a study on Wordsworth, Charles du Bos has defined the spiritual: "The presence of a more where there was no sense of a less."⁹⁶ This is truly a gratuitous gift, a pure liberality that awakens something where there was nothing. And this applies both to what is given and to what receives: grace perpetually creates new eyes for new suns.

Gregory starts from the text of the Canticle: "Thy eyes are as those of doves." The eyes are beautiful because the beautiful form (*εὐμορφία*) of the dove appears in their pupils. The soul takes on the aspect of what it

⁹³ XLIV, 1037 B-C.

⁹⁴ XLVI, 105 B-C.

⁹⁵ See XLIV, 1244 A - 1248 C with *ἐπεκτεινόμενος* (1248 A).

⁹⁶ "Du spirituel dans l'ordre littéraire," III, *l'igile*, cahier 4 (Paris, 1931), p. 200.

gazes on (*ἀτενίζειν*—the term is borrowed from Plotinus). No longer regarding the flesh and the blood, it looks toward the spiritual (*πνευματικόν*) life, as the Apostle says, living by the Spirit and walking in the Spirit, and becoming wholly spiritual (*πνευματικός*) in all things. No longer psychic nor carnal, the soul, liberated from its adhesion to the body, has in its eyes the form of the dove; that is to say, the imprint of the spiritual life shines in the eyes of the soul. And now, having had the dove in its eyes, it beholds for the first time the beauty (*μορφή*) of the Bridegroom. For, as Paul has said, no one can call Jesus Kyrios except in the Holy Spirit."⁹⁷

This notion of the appearance of something where there was nothing is the essential Biblical notion of creation, which is synonymous with absolute beginning, total novelty. Gregory employs it in reference to our theme:

Since intelligible reality is pure of all limitations, it is completed by nothing. But it is divided into two orders; there is the increate, creative reality that is always identical with itself; and, on the other hand, there is the reality that has been brought into existence by creation. When it turns toward the first cause, it is in a sense continuously created (*παντοτεκτίζεται*), growing by its increase in the good, so that in it, too, we see no limit and so that its growth can be circumscribed by no limit; but the present good, even if it seems the greatest and most perfect that is possible, is never anything but the beginning of a superior and greater good. And this confirms the saying of the Apostle that through the striving toward what is ahead (*ἐπέκτασις*), the things that formerly seemed perfect fall into oblivion.⁹⁸

Every spiritual growth is the beginning of an entirely new reality, comparable to the first creation: "Because the word of the Logos is an effective word (*δύναμις*)—did not the light shine at its command in the Creation?—so now when the Logos bids the soul to come to Him, the soul, instantaneously filled with power (*δυναμωθείς*) by the commandment, is changed (*μεταποιηθείς*) into something more divine and metamorphosed by a good change from the glory in which it is into another glory."⁹⁹ Thus every growth of the soul is an absolute beginning: "That which is created has not merely begun to be, but must be considered as always beginning to be in the good through growth toward the better. That is why its attainment never

⁹⁷ Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 833 D - 836 A.

⁹⁸ XLIV, 885 D - 888 A.

⁹⁹ XLIV, 945 D - 948 A.

ceases, but everything created by participation becomes the beginning of a higher ascension. And according to the words of Paul, it never ceases to stretch forth (*ἐπεκτεινόμενος*) toward what is ahead and to forget what is behind."¹⁰⁰

Thus *εpektasis*, as perpetual creation, simply situates anthropology in the central line of Biblical thought, that of the history of salvation. The Bible shows the history of salvation as a series of divine actions of absolute promotions, which constitute the sacred history. The creation of the world was a first *κτίσις*. The resurrection of the Logos is a new creation: "Because the old creation, immersed in sin, has passed, a new and divine creation (*καινή κτίσις*) has followed it. And the prince of life has initiated it, becoming the first-born of life."¹⁰¹ Baptism in turn is a creation, inspired by the Holy Spirit of the baptismal waters, just as the first creation was inspired by the same Spirit. Spiritual growths in their turn are new creations inspired by the same Spirit: "He who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts" (II Cor. 4 : 6).

This last point is suggested by Gregory:

Thou hast been buried with me by baptism in death, thou hast come with me to the hill of incense: these words designate the participation in the godhead to which thou hast risen by resuscitating from me. Thenceforward ascend with me to other mountains, progressing and ascending by effective gnosis. It is not possible to come with me without having passed through the myrrh of the night to the incense of the godhead. But once thou hast reached this height, cease not, as though thou hadst by these things attained perfection (*τελειότης*), to ascend. For thee the incense is indeed the beginning (*ἀρχή*) of faith, in which thou hast partaken by the resurrection, but it is only the starting point of the journey toward higher goods. Starting from here, thou wilt not cease to go from ascension to ascension.¹⁰²

This text introduces a second characteristic theme of Gregory's vision, that of the *τέλος-ἀρχή*: every perfection (*τέλος*) is the beginning (*ἀρχή*) of a greater good:

We see the soul as in the mounting of a ladder [writes Gregory], guided by the Word, ascending toward holiness. Called to approach

¹⁰⁰ XLV, 797 A-B.

¹⁰¹ XLVI, 276 C.

¹⁰² XLIV, 944 B-C.

the light, it has become beautiful, taking in the light the form of the dove. Then, having participated in the good as much as it could, it is drawn once more by the Word to participate in supernatural beauty, as though it were still at the beginning (*ὑπαρχή*) and had had no part in it. Thus in proportion to its progress its desire increases for what is always manifested to it more—and because of the superabundance of goods that it never ceases to discover in the transcendent, it believes that it is only at the beginning of its ascension. That is why the Word says again: Arise, to the soul that is already arisen and: Come, to the soul that has already come. He, indeed, who really arises, must forever arise, and he who runs toward the Lord will never lack wide space. For one must always arise and never cease to run toward Him who says: Rise and come, and always gives one the strength to rise toward the better.¹⁰³

The soul no longer transforms itself *into* a dove, but from dove to dove; that is to say, the Spirit unceasingly awakens in the soul new spiritual creations in its image:

Thou understandest the continuation of the thought. He who commands us to go from beauty to beauty (*καλὴ ἐκ καλῆς*) follows the word of the Apostle commanding the same image to transform itself from glory to glory (*μεταμορφοῦσθαι ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν*), so that what is received is always a glory and what is unceasingly discovered, great and exalted as it may be, always appears smaller than what is hoped. Already a dove through what it has realized, it nevertheless receives the order to become dove again through its metamorphosis (*μεταμόρφωσις*) into something better. And when this is accomplished, that which is beyond will be manifested.¹⁰⁴

I cannot dwell on the profound unity that we find here, the unity from which the theme of the metamorphosis into a dove derives all its variations. And I can only note in passing the allusion to the Pauline metamorphosis from glory to glory. But I wish to stress the central idea that every culmination is merely a beginning and every arrival a point of departure. Everything appears forever new, everything begins again. This notion of a perpetual beginning, which is never a reiteration but always new, is one of the capital ideas of Gregory."¹⁰⁵ I shall cite only a single text:

103 XLIV, 876 B-C.

104 XLIV, 876 C-D.

105 XLIV, 889 B-C; 892 B; 997 D.

Thou art the Most High, and thou canst not appear lower to those who mount, because thou art always above the strength of those who rise. What they grasp without cease is always greater than what they had grasped before, but never encompasses what is sought; the limit of what is discovered is the starting point for the discovery of higher things for those who mount. And thus he who mounts never stops, going from beginnings to beginnings (ἀρχὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς), through beginnings that never have an end.¹⁰⁶

This surmounts Origen's argument that makes boredom (κόρος) into the principle of change and hence of motion. This argument implies that there can be weariness in the good, so that relapses are always possible. Gregory—and as Ivanka¹⁰⁷ has shown, this is one of his great achievements—shows that spiritual movement, by its very nature, cannot know boredom, because it is the discovery of a perpetual novelty. Movement is not instability but growth. Only the flesh knows satiety. The Spirit never wearies: "The soul turned toward God, which has given itself to this desire for incorruptible beauty, has an ever new (νέα) desire for the transcendent, since its desire is never quenched by satiety. That is why it never ceases to strive (ἐπεκτεινόμενος) toward that which is before, issuing from where it is to penetrate farther inward to where it is not yet."¹⁰⁸

Spiritual activity is developed by exercise. This is clearly stated elsewhere: "Satiety gives surcease to the appetite and the pleasure of drinking ceases with thirst. But the possession of virtue, once solidly established, is not measured by time or limited by satiety (κόρος); it gives to those who live by it the impression of something intact, new, renascent."¹⁰⁹

Here Gregory is the heir to a Biblical theme. This theme of the τέλος-ἀρχή, of the end that is a beginning, is entirely different from the ἀρχή-τέλος. It designates the articulation, the hinge in growth, the passage from one state to another. It is applied to the history of salvation. Every epoch is a τέλος, an end. Justin shows in Noah the end of the old world and the beginning of the new. Cyril of Jerusalem sees in the baptism of Christ in the Jordan the dividing line between the worlds of the Old and of the New Testament. Christ is essentially the τέλος-ἀρχή, destroying the ancient

106 XLIV, 941 B-C.

107 Endre von Ivanka, *Hellenisches und Christliches im früh-byzantinischen Geistesleben* (Vienna, 1948), pp. 49-53.

108 Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1033 D - 1036 A.

109 XLIV, 1244 D - 1245 A. See 1084 C-D.

world by his death and inaugurating the new. Baptism is a *τέλος-ἀρχή*.¹¹⁰ And similarly all the stages of spiritual life are perpetual beginnings, although they are also achievements. What had seemed an end, a perfection—and was one—the only perfection commensurate with him who was seeking, proves to be only a point of departure. Once the summit that filled the horizon is attained, another appears, and thereafter new summits arise without cease. Such is the eternal discovery of the divine splendors—in which what is discovered appears always as nothing in relation to what remains to be discovered—"a drop of the night dew, in which the locks of the Beloved are bathed."¹¹¹ Yet it is only a drop of dew beside the ocean of infinite darkness. As doves succeed doves, so darknesses succeed darknesses, forever darknesses and forever doves, forever obscure and forever luminous. Such is the *Wandlung* of the soul in Byzantine mysticism.

¹¹⁰ See my *Sacramentum futuri* (Paris, 1950), pp. 61-77.

¹¹¹ Migne, *PG*, XLIV, 1004 A.

Metamorphosis in Animals:
The Transformations of the Individual
and the Type

The transformations undergone by certain animals in the course of their lives have provided human expression with some of its oldest images. From time immemorial the metamorphosis of the caterpillar into a butterfly has served as a metaphor for intimations of higher being. And the same creature, in the quiescent pupa, the nymph or chrysalis, has provided a strict hieratic image of contemplation, of serene expectation of things to come, of the promise of resurrection.

It is scarcely possible to witness the transformations of a dragonfly without experiencing an assault of inner images pointing in the same direction as the meditations in which Jan Swammerdam for the first time reverently described the metamorphosis of the May flies as a "copy of human life." The first part of our discussion will deal with cyclic changes of this kind, all leading back to the same starting point, the egg.

The word "metamorphosis" with which we designate these changes of form is employed by biologists in several senses. Those of us who have a literary background are perhaps acquainted with the concept of metamorphosis employed by Goethe and still used by comparative morphology: the divergent forms successively embodying a fundamental type or blueprint. Goethe's discussion of the metamorphosis of plants treats of this kind of transformation; all theories of evolution deal with such metamorphoses, and accordingly seek to determine how one fundamental type develops from another.

Both possibilities of transformation have been discussed in so many variants at our Eranos Conference that a biologist may be justified, in his

contribution, in considering them both from one standpoint. Consequently, the second part of our discussion will deal with the transformation of the type. If this lecture comes at the end of our Conference, it is not because I claim the last word. It is an end, because if the study of natural phenomena takes a complete view of its subject matter, it must lead us back to the beginning. Thus it stands at the end because our conferences are sustained by the spirit of encounter and correlation among all fields of knowledge.

I

We turn first of all to the strange transformation that certain animals undergo in the course of their lives; in these species an individual appears successively in a number of forms. The first form, and sometimes several of the early forms, may deviate so radically from the mature form as to obscure their membership in the same species or even genus: the early form "masks" the mature type and is consequently called a "larva." To follow the life development of the different forms of larvae is one of the main problems of zoology and it has not yet been fully solved. No one can say how many larvae are still considered by biologists as distinct species. Insects and crabs, worms, snails, mollusks, and echinoderms are the groups in which metamorphoses are most frequent. But among the vertebrates frogs and salamanders provide examples with which every child is familiar.

In this kind of metamorphosis the question of an animal's change of form is clearly brought home to us, and with it the question of the creature that undergoes the change and of the extent of its inner and outer transformation. For our discussion of the problem we choose the example of the butterfly—perhaps its familiarity will help to give us a stronger impression of the strangeness of the operations it effects. The study of the metamorphosis of insects and of the butterfly in particular has given us significant insights into the workings of these processes. And the research carried on in the last few years is so illuminating that there is every reason to favor this sector of animal life as a basis for a general exposition of the problem of metamorphosis.

A first question facing scientists was, in a general sense, clarified in the years from 1926 to 1940. It is this: at what stage of development can we ascertain the presence of the forms that will later mature? By interventions

in the development of eggs, we are able to determine the time at which essential traits in the development of the various organs are fixated, in other words, when their development is determined. The irradiation of eggs with ultraviolet light offers the possibility of particularly minute observations: it produces localized injuries which tell us something about the place and time of appearance of the earliest rudiments of organs. At certain definite moments—the sensitive phases—in the earliest embryonic development we are able to produce injuries which do not at all disturb the formation of the larva but do appreciably affect the metamorphosis to the mature form. In flies, where many organs (proboscis, eyes, legs, wings) become visible only in the last act of development, it has been possible to show that these organs are all prefigured in the earliest germ development, in a form which cannot yet be distinguished under the microscope but which is nevertheless wholly or in large part established. The time in which this fixation occurs varies from one group of insects to another. In insects with complete metamorphosis, i.e., with larva, pupa, and mature form (= imago), the egg already contains the rudiments of all the organs that distinguish the three stages, and in addition all the equipment for the processes leading from one stage to the next. These experiments lead biologists to ask how the structure and development of these organs are prefigured in the sub-microscopic structure of the germ. But here we shall merely mention the existence of this question, without discussing it, because it is one of the great riddles which biologists, chemists, virologists, and physicists are all trying to solve.

In any event, three radically different forms are prefigured in the egg of the butterfly. In the caterpillar stage certain organs function fully, but certain others that will develop in the imago are no more than little groups of cells that we call imaginal disks. Experiment reveals a complex mechanism by which the modifications of the various forms and the transformation from one to another are strictly regulated. But at the same time the study of the first processes of development shows us that the infinitesimal quantity of living substances constituting the egg creates these patterns and guides and regulates the events which will ultimately result in the minutely ordered sequence of the animal's future development. The discovery of this mechanism does not reduce the egg to a mosaic of patterns, functioning together like parts of a machine; rather, it leads us to view the mechanism of growth as a system "developing itself," a process embodying the whole specific

nature of the living creature. This autonomous growth teaches us to look with suspicion on all comparisons between the organism and a machine: such comparisons have only the most limited validity, and in employing them we must remain fully aware that every living creature is very much more than a machine. None of the episodes of metamorphosis mysteriously prefigured in the seed is so striking as the sudden transformation of the caterpillar into a pupa or as the last act: the emergence and maturation of the butterfly. The common molts whereby the caterpillars grow from a few millimeters at the time they leave the egg to finger length or more—these castings off of skin are also transformations; they too require some of the processes that characterize the final metamorphosis. We shall have to touch on them in our discussion, but we shall concentrate on the last act of the caterpillar's life, the actual transformation.¹

What change of mood takes place in a caterpillar that after a long, monotonous period of feeding on some plant—frequently one and only one particular plant—it should suddenly look around for an entirely different place favorable for pupation? What transformation takes place when this caterpillar turns into a quiescent chrysalis, in many cases previously spinning a delicate cocoon of the kind that provides us with natural silk fiber? What change of mood leads certain caterpillars suddenly to begin spinning a delicate but strong fiber belt from which the pupa will hang? And what, finally, leads the creature to cast off the pupal covering, spread its wings, and totally alter its mode of life to become a butterfly? We can say nothing of the inner processes that accompany these transformations, but let us at least bear in mind that these moods and changes of mood are important factors in the reality whose mechanism is in part disclosed by our biological experiments. We shall try to look into this process as far as the present state of our knowledge permits.

¹ For details on these processes see: J. J. Bounhiol, "Recherches expérimentales sur le déterminisme de la Métamorphose chez les Lépidoptères," *Suppléments au Bulletin biologique de France et de Belgique* (Paris), XXIV (1938); O. Pflugfelder, *Entwicklungsphysiologie der Insekten* (Leipzig, 1952); B. Scharrer, "Hormones in Insects," in K. V. Thimann, ed., *The Action of Hormones in Plants and Invertebrates* (New York, 1952), Vol. I; and C. M. Williams, "Morphogenesis and the Metamorphosis of Insects," *The Harvey Lectures 1951-1952* (New York), Series 47 (1953). The most recent investigations are described in "Relazioni Tenute al Convegno sulla Neurosecrezione," *Pubblicazioni della Stazione Zoologica di Napoli*, Suppl. (Naples), XXIV (1954); [and also *Zweites internationales Symposium über Neurosekretion* (Lund, 1957), ed. W. Bargmann, B. Hanström, and B. and E. Scharrer (Berlin, Göttingen, and Heidelberg, 1958)—A.P. (1963)].

In the last two decades important new factors have been revealed by ingenious experimentation, and the butterflies have been investigated with particular thoroughness. These experiments have caused a decisive change in our thinking about the metamorphosis of insects. Only three decades ago it was generally agreed that insects produced no hormones, because at that time attempts to implant seminal glands disclosed no hormonal effect on the bodies of insects, whereas a very noticeable effect is produced in vertebrates. Today, observations of insects, despite the very different structure of the seminal glands in the two groups, disclose a complex process showing certain parallels with that which takes place in vertebrates. And this transformation in our knowledge is also in keeping with the subject of our Conference.

A number of experiments showed first of all that the brain of the insect exerted an indispensable influence on the entire metamorphosis. A caterpillar can be kept alive for a considerable time without a brain, but no metamorphosis occurs. At a certain moment—we shall have more to say of the time factor later on—this particular activity of the brain sets in: it produces, in the organism as a whole, a state of readiness for transformation. If isolated parts are subjected to this influence, they too undergo the transformation. But how does the insect brain induce such readiness?

The investigation of this mysterious process may be regarded as one of the most significant achievements of zoology in the last fifteen to twenty years. For it has led to the discovery that in the insect brain, along with the typical nerve cells, cell groups are at work whose function it is to form hormones, substances which are carried by the blood to the various scenes of their activity. Careful dissection of the brain has revealed, in the cerebrum of insects, two pairs of these cell groups, both of which are neurosecretory (see fig. on p. 302).

We also know that these hormones are transported along the nerve fibers to two little glands known as *corpora cardiaca*. It is not definitely known whether the brain hormones are modified in the *corpora cardiaca*, but we do know that they are not yet active at this point. It is their influence through the blood on another producer of hormones, the prothoracic gland—in the foremost of the three breast segments of the caterpillar—that first has far-reaching consequences. The excellent Pierre Lyonnet (1707-1789), a French lawyer of the eighteenth century, described this




Diagram of the anterior part of an insect,
with the most important hormone glands

prothoracic gland in great detail in his *Traité de la Chenille qui ronge le bois des Saules*, one of the fruits of his industrious leisure. Two centuries were to pass before it became known that this seemingly unimportant group of cells is the producer of an essential substance. No metamorphosis can take place without this prothoracic gland or, in certain other insect groups, a corresponding gland that may be somewhat differently situated.

The brain substance which reaches the blood by way of the prothoracic glands stimulates these glands to secrete the actual hormone of metamorphosis which, distributed through the blood in minute quantities, is able to release in the most divergent organs the processes which, taken together, lead ultimately to pupation and transformation. In a drop of pupa blood containing the substances secreted by the prothoracic gland a group of germ

cells can be made to develop into mature spermatozoa, whereas without this hormone the same group of cells in the same blood would have remained in a state of quiescence and matured no further. None of the many hormones in vertebrates produces this maturation of sperm cells that we meet with in insects. The prothoracic hormone is a very special substance.

In certain butterflies we observe still another reaction that shows how closely living creatures are wedded to their environment. In a large silk spinner, *Platysamia cecropia*, the caterpillar transforms itself into a pupa just as we should expect. But in order to develop any further, the pupa requires a period of rest at a cool temperature, a so-called diapause. Uncooled pupae never turn to butterflies. The cooled pupa, on the other hand, can be preserved for months at a temperature of approximately 40° Fahrenheit and be made to transform itself into a butterfly at any time. An experiment conducted at Harvard University by C. M. Williams, who has intensively investigated this species and its relatives, provides some highly significant information. The brain is removed from an uncooled pupa. Normally this pupa would be incapable of any further transformation. But now a brain is inserted which has previously been subjected to the requisite cooling in its original abode. Even in the uncooled pupa, the precooled brain suffices to release complete metamorphosis. In normal life hibernation brings about the necessary cooling and thus becomes a factor in promoting and regulating life. In technical terms, cooling makes the brain "competent" for metamorphosis, while the ensuing warmth creates an "active" brain. The outside brain does not have to be grafted in its proper anatomical place but merely has to be present, an indication that it merely supplies substances which act through the body fluid.

The joint action of the brain glands and of the prothoracic glands is only a part of the complicated process of metamorphosis. Still other participants are required. The brain with its neurosecretory cells (26 in all in C. M. Williams' specimen) and the prothoracic glands are always present in the caterpillar phase. What then prevents them from emitting their secretions at any chance moment in the life of the caterpillar? What prevents the young caterpillars from metamorphosing themselves at an early stage and producing smaller pupae and butterflies?

Delicate studies in experimental biology have resulted in the discovery of an important factor which prevents premature metamorphosis. Near the brain, at the front end of the insect's large dorsal basin, are two little glands,

the *corpora allata*, often closely joined to the *corpora cardiaca*. In 1938 the French biologist J. J. Bounhiol demonstrated in Bordeaux that these *corpora allata*, despite their small size, perform an important function. They continuously pour into the insect's blood a substance which influences a number of metabolic processes and which, in particular, maintains the tissues in a youthful, larval state. Many kinds of insects were subjected to the experiment—here I shall not speak of the technical difficulties—with conclusive results: removal of the *corpora allata* induces metamorphosis. These two little glands secrete the substance which acts as a brake, normally postponing the last great event in the life of the insect from molt to molt. For this reason the *corpora allata* have also been called "juvenile glands" or "status quo glands," and their secretion has been termed a rejuvenation hormone. The term accounts no doubt for the secret interest which many scientists and still more laymen take in this mysterious substance.

Under the influence of the juvenile hormone of the *corpora allata* the larval stage of insects can be extended for a long period: we are all familiar with the flights of cockchafers, which occur at intervals of three or four years, indicating that this period is the life span of the larva. The stag beetle lives as a larva for five years; some of the large dragonflies spend several years in the larval phase. An American variety of cicada (*Magicalcada septemdecim*) has a larval period of seventeen years, to which the American Indians attach a special significance. A southern variety of the same species spends thirteen years in the larva. The larvae of these cicadas live in the ground. In the last stage they build a little earthen tower four to six inches in height, a hollow finger of earth, at the tip of which the larva turns into a nympha. At the base of the tower a hole remains open, through which the nympha later leaves to climb a tree where it turns into a fully winged insect having a life span of only about one month.

Our knowledge of the juvenile hormone raises a new question. Who sets the alarm clock to mark the moment when the "rejuvenation" should stop? Who gives orders that hormone production should stop at the right moment, so enabling the substances that make for metamorphosis to do their work? We do not fully know. The question is still controversial. In some insects the inhibiting effect of the *corpora allata* in the larva diminishes from molt to molt—the braking factor is thus reduced by stages. In others—the butterflies, for example—it stops suddenly after the caterpillar's last molt; there are certain indications that the *corpora allata* themselves resorb the re-

juvenating substances which are still circulating in the blood and in the final phase make them completely ineffectual.

As soon as the rejuvenating substances cease to circulate, the hormones of the prothoracic gland gain the upper hand and the final metamorphosis sets in. With metamorphosis the prothoracic glands have done their work and are done away with. The *corpora allata*, on the other hand, grow considerably and assuredly have other functions in the imago, but of these we still know very little. Insects have still other glands to which biologists attribute an importance for metamorphosis. But their function is uncertain and I mention them only to avoid making things look too simple.

Thus we know of certain reagents known as hormones, small quantities of which induce and govern essential developments in the life of the insect. Perhaps it will be worth our while to reflect for a moment on the action of hormones, for it is only by considering the part they play in the general process of development that we can gain even a limited and provisional idea of the mystery we call the organism.

A point of particular interest is that the secretions of the hormone glands are not specific or only slightly so: the hormone of the prothoracic gland of a fly acts like that of a butterfly; *corpora allata* of entirely different origin produce the typical reaction in almost all insects.

This brings us to a first important insight: the hormone glands are very general action systems; they are widely distributed and interchangeable. The reaction characteristic of each insect—the formation of the butterfly's wings with their specific patterns, that of the fly's proboscis, the special leg structure that distinguishes a mole cricket from a green grasshopper, all the colors and forms that characterize each particular species of insect—these "specific" characteristics are not brought about by hormones. They result from hereditary reaction patterns in the tissues, which are in every case endowed with form potentialities peculiar to the species. The hormones are necessary as intermediaries; without them the potentiality cannot be realized, but they do not create it.

The living substance of the species prepares the way for all this at an early stage of development. To each part of the body it assigns its possibilities of growth, to each nerve center its modes of response. It also provides the hormone centers, and in all these embryonic preparations it

regulates the sequence of stages, the transformations that culminate in the final metamorphosis.

Consequently biologists do not, in this connection, speak merely of cause and effect. The prothoracic hormone is not the cause of metamorphosis, any more than the secretion of the *corpora allata* causes the inhibition of metamorphosis. The reaction norms of this or that organ might, just as well as metamorphosis, be said to be the "cause" of metamorphosis or inhibition. Both ideas are false: hormone and reaction norms go hand in hand, both spring from the formative processes of a germ cell. As systems of action and reaction, they are parts of a larger system, which already in the germ cell is attuned to transformation in time.

Thus the preparation of all the mechanisms of transformation begins in the germ cell. In some insects, flies for example, this early preparation includes the setting aside of new germ cells, so that, even before the individual for which the egg is destined begins the course of his life, provision is made for the next generation. If the plasma of the species begins at so early a stage to prepare the way for the end of the individual and the coming of a new generation, you will readily understand how a biologist may incline to agree with the mystics that the end is in the beginning, the beginning in the end.

The example of the butterfly does more than acquaint us with important new findings of research; the study of transformation in an animal group so remote from man does more than enrich our view of nature. I have described this case in some detail because, despite the strangeness of its whole mechanism, so different from ours, the transformations of the butterfly present a mysterious parallel to our own. For one thing, they too are subject to the supraindividual laws of the species. Let us give this question a moment's attention.

Our course of development is also determined in the egg; many of our patterns are pre-established; the structure of those actions and reactions which bring about the changes characteristic of the ages of life and determine the various constitutions and temperaments is laid down in advance. Let us consider just a few of the most important correspondences on which our observation of the metamorphosis of butterflies throws light.

To the co-operation of brain hormones and prothoracic glands corresponds, in the vertebrate, a mechanism that has been investigated in detail

only in the last few years. Neurosecretory cell groups in the midbrain of the vertebrates produce hormones, which move through the extensions of these cells and collect in a particular part of the brain, the hypophysis, which is formed from the nervous system in the embryo. To a certain extent this neurohypophysis performs the same function as the *corpora cardiaca* in insects. From it the stored-up hormones pour into the blood, through which they reach other workshops, the adrenal glands for example, in which further reactions are touched off. Among the processes guided by the neurohypophysis, one of the most certain seems to be the influence on the body's water economy. Another probable effect of the neurosecretory cells in the midbrain has been revealed by experiments with birds. The path of the hormone channels to the neurohypophysis is surrounded by the fine veins of a special cerebral circulatory system, which perhaps leads the hormones via the blood channels to the main part of the hypophysis, the anterior lobe, whence in turn they exert their special effects, for example on the seminal glands.

In making this comparison, let us not forget that in some cases—in men as in the higher mammals—the thymus serves as a special organ of rejuvenation and that its change of function and structure at the time of sexual maturity brings about an important hormonal change. It is probable that we shall discover still other substitutions of this kind, and synergisms as well.

These parallels are also manifested in the human habitus, which can show certain signs of metamorphosis, though they are far less conspicuous than in insects.

If we wish to account for the profound changes of mood that occur in the vertebrates, including man, we shall have to find out more about the way in which the neurosecretory centers act as intermediaries between the hormone glands and the nervous system. It is quite safe to suppose that the affects and many unconscious processes are governed by the orchestration of these factors.

The presence of a similar preformed system of excitation in insects shows us that the mechanisms underlying changes of mood and related changes of behavior are very much alike in radically divergent types of animal.

Now I should like to give you an idea of how closely the hereditary orchestration of the hormone glands and the reaction mechanism of the tissues can be reflected in an animal's outward appearance. The changes in the plumage of birds may give us an idea of this.

At the nestling stage the plumage of the laughing gull (*Larus ridibundus*) is a protective dun color; the change to the normal plumage of the young gull is a kind of metamorphosis. The dress of the young bird, which is very different also from that of the old ones, is heavily sprinkled with brown and lacks any conspicuous head markings. But the tip of the tail is black, while the bill and feet are grayish green and flesh-colored.

The first mating dress has a new feature: the head is a deep brownish black, mixed with little white feathers, and there is some white around the eye. There is still a good deal of brown at the top of the wings, an indication of youth. The tail retains its black tip. This, along with the hood, is characteristic of the laughing gull breeding for the first time.

Only in the second year, as a sign of full maturity, is the magnificent gull gray of the wings attained; the tail now becomes pure white, the head a deep dark brown bordering on black, the feet and bill an intense red.

All the stages of life are clearly marked by the habitus; the bird's outward appearance communicates its changes of stage to the other members of the species, who are enabled by hereditary predisposition to interpret this script, and also to scientists, who have deciphered it by painstaking effort.

And still another change of inner stage is reflected in the bird's dress. Each summer, year after year, the plumage is modified after the mating period; the dark hood vanishes and the head is marked only by a few sparse spots of black. Thus the period of sexual quiescence is outwardly distinguished from the mating period.

I have designedly chosen this simple case of a native European bird in order to dispel the idea that metamorphosis is always an impressive, dramatic affair. But in this unassuming yet significant form the phenomenon is widespread and deserves more attention than is usually accorded it. The colors and forms which make up these patterns are far from being superficial and meaningless; on the contrary, all form and function are tied up with an animal's specific essence. The surface no less than the individual function of a given inner organ reflects the essence and meaning of the whole. In some of the highest animal groups, particularly in those with the most highly developed vision, such as the birds, the manifestation of inner changes in outward appearance is particularly pronounced. And these transformations are not mere epiphenomena, they are not irrelevant surface occurrences; they are interpreted, "recognized" by other members of the species whose behavior they determine. Not only does an inner transforma-

tion in the individual correspond to the change in dress and behavior; no, every member of the species is equipped with the means of recognizing the changes in the appearance of its fellows and of acting accordingly.

The plumage is not the only outward manifestation that changes with the inner state; in birds, the song, the call, also becomes a means of communication no less varied than the change of dress and gives eloquent expression not only to momentary changes of mood but also to the great rhythms of life. We have all noticed how the sound of the woods changes with the seasons, even though no birds may be in sight: how lively the forest is in May, in the spring, when even the invisible inhabitants bear witness to their life in songs and calls, and how different in late summer, how strange this silence reflecting the metamorphosis of the hidden songbirds. Song is existence—in it the bird discloses its life, following the moods of the moment far more closely than is possible in the more constant medium of dress.

Our discovery of animal metamorphoses raises the question of their meaning and purpose. And though the scientist's first task is to investigate the what and the how, still, when it comes to the study of living things, he cannot evade the question of meaning. The question "Why? To what end?" arises inescapably, though it is often hard to know when the question is permissible and when it exceeds the limits of scientific knowledge.

A first purpose of metamorphosis is the conservation of life. This aspect of the question is perfectly compatible with scientific statement, and a wide field of inquiry, known as ecology, is devoted to such problems among others.

In the lives of many animals, change of form is related to a radical change of environment. This is most particularly true of innumerable creatures of the ocean, whose larvae swim or float in the open sea. Few genuine metamorphoses take place in fresh water—and this is a problem in itself. On closer scrutiny, we find that freely moving larvae with distinct forms are particularly frequent in species which in their definitive form are confined to one spot or are at least highly immobile. The starfish and sea urchins, the snails and shellfish, the worms that live in sand or in reeds, are all confined to one spot; and all of them have free-floating larva forms. Undoubtedly the purpose of these pelagic stages is to diffuse the species with the help of favorable ocean currents. One is reminded of the way in which

plants, which must also live in one place, scatter their seeds. Here, then, metamorphosis is important for the conservation of the species.

Equally clear is the purpose of metamorphosis among the many parasites whose change of form is connected with a change of host and helps the animal to prepare itself for the next stage in its complicated life.

We find similar factors of conservation in examining the metamorphoses of insects. But here it is the mature forms which diffuse the species. The larvae are often restricted to a small feeding ground; they live in a single plant, in the ground where travel is difficult, in a narrowly circumscribed area at the bottom of a brook, or, in the case of fly maggots, in an animal cadaver. In all these cases it is the mature winged form that enables the insect to conquer new realms, which are often reached by long flights. The more mobile the flying form, the farther the species, which as a larva is often restricted to a very small area, can extend its range. Anyone who sees a dragonfly resting far from the water is a witness to the mysterious process by which insects diffuse their species, often crossing seas and mountain ranges.

The ecological interpretation of metamorphosis involves only one aspect. If we consider the distribution of metamorphoses in the animal world, another important set of facts opens up to us. Complete, deep-seated metamorphosis, such as that of the sea urchins or insects, is limited to the simpler forms of organism—it occurs in none of the higher types.

Insects and crustaceans are the highest of the invertebrates disclosing genuine metamorphosis. The highest type of invertebrate, the cephalopod, shows only scant traces of metamorphosis, involving chiefly the proportions of the tentacles and the form of the fins. If we classify the vertebrates according to the development of their nervous systems, we again find the most conspicuous metamorphosis in the lowest groups: the lancelet (*Amphioxus*) shows a spectacular metamorphosis, while that of the lampreys, frogs, and salamanders is very considerable. The fishes with highly developed nervous systems, the sharks, rays, and bony fishes, have no true metamorphosis; only a few deep-sea varieties—the eels, for example—have a conspicuous one, and here again what changes do occur are largely changes of proportion and color, never of basic structure. None of the large groups of land animals, neither the reptiles nor the birds nor the mammals, shows a true metamorphosis.

This strange distribution of complete metamorphosis calls our attention to a hierarchical order. Not only are the animals around us embedded in

special environments to whose conditions they are adapted; they are also centers of an activity of their own, experiencing their environment in their own way. But this rich inner life and the resulting relations to the world are apportioned very unequally among the animal groups—so much so that all scientific systems more or less admittedly base their classification of the large groups on a system of relations with the environment. To be sure, our insight into these distinctions has been considerably reduced in the last hundred years by the predominance of utilitarian conceptions; today we are trying to regain and increase it by the use of objective methods and to formulate our statements on the subject with greater precision.

Complete metamorphosis seems incompatible with the highest levels of animal life—that is the first and most general conclusion of a comparative survey. By full metamorphosis we mean a change of structure involving essential changes in behavior, in the functioning of the nervous system and the sensory organs—a metamorphosis, in other words, such as that which takes place in a pupal stage. The extraordinary transformation of a pluteus into a sea urchin is also of this kind.

The restriction of full metamorphosis to the lower levels of animal life also involves many problems. Of these we shall consider only one: the significance of the individual.

To biologists the perishable individual is primarily an interchangeable representative of the enduring species. And the discovery of the primary character of the supraindividual has given this point of view still greater currency. Consequently, even the astonishing mechanisms for the preservation and defense of the individual tend to be regarded too exclusively as mere parts of a larger system working toward conservation of the species. When, for example, a biologist applies the term "hypertelic" to phenomena which obviously serve some purpose beyond conservation of the species, it is evident that he regards the survival of the species as the one and only *telos* and looks upon any hypertelic feature as a mere nail in the animal's coffin, as a symptom of degeneration.

Thus it is imperative that we begin once more to view the relation between the collective and the individual as a complementary, reciprocal relationship, and that we cease to disregard the evolution of the individual. It seems to me that in furthering this point of view a biologist can make a not unimportant contribution to the discussion of the problems with which our Conference is concerned.

At this point we must counter a possible misunderstanding, the notion that complete metamorphosis precludes individuality. Individuality is an attribute of all living things, and the more closely we observe, the more evident become the signs of individual differences. The investigations of von Frisch and his students on bees are gradually leading us to abandon our original notion of insect behavior as a relatively invariable sequence of instinctual reactions and to recognize striking individual variations.

The presence or absence of a genuine, complete metamorphosis will have to be considered in the light of the relation between the species and the individual. As long as the conservation of the species has precedence over the formation of individuals, metamorphosis remains a satisfactory mode of development, providing an excellent solution to certain problems and allowing of extreme variation in the form of the larva and mature animal. But as the "centrality" of the individual becomes more pronounced, it increasingly precludes the possibility of genuine metamorphosis and makes for the retention of a single specific form.

The highest forms of individuality, such as we observe among the higher vertebrates, do not occur in those animals that undergo metamorphosis. We have said that an individual factor is demonstrable even with metamorphosis—but it would be a mistake to suppose that minute observation of butterflies and bees, termites and wasps, discloses increasingly subtle differences, ultimately confronting us with a kind of miniature human being. Even the closest observation reveals only as much individuality as is possible within certain limits of variability—and all complex organisms have such limits.

The attainment of higher degrees of inwardness, of a richer structuring of the world through the experience of the individual, is a phenomenon of a special kind which has often been noted by biologists trying to understand the evolutionary process. This phenomenon is what has been called "elevation," as opposed to mere "specialization" (Franz, 1935). What Sewertzoff (1931) designated as "aramorphosis" refers to an intensification of all the functions as opposed to an "idioadaptation" which seems to refer one-sidedly to definite environmental conditions.² In our own studies on cerebralization we have dealt with the same problems, trying to arrive at objective definitions of this "elevation" or "aramorphosis" by investigation and measurement of the highest nerve centers.

² Victor Franz, *Der biologische Fortschritt* (Jena, 1935); A. N. Sewertzoff, *Morphologische Gesetzmässigkeiten der Evolution* (Jena, 1931).

The highest degrees of elevation known to us, the most complex aramorphosis, the most intense cerebralization—all are accompanied by an emphasis on the individual and hence by a particular "life value" which far exceeds any pure conservation or transformation of the species.

II

In investigating cyclic metamorphoses, such as that of the butterfly, biologists work within the clearly recognizable life spans of individuals. Difficult as some of the technical and theoretical problems may be, the frame of reference within which these investigations move is perfectly clear: with the discovery of the interrelation between action systems and reaction systems, with the reduction of these organs and functions to their genesis in the germ cell, a scientific solution has been found to a number of important problems.

But biologists are working on still another problem relating to transformation, which presents far greater difficulties: to explain the hidden processes which cause variations in the fixed life cycles of a species and so produce new forms. The countless documents of paleontology and comparative morphology demand such an investigation. The biologists who are carrying on this work in our time investigate all manner of new biological forms, even though what is new about them may be ever so unimpressive. This concern with what is totally new creates a great basic difficulty which does not arise in connection with the problem of cyclic metamorphoses: in the investigation of evolution there is no self-contained system of reference by which to interpret the results of experiment—as every physiologist does (often unconsciously but with perfect justification)—it is not possible to relate our experimental data to a *known* totality. We can only refer them back to the inherited substance of the genus or species in which the change has been produced. We can only prove that there has been a deviation from what was formerly present. But there is no sign to lead the scientific intelligence forward into the future. Is the change aimless, accidental, without direction? Does it follow rules of change which we shall be able only in the distant future to formulate on the basis of a whole sequence of changes? Most experimental biologists set down the "mutations" which we actually observe as accidental and undirected. But in judging this interpretation we must proceed with the utmost caution, bearing in mind that

it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw conclusions relating to the future. A good deal of sterile discussion would be avoided if more attention were paid to this fundamental difference between the study of evolution and descriptive physiology.

In view of this difficulty facing the experimental study of evolution, it strikes me as exceedingly important to define the system of reference within which one is operating. In studying extinct animal species and comparing them with existing forms, one must conclude with the present unless we are dealing with wholly extinct groups. Thus a comparison with the groups to which we ourselves belong cannot encompass the remote future of the human race. But the study of large extinct series of organisms, or even of groups reaching into the present, permits us to include the latest and the earliest forms in a single system of reference and so to draw inferences concerning relationships that are necessarily hidden from the experimental scientist. Here I wish to speak about one aspect of such investigation in order to illustrate the second important meaning attaching to the word "transformation" in biology.

Transformation of types—metamorphosis of living forms. The question raised by these phenomena is equally obscure, and the phenomena themselves are just as puzzling and significant whether we turn our attention to the flowering plants or the vertebrates, or limit ourselves to a far smaller and more homogeneous group such as the birds, or concern ourselves with the insects, corals, snails, or mollusks, in whose shells such fantastic possibilities of formation are realized.

Here we shall concentrate on the evolution of the mammals. We ourselves are a part of it, and the problems involved encompass the problem of our own development.

Starting from geological facts, we establish a chronological relation between the evolution of the mammals and the other orders of biological development known to us from the insights we have gained into the organisms of earlier periods.

The time with which we are dealing amounts to some three hundred million years and embraces three long periods, punctuated by two great transformations which are among the central problems of evolution. In the course of these three hundred million years a vast number of very diverse evolutionary processes took place. One chain of development produced the

horse, others of a very different kind culminated in the elephant, the whale, the deer, the antelope, or the giraffe. We must at least bear this multiplicity in mind, though in the following we shall consider only a single direction of transformation.

The first period began with the Triassic age and probably ended with the last Cretaceous age. This is the period in which the first, most primordial type of mammal lived on earth. Here we shall simply observe that there was such a period. At that time there were many forms of archaic mammal; among them the group that forms a true placenta and that we call Eutheria is of particular importance to us.

The second period began with the Tertiary and came to its climax in the middle of it, roughly in the Miocene. Now there developed a higher type of mammal, again extremely varied in form and mode of life. Isolated groups have survived from both periods, few from among the early Eutheria, many from the higher stage, among which the deer, antelope, elephant, horse, seal, whale, dolphin, long-tailed monkey, baboon, and anthropoid ape must be included.

In the middle of the Tertiary, if not before, occurred the transformation that is of particular importance to us. It was then that the Hominidae made their appearance, forms close to our human type, with which perhaps our own mode of existence began.

Here, of course, I shall only try to give the most general picture of the three periods and two transformations. My purpose in so doing is to throw some light on the origin of our form of existence and so illustrate the questions involved in the biological study of transformation by an example that is particularly close to us.

Let us first take a look at the archaic, basic type with which our picture begins. Here we shall disregard the duckbills and echidnas (the egg-laying mammals) as well as the marsupials, for these animals have evolved in very peculiar ways and can supply only very indirect information about the transformations with which we are concerned. The archaic representatives of the large group of Eutheria were relatively small in stature. Martens, squirrels, shrews, and porcupines give us a general idea of these oldest Eutheria.

The development of the higher brain centers is slight; as a means of orientation the sense of smell is dominant, though the eyes and ears may

play a considerable role. For this reason we call this stage macrosmatic.³ Employing a recently elaborated method of codifying brain development on the basis of the cerebral cortex, we find in these archaic mammals indices running from 1.7 to approximately 5—figures which take on meaning only when compared with our figures for higher stages. These early mammals were not very long-lived (three to ten years seem to be the limits), but they achieved sexual maturity at an early age, bore litters of five to ten—perhaps more—and seem to have all had brief gestation periods, roughly from five to six weeks. The young were helpless, naked nestlings—there was generally some sort of nest construction, often lined with some of the mother's hair for warmth. The brain development at the moment of birth was so slight that this central organ had to increase in volume by roughly seven to ten-fold, sometimes more, a circumstance which made the infant quite helpless. The young developed quickly to maturity. Though with numerous variations, this was the basic pattern.

Another characteristic of these primordial mammals is related to the short gestation period. At birth the eyes and ears were undeveloped and for many days still in need of the liquid medium previously provided by the womb, the primordial water of the sheltered beginnings. This was provided by a temporary envelope. The eyelids grew together; the ear lobes bent forward and grew into the skin; the walls of the outer acoustic duct grew together. Protected by these envelopes the organs of sight and hearing developed their mature form. The close relation between these envelopes and early birth is attested by the marsupials, which have gestation periods of only eight to ten days and whose eyes and ears are similarly sealed in the early stages.⁴

The second stage in the development of the mammals discloses a number of new traits. Body size increases, some giant forms occur. The brain centers are considerably more complex; optic and acoustic orientation become far more important than in the archaic period; in some groups—the apes for

3 For further details and documentation see my *Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen* (2nd edn., Basel, 1951); and "Die allgemeine biologische Bedeutung der Cerebralisations-Studien," *Bulletin der Schweizerischen Akademie der Medizinischen Wissenschaften* (Basel), VIII (1952). See also K. Wirz, "Studien über die Cerebralisation: Zur quantitativen Bestimmung der Rangordnung bei Säugetieren," *Acta Anatomica* (Basel), IX (1950); and "Ontogenese und Cerebralisation bei Eutheria," *Acta Anatomica* (Basel), XX (1954).

4 R. Weber, "Transitorische Verschlüsse von Fernsinnesorganen in der Embryonalperiode bei Amnioten," *Revue Suisse de Zoologie* (Geneva), LVII (1950).

example—the sense of smell is appreciably blunted; the whales go furthest in this microsmatic development. The cortical indices run roughly from 8 or 10 to 70 (compared with 1.7 to 5 in the first stage). Longevity increases with body size, twenty to thirty years becomes a common life span and members of some groups often live to be forty—the enormous life spans attributed to elephants are a mere indulgence of the human imagination; actually the age of fifty is seldom exceeded and then by no more than two or three years. Twenty-five to thirty years may be regarded as average longevity at this stage.

There is also a significant transformation in the mode of reproduction. Sexual maturity is postponed to the second or third year, sometimes until still later. Only one or two young are born at a time. The infant is much closer to the adult state than at the archaic stage: in behavior and proportions the young animal is a small replica of its parents. The brain has developed considerably: its volume doubles or at most triples by maturity; sometimes—as in camels and horses—it increases only by roughly one half. These young animals leave the nest at a very early age, a state of affairs characteristic of the higher mammals. Where the infant, as among the apes, clings to the mother and lets itself be carried, it takes an active part in the proceedings and is not merely held by the parent. This highly developed state at birth is the result of a prolonged period of gestation, many weeks longer than in the archaic forms, in some groups exceeding a year, in the sperm whales sixteen months, in the elephants twenty-two months. During this time the infant achieves the full sensory development of the adult, the posture characteristic of the species, the hereditary modes of social behavior, and full mobility. All these characteristics grow and mature in the shelter of the womb. Still another new development is that in many groups blood loss in childbearing is either reduced to a minimum or ceases altogether, thanks to a particular form and function of the connection between mother and young: this stage is attained by the whales and the higher hoofed animals and, among the primates, by the lemurs. The fact that the true apes, even at this higher stage, retain the original placenta with loss of blood at birth presents a problem in itself.

Our account of this second stage in the development of the mammals has been static—but each of the characteristics we have mentioned raises the question of change, of transformation.

We have spoken of increased body size and stressed the greater longevity.

What unknown transformations in the organization of the basic substance, the specific plasma, does this imply? How much regrouping and modification in the relations of the transformation systems that regulate the life of a mammal? We know that this transformation affects the reaction systems of the organs more than the action systems of the hormone glands, which always produce relatively unspecific agents. The change in the orchestration of the sense organs by which the animal experiences its environment gives us an idea of the mysterious and far-reaching processes involved in the mammal's development to a higher stage: apart from a number of structural changes, there is a general broadening of the animal's social and ecological relations. The new stage brings with it a more pronounced individual form; the individual gathers and utilizes more experience over a longer period of time, and this is reflected in the life of the group. This increase of experience is of course closely connected with the transformations that determine increased growth and longevity. Thus the new stage is not characterized by a mere accumulation of isolated physiological traits. And it is only when we consider the whole texture of new possibilities that we begin to suspect the magnitude of the problems raised by such transformations. Whether the transformation was effected in many small steps or in larger, more sudden metamorphoses, we do not know—nor do we know whether or not the transformations are of the same kind as those that are observed in experiments today, whether or not they resemble the mutations studied in genetics. From time to time research in comparative morphology opens up a rift through which we perceive a phenomenon that seems to represent a part of these far-reaching processes. We know today, for example, that the body began to change in form and increase in size at a stage of relatively low brain development, and that larger brain volumes were attained much later in the development of the higher mammals.⁵ We have also learned that in most groups of mammals the new mode of reproduction, characterized by reduction in the number of young, prolonged gestation, mobility at birth, came first, and that only after this mode of reproduction was fully established did the process of brain transformation set in. This precedence of the transformation in body form, mode of growth, and mode of development over the increase in brain volume has also been

⁵ T. Edinger, "Die Paläoneurologie am Beginn einer neuen Phase," *Experientia* (Basel), VI (1950), 250-258; and "Paleoneurology versus Comparative Brain Anatomy," *Confinia Neurologica* (Basel), IX (Goldstein Anniversary-Number) (1949).

demonstrated in birds. Here, it may be presumed, we have hit on a significant rule governing the evolution of higher animal forms—we prefer to speak of a “rule,” for in view of the wealth of possibilities we shall do well to be cautious in speaking of “laws.”

Another phenomenon worth noting is that for a few days or weeks during gestation the eyelids and ears of all mammals at this second stage form the envelopes characteristic of the first stage. The embryo seems to be preparing for an archaic, early birth with the old protective mechanisms. These mechanisms of the early stage are embedded by heredity in the germ cell of every higher type of mammal, and the corresponding processes take place in the embryo—while the prolonged gestation period of the higher stage is fixed by heredity in the maternal organism. This repetition of protective structures connected with early birth is one of the most impressive indications of the profound kinship of all mammals. To the scientist it is a functionally meaningless sign indicating the occurrence of an archaic period in the uterus and hence also marking the moment at which the embryo enters on a new phase. Now the eyelids and ears open, and in the dark peace of the uterus there begins the period which the archaic mammal would have spent in the sheltered world of the nest or under its mother's protection. As indications of transition, these phenomena are of the utmost significance for our knowledge of the mammals' order of rank. They bear witness to the reality of transformations from stage to stage, regardless of how we picture these transformations.

And now the third stage—that of the Hominidae. It is with this stage that we are most especially concerned, and even if we take a definitely biological view in surveying the three stages, the special nature of man is evident. But whereas we possess a large number of documents—fossil evidence—for some groups of the first two stages, those pertaining to the Hominidae are still relatively rare.

Thus we know little about the early geological stages. At the end of the Tertiary and somewhat later we have the *Australopithecus* of South Africa, a presumably erect hominid with a relatively small brain volume of 700 cubic centimeters. The more we study these hominids, the more human they seem: it is not without reason that a new name has recently been given them, *Australanthropus* instead of the original name that meant “southern ape.” Only recently the prehomimid, *Oreopithecus*, was discovered in Tuscany, a prehuman type from the Miocene—proof that these early forms of

our race also lived on European soil.⁶ We do not yet know the size of the earliest hominids. The *Australopithecus* of the late Tertiary was approximately as large as the present dwarf races of mankind.

In our biological comparison we must utilize all paleontological documents as completely as possible. But narrow limits are imposed on this work, and we learn relatively little from fossil finds, because the hominids were noteworthy for their lack of physical specialization. It is probable that even at early stages this type was distinguished from others only by behavior, experience of the world, and social forms, none of which can be read from fossil remains.

But in any case a biological comparison must be based on a species that is known to us. Thus we take man of the historical period as our type. This is the only way of figuring out what transformations must have taken place in the course of the mysterious process through which man became man. Having defined our type according to the best scientific method, we compare the paleontological material with it. This is the only way in which we can evaluate this material and determine to what extent it supplies a record of our development.

The first important fact resulting from comparison with the two preceding stages is a further prolongation of the life of the individual. The average longevity is now twice that of the higher mammals: sixty to seventy years instead of thirty to forty-five. We shall content ourselves with this statistical observation, but it should be noted that we are still looking for an explanation of it. We know of no special orchestration of the hormone glands that might explain why human beings have a longer life span than the higher mammals. Since the secretions of the hormone glands are largely similar in the most divergent vertebrates, the increased longevity is probably a product of the reaction systems and hence ultimately of the germ plasma and its hereditary factors. Whether the increased nerve mass in our brain has anything to do with it, we do not know. Our neopallium index of 170 is more than three times that of the anthropoid apes and more than twice that of the elephants. The paleontological findings suggest that also in the development of man, the new body form—in this case erect posture—preceded the higher brain development, that the rule we have noted in connection with the birds and lower mammals also applies to man.

6 J. Hürzeler, "Zur systematischen Stellung von *Oreopithecus*," *Verhandlungen der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft in Basel* (Basel), LXV (1954), 88-95.

Particularly significant are the transformations in mode of growth. Sometimes we obtain a better understanding of the reality by setting up a fiction as a basis of comparison. The fiction we choose here is a human type that is also in every respect a higher mammal of the second stage. The comparative biology of the higher mammals provides ample material from which to construct a fiction of this kind.

The extraordinary brain development in itself requires a period of gestation far longer than that of the anthropoid apes. Since all the higher mammals are born in the posture typical of their species, the newborn animal-man should also, at birth, be capable of standing erect, endowed with the neuromuscular maturity of a foal or calf, a small macaque or baboon, a dolphin or a newborn whale. Taken together, these circumstances should call for a period of human pregnancy extending from twenty to twenty-two months.

It is a strange fact that the human mode of development accords precisely with this requirement. Since the work published by E. von Lange in 1903,⁷ it has been widely recognized that our development in the first year after birth is fetal, and further light was thrown on the matter in 1922 by the American biologist Scammon.⁸ Our growth processes follow the laws of fetal development up to the moment corresponding to the birth of our fictitious animal-man. In reality our period of development breaks down into two radically different parts. The long gestation that is theoretically required is passed in two media: the first half, in the womb, makes possible the maturation of inherited dispositions; the second half, thanks to early birth, is situated in the richer environment of group life, in a social uterus as it were, where development becomes a synthesis of maturation, experience, and adaptation to the life of the community. This fusion of growth and learning is the special secret of the human stage. The fiction of the animal-man throws a bright light on our astonishing mode of development which is not, as has sometimes been thought, a mere prolongation and slowing down of the animal mode. Our human life has a richly articulated basic melody, a pervading theme which is varied in the life of each individual. The part of it which may be evaluated as fetal, since it occurs before man

7 "Die Gesetzmässigkeiten im Längenwachstum des Menschen," *Jahrbuch für Kinderheilkunde*, n.s., LVII (1903).

8 R. E. Scammon, "On the Time and Mode of Transition from the Fetal to the Post-natal Phase of Growth in Man," abstract in *Anatomical Record*, XXIII (1922): 1, 34.

acquires his specific posture and language, is sharply divided into a purely maternal and a richer social period. The ensuing period up to full maturity is once again divided into stages which have no counterpart in the development of the higher mammals, the most specific of these being the late acceleration of growth at the age of puberty. In the first part of our lecture we have mentioned a few of the organic factors that regulate the stages in our development, which we compared with the metamorphoses of insects. But we have also learned that these hormonal organs are of a very general nature and do not account for specifically human features, that their organization and orchestration are governed by specific structures which we must assume to be situated in the plasma, with its hereditary fabric of cell nuclei, though thus far we have no definite knowledge of the specific factor that produces man's prolonged life span and characteristic transformations.

The early period of development peculiar to our form of existence is closely related to the specific nature of man. For man is unique in the fact that though the apparatus with which he experiences his environment is largely laid down by heredity, the free combination of hereditary material with subsequent impressions plays an enormous part in his actual experience. A good deal of light is thrown on the mystery of what has been called our openness to the world by our form of development, for all the essential forms of human behavior have their roots in the social uterine period with its special mode of development accompanied by learning. Upright posture, language, intelligent action—these three specific human attributes develop from open predispositions in the course of maturation; the social group—chiefly the mother but under normal circumstances the entire environment, social as well as natural—contributes to their formation. All this is connected with the special nature of our infant state, which only the dullest observer can identify with the nestling stage of the archaic mammals. The human embryo first passes through an archaic phase, in which the gates of the senses are sealed off, a phase oriented toward early birth. In the second to fifth month this phase is completed. Then the human embryo enters its second phase: that of the higher mammal; once again the gates of the senses open, as though the infant were already born. In this period the neuromuscular apparatus matures quickly. It is not for nothing that neurologists have likened the state of our nervous system at birth to that of a foal rather than that of a lion or bear cub. So far, man seems to be developing according to our model. But the blueprint does not call for completion of this second

phase; it is diverted into a third. The growth of the hind extremities begins to lag, so that they are no longer than the arms at the time of birth. The human child comes into the world in its unique position, turning its eyes to its mother in its helplessness as no other higher mammal does in the act of suckling. The peculiarities of our newborn babe can only be meaningfully explained as a birth into the "social uterus."

If I were asked what fact accessible to biological investigation marked the most significant transformation in the development of man, I should speak of the connection between our openness to the world and freedom of decision and the twin phases of our early development, and most particularly of the special character of the first year of man's life, which I have designated as the period of the social uterus.

The transformation from an animal embedded in its environment, from a creature whose reactions to a relatively few predetermined things are fixed by heredity into a being open to the world, master of his experience, and able to choose his social forms and means of communication: this is the one great step in the development of man. The rest—the transformation in the human germ of the experiential mechanism, from hereditary structures with little capacity for receiving impressions into specifically human "open" systems, which take on their characteristic structure only in confrontation with the environment, and which even then remain subject to change to a degree that varies with the individual—is complementary. The special character of creative individuals is in part determined by this childlike openness. And the constant need of completion that is manifested in religious sentiments is another aspect of this human openness; we find it symbolized in the image of the open wound or of the flower awaiting fulfillment. With what biologically identifiable particulars of our human structure this specific openness is connected, we do not know. But whether it proves to be localized in the cerebral cortex or elsewhere in the brain, there is no doubt that its special nature derives from specific predispositions embedded in the human plasma.

Paleontological investigation has situated the events that make up the genesis of man roughly in the middle of the Tertiary, perhaps some twenty million years before our historical era.

Comparative biology, for its part, has begun to describe the great typological stages that characterize the transformation leading to man. This

comparative research is today tending toward a new point of view. Formerly, biology was generally concerned with establishing the characteristics that we share with higher animals related to us in form. Where this method was employed, it was necessary to forget or disregard everything that is specifically human, though it was this very factor whose origins were to be explained. The contrary procedure, which consists in investigating only the distinguishing features, in order to stress our special position, is just as one-sided, for it disregards the many essential traits that we share with the animals. Both these methods set artificial boundaries; both speak of a something called "man," but in both cases it is a lifeless, intellectual fiction.

In our attempts at comparison we try to describe the whole life form at every stage. In this way we arrive at descriptions that take account both of the parallels and of the differences, and thus show what must actually have happened at every stage of development. The exposition is static. But by emphasizing the contrasts between stages, it calls attention to the facts that an investigation of the dynamic aspects of human development must try to explain.

Our comparative studies make it clear that the investigation of fossils touches on only one aspect of the problem of transformation. I believe that it is one of the great tasks of biology to open up the whole range of the problem.

Only then are we made aware of such unanswered questions as these: Was what we have termed the human stage attained in *one* vast process of development? Or was it realized in many separate steps? Are such steps comparable to those which experimental scientists call mutations; are they small transformations accumulating over millions of years? Or are these experimentally induced transformations merely one type of transformation among many others of which we thus far have no experimental knowledge?

To these questions we have no definite answers, despite the very positive statements of certain students of *evolution*. For in choosing among possible hypotheses and solutions in biology, men are not guided entirely by objective evidence; another important factor is their whole personal mode of experiencing the world, and this includes religious needs, aesthetic evaluations, historical knowledge, theoretical views of all kinds, dominant moods, critical encounters and experiences, intuitive powers and the general cultural situation which affects our conscious attitudes and, to a still greater degree, our unconscious ones.

The richer becomes our experience of the specific nature of the human mode of existence and its special possibilities—particularly our insight into the prefigured structure of the finished human individual—the more mysterious and obscure becomes the problem of origins.

But all of us here are working together to obtain such insight into the prefigured structures. Perhaps our survey has thrown some light on the magnitude of the problem of origins seen in its biological aspect. I trust we have made it clear that our attitude is not one of easy, comfortable agnosticism. Nothing is gained by insisting that we know nothing; the essential is that we seek, by rigorous and untiring research, to know what is within the limits of our knowledge. It is only the widest knowledge that can confer some insight into the vastness of what remains hidden, that can enable us to peer into the darkness which hides what we do not yet know, and this encompasses not only today's scientific problems, but also the dark sphere of eternal mystery. At the end of every quest, even when it is crowned by discovery, the biologist, too, peers into the darkness that one of our lecturers has termed *lumineuses ténèbres*. There lies the zone of silence where discourse has its limits. In the course of our conscious effort, we come to the point where, with the Zen master, we find it better to raise a finger than to say anything whatsoever.

Death and Rebirth in the Light of India ¹

I

"Rebirth," this "Thunderword of Eternity," this "Light of the Unspeakable Light," has been interpreted by no other culture in as many ways as by the Indian genius. India gave the world the vision of *samsāra*, the timeless circuit through deaths and rebirths without number; and what the same India, since pre-Aryan times, has appropriated to itself in the way of both contradictory and corresponding symbols of this idea could be dealt with appropriately only in a work of many tomes. In a single lecture one can dip no more than a cupful from this deep spring.

According to a late phase of the Vedic tradition, a wonderful path of rebirth, leading to a realm beyond birth and death, lies open to the enlightened initiate who knows his most secret essence and can correctly answer the guardians of the cosmic spheres. This path was conceived as an esoteric part of the ritual for the dead and became associated in later times with the smoke and flame of the pyre on which the dead man was burned. But although the secret doctrine was thus intimately associated with the all-important fire sacrifice and embedded profoundly in the ritualistic conceptions of later Vedaism, actually it juts from another stratum into the realm of the Vedic theology of sacrifice and speculation on the gods and the power of sacred syllables. Not yet accessible to us in the context of the earlier tradition, it can be discerned only where the early Vedic rigor relaxes; but then it disappears again, together with the whole Vedic theology of sacrifice: sterilized and overlaid by the matter of Hinduism—which latter, being derived largely from pre-Aryan tradition, teaches "transformation" into the Self (*ātman*) and yoga, instead of "rebirth" and magic ritual, as the ways to perfection.

In the midst of a late Vedic disquisition on the magic power of the syllable

¹ [Translated in collaboration with Joseph Campbell.]

OM, which was particularly sacred to the singer priests of the Sama-Veda, we suddenly come across a model dialogue for the dead man's encounter with the powers of the macrocosm, who at the time of his dissolution will threaten to take back into themselves their part in his microcosm.² These passages mark his stages of ascent to everlasting rebirth. First the dead man speaks to the earth:

"Thou art in secret, thou art a god, thou art onblowing; blow on him who hates us and whom we hate. Thou art great, thou art manifold, thou art extended. . . . Thou art a god coming into existence; may I come into existence. Thou art existence; may I exist. Thou art becoming; may I become. What offspring is declared to be thine, that offspring I do not comprehend. That offspring I declare to be thine. My name, my body, my foundation; that of me is in thee. Do not take that of me unto thee." Thus he speaks to this earth, and when he arrives, this earth receives him joyfully, saying: "Thine, O reverend sir, is this world. This world is ours in common." "Verily what of me is in thee," he says, "give that back to me." To which the earth replies: "What now of thee is there in me?" And he answers: "My name, my body, my foundation. That of me is in thee; give that back to me." That this earth gives back to him. He says to her: "Carry me forth." "To what?" "To Fire." She carries him forth to Fire. He says to Fire: "Victorious art thou, may I be victorious; world-conquering art thou, may I conquer the world; eating art thou, may I eat food; an eater of food he becomes who knows thee thus."

² *Jaiminiya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa* III. 20.1. Cf. "The Jaiminiya or Tālavakāra Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa," text, translation, and notes by Hanns Oertel, *JAOS*, XVI (1894), Pt. I; cf. also Oertel's "Contributions from the Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa to the History of the Brāhmaṇa Literature," *JAOS*, XIX (1898). In the post-Vedic period of the Brahman tradition this text fell into disuse and was quite forgotten, but unlike many other Vedic works which were lost in consequence of a similar fate, it was preserved in manuscript, and a critical edition (above, 1894) was published in the United States. It is not included in the extensive collection of nine times twelve Upaniṣads, extending from the Vedas to the Tantras, that is current in India (*One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads*, Bombay: Nirṇaya Sagara Press, 1925), nor did Deussen include it in his *Sechsig Upaniṣads des Veda* (Leipzig, 1897), the contents of which he selected according to Anquetil Duperron's *Oupnek'hat*; apparently, though his work appeared in 1897, he had no knowledge of the American publication of 1894. It is noteworthy that even in the second edition, in which he made use of the American edition of the *Gopatha-brāhmaṇa* for his text of the "Pranava-Upaniṣad," he ignored Oertel's text of the *Jaiminiya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa*, which offers valuable variants of many important Upaniṣad texts included in his collection. [The quotations from the *Jaiminiya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa* that follow are translated from Professor Zimmer's renderings of the Sanskrit text published by Oertel (1894). All the other quotations are also translated from the author's German, unless otherwise attributed.—Ed.]

In this way the dead man equates himself in all things with the nature of the divinity that he approaches: by praising its powers, he acquires them; he shows that he knows its secret. Consequently the godhead must treat him as an equal and is obliged to satisfy his wish. Once again the same formulas about coming into existence and being the offspring of the god are repeated. Then the dead man designates his own share:

"My penance, my splendor, my food, my speech—that of me is in thee. That of me do not take unto thee," he says to Agni, Fire, and when he arrives this fire receives him joyfully, saying: "Thine, O reverend sir, is this world. This world is ours in common." He says: "Verily, what of me is in thee, give that back to me." Agni asks: "What now of thee is there in me?" And he answers: "My penance, my splendor, my food, my speech—that of me is in thee; give that back to me." That Fire returns to him. And he says to Fire: "Carry me forth." "To what?" "To Wind."

Fire carries him forth to Wind.

From Vayu, Wind, the defunct recovers his exhalation and inhalation and his "learning" (his sacred knowledge). Thence he goes on to "the world of the atmosphere," which is forced to return to him the ethereal element of space (*ākāśa*). The cardinal points, between which space is stretched, give him hearing, for space is the medium of sound; day and night give him "imperishableness" (*akṣiti*). Here he has entered into the series of circling phases of time, whose rhythm governs the changes of all that is perishable. Then he comes to the half-months of the waxing and waning moon; here are his "petty joints," which they must give back to him; then he comes to the full months, who must return his "gross joints," and the seasons (*ṛtu*), who give back his "chief joints."

At length he comes to the year, the great symbol of the whole, the all-embracing, which encompasses the coming into being and the passing away of nature.

"Verily what of me is in thee," he says, "give that back to me." "What now of thee is there in me?" "This self of mine. That of me is in thee. Give that back to me." That self the year gives back to him.

By this time, one might suppose, the dead man must be whole, for what the lower spheres of cyclical, perishable life had taken from him, they have given back, and last of all the keystone, the core of his self. With the year

he has reached the upper realm of the unchanging. Yet his journey continues. Thanks to his newly integrated nature, he causes himself to be borne aloft to the heavenly Gandharvas, the Blessed of the upper world, who are engaged in perpetual love games with the Apsarases, the women of heaven. From the Gandharvas he demands, as his own, "fragrance, joy, delight," and from the Apsarases, "laughter, play, sexual pleasure." Like all the previous divine beings, the heavenly lovers wish to share their world with him. Presenting himself as their equal, what more can he desire than to dwell with them, happily captive in their sphere. (Goethe's "Stay a while—thou art so fair!") And in every sphere he meets this same temptation, though it is never stated in so many words, to content himself with its superhuman power and greatness: to linger with the Fire, the Ether, the Circling Year; but the initiate knows no dallying, nothing can stop the enlightened man.

So he reaches Heaven (*Dyaus*, etymological equivalent of *Zeus*), who asks: "What of thee is there in me?" And the man replies: "Satisfaction"—*trpti*, which is to say: satiety, a boundless, self-contained well-being. This is the essence of the spotless shield of heaven, vaulting over all limits, delighting in its own opalescence.

He proceeds to the sun, the ancient place of enduring immortality, the unchanging source of all-consuming power. Yama, god of the dead, is the son of Vivasvant, the sun god, "him who shines in all directions"; these two figures appear both in the Vedas and in the Avesta, and hark back to the common Indo-European past. The sun is the abode or gateway of deathless life. But here the design, whose complexity suggests interpolation and revision, becomes confused: the sun is not the ultimate goal. From it, the transformed man takes vitality (*ojas*), physical strength (*bala*), and beauty, and causes himself to be carried further, to the *moon*! But he had long left the lunar principle behind him.

As the sun belongs to the year, so the moon belongs to the months and to the half-months of its waxing and waning. A satellite of the earth, it constitutes the cosmic sphere closest to the earth, delimiting the "sublunar" world of short-lived perishable creatures. It governs the tides, brings about the changes in the weather, is lord of the rain, and determines the monthly lunar rhythm of women, the "*ṛtu*," or menstrual "season." It is the lord of vegetative life and its short-waved rhythm. In India the moon is called the "Master of Plants and Herbs" and regarded as the life-bestowing "pa-

tron" of nature. It ushers in the refreshing night, when the creatures rest from the overpowering heat of the sun and from the labors of the day, so permitting the vegetative part of them to renew itself and to grow. Each night it feeds the mortal, earthly world on the milk-white nectar beams of the potion, Deathless (*amṛta*), that the gods quaff from the moon, their drinking bowl, which perpetually refills itself.

The man says to the moon: "The path of truth forsakes thee not; the path of deathlessness forsakes thee not. Anew and ever anew thou art born. 'Carrier' by name, a Brahman, thou dost worship: therefore those two who truly are—gods and men—carry food to thee. He who knows thee thus becomes an eater of food. . . . Mind is mine, seed is mine, progeny is mine, reconstitution (rebirth) is mine: that of me is in thee. Do not take that away from me." So he receives mind, seed, progeny, and rebirth: all, things that might reasonably be asked of the Lord of Creatures by one wishing to be reborn on earth and in the flesh, but hardly by one who has outgrown his common bond with the year, Heaven, and the sun. These goods—seed and progeny, a human mind, and rebirth as a creature—are the goal of the shorter way, when the dead man goes no farther than the moon; and to demand and accept these gifts of rhythmic transience, which have meaning only for the sublunar zone, is to renounce the prospect of a further ascent to the imperishable heights.

Thus the ritual ends strangely. The man wishes to be carried on to the highest sphere: to the world of *brahman*, the unconditioned; but the moon carries him to the sun, since for the moon the sun is the essence of the unconditioned, in contrast to its own conditioned play of transformations. However the man has already been to the sun, and so he says to it: "Carry me further." "Where to?" "To the world of *brahman*," says the man again, as he has just said to the moon. The sun does not comply, but carries him back to the moon. "He thus wanders to and fro between these divinities. This is the end. There is no carriage beyond this limit."

The man knows, therefore, of the world of the Unconditioned Highest, but he cannot attain it. Still, he does not lament, not a word is wasted on this subject. On the contrary, the man is referred back to the possession of all the worlds already passed:

All the worlds of which we have spoken, upward from here below, these he has obtained, has conquered; in all of them he moves as he will, who knows thus. If he should wish "May I be reborn here

on earth," on whatever family he might concentrate his inner regard, be it a Brahman or royal family, into that he will be born. Into whatever world he wants, he will go, fully foreknowing. But Satyayani has said: "Ofttimes, indeed, this world is plagued with many ills. People speak of these to each other and complain. Who then, having cast this world away, would wish to return to it or to be here again within it?"

This concluding remark, with its pessimistic view of existence, is a condemnation of the ancient path of rebirth herein described, which enables man, in the course of a journey through the cosmic spheres, to achieve integration with his proper nature and therewith free entry into the best circles of Brahmanic-Aryan feudal society. There is no mention of the journey to the higher cosmic spheres of imperishability, which leads not to the moon but beyond the months to the sun. The author of this archaic text did not yet know how to attain to the unconditioned, to *brahman*.

With some change in the powers inhabiting the spheres, this journey from the earth upward to the sun and to heaven might well occur in a Gnostic system of rebirth. According to the Gnostic pattern, the soul rises from the earthly material world through the sublunar sphere, which is occupied by lower spirits; leaving the sublunar realm by way of the moon, it continues through the planetary spheres to the heaven of fixed stars; departing from this abode of the star spirits and the ether, it attains the "supracelestial place," traverses the realm of pure ideas, and makes its way, with the help of the Logos, to the highest transcendent source of itself and of the whole world: back to God. This journey can be read to mean the exact opposite, as the Indian; namely, that in every sphere traversed the monad casts off and leaves behind the planetary forces and earthly heaviness it had received in the course of its descent from the primal source to the earth. However, Gnosticism also knows the way of integration, according to which the soul returning to God is enriched at every sphere with the higher powers which make it more akin to the divine omnipotence. Epiphanius (d. A.D. 404), bishop of Salamis on the island of Cyprus, writes in his work against the heretics:

The Gnostics cite a falsified Gospel under the name of the holy apostle Philip, which teaches: The Lord opened to me what words the soul should use when it ascends to heaven, and how it should reply to each of the higher powers. Namely: "I have come to know

myself and have gathered myself from all quarters: I have not begotten children to the Archon [the lord of this world], but have extirpated his roots, and *have gathered together the scattered members into one; and so I know thee who thou art; for I am of the number of those from above.*" However, when a soul is found to have propagated offspring, it is detained below for as long as it takes to receive its children and draw them to itself!³

Propagation here, as in Manichaeism, is a sinful dispersal of the divine spark of light of one's own essence. The sparks scattered by propagation must be recovered, incorporated, and integrated before the soul can complete the process of integration—the gathering of its scattered members—and rise up. Unfortunately, we know nothing more of this interesting, late-second-century Gospel of Philip, but a number of related Gnostic texts contain similar teachings.

The Indian text of the *Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa* should certainly be dated as early as the seventh or eighth century B.C. More than a thousand years separate the two traditions, but they are branches of the same tree. Another branch, intermediate in time, was Orphism—which, if Bachofen is to be believed, was the great Greco-Oriental doctrine that re-emerged in Gnosis. In a work of his old age, written in 1867, ten years before his death and long after his conception of the history of the ancient religions and symbols was complete, this grand seigneur of the study of antiquity wrote an interpretation of a record of Orphic rebirth symbolism that goes back to the same fundamental intuition as the Indian ritual we have been discussing and its Gnostic parallels. The record in question is a mortuary urn of the second or first century B.C., found in Canosa, in southern Italy. Canusium was in the territory of the Apulian Dauni; the hypogeum from which the vase was taken discloses an inscription from the period of Pompey (687 after the Founding of the City); various attendant circumstances have made it possible to date the vessel at the end of the second century B.C., roughly at the time of the second Punic War.

In the transparent symbolism of its color relief, this mortuary accessory—companion of the soul and pledge of the knowledge that saves—shows the soul's ascent through the upper spheres of the cosmos to eternal rebirth in the highest place, whence it came: light of the supreme light. At the bottom the lunar world is represented—to quote Bachofen—by

3 *Adversus haereses*, xxvi, 13 (Migne, PG, XLI, 352).

the full, solemnly friendly face of the moon, the abundant hair of the color of glowing coals; above it, the silvery sheen that commonly rings the luminary at night. . . . An enormous uplifted pair of wings gives the body of the moon its power of ethereal flight (these are the *alae lunae* of Manilius, mentioned also in the Homeric Hymn). . . . [Higher up one sees] the four white neighing steeds of the sun, drawing the purple chariot supported by two swiftly rotating wheels (the *equi anheli* of Manilius) . . . beside these two dominant luminaries . . . the five other planets: first, between sun and moon, Mars-Pyroeis, recognizable by the circle of fire edged with saffron; then, beside the purple sun chariot, Venus-Eosphoros, with the grayish twilight glow; next Mercury-Stilbon . . . at once white and night-blue in accordance with his twofold nature; and finally, at the upper and lower limits of the elongated lateral cavity, Saturn-Phainon and Jupiter-Phaeton, the former at the height of its orbit, while the latter, like the moon, is represented as a luminary well disposed toward man. It is obvious and unquestionable that these are the seven planets (for all antiquity numbered the sun and moon among the planets).

In the middle of this eternally moving planetary cosmos, there appears, entirely filling the lateral space with the vast development of its threefold nature, a hippocampus [a mythical animal, a "sea-horse"], whose enormous size alone bears witness to the lofty significance attributed to it. In power and swiftness of movement, it rivals the luminaries surrounding it; indeed, the combined resources of its threefold nature [beast of the land, water, and air] lend its irresistibly swift course still greater impetus. In the two accompanying representations, the Dolphin and the Planet Mercury, the artist has given us the means of deciphering this animal hieroglyph. For both are known to us as faithful and loving companions of departed souls, both the eminently poetic and mystical dolphin, swiftest among the beasts of the sea, and the divine intermediary between the higher and the lower world [namely Mercury-Hermes-Thoth], who in other vase paintings is represented with the dolphin in his hand and on certain gems is shown standing on the dolphin.

The presence of these two mortuary symbols shows beyond any doubt the relation between the winged hippocampus and the soul liberated from the prison of the body. "Filled with joy, it takes flight from the body," as Plato says in the *Timaeus* [81e]. No less eloquent is the representation of the hippocampus itself. Borrowed, like the dolphin, from the iconology of the hieratic sepulchral tradition, it shows by the exact correspondence of its horse part to the prototype of the team of the sun, and of its wings to the form and color distribution of the wings of the Moon, the relation-

ship of Psyche with Sol and Luna, the two rulers of the planetary world and the sources of the higher components of man's nature [or, as the Indian formula puts it: "What of me is in thee"]. Thus there can be no doubt as to the pictorial content of our vase painting. It represents the return to its cosmic origins of the soul liberated from the tomb of its body or, to speak with the Neoplatonists, the "rise to animated form." Hence the feeling of joyful triumph which permeates and animates every part of the triform hippocampus. The fetters have fallen away; given back to its original nature, the immortal part of our self (*volucer animus*) flies swiftly back to its home; its yearning for the moon, the Uranian Leuke, the heavenly abode of the souls, lends it wings. Thither he is escorted by Mercury and the Dolphin, the swift and friendly *psychopompoi* of the ancient religion. They all direct their striving toward this heavenly body, which, being the immediate goal of their striving, has been given a prominent position at the center front. . . . The cosmos of the planets appears as the foundation of a doctrine of the soul justifying the hope of an otherworldly existence.⁴

It was necessary at this point to hear Bachofen himself, the born master and initiate in the reading of ancient myths and iconography; his interpretation of the cosmic journey of the soul toward rebirth, so deeply meaningful and inspired, cannot be stated more succinctly. The upper part of the vessel, crowned with turretlike tubes that served no practical purpose but are symbolic, like its entire ornamentation, completes the symbolism of this mortuary vessel as an image of the cosmos and the cosmic journey of the soul to its supreme home. The turrets represent—

the "tower of the sun god" of Pythagorean Orphism, [which] from *Timaeus* to Proclus is described as "a summit and at the same time a center." [Two lower] side openings are the so-called gates through which Sol passes in the two solstices; and the elongated opening, which extends at middle height from the main turret to the back of the vase, corresponds to the galaxy which the ancients conceived in circular form, surrounded by the highest ether and delimited by the *Portae Solis*. . . . Without it the doctrine of the soul would have remained a half-intelligible fragment. For to the gates of the sun and the Galaxy attach the psychogonic ideas which govern

⁴ *Unsterblichkeitslehre der orphischen Theologie auf den Grabdenkmälern des Altertums* (1867). Quoted from the reprint edition: Johann Jakob Bachofen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. W. Weiper, V (Berlin, 1938), pp. 16ff. (Cf. *Gesammelte Werke*, VII [Basel, 1958], pp. 14-16.)

the destiny of the soul in its passage through the planetary zones, whether in descending to be born or in its ultimate return to the first sources. . . . The picture cycle on this vase begins where the law of immortality goes into force [in the lunar sphere as the lower limit of deathlessness]. Limited to the spheres to which death does not penetrate, it sums up a doctrine of confidence in an Uranian-cosmic existence developing from the decay of the body.

On this journey homeward to the supreme light, the soul gives back to the planets, whose spheres it traverses, the powers and burdens which, in descending earthward, it received from them as elements of its individuation, as bonds and limitations to its divine universality.

Bachofen's representation of the Orphic-Pythagorean way of redemption, whose oriental origin is known, points to the ultimate source of the Neo-Vedic rebirth symbolism, though of course Brahmanic thinking with its vast originality has creatively transformed the primordial pattern at the root of both developments.

The Indian journey of man to his integration after death, as taught with many ramifications but without any proper beginning or ritual setting and with a strange ending in the *Jaiminiya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa*, has a companion piece in a secret doctrine of the *Jaiminiya-Brāhmaṇa* itself, to which the text known as the Upanishad forms the usual appendage. This text speaks of man's twofold possibility of rebirth: in the sublunar zone of mortal, propagating creatures, through the womb of a woman; and in the imperishable transcendent sphere, through the womb of the sacred votive fire, whose flame is a messenger and intermediary between men and the gods. Here we read:⁵

Verily there are two wombs, the womb of the gods and the womb of men; for there are two worlds, the one divine, the other human. What the human womb is, that, indeed, is the human world; that is the birth-giving part of woman; from thence progeny comes to birth. Therefore one should desire an excellent wife, [thinking]: "In my womb, my world, no other shall arise." When he then arises, there go forth first his life powers [life breaths: *prāṇa*]; then the seed is emitted. He returns his life powers, his ether powers (*ākāśa*) to [the womb], where, indeed, all seeds of themselves are of equal force; whence he will be born as he who he is.

And even so the world of the gods is the godly womb. The votive

⁵ Cf. Oertel, "Contributions from the Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa" (1898), pp. 115-17. German in Johannes Hertel, *Die Weisheit der Upanishaden* (Munich, 1922), pp. 150ff.

fire [*āhavanīya-agni*, which, of the three fires of Vedic ritual, constitutes the gate to the world of the gods, while the south fire guards that of the powers of death and destruction, and the paternal fire serves earthly existence] is the womb of the gods, the godly world. Therefore, of him who pours an oblation into the paternal fire, one should think: "He makes himself here on earth (he will be born again here on earth)." The one who offers an oblation and renders it properly [i.e., pours it into the offering fire], thereby pours himself into the divine womb. His self arises there above, in yonder sun. He who knows thus has two selves, two wombs; verily one self, one womb, has he who does not know this.

If one knowing thus departs from this world, his life breath goes up first. That explains to the gods: so much good was done by him, so much evil. Then along with the smoke of the funeral pyre he himself goes up and above. The seasons (*ṛtu*) are the doorkeepers of these spheres. To them he should make answer thus—

And now we hear for the first time the words of the man who does not "know this," who has only *one* self, *one* womb, and knows himself to be irrevocably a child of the sublunar sphere of the vegetation that dies and is reborn, subject to the regulation of the moon and the seasons (*ṛtu*), and who consequently, like the uninitiated man in the Tibetan Book of the Dead, cannot help demanding new rebirth in a creaturely womb:

"O Seasons, by the Illustrious One seed has been brought hither every half-month, by the one newly born, to whom the world of the Fathers belongs."

The Illustrious One is the moon, the divine vessel of immortal life sap, "reborn" each month. To it "the world of the Fathers belongs," it is itself that world: to it arise the dead and they partake of the potion of immortality until, in the course of eternal change, they must return to the earth to be reborn, just as he himself vanishes and emerges from concealment as the new moon. "Sickle of the new moon, swiftly increasing" (*śiṣu*) is in Sanskrit a familiar term for the rapidly growing infant; hence, Tagore calls his children's songs "Shishu"—in English, *The Crescent Moon*.

The dead man says further to the Seasons: "Send me forth from here into a man as maker: pour me from the man as maker into a mother." Thus one who with his created nature "knows" no better, equates himself with the changing moons and remains in the sphere of death and earthly rebirth.

But the knower knows of the unchanging sphere beyond the lunar ebb and flow, and says: "I am here as one Hither-born, born hither: comparable

to the intercalary thirteenth month, joined to the twelvefold year. . . .” He identifies himself with the unchanging principle, in the form of the solar year, and is comparable to the intercalary thirteenth month, which must be added to the twelve short lunar months to form the complete solar year. In this way he elevates himself above the lunar sphere to the imperishable world of the solar year. The terms “born hither” (*upajāya*) and “Hither-born” (*upajāyamāna*)—born, that is to say, into the company of those already in the sphere of the new birth—also denote “reborn.” The one “reborn” goes on and declares by way of emphasis to the Seasons:

“Of this I am aware; of this I am sure. So, lead me, the new arrival, O ye seasons, to immortality.” And the Seasons lead him, as a knower leads one unknowing; as an enlightened one leads one who is not enlightened, so the Seasons lead him. They lead him beyond.

And he comes to him “who glows there above” (the sun). He asks him when he comes, “Who art thou?” He introduces himself by his name and surname, and declares: “Thy self that was with me stands here before thee.”

The reborn one has become aware of his solar self, is certain of his imperishable solar nature; and just as in the preceding journey to the divine world the dead man said: “What of me is in thee, give that back to me,” to which the god replied: “Thine is this world: this world is ours in common,” so likewise in the present case the dead man has returned home to his own—a spark of the imperishable power of the sun to its source.

But the powers of the lower realm of eternal change in birth and death are unwilling to let the one reborn to changelessness go free. From below they reach out for their victim, their old possession who is slipping upward, away:

The Seasons rush after him who has attained his self, seize him by the feet, and carry him off. Then day and night come to his place (and the Seasons must release him). Then he should say to HIM: “I am KA [that is WHO, a name for the “Lord of Creatures”]; thou art SUVAR [that is, etymologically, Helios, Sol: the sun as the abode of the blessed, hence sun and heaven in one]. To thee, who ‘traversest heaven, who art in the sun (*svar-gya*),’ I have gone as the sun (*svar agām*).” For “KA,” “Who,” is the “Lord of Creatures”; hence one who knows this is “SUVAR-GA” [going to the sun, in the sun, heaven]. For such a one goes to the sun. To him says HE (the lord of the sun): “What thou art, that am I; what I am, that art thou. Come!”

This is the Assumption; "Come," says the upper world to its creature who, because he knows, is privileged to return to it. It is the goal of all gnosis, and in the Apocalypse, for example, we find it expressed in Christian terms:

And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem . . . prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. . . .

And I John saw these things, and heard them. And when I had heard and seen, I fell down to worship before the feet of the angel which shewed me these things. Then saith he unto me, See thou do it not: for I am thy fellowservant, and of thy brethren the prophets, and of them which keep the sayings of this book. . . .

And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely. . . .

He which testifieth these things saith, Surely I come quickly. Amen. Even so, come, Lord Jesus.⁶

In India the man reborn casts off what still clings to him of his earthly past: "He comes to the essence of his good works. His sons inherit his possessions, his forefathers his good works." While his dead ancestors in the lunar world feed on their store of good deeds and must return to earth when it is exhausted, he who has been reborn to the sun gives away this precious treasure, the accumulation of which is one of the principal motives of the good life on earth (along with fear of the Kadi and the vanity of wishing to be numbered among the good and just); he has no need of this credit balance. At the inexhaustible source of power, a man does not consume the capital of his virtues. Transformed by the knowledge of his true, imperishable self, enlightened in his hidden essence, he is now beyond good and evil, just as he has transcended death and rebirth; no more than "a drop of water clings to a lotus leaf" do good or evil deeds cling to the Divine Knower.

II

A death ritual in the *Jaiminiya-Brāhmaṇa*⁷ presents the same pattern with certain noteworthy variations.

⁶ Rev. 21: 2-3, 22: 8-9, 17, 20.

⁷ Cf. Oertel (1898), pp. 111ff.

The dead man goes forth into the night with the smoke of the funeral pyre and from the night into the day. From this short-lived, rapidly alternating sublunar pair, he continues upward to the half-month of the waning moon, thence (as from night into day) to the more luminous half-month of the waxing moon and the higher unity encompassing both, namely the full lunar month. "There, in the full month, the imperishable part of his body (*Śarīra*) and his life-breath (*asu*) come together." *Asu*, the life principle, is etymologically related to *animus*, *anima*, Greek *anemos*, "the wind"; it is an older designation for what was later called *prāṇa*, "life breath, vital force." "One of the seasons [masculine in Sanskrit], a hammer in his hand"—an old weapon, harking back to the Stone Age: divinities are conservative in their clothing and implements—"having descended on a ray of light, asks him: 'Who art thou?' 'Purusha' (man, being), says he." The dead man's answer is almost identical with its counterpart in the other ritual. And if he is a "knower," he tells of his sunlike imperishable nature: "I, here, am one reborn (*upajāya*)—reborn as the intercalary twelfth month amid the thirteen" [i.e., he designates himself as the intercalary month, inserted in the penultimate, twelfth position, to transform the lunar year into the solar year].

The two journeys to moon and sun and the different possibilities of rebirth that they encompass represent an older and a newer system of astronomy and cosmology; the solar principle overcomes the archaic lunar principle. As the solar source of imperishable power gained predominance over the venerable old bestower of life and regulator of time, there arose a concept of immortality which had been quite unknown to the earlier moon worshippers alternating between joy and anguish and caught up in the inexorable cycle of death and creaturely rebirth.

An explanatory interpolation says: "He is the thirteenfold one 'who shines up there' (the sun)." While on the other hand, of the moonbound it is said that "they bring offerings here on earth to the Illustrious King Soma" (the moon as potion of immortality). With such offerings to the moon, a man binds himself to the lunar sphere: with his self he enters into the moon, to be conceived after his death by way of the moon through a human womb, according to the rhythm of lunar time, and so brought into the world again.

The initiate continues:

"Of this I am aware; of this I am sure. So lead me, O Seasons, to immortality, the twelvefold⁸ through the thirteenfold father,

⁸ Read in the text "*dvādaśam trayodāśena*" instead of "*dvādaśa trayodaśena*."

through this mother, through this faith, through this food-eating, through this reality. Day is my father; night my mother; reality am I. As such, O Seasons, lead me to immortality." . . . Not a man is he who knows thus; one of the gods is he who thus knows. The Fathers and Grandfathers [who dwell in the sphere of the moon, which he traverses in his upward course] hurry to meet him and ask: "What hast thou brought to us from there [below]?" To them he should make answer: "Whatever good deed I have done, that is yours." Such a one's sons enter upon his inheritance, his fathers upon his good actions, his enemies upon his evil deeds. Having thus made this threefold division, he enters into the same world with him "who shines up there."

Certain Upanishads which, unlike the texts of the Jaiminiya school, have had the historical good fortune to be gathered into a classical tradition, have further developed this doctrine of initiation in the direction of sunlike, celestial rebirth.⁹

They all stress the fact that this doctrine is not included in the old Brahman tradition, but familiar only to the aristocracy. The young Brahman Shvetaketu, who from the twelfth to the twenty-fourth year of his life followed the "career in *brahman*" with his teacher and imbibed the enormous complex masses of the tradition of all four Vedas, cannot answer when a prince, wishing to test his knowledge, asks him about the two ways of rebirth. His father and mentor, Uddalaka Aruni, a descendant of the Gautamas, an ancient family of seers and priests, who was one of the great thinkers of the Upanishadic period—the famous TAT TVAM ASI is attributed to him—must admit to his disappointed son that he has never heard anything of the "Doctrine of the Two Ways." However, in his thirst for knowledge this Aruni recognizes no obstacles and willingly humbles himself. The celebrated teacher and initiate goes as a student to the prince, who should properly have sat at *his* feet, in order to learn from the member of the lower caste. And the prince assures him that this doctrine had never before been communicated to a Brahman.

⁹ The entire material translated and excellently commented in Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, pp. 23ff. (*Kaushitaki Upanishad*), 137ff. (*Chândogya-Upanishad* with comparison of the parallel texts in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* and *Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upanishad*), and 505ff. (*Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upanishad*). Cf. also J. Hertel, *Die Weisheit der Upanishaden*, pp. 74ff. and 148ff., and A. Hillebrandt, *Aus Brāhmanas und Upanishads* (Jena, 1923), p. 67. [English: R. E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads* (London, 1921); S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upanishads* (London, 1953); Swami Nikhilananda, *The Upanishads* (New York, 1949 ff.), 4 vols.]

For, indeed, it had not been derived from the learned tradition of the sacrificial theology of the older Veda, but was a portion of the Indian heritage introduced into that sanctified learned tradition in the period of the Upanishads, when it was first recognized and adapted by path-breaking thinkers like Aruni himself. Moreover, as we now know, the India in which the Vedic school of thought of the Aryan immigrants had taken root—seeking in vain to seal itself off from the influences of its new cultural soil—had already been manifoldly fructified by the culture of the Sumerians and Babylonians. The Indus civilization of the second millennium B.C. (Mohenjo-Daro) and the style of the sculpture of Bharhut (second century B.C.)¹⁰ are not the only proofs of this. Evidences from Indian cosmologies and symbolisms of the most divergent times and places might be endlessly adduced to confirm the influence of ancient Mesopotamia on pre-Aryan India¹¹—whereas a contrary relationship between the two cultural spheres would be surprising to say the least. Hence, it must be concluded that the late Vedic-Gnostic reincarnation doctrine of the “knower” who through his gnosis escapes from the sublunar world and its cycle of death and rebirth, must have had its ultimate roots in Mesopotamia. As out of that ancient cradle so many things have come that hold sway over us to this day, a Sumerian-Babylonian spiritual heritage, diffused to the Orient and there creatively transformed, also travelled westward to become the Greek Orphism, and finally, nourished anew by the old energies of its Near Eastern mother soil, celebrated its resurrection in Gnosticism.

The *Kaṣṭhiki Upaniṣad* teaches: “All who depart from this world go, without exception, to the moon, which, during the first half of the lunar month, waxes on their breathing spirits (*prāṇa*), and during the waning half, sends them forth to be born.” They are conceived anew on earth and born. “But the moon is also the door of the heavenly world. Anyone able to answer him, he lets pass; but the one who cannot answer, he rains down, as rain, here on earth”: and he is reborn as some sort of animal or man, according to his deeds (*karman*) and knowledge. When one arrives at the moon, the moon asks: “Who are you?” Here the moon has replaced the seasons as the examiner of the soul. But the initiate answers him with

¹⁰ C. L. Fabri, “Mesopotamian and Early Indian Art, Comparisons,” in *Études d'Orientalisme à la mémoire de Raymonde Linossier* (2 vols., Paris, 1932), Vol. I, pp. 203ff.

¹¹ Cf. H. Zimmer, “Die vorarisch-altindische Himmelsfrau,” in *Corolla: Festschrift für L. Curtius* (Stuttgart, 1937), Vol. I, pp. 183–86.

the old lines to the seasons. So he reaches the "path of the gods," passes through the worlds of Fire and Wind, of the gods Varuna and Indra, and the Lord of Creatures, to the world of Brahma.

There the river Ageless flows, there grows the tree Refreshment, and there towers the palace Unconquered. Indra, king of the gods, and the "Lord of Creatures" are the guardians of its threshold. Therein stands the couch "Of Unmeasured Splendor" and two beautiful women await the Perfected One: Mentally Congenial (*mānasī*) and her counterpart Lovely to See (*cākṣuṣī*): "With flowers in hand they weave the worlds": the inward, spiritual and the sensory, outward worlds. Here too is the realm of the Mothers, the celestial women Amba and Ambayavi—that is to say, Mother and Little Mother—and of the maternal streams of the universe, which are called "Ambaya," motherly beings. "To this world comes he who knows this." Brahma, the Lord of this world, sends five hundred celestial women to greet him, saying: "Hurry to him; for by virtue of my glory (which is within him, thanks to his knowledge gained through initiation, and has elevated him to the likeness of Brahma) he has come to the river Ageless and, truly, will never grow old." The river Ageless is the bounding stream that encircles the Paradise of Deathlessness, just as Styx forms the boundary of Hades and the River of Fire, "Fordless" (*Vaitarani*), bounds the Indian underworld.

As has ever been the custom on such "Magic Flute" occasions for initiates, the reception takes the form of a grand opera. The hero is surrounded by a chorus and ballet: five hundred celestial women with fruits to refresh him, ointments and wreaths, vestments and perfumed powder. They "adorn him with the adornment of *brahman*." Thus newly and properly clad, "he goes on, adorned with the adornment of *brahman*, as a knower of *brahman*, to *brahman*." "He arrives [earlier presumably] at the lake Ara (Storm Flood), which he crosses with his mind. On coming to it, those who know only the immediate, sink. . . . He arrives at the river Ageless, and this, too, he crosses with his mind." This is the boundary; for here, freshly clad, he leaves behind his old prepossessions. That is the indispensable negative ritual of investiture to the new status: "He shakes off his good deeds and his evil deeds. His friends and relatives succeed to his good deeds; his enemies to his evil deeds. And as one driving a chariot looks down upon the two chariot wheels, he looks down upon day and night here below, upon good and evil deeds, and upon all pairs of opposites."

The knower of *brahman* is the whole man, he has been made whole by the integration of opposites. He has transcended the opposition of thou and I, of I and world, inside and out, friend and enemy, joy and sorrow. "Devoid of good deeds, devoid of evil deeds, a knower of *brahman*, unto *brahman* he proceeds. He comes to the tree Refreshment; the fragrance of *brahman* enters into him. He comes to the city Salajya; the flavor of *brahman* enters into him. He comes to the castle Unconquerable; the sunlike, blinding, radiant, fiery energy of *brahman* enters into him. He arrives; and the two guardians of the threshold, Indra and the Lord of Creatures, flee before him. He comes to the hall Vibhu (all permeating, divine expanse); the glory of *brahman* enters into him. He comes to the exalted throne estrade Splendidly Shining"—this is the name by which the moon is addressed in the strophes; it also means "gazing far about"; for vision is to the Indians not a receptive mirroring but a radiation that reaches out to things from within. "This throne estrade is Knowledge, for by Knowledge one gazes far about. He comes to the couch Unmeasured Splendor; this is the Life Energy (*prāṇa*: Life Breath). What Has Been and What Is To Be are its two front legs, Radiant Beauty (*śrī*) and Flowing Refreshment (*irā*) the two back legs. . . . Radiant Beauty its cushion. Upon it Brahma sits."

The initiate, who thanks to his knowledge has himself become *brahman*, does not kneel to Brahma as a subject, but approaches him as one ruler another:

He goes up to him, he who knows this, one foot before the next. Brahma questions: "Who are you?" He is to answer: "I am a season. I come from the seasons. Through the womb of cosmic space (ether, *ākāśa*) I was produced, as the semen through a wife."

That was his lunar origin which he has left behind. But at the same time he knows himself to be light of the inexhaustible light: "I am the radiant brilliance of the year, the immortal Self (*ātman*) of all beings. Thou art the Self of all being. What thou art, that am I."

Brahma asks him: "What am I?" He is to answer: "The true reality (*satyam*). "What is reality?" "That which is neither the gods nor the life energies (of all creatures: *prāṇa*) is 'real' (*sat*). "The gods and life energies are "-ity" (*-yam*). This is what is expressed by the word *sat-yam*, (Real-ity). These two are here the All.

World and upper world, cosmos and transcendence, form the Whole, the unfolded transience and the truly real, beyond, which is its source. "This All here: thou art that." Thus he declares to him there."

And the Highest (after a further play of questions and answers) effects the Assumption: "HE says: 'Mine are the primeval waters of life: this world, indeed, is your world here.'" Thus the initiate returns home to the source of all gods and beings, to the waters that preceded all creation, to the fertile waters of the cosmos, in which Brahma comes into being as a golden and imperishable seed (*Hiranya-garbha*) and expands as a golden cosmic egg, whose half shells form heaven and earth and whose content unfolds into all gods and creatures—to the waters of life into which at every end of the world all forms that have condensed from them again dissolve, just as all the configurations of consciousness dissolve, in dreamless sleep and in the ecstasy of the yogi, into *brahman*.

It is these same waters of life that our Gnostic Apocalypse, through the mouth of the Logos, promises as the goal of rebirth in God: "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. . . . And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."

The two greatest of the classical Upanishads, the *Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*,¹² present, finally, two roughly parallel versions of one amplified doctrine, teaching not only the two paths of man's rebirth in the sub-lunar and suprasolar spheres of *brahman*, but also the lore of man's descent from the sphere of the gods to the earthly world. In the closing period of Vedic thought the dominant features of the ritual—the sacrificial fire and the burnt offering—still give symbolic form and structure to this secret doctrine: a man comes into being on earth through a transformation and rebirth, brought about by a fivefold burnt offering of the gods.

The first sacrificial fire in which the gods make their offerings is the upper world. Its fuel is the sun, whose rays are the smoke; the day is its flame; the four cardinal points are its coals, and the intermediate directions its sparks. In this fire the gods offer up faith (*śraddhā*): i.e., that unconditioned certainty, in full possession of the truly real, which is honest piety. From this offering arises—"there is put together"—King Soma: the moon, the elixir of immortality, the godly drink Deathless. The gods pour it as a libation into the second fire, which is the rain, named after the rain god Parjanya—a

¹² Respectively 6. 2. 1 and 5. 3. 1.

name that already belonged to the common Indo-Celtic linguistic heritage and age, before the formation of Sanskrit: it appears in Lithuanian as "Perkunas," in Old Norse as "Fjörgyn." The year is its fuel, the clouds its smoke, the lightning its flame, the thunderbolt its coals, the hailstones its sparks. With it the divine germ descends into the mid-zone between heaven and earth (*antarikṣa*), the atmosphere of the clouds.

In this "fire" the gods sacrifice King Soma, and his fluid (as one might expect) is transformed into rain. The next fire, which brings about a kind of alchemical transformation of the divine life substance that the gods pour into it, is the world here below. In this fire the earth is the fuel; its smoke is fire, its flame the night, its coals are the moon, and its sparks the stars. Here the sublunar sphere, from the earth to the moon and the sparkling night sky, is taken as an earthly unity. In this fire the gods sacrifice the rain, and from their oblation springs "food" (vegetable food).

The fourth sacrificial fire is man, that is: the male (*puruṣa*). His open mouth is the fuel, his breath the smoke, his voice the flame; his eyes are the coals, and his ears the sparks. In this fire the gods sacrifice food, and from their oblation arises the seed. The last sacrificial fire is woman; its fuel is the womb, and its sparks are desire. In this fire the gods sacrifice the man's seed, and from their offering arises man on earth, the fifth and last transformation of the divine substance *śraddhā*.

This is the strange answer to one of the puzzling questions to which the young Shvetaketu knew no answer: "At which libation are the waters, when they are offered, endowed with human voice, do they stand up and speak?" In the beginning of the alchemical process there was no mention of these waters as the initial substance underlying the fivefold magical transformation; on the contrary, what was mentioned as the substance of the first libation was *śraddhā*, "faith." Thus *śraddhā* must be this water, not, to be sure, the water of the rain in the middle atmosphere, which springs from the moon elixir Deathless in the course of the third transformation, but the supracelestial water of life, the divine primal substance of the world, which is transformed into each and every living thing and whose most pregnant forms are the moon as the divine fluid of deathlessness and the seed of man. This identification of the waters of life with *śraddhā*—true belief based on an awareness of the true reality—is an extension of the old Vedic notion that the primal waters of the universe are *ṛta*, that is, the veritable element and order of all things, the truly real, the primordial and

eternal substance of the world, all-encompassing as the life sea, omnipresent, omniscient in timelessness, preceding all life forms (which are the perishable transformations of the primal waters), the only true eternal being and hence the guardian of truth, the god who safeguards oaths and punishes betrayal.

Thus the divine powers, who are present as active forces in every sphere of the cosmos, offer up the primordial substance of the universe, the waters, to the transformative power of the holy fire, which (like the waters) has many forms in the various strata of the cosmos, ranging from the upper world to the woman's womb: all being places of rebirth.

"In this (fifth) fire the gods offer semen as the oblation," says the text. These gods are evidently the "gods in our body," who govern the microcosm in all its parts, which are analogous to those of the macrocosm.¹³

From this libation a person (*puruṣa*) arises. Thus the waters at the fifth libation become endowed with human voice. Enclosed in the ovum, the seed rests ten or nine lunar months and then is born. He lives as long as he lives, and when he then dies, they carry him to the fire. This fire is an actual fire (a regular, common fire); its fuel is fuel; its smoke, smoke; its flame, flame; its coals are coals, and its sparks, sparks. In this fire the gods offer the person as sacrifice. From this oblation a man of the color of light arises (or is "put together").

So those who know all this, and those, too, who in forest solitude revere Faith (*śraddhā*) in their mind and concentration as the truly real, pass into the flame of the fire; and from the flame into the day, from the day into the half-month of the waxing moon, from the half-month of the waxing moon into the six months (the half-year) during which the sun moves northward [i.e., into the rising year between winter solstice and summer solstice, where the arc of the sun, between the shortest and the longest day of the year, moves steadily northward and becomes continually longer and higher]. From those months they pass to the realm of the gods, and from the realm of the gods to the sun, from the sun to the sphere of lightning. There a spiritual man [or, according to the alternate version: "a man who is no man"] approaches and conducts them to the Brahma-worlds. In these Brahma-worlds they reside in the supreme, most remote distances. From these there is no return. That is the "Way of the Gods."

¹³ On this view cf. my lecture "On the Significance of the Indian Tantric Yoga" (orig. 1933), PEY 4, pp. 30ff.

Here there is no further mention of the Seasons as guardians of the threshold or of the moon as the gate to the upper world, where the Knower must give an account of himself and say whether he has succumbed entirely to the earthly-lunar sphere and its timeless "die and become" or whether he may declare himself to be "light of the inexhaustible light" and return to the supreme source of cosmic light. Nor is the sun any longer the examiner of souls; here it is the lightning, considered as the supreme light of heaven, which silently takes possession of the Knowing Elect and leads them home to the supreme transcendence: there "they dwell in the supreme, most remote distances"—*parāḥ parāvataḥ*.

He who does not possess this "knowledge" of rebirth at the highest source, nor honor *śraddhā* in his devotion as the true primordial substance, the water of life, remains captive in the sublunar circle; and if heaven rewards him for his performance of the Brahmanical sacrificial ritual, his kindness and asceticism, he attains to the moon. In this later doctrine, the whole itinerary is different from the journey to the world of *brahman*. It leads over the lesser degrees, which are poorer in light, into the smoke instead of the flame of the funeral pyre, through the half-month of the waning moon, through the half-year of the diminishing arc of the sun. Thus the dead man arrives at the "world of the fathers" and the moon: this is the "way of the fathers," or "of the ancestors."

There the dead are reborn as "food"; and on this heavenly substance the gods feed, devouring the moon, King Soma, in accordance with the saying: "Wax and wane."

And when this round is concluded for them, they (those blessed ones in the moon) pass into space; from space into wind, from wind into rain, from rain into the earth. On reaching the earth, they become food and again are poured as an offering into the fire of man, whence they are born in the fire of woman, and, again rising through the various worlds, they wheel round in the same way, evermore. But those who do not know of these two ways, become what crawl and flit about and bite.¹⁴

¹⁴ This conclusion about rebirth on earth according to *Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 6. 2. 16. The preceding according to the same version and *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 5. 3. 1-5. 9. The same applies to the return from the moon where the souls have served as food for the gods [*Chānd.-Up.* 5. 10. 5]: "After having remained in it as long as there is a residue of their good works, then by that course by which they came they return again, just as they came, into space; from space, into wind. After having become wind, one becomes vapor (i.e., smoke). After having become vapor, he becomes cloud. After having become cloud, he rains down. They are born here as rice and barley, as herbs and trees,

The way of the "fathers" or "ancestors," the circuit in the sublunar zone, is the older way. Formerly the moon, continually reborn after total disappearance, was the comforting token that death, like the moonless black night, was but a passage to the rebirth of the infant-crescent, in accordance with the saying: "Wax and wane." The recurrent phases of the moon were a visible pledge of eternally renewed rebirth. But this lunar era of the human spirit with its hope of immortality grounded in perpetual alternation, gave way to the solar era, when the unchanging eternity of solar existence was promised to those initiated through "knowledge." The moon, formerly a symbol of the supreme consolation and visible hope, now came to stand for the nightmarish vicious circle of death and birth, whence only an esoteric "knower" could escape into a higher, transcendent world. The lunar circle creates the profound world-weariness of *saṃsāra*, the bitterness of the timeless and aimless transmigration that has been the hallmark of Indian culture from time immemorial:

Unceasingly in every spot, in every heavenly quarter, in water and on the dry land, creatures are born and creatures die, like bubbles in water.

This critique of rebirth and immortality in the sublunar, material cycle was already announced by Shatyayani in the *Jaiminīya-Brahmaṇa*:

This world is plagued indeed with many ills. Who, therefore, having cast it off, would wish to return to it, or to be here again within it?

as sesame plants and beans. From these forms of existence it is truly extremely difficult to emerge; for only if some one or other eats him as food and emits him as semen, does he develop further. Accordingly, those who are of pleasant conduct here—the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter a pleasant womb, either the womb of a Brahman, or the womb of a Kshatriya, or the womb of a Vaishya. . . . But for those who are of stinking conduct here—the prospect is that they will enter a stinking womb, either of a dog, of a swine, or of an outcaste. But on neither of these ways are those tiny, continually returning creatures, of whom it is said: 'Be born and die'—theirs is a third state. Therefore it comes about that the world above is not filled up. [One of the prince's questions that Shvetaketu could not answer was "Do you know why yonder world is not filled up?"] Therefore one should seek to guard himself. As to this, there is the following verse:

The plunderer of gold, the liquor-drinker,
The invader of a teacher's bed, the Brahman-killer—
These four sink downward in the scale,
And, fifth, he who consorts with them.

But he who knows these five fires [as transformative forces of fivefold rebirth in the five spheres of the cosmos] is not stained with evil, even though consorting with those people. He becomes pure, clean, possessor of a pure world, who knows this—yea, he who knows this!"

Good Gnostic thinking, this! The medieval sect of the Catharists (the "Pure"—a scandalously pretentious name), who along with the Albigenses were exterminated with fire and sword in Christ's name for espousing Gnostic errors, held that "there is no other hell than this sublunar world." That was going too far: a truly Indian doctrine. True, the medieval Church with magnificent naïveté taught that human life on earth was a vale of tears and trials. But had the world not been "redeemed" and purified by Christ's sacrifice on the Cross? The modern West has never long allowed such Gnostic-Indian teachings to mar its enjoyment of the so-called fair earth; and the collective human powers—Mother Church, Father State, or Brother People's Comrade—which from time to time threaten to transform sublunar existence into a hell by organizing human bestiality and supplying men with ideals on the strength of which to murder, torture and burn, to pillage and banish each other with a clear conscience—these demonic collective powers have always been resolute in their opposition to the ultrapure faultfinders who look down from the vantage point of a higher knowledge upon the cycle of death and rebirth that makes this sublunar sphere a hell, who take a critical view of the pleasure and pain, the blood, ashes, and tears of *samsāra*. That is why, though the wisdom of India has aroused no little interest in certain Western circles, it has so seldom struck effective roots among us.

Man's knowledge of his eternal part, into which he desires to be reborn, rises above the visible solar world to the supersensory world of *brahman*, the sacred power that makes seers one with the gods and lives on in holy usage, word and knowledge: the fervor and faith of the initiate. The Knower (i.e., the one in possession of gnosis) who can escape from the sublunar and solar zones and enter into the spheres of Brahma, the *parāḥ parāvataḥ*, those supreme most remote distances, is in the Gnostic view a Peratic, since, thanks to his knowledge or "gnosis," he has surpassed the *perās*, the ultimate boundary of the world. He has achieved the *perān*: the passage beyond the sphere of rebirths and of the lower world.

In his *Elenchos* against the heresies of his day, Hippolytus, bishop of Ostia at the turn of the second century, deals with the sect of the Peratai, who boast of being alone capable of *perān*: "surpassing transience." Their initiates have successfully crossed the Red Sea, the water of transience, which is Kronos (circling time and death), and have escaped the bondage of Egypt, which is life in the body, the sublunar world of death and birth.

They have emerged from creation, thanks to their gnosis, their "knowledge," for they "have recognized the necessity in creation and the ways by which man came into the world."¹⁵

Thus they returned home to the land of promise, the Promised Land, which the Apocalypse calls the Bride, the Heavenly Jerusalem, or the Spirit, the Logos. The notion of *perān* was already familiar to Philo of Alexandria and to the sect of the Naassenes, who were related to the Peratai. But are not all Gnostics and all mystics and prophets of redemption, who teach a cosmic ascent of the liberated soul into a world of transcendence, a remote, upper *perās*—are they not all Peratai? One might take Peratai as a generic term for them all. The Pythagorean Orphics, whose beliefs are attested in Bachofen's vase from Canosa, were no less Peratai than the Neo-Vedic initiates of the "Five Fires" and "Two Ways." The Worlds called *parāḥ parāvataḥ* are the same—syllable for syllable—as those termed by the Gnostics *perās*.

Today we look upon the Greco-Oriental cosmology, which forms the framework of the ascent of the soul to supreme rebirth, as a merely sublime symbolic system; for the divine cosmic theater, through whose loft the soul "really" journeyed upward, now is closed. Modern physics and astronomy have stripped the cosmos of its gods. The process began with the pre-Socratic philosophers and the pre-Ptolemaic Greek scientists. Galileo and Kepler took up their ideas, and Einstein and Planck, Eddington and Dirac, have carried them still further.

Thanks to the modern telescope which, penetrating beyond the Milky Way, has reduced our solar system and our little parcel of earth within it to the dimensions of a local merry-go-round, a village fair in a vast Asia of stars, what to the Pythagorean Orphics as well as to the Christian and Neo-

¹⁵ Cf. H. Leisegang, *Gnosis* (Leipzig, Kröners Taschenausgaben, 32) p. 142; quoting Hippolytus, who, drawing on the original sources of the Peratai, wrote: "They call themselves Peratai, for they believe that no creature can escape from the fate which is allotted the creatures from birth. For if something 'is born, it must also perish,' as the Sybil also declared. But we alone, who have recognized the necessity in creation and the ways by which man came into the world, have also learned to travel through, and we alone are able to surpass transience. . . . Death overcomes the Egyptians in the Red Sea and their battle wagons; all the unknowing—i.e., who have no gnosis—are Egyptians. And that is the meaning of the Exodus from Egypt, namely, the exodus from the body; for in their opinion the body is a little Egypt; and to cross the Red Sea is to attain to a place beyond Creation; and to be in the desert is to be beyond Creation, where all the gods alike of corruption and of redemption have their being. The gods of corruption are the stars, which impose upon creatures the necessity of birth and change."

Vedic Gnostics was cosmic reality has become what it always was: a symbol of psychic realms and processes.

All the images and intimations of his depths that man, from the Stone Age almost to the present time, projected upon the shimmering screen of the universe, have flowed back into man himself.

However, the Indians, more than two thousand years ago, recognized such cosmologies and journeys of rebirth through the cosmic spheres to be projections of the psyche upon cosmic space, and at an early date gave this knowledge a clear formulation in Mahayana Buddhism. Neither mathematics nor astronomy and physics, with their ever improved tools and methods, were needed; for in India the unmatched, practical psychology of Yoga put an early end to all gnostic possibilities, with their cosmic journeys of the soul. The clarification of the inner cosmos of the soul to its ultimate depth deprived the projections from this bubbling deep of their magic: those self-generated images that hold the outward eye and mind transfixed, under the spell of their Maya. Yoga, a system with ancient pre-Aryan roots, recognized all gnostic doctrines of the cosmos to be symbols of psychic reality; and therewith the "doctrine of the two ways" became, together with the Brahman ritual of the fire sacrifice, an empty element of a dead tradition. *Brahman*, the supreme transcendence (*parāh, perās*), is the innermost self (*ātman*) within man and all beings: from it arises all the Maya of the world and ego, and all the stages of the journey to it are within ourselves, in the inner cosmos.

A great living sage of India, the Saint Shri Ramana Maharshi of Tiruvannamalai (b. 1879),¹⁶ has given to the teaching of this inward road, which Hinduism more than any other culture has systematically developed, a new Vedantic-Yogic formulation, based on his own fresh experience: as the Quest for the Self:

In the middle of the cave of the heart gleams, one and universal, the pure absolute, *brahman*, manifested as "I-I" in the form of the Self, the *ātman*. Let your mind explore itself, let it plunge into the heart and find with bated breath your position in the Self.¹⁷

¹⁶ [Died 1951. Cf. Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (New York, 1951), p. 614, and C. G. Jung, "The Holy Men of India," *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (CWJ, 11; 1958), pp. 576ff.]

¹⁷ This stanza by Shri Ramana is to be found in T. Ganapati Shāstri's *Ramana-Gītā* II, 2 and represents the quintessence of his doctrine; the two following stanzas are in the 40 *Lehrverse* (Didactic Verses) of Shri Ramana, Nos. 28 and 30, *Sat-Darshana-Bhāshya*

Like a diver seeking to find what has fallen into the water,
You must plunge inward with collected mind,
You must halt breath, speech, and every impulse
In order to find the place whence the I
Which rises upward has its source.

When the mind, questing inward for "Who am I,"
Reaches the heart, there is self-revealed an "I I"
Before whose presence the I bows and is extinguished.
Though it reveals itself thus, it has not the nature of I;
It is perfection and nothing other than the self.

Instead of a cosmic journey of the soul after death: transformation in one's lifetime, redemption while yet alive (*jīvan-mukti*):

He who finds his way to the core of the Self, whence rise all levels of the I, all spheres of the world, he who finds his way home to his first source with the question "whence am I?" is born and reborn. Know that whoever is so born, is the wisest of the wise—each moment of his life he is reborn anew.

Verses 30 and 32, "Truth Revealed, Sad-Vidyā," 28 and 30. The conclusion is in Shri Ramana's *Anubhandam* (Supplement to Sad Vidyā 11-12, in *Truth Revealed, Sad-Vidyā*, p. 33). The didactic dialogues and discourses and mottoes of Shri Ramana Maharshi have been published in a series of small books and brochures by the Shri Ramanasramam Book Depot, Tiruvannamalai, South India. [For a collected German-language edition with biographical introduction and notes, see Heinrich Zimmer, *Der Weg zum Selbst*, ed. by C. G. Jung (Zurich, 1944). The tr. of Jung's foreword is cited in the preceding n.]

Immortality

I

"To the psyche," wrote the man to whom these pages are dedicated¹ in veneration and gratitude, "death is just as important as birth and, like it, is an integral part of life."

Death is the end of life but at the same time a part of life; we do not know it until our life is at an end and consequently can say nothing concerning it. Nevertheless, we know it well and are well able to speak of death. It is both future and present. Death is a part of the rhythm of our life; to live is to die: *Nascentes morimur finisque ab origine pendet*.² The moment we begin to live, we begin to die. Every period of sleep is a half-death; Thanatos and Hypnos are brothers. Every transition from one phase of life to another is a kind of death. This is the truth of the primitive ritualistic dogmatism which looks upon each of life's transitions—accession to manhood, to the dignity of medicine man or chief, marriage, etc.—as a death and rebirth, a truth which is quite in harmony with biological insight into the periodicity of life. Life is an ocean with rising and falling tides. This means that death is always implicit in it. The ancient Egyptians had a beautiful expression for this periodicity of life: *whm ankh*, "to repeat life." Life is something that repeats itself. But the same term means the life after death—immortality, as we call it.

This brings us to the very center of our problem: the anthropological *topos* of immortality. This notion (I should like to state expressly at this point) is not a paradox. Precisely because death not only transcends life but also forms a part of life, it is possible to consider death from an anthro-

¹ [This paper appeared in *EJ*, XVIII, in 1950—a special volume for C. G. Jung's 75th birthday, entitled *From the World of the Archetypes*. The quotation is from Jung's commentary in *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, tr. Cary F. Baynes (rev. edn., New York and London, 1962), pp. 124f.—ED.]

² Manilius, *Astronomica*, IV, 16 (ed. T. Breiter, Leipzig, 1908).

pological point of view; in this sense the "transcendent" becomes at least partially "immanent."

For the Greeks man was essentially *brutos*, "mortal." Contrasted to men are the gods, whose essence it is to be immortal, *athanatoi* or *ambrotoi*. They feed on *ambrosia*, the food of immortality. Animals are not mortal in the same sense as men. Death is constitutive of human existence. Not only *must* men die; they fulfill their essence by dying.

The same conception prevails in the Middle East: "When the gods created man," we read in Gilgamesh, "they allotted to him death, but life they retained in their own keeping."³ And in some form we find it almost everywhere. Man's death is the pledge of his alienation from nature. Hence the fear of death and mortal guilt which are absent in gods and animals. As Henriëtte Roland Holst, a great Dutch poet, has said:

How tranquil is dying in nature,
The leaf falls, rusts on the silent earth,
passes, and in passing takes on new worth:
every creature knows its time and awaits its hour

and always, between the time of dying
and the coming of a new generation,
stands expectation, like a silent sentinel
on the wharves that are otherwise so busy.

This is what gives the life of nature in these regions
a tranquil mellowness:
silence shrouds those who have succumbed
and a new generation is awaited in silence.

But in the human world there is a mingling
of the rising and perishing generations.
A terrible thing it is: the smell of rot
lies heavy upon young, unsuspecting souls.

In a cemetery of outlived forms
among the coffins of crime and guilt,
in an infernal turmoil that invades their very pores
the young must build their new norms.⁴

³ *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, tr. N. K. Sanders (Harmondsworth and Baltimore, 1960), p. 99.

⁴ [Tr. R.M. from German.]

If each individual man and all mankind *must die*, it is because of man's power to objectify himself; the animal and nature perish; man sees himself die.⁵ He experiences his own death long before his last hour. He knows instinctively that he is neither nature nor god, and a great many of his myths relate how death came into the world. He takes a critical attitude toward death in nature and toward divine immortality as well.

II

This critique can take different forms. Primitive man includes death in the process of life. His life is not, like ours or that of the Greeks before us, limited by death at one end and birth at the other. Life is in every case continuous; but there are stoppages akin to dams in a river, which men overcome by ritual means. Such dams are, first of all, birth (which is actually a rebirth), sickness, marriage, etc. Death is merely one of the most important intervals, *tempora*; it is not final. Survival after death is taken just as much for granted as is survival after the rites of puberty. Life renews itself, continues through ever-repeated rebirths, and so takes on something of the somber color of death, which spreads, as it were, over the whole of life. But death loses what life gains. It becomes a state of being that is just as self-evident as life.⁶

This primitive view survived among the so-called civilized peoples, taking the form of an animatism, usually with pantheistic coloration. As Pierret, the early Egyptologist, put it in exact agreement with the most ancient texts: "There is no death in the world but only transformations . . . never annihilation."⁷ All these denials of death from the ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts down to Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird* are more or less speculative formulations of a primitive life feeling such as that described by Leenhardt, in connection with New Caledonia: "The dividing line between life and death is a boundary between two states of being, not between being and nothingness. Our concept of death is not to be met with among the people

5 On the following, cf. also my anthropological studies: *Der Mensch und die Religion* (Basel, 1941); *L'Homme primitif et la religion* (Paris, 1940); "L'Anthropomorphisme comme forme de l'anthropologie," *Le Monde non-chrétien* (Paris), 1947; "Menswording en cultuurverschuiving," *Mededeelingen der Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schoone Kunsten van België* (Antwerp), 1948; "L'Homme et la civilisation," *EJ* 1948; "Primordial Time and Final Time," *Man and Time* (PEY 3), pp. 324-50.

6 See my *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, tr. J. E. Turner (New York, 1938); orig.: *Phänomenologie der Religion* (Tübingen, 1933).

7 P. Pierret, *Le Dogme de la résurrection chez les anciens Égyptiens* (Paris, 1871, lithographed), p. 17.

of the Grande Terre."⁸ Death is a mere crisis in life, and the purpose of the rites relating to it is only to help life through a difficult moment,⁹ comparable to sickness or the transition from one phase to another.

The biological analogy to which I have alluded above is particularly clear in the case of sleep: the life cycle must be perpetuated, and death, like sleep, presents a difficulty. De Buck has explained that for the Egyptians sleep was a symbol of death and awakening a kind of resurrection. An Egyptian could not have said: the child is not dead, he is only sleeping.¹⁰

Once speculation sets in, this ritualization of death becomes an outright denial of death, in which the totality, life and death, is absorbed by an all-embracing vital force to become part of a divine (or animal) and therefore unconscious life.

But among primitive peoples we also find another view of death. Here death is not denied, but opposed and condemned as unnatural. While the first view leaves no room for the human element, here the essential is a purely human protest. Death is presupposed as a fact that can in no way be denied:

When in the gray primeval times God made things,
He made the sun;
And it comes into being and passes away and comes again into being.

He created the moon;
And it comes into being and passes away and comes again into being.

He created the stars;
And they come into being and pass away and come again into being.

He created man;
And he comes into being and passes away and does not come again.¹¹

The human character of death and the protest against death are made very clear in this song of the Dinka, of the Upper Nile valley. Such a protest can be heard among many primitive peoples and modern peoples as well. Certain tribes look upon all death as violent. There is no such thing as a "natural death"; in their eyes, a death without discernible violence must

⁸ M. Leenhardt, *Gens de la Grande Terre* (Paris, 1937), p. 177.

⁹ Vilhelm P. Grønbech, *Vor Folkeat i Oldtiden* (Copenhagen, 1912), Vol. IV, pp. 58f.

¹⁰ A. de Buck, *De godsdienstige opvatting van den slaap* (Leiden, 1939), p. 14.

¹¹ August Seidel, *Geschichten und Lieder der Afrikaner* (Berlin, 1896), p. 336. Cf. K. T. Preuss, *Die geistige Kultur der Naturvölker* (Leipzig, 1914), p. 76.

have been brought about by magic or other supernatural activity. Where the identity of the "murderer" is not evident, he is discovered and punished by magical means.¹² Sometimes this view takes on a rather meditative form; the culture hero of the Maori, for example, was said to have opposed the thought of death without return, for death "struck him as unworthy and an offense against human dignity."¹³

Where this thought structure prevails, the fact of death is fixed and inexorable. No attempt is made to assimilate man to the rest of nature by renewal or reincarnation. The Dinka are right: man does not return.

But here we are dealing with the spirit, not of course in the sense that the spirit outlives the body, but in the sense that the spirit opposes nature—even divine nature. The animal merges with the whole of life; this whole can be divine. But man by his very essence cannot "merge"; his life as such is a protest against death. The primitives are right: a man's life can be taken from him only by violence.

Obviously it would be a mistake to speak of two distinct "orientations" of primitive peoples in respect to death; the two views intersect, alternate, or subsist quietly side by side. Nevertheless there are two attitudes, which for us moderns have become well-nigh incompatible. The one, declaring all things to be divine and expressing its satisfaction with divine nature, strives for actual immortality. The second postulates a survival: man is not immortal, he dies in the full sense of the word, but he overcomes death in some way. For, as someone has said: "The first condition for survival after death is death itself."

These ideas are still alive. In our own time certain proponents of existentialist philosophy have given expression to the most radical protest against death. To Albert Camus, for example, the hopelessly irrational contingency of death is the absurd par excellence.¹⁴ From the wreckage of utter absurdity Karl Jaspers saves the possibility of transcendence in failure. These ideas, it must be admitted, are not entirely new: the author of Ecclesiastes outdid any modern nihilism and found no transcendence, in the form of an afterlife or in any other form, that could be pitted against "vanity."

¹² See my *Religion* (n. 5, above); L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, tr. Lilian A. Clare (London, 1926), pp. 276ff.; A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, ed. Theodore Besterman (2nd edn., rev., London, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 32ff.; B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (London and New York, 1899), p. 48.

¹³ Robert Hertz, *Mélanges de sociologie religieuse et folklore* (Paris, 1928), p. 123, n. 1.

¹⁴ [*The Myth of Sisyphus*, tr. Justin O'Brien (London and New York, 1955).—Ed.]

III

We have seen that the recognition of death is prerequisite to the idea of an afterlife. But the question arises: does not the recognition of death, on the other hand, make all survival impossible? If I die and do not enter into another stage of life, but really die (i.e., rot), how can I be expected to live on? Or rather: what, in me, can be expected to live on? For I am I — i.e., a man, body and soul. And there is not one single reason to exempt a part of this man from destruction. For sometimes what we call "spirit" dies even before the "body."

Anthropologically speaking, this is the most important part of our problem. How is it possible that man should even conceive the idea of an afterlife when he is essentially *brutos* and knows it? Or to put it in a different way: can he know that he dies? Can he see himself die? Preuss tells of a Winnebago shaman who had the following to say about his own rebirths:

We were attacked by a company that was on the warpath and killed us all. But I did not know I had been killed. I thought I was running about as usual, until I saw a pile of corpses on the ground, and my own among them. [He goes on living] until I died of old age. My bones fell apart at the joints, my ribs caved in, and I died a second time. I experienced no more pain in death than the first time. This time I was buried in the way then customary. I was wrapped in a blanket and lowered into the grave. There I rotted. I watched the men who were burying me.¹⁵

This is a remarkable statement, even for a medicine man. Apparently he dies twice. But even after the second death he is still alive. He sees himself die, he sees himself being buried, he sees himself rot. Wild fantasy? I do not believe in wild fantasies. Everything man experiences is somewhere stored up in him, and his fantasy cannot escape from the framework of collective experience.

The most remarkable thing about this report is that it partakes of both above-mentioned ways of experiencing death. The man simply goes on living after death. But he really dies and gives a crass account of the process. He sees himself rot. Who sees and who rots? Man is a being who lives by his *con-scientia*. Animals live directly, man indirectly, through something

¹⁵ K. T. Preuss, *Tod und Unsterblichkeit im Glauben der Naturvölker* (Tübingen, 1930), p. 23.

extrahuman. Human existence is ex-centric. Man sees himself, hears himself, observes himself. The "he" is his co-knower, the ego that sees his other ego.

In this light, the belief in immortality is an extreme case of human existence. The ground of human existence is not life itself; if it were, man would be an animal that did not observe itself, a piece of world, mere nature. Human existence is grounded in a belief. Man believes in something outside himself, which is the pledge of his existence. We may call it consciousness, but then in the sense of *con-scientia*, co-knowledge of our life, objectivization of life from some outside vantage point.

This "outside vantage point" is always present, even in death. That is why we said at the outset that dying is a human affair. Man as he lives and breathes is assuredly not immortal; nor does he live on after his death. But quite independent of death or life is the "it" which perceives and in perceiving posits an existence beyond death.¹⁶

IV

The same conviction is to be found in all the various narratives of men who have visited the "other world." The Egyptian Satni-Khamois is a predecessor of Dante: he beholds the tortures of the damned in the other world.¹⁷ Plutarch tells how Thespesios visited the underworld and the abode of the blessed.¹⁸ Similar journeys are attributed to Isaiah, Apollonius of Tyana, Simon Magus, Er the Armenian, Hermotimos of Klazomenai, Aristeas, and many others whose names have not come down to us.¹⁹ Many of these travelers to the other world were ecstasies, but not all, and Dante certainly not. But whatever their form, these journeys are an attempt to provide an objectivized dead self with an environment. The result is an "other world" that is accessible to human experience.

¹⁶ On this point, cf. my above-mentioned works (nn. 5, 6).

¹⁷ G. Maspero, *Popular Stories of Ancient Egypt*, tr. Mrs. C. H. W. Johns (New York and London, 1915).

¹⁸ *De sera numinum vindicta* (*Moralia*, tr. Delacy and Einarson, LCL, 1959); Konrad Burdach, *Vorspiel* (Halle, 1925), Vol. I, pt. 1, p. 118.

¹⁹ Burdach, *Vorspiel*, pp. 122ff.; W. Bousset, "Die Himmelsreise der Seele," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (Tübingen), IV (1901), 252ff.; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, tr. W. B. Hillis (London, 1925), pp. 300, 329ff.; Carl C. T. Andersen, *Islandske Folkesagn og Æventyr* (Copenhagen, 1864), pp. 234ff.

From time immemorial there have been thinkers who limit the "it," which survives because it is constitutive of human life, to a part of the man, in the belief that by so doing they in a measure limit the fact of death. This is the significance of the doctrine of the soul in so far as it concerns death and immortality. This has nothing to do with the original conception of the soul. To the primitive mind the soul is the man himself or a part of the man side by side with other parts.²⁰ The man, or parts of the man, may live on — but not in opposition to the body which dis-integrates. Under the overpowering influence of the Platonic anthropology, the soul came to be regarded almost universally as the "immortal soul," that is to say, what is left after the man is destroyed. Neither anthropology nor theology has ever concerned itself very much with the soul as such. As Jung says: "... our religion speaks of an immortal soul; but it has very few kind words to say for the human psyche as such, which would go straight to eternal damnation were it not for a special act of Divine Grace."²¹ Platonic anthropology and the Christian "doctrine of immortality" have debased the soul while supposedly elevating it; they have made it into a mere escape, a way out — one might almost say, an evasion. Inevitable death is restricted to the "body"; the deified soul is immortal. Few thinkers have been clearly aware that by espousing such a view man renounces his possibility not only of living but also of living on. On the contrary, Christian Platonism builds its hope of immortality on the soul, whose decay is not so readily verifiable as that of the body.

But this is the opposite of the true state of affairs. Preuss puts it very aptly: "Thus the so-called doctrine of immortality is not created by a previously discovered concept of the soul, but the other way around: a somehow existing belief in survival after death led men to reflect on the nature of the afterlife and on the difference between the dead in the afterlife and the living, and to fixate their reflections in faith."²² Man's consciousness of an existence after death, his certainty that somehow survival forms a part of his essential humanity, is always primary. The doctrine of the soul (not

²⁰ See my *Religion* (n. 6, above).

²¹ "Psychology and Religion," in *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (CWJ, 11, 1958), p. 17.

²² *Tod und Unsterblichkeit*, p. 17.

the primitive or Biblical belief, but the Platonic-Christian doctrine) is only an attempt to substantiate man's belief in a humanity transcending death. Thus the *opus mortis* is limited, but with it the possibilities of human existence. As Tertullian put it: "Such, then, is the work of death—the separation of the soul from the body."²³

VI

Franz Rosenzweig has spoken of the disastrous role of philosophy in evading the ultimate (and first!) anthropological questions. In this sense death is the philosophical stumbling block.

All knowledge of the universe begins with death, with the fear of death. Philosophy presumes to cast off earthly fear, to deprive death of its sting, and Hades of its pestilential breath. . . . [It] denies the anguish of the earth. It glosses over the grave that opens up before our every step. It lets the body fall into the abyss, while the free soul flutters over it. That the fear of death knows no such division into body and soul, that it screams I, I, I and will hear nothing of a reduction of fear to a mere "body"—what is that to philosophy? Philosophy's great effort is precisely to make man forget his bond with death and in death. [But:] Man should not cast away his fear of the earthly; he should remain in the fear of death. Philosophy concludes that death is nothing. In truth, however, death is not an ultimate end but a first beginning, and death is in truth not what it seems, not merely an inexorable something that cannot be wished away.²⁴

After long centuries in which the reality of death was scarcely mentioned, existential philosophy (and assuredly this is one of its foremost achievements) brought death back into philosophy, and some existentialists, as Rosenzweig demanded, have taken the fact of death as their starting point. Max Scheler was a pioneer in this direction; Heidegger, Jaspers up to a certain point, and such men as Albert Camus have followed. Not only the bitterness of death but also the relation of life to death are once more taken seriously.

All these thinkers, as far as I can see, evaluate death as an anthropological problem. This anthropological problem is also philosophical, but in a very

²³ "*Hoc igitur opus mortis: separatio carnis atque animae.*" Tertullian, *De anima*, 52 (*Writings*, tr. P. Holmes, Vol. II, Edinburgh, 1870, p. 525).

²⁴ F. Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (2nd edn., Frankfurt a. M., 1930), pp. 7ff.

different sense from that usually given the term. For in *this* philosophy it is possible to say something about the "it" in man, which sees the man rot, which goes on journeys to heaven and hell, and which is constitutive of existence in life and death alike. This "it" has neither body nor soul. Though it is in no sense an abstraction, it seems to have nothing to do with the time that governs our entire life. Our psychophysical ego has a history; it goes through a development. But the perceiver, who is also our ego, our ex-centric I, remains outside the temporal process; he does not, at our death, vanish from our view (we no longer have any); it is we who vanish from his view.²⁵ I shall have more to say of this.

VII

Among the images used to illustrate the Platonic relationship between body and soul (oyster and shell; body, tomb of the soul; pupa and butterfly, etc.), one of the most important is the metaphor of the garment that cloaks the soul. The body is like a garment that the soul casts off in death. This metaphor is very old; we find it as early as the Pyramid Texts of ancient Egypt.²⁶ But in certain of its aspects this figure is of the utmost anthropological interest and is far more than a body-soul metaphor.

I shall attempt to clarify my meaning by referring to an essay by Erik Peterson.²⁷ His starting point is the story in Genesis of the first clothing of Adam and Eve, which, he contends, is not an explanation of the origin of clothing, but a "theory of the nature of man." Fallen man can achieve self-awareness only if he covers his body in some way or (in magical form) ties an "apron" around it. Before the fall, the primordial parents were unclothed, but not naked: they were clad "in sanctifying grace . . . stripped of this garment, they become subject to death." Thus we can never understand man directly, never take man as our starting point, for "that would be trying to understand him through his nakedness," in the manner of existential philosophy. The garment is an essential part of the man. "Man becomes naked by his own will when he loses the garment for which his unclothed nature was created, when he casts off the tunic which enabled him to know his dignity."

²⁵ Rudolf Eisler, *Kant-Lexikon* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 555-57, s.v. "Unsterblichkeit."

²⁶ Cf. Samuel A. B. Mercer, *The Pyramid Texts in Translation and Commentary* (4 vols., New York, 1952), Vol. I, Utterance 419.

²⁷ "Theologie des Kleides," *Universitas* (Stuttgart), III (1948).

Nakedness, as Peterson wrote in an earlier essay of the same title,²⁸ came into being only after the fall, when "the eyes of men were opened." Before the fall, man took a different view of his body, because man was present to God in such a way that the body—even when clothed by no human garment—was not "naked." Through the fall he is "laid bare in his being." Fallen man has lost his garment. What he now wears on his body is merely the dress that goes with his social position; it may be honorable, but it is not innocent. His only true garment is the baptismal dress which restores to man his original innocence in sacramental rebirth.

Here, in my opinion, the early Christian view of man is reproduced in all its depth. For our present purpose the essential is this: the garment in question is not the body that cloaks the soul (the body can never be a garment, one cannot put it on and take it off at will); this garment is what makes man a man, not his purely biological constitution, his nakedness, as he emerged from the womb, but something additional that he puts on, or rather that God puts on him. Unlike animals whose essential nature it is to be naked, man is most himself not when naked, but when clad. He need not be clad in actual clothes. The Greek art of the Golden Age and later the Renaissance "discovered" man by undressing him. But what they discovered was not his natural nakedness; if it had been, their men would not have been men or their art art. What they created is a man, whether naked, half-naked, or fully dressed, who manifests himself as a man. No doubt the Greek nude is something different from a Christian "clothed in sanctifying grace." But both are an attempt to see man as man and not as a naked animal. The nudes of the Greeks of the so-called postarchaic period (in the full flower of the archaic period itself clothing still was the rule) are the works of men conscious of clothing—no less than modern paintings and statues in which the person is represented without clothes. They give full play to joy in the splendor of the flesh; and yet their aim is to portray a mankind which is not naked by nature, but which even when it has removed its clothes retains the garment of the spirit.

In this sense the enduring in man is neither the body nor the soul, but the garment. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed

28 *Benediktinische Monatsschrift* (Beuron), XVI (1934), 347ff.

upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life" (II Cor. 5 : 1-4). The enduring in man is the tabernacle or garment given by God.

VIII

Thus the "something" that is constitutive of life and death is fundamentally "transcendent." It is not in man; it makes man. Consequently, we cannot accept the Platonic definition of "immortality," to the effect that some part of man, whether body or spirit, endures. There is nothing eternal in man. But just as he can be a man thanks only to his ex-centric, objectifying, conscious ego, just as he can exist as man only by virtue of something that is outside him, so he can survive death only in so far as he is "outside himself," in so far as he "has been clothed."

This belief contrasts sharply with the prevailing Christian conception of immortality, which is certainly not "Christian," though Christianity adopted it (borrowing it from Greek paganism) and retained it for centuries. Still less is it Biblical. We find its classical formulation in Cicero: "The souls of men are divine, and when they depart from the human body, they can return to heaven, the more readily in so far as they have been virtuous and just."²⁹ The Biblical idea of resurrection is directly contrary to this conception of immortality, as Calvin clearly saw: "And yet, though several philosophers were not at all ignorant of the immortality of the soul, not a single one had the slightest notion of the world of the resurrection of the flesh."³⁰

Years ago I attempted, in a little book written in Dutch, to develop this opposition.³¹ Here I can only sum up the essentials. Moreover, most of what I said may be found in many more recent works.

Many peoples, primitive as well as civilized and "half-civilized," have differentiated powers which, taken together, constitute human life. I have gone into this in my *Phenomenology of Religion* and in the above-mentioned

²⁹ *De amicitia*, IV, 13: "animos hominum esse divinos, iisque cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in coelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum."

³⁰ *Institution de la Religion chrestienne*, ed. J. Pannier (Paris, 1936-39), II, 161: "Pourtant, combien que plusieurs Philosophes n'ayent point esté du tout ignorans de l'immortalité de l'âme, toutesfois il n'y en a pas un seul lequel ayt eu le moindre pensement du monde de la resurrection de la chair."

³¹ *Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding?* (Assen, 1947).

little book in Dutch, citing examples from divers sources. The clearest example is the ancient Egyptian anthropology, in which we find a whole assortment of heterogeneous "souls." Our knowledge of the special character of the various souls is very incomplete. But we do know that each one represents a powerful force in man. First, there is the *Ba*, the soul in the form of a bird, present also after death, sometimes occurring in the plural *Baw*, more in the sense of a power than of the soul; then the *Ka*, a kind of double, perhaps originally his placenta, at the same time the repository of his power and guarantee of his life after death, existing outside the man even before his birth. Here we have a magnificent example of a primitive, ex-centric anthropology. There are still other more or less clearly delineated soul figures, among them the *Khat*, "the body." This is not a systematic anthropology, for the powers are not delimited from one another or from the world. However, the man exists in these figures, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, is emphasized.

Here, as in many similar cases, there is differentiation—without dualism. One part of existence is never sacrificed with a view to saving the rest. Everything is equally necessary. Radically different is the anthropology favored by the Greeks and most of the Christian world, which lets a part of the man die in the hope of saving the remainder "for immortality." This is true Platonism, some of it earlier than Plato, which surrenders the body to destruction in order to save the soul (now taken in a spiritualist sense). This conception dominated a part of the ancient world and has prevailed almost exclusively in Christian anthropology. And yet the Church, in its Credo, clung instinctively to the resurrection of the flesh. Herein Biblical thinking, primitivism, and also Christian faith were in a sense vindicated. But it is only in recent times that a belief in resurrection has begun to make headway against the belief in immortality. The Bible speaks only of man as such, whom the Old Testament calls *basar* (flesh), but without the slightest pejorative intention. All flesh—that is, all men—is as grass. In the New Testament the soul, the psyche, is used (the Hebrews had used the word *nefesh* in the same sense) to indicate the essential in man: "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" To be sure, a distinction is sometimes made between flesh and soul, particularly in St. Paul, but they are never represented as a dichotomy: we never hear of a divine or immortal soul in contradistinction to the perishable body. In St. Paul, the divine in man is never a part of the human essence but is,

in a manner of speaking, added to it. It is the *pneuma*, which is not the spirit of man but the spirit of the Lord, if not the Lord Himself.

This way of thinking corresponds to the doctrine that resurrection is an act of God with which man merely complies. Thus resurrection, or "eternal life" as it is called in the Gospel of St. John, begins in this life. Those who belong to the Lord live with His resurrected life; to all intents and purposes they are already resurrected (Rom. 6 : 4; Col. 3 : 1; Eph. 5 : 14). Thus resurrection applies to the body, but equally to the inner man. St. Augustine wrote:

There are some who suppose that resurrection applies only to the body and contend that the first resurrection will be a bodily one; for what falls, they say, may rise again. The body falls in dying (so it is that the cadaver derives its name from *cado*, "to fall"). And so, they say, resurrection cannot be of the soul, but only of the body. But what will they reply to the apostle who calls [the betterment of the soul] a resurrection? For it was according to the inner, not the outward, man that they resurrected, to whom he said: "If ye then be risen with Christ, seek the things which are above."³²

Resurrection is precisely the new life that has been bestowed on a man.

This belief in resurrection, as Tor Andrae says, is unique,³³ "a turning point in the faith of mankind," manifested first in late Judaism, later in Islam and in Christianity. Anthropologically speaking, it means that just as death rules over a man even before he dies, so the newly created life takes possession of him while he is still alive. In this life, mortal man obtains a life that extends beyond death.

This brings us back again to the nameless "something" which "endures," which is the witness both of life and of death, which sees itself live and die, which is not a part of man but is nevertheless constitutive of man, which, coming from outside of man, first creates the possibility of the inner as well as the outward man. In the Christian view of resurrection, this realm of survival, this hereafter, is at the same time the realm of "salvation"; it is not merely a continued existence, but is also a life in the "pneumatic," "saving world" of new creation.³⁴ This is the world of beatitude and damnation, heaven and hell, the world of the *Divine Comedy*.

Thus theology leads to anthropology. But in the Biblical anthropology

³² *City of God*, XX, 10; tr. John Healey, ed. R. V. G. Tasker (2 vols., London and New York, 1945). [Tr. R.M., in consultation with John Healey. The bracketed passage is not in the text and was supplied by Healey from context.—Ed.]

³³ *Die letzten Dinge* (Berlin, 1940), p. 67.

³⁴ O. Piper, *Die Grundlagen der evangelischen Ethik* (Gütersloh, 1928), Vol. I, pp. 175f.

no one is "immortal" except God alone. Man dies; he achieves a new life only by *actually* receiving a new, regenerated life, a life of resurrection. This notion of "actuality" is here a watershed, which has its prolongation in Christianity. A. D. Nock has brilliantly described what we find on both sides of the watershed. On the one side, the Orphic-Platonic anthropology, according to which an immortal element is imprisoned in the tomb of the body:

Man felt himself to be, as Marcus Aurelius says, "a small soul carrying a dead body. . . ." The body wins time after time and the man feels each time a little less his own master. Discipline can do something, but the only true liberation will come with freedom from the flesh. . . . Christian theology did not deny the value of these ideas. The glorified body of the risen man is in the higher theology, as in Paul, quite distinct from the earthly body and would have no tendencies to evil, no sensual cravings; in the resurrection they would neither marry nor give in marriage; and the present body of man needed mortification and ascetic control. But Christian theology did find itself in radical opposition to the philosophic notion of the soul as a thing essentially divine and essentially immortal and of an immeasurable superiority to the body, needing only purification and freedom from carnal contacts to enjoy God for ever. . . . Paganism stood for the deliverance of the real self, aided by sacrament and system, but having in the last resort within itself the means of salvation and struggling for immortality in bliss as a prize to be won by those who had wished to live in accordance with virtue and succeeded. Christianity stood for the redemption and resurrection of the whole as an entity containing higher elements, helpless in itself, but capable by divine favour of receiving salvation and destined at the end to become a glorified unity. The issue is after all the doctrine of grace. The genius of Christianity lies on the side of Augustine, the genius of paganism on the side of Pelagius. The one built on a consciousness of sin and on revelation, the other on a consciousness of goodness and on common sense. On this issue we must all take sides.³⁵

The paradoxical part of all this is that the fear of death turns out to be the fear of losing the garment, the additional something, the grace, the thing from outside, that which makes the man a man: "If so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked" (II Cor. 5 : 3).

³⁵ A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 248f. (quoted by kind permission of the Oxford University Press). Cf. Étienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, tr. A. H. C. Downes (London, 1936), pp. 170f.

IX

In this context the afterlife is not something to be taken for granted. Precisely because the continuation, or rather the renewal, of life signifies participation in a new, different reality, the "natural" has nothing to do with it. Preparations for this realization are discernible here and there, all over the world. There are Elysium and Tartarus, there are heaven and hell and the place between them. There are the good and the evil; the nobles and kings, whose power raises them above death, and the common people; the elect and the *massa perditionis*. Often rites were employed to make men live on after death. The Egyptians called incense *s-utr*, "that which makes divine." Mourning for the dead assures them of life in Egypt and elsewhere: those who mourn for Osiris make him immortal.³⁶ Burial and cremation were originally methods of preserving, or renewing, life. What retains its validity for us is the tenet that the afterlife is not to be taken for granted.

X

Tender and fragile is human life, a premature, extrauterine birth, as the more recent biology teaches us. It is situated between birth and death. Of birth we know little, not much more than that it takes a man his whole lifetime to cut the umbilical cord, that he goes on being born until he dies: *nascentes morimur*.

Of death we know far more. "*La mort est le fait le plus profond et le plus significatif de la vie, qui élève le dernier des mortels au-dessus de la quotidienneté et de la platitude. Elle seule pose dans sa profondeur la question du sens de la vie.*"³⁷ Death is therefore indispensable because it admonishes us of the ex-centric character of our life. G. C. Lichtenberg remarks that the question of our "pre-life" should interest us just as much as that of our afterlife.³⁸ Our life emerges and has its place between the two mysteries of before and after. But the mere fact that we can speak of before and after shows us that death is not, any more than birth, fulfilled in our life.

³⁶ *Book of the Dead*, ed. E. A. Wallis Budge (London, 1898), ch. 1, 11f.

³⁷ N. Berdiaeff, *De la Destination de l'homme* (Paris, 1935), p. 323.

³⁸ *Aphorismen und Schriften*, ed. E. Vincent (Leipzig, 1931), p. 51.

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ADOLF PORTMANN, Ph.D. Born 1897. Since 1931, professor of zoology, University of Basel. Early studies as a painter helped direct his interest to general questions of animal form and pattern and to the comparative morphology of vertebrates. He began his studies in marine biology at laboratories in France and Germany. Principal publications: *Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen* (1944), *Einführung in die vergleichende Morphologie der Wirbeltiere* (1948), *Animal Forms and Patterns* (1948; tr., 1952), *Animals as Social Beings* (1953; tr., 1961), and numerous popular works, among them *Vom Ursprung des Menschen* (1944). He has spoken at all the Eranos meetings from 1946 on.

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The contents of the *Eranos-Jahrbücher*, consisting of thirty-two volumes through 1963, are listed (in translation) for reference. The lectures were delivered in German (chiefly), French, English, and Italian. In the first eight *Jahrbücher*, all the papers were published in German; in later volumes, they were published in their original language. An index of contributors is at the end. In the following list, the titles of papers translated in the present series are indicated by superior numbers for volumes, thus: 1. *Spirit and Nature* (1954); 2. *The Mysteries* (1955); 3. *Man and Time* (1957); 4. *Spiritual Disciplines* (1960); 5. *Man and Transformation* (1964).

I: 1933: Yoga and Meditation in the East and the West

- HEINRICH ZIMMER: On the Significance of the Indian Tantric Yoga ⁴
 Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS: Religious Exercises in India and the Religious Man
 ERWIN ROUSSELLE: Spiritual Guidance in Contemporary Taoism ⁴
 C. G. JUNG: A Study in the Process of Individuation
 G. R. HEYER: The Meaning of Eastern Wisdom for Western Spiritual Guidance
 FRIEDRICH HEILER: Contemplation in Christian Mysticism ⁴
 ERNESTO BUONAIUTI: Meditation and Contemplation in the Roman Catholic Church

II: 1934: Symbolism and Spiritual Guidance in the East and the West

- ERWIN ROUSSELLE: Dragon and Mare, Figures of Primordial Chinese Mythology
 J. W. HAUSER: Symbols and Experience of the Self in Indo-Aryan Mysticism
 HEINRICH ZIMMER: Indian Myths as Symbols
 Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS: On the History of the Symbol of the Wheel
 C. G. JUNG: The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious
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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AEO</i>	<i>Archives d'études orientales</i> . Stockholm.
BI	Bibliothèque Iranienne. Teheran and Paris.
CWJ	Collected Works of C. G. Jung. New York and London.
<i>EI</i>	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i> . Leiden and London, 1908-36.
<i>EJ</i>	<i>Eranos-Jahrbuch</i> . Zurich.
<i>ERE</i>	<i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</i> . New York and Edinburgh, 1917-26.
<i>GCS</i>	<i>Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller</i> . Ed. by O. Stählin. Berlin, 1905-36. 4 vols.
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i> . Boston.
Migne, <i>PG</i> and <i>PL</i>	J. P. Migne, ed. <i>Patrologiae cursus completus</i> . <i>PG</i> = Greek Series. Paris, 1857-66. 166 vols. <i>PL</i> = Latin Series. Paris, 1844-64. 221 vols. Refs. are to columns.
PEY	Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks (the present series).
PW	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> . Begun by Georg Wissowa, ed. by Wilhelm Kroll. Stuttgart, 1894- . Refs. are to columns.

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