GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS

(EAST & WEST)

RAM CHANDRA GUPTA

LAKSHMI NARAIN AGARWAL
EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS : AGRA

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By

RAM CHANDRA GUPTA

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To

Dr. E. Asirvatham

University Professor of Political Science

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PREFACE

Political thinkers through the ages have been perplexed by the relationship between the individual with his mental and spiritual capacities and the state with its conception of guiding and controlling authority.

The traditional belief is that man is a social and political animal and that he cannot realize himself without the positive assistance of the state. According to this belief, the state is considered a 'self-actualizing and self-moralizing' entity and the man outside it is nothing but, to quote Hegel, "an unethical abstraction". This belief, which originated in the theories of Plato and Aristotle, persistently holds its influence in the political world. It is not very difficult to link up this concept with the theories of modern dictatorships, Fascist or Communist, and state-collectivism.

On the other hand, there are thinkers who start with man as an embodied spiritual entity. Such an entity might not be at all wise or all-fine ; it might fall into error and follow the path of sin, permitting himself, in the language of certain schools of theology, to listen to the voice of *Satan*. His greatest need, then, would be redemption, salvation, turning his face steadily towards the fountain head of purity, mercy and love.

On the political plane, man can be considered, as put by John Locke and J. S. Mill, a creature possessing both self-interest and wide sympathies. What is more, he is endowed with reason. His mind is a *tabularasa*, a blank tablet, which man's innate capacity enables him to fill in from experiences based on stimuli from the world outside. The universe is subject to an ordered rule of natural law. The inevitable result of man's innate sympathies, his power of reasoning and the natural law on which his knowledge and experience are based is political society, a state, in which his activities normally tend to be of a social nature, *i.e.*, of a kind likely to benefit other men. He can best find the fulfilment of his self in a political society with liberal and democratic institutions. But the kind of state which Locke and Rousseau visualise is a responsible and democratic

state with sufficiently wide representation. Mill goes a step further in his enunciation of individualism. He considers too much state-interference as a definite evil. According to him, that state is good which interferes in the affairs of individual only when some common good is involved.

The views of liberal and individualist thinkers are mostly atomistic, because they take the individual human being as the entity, the unit, that has to be considered in relation to the state. But it is necessary to make a reference here also to what is called the pluralist concept. According to this concept, the really important unit is not the individual but certain organisations of individuals, with a greater or smaller community of interests. Attention is drawn to the important roles which some of these organisations, sub-political groups as they are generally called, have played and still play, in the society and the extent to which they have influenced and still influence, the state. Many such groups can easily be recalled, for example, the family, the school and the church.

The emphasis to-day is on organisations of an economic nature like trade unions and guilds. We cannot deny the fact that in modern society, such organisations wield great influence and force. The organisation of these economic groups is essential not only for pressing the government to be responsive to the demands of the people, but also for fighting *en masse* for their fulfilment. Russell, Laski and Cole, the chief advocates of political pluralism and guild socialism and the principal upholders of the idea of organising the state on the basis of such economic groups, firmly maintain that the factor of consent is not likely to operate effectively in any society where there is serious inequality of economic condition ; and they conclude that the absence of such consent is, in the long run, fatal to social peace.

Thus there are several schools of political thought which were and which have been founded from time to time by great political thinkers and each school approaches, in its own way, the problem of interrelation of individual and state. Although almost all thinkers have reflected over this problem, there are thinkers who have dilated on it more seriously and consistently and hence they deserve a more secure and permanent place in the history of political thought than others.

The present book is an attempt to study the political ideas of those political thinkers of East and West whom I consider as quite original in their thinking and who have made, of course, in my view, some contribution of permanent nature to political thought. Particularly, I have been guided in this selection of political thinkers by my own special leaning for them for one or the other reason. At the same time, I must admit here that this book cannot serve the purpose of history of political thought of the world. I have studied each political thinker separately in his entirety. However, the reader can get a fair idea of the social and political conditions of their respective periods, and thereby a glimpse of the history of political thought of different countries.

The book must speak for itself. Here I would only acknowledge the debt it owes to many of my friends, and especially to some of my elders, the late Hugh Gaitskell, Dr. Phillips Bradley (Chief Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Bombay), Prof. R. Bhaskaran (Prof. of Political Science, Madras University), Dr. E. Asirvatham (Prof. of Political Science, Jabalpur University) and Prof. Dr. K. V. Rao (Prof. of Political Science, Hindu University, Banaras), who inspired me in my work. It also owes to my publishers, without whose timely encouragement, the work would not have been otherwise completed. I need not say here that none of these has any responsibility for the opinions I have expressed.

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September 15, 1963

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PART I

Asian Thinkers

1. *Manu*
2. *Kautilya*
3. *M. K. Gandhi*
4. *Manavendra Nath Roy*
5. *Vinoba Bhave*
6. *Jaya Prakash Narayan*
7. *Mao Tse-Tung*

Manu

Although *Smritis* or *Dharmaśāstras* occupy the most important place in the Hindu literature on the regulation of life in all its aspects—social, political, economic, domestic, religious, legal and cultural—it is quite unfortunate to find out that it is not possible to ascertain their exact dates. Their origin perplexed even ancient writers. There is a great controversy about the date of Manu. The opinions of modern scholars range over an extraordinary long period. Sir William Jones, for instance, refers Manu to 1200 B.C. Later, some scholars brought him down to the twelfth or thirteenth century A.D. It is now generally agreed that the *Smritis* assumed their present shape at various epochs in the first millennium of the Christian era. R. G. Bhandarkar placed them in the Kuśāṇ-Gupta period, that is, between the middle of the second and the end of the fifth century A.D. Hopkins refers Manu to the beginning of or even before the Christian era, while he assigns Viṣṇu to the third, Yājñavalkya to the fourth and Nārada to the fifth century A.D.[1] Jolly thinks that Manu cannot be later than the second or third century A.D., while Viṣṇu cannot be earlier than the third. He would place Yājñavalkya in the fourth and Nārada about the commencement of the sixth century while referring Brihaspati and Kātyāyana to the sixth or seventh century A.D. Bühler's conclusion is that *Manusmriti* existed in the second century A.D. Thus it is difficult to say anything definite about the period of Manu and his work *Manusmriti*.

The political ideas of Manu are expressed in his great *Smriti* work and of all the *Smritis* that of Manu is admittedly the most important and authoritative. Brihaspati remarks that the first rank belongs to Manu, because he has embodied the essence of the *Veda* in his work, and that the *Smriti* text which is opposed

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1 Hopkins, *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 279.

to Manu is not approved. The *Dharmaśāstra* of Manu is perhaps based on the *Mānava Dharmasūtra* which has disappeared. According to a tradition, *Manusmriti* is addressed to *Rajas* and other such personages and not to scholars. There are many verses common to the *Smriti* and the *Mahābhārata*. Manu treats of the whole of life, and, differing from others, declares that the chief good consists in the combination of *Artha*, *Dharma* and *Kāma*. Needless to say, he is wedded to the recognized *Dharma* of castes and stages and declares, in a most pronounced and dogmatic fashion, for supremacy of Brāhmaṇas over the persons of other castes. He prescribes jobs for the people of all castes and asks them to attend on their respective occupations. In particular, Vaiśyas and Śudras should be compelled to perform their prescribed jobs strictly, because if they swerved from their duties, the whole world would be thrown into confusion.[2] It is not impossible that Manu's advice was partially followed in practice. It was about this period that Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi prided himself on his restoration of caste rules.

Manu's view of the sources of state law repeats that of the early *Smritis*. The king, we read in one place (VIII, 3), shall daily examine the suits of litigants falling under the eighteen titles of law in accordance with the principles derived from regional usage (*deśadrishṭa*) and from the Sacred Canon (*śāstradrishṭa* : the righteous king, we read elsewhere (VIII, 41), shall enquire into the usages (*dharmas*) of regions and castes (or according to another interpretation the regional *dharmas* applicable to each caste) as well as those of guilds (*śreni*) and families (*kula*), and he shall then settle the distinctive usage (*dharma*) of each group : the king, we are told in a third extract (VIII, 46), shall establish as law what may have been practised by good men as well as the virtuous twice-born classes, provided that this is not opposed to the usages of regions, families and subcastes.[3]

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2 Manu, III, 13 ; VIII, 418.

3 The above follows the explanation of most of the commentators (Kullūka, Nārāyana, Rāghavānanda, and Nandana). According, to Medhātithi's explanation, on the other hand, the king should ordain for regions, castes and families the practices of good and righteous twice-born men, provided these are not opposed to the canon—a view which is more in accordance with the spirit of the old *Smritis*.

The above extracts stamp the Sacred Canon and custom as the joint source of state law, the latter being taken as before in a wide sense so as to embrace the usages of local, social and economic groups. Also, he admits one's own conscience as the source of law. Manu asks the king, while discussing the modes of judicial decision, to examine daily the suits of litigants by applying the lessons of Virtue and Wealth as well as their opposites, and to discover the internal disposition of men by external signs : the king should discover the right path by inference as a hunter discovers the lair of a wounded deer by drops of blood, and he should pay full attention to the witnesses, to the time and place and to such other factors. These extracts implicitly recognize the early *Smriti* principle that justice administered at the king's court involves the application of human reason or one's own conscience to the sources of state law.

Manu expatiates at length on the ideal, the majesty of the kingship and the need of a firm policy—*daṇḍa* or chastisement ; but he holds that the king should "behave like a father towards all men" and please all. He is most probably reflecting actual practice when he wants the king to regulate the economic life of the community. The king should watch and control traders—'open cheats'. He must fix the prices of all marketable goods, mark the weights and measures and re-examine them every six months. The followers of various occupations, mechanics, manual workers come in for state supervision. Physicians or veterinary surgeons, who wrong their patients, must be fined. Manu again seems to steer close to facts when he insists on the appointment of a learned Brāhmaṇa as the royal priest and of seven or eight ministers. Every day they should be consulted on peace, war, finance, endowments and general administration. The king should consult them first individually and then collectively and ultimately decide for himself. Another official of first-rate importance was the Ambassador, a sort of foreign secretary and plenipotentiary, who negotiated alliances and transacted that business by which kings are "disunited or not". Manu also tells us about a number of other important officials who were concerned with mines, manufactures, storehouses, revenue, etc.[4]

[4] Manu, VII, 54-68, 80-81, 147-51.

The complementary principle of the king's obligation is developed by Manu along the three lines hinted at or indicated in the early *Smritis*, namely, the divine, the ethico-religious and the quasi-contractual, the first taking characteristically enough the foremost place in our author's thought. Repeating in the first place the old Vedic dogma of creation of the four castes out of different limbs of the Creator's body, Manu (I, 89) declares that He assigned to the Kshatriya the occupation of protecting the people and so forth : the king on receiving the Vedic sacrament, we are told more particularly (VII, 2-3) at the beginning of the author's theory of the king's creation, is bound to protect the whole world, and the Lord created the king for the protection of the whole creation : the king, we read similarly (VII, 34), has been created as the protecter of those who in due order are intent upon the performance of their duties. The king's foremost duty (*dharma*) is the protection of his subjects : for a Kshatriya the most commendable occupation is the protection of the people. Thirdly and lastly, we read (VII, 144 ; VIII, 307-8) that the king who enjoys the specified rewards is bound to discharge his duty of protection, that the king who receives the agricultural tax, duties, fines, etc., but fails to protect his people, goes after death surely to hell ; and the king who receives one-sixth of the agricultural produce as tax but fails to give protection, takes upon himself the foulness of all people, and that when the king receives the agricultural tax but does not punish thieves, his kingdom is disturbed and he loses heaven. In the above extracts the author first develops the old *Smriti* doctrine of the Kshatriya's divine ordination for protection so as to lead to the conclusion that protection is the divine purpose of the king's creation : secondly, he repeats the early *Smriti* principle declaring protection to be the king's obligation by law of his order : thirdly and lastly, the author, while repeating the old *Smriti* conception of the king's obligation of protection in return for taxation, fortifies it with formidable temporal and spiritual sanctions.

As regards Manu's theory of the coercive authority (*daṇḍa*) of the ruler, it can be firmly maintained that he (Manu) develops it along the lines of the old *Arthaśāstra* thinkers. He tells us that for the king's sake, the Lord created in days of

yore His own son *Daṇḍa* the protector of all creatures, Law (*dharma*), formed of Brahmā's lustre : *daṇḍa* is the king, the male, the director, and the ruler as well as the surety of observance of their duties (*dharma*) by the four orders (*āśramas*). *Daṇḍa*, he further tells us, rules all people ; *daṇḍa* alone protects them ; *daṇḍa* is awake when others are asleep, the wise declare *daṇḍa* to be identical with the law (*dharma*). Through fear of *daṇḍa*, the author continues, all creatures, movable and immovable, "yield themselves for enjoyment" and swerve not from their duties. The whole world, as observed in *Arthaśāstra* texts, is kept in order by *daṇḍa*, good men are rare and it is through fear of *daṇḍa* that the whole world "yields the enjoyments which it owes". Even the gods, the demons, the demi-gods, the goblins as well as the bird and snake deities, the author adds with magnificent exaggeration, "yield themselves for enjoyment" only when they are tormented by fear of *daṇḍa*. The king, we read, is a just inflicter of *daṇḍa*, who is truthful, who acts after due consideration, who is wise and who is conversant with Virtue, Pleasure and Wealth : the king who is voluptuous, partial and deceitful, on the other hand, is destroyed by the same *daṇḍa* which he inflicts : when the king swerves from his duty (*dharma*) *daṇḍa* strikes him down with his relatives and his kingdom, nay more, it afflicts the whole world and likewise the gods and the sages. Regarding the ruler's qualifications, the author remarks that *daṇḍa* cannot be inflicted justly by one without assistants or a fool or a covetous man, or one whose mind is unimproved, or one who is addicted to sensual pleasures, while it can be justly inflicted by one who is pure and truthful, who acts according to the canon ; who has good assistants and who is wise.

The doctrine of *daṇḍa* is dealt with by the author much more briefly in two short extracts. The whole world, he says in one place (VII, 103), stands very much in awe of one who is ever ready to apply *daṇḍa*. Neither the father, nor the mother, nor the friend, nor wife, nor son, nor the domestic priest, we are told in another place (VIII, 335), is exempt from the king's *daṇḍa*, should they fail to follow their duties.

In these extracts the author in the first place emphasizes the old *Arthaśāstra* idea of the high authority of *daṇḍa* by rais-

ing it to the level of the foremost political principle as well as a divine institution derived from the highest divinity. This view is justified by the function of *daṇḍa* in ensuring individual security in respect of person and property as well as stability of the social order. The above conception of the origin of *daṇḍa* fits in with and completes the author's doctrine of Divine creation and endowment of the temporal ruler. In the second place, the author repeats the old *Arthaśāstra* doctrine of identification of *daṇḍa* with law, so as to mean probably that the one is the essential means of fulfilment of the other. Thirdly, the author justifies his view of the high function of *daṇḍa* by reference to an old *Arthaśāstra* principle based upon human psychology, namely, that the fear of *daṇḍa* is the grand motive for the fulfilment of individual obligations. Fourthly, according to the author, the king's mode of application of *daṇḍa* is the key to the weal and woe of the individual and the community. Fifthly, the author enumerates the good qualities (truthfulness, discrimination, wisdom, submission to canonical authority and equipment with good assistants) qualifying the ruler for the exercise of *daṇḍa* as well as the bad qualities (self-indulgence, partiality, deceitfulness, greed, ignorance and want of assistants) disqualifying him for the same. Sixthly and lastly, the author lays down the principle of the king's unlimited jurisdiction over offenders irrespectively of their rank or status. This involves the application of the old *Arthaśātra-Smriti* principle enjoining strict impartiality upon the king in the administration of criminal justice.

Manu's discussion of the administration of justice is not confined only to the doctrine of *daṇḍa* which the king, according to him, should use very cautiously and impartially with a view to rendering justice in society, but also to the system of checks and limitations imposed by the *paura-janapada* and the council upon the king. Manu strongly holds : "Without the *mantrins* matters of state should never be considered by the king alone, be he an expert in all the sciences and versed in policy. A wise king must always follow the opinion of the members of the council of *adhikārins* or ministers with portfolios, of the President and subjects. He must never follow his own opinion. When the sovereign becomes independent (of

his council) he plans for ruin. In time he loses the state and loses the subjects."[5] The king should conduct the ministers separately and then "all of them together" in the council, as explained earlier. By thus discussing, the king was to derive benefit. The cleverest of the ministers, who should be a Brāhmaṇa, was to be completely depended upon by the king, and entrusted with the execution of all the resolutions.[6] All the business thus was to be left for execution in the hands of a Prime Minister or Chancellor.

Further, in Manu the king is made liable to be fined. Manu writes :

कार्षापणं भवेद्दण्ड्यो यत्रान्यः प्राकृतो जनः ।
तत्र राजा भवेद्दण्ड्यः सहस्रमिति धारणा ॥[7]

"Where common man would be fined one *kārshāpaṇa* the king shall be fined one-thousand ; that is the settled law." King's powers and obligations are defined in the law-sūtras and law-books as part and parcel of the law (in chapters on Constitutional Law, the *Rājadharma* or 'Laws for Kings'). Even in the palmiest days of Hindu monarchy, neither in the *Mānava-Dharmaśāstra* nor in the *Arthaśāstra*, was the king placed above the law. He could make new laws according to the *Arthaśāstra* ; according to Manu, he could not do so ; but when he could make laws he passed only regulatory laws and not laws substantive or laws making him arbitrary.

The Judges in Persia under Cambyses "found a law that the Persian king might do whatever he pleased".[8] But such a finding was impossible to be come to by Hindu judges and lawyers ; so much so that even the author of the *Arthaśāstra* tells his prince that destruction befalls an arbitrary king. As far as Manu was concerned, he could never approve of the idea of an arbitrary king, imposing his will upon his subjects unscrupulously and ruthlessly. The idea of an arbitrary or an irresponsible king was repulsive to him. His king, in fact, was a constitutional and responsible king, who always respected the

5 Manu, VII, 58-59.
6 *Ibid.*, VII, 57.
7 *Ibid.*,VIII, 336.
8 Rawlinson, *Herodotus*, II, 468 (Revised edition).

decision of his *mantri-parishad* and who himself was liable to be fined and admonished for his mistakes and wrong-doings.

Related to Manu's principle of coercive authority of the ruler and his doctrine of *daṇḍa* is his theory of government which may be considered chiefly under three heads, namely, the king, the officials and the administrative organization. Under the first heading, Manu considers the intellectual and moral qualifications of the ruler as the latter is the most important unit of the state administration. Manu asks the king to follow the advice of Brāhmaṇas learned in the *Vedas*. The king should constantly worship and acquire the knowledge of Supreme Soul. He should exert to conquer his senses, for otherwise he cannot control his subjects. The king's self-control, in particular, is justified by the old *Arthaśāstra* doctrine that this is the prerequisite of his successful administration.

Under the second heading relating to the king's officials, Manu discusses the part played by the king's ministers and other officers in the administration of the state. Even an easy undertaking, says Manu, can be performed with difficulty by a single man, how much more difficult it is to govern a kingdom yielding much revenue, especially if one has no assistant. Here Manu discusses the qualifications of different classes of the king's officials, such as his ministers and other officers, his ambassador, his domestic chaplain and the superintendents of the administrative departments. Here, it will not be unwise to state that Manu, following the *Arthaśāstra* tradition, repeats, of course, with slight verbal changes, the seven constituents of the state. According to the early *Arthaśāstra* thinkers the seven constituent elements (*prakriti*) of the political organization (*rājya*) are : *svāmī* (the sovereign ruler), *amātya* (the official), *janapada* (the rural area), *durga* (the fortified or urban area), *kośa* (revenue), *bala* (the standing army) and *mitra* [the (permanent) foreign ally]. Manu only puts in place of *durga* and *janapada* of the *Arthaśāstra* list *pura* (the capital city) and *rāshṭra* (the kingdom) ; and the remaining five elements of the state have been accepted by Manu in original. Manu shows the impossibility of one-man rule in view of the difficulty and complexity of governmental affairs. He pleads for the appointment of high officials or ministers to look after each department

of the government separately. Although Manu shows an originality when he states that as among the three staves tied together (by a rope of cows's hair) used by a monk, no particular staff is superior, so among the seven 'limbs' of the state no particular one can be said to excel the others since each of them has a particular excellence of its own and this involves the essential parity of the factors of the state-structure in spite of their admitted inequality in certain respects, his view evidently makes a closer approach to the organismic theory of the state than was achieved by the earlier thinkers.

As regards the third and the last branch of the theory of government, the army which is the means of controlling (the subjects), we are told (Manu, VII, 65), depends upon the minister, the revenue and the kingdom depends upon the king, while peace and war depend upon the ambassador. This presents a sharp contrast with Kauṭilya's principle of distribution of the departments of the central government based on his appreciation of the political danger from ministers, namely, that the revenue and the army should be reserved by the king for his direct control.

Referring to his scheme of local government through a chain of officials in charge of single and larger units of villages, Manu (VII, 115-24) requires another minister (*sachiva*) of the king to inspect their business unremittingly. In local government the ultimate unit was the village. Every village must have a headman. The successively higher areas of local government were formed by groups of ten, twenty, a hundred and a thousand villages. Every town must have "a superintendent of all affairs" with an army of spies to assist him in "exploring" the behaviour of the people. Local government, as a whole, should be placed in charge of a minister at the headquarters. A company of soldiers must be stationed "in the midst of two, three, five or hundreds of villages for the protection of the kingdom". All this seems to have a basis in facts. Also, there is a touch of realism in what Manu says of the need of supervising and controlling royal officials. These, though appointed for the protection of the people, "generally become knaves" and seize the property of others. Evil-minded officials who were guilty of bribery must suffer the confiscation of their whole property and

must be banished. Ministers or judges who were at fault in the discharge of their duties should be fined a thousand *paṇas*.[9]

Lastly, we come to Manu's principles and policies of government, which may be conveniently considered under two heads, namely, those relating to public security and to inter-state relations (matters relating to foreign policy). With regards to the policy of public security, the king, according to Manu, will detect with the help of spies two classes of thieves who are otherwise called rogues and thorns in the side of the people. The first class called 'the open thieves' consists of those who take bribes and other types of cheats, rogues, gamblers, fortune-tellers, high officers and physicians guilty of improper conduct and so forth. The second class called 'the secret thieves' comprises burglars, foresters and so forth. Manu mentions methods that the king should employ for the detection and punishment of both these classes of culprits. Punishments are prescribed by Manu for various acts of injury to the public such as breaking down dams of tanks, cutting off the water-supply, wrong treatment of patients by physicians, destroying bridges, adulterating commodities, dishonest dealing with customers, practising incantations for destroying life, dishonest behaviour by goldsmiths as well as theft of agricultural implements and medicines. Punishment is also prescribed for royal officers and vassals who remain inactive during attacks by robbers and for the public failing to give help according to their capacity, when a village is being plundered or a dyke is being destroyed or a highway robbery is being committed.

As regards the policy of inter-state relations, Manu indicates the principle of application of the six types of foreign policy (*guṇa*). The king, he tells, shall make peace when he is sure of his own gain and superiority in future and of his inferiority at present; he shall wage war when he thinks that he is very strong to defeat the enemy; he shall march against the enemy when his army is well disposed towards him and is comparatively superior; he shall be neutral when he is weak in chariots and troops; he shall divide his forces when he finds that his enemy

[9] Manu, VII, 123-44; IX, 234.

is stronger in every respect ; and he shall take refuge with a rich and powerful king when he is very easily assailable by the enemy's forces. The king, while determining his war policy, shall consider the future and the immediate present as well as the good and bad aspects of all past transactions.

While discussing king's duty towards war and fighting, Manu tells that the king, when challenged by an enemy of equal, inferior or superior strength, must not refrain from fighting, for this is the Kshatriya's *dharma*. The Kshatriya's duty, says Manu (X, 119), is to achieve victory and not to turn back in battle. Manu promises heaven to those who fighting with approved weapons are killed in battle without thought of retreat for the purpose of acquiring land.

While summing up his discussion regarding the policy of inter-state relations, Manu makes use of the old *Arthaśāstra* doctrine of the four political expedients of conciliation, bribery, dissension and force. Manu is of the opinion that while all the four expedients being properly directed lead to success, force should be restored to as the last alternative. As he is hesitant on the point of using force, he also speaks with a divided mind on the question of territorial annexation. As a general principle Manu (IX, 251) urges the king to strive after the acquisition of countries that have not been conquered and to protect those that have been acquired. Here he speaks like the *Arthaśāstra* thinkers, particularly like Kauṭilya. But at other places Manu deprecates territorial annexation and, as such, departs from the tradition of *Arthaśāstra* thinkers. Manu concludes by asking the king to abandon without hesitation even a rich and fertile land (after conquest), should this step be necessary for his own safety.

Thus the goal of inter-state relations in Manu's thought is somewhat different from that of Kauṭilya and other *Arthaśāstra* thinkers. Manu's conclusion is that the political wisdom consists in arranging everything or every matter in such a fashion that neither the ally nor the neutral nor the enemy can injure him and the state. It implies that the goal of foreign policy consists in assuring for the state its complete security abroad. This is somewhat a static goal which can be easily contrasted with the dynamic programme of Kauṭilya's foreign

policy involving the constant advancement of the state. Hence it is not inadequate to remark that "Manu's departure from the ambitious standard *of many Arthaśāstra thinkers and* of Kauṭilya betrays the overwhelming influence of the traditional *Smriti* conception of a stable social order."[10]

[10] U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas*, Chap. IX, p. 184 (*Italics mine*).

Kauṭilya

Although nothing can be said so far firmly and with certainty, it is mostly believed that Kauṭilya was born in Takśilā. He received his education in the university of Nālanda, a university of world-wide fame. It is a common belief that Kauṭilya met Chandragupta in this university, who had also come here to receive his education. Kauṭilya was much impressed by Chandragupta. In fact, he found in the latter the qualities of a real king of India. Kauṭilya's dream of installing Chandragupta on the throne of Magadh was realized when the latter became not only the king of Magadh, but the imperial king of India. And the former acted as the renowned minister of Chandragupta, the founder of the imperial Maurya dynasty, in succession to the dynasty of the Nandas.

Kauṭilya, who is also known as Chāṇakya, wrote a famous book, known as *Arthaśāstra*. He was not the first person to write *Arthaśāstra*, a book on the subject of acquisition and preservation of dominion (*prithivī*). There were already three *Arthaśāstra* schools, namely, those of Manu, Brihaspati, and Uśanas, but Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is the only complete work of its kind that has come down to us. The contents comprise the branches of central and local administration, home and foreign policy, civil and criminal law and the art of warfare. As Kauṭilya's work is avowedly a summary of the early *Arthaśāstra* literature, there arises the natural presumption that the same topics were handled by the above authors. This presumption is made a certainty by Kauṭilya's citations of his predecessors' views under the above heads. It is not merely in the range but also in the quality of its application to the problems of state and government that the *Arthaśāstra* opens a new chapter in the history of our ancient political literature. For the authors, while making a detailed examination of the rules and principles of state administration and policy such as is

unknown to their predecessors and contemporaries, approach their problems exclusively from an objective standpoint.[1]

In framing their rules and principles of government the *Arthaśāstra* thinkers in general apply the methods of observation, analysis and deduction in respect of the phenomena of political life. The method of the science, in other words, is primarily an empirical (if not a scientific) one. In Kauṭilya's work this is supplemented by some interesting applications of what may be called the historical method, as the author occasionally draws upon traditional history to justify his arguments. This is however made, in the words applied by a modern historian of political theory to the thought of Machiavelli, to point a moral which has already been set forth and "adorn a tale which has already been told."[2]

It is in the branch of state law that Kauṭilya's ideas mark a great advance upon those of his predecessors. In his chapter (III, 1) introducing his section on law and legal procedure, the author refers prominently to four sources of the state law. These are the Sacred Canon (*dharma*), the current (*Arthaśāstra* ?) law (*vyavahāra*), usage (*sainsthā*) and reasoning (*nyāya*). Explaining the rule of interpretation in the event of conflict of these laws, the author seems to state that the king should decide a law-suit in accordance with the canon when the current law is in conflict with the canonical works or with usage. Again he appears to observe that in the event of conflict between the canon and reasoning founded upon the law, reasoning will be the authority, the strict letter of the canonical text in this case being regarded as dead. Comparing the above account with that of the *Dharmasūtras* we can perhaps trace a twofold development in the author's thought. This consists, firstly, in the addition of the *Arthaśāstra* (?) to the sources of the state law and in the clear recognition of reasoning as one of these sources. In the second place, the author lays down a double rule of interpretation in the event of conflict of laws. He seems to

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1 For references to civil law and the art of warfare in the early *Arthaśāstra* works, *vide* Kauṭilya's quotations (III, 4-7, 11, 14, 17, 19-20 ; X, 6 etc.).

2 *Vide* the historical instances quoted by Kauṭilya (I, 6, 20 ; VIII, 3 ; IX, 7 etc.). The above quotation is from *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* by W. A. Dunning, p. 293.

mean, firstly, that the canon prevails when this is in conflict with *Arthaśāstra*, or else when usage is in conflict with the latter, and secondly, that reasoning based upon the law prevails when this is in conflict with the canon.

As regards the authority of usage, Kauṭilya's views agree with those of the *Dharmasūtras*. The king, he remarks, shall settle the law on this subject in accordance with the traditional usages of regions, castes, industrial and other organizations and villages. The king, according to him, should abrogate such customs as are harmful to his own interest or are contrary to righteousness, and establish instead the righteous customs : the king should adopt the righteous customs whether old or new and not their reverse, and he should abrogate unrighteous customs that have been started by others. Kauṭilya, following the early *Smriti* precedent, conceives the king to be subject to the law of his order. He makes the king liable to clauses of the civil and the criminal law for the fulfilment of his political obligations. This involves the application of the rule of law to the sphere of the king's internal administration.

Kauṭilya's approach either to the problem of actual administration of the state or to the question of mutual relations of the temporal ruler and his subjects was not that of a theorist. As such, he was not merely concerned with systematizing theories of state ; he made the politics of his country an object of his immediate concern. Kauṭilya was a *Śrotriya* or Vedic Brāhmaṇa.[3] At the same time Alexander's incoming and the stupid administration of the upstart (*Nava*) Nanda concerned him more than his Vedic studies. He thought it necessary to overhaul the existing system. The Brāhmaṇa emphasized again and again that state was a life on which depended social, individual and spiritual happiness. He reminded the people again and again that the bases of civilization of the Race are rooted in polity,

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[3] चाणक्य इति विख्यातः श्रोत्रियः सर्वधर्मवित् ।

Telang's *Mudrārākśasa*, Upodghāta, p. 44.

येन शास्त्रं च शस्त्रं च नन्दराजगता च भूः ।
अमर्षणोद्धृतान्याशु तेन शास्त्रमिदं कृतम् ॥

Arthaśāstra (p. 429).

that the sword which protects the people is the womb of civilization. The Brāhmaṇa idealized and idolized the country of the Āryas as much politically as religiously.

It was in the above context that Kauṭilya defined the position of the temporal king and his relationship with his subjects. He reduced the position of a king to that of the servant of state, or rather as our forefathers put it mercilessly, of a drudging 'slave' (*dāsya*). The epic exhibits as an ideal that a king should even give up his dear wife if asked to do so by his subjects : a popular and somewhat crude way of expressing the king's position, but all the same enshrining the radical demand of Hindu constitution from its king to sink his individuality into his office. With such principles the king was virtually a constitutional slave. And the great monarchist Kauṭilya, the Hindu Hobbes, would not allow the king to have personal likes or dislikes. "A king has no personal likes : it is the likes of the subjects (that should be followed by him)."[4] But this lofty sense of sacrifice made the constitutional slave into the moral master : that "one man who rules over numerous wise and brave men." "Kings," the author (Kauṭilya) continues, "are visible dispensers of favours and disfavours, and as such they are in the position of the god Indra and Yama respectively : he who despises them is visited with divine punishment." "Thus," concludes Kauṭilya, "the lowly folk should be silenced."

How far it is from forming in Kauṭilya's thought a philosophical theory of kingship is proved by his significant reference to 'the lowly folk' whom it is sought to impress. In short, it is in the author's opinion a bit of commonplace platitude to lull the discontent of the masses against their ruler. Nevertheless we may analyse the above extract, such as it is, to indicate the divergent and even contradictory strands in its composition. The extract starts with a State of Nature indicated by a single telling phrase ('the law of the jungle') which imports a new technical term (*mātsyanyaya*) into the vocabulary of our ancient political literature. To end this evil State of Nature the people, we are told, made an agreement with a Patriarch (Manu, son of the Sun) who is regarded in Brahmanical mythology or

[4] *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. I, Ch. 19 ; 16 (p. 39)

pseudo-history as progenitor of the present lines of kings. Likewise, Kauṭilya remarks that the people's agreement with Manu was preceded by his Divine creation. Whatever that may be, the agreement of the people in Kauṭilya's extract charges the people with payment of their customary dues to the ruler evidently for inducing him to end the condition of anarchy. From his theory of the origin of kingship Kauṭilya draws the corollary—so relevant to his immediate and limited objective—that the king's taxes and punishments are necessary in the people's own interests as they provide him with the means of ensuring the security and prosperity of his subjects. Kauṭilya further lays down the theory of the king's equivalence to the two most famous guardian deities of the world by parity of functions, and he derives therefrom the corollary of the subjects' religious obligation to honour their ruler.

In Kauṭilya we notice a development of the theory of *daṇḍa* in three principal directions. In the first place he amplifies the older view of the function of *daṇḍa* in the general make-up. *Daṇḍa*, he says (14 and 5), is the means of ensuring security and prosperity of the three sciences, namely, the Sacred Canon (*trayī*), Philosophy (*ānvīkśikī*), and Economics (*vārtā*) : in fact *daṇḍa* is their root : the course of worldly affairs (*loka-yātrā*) depends upon *daṇḍa*, and therefore he who seeks this course should constantly be ready to apply *daṇḍa*. In other words, the application of *daṇḍa* is justified on the ground that it is the safeguard of man's worldly existence, while it ensures the fulfilment of his complex interests as represented by the three other traditional sciences besides Politics. In the second place, Kauṭilya applies his deeper political insight to lay down a new technique relating to *daṇḍa*. The king who is severe in the application of *daṇḍa*, we are told, afflicts all creatures, and one who is mild in its application is overpowered by them, while one who justly inflicts it is respected by them. This implies that respect for authority is ensured by the just application of *daṇḍa* in contrast with its severe and its mild application which leads respectively to the overthrow and disregard of the same. Thirdly and lastly, Kauṭilya gives us a complete explanation of the function of *daṇḍa* by posing three alternatives. When *daṇḍa* is applied with sound knowledge of

the canon, it confers the threefold end of life upon the people : when it is applied improperly under the influence of desire or anger or without knowledge, it afflicts even the forest-dwelling ascetics, not to speak of the householders : when it is not applied at all, it leads to the condition indicated by the maxim of the larger fishes devouring the smaller. All this means that while the lawful application of *daṇḍa* ensures the complete happiness of the individual, its unlawful or vicious application causes universal disaffection, and its non-application produces anarchy symbolized by the law of the jungle.

Kauṭilya's views on the theory of government under which he discusses three important subjects, the king, the officials, and the mechanism of the administration, are equally important and show a considerable development on the ideas of the early *Arthaśāstra* on several points. About the position of the king. Kauṭilya remarks that the king makes or mars the constituent elements of the state according as he is properly qualified or not. Justifying in this connection his own view against the contrary opinion of Bhāradvāja, the author explains the supreme importance of the king's function. The king alone, he argues, selects the whole body of assistants ; he directs the heads of the administrative departments ; he remedies the calamities of the human and the material elements of the state and strengthens them ; he replaces bad officers with good ones, he is constantly employed in honouring the deserving and punishing the wicked ; he endows his ministers and other subjects with his own prosperity ; when he is prosperous, the ministers and others being dependent upon him for their success and failure follow his behaviour, for the king stands at their apex. The king, in other words, is the master-key to the working of the whole administrative machine, appointing, guarding, correcting, strengthening and shaping its different factors.

Kauṭilya's arguments regarding kingship involve evidently a strong plea for the dynastic principle as well as the principle of high birth. He holds that a new king is worse than a diseased king because the new king acts without restraint in the belief that he himself has acquired the kingdom. Again, he argues that a strong but low-born king is worse than a weak but high-born one, and that the rule of a conqueror is worse

than the dual rule of father and son or else of two brothers. It is the nature of prosperity to attend high birth, and hence the subjects willingly wait upon the weak but high-born king, but the subjects tend to waver in their allegiance to a king who is strong but low-born. In the same way, the dual rule is productive of equal security and welfare of the subjects, and therefore it tends to come under the control of the officials. Thus Kauṭilya reacts against the antimonarchic and the antidynastic tendencies characteristic of the older masters.

Along with other things, Kauṭilya regarded education as the most important thing, which is to be given to the princes with a view to training their minds and disciplining their wills. Hence he gives a comprehensive scheme of education of the princes. The prince, we read (1-5), after the performance of his tonsure ceremony shall apply himself to learn writing and arithmetic : after his investiture with the sacred thread he shall learn the Sacred Canon (*trayī*) and Philosophy (*ānvīkśikī*) from cultured persons, Economics (*vārtā*) from the heads of the administrative departments, and Politics (*daṇḍanīti*) from those versed in its theory and practice. The education is to be continued after the sixteenth year when the prince has undergone the ceremonies of shaving of the head and marriage : he shall devote the first part of the day to learning the military science and the second part to hearing lessons on a large number of sciences grouped together under the heading of traditional history. Through this intellectual training the prince shall learn discipline : Kauṭilya warns that one who fails to keep his sense-organs or fails to practise non-attachment towards the impressions of his sense-organs perishes instantly even if he were to be the ruler of the earth up to the bounds of the four oceans.

Not only does Kauṭilya give us our first known complete scheme of the prince's education, but he also presents us with a list of the king's qualifications. He classifies the king's qualities under four heads : these are the qualities of an inviting nature, those of the intellect, those of the will, and the king's distinctive qualities. It is quite unnecessary for us to go into the details of this pedantic classification. It will be sufficient to say here that it illustrates the author's sense of the comprehensive qualifications needed for the king's office : these

comprise the qualities of intellect and character, of birth and training as well as of sound principles and policies of government.

Whatever the qualities and qualifications the king may have but the Hindu king can never be regarded as a personal ruler. It is a law and principle of Hindu constitution that the king cannot act without the approval and co-operation of the council of ministers. The law *sūtras*, the law books and the political treatises are all unanimous on this point. Manu calls a king foolish who would attempt to carry on the administration by himself. He regards such a king as unfit.[5] He lays down that the king must have 'colleagues', i.e., ministers ; and that in their midst and along with them he has to consider ordinary and extraordinary matters of state,[6] even ordinary business ought not to be done by one man, not to speak of the conduct of a kingdom. Yājñavalkya is of the same opinion and so are the other law-givers. Kauṭilya, likewise, (although he was the greatest advocate of monarchy) has to say that matters of state should be discussed by the council of ministers and whatever the majority decides the king should carry out. It should be noted that this rule is enjoyed even when there is a body of *mantrins* or cabinet separate from the *mantri-parishad.* The *Arthaśāstra* says :

"When there is an extraordinary matter the *mantrins* and the *mantri-parishad* should be called together and informed. In the meeting whatever the majority decide to be done, should be done (by the king)."

It is remarkable that the king is not given even the power of vetoing. Kauṭilya in emphasising the importance of the *parishad* says that Indra was called 'thousand-eyed', although he had only two eyes, because he had thousand wise members in his *mantri-parishad* who were regarded as his eyes.[7]

In the same way, Kauṭilya considers the appointment of the *amātyas* (the officials) indispensable for carrying out the work of government, and gives a comprehensive scheme of their functions. Government, he says at the conclusion of one of his chapters

5 Manu, VII, 30-31.
Ibid., 54-57.
Arthaśāstra, I, Ch. 15, 11.

(1-7), is possible with the help of assistants, a single wheel does not move : the king should appoint ministers (*sachivas*) and abide by their advice. The king's acts have to be performed simultaneously, they are numerous and they are scattered in different places, and therefore the king has to get his acts by the *amātya* lest there be a lapse regarding time and place. In other words, the *amātya's* office is justified by the impossibility of one-man rule and by the number as well as the wide distribution in space and time of the governmental functions. In the second place, Kauṭilya, while criticising the view which ranks the calamity of the *amātyas* above that of the rural area (*janapada*), explains the high importance of the *amātya's* functions. All administrative acts relating to the *janapada*, he argues, depend upon the *amātya* : such are the acts of ensuring its security and welfare against its internal and external enemies, remedying its calamities, colonization and improvement of its waste lands, and benefiting it through the collection of taxes and fines. This means that the *amātya* is the motive force behind the security and development of the heart of the kingdom, namely, its rural area.

As regards the selection of the *amātyas* for special posts, Kauṭilya, after describing the four-fold test (that of Virtue, Wealth, Desire, and Fear) laid down by his predecessors, modifies their scheme in one vital respect. The king, he says, must on no account make himself or his queen the object in the matter of testing the *amātyas*, but he shall select third persons for this purpose. The king, he argues, should not corrupt an innocent mind which act would be like putting poison in water, for when an innocent mind is corrupted somehow, it passes beyond cure : when a good man's mind is corrupted by the four tests, it does not turn back without reaching the farthest limit (of evil). This extract, which does credit to the author's knowledge of human psychology, conveys a much-needed warning to the king against the danger involved in the traditional scheme. This is based upon the author's conviction of the tendency of temptation to corrupt innocent minds.

Kauṭilya also does not leave untouched other aspects of king's administration, such as civil and military administration. The king's civil and military administration involve a number

of important principles. The king, we are first told, should keep under his own control the two vital portfolios of the central government, namely, the revenue and the army. This is based upon the author's conviction of the grave danger arising from the disaffection of the innermost circle of the king's ministers. Secondly, we read that the departmental heads should not only be selected for their merit, but should also be constantly supervised when in office. This is founded upon two allied arguments, namely, that human nature is fickle and that power breeds corruption. The heads of departments are further warned against mutual combination as well as conflict on the ground that these involve the loss and destruction respectively of the king's substance. Thirdly and lastly, we are told that the army should be placed under a divided command since this is a sure guarantee against treachery.

Kauṭilya's principles of government like those of his predecessors are mostly embedded in his discussions of the lines of state policy. He writes about the king that when the king is alert, his servants likewise become alert. But when he is careless, they become equally so, and they destroy his work and he is overpowered by his enemies. Kauṭilya further writes that the king should perform his work with the application of constant exertion, for exertion leads to success, while its opposite is certain to produce failure in respect of past and future acts. The author enjoins almost with a religious solemnity the king's observance of the qualities of exertion, dutifulness and impartiality. This culminates in the author's doctrine of the king's complete identification of his interests with those of his subjects.

As regards the policy of state relief of the people against providential calamities, Kauṭilya remarks that the king shall show favour like a father to his people when they are afflicted by these visitations. The king is required to maintain the infants, the aged, the diseased and the distressed persons, helpless as well as barren women and the sons of women who are without guardians. On the other hand, we are told that the king should enforce (by fine or imprisonment in some cases) the duties of slaves and pledgees and relations towards their masters and principals, those of village-elders in respect of the property of minors and temples, and those of relatives regarding

maintenance of wives and children, parents, minor brothers and unmarried as well as widowed sisters : should anyone embrace the monastic order without providing for the livelihood of his wife and so or induce a woman to adopt the same, he would also be liable to a fine : one who has passed the age of reproduction can enter the monastic life after obtaining the permission of the judges. All this introduces us to a double aspect of the king's paternal rule over his subjects, namely, the humanitarian and the authoritarian.

Kauṭilya's policy of acquisition of dominion has been discussed in Section XIII of his work bearing the title, 'The means of capturing a fortress'. The author gives in detail the fivefold method of achieving this result, namely, by creating disaffection among the enemy's partisans, by getting rid of the enemy through secret tactics, by setting spies on the enemy's kingdom by siege, and by assault. Here the author contemplates four grades of acquisition of dominion descending from a king's mastery over a state-system to his lordship over a few vassals. Nevertheless, the methods of its acquisition follow a uniform pattern which is modelled on the means of capturing a fortress by the employment of wholesale treachery and violence.

But the more important than this is Kauṭilya's policy of preservation of dominion. The rules relating to this policy may conveniently be studied under four heads, namely, the policy of security of the king and the community, colonization of the rural and urban areas, financial policy during an emergency and the policy of inter-state relations.

While discussing the policy of security Kauṭilya first takes up the question of the king's personal security by pointing out its high political importance. The king, whose safety is ensured from those far and near, Kauṭilya writes (I, 17), is capable of protecting the kingdom. The king, according to him, should secure his safety in his palace and particularly in the acts of visiting his queen, taking his meals and attending to his other bodily needs, witnessing shows, visiting gardens, hunting, granting interviews, and joining in fairs and festivals. Secondly, Kauṭilya discusses the question of the king's keeping a watch over the behaviour of his own officials as well as those of his enemies. This involves the application of an elaborate

system of espionage on the widest scale and with a high degree of technical perfection. Kauṭilya enumerates nine different classes of spies called after their appropriate technical terms, and he explains how the first five of these classes should be stationary and the remaining four should be peripatetic : the spies are to be set in motion to keep a watch over eighteen classes of the king's officials as well as over the foreign kings and their corresponding set of officials. Thirdly, Kauṭilya discusses the measures which a king should necessarily take for guarding his own loyal and disloyal subjects against the enemy's wiles and for seducing those of the enemy. Lastly, Kauṭilya describes in detail the methods of detection and arrest of thieves and adulterous persons as well as those of discovering stolen property and examining cases of suspected murder, and finally, those of punishing various types of offenders including officials guilty of abuse of authority.

Under the head of colonization of rural and urban areas, Kauṭilya explains the scheme of state-planned colonization of the rural area, which involves the application of the geo-political ideas. Listing the programme of the all-round development of the rural area in his work *Arthaśāstra* (II, 1), the author remarks that the king shall save his territory from affliction by the enemy's troops as well as from the visitations of pestilence and famine, that he shall prevent the people from indulging in expensive amusements, that he shall protect agriculture from the burdens of fines, compulsory labour and taxes and the cattle-pens from thieves, wild animals and poisoners as well as from diseases, but he shall protect trade-routes which are in danger of being made insecure in different ways, and lastly, that he shall similarly protect all forests, irrigation-works and mines and start new ones.

As regards the financial policy of the state in an emergency, Kauṭilya devotes one full chapter (V, 2) to the king's policy of replenishing his treasury when he is without revenue and is faced with financial difficulties. The author mentions alternative methods of replenishing the royal treasury by force and fraud through the agency of spies as well as government officers. The fundamental principle underlying it is that the necessity of the king or the state justifies the application of force and

fraud in varying degrees for raising revenue in a grave emergency. This is subject only to the limitation imposed by sound policy in the shape of avoidance of public discontent. When the author allows the property of enemies of the state and of sinners to be seized on various pretexts in the interest of the state, he anticipates a "twofold principle which was destined to be developed fully by Bhīshma in the *Mahābhārata*, namely, that the interest of the state in its grave emergency overrides the rules of morality and that ownership is founded on virtue."[8]

Lastly, let us deal with Kauṭilya's discussion of an old *Arthaśāstra* problem of inter-state relations arising from the subjects' attitude towards their ruler. Of the three vulnerable types of kings, namely, one who is plunged in a grave calamity but is a just ruler, one who is plunged in a minor calamity but is an unjust ruler, and one who has disaffected subjects, it is asked, which should be attacked in preference to the others? Answering this question in favour of the last type, Kauṭilya argues that in the event of an attack the subjects help the first king and remain indifferent towards the second, but they destroy the third king, be he never so strong. And Kauṭilya gives a solemn warning to the king against ill treatment of his subjects in the interest of his own security. For the author, after giving a long list of the king's faults because of which his subjects become poor, greedy and disaffected, observes that when the subjects become poor they become greedy, that on becoming greedy, they become disaffected and that on being disaffected they go over to the enemy's side, or else themselves slay their master: the king, therefore, must not produce the causes tending to make the subjects poor, greedy, and disaffected, but on the contrary he should counteract them immediately after their appearance. Poverty, greed and disaffection of the subjects arising by a causal chain from the king's faults, we are further told, lead to his destruction by themselves or by the enemy.

While discussing the policy of a weak king towards his powerful aggressor, Kauṭilya asks the weak king to take refuge

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8 U. N. Ghoshal: *A History of Indian Political Ideas*, p. 138.

with a still more powerful ruler, or else seek shelter in an impregnable fort. The weak king, according to him, should adjust his policy of purchasing safety according as the aggressor belongs to one or other of the three types of conquerors, namely, the righteous, the greedy and the demoniac. When peace is established, the king should try by guile to circumvent its clauses (clauses of peace treaty) ; should the aggressor exact surrender of troops, he may be given such elephants and horses as are disabled or as though able have been treated with poison, or else such troops as will destroy or harm him ; should he demand surrender of money, he may be given such costly articles as would find no purchaser, or such common articles as would be useless for his fighting ; should he demand land, he is to be given such land as can be easily recovered or is open to the enemy's attack, or is not protected by forts, or such as can be colonized only with great expenditure of men and money.

In the light of the above analysis we can now easily understand the goal of inter-state relations, as given by Kauṭilya. Kauṭilya explains his plan for the alignment of its constituent elements by the analogy of a wheel : within the sphere of the *prakritis*, he says, the Aggressor shall conceive the kings separated from him (i.e., his allies) as the circumference and those in between as the spokes and himself as the axle. Further, the author, while explaining the significance of the place-factor in relation to the policy of attack, defines the Aggressor's sphere of influence : the whole territory, he remarks, extending north to south from the Himalayas to the southern sea and stretching in the reverse direction for a distance of 1,000 *yojanas* is called the sphere of the world-ruler (*chakravartī*). The above ideas involve what may be called a dynamic conception of the goal of inter-state relations. The objective of foreign policy, we are firmly told, is progressive advance from a condition of Decline to that of Equilibrium and then to that of Progress.

Thus Kauṭilya's work contains the most perfect, the most complete and the most important contribution on the subject of state and its policies made by our ancient thinkers. Kauṭilya in contrast with some of his radical predecessors based his funda-

mental ideas of society and the state upon the *Smriti* pattern, thus helping to rehabilitate the science of *Arthaśāstra* in the eyes of the Brāhmaṇa canonists. It is tempting to suggest that he thus "contributed not only to the remarkable conception of the superlative merit of *Rājadharma* in the *Mahābhārata*, but also to that wholesale incorporation of the *Arthaśāstra* material into the old *Smriti* tradition which constitutes one of the most distinctive characteristics of the political thought of Manu and Yājñavalkya as well as of Bhīshma in the Great Epic."

3

M. K. Gandhi (1869-1948)

The great man is one who makes others great and who carries with him the burden of the whole humanity. The greatest fact in the history of man on earth is not what he achieves materially or what he gains here, but the growth of his Soul from age to age in its search for truth. Those who take part in this adventure of the Soul secure an ever-lasting place in world history. The greatness of Gandhi lies not in his heroic struggle for India's freedom but in his ever striving for the Soul-force and in his insistence on the creative power of the Soul.

Although Gandhi was mainly responsible for the mighty upheaval of Indian nation who broke its old chains, his way of thinking and method of revolution were unique. Politicians are not reputed to take religion seriously, for the values which they cherish and to which they are committed, such as political control over inferiors and economically undeveloped peoples and the economic exploitation of the poorer and weaker human beings, are so inconsistent with the values of religion that the latter cannot be taken too seriously. But for Gandhi, all life was of one piece. He himself admitted : "To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics ; and I can say, without the slightest hesitation and yet in all humility, that those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means !" Like Buddha and Mahāvīra he accepted an integrated view of life and as such he condemned the division of religion and politics. He regarded religion and politics as two different sides of the same coin. He was a devoted worshipper of the Soul and, by that relation, of God and His humanity.

Gandhi was not a politician in the Machiavellian sense, but he did what his knowledge *a priori* taught him. He never lost touch with his spirituality even in the moments of his great political engagements. He, like Machiavelli and modern politicians, Marxists and others, did not separate religion from politics but tried to provide a synthesis of the two. Machiavelli started with the assumption that human nature is selfish and the effective motives on which a statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for security in the masses and the desire for power in rulers. Government is founded upon weakness and insufficiencies of the individual, who is unable to protect himself against the aggression of other individuals unless supported by the power of the state. As such, Machiavelli regarded human nature as egoistic and rejected the old belief in a supernatural end for man. Disbelieving in a supernatural end for man, he not only separated morality from politics, but also relegated religion to a very subordinate position in his political system. In the same way, Karl Marx and his followers in the 19th and 20th centuries, being influenced by Darwin's idea of biological evolution of human society, took the mechanistic and materialistic view of human life as Thomas Hobbes had conceived of it in the 17th century under the influence of Galilio and Newton. Marx and his followers did not assign any part which religion has to play in determining individual and social actions. But quite contrary to them, Gandhi primarily based all his social and political doctrines on the religious and spiritual view of human life. According to him, politics devoid of religion is a death-trap because it kills the Soul. In *Young India* he once wrote that "at the back of every word that I have uttered since I have known what public life is and of every act that I have done, there has been a religious consciousness and a downright religious motive." For him, there was no religion apart from human activity. He did not believe in any particular religion, and his religion was the service of the whole humanity. Religion, when particularized, gives a partial outlook of life, but, in reality, it is a passion for love which sees the whole world, whether human, animal or vegetable, within itself. There is one and one Truth

only, although it is put in different ways. "*Ekam Sad Vipra Bahudā Vadanti.*" God lives even in the smallest atom. To love God is to love His creation. Hence Gandhi was fully justified to love and extend his sympathy to the lowest creature and combine religion with politics. His idea of combining religion with politics is a challenge to those political thinkers who take a partial view of human life.

Although Gandhi drew inspiration from all the religions of the world and he belonged to the whole world by extending his love and sympathy to the whole humanity, he was primarily nurtured in the traditions of Hinduism. Hinduism is the religion of Truth which sees no difference between Truth and Religion and Truth and God. Gandhi himself said that "Truth is God and there is no other God than Truth." The thinkers and the peoples all over the world may differ on the conception of religion and God ; they may also deny the existence of God, and religion to them may appear loathsome, but no one denies the idea of Truth. That is why Gandhi inverted the phrase and said that "Truth is God" in place of "God is Truth". And Truth, according to him, can be realized in perfect sense through love and *ahiṃsa*. "He prayeth best who loveth best both man and bird and beast" was his diction.

In a world where the rulers of nations are relying more and more upon brute force and the nations trusting their lives and hopes to systems which represent the denial of law and brotherhood, Gandhi stood out as an isolated and most impressive figure. He was a ruler obeyed by millions, not because they feared him but because they loved him ; not as the master of wealth and secret police and machine-guns, but as holding that spiritual authority which, when it once dares to assert itself, seems to reduce almost to impotence the values of the material world.

We cannot, of course, assume that a spiritual authority is always right in its guidance. Its claims and professions can seldom be proved or disproved. It is directed by human beings, who are subject to ordinary human frailties and as liable as other autocrats to be corrupted by power. But among spiritual rulers, as among rulers in general, Gandhi stood as almost unique. In the first place, he uttered no dogma, no

command, only an appeal ; he called to our spirits ; he showed what he held to be the truth, but did not exclude or condemn those who differed from him. In the second place, he was unique in his manner of fighting, as was shown best in his fifteen years' struggle for the rights of Indians in South Africa. He and his followers were repeatedly imprisoned, herded with criminals, treated as sub-human beings, yet whenever the government which oppressed him were weak or in trouble, instead of pressing his advantage he turned and helped them. When they were involved in a dangerous war, he organized a special corps of Indian stretcher-bearers to help them ; when, in the midst of a non-violent strike by his Indian followers, the government were suddenly threatened by a revolutionary railway strike, he immediately gave orders for his people to resume work until his opponents were safe again. No wonder that he won the day. No genuinely human enemy could hold out against that method of fighting. Thirdly, perhaps the hardest point of all for a leader who is worshipped and idealized by immense multitudes, he never claimed to be infallible. While launching his 'non-co-operation' campaigns, he always used to pause and re-think about the rightness of his actions. The spiritual authority of one unarmed man over great multitudes is in itself wonderful, but when that man not only abjures violence and helps his enemies in their creed, but also recognizes his own human fallibility as did Gandhi, he claims unanswerably the admiration of the whole world.

It is necessary to view Gandhi's life-activities as a developing and an unfinished chapter of Indian history. Our Indian history has been primarily made by spiritual individualities. The mighty spiritual individualities who have played the leading role in our history have always been integrated beings. They integrated themselves by disciplining their warring members. The more complete the harmonious fusion of the activity of the hands, the head and the heart, the greater the individuality. Not by outer opulence but by inner enrichment have they served their beloved Motherland. When necessary they have worn a royal garb, as in Rama's case ; in another era Siddhārtha, also a prince, exchanged his sceptre for the begging-bowl of the Buddha ; both were integrated indivi-

dualities. There have been others—poets, seers, sages, all of them different in their outer appearance and working in environments which were different, but all of them the same in their inner consciousness—minds enlightened by souls, hearts full of the *Tathāgata Light.* Of them it might be said not so much that they were the makers of Indian history as that they were made by world history, that is, by the power of the Spirit in the region called *Bhāratavarsha*, described as *Karma-Bhūmi*, the 'Land of Works'. They all served humanity by sustaining India's real nature, her innate property, her spiritual law and order, which are all implicit in the term *Dharma.* This line of thought may appear fanciful and historically unsound to occidental scholars who do not recognize the spiritual basis of human life.

The orthodox occidental scholars think that although Gandhi was a great spiritual leader like Buddha and Mahāvīra, he was not a political thinker as he did not exclusively dilate on the state and its related problems. Further they think that whatever ideas Gandhi expressed on political questions as those of the nature and functions of the state, form of government, distribution of wealth and the question of individual freedom and whatever methods he adopted in fighting for India's freedom were mostly inconsistent and impracticable. But this is not correct. We form such an opinion when we see him as a soul, and when we take into account the fact that he was one who refused to make compromises between his head and his heart, who declined to go against his own conscience, who viewed all events not from the mundane standpoint, but as avenues for soul-learning for himself and of soul-service of others. He practised his philosophy, he lived up to his principles ; and therefore he remained a puzzle of varying bafflement to all who compromise and so remain in a disintegrated state of mental confusion.

No doubt, some people speak of Gandhi as a mystic and a religious man, he was best known to the world as the political leader of India, no matter of a different type and calibre. As an integrated being he expressed his views on the various political, economic and social questions. His idea was of a new social order based on universal love and *ahiṃsa.* Under his

thesis of new social order he discussed the idea of establishing a non-violent society and related to it his conceptions of stateless society, democracy, decentralization of economic and political powers, *Varṇa Vyavasthā*, trusteeship and so on.

Gandhi's ideal society was a non-violent and stateless society. He repudiated state on ethical, historical and economic grounds. The compulsive and predatory nature of state authority took away the moral value of the individual's actions. A man is moral when he acts freely and voluntarily. To quote Gandhi himself, "The state represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The individual has a soul, but as the state is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence." Although, like anarchists, he regarded the state as rooted in violence, he differed from them. Unlike them, he put emphasis on moral force and on the realization of one's own self and his technique of establishing a stateless society was of non-violence and love. According to him, only a society based on non-violence could be stateless. Hence there was no place for violence in Gandhi's ideal society.

Further, Gandhi also did not want to abolish the state completely as did the anarchists. He frankly admitted that the society would have representative institutions and government. Although, he made it clear, ideal society would be a stateless society consisting of self-sufficing, self-regulating and self-governing village communities joined together in a voluntary federation, the maintenance of federation involved the necessity of government. Thus he meant by his ideal society predominantly a non-violent state, and not a non-violent and stateless society as it is generally thought. He was only opposed to the oppressive authority and to the theory of absolute sovereignty of the state, but not to the ideal state itself. He believed in the sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority. According to him, a man owed only a limited and relative loyalty to the state as he also owed his loyalty to other associations. That loyalty was conditional on the state appealing to the conscience of the people. That might involve a perpetual danger of anarchy, but that was the only adequate safeguard against the abuse of political power. Thus Gandhi's

ideas of limited and relative loyalty to the state and of conditional anarchy were very similar to those of the pluralists, particulary like MacIver, Leon Duguit and Harold J. Laski. But unlike them, he provided ample safeguards against anarchy by making disobedience non-violent.

In fact, Gandhi's ideal state was a non-violent democratic state where social life would remain self-regulated. In a democratic state everyone is his own ruler. According to him, democracy lies not in the number of persons who vote or in the size of Assembly, but in the sense to what extent masses imbibe the spirit of non-violence and social service. Manual work gives an opportunity to all who wish to take part in the government and the well-being of the state. In an ideal democratic state the powers are to be decentralized and equality is to prevail in every sphere of life. Every individual is to be given fullest freedom to devote himself to social service according to his capacity. The structure of the state that is to emerge as a result of non-violent revolution is to be a compromise between the ideal non-violent society and the facts of human nature. He agreed to Lord Lothian that "democratic government was a distant dream so long as non-violence was not recognized as a living force, an inviolable creed, not a mere policy." The state is to continue to exist on account of the anti-social tendencies of certain individuals and groups. There is also the danger of anarchy to be safeguarded against. But the functions of the state, according to him, are to be reduced to the minimum. Like Figgis, Gierke, Bertrand Russell, G. K. Chesterton, G. D. H. Cole and other guild-socialists, Gandhi admitted that most of the functions of the state were to be transferred to the voluntary associations in order to have a real self-government in the country. There are certain things which cannot be done without political power, but there are also numerous other things which do not at all depend upon political power and hence they should be left to the voluntary associations. Like the guild-socialists, he was against the wage system and favoured the establishment by the workers of self-government in economic and political spheres of national life. Also like them, he maintained that on account of the large-scale production there was no scope for beauty and craftsmanship. The individual worker

became merely a cog in the machine and his individuality completely disappeared. The influence of John Ruskin, Carlyle and William Morris was decisive on Gandhi as he, like them, detested the monotony of machine production and looked back to the time when the independent workmen of the past took pride in creative work and produced the greatest art for which the past was famous. And he reached the conclusion of Henry Thoreau, an anarchist, and J. S. Mill, an individualist, that that government is best which governs the least. This means that when people come into possession of political and economic power, the interference with the freedom of the people is reduced to a minimum. He remarked, "a nation that runs its affairs smoothly and effectively without much state interference is truly democratic. Where such condition is absent the form of government is democratic in name."

Gandhi was not a visionary but a practical and logical thinker, and he related his theory of government to his conception of human nature. His description of human nature was well-balanced. His intensive tours of India and intimate contact with the people helped him to understand human nature in its right perspective. As an empiricist he was concerned with human nature not only as it was but also as it could be trained and moulded. He did not believe, as did Rousseau, that man was all good, but he admitted that every one of us was a mixture of good and evil. The difference was only one of degree. Admitting the animal ancestry of man he said that "there is no one without faults, not even men of God. They are men of God not because they are faultless but because they know their own faults and are ever ready to correct themselves." This does not mean that he, like Thomas Hobbes or J. Bentham, believed that human beings are merely brutes and depraved or egoistic. His belief was that sins and errors are not the true self of man. Man is able to mould himself and even the worst of the people can be transformed. There is a self-conscious will in man which can be used to revolutionize his life. It was his strong belief in the self-conscious will in man which made him think in terms of individual freedom. Freedom is the demand of this will which no state or society can dare to ignore. According to him, man is free to act according

to his own conscience. He can even revolt against the established order of state or society. Socrates and to some extent Kant had also accepted this view long before that human nature is self-conscious. But Gandhi gave a spiritual colour to such a view of human nature and he, therefore, said that man is not only self-conscious being fighting for his freedom but he is also by nature going higher. Human nature is in its essence one and every man has the capacity for the highest possible development. To quote him, "The soul is one in all. Its possibilities are therefore the same for everyone."

Gandhi was not only a great individualist and a practical idealist but he was also a first-rate egalitarian and a socialist. He firmly believed that the ideal of non-violence could be achieved only if the gulf dividing the rich and the poor was made as small as possible. But he regarded the principle of absolute equality, which the dogmatic Marxists stress too much, as impossible. His idea of economic equality was that "everyone would have a proper house to live in, sufficient and balanced food to eat, and sufficient khadi with which to cover himself." He also said that "the cruel inequality that obtained today would be removed by purely non-violent means." To achieve his ideals, Gandhi did not suggest any wholesale confiscation of property of the landlords and capitalists. Like Christian socialists he wanted to achieve his goal of economic equality by changing their mentality through love and persuasion. They were to be persuaded to act as the trustees of peasants and workers. But if they failed to act as trustees, their lands and industries would then be taken over by the government through legislations. The industries were to be run not for profit, but for the benefit of the whole society. In the management the workers were to be given due share along with the government. Following the footsteps of Leo Tolstoi, Gandhi urged the people to earn their own livelihood through spinning and running their own small-scale industries. As he had a distrust of authority like Tolstoi, he disliked the concentration of power in both economic and political fields. He said that there was to be decentralization, as far as possible, as centralization and large-scale production were considered to be enemies of democracy.

In fact, the whole range of Gandhian thinking is superimposed by the influence of the concept of the Soul. As in the case of machines, the idea of the State and Government have also been encircled by the higher ideals of life and Soul which will not come in the strict orbit of economic socialism. He felt that decentralization is the best method and on this ground he remarked, "God forbid that India should ever take to industrialism after the manner of the West." Concentration of power will not enlighten the individual. Rather it will frustrate the inner genius. Gandhiji believed that every individual has equal responsibility for the society, and hence the possibility of making everybody as big as everybody else must be widened. This will only be possible in a socialism of decentralized power. In this approach to socialism the Gandhian socialism strikes a new ground. Socialism always has meant some kind of regimentation and state control over the individual. Though Marx himself had supported, of course very vaguely, some kind of decentralization of power, the other socialists had wanted power to be centralized as far as possible. In the 20th century, particularly after the World War II, this trend for centralization has been quite visible. But in case of Gandhian socialism, like the guild-socialists, there has been an attempt for making power as much diffused as possible. ".....every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers.....every village has to be self-sustained and capable of managing its affairs, even to the extent of defending itself against the whole world. It will be trained and prepared to perish in the attempt to defend itself against any onslaught from without. .....Such a society is necessarily highly cultured in which every man and woman knows what he or she wants and, what is more, knows that no one should want anything that others cannot have without equal labour."

From the Gandhian application of socialism, however, it must not be thought that Gandhiji was a mystic or his socialism was only a matter of the mind. He was intensely practical and his principle was that the life of the individual should get all possible expression only in the context of society. He added to this the possibility of application of non-violence and truth

in all activities and thought. Gandhian idea in general and Gandhian socialism in particular is no mere theory, not merely an intellectual grasp or philosophical satisfaction which can be attained by simple speculation and thinking. The most peculiar and significant aspect of Gandhian socialism is the emphasis which Gandhiji laid on the internal aspect of life. Even in case of the theory of *sarvodaya* and the *sarvodaya samāj*, Gandhiji did not give much importance to external forces to organize the institutions. He did not believe that revolution or evolution when imposed from outside would bring about any fundamental change in human nature or in society. The entire responsibility of reconstruction in social, economic and political aspects must start with the individual himself; without the individual's consistent and constant attempt for reorientation no amount of effort will bring the socialistic order. The Gandhian idea of *sarvodaya* is the apex of Gandhian socialism. *Sarvodaya* does not mean that majority alone is enough ; the growth and upliftment of everyone is vitally necessary. In this respect, Gandhian socialism thinks of society as an organic whole where differences do not exist. The concept of organic unity, where all individuals have equal importance and the rise of everyone is dependent on the rise of every other, is a fundamental contribution to socialistic theory and practice. It opens a new approach in socialistic thought. The previous socialist thinkers had the belief that without a sizable majority no social change can be effective. Socialism for them was to be founded by force and force always meant the force of the body combined with that of the mind. But in most cases the mental forces did not exist or existed in a perverted form of cheap propaganda, or in many cases it was grossly prostituted in the name of higher ideals and for the sake of socialism. But in case of Gandhian socialism it is altogether different. Gandhian theory puts enormous emphasis on the capacity of the individual. Socialism, nay any other principle, must start with some individual. "Socialism begins with the first convert. If there is one such, you can add zeros to the one and the first zero will account for ten and every addition will account for ten times the previous number. If, however, the beginner is a zero, in other words, no one makes the beginning, multi-

plicity of zeros will also produce zero value." This dependence on the first 'convert' is comparatively unknown in western socialism. In western socialistic thought, "we have got to think in terms of collective groups of the trade unions, kisan panchayats, socialist parties, and youth organizations etc. These collective expressions of the people will suck into their folds millions of men through struggles as also through co-operative efforts will qualify themselves for the responsibility of building up of a free and equal society that we call socialism."

This individual approach to socialism was necessitated for practical reasons. In case of an economy like that of the United States the individual approach to socio-economic issues will be impossible. In India the case is quite different. Unlike in the western countries there is much time and opportunity in India for the individual to contemplate and brood for himself and the society he lives in. Moreover the predominant nature of an agricultural economy necessitates for poise, contemplation, inner searching and the tendency to isolate oneself from the rest. In an industrial community, where the tempo of life is unimaginably fast and the commercial economy makes life a matter of monetary calculation, all these are unnecessary, and sometimes dangerous also. Industrial civilization creates a mass-man who will be unable to find out his individual existence. Hence the socialism of western pattern necessarily is for the group and the units of the group. On the other hand, Gandhian socialism is for the individual and the groups of individuals.

Thus Gandhi's political philosophy was a fusion of individualism, idealism and socialism. And the key-words of his economic and political programme were self-sufficiency, non-competition, equitable distribution and decentralized production. He incarnated India's traditional ideal of saint, but on the other hand, he belonged to the most modern type of mass-leader. Gandhi, like Jefferson, thought of politics in moral and religious terms. That is why his proposed solutions bear so close a resemblance to those proposed by the great American. That he went further than Jefferson—for example, in recommending economic as well as political decentralization advoca-

ting the use of *satyāgraha* in place of the ward's "elementary exercises of militia"—is due to the fact that his ethic was more radical and his religion more profoundly realistic than Jefferson's. Although Gandhi's plan was not adopted like Jefferson's, he is regarded and would be regarded in world history as the most visible, most spectacular, most single-minded and most pure-hearted symbol of redeemed humanity.

Manavendra Nath Roy (1886-1954)

Manavendra Nath Roy was a born revolutionary. While still a young boy, Roy came under the influence of Swami Vivekanand, Swami Ramtirth and Swami Dayanand Saraswati. But he received his political vision from the revolutionary ideas of Bipin Chandra Pal, Aurobindo Ghosh and Surendranath Banerjea. He was very much moved by the vigorous style of their speeches. He was also fairly intimate with Jatin Mukherjee and worked in co-operation with the leaders of the Yugantara group, who had become sufficiently notorious for their revolutionary activities in Bengal.

By 1915 Roy was twice arrested, first, in 1910 in connection with the Howrah conspiracy case, and secondly, in 1915 in connection with a political dacoity in Calcutta. Ultimately, in the end of the year 1915 Roy fled to Dutch Indies. He also visited Java, Philippines, Korea and Manchuria. He later went to the United States and stayed for some time, working there in collaboration with Lala Lajpat Rai. In 1920, on the invitation of V. I. Lenin he went to Russia and became there the adviser of the Bolshevic Party on colonial problems. He also became the head of the Oriental Department of the Moscow Institute. He was sent to China at the end of 1926 along with Borodin and Blucher. He had gone there as the chief representative of the Communist International. He stayed there till the middle of 1927. He advised the Chinese communists to embark upon a plan of agrarian revolution with a view to extending their social basis.[1] But the Communist Party of China did not act on his advice and was helped by Borodin, the agent of the Soviet Government. This amounted, according to Roy, to a betrayal not only of the peasants, but also of the proletariat.[2] He also did not like the policies which Stalin

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1 H. M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (4th ed.), p. 447.
2 M. N. Roy, *My Experience of China*, pp. 30-31.

and other Russian communists pursued and the way in which they behaved in order to realize international communism. Roy's criticism of Stalin's red sectarianism and extreme leftism led to the final break between Roy and the Communist International in 1928-29. Being fed up with Stalinism, Roy returned to India incognito in 1930. But he was imprisoned for six years (1931-36) in the Kanpur conspiracy case. In 1936 (on his release from jail) he entered actively into Indian political life. And after working for nearly 18 years as a Congress worker and also as an organizer of Radical Democratic Party he died on January 25, 1954.

Roy was not a Marxian in the sense Lenin or Stalin was. As a person, Marx evoked great praise from Roy. The latter regarded Marx as a great humanist and a lover of freedom. But he wanted to restate the "humanist, libertarian, moralist" kernel of Marxism after freeing it from the dogmatics of economic determinism.[3] He either repudiated the teachings of Marx or made substantial modifications in them. He writes in his book, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution* : "Marx's proposition that consciousness is determined by being placed materialist metaphysics on a sound scientific basis. His subsequent thought, particularly sociological, however, did not move in the direction indicated by the significant point of departure. Marxism, on the whole, is not true to its philosophical tradition. In sociology, it vulgarises materialism to the extent of denying that basic moral values transcend space and time. With the impersonal concept of the forces of production, it introduces teleology in history, crassly contradicting its own belief that man is the maker of his destiny. The economic determinism of its historiology blasts the foundation of human freedom, because it precludes the possibility of man ever becoming free as an individual. Yet, contemporary sociological thinking has been considerably influenced by the fallacious and erroneous doctrines of Marxism which do not logically follow from its philosophy."[4]

Roy felt that the Marxian interpretation of history was

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3 M. N. Roy, *New Humanism*, pp. 25-26.
4 M. N. Roy, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, Vol. II, pp. 216-17.

defective, because it allowed slender role to mental activity in the social process. The materialist conception of history, to identify the history of civilization with the history of class struggle, loses all sense, Roy said, if intelligence is accorded no place in the process of social revolution. In that case, Marxism as a philosophy of action will have no leg to stand on, and revolutions will be impossible. They are historically necessary, but they are also made by men moved by the idea of revolution. According to him, it is palpably absurd to regard history as a succession of events brought about by the automatic development of the means of production. The man cannot be eliminated from the evolutionary process of history. Social forces are not metaphysical categories ; they are the collective expression of the creativeness of man, and the creative man is always a thinking man. In the Marxist philosophy of history, ideas are regarded as the epiphenomena of matter. Consciousness is posterior to reality. As such, in the Marxist philosophy of history the creative role of ideas is minimized and the upholders of this doctrine of primacy of ideas are ridiculed as fantastic utopians. M. N. Roy sought to restate Marxism. He put a theory of two parallel processes—ideal and physical, composing history in its integrated form. It is true, he said, that ideation is a physiological process consequent upon the interaction with the environment. But once arisen, ideas have a logic of evolution of their own. There is a mutual influence between the dynamics of ideas and the dialectical progression of social process. "Philosophically, the materialist conception of history must recognize the creative role of intelligence. Materialism cannot deny the objective reality of ideas. They are not *sui generis* ; they are biologically determined ; priority belongs to the physical being, to matter, if the old-fashioned term may still be used. But once the biologically determined process of ideation is complete, ideas are formed, they continue to have an autonomous existence, an evolutionary process of their own, which runs parallel to the physical process of social evolution. The two parallel processes, ideal and physical, compose history. Both are determined by their respective logic or dynamics or dialectics. At the same time, they are

mutually influenced, the one by the other. That is how history becomes an organic process."[5]

Roy further said that "the materialist conception of history fails when it dismisses ideal systems (ideologies) as mere superstructures of economic relations, and tries to relate them directly with the material conditions of life." The logical development of ideas and the generation of new social forces take place simultaneously, together providing the motive force of history. But in no given period, he stated, can they be casually connected except in the sense that action is always motivated by ideas. A new idea must be referred back to an old idea. Philosophy has a history of its own, and it is not a kaleidoscope of phantoms. Inasmuch as action is motivated by ideas, determinism in history is primarily ideal. "Historical determinism comes to grief whenever its exponents take a superficial, one-sided view, ignoring the dynamics of ideas."[6]

Karl Marx, under the influence of Hegelian dialectics, had rejected the eighteenth century materialism of Diderot, Helvetius and Holbach. He had also repudiated the humanist materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach by whose *Essence of Christianity* he had been influenced. Roy criticized Marx and held that the rejection by Marx of Feuerbachian humanist materialism or what Woltmann called anthropological materialism was unfortunate. Roy was critical of the Marxian rejection of the autonomy of the human being. He revolted against the fatalism implicit in the prophetical sociology of Karl Marx.[7]

M. N. Roy not only criticized the economic determinism and the dogmatic materialism of Karl Marx, he had also a difference of opinion with Lenin. Lenin held that during the finance-capitalist and imperialist phase of world economy it was necessary to achieve an integration between the bourgeois nationalistic struggles of the colonial world and the rising proletarian movements in the advanced countries of the western civilization. Roy presented a different thesis in which he attempted to expose the anti-proletarian attitude of the Asian nationalist leaders. Lenin's opinion was mostly based on his

5 M. N. Roy, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, Vol. I, p. 11.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
7 M. N. Roy, *New Humanism*, p. 19.

experiences of the western countries where the bourgeoisie had been the spokesmen of a national democratic evolution. Although Roy agreed that imperialism is the higher stage of capitalism and hence colonial struggle for liberation was a part of the international struggle against moribund capitalism, he felt that the situation in the oriental countries in the early twentieth century was not the same as in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In such a situation the class structure of the leadership of the national freedom movement was bound to be different from that of the West. Roy also did not support the Russian Revolution, which was fought mainly under the guidance of Lenin. According to Roy, the Russian Revolution did not occur in mechanical conformity to a previously laid down *a priori* law of history. He regarded it as a "fluke of history" occurring due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances. Russia, he felt, was not fully mature for a social and political transformation. He said that "the communist movement has been made a subservient adjunct to the interests of the Russian State and there has been an alienation of the "non-proletarian periphery".[8] And he regardad Russian communism as state capitalism.

Roy was completely opposed to the monopolization of the leadership of Third International by the Russian communists who claimed to be masters both of Marxist theory and practice. The slogan of socialism in one country, proclaimed by Joseph Stalin in 1924, precluded the possibility of the realization of international communism.[9] Roy advocated the "decolonization" theory at the time of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International. It signified the growing exhaustion of British imperialist finance and the partial transfer of its benefits to the Indian bourgeoisie. Roy indicated the changing character of imperialism.[10] The decolonization thesis stressed the growing exhaustion of the exportable capital of the imperialist countries, necessitating a joint partnership with the native bourgeoisie. Roy prophesied that in the long run the depreciating value of

8 M. N. Roy, *New Humanism,* p. 21.
9 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
10 R. C. North and X. J. Eudin, "M. N. Roy and the Theory of Decolonization," *The Radical Humanist,* July 12, 1959.

imperialism would compel the foreign capitalists to part with power. The Sixth World Congress of Communist International passed a resolution warning the Indian people against their possible betrayal by the counter-revolutionary Indian National Congress. M. N. Roy suggested the demand for a Constituent Assembly for India. This stand of Roy was criticized by the orthodox communists and they (the latter) considered him to be a bourgeois nationalist democrat.[11] All these differences between Roy and the communists created a rift between them, and the former, being disgusted with Marxian dogmatism, Lenin's thesis of proletarian revolution and Stalin's red sectarianism and extreme leftism, left Russia for India in early 1930.

M. N. Roy was not only a great revolutionary and a fighter, who revolted against the British imperialism and fought for Indian freedom, but he was also a deep scholar of India's manifold problems. In 1922 he made a sociological study of contemporary India in his *India in Transition*. In this book Roy showed his difference of opinion from the British imperialists of the school of Montague who believed in the principle of gradual development of responsible government. He badly criticized those Indians who relied upon the British statesmen and tried to work out the reforms contemplated in the Government of India Act of 1919. He also ridiculed the confusion and religious revivalism attempted by the group of extremists and nationalists. He made a prophesy that the future Indian nation was going to be shaped by the "inexorable evolution" of the progressive forces latent in Indian society. "The Indian transition was a consequence of the movement of social forces which were struggling for the replacement of the old bankrupt decadent socio-economic structure."[12] In India the struggle for national freedom was going side by side with the raging class struggle. In this book he discussed three basic social phenomena—the rise of the Indian bourgeoisie, the pauperization of the peasantry and the impoverishment of the urban proletariat. And the task of winning the freedom of India, in Roy's opinion, would have to be shouldered by the "workers and peasants consciously organized and fighting on the grounds of class-struggle."

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[11] M. N. Roy, *Fragments of a Prisoner's Diary*, Vol. II, pp. 99-100.
[12] M. N. Roy, *India in Transition*, pp. 84-85.

M. N. Roy published another book towards the end of 1922. In this book, *India's Problem and Its Solution*, he criticized Gandhian ideology. He showed his dissatisfaction with the constructive programme of the Congress adopted at Bardoli on February 12, 1922. In its place he pleaded for the creation of a revolutionary mass party which would organize mass strikes and foment discontent against the existing political and economic system of the country. In place of the civil disobedience, the programme of the Congress Party, Roy put forth the idea of "militant action of the masses".

In December, 1922 the 'Vanguard Party' with which Roy was closely associated sent a programme to the Indian National Congress on the eve of the Gaya Congress. The programme contained the following items :

(i) Abolition of landlordism,
(ii) Reduction of land rent to a minimum,
(iii) State aid for modernization of agriculture,
(iv) Abolition of all indirect taxes and a progressive income tax,
(v) Nationalization of public utilities,
(vi) Development of modern industries under state aid,
(vii) Legalization of labour organizations,
(viii) Eight-hour day : fixation of minimum wages by legislation,
(ix) Workers' councils in big industries,
(x) Profit sharing to be introduced in all big industries,
(xi) Free and compulsory education,
(xii) Separation of state and religion,
(xiii) A national militia to replace the standing army.[13]

This programme was not welcome in the Indian press as it was tinctured with communist ideology.

A year after Roy paid his glowing tributes in his book, *One Year of Non-co-operation*, to Mahatma Gandhi. He compared Gandhi with St. Thomas Aquinas, Savonarola and Francis of Assissi. He acknowledged four constructive contributions of Gandhiji : (1) Use of mass action for political purposes, (2) Consolidation of the Indian National Congress, (3) the

[13] Taken from *Modern Indian Political Thought* by V. P. Verma (Chap. on M. N. Roy, pp. 623 to 662.)

liberation of the national forces from governmental repression by the 'slogan of non-violence' and (4) the adoption of the technics of non-cooperation, non-payment of taxes and civil disobedience.[14]

However, he had no liking for certain principles of Gandhism. He felt that Gandhism lacked an economic programme to win mass support. At the same time, it also lacked a revolutionary mass movement. Gandhism, in Roy's view, did not have any programme for organizing the proletarian class with a view to doing away with the landlords and capitalists. On the contrary, it (Gandhism) worked for the unity of all sections of Indians. Roy called the economics of charkha quite reactionary. He said that "Gandhism was not revolutionism but 'weak and watery' reformism." Non-violence, the basic philosophy of Gandhism, he regarded as a mark for hiding the true nature of grim social exploitation. He regarded Gandhian *ahimsa* as a subtle intellectual device for concealing the capitalist exploitation of the country. He criticized the bankruptcy of Congress leadership and stated that under Gandhi's leadership the Congress was being turned into a spinner's association.[15] And he was not ready to accept the ethical or spiritual basis of Gandhian constructive programme.

Roy organized Radical Democratic Party in December, 1940 and advocated a new orientation towards 'scientific politics'. He advocated what he called 'Twentieth Century Jacobinism'. During the World War II he supported the Allies, particularly after the fall of France. He did not regard the World War II as a war between nations. He considered it an international Civil War, the enemy in which was not a state but a rampant ideology. It was a war against fascism. A decisive victory against fascism could be won only by defeating fascism on the home fronts of the belligerents. In order that India could really defend herself in this war, an agrarian revolution was essential. Also, India should participate in the war from the side of the Allies. During the World War II Roy characterized the Indian National Congress as the representative of nascent

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14 M. N. Roy, *One Year of Non-co-operation,* pp. 50-56.
15 M. N. Roy, "Morality and Politics," *The Alternative,* pp. 16-17.

Indian fascism.[16] He interpreted the Congress opposition to India's participation in the war as fascistic. Also, the 1942 revolution, in Roy's opinion, was fascistic because it indirectly hindered the cause of Red Moscow by weakening the Allied front. Gandhi's appeal to faith reminded Roy of fascist irrationalism and voluntarism. He characterized Mahatma Gandhi ultimately as the embodiment of Indian backwardness and obscurantism and condemned his action as "the mischief of whipping up forces which undermined the Indian home front".[17] He also advocated an 'isolation' of the Indian leaders in jail. His open support of British repressive ruthlessness and his vehement criticism of Indian leaders, particularly of Mahatma Gandhi, made him almost alienated from Indian public opinion.

In the last few years of his life M. N. Roy became an exponent of 'New Humanism'. He, like Turgot and Condorcet, felt that the advance of science was a factor for the liberation of man's creative energies. The characteristic feature of modern civilization is the progressive triumph of science over superstition, reason over faith. The struggle had been going on ever since the dawn of history. Even during the dark Middle Ages, when scientific knowledge acquired by the ancient Greeks was nearly forgotten, rationalism asserted itself in the form of the scholastic Christian theology which conceived the grand idea of a law-governed universe, and thus prepared the ground for a revival of science. "The most profound and penetrating of the causes that have transformed society is a mediaeval inheritance."[18]

The revolt of man known as the Renaissance heralded the modern civilization. It took place over a period of two hundred years from the middle of the fourteenth to that of the sixteenth century. As a matter of fact, it was a much longer process. The revival of science began a century earlier, with Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus. They, on their part, had been inspired by the Arabian scholars who had kept the fire of scientific research burning while Europe was merged in the darkness of ignorance during the four hundred years between

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16 M. N. Roy, *War and Revolution*, pp. 100-01.
17 M. N. Roy, *Freedom or Fascism* (Dec. 1942) p. 105.
18 Lord Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*.

the conquest of Rome by Genseric and the restoration of the Western Empire by Charlemagne.

The significance of the Renaissance, writes Roy in *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, "undoubtedly was profoundly revolutionary ; but it was a revolution in the realm of ideas and values, which destroyed the moral sanction of the feudal order, and consequently prepared the ground for the social and political upheavals of the following centuries."[19] The Renaissance declared the dignity and sovereignty of the individual on the authority of the Sophists, Epicureans, Stoics and also of early Christianity. It did not herald the rise of any particular class ; it was the revolt of man, patronized and promoted by all the free spirits of the time belonging to the feudal aristocracy, the Church or the rising class of traders. Classicism was conservative. As against it, the romanticism of the humanists proclaimed the freedom of will, and faith in the creativeness of man. It liberated reason from the yoke of teleology. It maintained that the law-governed universe did not preclude revolutions to be brought about by man's will to freedom and urge to create. It declared the spiritual liberation of man, and ushered in the era of modern civilization, which immensely expanded the scope of human activity. Growing knowledge of nature increased the power of man to prosecute the struggle for freedom more effectively than ever before.

Roy was inspired in the humanist phase of his intellectual work by the philosophical Radicals like Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and Bentham and their critical approach to the contemporary social and economic situation. He considered the rejection by Marx of their individualist liberating doctrine as a bourgeois abstraction, as unfortunate and as indicating an inadequate grasp of the historical evolution of ethical concepts. He pleaded for a New Humanism based upon natural reason and secular conscience. Thus a rationalist humanist ethics based upon the acceptance of materialist cosmology is the sole panacea of man.

Roy's humanism (known as New Humanism) differed from the French and German schools of humanism of the nineteenth

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19 M. N. Roy, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, Vol. I, p. 65.

century. New Humanism claims to re-assert the sovereignty of man by emphasizing that history is the record of human activities and society has no business to impose itself as a leviation on man. It is not based on poetic or romantic grounds of sentimental effusions. It is based on a mechanistic cosmology and materialistic metaphysics.

New Humanism is cosmopolitan in its outlook. It replaces the spirit of nationalism by the spirit of world brotherhood. Like Tagore, Gandhi and Aurobindo, Roy also believed that a confraternity of morally and spiritually liberated individuals is the fundamental requirement for the realization of a better and healthier society. New Humanism is pledged to the ideal of a commonwealth and fraternity of free men. Roy was a firm believer in a world federation. He writes in his *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*: "New Humanism is cosmopolitan. A cosmopolitan commonwealth of spiritually free men will not be limited by the boundaries of national states—capitalist, fascist, socialist, communist, or of any other kind—which will gradually disappear under the impact of the twentieth century Renaissance of Man."[20] Roy, differentiating between cosmopolitanism and internationalism, pleaded for a spiritual community. He believed that a true world government could only be built upon the neutralization of nation-states. This may be regarded as a philosophy of cosmopolitan humanism.

Roy accepted that "the vital prerequisite for a social and political reconstruction was an intellectual renaissance of man and the imbibing of the fundamental essence of the philosophy of New Integral Humanism." The potentiality of freedom, according to him, is latent in man. The realization of freedom depends upon the awareness by man of his creative powers.

Also, the decentralization of political and economic power is necessary for the individual freedom. Centralization, Roy was of the opinion, amounts to the negation of free initiative and autonomous choice. Political parties with their country-wide organizations and vast financial resources become agents of centralization. He pleaded for the minimization of the role of political parties. He was completely opposed to the concep-

[20] M. N. Roy, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, Vol. II, p. 310.

tion of political power as the sole instrument of effectuating social change. He felt that intensive activities in villages and workshops would be more useful instruments of social transformation than the acquisition of political power through party organization and consolidation.

The essence of a true democracy, Roy firmly believed, is to make every individual within its boundaries free to exercise his own judgment and participate actively in the affairs of the state. The individual is exposed to innumerable types of tyranny in the modern state whatever its form may be. And the urgent need is to make him free to exercise his own initiative. The totalitarian claims of organization, regimentation and coordination must not be allowed to subvert the freedom of the individual. John Dewey was right when he remarked, while defining his experimental approach in his *Democracy and Education*, that "the people receive training in the process of democracy by a process of trial and error and experimentations." Roy, accepting John Dewey's approach, felt that the people were powerless between elections and the rule of law did not afford any protection in critical times.[21] Hence he formulated an idea of 'organized democracy' where there would not be the imposition of the commands of the Leviathan seated on the top but where local people's committees would handle power. He pleaded for doing away with the system of democratic centralism. He wished a social system "where social technology and the pooled powers of human reason and engineering would be applied to the reconciliation of individual freedom and social good and progress."[22]

Roy, like Jaya Prakash Narayan, also had formulated the concept of 'organized democracy' and partyless democracy and state. The entire state structure is to be built upon the basis of organized local democracies. They will be the political schools of the nation and will train the people in the art of intelligent handling of their social and moral responsibilities. The organization of local political schools is, according to Roy, highly indispensable with a view to awakening the political

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21 M. N. Roy, *New Humanism*, pp. 10-11.
22 Quoted from Dr. S. P. Varma's *Indian Political Thought*, p. 654.

consciousness of the individual citizens and minimizing the tyranny of the government rule. A constant control over the governors will be exercised through direct democratic checks like recall and referendum.

Rousseau's theory of direct democracy was, in a sense, accepted by Roy because the latter's ideal was to foster the direct participation of the entire adult population through the people's committee. The realization of this scheme, in fact, depends on the efforts of the morally and intellectually advanced sections of the population. They will be "united in a political party and their sole task is to promote the rational and moral well-being of the people. This party of spiritually free men and women would not seek to capture power. They are aware of the radical antithesis between individual autonomy and concentration of power. The principal aim of this spiritual party, if such a word can be used, will be to help the organization of people's committees which will be the principal foci of democratic power."[23]

Further, Roy was not only against monopoly capitalism with its proliferating combines, trusts and cartels but he was also opposed to liberal capitalism with its doctrine of *laissez faire* and state capitalism with emphasis on state enterprise. All these systems are dangerous to real democracy. Hence, the only system left, in Roy's opinion, is some form of economy based on "widespread decentralization and a spirit and practice of cooperation".[24] It is a system of 'cooperative economy', which Mahatma Gandhi worked upon more thoroughly and consistently.

M. N. Roy rejected formal parliamentary democracy and competitive economy on the one hand, and political dictatorship and economic regimentation on the other. In their place, he offered a concrete programme of the construction of a cosmopolitan cooperative commonwealth, which attaches supreme importance to the freedom and initiative of the individual. Although he failed to work on a consistent system of thought either in the field of political philosophy or in that of economic

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23 Quoted from Dr. S. P. Varma's *Indian Political Thought*, p. 655.

24 M. N. Roy, *National Government or People's Government*, p. 104.

thought, he laboured to synthesize different elements of thought. He endeavoured to combine in his politico-philosophical thesis the elements of rationalistic renaissance, 'physical realistic' cosmology, humanistic ethics and individualistic federalism. And he deserves surely a place not only among the recent Indian writers on political thought, but also among the great European political thinkers of the twentieth century. He was perhaps one of the most learned and prolific writers on the political and philosophical subjects in the modern age.

Acharya Vinoba Bhave (1895-)

Acharya Vinoba, as he is known to millions, was a trusted and faithful disciple of the late Mahatma Gandhi. He even looks somewhat like Gandhi, except for a grey beard and frowsy dark hair. He has the same emaciated body, wears the same sort of bifocal glasses, speaks in the same calm, soft voice, with kindly humour. One of the most learned figures in India, he knows well Sanskrit, Persian, Urdu, Hindi, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, Telugu, Kanarese, Malayalam and English, and this array of languages serves him well on his travels through polyglot India. It is not for his learning, however, that India's millions have given their hearts to Vinoba Bhave. They have done that because he has brought them a new hope.

Vinoba Bhave was born on September 11, 1895 to a Brāhmaṇa family in Gangoda, a village in Western India. His given name was Vinayak, but Gandhi changed it to Vinoba in later years, and the disciple accepted it as his name. At ten the boy began his career of holy name : he made a resolution of lifelong celibacy, gave up sweets and started going barefoot. Gandhi, who in young manhood was a lawyer and a comfortably married man, admired Vinoba's untarnished virginity. The Mahatma frequently said that his only regret in life was that he had known the delights of sex.

At 20, Bhave was shipped off to study at Bombay, but he went instead to Bengal. Apparently (he is reticent about his early life) he joined the nationalist movement in Bengal, eating at public kitchens. He studied Sanskrit at Benaras, and became deeply immersed in Hindu theology. He first saw Gandhi in 1916. Being too shy to approach the Mahatma, Bhave wrote a letter instead, and Gandhi invited him to join the *aśram* at Sabarmati. When Gandhi learned that his new follower had not written to his family for several years, he sat down

himself and wrote to Bhave's father : "Your Vinoba is with me. His spiritual attainments are such as I myself attained only after a long struggle."

Bhave was restless at Sabarmati, however, and went away to study more Sanskrit, telling Gandhi that if he did not find peace of soul he would then be back in a year. Over the ensuing months, the others in the *aśram* forgot his promise, but one morning at prayers, the Mahatma said that this was the day Vinoba had promised to return. Vinoba was back before nightfall.

In 1932 Bhave suffered his first arrest for taking part in Gandhi's civil disobedience movement. Thereafter he spent several more terms in British jail, serving a total of about two years. After India won her nationhood, through the bloody communal riots between Hindus and Muslims and through Gandhi's death, Bhave remained in obscurity, except for occasional newspaper articles carrying his strictures against money. To Bhave, money "tells lies and is like a loafing tramp." For a medium of exchange he favoured scrip, showing the number of hours a person had worked to earn it. In his post-prayer speech once Vinoba remarked at Rajghat, Delhi that village economy should be based on "labour, after money was eliminated. Some people imagined he wanted to go back to the old barter system. That was not his plan at all. He was not against currency. Actually, he preferred paper currency to coinage. But the currency he wanted was of labour. It should not be printed at Nasik at the behest of some ruler. It should be a currency adopted by the villagers themselves for their own use. In this currency there should be no question of any credit."[1]

Vinoba is engaged at present in a great experiment at his *aśram* at Paramdham, Paunar, for reducing the use of money as far as possible. According to him, money as the sole medium of exchange has done greater mischief and havoc in the world than anything else. He was engrossed, along with his few companions, in the task of adding to the production of the land with the simplest of implements, not depending even

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[1] *Harijan*, 29-12-51.

on bullocks for tilling the land. He wants to see what the extreme form of manual labour can achieve in agriculture in the present circumstances, where pumps, machines and tractors are considered to be the most up-to-date and scientific implements of agriculture.

The thesis which he propounded at Shivarampalli whenever he found an opportunity to do it was the sacredness of labour and the new orientation of the whole constructive programme through it. The purity derived from simple manual labour and revaluation of all our values in the present civilized world through this value is, according to Acharya Vinoba, the panacea for all our ills and difficulties. If we eliminate money currency and take to labour with a new faith, fervour and piety, the condition of the world would be revolutionized. The need of the hour is production and greater production with this new ideal. Vinoba repeatedly pointed out that if we utilized to the fullest extent our hands with the barest and simplest of instruments at our command, our needs would be more than satisfied. Non-exploitation, decentralized society, simplicity, beauty of life and economic equality will be necessarily achieved if we learn to look at manual labour from this new point of view.

If we look at Gandhiji's programme for productive labour, we will understand that it was not merely for producing khaddar that Gandhiji laid the greatest stress upon spinning. Of course, spinning would produce khaddar ; but the stress was on the revolution involved in the insistence on productive work. He placed before the nation a type of physical work which, besides producing wealth, was such as could be done by the aged and the young alike. Productive labour is not a thing from which anyone, who can at all work, should claim an exception. All those who take a share in the consumption of goods, must also take a share in their production. A judge or a teacher may not say that he is rendering some other service to society. For, he does not live on books and records alone but also on food, and needs cloth like all other beings. He must therefore share directly in their production.

But unfortunately the Congress could not understand Gandhiji and attached more importance to the payment of

four annas than to yarn. It made the usual confusion between wealth and money. It was not realized that payment in the shape of hand-spun yarn was payment through production of new wealth, which the payment in the shape of money was not. Money, we have plenty of, at present ; but wealth, which indicates prosperity, has diminished. If we give prestige to money, the prestige of labour is necessarily reduced. Under Gandhi's scheme, a person giving a *lakh* of rupees to the Congress would have been considered its donor but not a member entitled to vote. The contributor of hand-spun *yarn* would have become the voter. It was a revolutionary idea, which the Congress failed to understand.

Vinoba has accepted this *sarvodaya* ideal of his *guru*, Gandhi-ji, and practises it fully in life. He points out that in a civilized society the first necessity of man is not so much food as cloth. You can go about anywhere in the world without feeling ashamed even if you have remained hungry for some days. But modern civilized society does not allow you to move about naked even in all the parts of your house, and hence even though it may not be possible for every man to grow his own food, he should produce at least his own cloth ; and fortunately this is much simpler and more within one's own power than the production of food. Besides, on the moral plane, khadi is particularly the emblem of a peaceful and non-violent order. It is suggestive of industriousness, bread labour, non-exploitation and self-expression.

Even more than Pandit Nehru, Vinoba wears the mantle of Gandhi, for he was above all the other disciples whom Gandhi loved. They first met shortly after Gandhi's return from South Africa, when Vinoba was a young student with contradictory desires to be a hermit and a revolutionary. The Mahatma resolved that dilemma, and Vinoba became a disciple in the non-violent independence movement. Within a few months Gandhi was so impressed with him that he gave the young man, twenty-five years his junior, the title of 'Acharya', or 'Teacher', which he proudly bears today.

During the political troubles between the wars Vinoba spent a few months in jail, but it was only in 1940 that Gandhi singled him out for eminence as the individual who opened the

campaign of passive resistance to the British war effort in India. He spent most of the next five years in jail, learning new languages and studying the Koran so that as a Hindu he could get on to terms with Muslim Indians.

After Gandhi's assassination in 1948, the ascetic, celibate Vinoba was his obvious successor ; but though others tried to push him to the fore, it was not till 1951 and the launching of the *Bhoodān* movement that he found his own platform for a national movement. Gandhiji's crusade for political independence had succeeded ; Vinoba undertook the harder, subsequent task of freeing the Indian peasant from economic bondage. His methods remain fundamentally those of Gandhi, based on non-violence, meeting greed with sacrifice, the arrogance of power with humility, and above all meeting hatred, contempt and opposition with love. For the vast changes he wishes to make Vinoba has coined the phrase 'the revolution of love'.

The gifts of land are at the core of Vinoba's movement, as the land problem is the core of India's difficulties, but they are only expressions of a deeper philosophy. "We do not aim at doing mere acts of kindness, but at creating a kingdom of kindness," Vinoba has stated. This 'Kingdom of Kindness' is no more a sloppy anti-intellectual sentimentality than the Kingdom of God in the Gospels. Vinoba's sharp intellect has considered the progressive, competitive, mechanised social revolution, for which Pandit Nehru is striving, and has rejected it as Gandhi rejected it before him.

He is not absolutely opposed to machinery as such, so long as it is harnessed to "the service of man" ; but he is convinced that mass production and a money economy which piles up wealth and goods is a social evil. What he wishes to see in India is some 5,00,000 villages growing their own food, spinning and weaving their own cloth, building their own roads and houses, making their own furniture and implements, and buying from the factories only a tiny minimum of essential manufactured goods.

To achieve this ideal, it is first of all necessary to create a more equitable distribution of land—hence the "looting with love" of the larger landowners, and the presentation of their gifts to the landless peasants. But, beyond this, Vinoba's revo-

lution aims specifically at the abolition of property-owning, and already some progress has been made towards his apostolic ideal of "holding all things in common". In the past eleven years the inhabitants in nearly 30,000 villages have given all their land to Vinoba, not as individual plots, but for the good of the village community as a whole.

Vinoba started *Bhoodān* (land-gift) movement in 1951 in Telangana in Hyderabad, which reached the climax of *Grāmdān* (village-gift) by voluntary relinquishment of private ownership of land. In the 10,000 square miles of Telangana, 80,00,000 peasants had long suffered the worst land tyranny in India. They were virtual serfs, without hope of getting land of their own. Communist guerrillas moved in to correct this—in their own way. They killed or put to flight scores of landowners, distributed the land, seized whole villages and set up their own schools. In battles between guerrillas and state constables backed by government troops, 3,000 people were killed and 35,000 reds jailed. Both landowners and farmers were caught in the murderous crossfire. Bhave, first, with an idea of preaching *ahiṃsā* wandered into areas from which the police had warned him to stay away. But soon he realized that this was not enough. "I confess," he said, "that the incendiary and murderous activities did not unnerve me, because I know that the birth of a new culture has always been accompanied in the past by blood baths. What is needed is not to get panicky, but to keep our heads cool and find a peaceful means of resolving the conflict. The police are not expected to think out and institute reforms. To clear a jungle of tigers, their employment would be useful. But here we have to deal with human beings, however mistaken and misguided. When a new idea is born, new expression cannot combat it." And he thought of asking landowners to give land to the landless, saying that if they did not, the communists or the government might take it away. Thus *Bhoomidān-yajña* was born, in bloody Telangana. Even the Nizam of Hyderabad, one of the richest and most miserly men in the world, gave some land, though neither the Nizam nor Bhave would say how much (the merit earned by giving is lost by boasting of it). Some 35,000 acres were collected and

re-assigned to the most destitute. Gradually the revolt and the terror died down.

Even Prime Minister Nehru, a modern, half-westernized man, feels delighted on this achievement. In fact, in this age of wary scepticism, we find the new hope that in days of facing great social problems we shall stand about like men in a burning house, each unwilling to burn himself putting out the fire that is about to consume all. In India, one man assumed the responsibility for 'putting out the fire'. To solve the problems facing Indian children unclothed, unfed, villagers digging little pits in dry river beds to find clean water, walking a mile to bring water from slimy green pools, men without land and without work, Vinoba Bhave has taken drastic steps which leave no doubt about his sincerity.

He has left his home for ever to walk until land is distributed to the poor. He will take land, wealth, or labour donations from the poor as well as the rich. If he does not receive the first time, he or his workers will go again and again. Every individual has a right to those things that are necessary to his survival. Eating is as necessary as breathing and drinking ; water, air and sunlight are free, why not land ? And how can the rich refuse, when the poor give ?

He accepts any workers, of any background or beliefs. He asks them to consider themselves first as human beings. Members of all India's parties have come to him, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists. Many have told him that these people are working in this movement to gain prestige. His reply was "Let them come. There is no harm in prestige from good work. Need I go and ask them ?" Thus Vinoba has not only managed to get dissenting parties to cooperate towards the same goal, but he has also settled innumerable disputes.

In the cold light of western economics, Vinoba's crusade is full of pitfalls and anxious question marks. Like Gandhi, who never lived to practise as an administrator what he had preached as an agitator, he wants to save the Indian village from western materialism. He would transfer virtually all powers to the village assembly, so that necessary reforms would come about not by legislation from Delhi, but from inside the village itself. In this way, reforms would happen only when local conditions,

based on the full understanding and consent of all the villagers, became ripe. A village assembly, for example, should have the right to prohibit imports of industrially produced food and mill cloth from the cities, where this would upset the pattern of village life or cause unemployment.

Politically, Vinoba's critics ask whether simple peasants will not confuse this noble message with communist invitation to grab land by violence. But no one dares assail—openly at least—the frail little man who probably represents today the biggest bloc of votes throughout the length and breadth of the country. Since Vinoba's triumph in Telangana, the communists are bitterly aware that he is their deadliest rival for the possession of the souls of those million of under-privileged Indians whom Marxist theory had always promised them as easy recruits. In one village terrorized by communists, he challenged them directly : "Do you really believe in your ideology ? If so, why not come in the daytime instead of by night ? If you want to loot the people, loot as I do, with sincerity and affection."

The secret of Vinobaji's success is his great spirit of universal love and renunciation. To the communist he also speaks words of affection. He says, "If you would give up class hatred and truly work for the good of all, I would be the first to join you." And despite official communist denunciation of his work, in some areas leading party members have contributed land. His approach is the same to all men, whatever their creed and conditions. An effort to reach the divine spark which he believes them to possess and then to make real to them the needs of their fellows in a language they can understand—this ideal he has put quite literally into practice. Vinobaji has taught himself no less than 16 languages. At 46 he learned both Persian and Arabic so as to be able to converse more freely with his Muslim neighbours.

It should also be remembered that Indians honour one thing above all—renunciation. Renunciation of worldly possession—that ideal finds its echo in every Hindu heart. Even industrial tycoons are still apt suddenly to throw up everything and retire to die in a mud hut by the Ganga. Vinobaji has reversed this

process. At the age of 57, when most people think of retirement, Vinobaji has emerged from it.

In was Gandhiji who first demonstrated the powerful effect on his countrymen of renouncing wealth for the sake of human service rather than personal salvation. Vinobaji has trodden the same pathway into India's heart. He has no possessions beyond a spinning wheel and a few home-spun clothes. Hundreds of people have offered him their cars so that he could move more quickly from village to village. They believed he would get more work done. But Vinobaji courteously refused such offers. The peasants cannot afford cars and he knows better than to break the magic bond of sympathy that binds him to the peasants. Again Vinobaji suffers from ill-health. He has a chronic duodenal ulcer and is subject to dysentery. And this has made him old and frail before his time. A few years back, when stricken with severe malaria, he refused to be treated with quinine since the peasants could not afford it. Is it any wonder that seeing this elderly saint slowly but surely ruining his health in their service, these same peasants should hold him in veneration ?

Vinobaji has acquired his strength through renunciation, much as India's ancient sages were supposed to acquire magical powers through their austerities. His magic is singleness of purpose and an iron will. There are many stories about his will-power. At the age of ten he is said to have sworn a vow of chastity from which he has never swerved. At the age of twenty when he joined Gandhiji's rural centre he took his certificates and diplomas—and being a brilliant scholar and mathematician he had many—and burned them one by one in the flame of an oil lamp, in spite of his mother's horrified protests. A few years later, at this same beloved mother's death he refused to attend her funeral, since the pyre would be lit by a Brāhmaṇa ; and Vinobaji, although himself born an orthodox Brāhmaṇa, had come to disapprove of the caste system. When he joined Gandhiji, the Mahatmaji told him to simplify life. Vinobaji took his words to heart. He vowed to wear no more than one garment at a time and to forgo salt, the last remaining condiment which he allowed himself.

But with all his asceticism, Vinobaji has resisted pride of

poverty—that subtlest temptation of the saints. He has never urged anyone else to follow his way of life. And he goes his own way with a striking serenity. To someone who asked him if his work would succeed, he replied, "Fire merely burns. It does not care whether anyone puts a pot on it, fills it with water and puts rice in it to make a meal. To burn is the limit of its duty."

Vinobaji's approach is democratic, and, as such, he does not try to impose solutions from above. He approaches the villagers in familiar ways ; he talks to them in their own language so that they understand him. He does not try to put into effect a pre-arranged solution to "uplift the masses". He seeks to prepare them so that they themselves can arrange their own lives to their best benefits. The seeds for a full and meaningful life are there in India's half-million villages. Vinobaji is preparing the ground so that these seeds might grow and bear fruit.

He strongly feels that laws, without a change in people's hearts, are not very effective. He cites the fact that though there is a law forbidding discrimination against Harijans, still it continues. Vinobaji's approach is first to cause a revolution in people's hearts, and then concern himself about legislation. Similarly we cannot create full meaningful lives by plans and programmes, without first preparing the groundwork through direct sympathetic contact with the villagers—and this is Vinobaji's way.

The cornerstone of Vinobaji's whole programme is flexibility. Just as he inspires the village folk, they inspire him. This mutual process is what is so outstanding about his approach. The evolution of *Bhoodān* into *Grāmdān*, and all the other '*dāns*' has been a natural one. Although Vinobaji firmly believes in village co-operation, he does not prescribe the particular structure of this co-operation, but leaves this to the villages. Here is his great strength.

It will be wrong to think that Vinobaji is against industrialization. He himself has stated this many times. Once the groundwork is laid enabling villagers to decide for themselves how they hope to realize full lives, then they can choose how much and what forms of industrialization they find most suit-

able to their needs as they see them. Hence Vinobaji is not against anything. He is for helping people realize themselves in ways that they think are best.

In tune with the above principle of helping the people to work for themselves, Vinobaji expounds the idea of *Rām Rājya*, the decentralized society of self-sufficient and self-ruling villages. He writes that majority rule as a democracy is simply counting heads, not necessarily implying greater reason or sagacity is on the bigger side. The entire emphasis is on rights, not duties, he writes, and the idea is to bring pressure on society, not render service to it. Therefore, he advises the villagers to rely more on themselves and less on the government. He directly encourages democracy on the village level.

Vinobaji talks of *swarāj* in its Vedic connotation : "The government of each by each, such that it will seem to each his own rule, or it is government of all : the Kingdom of God, *Rām Rājya*." This society of 'God-rule' may also be called 'No-rule'. The state would wither away, leaving government to the village, which "will think and decide things with one mind." He explains that the government that is established in Delhi cannot be expected to come and deliver happiness to all the villages in India. He, therefore, impresses upon the people to have a committee of their own in every village to look after its affairs. This committee should study the requirements of the village and try to meet them as far as possible in the village itself. He warns the villagers that they should not allow the outside evils of party politics and the exploitation of the poor by the rich to enter into their villages. This will eliminate the evils of their villages one by one and will maintain a peaceful and healthy atmosphere there. Unless the people in villages realize the necessity of self-government and start relying in their own *śakti* (power), it is not possible, according to Vinobaji, to materialize the dream of *Rām Rājya* or of *sarvodaya*. The only legitimate government authority, he feels, is *janaśakti*, the non-violent power of the people.

Vinobaji mostly draws inspiration from the *Bhagvad Gītā*. For him, as for Gandhiji, it is the supreme book of human guidance. This great Sanskrit poem, inbedded in a larger work called the *Mahābhārata*, is later than the *Vedas* and the

Upanishads, and fills a role in the Hindu holy books something like that of the New Testament in the Bible. During one of his jail terms, Vinobaji lectured every Sunday on the *Gītā*. He translated it into Marathi verse, and this work sold about a quarter of a million copies.

The *Gītā* prescribes three paths for the Soul's union with God : *Karma-yoga*—the way of action ; *Jñana-yoga*—the way of knowledge ; and *Bhakti-yoga*—the way of love. The poem is set in the frame of bloody battle, a great battle on the plain of Kurukśetra. The hero, Arjuna, is downcast because he must fight against men who, he suspects, are his brothers, even though they are foes, and the god Krishṇa gives Arjuna advice. Krishṇa persuades Arjuna that it is permissible to fight, indeed, that he must fight, so long as the struggle serves no selfish ends. Although most Indian scholars believe that the poem refers to a real battle, Gandhi was so deeply committed to non-violence that he conceived himself that the battle of Kurukśetra was an allegory, that it portrayed the conflict of good and evil in the human heart.

Vinobaji practises *Karma-yoga*, the way to God through action in the world. "You must perform every action sacramentally, and be free from all attachment to results." It is not to be undertaken without first mastering the other *yogas*, learning control of the body, the breathing and the mind ; learning concentration through love and devotion by prayer ; gaining knowledge by meditation.

Vinobaji has read and admired the scriptures of other religions, and he knows that the way of love was discovered long ago in many places outside the mountain-walled subcontinent of India. Yet in this racked century, the way of love seems, as *Bhoomidān-yajña* shows, always new.

Vinobaji as a person is unassailable : a selfless man, dedicated to service to God's children. And India is fortunate to have produced such a man and it is wise to listen to him.

Jaya Prakash Narayan (1902-1979)

Jaya Prakash Narayan, born in a middle-class family of Bihar, received his education both in India and U.S.A. While still a young boy, he became an ardent nationalist and leaned towards the revolutionary cult of which Bengal was the noble leader at that time. But before his revolutionary leanings could mature, Gandhiji's first non-co-operation movement swept over the land as a strangely uplifting hurricane. He had an unusual experience of soaring up with the winds of a great idea.

It was then that freedom became one of the beacon-lights of his life, and it has remained so ever since. His passion for freedom, with the passing of years, transcended the mere love for the freedom of his country and embraced the idea of freedom of man everywhere and from every sort of trammel—above all, it meant freedom of the human personality, freedom of the mind and freedom of the spirit. This freedom Jaya Prakash Narayan has never thought to sacrifice either for the sake of bread or for power, security, prosperity, glory of the state or for anything else.

Quite strangely, it was in the land of resilient and successful capitalism, in the United States of America, where he was a student from 1922 to 1929, that he came in contact with East European intellectuals and turned to Marxism. It was, he writes, at "Madison, Wisconsin, the home of La Follette progressivism then, that in the company of Jewish and European-born fellow students I drank deep at the fountain of Marxism." At the same time, he was influenced deeply by the "pungent" writings of M. N. Roy, which almost completed his conversion to Marxism.

While under the spell of Marxism, J. P. Narayan was much impressed by the Marxian philosophy of revolution. It seemed to him a surer and quicker road to the freedom of a country and the emancipation of its masses than Gandhiji's technique of

civil disobedience and non-co-operation. The thrilling triumph of the great Lenin in Russia, accounts of which he consumed with unsatiated hunger, seemed to establish beyond doubt the supremacy of the Marxian way to revolution. Also, Marxism stood, he felt, for equality and brotherhood—the qualities without which freedom is not enough. He interprets the word freedom and shows his leaning towards Marxism in the following lines : ".....It must mean freedom for all—even the lowliest —and this freedom must include freedom from exploitation, from hunger, from poverty. I cannot say what were the early experiences that had laid the foundations in the subconscious mind of sympathy with poverty and suffering. But the latent sympathy certainly was there, and it was awakened and brought to the surface of conscious living by Marxism."[1] At this time he was not very certain about Gandhiji's stand on the vital question of equality which captivated him as much as the ideal of freedom.

Although a Marxist, Jaya Prakash Narayan never became a protagonist of Russian communism. He had a deep moral revulsion against the atrocities of Russian Bolshevic party. In the thirties he had favoured the united popular front with the communists, which he, in 1940, denounced strongly, and since then he has been one of the foremost critics of the authoritarian regimentation of Russian communism.[2]

Mr. Narayan's differences with the Indian communists and their brand of Marxism arose soon after his return to India from U. S. A. In December, 1929 when Gandhiji failed to persuade Lord Irwin to agree to his demand of full 'dominion status' for India, in terms of the Calcutta Congress Resolution, the stage was then set for a gigantic leap towards national freedom. As a part of his prolonged programme, Mahatma Gandhi launched his celebrated Salt Satyagraha. The whole nation was awakened and the masses offered satyagraha on a large scale. But, strangely enough, the communists were nowhere in evidence. They, rather, denounced the national

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1 J. P. Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya* (1959).
2 J. P. Narayan's letter to the communists, published in the Indian press on Nov. 18, 1956.

movement as bourgeois and Mahatma Gandhi as a lackey of the Indian bourgeoisie. The communists in India were following the policy laid down by the Third Communist International which by then had come completely under the leadership of Stalin. He felt that the Communist Party of India was not a free agent but a tool of Moscow; that the primary loyalty of the party was first to Russia and only then to anybody else; that when the communist parties talked of united front, it was always a ruse and at best a temporary policy dictated by the exisgencies of the situation; that their unswerving goal was always "monolithic communist rule"; and that the communists could never think of sharing power with any one, except as a makeshift with convenient stages. These were the observations that made Narayan indifferent to communists. Also the patently mistaken policy that the Comintern had been following since 1928 and which had resulted in the division of the labour and socialist movements throughout the world and in the isolation of the communists from the national movements in all the colonial countries, appeared to Narayan contrary to Marxist theory generally and specifically to the famous colonial policy enunciated by Lenin. All this made him differ with the CPI. He also did not like the dictatorial regime in Soviet Russia and became ideologically alienated from her.

Naturally Narayan kept away from the CPI and joined the ranks of the soldiers of freedom under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. But as Marxism had left its own deposits in his mind, he could not commit whole-heartedly to Congress policy and programme, in spite of the famous Karachi declaration. The Karachi Resolution appeared to him quite vague and inadequate. He realized that the Congress, even under the leadership of Gandhi, could not provide Indian people with a real socialist programme and conduct the fight for independence in a more revolutionary manner. With the result, Narayan (who had socialist leanings since he came under the influence of Marxism) formed the Congress Socialist Party with the help of other disillusioned congressmen of socialist persuasion. The Congress Socialist Party, he says, "played a notable part in giving shape to the socio-economic content of Congress policy and a keener edge to the struggle for freedom."

For nearly twenty-four years, from 1930 to 1954, Narayan worked as a socialist. He had been the foremost leader, propagandist and spokesman of Indian socialism. Mahatma Gandhi had accepted him to be the greatest Indian authority on socialism. He not only took the initiative in the formation of the Indian Socialist Party in 1934, but also showed a remarkable genius in popularizing the party and its programme.

In 1934 Jaya Prakash Narayan realized that socialism could be the real basis of India's freedom. In a resolution submitted to the Ramgarh Congress of 1940, he advocated collective ownership and control of all large-scale and heavy production. He moved that the state should nationalize heavy transport, shipping, mining and the heavy industries. As such, his earlier socialism shows an impact of the ideas of American and British socialists.

Narayan considered socialism a complete theory of socio-economic reconstruction. It is much more than a theory of personal ethics.[3] Repudiating the idea of biological inequality of man, Narayan as a socialist pointed out that rampant inequality in the social and economic spheres was a function of the disproportionate control of the means of production. He, therefore, urged that society had to provide that kind of arrangement where the economic impediments that hindered the power and faculties of men were to be removed. As such, he stood for social and economic equality in life as against a psychological standardization. According to him socialism is a theory and technic of widespread planning. Its aim is "harmonious and well-balanced growth of the whole of society."[4]

After re-examining the basic postulates of Marxism and their practical application by communists, he came to ask a serious question : Was Marxism-Leninism a safe guide to the social revolution and to socialism ? It became quite clear to his mind on basis of his personal experiences that in a society where it was possible for the people by democratic means to bring about social change it would be counter-revolutionary to resort to violence. He also realized that socialism could not

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[3] J. P. Narayan, *Towards Struggle* (1946), p. 65.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

exist, nor be created, in the absence of the democratic freedoms. As a logical corollary, he rejected the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which in effect meant "the dictatorship of a bureaucratic oligarchy." He writes in his book, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, recapitulating his old impressions about Russia, the home of communism :

"The Russian revolution had started as a people's revolution that had the active support of the broad masses of Czarist Russia, but Lenin converted it into a minority revolution when he forcibly dissolved the Constituent Assembly in which he was in a small minority and seized power with the help of rebel soldiers and the urban working class. The subsequent miscarriage of the revolution and distortion of socialism to my mind was the direct result of a forcible seizure of power by a minority."[5]

Narayan thus reached the conclusion that even where the people were denied democratic freedoms, a violent revolution should have been carried with the help of popular support and the revolutionary government ought to have the backing of the majority of the people. As such, no revolution, revolutionary or peaceful, social or political, was possible, according to him, without popular support. And the path to socialism could not pass through dictatorship of any kind.

The Soviet experience made it further clear to him that socialism was not merely "the negation of capitalism". He felt that even if capitalism was destroyed and industry, trade, banking, agriculture—all were nationalized and collectivized, it was not necessary to have socialism in the perfect sense. In Soviet Russia, Narayan writes in the same book, "we see not only denial of 'formal' freedom, but also denial of social justice, of equality ; we saw the growth of a new class of bureaucratic rulers, of new forms of exploitation. All this was not only the absence of socialism but also its negation." What to speak of J. P. Narayan, even Karl Marx, had he been alive to see Stalin's power to dictatorship, would have revolted against the type of socialism that Stalin, following Lenin's direction, could establish in his regime. As Professor Paul A. Baran, a staunch Marxist

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5 J. P. Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, p. 18.

teaching at Stanford University (U.S.A.) writes : "It is merely the cult of personality in reverse to ascribe all the crimes and errors committed in the Soviet Union before the Second World War and in all of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after it to the evil personalities of Stalin, Beria, and their associates. Matters are not so simple ; and the general feeling is wholly understandable that it is indeed the 'entire system' that must be held responsible for what was perpetrated by the leadership. Yet it is a grievous fallacy to conclude from this that socialism is the entire 'system' that needs to be repudiated. For it is not socialism that can be fairly charged with the misdeeds of Stalin and his puppets, *but it is a type of political system that evolved partly due to the backwardness of the masses and partly due to internal power politics and the suspicious nature of the communist leaders.*

The evil ends that had resulted from the evil means in Russia, particularly the foul means that were used to perpetrate the staggering crimes during the purges, made Jaya Prakash revolt against the "revolutionary ethics" of Marxism and forced him to question if good ends could ever be achieved by bad means. At the same time, he realized that European socialism, both Marxian and non-Marxian, was the picture of an industrialized society. Socialism, according to European thinkers, could be established only on the ruins of capitalism, after its being matured. While in Asia industrial capitalist development was in its infancy and Asian countries were overwhelmingly rural and agrarian communities. Hence, Jaya Prakash felt that it was difficult to learn anything or take any guidance from their experiences. "The communists have no doubt been successful—in the sense of capturing power—precisely in backward and rural communities, such as Russia and China. But the 'socialism' that they have built up is a far cry from the brotherhood of the equal and the free which to me is the essence of true socialism."[7]

Thus Jaya Prakash concluded in favour of democratic methods and realized the need for decentralization. He also

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6 Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957). (*Italics mine*).
7 J. P. Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, p. 24.

realized that means must be morally consistent with the ends. He interpreted socialism in the context of Indian needs and the dominant values in Indian culture. He stood for reduction of land revenue, the limitation of expenditure and the nationalization of industries. The fundamental social and economic problem in India was to eliminate the exploitation of the masses and this could be achieved if the people through their efforts came to control their political and economic destiny. He felt the need for village reorganization and urged like Gandhi that villages should be made self-governing and self-sufficient units. This necessitated a drastic reform of land laws. He submitted a resolution to the Ramgarh Congress in 1940 in which he emphasized upon the idea of transferring land to the actual cultivator. Supporting co-operative farming in India he wrote : "The only solution is to clear away all the vested interests that lead in any manner whatever to the exploitation of the tiller of the soil ; liquidate all agrarian debts ; pool the holdings and establish co-operative and collective farming, state and co-operative credit and marketing system and co-operative subsidiary industries."[8] Co-operative efforts alone, according to him, could provide the balance between agriculture and industry. The primary economic problem in Asia, particularly in India (also in China), is agrarian reconstruction. Hence, the state has to set up its own industries and also embark upon other avenues of economic rehabilitation. Jaya Prakash considered the present individualistic organization of agriculture wasteful. The acceleration of production in the agrarian sector was dependent upon "co-operative and collective farming".[9]

As a socialist, he believed in the urgency of economic problems of the country, and he, therefore, stressed the need for solving the economic problems first. There is no apparent inevitable connection between economic causation and cultural reality. But it is also true that without the satisfaction of basic economic needs cultural creativism is a sheer impossibility. Hence Jaya Prakash pleaded for the eager maintenance of the conditions that are indispensable for the realization of equality

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[8] J. P. Narayan, *Towards Struggle,* pp. 90, 236.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 92.

of opportunities. Thus "economic minimum is a prime precondition for the resplendence of the fruits of culture."[10]

Even as a socialist, Jaya Prakash Narayan was not opposed to the dominant values of Indian culture. Indian culture has exalted the ideal of the emancipation of the individual from the thraldom of the lower ego and acquisitiveness. It has never sanctioned a false immersion in the petty satisfactions of the narrow self. Sharing has been one of the most dominant ideals of Indian culture and hence it is ridiculous to condemn socialism as an importation from the West. The organized economic doctrines of socialism have been formulated in the West but its fundamental idealism is a part of Indian culture also.

In fact, socialism for him was always a way of life. It represented a set of values to which he owed allegiance voluntarily and which he tried to put into practice in his lifetime. These values he did not see developing anywhere as a result of merely institutional changes, whether economic or political. And some years after it became quite clear to him that socialism, as we ordinarily understand it, cannot take mankind to the sublime goals of freedom, equality, brotherhood and peace. Socialism, no doubt, gives promise to bring mankind closer to these values than any other competing social philosophy. But he was persuaded to believe at Bodh Gaya Sarvodaya Sammelan (in 1953) that unless socialism is transformed into *sarvodaya*, the beacon-lights of freedom, equality and brotherhood would remain beyond its reach.

Jaya Prakash completely broke with Marxism and turned to *sarvodaya* philosophy. He attempted to reinterpret the basic question of individual behaviour that he is to exhibit in the realm of politics from an ethical viewpoint. The study of matter is an objective exploration, whereas that of consciousness is subjective realization. The study of matter, the objective exploration, science in short, is necessarily amoral. The Marxists (and the materialists generally), having reduced consciousness to a behaviour of matter, naturally knocked the bottom out of ethics. They talk a good deal no doubt of revolutionary ethics, but that is nothing more than the crassest application of

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10 J. P. Narayan, *Towards Struggle*, p. 39.

the theory that the end justifies the means. Once an individual persuades himself, sincerely or otherwise, that he is on the side of the revolution (or the Party of the People) he is free to commit any infamy whatsoever.

Not only the Marxists and materialists but also those who differ from them in philosophy attempt to understand consciousness by the methods of science. Mental science also, therefore, provides no sure basis for moral behaviour. Nor is it ever possible for science to understand consciousness, which can only be subjectively experienced. Subjective experience is by its very nature incapable of being expressed in material categories. Therefore all the mystics and *yogīs* who had experience of subjective reality, or absolute consciousness, have been unable to express it in any language.

Modern science has reached a point where the dualism of matter and consciousness becomes too tenuous to be real. And it cannot resolve this dualism completely, because in objective study the seer and the seen must remain different, no matter how "inextricably commingled". It is only in the ultimate spiritual experience that this dualism can be removed and the seer and seen become one.

The root of morality lies in the endeavour of man to realize this unity of existence, or to put it differently, to realize his Self. For one who has experienced this unity, the practice of morality becomes as natural and effortless as the drawing of breath. Jaya Prakash, as a *sarvodaya* leader, insists, in all humility, upon an integrated view of life.

This leads him at once to an aspect of the task of social and economic reconstruction that both socialists and communists have so far neglected. Socialists and communists both lay great emphasis on material prosperity and on an ever-rising standard of living. Although in a country like India it is the main task of social reconstruction to raise quite considerably the people's standard of living, it would not do here or elsewhere, Jaya Prakash thinks, to apotheosize material happiness and encourage an outlook on life that feeds an insatiable hunger for material goods. According to him, there can be no peace in the minds and hearts of men, nor peace amongst men, if this hunger gnaws at them

continuously. He writes : "In such a restless society violence and war would be endemic. All values of life would be subordinated to this over-mastering desire for more. Religion, art, philosophy, science would have to serve that one aim of life : to have more and still more. Equality, freedom, brotherhood would all be in danger of being submerged in a universal flood of materialism." Hence disciplining of the bodily appetites is essential for a moral life and growth of the human personality and the blossoming of all human qualities and values. This is true particularly of socialist values. The socialist way of life, as Jaya Prakash Narayan believes, is a way of sharing together the good things that common endeavour may make available. He writes : "I believe that unless members of society learn to keep their wants under control, willing sharing of things may be difficult, if not impossible, and society would be bound to split into two divisions : (1) comprising of those who are trying to discipline others and (2) comprising of all the rest. Such a division of society always leaves the question open : who would discipline the discipliners, rule the rulers ?" "The only solution seems to be to restrict as much as possible the need and area of disciplining from above by ensuring that every member of society practises self-discipline and the values of socialism, and among other things, willingly shares and co-operates with his fellowmen."[11]

This brings us near to the problem of party and power politics and non-party and non-power politics which we commonly call *rājnīti* and what Vinoba has simply called *loknīti*. Having come to believe under the deep influences of Mahatma Gandhi and Vinoba that politics cannot deliver the goods, the goods being the great human ideals of equality, freedom, brotherhood and peace, the party system, he feels, is emasculating the people. It does not function so as to develop their strength and initiative, nor to help them establish their self-rule and to manage their affairs themselves. All that the parties are concerned with is to capture power for themselves so as to rule over the people, no doubt, with their consent. The party system, he feels, is seeking "to reduce the people to the position

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[11] J. P. Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, pp. 31-32.

of sheep whose only function of sovereignty would be to choose periodically the shepherds who would look after their welfare !"

As a way out of the faults and failures of the party system, Jaya Prakash Narayan stands for people's self-rule. For its realization, the frame of reference will have to be changed from parliamentary democracy to something different. The process must be started from the bottom. A programme of self-rule and self-management must be placed before the people and by a constructive, non-partisan approach they must be helped to translate it into practice. It is quite clear that it was in order to undertake such a programme on a nationwide scale that Gandhiji was thinking of converting the Congress into a non-partisan *Lok Sevak Sangh*. It is exactly this task that Vinobaji has undertaken. Like Gandhi and Vinoba, Jaya Prakash also strongly believes that human freedom can be fully and wholly realized only in a stateless society, although he is not sure whether the state would ever wither away completely. He views with deep apprehension the march of the state to greater and greater glory. He regards democratic socialists, communists as well as welfarists as statists. According to him, all of them hope to bring about their own variety of the millennium by first mastering and then adding to the powers and functions of the state. The independent trade unions are in better position and *they* do not solve the problem. These unions are supposed to be a great bulwark of freedom, but it is to be acknowledged with fairness that the great trade unions are themselves becoming more and more ridden with bureaucracy. What we find, Jaya Prakash feels, is that the state, in all its varieties, remains a Leviathan that will sit heavily on the freedoms of the people.

Being fed up with the state's restraining authority, Jaya Prakash Narayan turns to *sarvodaya* fully with a view to finding out a sure way-out of the present state of affairs and establishing a real socialism. He expresses his views on this point: "The remedy is to create and develop forms of socialist living through the voluntary endeavour of the people rather than seek to establish socialism by the use of the power of the state. In other words, the remedy is to establish *people's*

socialism rather than *state socialism*." And *sarvodaya*, he thinks, is people's socialism. He believes that the more of people's -r voluntary socialism and the less of state-enforced socialism, the fuller and more real the socialism. It should be clear here that in order to develop non-state forms of socialism, it is quite unnecessary, according to him, for any one to function as a party or to engage in a struggle for the capture of power. Both power and party have no relevance in this context. What is needed rather is a band of selfless workers who are prepared to live and move in the midst of the masses and help them to reorganize their lives on a self-reliant and self-controlling basis. One cannot help being reminded here of Mahatma Gandhi's *Lok Sevak Sangh*.

Jaya Prakash, at the same time, seems anxious to change the present form of society, which, according to him, is a complex and top-heavy society. The present society is only a heaven for bureaucrats, managers, technocrats and statists. It, in his views, cannot be a home for brothers to live together as brothers. Socialists also, in the name of science, production, efficiency, standard of living and other hallowed shibboleths, have accepted this "whole Frankenstein of a society—lock, stock and barrel—and hope, by adding public ownership to it, to make it socialist." Jaya Prakash considers such a society quite unsuitable for establishing real socialism. He says : "Self-government, self-management, mutual co-operation and sharing, equality, freedom, brotherhood—all could be practised and developed far better if man lived in small communities." Because man is a product both of nature and culture it is necessary for his balanced growth that a harmonious blend between the two is effected. This blending of nature and culture is possible only, in Jaya Prakash's view, in comparatively smaller communities. Gandhiji also had insisted that the Indian village and village self-government (*grām-rāj*) were the foundations for his picture of society—the society of equal and free beings living as brothers in peace.

And for establishing such a type of society Jaya Prakash relies on a non-violent social revolution, which Gandhiji had long back advocated and which Vinobaji at present is trying to bring about through his programmes of *Bhoodān*, *Grām-*

dān and *Sampattidān*. Other revolutions, Jaya Prakash believes, failed because those who brought them about used means that were inconsistent with their ends. But in the *sarvodaya* method of revolution (which is the only non-violent method of revolution) the ends and means become one. This is a new technique of which the world has had no experience yet. It is therefore common for new ideas to be treated with suspicion and reserve. But for us "in India who have had the privilege of witnessing the miracle of national freedom being won with radically new ideas and methods, which too had been met first with doubt and division, it should not be difficult to appreciate the new ideas and methods of Vinoba that are after all in the nature of an extension and development of the earlier ones used by the Father of the Nation. We in India have also the additional privilege as one of the youngest nations of today, of being in a position to benefit from the success and failures of others."[12]

Thus Jaya Prakash Narayan, drawing inspiration from the programmes of Gandhiji and Vinobaji, stands for a stateless and partyless society—a society the members of which will be self-reliant and self-regulated. He dislikes force and authority. His method is a method of persuasion. In the international field, he accepts the concept of a world community. He is against the devastations of organized militarism and totalitarian ravages. In short, he is a great humanitarian, and his socialism is not only a philosophy of social and economic reconstruction of Indian society, but it is also a philosophy of moral and spiritual rebirth of Indian life.

12 J. P. Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, p. 51.

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Mao Tse-Tung (1893-)

Mao Tse-Tung is the most important figure in the history of communist China. Although he cannot be regarded as the founder of the Communist Party of China, he has given it life and philosophy.

Mao started his life in 1919 as a petty clerk in the library of the National Peking University, and came under the influence of Chen Tu-hsin and Li Ta-chao, who were then the Dean of Arts Faculty and the Librarian respectively in the same University. It may be recalled here, to understand the circumstances under which Mao's mind and philosophy were finally shaped, that in 1919 the Versailles Peace Conference completely disregarded China's rights and interests, even though China was an ally of the victorious powers. China's disillusionment came suddenly and unexpectedly, so that when Russia, then a young communist republic only two years old, made its declaration to China, voluntarily abolishing all unequal treaties contracted by the Tsarist government and offering to retrocede all territorial concessions, the Chinese intellectuals flocked into the open arms of the Soviets. On July 25, 1919, the Soviet government addressed its first declaration "to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China" renouncing all the conquests and special privileges acquired by the Tsarist government in China. The Soviet government urged the Chinese people to enter into official relations with them :

"If the people of China want to become free like the Russian people and be spared the lot prepared for them by the Allies at Versailles, which would make of China a second Korea or a second India, let it understand that its only ally and brother in its struggle for national freedom are the Russian workers and peasants and their Red Army."[1]

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1 J. B. Condliffe, *Problems of the Pacific.*

Such a policy of the new Soviet government attracted the Chinese scholars, particularly the late Tsai Yuan-pei, the head of the National Peking University. He was a great educationist and philosopher of his time, and he, being impressed by Chen Tu-hsin, Li Ta-chao and Mao Tse-Tung, employed them in the University. As such, the National Peking University served as a base for spreading the communist ideology and propaganda in China.

In 1920 Chen Tu-hsin and Li Ta-chao founded a society for the study of Marxism in Peking. Contemporaneously, another society of the same nature came into existence in Shanghai, known as the 'Young Socialist League'. Both societies attracted large numbers of intellectuals and young people, and were the forerunners of Chinese Communist Party.

Chen Tu-hsin had established contact with Moscow as early as 1919 and sent representatives to the Soviet capital to solicit Chinese membership in the Third International, known as the Comintern.[2] Mr. Marling, a representative of the Comintern, arrived at Shanghai in 1920 and arranged to organize a Chinese Communist Party. Chen then called a conference of all sympathisers the following May, and the Communist Party of China was inaugurated.[3] Chen Tu-hsin was elected as Chairman of the party ; and Mao Tse-Tung, Chang Kuo-tao,[4] Lin Po-chu, and others were members.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it had taken control of the mainland, and a new regime was proclaimed. Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Communist Party, was elected Chairman of the 'Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China'. Six vice-chairmen, namely Mme. Sun Yat-sen, nee' Soong Chin-ling,

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2 Yakhonto H, *Chinese Soviet.*

3 Chou Hsiang-Kuang, *Modern History of China.*

4 "Chang is one of the oldest members of the Chinese Communist Party. He was the leader of the Nan-Chang insurrection of 1927, which marked the beginning of the communist armed struggle all over the front and ended with the foundation of the first Soviet Republic in Kiang-Si. He was the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Government in Shensi. For his feat at Nan-Chang he was awarded the Order of Lenin on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Due to his different policy with Mao Tse-Tung, Chang left the mainland and joined the newly formed 'China's Fighting League for Free Democracy'. (Quoted from Chou Hsiang-Kuang's *Political Thought of China.*)

General Chu Teh, C-in-C of the communist armies, Mr. Kao Kang, Chairman of the Regional Government of North-East China, Mr. Liu Hsiao-chi, member of Central Working Committee of the Communist Party, Chang Lan, Chairman of the China Democratic League, and General Li Chi-Shen, Chairman of the KMT Revolutionary Committee.

Mao Tse-Tung, after assuming the charge of his office as a Chairman, proclaimed the inauguration of the new regime. He announced : "This government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government which is willing to observe the principle of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respects of territorial integrity and sovereignty." A message was sent to all diplomatic representatives in China inviting recognition of the new regime.

In mainland China today the Communist Party exercises absolute control over the state, the economy, and the people. Party statements about every conceivable subject always include a declaration that nothing would be possible without the "wise and correct leadership of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, and the Central People's Government, and by firm reliance on the labouring masses." The fundamental objective of the Party is to propagate Marxism abroad and, wherever an opportunity presents itself, bring about the establishment of communist regimes in other countries. During the early years of the regime, communist policy in Asia was one of "revolutionary armed struggle". Peking gave support to the communist guerrillas in Malaya (most of whom were Chinese), assisted the communist forces in Vietnam, took part in the occupation of North Korea and the attempt to seize South Korea, and gave help to communist dissidents in Burma, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

The policy shifted in 1953 and 1954. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, declared his support for the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Once North Vietnam and North Korea had been brought under communist rule, there were no other Asian countries in which the local communist party was strong enough to seize control and keep it. Secondly, Peking presumably realized that a communist takeover in one country would

cause its neighbours to have doubts about the desirability of a neutralist policy. Finally, since 1954 Peking has considered the diplomatic support of neutralist Asian countries of more immediate importance than revolutionary activity. This does not mean, however, that Peking has severed connections with foreign communist parties. A constant stream of Asian communist leaders visits Peking as well as Moscow in order to lay plans for disrupting governments and economies abroad. Presumably they also prepare for a future shift back to a declared policy of 'armed struggle'.

In accomplishing the fundamental objectives of the Communist Party, the leaders, under the guidance of Mao Tse-Tung, have selected certain aspects of the traditional Chinese system and used them for their own ends. These included, on the whole, the worst features of China's imperial political structure : political centralization, rule by an elite, dogmatism, exploitation of the peasantry, and expansionism. The intellectuals, political figures, and ordinary people who took part in the Chinese revolutionary movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries wanted, for the most part, to establish some form of democracy in China. Consequently, most of them were opposed to precisely those aspects of the imperial system which the communists have found it expedient to exploit.

The ideas and doctrines of Mao Tse-Tung are being translated into practical policies and programmes of the Chinese Communist Party. The 'Thought of Mao Tse-Tung' is not only a source of doctrine but a guide to action of the Communist Party of China. It 'uses' the 'Thought of Mao Tse-Tung' for the achievement of the ends of communism in the country. Liu Hsiao-chi, Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government of Communist China, thus expounds its uses :

"Using the Thought of Mao Tse-Tung—the thought which unites the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution—as the guide in all its work, our Party has formulated a revolutionary programme and revolutionary policies fully representing the interests of the Chinese nation and people.

"It has not only waged an irreconcilable struggle against all the enemies of the Chinese nation and people and against all

the reactionary political groups that betray the interests of the Chinese nation and people, but it has also routed opportunism of every description within the Party itself.

"It is precisely under the guidance of the great Thought of Mao Tse-Tung that our Party has gathered together the most loyal, most courageous, most conscious and best disciplined representatives of the Chinese working class and labouring people, and has become the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class, fighting most resolutely and courageously against the enemies of the Chinese nation and people, and knowing how to strike at the enemies and how to avoid their blows."[5]

This potent 'Thought of Mao Tse-Tung', now in action in the communist China, is set forth compactly in a pamphlet, called *New Democracy*, originally published in 1940. Its ideas are supplemented by some of Mao Tse-Tung's recent writings, of which the most important are *On Coalition Government* (1945), *The Present Position and the Task Ahead* (1947), and *The People's Democratic Dictatorship* (1949).

The main object of these books is to show that communism is the ultimate aim of China, although it will take some years. China has to remain under the type of state called 'New Democracy' for a number of years, before it can be sovietized. 'New Democracy', according to Mao Tse-Tung, means two things : first, democracy for the people, and, second, dictatorship for the reactionaries. These two things, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship. Under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party in 'New Democracy', various classes unite to create their own state and elect their own government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the henchmen of imperialism—the landlord class and bureaucratic capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, which represents these classes, and their accomplices. The people's government will suppress such persons. It will only permit them to behave themselves properly. It will not allow them to speak or act wildly. Should they do so, they will be instantly curbed and punished. The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the

5 Quoted from Chou Hsiang-Kuang's *Political Thought of China.*

people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly and association.

The 'New Democracy' is based on a compromise : it does not go in for the immediate application of Lenin-Stalinist principles. It means welding the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie into a united front under the leadership of the working class, and from this proceeding to the creation of a state of the people's democratic dictatorship, a state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. Mao Tse-Tung writes : "Our present task is to strengthen the people's state apparatus—meaning principally the people's army, the people's police and the people's courts—thereby safeguarding national defence and protecting the people's interests. Given these conditions, China, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, can develop steadily from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a New Democratic into a Socialist and, eventually, Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony."[6]

Mao's definition of 'New Democracy' is based on the Leninist idea of practical democracy. At the end of his vista is a Communist China—not a China free to seek and find her independent national self-expression—a society not growing in the organic way of growth, but forcibly shaped in a mould. He describes three stages by which the Marxist aim is to be accomplished in China.

1. Placing the country under the political leadership of the Communist Party and working through the party regime ;

2. Carrying through a Socialistic Revolution by means of policies operated by the state ;

3. Producing the Soviet pattern in Chinese life and society through the practice of socialism.

While Sun Yat-Sen's aim was to train the people in the ways of democracy and self-government, Mao Tse-Tung's aim is to restrict democracy and freedom and place the people of China under the Communist Party's leadership.

Communist Party's supremacy remains fundamental in

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6 Mao Tse-Tung, *People's Democratic Dictatorship.*

communist democracy, which Mao, later on, calls 'the People's Democracy'. This Party is supposed to be the vanguard of the working class in its Marxian struggle towards dictatorship. It is to guide and lead the people. The communist concept of it is not Abraham Lincoln's "government by the people, of the people, and for the people". They think of the people in terms of classes and perceive in all existing forms of society an inherent class-conflict. This conflict divides society into two vertical sections. Some classes are regarded as being of the people and other enemies of the people. The communist state recognizes only the former—the rest being separated from them under distinctive labels as 'bourgeoisie', 'capitalist', 'reactionary', etc.

A 'People's Democracy' is democracy with regard to those classes of society only which it recognizes healthy for its own life and progress. The classes, which it considers reactionary and unhealthy, are suppressed. Mao Tse-Tung writes :

"We definitely have no benevolent policies toward the reactionary or the counter-revolutionary activities of the reactionary classes. Our benevolent policy does not apply to such deeds or such persons who are outside the ranks of the people ; it applies only to the people.

"The people's state is for the protection of the people. Once they have a people's state, the people then have the possibility of applying democratic methods on a nationwide and comprehensive scale to educate and reform themselves, so that they may get rid of the influences of domestic and foreign reactionaries. Thus the people can reform their bad habits and thoughts derived from the old society, so that they will not take the wrong road pointed out to them by the reactionaries, but will continue to advance and develop toward a socialist and then communist society."[7]

And the methods, which the communist leaders use, are claimed to be democratic. They claim to use the methods of persuasion and not of compulsion. If the people break the law, they will be punished, imprisoned or even sentenced to death. But these will be individual cases, differing in principle from the dictatorship imposed against the reactionaries as a class.

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[7] Mao Tse-Tung, *People's Democratic Dictatorship.*

As for those belonging to reactionary classes or groups, after their political power has been overthrown, Mao Tse-Tung remarks, land and work will be given. They will also be permitted to make a living and to reform themselves through labour into new persons—but only on condition that they do not rebel, sabotage or create disturbances. If they do not want to work, the people's state will force them to do so. Furthermore, Mao writes, "the propaganda and educational work directed toward them will be carried out with the same care and thoroughness as the work already conducted among captured army officers. This may also be spoken of as a 'benevolent policy', but it will be compulsorily imposed upon those originally from enemy classes. This can in no way be compared to our work along self-educational lines among the ranks of the revolutionary people."

This job of reforming the reactionary classes, according to Mao Tse-Tung, can be handled only by a state having a people's democratic dictatorship. When the work has been completed, China's major exploiting classes—the landlord class and the bureaucratic capitalist class, i.e., the monopoly capitalist class —will have been finally eliminated.

In fact, the foundation of the people's democratic dictatorship is, according to Mao, the alliance of the working class, peasantry and urban petty-bourgeoisie. It is essentially the alliance of the workers and peasants because these two classes comprise eighty to ninety percent of China's population. In overthrowing imperialism and the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, these two classes are the major force. The transition from 'New Democracy' to socialism also depends primarily upon the alliance of these two classes. Mao Tse-Tung writes : "The democratic system must be built up from the ranks of the people, giving them freedom of speech, of assembly, and of convocation. The right to vote is given to the people only, not to the reactionaries. These two aspects—democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries—combine to form the democratic dictatorship of the people. Our present task is to strengthen the apparatus of the popular state. This applies principally to the army, the police, and the judiciary.....The army, the police, and the judiciary are the instruments by

which class oppresses class. Towards hostile classes the state apparatus is the instrument of oppression ; it is violent and not benevolent....."[8]

The people's democratic dictatorship, Mao strongly believes, must have the leadership of the working class. This is because the working class is the most far-sighted class, most impartially just and most filled with revolutionary thoroughness and consistency. The entire history of revolution proves that "without the leadership of the working class, a revolution will fail ; but with the leadership of the working class, a revolution will be victorious." Mao firmly believes that in an era of imperialism, no other class in any country can lead any genuine revolution to victory. Proof lies in the fact that China's petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie have led revolutions on many occasions, but "all ended in failure."

The communism in China is said to be fathered on Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and presented as a 'national programme'. Mao Tse-Tung says :

"Sun Yat-Sen had a different outlook from us, and started out from a different class standpoint in observing and dealing with problems, but in the twenties of the 20th century, on the problem of how to struggle against imperialism, he arrived at a conclusion which was fundamentally in agreement with ours."

Yet in Dr. Sun's San Min Chu I, the stages for the progress of the Revolution as described by him decidedly do not lead towards anything like proletarian dictatorship.

Mao Tse-Tung, like a staunch Marxist, believes that communism stands ultimately for a classless society without which democracy and socialism, in real sense, cannot be established. He states that in a classless society, in the joint efforts of each person, acting as a member of the society, together with the remaining members of the society, "definite productive relations were established and productive activity was carried out directed towards solving the problems of the material life of people." In various class societies definite productive relations are also established in various forms between the members of the various class societies, and "productive activity is carried out directed

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8 Mao Tse-Tung, *People's Democratic Dictatorship.*

towards solving the problems of the material life of people. This is the basic source of the development of human cognition."[9]

The social practice of people is not limited to productive activity alone, but has also many other forms : the class struggle, political life, activity in the spheres of science and art ; in brief, people take part in all spheres of social practical life. Hence, in the process of their cognition human beings get to understand, besides material life, various relations between people in the process of political and cultural life (closely connected with material life). An especially profound influence on the development of human cognition is exerted by various forms of the class struggle. In class society each person occupies a definite class position and every ideology has a class stamp. On the contrary, Marxist philosophy, as interpreted by Mao Tse-Tung, believes in a broad social and political culture which the people themselves evolve through trial and error and by using their practical commonsense. Mao condemns dogmatic philosophy, and stands firmly for a philosophy that adopts scientific methods of Marx and Engels with a view to understanding the various processes of evolutionary society. Hence, Mao and his party have launched on an enterprise to develop a democratical and scientific culture side to their New Democracy. Mao is of the opinion that New Democracy cannot be maintained without this new culture. He says :

"The popular scientific culture of the broad masses of the people is anti-feudal—it is the culture of New Democracy or of New San Min Chu I—it is the new national culture of the Chinese people.

"The economy of New Democracy wedded to the New Culture with which it shall work in unison will provide the groundwork for the establishment of the New Democratic Republic which not only shall exist in name but also in fact, as this shall be the New China that we are creating."[10]

Mao Tse-Tung calls it a 'national culture', but what follows from his description is that 'national' does not mean in this context that it should be the reflection of the nation's mind, but

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[9] Mao Tse-Tung : *Concerning Practice.*
[10] Quoted from *Political Thought of China* by Chou Hsiang-Kuang, p. 227.

a part of the world-culture of communism. "It is the culture," Mao says, "of and for the Chinese people which, although possessing characteristics and peculiarities of its own, yet seeks also to interlink and fuse itself with the national socialist culture and the New Democratic culture of other lands, so that they mutually become the component parts of the new world culture." It is, therefore, essential to bring about radical changes in China's old culture, which, Mao feels, cannot fit in the New Democracy and new socialist culture. "Without the overthrow of these reactionary cultures, new culture can never be established, nor extended, if the other is not stopped or crushed. The struggle between the two is a struggle of life and death."

Hence the communists, under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, have carried out a determined assault on the aspects of Chinese tradition and society which have been the foundation of Chinese civilization. The family has always been the basis of the social order in China ; society was bound together by ties of kinship. The Chinese family system, in fact, is a community of kindred. Each family has its own surname and its law of succession. In every family, there is a temple for ancestor-worship. Ancestor-worship cultivated a sense of unity in that all things are rooted in Heaven and that all men derive themselves from their forefathers. There is a spiritual community between the living and the dead. Confucius said : "In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently, when he sees that they are not inclined to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence but does not abandon his purposes ; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur." It may be said, in short, that the family system with ancestor-worship and several other rites strengthened the ties of each member of the same kin, and through this, united the people of the whole country. The necessity of each family having a successor had a great effect on the growing size of the population. The communists have denounced these customary relationships as 'feudal', and normal ties of affection have been termed 'reactionary'.

Communes are, in part, intended to weaken the family. Members are fed in mess halls, children are taken from their

parents and placed in communal nurseries, and husbands and wives are separated during the day for work in labour brigades. Older people, the focus of influence and respect under the traditional system, are sent off to homes for the aged where they are required to do as much work as their strength permits. Peasants have been ordered to tear down family shrines and allow the communes to plough up grave plots. It is an attitude contrary to the tradition of China ; it can conduce only to disruption, tension between the old generation and the new, unhappiness in family life on a countrywide scale.

Also, the Chinese communists have attempted to scrap all Chinese religious faith completely and confine the Chinese mind to the philosophy of 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism'. Socially, the communists regard religion as the 'opiate of the people'. Christianity especially has served as an instrument of supporting the capitalistic social order, while Confucianism has served for the ruling class for the last 2500 years in China. Mao Tse-Tung declares in his *New Democracy* : "Chinese communists may form an anti-imperialist united front politically with certain idealists and disciples of religions, but can never approve their idealism or religious teachings." The leaders of religious groups have been required to serve communist ends, and many have been imprisoned, executed, or forced to make public confessions of alleged crime. A steady effort is made to obliterate the local traditions and customs of China's various regions and minority nationalities ; along with the Chinese people, they are being absorbed into a vast, conformist mass culture. It is the party centre in Peking which dictates the form and content of life in 'New China'.

The communist elite has taken advantage of China's tradition of political centralization. Every dynasty has attempted to centralize all power in the capital and eliminate the countertendency toward provincial and regional autonomy or semi-autonomy. The communists have gone further in this respect than any earlier regime. Modern techniques of communications and totalitarian political methods have made it possible for the communists to regiment the Chinese people to an unprecedented degree.

The 'hundred flowers' experiment of 1957 is a practical

example of the over-riding importance accorded to the party as an entity in the field of expression of ideas. Mao Tse-Tung urged Chinese intellectuals to speak out, but they went beyond the limits he had set and criticized the basic assumptions of the communist regime. One purpose of Mao's offer to the intellectuals was to give the world the impression that freedom of speech was possible under communism in China. This propaganda advantage was sacrificed when the communist leaders saw that criticisms were being directed at the party itself. While the world watched with concern, dismay, and disappointment, Peking forced its critics to make self-abasing 'confessions', removed them from their posts, and sent many to labour in the countryside.

In fact, Mao Tse-Tung is not a democrat at all, although he poses to be so. He, as a chairman of the communist party, does not tolerate unnecessary discussions, cliques and factions within the party itself in spite of his philosophy of 'hundred flowers'. It is nothing but a smoke-screen which cannot hide his real intentions any more. He has an advantage of his unchallenged personal ascendency in China as compared with the prolonged discussions and struggle for power in the Soviet Union—a source of uncertainty and confusion in Soviet policy which has left the authority of the Kremlin in the communist world seriously impaired. Under the circumstances when the authority of the Kremlin is fighting for certainty, he (Mao), as a prophet of power, finds it suitable to attempt for assuming leadership of the communist camp. Outside the communist world he pursues a policy of expansionism and unfriendliness. Recent Chinese aggression against India has proved clearly Mao's intention of territorial aggrandisement and his philosophy of 'hundred flowers' is but a propaganda to confuse the world opinion.

Mao Tse-Tung is a figure comparable to Lenin in that he is the founder of the regime of which he is the head, the man who led his party to the conquest of power. He was not a successor to an authority already established ; he was the creator of that authority. He holds today the position that Lenin would presumably have held had he still been alive nine years after the final victory in 1920 over General Wrangle. But in the U.S.S.R.

there have been two demises of the supreme leadership, and each has been followed by a period of 'collective leadership' marked by instability, dissension, and a struggle for power resulting in the emergence of a new personal autocracy. Whatever the theory of 'democratic centralism' on paper, the communist party state requires in practice at its apex a single potentate who can be the final arbiter between cliques and factions within the party. Collective leadership simply does not work for more than a brief interval of time. On the other hand, the emergence of a new dictator evokes intense jealousy among those who were previously his equals in rank, and a widespread fear of the ways in which he may use his power, particularly if party members have suffered excessively under the rule of the last boss. The contest for the succession can thus become extremely bitter, with consequent dislocation and uncertainty in domestic and foreign policy. Such a critical period could in China follow the death of Mao Tse-Tung, but so far the Chinese communists have had the advantage of a decisive personal leadership.

PART II

European Thinkers

1. *Plato*
2. *Aristotle*
3. *St. Thomas Aquinas*
4. *Niccolo Machiavelli*
5. *Thomas Hobbes*
6. *John Locke*
7. *Jean Jacques Rousseau*
8. *Thomas Hill Green*
9. *John Stuart Mill*
10. *Karl Marx*
11. *Friedrich Nietzsche*
12. *Leo Tolstoi*
13. *Georges Sorel*
14. *Graham Wallas*
15. *Harold J. Laski*
16. *G. D. H. Cole*
17. *Bertrand Russell*
18. *Nikita S. Khrushchev*

Plato (428 or 427 B.C.—347 B.C.)

Plato's meeting with Socrates was a turning point in his life. Socrates, Plato's guide and master, was a person of grotesque, almost repulsive, appearance : short and stout, with a snub nose, large prominent eyes, thick lips, full of wit and irony, ready to take a joke against himself, a good mixer, no respecter of persons. Plato, his disciple, presented a complete contrast. He had been brought up in comfort, and perhaps in wealth ; he was a handsome and vigorous youth—called Plato, it is said, because of the breadth of his shoulders ; he had excelled as a soldier, and had twice won prizes at the Isthmian games. Philosophers are not apt to develop out of such an adolescence. But Plato's subtle soul had found a new joy in the 'dialectic' game of Socrates ; it was a delight to behold the master deflating dogmas and puncturing presumptions with the sharp point of his questions ; Plato entered into this sport as he had in a coarser kind of wrestling ; and under the guidance of the old 'gad-fly' (as Socrates called himself) he passed from mere debate to careful analysis and fruitful discussion. He became a very passionate lover of wisdom, and of his teacher. "I thank God," he used to say, "that I was born Greek and not barbarian, freeman and not slave, man and not woman ; but above all, that I was born in the age of Socrates."

Plato was twenty-eight when the master died ; and this tragic end of a quiet life left its mark on every phase of the pupil's thought. It filled him with such a scorn of democracy, such a hatred of the mob, as even his aristocratic lineage and breeding had hardly engendered in him ; it led him to a Catonic resolve that democracy must be destroyed, to be replaced by the rule of the wisest and the best. It became the absorbing problem of his life to find a method whereby the

wisest and the best might be discovered, and then enabled and persuaded to rule.

Meanwhile his efforts to save Socrates had marked him out for suspicion by the democratic leaders; his friends urged that Athens was unsafe for him, that it was an admirably propitious moment for him to see the world. And so, in that year 399 B.C., he set out. Where he went we cannot for certain say; there is a merry war of the authorities for every turn of his route. He seems to have gone first to Egypt; and was somewhat shocked to hear from the priestly class which ruled that land, that Greece was an infant state, without stabilizing traditions or profound culture, not yet therefore to be taken seriously by these sphinxly pundits of the Nile. But nothing so educates us as a shock; the memory of this learned caste, theoretically ruling a static agricultural people, remained alive in Plato's thought, and played its part in writing his Utopia. And then off he sailed to Sicily, and to Italy; there he joined for a time the school or sect which the great Pythagoras had founded: and once again his susceptible mind was marked with the memory of a small group of men set aside for scholarship and rule, living a plain life despite the possession of power. Twelve years he wandered, imbibing wisdom from every source, sitting at every shrine, tasting every creed. Some would have it that he went to Judea and was moulded for a while by the tradition of the almost socialistic prophets; and even that he found his way to the banks of the Ganges, and learned the mystic meditations of the Hindus.

He returned to Athens in 387 B.C., a man of forty now, ripened to maturity by the variety of many peoples and the wisdom of many lands. He had lost a little of the hot enthusiasms of youth, but he had gained a perspective of thought in which every extreme was seen as a half-truth, and the many aspects of every problem blended into a distributive justice to every facet of the truth. He had knowledge, and he had art; for once the philosopher and the poet lived in one soul; and he created for himself a medium of expression in which both beauty and truth might find room and play—the dialogue. Never before, we may believe, had philosophy assumed so brilliant a garb; and surely never since. Even in translation

this style shines and sparkles and leaps and bubbles over. "Plato," says one of his lovers, Shelley, "exhibits the rare union of close and subtle logic with the Pythian enthusiasm of poetry, melted by the splendour and harmony of his periods into one irresistible stream of musical impressions, which hurry the persuasions onward as in a breathless career."[1]

In pursuing his enquiries on the subject of virtue, Socrates had always before his mind the idea of a happier and better society which he hoped to persuade man to establish. Plato's interests were equally practical. He felt, with that half conscious conviction and self-assurance characteristic of the young, that he was cut out to be a great statesman, a master of men. Those companions with whom he mixed—the great men of the time—encouraged him to nourish such ambitions because they realized his unusual distinction of mind. His future thus seemed assured. But at the critical moment of his career, his beloved master was arrested on the charge of worshipping false gods and of corrupting the young. To Socrates himself, now a weary old man, the event must have come as no great surprise ; he had expected—almost courted—it. But the effect upon his small band of disciples was devastating. From Socrates, Plato had derived the emotional stimulus that he felt he would need to transform himself from a mere politician, a party manager, into statesman of lofty ideals. He was to be the first man of his time to demonstrate the workability of a political plan based upon justice instead of self-interest. He was to be the instrument whereby the glory of Athens, now in danger from formidable external enemies, was to be regenerated from within. The democratic regime under which he had grown up seemed to be based upon false—that is to say, materialistic—values ; and when in turn that regime was overthrown and a new government of thirty reforms substituted for it, Plato, being personally acquainted with many of the latter, had sincerely believed that the Athenian state would now at last recover its soul.

"I thought," he later explained in one of the most interesting of his letters, that it (the rule of the Thirty) would substitute

[1] Quoted by Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918), p. 5.

the reign of justice for the reign of injustice and so I gave it my closest attention to see what it would do. And I saw these gentlemen within a "very short time make the democracy they had destroyed seem like a golden age ! I was deeply disgusted and dissociated myself entirely from this deplorable government. Shortly afterwards the Thirty were turned out and their regime destroyed. Once again I was filled with a desire to take an active part in politics. It was not surprising that those revolutionary times resulted in personal reprisals of violent character ; but on the whole the restored democracy exercised considerable moderation. And yet, as ill-luck would have it, certain influential persons brought an action against Socrates. The charge was an outrageous one, of which Socrates was completely innocent. They accused him of irreligion, and on this account the jury condemned him to death."

Henceforth Plato was to entertain towards politics and the profession of statecraft feelings of unconcealed revulsion. "The more I considered it," he wrote, "and the older I grew, the more difficult appeared to me to be the task of decent government. Traditions of honesty and the actual observance of law alike were degenerating in Athens with surprising rapidity, and when I saw how chaotic the political situation was, I felt completely baffled.....Finally I came to the conclusion that every state without exception is badly governed, and that the state of legislation is everywhere so deplorable that no improvement is possible without drastic reconstruction combined with some very good luck. And so I was forced to extol true philosophy and to declare that through it alone can real justice both for the state and for the individual be discovered and enforced." And he concluded with the following profound observation : "Mankind will find no cessation from evil until either the real philosophers gain political control or else the politicians become by some miracle real philosophers."

He saw, as Socrates had taught him, that the most urgent and difficult of all reforms was that to be undertaken within man himself, a reform that should ultimately extend to all mankind, embracing both Greeks and barbarians, slaves and free men. That a truely just society could be established within measurable time he was too disillusioned to believe.

A long period of education must prepare the way for any such millennium. Nevertheless, if his ideals were pronounced too lofty to be realized, he was convinced that no goal less lofty was worth pursuing. Greek civilization could survive, he believed, only through the kind of spiritual renewal that would render impossible a repetition of the scandal of Socrates' persecution. Indeed, the test of a just society was simply whether it would foster and honour its great reformers and teachers, or whether, out of crass ignorance on the part of the masses or from fear of exposure and ridicule on the part of a few tyrants, it would seek to muzzle them.

Taking his clue from Socrates that the aim of philosophy is to prescribe the kind of life most likely to promote the happiness of man, Plato realized that such a subject of enquiry depends for its clarification upon the answer to the questions : What kind of a being is this creature, man, that he should need to be concerned with his own happiness ? What distinguishes him as a living entity from the rest of creation ? In seeking to answer these questions, Plato pursued his speculations to a point where Socrates, content to 'shelve' metaphysical matters, or at best to interpret them in an allegorical fashion, had called a halt. Never wholly forsaking his early political ambitions, Plato earnestly sought to combine his loftiest notions with plans for a social system or Republic wherein the human spirit, destined for immortality in another sphere, might develop its latent capacities.

In short, Plato's political theory was concerned not so much with a state that should promote the material well-being of its inhabitants as with a system capable of opening the way to the good life by providing the maximum incentive to it. Here his attitude differs from that of the most modern writers. Today's man's ideas of goodness and badness are generally supposed to be matters private to himself. The good life is something to be lived apart from, and often in spite of, the social system of the day. Religion, for instance, is a private affair, a matter for the individual conscience. To Plato this division of life into a public and a private sphere was not to be tolerated. Politics and morals were also the same. Bad politics lead to bad

behaviour. The good life was possible only in the good state,[2] which he always called as the ideal state.

Plato was dissatisfied with the Athenian democratic system and the Greek civilization, and he wrote a number of Dialogues, such as *Crito*, *Apology*, *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Phaedres*, *Symposium*, *Euthydemus*, and *Republic*. In his later years he wrote the *Theateus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Laws*, and the half-finished *Critias*. Of that the greatest is the *Republic*, which is also regarded as the greatest book in the history of Political Thought. It is this book in which he discusses his ideal state. In fact, it is this book in which we find his metaphysics, his theology, his ethics, his psychology, his pedagogy, his politics, his theory of art. Here we shall find problems reeking with modernity and contemporary savor : communism and socialism, feminism and birth-control and eugenics, Nietzschean problems of morality and aristocracy, Rousseauian problems of return to nature and liberterian education, Bergsonian *élan vital* and Freudian psycho-analysis—everything is here. It is a feast of the *élite*, served by an unstinting host. "Plato is philosophy, and philosophy Plato," says Emerson ; and awards to the *Republic* the words of Omar about the Koran : "Burn the libraries, for their value is in this book."[3]

The fundamental idea of the *Republic* came to Plato in the form of his master's doctrine that virtue is knowledge. His own unhappy political experience reinforced the idea and crystallized it in the founding of the Academy to inculcate the spirit of true knowledge as the foundation for a philosophic statecraft. But the proposition that virtue is knowledge implies that there is an objective good to be known, and that it can, in fact, be known by rational or logical investigation rather than by intuition, guesswork, or luck. The good is objectively real, whatever anybody thinks about it, and it ought to be realized not because men want it but because it is good. In other words, will comes into the matter only secondarily ; what men want depends upon how much they see of the good, but nothing is good merely because they want it. From this it follows that

2 For Plato, the State signifies the City State of his day.
3 Emerson, *Representative Men*, p. 41.

the man who knows—the philosopher or scholar or scientist—ought to have decisive power in government and that it is his knowledge alone which entitles him to this.

Plato started by dividing the citizens into three classes : the common people, the soldiers, and the guardians. The last, alone, are to have political power. There are to be much fewer of them than of the other two classes. In the first instance, it seems, they are to be selected by the legislator ; after that, they will usually succeed by heredity, but in exceptional cases a promising child may be promoted from one of the inferior classes, while among the children of guardians a child or young man who is quite unsatisfactory may be degraded. This dividing of tasks and securing the most perfect performance of each—the specialization of function which is the root of society—depends upon two factors, natural aptitude and training. The first is innate and the second is a matter of experience and education. As a practical enterprise the state depends on controlling and inter-relating these two factors ; in other words, upon getting the best human capacity and developing it to the highest degree by the best education. The whole analysis supports the initial conception : there is no hope for states unless power remains in the hands of those who know, first, what task an ideal state requires, and second, what heredity and education will supply the citizens fitted to perform them.

Thus Plato's theory of the state can be divided into two main parts : first, that government is an art depending on exact knowledge of which the philosopher-ruler is only capable, and, secondly, that knowledge can be taught. Logically the second part is a premise for the first. This we can very well understand by further analysing Plato's mind on the problem of good government.

Plato came to believe that every form of government tends to perish by excess of its basic principle. Aristocracy ruins itself by limiting too narrowly the circle within which power is confined. Oligarchy ruins itself by the incautious scramble for immediate wealth. In either case the end is revolution. When revolution comes it may seem to arise from little causes and petty whims ; but though it may spring from slight occasions it is the precipitate result of grave and accumulated

wrongs ; when a body is weakened by neglected ills, the merest exposure may bring serious disease.[4] "Then democracy comes : the poor overcome their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing the rest ; and give to the people an equal share of freedom and power."[5] Even democracy ruins itself by excess—of democracy. Its basic principle is the equal right of all to hold office and determine public policy. This is at first glance a delightful arrangement ; it becomes disastrous because the people are not properly equipped by education to select the best rulers and the wisest courses. "As to the people they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them;"[6] to get a doctrine accepted or rejected it is only necessary to have it praised or ridiculed in a popular play. Mob-rule is a rough sea for the ship of state to ride ; every wind of oratory stirs up the waters and deflects the course. The upshot of such a democracy is tyranny or autocracy ; the crowd so loves flattery, it is so "hungry for honey", that at last the wiliest and most unscrupulous flatterer, calling himself the "protector of the people" raises to supreme power.[7]

The more Plato thought of it, the more astounded he was at the folly of leaving to mob caprice and gullibility the selection of political officials—not to speak of leaving it to those shady and wealth-serving strategists who pull the oligarchic wires behind the democratic stage. Plato is found complaining that whereas in simpler matters—like shoe-making—we think only a specially-trained person will serve our purpose, in politics we presume that every one who knows how to get votes knows to administer a city or a state. When we are indisposed we call for a trained physician, whose degree is a guarantee of specific preparation and technical competence—we do not ask for the handsomest physician, or the most eloquent one ; well then, when the whole state is ill should we not look for the service and guidance of the wisest and the best ? To devise a method of barring incompetence and knavery from public

4 *Republic*, 556.
5 *Ibid.*, 557.
6 *Protagoras*, 317.
7 *Republic*, 565.

office, and of selecting and preparing the best to rule for the common good—that is the problem of political philosophy.

But behind this problem of political philosophy lies the problem of psychology. There is an urgent necessity to understand the nature of man and change his psychology before we start with the work of establishing an ideal state. Plato writes in the *Republic* that "governments vary as the characters of men vary ;...states are made out of the human natures which are in them."[8] The state is what it is because its citizens are what they are. Therefore, we need not expect to have better states until we have better men ; till then all changes will leave every essential thing unchanged. "How charming people are ! —always doctoring, increasing and complicating their disorders, fancying they will be cured by some nostrum which somebody advises them to try, never getting better, but always growing worse.....Are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at legislation, and imagining that by reforms they will make an end to the dishonesties and rascalities of mankind—not knowing that in reality they are cutting away at the heads of a hydra ?"[9] In fact, we cannot build Utopia with young people corrupted at every turn by the example of their elders. We must start, so far as we can, with a clean slate. It is quite possible that some enlightened ruler will empower us to make such a beginning with some part or colony of his realm. In any case, we must give to every child, and from the outset, full equality of educational opportunity ; there is no telling where the light of talent or genius will break out ; we must seek it impartially everywhere, in every rank and race. The first turn on our road is universal education.

One cannot fail to be astonished at the amount of space which Plato has devoted to education in the *Republic* and at the meticulous care with which he has discussed different studies in it. He frankly admitted that the state was first and foremost an educational institution. He called it "the one great thing". If the citizens are well-educated they will readily see through the difficulties that beset them and meet emergencies as they arise. So striking is the part played in Plato's ideal state by

8 *Republic*, 544.
9 *Ibid.*, 425.

education that some have considered this to be the chief topic of the *Republic*. Rousseau said that the book was hardly a political work at all, but was the greatest work on education ever written. Obviously this was no accident but a logical result of the point of view from which the work was written. If virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, and the educational system to which it is the one indispensable part of a good state. From Plato's point of view, with a good system of education almost every improvement is possible ; if education is neglected it matters little what else the state does.

Plato's plan is, therefore, for a state-controlled system of compulsory education. His educational scheme falls naturally into two parts : the elementary education, which includes the training of young persons up to about the age of twenty, and culminates in the beginning of military service ; and the higher education, intended for those selected persons of both sexes who are to be members of the two ruling classes and extending from the age of twenty to thirty-five.

The plan of elementary education given in the *Republic* was rather a reform of existing practice than the invention of a wholly new system. It combines the training usually given to the son of an Athenian gentleman with the state controlled training given to a youthful Spartan. The curriculum is divided into two sections, gymnastics for training the body and music for training the mind. For the first ten years of life, education shall be predominantly physical ; every school is to have a gymnasium and a playground ; play and sport are to be the entire curriculum ; and in this first decade such health will be stored up as will make all medicine unnecessary. But mere athletics and gymnastics, Plato thought, would make a man too one-sided. "How shall we find a gentle nature which has also great courage ?—for they seem to be inconsistent with each other."[10] "We do not want a nation of prize-fighters and weight-lifters. Perhaps music will solve our problem : through music the soul learns harmony and rhythm, and even a disposition to justice;" for "can he who is harmoniously constituted ever be unjust ? Is not this, Glaucon, why musical training is so

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10 *Republic*, 375.

powerful, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret places of the soul, bearing grace in their movements and making the soul graceful ?"[11] Music moulds character, and therefore shares in determining social and political issues. It is valuable not only because it brings refinement of feeling and character, but also because it preserves and restores health. There are some diseases, Plato writes, which can be treated only through the mind[12] : so the Corybantic priest treated hysterical women with wild pipe music, which excited them to dance and dance till they fell to the ground exhausted, and went to sleep ; when they awoke they were cured. The unconscious sources of human thought are touched and soothed by such methods ; and it is in these substrata of behaviour and feeling that genius sinks its roots.

It is easy to exaggerate the influence of Sparta, particularly, upon Plato's theory of elementary education. Its most genuinely Spartan feature was the dedication of education exclusively to civic training. But its content was typically Athenian, and its purpose was dominated by the end of moral and intellectual cultivation. In fact, Plato's plan of training represents an Athenian, not a Spartan, conception of what constitutes an educated man. "Any other conclusion would have been unthinkable for a philosopher who believed that the only salvation for states lay in the exercise of trained intelligence."[13]

Higher education, which is regarded as the most original and the most characteristic proposal in the *Republic*, was to be given to the members of both sexes after an elimination test and was meant for the members of the guardian classes. It extended from twenty to thirty-five. This period was divisible into two parts, i.e., twenty to thirty and thirty to thirty-five. In the first, young persons were to be helped to choose their true vocations in life and get trained in them. There was to be a systematic scientific course. Dialectical power must be developed. Military training must also be given. At the age of thirty, a second elimination test would follow. This test is far severer than the first. Those who fail will become the auxiliaries, or executive

[11] *Protagoras*, 326.
[12] *Charmides*, 157.
[13] Sebine, *A History of Political Theory*, p. 65.

aides and military officers of the state. Those who pass this test will be the perfect guardians and will get a further five years' course of training in Mathematics, Astronomy and Logic. Now it is just in these great eliminations that we shall need every resource of persuasion to get the eliminated to accept their fate with urbanity and peace. For what is to prevent that great unselected majority, in the first test, and that lesser, but more vigorous and capable second group of eliminees, "from shouldering arms and smashing this Utopia of ours into a mouldering reminiscence?" What is to prevent them from establishing there and then a world in which again mere number or mere force will rule, and the sickly comedy of a sham democracy will re-enact itself *La capo ad nauseam*? Then religion and faith will be our only salvation: we shall tell these young people that the divisions into which they have fallen are God-decreed and irrevocable—not all their tears shall wipe out one word of it.

Plato's entire system of education in the *Republic* is a prerequisite to the organization of an ideal state. But state controlled education is not the only thing which can guarantee the constant supply of the selfless and efficient administrators and which can secure the people against the abuse of power. The second precaution which Plato takes against the abuse of power and the tendency of men to lust after functions other than those for which they are naturally best suited is a social one. The guardians and the guards are to live a life very different from that of the producers, one in which they must forgo all that makes life for the ordinary man worth living. They are not to own any property, for from the union in the same hands of political and economic power have sprung so many of the troubles of the world. If there is not a complete divorce between ruling and owning, rulers will not rule for the good of all but will use their power to increase their wealth, and owners, who lack the qualifications necessary for the proper exercise of power, will seek to seize control of the state. Significantly enough, when Plato analyses the corruptions of the ideal state he traces them all to that generation of men which leads to the union of political and economic power. Everything, therefore, used by guardians and guards will be held in common. They will have

no private homes, but will live a hard barrack-room existence, receiving that bare maintenance deemed necessary for soldiers on unending garrison duty. They will eat together, like consecrated men ; they will sleep together in single barracks, like soldiers sworn to simplicity. "Friends should have all things in common," as Pythagoras used to say.[14] So the authority of the guardians will be sterilized, and their power made poisonless ; their sole reward will be honour and the sense of service to the group. And they will be such men as from the beginning have deliberately consented to so materially limited a career ; and such men as at the end of their stern training will have learned to value the high repute of the statesman above the crass emoluments of the office-seeking politicians or the 'economic man'. Also, the guardians will have no wives. Their communism is to be to women as well as of goods. They are to be freed not only from the egoism of self, but from the egoism of family ; they are not to be narrowed to the anxious acquisitiveness of the prodded husband ; they are to be devoted not to a woman but to the community. Even their children shall not be specifically or distinguishably theirs ; all children of guardians shall be taken from their mothers at birth and brought up in common ; their particular parentage will be lost in the scuffle. All the guardian-mothers will care for all the guardian-children ; the brotherhood of man, within these limits, will graduate from phrase to fact ; every boy will be a brother to every other boy, every girl a sister, every man a father, and every woman a mother.

However, community of wives does not mean, according to Plato, indiscriminate mating ; rather there is to be strict eugenic supervison of all reproductive relations. The argument from the breeding of animals here starts its wandering career : if we get such good results in breeding cattle selectively for qualities desired, and from breeding only from the best in each generation, why should we not apply similar principles to the mating of mankind ?[15] For it is not enough to educate the

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14 *Laws*, 807.
15 *Republic*, 459.

child properly ; he must be properly born, of select and healthy ancestry ; "education should begin before birth."[16]

Further, Plato argues in the *Republic* that the eugenic society must be protected not only from deterioration within, but also from enemies without. It must be ready, if need be, to wage successful war. Our model community would, of course, be pacific, for it would restrict population within the means of subsistence ; but neighbouring states not so managed might well look upon the orderly prosperity of our Utopia as an invitation to raid and rapine. Hence, while deploring the necessity, we shall have, in our intermediate class, a sufficient number of well-trained soldiers, living a hard and simple life like the guardians, on a stated modicum of goods supplied by their 'maintainers and forefathers', the people. At the same time, every precaution must be taken to avoid the occasions of war. In short, the perfect society would be that in which each class and each unit would be doing the work to which its nature and aptitude best adapted it ; in which no class or individual would interfere with others, but all would cooperate in difference to produce an efficient and harmonious whole.[17] That would be a just state.

This completes the general outline of Plato's theory of the state starting from the conception that the good must be known by methodical study, the theory constructs society around this idea by showing that the principle is implicit in all society. The division of labour and the specialization of tasks are the conditions of social co-operation, and the problem of the philosopher-king is to arrange these matters in the most advantageous way. Because human nature is innately and inherently social, the maximum advantage to the state means also the maximum advantage to citizens. The goal is, therefore, a perfect adjustment of human beings to the possibilities of significant employment which the state affords. The remainder of Plato's argument might also be described as a corollary. The idea of the good, in fact, is the source of all truth, of knowledge, beauty and of moral goodness. It is the source of all knowledge

16 *Laws*, 789.
17 *Republic*, 433-34.

as well as the highest object of knowledge. It illumines the intelligible world. Its apprehension by the soul is Knowledge, its indwelling in the soul is Virtue, its shining forth to the soul—through the medium of sense—is Beauty, and its manifestation in the state is Justice.

It is clear that Plato in the *Republic* did not consider law as an essential element of the state. He did not wish to bind the hands or limit the powers of the philosopher-king with the rules of law as to force an expert physician to copy his prescription from the recipes in a medical text-book. He trusted too much the wiseness and sincerity of the philosopher-king. Hence the omission of law was not a matter of caprice but a logical consequence of the philosophy itself. But soon Plato became doubtful about the success of his own plan regarding the ideal state. Also, it ran quite contrary to the deepest convictions of the Greeks about the moral value of freedom under the law and of participation by the citizens in the task of self-government. Hence, Plato became more practical in his outlook towards the state and gave the law its due place in his later works, the *Statesman* and the *Laws*. Since it is difficult to have a real philosopher to rule the state in the ideal way, laws are necessary and, therefore, Plato sketched out a legal system to help, guide and restrain the imperfect governmental machinery.

The *Laws* represents an attempt to discover a practical system of government. With advancing years and maturer judgement, the idealism of Plato is giving place to practical wisdom. The *Laws* is shorn of much of the idealism of the *Republic* and the *Statesman* also. Experience at Syracuse, where Plato had gone with the expectation of founding an ideal state ruled by a philosopher-king, forced him to modify his views about many things, especially his communism of property and women. In the *Laws* Plato has to admit that private property and family life are essential human institutions, though he does not give them even now an unqualified support. Both private property and marriage are to be allowed but under strict state supervision. The state control of the educational system is also to be far less strict than in the case of the *Republic*. We find him in favour of establish-

ing a censorship over the "intellectual and artistic interests of the citizens". The only real restriction on marriage is with a view to preventing the perpetuation of really bad types of humanity. Women were to receive the same education as men and were allowed to participate in public affairs but, unlike the *Republic*, they were now not entirely free from domestic duties.

In the *Laws*, Plato suggests a number of useful checks on the vices of different forms of government. Every citizen is to be allowed to have his share in the government of his state according to his ability. The law is now, so to speak, the surrogate for that reason which Plato had sought to make supreme in the ideal state and which he still regarded as the supreme force in nature. The chief virtue in the ideal state had accordingly been justice, the division of labour, and the specialization of functions which puts every man in his proper place and 'gives him his due' in the sense that he is enabled to bring all his faculties to their highest development and allowed to put them to the fullest use. In the state of the *Laws* wisdom is crystallized—perhaps one might even say frozen—in the law; no such flexible adjustment of the individual to the state is possible, but the regulations made by the law are assumed to be the best possible 'on the whole'. Consequently, the supreme virtue in such a state is temperance or self-control, which means a law-abiding disposition or a spirit of respect towards the institutions of the state and a readiness to subordinate oneself to its lawful powers.

However, we find on the close examination of the *Laws* that Plato never definitely decided that the theory developed in the *Republic* was erroneous and had to be abandoned. He repeatedly stated that his purpose in the *Laws* was to describe a second-best state, and he sometimes put this assertion into conjunction with his strongest statements about the importance of law. Without laws men "differ not at all from the most savage beasts," and yet if a competent ruler should arise, they would have no need to be ruled by laws, "for no law or ordinance is mightier than knowledge."[18] In fact, the state

[18] *Laws*, 874 c ; 875 c.

ruled by law was always a concession to the frailty of human nature and never something which he was willing to accept as having a right to stand on a parity with the ideal. Still if the knowledge necessary to make the philosopher-king is unattainable, then Plato is clear that the common moral consciousness is right in believing that a government according to law is better than a government by men, rulers being what they are. The relation between the two theories is not at all satisfactory; "the ideal is logically irreproachable but not attainable in fact, while the second-best state is not impossible to attain but is shaky in respect to its credentials."

Also, Plato could never appreciate a democratic state. He was no democrat, but the most formidable opponent that democracy has ever had. He attached little value to and took little interest in the majority of producers. And it appears that he sacrificed the individual to the state. He compared the state to the human body, stating that when a finger is hurt the whole body feels the pain, and that when a member of the state is hurt all will likewise suffer. The state for him is the best in which the unity is that of the natural man. He stated that the happiness of the whole was more important than that of the part, that the happiness of the state came before that of any one of its three classes. He was of the view that the life of every individual had meaning only from the function he performed in the organism of the state. He meant that the supreme good was the unity of the whole. But it does not mean that Plato completely sacrificed the individual to the state. The state exists for the perfection of the individuals within it, and the development of the individuals within it perfects the state. We look in vain in the *Republic* for any difference between the laws of public and private morality. The state conforms to the ideal of the individual man, and leaves to a later age the assertion that what is morally wrong can be politically right. Plato's description of the unjust states hammers home the lesson that it is the falling away in personal conduct that leads to the lowering of tone in public life and to the passing of power into unfit hands for "constitutions are not born of oak and rock, but grow out of the characters in

each city."[19] And to compare Plato's Republic to the Totalitarian States of the twentieth century is to miss the whole point of his teaching, which is that the purpose of the state is the production of noble characters, that the true greatness of states is to be measured by the personal worth of their citizens. And ultimately Plato leaves with an idea that even though his Republic cannot exist on earth man can by contemplating the eternal pattern build himself into the true state, can realize the state within himself. So the "celestial city, like the Kingdom of God, is really within us, and in our daily actions it is up to us to try to fulfil its laws, so far as is possible to live like an immortal," as Plato says in the *Laws*. George Herbert's "Who sweeps a room, as for Thy laws, makes that and the action fine" is fully Platonic. "It is unimportant whether the perfect state exists anywhere or will exist in the future," Plato writes, "for the first man fulfils the law of that state and of no other." And, in view of the above consideration, it cannot be pleaded that Plato tried to sacrifice the individual to the state. In fact, he, to quote Wayper, "has founded human personality not on man-made law but on eternal standards."

When Plato ventured to speak of a 'philosopher-king', therefore, he had in mind something more than a benign but rather ineffectual figure, given to meditation and study, but separated by his superior intellect and rarefied tastes from the common herd. His philosopher was to be a practical philosopher ; his king was also to be a law-maker, an active statesman. He was to lay down the law with the authority not merely of his regal office but of his philosophical insight. In obeying the laws he proclaimed, the common people would thus be acting in conformity with the supreme good of the universe. Some of them would no doubt obey willingly, conscious of the wisdom of the law-giver. Some would obey mechanically, conscious merely of the necessity of conforming to a common standard. Some would obey with an ill-grace, being so far corrupted and immersed in the natural world that the 'pull' of heavenly wisdom would be felt hardly at all. He, however, never for an

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[19] C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought* (1958), p. 37.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

instant lost sight of the end to which human life should be directed. He remained in doubt only as to the means by which this end should be attained. Perhaps he hit the nail on the head most surely in a passage which occurs towards the end of the *Laws*, where he states the problem that in later ages was to become the chief preoccupation of all men of goodwill. "In no very long period of time," he observed, "an autocrat, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state ; he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct, praising and rewarding some actions and rebuking others, and degrading those who disobey. The quickest and easiest way for a state to change its laws is through the leadership of its masters : such changes never have and never will come to pass in any other way." So far, so good ; but, he continues, "the real impossibility, or difficulty, is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages ; but when once it is surmounted, every kind of blessing follows. *The difficulty is to find a divine passion for rational and just institutions.*" That indeed was the purpose of his life ; and if he failed to achieve it, his failure was touched with sublimity. From Socrates he had learnt that virtue was the child of true knowledge, and for himself he arrived at the idea that true knowledge issued from communion with the Supreme Good. The crucial question was whether mankind, left to itself and in the absence of some prolonged emotional stimulus, could ever be brought to desire this supreme communion for its own sake. That same question was later "tackled by the Christian philosophers with an insight that Plato could not have possessed. But those later philosophers in turn looked back to him as the most inspired of the thinkers of the old dispensation, whose doctrine of the Love of Good was the nearest approach to the Christian Gospel of Love."[21]

[21] E.W.F. Tomlin, *Great Philosophers of the West* (1959), p. 62.

Aristotle (385 or 384 B.C.—322 B.C.)

Aristotle was born in either 385 or 384 B.C. at Stagira, a Macedonian city some two hundred miles to the north of Athens. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, was a doctor of considerable ability, who finally rose to be chief physician at the court of Amyntas II, King of Macedonia. While in the latter's service, he wrote a number of books on medicine and natural science. Aristotle's mother, Phœstis, was a native of Calchis. By reason of his father's profession, the young boy became a member of the guild of Asclepiadae (named after Asclepius or Æsculapius, the Greek God of medicine), since the medical profession was hereditary in that confraternity. He had every opportunity and encouragement to develop a scientific bent of mind; he was prepared from the beginning to become the founder of science.

His early acquaintance with natural science had a profound effect upon his way of thinking. Not merely did it turn his interests in a particular direction—the direction of analysis, experiment, and classification—but it caused him finally to strike out on an original line of his own. This new departure in thought has affected all subsequent enquiry, whether scientific, philosophical, political or ethical. For the ideas and conclusions of Aristotle have entered into our common traditions of thought, so that we speak with his idiom even though we may protest ignorance of his writings.

We have a number of stories regarding his youth. One narrative represents him as squandering his patrimony in riotous living, joining the army to avoid starvation, returning to Stagira to practise medicine, and going to Athens at the age of thirty to study philosophy under Plato. A more dignified story takes him to Athens at the age of eighteen, and puts him at once under the tutelage of the great master; but even in this likelier account, there is sufficient echo of a reckless and

irregular youth, living rapidly.[1] The scandalized reader may console himself by observing that in either story our philosopher anchors at last in the quiet groves of the Academy.

A man of such originality might have been expected soon to weary of discipleship, and to seek the earliest opportunity of organizing an 'opposition' school of his own. But, as it happened, Aristotle was content to enjoy the status of pupil and imitator much longer and with a greater measure of self-effacement than many a thinker of lesser stature. The majority of scholars and intellectual leaders serve an apprenticeship of three, four or five years at some seat of learning, Aristotle served as many as twenty in the Platonic Academy. Finally, he left it for the only reason that might have been expected to prompt his departure, namely, the death of Plato in 347 B.C.

If our chronology is not at fault, Aristotle must have put in his first appearance at Athens at a time when Plato was away at the court of Dionysius II. Thus he probably did not have an opportunity of meeting the master until he had already become a well-established academician. His first teachers of Platonism were among those members, who, like himself, enjoyed the status of disciples. Although Aristotle soon succeeded in proving his ability, the activities at which he excelled were not as yet those of original speculation ; they were those of faithful interpretation of the master's own works. Aristotle's first writings, in fact, consisted not merely of dialogues in the Platonic manner but of expositions of Plato's ideas ; and these expositions were so distinguished for clarity and persuasiveness that for many centuries after his death they were studied with greater eagerness than the works of Plato himself.

It seems probable that later thinkers, such as Epicurus (340-270 B.C.) and later still Cicero (106-43 B.C.), derived their knowledge of Platonism less from the works of the master, which were regarded as exceedingly abstruse, than from the works of the pupil, which were accepted as models of precise statement. We should give a great deal to be able to read these early dialogues today ; but except for a few fragments and what can be deduced from a paraphrase here and there in the

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[1] Grote, *Aristotle* (London, 1872), p. 4.

works of less gifted writers, they have all been lost : a fate which, as we shall see, nearly overtook the whole body of Aristotle's writings.

Aristotle's writings ran into the hundreds. Some ancient authors credit him with four hundred volumes, others with a thousand. What remains is but a part, and yet it is a library in itself—conceive the scope and grandeur of the whole. There are, first, the *Logical* works : "Categories", "Topics", "Prior" and "Posterior Analytics", "Propositions", and "Sophistical Refutation" ; these works were collected and edited by the later Peripatetics under the general title of Aristotle's "Organon"—that is, the organ or instrument of correct thinking. Secondly, there are the *Scientific* works : "Physics", "On the Heavens", "Growth and Decay", "Meteorology", "Natural History", "On the Soul", "The Parts of Animals", "The Movement of Animals" and "The Generation of Animals". There are, thirdly, the *Esthetic* works : "Rhetoric" and "Poetics". And fourthly come the more strictly *Philosophical* works : "Ethics", "Politics" and "Metaphysics".

Here, evidently, is the Encyclopedia Britannica of Greece : every problem under the sun and about it finds a place ; no wonder there are more errors and absurdities in Aristotle than in any other philosopher who ever wrote. Here is such a synthesis of knowledge and theory as no man would ever achieve again till Spencer's day, and even then not half so magnificently ; here, better than Alexander's fitful and brutal victory, was a conquest of the world. If philosophy is the quest of unity Aristotle deserves the high name that twenty centuries gave him—*Ille Philosophus* : The Philosopher.

However, it is admitted that the writings attributed to Aristotle were not his, but were largely the compilations of students and followers who had embalmed the unadorned substance of his lectures in their notes. It does not appear that Aristotle published in his life-time any technical writings except those on logic and rhetoric ; and the present form of the logical treatises is due to later editing. In the case of the *Metaphysics* and the *Politics* the notes left by Aristotle seem to have been put together by his executors without revision or alteration. Even the unity of style which marks Aristotle's writings, and

offers an argument to those who defend his direct authorship, may be, after all, merely a unity given them through common editing by the Peripatetic School. About this matter there rages a sort of Homeric question, of almost epic scope, into which the busy reader will not care to go, and on which a modest student will not undertake to judge.[2] We may at all events be sure that Aristotle is the spiritual author of all these books that bear his name : that the hand may be in some cases another's hand, but that the head and the heart are his.

Like Plato, Aristotle maintained that the highest object of our intellect is the contemplation of eternal truth ; but he shared none of Plato's indifference to temporal matters. On the contrary, he told us to seek for truth in what lay around and about us, considering it no lapse from dignity on the philosopher's part to spend much of his time connecting and dissecting specimens, collating manuscripts, and rummaging among old archives and records. Socrates questioned men ; Aristotle went on to question things. He questioned in all directions, being the first great thinker to seek for an underlying connection between the various spheres of enquiry in which he interested himself. It came to him more clearly that above all questions of the physical world there loomed the question of questions—What is the best life ?—What is life's supreme good ?—What is virtue ?—How shall we find happiness and fulfilment ?

He was realistically simple in his ethics. His scientific training kept him from the preachment of superhuman ideals and empty counsels of perfection. "In Aristotle," said Santayana, "the conception of human nature is perfectly sound ; every ideal has a natural basis and everything natural has an ideal development." Aristotle began by frankly recognizing that the aim of life was not goodness for its own sake, but happiness. "For we choose happiness for itself, and never with a view to anything further ; whereas we choose honour, pleasure, intellect ...because we believe that through them we shall be made happy."[3] But he realized that to call happiness the supreme good was a mere truism ; what was wanted was some clearer

2 Shule, *History of the Aristotelian Writings.*
3 *Ethics*, i, 7.

account of the nature of happiness, and the way to it. He hoped to find this way by asking wherein man differed from other beings ; and by presuming that man's happiness would lie in the full functioning of this specifically human quality. Now the peculiar excellence of man is his power of thought ; it is by this that he surpasses and rules all other forms of life ; and as the growth of this faculty has given him his supremacy, so, we may presume, its development will give him fulfilment and happiness.

The chief condition of happiness, then, barring certain physical prerequisites, is the life of reason—the specific glory and power of man. Virtue, or rather excellence, will depend on clear judgement, self-control, symmetry of desire, artistry of means ; it is not the possession of the simple man, nor the gift of innocent intent, but the achievement of experience in the fully developed man. Yet there is a road to it, a guide to excellence, which may save many detours and delays : it is the middle way, the golden mean. The qualities of characters can be arranged in triads, in each of which the first and last qualities will be extremes and vices, and the middle quality a virtue or an excellence. So between cowardice and rashness is courage ; between stinginess and extravagance is liberality ; between sloth and greed is ambition ; between humility and pride is modesty ; between secrecy and loquacity, honesty ; between moroseness and buffoonery, good humour ; between quarrelsomeness and flattery, friendship ; between Hamlet's indecisiveness and Quixote's impulsiveness is self-control.[4] "Right", then, in ethics or conduct, is not different from "right" in mathematics or engineering ; it means correct, fit, what works best to the best result.

The golden mean, however, is not, like the mathematical mean, an exact average of two precisely calculable extremes ; it fluctuates with the collateral circumstances of each situation, and discovers itself only to mature and flexible reason. Excellence is an art won by training and habituation ; we do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence, but we rather have these because we have acted rightly ; "these virtues are

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4 *Ethics*, i, 7.

formed in man by his doing the actions;" we are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit: "the good of man is a working of the soul in the way of excellence in a complete life;.....for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy."[5]

But the golden mean, said our matter-of-fact philosopher, is not all of the secret of happiness. We must have, too, a fair degree of worldly goods: poverty makes one stingy and grasping; while possessions give one that freedom from care and greed which is the source of aristocratic ease and charm. The noblest of these external aids to happiness is friendship. Indeed, friendship is more necessary to the happy than to the unhappy; for happiness is multiplied by being shared. It is more important than justice: for "when men are friends, justice is unnecessary; but when men are just, friendship is still a boon." "A friend is one soul in two bodies," yet friendship implies few friends rather than many; "he who has many friends has no friend;" and "to be a friend to many people in the way of perfect friendship is impossible." Fine friendship requires duration rather than fitful intensity; and this implies stability of character; it is to altered character that we must attribute the dissolving kaleidoscope of friendship. And friendship requires equality; for gratitude gives it at best a slippery basis. "Benefactors are commonly held to have more friendship for the objects of their kindness than these for them. The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one are debtors and the others creditors,.....and that the debtors wish their creditors out of the way, while the creditors are anxious that their debtors should be preserved." Aristotle rejected this interpretation; he preferred to believe that the greater tenderness of the benefactor was to be explained on the analogy of the artist's affection for his work, or the mother's for her child. We love that which we have made.[6] However, Aristotle's ideal man is no mere metaphysician.

"He does not expose himself needlessly to danger, since there are few things for which he cares sufficiently; but he is

5 *Ethics*, i, 7.
6 *Ibid.*, viii and ix.

willing, in great crisis, to give even his life—knowing that under certain conditions it is not worthwhile to live. He is of a disposition to do men service, though he is ashamed to have a service done to him. To confer a kindness is a mark of superiority ; to receive one is a mark of subordination.....He does not take part in public displays.....He is open in his dislikes and preferences ; he talks and acts frankly, because of his contempt for men and things.....He is never fired with admiration, since there is nothing great in his eyes. He cannot live in complaisance with others, except, it be a friend ; complaisance is the characteristic of a slave.....He never feels malice, and always forgets and passes over injuries.....He is not fond of talking...It is no concern of his that he should be praised, or that others should be blamed. He does not speak evil of others, even of his enemies, unless it be to themselves. His carriage is sedate, his voice deep, his speech measured ; he is not given to hurry, for he is concerned about only a few things ; he is not prone to vehemence, for he thinks nothing very important. A shrill voice and hasty steps come to a man through care...He bears the accidents of life with dignity and grace, making the best of his circumstances, like a skilful general who marshals his limited forces with all the strategy of war...He is his own best friend, and takes delight in privacy whereas the man of no virtue or ability is his own worst enemy, and is afraid of solitude."[7]

From so aristocratic an ethic there naturally follows a severely aristocratic political philosophy. Aristotle was honestly conservative because of the turmoil and disaster that had come out of Athenian democracy ; like a typical scholar he longed for order, security and peace. This, he felt, was no time for political extravaganzas. Radicalism is a luxury of stability ; we may dare to change things only when things lie steady under our hands. And, in general, says Aristotle, "the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil ; and when the advantage of change is small, some defects whether in the law or in the ruler had better be met with philosophic toleration. The citizen will gain less by the change than he will lose by acquiring the

[7] *Ethics,* iv, 3.

habit of disobedience."[8] Let us not disregard the experience of ages. Surely, "in the multitude of years, these things, if they were good, would not have remained unknown."[9]

"These things", of course, mean chiefly Plato's communistic republic. Aristotle fought the realism of Plato about universals, and the idealism of Plato about government. He found many dark spots in the picture painted by the master. He did not relish the barrack-like continuity of contact to which Plato apparently condemned his guardian philosophers. Conservative though he was, Aristotle valued individual quality, privacy and liberty above social efficiency and power. He would not care to call every contemporary brother or sister, nor every elder person father or mother; if all are your brothers, none is; and "how much better it is to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion!" In a state having women and children in common, "love will be watery...Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection—that a thing is your own, and that it awakens real love in you—neither can exist in such a state" as Plato's.[10]

Perhaps there was, in the dim past, a communistic society, when the family was the only state, and pasturage or simple tillage the only form of life. But "in a more divided state of society," where the division of labour into unequally important functions elicits and enlarges the natural inequality of men, communism breaks down because it provides no adequate incentive for the exertion of superior abilities. The stimulus of gain is necessary to arduous work; and the stimulus of ownership is necessary to proper industry, husbandry and care. When everybody owns everything nobody will take care of anything. "That which is common to the greatest number has the least attention bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly ever of the public interest." And "there is always a difficulty in living together, or having things in common, but especially in having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travellers "are an example to the point; for they

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8 *Politics*, ii, 8.
9 *Ibid.*, v, 8.
10 *Ibid.*, ii, 4.

generally fall out by the way, and quarrel about any trifle that turns up."[11]

Aristotle was of the opinion that human nature is nearer to the beast than to the god. The great majority of men are natural dunces and sluggards; in any system whatever these men will sink to the bottom; and to help them with state subsidies is "like pouring water into a leaking cask". Such people must be ruled in politics and directed in industry; with their consent, if possible, without it if necessary. "From the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, and others for command."[12] For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master; and he who can work only with his body is by nature a slave. The slave is to the master what the body is to the mind; and as the body should be subject to the mind, so "it is better for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master." The slave is a tool with life in it, the tool is a lifeless slave.

Such a philosophy typifies the Greek disdain for manual labour. Such work in Athens had not become so complicated as it is today, when the intelligence demanded in many manual trades is at times much greater than that required for the operations of the lower middle class, and even a college professor may look upon an automobile mechanic (in certain cases) as a very god. Manual work was then merely manual, and Aristotle looked down upon it, from the heights of philosophy, as belonging to men without minds. Manual labour, he believed, dulls and deteriorates the mind, and leaves neither time nor energy for political intelligence. It seemed to Aristotle a reasonable corollary that only persons of some leisure should have a voice in the government. Thus Aristotle defended slavery wholeheartedly.

Aristotle, in the same way, considered woman as inferior to man. The male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; the one rules and the other is ruled; and this principle extends, of necessity, to all mankind. Woman is weak of will, and therefore incapable of independence of character or position; her best condition, according to Aristotle, is a quiet home life in

11 *Politics*, ii, 5.
12 *Ibid.*, i, 5.

which, while ruled by the man in her external relations, she may be in domestic affairs supreme. Women should not be made more like men, as in Plato's republic ; rather the dissimilarity should be increased ; nothing is so attractive as the different. "The courage of a man and that of a woman are not, as Socrates supposed, the same : the courage of a man is shown in commanding ; that of a woman in obeying...As the poet says, 'Silence is a woman's glory'." [13]

Aristotle, further, advised man to defer marriage till the vicinity of thirty-seven, and then to marry a lass of some twenty years. A girl who is rounding the twenties is usually the equal of a man of thirty, but may perhaps be managed by a seasoned warrior of thirty-seven. What attracted Aristotle to this matrimonial mathematics is the consideration that two such disparate persons will lose their reproductive power and passions at approximately the same time. According to him, the union of male and female when too young is bad for the creation of children ; in all animals the off-spring of the young are small and ill-developed, and generally female." Health is more important than love. Further, "it conduces to temperance not to marry too soon ; for women who marry early are apt to be wanton ; and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they marry while they are growing."[14] Aristotle did not want to leave these matters to youthful caprice. On the contrary, he wanted the state to supervise and control them. The state, he firmly stated, should determine the minimum and maximum ages of marriage for each sex, the best seasons for conception, and the rate of increase in population.

Likewise, the state should control the education. "That which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government...The citizen should be moulded to the form of government under which he lives."[15] By state control of schools we might divert men from industry and trade to agriculture ; and we might train men, while keeping property private, to open their possessions to discriminately common use. Let youth be taught

[13] *Politics*, i, 13.
[14] *Ibid.*, vii, 16.
[15] *Ibid.*, v, 9 ; viii, 1.

the great boon it has in the state, the unappreciated security which comes of social organization, the freedom that comes of law. "Man, when perfected, is the best of animals ; but when isolated he is the worst of all ; for injustice is more dangerous when armed, and man is equipped at birth with the weapon of intelligence, and with qualities of character which he may use for the vilest ends. Wherefore if he have not virtue he is the most unholy and savage of animals, full of gluttony and lust." And only social control can give him virtue. Through speech man evolved society ; through society, intelligence ; through intelligence, order ; and through order, civilization. In such an ordered state the individual has a thousand opportunities and avenues of development open to him which a solitary life would never give. "To live alone," then, "one must be either an animal or a god."[16]

After establishing necessary safeguards in education, in religion, and in the ordering of family life, Aristotle now turned to the definition of the state. He considered the state the highest form of community. Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good ; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.

The state, according to Aristotle, comes into existence when several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing. It comes into being for the sake of life, and continues for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. "For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best."[17]

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[16] *Politics*, i, 2.
[17] *Ibid.*

Hence it is evident, Aristotle writes in *Politics*, that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity. He is like the "tribeless, lawless, hearthless one." That man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animal is evident. Nature, as we very often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. It is also the characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Further, Aristotle was of the view that the state was by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing ; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god ; he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all ; since armed injustice is the most dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if we have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice, writes Aristotle, is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

Now we come to the question as to what form of political community is best of all from the above view-point. All forms have good and bad commingled in them, and are severally adapted to various conditions. Theoretically, Aristotle remarked, the ideal form of government would be the centralization of all political power in the one best man. Homer is right : "Bad is the lordship of many ; let one be your ruler and master."

For such a man law would be rather an instrument than a limit : "for men of eminent ability there is no law—they are themselves a law." Anyone would be ridiculous who should attempt to make laws for them ; they would probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares when, in the council of beasts, the latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all—"Where are your claws" ?[18]

But in practice, monarchy is usually the worst form of government, for great strength and virtue are not near allied. Hence the best practicable polity is aristocracy, the rule of the informed and capable few. Government is too complex a thing to have its issues decided by number, when lesser issues are reserved for knowledge and ability. "As the physician ought to be judged by the physician, so ought men in general to be judged by their peers...Now does not this same principle apply to elections ? For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge : a geometrician, e.g., will choose rightly in matters of geometry ; or a pilot in matters of navigation..... So that neither the election of magistrates nor the calling of them to account should be entrusted to the many."

The difficulty with hereditary aristocracy is that it has no permanent economic base ; the eternal recurrence of the *nouveaux riches* puts political office sooner or later at the disposal of the highest bidder. "It is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices.....should be bought. The law which permits this abuse makes wealth of more account than ability, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example" ; and "where ability has not the first place there is no real aristocracy."[19]

Democracy is usually the result of a revolution against plutocracy. "Love of gain as the ruling classes tends constantly to diminish their number"; "and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters and establish democracies." This "rule by the poor" has some advantages. "The people, though individually they may be worse judges than those who

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[18] *Ibid.*, iii, 13.
[19] *Ibid.*, ii, 11.

have special knowledge, are collectively as good. Moreover, there are some artists whose works are best judged not by themselves alone, but by those who do not possess the art; e.g., the user or master of a house will be a better judge of it than the builder;.....and the guest will be a better judge of a feast than the cook."[20] And "the many are more corruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily spoiled than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger, or by some other passion, and then his judgement is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment."[21]

Yet in practice, democracy opens an arena to the demagogues, and such a democracy is nearly certain to become lawless and disorderly. In practice, therefore, it is hardly different from tyranny. The problem of a democracy is to unite popular power with intelligent administration, and the latter is not possible by a large assembly. In any way, it is inferior to aristocracy. For it is based on a false assumption of equality; it "arises out of the nation that those who are equal in one respect (e.g., in respect of the law) are equal in all respects; because men are equally free they claim to be absolutely equal!" The upshot is that ability is sacrificed to number, while numbers are manipulated by trickery. Because the people are so easily misled, and so fickle in their views, the ballot should be limited to the intelligent. What we need is a combination of aristocracy and democracy.

Constitutional government offers this happy union. It is not the best conceivable government—that would be an aristocracy of education—but it is the best possible state. We must now ask what is the best constitution for most states, and the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favoured by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of

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20 *Ibid.*, iii, 15, 8, 11.
21 *Ibid.*, iii, 15.

government which states in general can attain. "It is necessary to begin by assuming a principle of general application, namely, that part of the state which desires the continuance of the government must be stronger than that which does not;" and strength consists neither in number alone, nor in property alone, nor in military or political ability alone, but in a combination of these, so that regard has to be taken of "freedom, wealth, culture and noble birth, as well as of more numerical superiority." Now where shall we find such an *economic* majority to support our constitutional government? Perhaps best in the middle class. It is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme—either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of the middle constitutions and those akin to them. Our state, remarks Aristotle in *Politics*, will be sufficiently democratic if the road to every office is open to all; and sufficiently aristocratic if the offices themselves are closed except to those who have travelled the road and arrived fully prepared. From whatever angle we approach our eternal political problem we monotonously reach the same conclusion: that the community should determine the ends to be pursued, but that only experts should select and apply the means; that choice should be democratically spread, but that office should be rigidly reserved for the equipped and winnowed best.

Leaving aside special circumstances that may be peculiar to a given case, the best practicable state, according to Aristotle, is which avoids the extremes in democracy and oligarchy that experience has shown to be dangerous. This state Aristotle

called the polity, or constitutional government. In any case the distinctive feature of this best practicable state is that it is a mixed form of constitution in which elements are judiciously combined from oligarchy and democracy. Its social basis is the presence of a large middle-class composed of those who are neither very rich nor very poor. It is this class which, as Euripides had said years before, 'saves states.' For they are not poor enough to be degraded or rich enough to be factious. Where such a body of citizens exists they form a group large enough to give the state a popular foundation, disinterested enough to hold the magistrates responsible, and select enough to avoid the evils of government by the masses. Upon such a social foundation it is possible to build a political structure drawing upon institutions typical of both democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle regarded Sparta as a mixed constitution. He was probably thinking also of the government attempted at Athens in 411, which aimed to form a citizen-body restricted to five thousand able to supply themselves with heavy armour and which in the *constitution of Athens* Aristotle said was the best government that Athens had ever had. "Like Plato, Aristotle was obliged by practical considerations to fall back upon property as a surrogate for virtue. Neither thinker believed that property is a sign of goodness, but both reached the conclusion that for political purposes it offers the best practicable approximation to it."[22]

In fact, a government, according to Aristotle, is good when it aims at the good of the whole community, bad when it cares only for itself. There are three kinds of government that are good : monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional government (or polity) ; there are three that are bad : tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. There are also many mixed intermediate forms. It will be observed that the good and bad governments are defined by the ethical qualities of the holders of power, not by the form of the constitution only. This, however, is only partly true. An aristocracy is a rule of men of virtue, an oligarchy is a rule of the rich, and Aristotle did not consider virtue and wealth strictly synonymous. What he held, in accordance with

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[22] G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (G. G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1948), p. 108.

the doctrine of the golden mean, is that a moderate competence is most likely to be associated with virtue. "Mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities." There, is therefore, a difference between the rule of the best (aristocracy) and of the richest (oligarchy), since the best are likely to have only moderate fortunes. There is also a difference between democracy and polity, in addition to the ethical difference in the government, for what Aristotle called "polity" retains some oligarchic elements. But between monarchy and tyranny the only difference is ethical.

As such, comparatively monarchy is better than aristocracy, aristocracy is better than polity. But the corruption of the best is worst; therefore tyranny is worse than oligarchy, and oligarchy than democracy. In this way Aristotle arrived at a qualified defence of democracy; for most actual governments are bad, and therefore, among actual governments, democracies tend to be the best. And the ideal state, according to Aristotle, if not a democracy, at least includes a democratic element. It is "a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible" and it ceases to be constitutional or genuinely political if the discrepancy between its members is so great that they cease to have the same 'virtue'.

Aristotle, at the same time, accepted the supremacy of law as a mark of a good state and not merely as an unfortunate necessity. His argument for this position was that Plato was mistaken when, in the *Statesman*, he made government by law and government by wise rulers alternatives. Even the wisest ruler could not dispense with law, because the law had an impersonal quality which no man, however good, could attain. The law is "reason unaffected by desire"; and the analogy which Plato used to draw between politics and medicine is wrong. Constitutional rule is consistent with the dignity of the subject, whereas a personal or despotic rule is not. The

constitutional ruler, as Aristotle conceived, rules over willing subjects ; he rules by consent and is quite different from a dictator. In short, constitutional rule, according to Aristotle, means three things : First, it is rule in the public or general interest as distinguished from a factional or tyrannous rule in the interest of a single class or individual. Second, it is lawful rule in the sense that government is carried on by general regulations and not by arbitrary decrees, and also in the vaguer sense that the government does not flout standing customs and conventions of the constitution. Third, constitutional government means the government of willing subjects as distinguished from a despotism that is supported merely by force.

And, in the making of law, Aristotle argued that the collective wisdom of a people was superior to that of even the wisest lawgiver. He developed the argument still farther in connection with his discussion of the political ability of popular assemblies. Men in the mass supplement each other in a singular fashion, so that by one understanding one part of a question and another another part, they all together get around the whole subject. He did not approve of Plato's argument that the knowledge of the wisest ruler could be better than the customary law. The rigid distinction between nature and convention, with the extreme intellectualism or rationalism to which this distinction had committed Socrates and Plato, was thus broken down by Aristotle. His point of view was that the reason of the statesman in a good state could not be detached from the reason embodied in the law and custom of the community he ruled.

After discussing his best state and the significance of law and customs in it, Aristotle switched on to the consideration of the causes of revolution. In Greece, revolutions were as frequent as formerly in Latin America, and hence Aristotle had a copious experience from which he drew certain inferences. The main cause was the conflict of oligarchs and democrats. Democracy, Aristotle remarked, arises from the belief that men who are equally free should be equal in all respects ; oligarchy, from the fact that men who are superior in some respect claim too much. Both have a kind of justice, but not the best kind. "Therefore both parties, whenever their share in the government

does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution."[23] Democratic governments are less liable to revolutions than oligarchies, because oligarchs may fall out with each other. The oligarchs seem to have been vigorous fellows. In some cities, we are told, they swore an oath : "I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them which I can." Nowadays reactionaries are not so frank.

Aristotle considered three things necessary to prevent revolution. These are government propaganda in education, respect for law, even in small things, and justice in law and administration, i.e , "equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own." Too much reliance should not be placed on devices to deceive the people. Too much power should not be allowed to concentrate in the hands of one man or one class of men and various classes in the state should be treated with consideration. No man or class of men should feel that they cannot hold political power. Great political offices should be outside the reach of unknown strangers and aliens. Holders of offices should not be able to make private gain, by bribery and gratification out of their offices. The administrative machinery, particularly financial administration, should be open to public scrutiny. Offices and honours should be awarded on considerations of distributive justice and no class of citizens should have a monopoly of political power. The citizens should be educated in the spirit of the constitution. The highest offices in the state should be distributed only on considerations of loyalty to the constitution, administrative capacity and integrity of character, but each citizen must have his due. The government of the day should keep before the public the danger of foreign attack in case of internal revolution. A revolution, to Aristotle, constituted more a political than a legal change. It had the effect of reversing ethical, social and economic standards.

Revolution is always unwise. It may achieve some good, but at the cost of many evils, the chief of which is the disturbance, and perhaps the dissolution, of that social order and structure on which every political good depends. The direct

23 Quoted from B. Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy* (Unwin Brothers Ltd., London, 1947), p. 213.

consequences of revolutionary innovations may be calculable and salutary ; but the indirect are generally incalculable, and not seldom disastrous. "They who take only a few points into account find it easy to pronounce judgement"; and a man can make up his mind quickly if he has only a little to make up. "Young men are easily deceived, for they are quick to hope." The suppression of long-established habits brings the overthrow of innovating governments because the old habits persist among the people ; characters are not so easily changed as laws. If a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of a society must desire it to be maintained. Therefore a ruler who would avoid revolution should prevent extremes of poverty and wealth,—"a condition which is most often the result of war"; he should (like the English) encourage colonization as an outlet for a dangerously congested population ; and he should foster and practise religion. An autocratic ruler particularly "should appear to be earnest in the worship of the gods ; for if men think that a ruler is religious and reveres the gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and are less disposed to conspire against him, since they believe that the gods themselves are fighting on his side."[24]

Aristotle's fundamental assumptions, in his *Politics*, are very different from those of any modern writer. The aim of the state, according to him, is to produce cultured gentlemen—men who combine the aristocratic mentality with love of learning and the arts. This combination existed, in its highest perfection, in the Athens of Pericles, not in the population at large, but among the well-to-do. But it began to break down in the last years of Pericles. After the death of Socrates, the bigotry of the Athenian democracy diminished, and Athens remained the centre of ancient culture, but political power went elsewhere. Throughout later antiquity, power and culture were usually separate : power was in the hands of rough soldiers, culture belonged to powerless Greeks, often slaves. The notion of popular education, in the modern times, has finally given a death blow to the old conception of combination of power and culture. Hence, the day of the "cultured gentleman is almost past."

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[24] *Politics*, iv, 5 ; ii, 9 ; v, 7 ; ii, 11.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 or 1227-1274)

St. Thomas Aquinas is regarded as the greatest of all scholastic philosophers. In all Catholic educational institutions that teach philosophy his system is to be taught as the right one. St. Thomas is not only of historical importance, but is a living influence, like Plato and Aristotle.

St. Thomas was born in 1225 or 1227 at the castle of Rocca Secca, a few miles from the town of Aquino, after which he later took his name. His father was Count of Aquino, a fief within the Kingdom of Naples and nephew of Frederick Barbarossa. His mother, Theodora of Theate, was descended from the old Norman kings of Sicily. Thus Thomas came into the world blessed with every material advantage. Both his parents and his teachers were anxious that he should enter the University of Naples, for they were sure that a great career lay before him either in the field of learning or in the ecclesiastical hierarchy ; and at that period the vocation of scholarship, like that of the priesthood, was held in far higher esteem than it is today. Hence Thomas was sent to Naples at the age of fourteen.

St. Thomas stayed at Frederick II's University of Naples ; then he became a Dominican, which surprised his parents, and went to Cologne, to study under Albertus Magnus, who was the leading Aristotelian among the philosophers of the time. After a period in Cologne and Paris, he returned to Italy in 1259, where he spent the rest of his life except for the three years from 1269 to 1272. During these three years he was in Paris, where the Dominicans, on account of their Aristotelianism, were in trouble with the University authorities, and were suspected of heretical sympathy with the Averroists, who had a powerful party in the University.

The period in which St. Thomas lived was a period of extraordinary religious and intellectual moment. It was the best period of Scholasticism which, as a philosophy of life, was all

comprehensive, including moral, social, political, economic and other problems. The Scholasticism of the Middle Ages had two characteristics. It assumed that church dogma was infallible and, hence, unquestionable. It also tried to clarify dogma by rational explanation i.e., to show that dogma was not at all contrary to reason. In all, the 13th century was marked by certain things which profoundly affected Aquinas's writings.

It is just said that the aim of Scholasticism was to demonstrate the harmony or compatibility between Reason and Faith. What St. Thomas succeeded in doing was not merely to prove such compatibility but to codify all knowledge in the light of it. Being an exceedingly careful and precise thinker, he avoided the pitfalls into which so many religious philosophers have sunk : he sought not to 'spiritualize' everything, but, by recognising what his modern disciple Maritain has termed the 'primacy of the spiritual', to define with accuracy the boundaries and 'rights' of the natural realm. Studying Aquinas for the first time, modern thinkers have been surprised and impressed to find that, austere and high-minded man though he was, he fully recognised the part played in human conduct and motive by such natural forces as sex. What he did not do was to attribute to such impulses a power and supremacy out of all proportion to their nature.

St. Thomas was also well acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and his (Aquinas's) works represented what is best in Hellenism. His friend William of Moerbeke provided him with translations from the Greek, and he himself wrote commentaries. Until his time, men's notions of Aristotle had been obscured by Neoplatonic accretions. He, however, followed the genuine Aristotle, and disliked Platonism, even as it appears in St. Augustine. He succeeded in persuading the Church that Aristotle's system was to be preferred to Plato's as the basis of Christian philosophy, and that Mohammedans and Christian Averroists had misinterpreted Aristotle.

Aquinas followed Aristotle in asserting that the 'form' is that which gives being to a thing and makes it what it is ; further, that all forms are in some way linked with matter, except the form of God, the Form of Forms. Thus we come to know God by and through the world of matter, which manifests a

hierarchy of Forms ; and since the more perfect a form is the more it increases its individuality, God is the supreme unity and supreme individual at once. For St. Thomas, the natural sphere has both meaning and purpose. He was not the kind of philosopher who claimed to know God in some direct fashions, and whose primary task was therefore to explain away the existence or 'illusion' of Matter.

St. Thomas held that the human mind was committed to a standard which prevented our intellect from being converted into something different, and possibly mischievous. That standard was Reason. In the same way, the human will was committed to a standard which, as long as it remained uppermost, preserved the will as a free instrument. That standard was the Good. The onset of sin was due entirely to our natural and sensual nature rising up and suspending the will's operations. St. Thomas refused to entertain the paralysing notion which Augustine came to embrace with excessive fervour : namely, that human souls were predestined to salvation or damnation. So great was his respect for Reason, and so ample his conception of it, that he held the Divine Will itself to be motivated by Reason. If there were any predestination to sin, it was not of the deterministic kind of Augustine ; it was a moral predestination.

Since the intellect necessarily has Reason for its guide, it can know and understand the world of Nature without any illumination from outside ; but as both the intellect and the world of Nature are, as it were, orientated towards God, philosophy inevitably leads on to theology and is completed by it. Thus St. Thomas wished to apply his important (and in its origin Aristotelian) distinction between 'potentiality' and 'actuality' to every sphere of existence. Since Nature is a hierarchy of Forms, each stage in the hierarchy is the 'form' of the stage next below it and the 'matter' of the stage next above it. Thus Matter is potential Spirit, the natural man a potential Christian, philosophy a potential theology, and the State a material version of the Church.

St. Thomas discussed his views regarding Nature and God in his book *Summa Theologica*, but he could not complete it. Great master of synthesis and codification as he was, he was

content to leave his finest work unfinished, because he was conscious of the idea that no single book and no single man could attempt to embrace all the mysteries of Nature and God; and also because, as he confessed to those friends who questioned him on this point, "all that he had written so far appeared to him as nothing in comparison with the wonderful things that God had been pleased to reveal to him recently."

Another important book of St. Aquinas is the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. This book was written during the years 1259-1264. It is mostly concerned to establish the truth of the Christian religion by arguments addressed to a reader supposed to be not already a Christian; one gathers that the imaginary reader is usually thought of as a man versed in the philosophy of the Arabs. The book tries to establish that what is demonstrable is, so far as it goes, in accordance with the Christian faith, and nothing in revelation is *contrary* to reason. But it is important to separate the parts of the faith which can be proved by reason from those which can't. Accordingly, of the four books, into which the *Summa* is divided, the first three make no appeal to revelation, except to show that it is in accordance with conclusions reached by reason; only in the fourth book are matters treated which cannot be known apart from revelation.

The First book is concerned with the existence of God. The existence of God is proved, as in Aristotle, by the argument of the unmoved mover.[1] There are things which are only moved, and other things which both move and are moved. Whatever is moved is moved by something, and, since an endless regress is impossible, we must arrive somewhere at something which moves other things without being moved. This unmoved mover is God.

Book II is mainly occupied with the soul in man. All intellectual substances are immaterial and incorruptible; angels have no bodies, but in men the soul is united to a body. It is the form of the body, as in Aristotle. There are not three souls in man, but only one. The whole soul is present entire in every part of the body. The souls of animals, unlike those of men, are not immortal. The intellect is part of each man's soul;

[1] In Aristotle the argument leads to 47 or 55 Gods.

there is not, as Averroes maintained, only one intellect, in which various men participate. The soul is not transmitted with the semen, but is created afresh with each man. There is, it is true, a difficulty ; when a man is born out of wedlock, this seems to make God an accomplice in adultery. This objection, however, is only specious.

The Third book is largely connected with ethical questions. Evil is unintentional, not an essence, and has an accidental cause which is good. All things tend to be like God who is the end of all things. Human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures, honour, glory, wealth, worldly power, or goods of the body, and is not seated in the senses. Man's ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue, because these are means ; it consists in the contemplation of God. But the knowledge of God possessed by the majority does not suffice ; nor the knowledge of Him obtained by demonstration ; nor even the knowledge obtained by faith. In this life, we can't see God in His essence, or have ultimate happiness ; but hereafter we shall see Him face to face. This will happen, not by our natural power, but by the divine light ; and even then, we shall not see all of Him. By this vision we become partakers of eternal life.

In this book, St. Thomas also discussed sexual ethics and pleads for strict monogamy. Polygyny is unfair to women, and polyandry makes paternity uncertain. He then passes on to sin, predestination, and election, on which his view is broadly that of Augustine. He seems to hold, with St. Augustine, that no reason can be given why some are elected and go to heaven, while others are left reprobate and go to hell. He also holds in this book that no man can enter heaven unless he has been baptized.

The Fourth book is concerned with the Trinity, the Incarnation, the supremacy of the Pope, the sacraments, and the resurrection of the body. In the main, it is addressed to theologians rather than philosophers.

The conclusion that St. Thomas draws in this book is that though revelation is above reason, it is in no way contrary to reason. Theology completes the system of which science and philosophy form the beginning, but never destroys its continuity.

Faith is the fulfilment of reason. Together they build the temple of knowledge but nowhere do they conflict or work at cross purposes.

But the most important part of Thomas's philosophy is the picture which he draws of Nature. The universe forms a hierarchy reaching from God at its summit down to the lowest being. Every being acts under the internal urge of its own nature, seeking the good or form of perfection natural to its kind, and finding its place in the ascending order according to its degree of perfection. The higher in all cases rules over and makes use of the lower, as God rules over the world or the soul over the body. No matter how lowly it may be, no being is wholly lacking in value, for it has its station, its duties and its rights, through which it contributes to the perfection of the whole. The essence of the scheme is purpose, subordination to an end. In such a structure human nature has a unique place among created beings, since man possesses not only a bodily nature but also a rational and spiritual soul by virtue of which he is akin to God. He alone of all beings is at once body and soul, and on this fundamental fact rests the institutions and the laws by which his life is directed.

The entire social and political conception of Thomas, which can be gleaned from his two books, *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *De Regimine Principum*, particularly from the latter book, falls directly into, or forms part of, his larger plan of Nature as a whole. Like Nature, society is also a system of ends and purposes in which the lower serves the higher and the higher directs and guides the lower. Following Aristotle, Thomas described "society as a mutual exchange of services for the sake of a good life to which many callings contribute, the farmer and artisan by supplying material goods, the priest by prayer and religious observance, and each class by doing its own proper work. The common good requires that such a system shall have a ruling part, just as the soul rules the body or any higher nature rules the lower."[2] Thomas compared the founding and ruling of states, the planning of cities, the

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2 G. H. Sabine : *A History of Political Theory* (George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London, 1948), p. 219.

building of castles, the establishments of markets, and the fostering of education to providence whereby God creates and rules the world.

Aquinas was of the opinion that man was a social and political animal and that the state was essential not only because it checked human evil, as it was held by the early medieval Christian thinkers, but also because an individual could not realize himself fully in its absence. Also, Aquinas attempted to support his earlier contention that the higher always rules over the lower by holding that as one man was superior to others in knowledge and justice, it was good that he should rule over others for their benefit. In Thomas's view rulership was trust for the whole community. He justified the authority of the ruler because he thought that whatever the ruler did, he (the ruler) did for the common good. The moral purpose of the Government, according to Thomas, is paramount. Broadly speaking, it is the duty of the ruler so to direct the action of every class in the state that men may live a happy and virtuous life, which is the true end of man in society. Ultimately, of course, this must lead to a good beyond earthly society, to a heavenly life, but this is beyond human power and is in the keeping of priests rather than of rulers. But it is characteristic of Thomas that he should regard an orderly political life as a contributing cause even to this ultimate end. More specifically "it is the function of the earthly ruler to lay the foundations of human happiness by maintaining peace and order, to preserve it by seeing that all the needful services of public administration, of judicature, and of defence, are performed, and to improve it by correcting abuses wherever they occur and by removing all possible hindrances to the good life."

The moral purpose for which political rule exists implies that authority ought to be limited and checked by the law. Thomas's dislike of tyranny was as great as that displayed by John of Salisbury though he explicitly disavowed the latter's defence of tyrannicide. Justifiable resistance is a public act of a whole people, and the right is safeguarded by the moral condition that those who resist are responsible for seeing that their action is less injurious to the general good than the

abuse which they are trying to remove. In fact, Thomas's interest was essentially in the moral limitations laid upon rulers, and the legal or constitutional phases of the subject seem not to have concerned him. He was explicit on the point that a king's power should be 'limited' (*temperetur*) though he never explained exactly what this meant. As a moralist, he broadly held that the end of the state, as also of the individual, was the realization of good in a virtuous life. To him, the source of all political authority is God who is the Supreme Governor of all things. From God the legitimate authority to govern passes to the whole community. The people under God are sovereign and they may delegate their authority to a monarchical, aristocratic or republican form of government.

St. Thomas was not so conscious of the functions of the government as he was conscious of its purpose. As such, he held that all governments were good or bad according as they worked. He strongly believed that the main aim of a man was to lead a virtuous life and that of government was to promote virtue among men to enable them to achieve eternal salvation. And the character of a government is to be determined according to the fulfilment of this object. Aquinas, like Aristotle, divided the governments into monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. He preferred monarchy to a democracy. His preference for monarchy was in line with his earlier argument that one God rules the universe and one soul rules the body. According to him, the monarchical form of government is the best, because it gives to the state important advantages of unity, regularity, experience and an analogy with Divine Rule. Tyranny he considered the worst type of government. The degeneration of a monarchy into a tyranny, he asserted, could be possibly prevented if the monarchy were a limited one. The best form of government is an elective monarchy in which a monarch should be made to take an oath to observe the constitution of the state so that if he breaks the oath he can be justifiably deposed. "The king must work for the sake of the kingdom and not *vice-versa*."

As Aquinas regarded the rule of God as superior to that of man, he held that a secular ruler could properly perform his

functions only in co-operation with and under the guidance of the church. Salvation was to be achieved not through reason but through faith, and on all questions of faith the church was the final authority. The Pope must, therefore, be obeyed by every one, including the temporal rulers, in everything whether relating to temporal or ecclesiastical affairs. A king might be the image of God, but if he disregarded the church, he could be excommunicated. In assigning superiority to the church over the most exalted of secular rulers, including the Holy Roman Emperor, Aquinas was only theorizing over a *fait accompli*. Besides, like all good medievalists, Aquinas believed in the fundamental importance of unity amidst universal disorder and anarchy and believed that this unity could only be achieved by the supremacy of the Papacy over all persons and all classes, spiritual or temporal.

Further, Aquinas believed that the whole universe represents a rational unity which is only possible through a rational scheme of interconnected laws. Human institutions, he maintained, are a part of the universe and, therefore, the same principles operate in the regulation of human institutions as they do in other levels of the universe. His constant attempt was to relate human law as closely as possible to divine law. To this he was led not only by his own inclination to harmonize, but also by the assumption that law is something much broader in its scope than a means of regulating human relationships. Law in the narrower human sense is, therefore, merely one aspect, important indeed but still an aspect, of a cosmic fact. This is the point which seemed to him important, and accordingly he developed his general theory of law more carefully than any part of his political theory. His classification of law was, therefore, one of the most characteristic parts of his philosophy.

Aquinas discussed four kinds of law at four different levels in a rational scheme of the universe. The first kind of law is Eternal Law, which is practically identical with the reason of God. It is the eternal reason which exists in the mind of God by which the whole universe is governed. This law is above the physical nature of man and, in its entirety, also beyond human comprehension, though it is not contrary to human

reason. This law regulates both the heavenly and earthly spheres. It works in the rational and irrational worlds in different ways. Over the irrational or inanimate world, it takes the form of natural laws like the law of gravitation.

The second, Natural Law, may be regarded as a reflection of divine reason in living beings. It is manifest in the inclination which nature implants in all beings to seek good and avoid evil, to preserve themselves, and to live as perfectly as possible the kind of life suitable to their natural endowments. Thomas mentioned as examples of this the inherent inclination in men to live in society, to preserve their lives to beget and educate their children, to seek the truth, and to develop intelligence. The reason of man helps him to evolve certain general principles of conduct through his innate knowledge of what is good or bad and these general principles form a body of Natural Law. Natural Law enjoins all that is implied to give human inclinations their widest scope.

The third, Divine Law, holds an important position in the rational scheme of laws as put forth by St. Aquinas. By Divine Law he meant substantially revelation. It is a gift of God's grace rather than a discovery of natural reason. An example would be the "special code of laws which God gave to the Jews as the chosen people or the special rules of Christian morals or legislation, given through Scripture or the Church." Aquinas believed that revelation added to human reason instead of destroying it. The structure of Thomas's system is built of reason and faith, but he never doubted that it was one structure. His applications even on the political level were interesting and important. Natural Law, because it is produced by unaided reason, is common to all men, both Christian and pagan ; hence morals and government do not in general depend upon Christianity. But Divine Law, on the contrary, is revealed by God to his chosen people. This position does not weaken the civic obedience of the Christian subjects to a pagan prince. It is rather strengthened when he (Thomas) said that the Christian subjects were not justified in refusing or withholding their obedience to a pagan prince. Heresy, indeed, Thomas regarded as one of the worst crimes, since it falsifies the truth on which salvation depends, and

the church may rightly absolve the subjects of an apostate or heretic ruler.

Human Law, the fourth in Thomas's scheme of laws, is derived from Natural Law and, hence, is subordinated to the latter. It is valid so long as it does not conflict with Natural Law. It is especially meant to regulate the human affairs and is subdivided into *ius gentium* (law of nations) and *ius civile* (civil law). This law, according to Aquinas, regulates the lives of a single kind of creature, and so must be applicable especially to the distinguishing properties of that kind. Since man is distinguished from other beings by rationality, the standard is set by reason ; and since reasonableness in man implies sociability, the law sets a standard for the general good, rather than for the advantage of an individual or a particular class. That is why the law has a general authority behind it rather than an individual will. Finally, Thomas regarded promulgation as an essential quality of law. He defined law as "an ordinance of human reason for the common good, promulgated by one who has the care of the community." As such, it has the following attributes : (1) It is necessarily based on reason. (2) The end of law being common happiness, it is always ordained for general welfare. (3) It is the product of the reason of the multitude or of the reason of the prince (king), acting for the multitude. (4) It should also be published and brought to the notice of all those to whom it applies. But the civil law does not cover the whole life of man and cannot, therefore, claim the whole allegiance of man. It does not operate over the spiritual side of man for which Divine Law is authoritative. As a whole, Human Law might be called a corollary of Natural Law, which merely needs to be made definite and effective in order to provide for the exigencies of human life or of special circumstances in human life.

St. Aquinas was one of those thinkers of the medieval period who desired to improve mankind by bringing about a combination between divine and human knowledge. He attempted to effect a happy compromise between divine revelation and human knowledge. His writings show an interpretation of ancient classics, particularly of Aristotle and

Cicero, in terms of Christian theology. He was a strong individualist, like other schoolmen, so long as he argued that the individual alone existed and had ultimate value. The social and political order existed for the sake of the individual alone. But as a schoolman, he held that the true end of the individual being to attain eternal salvation, the church had more to do with him than the state. The conception of a Christian society he took to be eternal. In short, Thomas's philosophy "sought to find the reasons for it as it was believed to be; to construct a rational scheme of God, nature, and man within which society and civil authority find their due place. In this sense, his philosophy expresses most maturely the convictions, moral and religious, upon which medieval civilization was founded."[3]

4

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

The Renaissance, though it produced no important theoretical philosopher, produced one man of supreme eminence in political philosophy : Niccolo Machiavelli. It is the custom to be shocked by him, and he certainly is sometimes shocking. But many other men would be equally shocking if they were equally free from humbug. His political philosophy is scientific and empirical, based upon his own experience of affairs concerned to set forth the means to assigned ends, regardless of the question whether the ends are to be considered good or bad. When, on the occasion, he allows himself to mention the ends that he desires, they are such as we can all applaud. Much of the conventional obloquy that attaches to his name is due to the indignation of hypocrites who hate the frank avowal of evil-doing. There remains, it is generally true, a good deal that genuinely demands criticism, but in this he is an expression of his age. Such intellectual honesty about political dishonesty would have been hardly possible at any other time or in any other country, except perhaps in Greece among men who owed their theoretical education to the sophists and their practical training to the wars of petty states which, in classical Greece as in Renaissance Italy, were the political accompaniment of individual genius.

Machiavelli (1469-1527) was one of the three great writers produced by Italy in the sixteenth century—Machiavelli, Ariosto and Tasso. He was the son of a Florentine lawyer, who was neither rich nor poor and who held a minor post in the government. When he was in his twenties, Savonarola dominated Florence ; his miserable end evidently made a great impression on Machiavelli, for he remarked that "all armed prophets have conquered and unarmed ones failed," proceeding to give Savonarola as an instance of the latter class. On the other side, he mentioned Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus. It is typical of Renaissance that Christ is not mentioned.

From his boyhood, Machiavelli had an absorbing interest in politics, the technique of influence, the chess of power. Immediately after Savonarola's execution in 1498, when he was twenty-nine years of age, he was appointed secretary to the Dieci della Guerra—a Council of Ten for war—and held that post for fourteen years. Machiavelli was of the view that a national militia should be formed with good equipment and training and that it should serve as the last firm line of the republic's defence. After long hesitation, the government accepted his plan and empowered Machiavelli to execute it. In 1512 Julius II, furious against Florence of having refused to join in expelling the French from Italy, ordered the armies of the Holy League to suppress Florence. Florence was taken and Machiavelli lost both his reputation and governmental post. Unfortunately at this time he was supposed to be involved in a plot to re-establish the Republic. He was exiled from Florence. He retired to a farm in the country, where he devoted himself to rustic employments and to literature, and his most important works were produced in this period of his life.

Machiavelli became an author for want of other occupation. His most famous work, *The Prince,* was written in 1513, and dedicated to Lorenzo the Second, since he hoped (vainly, as it proved) to win the favour of the Medici. Its tone is perhaps partly due to this practical purpose; his longer work, the *Discourses,* which he was writing at the same time, is markedly more republican and more liberal. He says at the beginning of *The Prince* that he will not speak of republics in this book, since he has dealt with them elsewhere. Those who do not read also the *Discourses* are likely to get a very one-sided view of his doctrine.

Writing in the age of Alexander VI and Julius II, of Cæsar Borgia and Medici, he realized that contemporary politics was not based on good Christian ethics but on self-interest. The Italian society of the 16th century, though intellectually brilliant and artistically creative, was a prey to the worst political corruption and moral degeneration. Injustice, cruelty and murder were the ways of government; faith and truthfulness had little place in the conduct of people; force and craft had become the master-keys to success and selfishness,

profligacy and debauchery were running rampant. It was a society which illustrated Aristotle's saying that "man, when separated from law and justice, is the worst of all animals."[1]

The beginning of the 16th century witnessed a revolution which sought to transfer "the allegiance of the human spirit from clerical to civil authority."[2] Medieval institutions had to give place to new institutions in conformity with the spirit of the time. The *Sacerdotum* vanished as a power and the church was reduced to the position of a voluntary association or a partner of national government. During this period there gradually emerged the institution of absolute monarchy as the prevailing form of government in western Europe. In contrast to this, the Italy of Machiavelli presented a picture of disunity and disrupted monarchy. The States of Venice, Florence, Naples, Milan and the papal states were pitted against one another in internecine wars and conflicts, and no power appeared strong enough to unite the whole country. To Machiavelli who was deeply influenced by these conditions, therefore, it was supremely important that Italy should be consolidated as a strong power under an absolute monarch.

Machiavelli's writings do not belong to the domain of political theory. He writes mainly of the mechanics of government, of the means by which the states may be made strong, of the policies by which they can expand their power and of the errors that lead to their decay or destruction. It is, as Prof. Laski says, "a grammar of power for the use of the sixteenth century Italy." Building upon his observation and experience, he explained with realism and incisiveness the way in which alone, as he knew contemporary Italy, the state could be made strong and enduring. He did not enquire whether it was right to attain position in that way ; nor did he consider that other and better ways did not exist. He sought two essential things : first, the rules to enable a person to realize his will in a world where such realization, without regard to its moral character, was the highest ambition ; and second, how, in a world of fraud, force and passion to maintain what one has obtained. Political and military measures are his sole concern and he divorces

1 Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (London, 1944), p. 338.
2 Figgis in *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. III.

these from all moral, religious and social considerations except for the purposes of political expediency. The prince must "know well how to use both the beast and the man." "Right and wrong have nothing to do with government." Success justifies all means, for success brings power, unity and stability. Beyond this criterion of success Machiavelli refused to go. He puts his position lucidly in these words : "A prince, therefore, who desires to maintain himself must learn to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may arise.—For, all things considered, it will be found that some things that seem like virtue will lead you to ruin if you follow them ; whilst others that apparently are vices, result in your safety and well-being."[3] And again he says : "Many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, for how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.....hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to hold his own to know to do wrong and to make use of it or not according to necessity."[4] The prince Leviathan of Machiavelli is not to concern himself with standards of rightness or religion in realizing his aim. He has to be very shrewd and diplomatic, to be good or bad as occasion demands and to use force without the consideration of its moral validity. The test by which he judges the actions of rulers is their ultimate success in obtaining, preserving and increasing their power. Thus politics becomes an end in itself and means are sacrificed for attaining it.

The Prince seems to be very explicit in repudiating received morality where the conduct of rulers is concerned. A ruler will perish if he is always good ; he must be as cunning as a fox and as fierce as a lion. There is a chapter (XVIII) entitled "In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith". We learn that he should keep faith when it pays to do so, but not otherwise. He should be merciful, faithful, humane, religious and upright, but his mind should remain so balanced that were it needful not to be so, he should be able and know how to change to the

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[3] *The Prince*, XV.
[4] *Ibid.*

contrary. A prince cannot observe all those rules of conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity and religion. He must therefore keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn. A prince should be careful that nothing ever escapes his lips which is not replete with the five qualities above named, so that to see and hear him, one would think him the embodiment of mercy, good faith, integrity, kindliness and religion.

The essence of Machiavellianism is not merely that it supplies a system of technical rules for the acquisition and maintenance of power. Such a system of rules would not necessarily involve a reversal of moral standards. Machiavelli's *Prince* is in part just such a technical treatise; but his notion of virtue makes it something much more than this. It is not open to him to say : "These are the means by which power may be attained : whether or not a virtuous man will employ them will depend of course upon the question whether their employment in a given set of circumstances would conform to the Natural Law (or to the rule of right and wrong)." The attainment of power is itself a proof of virtue and Machiavelli apparently recognized no other standard by which virtue is to be judged. The counsels of the 'prince' are thus not merely technical rules ; they purport to be rules for the exercise of 'virtue' ; and a reversal of moral values is involved in the substitution of this notion of virtue for the other.

This divorce between politics and ethics, or politics and religion has been vehemently criticized by the writers. Such an attempt to divorce religion or ethics from politics appears to be unethical to a common reader also. But this is not the correct evaluation of Machiavelli's political ideas. This is one-sided view of his doctrine, which we generally draw by reading his book, *The Prince*.

The Prince was written by Machiavelli with some definite purpose, and its tone is entirely different from that of the *Discourses*, which he had written at the same time. He regarded Italy of his time as the example of a corrupt society and hence he stated that when the necessary virtues had decayed,

there was no possibility either of restoring them or of carrying on orderly government without them, except by despotic power. He had in mind the necessity of the existence of a strong and unified Italy, which during his life-time, as for many centuries longer, had remained divided politically. As a student of practical politics, he sought to determine the workings of a real, not of an ideal, political life. *The Prince* is concerned to discover, from history and from contemporary events, how principalities are won, how they are held, and how they are lost. Fifteenth century Italy afforded a multitude of examples, both great and small. Few rulers were legitimate ; even the popes, in many cases, secured election by corrupt means. The rules for achieving success were not quite the same as they became when times grew more settled, for no one was shocked by cruelties and treacheries which would have disqualified a man in the eighteenth or the nineteenth century. Perhaps our age, again, can better appreciate Machiavelli, for some of the most notable successes of our time have been achieved by methods as base as any employed in Renaissance Italy. He would have applauded, as an artistic connoisseur in state-craft, Hitler's Reichstag fire, his purge of the party in 1934, and his breach of faith after Munich.

In fact, behind nearly everything that Machiavelli said was his assumption that human nature is selfish, and that the effective motives on which a statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for security in the masses and the desire for power in rulers. Government is founded upon the weakness and insufficiency of the individual, who is unable to protect himself against the aggression of other individuals unless supported by the power of the state. Men are always in a condition of strife and competition which threatens open anarchy unless restrained by the force behind the law. He frequently remarked that "men are in general bad, and that the wiser ruler will construct his policies on this assumption." We, therefore, conclude that governments and politics are only the reflection of human nature. Human nature being what it is, politics would remain the same as Machiavelli described it. Some social scientists and psychologists have come to the conclusion that there are certain instincts, urges and passions in man which are ineradi-

cable. Human nature, they say, has not changed for the last two thousand years. To Machiavelli also, human nature is unchanging. "Wise men say," he writes, "not without reason that whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past ; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who have been, and ever will be, animated by the same passions ; and thus they must necessarily have the same results."[5] Such a view of human nature involves two basic errors. Firstly, it is absurd to assume that human nature is something fixed and immutable. It is a determinist view and such views which Prof. K. Popper calls as "historicist" are an obstacle to a rational approach to the problems of the social, economic and political reconstruction. Secondly, it is of little avail to merely say that such and such is human nature, that love for power and domination, selfishness, acquisitiveness, envy and rage are the main springs of human action. The problem, after knowing these, is how to transmute and sublimate them into something good.

But in spite of his defective understanding of human nature and his preference for political virtues in place of moral or religious virtues, it is to be frankly admitted that Machiavelli never despised religion and that he was not immoral and irreligious in his politics. Those who expect him to do so will be surprised to read the title of a chapter in his *Discourses* : "The importance of giving religion a prominent influence in a state, and how Italy was ruined because she failed in this respect through the conduct of the church of Rome." We can also examine his remark : "Princes and Republics who wish to maintain themselves free from corruption must above all things preserve the purity of all religious observances and treat them with proper reverence ; for there is no greater indication of the ruin of a country than to see religion contemned."[6] He regarded church as necessary for the health and prosperity of a state. He knew that a state could not flourish if the citizens were induced to serve it solely by fear of such punishment as the ruler could inflict. As such, Machiavelli accepted religion in

5 *Discourses*, III, 43.
6 *Ibid.*, XII.

general but was against the evil effects of Christianity. "The observance of religious institutions," he says, "is the cause of the greatness of the republics ; disregard of these institutions produces the ruin of the state."[7] He had respect for religious institutions but he disliked Christianity as it was practised in his time. He excoriated it as having failed to make good citizens. It diverted too much attention to heaven and enfeebled men by preaching the feminine virtues. The rebellion of Voltaire, Diderot, Paine, Darwin, Spencer and Renan against Christianity was quite different from that of Machiavelli. They rejected the theology of Christianity but admired the Christian moral code. On the contrary, Machiavelli accepted its theology but rejected its ethic, its conception of goodness as gentleness, humility, non-resistance ; its love of peace and its denunciation of war. For his part, he preferred the Roman ethic based upon the principle that the safety of the people or state is the supreme law.[8]

"Where it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, we must admit of no considerations of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of praise or ignominy ; but putting all else aside we must adopt whatever course will save the nation's existence and liberty."[9] Alexander VI never did, nor thought of anything but cheating and yet he was eminently popular and successful. Romulus was equally justified in killing his brother for the sake of unity in the government. Frauds, cruelties and crimes committed in order to preserve one's country are "honourable frauds", "glorious crimes". There is no eternal or natural law, no right universally agreed upon and hence, thought Machiavelli, politics in the sense of statesmanship must be held completely independent of morality. Morality and religion are, at best, instruments of politics. This is what a modern politician or a statesman thinks of morality and religion. If a modern politician is justified in either separating morality and religion from politics or in subordinating them to it, Machiavelli was equally right in holding politics above morality

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7 *Ibid.*, I, 11-12.
8 Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization* (Volume V), Renaissance, p. 558.
9 *Discourses*, III, 41-42.

and religion for the purpose of the unity of the government or of the nation. Only a staunch moralist or a redeemed religious man will not accept such a view of the superiority of politics, because he interprets life in a metaphysical sense and, as such, he is never attracted by earthly virtue of power, fame, glory or national unity, etc. But Machiavelli was not a saint. He was an ordinary human being, who was moved by the force of the circumstances of his time and who was much more interested in the rebuilding of his country, Italy, which had lost its glory and strength and had become politically divided. He never attempted to idealize the state, but, on the contrary, he was concerned with the actual state of affairs and did his best for the greatness of Italy in the face of peculiar circumstances of his time. Further, Machiavelli, as said earlier, did not neglect totally the importance of religion in the life of a nation, but was conscious of the role which it plays in harmonizing the social and political life of the people.

However, the question is ultimately one of power. To achieve a political end, power of one kind or another, is necessary. This plain fact is concealed by slogans, such as "right will prevail" or "the triumph of evil is short-lived." If the side that you think right prevails, that is because it has superior power. It is true that power, often, depends upon opinion, and opinion upon propaganda ; it is true, also, that it is an advantage in propaganda to seem more virtuous than your adversary, and that one way of seeming virtuous is to be virtuous. For this reason, it may sometimes happen that victory goes to the side which has the most of what the general public considers to be virtue. We must concede to Machiavelli that this was an important element in the growing power of the church during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, as well as in the success of the Reformation in the sixteenth century. But there are important limitations. In the first place, those who have seized power can, by controlling propaganda, cause their party to appear virtuous ; no one, for example, could mention the sins of Alexander VI in a New York or Boston public school. In the second place, there are chaotic periods during which obvious knavery frequently succeeds ; the period of Machiavelli was one of them. In such times, there tends to be a rapidly grow-

ing cynicism, which makes man forgive anything provided it pays. Even in such times, as Machiavelli himself accepted, it is desirable to present an appearance of virtue before the ignorant public.

Also, Machiavelli accepted the superiority of Republics over princedoms in his book, *Discourses*. In this work, republics are distinguished from princedoms as free states from unfree, and are declared to be superior to the latter both in their essential nature and in many particular advantages. "The voice of the people," he said, "is the voice of God." In the election of their magistrates they make far better choice than princes ; and no people will ever be persuaded to elect a man of infamous character and corrupt habits to any post of dignity, to which a prince is easily influenced in a thousand different ways. If we compare the faults of the people with those of princes, as well as their respective good qualities, we shall find the people vastly superior in the making of laws, and in the forming of civil institutions and new statutes and ordinances, the people are superior in maintaining those institutions, laws and ordinances, which certainly places them on a par with those who established them. He was of the view that the people were guilty of fewer excesses than the prince, and that the errors of the people were of less importance and therefore more easily remedied.

Machiavelli thought of the state on the analogy of a living organic body. A state is made a state by a certain structure of organization, as the body is made an organism by a similar structure among its parts. In the state this structure is composed of the laws and institutions by which the people are governed, and the difference between a free state and an unfree state depends, according to Machiavelli, upon whether the citizens conform to these laws spontaneously or by compulsion. The unfree state is like a diseased body, of which the organs require to be compelled by the ministrations of a doctor to play their proper parts within the system. The free state is like a healthy body in which the parts keep in order naturally, and do not need to be reduced to order by means of a medical regime.

Viewed in this way, Machiavelli's philosophy of the state, as it was, cannot be considered fully inimical to the civilizing

forces of man as Laski thought, although there are chances of misunderstanding the former's doctrine. If the state has a moral basis[10] and it essentially stands for a moral purpose and if moral purpose of the state means the social welfare or the widest possible fulfilment of the material and cultural needs and desires of the people, then Machiavelli's *Discourses* gives a sufficient proof of his consciousness towards this ideal of the state. His preference for a princedom is purely conditional. Where virtue is lacking and people are corrupt and they have no respect for laws, it becomes necessary, according to Machiavelli, to establish some superior power which, with a royal hand, and with full and absolute powers, may put a curb upon the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. Otherwise, a free state, as described above, is definitely far superior to an unfree state. A strong prince, with a coercive authority, is needed only under peculiar circumstances. This appears to be quite sound and convincing.

Machiavelli was the product of Italy of the 15th century which had become an asylum of power-politics. There was no political unity, and, as such, it was open to external interference. Its unity and greatness were in danger. Machiavelli realized the urgent need of the then Italy in order to save it from ruin. He, therefore, wrote his famous book, *The Prince*. Although in *The Prince* he worked out philosophy of a very strong king, who was not to be bound by the moral standards of the people, but his king or prince was not an irresponsible one who never cared for the well-being of his citizens. Machiavelli was quite emphatic on this point. He said that the prince should be feared, but not hated by the citizens. Further, the prince must patronize the distinguished ability in the fine arts, and must liberally encourage the useful arts of commerce and agriculture. The prince must embrace every opportunity to develop a reputation for exalted purposes and character.

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10 "The state is based on a common conviction about a *right order* of human relations and the obligatory nature of the order."
(E. Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory*, p. 199)

"It possesses power because it has duties. It exists to enable men, at least potentially, to realize the best that is in themselves.....The state accordingly is subject to a moral test of adequacy."
(H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 27-28)

Hence it cannot be argued that Machiavelli had no respect for morality and religion, and that he tried to create a king as strong as a ruthless dictator, having no responsibilities towards his subjects. There seems to be nothing objectionable in his republics which he discussed at length in his famous book, *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius*, and considered superior to princedoms. Machiavelli's princedom, too, the idea of which he worked out under the peculiar circumstances of Italy of his time, is a lawful and responsible state. A good prince, according to him, must respect the laws of the state, and, as such, his authority must accept certain limitations at least in practice, if not in theory.

Nevertheless, Machiavelli's political thinking is in one or the other respect somewhat shallow. He had a passion for aggrandizement. If for Plato, as it was also for Gandhi, the impulse to aggrandizement was a symptom of disease, for Machiavelli, on the contrary, it was the symptom and natural consequence of health in a state. This passion for territorial expansion of the state is equally traceable in both of his books, *The Prince* and *Discourses*. Also, Machiavelli was occupied with great lawgivers, such as Lycurgus and Solon, who wanted to create a community all in one piece, with little regard to what had gone before. The conception of a community as an organic growth, which the statesmen can only affect to a limited extent, is in the main modern, and has been greatly strengthened by the theory of evolution. This conception is not to be found in Machiavelli any more than in Plato.

It might, however, be maintained that the evolutionary view of society, though true in the past, is no longer applicable, but must for the present and the future, be replaced by a much more mechanistic view. In Russia and Germany new societies have been created, in much the same way as the mythical Lycurgus was supposed to have created the Spartan Polity. The ancient lawgiver is a terrifying reality. To quote Russell, "The world has become more like that of Machiavelli than it was, and the modern man who hopes to refute his philosophy must think more deeply than seemed necessary in the nineteenth century."[11]

[11] B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, II impression, 1947), p. 532.

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Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

Thomas Hobbes was born at Westport in North Wilts in 1588. Before he was fifteen years old, he entered Oxford and immediately acquired a dislike for universities which lasted the rest of his life. As he was a man of a very studious nature, he became a classical scholar on his own account and, after he had passed his fortieth year, turned to philosophy by way of mathematics. In 1640 he abandoned England for France because of the threatening civil war. For nearly eleven years he lived in close association with the most eminent philosophers and scientists of Paris, and there he wrote his master work, *Leviathan*, which came out in 1651. His other two important books, *De Corpore Politico* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642), were also known to the world during his stay in France. As a firm believer in authority and order, he considered France of absolute monarchy rather than parliamentary England as his spiritual home. As a result, he constructed a system of strong and irresponsible sovereign authority on the basis of social contract theory. He was the first Englishman who wrote comprehensively on political philosophy.

Hobbes's political writings were prompted by the civil wars and were intended by him to exert influence upon the side of the king. He was a great critic of the upholders of the constitutional rule based on popular consent in the 17th century. As such, his writings were designed to support an absolute government, and in Hobbes's intention this meant absolute monarchy. He had full sympathy with and was attached to the royalist party, and he sincerely believed that monarchy was the most stable and orderly kind of government. Yet his books could not arouse the sympathy either of the Stuarts whom he meant to support or of the revolutionists and constitutionalists whom he attempted to refute. In fact, his political philosophy

had too wide a sweep to make good propaganda, but its drastic logic affected the whole later history of moral and political thought. Its positive influence did not fully grow until the nineteenth century, when his ideas were included in the philosophical radicalism of the utilitarians and in John Austin's theory of legal sovereignty.

Hobbes was the first modern political thinker who tried to bring political theory into close connection with a thoroughly modern system of thought, and he "strove to make this system broad enough to account, on scientific principles, for all the facts of nature, including human behaviour both in its individual and social aspects."[1] Though his ideas were mostly suited to his own time and have become obsolete now, yet the fact remains that he had something which can be rightly described as a science of politics, which served as an integral part of his whole conception of the natural world and which he maintained throughout with an extraordinary clearness. His philosophy well illustrates the remark of Bacon that "Truth emerges more easily from error than from confusion." Because of the clarity and pungency of his style Hobbes is regarded as the greatest writer on political philosophy that the English speaking peoples have ever produced.

The political philosophy of Hobbes is a part of his general philosophy based on scientific materialism which he grasped from the system of motion of Galileo and Newton. Galileo suggested that the physical world is a purely mechanical system in which all that happens can be explained with geometrical precision by the displacement of bodies relative to one another. Likewise, Hobbes conceived that all knowledge is of one piece and mechanics gives the pattern. Motion is the completely pervasive fact in nature. To this he related his analysis of human nature. There are various factors such as sensation, feeling, imagination, memory, reason, and thought which play a dominant role in shaping human behaviour. According to Hobbes, human behaviour is a mode of motion, a mechanical system, which can be explained with all

1 George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (Third ed., George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1957), p. 388.

exactness by analyzing the above factors. And social behaviour, upon which the art of government rests, is merely a special type of human behaviour which is exhibited when men act with reference to one another. The science of politics is therefore built upon psychology. He proposed to show not what government in fact is, but what it must demonstrably be in order to control successfully beings whose motivation is that of the human machine.

Hobbes's first problem, while discussing his political philosophy was, therefore, to state the principle of human behaviour and to formulate the conditions upon which a stable society is possible. In accordance with his materialistic principles reality consists always in the motion of bodies, which is "transmitted through the sense-organs to central nervous system, where it appears as sensation."[2] The perception of external bodies, to put in other words, causes an inward motion to the sense organs of the living organism which calls forth an outward reaction from the brain or heart. Every outward reaction of the sense organ is not to be called sense but only that "which at several times is by vehemence made stronger and more predominant than others." As the vital motion, which, he thought inadequately, is always connected with the heart rather than the brain, is heightened or repressed, two primitive types of feeling, appetite to or desire and aversion from, appear. According to Hobbes, some appetites or aversions are born with man ; others are acquired in due course of time. The object of a man's appetite is called 'good', that of his aversion, 'evil'. He did not believe that anything is inherently good or evil. Goodness or badness of a thing depends upon human feelings towards it and is, therefore, subjective. It may also differ with man and man. An object may attract one man and repel another. Men try to pursue in life what appears good to them. In this way, Hobbes's whole conception was more or less utilitarian in the sense that a man considers the utility and goodness of his action before he decides to act upon it. Man, according to him, not only pursues the object of his attraction, he also tries to defend it jealously against others who obstruct his effort of obtaining

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

it. Further, if two men desire the same object which they both cannot enjoy, their equality of ability and hope of achieving the object makes them enemies. Power means the acquirement of present means to attain some future good. Hobbes, on the whole, recognized three principal causes of conflict between men i.e., competition, diffidence and glory.

Hobbes based his description of state of Nature on his idea of selfish nature of man. To him, the only basis of human action is a perpetual desire for power because man is essentially selfish and egoistical. Men are by nature, he maintained, equal in powers, both of body and mind. No man is so strong as to be safe against the attack of others. They are also equal in their desire of safety, desire of glory and desire of gain. Passions of acquisition and self-preservation create mutual distrust and state of war. The means of security being precarious, no moderation of desire can place a limit to the struggle for existence. The desire for security, the really fundamental need of human nature, is for all practical purposes inseparable from the desire for power, the present means of obtaining apparent future goods, because every degree of security requires to be still further secured. Hobbes explained :

"I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to ; or that he cannot be content with a more moderate power ; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."[3]

The individual whom Hobbes thus described is completely self-centred and power-seeking animal. He has an endless need for power of every sort, whether riches, or position, or reputation, or honour—all that may forfend the inevitable destruction which must in the end overtake all men. 'The means for attaining power may be either tangible, what Hobbes called "gain", or intangible, what he called "glory", but the value is the same. As such, every individual, for Hobbes, is an absolutely solitary individual. Contrasting men with bees and

[3] *Leviathan*, XI.

ants, he said, "Men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not ; consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred and finally war."[4] Therefore men will always live in a condition of perpetual fear, of competition and war. He further argued that since knowledge comes from the senses and different senses cannot see the same world, a man and his world must be one and different from the world of other men. Different individuals have absolutely separate worlds, separate pleasures, truths, goods, and they belong to no order, moral or politic. Hobbes, so frequently portrayed as the great absolutist, is thus the greatest individualist in the history of political thought. "His is an extreme doctrine of individualism embracing everything. He is a Nominalist of the school of Occam, and his individualism is quite unqualified—more so, indeed, than that of any other writer."[5]

This is the picture of state of Nature which, Hobbes believed, man used to live in before the formation of society. Each human being in the state of Nature, it follows from the above account, is actuated only by considerations that touch his own security or power, and other human beings are of consequence to him only as they affect this. Since individuals are roughly equal in strength and cunning, none can be secure, and their condition, so long as there is no civil power to regulate their behaviour, is a "war of ever many against every man." In such a condition, there can be no distinction between right or wrong or just or unjust, for any conception of right and wrong or just and unjust presupposes a common standard of conduct, a common law to judge the case and a common superior to adjudge things. It is also inconsistent with any kind of civilization. Hobbes remarked: "In such condition, there is no place for industry ; because the fruit thereof is uncertain ; and consequently no culture of the earth ; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building ; no instruments of moving, and removing,

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4 *Ibid.*, XI.

5 C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought* (The English Universities Press Ltd., London, 1958), p. 52.

such things as require much force ; no knowledge of the face of the earth ; no account of time ; no arts ; no letters ; no society ; and which is the worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death ; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[6] Man's vainglory or pride unfits him for success in such a condition, but the condition itself is the result not of his defects but of his very nature. The state of Nature, as Hobbes described it, is "the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in." And the problem for Hobbes was how to extricate him from a position which the very principle of the universe, motion, has apparently designed for him.

This is only the one half of the picture of human nature, as discussed by Hobbes. And if, on the basis of Hobbes's description of this part of human nature, we once hold that man is completely self-centred and egoistic or savage and anti-social, it is then, we can reasonably conclude, not possible for him to set up a government. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the second principle in human nature, which, according to Hobbes, is reason. If the first principle—desire—hurries man on to take for himself what other men want and so embroils him with other men, the second principle—reason—teaches him to "fly a contranatural dissolution." What reason adds is not a new motive but a regulative power, or foresight, by which the pursuit of security becomes more effective without ceasing to follow the general rule of self-preservation.

The net conclusion that we draw about the human nature by considering both the principles, as described by Hobbes, is that it is neither so reasonable nor so unreasonable as he at first assumed it to be. Further, the reason, being actuated by the consideration of self-preservation, decides in favour of a civilized and social life. The transition is, however, made by the Laws of Nature, the "conditions of society or of human peace." The Laws of Nature meant for him a set of rules according to which an ideally reasonable being will pursue his own advantage, if he is perfectly conscious of all the circum-

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[6] *Leviathan*, XI.

stances in which he is acting and is quite unswayed by momentary impulse and prejudice. Since he assumed that in the large men really do act in this way, the Laws of Nature state hypothetical conditions upon which the fundamental traits of human beings allow a stable government to be founded. They do not state values but they determine casually and rationally what can be given value in legal and moral systems. Hobbes explained :

"Therefore the Law of Nature.....is the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies."[7]

"A Law of Nature is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same ; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved."[8]

Reason teaches men to obey Natural Laws, which, according to Hobbes, are nineteen in number. The first Law of Nature holds that every man should seek peace and preserve it, and if he cannot obtain it, he should "use all helps and advantages of war." The second Law of Nature lays down that a man must be willing, along with others and in the interest of peace and self-preservation, to forswear his right to all things, be content with as much liberty as would allow others over himself and transfer some of his rights by a contract. The third Law of Nature enjoins that "men perform their covenants made." According to the fourth Law of Nature, the man to whom the rights are transferred causes no injury to the one who makes that transfer. These are the most important Laws of Nature. Other Laws of Nature point to the advisability of an individual accommodating himself to the rest, cultivating complaisance, spirit of freedom, sense of equity and avoiding the spirit of revenge, cruelty, pride and avarice.

There are two things about Hobbes's Natural Laws. First, they are not the principles of an Eternal Justice or of a Perfect

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7 *De Cive*, II, 1.
8 *Leviathan*, XIV.

Morality, as understood by the Stoics, of which actual law is the imperfect reflection. They are merely "counsels of prudence." While discussing Natural Laws Hobbes remarked that "there are no such things as moral rights, no clash between a man's duty and a man's interest, but only an appeal from man drunk to man sober, only a difference between bad and good calculation.[9] Secondly, Hobbes's Natural Laws do not imply that there is such a thing as a common good. They are merely the postulates by which Hobbes's rational construction of society is to take place. They are at once the principles or rules of perfect prudence and of social morality, and therefore they make possible the step from the psychological motives of individual action to the precepts and values of civilized law and morality.

Thus Laws of Nature serve as the sound basis of society and later on of government. The prime condition of society is mutual trust and the keeping of covenants, for without it there can be no certainty of performance, but there must be a reasonable presumption that other persons will meet you on the same ground. Hobbes, it must be admitted, was conscious of the fact that the egoistic element in human nature would make any covenant or society impossible. He, therefore, worked out a plan for the Laws of Nature. The setting up of the Laws of Nature is a way of redressing those competitive and ruthless qualities of human nature which are inconsistent with mutual confidence. However, he was completely a utilitarian and an individualist in his thinking. According to Hobbes, all human behaviour is motivated by individual self-interest, and society is essentially regarded merely as a means to this end. The power of the state and the authority of the law are justified only because they contribute to the security of individual human beings, and there is no rational ground of obedience and respect for authority except the anticipation that these will yield a larger individual advantage than their opposites. Social well-being as such disappears entirely and is replaced by a sum of separate self-interests.

Society, according to Hobbes, is merely an 'artificial' body, a

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9 *Leviathan*, XIV.

collective term for the fact that human beings find it individually advantageous to exchange goods and services. But the will of the representative, who is to act as the sovereign, cannot be the common will of all, because there is no such thing. His representative will is a substitute for the conflicting individual wills, and this substitution is the only way in which many men can find unity. "A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented ; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that makes the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person : and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude."

Although Hobbes's analysis of human nature is defective, there is a logical consistency in his ideas and conclusions. It has already been stated that Hobbes considered man's nature as antisocial. In view of this assumption, it is unreasonable to expect men to agree spontaneously to respect one another's rights. Hence the performance of covenants may be reasonably expected only if there is an effective government which will punish non-performance.

"Covenants, without sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[10]

"The bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power." [11] All the Laws of Nature, such as justice, equity, modesty, mercy etc., are helpless to teach men to live in co-operation with mutual understanding without the force of power to cause them to be observed. Hence coercive power is needed to apply necessary sanctions to curb man's innately unsocial inclinations. Apparently Hobbes meant that reason provides a sufficient ground for mutual accord but is too weak to offset the avarice of men in the mass. In substance his theory amounted to "identifying government with force ; at least, the force must always be present in the background whether it has to be applied or not."[12] Hobbes's thought on

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10 *Ibid.*, XVII.
11 *Ibid.*, XIV.
12 G. H. Sabine, *op. cit.* (1957), p. 398.

this point becomes further clear when we consider his statement that "the agreement of *other* creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit."[13]

Hobbes, in the second part of *Leviathan*, created a commonwealth by giving a new orientation to the old idea of the social contract. The social contract before him represented a governmental contract, a contract between ruler and ruled. He built his commonwealth on the idea:

"The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that, by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgements, to his judgement."[14]

He further explained:

"I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner." This done, "the multitude so united in one person, is called a *commonwealth*, in Latin *civitas*."[15]

The underlying idea of all his arguments is that a mere multitude cannot have rights and cannot act authoritatively. Only individual man can do this. The net conclusion is that

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[13] *Leviathan*, XVII. (Italicized word mine).
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*

any collective body is merely artificial. Some one must act in the name of the whole group. And a corporation is not really a collective body at all but one person, whose supreme will is to be received for the will of all its members. On this analogy it follows, of course, as George H. Sabine also remarks, that society is a mere fiction. But I differ from Sabine when he says that "Hobbes's thought on this point can be stated, perhaps more accurately, by using the legal conception of a corporation instead of contract, as he did in *De cive*."[16] Sabine's assumption is that Hobbes's commonwealth is, more or less, based on the legal conception of a corporation, and not on the idea of a perfect contract which entails an agreement on the part of the people who compose a corporation, or who are part and parcel of it. If we admit this assumption, we are likely to conclude that Hobbes's conception of political commonwealth was not at all individualistic in essence, and the members have no say in making of a corporation or of a political commonwealth. Although such a confusion arises when we examine the attributes and powers of Hobbes's sovereign, it is not adequate to say, as Sabine remarks, that the idea of contract or of voluntary agreement amongst people themselves is not clear in Hobbes's commonwealth. Hobbes was quite emphatic on this point when he stated :

"The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by natural force ; as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves and their children to his government.....The other, is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some one, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a political commonwealth, or a commonwealth by *institution* ; and the former, a commonwealth by acquisition."[17]

However, it is to be admitted that, for Hobbes, there is no choice except between absolute power and complete anarchy, between an omnipotent sovereign and no society of whatsoever kind. According to him, social body has no existence except through its constituted authorities, and its members have no

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16 G. H. Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 398.
17 *Leviathan*, XVII.

rights except by delegation. All social and political authority must accordingly be vested in the sovereign. The characteristics of Hobbes's Leviathan are unmistakable. He is the sole source of laws, and he is, of course, the sole interpreter of laws. He is not subject to civil laws, although he remains bound by them so long as he does not repeal them. Hobbes did not recognize the utility of the traditional medieval idea that the king should be *sub lege*, subject to the condition that he should obey the law. Nor did he recognize the use for the idea of fundamental law, of a law that cannot be changed by the sovereign without the consent of the people. He wrote that "I could never see in any author, what a fundamental law signifieth." Sovereign is the creator of Right and Justice. The Law of Nature cannot be pleaded against him, for the purpose of the Law of Nature is the creation of sovereign, who alone can interpret it. The Law of God can also not be pleaded against him, because it is through him that the Law of God can be approached. Hobbes wrote that "there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person ; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God."[18] Further, the sovereign is the sole judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what are conducive to peace and tranquillity. He has the final right of judging things ; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. "For," he wrote, "without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another : the laws concerning *meum* and *tuum* are in vain ; and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted."[19] Sovereign has also the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths ; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed and

[18] *Ibid.*, XVIII.
[19] *Ibid.*

paid for that end ; and to levy money upon the subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. These are some of the rights which the Leviathan of Hobbes enjoys and which are the marks, according to him, by which a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed and "resideth."

There is also another side of his theory of sovereignty which though Hobbes emphasized less, yet to which he was not blind at all. For controversial purposes he stressed the point that resistance to authority can never be justified, since justification would require the approval of authority itself. It equally follows, however, that resistance will, in fact, occur wherever government fails to protect—the condition for subjects' submission. If the protection is not guaranteed by the sovereign to the people, the latter may then be thrown back upon their individual resources for self-protection and may rightly give their obedience to a new sovereign who can protect them. It is only on the utilitarian ground that Hobbes justified any government, and the later thinkers had no difficulty in accepting this point of view. And Sabine is right when he remarks on this point that "what limits the sovereign is not the law of nature but the power of his subjects. Hobbes's sovereign is faced by a condition and not a theory, but there can be no limitation of the civil law in its own field. Bodin's conception of a constitutional law limiting the competence of the sovereign has disappeared entirely."[20]

In fact, it will be wrong to say that Leviathan is such a person who can tolerate no liberty. There is liberty under him. It is that which man enjoys in the silence of the laws. Leviathan has no passion for undue interference. "For the use of laws is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions ; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion ; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in their way." Men can enjoy sufficient liberty "to buy and sell and otherwise contract with one another ; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and

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[20] G. H. Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

institute their children as they themselves think fit ; and the like."[21] Although it would be unwise to see in Hobbes an early exponent of *laissez faire*, he was, however, convinced of the fact that the distressed "ought not to be left to the charity of private persons"—they were Leviathan's responsibility. And he also held that "there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts, such as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture which requires labour." But, Hobbes believed, Leviathan was not to interfere in the matters of intellect and conscience as these were beyond his reach. Also, Leviathan cannot force "men to believe." "Thought is free." Hobbes, in fact, was an implacable enemy of all authority in philosophy, belief and opinion. And the justification for the existence of the "secret-thought police to be found in 20th century totalitarian states is not to be sought in him."[22]

In this way, Hobbes's political philosophy was quite individualistic in essence in spite of the fact that he propounded a theory of an absolute sovereign. He was as much the product of the circumstances of his time as Machiavelli was, and hence it would be wrong to expect from him the doctrine of a perfect democracy or of a perfect individualism as we have in the 20th century. At the same time, it should also be remembered that although the despot, the hero, the divinely-appointed ruler—or whatever else he may choose to call him—will not invariably have wisdom or foresight, at least it will always be his interest to keep the rival folly, the innate lawlessness of the many-headed multitude, in check. The besetting sin of democracy is anarchy, and the best check yet discovered upon anarchy is the strong arm and, when necessary, the sharp sword of the ruler who is ultimately responsible only to himself. It is true that the motive power must commonly, if not always, be looked for from below ; but the wild forces of nature, which furnish the raw material of the statesman, will in the ordinary course of things spring from the multitude and the soil. But what is the motive power, or wild force, with-

[21] *Leviathan*, XXI.
[22] C. L. Wayper, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

out guidance ? And what is the worth of raw material until it is fashioned and worked up ? At the lowest estimate, Vaughan rightly remarks, "the second element is as necessary to the final product, the welfare and progress of mankind, as the first. And if, on the strictest construction, the rulers can claim no more than the second place, that is the worst of reasons for asserting that he has no place at all. Judged by a purely ideal standard, both may be evils ; certainly, both carry many evils in their train. But in this imperfect world, both are necessary evils ; and the one without the other would be ten times more evil yet."[23] But looking from the viewpoint of the spirit of political commonwealth another remark of Vaughan that "the state of Leviathan is a state avowedly founded upon slavery : founded therefore upon a principle which is the very negation of all justice"[24] does not hold much truth. Also his remark—"The 'society' called together by the 'covenant' is seen, directly we examine it, to be no society at all. All life is gathered in the 'one man' at the head of it ; the rest of the body is a dead weight, a mere unprofitable mass"[25]—does not sound very convincing. If we closely examine the liberty of subjects and the condition of revolution against the sovereign, as made clear by Hobbes in Chapter XVIII of *Leviathan*, his viewpoint becomes crystal clear. Further, his discussion of the characteristics of political commonwealth in Chapter XVII of *Leviathan* also clearly indicates that the voluntary consent of the people remains fundamental in the making of a corporation or of an institution. The idea of self-preservation which actuates men to agree to the authority of a sovereign serves as a positive limitation to the unbridled passions and authority of the sovereign. Men, who were, according to Hobbes, so ego-centric and so jealous of their freedom that they remained at war against one another in the state of Nature, cannot be reduced under any circumstances to the state of slavery. They submit to the authority of sovereign purely on the utilitarian ground and a society which

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23 C. E. Vaughan, *History of Political Philosophy* (Manchester University Press, England, 1925), p. 53.
24 *Ibid.*, p. 51.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

is based on a utilitarian principle cannot be regarded as a society of mere slaves or of 'unprofitable mass' as Vaughan wrongly thinks.

Hobbes's remarks on Natural Laws serve as a forceful reminder of the fact that Leviathan's authority is legitimate only because of the consent of each individual. Men can be forced to obey a *de facto* sovereign power, but they have no moral obligation to do so in the sense that they have a moral obligatian to obey the Leviathan that they have authorized to act for them. His doctrine of social contract was an attempt to answer the question, "Why do men obey the state ?" not "What is the historical origin of it ?" In employing it Hobbes was remarking, "This is how I can best explain my idea of the state," and his advice is legitimate since his is an analytical and not a historical problem—a problem on which there has been a great fuss since the 17th century and on which Hobbes's doctrine of social contract has been much challenged. In fact, his doctrine of social contract ought to be understood in a logical and not in a chronological sense. It was mainly concerned with the origin of the state, not in time but in reason. Over and above, for Hobbes as for Burke, "politics ought to be adjusted, not to pure human reasonings, but to human nature ; of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part." Given such an individual as the one with whom Hobbes starts, no other contract than this is conceivable. Admitting the fact that man's nature is constant, only such a contract as this, Wayper rightly remarks, "can ensure that the natural result of man's nature, namely chaos, will not also be constant. The reflection of a lantern can be changed by the insertion of a lens through which its rays must pass without any alteration being made to the lantern itself, and the chaos which is the normal result of a man's quest for Felicity in a world in which he is not alone can be changed into peace without any alteration in man himself—but only by insertion between man and the screen of the world of the artificial lens, which is Leviathan."[26]

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[26] C. L. Wayper, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

On the basis of our above discussion of Hobbes's political doctrines we can finally draw that his work, *Leviathan*, is the first consistent statement of "complete sovereignty" in the history of political thought. The state in the Greek political thought had a high moral and spiritual character. Both legal and ethical aspects were blended in it. It was not an organization in the ordinary sense but an organization—a moral organization, as politics, to the Greeks, was the ethics of whole society. In the Roman political thought the state was conceived as the legal sovereign, but the political sovereignty lay with the people as a whole. The delegation of authority by a governmental contract, and not by a social contract, was made to the public officials, although the delegation was considered completely irrevocable. Political authority in the Middle Ages was regarded as the expression of justice. The medieval thinkers held, with the Greek writers like Plato and Aristotle, that the propagation of justice and right is one of the great functions of the state. The state, as such, had as much to do with the moral conduct of a man as the church. Machiavelli was struggling with two different systems of government—Princedom and Republic—and his views lacked consistency regarding any definite theory of state. Bodin, who is regarded as the first to maintain explicitly the doctrine of state sovereignty, subjected the absolute king to the common custom, the law of Nature and the law of God. Hence it was Hobbes who first propounded a doctrine of the absolute and unrestricted sovereignty of the state. His sovereign enjoys an absolute authority over his subjects, and his powers can neither be divided nor limited either by the law of Nature or by the law of God. He is all in all.

Nevertheless, the state, Hobbes emphatically asserted, is a machine, an artefact, a contrivance of man. It is based on mutual agreement between men. Viewed in the light of Hobbes's theory of contract, the meaning of state becomes clear and understandable. "Once men view the state as something made by themselves, they may think that they can build something other and better than Leviathan." According to Hobbes, the most important thing about the state is that it is nothing more than a machine.

Lastly, Hobbes's *Leviathan* is not only a forceful enunciation of the theory of sovereignty and of the machine view of the state, it is also a powerful statement of individualism. While discussing the origin of the state, Hobbes made the purpose of government quite distinct from the point of view of the individual members. The resulting estimate of the government is wholly secular and utilitarian. The advantages of government are tangible and they must accrue quite tangibly to individuals, in the form of peace, comfort and security of person and property. This is the only ground upon which government can be justified or even exist. Hobbes did not let us forget that the state exists to serve men's needs and that its moral authority derives from the consent of the governed. Wayper correctly remarks on this point that "Hobbes is no liberal or democrat, but he is a *thorough* individualist, not because he believes in the sanctity of individual man, but because for him the world is and must always be made up of individuals."[27] And the recognition of self-interest as the dominant motive in life has been the most pervasive tendency in modern times. As such, Hobbes's *Leviathan* is, in Professor Oakeshott's words, "the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English Language."

[7] C. L. Wayper, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65 (Italicized word mine).

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John Locke (1632-1704)

'If I have anything to boast of, it is that I sincerely love and seek truth with indifferency whom it pleases or displeases.'

—*Letter to his friend Anthony Collins.*

Born at Wrington in Somersetshire in 1632, Locke is regarded as the greatest figure in the history of English political thought. He came of Puritan parents, and was for fourteen years educated in his own family circle—a little pocket of peace in a restive country soon to be plunged into civil war. He was educated at Westminster and Oxford—of which his recollections, like those of Hobbes, were not the most complimentary. Judging from some of his observations in a later essay entitled *Thoughts on Education*, he was most unhappy at school, forming a poor opinion not merely of Westminster but of public schools in general. Even at Oxford, where he went in 1652 and stayed for thirty years and where he considered an atmosphere more congenial to his already precocious mind, he was not very happy. Governed by Independents and crowded with Presbyterians, Oxford was becoming a hot-bed of fanaticism and heresy-hunting; and although Locke was by upbringing favourable to Puritanism, he found a great deal less liberty in the new regime than he had expected. Nevertheless, such men as Owen and Godwin were advocates of genuine religious liberty, and inspired in Locke that devotion to the idea of Toleration upon which he was later to write with such eloquence.

Recounting his early career to his patroness, Lady Masham, Locke later confessed that he was far from being a model student. Nevertheless, he studied in his own way, read widely, including the works of Descartes and Hobbes. The writings of Descartes awakened his interest in philosophy, and his friendship with Robert Boyle aroused his enthusiasm for the natural

sciences. He became a student of medicine and then was appointed physician to Lord Ashley. He was later appointed confidential secretary to Lord Shaftesbury, the founder of the Whig party. This association with the brilliant but erratic Shaftesbury was to influence Locke's life just as his connection with the Devonshires had influenced Hobbes's, and it gave him what Hobbes lacked, direct experience of practical, political affairs.

Notwithstanding, the parallel between his life and that of Hobbes is striking. Each studied at Oxford, for which each had little use. Each on leaving the University formed connections which influenced his whole life. Each wrote against a background of hectic political life and finally of revolution. Each sought refuge and safety abroad, and each peacefully completed his life in England. Each was an acknowledged political figure. But their conclusions regarding the ultimate goal of human life and the theory of state were widely divergent, and in the reputations that were theirs they differed as much as men may. Hobbes, to quote C. L. Wayper, "roused the wrath and resentment of Englishmen; Locke won their enthusiastic regard. His was the perfect justification for their perfect revolution—typically English alike in its lack of bloodshed, its respect for property, and its refusal to push matters to their logical conclusions." He emerged as a public figure, and was appointed in 1673, on Ashley's influence (afterwards famous as Earl of Shaftesbury), Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations.

His immersion in public life undoubtedly proved beneficial not only to Locke himself, but also to philosophy. He was never to suffer from that ingrown academic mentality which afflicts so many scholars and otherwise able thinkers. At Exeter House, where he met persons of every sort, he could select at will those with whom he wished to form lasting associations. Like many others who are surrounded by a throng of people, he enjoyed best the company of a small group of intimates. Out of a little 'study circle' at Exeter House in 1671 developed the greatest enterprise of his life. 'Five or six friends' had assembled, at Locke's invitation, to discuss the 'principles of morality and religion'. They were soon baffled by 'difficulties

that arose on every side'. Locke suggested that, as a prelude to such discussion, the members should think out for themselves the limits of man's capacity for knowledge. At first he believed it possible to jot down on 'a single sheet of paper' what these limits were ; but he soon found the task more arduous than he could have dreamed possible. Thus 'what was begun by chance was continued by entreaty, written by incoherent parcels, and after long intervals of neglect resumed again as humour and occasions permitted.' Twenty years were to pass before the great *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* was finally completed, but such were its small beginnings.

Locke finished the *Essay*, contributed articles to Le Clerc's *Bibliotheque Universelle* (these latter were his first publications), and thus embarked at the age of fifty-four upon the career for which he had been so long preparing, that of authorship. The next two years were occupied in consolidating his fame. He had a large number of manuscripts ready for the press, which were issued one after another to a now eager and receptive public : the *Letters on Toleration*, the two *Treatises on Civil Government* (published anonymously), and the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* itself. After that Locke, partly from inclination and partly on account of his health (which the climate of London had never suited), decided to retire to the country. This was to prove the most pleasant exile of all that he had experienced. His hosts, Sir Francis and Lady Masham, were the embodiments of hospitality and, what was much to Locke's taste, of human understanding. And thus Locke spent the last years of his life at the little village of Oates, conveniently situated twenty miles out of London, in the heart of Essex.

John Locke was the apostle of the Revolution of 1688, the most moderate and the most successful of all revolutions. Its aims were modest, but they were exactly achieved, and no subsequent revolution has hitherto been found necessary in England. Locke faithfully embodied its spirit, and most of his works appeared within a few years of 1688. His chief work in theoretical philosophy, the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, was finished in 1687 and published in 1690.

His *Essay* is the most important book, upon which his fame most securely rests ; but, at the same time, his influence on the philosophy of politics was so great and so lasting that he, to quote B. Russell, "must be treated as the founder of philosophical liberalism as much as of empiricism in theory of knowledge."[1] Locke was the most fortunate philosopher, who completed his work in theoretical philosophy just at the moment when the government of his country fell into the hands of men who shared his political opinions. Both in practice and in theory, the views which he advocated were held, for many years to come, by the most vigorous and influential politicians and philosophers. His political doctrines, with the developments due to Montesquieu, are embedded in the American Constitution, and are to be seen at work whenever there is a dispute between President and Congress. The British Constitution was based upon his doctrines until about fifty years ago, and so was that which the French adopted in 1871. In fact, there is an intimate connection between his theory of knowledge and his politics, and this connection is fully evident not only in France, but also in England (although comparatively in a lesser degree).

A characteristic of Locke, which descended from him to the whole Liberal movement, is lack of dogmatism. Some few certainties he took over from his predecessors : Our own existence, the existence of God, and the truth of mathematics. But wherever his doctrines differ from those of his forerunners, they are to the effect that truth is hard to ascertain, and that a rational man will hold his opinions with some measure of doubt. This temper of mind is obviously connected with religious toleration, with the success of parliamentary democracy, with *laissez faire*, and with the whole system of liberal maxims. Although he was a deeply religious man, a devout believer in Christianity who accepted revelation as a source of knowledge, he nevertheless hedged round professed revelations with rational safeguards. On one occasion he said : "Revelation must be judged by reason." Thus in the end reason remains supreme.

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1 B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1947, 2nd impression), p. 628.

What Locke meant by "reason" is to be gathered from his whole book. There is, it is true, a chapter called "Of Reason", but this is mainly concerned to prove that reason does not consist of syllogistic reasoning, and is summed up in the sentence : "God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational." Reason, as Locke used the term, consists of two parts : First, an inquiry as to what things we know with certainty ; Second, an investigation of propositions which it is wise to accept in practice, although they have only probability and not certainty in their favour. "The grounds of probability," he said, "are two : conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others' experience." The King of Siam, he remarked, ceased to believe what Europeans told him when they mentioned ice.

Locke may be regarded as the founder of empiricism, which means that all our knowledge is derived from experience. Accordingly, the first book of the *Essay* is concerned in arguing, as against Plato, Descartes and the scholastics, that there are no innate ideas or principles. Locke launched a frontal attack upon *a priori* thinking in general. If truth is native to our minds, he said, observation and experimental enquiry will lead us nowhere ; at best they can merely confirm our knowledge, never add to it. And it is doubtful whether, taking the word confirmation literally, they can even confirm such knowledge ; because an indubitable 'inner' conviction of the kind furnished by Descartes's *Cogito*, for instance, needs no additional evidence in its favour. In Locke's opinion, however, we arrive at knowledge by a method which is the reverse of that of the spider, who spins its web out of its own bowels. We do not nurture ideas from within ; we acquire them from without. There are no 'innate ideas'. All our ideas (i.e., all our knowledge) are acquired through and in sensation. In the second book, Locke set to work to show, in detail, how experience gives rise to various kinds of ideas. Having rejected innate ideas, he said :

"Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store, which

the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer in one word, from experience : in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself."[2]

Our ideas are derived from two sources : (1) sensation, and (2) perception of the operation of our own mind, which may be called "internal sense". Since we can only think by means of ideas, and since all ideas come from experience, it is evident that none of our knowlege can antedate experience.

Perception, he said, is "the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it." This may seem to a modern, almost a truism, since it has become part of educated commonsense, at least in English-speaking countries. But in his day the mind was supposed to know all sorts of things *a priori*, and the complete dependence of knowledge upon perception, which he proclaimed, was a new and revolutionary doctrine.

To 'know', in Locke's view, is to perceive a relation between ideas. Ideas, according to him, are of two kinds. These are : first, simple ideas, derived either immediately in sensation, or by a kind of 'inner' experience called reflection ; secondly, there are complex ideas, which are no more than combinations of the first. The mind or spirit of man originally resembles an empty tablet ; experience is that which writes upon it. Before we admit sensation, we cannot engage in thinking : *nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu*—'There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses.'

That which causes an idea to be produced in our mind is, in Locke's terminology, the 'quality' of the external object. And here Locke introduced a distinction which has played an important role in all later philosophical thought.

Qualities, such as solidity, extension, form, number, etc., are all constant qualities : to whatever alterations the body or object is subjected, these qualities suffer no change. Such qualities Locke called 'primary'. They are to be distinguished

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2 *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. I, Sec. 2.

from what he called 'secondary' qualities, which, though not to be found in the object itself, are the result of the impact of some power in the primary qualities upon our sense-organs. Such secondary qualities are colours, odours, sounds, tastes, etc. ; qualities occasioned by the object, but *produced* as a result of something which we, as observers, contribute. Without human sense-organs, colours and sounds, odours and tastes would simply not exist.

Granted that we know all things through sensation, or that all our knowledge purely depends upon perception it does not follow at all that our perception of things or our experience of the external world is always identical. In fact, the experience or the knowledge about a thing varies from time to time and from person to person. This poses a problem which is of a great importance to both a psychologist and a student of ethics. For a moment, it may be admitted that our knowledge regarding the constant qualities, which Locke called 'primary' qualities, of an object may be alike, but our experience in the form of an inner sensation or feeling cannot be the same. And it is here that Locke introduced his ethical doctrines with which his later political ideas are closely connected.

Locke's ethical doctrines are interesting, partly on their own account, partly as an anticipation of Bentham. Like Bentham, Locke was a man filled with kindly feeling, who yet held that everybody (including himself) must always be moved, in action, solely by desire for his own happiness or pleasure. A few quotations will clarify this point.

"Things are good or evil only in relation to pleasure or pain. That we call 'good' which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain, in us."

"What is it moves desire ? I answer, happiness, and that alone."

"Happiness, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of."

"The necessity of pursuing true happiness (is) the foundation of all liberty."

"The preference of vice to virtue (is) a manifest wrong judgement."

"The government of our passions (is) the right improvement of liberty."[3]

Locke states that liberty depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the government of our passions. This opinion he derived from his doctrine that private and public interests are identical in the long run, though not necessarily over short periods. It follows from this doctrine that, given a community of citizens who are all both pious and prudent, they will all act, given liberty, in a manner to promote the general good. There will be no need of human laws to restrain them, since divine laws will suffice. The hitherto virtuous man who is tempted to become a highwayman will say to himself: "I might escape the human magistrate, but I could not escape punishment at the hands of the Divine Magistrate." He will accordingly renounce his nefarious schemes, and live as virtuously as if he were sure of being caught by the police. Legal liberty, therefore, is only completely possible where both prudence and piety are universal; elsewhere, "the restraints imposed by the criminal law are indispensable." Locke repeatedly stated that morals, like mathematics, is a demonstrable science, subject to ascertainable, universal laws, but he did not develop this idea so fully as could be wished.

Further, Locke attempted to tell us what these universal laws are. They are the Divine Law and the Natural Law. The Divine Law is God's will for man's behaviour, which is made available to man both by divine revelation and by the use of his own reason, and which is, above all, to be looked for in the New Testament. The Natural Law is also an eternal law, the criterion of good and evil, discoverable by reasoning and commanding men to carry out the will of God.

It is typical of the very contradictory nature of his theory of morals that, having said that men are incapable of desiring anything but pleasure, he maintained that they ought to act so as to produce the greatest amount of public or general happiness, and contended that the criterion of the goodness and

[3] Refer to Book II, Chap. XX.

the badness of their actions is their result expressed in terms of public happiness.

It must be admitted that Locke's view of human nature is not so profound and as consistent as that of Hobbes. However, his problem is very much the same as that of Hobbes. Why do such men as his wish to form civil society, and how can they do so ? Locke's answer to that problem appears to be very different from Hobbes's. It is essentially a justification, though written before the event, of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a revolution which Hobbes would have regarded as anarchic and deplorable in the extreme. And with a view to putting forward his answer to that question and advancing his justification of the Revolution, Locke made use, as did Hobbes and so many other thinkers of that 17th century to which the feudal contract was still a lively memory and the commercial contract comparatively new and very appealing, of the state of nature and of the social contract as devices which helped him to clarify his ideas.

Locke's two *Treatises on Civil Government* are different both in object and in value. "The first is a detailed and tiresome response to the historic imagination of Sir Robert Filmer."[4] It is a reply, in other words, to Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha : or The Natural Power of Kings*, which was published in 1680, but written under Charles I. The king, according to Filmer, is perfectly free from all human control, and cannot be bound by the acts of his predecessors, or even by his own, for "impossible it is in nature that a man should give a law unto himself. *Patriarcha* begins by combating the "common opinion" that "mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it please, and the power which any one man hath over others was first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude." "This tenet," he writes, "was first hatched in the schools." But the truth, according to Filmer, is quite different. It is, that originally God bestowed the kingly power upon Adam, from whom it descended to his heirs, and ultimately reached the

4 H. J. Laski, *Political Thought in England* (Oxford University Press, Great Britain, Reprint 1955), p. 29.

various monarchs of modern times. Kings now, he advances his arguments in his *Patriarcha*, "either are, or are to be reputed, the next heirs to those first progenitors who were at first the natural parents of the whole people." Our first parent, it seems, did not adequately appreciate his privilege as universal monarch, for "the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of Adam." The desire of liberty is a sentiment which Sir Robert Filmer regarded as impious. According to him, political power derives, not from any contract, nor yet from any consideration of the public good, but entirely from the authority of a father over his children. His view was : that the source of regal authority is subjection of children to parents ; that the patriarchs in Genesis were monarchs; that kings are the heirs of Adam, or at least are to be regarded as such ; that the natural rights of a king are the same as those of a father ; and that, by nature, sons are never free of paternal power, even when the son is adult and the parent is in his dotage.

Locke's first *Treatise on Civil Government* was written to disapprove the doctrine of royal prerogative based upon the divine right. It followed the method of Sydney in refuting point by point the arguments of Filmer's *Patriarcha*. Locke pointed out that, if parental power is what is concerned, the mother's power should be equal to the father's. He laid stress on the injustice of primogeniture, which is unavoidable if inheritance is to be the basis of monarchy. He showed the absurdity of supposing that actual monarchs are, in any real sense, the heirs of Adam. Adam can have only one heir, but no one knows who he is. Would Filmer maintain, he asked, that, if the true heir could be discovered, all existing monarchs should lay their crowns at his feet ? If Filmer's basis for monarchy were accepted, all kings, except at most one, would be usurpers, and would have no right to demand the obedience of their *de facto* subjects. Moreover, parental power, he stated, is temporary, and extends not to life or property. In fact, we appreciate the point of view of Locke and feel that in near future *Patriarcha* will appear as fantastic as Filmer seems now.

Locke's second *Treatise on Civil Government* is a comprehensive and systematic discussion of the origin, nature, and province of government. He acknowledged his indebtedness to Hooker,

from whom he derived his main ideas. He agreed with Hobbes in his individualistic point of view and in his dependence upon the social contract theory, but he rejected almost every premise of Hobbes's philosophy. To Hobbes the State of Nature which precedes political organization had been a state of war. Neither peace nor reason could prevail where every man was his neighbour's enemy ; and the establishment of absolute power, with the consequent surrender by men of all their natural liberties, was the only means of escape from so brutal a regime. Locke denied such a state of affairs in the State of Nature, although he, like Hobbes, considered "State of Nature" antecedent to all human government. In this state, according to Locke, there is a "law of nature", but the law of nature consists of divine commands, and is not imposed by any human legislator. It is not clear how far the State of Nature was, for Locke, a mere illustrative hypothesis, and how far he supposed it to have had a historical existence ; but it is quite clear that he tended to think of it as a stage that had actually occurred. Men emerged from the State of Nature by means of a social contract which instituted civil government. This also he regarded as more or less historical. But for the moment it is the State of Nature that concerns us.

What Locke had to state about the State of Nature and the Law of Nature is, in the main, not original, but a repetition of medieval scholastic doctrines. St. Thomas Aquinas said :

"Every law framed by man bears the character of a law exactly to that extent to which it is derived from the law of nature. But if on any point it is in conflict with the law of nature, it at once ceases to be a law ; it is a mere perversion of law."[5]

Throughout the Middle Ages, the Law of Nature was held to condemn "usury", i.e., lending money at interest. Church property was almost entirely in land, and landowners have always been borrowers rather than lenders. But when Protestantism arose, its support—especially the support of Calvinism—came chiefly from the rich middle class, who were lenders rather than borrowers. Accordingly, first Calvin, then other

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5 Quoted by Tawney in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.*

Protestants, and finally the Catholic Church, sanctioned "usury". Thus Natural Law came to be differently conceived, but no one doubted there being such a thing.

Many doctrines which survived the belief in Natural Law owe their origin to it ; for example, *laissez faire* and the right of man. These doctrines are connected, and both have their origins in puritanism. Two quotations given by Tawney will be sufficient to illustrate this. A committee of the House of Commons in 1604 stated :

"All free subjects are born inheritable, as to their land, and also as to the free exercise of their industry, in those trades whereto they apply themselves and whereby they are to live."

And in 1656 Joseph Lee wrote :

"It is an undeniable maxim that every one by the light of nature and reason will do that which makes for his greatest advantage.....The advancement of private persons will be the advantage of the public."[6]

Thus Locke, in theory of Government, resembles most of the men who have won fame for their ideas, and in this there is little that is original. As a rule, the man who first thinks of a new idea is so much ahead of his time that everyone thinks him silly, so that he remains obscure and is soon forgotten. Then, gradually, the world becomes ready for the idea, and the man who proclaims it at the fortunate moment gets all the credit. So it was, for example, with Darwin ; poor Lord Monboddo was a laughing stock.

In regard to the State of Nature, Locke was less logical than Hobbes, who regarded it as one in which there was war of all against all, and life was nasty, brutish and short. But Hobbes was reputed an atheist. Locke considered the State of Nature a happy state in which the conduct of men was governed by a body of rules. The belief in a happy State of Nature in the remote past is derived partly from the biblical narrative of the age of the patriarchs, partly from the classical myth of the golden age. The general belief in the badness of the remote past only came with the doctrine of evolution. Locke defined the State of Nature in the following words :

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[6] Quoted by B. Russell in *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 649.

"Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature."

"The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions ; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker ; all the servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business ; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's, pleasure.

"And that all men may be restrained from invading other's rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the Law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation."[7] Such a description, unlike Hobbes's, was of an imagined community of virtuous anarchists, who need no police or law-courts because they always obey "reason", which is the same as "natural law", which in turn, consists of those laws of conduct that are held to have a divine origin. (For example, "Thou shalt not kill" is part of natural law, but the rule of the road is not.) Its arbiter is reason and, in the natural state, reason shows us that men are equal. From this quality are born men's natural rights which Locke, like the Independents in the Puritan revolution, identifies with life, liberty and property.

Obviously enough, for Locke, the instinct of self-preservation was, as Hobbes had also granted, the deepest of all human impulses. By Liberty Locke meant the right of the individual to follow his own bent. Law, in such an aspect, is clearly a means to the realization of freedom in the same way that the rule of the road will, by its common acceptance, save its observers from accident. It promotes the initiative of men by defining in terms which by their very statement obtain acknow-

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[7] *Civil Government*, Book II, Chap. II.

ledgment of the conditions upon which individual caprice may have its play. The conception of the right to property Locke derived from some sort of primitive anarchism in which a man was supposed to defend his property (by every possible means) with which he had associated his labour, or from a primitive communism which became transmuted into individual ownership whenever he mingled his labour with some object. This labour theory of ownership lived, it may be stated, to become, in the hands of Hodgskin and Thompson, the parent of modern socialism.

The state of Nature, which Locke described, was thus in contrast to the argument of Hobbes, pre-eminently social in character. It was one of "peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation." This he defended on the ground that the law of Nature provides a complete equipment of human rights and duties. But such a state of Nature was in no way a civil state. There was no common superior to enforce the law of Nature. Each man protects his own interests as best he could, and his right to his own and his duty to respect what was another's were as complete as ever they could become under government. But, because the intelligences of men worked differently in the absence of common standard of justice, there was bound to be an inconvenient variety in the conceptions of justice. The result was uncertainty and chaos. It was here that the social contract emerged. But just as Locke's natural state implies a natural man utterly distinct from Hobbes's gloomy picture, so does Locke's social contract represent rather the triumph of reason than of hard necessity. Everything that is ever right or wrong is so eternally ; positive law adds nothing to the ethical quality of different kinds of conduct but merely provides an apparatus for effective enforcement. Against Hobbes, Locke tried to set up the proposition that moral rights and duties are intrinsic, that morality makes law, and not law morality, and that governments have to give effect to what is naturally right prior to its enactment.

Locke's contract was a contract of each with all, a surrender by the individual of his personal right to fulfil the commands of the law of Nature in return for the guarantee that his rights as Nature ordains them—life and liberty and property—

would be preserved. The contract was thus not general as with Hobbes but limited and specific in character. Locke wrote in Book II : "Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it enquires not the freedom of the rest ; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature : when any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest."[8] As such, it was a contract with the community as a whole which resulted in the establishment of that common political superior—the state—which was supposed to enforce the law of Nature and punish infractions of it.

Locke's state, thus, is not a sovereign state : the very word 'sovereignty' does not occur throughout the treatise, the state has power only for the protection of natural law. Its province ends when it passes beyond those boundaries. The power given up was not vested in a single man or organ but in the community as a whole. Even the sovereignty of the political community or state is not absolute, it having only the power to protect natural law. Such a contract involved the necessity of majority rule. Each man surrendered to community his right to execute natural law ; hence the minority must be bound by the will of the majority, who might use force if necessary. The consent of individuals to membership in the political community might be expressed or tacit. Thus the effect of the original contract was made binding upon the descendants of its founders. However, the government, he held, remains responsible to the people ; its power is limited both by moral law and by the constitutional traditions and conventions inherent in the history of the realm. Government is indispen-

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8 Locke, *Civil Government*, Book II, Chap. VIII.

sable and its right is therefore in a sense indefeasible, but it is also derivative in the sense that it exists for the well-being of the nation.[9] Both government and society exist to preserve the individual's rights, and the indefeasibility of such rights is a limitation on the authority of both.

Locke regarded the original contract as the first step to the drawing up of a trust. People, having formed a society, must then institute a government. They do not do this by making a contract with the Government—that, as Rousseau was so clearly to point out, would be to invest government with too much dignity and authority. Men do this by drawing up a trust which creates Government as "only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends." If there is a miscarriage of power by those in authority, the government will be dissolved and the power will revert to the society. Locke concluded his *Treatise on Civil Government* with the following remark :

"The power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community : because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement, so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts ; because, having provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any person or assembly only temporary ; or else, when, by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited ; upon the forfeiture of their rules, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves or place it in a new form, or new hands, as they think good."[10]

Locke is regarded as a thorough-going individualist because

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[9] Refer to Locke's *Civil Government*, Book II, Chap. IX.
[10] *Ibid.*, Chap. XIX.

he placed his individual before his state. He based his whole theory of the state on consent. The contract of obedience must be free or else, as Hooker had previously insisted, it is not a contract. Yet Locke urged that the primitive members of a state are bound to its perpetuation simply because, unless the majority had power to enforce obedience, government, in any satisfactory sense, would be impossible. He believed that consent to form a political society implies acceptance by every one of the rule of majority because unanimity of will and opinion is rare and individual wills or minority wills can't reassert themselves without reversion to the state of Nature.

Locke recognized, though he did not explicitly describe its nature, the distinction between state and government. Indeed, at times he approximated a secondary contract (worked out more clearly by his great German contemporary, Pufendorf) by which government was created after establishment of civil society. The distinction is made in the light of what is to follow. For Locke "was above all anxious to leave supreme power in a community whose single will, as manifested by majority-verdict, could not be challenged by any lesser organ than itself."[11] Government there must be if political society is to endure ; but its form and substance are dependent upon popular institution. And his 'right to revolution', a development of the earlier theory of resistance, became one of the most influential parts of his doctrine. A government which begins in force can be justified, as all governments are justified, only by its recognition and support of the moral rights inherent in persons and communities. In other words, the moral order is permanent and self-perpetuating, and governments are only factors in the moral order.

Locke followed the great Aristotelian tradition in dividing governments into monarchies, aristocracies and democracies, considering the location of legislative authority as the fundamental test. The executive and the judiciary he viewed as clearly dependent upon the law-making body. He, anyhow, did not develop explicitly the theory of separation of powers.

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11 H. J. Laski, *Political Thought in England* (Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 33.

He was willing to have a king if the king were divested of his law-making power and if his right to rule were acknowledged to depend upon popular consent. It does not mean that Locke disliked completely kingship. His *Letters* show that he disliked the Cromwellian system and the republicanism which Harrington and Milton had based upon it. He was ready to have a kingship provided it fulfilled the condition, mentioned above. Although admitted that monarchy, from its likeness to the family, is the most primitive type of government, he denied Hobbes's assertion that it is the best. It seems, in his view, to degenerate always into the hands of lesser men who betray the contract they were appointed to observe. In the same way, he did not consider aristocracy much better off since it emphasizes generally the interest of a group against the superior interest of the community as a whole. According to him, democracy alone proffers adequate safeguards of an enduring good rule ; a democracy, that is to say, which is in the hands of delegates controlled by popular election. He further said that although, in a democracy, the legislature is the most supreme organ of the government, it must be removable by the community. It is implied that, like the English House of Commons, the legislative is to be elected from time to time by popular vote. The condition that the legislative is to be removable by the people, if taken seriously, condemns the part allowed by the British Constitution in Locke's day (also today) to King and Lords as part of the legislative power. In all well-framed governments, Locke said, the legislative and executive are separate. (It is surprising that Locke said nothing about the judiciary.) The question therefore arises : What is to be done when they conflict ? If the Executive fails to summon the legislative at the proper times, we are told, the Executive is at war with the people, and may be removed by force. This is obviously a view suggested by what happened under Charles I. From 1628 to 1640 he tried to govern without Parliament ; this sort of thing, Locke felt, must be prevented by civil war if necessary.

Further, the question of the rights of the individual as against the government, is a very difficult one. It is too readily assumed by democrats that, when the government represents

the majority, it has a right to coerce the minority. Upto a point, this may be considered true, since coercion is the essence of every government. But this sort of divine right of majorities, if pressed too far, may become almost as tyrannical as the divine right of kings. Locke said little on this subject in his *Essays on Government*, but considered it at some length in his *Letters on Toleration*, where he argued that no believer in God should be penalized on account of his religious opinions. He argued that the state should deal only with the preservation of social order, not with the souls of men. He regards the church as a voluntary society, without the right of coercion ; and he favoured toleration in religion. The state, he argued, should suppress opinions only when they are subversive of public peace. But he was against Catholics, Mohammedans and atheists. He argued that Catholics owed allegiance to a foreign power ; Mohammedans' morals were incompatible with English civilization ; and atheists lacked a sanction for good conduct. This shows that his conception of toleration in religion was limited and biassed. The same defect appears in his theory of popular consent. As soon as he accepted the right of the majority to coerce the minorty, no matter half-heartedly or whole-heartedly, or either for the perpetuation of civil society or in the public interest, he paved the way for the tyrannical rule of majorities. There is no guarantee that the choice of the majority is always good and pious and in the interest of the community as a whole, while the minority is always wrong and its every action threatens the very basis of civil society. Locke's silence on this puzzling, but important, subject makes his individualism or his theory of popular consent as ambiguous and idealistic as that of Green in the nineteenth century.

However, it may be admitted that Locke's theory is superior to Hobbes's. He, starting with the state of Nature, created a limited government, while Hobbes concluded in favour of an absolute and irresponsible sovereignty. Locke firmly believed that the political community, which holds the real power, delegates its power to the government, reserving the right to overthrow the latter if necessary, whereas the sovereignty of Hobbes was absolute and inalienable. Also, Locke expressly gave the right of revolution to the people, which Hobbes denied

and considered as unlawful. Locke saw that vigilance is the sister of liberty, where Hobbes dismissed the one as faction and the other as disorder. At every point, that is to say, where Hobbes and Locke are at variance, the future has been on Locke's side. Although he might not have defended his cause so splendidly as his rival (Hobbes), it is at least admitted by most that he had a more splendid cause to defend.

Locke was the true progenitor of Benthamism, and his work can hardly be understood, save in this context. Just as in his ethical inquiries it was always the happiness of the individual that he sought, so in his politics it was the happiness of the subject he had in view. "That which is for the public welfare," he said, "is God's will" ; and therein we find the root of that utilitarianism which, as Maine pointed out, is the real parent of all nineteenth-century change. And with Locke, as with the Benthamites, his clear sense of what utilitarianism demanded led to an over-emphasis of human rationalism. No one can read the second *Treatise* without perceiving that Locke looked upon the state as a machine, which can be built and taken to pieces in a very simple fashion. Herein, undoubtedly, he, to quote Laski, "over-simplified the problem ; and that made him miss some of the cardinal points a true psychology of the state must seize. His very contractualism, indeed, is part of this affection for the rational. It resulted in his failure to perceive how complex is the mass of motives embedded in the political act. The significance of hard instinct and the vast primitive deeps of the unconscious were alike hidden from him."[12] This is a defect which we note in his writings, but excusable. For it needed the demonstration by Darwin of the kinship of man and beast for us to see the real substance of Aristotle's vision that man is embedded in political society.

Locke's political philosophy proved, on the whole, quite adequate and useful until the industrial revolution. Since then, it has been increasingly difficult to tackle the important problems. The power of property, as embodied in vast corporations, grew beyond anything imagined by Locke. The necessary functions of the state—for example, in education—

12 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

increased enormously. Nationalism brought about an alliance, sometimes an amalgamation, of economic and political power, making war the principal means of competition. The single separate citizen has no longer the power and independence that he had in Locke's speculations. Our age is one of organization, and its conflicts are between organizations, not between separate individuals. The state of Nature, as Locke stated, still exists as between states. A new international Social Contract is indispensable before we can properly enjoy the promised benefits of governments. Here Bertrand Russell correctly remarks that if "once an international government has been created, much of Locke's political philosophy will again become applicable, though not the part of it that deals with private property."[13]

13 B. Russell, *op. cit*, p. 665.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

Rousseau, though a *philosophe* in the eighteenth century French sense, was not what would now be called a "philosopher". Nevertheless he had a powerful influence on philosophy, as on literature, education, religion, taste and manners and politics, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say with Lanson that he is to be found at the entrance to all the paths leading to the present. Whatever may be our opinion of his merits as a thinker, we must recognize his immense importance as a social force. This importance came mainly from his appeal to the heart, and to what, in his day, was called "sensibility". He is the father of the romantic movement, the initiator of systems of thought which infer non-human facts from human emotions, and the inventor of political philosophy of pseudo-democratic dictatorships as opposed to traditional absolute monarchies. Ever since his time, those considered themselves reformers have been divided into two groups, those who followed him and those who followed Locke. It will not be inadequate to say that few men have more affected the mind of the modern world than Jean Jacques Rousseau. His, so Bergson tells us, was the most powerful of the influences which the human mind has experienced since Descartes. Yet there has been no writer about whom it has been more difficult to find agreement than about Rousseau. He has been greatly lauded and, at the same time, more maligned. He has been hailed as the philosopher who has seen most deeply into the nature of the state since Plato. Yet much of what the French, for whom the writing of recent history is an expression of political faith, have said of him had better remain untranslated.

Rousseau was so sensitive by nature and his mind was so prone to certain types of impression that he could not concentrate on and stick to a particular idea for a long time. This

worked to his great disadvantage. No eminent writer has ever been so full of contradictions as Rousseau is. He tells us both that property is the root of all evil and that it is a sacred institution. If he pleads for individual liberty, he also insists on absolute submission to the state. On the one hand, he wants toleration for all and, on the other, he banishes atheists from his republic. He is considered as the extreme individualist, the latest and greatest of the individualist political theorists. Bonald declared that he wished "to make constant the inconstant, to order disorder," and Lamennais wrote that his work was "a sacrilegious declaration of war against society and against God." He is also regarded, at the same time, as the extreme absolutist, the precursor of nineteenth-century German idealism. Constant said of him that "he is the most terrible ally of despotism in all its forms," and Duguit remarked that "J. J. Rousseau is the father of Jacobin despotism, of Cæsarian dictatorship, and the inspirer of the absolutist doctrines of Kant and of Hegel." As such, he is both extreme individualist and extreme absolutist. "A stern asserter of the State on the one hand," Vaughan stated, "a fiery champion of the individual on the other, he could never bring himself wholly to sacrifice the one ideal to the other."

It is, however, surprising and rare in the history of political philosophy that the source of influential theory can be so precisely traced to individual personality as in the case of Rousseau. Indeed, there is none so fine, brilliant, lucid and master of the finest prose, as Rousseau was, since Plato in the whole history of political thought. We dare not believe that he could not adequately express what he wanted to say. But he "had the dangerous gifts of epigram and paradox, and the greatest of writers if he indulges them too frequently is open to misunderstanding."[1] In fact, he was of a sensitive, emotional, self-conscious temperament, impatient of control, even of self-control. And his ideas reflect his own personality. He resented against all conventions and restraints, disparaged authority and civilization, and urged the universal value of human

1 C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought* (English Universities Press Ltd, London, 1958), p. 138.

freedom. He had no sympathy with the ideas of moderate reform, such as those of Voltaire and physiocrats, who favoured an enlightened monarchy, or of Montesquieu, who desired the adoption of English constitutional checks and balances. He desired to extend equal rights to the peasants and labourers, as well as to the middle class. He vehemently attacked the belief of intellectuals that progress would result from enlightenment. His ideals aimed at direct democracy and equality, demanded a radical reconstruction of the social and political order, and led logically to the Revolution.

Rousseau's ideas regarding social and economic equality, his criticism of the modern civilization and his bid for simple life and radical reconstruction of society—all were the direct result of his bitter experiences from his own social and economic relationships in life. He was greatly humiliated in the company of all types of people and he was always put to an awkward position both by his friends and foes. Whatever might be the reasons for his incapability of having good and harmonious relations with the people—either the degeneration of human virtues in man, as he himself hinted at, or his own uncontrolled and sensitive temperament, or his squalid and irregular domestic life—destitute of all the ordinary virtues, his dirty habits and extravagant nature, it was but a fact that he was wholly incapable of agreeable social relations with rational and cultivated men. Efforts of many such men, admirers of his genius and his theories, to establish and maintain cordial relations with Rousseau ended uniformly in failure, with a great access of bitterness and rancour on his part toward things in general. Only one human being seems to have possessed the power to induce more than a feeble flicker of the rudimentary social instinct in Rousseau, and this was the ugly and ignorant woman, Thérése le Vasseur, with whom for nearly thirty-three years he lived in illegal and irregular domestic relations.[2] He had five children by her, all of whom he took to the Foundling Hospital. No one has ever understood what attracted him to her. Rousseau himself once asserted (truly or falsely) that he never had a spark

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2 Morley, *Rousseau*, I, Chap. IV; also refer to *A History of Western Philosophy* by B. Russell, Chap. XIX.

of love for Thérése ; in later years she drank, and ran after stable-boys. Probably he liked the feeling that he was indubitably superior to her, both financially and intellectually, and that she was completely dependent upon him. Although he never married her, he treated her almost as a wife, and the grand ladies who befriended him had to put up with her. He was always uncomfortable in the company of the great, and genuinely preferred simple people ; in this respect his democratic feeling was wholly sincere.

Such a temperament as Rousseau's formed a stimulating environment to develop his political theory in the middle eighteenth-century France. The smouldering fire of protest that determined his restless and unhappy private life became a devouring flame, when he attained publicity by winning a prize of Academy of Dijon in essay competition in 1750, and he turned his attention to the religion, morals, manners and politics of his day. Society on the continent abounded in conditions that were in highest degree odious to thoughtful men. Feudal class distinctions, medieval theology and divine-right monarchy were salient facts of the situation. Louis XV, as an embodiment of God-given absolute power, was contributing all that his sodden and lustful nature could to destroy the sense of duty and respect on which the whole fabric of the monarchic system rested.

The reaction to such a philosophy of absolutism and obscurantism was in vogue when Rousseau was preparing to build up his political theory. He read, although in a superficial way, history and the famous writings of earlier political philosophers. He admired and idealized the Greek and Roman Republics. His admiration for small states and for direct democracy can also be traced partly to the influence of Geneva, where he spent his boyhood, under a system markedly different from that of France. He was not happy with the social and economic life of France, which appeared to him (as to other rationalists also like Voltaire and Montesquieu, although they differed in their approach and methods from Rousseau) quite burdensome as it protected social and economic distinction in society and maintained the privileges of the nobility. Nor was he satisfied at all with the political system of France. Many of

his political ideas were drawn from Pufendorf, Locke and Montesquieu. His doctrine of popular sovereignty resembles in many particulars that of Althusius.

Rousseau built up his political theory on the conception of prepolitical "State of Nature". The reason is that he grew up in the rigorously Calvinist atmosphere of the small city state of Geneva. Throughout his life, in spite of his conversion to Catholicism and a great humiliation which he suffered in Geneva, his love for his home remained undimmed and strongly shaped his political thought. As he was a restless man by nature, he was never completely at home in any profession, in any science, in any religion. He was more truly, as he said of himself, "the lonely wanderer". He could never tolerate external restraint. He was a man of great sincerity, hating sham, loathing the life of the salons and of Parisian society. He was a man of the deepest feeling, of great tenderness, of extreme susceptibility. Reverie he found easier than reflection. And what touched his heart straightway unloosed his tongue. Background and temperament made him protest against the artificiality around him. The philosophes, he said, "know very well what a citizen of London or Paris is, but not what a man is." And because their rationalism contented itself with what he could not, he became increasingly aware that their rational agnosticism was not for him. Against the reason which great intellectuals used as their weapon to hide the weaknesses and evils of society, Rousseau appealed to conscience, to the moral sentiment of man. Hence in the *Discourse on Inequality* (1754) he started with the analysis of human nature. He considered the natural man, living in natural surroundings or in the "state of nature", as a "noble savage". Man, as a natural animal, lived the happy and care-free life of the brute, without fixed abode, without articulate speech, with no needs or desires that can't be satisfied through the merest instinct. According to him, men in the "state of nature" were equal, self-sufficient and self-controlled. Their conduct was based, not on reason, but on emotions of self-interest and pity. Man's first feeling was that of his own existence, and his first care that of self-preservation. The produce of the earth furnished him with all he needed, and instinct told him how to use it. Hunger and other appetites

made him at various times experience various modes of existence ; and among these was one which urged him to propagate his species—a blind propensity that, having nothing to do with the heart, produced a merely animal act. The want once gratified, the two sexes knew each other no more ; and even the offspring was nothing to its mother, as soon as it could do without her.[3]

The natural state, as thus conceived by Rousseau, is a state of substantial equality. No baneful distinction is to be found among the individuals who pursue in isolation the placid routine of satisfying their physical needs. But the deadly seeds of a different order are ready to germinate. With no necessary ground for it in his description of the savage state, Rousseau assumed that the human race became increasingly numerous ; divergencies of soil, climate and season then caused differences in manner of life among men. Men began now to take the difference between objects into account, and to make comparisons ; they acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit, which soon gave rise to feelings of preference. In consequence of seeing each other often, they could not do without seeing each other constantly. A tender and pleasant feeling insinuated itself into their souls, and the least opposition turned it into an impetuous fury : with love arose jealousy ; discord triumphed, and human blood was sacrificed to the greatest of all passions.

As ideas and feelings succeeded one another, and heart and head were brought into play, men continued to lay aside their original wildness ; their private connections became every day more intimate as their limits extended. Their life became gradually complicated and they could no more enjoy peaceful living. Intercourse of individuals and families became common and through it the ideas of competition and preference were developed. "From the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another ; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality and peace disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling

[3] *Contrat Social* (1762).

fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops."[4] Although evils follow in their train, this primitive stage is not, according to Rousseau, an intolerable state. Looked upon as a mean between the indolence of the savage state and the too intense activity of the later phase, it appears to him the happiest period in the life of humanity—"the least subject to revolutions, the best for man."[5] It is quite important to note that while Rousseau described the savage state, he was disposed to consider it as the happiest and best, and when he moved on to the tribal and early social state, this in turn appealed to him as preferable. But, according to him, evil arose with the progress of civilization. The division of labour that followed the development of the arts, metallurgy and agriculture and the rise of private property created distinctions between the rich and the poor and ultimately broke down the happy natural condition of mankind and necessitated the establishment of civil society.

Rousseau regarded "state of nature" as an actual historical condition. He minimized the importance of reason. But it does not mean that he was always a deadliest enemy of reason. He was conscious of the role which reason plays in harmonizing various sentiments in man.

There are, he thought, two original instincts that make up man's nature. There is self-love or the instinct of self-preservation, and there is sympathy or the gregarious instinct. As these instincts are always beneficial, man is by nature good. But self-love and sympathy often come into clash with each other and hence, according to Rousseau, man takes the help of a sentiment to resolve the clash, which men call conscience. But since conscience is only a blind sentiment, it will not teach man what is in fact right. Conscience, therefore, requires a guide and that guide is reason, which develops in man as alternate courses of action present themselves before him. Reason teaches him what to do and conscience makes him do it. Thus it

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4 *Ibid.*

5 W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories* (From Rousseau to Spencer) (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1920), p. 9.

follows from Rousseau's arguments that conscience and reason are in close attendance on man and together restrain the desire that is in him. Hence the "natural" man will be one in whom strong conscience and steadfast reason have successfully harmonized self-love and sympathy, the "unnatural" man one in whom these elemental instincts have been suppressed while conscience sleeps and reason errs. As such, Rousseau was against the perverted reason which is the characteristic of a civilized man. Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke held that the rational powers of a natural man had enabled him to create social and political organization. Rousseau, on the contrary, taught that reason was the outgrowth of the artificial life of man in organized society, and that the results of its development were calamitous. The "noble savage" was Rousseau's ideal. The state was an evil, made necessary by the rise of inequalities among men.

Political society, according to Rousseau, is created with a view to safeguarding the individual against the corrupting influences of society. Now it is not to be denied that the first impression left on our minds by his latter group of writings is strangely different from that left by the former. If in the political writings, *Contrat Social* (1762) and also *Constitution for Corsica* (1765), the "state is all in all", in the social and moral writings it seems at first sight to be either disparaged or wholly disregarded. On closer inspection, however, we shall see that this first impression needs to be corrected. We shall realize that the state which Rousseau disparaged in the *Discourse on Inequality* (1754) and in *Emile* (1762) is not the ideal state of the *Contrat Social*, but the actual state, as known to us from experience and history. Above all, we shall be forced to the conclusion that what excited Rousseau's mislike and suspicion in these writings is not the state, but society of any sort or kind, quite apart from the civic ties by which, in fact, it is held together. His ideal, alike in the *Discourse* and in *Emile*, is, no doubt, individual freedom : freedom, however, not in the sense of immunity from the control of the state, but in that of withdrawal from all the oppressions and all corruptions of society. In both treatises alike, it is therefore not the state, but society, which is the enemy. Rousseau's conclusion is : "It is our

business to make every individual member absolutely independent of his fellow-members and absolutely dependent on the state. It is only by the force of the state that the liberty of its members can be secured."[6] And if Rousseau had really been the individualist that some critics suppose, it is certain that he might easily have woven them into a theory more or less closely resembling that of Locke. But it was equally open to him to turn them in exactly the opposite direction ; to argue that the reason without which the primitive instincts of 'conscience' are no more than blank forms, so far from being inherent in the natural growth of the individual, does in fact come to him only in and through the state. C. E. Vaughan rightly remarks : "Regarding *Discourse* and *Emile* it can be said that the state of nature is glorified in the one ; the ideal of the other was, or was taken to be, an isolation of the individual almost as complete as that attributed to the state of nature. And hasty readers jumped to the conclusion that the man who thus mistrusted society must look with still deeper suspicion upon the very existence of the state ; that, at the very least, he must desire to restrict its action within the narrowest limits possible ; that he must be a sworn foe to entrusting it with any powers beyond the protection of individual life and individual property."[7]

Hence, Rousseau in his *Contrat Social* presented a theory of the state. In the development from the state of nature, there comes a time when individuals can no longer maintain themselves in primitive independence ; it then becomes necessary to self-preservation that they should unite to form a society—a political society. Rousseau admitted that "the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution." In the first chapter of his book, *Contrat Social*, he also

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[6] *Contrat Social*, II, xii.

[7] C. E. Vaughan, *Du Contrat Social on Principes Du Droit Politique* (Published by Manchester University Press, 1947), Introduction, p. xviii.

remarked : "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains. One who believes himself the master of the rest is only more of a slave than they ? How does that change come about ? I do not know. What can render it legitimate (légitime) ? That question I think I can answer."[8] This means that the liberty and equality that characterize the state of nature, in whatever sense the term is used, are in the civil state gone. Rousseau justified their disappearance, in his usual way, by proving that they were not gone at all, but subsisted as fully after, as before, the institution of government. And the device that he hit upon for solving the problem of his work was the social poet. Authority of man over man can have no rational basis, he held, save agreement and consent. And there is but one species of agreement conceivable in which liberty is retained while authority is instituted. This single species is the pact through which a multitude of individuals become a collective unity—a society.

Rousseau's thought here seems to reject the prevalent notions regarding the origin of the state. He rejected the view that family is the basis of the state. The state, Rousseau argued, is not an outgrowth of the family ; for it lacks the natural basis, the tie of natural affection, upon which the family rests. Also, he rejected the force theory. According to him, it is not founded upon the 'right of the stronger', nor, more specifically, upon the 'right of slavery', the right of the conqueror to enslave those he has subdued in battle ; for such claims are the negation of all Right. And, even if this were not so, they could give rise to nothing more than an 'aggression' ; they could never produce that organic union which is essential even to the most rudimentary forms of what we recognize as the state.[9] Hence the only alternative left, he emphatically stated, is to base political society upon 'convention' or 'contract' ; and that, in fact, is the solution adopted by "the soundest of those who have written of such matters : above all, by two thinkers so different as Hobbes and Locke." Rousseau's thought, in fact, shows the very strong influence of both Hobbes and Locke. It is

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[8] *Contrat Social*, I, i.
[9] *Ibid.*, I, vi.

the latter, however, whom he followed to the end—and beyond. From the ingenious reasoning by which Hobbes made absolute monarchy a logical corollary of the social contract, Rousseau turned with strong denunciation. But the Hobbesian precision in defining the terms of the contract obviously appealed to him, and his own treatment of the subject is but the substance of Locke developed by the method of Hobbes.

Political society was created through social pact, since only by agreement and consent could authority be justified and liberty retained. Rousseau held that each individual gave up his natural rights to the community as a whole. Or the contract consists in "the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others." The alienation is to be without reserve: "If individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical." Each person, according to Rousseau, in the state possessed an equal and unalienable portion of the sovereignty of the whole and gained back, under the protection of the state, the rights he had given up.

The contract of Rousseau was social and not governmental. To him, as to Hobbes, it was the total surrender of the whole community, not however to a despot exalted above the community, but to a community itself. It was Rousseau's belief that the conditions essential for growth, for the formation of a specific code of right and wrong, however rudimentary, are to be found only in that ordered development of society which we call the state. The state, in his view, is not something external to the individual, but of the very essence of his being. So far from imposing restrictions on his liberty, it is the condition without which liberty would be only another name for bondage to his most selfish and most destructive passions. According to Rousseau, there could be no conflict between authority vested in the people as a whole and their liberty as individuals.

Viewed in this way, the social contract is not a contract which men make with their future ruler. The government is their mere agent. To make a contract with it would not only give it a dignity to which it ought not to pretend, it would place men under the rule of some individuals or groups, which would be nothing but slavery. Such a contract would defeat the ends for which men come together, those ends being the fulfilment of their nature, which slavery would make impossible. For men not only need society in which to develop ; without freedom they cannot develop. Therefore their problem is to create a society "in such a way that each, when united to his fellows, renders obedience to his own will, and remains as free as he was before." And the sovereign "cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so." It should be observed here that the "sovereign" means, in Rousseau, not the monarch or the government, but the community in its collective and legislative capacity.

The social contract can be stated in the following words : "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." This act of association creates a moral and collective body, which is called the "state" when passive, the "sovereign" when active, and a "power" in relation to other bodies like itself. Rousseau's conviction was that the community, the state, is something essentially different from the sum of the individuals who compose it ; that it has a being, a life, of its own which is not identical with that of its members, taken severally ; that it is not an aggregate, but a corporate unity ; in a word, that it is an organization, to the life of which every member contributes, unconsciously as well as consciously. The idea of the state as an organism dominates the whole of the *Contrat Social*.

The moral aspect of the problem needs some explanation. What did Rousseau mean by his assertion that, with the passage from the natural to the civil state, the sense of justice and duty is first awakened in the mind of man ; that "his actions receive thereby a moral character which was wanting to them before" ;

that "from a stupid and limited animal, he now for the first time becomes a reasoning being and a man ;"[10] in a word, that, apart from the state, no distinctively moral life is possible for man ? He surely did not mean that, as a member of the state, man suddenly finds himself in possession of qualities of which, in his previous condition, he had given no sign, no promise, whatever. Such a view would, in itself, be wholly irrational. The instinct of justice, that is, at least under the form of natural pity, is, according to Rousseau, from the first present in man's heart ; but that this instinct should develop into a conscious sense of duty is, humanly speaking, impossible save under the fostering guidance of the state.

Further, the state which is created through the social contract is not, according to Rousseau, an arbitrary state. It is established with a view to maintaining an atmosphere in which individuals can enjoy their liberty in the best possible way. Also, it has to work through a 'general will'. The general will is, to him, no abstract idea such as, once recognized, may be left to take care of itself. On the contrary, it is a living principle of action : a principle to be kept alive only by the sleepless devotion, the watchful jealousy, of all the individuals concerned. It is this devotion, this jealousy, which alone can "hold the state true, to the end for which it was founded—that is, the common good of all" : that common good, the necessity of obedience to which is "the one fundamental law of the state, the one law which flows directly and immediately from the social contract."

The conception of the "general will" plays a very important part in Rousseau's system. In this connection, it is argued that the sovereign need give no guarantees to its subjects, for, since it is formed of the individuals who compose it, it can have no interest contrary to theirs. "The sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it should be." This doctrine is misleading to the reader who does not note Rousseau's somewhat peculiar use of terms. The sovereign is not the government, which, it is admitted, may be tyrannical ; the sovereign is a more or less metaphysical entity, not fully embodied in any

[10] *Contrat Social*, I, viii.

of the visible organs of the state. Its impeccability, therefore, even if admitted, has not the practical consequences that it might be supposed to have.

The will of the Sovereign, which is always right, is the "general will". Each citizen, *qua* citizen, shares in the general will, but he may also, as an individual, have a particular will running counter to the general will. The Social Contract involves that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to do so. "This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free." This conception of being "forced to be free" is very metaphysical in nature. The general will in the time of Galileo was certainly anti-Copernican; was Galileo "forced to be free" when the Inquisition compelled him to recant? Is even a malefactor "forced to be free" when he is put in prison? Think of Byron's Corsair:

> O'er the glad waters of the deep blue sea,
> Our thoughts as boundless and our hearts as free.

Would this man be more "free" in a dungeon? The odd thing is that Byron's noble pirates are a direct outcome of Rousseau, and yet, in the above passage, Rousseau forgets his romanticism and speaks like a sophistical policeman. Hegel, who owed much to Rousseau, adopted his misuse of the word "freedom", and defined it as the right to obey the police, or something not very different.

The general will is not identical with the will of the majority, or even with the will of all the citizens. It seems to be conceived as the will belonging to the body politic as such. If we take Hobbes's view, that a civil society is a person, we must suppose it endowed with the attributes of personality, including will. But then we are faced with the difficulty of deciding what are the visible manifestations of this will, and here Rousseau leaves us in the dark. We are told that the general will is always right and always tends to the public advantage; but that it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are equally correct, for there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will. How, then, are we to know what is the general will? And a sort of answer is:

"If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its deliberations, the citizens had no communi-

cation one with another, the grand total of the small differences would always give the general will, and the decision would always be good."

The conception in Rousseau's mind seems to be somewhat this : every man's political opinion is governed by self-interest, but self-interest consists of two parts, one which is peculiar to the individual, while the other is common to all the members of the community. If the citizens have no opportunity of striking logrolling bargains with each other, their individual interests, being divergent, will cancel out, and there will be left a resultant which will represent their common interest ; this resultant is the general will. Perhaps, Rousseau's conception might be illustrated by terrestrial gravitation. Every particle on the earth attracts every other particle in the universe towards itself ; the air above us attracts us upward while the ground beneath us attracts downward. But all these "selfish" attractions cancel each other out in so far as they are divergent, and what remains is a resultant attraction towards the centre of the earth. This might be fancifully conceived as the act of the earth considered as a community, and as the expression of its general will.

To say that the general will is always right is only to say that, since it represents what is in common among the self-interests of the various citizens, it must represent the largest collective satisfaction of self-interest possible to the community. In my opinion this interpretation of Rousseau's meaning seems to accord with his words better than any other.[11] According to Rousseau, the existence of subordinate associations within the state comes into direct conflict with the expression of the general will. Each of these will have its own separate will, which may conflict with that of the community as a whole. "It may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations." This leads to an important consequence : "It is therefore essential,

[11] e.g., "There is often much difference between the will of all and the general will : the latter considers only the common interest : the former looks to private interest, and is only a sum of particular wills : but take away from these same wills the more and the less which destroy each other, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences."

if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the state, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts : which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great Lycurgus." In a footnote, Rousseau supports his opinion with the authority of Machiavelli.

The "general will" deals, according to Rousseau, not only with matters of public, as understood by definition, but also of private interest. It, in fact, can't allow anything to stand between it and the complete loyalty of its citizens. It would, Rousseau believed, be better that lesser associations than the state should not exist, but if they do they must always be subordinate, and if any conflict of loyalties should ever occur, citizens must always obey the state. So jealous a God in the general will that Rousseau thought it should even substitute for the old religions of the world a new civic religion which all who would remain members of the state must accept, deviation from which, once accepted, should be an offence punishable with death.

The general will, Rousseau said, must always be inalienable and indivisible. Hence it cannot be represented in parliamentary institutions. "As soon as a nation appoints representatives," he remarked, "it is no longer free, it no longer exists." England, he declared, was only free during elections, after which it is "enslaved and counts for nothing." He also added that "the use which it makes of the brief moment of freedom renders the loss of liberty well deserved." Also, the general will can't be delegated in any way whatever. Any attempt to delegate it will mean its end. He stated : "The moment there is a master, there is no longer a sovereign." As such, nothing less than all the people together can be trusted to will the general will. As Rousseau expressed it, it is only "the voice of the people" that is "the voice of God." It must take into account the voice of every citizen, since it was agreed in the contract that each is received as an "integral part of our group." It must bind them equally, since that also is implied in the contract in which each surrenders his all on equal terms, so that it is "in the interests of none to make them onerous to his fellows." It follows from Rousseau's arguments that the general will can't

be an executive will. The people ought not to be responsible for the details of government. Those who make the law should not carry it out, for it is the characteristic of the Sovereign General Will that it must be impersonal, and the decrees of government may frequently be particular and personal. Hence Rousseau made a clear distinction between the sovereign people and the government. The people, according to him, entrusts its executive power to its agent, the government, though it may retain a limited right of supervision over it. The enactment of any governmental organ is merely a device for carrying into effect the superior commands of the true law-making body. The state, he argued, is the entire body-politic, manifesting itself in the supreme and sovereign 'general will', the government comprised the individuals chosen by the community to apply the general will. The government was created not by contract, as Hobbes thought, but by the act of the sovereign people. Rousseau was so confident of the indefeasible rights of the sovereign people that he was willing to delegate powers which Locke and Montesquieu thought dangerous.

But such a system meets with failure in practice. The state would have to prohibit churches (except a State church), political parties, trade unions, and all other organizations of men with similar economic interests. The result is obviously the Corporate or Totalitarian State, in which the individual citizen is powerless. Rousseau himself realized that it might be difficult to prohibit all associations, and hence added, as an afterthought, that, if "there must be subordinate associations, then the more there are the better, in order that they may neutralize each other." Also, he realized that the executive is inevitably an association having an interest and a general will of its own, which may easily conflict with that of the community. He maintained that while the government of a large state needs to be stronger than that of a small one, there is also more need of restraining the government by means of the sovereign. The tendency of government to expand its powers at the expense of popular control led him to maintain later on that only in small states and under simple conditions can the general will permanently maintain its supremacy. Believing that the sovereign people must act directly in making law,

Rousseau favoured direct democracy and held that representative assemblies were a sign of political decay. To prevent, therefore, government usurpation, he suggested periodical assemblies of the sovereign people, at which they should decide whether they wished to maintain the existing form of government and to retain existing office holders. Thus he tried to minimize the evils of government rule in big states where direct democracy, according to him, was not possible. But he could not protect the individual against the general will. His doctrine that the individual surrendered all his natural rights to the general will established a popular sovereign as absolute as the Leviathan of Hobbes. Against the sovereign people, the individual possessed no rights.

Rousseau's theory of social contract remains almost (elusive) illusive. We generally acknowledge that freedom is the essence of contract : freedom to make it, or not to make it, in the first instance, freedom to bargain over its terms, over the obligations it imposes on us, in the second. How is it with Rousseau's *contract* on these two crucial points ? The former freedom, the freedom of the individual to reject the contract, is strictly limited by his arguments : by the repeated admission that, directly one group of men has formed itself into a community, all the rest, by the mere force of circumstances, are compelled to follow suit. The latter freedom, the freedom of bargaining, is rejected root and branch. For does he not expressly assure us that the terms of the contract are so rigidly determined by the nature of the act that the smallest modification of them would make the whole covenant null and void ? And does he not go on to tell us that the terms in question may all be summed up in this sweeping condition : the absolute surrender of every associate with all his rights, to the community at large ? An act of such a character may be rich in benefits to those who engage in it ; but to call it a contract is a gross abuse of the term.

In fact, it is difficult to reconcile Rousseau's love of liberty, which formed such passionate expression as his assertion : "When a man renounces his liberty, he renounces his essential manhood, his rights and even his duty as a human being" which led him to comment on Aristotle's view—that some men are slaves

by nature, that men can only be slaves by nature if they have first been made slaves against nature, either with his doctrine of General Will or with his theory of Social Contract. For if the general will is supreme and absolute, the individual freedom becomes meaningless and the social contract remains unnecessary. On the contrary, if individual freedom is significant and the social contract necessary, the general will cannot be supreme and absolute. Rousseau himself could not reconcile them satisfactorily.

It is to be admitted, however, that in spite of Rousseau's inconsistencies and his failure to give an adequate solution to the old problems of eluding tyranny, his *Contrat Social* could fire the revolutionary spirit in France. His advocacy of democracy, in spite of its limitations, was no doubt one of the things that made the French Government implacably hostile to the book ; the other, presumably, was the rejection of the divine right of kings, which is implied in the doctrine of the Social Contract as the origin of government. Also, his advocacy that the whole duty of the state towards its members is not discharged when it has established formal equality for all before the law, but the state, as a matter of fact, should work for an operative and real equality and that it (state) should neither create millionaires, nor beggars revolutionized the French Society.

The *Contrat Social* became the Bible of most of the leaders in the French Revolution, but no doubt, as the fate of Bibles, it was not carefully read and was still less understood by many of its disciples. It reintroduced the habit of metaphysical abstractions among the theorists of democracy, and by its doctrine of the general will it made possible the mystic identification of a leader with his people, which has no need of confirmation by so mundane an apparatus as the ballot box.

8

Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882)

To any serious onlooker the assessment of the Victorian Age should appear a difficult task because the glow of its surface tends to conceal its undercurrent of troubles. On May 1, 1851, the worried Europe woke up to see the startling industrial progress of England as exhibited in the Crystal Palace Exhibition. The grimaces of the "hungry forties" were gone on April 10, 1848, the Chartist Movement was skilfully quietened and the waves of the contemporary European revolt failed to reach the English shore with the result that amid of the flurry of continental chaos the banner of England stood high fluttering the message of hope and promise.

The Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 was a glass-case witness to England's claim as the "workshop of the world". By that time the Iron Age in England was rapidly approaching its zenith and, thanks to the effort of George Stephenson of Tyneside, the Railway Age had brought its thrill of motion. In short, in England social and economic life was changing under the impact of scientific progress. One cannot deny the nest of material prosperity England secured since the "fifties to the credit of scientific and industrial advancement." But it is in this admission of fact that one may sense the real trouble of the Victorian era. Amid the cheers of material progress it was overlooked that the social belief had been darkened by a mood of doubt and scepticism.

In the first half of the 19th century the so-called discord between philosophy and religion, knowledge and faith had not grown poignant. In fact, in the early Victorian age popular excitement centred round the controversies between the side-issues of religion and not between philosophy and religion.

The Oxford Movement which originated from an unmeaning ecclesiastical scare silently brought a religious revival. In the thirties and forties Tractarian brochures flooded England to cause a widespread storm of protest and ultimately with the secession of Newman and his associates it had to breathe its last. But that this movement unknowingly pushed on a religious interest can be guessed from the picture of the time immediately following this movement. The Victorians were then very regular both in private prayer and public worship. This lead in this line was given by the Royal family. Attendance in the church twice a day was not an uncommon feature of the family life. A concept of Christian fraternity was widely talked on even among the working classes. But with the gradual seizure of social life by science and industrialism this religious faith was sadly eclipsed by a cynical sense of doubt, and philosophy, being steadily yoked to materialism, came to be used as an instrument for hurling obloquy against religion. Religion, however, had to wait the rudest blow until the discoveries of geology and evolution—appearing in Charles Lyell's famous book *The Principles of Geology* (1830) and Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859). This conflict between science and religion climaxed in 1860 when in the classic debate at the Oxford meeting of the British Association, Thomas Huxley euphemistically retorted the sarcasm of Bishop Wilberforce who there expressed most crudely the typical theological allergy to the scientific ideas of evolution.

Religion was gradually reduced to an emotion and philosophy to a mechanical formula and so the chasm between the two grew alarmingly wide. It became a fashion of the time to acclaim man as the "master of things". But amid the enthusiasm of this glorification of man it was forgotten that the greatness of man might be assured best by the acceptance of a spiritual principle. The real need of the time was a new kind of philosophy which could avoid evangelical fads as well as materialistic scepticism and emphasize the essential greatness of man in the context of a religious temperament. Indeed, the spirit of the age was waiting for a man who could come and say that philosophy on its part is seen to be the effort towards self-recognition of that spiritual life of the world, which fulfils

itself in many ways but most completely in the Christian religion, and to be thus related to religion as the flower to the leaf."[1]

It was a sincere desire to heal the spiritual crisis of his age that inspired Thomas Hill Green to start his pen. The philosophy which was roughly sketched by Coleridge and which occasionally lulled the imagination of J. S. Mill needed a man who by his consistent thought would give it a comprehensive shape. In T. H. Green we exactly find this man. When in the Victorian England the spiritual view of life sadly sank down amid the torrents of material prosperity Green, a young student at Oxford, thundered : "In no depth of their debasement have men consented to confine the range of the mind within the limits of the fleshly tabernacle, which is the seat of its imprisonment."[2]

It was Green's conviction that philosophy should build up a theory of the essential greatness of man by emphasizing a higher conception of life. Green mellowed the English thought with a religious mood, but at the same time cancelled all worn-out theological dogmas. He really came to grips with the problem of his time. So Green ought to be remembered even today because with him started a new season in the climate of philosophic thought in the Victorian England.

But in the field of political philosophy Green was not an innovator as he was in the sphere of metaphysical and ethical enquiry. If in regard to speculative thought he was a path-maker whose theory sought to satisfy the crying spiritual need of his age, in regard to political philosophy, he was, indeed, a child of his time. But for that reason it will be unfair to argue that his political philosophy was of less significance. Green, as Barker says, "addressed himself to eliciting and explaining the presuppositions implicit in the contemporary life of the English state."[3] It is not a fact that had he not constructed his political philosophy collectivism would have failed to invade England. Blot out Green's name from the pages of the history of political thought and you will

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[1] T. H. Green, *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 121.
[2] T. H. Green, "College Essay on Loyalty", extracted from Nettleship's *Memoir*, p. 20.
[3] Ernest Barker, *Political Thought in England*, p. 22.

find no difficulty in detecting a sequence in the events of state intervention in England. Wherein then lies his importance? His credit, in fact, lies in the fact that he, by his political philosophy, rendered a logical interpretation to the events of his time. In the earlier period utilitarians came with their well-knit theory, hammered hard and ultimately succeeded in injecting a spirit of individualism in the artery of administration. Thus individualistic attitude of the state developed in the wake of an organized philosophy. But unlike this the collectivistic approach of the state developed, in the later Victorian period, more under the influence of the necessity of facts than of the persistence of a philosophy. Now these growing facts of state interference needed a philosophy to rest on. Green's task was to provide this philosophy of the collectivist state. As Laski says: "What the philosophers like T. H. Green.....did was to provide the basis for understanding the necessity of the change. They prepared men to receive it.....They established the canon of their age."[4]

The political philosophy of the utilitarians was firmly yoked to their ethical theory and a solicitude to maintain this canonic coherence largely moulded their individualistic creed. It would scarcely be just to say that Green's political philosophy was not loyal to his metaphysical ethics. In fact, Green's *Principles of Political Obligation* is an illustrative appendix of his *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Yet one should remember that his political philosophy was influenced less by this theoretician's concern for a coherence between his different shades of thought. More important, in this regard, was Green's humanitarian outlook. His genuine distress at the sight of the poor, indeed, contributed largely to the development of his collectivism and so it was scarcely a dogma. He was a collectivist not because he was a dogmatic theoretician but because he was a humanitarian and true Christian who discovered moral responsibility of the state in arresting the danger of social calamity. "He had the warmest interest in, and the strongest sympathy for, the humbler classes. No man had a truer love

[4] H. J. Laski, *The Leaders of Collectivist Thought, Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians*, p. 420.

for social equality, or a higher sense of the dignity of simple human nature."[5] It is because of this Christian love for the oppressed humanity that he felt no contradiction in being both a collectivist and a liberal. He emphasized state-intervention but was not impervious to the basic need of individual's right of free development. It is these things that should impel one to feel at home with his political ideas.

Green entered Oxford in 1855 and was intimately associated with it until the last day of his life. His writing profusely contributed to the prestige of Oxford because with him, in fact, began its philosophical tradition. Long ago, Bentham, with his hackles up, spoke ill of the life at Oxford. He harshly said that going to the foolish lectures of his tutors to be taught something of logical jargon he there had learnt nothing. How far these remarks were influenced by his personal feelings might be a matter of opinion ; but one cannot deny that even in the mid-Victorian era life at Oxford was not at all enviable. "Living in small, semi-monastic communities with a continuous tradition of four or five hundred years behind them, the Fellows of colleges were isolated from the busy, changing world and often, from their heavy drinking and unalterable opinions, were nicknamed the 'two-bottle orthodox'. At a time when railways were changing the face of Britain, the only railroad permitted in Oxford was the ingenious contrivance in New College for circulating the port round the fireplace in the Senior Common Room."[6] If anybody, keeping aside these considerations, wishes to probe deeper, he is likely to be struck by the fact of quiescence in philosophical speculation at that time. In 1858 Green lamented : "I am almost ashamed to belong to a University which is in such a state of darkness."[7] This remark may serve as a pointer to the fact how the field of philosophical thought at Oxford remained absolutely barren. In fact, when persons like Mill, Spencer, Bain, Lewes, Jevons and Sidgwick produced tomes of philosophy to stir English mind the speculative spirit at Oxford was in a painful process of atrophy.

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[5] James Bryce, *Contemporary Review*, May, 1882.
[6] D. Lindsay and E. S. Washington, *A Portrait of Britain*, Chap. 9.
[7] R. L. Nettleship, *Memoir*, p. 23.

Oxford was ruffled by the Oxford Movement which actually placed an insurmountable hurdle against the growth of philosophic thought. Drowned, as it was, in theological dogmas the Tractarian Movement cared little to comprehend the mind of the age. The aptitude for contemplation which is the real source of philosophy was cowed down amid the excitement of ecclesiastical controversy. So naturally philosophy could not have its nourishment. The Oxford Movement ultimately died down but it left back its leaven in the quadrangles of Oxford. The mood of theological discussion of the previous period was transformed into an ecclesiastical party spirit : theological debate was substituted by a crude form of platform intrigue and manœuvre. The university came under the terrorism of an ecclesiastical Ring. So there was little of mental freedom necessary for contemplation. Memory-work being the most reliable means for winning these distinctions, they naturally felt no urge for a philosophical training. The young tutors, too, upon whom mainly rested the responsibility of teaching philosophy, were more interested in seeing their students come off with flying colours and so took pains to teach them methodical tactics out of their own experience. The burdensome syllabus of *Litterae Humaniores*, of which philosophical study was an appendage, put so heavy premium upon students' industry that they could really find no adequate time for a proper grasp of philosophical knowledge.

When all these factors welded to cramp the philosophical initiative in Oxford a man appeared to usher in a new wave : he was Benjamin Jowett. Jowett translated three volumes of Plato in which his introduction and appendices contained more of philosophy than of more commentary. So with him set in a true climate of philosophy in Oxford. But Jowett might never claim to have constructed an independent and positive philosophy. It was T. H. Green who came forward to complete the half-done task of his master. In his lectures he was more than a routined teacher. Every class-lecture was carefully weaved in philosophical niceties. Moreover, by his *Prolegomena to Ethics* and *Principles of Political Obligation* he built up a positive philosophy which marked the

beginning of a forceful philosophical movement ever remembered by posterity as the Oxford Idealism.

Green's political philosophy cannot be correctly comprehended unless we go up the rungs of his metaphysics and ethics and it is herein that one may watch the important characteristic of Green's approach. The empiricist philosophers, no doubt, took pains to write on political principles. But while grappling problems of politics they acted more as politicians than as philosophers. Generally in their writings we do not find any attempt to treat politics as an integral part of a complete philosophical system. Locke exerted no effort to erect a bridge between his theory of knowledge and theory of government. Hume was too busy with his metaphysical heresy to give any primary attention to political questions. It will be wrong, however, to argue that in Mill too we find no desire to set a connecting thread between politics and philosophy. His psychical atomism, by implication at least, has got a clear correspondence with his doctrine of individualism. But in his political treatises Mill was more interested to combat the practical questions of politics. It is difficult to discover in his writings any attempt to develop a comprehensive philosophy of state.

Judged in this perspective, Green was the first man in the nineteenth century to construct a comprehensive philosophy of state. There is a direct affinity between his metaphysics and politics between which his ethics serves as a necessary interlude. It is this perfect harmony between a speculative thought and the practical problems that has conferred Green a unique position in the history of English political thought. "He went straight," as David Ritchie relates, "from the declaration of the polls, when he was elected a town councillor, to lecture on *The Critique of Pure Reason*."[8] This indicates the man who used his metaphysics as a necessary contrivance to come up to the field of political theory : the man who was both a philosopher and a practical reformer, both an idealist in philosophy and a liberal in politics.

Green's philosophy of the state, the subject of our main

[8] D. G. Ritchie, *The Principles of State Interference*, Chap. III, Section 1.

concern in this chapter, was thus built up on a very sound and reasonable footing. For all his belief, like Hegel's, that the state was the embodiment of the Divine Spirit, he never considered the state an end in itself. It was a means to an end, and that end was the full moral development of the individuals who compose it. His ethics made him to believe passionately with Kant that every man has a worth and dignity which forbids his exploitation for any purposes whatever. "The life of the nation," he insisted, "has no real existence except as the life of the individual composing it." "To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind except as relative to some greater worth of persons," he wrote, "is to use words without meaning." It is in this context that he regarded the functions of the state as being negative. According to him, the state cannot teach morality to men, nor can it make men moral, since morality consists in "the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties." It is to remove obstacles which prevent men becoming moral.

It is true, of course, that in order to remove obstacles the state must interfere to such an extent that what appears negative in form soon seems most positive in content. "To any Athenian slave, who might be used to gratify a master's lust," he wrote, "it would have been a mockery to speak of the state as a realisation of freedom ; and perhaps it would not be much less to speak of it as such to an untaught and under-fed denizen of a London yard with gin-shops, on the right hand and on the left." It was for the state to see that the mental and physical mal-nutrition, together with the gin-shops, were removed. "To uphold the sanctity of contract," he said, "is doubtless a prime business of government, but it is no less its business to provide against contracts being made which from the helplessness of one of the parties to them, instead of being a security for freedom, become an instrument of disguised oppression." In acknowledging that as its business, the state was assuming no inconsiderable powers of intervention. Green's indignation at the moral degradation which for so long society had so easily accepted shines through his words : "We content overselves with enacting that no man shall be used by other men as a means against his will, but we leave it to

be pretty much a matter of chance whether or not he shall be qualified to fulfil any social function, to contribute anything to the common good, and to do so freely." Indeed, he would gladly have echoed Carlyle's "that no one should die ignorant who has the capacity of knowledge, that I call a tragedy, though it should happen, as by some computations it does, a thousand times a minute." If the state was to intervene to prevent that tragedy, to ensure that everyone should be qualified to contribute something to the common good, its intervention was likely to be steady, constant, and far-reaching, and its purpose would clearly be positive.

The negative role which Green assigns to the state as the remover of obstacles is nevertheless significant. What is most important in life is a subject which, according to Green, falls within the province of the individual. And such a theory defines and limits state actions more than they could ever be defined and limited by the utilitarians. The state can do everything which will help, but it must do nothing which will hinder the free development of moral personality. The real function of government being to maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible, and morality consisting in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties, paternal government "does its best to make it impossible by narrowing the room for the self-imposition of duties and for the play of disinterested motives." Green, in fact, was never tired of insisting that institutions exist for men, and not men for institutions. They are important for the effect they have on their members.

Green did not idealize the state as Plato, Hegel and the subsequent English Idealists, Bradley and Bosanquet, did, but, on the contrary, he tried to establish the importance of individual men and women, and it is hardly surprising to find that in spite of the aura of mysticism which surrounds his conception of society, the state, according to him, is not something more than the sum of the wills of its citizens. He did not find in it, as Rousseau did, "*Un moi commun*", a common me.

He believed in the existence of the General Will. It was his belief that General Will is the real basis of the state. Legal sovereignty, he fully agreed with John Austin, must reside in

the supreme authority within the state, in that body which recognizes no power above itself. But behind this legal sovereign is the General Will, and this General Will is what really determines the habitual obedience of a people. Men habitually obey only those institutions which, perhaps unconsciously, they feel represent the General Will. It is quite clear that for him General Will meant the will for the state, not the will of the state. His General Will, it is almost obvious, is certainly not that in whose name so many crimes have been committed, which has proved such an excellent stick, not only with which to beat minorities, as Dean Inge saw, but with which to bludgeon whole communities into obedience, that it has become almost accredited villain of modern political thought.

Although Green held that will, not force, was the true basis of the state, he was fully conscious that there were states in which force was predominant. For such states he had no liking as they could not fulfil their ideal function. Hence while Green rejected Rousseau's view that the General Will was entirely in abeyance in all existing states, he also rejected Hegel's view that the laws in all existing states were synonymous with the General Will. The state, therefore, as it exists is not necessarily a complete embodiment of the Divine Spirit than the individual. Thus Green, unlike Hegel, tried to safeguard the individual against the monistic state. He also differed from Hegel in his conception of freedom. For Hegel, Freedom is the voluntary identification of self with the laws of the state. But according to Green, Freedom is the right of a man to make the best of himself. This may mean voluntary identification of self with the laws of the state. If the state is a good state, if it is adequately fulfilling its function, it will mean this. But it might not mean this. It might even mean that the individual, albeit in fear and trembling, will be compelled to go up against the state—a possibility which Hegel could never but which Green readily admitted.

Green thus not only tried to limit the authority of the state by the demands of the individual, but he was also willing to admit the possibility of the state's supersession by other and perhaps higher forms of society. "It is easy," he wrote, "to conceive a better system than that of the great States of modern

Europe with their national jealousies, rival armies, and hostile tariffs." And while acknowledging how far mankind is from realizing "the dream of an international court with authority resting on the consent of individual states," he believed, "that there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of a system of independent States incompatible with it, but that on the contrary every advance in the organization of mankind in states in the sense explained is a step towards it."

This as well as his admittance that good government must not always be popular government, and the dictatorship also might act according to the General Will, creates some doubts about his individualism. Though his preference for popular control and participation in government is admitted, it has nevertheless been claimed that the seeds of authoritarianism are to be detected in Green's writings. But in the light of his loud proclamation that the best government can only be self-government the doubts about his individualism are removed. Un-Hegelian in his refusal to consider the state an end in itself, as something other and greater than the sum of the individuals who are its citizens, as necessarily a complete embodiment of the Spirit than the individual, un-Hegelian in his insistence that the individual may have the duty to act against the state, that the state must preserve the rights of the lesser communities within it and respect the rights of the greater community of which it is itself part, Green is no less un-Hegelian in this, that for the passive voluntary identification of self with an authoritarian state which Hegel demands, he substitutes an active participation in a democratic state which his individualism requires. Green, to quote Wayper, "the individualist, who judges State, Society, General Will by their worth for the development of individual morality and individual character, who so notably and so nobly dedicated himself to social and political service in the city of Oxford, would not have been true to himself had he done less—and would certainly have made much less of an appeal than he did to Englishmen."[9]

"If it be individualism to see in every political movement the fate of human beings and in every controversy over institu-

[9] C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought*, Chap. III.

tions the weal or woe of fellow citizens, then there are few more declared individualists in political philosophy than T. H. Green," writes Maccunn.[10] Green refuses to accept the Mechanistic theory of the state, because he is convinced that will, not force, is the true basis of the state. He accepts the organic theory of the state only with many qualifications. He regards the state as natural since man is necessarily a social animal. He regards freedom not as the absence of restraint but as a process of self-development by freely obeying laws and customs which are seen to embody a rational scheme of justice within the community. He believes the state to be essentially good, because it is indispensable to guide and enable men to understand their own moral obligations and to call upon the best in them. He teaches men to see that faith in their own moral development and faith in their fellow-men matters far more to them than any particular interest, they may have. And in his distinction between outward acts and inward will, between what is better done even from the wrong motive and what is only valuable because of its motive, he gives men a far sounder criterion whereby to judge state-action than did Mill with his doctrine of self-and-other-regarding actions. In doing so, he gives the individual a far more effective protection against the undue exercise of the state's power than anything with which utilitarianism could provide him. Correcting and supplementing both utilitarianism and idealism, Green gives men a common sense criterion which they can apply to states. Every state, he shows them, can be judged by its practical and ideal contents here and now. It will be a good state if it contains the largest possible number of happy, moral human beings.

Mill's philosophy was dominant in England when the Oxford philosopher began his work ; and though Green consistently avoided polemics, an undercurrent of opposition to Mill runs through his writings. He respected and admired the man ; but in the *Introduction to Hume* and in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, as well as in the lectures on Mill's logic, his dissent from the philosophy is made manifest. He points out the inade-

[10] J. Maccunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*.

quacy of Mill's conception of cause; in the *Introduction to Hume* he makes a somewhat contemptuous reference to the "juggle, which the modern popular logic performs with the word 'phenomenon';"[11] and from the ethical theory of utilitarianism his dissent is absolute and unqualified. It is true, he generously recognizes the practical value of utilitarianism. This is the theory, he says, which has given the conscientious citizen in modern Europe "a vantage-ground for judging of the competing claims on his obedience, and enabled him to substitute a critical and intelligent for a blind and unquestioning conformity;"[12] and he pronounces that "there is no doubt that the theory of an ideal good, consisting in the greatest happiness and of the greatest number, as the end by reference to which the claim of all laws and powers and rules of action on our obedience is to be tested, has tended to improve human conduct and character."[13] But nevertheless he utterly rejects the idea of pleasure being the one true end of moral action, and instead places the *summum bonum* for man in "some perfection of human life, some realization of human capacities."[14] The improvement in conduct and character is sufficient in itself, whether it be accompanied with pleasure or not. Both in his metaphysics and in his politics Green was irreconcilably at variance with the utilitarians. His function was to substitute for their empiricism an idealistic interpretation both of the universe and of human life.

To conclude, Green, with his practical knowledge of the problems of the state and his faith in political liberalism, tried to make individualism moral and social and idealism civilized and safe. If he paved the way for speculative thinking in the field of metaphysics, he attempted to liberalize the politics and safeguard the dignity of the self-conscious individual against the restraining character of the state. In fact, his unshakable faith in man as a self-conscious and self-moralizing entity has a sound metaphysical basis.

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[11] *Hume's Works*, i, 202.
[12] *Prolegomena*, 361.
[13] *Ibid.*, 363.
[14] *Ibid.*, 390.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

John Stuart Mill is today undoubtedly the most widely known nineteenth-century British political writer. And this is correct, for he was the most prolific author of influential political tracts.

J. S. Mill, the eldest son of James Mill, was born in London on May 20, 1806. No child of James Mill underwent a more "unusual and remarkable" boyhood than young John Stuart Mill. This fact has been admitted by J. S. Mill himself in his *Autobiography* (1873).[1]

Two years after John's birth, his father came into contact with Jeremy Bentham and was so much influenced by him (Bentham) that during the remainder of his life he devoted his energy and talents to promoting the cause of utilitarian reform. Bentham's faithful disciple selected his son, John Stuart, "to be the legitimate heir of the Benthamite tradition."[2] James Mill, conforming to the dictates of his theory of the *tabula rasa*, set about to manufacture, by a process of managed instruction, the perfect Utilitarian Mind.

The younger Mill's entire formal education was under the direct tutelage of his determined parent. James Mill was an "exacting teacher of momentous subjects," and a stern and severe taskmaster as well. John Stuart's education started at an early age of three with the study of Greek. At eight he began the study of Latin, history and the classics. In Stuart's fourteenth year there was an interlude for travel abroad. But

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[1] J. S. Mill wrote his autobiography during the last five years of his life; most of the manuscript dates from 1870. Shortly after Mill's death the manuscript was edited and prepared for publication by his step-daughter Helen Taylor, who deleted a few passages where Mill referred to his father or his wife. Otherwise, it was printed as Mill left it still unfinished.

[2] *John Stuart Mill—On Liberty*, ed. by Currin V. Shields, Introduction, p. vii (Liberal Arts Press, N. Y., 1956).

while he spent the year living in France with the family of General Sir Samuel Bentham (Jeremy's brother), John's "mental cultivation" continued without interruption. After his return to London, he read law, at the age of fifteen, with the Benthamite legalist, John Austin. At the same time, his education also included earnest conversations with many distinguished members of the Benthamite circle who frequented the Mill residence. In the course of the daily drills and recitations and lectures and conversations, James Mill shaped as best he could his son's mind to suit the Benthamite image.

John Stuart's formal education ended as his professional career began in 1823, when he was appointed an assistant to his father, the Examiner of Correspondence for the East India Company. He spent his entire professional life, a period of thirty-five years, in the employment of the East India Company. In 1856 he was promoted to the office of Chief Examiner, the post second in command in the home service to the Secretary. This office he held until the Company was dissolved by an Act of Parliament in 1858. Mill then declined an offer of a Government post, preferring instead to retire from the administrative service. In 1865 he was elected a member of the House of Commons for Westminster, he served three years, until his defeat for re-election. The last years of his life Mill devoted to his writings. Much of the time he lived in France with his step-daughter as a companion. Mill died on May 8, 1873 at Avignon, where he now lies buried in a tomb with his wife.

Mill's first great literary achievements were in the *Westminster Review*, where by his pen he brought himself into a prominence that left little doubt of a brilliant literary future, and made him a real influence in philosopy and politics. The systematic expression of his political theory is to be found in his famous work *On Liberty* and that on *Representative Government*, which we shall shortly consider in some detail. When these were published in 1859 and 1861 respectively, Mill had achieved great distinction as a philosopher and was, through his famous *Political Economy* (1844), one of the most influential thinkers of the time.

Also in 1861 Mill wrote a series of articles for *Fraser's Magazine* (October-December, 1861) which were printed as a

short treatise, *Utilitarianism*, published in 1863—the subject which absorbed Mill's attention throughout his entire lifetime: social ethics. It is in this work that Mill draws his famous distinction between the quantity and quality of pleasure. By the time Mill concluded his exposition of utilitarianism, he had virtually abandoned every distinctive tenet of the Benthamite faith.

In 1865 two of Mill's lesser works were published: *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, and *Auguste Comte and Positivism*; the latter originally appeared in the form of articles in the *Westminster Review*. Four years after, he published *The Subjection of Women* (1869). It was a fitting climax for his career as a writer of political essays. But after his death, several treatises of engrossing interest and high import saw the light. The first was the *Autobiography*, published in 1873. A sensation not less intense was aroused by the posthumous treatise, *Three Essays on Religion*, published in 1874. In fact, these two posthumous works increased his already great reputation and mark a fitting close to a great career of scholarship and service. Green expressed his respect for him by echoing Gladstone's remark that Mill was a saintly man. He considered Mill to have been an "extraordinary good man." These comments are Mill's truest epitaph. In the whole history of Political Philosophy there are few more appealing characters than his.

Mill's political philosophy is based on his principles of logic, formulated in his great work, *System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, which he published in 1843. In the sixth book of his *System of Logic*, entitled "*On the Logic of the Moral Sciences*," there are several lucid chapters on the logic of politics. In these chapters he had showed the need and urgency of the application of logical procedure to the phenomena of society and of government. The principles on which Mill proceeds in this book are those that he had expounded in the previous parts of his great treatise, especially in connection with Induction, which involves the deductive application of laws inductively obtained. The inductive process, according to him, consists in generalizing from experience, in discovering the causes of phenomena and ascertaining their laws, according to

various experimental methods specifically formulated (agreement, difference, joint method of agreement and difference, residues and concomitant variations) and copiously exemplified, and in making application to new cases of the generalizations thus inductively reached and bringing them back to the facts of experience in order to having them verified and established. Mill rejected the method of arriving at truth purely on the basis of abstract thinking. He also did not approve the method of those who try to formulate general principles either in the field of politics, or of economics, or of any social science, trusting to specific experiences. His approach was highly empirical. The distinctive name by which he called his method is "The Physical or Concrete Deductive Method". It, according to him, proceeds deductively indeed, but by deduction from many, not from one or a very few, original premises ; considering each effect as an aggregate result of many causes, operating sometimes through the same, sometimes through different agencies, or laws of human nature.

As age succeeds age, experience grows, and one generation of men differs from another. At any particular time, the circumstances of society determine its character ; but the circumstances are in turn reacted on by the society and in no small degree are moulded by it. This throws the student of social science upon the study of history so that he may discover, if possible, the law of human progress. But the generalizations made from the facts and events of history are not in themselves sufficient to guide us ; they are simply empirical laws of society, and need to be verified.

Mill applied the same empirical method in explaining the validity of moral institutions. Although he did not deny the existence of moral institutions, he raised the question of their value ; and, in working out an answer, he demonstrated that many notions and principles in morals that passed for infinitive were falsely so regarded, being merely common opinion and belief, or, it might be, mere sentiment or prejudice, untested by reason. On the other hand, he strongly maintained that what is valuable in morality is founded in experience and may be corroborated by it. Instead of basing moral ideas on intuition and holding them beyond the reach of human experience, he

brought them into direct relation with experience and insisted on testing their validity thereby. On his detailed analysis, he found, as Bentham and James Mill had done, that they ultimately derived their character from the pleasure-value of their consequences. Thus Mill gives hedonistic colour to his thinking which runs through his later political writings.

Nevertheless, although pleasure is the ultimate test of moral value, he thought it essential to strengthen the utilitarian position by drawing a distinction between the different kinds of pleasure. Mill desired to safeguard utilitarianism from the reproaches, which were levelled against it due to its hedonistic basis, by overthrowing the whole utilitarian position. Hence he sought to establish the non-utilitarian proposition that some pleasures are of a higher quality than others. For Bentham and James Mill, pleasures differ only in quantity and one pleasure is as good in itself as another, as Bentham put it : "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." But, on the contrary, J. S. Mill regarded it as quite compatible with the principle of utility to introduce into the conception the distinction between quantity and quality of pleasure, and to lay emphasis on quality. Pleasures are thus conceived as in themselves intrinsically different : there are higher and lower among them. The proof of this is appeal to intelligent people who have had experience of both : they are the judges, and their testimony is decisive. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides."

Thus Mill's assertion that pleasures differ not only in quantity but quality as well, is undoubtedly a truer reflection of human experience than is Bentham's insistence to the contrary, in spite of the fact that it appears mostly non-utilitarian as Sidgwick, who was so ruthless and logical a thinker, remarked that "if we are to be hedonists we must say that pleasures vary only in quantity, never in quality. Utilitarianism, because it is hedonism, must recognize no distinction between pleasures except a quantitative one.

However, Mill, in order to meet a challenge of the strong antihedonist movement of his day, personified by Carlyle, made use of the non-utilitarian argument that pleasures cannot, in any case, be objectively measured. The felicific calculus is, he said, absurd, and men have always relied upon the testimony of "those most competent to judge." "There is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both?"[3] Mill was, to quote Wayper, "of course right in maintaining the absurdity of the felicific calculus," but if it is once admitted that pleasures can no longer be measured objectively, a vital breach has been made in the well-known thesis of Utilitarianism.

Mill maintained the further non-utilitarian position by holding the view that not the principle of utility but the dignity of man is the final end of life. He approved of Humboldt's doctrine of "self-realization". "It really is of importance," he said, "not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." "What more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs," he asked, "than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be?" It was, more or less, the total rejection of the view of Bentham and James Mill that not self-realization but the achievement of pleasure and the avoidance of pain is the end of human life. Mill, on the contrary, held that one pleasure is better than another if it promotes the sense of dignity in man. Thus our criterion of goodness is no longer the principle of utility. The transformation of egoism into altruism is effected, he further explained, by the same process that turns a money-seeker into a miser. A man may begin by desiring money for the pleasure that it can procure him, but by and by he transfers his affections from the end to the means, and goes on amassing money for its own sake. So although pleasure to self is the ultimate explanation of human disinterestedness, self is forgotten gradually by the ethical man in his earnest

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3 C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought* (The English Universities Press Ltd., London, 1958), p. 111.

and devoted service of others, and his highest pleasure comes when he does not directly seek it. As such, his (man's) own happiness is found in doing good to his fellows or to other sentient creatures. Mill laid great stress on what, since his day, has come to be known as the paradox of pleasure—the Hedonistic paradox. Directly aiming at pleasure may fail to secure it. As Bain puts it, "happiness is not gained by a point-blank aim ; we must take a boomerang flight in some other line, and come back upon the target by an oblique or reflected movement." Thus happiness, according to Mill, is to be found only indirectly "aiming at something else." This is to place moral ends above happiness, which becomes not indeed a state of pleasures but a state of mind which ensues when one pursues some moral end. Viewed from this viewpoint, the state becomes a moral institution with a moral end. Not utility but the promotion of virtue in the individual is what it must aim at.

Mill continues his non-utilitarian interest and gives emphasis to the idea of moral obligation : Bentham had conceived of this as the sheer product of the selfish desires and anticipation of men. Mill considered Bentham's view far too simple and naive. Fear, memory, self-esteem, he admitted, play their part in its composition, but so do love, sympathy, religious emotion and occasionally even self-abasement. Mill not only accepted the emotional basis of the state, but went far to admit Green's contention that "public duties, and responsibilities cannot logically be derived from private rights and interests." He held that there is in mind or self or ego something more than what there is in matter. It is the characteristic of human mind that it presents itself not only in the form of a series of states, but it is also conscious of them. In other words, the ego or self is that which binds the states together, just as the thread holds the beads together in a necklace. It is this self-conscious state of human mind which, according to Mill, promotes the sense of dignity in man. Thus he was against Bentham's idea of moral obligation being interpreted merely in terms of the principle of utility.

However, John Mill remained true to his utilitarian training in spite of all his alterations in Benthamism. He viewed the

government as an association of men, made by them for their social well-being. Human will and purpose always are operative in the life of political institutions. Though there are other factors which enter into the problem, yet a government functions at any particular time only so far as the people whom it controls are willing to accept it, and are able, as well as willing, to do what is necessary to keep it going and fulfilling its end. "Social well-being", the end of government, Mill thought of as meaning the possession of desirable qualities by a number of concrete human beings, not the perfect adjustment of the abstract relationships which make these men a society. Hence the fostering of such qualities as virtue and intelligence is the first criterion of good government. Also, the fostering of such qualities is necessary for the moral development of the individuals when we consider the state a moral institution with a moral end as Mill did while introducing into utilitarianism a moral criterion. Only second in importance is the character of the machinery itself,—the degree in which it is adapted to make the best use of such qualities as the individuals possess.[4]

Although Mill flatly rejected Comte's famous criteria of the happy society, "Order and progress", and objected to the terms on various acutely distinguished metaphysical grounds, he accepted the influence of the latter's spirit and very often ascribed to a community attributes that cannot be readily predicated of a mere sum of human beings. These qualities must, as stated above, be the first consideration in any estimate of the social well-being. What must be the fundamental condition in the relation between the government and the individuals over whom it exercises authority, is set forth by Mill in his celebrated essay *On Liberty*.

In the opening passages of the essay Mill poses a question : What are (i.e., should be) the limits of the collective authority of society over the individual ? And he set, as his task in the essay, to explain "a very simple principle" for determining the proper limits for individual and collective action. The principle applies to governmental authority, but his main purpose, Mill declared, is to show the limits of interference "by the

[4] *Representative Government*, Chap. II.

collective opinion of society" in private affairs. Interference is justified, he contended, only by the need for "self-protection" : to prevent harm to others. The thesis of his essay is :

> ".....that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, interfering with the freedom of action of any of their member, is self-protection—that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he does otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else."[5]

It means that while much collective interference in individual affairs is not justified, some certainly is. Collective authority can be used to interfere, but it should not be used to interfere "wrongly." What are the rightful limits, then, to individuality? An individual, said Mill, has duties as well as rights. He has duties to himself and to others. He has a duty to bear a fair share of society's burdens, and a duty not to injure others by his conduct. Over individual conduct, which affects the interests of others, society has jurisdiction. When definite damage or risk of damage to others results from individual action, the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of law, because society has a right to protect its members from "moral vices."

Mill's development of this doctrine, on the basis of utility, embodies a complete and systematic philosophy of individualism and *laissez faire*. He stood forth as the advocate-general of individuality—of the supreme importance of deve-

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5 *On Liberty*, Chap. I (Introductory).

loping the individual in all the completeness of his being, so that his active and his intellectual nature might have their utmost scope and reach their highest efficiency. Without this, he thought, general progress was impossible. Mill took up the cause and pleaded that he (individual) should have the utmost freedom for development—freedom of thought, of speech and expression, and of action. Freedom of thought and expression, he (Mill) defended with Miltonian fervor and more than Milton's acumen.[6] Individuality as an element of well-being he sustained with the reasoning that William Von Humboldt had developed from different premises, and proclaimed forcefully that the repression of originality in thought and conduct, whether by law or by public opinion, is the essence of despotism and is fatal to the progress of the race.

A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, can't be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths ; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant, to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is "as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of early Christians and if the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind."[7] That the authors of such splendid benefits should be required by martyrdom, that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable state of things. The propounder of a new truth, according to Mill, should stand as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians,[8] the

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6 *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, p. 244.
7 *On Liberty*, Chap. II.
8 The Locrian law code (about 660 B.C.) was extremely severe, apparently in order to combat the lawlessness of that young community and to give it a political order. Locri was founded by the Eastern or Opuntian

proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit ; and he believed that "this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.

Mill divided all actions into two categories. There are those actions which concern only the individual performing them, or self-regarding actions. There are those actions which affect others, or other-regarding actions. And he concluded that there should be no interference with self-regarding actions, but only with such other-regarding actions as produce positive, demonstrable harm to others. Mill here frankly admitted, as a natural development of this position, that it is legitimate to oblige a man to bear his share in maintaining society—conscription is not to be regarded as an unwarranted infringement of liberty. He must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice, at his own cost. This is what individuality means : the individual's own nature and its development, and not traditions or customs of the people, must be the determining factor. If this is not permitted, if a man is not to be allowed to develop his own character at his own risk, then there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

Mill includes in the region of human liberty the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling,

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Locris about 683 B. C. This law code, incidentally, was the first written code among the Greeks and in Europe, and many of its principles remained in force for many centuries thereafter. Apart from the principle the author refers to, it also sanctioned in Greek social life the principle of retaliation (*Lex Talionis*).

absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people, but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires, he further argued, liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do "does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong." Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual follows the liberty, within the same limits, "of combination among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age and not forced or deceived."[9]

Mill wanted to promote the development of individual men and women, for he was convinced that all wise and noble things come, and must come, from individuals. According to him, there can be no self-development without liberty. It is this connection between liberty and self-development which interested him most, and he went on to argue that liberty is necessary for the happiness of society. He writes in *On Liberty*:

"No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest."[10]

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9 *On Liberty*, Chap. I.
10 *Ibid.*

The problem of social ethics for Mill was to separate the legitimate sphere of individual liberty from that of collective authority. The key to Mill's solution is "social progress". He did not value the freedom of other-regarding conduct as an end in itself. He stressed the value of liberty and urged its recognition, but he made no claim that any liberty is absolute. Individual freedom is justified, according to Mill, by a contribution to the general interest. Liberty is a valuable means to the more highly valued end of progress, in which every member of society has an interest. Mill believed that his principle supplied a practical criterion for distinguishing those actions which advance progress from those who hamper it. The former actions should be encouraged in practice, while the latter could be restrained. Thus Mill believed he solved the problem of the relation between liberty and authority.

In his belief about the practicability of his "very simple principle," Mill was plainly mistaken. Implicit in his formulation of the problem is a practical question: Who should decide which actions are contrary to the general interest and should be restrained? This question, Mill never really answered. He said that the individual has jurisdiction over his "self-regarding" conduct, while society has jurisdiction over "other-regarding" conduct. But this is no answer, because the problem in practice is to determine which actions adversely affect other people. When persons disagree about this, who should make the binding decision? The individual? Or society? Mill gave no forthright answer to this question; he shrank from the two logical alternatives his theory implies. Mill could not accept the view that the individual should decide because he believed that few people are capable of making reasoned decisions. The alternative, that society should decide, Mill found unpalatable, too; after all, part of his message is to caution against the tyranny of common opinion. What Mill tacitly assumed, apparently, is that "reason" can reveal to an exceptional few the correct answer. But doubts about this assumption are suggested by the inability of the "saint of rationalism" himself to decide whether or not certain individual actions should be restrained in the general interest. As a practical matter, Mill's principle offers no guidance what-

soever in determining the morality of "other-regarding" conduct.

However, Mill's doctrine of the individual's liberty of conduct may be summarized under three heads: (1) The advocacy of the due recognition of the place and importance of impulse and desire in man, as distinguished from intellect, though in close connection with it—the "supreme need of amply acknowledging the active and energetic side of the individual's nature;" (2) insistence on the view that spontaneity or individuality is a necessary ingredient in happiness or human welfare, and (3) revolt against the conventionalities of society that hinder, or seem to hinder, the development and expression of individuality—against the despotism of social custom. His own conduct not infrequently exemplified this revolt, and, in consequence, he suffered in the public estimation. The independence that he claimed for himself, he demanded for every individual. Mill identified individual's energy with "genius" or "originality", and forgot that energy, in certain cases, might be mere eccentricity. It may appear not as strength, but as the weakness of character. He also did not sufficiently recognize that, although a man's desires and impulses were indispensable to the development of his nature, they were not a sure guide to the proper outlet for this activity.

In his *Representative Government* (1861), Mill proceeded to discuss the form of Government that would best apply the basic principles of liberty as he conceived them. Ideally he considered that form of government to be the best in which "the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community," every citizen not only having a voice in the expression of the sovereign will, but also, at least occasionally, an actual part in the discharge of some public function. The excellence of such a government is to be deduced from two principles: first, "that any task is done best by those whose rights and interests are immediately involved"; and second, "that the faculties of men—moral, intellectual and practical—are most developed and improved when they are in active exercise.[11]

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[11] *Representative Government*, Chap. III.

This description is, in fact, of a form of state rather than of government, although Mill ignored such a distinction. He named it "representative government", and made it conform strictly to its name by ascribing to it as its essential characteristic thus :

> ".....that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise, through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government."[12]

Although Mill apparently committed himself to the dogma of a determinate and absolute human sovereign combining the peculiarly ill-assorted thought of Austin and Blackstone, and separated himself from the French liberals like Guizot, who insisted that absolute power in any human depositary, even "society" or the "people", was incompatible with rational liberty, he had a definite horror in his mind, of the tyrannical rule either of one person or of the society, working as a collective authority, over the individual. He knew that even this system of government has its weaknesses. The most dangerous of them, he thought, is the exposure to the unjust domination of the numerical majority. An inevitable tendency of popular government toward "collective mediocrity" enhances the peril from this source, so that power gravitates surely toward the less intelligent classes of the people. To counteract this Mill supported the system of proportional representation, which he regarded as the necessary complement of democratic government. He realized that the value of votes is not always equal. Intelligence, education, and superior virtue count for more than ignorance, stupidity, and indifferent character. Hence he advocated plurality of votes to the higher educated citizens. He even went the length of drawing out a scheme and grouping citizens so as to show what classes should and what should not be allowed a plurality of votes ; the basis of the classifi-

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[12] *Ibid.*, Chap. V.

cation being mental culture and moral qualities. By introducing this system, he believed, the evils of extending the suffrage would be minimized, and the instructed minority would have a share in the government that would make always for progress. Under such a system the able man would be sure of coming to the position where his ability would tell for the common good, instead of remaining submerged beneath the surge of the mediocre and worse.[13]

The question, which Mill always asked himself, is : How can I make democracy safe for the world, how can I ensure that this inevitable process will be for the good and not the evil of mankind ? And his answer was well summed up in words which Lord Lothian once used with telling effect to an Indian audience. It runs as : "Democracy is not a gift to be conferred, but a habit to be acquired. It cannot succeed unless it produces a race of aristocrats—and an aristocrat I would define as one who puts more into life than he takes out of it." Mill was certain that democracy can produce aristocrats so defined. His basic assumption is that men are made what they are by their education. By education he did not mean that which is exclusively concerned with books and academic studies. "The main branch of the education of human beings," he said, "is their habitual employment." He was an advocate of industrial as well as of political democracy. He believed, too, in education "in and through the exercise of social duties."

Mill showed a difference between true and false Democracy. The principle, "Every man to count for one ; no man for more than one," is, he thought, a principle of false democracy. For it implies the belief that any man is as good as any other, a belief which not only ignores the obvious differences of intelligence and virtue between men but which Mill believed to be "almost as detrimental to moral and intellectual excellence as any effect which most forms of government can produce." "Exclusive Government by a Class" is false democracy. True democracy, on the contrary, will give weight and influence to all the different elements of society. It will give

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13 *Ibid.*, Chap. VII.

plural votes to capable persons. It will insist on proportional representation. It will also abolish the ballot since "people will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from pique, from personal rivalry, even from the interests or prejudices of class or sect, more readily in secret than in public." Mill would grant, in a true democracy, suffrage to all adults (women as well as men) of adequate age, conditioned by the fact that the voter is a tax-payer, nor under legal disqualification. The suffrage that he contemplated, therefore, was to be universal but graduated. The requirement that the voter should be a tax-payer necessitated the lowering of the amount of tax demanded, if the power of voting were to reach the poorer classes. Although he did not discuss the question of Monarchy, he regarded second chamber as necessary for a true and successful democracy, which is not very satisfactory from a practical viewpoint. In the second chamber will be especially represented those factors in the national life which will never be adequately represented in an assembly popularly elected, so composed as to "incline it to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority, and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against their errors and weaknesses." True democracy will insist that representatives are true representatives and not mere delegates. It will not ignore the "radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it," but will realize that the true function of a Parliament is not to administer but to watch and supervise the administration. And, lastly, it will be alive to the danger of majority tyranny, for it will know that "the silent sympathy of the majority may support on the scaffold the martyr of one man's tyranny; but if we would imagine the situation of a victim of the majority itself, we must look to the annals of religious persecution for a parallel."[14]

These discussions illustrate the practical hearing of Mill's theory. The Reform Act of 1867 was already in debate and it furnished the basis of his argument. On the practical issues of the times he was a liberal rather than a radical. His

[14] *Ibid.*

speculative doctrine remained immovably, however, that of his early training. Truth and righteousness in society and government were discoverable through the process of logical deduction from the utilitarian dogmas as to the nature and end of man. He inherited a Benthamite system of thought which he found too confining for his inquiring nature, yet he was unable to break away from utilitarianism entirely and start afresh to build a system more congenial to his wide-ranging intellect. His bent of mind was for analysis instead of synthesis. But this surely can be only a part of the explanation. The fact is that Mill was disposed to entertain conflicting views on issues. The question is why he was so disposed. The answer is suggested by the peculiar role it was Mill's destiny to play in modern thought.

John Stuart Mill is a pathetically symbolic figure in the development of British political thought. In his writings we find reflected the intellectual cross-currents of the mid-nineteenth century, contradictory though they were. For Mill stood midway in a transition in British thought, not completed in his life-time. Mill, born into the utilitarian movement, was in his youth a radical reformer. He and his set agitated for the repeal of legislation which imposed restraints on the many members of British society for the benefit of the landed aristocracy. Their agitations bore fruit. Then in his later years Mill's enthusiasm for popular government declined, finally to the point of frank hostility toward democratic rule. Mill accounted for this shift in his thinking largely by the impression that Alexis de Tocqueville's "remarkable work" made on him.[15] In this report on the American experiment in democracy, what impressed him most, Mill said, was the description of the "weaknesses" and "dangers" of popular rule. The basic problem in a system of popular government, Mill came to feel, is to prevent the tyranny by a majority of the common people—"the uncultivated herd who now compose the labouring masses"—over a minority of exceptional individuals.

15 Mill reviewed the first volume of *Democracy in America* when it appeared in 1835. He wrote a review of the second volume for the *Edinburgh Review*, Oct., 1840. Often in his writings Mill alluded to Tocqueville's views.

This feeling Mill shared with other middle-class Liberals of the nineteenth century.

Mill's theory, in fact, represents the best and the worst in liberalism. Out of utilitarianism there emerged two contrary traditions : in the fertile intellectual soil cultivated by the Benthamites, the middle-class liberalism and the working-class socialism of the nineteenth-century Britain took seed. Both the individualist Herbert Spencer and the collectivist Robert Owen could look for inspiration to the utilitarian creed. But middle-class liberalism was a half-way house between the Redical reform of the Benthamites and the Fabian reform of the socialists. This house John Stuart Mill occupied, but not with ease and comfort. Mill recognized in his *Principles of Political Economy* that distribution was a matter of artificial arrangement which might be regulated by the state, and advocated taxation of the unearned increment of land. Here he laid the foundations on which the Fabian party was destined to build. The *Essay on Liberty* was, it is true, a fine indication of spiritual liberty and originality against restraints whether of legislation or of social opinion, but the trend towards something like State Socialism still remained ; and in his *Autobiography* Mill tells us that he looked forward to a time when "the division of the produce of labour.....will be made by concert on an acknowledged principle of justice." In his *Essay on Utilitarianism* he so far abandoned the principle of self-interest as to adopt the principle of self-sacrifice. "To serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own," was, he felt, in the present very imperfect state of the world's arrangements, "the highest virtue that can be found in man."

As such, Mill was neither an authentic individualist nor a genuine collectivist. In fact, he was not a doctrinaire thinker at all. He was a liberal who wanted both to eat and keep his political cake. But Mill's uncommon common sense told him he could do neither.

Taken together, John Stuart Mill's political theory bears the unmistakable stamp of nineteenth-century British speculation during a period of ferment. He was the last of the utilitarians, who lived to bury, not praise, the middle-class creed of his

father. Between the Benthamite reform of the early decades of the century and the Fabian reform of the last decades, Mill stood "at dead centre, not firmly and steadily, but doggedly". His common sense "led him to probe the implications of contradictory views which were the Liberal stock in trade." "In this he pointed the way for later thinkers whose minds were less trammeled by the clichés, and whose efforts were less hampered by the prejudices, of the British middle-class."[16]

16 Currin V. Shields, *John Stuart Mill : On Liberty* (Introduction).

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

Karl Marx was born on May 5, 1818 in the city of Treves (Rhenish Prussia). His father was a lawyer, a Jew, who in 1824 adopted Protestantism. The family was well-to-do, cultured, but not revolutionary. He studied jurisprudence, history and philosophy at Bonn and Berlin Universities. He concluded his course in 1841, submitting his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. In his views Marx at that time was still a Hegelian idealist. In Berlin he belonged to the circle of "Left Hegelians" (Bruno Bauer and others), who sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

After graduating from the University, Marx moved to Bonn, expecting to become a professor. But the reactionary policy of the government—which in 1832 deprived Ludwig Feuerbach of his chair and in 1836 refused to allow him to return to the University, and in 1841 forbade the young professor, Bruno Bauer, to lecture at Bonn—forced Marx to abandon the idea of pursuing an academic career. At that time the views of the Left Hegelians were developing very rapidly in Germany. Ludwig Feuerbach began to criticize theology, particularly so in 1836 and after, and turned to materialism which in 1841 gained the upper hand in his philosophy. Engels writes, "We (i.e, the Left Hegelians including Marx) all became at once Feuerbachians."[1] At that time some Rhenish radical bourgeois who had certain points in common with the Left Hegelians founded an opposition paper in Cologne, *Rhenish Gazette*—the first number appeared on January 1, 1842. In October 1842 Marx became its chief editor. The revolutionary-democratic trend of the paper became more and more pronounced under

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[1] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Eng. ed., 1946, p. 22.—Ed.

Marx's editorship. But he decided to resign the editorship when, on January 1, 1843, the government took decision to suppress the paper, although his resignation could not save it, which was closed down in March, 1843.

In the autumn of 1843 Marx went to Paris with a view to publishing a radical magazine abroad. In his articles in this magazine, he appeared as a revolutionist. He advocated the "merciless criticism of everything existing", and in particular the "criticism of arms", and appealed to the masses and to the proletariat.

In September, 1844, Frederick Engels came to Paris for a few days, and from that time forth became Marx's closest friend. They both took a most active part in the then seething life of the revolutionary groups in Paris (of particular importance was Proudhon's doctrine, which Marx thoroughly demolished in his *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), and, vigorously combating the various doctrines of petty-bourgeois Socialism, worked out the theory and tactics of revolutionary *proletarian Socialism*, or Communism (Marxism). In the Spring of 1847 Marx and Engels joined a secret propaganda society called the Communist League, took a prominent part in the Second Congress of the League (London, November, 1847), and, at its request, drew up the famous *Communist Manifesto*, which appeared in February, 1848. With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines the new world-conception, consistent materialism, which also embraces the realm of social life, dialectics, the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, the theory of the class struggle and of the historic revolutionary role of the proletariat—the creator of the new, Communist society.

From 1848 to his death in 1883, Marx lived a very hard life. He was banished from Belgium in February, 1848, from Germany in May, 1849, and from Paris in June, 1849. He then went to London, where he lived to the day of his death. He suffered dire poverty. Had it not been for Engel's constant and self-sacrificing financial support, Marx would not only have been unable to bring his work on *Capital* to a conclusion, but would have inevitably perished from want. Moreover, the prevailing doctrines and trends of petty-bourgeois Socialism,

and of non-proletarian Socialism in general, forced Marx to carry on a continuous and merciless fight and sometimes to repel the most savage and monstrous personal attacks. Holding aloof from the circles of political exiles, Marx developed his materialist theory in a number of historic works, devoting his efforts chiefly to the study of political economy. Marx revolutionized this science in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (Vol. I, 1867).

His strenuous work in the International and his still more strenuous theoretical occupations completely undermined Marx's health. He continued his work on the reshaping of political economy and the completion of *Capital*, for which he collected a mass of new material and studied a number of languages (Russian, for instance) ; but ill-health prevented him from finishing *Capital*.

On December 2, 1881, his wife died. On March 14, 1883, Marx peacefully passed away in his arm-chair. He lies buried with his wife and Helene Demuth, their devoted servant, who was almost a member of the family, in the Highgate Cemetery, London.

Marx was not, of course, the first socialist writer of the 19th century. There was a rich crop of socialist ideas before he wrote : St. Simon and Guizot were spreading the idea of class war ; Proudhon spread the notion that property is theft ; Fourier put forward the conception of the middle-classes as commercial despots ; Sismondi pointed out the inevitability of crisis, booms and slumps ; Owen advanced his hope that the new factory era would be of co-operation in place of competition. Marx called them in scorn "Utopian" socialists, because they attacked (it was his belief) the wrongs in the capitalist system, and not the system itself. He was of the view that their utopias were without definite programmes, and, as such, he questioned the possibility of their final attainment. Though they popularized the idea of a socialist society and they elaborated the labour theory of value, yet they failed as utopians. Marx succeeded as a scientific propounder of political and economic theory. He was convinced of the rottenness of western civilization.

From 1844-45 on, when his views took shape, Marx was a

materialist, in particular, a follower of Ludwig Feuerbach, whose weak sides he even later considered to consist exclusively in the fact that his materialism was not consistent and comprehensive enough. Marx regarded the historic and "epoch-making" importance of Feuerbach to be that he had resolutely broken away from Hegelian idealism and had proclaimed materialism, which already "in the eighteenth century, especially in France, had been a struggle not only against the existing political institutions and against.....religion and theology, but also.....against all metaphysics." In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring* (which Marx read in manuscript) :

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being..... The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved.....by a long and tedious development of philosophy and natural science....."[2] "*Motion is the mode of existence of matter.* Never anywhere has there been matter without motion," "motion without matter," "nor can there be....."[3] "If the.....question is raised : what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment ; whence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature but are in correspondence with it."[4]

Marx decidedly rejected not only idealism, always connected in one way or another with religion, but also the views, especially widespread in our day, of Hume and Kant, agnosticism, criticism, positivism in their various forms, regarding such a philosophy as a "reactionary" concession to idealism and at best a "shame-faced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world." On this question, we can see a letter of Marx to Engels dated December 12, 1868, in

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2 *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (Anti-Dühring) Eng. ed., 1934, p. 54—Ed.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 71—Ed.
4 *Ibid* , pp. 44-45—Ed.

which Marx, referring to an utterance of the well-known naturalist Thomas Huxley that was "more materialistic" than usual, and to his recognition that "as long as we actually observe and think, we cannot possibly get away from materialism," at the same time reproaches him for leaving a "loophole" for agnosticism, for Humeism. It is especially important to note Marx's view on the relation between freedom and necessity: "Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood." "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity." This means the recognition of objective law in nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom. Marx and Engels considered the fundamental limitations of the "old" materialism, including the materialism of Feuerbach, to be: (1) that this materialism was "predominantly mechanical," failing to take account of the latest developments of chemistry and biology; (2) that the old materialism was non-historical, non-dialectical, and did not adhere consistently and comprehensively to the stand-point of development; (3) that it regarded the "human-essence" abstractly and not as the "ensemble" of "social relations," and therefore only "interpreted" the world, whereas the point is to "change" it; that is to say, it did not understand the importance of "revolutionary practical activity."

Hegelian dialectics, as the most comprehensive, the most rich in content, and the most profound doctrine of development, was regarded by Marx and Engels as the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. They considered every other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, one-sided and poor in content, and distorting and mutilating the real course of development in nature and in society. Marx and Engels, as the latter writes, tried to rescue conscious dialectics and apply it in the materialist conception of nature.

Nowhere, unfortunately, did Marx tell us what he meant by materialism. But at least he made it clear that his materialism was dialectical, not mechanical. In mechanical materialism evolution is the path taken by material things under the pressure of their environment. In dialectical materialism, evolution is the development of matter from within, environment helping or hindering, but neither originating the evolu-

tionary process nor capable of preventing it from reaching its inevitable goal. Matter, to the dialectical materialist, is active, not passive, and moves by an inner necessity of its nature. therefore, dialectical materialism is more interested in motion than in matter, in a vital energy within matter inevitably driving it towards perfect human society just as Hegel's demiurge drove forward to the perfect realization of spirit. As Engels said : "The dialectical method grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their sequence, their movement, their birth and death."

This motion, to the dialectical materialist who follows Hegel very closely here, is made possible by the conflict of opposites. Each stage reached in the march to the classless society, the thesis, calls into being its opposite or anti-thesis, and from the clash between the two a new synthesis emerges in which what was true in both thesis and anti-thesis is preserved and which serves as a starting point for the whole process again until the classless society has been achieved.

How closely Marx followed Hegel is quite clear. For Hegel the universal substance was Spirit ; for Marx it was Matter. Both Spirit and Matter need to develop themselves and both do so by means of an inner dialectic. For Hegel the inevitable goal was the Idea fully conscious of itself ; for Marx the goal was the classless society, perfectly organized for production, sufficient for itself. Lenin was justified in saying how impossible it is to understand Marx without having studied Hegel. "In Hegel's writings, dialectic stands on its head. You must turn it right way up again if you want to discover the rational kernel that is hidden away within the wrappings of mystification." (*Das Capital*). "It is not consciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness." Moreover, the third of his theses on Feuerbach runs : "The materialistic doctrine that men are the products of circumstances and education, and that changed men are therefore the products of other circumstances and a changed education, forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated."

It seems, therefore, clear that Marx had an idea that man could become the master of his own destiny, though he per-

suaded many that he meant the exact opposite, that history is wholly predetermined. Engels also later admitted that he and Marx had overstated the extent to which economic causes could be found for political and legal institutions. Yet Engels maintained that the economic situation "is in the last instance the determining factor of history."

Having realized the inconsistency, incompleteness, and one-sidedness of the old materialism, Marx became convinced of the necessity of "bringing the science of society...into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon."[5] Since materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of being, and not conversely, materialism as applied to the social life of mankind has to explain social consciousness as the outcome of social being. "Technology," writes Marx in *Capital* (Vol. I), "discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them."

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or rather, the consistent continuation, extension of materialism to the domain of social phenomena, removed two of the chief defects of earlier historical theories. In the first place, they at best examined only the ideological motives of the historical activity of human beings, without investigating what produced these motives, without grasping the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations, and without discerning the roots of these relations in the degree of development of material production ; in the second place it was precisely the activities of the masses of the population that the earlier theories did not cover, whereas historical materialism made it possible for the first time to study with the accuracy of the natural sciences the social conditions of the life of the masses and the changes in these conditions.

Marxism, then, is an optimistic doctrine of inevitable progress and of the ultimate triumph of man. "Man has only to know himself, to measure all conditions of life against himself,

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[5] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Eng. ed, 1946, p. 34—Ed.

to judge them by his own character, to organize the world according to the demands of his own nature in a truly human way and he will have solved all the riddles of our age," is Engels's proud claim. Marxism points the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the genesis, development, and decline of social-economic formations. People make their own history. But what determines the motives of people, of the mass of people, that is ; what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and strivings ; what is the ensemble of all these clashes of the whole mass of human societies ; what are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all historical activity of man ; what is the law of development of these conditions—to all this Marx drew attention and pointed out the way to a scientific study of history as a uniform and law-governed process in all its immense variety and contradictoriness.

As soon as mankind emerged from the primitive communist state, it was seen that at every stage of social development a particular class got control and exploited the rest. It did not happen per chance, but, according to Karl Marx, it is an exorable law of history. The rise and domination of each class is as necessary as are the various phenomena of history which in Hegel's view were needed by the Spirit on its way to its goal. Applying the dialectics, it follows that each dominant class develops its opposite, and from the clash between the two, baron and serf, freeman and slave, burgess and journeyman, oppressor and oppressed, the new ruling class emerges. The source of the conflict of strivings lies in the differences in the position and mode of life of the classes into which each society is divided. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles", wrote Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*. "Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes..... The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class

antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature : It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat."[6] In a number of historic works, Marx has given us brilliant and profound examples of materialist historiography, of an analysis of the position of each individual class, and sometimes of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how "every class struggle is a political struggle." This class war, according to Marx, reaches its simplest phase when the capitalist is face to face with the proletariat. Capitalism, the thesis, calls into being its anti-thesis, organized labour, and from the resultant clash the final synthesis of the classless society will result. Thus Marx, with a view to determining the resultant of historical development, analyses and gives a complex network of social relations and *transitional* stages between one class and another, from the past to the future.

The most profound, comprehensive and detailed confirmation and application of Marx's theory is his economic doctrine.

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society," says Marx in the Preface to *Capital*. The investigation of the relations of production in a given, historically defined society, in their genesis, development, and decline—such is the content of Marx's economic doctrine. In capitalist society it is the production of *commodities* that dominates, and Marx's analysis, therefore, begins with an analysis of the commodity.

A commodity is, to define it, a thing that satisfies a human want. It is also a thing that can be exchanged for another thing. The utility of a thing determines its use-value. In daily life, a certain number of use-values of one sort are exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another

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[6] V. I. Lenin, *Marx-Engels-Marxism* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947—Eng. ed.)

sort. What is common to them is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products people equate to one another the most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relations in which the single producers create diverse products, and in which all these products are equated to one another in exchange. Consequently, what is common to all commodities is, according to Marx, not the concrete labour of a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. The magnitude of value is, therefore, determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of a given commodity, of the given use-value. "..... Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it."[7] We can understand, Marx explains, what value is only when we consider it from the standpoint of the system of social relations of production of one particular historical formation of society, relations, moreover, which manifest themselves in the mass phenomenon of exchange, a phenomenon which repeats itself millions upon millions of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour time."[8] Having made a detailed analysis of the two-fold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyse the *forms of value and money*. His main task in *Capital* is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of development of exchange, from isolated and casual acts of exchange to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and to the money form of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal equivalent. Being the highest product of development of exchange and commodity production, money masks and conceals the social character of private labour, the social tie between the indivi-

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[7] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 45.—Ed.
[8] *Op cit.*, p. 6.—Ed.

dual producers who are united by the market. Marx analyses in great detail the various functions of money ; and it is quite essential to note here in particular that the abstract and seemingly at times purely deductive mode of exposition in reality reproduces a gigantic collection of factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production. "……If we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as a means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production."[9]

The fact of growth of money in capitalist circulation is quite well-known. It is this growth which transforms money into *capital*, as a special, historically defined, social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of commodity circulation, for the latter knows only the exchange of equivalents ; it cannot arise out of an addition to price, for the natural losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalize one another, whereas what we have here is not an individual phenomenon but a mass, average, social phenomenon. In order to derive surplus value, the owner of money "must…… find……in the market a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"[10]—a commodity whose process of consumption is at the same time a process of creation of value. And, according to Marx, such a commodity exists. It is human labour power. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which, like the value of every other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production. Having purchased labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work, "for the twelve hours—the whole day, let us suppose." The labourer produces product sufficient to cover the cost of

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[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Capital*, p. 145.—Ed.

his own maintenance in the course of first six hours, and he produces "surplus" product, or surplus value, in the course of next six hours, for which the capitalist does not pay.

There are two principal methods by which surplus value can be increased: by lengthening the working day ("absolute surplus value"), and by shortening the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). Analysing the first method, Marx gives a most impressive picture of the struggle of the working class to shorten the working day and of governmental interference to lengthen the working day and to shorten the working day. Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all civilized countries of the world has provided a wealth of new facts amplifying this picture.

To continue new and important in the highest degree is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, i.e., the transformation of a part of surplus value into capital, its use, not for satisfying the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production. Marx revealed the mistake of all the earlier, classical political economists (from Adam Smith on), who assumed that the entire surplus value which is transformed into capital goes to form variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* and variable capital. Of tremendous importance to the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into socialism is the more rapid growth of the constant capital share as compared with the variable capital share.

The accumulation of capital, by accelerating the replacement of workers by machinery and creating wealth at one pole and poverty at the other, also gives rise to what is called the "reserve army of labour," to the "relative surplus" of workers, or "capitalist overpopulation," which assumes the most diverse forms and enables capital to expand production at an extremely fast rate. This, in conjunction with credit facilities and the accumulation of capital in the means of production, incidentally furnishes the clue to the *crises* of overproduction that occur periodically in capitalist countries—at first at an average of every ten years and later at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From the accumulation of capital under capitalism must be distinguished what is known as primitive accumula-

tion : the forcible divorcement of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants from the land, the stealing of the commons, the system of colonies and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates the "free" proletarian at one pole, and the owner of money, the capitalist, at the other.

New and important in the highest degree, further, is the analysis Marx gives in the second volume of *Capital* of the reproduction of the aggregate social capital. Here, too, Marx deals not with an individual phenomenon but with a mass phenomenon ; not with a fractional part of the economy of society but with this economy as a whole. Correcting the mistake of the classical economists mentioned above, Marx divides the entire social production into two big sections : (1) production of means of production, and (2) production of articles of consumption ; and examines in detail, with arithmetical examples, the circulation of the aggregate social capital—both in the case of reproduction in its former dimensions and in the case of accumulation. The third volume of *Capital* solves the problem of the formation of the average rate of profit on the basis of the law of value. The immense advance in economic science made by Marx consists in the fact that he conducts his analysis from the standpoint of mass economic phenomena, of the social economy as a whole, and not from the stand-point of individual cases or of the external, superficial aspects of competition, to which vulgar political economy and the modern "theory of marginal utility" are frequently limited. Marx first analyses the origin of surplus value, and then goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between the surplus value and the total capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a "high organic composition" yields a lower than average rate of profit ; capital with a "low organic composition" yields a higher than average rate of profit. The competition of capitals and the freedom with which they transfer from one branch of production to another reduce the rate of profit to the average in both cases. The sum total of the values of all the commodities of a given society coincides with the sum total of prices of the commodities ; but, owing to competition, in individual

undertakings and branches of production commodities are sold not at their values but at the *prices of production* (or production prices), which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

Marx's theory of Surplus Value is merely the introduction to something that interested him far more, an examination not of capitalism as it is but of capitalism as it was becoming. Using nature in the Aristotelian sense of what a thing will become when fully developed, we may say that it is with the nature of capitalism that Marx is primarily dealing, and that his main concern is to show that its nature is self-destruction. Capitalism, according to him, is doubly doomed—doomed by the general law of capital accumulation and centralization which begins to operate automatically as soon as capitalists appropriate surplus value ; doomed also by its own internal contradictions. "To accumulate," Marx says, "is to conquer the world of social wealth, to increase the mass of human beings exploited by him, and thus to extend both the direct and the indirect sway of the capitalist." Competition, the growth of credit, the development of a joint-stock system, technical improvements involving high initial capital cost, all speed up the accumulation and the centralization of capital. The development of capitalism simplifies the class-struggle, since it leaves only two classes, the property owners and the wage-earners, embattled against each other. Thus by increasing the poverty of the great majority and by simplifying the class struggle, the law of capitalist accumulation leads capitalism to the final and inevitable clash with the proletariat that can have no other ending than the triumph of the oppressed.

Marx prophesied that capitalism would destroy itself by its own internal contradictions. According to him, it is too wasteful of men. Under the pressure of competition it becomes "a squanderer not only of flesh and blood, but also of nerve and brain." This waste must ultimately cause a breakdown of the mechanism of capitalism, which cannot work without men. Of even greater importance, it creates abundance, and fails to cope with it. Capitalism can never solve the fundamental contradiction that competition both

makes inevitable the greatest increase in the production of goods and by rationalization of production methods and consequent lowering of wages reduces the market for these goods, thus destroying the possibility of existence for the over-developed enterprises it has itself called into being. It completely fails to deal with the crises it thus itself brings on. Truly speaking, the monopoly of capitalism becomes a fetter on the mode of production which has sprung up and flourished along with it and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist husk. This bursts asunder. "The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

From the foregoing it is evident that Marx deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of motion of contemporary society. The socialization of labour, which is advancing ever more rapidly, in thousands of forms, and which has manifested itself very strikingly during the half-century that has elapsed since the death of Marx in the growth of large-scale production, capitalist cartels, syndicates and trusts, as well as in the gigantic increase in the dimensions and power of finance capital, forms the chief material foundation for the inevitable coming of socialism. The intellectual and moral driving force and the physical executant of this transformation is the proletariat, which is trained by capitalism itself. The struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, which manifests itself in various and, as to its content, increasingly richer forms, inevitably becomes a political struggle aiming at the conquest of political power by the proletariat ("the dictatorship of the proletariat"). The socialization of production is bound to lead to the conversion of the means of production into the property of society, to the "expropriation of the expropriators." This conversion will directly result in an immense increase in productivity of labour, a reduction of working hours, and the replacement of the remnants, the ruins of small-scale, primitive, disunited production by collective and improved labour.

Marxian Socialism puts the question of the state on the same historical footing, not only in the sense of explaining the past but also in the sense of a fearless forecast of the future and of bold practical action for its achievement. The state, which is an organized violence, inevitably came into being at a definite stage in the development of society, when society had split into irreconcilable classes, and when it could not exist without an "authority" ostensibly standing above society and to a certain degree separate from society. Arising out of class contradictions, the state becomes "the state of the most powerful class, the class which rules in economics and with its aid becomes also the class which rules in politics, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was primarily the state of the slave-owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is a tool for the exploitation of wage-labour by capital."[11] Even the freest and most progressive form by the bourgeois state, the democratic republic, in no way removes this fact, but merely changes its form. Socialism, by leading to the abolition of classes, will thereby lead to the abolition of the state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not "abolished," "*it withers away.*"[12] "The society that will reorganize production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers will put the machinery of state where it will then belong : into the museum of antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe." (Engels : *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.*)[13]

During the period of dictatorship of the proletariat the state continues to be the repressive organ of the class controlling the means of production, but instead of the minority oppressing

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[11] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Moscow, 1940) p. 141.—Ed.
[12] Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 315.—Ed.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 143.—Ed.

the majority, the majority will oppress the small group of former exploiters. The worker's state will thus be far more democratic than the bourgeois parliamentary government. They were, indeed, a sham and a contradiction in terms since democracy cannot exist in any society which is divided, as it is under capitalism, into two irreconcilably antagonistic groups.

Under the loving care of the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialism will blossom into communism. Two things we can be sure of this golden age—society will be organized and then goods distributed on the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." And, of course, there will no longer be a state. That instrument of class oppression will have come to an end of its long march through history, for there will be no more classes.

As such, Marx's theory of Historical Materialism is not a sovereign formula to be mechanically applied, but a working hypothesis, a method of investigation which will help us to understand the pattern of the part and to predict the path of the future.

However, it is to be admitted that Marx failed in his evaluations of growing capitalism. He believed that the development of capitalism would leave facing each other in irreconcilable opposition two and only two classes. That has not been so. He could not think of the emergence of a new class of managers and skilled technical advisers. And for this he is not to be blamed as he depended for his conclusion on the past experience. But he claimed to be able to foretell the future of capitalism and it seems evident that he has failed to do so. The forecasts based on his economic analysis of Surplus Value have similarly proved wide of the mark. He declared that working men must become ever poorer until the day of final reckoning. But real wages today are considerably higher than they were a century ago, not lower as they should now be according to Marx. He also said that capital would be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands and the small capitalists and business men would be crushed out of existence. This has not happened. In fact, the ownership of capital is being more evenly spread throughout the community than at any previous period. Marx was convinced that the classless society was coming because he believed

that the next phase of history would witness the revolutionary clash of two completely opposed classes. As these have not emerged, the classless society "would still appear to be shimmering dejectedly on far-away horizons."[14] And the Marxian belief that the state would ultimately "wither away" seems to be almost fantastic.

Marx was a prophet of a revolutionary creed. He had no liking for democracy. A democratic system was totally alien to his temperament in spite of his plea for democratization of social forces. He was essentially a prophet who had to dominate every movement he entered and who had no patience with difference. Laski remarks in his book *Karl Marx* (1922) : "He was contemptuous.....of all who did not think exactly in his fashion, he never learned the essential art of colleagueship."[15] Marx dismissed liberty as a purely bourgeois ideal and was openly scornful of democracy as a bourgeois invention designed to deceive the people ; for him, history was the story of clashes between determined minorities contending for power. As a prophet of force and revolution, he failed to analyse human nature correctly. The admission that he had no knowledge of human nature is a proof that great man as he was he yet did not know all things.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that "the true and the false together in him constitute one of the most tremendously compelling forces that modern history has seen." For the power of his message and for his influence upon the future movement of communism, Marx can be "sure of his place in any collection of the world's great masters of political thought."[16]

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14 C. L. Wayper, *Political Thought* (London, 1958), p. 215.
15 Laski, *Karl Marx*, p. 25.
16 C. L. Wayper, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Nietzsche, a pious and Puritan, chaste as a statue, to the last, was born at Röcken, Prussia, on October 15, 1844—which happened to be the birthday of the reigning Prussian King, Frederick William IV. His father, who had tutored several members of the royal family, rejoiced at this patriotic coincidence, and named the boy after the king. "There was at all events an advantage in the choice of this day for my birth ; my birthday throughout the whole of my childhood was a day of public rejoicing."[1]

His life was very simple. His father was a Protestant pastor, and his upbringing was very pious. The early death of his father left him a victim to the holy women of the household, who petted him into an almost feminine delicacy and sensibility. He disliked the bad boys of the neighbourhood, who robbed birds' nests, raided orchards, played soldier, and told lies. His schoolmates called him "the little minister," and one of them described him as "a Jesus in the Temple." It was his delight to seclude himself and read the Bible, or to read it to others so feelingly as to bring tears to their eyes. But there was a hidden nervous stoicism and pride in him : when his school-fellows doubted the story of Mutius Scaevola he ignited a batch of matches in the palm of his hand and let them lie till they were burnt out.[2] It was a typical incident : all his life long he was to seek physical and intellectual means of hardening himself into an idealized masculinity. "What I am not, that for me is God and virtue."

At the age of eighteen he lost his faith in the God of his fathers, and spent the remainder of his life looking for a new deity ; he thought he found one in the Superman. He said later

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1 *Ecce Homo*, Eng. Translation, ed. Levy, p. 15.
2 Mencken, *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Boston, 1913, p. 10.

that he had taken the change easily ; but he had the habit of easily deceiving himself, and is an unreliable autobiographer. He became cynical, like one who had staked all on a single throw of the dice, and had lost ; religion had been the very marrow of his life, and now life seemed empty and meaningless.

After three years, in 1865, he discovered Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*, and found in it "a mirror in which I espied the world, life, and my own nature depicted with frightful grandeur." He took the book to his lodgings, and read every word of it hungrily. "It seemed as if Schopenhauer were addressing me personally. I felt his enthusiasm, and seemed to see him before me. Every line cried aloud for renunciation, denial, resignation."[3] The dark colour of Schopenhauer's philosophy impressed itself permanently upon his thought : and not only when he was a devoted follower of "Schopenhauer as Educator" (the title of one of his essays), but even when he came to denounce pessimism as a form of decadence, he remained at bottom an unhappy man, whose nervous system seemed to have been carefully designed for suffering, and whose exaltation of tragedy as the joy of life was but another self-deception. "Only Spinoza or Goethe," states Will Durant, "could have saved him from Schopenhauer ; but though he preached *acquanimitas* and *amor fait*, he never practised them ; the serenity of the sage and the calm of the balanced mind were never his."

At the age of twenty-three Nietzsche was conscripted into military service, although he would have been glad to get exemption as being near-sighted and the only son of a widow. However, a fall from a horse so wrenched his breast-muscles that the recruiting-sergeant was forced to yield up his prey. His military experience was so brief that he left the army with almost as many delusions about soldiers as he had had on entering it. From military life he passed to its antipodes—the academic life of a philologist ; instead of becoming a soldier, he became a Ph.D.

He proved a brilliant scholar at the university in classics and philology, so much so that in 1869, before he had taken

[3] Quoted by Mencken, p. 18.

his degree, he was offered a professorship of philology at Basel, which he accepted. His health was never good, and after periods of sick leave he was obliged to retire finally in 1879. After this, he stayed in Switzerland and Italy ; in 1888 he became insane, and remained so until his death. He had a passionate admiration for Wagner, but quarrelled with him, nominally over *Parsifal*, which he thought too Christian and too full of renunciation. After the quarrel he criticized Wagner savagely, and even went so far as to accuse him of being a Jew. His general outlook, however, remained very similar to that of Wagner in the *Ring* ; Nietzsche's Superman is very like Siegfried except that he knows Greek. It is a fact that under the spell of the great composer, Nietzsche began to write his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* (published in 1872), which was to begin with the Greek drama and end with *The Ring of the Nibelungs*, preaching Wagner to the world as the modern Æschylus. He went up into the Alps to write in peace, far from the madding crowd ; and there, in 1870, came to him the news that Germany and France had gone to war.

Nietzsche was not consciously a romantic. Indeed, he often severely criticized the romantics. Consciously his outlook was Hellenic, but with "the Orphic component omitted." He admired the pre-Socratics, except Pythagoras. He had a close affinity to Heraclitus. Aristotle's magnanimous man is very like what Nietzsche called the "noble man", but in the main he considered the Greek philosophers from Socrates onwards inferior to their predecessors. He could not forgive Socrates for his humble origin ; he called him a "*roturier*", and accused him of corrupting the noble Athenian youth with a democratic moral bias. Plato, especially, is condemned on account of his taste for edification. Nietzsche, however, obviously did not like condemning him, and suggested, to excuse him, that perhaps he was insincere, and only preached virtue as a means of keeping the lower classes in order.

In spite of Nietzsche's criticism of the romantics, his outlook owed much to them ; it is "that of aristocratic anarchism, like Byron's, and one is not surprised to find him admiring

Byron."[4] He attempted to combine two sets of values which are not easily harmonized : on the one hand he liked ruthlessness, war and aristocratic pride ; on the other hand, he loved philosophy and literature and the arts, especially music. Historically, these values co-existed in the Renaissance ; Pope Julius II, fighting for Bologna and employing Michelangelo, might be taken as the sort of man whom Nietzsche would wish to see in control of governments. It is natural to compare Nietzsche with Machiavelli, inspite of important differences between the two men. As for the differences : Machiavelli was a man of affairs, whose opinions had been formed by close contact with public business, and were in harmony with his age ; he was not pedantic or systematic, and his philosophy of politics scarcely formed a coherent whole ; Nietzsche, on the contrary, was a professor, an essentially bookish man, and a philosopher in conscious opposition to what appeared to be the dominant political and ethical trends of his time. The similarities, however, go deeper. Nietzsche's political philosophy is analogous to that of *The Prince* (not *The Discourse*), though it is worked out and applied over a wider field. Both Nietzsche and Machiavelli had an ethic which aimed at power and was deliberately anti-Christian, though Nietzsche was more frank in this respect. What Cæsar Borgia was to Machiavelli, Napolean was to Nietzsche : a great man defeated by petty opponents.

Nietzsche strongly opposed the conventional virtue. True virtue, as opposed to the conventional sort, is not for all, but should remain the characteristic of an aristocratic minority. Nietzsche admired certain qualities which he believed to be only possible for an aristocratic minority ; the majority, in his opinion, should be only means to the excellence of the few, and should not be regarded as having any independent claims to happiness or well-being. "We—immoralists," he cried, "we will go beyond moral good and evil, beyond right and wrong. We will speak of nobility and vulgarity, not of right and wrong, of *gut und schlecht*, not of *gut und boese*. Our standards are

[4] B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1947), p. 789.

essentially aesthetic. What have we to do with the masses, the slaves ? Shall the artist turn nurse ? Shall we all share the air of the sick-room for the sake of a spiritual unity ? What would happen to beauty if we all turned missionaries to the barbarians ? Forget the masses and turn to beauty and power. Be a master, if you can,—a Napoleon, a Beethoven, a Bismarck, a Wagner. It is these few who can give life its real worth."[5] Politically the implications are, let those rule who really can, in whom the Will to Power can effectively assert itself. A state is judged by the masters it produces. The masses are mere instruments in producing them.

Nietzsche hoped to destroy, in *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) and *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), the old morality, and prepare the way for the morality of the superman. According to the old morality, which was brought to its peak by Jesus, every man was of equal worth, and had equal rights. Out of this doctrine came democracy, utilitarianism, socialism ; progress was now defined in terms of these plebeian philosophies, in terms of progressive equalization and vulgarization, in terms of decadence and descending life.[6] The final stage in this decay is the exaltation of pity and self-sacrifice, the sentimental comforting of criminals, "the inability of a society to excrete." Sympathy is legitimate if it is active ; but pity is a paralyzing mental luxury, a waste of feeling for the irremediably botched, the incompetent, the defective, the vicious, the culpably diseased and the irrevocably criminal. There is a certain indelicacy and intrusiveness in pity ; "visiting the sick is an orgasm of superiority in the contemplation of our neighbour's helplessness."[7] His main objection to Christianity or to the old morality was that it caused acceptance of what he called "slave morality". It is curious to observe the contrast between his arguments and those of the French *philosophes* who preceded the Revolution. They argued that Christian dogmas are untrue ; that Christianity teaches submission to what is deemed to be the will of God, whereas self-respecting

5 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power ; Beyond Good and Evil ; The Joyful Wisdom, etc.*
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), pp. 121-23.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Dawn of Day* (1881), p. 232.

human beings should not bow before any higher power ; and that the Christian Churches have become the allies of tyrants, and are helping the enemies of democracy to deny liberty and continue to grind the faces of the poor. Nietzsche was not interested in the metaphysical truth of either Christianity or any other religion ; being convinced that no religion is really true, he judged all religions entirely by their social effects. He agreed with the *philosophes* in objecting to submission to the supposed will of God, but he would substitute for it the will of earthly "artist-tyrants". Submission is right, except for these supermen, but not submission to the Christian God.

Christianity, he argued, aims at taming the heart in man, but this is a mistake. A wild beast has a certain splendour, which it loses when it is tamed. The criminals with whom Dostoevsky associated were better than he was, because they were more self-respecting. Nietzsche was nauseated by repentance and redemption, which he called a *folie circulaire*. It is difficult for us to free ourselves from this way of thinking about human behaviour ; "we are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two thousand years." There is a very eloquent passage about Pascal, which deserves quotation, because it shows Nietzsche's objections to Christianity at their best :

"What is it that we combat in Christianity ? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble ; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves—until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation ; that gruesome way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example."[8]

Christianity, Nietzsche thought, is responsible for human decay. And the formula for decay, according to him, is that the virtues proper to the herd infect the leaders, and break them into common clay. "Moral systems must be compelled first of all to bow before the *gradations of rank* ; their presump-

[8] Quoted from *A History of Western Philosophy* by B. Russell, p. 794.

tion must be driven home to their conscience—until they thoroughly understand at last that it is *immoral* to say that 'what is right for one is proper for another'." Different functions require different qualities ; and the "evil" virtues of the strong are as necessary in a society as the "good" virtues of the weak. Severity, violence, danger, war, are as valuable as kindliness and peace ; great individuals appear only in times of danger and violence and merciless necessity. The best thing in man is strength of will, power and permanence of passion ; without passion one is mere muck, incapable of deeds. Greed, envy, even hatred, are indispensable items in the process of struggle, selection and survival. Evil is to good as variation to heredity, as innovation and experiment to custom ; there is no development without an almost-criminal violation of precedents and "order". If evil were not good it would have disappeared. We must beware of being too good ; "man must become better and more evil."[9]

The ultimate ethic is biological ; we must judge things according to their value for life ; we need a physiological "transvaluation of all values." The real test of a man, or a group, or a species, according to Nietzsche, is energy, capacity, power. In the same way, he considered force as the basis of the state, and obedience to it a matter of compulsion rather than of co-operation.

Now the question arises as to what Nietzsche meant by "biologically superior". We shall mean, when interpreting him (Nietzsche), that individuals of the superior race, and their descendants, are more likely to be "noble". They will have more strength of will, more courage, more impulse towards power, but less sympathy, less fear, and less gentleness. According to Nietzsche, victors in war, and their descendants, are usually biologically superior to the vanquished. It is therefore desirable that they should hold all the power, and should manage affairs exclusively in their own interests.

Just as morality lies not in kindness but in strength, so the goal of human effort should be not the elevation of all but the development of finer and stronger individuals. "Not mankind,

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[9] *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 165.

but superman is the goal." The very last thing a sensible man would undertake would be to improve mankind : mankind does not improve, it does not even exist—it is an abstraction ; all that exists is a vast ant-hill of individuals. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a huge experimental workshop where some things in every age succeed, while most things fail ; and the aim of all the experiments is not the happiness of the mass but the improvements of the type. Better that societies should come to an end than that no higher type should appear. Society is an instrument for the enhancement of the power and personality of individual ; the group is not an end in itself. "To what purpose then are the machines, if all individuals are only of use in maintaining them ? Machines"—or social organizations—"that are ends in themselves—is that the *Umana Comedia* ?"[10]

Energy, intellect, and pride,—these make the superman. But they must be harmonized : the passions will become powers only when they are selected and unified by some great purpose which moulds a chaos of desires into the power of a personality. "Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener but the soil of his plants !" Who is it that follows his impulses ? The weakling : he lacks the power to inhibit ; he is not strong enough to say No ; he is a discord, a decadent. To discipline one's self—that is the highest thing. "The man who does not wish to be merely one of the mass only needs to cease to be easy on himself." To have a purpose for which one can be hard upon others, but above all upon one's self : to have a purpose for which one will do almost anything *except betray a friend*,—that is the final patent of nobility, the last formula of the superman.[11]

Only by seeing such a man as the goal and reward of our labours can we love life and live upward. "We must have an aim for whose sake we are all dear to one another."[12] Let us be great, or servants and instruments to the great ; what a fine sight it was when millions of Europeans offered themselves as

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[10] *The Will to Power* (1889), ii, 387, 135 ; *Human All Too Human* (1876-80), i, 375.
[11] *The Dawn of Day*, 295.
[12] Salter's *Nietzsche the Thinker* (N. Y., 1917), 446.

means to the ends of Bonaparte, and died for him gladly, singing his name as they fell ! Perhaps those of us who understand can become the prophets of him whom we cannot be, and can straighten the way for his coming ; we, indifferent of lands, indifferent of times, can work together, however separated, for this end. Zarathustra will sing, even in his suffering, if he can but hear the voices of these hidden helpers, these lovers of the higher man. "Ye lonely ones of today, ye who stand apart, ye shall one day be a people ; from you who have chosen yourselves, a chosen people shall arise ; and from it the superman."[13]

Nietzsche was a passionate believer in the hero. He did not like democratic form of government as he did not like herd or mass morality. He considered democracy, like Christianity, responsible for national decay. Both believe in mass morality, which Nietzsche hated and abhorred. Democracy, he explained, means drift ; it means permission given to each part of an organism to do just what it pleases ; it means the lapse of coherence and interdependence, the enthronement of liberty and chaos. It means the worship of mediocrity, and the hatred of excellence. It means the impossibility of great men—how could great men submit to the indignities and indecencies of an election ? What chance would they have ? "What is hated by the people, as a wolf by the dogs, is the free spirit, the enemy of all fetters, the not-adorer," the man who is not a "regular party-member". How can the superman arise in such a soil ? And how can a nation become great when its greatest men lie unused, discouraged, perhaps unknown ? Such a society loses character ; imitation is horizontal instead of vertical—not the superior man but the majority man becomes the ideal and the model ; everybody comes to resemble everybody else ; even the sexes approximate —the men become women and the women become men.[14] As such Nietzsche held democracy a wretched experience in human history which gives birth to timidity, irresponsibility and, above all, to feminism. And with feminism, he said,

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[13] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 107.
[14] *The Will to Power* (1889), i, 382-4 ; ii, 206.

come socialism and anarchism. All of them, he explained, are of the litter of democracy; if equal political power is just, why not equal economic power? Why should there be leaders anywhere? There are socialists who will admire the book of Zarathustra; but their admiration is not wanted. "There are some that preach my doctrine of life but at the same time are preachers of equality.....I do not wish to be confounded with these preachers of equality. For within me justice saith, 'Men are not equal'." "We wish to possess nothing in common." "Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-insanity of impotence thus crieth out of yourselves for equality." Nature abhors equality; it loves differentiation of individuals and classes and species. Socialism is antibiological: the process of evolution involves the utilization of the inferior species, race, class, or individual by the superior; all life is exploitation, and subsists ultimately on other life; big fishes catch little fishes and eat them, and that is the whole story. Socialism is envy: "they want something which we have." It is not the leaders that must be feared, but those lower down, who think that by a revolution they can escape the subordination which is the natural result of their incompetence and sloth.

Nietzsche also warned us against the tendency of putting the political power into the hands of the business class. He said that the problem of politics is to prevent the business man from ruling. For such a man has the short sight and narrow grasp of a politician, not the long view and wide range of the born aristocrat trained to statesmanship. The finer man has a divine right to rule—i.e., the right of superior ability. The simple man has his place, but it is not on the throne. In his place the simple man is happy, and his virtues are as necessary to society as those of the leader; "it would be absolutely unworthy a deeper mind to consider mediocrity in itself as an objection." Industriousness, thrift, regularity, moderation, strong conviction,—with such virtues the mediocre man becomes perfect, but perfect only as an instrument. "A high civilization is a pyramid; it can stand only upon a broad base; its prerequisite is a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity." Always and everywhere, some will be leaders and some followers;

the majority will be compelled, and will be happy, to work under the intellectual direction of higher men.[15]

> "Wherever I found living things, there also I heard the speech of obedience. All living things are things that obey. And this is the second : he is commanded who cannot obey his own self. This is the way of living things. But this is the third I heard : to command is more difficult than to obey. And not only that the commander beareth the burden of all who obey, and that this burden easily crusheth him :—an effort and a jeopardy appeared unto me to be contained in all commanding ; and whenever living things command they risk themselves."[16]

The ideal society, then, would be divided into three classes : producers (farmers, proletaires and business men) ; officials (soldiers and functionaries), and rulers. The latter would rule, but they would not officiate in government ; the actual work of government is a menial task. The rulers will be philosopher-statesmen rather than office-holders. Their power will rest on the control of credit and the army ; but they themselves will live more like soldiers than like financiers. They will be Plato's guardian again ; Plato was right—philosophers are the highest men. They will be men of refinement as well as of courage and strength ; scholars and generals in one. They will be united by courtesy and *corps d' espirit* : "These men are kept rigorously within bounds by morality, veneration, custom, gratitude, still more by reciprocal surveillance, by jealousy *inter pares* ; and on the other hand, in their attitude towards one another they will be inventive in consideration, self-command, delicacy, pride, and friendship."[17]

But Nietzsche was not, however, a worshipper of the state ; he was far from it. He was a passionate individualist, a believer in the hero. The misery of a whole nation, he said, is of less importance than the suffering of a great individual : "The misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty men."

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[15] *Antichrist* (1889), pp. 219-20.
[16] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 159.
[17] Quoted by Nordau, *Degeneration* (New York), 1895, p. 439.

He was also not a nationalist, and showed no excessive admiration for Germany. He wanted an international ruling race, who are to be the lords of the earth : "a new vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years."

However his doctrine of aristocracy ruling the earth is not tenable. The aristocracies of birth are nowadays discredited. The only practicable form of aristocracy is an organization like the Fascist or the Nazi Party. Such an organization rouses opposition, and is likely to be defeated in war ; but if it is not defeated it must, before long, become nothing but a police state, where the rulers live in terror of assassination, and the heroes are in concentration camps. In such a community faith and honour are sapped by delation, and the would-be aristocracy of supermen degenerates into a clique of trembling poltroons.

Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910)

Count Leo Tolstoi was born at his ancestral home of Yasnaya Polyana, Russia, on September 9, 1828. He came of an ancient and noble family. He had everything with him that one could suppose necessary for a happy life. He was healthy, indeed stronger physically than any of his contemporaries; he was intellectually vigorous, artistically fresh. As the master of a great estate he had no material worries; he enjoyed reputation in the first place as a descendant of one of the most aristocratic noble families; in the second, and still more, as the greatest writer in the Russian tongue, and a novelist famous throughout the globe. His family life was perfectly harmonious; he had wife and children, and no outward cause is to be traced for the slightest discontentment with life.

Tolstoi, an earth-bound man of this world, who had seen and felt the sensuous side of our earth as no one else had, had no inclination towards metaphysics and speculative thinking. But he received a blow—a blow from somewhere out in the dark. This inward shock, which Tolstoi received when he was about fifty, had no name, and really no visible cause. But he felt that something fearful had happened to him. "Life came to a standstill, and turned sinister." He felt all his limbs, as it were, asking himself what had happened—why this sudden melancholy, these spells of terror, why nothing pleased or moved him any more. He felt only that work revolted him, that his wife became a stranger, his children left him indifferent. A disgust of life *taedium vitae*, possessed him, and he locked his sporting gun away lest in despair he should turn it upon himself. "At that time he first clearly realized (he describes his condition in a self-portrait, the Levine of *Anna Karenina*) that every living being, and he too, had nothing to look forward to but suffering, death and

eternal decay ; and so he had decided that he could not go on living like this ; either he must find an explanation of life, or he would shoot himself."

"To give a name to this inner turmoil which shaped Tolstoi into a speculator, a thinker, a life-teacher, would be senseless. Probably it was a mere climacteric condition, fear of old age, fear of death, a neurasthenic depression which turned into a passing spiritual paralysis. But it is in the nature of intellectual man, and above all of the artist, that he observes and tries to overcome his inward crisis. At first, only a nameless unrest began to possess Tolstoi. He wanted to know what had happened to him, and why life, which until then had seemed so sensible, so rich, so luxuriant, so varied, all at once became shallow and meaningless. And like his Ivan Ilyitch in the magnificent story when he feels death's talons for the first time and asks himself in alarm, "Perhaps I have not lived as I should have lived ?" Tolstoi began day by day to examine himself on his life and on the meaning of life. He was a truth-seeker and philosopher not from native pleasure in speculation or from intellectual curiosity, but for self-preservation, from despair. His thinking, like Pascal's, is philosophy on the brink or out of the abyss, the *gouffre* ; he searched life in fear of death, of nothingness. There is a strange document of Tolstoi's from that period, a sheet of paper on which he listed the six "unknown questions" which he had to answer :

(a) Why am I living ?
(b) What is the cause for my existence and that of everyone else ?
(c) What purpose has my existence or any other ?
(d) What does the division which I feel within me into good and evil signify, and for what purpose is it there ?
(e) How must I live ?
(f) What is death—how can I save myself ?

The answering of these questions was, more than his literary work, the meaning and purpose of Tolstoi's life for the next thirty years.

Tolstoi, with a view to understanding the meaning of life, began to study philosophic books of every tendency, Schopenhauer and Plato, Kant and Pascal. But neither the philosophers nor the sciences gave him his answer. Tolstoi was displeased to find that the opinions of these wise men were only "clear and exact where they do not deal with the direct questions of life," but that they wholly evaded answering when asked for decisive advice and help; and that none of them could explain the only thing he himself thought important: "What temporal, causal and spatial meaning has my life?"

And so he shifted from philosophy to religion. Knowledge had denied itself to him, so he sought a faith, and prayed: "Give me a faith, O Lord, and let me help others to find it." He writes in his book, *My Confession*:

> "When I had come to this conclusion, I understood that it was useless to seek an answer to my question from knowledge founded on reason, and that the answer given by this form of knowledge is only an indication that no answer can be obtained till the question is put differently—till the question be made to include the relation between the finite and the infinite. I also understand that, however unreasonable and monstrous the answers given by faith, they have the advantage of bringing into every question the relation of the finite to the infinite, without which there can be no answer."[1]

Tolstoi, in this distracted stage, was not yet concerned for any universal doctrine; he was no initiator, no spiritual revolutionary. He wanted only to find a path and a goal for himself, the bemused individual, Leo Tolstoi, to reconquer his peace of soul. In his own words he wanted only to "save" himself from his own nihilism, to find a sense for the senselessness of existence. He did not yet even dream of proclaiming a new faith, and had no desire to depart from traditional, orthodox Christianity. He made every effort to be wholly devout; he "observed all the commandments and regulations of the Church, fasted, made pilgrimages to monasteries, kneeled

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[1] *My Confession* (1882).

before *ikons*, debated with bishops and priests and sectarians ; and above all he studied the Gospels."

And now the same thing happened that always happens to restless seekers after truth. He found that the laws and commandments of the Gospels were neglected, and that what the Russian Orthodox Church preached as Christ's teaching was by no means the original, the "true" teaching of Christ. Here he discovered his first task : to explain the real sense of the Gospels, and to teach this Christianity to everyone "as a new concept of life, not as a mystical doctrine." The seeker had become a confessor, the confessor a prophet ; and from prophet to zealot would be no great step. A personal despair began to take shape as an authoritarian doctrine, a reformation of all intellectual and moral thinking, and a new sociology besides.

Tolstoi, after his books, *My Confession* and *My Faith*, were forbidden by the censors and the Holy Synod respectively, beg to undermine all the foundations of Church, State and temporal order. Like the Waldensians, the Albigensians, the Anabaptists, the peasant preachers of the revolutions, like everyone who tried to turn Christianity back to primitive Christianity and to live by word and letter of the Bible alone, Tolstoi was now unalterably on the way to becoming the most determined enemy of the state, the most passionate anarchist and anti-collectivist of modern times. His strength, his determination, his endurance and his unruly courage combined to carry him farther on the one hand than the most zealous reformers, like Luther and Calvin, and on the other hand, in sociological matters, farther than the most daring of anarchists, Stirner and his school. Before long modern civilization, contemporary society of the nineteenth century with all its justice and injustice, knew no more desperate and dangerous adversary than the greatest literary artist of its time. No one was a more effectively destructive critic of society than the man who had been the greatest artistic builder of his epoch.

Tolstoi, at first, thought that he was attempting only to put his own private life in order, to give rest to his soul by suiting his personal attitude as closely as possible to the commands of the Gospel. He intended nothing beyond living at peace with

God and at peace with himself. But all unbeknownst the original original, "what was wrong in my life ?" grew to the general one, "what is wrong in all our lives ?" and thus became the criticism of the age. He began to look around and discovered—which was not hard to do, particularly in the Russia of those days—the inequality or social conditions, the contrast between rich and poor, luxury and squalor ; beyond his own private mistakes he saw the general injustice of his upper-class fellows, and took it for his chief duty to repair this injustice with all his strength. A chance stay in Moscow in 1881 brought him close to the social question for the first time. In his book *What Are We to Do* ? he paints in staggering form this first encounter with the mass misery of a great city. Of course his clear eye had seen poverty in his travels and walking trips a thousand times before, but this had been merely the individual poverty of villages and countryside, not the concentrated proletarian poverty of the industrial cities, poverty as a product of the age, the machined product of a machine civilization. Putting into practice his attitude towards the Bible, Tolstoi tried to mitigate the misery at first by gifts and contributions, by organizing philanthropy ; but he soon saw the uselessness of every individual action, and "that money alone could do no good here in changing these people's tragic existencies." A real change can be achieved only by a total reconstruction of the present social system. Thus he writes the fiery words of warning upon the wall of the times : "Between us, the rich and the poor, there is always a wall of false education, and before we can help the poor we must tear down this wall. I was driven to the conclusion that our wealth is the real cause of the common people's misery." Something is wrong with the present social structure : that was clear to him in the innermost recesses of his soul, and from that day onward Tolstoi had one single purpose—to instruct people, to warn them, to educate them into taking pains of their own free will to make good the fact that men are stratified into such wholly separate classes.

Gradually Tolstoi became firm in his belief that property is the root cause of inequality and suffering in society. Hence he started his attack upon property a hundred times more bitterly than Karl Marx and Proudhon. "Today possessions

are the root of all evil. They cause the suffering of those who possess and of those who do not possess. And the danger of collision is unavoidable between those who have too much and those who live in the poverty". All evil begins with property, and so long as the state still recognizes the principle of property, according to Tolstoi, it is being both unchristian and unsocial, and becomes one of, in fact the chief of, the guilty parties. "States and governments intrigue and go to war for property, now for the banks of the Rhine, the lands of Africa, now for China and the Balkans ; bankers, traders, manufacturers and land-owners work, plant and torment themselves and others, only for property. Officials fight, cheat, oppress and suffer, all for the sake of property alone. Our courts, our police defend property. Our penal colonies and prisons, all the horrors of our so-called suppression of crime exist entirely to protect property."

A man is trained first of all in habits of obedience to state laws. At the present time every act of our lives is under the supervision of the state, and in accordance with its dictates a man marries and is divorced, rears his children, and in some countries accepts the religion it prescribes. What is this law, then, that determines the life of mankind ? Do men believe in it ? Do they consider it true ? Tolstoi's answer was : "Not at all." In most cases they recognise its injustice, they despise it, and yet they obey it. It was fit, Tolstoi writes, that "the ancients should obey their law." It was chiefly religious, and they sincerely believed it to be the only true law, to which all men owed obedience. Is that the case with us ? We cannot refuse to acknowledge that the law of our state is not the eternal law, but only one of the many laws of many states, all equally imperfect, and frequently wholly false and unjust—a law that has been openly discussed in all its aspects by the public press."[2] Men have long since realized that there is no sense in obeying a law whose honesty is more than doubtful, and therefore they must suffer when, though privately denying its prerogative, they still conform to it. When a man's whole life is held in bondage by laws, whose injustice, cruelty and

2 From *The Kingdom of God.*

artificiality he plainly discerns, and yet is compelled to obey these laws under penalty of punishment, he must suffer ; it cannot be otherwise.

In Tolstoi's opinion the state shields all the injustice of present-day society. It was invented only to protect property ; only for this purpose it set up its many-meshed system of force, with laws, prosecuting attorneys, prisons, judges, policemen, armies. But the most frightful and godless misdemeanour of the state, Tolstoi believed, was a new invention of his own century, universal military duty. To him nothing was such a provocation to the Christian man to betray the precepts of Christ and the commandments of the Gospels as his yielding to a State's order, allowing a tool of murder to be forced into his hand to kill some perfect stranger for the sake of a chance catchword—Fatherland, Freedom, the State. These catchwords, Tolstoi keeps shouting, have no purpose but to protect property that does not belong to him, and forcibly to raise the idea of property to that of a higher moral law. And if men submit to authority, it is only because they fear that if they were to resist, they would be subjected to violence. All the requisitions of the state, such as the payment of taxes and the fulfilment of public duties, the submission to penalties in the form of exile, fines, etc., to which men seem to yield voluntarily, are always enforced by the physical threat or the reality of physical punishment.

Tolstoi regarded physical violence as the basis of authority. It is the military organization that makes it possible to inflict physical violence, that organization wherein the entire armed force acts as one man, obeying a single will. The assemblage of armed men, submitting to one will, forms what is called an army. The army has ever been and still is the basis of an authority, vested in the commanding generals ; and the most engrossing interest of every sovereign, from the Roman Cæsars, to the Russian and German emperors, has always been to protect and flatter the army, for they realize that when the army is on their side, power is also in their hands.

We are told, Tolstoi writes while further pushing his viewpoint against the government and its physical force, that the government and its armies are necessary for our defence against

the neighbouring States which might subject us. But all the governments say this of one another ; and yet we know that every European nation professes the same principles of liberty and fraternity, and therefore needs no defence against its neighbour. Hence no man who reflects on the significance of the State, in whose name he is required to sacrifice his peace, his safety, and his life, can escape the conviction that there is no longer any reasonable ground for such sacrifices. Tolstoi writes : "The Christian nations of the present day are in a position no less cruel than that of pagan times. In many respects, especially in the matter of oppression, their position has grown worse. In the former the external aspect of cruelty and slavery corresponded with the inner consciousness of men, a conformity which only increased as time went on ; in the latter the external condition of cruelty and slavery is in utter contradiction which grows more and more striking every year."[3] The misery and suffering resulting therefrom seem so useless. It is like prolonged suffering in child-labour. Everything is ready for the coming life, and yet no life appears.

Thus Tolstoi—the gospel-seeker permanently turned radical anarchist—came to the conclusion that it was the duty of every intelligently moral person to resist the state if it demanded something "unchristian", i.e., military service, and this not by force but by non-resistance ; in addition he must voluntarily give up every activity which depends on exploiting the work of others. Honourable men must think and act not patriotically but humanely ; ceaselessly Tolstoi keeps pointing to the holiest right of the individual, that to decline things out of inner conviction although they be legally allowed or even required, to be refractory to every pronouncement of the state which they do not recognize as moral. Therefore he advises the Christian man to evade all arrangements and institutions as much as possible, not to appear in courts of law and to accept no offices, in order to keep his soul pure. Again and again Tolstoi encourages the individual not to be intimidated by the false, the anti-moral principle of force, even if it calls itself the force of law and order, for the state in its present form is of itself the

[3] *Ibid.*

defender, lawyer and bailiff of a latent injustice ; and even anarchical crimes of individuals do not seem to Tolstoi so morally corrupting as the apparently well-ordered and humanly acting institutions of this arch-enemy. "Thieves, robbers, murderers, swindlers are an example of what one must not do, and they inspire in men's minds a horror of wrong-doing. But men who commit acts of theft, of robbery, of murder, of chastisement, and gild them with some religious, scientific or liberal justification—who do it as land-owners, merchants or manufacturers —appeal to others to imitate their acts ; they injure not only those who suffer under it, but thousands and millions of men whose morals they ruin by destroying the distinction between good and evil in those men's minds.....A single sentence of death carried out by men who are not under the influence of passion, by prosperous, educated persons with the encouragement and assistance of Christian clergymen, corrupts and brutalizes mankind more than hundreds and thousands of murders committed by uneducated working men, usually in an access of passion.....Every war, even the shortest, with all its accompanying losses, thefts, tolerated excesses, robberies, murders, with the supposed justification of its necessity and justice, with the praise and glorification of warlike deeds, with prayers for the flag and the Fatherland and the hypocritical anxiety for the wounded, corrupts men more in one year than millions of robberies, arsons and murders committed by individuals under the influence of passion in the course of hundred of years." In other words, the state, according to Tolstoi, is the chief criminal, the true Antichrist, the personification of evil.

And Tolstoi aptly concluded that it was the natural duty of a Christian to withdraw himself both from the demands and the temptations of this devilish spectre. The free Christian must be just as indifferent to Russia as a state is to France or England ; he must think not in nations but on a universal human basis. Spiritually Tolstoi withdrew from the state as he had from the orthodox Church, declaring : "I cannot recognize states or nations, nor take part in quarrels between them, either by writing on the subject or by serving a single state. I can take no part in anything which rests on the

difference between states, like custom houses, tax collection, the manufacture of explosives and arms, or any warlike preparations." The "Christian man" in Tolstoi's sense—actually we might always say instead "the pure anarchist"—must deny the state ; he must live morally outside this immoral institution. "The Christian who contemplates that law of love implanted in every human soul, and quickened by Christ, the only guide for all mankind, is set free from human authority."[4] Only this wholly passive, wholly negative, apathetic attitude, willingly accepting any suffering, distinguishes him fundamentally from the political revolutionary, who hates the state instead of ignoring it.

This "anti-state doctrine" of Tolstoi's—we are reminded of Luther's tract on *The Freedom of the Christian Man*—is in itself splendidly direct and forceful. The flaw within the system appears only when Tolstoi attempts to turn his demand for self-determination into a positive theory of the state. Instead of a stable, uniform state structure with authorities and laws and executive organs, he recommends as a means of cementing all contradictory interests—this we are astonished to hear from a man who searched every depth of the human soul as almost no one ever has—simply "love", "brotherhood", "faith", "life in Christ". According to Tolstoi the vast abyss existing today between the property-owning classes, spoiled children of culture, and the pauper classes can be spanned only if the property-owning classes voluntarily give up their privileges, and cease to make such great demands upon life. Let the rich man give up his wealth, the intellectual his arrogance ; let the artist create his works with a view solely to intelligibility for the masses, let everyone live wholly by his own work, receiving no more for it than he needs for this primitive form of life. This is Tolstoi's central idea : Social levelling must be accomplished not from below, as the revolutionists demand, by forcibly taking all property from the owners, but from above, by a spontaneous concession from the propertied classes.

Tolstoi realized clearly that once equal needs or rather simplicity of needs have restored unity among men, the evil

[4] *Ibid.*

instincts of envy and hatred can find no further objects of attack. It will be superfluous to create special authorities and to use force in maintaining them. The real kingdom of God on earth will begin as soon as all social exaltations and subordinations are done away with, and people have once more learned to form a single brotherly community.

So powerful was Tolstoi's authority in his time and so attractive was his thesis on society that many people desired to realize his theory of society in practice. But, catastrophically, these attempts ended in disappointment, and Tolstoi did not succeed in establishing the basic principles of Tolstoianism even in his own house and family. For years he tried to harmonize his private life with his theories ; he gave up his beloved hunting so as not to kill animals, so far as possible he avoided using the railroad, he turned over the income from his writings to his family or to charitable purposes, he refused to eat meat because it required the forcible death of living creatures. He ploughed in the fields himself, went about in a coarse peasant coat, and nailed the soles of his shoes with his own hands. But all this could not change the hearts of the members of his family. His wife became estranged, his children could not understand why they in particular must be brought up like milkmaids and peasant boys for the sake of their father's theories ; his secretaries and translators brawled like drunken coachmen over the property in Tolstoi's writings. Not a single soul around him accepted the life of this splendid pagan as a truly Christian one, and he himself knew in the end, as his diary shows, that his intellectuality and his pride unsuited him more than anyone to fulfil the imperiously propagated ideal. And the eighty-three-year-old man, feeling death come upon him, flees out of his house by night, and dies in a little railroad station, lonely and disappointed in his holiest purpose.

Although Tolstoi's principles were greatly ridiculed during his own life-time, and he died a tragic death, it would be unjust not to recognize the powerful, even the epoch-making effects which the world owes to Tolstoi's theory of life, and it is definitely no exaggeration to say that not one of his contemporary thinkers, not even Karl Marx or Nietzsche, produced equal emotion in millions and millions of people—although in

tendency their effects varied altogether. None of the nineteenth-century Russian revolutionists smoothed the path so much for Lenin and Trotsky as this anti-revolutionary Count, who was the first to defy the Tsar, and who, pursued by the ban of the Holy Synod, had left the Church, who had shattered all existing authority with hammer blows, and who demanded social reconciliation as the necessary condition for a new and better world. His works, forbidden by the censors, were copied by hand, and reached a hundred thousand readers, making common knowledge of his demand for the abolition of property at a time when the wildest of the social-revolutionists were still modestly satisfied with liberalistic palliations and reforms. Nothing could make Russia radical as Tolstoi's radicalism in thinking. Despite all his inward opposition he deserves a monument on Red Square. For as Rousseau was the ancestor of the French Revolution, so Tolstoi was the Prodromos, the true ancestor of the Russian world revolution.

Tolstoi's ideas undoubtedly made history on a world scale, his theoretical writings with their contradictions belong once and for all with the most important intellectual and social constituents of our times. Even today they still have much to give to the individual reader. Every statesman, every sociologist will discover prophetic foresight in his fundamental criticism of our age ; every artist must be spurred on by the example of this mighty poet, who tormented his soul that he might think for all, and might battle·injustice on earth and with the power of his words. It is always "an exquisite delight when we can regard a towering artist as a moral example also, as a man who, instead of ruling by his celebrity, makes himself the servant of humanity, and in his struggle for a true ethos submits to only one out of all the authorities on earth—his own incorruptible conscience."[5]

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[5] *Tolstoi* by Stefan Zweig (Cassell & Co. Ltd., London, 4th ed. 1948), p. 19.

Georges Sorel (1847-1922)

Hardly is there any political philosopher of the twentieth century which has aroused so many misinterpretations as does Georges Sorel. Sorel has been claimed for the Soviet theory of the state as much as for the fascist political philosophy. Indeed, the complicated and very often rather baroque character of his works explains to some extent those misinterpretations. The following remarks attempt to give an unbiassed outline of the political ideas of this great French thinker who is so difficult to interpret.

Sorel was born in Cherbourg in 1847. After he had matriculated in his home town, he attended the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris and became an engineer. For nearly 25 years, he served as a Government Engineer and was busy in building French bridges and roads. Having reached the age of forty-five he asked to take retirement from government service. Up to this period he did not make any distinctive mark of his literary career. Only as a mature man he began with his literary work which broke out of him like a volcano : before he died in 1922—the year of Mussolini's march on Rome—Georges Sorel wrote seventeen books, lengthy introductions to eight books, written by others, and published numerous articles and essays in forty-one reviews. Until today nobody has attempted a satisfactory monograph of Sorel's formidable work which is so difficult to understand as a unity.

Sorel was much devoted to his wife, who had died childless. She had been his most devoted and faithful comrade. To her memory he dedicated later on the following moving words :

"Happy is the man who has met a devoted, energetic, and proud woman who never allows his soul to be contented, who knows how to recall the obligations of his task and who occasionally reveals to him even his own genius."

Sorel's deep moralism—so reminiscent of Proudhon—has "its roots in his marriage."[1] He himself acknowledged the morally purifying effect of a good and happy marriage. It was here that he had discovered the bulwark against the tendency of levelling down the moral values by the decadent sensualism of his age. This tendency he regarded as quite unfair and discouraging for the healthy growth of human society, and he was much critical of it.

Without his faith in moral values and without his belief in the proletariat, which he developed as a result of his feelings of bitter resentment and contempt against the middle-classes whose contact he came into as an officer and which is also fundamentally connected with his moralism, it would hardly be possible to understand the various stages of Sorel's spiritual and political development. His first writings, which he published in 1889, showed a conservative attitude, but soon he got interested in Marxism and accepted the perspective of the revolutionary cataclysm. In 1899, he gave up socialism for syndicalism. He contributed a series of articles on syndicalist philosophy and those articles were compiled in the form of his famous book, *Reflexions sur la Violence*, which he published in 1906 and with which he became the intellectual leader of French revolutionary syndicalism. During the World War I, he showed his antipathy towards democracy and the middle-classes ; later on, he bitterly attacked the treaty of Versailles and hailed Lenin as the liberator of the proletariat in a powerful postscript to the fourth edition (1919) of the *Reflexions*.

It is always well to remember that Sorel, although he professed the creed of violent revolution, was still a Marxian, with the conviction that capitalism carries fatally within its own nature the seeds of its destruction. He took up the position that Marxism could not be understood without syndicalism and syndicalism was meaningless without a clear apprehension of Marxism. He formulated an anti-state principle and, as such, he rejected the state entirely. He did not find any gain from political action even if the workers came to have complete

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1 The Third Republic : *Political Thought in France* by J. P. Mayer (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1949, revised ed.)

control over it. His main aim was to set up an organization of the working class for industrial self-government. That organization was to be separate from the state and was not to take part in political affairs. It was not to co-operate with the state in any way. The state was to be destroyed and a new social system consisting of autonomous economic groups was to be established.

Sorel firmly maintained that social classes were differentiated by dissimilarity of cultures and economic distinctions. Every class, according to him, developed separately its own peculiar social characteristics, its own ethics and its own mode of action. Every class attempted to impose its own system upon others. The propertied class, as such, used the territorial state for that purpose. It gained control over the state and used it to dominate the working class either by military force or by electoral manipulations. And it was of no use to the workers to capture the state from the middle classes because the state was entirely unsuited to the proletarian rule. Hence the state had to be replaced by a new social system adapted to the special qualities of proletarian class. The new social system was to be arranged according to the economic functions. Workers in every vocation were to be grouped in syndicates and unions. They are not only to fight for higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions, but were also to manage and administer the industry as their own. Thus, the central political organization was to be eliminated. In a new system, the workers were to act as their own masters and thus their creative and productive faculties were to develop.

Sorel had an insight to push to their logical conclusions the anti-intellectualistic philosophies of 'activism', and the unrestrained fashion of expressing himself that was fitting to an apostle of violence. Although he had become an apostle of violence before he professed the pragmatic faith, he had manifested his predilection for it clearly enough in its generally anti-intellectualistic aspects, and had shown himself an unconscious disciple of the 'will to believe' by his doctrine of social myths, and in particular the myth of the general strike. This is the kernel of Sorel's contribution to syndicalist theory, and it has had such surprising applications in fact that one may be justified in exami-

ning its relations to pragmatism at some length. In syndicalist theory generally, the general strike has been conceived as the means by which society will pass from capitalism to socialism ; it is the catastrophic revolution of the Marxian prophecy.

All political, social, moral and religious revolutions of the past have been made by minorities. The masses have always been passive. The militant Christians forced the edict of Milan in 313 and the Jacobins were also a resolved minority. "The majority of a country cannot generally perform great changes which are based on absolute theories. A society develops itself historically and the masses remain in their traditions."[2] Thus Sorel wrote in 1889 in his book, *Le Procés de Socrate.* The 'will to power', not numbers, creates a new social substance. *Elites* of soldiers, officers, and generals have alone won battles, the captains of industry have built up capitalism ; Catholicism, too, has been formed by a religious elite. According to Sorel, the elites of the future will be the proletarian elites, and thus he shared the view-point of Karl Marx. The workers, Sorel further developed his views on this point, must be as certain of their victory as the martyrs of the first Christian centuries. This certainty alone gives them perseverance in their battles and makes them to overcome all obstacles which they may meet on their strenuous way. The discipline of elites cannot grow within a political party. The *centre* of the formation of a proletarian elite must be seen in the syndicalist movement. Here is the school of revolutionary creed for the working classes. In strikes, the appropriate means for bringing about social and economic changes according to Sorel as also according to all other syndicalists, the leaders of the syndicates try out their social responsibility until the masses in the factories are ripe for the 'myth' of the *general strike.*

Sorel felt that intimidation by the employers and repression by the government would alike be rendered impossible by the fact that the strike would be general, extending over the entire country, whereas the army would be scattered and dispersed. However, his conception of general strike is a very different one. For him it simply suffices that the idea of a general strike as

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2 *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

the means to the Marxian revolution exists widely as a belief which gives the proletariat courage and the will to revolt. In common with all the beliefs of a similar nature which have inspired men to sacrifice and even to martyrdom, it is mythical in its character, and not to be treated by critical analysis. His principle of general strike announces the birth of a new society which is to follow the period of capitalism. A militant energy, discipline, love of work, purity of morals—these are the virtues of a proletarian elite to be qualified for building a new order of society. As such, he had given a most striking exhortation, in the spirit of his interpretation of the 'will to believe', to French and Italian syndicalism, urging the necessity of creating a heroic 'myth'—the catastrophic regeneration of society through the general strike—a sublime fanaticism of violence to revitalize the sick soul of Europe.

The syndicalist doctrine Sorel seized upon to turn into 'myth', a motive force for that belief which he saw with James that man must have faith in order to act, or that the pragmatic essence of his (Sorel's) thought follows a reasoning which perhaps be put in something like the form of James's 'faith-ladder' of inferences, by which men actually proceed to a determination. It is, however, evident from Sorel's entire set of political writings that he thought too much ever to be anything but an intellectual in the labour movement himself. He himself consistently attempted to avoid the pragmatic test for his myths, and warned his disciples against the querulous effort to test a 'myth' in terms of its actual consequences. Thus he writes in the *Reflexions sur la Violence*: "I do not attach importance to the objections given to the General Strike on the ground of practical considerations. There is no way to be able to forecast the future in a scientific manner or even to discuss the superiority which certain hypothesis can have on others." He further writes about the value of 'social myths': "Experience proves to us that the constructions of a future, undetermined by time, can be of great value and need not have any disadvantages while they are of a certain nature; that is to say, while they concern myths in which they find the strongest tendencies of one people, party or class, forces which present themselves to the spirit with the insistence of instincts in all circum-

stances of life, and which give an aspect of plain reality to the hopes of the next action on which the reform of the will is founded. We know that these social myths prevent no man from knowing how to make profit from all the observations he makes in the course of his life and are no obstacle to the fulfilment of his normal occupation."

Sorel, for all his pragmatism, had insisted that the myth was not to be tested in any way. That is the sort of condemnation which is passed on his theory of violence by English socialism and milksop parliamentarianism. The greatest cross Georges Sorel has to bear is the accusation that is very often made against him that his theory of myths is no more than a 'false translation' which turns the real opinions of the revolutionary syndicalists into a mere 'intellectualistic sophism'. Such accusations regarding his doctrine of the myth and his pragmatism have made his position difficult and there is every likelihood for misunderstanding his entire social philosophy. But if we study his doctrine of myth in the light of his above remarks, its value remains untarnished. Further, his pragmatic interpretation of the doctrine of myth as 'will to believe', which he mostly drew from William James, is fully in consonance with the pragmatic spirit. In support of this remark, let us examine certain statements of William James himself about pragmatism : ".....an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives. That it is *good*, for as much as it profits, you will gladly admit. If what we do by its aid is good, you will allow the idea itself to be good in so far forth, for we are the better for possessing it. But is it not a strange misuse of the word 'truth', you will say, to call ideas also 'true' for this reason ?"[3] James further expresses : ".....that truth is *one species of good*, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The *true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons*.....If there be any life that it is really better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it would be really *better for us* to believe in that idea, *unless*,

3 Willam James : *Pragmatism* (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1907), p. 75.

indeed, belief in its incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits. 'What would be better for us to believe !' This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we ought to believe,' and in *that* definition none of you would find any oddity. Ought we ever not to believe what it is *better for us* to believe ? And can we then keep the notion of what is better for us, and what is true for us, permanently apart ?"[4]

Although true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify, and false ideas are those that we cannot, the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. If we ask as to what the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically do mean, the answer is that they signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated data. But it is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than the ordinary agreement—formula—just such consequences being what we have in mind whenever we say that our ideas agree with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while—such feeling being among our potentialities—that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. Over and above, the pragmatistic requirement is that a particular idea to be in perfect agreement with reality ought to be pleasant and agreeable to a person, in search of faith. Sorel's doctrine of myth, which he interpreted as 'will to believe', was to serve as a belief, a motive force to encourage the proletariat to will to revolt. And a 'will to believe' is a pre-requisite condition before a firm action is being taken in any direction. It has a value in itself. The sacrifices of the Napoleonic soldier to the glory, of the Roman to the conquest of the world, of the Christian to his other worldly faith—these are things which no intellectualistic philosophy may explain. History shows such faith rewarded by success,

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-77.

and it is a faith that does not go with intellectualism. Hence Sorel's main aim was to inspire the working classes to revolt without questioning the efficacy of his method. The philosophy of revolution, as maintained by Sorel, was an attitude of mind, a way of thinking, which he firmly maintained and which suited his special temperament. In this way, it was mostly agreeable to him and hence pragmatic in essence.

Sorel's theory of elites has its roots in his appreciation of the moral forces which are substance and strength of the human being. Here it should be understood that he was much more influenced by Proudhon than by Karl Marx though the latter's early writings show a clear ethical tendency very much in contrast to the positivist-deterministic touch of his later works. It is true that Sorel's theory of history is deeply indebted to Marx which can be clearly seen by studying the preface which he wrote to R. A. Seligman's *L'interpretation economique de l'historie* : "Never discourse of the Right, political institutions, ideologies of art, of religion, of philosophy, without representing in its entire reality the economic life of the people under consideration, with its historical class divisions, with its development of technical processes, and with its natural conditions of productivity. The *rapprochement* thus established between the inner structure of a society and its superstructure throws a vivid light on those things which the society contains, and leads often towards a way of grasping its history." Yet Sorel was always very conscious of the difficulty, if not of the impossibility, of giving a *general* and *direct* series of causes interrelating the economic sphere of societies with the non-economic realm.

Consequently, Sorel maintained that contingency and human will-power play a decisive role in the historic process. In this respect he largely draws on Vico's social philosophy, interpreted in latter's doctrine of the *ricorsi*, the 'repetitions'. But Sorel attempted to transform the doctrine of the *ricorsi* in an original sense. While Vico gave the *ricorsi* a providential meaning, Sorel taught that the *ricorsi* were by no means only an historic division into *epochs*. The 'repetitions' can happen, he asserted, more frequently in the course of the historic process than Vico assumed and, furthermore, development and primitivity may occur simultaneously.

History shows that the heritage of the great teachers of humanity can only be preserved by a truly heroic effort of the human will. Decadence is nothing else than the manifestation of our vulgar, barbaric and absurd instincts which have been covered for a moment by an artificial order which genius has imposed on us. Sorel was a most bitter critic of his own time, a true contemporary of Jacob Burckhardt and Nietzsche. Sorel strongly criticized democracy because democracy, it was his firm belief, attempts to share out a cheap happiness to all men, without acknowledging qualitative differentiations or asking for moral energy. During democratic elections he saw only one master ruling the whole scene and that was money. He also criticized the marriage system. According to him, marriage is only an alliance of interests. Look at the divorce statistics of the capitalist countries. He was against neo-Malthusianism. He said that we were living in an age of inescapable mediocrity. Here Sorel was deeply influenced by the Caesarism, of Louis Napoleon and its consequence on French history. Renan's *Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale* was one of the books with which Sorel was thoroughly familiar. The *Réforme* exerted a profound influence on Sorel. The disillusionment about Germany and the horror of the consequence of the unchecked application of universal suffrage in France are indeed the guiding principles of the *Réforme*.

"The dream of my life" (Renan writes with regard to Germany)".....was to work in the feeble measure of my forces for the intellectual, moral, and political alliance of France and Germany including that with Britain, and forming a force capable of governing the world in the way of liberal civilization, at an equal distance from democracy and from the puerile anticipation of a return to the past which cannot be relieved."

But this dream of Renan was finally and irrevocably destroyed. Renan was also not satisfied with the politics of France. He seemed to be profoundly apprehensive of the future of France. He wrote :

"Until now France has known only two poles : catholicism and democracy ; always oscillating between one and the other, she never finds rest. To serve penance for her demagogic excesses, France throws herself into a narrow catholicism ; to

react against a narrow catholicism, she throws herself into a false democracy."

But Renan's warnings remained quite unheard. As Renan was not at all satisfied with French political system and its false democracy, so was not Sorel. And the influence of Renan, a great French historian, was decisive on Sorel.

Sorel's political philosophy is a doctrine of action. His activism reveals itself in his theory of knowledge, where he is much indebted to Henri Bergson. Although Sorel stood for giving into the hands of the workers all the powers, he refused to give details regarding the syndicalist society. He used Bergsonian irrationalism to justify a revolutionary labour movement having no definite goal. The future of society, according to Sorel, was to be known by intuition. He drew his philosophy of 'intuition' and 'action' directly from Bergson. Examine Bergson's remarks : "There are in truth no things : things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions."[5] This view of the world, which appeared difficult and unnatural to intellect, is, according to Bergson, easy and natural to intuition. Under the guidance of intuition, we perceive that "form is only a snapshot view of transition," and the philosopher "will see the material world melt back into a single flux."[6] In the same way, Sorel was of the view that only action is the criterion of truth. There is no monism of thought. The ancient philosophy of unity has finally abdicated : "enough of metaphysics.....Let us descend to the level of daily life." The proletarian elites alone can build a new world : they will replace the old static metaphysics by the right and the ethics of the world of the worker.

In the same way, Sorel's doctrine of general strike was nothing but a 'myth' which needs no intellectual interpretation. It was a myth like the second coming in Christianity. In fact, it is nothing, but an intuitional formula which to the modern mind is hardly defensible. Though Sorel vehemently rejected political socialism whether represented by Guesde or

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5 B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1947), pp. 826-27.
6 *Ibid.*

Jaurés, it seems that he orientated his political philosophy in a too one-sided sense towards the 'proletariat'. He clearly underrated "the social differentiations amongst the industrial workers themselves ; he has also hardly analyzed the rising new strata between the bourgeoisie and the workers which have entirely altered the structure and the balance of modern society."[7]

However, it must be admitted that Sorel's social and political philosophy was a definite attempt to liquidate the rigid orthodoxy of Marxist system in spite of the fact that he showed his indebtedness to Marx and stated, as said earlier, that his philosophy of revolution could only be interpreted and well understood in the light of Marxian thesis of capitalism. He tried to relate the ideas of Marx to the philosophy of Nietzsche and Bergson in order to relieve the entire philosophy of Marx from its orthodox character. Unlike the latter, he was fully conscious of the moral forces in history and appreciated the significance of political and legal institutions in social history. Likewise, his doctrine of elites forms the most important and fundamental part of his philosophy, in spite of its gross distortion by Fascists, although it is a fact that Sorel's philosophy of action and his anti-intellectualism bring him near Fascism. Contrariwise his faith in the moral values and his philosophy of intuition make him the spiritual father of the movement of the working classes. And Sorel belongs to the same spiritual family to which Tocqueville, Montalembert, Renan and Péguy belong. His theory of moral élite will ever inspire the best part of a further political philosophy.

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[7] J. P. Mayer, *Political Thought in France*, p. 120.

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Graham Wallas (1858-1932)

Graham Wallas was born in 1858 in a clergyman's family. He received his education at Shrewsbury School and Corpu Christi College, Oxford. He started as a school teacher, but later on he became famous as a great scholar. He was partly instrumental in the foundation of the London School of Economics. Later on, he became head of the department of Political Science in that School and taught for about 30 years. On his retirement, he was succeeded by Prof. Harold J. Laski. Wallas served for about twenty years on the Senate of the London University and made valuable contributions towards the administration of the university. He showed his interest in practical politics as a member of the London School Board, the London County Council and the Royal Commission on Civil Service.

His important works are *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), *The Great Society* (1914) and *Our Social Heritage* (1921). All of them are marked by the desire to interpret political phenomenon in terms of psychological forces, and not in terms of form and structure. He speaks that politics is largely "a matter of subconscious processes of habit and instinct, suggestion and imitation," and only slightly of conscious reason. Although Wallas, in his later writings, discussed the organization of thought and will, and gives more attention to the rational element in political psychology, his approach was more or less anti-intellectual. With a view to studying politics in a psychological context he emphasized the necessity of a new approach to the study of politics and changed from the qualitative to the quantitative methods of argument. Rockow rightly remarks that "while Professor Mc-Dougall is Platonic, Professor Graham Wallas is obviously an Aristotelian."[1]

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1. *Contemporary Political Thought in England*, Chapter on G. Wallas.

It is admitted that Graham Wallas received a lot of help from books on psychology, but his own admission is that he based his conclusions on material derived from his own experience as a teacher, administrator and practical politician, and also from the accounts of their thought processes as given by some of his students and friends in England and America. He himself says that "My main material has been derived from my experience, during more than 40 years, as a teacher and administrator, and from the accounts of their thought-processes given by poets and others who were not professed psychologists, by some of my students and by friends in England and America." The problem before Graham was as to how far the knowledge accumulated by modern psychology could be made useful for the improvement of thought-processes for a working thinker.

He advocated the need of following the quantitative method in politics if the people were not to face disappointment in their day-to-day affairs. He felt that every year larger and more exact collections of detailed political facts were being accumulated. He found that the intellectual work of preparing legislation, whether carried on by permanent officials or Royal Commissions or Cabinet Ministers, took every year a more quantitative and less qualitative form.

For the sake of comparison, he referred to the methods followed by the Commission on Poor Law of 1833-34 and the Poor Law Commission of 1905. The argument of the earlier commission was in *a priori* form. All men seek pleasure and avoid pain. The *a priori* argument is admirably illustrated by indicating that labouring men will not exert themselves unless they are offered the alternative of starvation or rigorous confinement, though no attempt is made to estimate the proportion of the working population of England whose character and conduct is represented by each instance. The *a priori* deduction is illustrated and not proved by the example given. The Poor Law Commission of 1905 was driven to new lines. It does not assume that human energy is dependent solely on the working of the human will in the presence of the ideas of pleasure and pain. It has been forced to tabulate and consider innumerable quantitative observations relating to the very many

factors affecting the will of paupers and possible paupers. It cannot avoid the task of estimating the relative industrial effectiveness of health which depends upon decent surroundings, of hope it may be made possible by state provision for old age, and of the imaginative range which is the result of education, and of comparing all these with the purely economic motive created by ideas of future pleasure and pain. The evidence is collected, not to illustrate general propositions otherwise established, but to provide quantitative answers to quantitative questions. Instances in each case are accumulated according to a well-known statistical rule until the repetition of results shows that further accumulations are useless.

It was to be considered, after the commissions of 1834 and 1905, whether men voted best in areas where they kept up habits of political action in connection with parliamentary as well as municipal contests, and whether an election involving other points besides poor law administration was more likely to create interest among the electorate. If more than one election was held in a district in any area, it may be found by the record of the percentage of votes that electoral enthusiam diminished for each additional contest allowing their rapidly descending curve. The final decisions must involve the balancing of all these and many other considerations by an essentially quantitative process. Throughout the argument, the population of England was to be looked upon not "on the average or *en masse*" but as consisting of individuals who could be arranged in 'polygons of variation' according to their nervous and physical strength, their character and the degree to which ideas of the future were likely to affect their present conduct.

On the basis of his keen observations of different political situations in England and elsewhere, Wallas concluded that "The study of politics is just now (1908) in a curiously unsatisfactory position."[2] The position was unsatisfactory because the expectations aroused in the minds of thinking people had not been fulfilled ; the actual working of democracy which was deemed to be the best form of government

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2 *Human Nature in Politics* (opening Paragraph).

had left people disappointed. People thought that the failure of democracy was due to defective political institutions, to restricted franchise and inadequate education, but Wallas held a different view. He was of the view that enough attention had not been paid to the facts of human nature. Wallas' work is an attempt to interpret political phenomena in terms of psychological forces rather than in terms of form and structure. The fundamental forces considered were those of Intelligence, Love and Happiness, on the basis of which he endeavoured to rebuild a political theory and a political structure. His work in this field was suggestive rather than conclusive, however, inspiring and stimulating further inquiry.[3]

Wallas pleaded that the study of politics must not be separated from the study of human nature. His own words were attempts towards overcoming the separation between the two which was a marked feature of the writings of the early and middle-nineteenth century writers. The student of politics must deal not with the abstract man, but with the full man who is a creature "compact of emotions, impulses and instincts as well as conscious reason." If the political doctrines in which a man is educated are based on the view of man as a rational being whose every act is the result of an intellectual process by which he "first thinks of some end which he desires and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained," he would have to leave aside his text books and change his views when he comes to deal with practical issues and with living men and women ; he would discover that his views bore no relation to reality. Therefore, Wallas asked his readers to do away with the intellectual fallacy, and overcome their "tendency to exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind." He said that if a faithful record of all that an individual did and said in the course of a day were to be kept, we would find that a very small number of activities were a result of a deliberate search for the means of attaining ends. Most of them would be found to be either half-conscious repetitions, under the influence of habit, of movements which

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[3] Walter Lippmann, *Preface to Politics, Public Opinion,* and other works.

were originally more fully conscious or to have their basis in the impulsive and instinctive endowment of human nature. The conclusion naturally follows that politics must "legally be a matter of subconscious process of habit and instinct, suggestion and imitation" and "only in a slight degree the product of conscious reason." In contrast to the rationalistic and collectivistic approaches of Hobhouse and Clifford, Graham Wallas in *Human Nature in Politics* suggests that reason has little to do with the whole process. The secret of politics, according to him, lies in man's suggestibility, his habits and emotions. Names are set up for artificial entities (my country, my party, my nation) and the emotional or 'suggestive' power of these symbols is the real basis on which politics rests and by which it operates.

Since not all our impulses and instincts are of value and significance to the politician, Wallas described the most important of them. The most important of them is affection or love ; the next is fear, and the desire for property may be placed third. To these may be added the fighting instinct and the instincts of suspicion, curiosity, and the desire to excel. If we want to rebuild political theory and political structure, we shall have to pay attention to intelligence and the desire for happiness which are also fundamental forces shaping human life. It must be borne in mind that Graham Wallas was not an irrationalist ; he did not exclude reason or intelligence completely from political life ; he simply drew attention to the fundamental role played in it by sub-conscious factors. According to him, the "empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inference." In his later writings, when he discussed the organization of thought and will, he gave more attention to the rational element in the psychology of politics.

Graham Wallas was of the opinion that human political behaviour is influenced not only by psychological equipment but also by political environment. This environment is subject to constant change ; new political entities and new habits of thought and feeling come into existence and shape our political

behaviour. The national flag and anthem and political parties are among the chief political entities round which habits of thought and feeling develop. They do stand for intellectual ideas and may therefore have intellectual origins ; but to the mass of people they are something more than bare ideas ; they are 'emotion-charged and emotion-making names'. The art of the politician consists in attaching certain emotions to them and then exploiting those emotions. The appeal to emotions is the stock-in-trade of all skilled political leaders.[4] Emotions, according to Wallas, tend to associate themselves with certain political slogans, or with a party : "White Supremacy" in the Southern States, "The Party of Lincoln", "Jeffersonian Democracy", "The Grand Old Party", are all symbols which arouse in the appropriate hearer a complex of feeling and impulse which are sufficient for all practical purposes. Those interested in the party management furnish all the reasoning which they regard as necessary.

Graham Wallas indicated the manner in which party leaders are able to make an emotional appeal to the citizens through party symbols and shibboleths and thus reduce to a nullity the critical capacity of the voters and make them easy victims of the party propaganda.[5] This is most clearly manifest during elections. Each party coins a few slogans and makes them emotional symbols. Great efforts are made to create public opinion by a deliberate appeal to the emotional suggestibility of the people. As a consequence, elections become, or tend to become, 'psychological orgies' and 'exercises in spell-binding'. "The party names and symbols, the party colours, placards and songs are all let loose on the suggestibility of the electorate."

Wallas maintained that in politics men act under the immediate stimulus of affection and instinct, and that affection and interest may be directed towards political entities which are very different from those facts in the world around us which we can discover by deliberate observation and analysis. He showed that when people form inferences as to the results

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[4] *Human Nature in Politics*, Chap. II.
[5] *Ibid.*

of their political actions, they do so, not by a process of reasoning, but in a non-rational way. Their minds act like a harp, "all of whose strings throb together ; so that emotions, impulse, inference, are often simultaneous and intermingled aspects of a single mental experience." This non-rational character of our mental processes is heightened when we act in excitement and as a part of a crowd. According to Wallas, a great majority of people live, so far as their mental and intellectual life is concerned, under the conditions of a crowd ; they substitute non-rational for rational inference. Urbanization has increased this tendency manifold. It is no longer even necessary to be gathered together in one place for suggestion to have its effect. The radio, the press and the cinema do their work too well. The excitement caused everywhere during World War II and the manner in which President Roosevelt induced the people of the U.S.A. to enter it afford excellent illustrations of the way in which suggestion and sympathetic excitement influence public opinion. It is the great merit of Graham Wallas to have revealed the subtle and pervasive way in which public opinion is formed by non-rational processes.

According to Wallas, there is a great disparity between actual democracy and the intellectual assumptions of the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers of democracy. We are struck by the gullibility of the masses. Majorities can be secured by manipulating the sub-conscious mental lives of individuals. Politicians exploit names, images and symbols to secure the votes of the people. Vote for a particular party does not indicate that we have given the same after an impartial examination of the whole problem. Votes are given because the name of a particular party arouses the sympathy of the voter. In certain cases, clever posters do the trick. Elections tend to be floods of mass suggestion. Voters are made to vote for a particular issue without being conscious of the nature of their mental processes.

The electorate can be hypnotized by the popular press, drugged with advertisements, deafened by the boosting of the business candidates. It can be influenced by centralized mass suggestion, exercised through all the organs which form and control public opinion, into condoning and even encouraging a

policy of hatred and passion of which each individual would in his private capacity be ashamed. It may be suborned by powerful financial groups into voting for measures which though prejudicial to the common welfare, are advantageous to the groups in question.

If what has been said above regarding the non-rational character of the forces which influence the judgment of the voters and shape public opinion is true, there seems to be little hope for democracy or representative government ; the arguments of Graham Wallas cut the ground from under the feet of the democrat. Education of the people is no remedy ; instead of minimising the evil, it tends to minimise it. Since elementary education gives to the voter merely the power to read ; it leaves him or her at the mercy of the clever manipulator of the public opinion even more than before.

But Wallas was no anti-democrat ; he did not advise the people to leave everything to the most intellectual persons. He argued that the best intellects may themselves be the victims of suggestion ; leaving matters to them would not necessarily improve matters. Moreover, "government without consent is a complicated and ugly process." According to him, the remedy lies in the gradual extension of the sphere in which intelligence can play a greater role in politics. Man does think and knowledge is still a power. We must increase the part to be played by reason in the management of our common business. Our ideal should be to make the casting of vote as much based upon the impersonal weighing of scientific evidence as the decisions of a jury. On the positive side, he expected that modern psychology would offer a much truer, though a more complex conception of human nature on which the politician can build, and that with the help of new quantitative methods which were coming into vogue political thinkers would be able to state their problems more fully and answer them with greater accuracy than in the past. These tendencies may enable us to develop a new political science. Wallas "looks forward to improvement by education, and he looks forward to guidance rendered effective by a clearer perception of the impulses upon which men and women act. Perhaps, an election will become more and more the educational process for which he, like Mill,

ardently hopes."[6] The spread of education could place the management of political parties in the hands of those who possess civil consciousness. Finally Wallas hoped that the name of Humanity might become charged with emotion and come to have no less emotional effect than what the national flag and national anthem and party labels possessed at the present time. He was a great optimist ; he expected much in the way of social improvement from 'social invention', and laid stress on deliberate plans of social control and direction. In his other works he attempted to give a more socialized content to the doctrines of political liberty and natural rights.

It is clear to the exponents of democracy that its successful operation depends upon the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, for efficient participation of individuals in group affairs, either directly or under the guidance of leaders whose opinions they accept, necessitates a factual basis of activity. All the writers recognize this, and some, like Lippmann, Lowell, Zueblin, Cooley, Dicey, Ellwood, Follett, Godkin, A. B. Hall, Mecklin and Wallas have given special attention to the subjects of public opinion and education. In discussing the formation and functioning of public opinion, the work of Lippmann and Wallas is especially valuable in emphasizing the unconscious factors that play a prominent part. Their insistence that man's human nature must be considered as a factor in all discussions of political activity lends a valuable dynamic note to analyses of democracy.

Wallas saw representative government constantly growing. But nowhere is it a complete success, partly because of a faith in the Benthamistic concept of man as a rational machine. This intellectualistic theory ignores the importance of the unconscious drives to behaviour without consideration of which the problems of democracy cannot be squarely met.[7] The success of democracy, which is the most satisfactory form of government yet devised, and under which Wallas included the idea of social equality,[8] demands that political faith be strengthened, thus

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6 R. H. Murray, *The History of Political Science from Plato to the Present*, New York (1926).
7 *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 22.
8 *Ibid.*, p. 231.

combatting the domination of the unconscious upon which the unscrupulous leaders can play to obtain their own ends.[9] Wallas advocated reform of the electoral systems so that an election would not be a mere device for registering a poorly formed opinion, but would become the agency for forming an intelligent opinion. Having shown how little thought actually enters into the political life of the individual, Wallas urged the social organization of thought as a method of attaining a more rational basis of behaviour.[10]

Expressing his views on the doctrine of liberty, which he considered as highly essential for the successful working of democracy, Wallas wrote that any socialized theory of liberty should provide, not only for the removal of all obstructions in the way of using one's faculties but also for the conscious and organized will to use them. Liberty is, thus, a positive as well as a negative concept. On these grounds Wallas found that the Periclean notion of liberty was far more helpful than the negative definitions of John Stuart Mill and Sidney Webb. He did not favour empty individualism of J. S. Mill. Whenever he discussed individual liberty, he did not lose sight of social needs. On the political plane, liberty and liberal institutions are not matters which may be deliberately willed by statesmen and put into operation without reference to the social environment.

Wallas considered the present working of government as burdensome and uncreative. He pointed out to the discrepancy between the structure and functions of government.[11] According to him, human mind has failed to develop proper forms of co-operative thought to keep pace with the governing complexity of social life. Our committees, our municipal councils, and the House of Commons are not true to their purpose of group deliberation. If thinking is done at all, it is done in small groups of party leaders or of individual members, in correspondence, in interviews between members and responsible officials. Effective discussion has so far been possible in the cabinet on account of its selected personnel and the solidarity of the party. Any reform which aims at impro-

9 *Ibid.*, p. 206 ff.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 185 ff; *The Great Society*, Chap. XI.
11 *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII.

ving the capacity for deliberation of these institutions must recognize the complexity of legislative problems and the existence of forms of impersonal means of communication. The House of Commons may be forced to diminish its membership. It may make greater use of committees and also abolish the Committee of the Whole House. The Cabinet will have to rely on the work of committees. The size of the local bodies has to be reduced. The House of Lords must assume the nature of a Royal Commission.

Also, according to Wallas, changes should be made in the civil service with a view to increasing the possibilities of creative thought on their part. They should be prevented from the spirit of narrow professionalism. The spirit of originality should be encouraged among them. The present official atmosphere stands in the way of originality. The spirit of conservatism is very strong. This results in efficiency of management of details but infertility in the invention of principles. If civil administration is to be humanized, greater opportunities should be given to officials for creative thought. They should make public investigation of some public matters. They should make oral reports to parliamentary or cabinet committees. Their reports on the working of departments should be signed by them.

Graham Wallas also devoted his attention to the problems of nationality and international organization. A great majority of the sociologists are agreed that the sovereign national state cannot be regarded as the final stage in political evolution. Some form of international organization must be found which will eliminate national wars in a manner similar to that in which the national state has ended neighbourhood and sectional conflicts. The chief thesis of Wallas' latest book, *Our Social Heritage,* is the assertion that society and civilization cannot long endure unless some adequate method is found to avert the destructive wars of the modern era. He makes a number of suggestions as to how we may build up reaction patterns founded upon international co-operation rather than national egoism and rivalry.[12]

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12 *Our Social Heritage,* Chapters IX-XII.

On the basis of our above observations of the views of Graham Wallas we can conclude that he was a great humanitarian, a democrat and a rationalist. Democracy in practice may be pretty bad, but at least it is better than government by an irresponsible dictator or oligarchy, and the one or the few are apt to be as irrational as the many. Moreover, Wallas is optimistic enough to think that mankind though normally irrational, may be trained or educated to act more or less rationally. In fact, much of Wallas' work is concerned with discovering within the democratic framework effective methods of substituting rational control of social processes for the unreasoning group action of the herd. In like manner, we find Lippmann lauding such American institutions as the League of Women Voters which attempts to lay before its members an impartial survey of political facts as an antidote to the irrational propaganda employed by all the major political parties.

Graham Wallas wielded great influence. His writings have won for him a very high place in the literature of politics. There are very few books on politics which do not make a reference to his works. His quantitative method is followed all over the world.

15

Harold J. Laski (1893-1950)

Right from his birth to death in 1950, Harold J. Laski was concerned mainly with the liberty and rights of the individual. As a progressive intellectual he insisted more on an experimental political philosophy based on a dynamic theory of state functions and a social psychology of the motives and desires of men than on abstract principles of politics. He always remained in search of a new faith, and came under the various influences which made him change his political ideas from time to time. At the successive stages of his career we find him as an ardent proponent of some sort of individualistic federalism, Marxian socialism and democratic trade unionism. His activities as a political philosopher, teacher, party leader, public speaker and confidential adviser to public men were so numerous that he found no time to revise his political writings and give them a consistent statement. Nevertheless the corner-stone of his political philosophy was his faith in the individual. To establish this we must examine carefully his career.

Harold Laski, the second son of Nathan and Sarah Laski, was born in a Jewish community on June 30, 1893. This was the period when different ideologies, such as Utilitarianism, Fabian Socialism and Communism were spreading with a view to reforming the various prevalent conceptions regarding sovereignty, parliamentary democracy and economic and political liberties of the individual. Laski, the product of such a period, imbibed its spirit fully. As a young boy he spent most of his time reading books on science and liberalism. They predisposed him to oppose all orthodox opinions and dogmas regarding the social and political institutions.

It is interesting to note that the political movements which impressed young Laski in his undergraduate days, and to which he constantly referred in his early articles, were the

Women's Suffrage Movement, Trade Union Movement in France and the alliance between Ulster and a section of the Conservative Party to sabotage the Liberals' Home Rule Legislation for Ireland. These movements of the pre-war period were rooted in a violent outburst against the spirit of Victorian Liberalism. In this period the belief in the gradual progress in the status of women and the respect for constitutional procedures were rejected by the more violent suffragettes and the radical trade unionists. It seemed as if the orderliness and respectability of the nineteenth century had become such a strain on the feelings of a number of men that they were trying to destroy the liberal world in which they lived. It was at this period that Laski spent his formative years in school and college, and he became a rebel against such an atmosphere. He felt the need to dedicate his life to find out a new world with a view to relieving the down-trodden common man from want, ignorance and misery that were noticed as the common feature of the Victorian era. He took part in Suffragette Movement and helped the strike of chain-makers by collecting money. At this time, though he remained content with constitutional agitation, yet the idea of revolution was agitating his mind. He wrote a short book with the title *The Chosen People* (which remains unpublished) in which he told that we should welcome the ideas of Darwin and Marx in order to get rid of the traditional outlook that had become outworn. Further, he maintained that social truth could only be discovered in an atmosphere of freedom.

Laski's first book was a translation of Léon Duguit's book *Law in the Modern State* on political pluralism from French. At the same time, he was greatly influenced by the writings of the late F. W. Maitland while studying history at Oxford. Ernest Barker was mainly responsible for it. Barker, his tutor, himself being interested in the academic revolt against Hegelism, encouraged him in his study of medieval lawyers. Gierke, Maitland and Figgis had justified the theory of corporate personality as applied to religious and industrial organizations in society. Laski drew inspiration from them, and his earlier writings were devoted to the task of supporting the theory of corporate personality of religious bodies and guilds

which were able to maintain their rights and independence against the state in the Middle Ages. He argued that trade unions should have a similar position in the modern society. But his theory of groups was different from that of Figgis, Gierke and Maitland. It was purely individualistic in essence, because he maintained it for safeguarding individual liberty. For this purpose he also made a special study of the legal system which protects the rights of associations and free speech in America.

Laski thus started his career with an attack on the monistic theory of the state sovereignty, as expounded by the idealists, considering it as dangerous to the individual liberty. To defend individual liberty against the coercive authority of the state, he, on the one hand, tried to establish the corporate personality of groups, and, on the other, he elaborated the individualistic theory of obedience to the state. His formula of 'contingent anarchy', appearing as it does in his individualistic theory of obedience, worked as a revision of the relations between the individual and the state. He criticized traditional political thought for its concentration on state power at the expense of the political society (the people), for its over-simple assumptions about human nature and for its *penchant* for deductive reasoning. He remarked :

> "The simple *a priori* premises of Hobbes or Locke, the intriguing mysticism of Rousseau's General Will, eloquence about the initiative of men and its translation into terms of private property are no longer suited to a world that has seen its foundations in flame because to its good intentions an adequate knowledge was not joined. What we need... is the sober and scientific study of the conditions of social organizations."[1]

Quite often Laski called for a new inductive political philosophy, centred less on political principles than on administrative functions and based on a realistic social psychology that would do more justice to the complex character of human personality and motivation than did the psychology of Aristotle

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[1] "Democracy at the Crossroads", *Yale Review*, N. S. IX (July, 1920), pp. 802-03.

or Machiavelli or Hobbes. He did not approve of the classical theory of human nature that regards it as static and fixed. On the contrary, he asserted that human nature is dynamic and evolutionary. Like Graham Wallas, he thought that the new political theory, seeking an institutional structure that would offer opportunities for the creative expression of the diverse impulses of men more adequate than those provided by the sovereign state, should be grounded in a satisfactory knowledge of the motives and desires of men. Each man must be encouraged to realize his own personality, while the state must be so organized as to give scope to the individual's sense of spontaneity and his creative impulses, thereby fostering the emergence of a wide diversity in the desires, attitudes and values of its citizens.[2] Since he was primarily concerned with the preservation and promotion of individuality and spontaneity, he rejected order and unity as the final values.

As hinted at, Laski studied carefully the pluralistic and pragmatic philosophies of Figgis and Maitland and James and Dewey, and found a point of view that was extremely congenial to his own opposition to the revived state idealism, and to his conviction, which marked him as heir to the utilitarian tradition of Bentham and the Mills, that the state was to be judged in the light of its actual contributions to the well-being of its citizens. The test of validity of state action is a pragmatic and utilitarian test. That is, how far successful it is in achieving its purpose, namely, the promotion of the good life for its citizens. Viewed in this fashion, the state becomes, he thought, what Duguit called "a great public service corporation".

Further, as he was aware of the dangers of concentration of powers in the state, he called its authority as federal. There are, he argued, various associations in society, and each of them has an important part to play in the development and enrichment of an individual's personality. But each association has only a partial contribution to make to the individual. The state, as one of these associations, can satisfy only the

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[2] *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* by Laski (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1917), pp. 24-25.

partial needs of the individuals, and therefore their allegiance to the state is partial. The state cannot regulate the whole life of a man, and it must share this function with other associations. The state, in this sense, is not unitary ; it is not absolute ; it is not independent. It is rather pluralistic and federal as society is federal.

Laski thus argued in his earlier writings that the authority of the state should be federalized and mass participation in political activity be increased. If these principles reflect his adherence to the ideals of individual and group freedom, they also constitute limitations upon the exercise of power, weapons for defending labour and its organizations against hostile action on the part of the state. There was, therefore, a fundamental ambivalence in his attitude towards the state's final coercive power, and he conceived of the authority of the state as conditional. The state is given power to control men and their voluntary groups in order that it may satisfy their common needs ; it commands obedience to its laws from them as long as they are in their interest. But gradually his belief that the individual cannot develop his personality and enjoy freedom in the presence of economic insecurity, which he had maintained somehow or other from his early childhood and which he called as the 'central conviction' of his life, became stronger after the publication of '*Grammar of Politics*' (1925) due to the changed political and economic situations in Europe.

There was a great economic crisis in Europe which he ascribed to the inefficient capitalist system. He felt that even the British and American democracies were unable to tackle their economic problems of this period. As opposed to the failure of economic policies in capitalist democracies, the Soviet Union had made great economic progress and had directed its efforts towards the equalization of wealth and the establishment of economic security for all the citizens. The comparison of the British and the American systems with that of the Soviet Union convinced him that the democratization of state power was not the real solution of the problem, and that individual liberty was merely a function of economic equality. Consequently, his faith in some sort of humanistic socialism, mainly rooted in his sense of social justice, which he

had maintained from his young age became stronger. He himself had admitted that "I have, I suppose, been a socialist in some degree ever since the last years of my school days."[3] He also had recorded the influence exerted upon him while he was a schoolboy in Manchester by a "great schoolmaster who made us feel the sickness of an acquisitive society," by the books he had read, especially those of the Webbs, and by a speech in which Keir Hardie had described the labour struggles of the Scottish miners. He became sick of the old economic structure of society and gradually started looking towards Marxism for an answer. While accepting Marx's economic interpretation of politics and living under his strong influence he called his early pluralism a half-way house to the real solution of the problem. For him "the pluralist attitude to the state and law was a stage on the road to an acceptance of the Marxian attitude to them."[4] His argument was that as the state was an 'executive instrument' of the economically dominant group in society, it was necessary to destroy first of all the class-structure of society before limiting the powers of the state. In a classless society, he thought, the purpose and the function of the state would automatically change. With this also changed his definition of individual liberty as found in the first edition of *Grammar of Politics* (1925). He asserted that liberty was not so much a positive thing as it was a negative condition. As such, the strong state action was essential both to protect the individual liberty and change the old economic structure of society.

Although Laski approved of the necessity of a strong state (during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism) with a view to bringing about a new economic structure and, at the same time, regulating the federal life of society, he was never in favour of the method which Russia had applied in replacing her old economic system by a new Marxist system. He also did not welcome the dictatorship in the Soviet Russia and the Marxian identification of state with society. His

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3 "Harold J. Laski", in Clifton Fadiman, ed., I Believe : *The Personal Philosophies of Certain Eminent Men and Women of Our Time* (N. Y. 1939), p. 139.

4 *The Crisis in the Theory of the State* in Vol. II of Law (1937), p. xii.

fundamental belief was in the freedom of the mind, and he regarded society as federal in character. He always insisted upon the democratization of the state power. The groups, he said, must enjoy necessary freedom in their own sphere of action, and they should participate in the process of administration. Without this the state would become coercive, and the liberty of the individual would remain in danger. He firmly argued that the benefits of civil liberties could not be sacrificed for the sake of a strong state for creating a new socialist state. He paid a glowing tribute to Britain for its democratic way of life in the following words :

> "Nowhere have I found in greater degree either the qualities which make private life lovely or in public relations the instinctive embodiment of the anxiety for fair play...When all is said against this people that can be said, British leadership seems to me to have been a beneficent thing in the history of civilization."[5]

While accepting the power of the state as a stage to bring about classless society, he did not dismiss the fears of bureaucracy and ignore the need for safeguards. He said that "unless we recognize that decentralization is the secret of freedom, government becomes 'they' instead 'we' ; and that sense of aloofness is fatal to the fulfilment of personality. Do let us ceaselessly remember that planned democracy is planning for the individual citizen, and not against him."[6]

Holding the purpose of society superior to that of the state, he still insisted upon the need of participation of voluntary groups in the process of administration. The state should give to the groups their due place in the inquiries and negotiations that precede any final decision of the government. Representatives of voluntary associations should sit with and advise government officials on political and economic questions of common interest. There should be a network of advisory committees and industrial councils to guide the government at all levels, and the rule-making powers should be more and

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[5] "Democracy in War Time" in G.D.H. Cole et al, *Victory or Vested Interest* (1942), p. 40.

[6] "Choosing the Planners", in G.D.H. Cole et al, *Plan for Britain* (1943), pp. 123-34.

more devolved upon territorial and functional assemblies in order to check the concentration of powers in the hands of the government. Such a mass participation of the democratization of state power, he regarded as highly essential to safeguard the individual and group freedom against the coercive authority of the state. His argument was that the atmosphere we required, if we wanted to attain happiness for the multitude, was one in which we were to gain everything by common experience and not by force and compulsion. In a dictatorship the leaders insist upon an artificial unity, and, as such, there remains no scope for diversities in social life. The chief danger to society, according to him, is from the desire of those who possess power because they develop, in the long run, the habit of keeping society static for their personal gains. But society, he argued, is not static ; it is dynamic and diverse. And the path to happiness is not a single one. Men are not willing to yield the insight of their experience to other men's insight merely because they are commanded to do so. They love freedom and try to maintain it by all means because it is necessary for the development of their life. Laski remarked that "liberty cannot help being a courage to resist the demands of power at some point that is deemed decisive ; and, because of this, liberty, also, is an inescapable doctrine of contingent anarchy. It is always a threat to those who operate the engines of authority that prohibition of experience will be denied."[7]

In place of state dictatorship, Laski elaborated the idea of some sort of commonwealth of economic groups and trade unions, working side by side with the government. He pleaded that it was only with their consent and their collective effort that any economic and political change in society could be brought about. Thus he was in favour of a conscious change in which the masses participate actively and consciously. He was so enamoured of individual freedom and democratic way of life that in spite of his acceptance of the necessity of a strong state, he completety dismissed the idea of an all-inclusive state.

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[7] *Liberty in the Modern State* by Laski (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 211.

He argued for a limited state authority with a view to maintaining individual liberty. He did not want that its authority should ever degenerate into dictatorship as it had happened in the Soviet Union. As he was conscious of society and its federal structure, he constantly regarded authority as federal and believed that the state necessarily worked in society as one of its agencies. It is society which always determines as to what should be the purpose and functions of the state from time to time. Thus the state, according to him, is merely a means to attain social justice, and that it should work as an instrument of realizing the multitudinous aims of society.

From the above analysis of Laski's career it can be stated that he was mainly concerned with the understanding of the problems of individual liberty in relation to the complexities of society and the restraining character of state authority. He did not discuss the claims of individual liberty, the nature of society and the character of state authority separately from an academic view-point. On the contrary, as a political philosopher he viewed them as the most urgent, practical and interconnected problems of the modern age. He sought to reconcile their claims within the framework of actual experiences rather than abstract principles.

Laski reflected the spirit of the period in which he lived. The time, in which he was born and lived, was the period of revolution and reform. The liberalism of the Victorian Age was crumbling down, and the various theories like pluralism, Fabian socialism and communism were becoming more and more popular. Under the influence of these theories, the claims of the people were put forward with a view to raising their standard of living, and there was a general demand to modify the existing political institutions in order to bring an overall change in their economic and political status in society. The change in the position of the working class and women was urgently needed. For that it was urgent, first to change the economic order of society, and, secondly, to review the classical theory of state monism. Laski studied the problems of his time and tried to find out a solution to them. He was not an arm-chair thinker, but, on the contrary, he was out and out a practical man. He was always ready to admit his

mistakes and revise his political ideas in view of the changed political and economic conditions, and, as such, he was not at all dogmatic in his attitude towards any political, or economic or social question. He remained sincere, throughout his career, to the cause of individual freedom and human progress, and discussed the authority of the state in perspective of the various demands of the federal society. Thus his theory of the state was a dynamic theory of state functions.

Laski was a political scientist who was deeply interested in public affairs. He influenced the practical politics of England of his time, and was admitted as the real leader of the Labour Party. With the help of his great knowledge and intellectual power he guided the great political leaders like Attlee, Morrison and Bevin. Even the Beveridge Plan, introduced in the time of the conservative Prime Minister Mr. Churchill in 1943 in order to bring about reforms in the fields of insurance, health, child welfare, relief in old age and working conditions of labourers, seemed to carry its reformative spirit indirectly from Laski's proposals for a radical reconstruction of the economic and political order.

Laski himself had admitted that a number of fundamental principles should be recognized immediately, even if they could not completely be applied for the time being. Certain sectors of economy must be placed under public ownership ; the educational and public health systems must be radically reformed and extended ; a great housing programme must be started ; there must be provision for relief in old age ; and the state should control imports and exports.[8] Though Beveridge Plan in the war period cannot be regarded to have been based on these principles of Laski, yet his indirect influence in its shaping is decisive. As a matter of fact, he was not satisfied with such meagre reforms as he wrote :

> "These proposals do not assume the establishment of a socialist state at the end of war.....Their purpose is different, though a related one."[9]

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[8] *Reflection on the Revolution of Our Time* by Laski (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1943), pp. 349-51.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

These proposals only constitute, according to him, a beginning of the necessary movement to a free socialist state.

Further, he not only guided the governmental policies of England, but he also inspired the statesmen in other countries to take the work of social reforms after the Second World War. The conception of social welfare, which Indian leaders at present keep in view to reshape India's economy and politics, is similar to Laski's idea of social justice and fundamental reforms mentioned above. Thus we can very well find his influence in the practical field as it is found in the field of thinking.

Laski remained an intellectual leader of a great number of people in England and exerted his influence, directly or indirectly, in shaping the various policies of the country. If he did not stick to one political faith in his life, it was due to his over-conscientiousness which made him hesitant about every political theory of the state. But whereas other 18th and 19th century thinkers failed in adjusting the claims of the individual to those of the state, he succeeded with his factual and realistic approach to the problem. Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Bentham and J. S. Mill were utterly practical who relied too much upon the selfish nature of the individual. These thinkers commonly shared the view that as self-interest is the motive force in society, the state should interfere with commerce and industry as little as possible. Although they differed from one another on several points, their conclusion that liberty is the essence of restraint was practically the same. Such a conclusion regarding human nature was prompted by their defective knowledge of human psychology. Hence, their defence of the selfish nature of man and the freedom of opinion is not adequate to remove all our doubts. As they missed the academic and conceptual aspects of the problem, they failed in reconciling individual liberty to state authority. On the other hand, Green, Bradley and Bosanquet were university professors and their approach was too academic. As academicians, they idealized the state and accepted, to all intents and purposes, the majesty and might of the government. Even Green was no exception to it. He too insisted that the state was the only source of actual rights. By freedom he understood an identifi-

cation of oneself with the Divine Spirit. And since he agreed that the Divine Spirit found its highest expression in the state, it is obvious how close was his approach to the Hegelian thesis that true liberty is realized in the state, which Bosanquet and Bradley were whole-heartedly committed to. Their conclusion regarding the realization of liberty by the individual was completely vague and not understandable. They were not conversant with the practical nature of the problem, and, as such, they visualized things from a distance. Consequently, they also failed in finding out an adequate solution of the problem. Laski had an advantage over both sets of thinkers. He was both an academician and a practical statesman. He looked to the problem at close quarters and could succeed in presenting a well-argued thesis on individual liberty. He followed a middle-path in opposition to the empty individualism of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham and Mill and the pseudo-Hegelianism of Oxford idealists like Green, Bradley and Bosanquet.

As such, Laski's undogmatic approach and his sincerity to the human progress made him popular both among the common people and the intellectuals. They were attracted towards him because he spoke to them about the questions that were uppermost in their minds regarding the economic and political problems of their age. He told them not to be dogmatic in their outlook and judge things on the basis of their usefulness in social life. The age we live in is an age of reason and criticism. It is an age in which we question and examine everything before we accept it. We cannot approve of things because they were found valuable in the past. He, therefore, warned them that it would be sheer mistake to stick to one conclusion dogmatically. In his own life he was always found ready to admit the mistakes of his conclusions and revise them with a new vision. As a political analyst, he evaluated political institutions and political problems in relation to the life of the people and attached importance to them in view of their purpose and functions in society.

16

G. D. H. Cole (1889-1958)

Guild Socialism, whose chief philosophic apostle was G.D.H. Cole, appeared as a reaction against the wage system and the ugliness and monotony of machine production. Its exponents looked back to the time when the independent guildsmen of the Middle Ages took pride in creative work and produced the greatest art for which the Middle Ages were famous. The French syndicalist movement and the theories of American Industrial workers of the world, with their bias against the state and against political action and their cry of "all power to the producer," helped the cause of Guild Socialism. The writings of G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, who saw in the recent collectivist legislation in Great Britain the beginning of a 'servile state' and who proposed as their ideal a 'distributive state', helped the movement of Guild Socialism. It was imagined by them and also by certain others, who led the school of anti-state politicial philosophy such as Dr. Figgis and Prof. Maitland, that certain associations residing within the state have interests which were independent of the state and their personalities were inviolable by state authorities. The state could recognize and guarantee the life of the societies, the family, the clubs, the union, the college, the church ; but it no more created life than it created the individual, though it orders his birth to be registered. Consequently, "the theory of sovereignty whether proclaimed by John Austin or Justinian or should in conflict by Pope Innocent or Thomas Hobbes, is in reality no more than a venerable superstition." Guildsmen were influenced by the 'functional principle' theory enunciated by Senor Ramiro de Maeztu, a Spanish journalist. According to this principle, there are no natural rights but only 'objective rights' which are conditional upon performing some useful

function by the individual or group claiming them. R. H. Tawney writes that property should be functional and industrial control should pass out of the hands of functionless owners into those of the workers, who render actual service.

The philosophy of Guild Socialism, in short, was "a half-way house between Syndicalism and Collectivism."[1] It attempted to adjust their equally justifiable and legitimate points of view. It was built upon the economics and sociology of the twentieth century. It was undoubtedly connected with Fabianism. The Guild Socialists were the English intellectuals. Most of them were previously members of the Fabian Society. Out of the most important exponents of Guild Socialism, G. D. H. Cole was proved to be the most active and most consistent apostle of this new ferment. He was the *infant prodigy* of Guild Socialism. He joined the Fabian society while he was merely an under-graduate. In 1912, he organized the Fabian Reaserch Department for the purpose of studying labour problems. In 1913, he became a Guild Socialist, and was soon recognized as the most active propagandist of the movement.

As said above, Cole was originally a Fabian, but the danger of government by 'a man behind a window' made him join the new movement. William Morris was his patron-saint. Like most revolutionaries, Cole desired a restoration, and what he desired to restore was the medieval society of societies. He gives the fullest expression to the demand for a federal structure of the state. The title of the book in which Cole presents the philosophic foundation of his new society is *Social Theory* (1920). In his *Guild Socialism Re-stated* (1920) he formulates the more detailed structure of a Guild-commonwealth.

Expressing the general philosophy of guildsmen, G. D. H. Cole says that "the state should own the means of production, the guild should control the work of production."[2] The guildsmen start from the assumption that the paramount evil in present-day society is the complete ordering of the

1 *A History of Political Theories* (Recent Times), ed. by C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1935), p. 227.
2 *Self-Government in Industry* (1st edition), p. 109.

working life of man by the owners of capital. This slavery, or 'wagery' as S. G. Hobson terms it, is far worse than poverty for "poverty is the symptom—slavery is the disease. The many are not enslaved because they are poor, they are poor because they are enslaved."[3] This being so, collectivism is only a little worse than capitalism since it merely consists in replacing the capitalistic bureaucrat by the state bureaucrat.

The present state has been incorrectly interpreted to act as the sovereign repository of the whole associative life of men. Man's experience is not confined to the state, nor does his relation to the state furnish his most immediate and constant wants. Each association is properly sovereign within its sphere. The present state includes all persons within its territory, and all can claim membership of it. As an all-inclusive association the state can deal properly only with those activities which affect men equally. It should be concerned not with man's differences, but with their common interest.

Cole rejected the point of view of Hobson that "in the final analysis the state as representing the community at large must be the final arbiter." In opposition to this view-point, Cole attacked the ultimate sovereignty of the territorial state. He also refuted the idea that the state is the centre of social and political unity. To him, the widest sphere of social unity is the community. It is a centre of feeling, a self-contained, inclusive region of associative life. Society is its organized aspect. Society is thus a complex of associations, but society cannot include the whole of the lives of individuals since the best elements of individuality escape organization. The principle underlying all associations is the principle of function. Individuals organize associations in order to fulfil a purpose which requires co-operative action for its attainment. "Social purposes are, thus, the raw material of social functions, and social functions are social purposes selected and placed in coherent relationship."[4] Of all associations the civic and economic associations of both producers and consumers are the most essential. Functions, then, and not an external source, gives rights to associations.

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[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 110.
[4] *Social Theory* by G. D. H. Cole (1920), p. 54.

The present state, according to Cole, carries with it the marks of its perversion by capitalism. Our present feeble attempts, Cole explains in his book *Social Theory*, to inaugurate democracy in politics is frustrated by the existence of a system approaching slavery in industry. Not poverty of the masses, but slavery is the curse of capitalism. He felt that capitalism and democracy went together. He was opposed to the democratic system of government as it worked in actual practice. He also attacked the system of territorial representation. According to him, a person who represents his locality, cannot be expected to decide questions relating to the relationship between the producers and the consumers. Hence, Cole advocated the reorganization of society on a functional basis. When capitalism is superseded by freedom, and when society is organized as a federation of functional organizations, each one democratically controlled, there will be no place for the present state organization. The functions, Cole was of the opinion, which an all-inclusive association may properly regulate, and which alone may rightly fall to the present state, will in a guild society be taken over by co-ordinating bodies more in harmony with the principles of freedom and function which will actuate that society. He writes :

"It is impossible to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness ; it is quite possible to represent, though with an inevitable element of distortion which must always be recognized, so much of human beings as they themselves put into associated effort for a specific purpose."[5]

Cole's position regarding the functions of the state did not remain constant. In his earlier work *Self-Government and Industry* (1917), he regarded the state as an association of dwellers in a common neighbourhood and hence of consumers, or enjoyers in common. Such an association, however, should be only one of many, he declared, and ought not to be dominant over other associations which represent men in their capacity as producers, fellow-worshippers, common believers, etc. The state, however, should be preserved as the representative of the consumers and should stand opposite the guilds. At the top

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 105-06.

there would be parliament, representing the consumers, and the Central Guilds Congress, representing the National Guilds. "Neither Parliament nor the Guild Congress can claim to be ultimately sovereign : the one is the supreme territorial association, the other, the supreme professional association."[6] If a dispute between the two were to arise on such matters as price and quality, "the final decision of such a quarrel ought to rest with a body representative of all the organized consumers and all the organized producers. The ultimate authority or sovereignty in industrial matters would seem properly to belong to some joint body representative equally of Parliament and of the Guild Congress. Otherwise, the scales must be weighted unfairly in favour of either consumers or producers."[7] What was to happen in the case of a deadlock was not mentioned, nor were the affirmative functions of the state made clear, aside from the fact that it was to skim off the surplus profits of any guild by means of taxation.

Largely as a result of Mr. Hobson's attack upon the idea that the state represented the consumer, Cole in his later works[8] changed his position in two respects ; first, he advocated the formation of other associations than the state to serve as the representatives of the consumer, and secondly, he shifted his emphasis from a national to a local co-ordination of production and consumption. Cole came to believe that the state represented the complex of the separate interests within the territorial unit, and not the consuming interest exclusively. But no group can represent all the interests of men. Each interest or 'function' must have separate representation.

According to the principle of functional representation, each person must have one vote for each functional association, that he joins. "Instead of 'one vote, one man', we must say 'one man as many votes as interests', but only one vote in relation to each interest."[9] Each association will have power to regulate its own life, and make rules binding its own

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6 *Self-Government in Industry* (Third edition), p. 135.
7 *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.
8 Particularly *Social Theory*, *Guild Socialism Re-stated*, and *The Reorganization of Local Government*.
9 *Social Theory*, p. 106.

members in its own special sphere. Each will also have the power of coercion to a limited degree. Society then will present a union of co-ordinated functional democracies.

In accordance, then, with the principle of functional democracy, each industry in a guild society will be organized into a national guild and administered on behalf of society by the workers, including the managerial and technical force. The management of each guild will be decentralized, with the factory as the unit of organization. The leaders will be chosen by the workers, although, if some technical skill should be required from them, choice may be limited to those who have acquired a certain proficiency. The expert advisers will not be directly elected. The managers of wider units of organization such as the district, or region, or nation, will be chosen indirectly. These managers will have the power of supervision and of representing the interest of the producers in conference with the representatives of the consumers. Their power, however, should be kept down as much as possible in order to avoid centralization. Contracts between guilds will be maintained by mutual conference, and where relations are specially interwoven, by interlocking directorates, while a guild congress will represent the interest of all guilds.

The congress, too, will be highly decentralized into local and regional bodies. It will regulate the disputes between guilds, confer with representatives of consumers, adjust pay of different kinds of workers—which pay need not be equal, at least at first. Each member of a guild will be assured full pay as long as he is connected with that guild.

The consumers, too, will be organized. The consumers must be differentiated into classes. Thus in "personal and domestic consumption there is differentiation between consumers while in the collective consumption" of, for instance, a commodity like water, the interests of all consumers are alike. There must, therefore, be appropriate councils to represent each respective group of consumers. These councils will also be decentralized with local and regional divisions. The councils existing in every locality will meet with the representatives of the guilds.

In such a co-ordinating structure the church will not participate. It may co-operate with other bodies, but not be co-ordi-

nated with them. It must have freedom to live its own spiritual life. It cannot conflict with other bodies, since its life is purely spiritual, while that of the others is material. The co-ordinating centre of the guild society will be the communes. The communes will be composed of the representatives of the consumers' councils and of the guilds. Thus the local communes will include representatives of the local consumers' councils and of the local guilds ; the regional communes, of the regional councils and of the regional guilds ; the national communes, of the national councils, and of the national guilds, and in addition, representatives of the regional communes, however, will also include some territorial representation. Wide decentralization will prevent the rise of a bureaucracy. As the representatives of the whole society, the commune, local, regional, or national as the situation may warrant, will possess the powers of co-ordinating various functional organizations and also such duties which no other authority can exercise. Under the first type of powers will come, among others, a host of financial duties. Thus it will review the budgets of the guilds, supervise pay of guild members, income, price, allocation of capital, the banking system, and allotment of taxation to the various guilds. To it will belong the surplus profits of the guilds. As a co-ordinating body it will act as the final court of appeal in disputes between functional bodies, and pass constitutional laws demarcating the respective spheres of such bodies. There will be judges, appointed by the commune from qualified members of the legal guild, to interpret the laws, but their decisions on disputed points must be subordinated to the declarations of the commune. Under the second type of powers will come, among others, authority over questions of war and peace, colonies, boundaries, personal conduct, and property. International questions of a civic and commercial nature, however, will be dealt with by the appropriate functional bodies.

Out of them the first is the most important and hence needs further explanation. Not only would disputes over prices between consumer and producer be settled by the commune but if goods were sold above or below cost, the commune would

make the decision as to how the surplus should be used or the loss borne. Furthermore, the relative amount of energy to be allocated to the product of consumers' goods, productive capital, and non-economic services would be similarly determined upon together with the allowance to be made to each industry or service. To secure this, the various guilds would present budgets to the communal council after consultation with their corresponding councils of consumers and with each other. After examination, these budgets would be passed upon by the commune. This would necessarily involve criticism of and control over the salary scale of the various guilds. The commune was also to have control over the amount of credit to be issued, although it would not necessarily operate the banks.

The commune will also control the coercive machinery and exercise the ultimate power of coercion over individuals and groups. Thus economic boycott may be applied against a recalcitrant group. But the mutual confidence and consultation which a functional society will stimulate will make the application of coercion infrequent. The guild society will see a wide extension of decisions reached by mutual negotiation. The coercion of individuals is provided for as a last resort but it is to be sparingly invoked. As for the coercion of functional groups, it is much better policy to trust them than to attempt to coerce them. But "trust does not and cannot involve the abandonment of all powers in the last resort." One is left in doubt, however, as to the precise form this ultimate coercion will take since the right of striking is upheld by Cole, as by all guildsmen, and the economic boycott has previously been declared "to be possible but not desirable."

In case of any conflict between the co-ordinating authority and any particular association, the individual alone may decide what conduct to pursue. The co-ordinating authority may coerce, but such coercion is purely physical and not moral. There will be no excuse to call the individual coerced 'traitor'. It should be remembered that the loyalties of the individual in a functional society will be distributed. His membership of different associations fulfilling varied functions does not involve one loyalty being subordinated to another.

In Cole we observe the most forcible enunciation of the theory of liberty as applied to industry. Viewed more narrowly, his doctrine is that of radical socialism, which recognizes the trade union world as an organ of revolt against capitalism and as the most effective means of attaining its ultimate supersession.

However, it should be pointed out that while he (Cole) denied the sovereignty of the state, he did not deny the necessity of retaining unity in society. His guild commonwealth is co-ordinated. It is highly decentralized both territorially and functionally, but its unity is preserved by vesting ultimate authority in the commune. The commune, we may recall, possesses the power to act as an ultimate court of appeal in disputes between functional bodies, to pass constitutional laws, and to control the coercive authority. The essence of a common authority is power to act in the capacity of ultimate jurisdiction ; the guild society has such authority.

Cole did not give the state the same authority which was given by Hobson. He attempted to put the state on an equal footing with the guilds. The state, according to him, is to be an association like any other association. Its functions are to be proportionate to the duties to be performed by it. The guilds are to control and manage the whole of production. The state is to perform such functions as the regulation of marriages and divorce, education of children, prevention and punishment of crimes, defence of the country, etc. In cases of conflict between the guilds and the state, the institution known as the Supreme Court of Functional Equity is to have the final word. It is also to possess the supreme power of coercion. It is in this way that the sovereignty of the state is to be taken away from it.

Cole, in fact, did not content himself with this role of the state. He went a step further in minimising the importance of the state. He came to the conclusion that the state could be allowed to wither away and ultimately disappear altogether "either after a frontal attack or by atrophy following upon dispossession of its vital power." The state, in short, is to be replaced by the communes. According to the new scheme, the various guilds are to be organized into communes and are

to be given separate powers and functions. Cole writes: "Orage and Hobson wanted the guilds to be 'chartered' corporations, acting under licence from the state; whereas others of whom I was one, were social pluralists, and believed that the sovereign state should in due course be replaced by some form of federal authority, resting on a partnership between producers' and consumers' and other 'functional' representatives."[10]

Although the above scheme of Cole appears to be very attractive and it attempts to abolish slavery from the industry with a view to establishing true democracy in its fuller sense, it is not free from certain defects. There is always a likelihood of conflicts. The representatives of the consumers and the producers will come to its session not for the purpose of deliberation, but as delegates of a fraction of the community, to represent its special and private will. Questions that concern the community as a whole can best be dealt with by the representatives of citizens. The common fact of citizenship is the widest common foundation for the organization of a state. Citizenship alone can serve as the most inclusive bond, and it alone offers the basis for common co-operative deliberation.

The principle underlying the organization of Cole's guild society is the principle of function. If this means broadly that claims to rights by individuals and groups must find their validity in social purpose, such a doctrine, we hold, is undeniably sound. It is true that in some respects the workers in a particular industry or service have an immediate interest; but then, it is to be noted, in other respects other groups have a special interest. If that be true, the logical conclusion is to place socialized industry in the hands of the state under a system which will allow wide decentralization and the active participation of the workers.

Cole was conscious of the heterogeneity even within the guild; hence he favoured due consideration to the special interests of craft organizations. Yet it is well to remember that to cover basic dissimilarities by a glib phraseology of

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[10] *A History of Socialist Thought* by G.D.H. Cole, Vol. IV, Part I (1914-31), (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1958), p. 454.

'function' or 'vocation', is as unreal as it is remote from profundity.

Cole's treatment of the role of the church in a functional society is also not satisfactory. A church, he stated, should have no representation in the commune, since its function is purely spiritual, while that of the other bodies is material. In case there is clash between the church and the other body and the commune is to decide the dispute, it would violate the principle of self-government, since it includes no representatives of the church.

In Cole's guild society the courts will occupy an important role, since the conflict of spheres of jurisdiction between functional bodies will be manifold. We have a right, then, to demand greater detail than Cole has given us in the structure of the judiciary. He has not told us fully about the hierarchy of courts, appeals, and the prevention of abuse either in appointment or in the exercise of power by the judges.

Cole's scheme, truly speaking, is not a theory of the state. It is a theory of 'administration of the functions of the state'. It is in the field of administration that his most suggestive contribution to the politics of socialism lies. The collectivist socialism implies all the evils of autocratic rule, centralization, and burcaucracy. So the Webbs and MacDonald realized the necessity for decentralization and for the participation of experts and workers in the management of socialized industry. It became their favourite slogan that 'economic power precedes political power'—by which was meant that the workers could achieve real freedom and democracy only by getting economic self-government. And the Fabian doctrine was modified in part due to the criticism of the guild-socialists, of whom Cole was a foremost leader.

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Bertrand Russell (1872-)

Bertrand Russell belongs to one of the oldest and most famous families in England, a family that has given statesmen to Britain for many generations. His grandfather, Lord John Russell, was a great liberal Prime Minister who fought an unyielding battle for free trade, for universal free education, for the emancipation of the Jews, for liberty in every field. His father, Viscount Amberley, was a free-thinker, who did not over-burden his son with the hereditary theology of the West. He is now heir presumptive to the Second Earl Russell but he rejects the institution of inheritance, and proudly earns his own living. When Cambridge dismissed him for his pacifism he made the world his university, and became a travelling Sophist, whom the world supported gladly.

There have been two Bertrand Russells : one who died during the war ; and another who rose out of that one's shroud, an almost mystic communist born out of the ashes of a mathematical logician. Perhaps, there was a tender mystic strain in him always ; represented at first by a mountain of algebraic formulae ; and then finding a distorted expression in a socialism that has the earmarks rather of a religion than of a philosophy. The most characteristic title among his books is *Mysticism and Logic* (1919) : a merciless attack on the illogicality of mysticism, followed by such a glorification of scientific method as makes one think of the mysticism of logic. Russell inherits the English positivist tradition, and is resolved to be tough-minded because he knows that he cannot.

In *Mysticism and Logic* Russell attacks on the illogicality of mysticism and glorifies the scientific method. He puts emphasis on logic and regards mathematics as divine. Not in philosophy.[1]

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1 For one thing, he never made up his mind exactly what he meant by philosophy.

In his heart he usually thinks of philosophy as an inferior pursuit compared with mathematics and science. One of the most often repeated notes in his writings is the continued gibery at 'the philosophers' for being too lazy to undertake the study of mathematics, or too stupid to understand it.[2] He expressed regret more than once (for instance, to Beatrice Webb in 1936) that he had not been a scientist instead of a philosopher.

The key to understanding Russell's philosophy is that it is essentially a by-product. To treat it as though it were an end in itself, though a natural enough mistake for philosophers to make, is liable to render it meaningless. But in fact there is a sense in which any worthwhile philosophy is a by-product. As Russell himself wrote, "A philosophy which is to have any value should be built upon a wide and firm foundation of knowledge that is not specifically philosophical."[3]

Russell's primary objects were to establish the truth of religion, the truths of mathematics, and the truth of science. He himself stated this explicitly in the case of religion and mathematics. "I hoped to find religious satisfaction in philosophy....."[4] "....I came to philosophy through mathematics, or rather through the wish to find some reason to believe in the truth of mathematics." Russell impressed one, in 1914, as cold-blooded, as a temporarily animated abstraction, a formula with legs. He tells us that he never saw a motion-picture till he read Bergson's cinematographic analogy for the intellect ; then he reconciled himself to one performance, merely as a task in philosophy. Bergson's vivid sense of time and motion, his feeling that all things were alive with a vital impetus, made no impression on Russell ; it seemed to him a pretty poem and nothing more ; for his part he would have no other god than mathematics. He had no liking for the classics ; he argued vigorously, like another Spencer, for more science in education. The world's woes, he felt, were largely due to mysticism, to culpable obscurity of thought ; and the first law

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2 e.g., In *Principles of Mathematics* (Passion), *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 80, and *Sceptical Essays*, p. 72.

3 Review of Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis* in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1956.

4 *Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* ('My Mental Development').

of morality should be, to think straight. "Better the world should perish than that I, or any other human being, should believe a lie ;.....that is the religion of thought, in whose scorching flames the dross of the world is being burnt away."[5]

His passion for clarity drove him inevitably to mathematics ; he was almost thrilled at the calm precision of this aristocratic science. "Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show."[6] He believes that the progress of mathematics was the finest feature of the nineteenth century ; specifically, "the solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably the greatest achievement of which our age can boast." In one century the old geometry which had held the fortress of mathematics for two thousand years was almost entirely destroyed ; and Euclid's text, the oldest school-book in the world, was at last superseded. "It is nothing less than a scandal that he should still be taught to boys in England."[7] What draws Russell to mathematics is its rigid impersonality and objectivity ; here, and here alone, is eternal truth, and absolute knowledge ; these *a priori* theorems are the 'Ideas' of Plato, the 'eternal order' of Spinoza, the substance of the world. In an early article he described how, in the greatest mathematical works, "unity and inevitability are felt as in the unfolding of a drama.....The love of system, of interconnection...is perhaps the inmost essence of the intellectual impulse." He was later forced to the conclusion that the love of system was the greatest barrier to honest thinking in philosophy ; just as he decided that "the demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is nevertheless an intellectual vice."

He put his conclusions in their most extreme form when he wrote in 1931 :

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5 *Mysticism and Logic* (London, 1919), p. 241.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
7 *Ibid.*, p. 95.

"Academic philosophers, ever since the time of Parmenides, have believed that the world is a unity.....The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness or any of the other properties that governesses love. Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to be said for the view that there is a world at all....."[8]

"The external world may be an illusion, but if it exists, it consists of events, short, small and haphazard. Order, unity, and continuity are human inventions, just as truly as are catalogues and encyclopaedias."[9]

According to Russell, the aim of philosophy should be to equal the perfection of mathematics by confining itself to statements similarly exact, and similarly true before all experience. To reduce all philosophy to a rigid mathematical form, to take all specific content out of it, to compress it into mathematics—this was the ambition of Russell.

"People have discovered how to make reasoning symbolic, as it is in algebra, so that deductions can be effected by mathematical rules.....Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions to the effect that if such and such a proposition is true of anything, then such and such a proposition is true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is of which, it is supposed to be true.....Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true."[10]

From such a starting point, Bertrand Russell was almost fated to pass into agnosticism. He found so much in Christianity that could not be phrased in mathematics, that he abandoned it all except its moral code. He is scornful of a civilization that persecutes men who deny Christianity, and imprisons those who take it seriously.[11] He can find no God in such a contradictory world. He follows Spencer in his vision

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[8] *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 98.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[10] *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 75-76.
[11] *Why Men Fight* (New York, 1917), p 45.

of the end of the world, and rises to eloquence in describing the Stoic's resignation to the ultimate defeat of every individual and every species. We talk of evolution and progress; but progress is an egotistical phrase and evolution is but one half of an unmoral cycle of events terminating in dissolution and death. "Organic life, we are told, has developed gradually from the protozoan to the philosopher; and this development, we are assured, is indubitably an advance. Unfortunately, it is the philosopher, not the protozoan, who gives us this assurance."[12] The 'free man' cannot comfort himself with childish hopes and anthropomorphic gods; he has to keep his courage up even though he knows that in the end he too must die, that all things must die. Nevertheless, he will not surrender; if he cannot win, he can at least enjoy the fight; and by the knowledge that foresees his own defeat he stands superior to the blind forces that will destroy him. His worship will go not to these brute powers without, that by their aimless persistence conquer him, and tear down every home and every civilization that he builds, but to those creative powers within him that struggle on in the face of failure, and raise for at least some centuries the frail beauty of carved and pictured things, and the majestic ruins of the Parthenon.

This was the philosophy of Bertrand Russell before the war.

And then came the Great Madness. Bertrand Russell, who had remained unknown to the world for many years, suddenly burst forth like a liberated flame, and the world was shocked to find that he was a man of great courage and a passionate lover of humanity. Out of the recesses of his formulae the scholar stepped forth, and poured out upon the most exalted statesmen of his country a flood of polemic that did not stop even when they ousted him from his chair at the University, and isolated him, like another Galileo, in a narrow quarter of London. Men who doubted his wisdom admitted his sincerity; but they were so disconcerted by this amazing transformation that they slipped for a moment into a very un-British intolerance. Our embattled pacifist, despite his most respectable origins, was outlawed from society, and denounced as a traitor to the

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12 *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 75-76.

country which had nourished him, and whose very existence seemed to be threatened by the maelstrom of the war. He was horrified by the war, and he tried to find out its causes. His conclusion was that private property was the cause and communism was the only cure.

All property, he pointed out, in his genial way, had had its origin in violence and theft; in the Kimberley diamond mines and the Rand gold mines the transition of robbery into property was going on under the nose of the world. "No good to the community of any sort or kind, results from the private ownership of land. If men were reasonable they would decree that it should cease tomorrow, with no compensation beyond a moderate life-income to the present holders."[13]

Since private property is protected by the state, and the robberies that make property are sanctioned by legislation and enforced by arms and war, the state is a great evil; and it would be well, if most of its functions were taken over by co-operatives and producers' syndicates. Personality and individuality are crushed into a rote conformity by our societies; only the greater safety and orderliness of modern life can reconcile us to the state.

Russell, in his famous book *Power* (1938), stresses the psychological as distinct from the environmental forces in politics. He brings himself into general line with the Chicago School by asserting a "power interpretation" of politics. He admits the need for a coercive power against crime. But he concludes that the lust for power is natural in humanity and that it must be controlled. He writes in *Power* :

"Most of the great abominations in human history are connected with naked power—not only those associated with war, but others equally terrible if less spectacular. Slavery and the slave trade, the exploitation of the Congo, the horrors of early industrialism, cruelty to children, judicial torture, the criminal law, prisons, workhouses, religious persecution, the atrocious treatment of the Jews, the merciless frivolities of despots, the unbelievable iniquity of the treatment of political opponents in Germany and Russia at the present day—all

[13] *Why Men Fight*, p. 134.

these are examples of the use of naked power against defenceless victims."[14]

There must be power, either that of governments, or that of anarchic adventures. There must even be naked power, as long as there are rebels against governments, or even ordinary criminals. But if human life is to be, for the mass of mankind, anything better than a dull misery punctuated with moments of sharp horror, there must be as little naked power as possible. Russell remarks that the exercise of power, if it is to be something better than the infliction of wanton torture, must be hedged round by safeguards of law and custom, permitted only after due deliberation, and entrusted to men who are closely supervised in the interests of those who are subjected to them.

It is useless to trust in the virtue of some individual or set of individuals. The philosopher king was dismissed long ago as an idle dream, but the philosopher party, though equally fallacious, is hailed as a great discovery. No real solution of the problem of power is to be found in irresponsible government by a minority, or in any other short cut. The permanent political solution of the problem of power is co-operation, not domination ; the immediate individual duty is the unintimidated statement of permanent ethical values against fanaticism, Marxist or Fascist, and, if necessary, through pacifist non-violent resistance.

Politics is the study of power. Violence is the basic evil. It is the enemy of reason. Man is too sensitive to the allurements of power to be trusted, save with the utmost pragmatic caution to use violence to repel it. The use of force is permissible, according to Russell, sometimes where there is the minimum possibility of illusion ; crusading never, except we suppose some impartial judge, above particular interests and sectional ideologies. In fact, Russell is hostile to every kind of force, which is being used for the coercion of the individual or individuals. And the state which mostly bases its authority on force does not find favour with Russell. He is hostile to the state more than what Laski was. His attitude is essentially Tolstoyan.

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[14] *Power* (Unwin Books, 1960), pp. 70-71.

Russell approaches a theory of politics from a psychological point of view. To him, impulses, not conscious purpose, determine man's conduct. In the main, man holds those beliefs that accord with his impulses. The reasons which man offers are thus quasi-rational. Man's conduct is normally governed by attempts to satisfy his impulses. Man's acts are directed not to the results which his innate tendencies involves but to the mere satisfaction of these tendencies themselves. According to Russell, there are two kinds of impulses : the creative and the possessive. The creative impulses are concerned with art and knowledge, of which there can be no exclusive ownership ; and the possessive, on the other hand, are concerned with the acquisition of exclusive ownership. Material goods alone can be exclusively possessed ; spiritual goods cannot. The possessive impulses involve taking things away from others ; the creative impulses involve adding new things for all. Impulses should not be crushed. It is the task of social institutions to direct them to healthy channels. Russell writes that "the supreme principles, both in politics and in private life, should be to promote all that is creative, and so to distinguish the impulses and desires that centre round possession."[15]

For the purpose of creative freedom, according to Bertrand Russell, the state is not at all suited. Its essence is power. Its basis is authority and tradition, and is thus unfit for the promotion of liberty. "The state and property are the great embodiments of possessiveness ; it is for this reason that they are against life, and that they issue in war." In external affairs the state uses its power for purposes of exploitation, and is limited only by fear of defeat in war. Its very efficiency as a power encourages international anarchy. In fact the state is primarily an organization for killing foreigners, that is its main purpose. There are, of course, other things they do. They do a certain amount of educating, but in the course of educating they try very hard to make the young think it is a grand thing to kill foreigners. Russell states : "I mean, take, for instance, that verse in the national anthem which they don't

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15 *Principles of Social Reconstruction,* p. 236.

sing as often as they did when I was young, where it says, 'Confound their ravish tricks, frustrate their politics and make them fall.' We all used to sing that with great gusto about every foreigner."[16] A national state is based on tribal feeling, which is the root of patriotism. And patriotism is a false religion since it lacks universality. The state attempts to confine human obligation to one segment of humanity. Our love for our own nation must be supplemented by justice for all peoples. The power of the state here is limited by the fear of rebellion or by the organized opposition of a strong group. Men obey the state because they fear anarchy within and aggression from outside.

Freedom is the supreme good ; for without it personality is impossible. Life and knowledge are today so complex, that only by free discussion can we pick our way through errors and prejudices to that total perspective which is truth. Let men, let even teachers, differ and debate ; out of such diverse opinions will come an intelligent relativity of belief which will not readily fly to arms ; hatred and war come largely of fixed ideas or dogmatic faith. Freedom of thought and speech would go like a cleansing draught through the neuroses and superstitions of the 'modern' mind.

For we are not so educated as we think ; we are but beginning the great experiment of Universal Schooling ; and it has not had time to affect profoundly our ways of thinking and our public life. We are building the equipment, but we are still primitive in methods and technique ; we think of education as the transmission of a certain body of settled knowledge, when it should be rather the development of a scientific habit of mind. The distinctive feature of the unintelligent man is the hastiness and absoluteness of his opinions ; the scientist is slow to believe, and never speaks without modification. The larger use of science, and of scientific method, in education, would give to us a measure of that intellectual conscience which believes only up to the evidence in hand, and is always ready to concede that it may be wrong. With such methods, education may prove

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16 *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind* (Arthur Barker Ltd., London, Second ed. Jan. 1961), p. 100.

the great solvent of our ills ; it may even make of our children's children the new men and women who must come before the new society can appear. "The instinctive part of our character is very malleable. It may be changed by beliefs, by material circumstances, by social circumstances, and by institutions." It is quite conceivable, for example, that education could mould opinion to admire art more than wealth, as in the days of the Renaissance, and could guide itself by the resolution "to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and desires that center round possession." This is the principle of growth, whose corollaries would be the two great commandments of a new and natural morality : first, the Principle of Reverence, that "the vitality of individuals and communities is to be promoted as far as possible" ; and second, the Principle of Tolerance, that "the growth of one individual or one community is to be as little as possible at the expense of another."[17]

There is nothing that man might not do if our splendid organization of schools and universities were properly developed and properly manned, and directed intelligently to the reconstruction of human character. Each individual has a distinct principle of growth which, when distorted by governmental regimentation, makes the life of the individual flabby, dull, and exhausting. The impulsive actions of the individual, which are injurious to others, are mainly the result of attempts to block individual growth. We should aim at harmony through differentiation, and not through mere aping of a uniform pattern. Russell states that "if human life is not to become dusty and uninteresting, it is important to realize that there are things that have a value which is quite independent of utility. What is useful is useful because it is a means to something else and the something else, if it is not in turn merely a means, must be valued for its own sake, for otherwise the usefulness is illusory."[18]

The sphere of individual action is not to be regarded as ethically inferior to that of social duty. On the contrary, some of the best human activities are rather personal than social.

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17 *Why Men Fight*, pp. 101, 248, 256 ; *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 108.
18 *Authority and Individual*, (Second Impression, 1955, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London), p. 113.

Prophets, mystics, poets, scientific discoverers are men whose lives are dominated by a vision ; they are essentially solitary men. When their dominant impulse is strong, they feel that they cannot obey authority if it runs counter to what they profoundly believe to be good. Although, on this account, they are often persecuted in their own day, they are apt to be, of all men, those to whom posterity pays the highest honour. It is such men who put into the world the things that we must value, not only in religion, in art, and in science, but also in our way of feeling towards our neighbour, for improvements in the sense of social obligation, as in everything else, have been largely due to solitary men whose thoughts and emotions were not subject to the dominion of the herd.

Russell feels that the world has become the victim of dogmatic political creeds, of which, in our day the most powerful are capitalism and communism. He writes : "I do not believe that either, in a dogmatic and unmitigated form, offers a cure for preventible evils. Capitalism gives opportunity of initiative to a few ; communism could (though it does not in fact) provide a servile kind of security for all. But if people can rid themselves of the influence of unduly simple theories and the strife that they engender, it will be possible, by a wise use of scientific technique, to provide both opportunity for all and security for all. Unfortunately our political theories are less intelligent than our science, and we have not yet learnt how to make use of our knowledge and our skill in the ways that will do most to make life happy and even glorious. It is not only the experience and the fear of war that oppresses mankind, though this is perhaps the greatest of all the evils of our time. We are oppressed also by the great impersonal forces that govern our daily life, making us still slaves of circumstance that no longer slaves in law. This need not be the case. It has come about through the worship of false gods. Energetic men have worshipped power rather than simple happiness and friendliness ; men of less energy have acquiesced, or have been deceived by a wrong diagnosis of the sources of sorrow."[19]

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

In this connection it must be said that Russell stands for a simple and unsophisticated life. That is why, he praised China for its faith in simple life when he went for a year to teach there. He felt that there was less mechanism, and a slower pace ; one could sit down and reason, and life would stand still while one dissected it. He, then, remarked :

> "I have come to realize that the white race is not as important as I used to think it was. If Europe and America kill themselves off in war it will not necessarily mean the destruction of the human species, nor even an end to civilization. There still be a considerable number of Chinese left ; and in many ways China is the greatest country I have ever seen. It is not only the greatest numerically and the greatest culturally, but it seems to me the greatest intellectually. I know of no other civilization where there is such open-mindedness, such realism, such a willingness to face the facts as they are, instead of trying to distort them into a particular pattern."[20]

But now as the situation has completely changed in China, Russell regards it as great a threat to world peace and humanity as Russia is.[21]

Russell is not only an arm-chair philosopher, but he is an empiricist. His method is inductive. He thinks that in order to serve the purpose of individual freedom a reconstruction of institution is fundamental. The capitalist autocracy in industry must be abolished. Russell, in this connection, remarks that socialism is not only inevitable, but desirable. Care must be taken, however, not to substitute for the dictatorship of the capitalist the dictatorship of the administrator. He praised communism and had high hopes from it, but when he visited Russia, he was disappointed to find out that the Russian government did not tolerate liberalism, freedom and democracy. He was so angered by the suppression of free speech and free press, and by the resolute monopoly and systematic use of every avenue of propaganda, that he rejoiced in the illiteracy of the Russian people ; the ability to read being,

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20 Interview in *New York World*, May 4, 1924.

21 *Bertrand Russell Speaks His mind* (Arthur Barker Ltd., London, Second Imp., Jan., 1961), p. 56.

in this age of subsidized newspapers, an impediment to the acquisition of truth. He was shocked to find that nationalization of the land had been forced (except on paper) to yield to private ownership; and it dawned upon him that men, as made today, will not properly till and husband their holdings unless they can rely on transmitting them, and the improvements which they put into them, to their children. "Russia seems on the way to becoming a greater France, a great nation of peasant proprietors. The old feudalism has disappeared." He began to understand that this dramatic overturn, with all its sacrifices and all its heroism, was only Russia's 1789. Hence, it is necessary that a regenerated society, according to Russell, must see an end not only to the evils of property, but also to the evils of power. Equalization of power must thus follow equalization of wealth. A social system, Russell strongly feels, must not only secure economic justice, but also the greatest possible development of the creative impulses. A vast dispersion of power by functional and territorial federalism is thus necessary.

One of the advantages to be gained from decentralization is that it provides new opportunities for hopefulness and for individual activities that embody hopes. If our political thoughts are all concerned with vast problems and dangers of world catastrophe, it is easy to become despairing. Fear of war, fear of revolution, fear of reaction, may obsess you according to your temperament and your party bias. "Unless you are one of a very small number of powerful individuals, you are likely to feel that you cannot do much about these great issues. But in relation to smaller problems—those of your town, or your trade union, or the local branch of your political party, for example—you can hope to have a successful influence."[22] This will engender a hopeful spirit, and a hopeful spirit is what is most needed if a way is to be found of dealing successfully with the larger problems. War and shortages and financial stringency have caused almost universal fatigue, and have made hopefulness seem shallow and insincere. Success, even if, at first, it is on a small scale, is the best cure

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

for this mood of pessimistic weariness. And success, for most people, means breaking up our problems, and being free to concentrate on those that are not too desperately large.

Hence, Russell supports the principle of self-government in industry. The interests of the consumers can best be represented by *ad hoc* organizations. The state cannot represent consumers, since when industry is concentrated in different sections the representatives of these districts in the government really represent the producers. The state should retain ownership of land and industrial capital, determine prices and quantity needed of each commodity. It should also have power to prevent any particular organization from acting in hostility to the interests of the community. It may also have the power of making war and peace, tariffs, and foreign policy ; but international questions like movement of population and apportionment of raw material can best be settled by special functional organizations. Both producers and consumers may use strikes and boycotts to enforce their demands. With the abolition of capitalism the state will be neutral in disputes between organizations, and it may, therefore, demand arbitration, and then offer its decisions for the guidance of public opinion. The principle of organization should be self-government for each organization in those activities that concern it alone, and regulation by a neutral authority of those activities that also concern others.

In Bertrand Russell we find the most emphatic expression of that demand for individual freedom which is a characteristic aspect of contemporary thought. The state, he asserts, is no longer a glorified policeman, but is becoming virtually a national householder. When the state participates in industry, education, sanitation, and when it alone manages innumerable industrial undertakings, the conception of it as power is hardly applicable. Russell, as do other individualists, conceives the state as an external force.

When Russell discusses freedom he has apparently in mind the freedom of the original artist from the conventions and traditionalism of his profession, or the freedom of the conscientious objector from conscription.

And when Russell accuses the collectivists of not being conscious of the dangers of concentration of power ; he surely has in mind the collectivism of the older type. The Webbs stressed individuality, decentralization, publicity, participation of workers, in order to avoid the evils of power. Hence, the collectivism which Russell denounces is that of older variety which was undoubtedly an enemy of liberty. Liberal socialists now recognize as emphatically as Russell the necessity of protecting and encouraging variation and growth. The issue, in fact, between Russell and the Webbs is not whether liberty is desirable, but by what means it may best be attained. Russell's suggestions for self-government in industry and for the organization of functional associations are, of course, realizable only after a long and gradual transition, for he recognizes the difficulties of a violent change. He writes in *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920) : "When I suggested that whatever is possible in England can be achieved without bloodshed, he (Lenin) waved aside the suggestion as fantastic.....The sort of revolution that is recommended is never practically grander except in time of national misfortune. It is by slower and less showy methods that new world must be built." As such, for more immediate purposes, what is important is a greater participation by the workers in industry and a greater decentralization of the functions of the present state.

It is a little difficult to pass from England to America, and then to Russia, and then to India and China, and yet keep one's Social philosophy unchanged. The world has convinced Bertrand Russell that it is too big for his formulae, and perhaps too large and heavy to move very rapidly towards his heart's desire. And there are so many hearts, and so many different desires. One finds him now "an older and a wiser man," mellowed by time and a varied life ; as wide awake as ever to all the ills that flesh is heir to and yet matured into the moderation that knows the difficulties of social change. All in all, a very lovable man ; capable of the profoundest metaphysics and the subtlest mathematics, and yet speaking always simply, with the clarity which comes only to those who are sincere ; a man addicted to fields of thought that usually dry up the springs of feeling, and yet warmed and illumined with pity, full of an

almost mystic tenderness for mankind. Not a courtier, but surely a scholar and a gentleman, and a better Christian than some who mouth the word. Happily, he is still hearty and vigorous, fighting for the cause of world peace. The flame of life still burns brightly in him.

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-)

Although we know that Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, was born on April 17, 1894, in a mine-worker's family in the village of Kalinovka in the Kursk province and that he worked, when he was only a child, as a herdsman and then as a metal worker in the factories and mines of the Donbass, the details about his family background, childhood and early youth are all still in a state of flux. Contrary to the rest of the world, in the Soviet Union the future is certain, shaped by plans and governed by 'inevitable' laws of development, while the past is most uncertain.

The biographers of Soviet leaders often have tasks similar in a way to that of archeological researchers. Soviet public life is absolutely depersonalised in the sense that the private life of public figures is taboo. According to Marxist principles subjective and personal aspects are of no consequence. None of Stalin's marriages, for instance, were ever reported in the Soviet Union. The Soviet press and radio never mention the family life, hobbies and idiosyncrasies of public figures. Until Khrushchev's visit to America, serious students of Soviet affairs refrained from writing anything definitive about his marriages and his children. On the eve of his departure, the foreign journalists in Moscow reported that he was "married for the first time in 1920, 1921, 1922 and for the second time in 1938." On September, 1959, in Washington Mme Nina Petrovna Khrushchev gave a press conference and in a revolutionary departure from Soviet practice, revealed that Khrushchev's first wife died "during the famine", and that she herself married him in 1924, when his two children by his first wife were six and eight years old.

In the Soviet Union public figures exist only in their official political capacities. The provincial newspapers naturally also

respect this rule. The local party secretary exists on their pages as party secretary and nothing else. One could say that the function is everything and the human being behind the function is nothing—as far as the public eye is concerned. The biographer has to read hundreds or thousands of newspaper articles, conference reports, speeches and interviews in order to establish a few 'personal and private facts' which could be obtained in five minutes about the public figures of the outside world.

In this strangely depersonalized and dehumanized world men start to be visible when and as far as they act out their public functions. Hence the Khrushchev-story has to begin with his 'Party-birth', with the time when he was chosen to become a member of Stalin's apparatus. From then on there is increasingly more circumstantial material, and later more and more direct evidence, for tracing the development of this almost anthropologically different human species—the Communist *apparatchik*.

As an *apparatchik* makes his way to the higher rungs of the hierarchical ladder, there is increasingly more direct documentary evidence on his actions and general behaviour.

Khrushchev's rise in the hierarchy had been uncommonly, unbelievably swift. He was then only forty years old but as to the all-important 'Party-age' he was much younger. He had joined the party only in 1918, when he was twenty-four, and had stepped on to the lowest rung of the hierarchical ladder of the Party apparatus as late as 1925, when thirty-one years old. In 1934 he reached the uppermost region of Soviet power by becoming first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. On the anniversary of the revolution he stood there on the top of the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square, among the 'great leaders' of the Party and government headed by Stalin.

Khrushchev represented a new type among the Soviet leaders. He was entirely a product of Stalin's apparatus. Although only four years younger than Molotov and roughly of the same generation as many of the 'old' Bolsheviks who took part in the conspiratory struggles before the revolution, Khrushchev was not one of the fathers but a child of the Bolshevik revolution.

The fathers of the revolution , Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and the others, were European revolutionary intellectuals, shaped by the revolutionary heritage of the nineteenth century. They are fully comprehensible to people unfamiliar with the Soviet system. Stalin's personality was already shaped partly by the party monolith created by Lenin and perfected by himself. Yet large regions of Stalin's personality are immediately comprehensible to the external world. Khrushchev, who was a semi-literate peasant worker and an adult when he joined the party, had nothing of the intellectual-emotional background of the fathers of the revolution. He learnt to think from the party and knew no other system than the Soviet one. His personality is just as enigmatic as the Soviet world. Khrushchev, the functionary, grew up together with the Party apparatus. His personality is only comprehensible through the stay of his incredibly dangerous climb up the ladder of Communist hierarchy.

Khrushchev, as the member of the Communist Party, did not belong to the class of intellectuals who had the interest and the will-power to go on reading and learning. He was certainly not of this type. The cultured intellectual after embracing Marxism had to relinquish, often through a very painful process, his old habit of thinking, discussing and arguing. The possibility that the opponent of Marxism can be right in the least little detail is firmly excluded. A Marxist must be immune to outside argument. Marxism, as the supreme science of human society, and Marxist dialectics, the method for every science, are infallible. And Khrushchev, an uneducated and a roughly-going man, had no intellectual habits to give up. His complete acceptance of Marxist theory was not hindered by a previous cultural background. He knew no science, no other system of thought, no other philosophy, no other economic theory but the Marxist one.

The Marxists whom Khrushchev met were immensely sure of themselves. They could, according to his impression, calmly and simply refute and annihilate any counter-arguments. For a really good Marxist the world with all its puzzles is not a terribly complicated, incalculable and unknowable thing, but something easy to understand and explain.

Thought are simple tools if you are taught how to use them. And if you have learnt thinking (that is : Marxism), then it is of little importance how cultured you are. Marxism teaches you what makes the human world and the world of nature 'tick'. Marxism gives the simple worker immense superiority over the confused intellectuals, over the aristocrats and millionaires of the mind. The revolution gives all this intellectual superiority to the workers. Lenin's remark that Marxist theory is a terribly strong weapon is quite correct.

Khrushchev and his fellow-students learnt in Party schools and *Rabfaks* that the stars in heaven, the Sun, the earth, all life on the earth, every activity is governed by scientific laws. These are like the laws ordered by Tsar or by the police except that they are stronger laws, because no human beings, no armies, nothing can change them. What these scientific laws ordain is inevitable. It happens whether we like it or not.

Khrushchev was to learn words and sentences explaining the scientific laws, by heart. He was to learn by heart : "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." He was also to cram : "The activity of the Bolshevik Party must not be based on the good wishes of 'outstanding individuals', not on the dictates of 'reason', 'universal morals', etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws." He was told, during his training in Party schools, that the real meaning of democracy is dictatorship.

> "Democracy is a state which recognizes the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organization for the systematic use of violence by one class against the other, by one section of the population against the other."[1]

And again :

> "Soviet Socialist Democratism does not in any way contradict one-man management and dictatorship ; the will of the class is sometimes given effect by a dictator who sometimes does more alone and often is more necessary."[2]

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1 Lenin, *Selected Works*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1937, Vol. IX, p. 70.

2 Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russian edition, Vol. XXX, p. 444.

Thus Khrushchev learnt with utmost sincerity all those lessons which were thought necessary by the Communist Party to make him a staunch die-hard comrade.

In various speeches Khurshchev often mentioned how hard he strove at the *Rabfak* to master the sciences. He certainly must have excelled in learning Marxism and in behaving as a loyal partyman, because barely a year after his entering the school, the Yuzovka City Party Committee sent his name to the *Rabfak* Party Committee as the comrade who should be elected Party secretary. The *Vydvizhenets*—'one who pushed himself forward'—was now pushed forward by his superiors in the party apparatus. The *Rabfak* had several party cells. Khrushchev became the superior of all the cell-secretaries—in fact the most important man in the *Rabfak*, in real influence outranking even the dictator of the school and all the teaching staff. He became the representative and the watch-dog of the Party over the entire school, over all the teachers and students.

After finishing the workers' faculty N. S. Khrushchev was in leading party-work in the Donbass and then in Kiev. In 1929 he began to study in the J. V. Stalin Industrial Academy in Moscow where he was elected secretary of the party committee. From January 1931, Khrushchev was secretary of the Baumann and then the Krasnopresnenski *raion* Party Committee of Moscow. During 1932-34 he worked at first as second, and then as first secretary of the Moscow city and as the second secretary of the Moscow oblast committees of the party ; in 1935 he was elected first secretary of the Moscow oblast and city committees of the party where he worked until 1938. In these years Khrushchev carried out organizational work of great magnitude in executing the plans projected by the party and government for the socialist reconstruction of Moscow, for developing public services in the capital, and for the improvement of the living conditions of workers and employees.

In January 1938 Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine ; in 1939 he was elected as a member of the Politbureau. During the Great Fatherland War of 1941-45, Khrushchev was with the army in the field, but he simultaneously completed his work at all other fronts—social, economic and political. He

conducted work of great magnitude in the organization of all-peoples partisan movement in the Ukraine against the German Fascist invaders. As political head of the Ukraine, as member of the Soviet Politbureau and as one of the leaders of the local military council, Khrushchev was directly involved in all political, economic and military operations. He was in charge of economic mobilization, of plans for evacuation of industries and of population. He had to see to it that all the important industrial equipment should be quickly dismantled and evacuated to the East. He had to give general orders for destroying equipment left behind. And the quick evacuation of hundreds of factories, of equipment, supplies, livestock, was one of the sensations of this period of the great war. It was praised by Soviet and Western observers alike and even German commentators expressed a grudging admiration. Thus Khrushchev's administrative and organizational talents were fully vindicated.

After the war the political situation in Soviet Union became very much complicated as Stalin became more and more capricious, irritable and brutal. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. He separated himself from the collective life. He chose to decide everything by himself without any consideration for anyone or anything. The purge-cyclones were raging over all parts of the Soviet Union and the satellite empire. Many were expelled from the Party. After that they were arrested and executed. But Khrushchev came out of the dangers unharmed. Rather his position became stronger.

From December 1949 until Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev worked in daily contact with Stalin. On the latter's 70th birthday Khrushchev wrote a pamphlet praising Stalin's genius. It was published in Moscow in Russian and in many foreign languages. The title of the English version is : "Stalin-Friendship Among the Peoples Makes Our Motherland Invincible." Although Stalin was very suspicious and capricious, Khrushchev's rivals and enemies had not been able to manoeuvre Stalin into liquidating him. In fact, Stalin thought Khrushchev useful in providing a counter-weight against other very ambitious people in his entourage. Suspicious as

Stalin was, he felt that Khrushchev constituted no danger to his rule. And this fact raised Khrushchev's position, and he gradually strengthened his hold on the Party during the regime of Stalin.

The day Stalin died Khrushchev was a member of the Presidium and one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. He was ranked as Number Five in the leadership. He became the actual head of the apparatus on March 14, when Malenkov had to relinquish his first secretaryship. This was the outcome of the struggle for power between all the leaders, Khrushchev himself had comparatively little to do with it. He was rightly placed. He had a very long past in the apparatus. He had been continuously a member of the Central Committee for the past nineteen years and of the Politbureau or Presidium for the past fourteen. The fact that he had the Party apparatus in his hand made it possible for him to exploit the further intrigues between the rivals for succession, and to use the enormous power of the apparatus in order to achieve his official accession to the first secretaryship. This rank was as yet not spelled with capital letters. It was his own doing however that he soon became the First Secretary and the dictator of the Soviet Union. With the apparatus in his hands this was to be expected.

Khrushchev became Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in 1958 after ousting Malenkov and Bulganin and defeating all his opponents. He tactfully dealt with the situation and foiled the attempts of Malenkov and Mikoyan group and of the Molotov-Kaganovich faction to demote him entirely in the Spring of 1957. When the campaign for a summit meeting was on, Khrushchev had to convince the Central Committee that the real head of the Soviet Union must be the Premier, since otherwise the figurehead, Bulganin, would have to negotiate with President Eisenhower and the other Western leaders. A few days before the end of the March session of the Supreme Soviet Mikoyan told Western reporters at an Embassy reception in Moscow that they should not expect any 'Government changes' at this session. But at the March 27 Session Voroshilov, as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, proposed that "dear Nikita Khrushchev" should be elected

Prime Minister in succession to Bulganin. Voroshilov spoke at length about Khrushchev's 'outstanding personality', 'creative endeavour', 'inexhaustible energy', 'untiring labour'. Supreme Soviet voted him into Premiership. Upon that Khrushchev expressed his sentiments : "By your decision, you have just expressed great confidence in me and have done me a great honour. I shall do everything to justify your confidence and shall not spare health, strength or life to serve you."

Khrushchev, like many others, had a deep-rooted hatred for Stalin and for those who had an unshakable faith in Stalin's policies, although he (Khrushchev) worked with Stalin and praised him during the latter's regime. Perhaps, it was for tactical purposes. But after the death of Stalin anti-Stalin feelings grew steadily in force and scope in Russia. Even Stalin's heirs did not want to defend and preserve the Stalin myth in its entirety. The die-hard Stalinists, led by Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, were prepared to make some concessions as long as Stalinist dictatorship (minus the bloody purges) was preserved intact. The middle-road *apparatchik* faction led by Khrushchev, was all along against too far-reaching anti-Stalinization. They feared that party dictatorship would suffer. During the three years of the post-Stalin era, Khrushchev himself alternated between linking his name to the Stalin myth and between distancing himself from it.

But on the 25th February, 1956 Khrushchev delivered a long speech making an all-round exposure of Stalin's mass-murders. He said :

> "Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people'. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven : this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had had reputations. This concept, 'enemy of the people', actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character....."

"This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the Party line, became victims. We must assert that in regard to those persons who in their time had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula 'enemy of the people' was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals."

Although this speech was delivered by Khrushchev, he was not very happy with the contents of the speech. In fact, he was forced by Mikoyan, Malenkov and their associates to present it. They thought that by this act Khrushchev would make it impossible for himself ever to aspire again to one man dictatorship. But Khrushchev did everything with his insertions to show that he had nothing to do with the murder cases and that Stalin was exclusively responsible for them.

Also, in making the official exposure of Stalin, Khrushchev had a chance to blacken his enemies as Stalinist and award the halo of anti-Stalinism to his adherents and to those of his rivals whom it was expedient at the moment to replacate. Consequently, he took great pains in his last minute insertions to show, to prove, to announce that Malenkov was the evil spirit and alter-ego of Stalin during the war, in fabricating the Leningrad affair and in other matters. He showed that Kaganovich tried to defend Stalin because he was Stalin's accomplice. Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov were accorded mixed treatment. Thus Khrushchev, in exposing the sins of Stalin, also had an opportunity to blacken the faces of his opponents, and to win the faith of the Communist Party in his own leadership.

The theses of the speech are :

1. Marxist-Leninist refutations of ideological pretexts for one-man dictatorship, for terror and mass repression. Hence the thesis is refuted that "as we march forward towards socialism, class-war must allegedly sharpen." The 'enemy of the people' concept is sharply denounced.

2. Proofs that according to Marxist theory and Lenin's practice ultimate power rests in the Party Congress and the Central Committee plenum. "There was no matter so impor-

tant that Lenin himself decided it *without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Politbureau.*"

3. That without democratic majority rule in the Central Committee and the Presidium, and without Socialist legality, there is no defence against "the wilfulness of individuals abusing their power."

It is quite evident from the above theses that Khrushchev is quite against the concept of one-man dictatorship. Also, he believes that majority principle to decide policies in the party meetings should be adopted. Further, he insists that war is not inevitable to defeat capitalism. He, in his television interview to the Columbia Broadcasting System on June 2, 1957, stated : "With regard to the ideology of capitalist and socialist countries, we have never concealed that there will be a struggle in this field, an ideological struggle.....Some people reproach me for allegedly changing my point of view, since I once said that if an atomic war came about it would be capitalism that would perish in that war. This I repeat today. But we think that *capitalism* should be destroyed not by means of war.....but through an ideological and economic struggle....." Thus Khrushchev appears as a revisionist of the old Marxist-Leninist theses.

Keeping in view his policy of peace, he placed a programme of seven-year plan before the Twenty-first Party Congress at the end of January, 1959 for the building of communism, which was finally approved by the Congress. His theses and report on the seven-year plan described its main task as follows :

1. the creation of the material and technical basis of communism ;

2. the full satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the Soviet people ;

3. the consolidation of the economic and defence power of the USSR ;

4. ensuring the victory of the USSR in the peaceful economic competition with the capitalist countries of the West.

The seven-year plan was the most important campaign in the Kremlin struggle for world supremacy, but through peaceful competition. Khrushchev claimed that United States economic

power would be equalled by the USSR in 1970, five years after the end of the seven-year plan :

> "If we calculate per head of the population, another five years will probably be needed after the fulfilment of the seven-year plan to catch up and outstrip the United States industrial output. Thus by that time, or perhaps even sooner, the Soviet Union will advance to the first place in the world both in the absolute volume of production and in production per head of the population. This will be a historical world victory for Socialism in peaceful competition with capitalism in the international area."[3]

Khrushchev pointed out that in this peaceful competition with the United States, they have to rely on political as well as economic factors. Among these Khrushchev attributed a great deal of importance to the 'scientific laws' about the 'inevitable crisis' and inherent contradictions of the capitalist-imperialist system. These 'laws' promulgated by Marx and Engels based on mid-nineteenth century experience and those derived by Lenin from the world situation in the first two decades of the twentieth century, are according to Khrushchev still valid in the second part of the twentieth century. "Capitalism," he emphasised, "is incapable of freeing itself from the death grip of its own contradictions."

Two other important political factors are :

1. The plan "will arise to an unparalleled degree the force of attraction of communist ideas," especially in the less developed countries of the world.

2. The economic progress of the entire Socialist camp, including China, and the consolidation of its strength and unity under Soviet leadership.

The Congress heard also something of the difficulties in the way towards victory. Aristov, one of the most powerful leaders under Khrushchev, referred to the heavy demands that are to be made on the Soviet engineering industry during the next seven years. He said that some engineering works were already overloaded and still had to deal with aid commitments to China, India and other countries. It should be noted in

3 Khrushchev's Speech, January 27, 1959.

this context, that the planning expert, Saburov, confessed that the anti-party group had opposed the policy of giving too much aid to under-developed countries.

Khrushchev spoke about ideological dangers :

"Some workers underestimate the harm of bourgeois influences upon Soviet youth, thinking that the bourgeois is far from us, and that our youth is beyond its reach. But this is an error. We cannot ignore the possibility of bourgeois influence and are obliged to wage a struggle against the penetration of alien views and morals among Soviet people and particularly among the young."

Speaking about the transition to communism ('to each according to his needs') Khrushchev emphasised that this can be attained only when there is 'an abundance of goods'. But the satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people does not mean the satisfaction of 'whims' or 'luxuries' as in the capitalist countries.

His theses on the transition to communism contained his very severe attack on Mao and the Chinese leadership. He did not name them, but Mao is unmistakably one of the 'comrades' whom he accused of inflicting damage on the building of communism and of having distorted and compromised the communist cause.

Khrushchev is a man of atomic age, and he is quite aware of the consequences of the thermonuclear war. That is why he tries to base his theory, policy and action on the real situation of the present world and not on dogmatic generalizations based on the situation in the last century. He fully understands that nuclear warfare by its very nature is exceedingly dangerous, particularly for dictatorships. If A- or H-bombs were dropped on the principal cities of the Soviet and satellite empire, thereby cutting off or annihilating central direction of the organs of repression, MVD, KGB, police, etc., popular revolts could break out everywhere. All his experience since Stalin's death has shown to Khrushchev and the apparatus that populations, armies, students, workers, even communists "are not to be trusted." Wherever the system of oppression appeared to be weakened, small and large scale revolts followed. The general disorder and disorganization following

a nuclear attack would not turn the British or American population against their regimes. "Nuclear war would entail for the free world many dangers, but not the danger of revolts against the British or American 'systems'. In Soviet Russia the regime itself would be in the greatest of dangers." A regime, which in the last analysis depends on the party apparatus (less than half a per cent of the population) and its secret police—cannot risk breaks in the 'monolithic unity' and strength of the entire machinery of oppression.

Further, he knows that his country has not yet got over the after-effects of the Stalin era and of the World War II. A third war could dangerously reduce the proportion of Russians within the USSR to that of the non-Russian majority of the inhabitants. And a third atomic war could annihilate the total population of the USSR. Rebutting the view that the recent events in the Caribbean were a victory for the United States, Mr. Khrushchev said on the 7th November, 1962,[4] after a sombre passage wherein he told his listeners how close the world had been to a thermonuclear war, that there was only one victor—reason. What is needed, according to him, in regulation of international disputes is flexibility.

Thus Khrushchev's regime stands for many bloodless successes in the international arena through a policy of compromise and mutual concessions and many achievements on the home front by permitting a far higher living standard and a far easier and safer political climate for the average citizen.

Khrushchev was and is a pragmatist in Marxism-Leninism. Marxist 'theses', and the dogmatic approach are used by him only on occasions when it suits his aims. In foreign affairs his approach is often non-ideological and peaceful. He feels that today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means "to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and, if they actually try to start it, to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans."[5] To be able to do this, all anti-war forces

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4 Khrushchev's Speech at Kremlin in regard to Cuban crisis on the 7th Nov., 1962.

5 *Khrushchev* by George Paloczi-Horvath (Secker & Warburg, London, 1960), p. 288.

must be vigilant and prepared, must act as a united front and never relax their efforts in the battle for peace.

In fact, Khrushchev wants to defeat capitalism, not by fighting a devastating war, but by attracting the peoples of the world towards the values of socialism, which, according to him are : free, democratic and open society ; tolerance and individualism ; belief in the basic human rights ; belief in absolute moral principles ; the right to strike ; the right to disagree ; the non-acceptance of an exclusive political dogma ; and a non-militarized society. And his socialism comprises, not only the Marxian values like economic equality, democratic and free society and dignity of human labour, but it also maintains the democratic values such as the freedom of expression, the right to differ and faith in basic human rights and absolute moral principles. He firmly asserts that there is no harm if Russia accepts certain democratic principles and fits them in her own life as many of her socialist values have been adopted by the Western Democracies.

Thus he dismisses completely the idea of waging a physical war against the capitalist countries. But the war for men's minds remains. This 'peaceful, ideological war' can be waged on both sides with Khrushchev's blessing. This war might even influence Khrushchev himself *if waged on both sides.*

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev is at the cross-roads. Emerging from the blood-red chaos of the Russian revolution, surviving the nightmare decades of the Stalin era, intriguing, manoeuvring, fighting his way to the top, he struggles now with tremendous problems. Dogma-bound, he is emotionally guided by the petrifaction of Marx's genuine anger at the social conditions of the last century. These emotions, kept alive by a sort of collective self-hypnosis of communist leaders, seek to justify tyranny and hatred of freedom and individualism by peopling the free world with the ghosts of bygone ages. His peasant's common sense and pragmatism pull him towards present reality, while the occupational disease of dictators has the opposite tendency. However, it is hoped that his great dreams, although they appear quite fantastic to dogma-bound communists, will pave the way for the survival of the humanity at least for a few decades more.

PART III

American Thinkers

1. Thomas Paine
2. Thomas Jefferson
3. Henry David Thoreau
4. John Dewey



Thomas Paine (1737-1809)

Immortal Paine, While mighty reasoners Jar,
We Crown thee General of the Headstrong war ;
Thy logic vanquished error, and thy mind
No bounds but those of right and truth confined.
The soul of fire must sure ascend the sky,
Immortal Paine, thy fame can never die ;
For men like thee their name shall ever save
From the back edict of the tyrant grave.

—*Mr. Lee.*

Thomas Paine, an English Quaker by birth, represented a remarkable blend of the French and American spirit and ideas. If he represented, on the one hand, the spirit and philosophy that were distinctively French, he, on the other, exhibited the qualifying influence of American ideas. But he was indeed primarily and essentially a political agitator and a pamphleteer rather than a detached and consistent philosopher. However, it cannot be denied that he had a wonderful faculty of both thought and expression, and his keen intellect and vivid phrases caught and fixed the doctrine of the revolutions often much more effectively than "the weightier and deeper analysis of mightier intellects."

Thomas Paine was influenced by two persons, John Wilkes and Benjamin Franklin, who were mainly responsible for his great political career. In 1768, while at Lewes, he joined the Headstrong Club. Paine became a welcome member of the Club almost immediately, not only because he was an excise officer, but because three or four of the men who had known him during his first experience gave excellent reports of him. It was a custom of the Club to discuss important political and economic questions concerning England. The members of the Club were great critics of the aristocrats and the men of wealth who dominated the country. This spirit of criticism and revolt was started by John Wilkes with his famous paper,

The North Briton. Paine was very much influenced by Wilkes' writings. From the first issue of Wilkes' paper Tom had been a devoted reader. To his delight he found that all the members of the Headstrong Club were followers of the intrepid politician, and on several occasions he had spoken on articles as they appeared and been listened to intently. Especially Wilkes' efforts for the working population had roused the Club, but Paine felt he meant even more than that to the country.

Through the spring and summer of 1772 Paine gave all his spare time, which was little, to writing his first political pamphlet, about twenty printed pages in length. He used the title of *The Case of the Officers of the Excise*. His next step was to go to London.

In London, Paine was introduced to Benjamin Franklin by one of the scientific men, with whom he had studied during his first year in the town. Later Franklin had invited Tom to his own home, at 36 Craven Street, where he had lived for a number of years. Franklin's fame as inventor deeply interested Tom. He knew that electricity especially was the hobby to which the famous Colonial was devoted ; also, Paine had read some of Franklin's publications, in particular *The Interest of Great Britain Considered with Regard to Her Colonies*, and another pamphlet, *Parable against Persecution*.

Franklin took to Paine. Here was the kind of man who belonged with the future. After hearing of what had happened since the failure to win the fight for higher salaries and a fairer treatment, he suggested it might be a good thing for his new friend to go to Pennsylvania. Thus on the advice of Benjamin Franklin, the American Agent in London, Paine left for America in 1774.

Paine became an editor of the *Pennsylvania Magazine* in U.S.A., and remained there for a year and a half in this capacity. He was also associated at that time with the two or three other journals which printed his articles. His radicalism was not liked at all by the owner of the magazine and the latter insisted on some changes, some cuts. The owner of the magazine absolutely refused to publish one article, 'African Slavery in America', which Paine wrote with the intention of having it appear in February, 1775. So Tom took it to the

Pennsylvania Journal, which printed it on March 8th. It was received with high praise, and was the best thing written favouring the abolition of slavery that had yet appeared, and had immediate effect, for on April 14th the first anti-slavery society in America was founded in Philadelphia. Remarking on the fact that Americans were complaining against the attempts by Britain to enslave them, Paine asks : "With what consistency or decency can they complain so loudly of attempts to enslave them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery ; and annually enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of authority, or claim upon them ?"

On October 18, 1775, Paine wrote a very brief piece, also published in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, which he named *A Serious Thought*, and signed Humanus. In it he denounces the "horrid cruelties exercised by Britain in the East Indies", which were indeed terrible at that period, under Lord Clive, and, mentioning that Britain had also brought slaves to America, yearly ravaging the "hapless shores of Africa" to her profit, he concludes :

> "I hesitate not for a moment to believe that the Almighty will finally separate America from Britain...and when the Almighty shall have blessed us, and made us a people *dependent only upon Him*, then may our first gratitude be shown by an act of continental legislation, which shall put a stop to the importation of Negroes for sale, soften the hard fate of those already here, and in time procure their freedom."[1]

In late October Paine sat down to write a little book, a pamphlet of some fifty pages, a great book, that spoke the truth in bold and simple language with complete courage. The title of the book was *Common Sense*. Within a month thousands upon thousands of readers were acclaiming it. It, as is well known, played a great part in the early days of the American Revolution. Throughout this work Paine's facility in denunciation and invective was characteristically prominent. Monarchy, nobility and all such incidents of hereditary govern-

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1 Quoted from *His Country Was the World* by Hawthorne (Longmans, Green & Co., U.S.A., 1949), p. 36.

ment were systematically loaded with scorn and bitter reproach.

By the time *Common Sense* appeared there had been several articles in different papers written by men of standing, one by John Adams, the member of the Second Continental Congress who had seconded Richard Henry Lee's ever-famous resolution, in which Lee declared "these Colonies are, and of a right ought to be, free and independent states." But nothing that could remotely touch *Common Sense* in reaching the whole of America and rousing in men's hearts the desire for national freedom. Before long close to half a million copies had been published, hardly a paper in the land but printed excerpts, and everywhere it was discussed and quoted.

In his brief foreword to the booklet we can catch the flavour of Paine's style, feel the quality of man. He opens with this paragraph : "Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favour ; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason....."

And closes with this :

"The cause of America in great measure is the cause of all mankind. Many circumstances have, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through which the principles of all lovers of mankind are affected.....the laying a country desolate with fire and sword, declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature has given the power of feeling ; of which class, regardless of party censure is,

The Author."

The first few pages of *Common Sense* sketch the origin and the growth of the government delightfully. He then passes on to the English Constitution, shows how it has failed and why, and ends, as to the usefulness of kings, in this wise :

> "In England a king hath little more to do than to make war and give away places, which, in plain terms, is to impoverish the nation and set it together by the ears. A

pretty business indeed for a man to be allowed eight hundred thousand pounds sterling a year for, and worshipped into the bargains."

Speaking next of America he writes in *Common Sense* that "no man was a warmer wisher for a reconciliation than myself, before the fatal 19th of April, 1775, but the moment the event of that day was known, I rejected the hardened, sullen-tempered Pharaoh of England for ever."

There was considerable fear that in case of separation between the two countries, America would face ruin, but Paine proved clearly that losing the British market would open the rest of Europe for trade, now forbidden to America. She must confine her trade to the mother country, and at such prices as could be gained from her—and Britain the one to decide. Also, he called his readers to remember that once America was independent she would be free from all the "European conflicts into which she was constantly being drawn by her connections with the British Empire." These two points appealed forcefully to many Americans of the upper classes who had not realized them. The little book indeed won over many who, until they had read it, saw no advantages in breaking away, and who now joined Washington in declaring that they were ready to shake off all connection with Britain, "a state so unjust and so unnatural."

Paine looked into the future. "The only King the Colonies would know was God. He reigns above, and does not make havoc of mankind like the royal brute of Great Britain. He demands that members of the Assemblies, the Conventions, Congress, shall be chosen whose business it will be to frame a Continental Charter...always remembering that our strength is continental, not provincial."

Common Sense is worth reading today, including as it does much that links up with present conditions. Read by the Americans of Paine's day it was like a sunrise. By its light men clearly saw what they had only dimly sensed. This pamphlet was the spoken beginning of the Revolution. It passed from hand to hand, until tens of thousands had read it, and became revolutionalists, knowing what it meant, wanting what it showed them. The common man read and reread

those parts that upheld its rights, as an intelligent human being, to have his share in government as a free elector; he rejoiced at the contempt for hereditary monarchy taken as a God-given right, and for the tyranny over the poor and lowly by the ruling classes of England, exercising a power given them merely because of their station in society, not because of worth or wisdom.

Thus *Common Sense* swept through Colonies, made its deep impress on the American mind, and drove public opinion toward the final break with Britain. The Continental Congress called for volunteers, appointed George Washington, commander-in-chief of the first American army, and empowered a committee headed by Thomas Jefferson to draft a declaration of independence. Paine himself rode the full crest of the tide rushing toward the war of liberation. His first leap from obscurity had come as the editor of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*. As the author of *Common Sense*, he catapulted into the front-ranks of the leaders of the movement he had helped arouse.

Also, on December 19, 1776, the first of Tom Paine's series of sixteen articles, known as *The American Crisis Papers*, was published in the *Pennsylvania Journal*. It opened with the words, "These are the times that try men's souls," a famous line that few realize was his. A great deal had happened to make that line true for America since *Common Sense* had rocked the country with enthusiasm. Paine was mixed up in all of it.

At the same time, Paine was busy with other affairs. In August, the Declaration was safely adopted. He and Franklin worked together with other leaders, to gain the assistance of the entire population of their state in the creation of a liberal constitution. The farmers of the west, the shopkeepers and artificers of Philadelphia, the workers as well as head men in the trades, all these as well as the gentry, laboured to construct it ready for passage a little later in the year. It guaranteed universal male suffrage, democratic representation, complete religious freedom and a one-chamber legislature to be elected annually, and it was greatly in advance of any other state constitution adopted before the end of the Revolution. Paine played an important part in all this.

As an important leader of the liberation movement, Paine

insisted that their cause itself was a conqueror. He reminded them that Joan of Arc, with a few broken forces, drove back the British armies that had been harassing France, and he asserted "God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction.....who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the calamities of war by every decent method which wisdom could invent." The confident, stirring words rang out through the darkness, and the hearts and spirits of the men rose in response. The darkest hour had changed to rising light, and America had passed successfully her worst crisis.

In 1787, after the Americans had gained their independence, Paine returned to England. In 1789 came the French Revolution, followed by Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*, which represented the reaction of a conservative and aristocractic mind against mobocracy. Paine, an ardent republican and an uncompromising foe of monarchy and aristocracy, hailed the Revolution with eagerness and joy. He set to himself the task of writing a rejoinder to Burke's *Reflections* to "demonstrate the falsity of the political philosophy of monarchical conservatism by an exposition of the American Constitution." Hence came *The Rights of Man*—a plea for democratic republicanism—written in 1791-92.

In *The Rights of Man* Paine attacked Burke's reliance on the past. He repudiated the claim that the Constitution of 1788 was law in England for all time. He summed up relations between past and present in one of his powerful sentences : "If the present generation, or any other, are disposed to be slaves, it does not lessen the rights of the succeeding generation to be free : wrongs cannot have legal descent."

A basic right of man was the right to be judged on his own merits and not on the accident of birth. Paine let loose a heavy barrage against one of his pet peeves—the titled aristocracy. After blasting away at earls, dukes and kings in general, he got around to France in particular : "It is, properly, from..... France that the folly of titles has been abolished. It has outgrown the baby-clothes of count and duke, and breeched itself in manhood."[2] This section of *The Rights of Man*, more than

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2 *Tom Paine : Freedom's Apostle* by Gurko, Leo (Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York, 1957), pp. 122-23.

any other, outraged the authorities in England and caused them to look on Paine as a dangerous man, concerned not only with Colonial independence but with undermining the British system itself.

As for Burke's second argument, the excesses of the Revolution, Paine had some sharp comments on this, too. If brutalities were committed by the people, he said, it was the fault of the Bourbon regime under which they had lived and by which they had been oppressed for centuries. Their masters had taught them no better, another reason for throwing out rulers who had not improved the character of their subjects. And why, asked Paine, did Burke shed so many tears over the possible fate of Marie Antoinette but had none to spare for the millions of wretched Frenchmen suffering under her rule and her husband's? So one-sided a sympathy cast doubt on the fairness of Burke's observations. Moreover, his prophesies on the course the Revolution would take, Paine continued, were so much guesswork, and one man's guess was as good as author's. (In these prophesies, Burke was proven right, Paine wrong.) But even should they all come to pass, Paine concluded, the French were justified in revolting against oppression.

In his earlier association with Burke, Paine had learned of the annual pension of fifteen hundred pounds which the Irish Orator had for some years been secretly receiving from the Crown, and of his ambition to have this pension increased. He therefore looked upon Burke's *Reflections* as dishonest from the start, as corrupted by self-interest and the desire for personal gain, and as a crude attempt to win the favour of the British king. To Paine's usual confident tone was added a note of righteousness that made *The Rights of Man* sound a bit like the Ten Commandments. Paine was never more sure of himself, of the soundness of his ideas, of the world being his oyster, and of the French Revolution as the second instalment of his conviction that all countries will soon be republican. However, it must be admitted that Paine, in spite of his immeasurable popularity in both England and France and his utmost sincerity to the cause of human liberty, had to flee from these countries. The part II of *The Rights of Man*

offended the British government. Prime Minister William Pitt induced the king to issue a royal proclamation against seditious writings. Paine was given a summons to appear in court on June 8th. He was told in the court that his trial for sedition could begin on December 18, 1792. But that day never came. He received an invitation from three districts to sit in the new National Convention in France as their representative. He made plans for a return to France and he actually left England for France before he could be arrested and tried for sedition. It was before December 18.

As such, Paine's radical writings could not appeal at all to the traditional conservatism of the British Government in England. Likewise, his politics, which were against ruthless Jacobin propaganda in spite of all his radicalism and his love for violence were not liked by the Jacobins. Paine was drawn to the side of Girondins in the new National Convention, whose leaders, Lafayette, Mirabeau, Brissot, and for a while Danton, were his personal friends. He was in favour of violence if violence was necessary, but needless violence appalled him, and the ruthless Jacobin propaganda among the brutalized elements of the parisian population seemed to him a dangerous political weapon. It appealed to the passions of man and not to his reason, and the road to the new world, Paine was convinced, lay only through reason. He opposed the Jacobins when they wanted to execute the deposed king, Louis XVI. Paine pleaded that Louis had come to the aid of the American Revolution at critical times, and if he were beheaded, the reaction in America would be very bad. But on January 21, 1793 Louis was led to the guillotine. Paine witnessed this event with growing dread and now, for the first time in life, a small doubt entered his mind. Perhaps men were not altogether reasonable animals and history was not marching strictly according to plan. The events that followed in 1793 confirmed this doubt and shook Paine's confidence in his life mission as violently as his experiences in 1792 had brought his confidence to a high pitch.

With friends and associates being guillotined right and left, Paine retired more and more from public life and worked on his new book, called *The Age of Reason*. Dealing with

religion, it was a book that would arouse a storm of enemies, and give him the mistaken and inaccurate reputation of atheist while he was still alive and for more than a century after his death. He, like other eighteenth-century deists, believed strongly in Creation or Nature. The world of Nature was harmonious and orderly. It had its definite laws. It was beautiful. And all these qualities could be perceived at once by every observer. If Nature existed—and who could doubt that it did—God existed, too, as its Creator.

> "The Creation.....is an ever-existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged ; it cannot be counterfeited ; it cannot be lost ; it cannot be altered ; it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will of man whether it shall be published or not ; it publishes itself from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to all nations and to all worlds."[3]

As a deist, Paine looked upon the organized churches in England and France as the allies of the royalists governments of those countries. He had attacked the governments and it was logical that it should come to examine the religious institutions which supported them. Since these institutions derived their authority from the sanctity of the Scriptures, Paine in due course inspected the claims of this sanctity, and rejected them, not from the point of view of an atheist or even an agnostic, but as a deist who inferred the existence of God from the direct evidence of senses and reason. He further argued that if the church had no valid supernatural claim, it had no right to be an official state religion, and the citizenry ought to be free to embrace it or not as they chose. The ferocious assaults on priests and church during the French Revolution had been preceded by the peaceful constitutional separation of church and state in America. It was the American example that Paine applauded and pointed to as ideal.

The Age of Reason, which was written by Paine in France, started trouble in America. Few things arouse men more than an attack on their religious convictions. He was accused as a blasphemer and anti-Christ. The great reputation, the

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 153-54.

immense store of good will Paine had left behind him in America began to melt under the charges of blasphemy. The popular press used violent language to lampoon him, and printed abusive cartoons showing Paine, his face distorted in a snarl, setting fire to a church. No reputation could long survive such treatment. Paine left America in 1787 as a hero. He was to return in 1802 as something of a villain.

When Paine returned to America in 1802, many sneering and harshly critical articles were published about him in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore newspapers. He was also opposed by the Federalist Party. They described him as a "lying, drunken, brutal infidel", "the loathsome Thomas Paine", "a drunken atheist", "let Jefferson and his blasphemous crony dangle from the same gallows." But President Jefferson was a great friend of him. While Jefferson ignored the criticism, Paine was roused to counter-attack. He was never one for taking things lying down, and even now in his old age, he found the energy to strike back at his vilifiers. He began issuing a series of essays called *Letters to the Citizens of the United States* in which he hacked away at the charges against him, ridiculed the Federalists, and reasserted his own principles. But his energy and fortune sank steadily and he died on June 8, 1809 at the age of seventy-two.

The above story of Tom Paine's life should not make us conclude that he was only a great agitator and an uncompromising enemy of monarchy, nobility and a hereditary government. He also presented from time to time in forceful terms the elementary principles of a constructive political philosophy. Like 18th century philosophers, Paine was also conscious of the distinction between state and society. He said that the state and society were not only different but had different origins, the former being artificial, the latter natural in growth. The opening passage of *Common Sense* is a classic in this respect.

> "Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively, by uniting our affections, the latter negatively,

by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher."[4]

Paine held that "all men are of one degree and consequently that all men are born equal and with equal natural right."[5] The state was held together more by identity of interests than legal coercion. His thinking on this was mostly derived from the philosophy transmitted by Locke. Paine also exhibited the influence of the *laissez-faire* dogma that pervaded his time when he pleaded for restricting the functions of government to a narrow and subsidiary limit. The rights of man, according to him, suggest limitation of government. The creation of law and the administration of law should be, to Paine, the only two functions of government. On the contrary, he magnified the importance of society by saying that society was not only natural but essential because of the diversity of human needs.

In Paine's writings we also find a vivid description of various types of government. To him, a mixed type of government is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Monarchy and aristocracy represent the corrupt form. These governments are, in Paine's opinion, incompatible with the true end of government. Democracy he considered as inadequate to the affairs of an extensive population. Representative government thus is the only logical and adequate system. Paine stood for a republican government built upon universal suffrage and run by representatives elected by the nation. He adopted substantially the doctrine of Rousseau that all legitimate government is republican. "What is called a *republic* is not any *particular form* of government.....It is a word of a good original referring to what ought to be the character and business of government.....Republican government is no other than government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well individually as collectively."[6]

Living in the age of reason, Paine tried to re-interpret the conception of law. Obviously influenced by the idea of law that Rousseau particularly emphasised, Paine took

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4 *Common Sense*, p. 1.
5 *The Rights of Man*, Part I.
6 In *Writings*, Conway's ed., Vol. II, p. 421.

occasion to point out that by no means all the enactments of a legislature are entitled to the name and character of law. "All laws," he remarks, "are acts, but all acts are not laws." Much that has the form of legislation is in fact but business contract agency, negotiation—the normal procedure by which an association of men carries out certain purposes. Distinct from these administrative instructions, laws are only those acts of the assembly that have universal application. This distinction Paine employed in putting forth his own opinion as "to the then troublesome affairs in America of the finances and the paper money."

Lastly it is also significant to note his views on the form and content of the written constitution. Paine held that it was not only essential to limit the authority of the government but that the "exact and detailed definition of its authority must be embodied in a constitution," and from this point of view the English political system is very defective. Written constitutions could alone secure the natural rights and popular liberty from being encroached upon by the government. To Paine, a constitution was not an ideal but a fact. It must be visible. A constitution is antecedent to government; the latter is a creature of the former. It is not the government but the people who make the constitution. And from this point of view England has no constitution.

Paine was very enthusiastic about the American constitution. "The American constitution," he said, "were to liberty what grammar is to language. They define its parts of speech and practically construct them into syntax."[7] He also commended the American constitution for its having a special provision for revision and amendment from time to time. But he did not favour the threefold classification of the powers of government in the American constitution. He perceived and pointed out that there were in fact but two kinds of power, first the making, and second the executing, of laws. In making this position Paine, of course, developed what Montesquieu had casually remarked that "the judiciary is not in its essence distinct from, but is merely one aspect of, the executive power."[8]

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7 *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 336.
8 *Espirit des Lois*, Montesquieu, Chap. VI.

Paine was a great humanitarian like Mahatma Gandhi, who regarded all of humanity as his country and thought of himself as a universal man. When still young, he had enrolled under the banner of freedom and remained its loyal and energetic apostle to his last day. In its name he had helped create one country, the United States, played a large role in the life of another, France, and left his deep mark on still a third, England. Without formal education, without benefit of family connections, he had won in his life-time enduring fame, notoriety and influence. He had stirred the hearts and shaken the minds of his contemporaries as few men did, and carved for himself a permanent place in the annals of history. His faith in reason and the power of reason to solve human problems was one of the great dreams of his time.

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826)

Devoted to his country's cause,
The Rights of Man and equal Laws,
His hallow'd pen was given :
And now those Rights and Laws to save
From sinking to an early grave,
He comes, employ'd by Heav'n.

—*Rembrandt Peale.*

Born on April 13, 1743 at Shadwell, Jefferson was "a typical American of his region and generation.....Living among planters and frontiersmen who knew and controlled their own lives with an easy mastery, he believed in the capacity of the free people of the whole country to see their own interests and pursue them as his own neighbours about him."[1] After his formal schooling, he continued to live in the brilliant colonial capital of Williamsburg for the next nineteen years, as a law student and law-maker. His preceptor in the legal profession was the learned and distinguished George Wythe. Jefferson was admitted to the bar in 1767 and practised his profession brilliantly until the courts were closed at the outbreak of the American Revolution. In 1769 he was elected for his first term as a legislator, and he continued to serve in the Virginia House of Burgesses until that body ceased to function in 1775.

Jefferson, being precluded by his illness from participating in the first Virginia Convention in 1774, attended the second Virginia Convention at Richmond in 1775. He was chosen as a delegate of the Old Dominion to the second Continental Congress in Philadelphia, where he took his seat on June 21, 1775. In 1776 Jefferson won lasting renown as author of the Declaration of Independence. In the fall of that year he left Congress and returned to Virginia, where he entered the House

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1 Woodrow Wilson, "The Spirit of Jefferson", *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, VI (1906), 551 f.

of Delegates. In the Virginia Assembly he pursued his memorable programme of legislative reform, seeking to bring the law of that Commonwealth into conformity with republican principles and to eliminate those features which were supposed to be the vestiges of English monarchical institutions. Jefferson was convinced that "our whole code must be reviewed, adapted to our republican form of government, and, now that we had no negatives of councils, governors and kings to restrain us from doing right, that it should be corrected, in all its parts, with a single eye to reason and the good of those for whose government it was found."[2] Two important measures enacted during his service in the House of Delegates were the laws for abolition of primogeniture and entail. These statutes promoted equal distribution of property, instead of permitting the whole estate of a land-holder to pass intact to his eldest son, and so on for generation after generation. These reforms, along with freedom of religion and diffusion of knowledge, he considered as forming a system by which every fibre would be eradicated of ancient or future aristocracy "and a foundation laid for a government truly republican."[3]

After retiring from the House of Delegates, Jefferson was chosen as the second republican Governor of Virginia on June 1, 1779 (succeeding Patrick Henry in that office). He served two one-year terms as chief executive, after which he had no public office until after his wife's death in 1782. Between 1783 and 1800 he served in America in different capacities and outside America as a plenipotentiary, in conjunction with John Adams and Benjamin Franklin, to negotiate treaties of commerce with European nations and as a minister to the French Court. On March 4, 1801, he was sworn in as third President of the United States. He served two terms, leaving the rustic capital of Washington on March 11, 1809, after the inauguration of his successor, James Madison. Thereafter he lived in retirement in Virginia, holding no public trust except as Rector of the University of Virginia, to the establishment of which Jefferson devoted his later years. During this period he was

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2 Paul L. Ford, ed., *Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson* (N.Y., 1914), pp. 66 f.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

fond of saying that politics was a subject "which.....I.....leave to the generation which it concerns. They are to feel the good and evil of measures, and therefore have the right to direct them."[4] Nevertheless, it was heartening to the aged statesman to learn that his tenets of republicanism were not being abandoned. "It is a comfort to me when I find the sound principles of the Revolution cherished and avowed by the rising generation."[5]

Regarding Jefferson's political writings it may be said that although he remained prominent in political life and advocated democratic theories of government, he produced no systematic treatise containing a statement of his political principles. But these (his principles) may be studied in his *State Papers* and in his voluminous correspondence, which often contain luminous and stirring discussion of current political problems.

Jefferson is the central figure in American history and, if freedom and democracy survive in our generation, he may yet prove to be the central figure in modern history. He was not only one of the Founding Fathers, the source and inspiration of much of American democracy and of American nationalism; he was, too, a world figure. Certainly, no other public man contributed so richly to so many chapters in modern history.

He was, of all the Founding Fathers, indeed of all the men of the eighteenth century, the most contemporary. Both in his public and his private life he addressed himself continuously to problems of permanent and universal interest. What he wrote and what he did—about the nature of society and of government, the relations of man to government, the meaning of republicanism and democracy, the significance of education and of toleration and of experimentation to democracy—is as relevant today as it was in the eighteenth century. It is, notwithstanding profound changes in politics and economy, as relevant for France, Germany and Italy in Europe and for India in Asia as it was for the young United States.

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4 To J. A. Bingham, July 2, 1822. Massachusetts Historical Society, *Jefferson's Papers*. *Cf.* to James Monroe, January 28, 1809. *Works*, XI, 96.

5 To Leonard M. Parker, July 24, 1821. Massachusetts Hist. Society, *Jefferson's Papers*. *Cf.* to John Holmes, April 22, 1820. *Works*, XII, 159.

Nor has any other American revealed himself or illuminated the history of American people more fully in his writings. Even his public writings constitute a record of incomparable importance : imagine American history without the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, the Ordinance of 1784, the Bill for the Diffusion of Knowledge, the Kentucky Resolutions, the First Inaugural Address, the Louisiana Treaty. Jefferson furnished both the soil and the seed from which many of the American national institutions grew. His versatility is by now a familiar, almost a hackneyed, subject. He was a scientist and an inventor ; he was the greatest American architect of his day ; he was a farmer, experimenting endlessly with crops and stock ; he was a man of letters ; he was a bibliophile, collecting not one but two of the greatest private libraries in the country ; he was something of a philologist ; he was a student of the classics—as who was not in that age—and of the Bible, compiling his own for good measure ; he was a lawyer and a collector of law reports.

Whatever he learned, whatever he knew, fitted into and enriched his philosophy. For of all American statesmen, Jefferson was the most philosophical. One abiding purpose runs through his whole life, one pervasive philosophy dominates it. He insisted that man should be free and he was persuaded that, once free, mankind would progress towards happiness and virtue. He was enraptured with the vision of mankind free from political tyranny, from the bondage of superstition and of ignorance, from the sins of the past, from poverty, from war. He had an eighteenth-century faith in the perfectibility of man, but it was not merely a visionary faith ; it was faith rooted in the reality of New world experience.

Jefferson's republican convictions were formed early in his life, upon what was then the Western frontier ; when he was only twenty-two years old they seem to have been crystallized by a speech of Patrick Henry in opposition to the British Stamp Act. From that time on he was a leader in every movement for freedom and independence, usually somewhat in advance of other 'rebels', finding what he said or wrote disapproved of at the time, only to win later assent. He developed with experiences which enlarged responsibilities gave him, but it was

uninterruptedly in one direction. Political expediency may have caused him to deviate on special points, but there are few men in public life whose course has been so straight. Natural sympathies, actual experiences, and intellectual principles united in him to produce a character of singular consistency and charm. He was that rare person in politics, an idealist whose native faith was developed, checked and confirmed by extremely extensive and varied practical experiences.

Although Jefferson's political ideas were greatly influenced by many political thinkers, he gave his own orientation to their concepts, and there was something distinctive, something original, in his political principles. What was new and significant was that all his ideas were set forth in the context of American circumstances which the American mind was prepared to work upon. He was as profoundly convinced of the novelty of the *action* as a practical 'experiment'—a favourite word of his in connection with the institution of self-government —as he was of the orthodox character of the ideas as mere theory.

Jefferson, as a radical democrat, used the language of the time in his assertion of 'natural rights' upon which governments are based and which they must observe if they are to have legitimate authority. What is not clear is that whether the word *moral* can be substituted for the word *natural* whenever Jefferson used the latter in connection with law and rights, not only without changing his meaning but making it clearer to a modern reader. Not only does he say : "I am convinced man has no natural right in opposition to his social duties," and that "man was destined for society," but also that "questions of natural right are triable by their conformity with the moral sense and reason of man."[6] In a letter to de Nemours, Jefferson developed his moral and political philosophy at some length by making a distinction "between the structure of the government and the moral principles" on which its administration is based. It was here that he said, "We of the United States are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats",

6 Jefferson Reader : *A Treasury of Writings about Thomas Jefferson*, ed. by Francis Coleman Rosenberger (E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1953), p. 211.

and then went on to give the statement a moral interpretation. Man is created with a want for society and with the powers to satisfy that want in concurrence with others. When he has procured that satisfaction by instituting a society, the latter is a product which man has a right to regulate "jointly with all those who have concurred in its procurement." "There exists a right independent of force" and "justice is the fundamental law of society." It means that man is social by nature and that his sociable and co-operative nature has given birth to society ; at the same time it signifies that his role in the regulation of society remains significant and equal with his other fellow beings with whom he co-operates in forming it.

Although Jefferson did not clearly propound any social contract theory like Rousseau, he regarded like the latter, his contemporary, the will of the people as the basis of any government. Rather, he was more clear and definite than Rousseau about the role which each individual is to play in the working of government. Like the latter, he did not attempt to substitute the word 'general will' for the 'will of the people'. And by the 'will of the people' he definitely meant the actual will of the people, and not the real or some sort of abstract will of the citizens which Rousseau was struggling with. As a thorough individualist he expressed his opinion : "I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation ; as free to transact their common concerns by any agents they think proper ; to change these agents individually or the organization of them in form or function whenever they please ; that all the acts done by these agents under the authority of the nation are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them and ensure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it."[7]

As such, Jefferson's individualism is not weakened either by the notion of 'general will' of Rousseau, or by the idealism of Thomas Hill Green. Green was an idealist and thought that the freedom of the individual was confined to the realization of self-consciousness. "The good will is free, not the bad

7 "Cabinet Opinion", in *State Papers*, expressed on April 28, 1793.

will." Green believed as did Rousseau, that the quality which characterized a man was 'moral freedom'. Like them, Jefferson did not believe that true freedom was only realizable in the state which was 'objective freedom'. Unlike them, he affirmed clearly that the rightful basis of any government was found in "the will of the nation, substantially declared." The forms and agencies of government may be modified or reorganized by the people at any time or to any extent. In his letter to the Abb'e Arnoux (Paris) on July 19, 1789 he had made his opinion quite clear regarding the role which the people are to play in the actual administration of the government affairs. He wrote: "It is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government as far as they are capable of exercising it, and this is the only way to insure a long continued and honest administration of its powers."

Thus the will of the people as the moral basis of government and the happiness of the people as its controlling aim were so firmly established with Jefferson that it was axiomatic that the only alternative to the republican position was fear, in lieu of trust of the people. Given fear of them, it followed, as by mathematical necessity, not only that they must not be given a large share in the conduct of government, but that they must themselves be controlled by force, moral or physical or both, and by appeal to some special interest served by government—an appeal which, according to Jefferson, inevitably meant the use of means to corrupt people. Jefferson's trust in the people was a faith in what he sometimes called "their common sense and sometimes their reason. They may be fooled and misled for a time, but give them light and in the long run their oscillations this way and that will describe what in effect is a straight course."[8]

In view of Jefferson's above remarks and statements regarding the very basis of the government, it becomes quite clear as what he considered to be the purpose of a rightful government. He proposed to reform the law of Virginia "with a single eye to reason, and the good of those for whose government it was framed." While President of the United

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8 *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

States he declared that "the will of the people.....is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to protect its free expression should be our first object."[9] In counselling students what books from his library they should read, Jefferson said : "I endeavour to keep their attention fixed on the main objects of all science, the freedom and happiness of man. So that, coming to bear a share in the councils and government of their country, they will keep ever in view the sole objects of all legitimate government."[10]

The classical Jeffersonian expression of the purpose of government is, of course, contained in the Declaration of Independence : that all men are created equal, endowed with certain natural rights ; and "that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."[11]

The object of the government is, therefore, the protection of pre-existing God-given rights, which all men enjoy under the law of nature. The mode by which just government is created is consent. The resemblances are obvious between Jefferson's theory and Locke's state of nature, governed by the law of nature, namely, reason, which state is superseded by civil society through the social compact.

It follows from this conception of the nature of government and the method of establishing it that not all of the rights enjoyed by citizens under the "state of nature" before entering into the social contract we surrendered to the government when the contract was formed. Accordingly Jefferson laid stress on constitutional limitations. The powers of government are not unlimited.[12] They extend only as far as provided by the constitution or basic fundamental law establishing the scope of governmental powers. An area of reserved natural rights remains after the government is created. Hence a bill of rights, specifying the boundaries of the area which the government may not invade, is an important feature of every constitution.

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9 To Benjamin Waring, March 23, 1801. *Writings*, X, 236.
10 To Thaddeus Kosciusko, February 26, 1810. *Ibid.*, XII, 369 f.
11 On another occasion Jefferson said that "It is to secure our just rights that we resort to govt. at all." To de'Ivernois, February 6, 1795. *Works*, VIII, 165.
12 *Works*, VIII, 471 (Jefferson's draft of Kentucky Resolutions).

Since "the purposes of every society do not require a surrender of all our rights to our ordinary governors," Jefferson concluded that "a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences." A system of internal checks and balances which shall restrain the government from invading the sphere reserved by the bill of rights becomes an important feature of a well organized government. In view of the disproportionate strength of the government in comparison with the individual citizen, it is imperative that the structure of the government be such as to bring one organ of government into operation automatically as a counter-veiling force whenever another organ threatens to exceed its rightful powers. Therefore, according to Jefferson, "the first principle of a good government is certainly a distribution of its powers into executive, judiciary and legislative, and a sub-division of the latter into two or three branches." "Hence the English constitution, acknowledged to be better than all which have preceded it, is only better in proportion as it has approached nearer to this distribution of powers." It is then easy to show "by a comparison of our constitutions with that of England, how much more perfect they are." Jefferson lamented that Americans "do not sufficiently know the value of our constitutions and how much happier they are rendered by them than any other people on earth by the governments under which they live."[13]

Freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury, habeas-corpus, and a representative legislature were enumerated by Jefferson when specifying what he considered as "the essentials constituting free government."

Included by Jefferson among natural rights were the following : life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness ; expatriation ; self-government ; freedom of religion ; freedom from retroactive legislation ; freedom from imprisonment for debt ; freedom from perpetual obligation ; freedom of communication between constituents and representatives ; commerce with neighbouring nations ; innocent navigation ; the right to labour for a liveli-

13 To John Adams, Sept. 28, 1787. *Works*, V, 349 f.

hood ; self-defence against wrong-doers and aggressors ; coercion against the delinquent party to a compact ; and the right to an impartial judge.

On general principles, Jefferson knew that possession of unusual and irresponsible power corrupts those who wield it ; that officials are, after all, human beings affected by ordinary weaknesses of human nature, "wares from the workshop, made of the same materials." Hence they were continually to be watched, tested and checked, as well as constitutionally limited in their original grant of powers. He firmly stated the principle that "the excellence of every government is its adaptation to the state of those to be governed by it." It was an axiom in his mind that liberty could not be safe but "in the hands of the people themselves, and, too, of the people with a certain degree of instruction."[14] If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be. The functionaries of every government have propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves, nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is safe.

In fact he was no friend of what he called 'sanctimonious reverence' for the constitution. He adhered to the view, expressed in the Declaration of Independence, that people are more disposed to suffer evils than to right them by abolishing forms to which they are accustomed. It was the more important, accordingly, to recognize that "laws and institution must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind" and that institutions must change with change of circumstances brought about by "discoveries, new truths, change of opinions and manners." Were he alive, he would note and scourge that lack of democratic faith which, in the professed name of democracy, asserts that the "ark of the overhauling of the fundamental law was the alternative to change effected only by violence and the repetition of the old historic round" of oppressions, rebellions, reformations....." There was but

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14 Letter to George Washington, Paris, January 4, 1786.

one thing, and that was unchangeable, and that was the "inherent and inalienable rights of man."

What has been said demonstrates also Jefferson's belief that the best form of government is that in which popular participation is assured. For not only is protection of the rights of the people the only legitimate object of government, but the best form of government is that which most effectively affords such protection. Only a republican form of government, where the people themselves participate in political processes, meets this test. Jefferson was convinced that the people themselves were the only safe guardians of their own interests. He noted the evils of hereditary and oppressive governments which provoked the people to rebellion. The remedy for such uprisings, he, insisted, was to correct the grievances suffered by the people, or to inform and educate them if the revolt was caused by a supposed grievance which did not in fact exist. Punishment for resistance to government should not be so severe as to encourage acquiescence by the people in violation of their rights. He believed "that government to be the strongest of which every man feels himself a part." Hence he considered the American republic to be "the strongest government on earth" where every man at the call of the law would "meet invasions of public order as his own personal concern."[15]

No government can continue good but under the control of the people. The people should share not only in the enactment of the laws, but also in their enforcement. This could be accomplished, according to Jefferson, through the jury system, in combination with popular election of the legislative assembly and of the executive magistrate. He regarded a government as republican only to the degree that "every member composing it has equal voice in the direction of its concerns."[16] He declared also that "the republican is the only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind."[17]

With regard to the machinery of government, Jefferson also favoured the principle that all questions should be decided by

15 To Edward Tiffin, Feb. 2, 1807. *Writings*, XI, 147; First Inaugural, *Works*, IX, 196 (*Cf.* p. 43)

16 To Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816. *Writings*, XII. 4.

17 *Ibid.*

those whom they concern. This meant the application of a system of federalism or 'governmental gradation'. Local concerns would be dealt with at the local level. Jefferson favoured the division of counties into 'wards', for the administration of affairs affecting only groups of that size. County, state, national, and international concerns would be handled by progressively wider units in the political hierarchy.

While the first purpose of the division into small local units was the establishment and care of popular elementary schools, the full aim was to make the wards "little republics, with a warden at the head of each, for all those concerns, which being under their eyes, they would better manage than the larger republics of the county or states." They were to have the "care of the poor, roads, police, elections, nomination of jurors, administration of justice in small cases, elementary exercises of militia." In short, they were to exercise directly with respect to their own affairs all the functions of government, civil and military. In addition, when any important wider matter came up for decision, all wards would be called into meetings on the same day, so that the collective sense of the whole people would be produced. Although the plan was not adopted, it formed an essential part of Jefferson's political philosophy. The significance of the doctrine of "states' rights" as he held it is incomplete both theoretically and practically until this plan is taken into consideration. "The elementary republics of the Republic of the Union would form a gradation of authorities." Every man would then share in the administration of affairs not merely on election day but every day. In fact, the heart of his philosophy of politics is found in his effort to institute the small administrative and legislative unit as the keystone of the arch.

"The natural right of self-government"[18] could thus be made applicable all the way from the individual citizen managing his own affairs to a democratic international organization embodying the modern notion of 'world government', a notion implicit in Jefferson's own principle of 'gradation' and not unfamiliar to Jeffersonian political thinkers, such as Richard

18 To John Pleasants, April 19, 1824. *Works*, XII, 353.

Price and Joel Barlow. "Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the right of self-government. They receive it with their being from the hand of nature."[19]

The value of governmental institutions, in Jefferson's view, was measured by their effectiveness as a means of expressing the popular will. As a Secretary of State, he instructed the American minister to France that: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared."[20] And the excellence of every government is its adaptation to the state of those who are governed by it. Likewise, all political institutions, he was of the view, must keep pace with the progress of events and develop as science and enlightenment advance. As such, the policies of a rightful government and the political life of a country should change with the fast-changing needs of the people.

Jefferson was a firm believer in the rights of man, which he regarded as inalienable and unchangeable, because they express the will of the righteous Creator of man embodied in the very structure of society and conscience. He was not an individualist in the sense of the British *laissez-faire* liberal school. He believed that individual human beings receive the right of self-government "with their being from the hand of nature." As an eighteenth-century deist and believer in natural religion, Jefferson connected nature and nature's God inseparably in his thought. He expressed that he had "no fear but that the result of our experiment will be that men may be trusted to govern themselves without a master. Could the contrary of this be proved, I should conclude either that there is no God, or that he is a malevolent being." We have to interpret these words literally and not rhetorically, if we wish to understand Jefferson's democratic faith. The connection of justice or equity with equality of rights and duties was a commonplace of the moral tradition of Christendom. He took the tradition

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19 *Works*, VI, 98. In his *Summary View* Jefferson wrote: "The God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time; the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them." *Works*, II, 39. This sentiment is voiced in the Latin motto: *Ab eo libertas a quo spiritus.*

20 To Gouverneur Morris, November 7, 1792. *Works*, VII, 175. See also *ibid.*, 198, 284 f.

very seriously. His statements about the origin of the Declaration of Independence are confined in what he wrote shortly before his death: "We had no occasion to search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our hearts."

In the hurricane of revolutions which have swept the world since the Great War, men, struggling with the wreckage and poverty of that great catastrophe and the complications of the machine age, have in despair surrendered their freedom for false promises of security and glory. Whether it be Fascism, Nazism, Communism, or their followers, the result is the same. Every day they repudiate every principle of the Bill of Rights. And where they have triumphed the first security of men has been lost. Theirs is a form of servitude, of slavery—a slipping back towards the Middle Ages. Whatever these ideologies are, they have one common denominator—the citizen has no inalienable rights. He is submerged into the state. Here is the most fundamental clash known to mankind—that is, free men and women, co-operating under orderly liberty, as contrasted with human beings made pawn of government, men who are slaves of despotism, as against free men who are the masters of the state. Hence Jefferson was eternally right when he held that liberty comes only and lives only where the hard-won rights of men are held inalienable, where governments themselves may not infringe, where governments are indeed but the mechanisms to protect and sustain these principles.

Jefferson's experience in Europe confirmed his conviction that American conditions were far preferable to those in other countries and should be preserved from contamination by foreign influence and example. In Europe he observed "governments of force" that were governments "of wolves over sheep." The comparison of American political institutions with those of Europe was "like a comparison of heaven and hell. England, like the earth, may be allowed to take the intermediate station." To George Washington he wrote: "I was much an enemy to monarchies before I came to Europe. I am ten thousand times more so, since I have seen what they are." Describing the policy he pursued as President, he

remarked : "Having seen the people of other nations bowed down to the earth under the prodigalities of their rulers, I have cherished their opposites, peace, economy and riddance of public debt, believing that these were the high-roads to public as well as to private prosperity and happiness."[21]

Jefferson regarded "republicanism and Americanism" as synonymous sentiments. The American system was a civilization based upon peace and productivity. Of the European countries he said : "They are nations of eternal war. All their energies are expended in the destruction of the labour, property, and lives of their people. On our part, never had a people so favourable a chance of trying the opposite system, of peace and fraternity with mankind, and the direction of all our means and faculties to the purposes of improvement instead of destruction."[22] He never forgot to declare that "the care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government." And to maintain this spirit of good government for the welfare of the people it is necessary, according to Jefferson, to devise a comprehensive system of public education with a view to enabling the people to participate in every department of the government. Because, he felt, in every government on earth there is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption and degeneracy. Every government degnerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves, therefore, are its only safe depositories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be improved to a certain degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be essentially necessary. An amendment in the constitution must here come in aid of the public education. The influence over government must be shared among all the people. If every individual which composes their mass participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe, because the corrupting of the whole mass will exceed any private resources of wealth, and public ones cannot be provided but by levies on the people. In this case every man would have to pay his own price.

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21 Edward Dumbauld, *Thomas Jefferson : American Tourist*, p. 211 f.
22 To James Monroe, June 11, 1823. *Works*, XII, 292.

On the experimental side, we must note that the triumph of Jefferson's party in the election of 1800 meant that the constitution of 1787 was to be used as a vehicle for popular self-government as an instrument of democracy. That document, viewed simply as a piece of political machinery, could be operated either in the Hamilton manner to a pattern a government on the British monarchy, or in the Jeffersonian fashion as a means of effectuating the ideals of freedom. The nation's polity was fluid and uncertain until Jefferson's presidency. The conservative, anti-democratic sentiment which grew in strength during the period of the Confederation and which was influential at the Philadelphia Convention[23] could have used the constitution as a basis for "administering the government into a monarchy," as the Jeffersonians feared might happen. But with Jefferson's victory at the polls the situation was different. The spirit of the government changed. He infused into the constitution the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. Thereafter, it was no longer merely a piece of ambivalent political machinery but an object of popular reverence, a cherished part of the American way of life.

The essential spirit of Jeffersonian political theory was faith in the people. "I have so much confidence in the good sense of man, and his qualification for self-government, that I am never afraid of the issue where reason is left free to exert her force."[24]

A new civilization, based on "cherishment of the people", Jefferson believed, was destined to arise in America. The doctrine of Europe was that the people was "a great beast" and must be restrained by brute force. The Jeffersonian doctrine was "that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights," and could be trusted to maintain law and order by means of a government of limited powers, responsible to the people, and permitting citizens "to think for themselves, and to follow reason as their guide."[25] The philosophy of

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[23] Edward S. Corroin, "The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention," *American Historical Review*, XXX (April, 1925), pp. 511-36.

[24] To Count Deodati, August 3, 1789. Massachusetts Historical Society, *Jefferson Papers*.

[25] William Johnson, June 12, 1823. *Writings*, XV, 442.

human brotherhood and enlightenment for which Jefferson stood (as did Gandhi in India), the confident faith that America was a virgin land of hope and opportunity, became the dominant and distinctive national tradition. Since then Americans are essentially life-affirmers rather than life-deniers ; "they believe in tomorrow."[26]

[26] Van Wyck Brooks : *The Confident Years* (Boston, 1952), pp. 582, 584 ff.

3

Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862)

Thoreau was the son of a local pencil-maker in Concord. He studied at Harvard and could occupy a room in the Emerson house. He flitted through the woods at nightfall. A Yankee non-conformist, a philosophic rebel, and a master of lean, incisive prose, Henry David Thoreau is today one of the most influential of all American writers. More eloquently than any other he exhorted the individual to uphold his natural dignity and integrity in the face of the institutions, conventions and beliefs that sought to enslave him. His friendship with Emerson, his solitary sojourn at Walden Pond, his fight for John Brown and the Abolitionists—these were the highlights of a quiet, uneventful life in Concord, Mass., a life dedicated to living, as he himself said, close to the bone and to the rigorous observation of nature. In *Civil Disobedience* (1864), he tells why he went to jail rather than pay a tax to a government which condoned human slavery. A favourite essay both of Tolstoi and Gandhi, it is perhaps the most effective statement that has ever been made against government as coercion and for the right of the individual to obey the dictates of his conscience rather than the dictates of the state.

As an extreme individualist and a believer in personal judgement, Thoreau did not approve of the experiment of Brook farm. He said, "I had rather keep bachelor's Hall in Hell than go to board in Heaven." He did not like at all the policy of advising and reforming others. He wished every individual use his own conscience in deciding the rightness or wrongness of every question. He was not an idealist and, as such, he did not conform to any code of morality. Nor did he like others to do the same thing. He agreed with Socrates that the conception of right should be subjected to the scrutiny of individual reason. But unlike the latter, he disliked the role of a reformer. Though he had no sympathy with reformers, yet

it is quite strange to note that he found a hero in John Brown, the slavery Abolitionist.

By nature Thoreau was a rebel and disparaged any sort of prescriptive authority. He was in favour of ignoring the state completely. That is why he refused to pay taxes to the state, although others paid them on his behalf. He heartily accepted the motto—"That government is best which governs the least," and liked to see it "acted up to more rapidly and systematically." This amounts to this, according to Thoreau : "That government is best which governs not at all."[1] And when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. He was of the view that government is at best but an expedient ; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. William Penn had also remarked thus : "Men must either be governed by God or they must be ruled by tyrants."

Thoreau was also sceptical of a majority rule which serves as the bedrock of modern democracy. When the power, he argued, is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases can't be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience, or in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable ? "Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the

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1 *Civil Disobedience* by Thoreau in "Political Philosophers" (Carlton House, New York, 1947).

legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right."[2]

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgement or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs.

Thoreau discussed the question of voting in a democracy and remarked that all voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. He said: "The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting *for the right is doing* nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote."[3] In fact, it is not a man's duty to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage

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2 *Ibid.*
3 *Ibid.*, pp. 302-03.

him ; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If one devotes oneself to other pursuits and contemplations, one must first see, at least, that he does not pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders.

The question arises as to how a man can be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy it. Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved ? If a man is cheated out of a single dollar by his neighbour, he does not rest satisfied with knowing that he is cheated, or with saying that he is cheated, or even with petitioning him (his neighbour) to pay him his due ; but he takes effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount and see that he is never cheated again. Action from principle, the perception and the performance of right, Thoreau argued, changes things and relations ; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divides states and churches, it divides families ; it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.

Thoreau had no faith in the existing laws. He called them unjust laws which strangle man's freedom. He questioned their propriety and asked : "Shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavour to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once ?" And his answer was that "men generally think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil." But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform ? Why does it not cherish its wise minority ? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt ? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it would have them ? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels ? This means that every government is based on injustice. And the remedy is, according to Thoreau, to break the law. If the injustice, he stated, is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let

it go. Certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps we may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil. But if it is of such a nature that it requires us to be the agent of injustice to others, then the only remedy for us is that we must break the law. Let our life be a counter-friction to stop the machine.

Advising the Abolitionists Thoreau said that those who called themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts and not wait till they constituted a majority of one, before they suffered the right to prevail through them. He thought that it was enough if they had God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbours principally constitutes, he argued, a majority of one already. Condemning the government of Massachussets on the question of slavery, which he regarded as a blot on the humanity, he remarked: "I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name,—if ten *honest* men only,—ay, if *one* HONEST man, in this state of Massachussets, *ceasing to hold slaves*, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done for ever."[4] He further remarked that "under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the state by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles."[5] Thoreau considered prison as the only house in a slave state in which a free man can abide with honour. And if any thinks that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the state, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not

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4 *Civil Disobedience*: "Political Philosophers", p. 307.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 308.

understand by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. A minority is powerless, he held much like Mahatma Gandhi in India, while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the state will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the state to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This he described as a peaceable revolution. "If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, 'But what shall I do?' my answer is, 'If you really wish to do anything, resign your office.' When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of bloodshed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man's real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now."

Thoreau himself refused to pay poll-tax for nearly six years, and for that he was put into a jail and physically tortured. But he did not acquiesce in the policy of the government and remained undaunted in his challenge against it. He bravely smiled at the weakness of the government. He saw that the government was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and he lost all his remaining respect for it, and pitied it.

Thus, according to him, the state never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. And whatever its physical force may be, it cannot fatally interrupt a man, if he is thought-free, fancy-free and imagination-free. But he remarked that "most people think differently from myself; and those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects content me as little as any." Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and

nakedly behold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are habitual to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Thoreau became so disgusted with the then American legislators and politicians that he expressed angrily his views against the American government. He said: "No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the much-vexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free-trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufactures and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations."

Thoreau, like many individualists, asserted that the authority of government is an impure one, but it must have the sanction and consent of the governed in order to be strictly just. It can have no pure right over a person and property but what he concedes to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress towards a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Thoreau questioned pertinently: "Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man?" And he answered like Gandhi and Jefferson that there would never be a really free and enlightened state until the state came to recognize the individual as a higher and independent

power, from which all its own power and authority were derived, and treated him accordingly. "I please myself with imagining a state at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbour ; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbours and fellowmen. A state which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious state, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen."[6]

Thoreau's practical experiences of the repressive policies of his country's government made him almost a rebel against the authoritarian rule of any government. With a view to redeeming the individual from the evil influences of the government he, as an extreme individualist and anarchist, recognized the necessity of right of revolution. According to him, all men recognize the right of revolution ; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions, in his chapter on the "Duty of Submission to Civil Government," resolved all civil obligation into expediency ; and he proceeded to say, "That so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God that the established government be obeyed and no longer..... This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other." Of this, he said, every man shall judge for himself. But Paley, in Thoreau's view, appeared never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expediency did not apply, in which a people, as well as an individual, should do justice. He cited an example and remarked : "If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 320.

myself." This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But Thoreau was courageous enough to declare that "he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people." He thus advised the individual to obey the dictates of his conscience and determine the value of every question rather than to submit to the desires of the state. In his views it was not desirable to cultivate respect for law, so much as for the right.

But in spite of all his anger against the prescriptive authority and evils of government, Thoreau, unlike Schmidt, Bakunin, Prince Kropotkin and other revolutionary anarchists, was not a mortal enemy of the state and its organizations, and as such, he did not believe like Leo Tolstoi in a theory of violent revolution. He asked for a better government which educates masses, promotes free trade and industry (but not capitalism and class distinctions) and over and above, which keeps the country free. But it, in no case, should coerce the individual. A good government according to him, is always based on the consent of the individuals and, as a principle, allows its subjects to follow their own conscience. He was an enemy of such a state as would tax its subjects heavily, take and waste all their property, harass them and their children without any gain and make impossible for them to live honestly and comfortably, in outward respects. He fully agreed with Confucious when the latter said that "if a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame ; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honours are the subjects of shame."[7] Thoreau classified his views regarding the grounds on which an individual can obey and disobey the state in the following words :

"Until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and

[7] Quoted from *Political Philosophers* (Carlton House, N.Y., U.S.A., 1947), p. 310.

life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the state than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worthless in that case."[8]

Finally, Thoreau, following in the footsteps of Rousseau, Tolstoi and Gandhi, stood for a simple life. He was averse to a complicated life. According to him, "This world is a place of business, there is no Sabbath." He further remarked: "Not the less does nature continue to fill the ear of youth with suggestions of this enthusiasm, and they are new men—if indeed I can speak in the plural number—more exactly, I will say I have just been conversing with one man, to whom no weight of adverse experience will make it for a moment appear impossible, that thousands of human beings might exercise towards each other the grandest and simplest sentiments as well as a knot of friends, or a pair of lovers." He firmly believed in the dignity of human labour and tried to give a moral tinge to almost all human efforts and aspirations. He was a great friend of the individual and looked with an utmost interest for all-round development of his personality.

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8 *Ibid.*

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John Dewey (1859-1952)

John Dewey, the third of four sons of a middle class couple, was born on October 20, 1859 in Burlington, Vermont. It was the year of the publication of *The Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin, by whom Dewey was later to be much influenced in his philosophic thinking. This child of rural Vermont was to become in this country the voice of scientific method, of disciplined inquiry as the chief agency and instrument of freedom in the complex industrial society of our time.

To describe Dewey as a maker of twentieth-century America, or a remaker of it, implies, of course, certain general assumptions as to the influences of ideas on history. It might be said that, if Dewey is recognized as a peculiarly American philosopher, it is because he caught the voice, accent and temper of the American tradition and the nature of the special contingencies and choices before it in his own era. He did not, it may be argued, make the tradition, or, for that matter, remake it. The expanding forces of technology, the intervolvement of public and private affairs, the rising tides of the labour movement, the revolt against authoritarianism in religion and in education—all of these play a large part in and colour his social philosophy—were, it may be argued, themes he translated into general terms of philosophical analysis; they were not consequences of his published ideas.

It is John Dewey himself, incidentally, who in his central work, *Democracy and Education*, assures us that philosophical differences matter only where they make a difference in educational practice. On that basis alone, again for better or worse, John Dewey's philosophy has had phenomenal influence on America, for everything that is associated with the transformation of education from mere passive learning of the three Rs to education as shared living, everything that is associated with the modern trend in education, the emphasis on education

as social and as an experience of shared life, is directly or obliquely the consequence of Dewey's ideas. Moreover, to Dewey's inspiration may be credited the whole tendency of modern legal thinking to turn from abstract principles to the estimation of law in terms of the consequences of law on human lives. And, latterly, the more surprising in the light of the fact that Dewey is so often labelled as a pragmatist and instrumentalist is his influence on aesthetics and criticism, which he has done much to take out of the hands of the formalists and semantic and scholastic pedants and reclaim for the exploratory imagination.

Dewey all his life retained something of the simplicity of the nineteenth-century world of individuality and of fair play, of first-hand respect for first-hand experience that was characteristic of the nineteenth-century Vermonters among whom he grew up. For all his recognition of the complex changes science and industry and international commerce were making in the twentieth century, he retained a paramount sense of the individual, and the private dignity of the individual, that had been the themes of Thoreau and Emerson in the nineteenth-century. He had the slowness of speech and the sharpness of perception of the weathered Vermonter. Nearly all his life he spent in the Universities ; yet he early had become aware that schools are a function of society, and he spent not a small part of his own life becoming acquainted with that society outside of schools, in adult education, in labour movements, in what was happening in science and government and industry, among plain people and artists.

Gradually Dewey's fame became world-wide. He was invited to China, where he spent two years following World War I teaching at the University of Peking, and at the Imperial University of Tokyo, where he delivered a series of lectures of which his book entitled *Reconstruction in Philosophy* was a consequence. He also visited Russia, with which, long before a great many other liberals, he became drastically disillusioned. In France a generation ago Dewey's philosophical rather than his educational works were very widely known. But he remained to the end of his life, in his ninety-second year, characterized by both a shrewd simplicity and an acute awareness of the

complicated new problems of men and women in the twentieth century. He always "saw around" the academy and felt that philosophy had its obligations to that society in which it emerged and which it expressed, and which it could help intelligently to transform itself, to grow and change in the light of disciplined guiding hypotheses, of which for him philosophy essentially consisted.

Dewey's trips abroad played a decisive part in the evolution of his social and political ideas. He discussed the state and its functions as a pragmatist in his *The Public and Its Problems* (1927). The state can be approached with as little respect for abstractions as greeted Society and the Individual. Of course, once we pronounce that magic phrase, The State, the temptation is to add immediately, "Loud cheers." For it seems to be indeed a thing, an entity, a metaphysical essence; at the very least, a causal agency having power to produce action. Now, when we begin looking in this direction, almost anything may turn up, and so the state has come to mean the whole series of hypostatizations that parade regally through the history of political philosophy. It ranges from the Hegelian capstone of the universal processes to a wicked ogre which is waiting only to be pushed over. But we have been looking in the wrong place for the state. It is not to be discovered in the land of essences or forms. But if the method Dewey proposed is to be followed, the state must be sought in actual happenings and consequences. It was nothing short of a pragmatic method.

Dewey found the state in the need for regulation of activities. As a pragmatist he stated: "The state is the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members."[1] Viewed from this point of view, the states come into existence as they are required; they grow and develop as they face new and more complicated problems. They are the consequences of specific needs. There is nothing here of some prepotent force which by fiat or nisus generates a mystical state. Neither is there any trick with changeless, permanent states. States--according to this hypo-

[1] *The Public and Its Problems* by John Dewey, p. 33.

thesis—are no more all-embracing than they are insignificant. They result from the projection of important consequences beyond the direct concern of persons and groups, consequences which require the establishment of special agencies. Therefore, as Dewey said, the formation of states becomes a series of experiments. Publics differ ; their needs and demands change. It is no more than reasonable to expect states to be flexible. By their very origin and nature they require constant scrutiny, revision, amendment. It is thus futile to talk about the 'best state' in terms of some pious hope which waits at the end of a rainbow. Yet it is equally futile to rely simply upon improvisation. Instead, the *Specific* search for the nature of the state directs its attention to problems that are real and soluble, it does not worry itself overmuch with the conceptual status or abstract justification of political activity. For example, included in this kind of an approach would be a deliberate accounting of the actual characteristics which states do possess, a type of inquiry which would be completely out of order were our attention fixed upon the traits which metaphysical states *ought* to have.[2]

Since the state is a functioning arm of public activity instead of some mystical power worthy of worship, it can be experimented with. In fact, as has already been emphasised, we should more correctly talk about *states* instead of *the State*. States are plural. They can be manipulated and directed. It is comic to set up some totalitarian political idol which is changeless, untouchable, and awe-provoking. It is scarcely less arbitrary to decide in advance upon the degree of state activity. As far as anything that can be called a qualitative character of the state is concerned, it must be regarded as neutral in predetermining the extension of powers. States expand when the indirect and far-reaching consequences of private action expand. They contract when intimate, face-to-face relations dominate.

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[2] These characteristics are worked out in Chapter II of *The Public and Its Problems*. They include such traits as localization of the state somewhere between associations which are narrow and intimate, and those which are remote and disconnected ; concern of the state peculiarly with long-time interests which are channelized and standardized by means of law ; functions of the state in dealing with irreparable conditions, e.g., those of inferiority of age or capacity ; and the like.

It goes without saying that the indirect and far-reaching consequences have expanded prodigiously since the industrial revolution ; the inference as to the powers of the state must be obvious. Yet to label the state collectivistic or total in its essence is as prejudicial to the understanding of political function as following back upon *laissez-faire* or limited police powers.

However, the word 'neutral' must not be misunderstood. Too often pragmatism, of whatever sort, has been decried as blind expediency or as resigned acceptance of whatever happens to be 'working' at the moment. Ludicrously enough, it finds itself accused of being responsible at the same time for both the fumbling and pointless efforts of liberalism, and the ostensible efficiency of fascism. But neutral does not mean indifferent. It does not mean refusal to allow concepts and symbols which have been obviously weighted one way or the other to determine antecedently what kind of state must be supported by political philosophy. Instead, the purpose of political philosophy is precisely "the creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that man may learn from their errors and profit by their successes."[3]

"It seems unnecessary to add that the political set-up for such experimentation requires a democratic state. This mention of the democratic state will not be a stimulus for discussing historical or political democracy.[4] That would involve material which is both too familiar and too tricky ; besides, it would not be exactly the point in question. For the connotations of Dewey here are those of method.

"The prime condition of a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not yet exist. In its absence, it would be the height of absurdity to try to tell what it would be like if it existed. But some of the conditions which must be fulfilled if it is to exist can be indicated.....An obvious requirement is freedom of social inquiry and of distribution of its conclusions."[5]

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3 *Op. cit.*, 34.
4 *Ibid.*, Chaps. III & V.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 160.

Democracy as a personal, an individual, way of life involves nothing fundamentally new. But when applied it puts a new practical meaning in old ideas. Put into effect it signifies that powerful present enemies of democracy can be successfully met only by the creation of personal attitudes in individual human beings ; that we must get over our tendency to think that its defence can be found in any external means whatever, whether military or civil, if they are separated from individual attitudes so deep-seated as to constitute personal character.

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed. That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, colour, sex, birth, and family, of material or cultural wealth. This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper unless it is put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents and relations of daily life. The foundation of democracy, according to Dewey, is faith in the capacities of human nature ; faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and co-operative experience. It is not belief that these things are complete but that, if given a show, they will grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action. He remarked that "the key-note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together : which is necessary from the stand-point of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals."[6] Dewey firmly maintained that mankind was ever subject to passion, dogma, self-interest, partisanship and propaganda. But these causes have lost "whatever frank, stout downrightness they once possessed.....They find entrance into the mind invested with a protective sheen of loyalty, sanity and security, progress, or whatever ideals are in fashion."[7] And a society of free indivi-

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6 *Problems of Men*, New York : The Philosophical Library, 1946, p. 58.
7 *Education Today*, New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940, p. 185.

duals in which all, through their own work, contribute to the liberation and enrichment of the lives of others, is the only environment in which any individual can really grow normally to his full stature. To profess democracy as an ultimate ideal and the suppression of democracy as a means to the ideal may be possible in a country that has never known even rudimentary democracy, but when professed in a country that has anything of a genuine democratic spirit in its traditions, it signifies desire for possession and retention of power by a class, whether that class be called Fascist or Proletarian. Dewey was not happy with a state which tries to curtail reasonable freedom, although he never supported the idea of freedom as a license to do whatever one likes without being considerate to others. He firmly asserted that our state is founded on freedom, but when we train the state of tomorrow, we allow it just as little freedom as possible He remarked : "No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take account of the needs. The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses."[8] Dewey strongly believed in human equality and denounced those persons who condemned Nazism for intolerance, cruelty and stimulation of hatred while their own actions were moved by racial, colour, or other class prejudice. The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment ; has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has. The democratic belief, according to John Dewey, in the principle of leadership is a generous one. It is belief in the capacity of every person to lead his own life free from coercion and imposition by others provided right conditions are supplied.

As such, democracy is a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgement and action if proper conditions are furnished. Dewey stated :

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8 *The Public and Its Problems*, New York : Henry Holt & Co , 1927, p. 208.

"I have been accused more than once and from opposed quarters of an undue, a utopian, faith in the possibilities of intelligence and in education as a correlate of intelligence. At all events, I did not invent this faith. I acquired it from my surroundings as far as those surroundings were animated by the democratic spirit. For what is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long run is self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man to respond with common sense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured by effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly, and free communication ? I am willing to leave to upholders of totalitarian states of the right and the left the view that faith in the capacities of intelligence is utopian. For the faith is so deeply embeded in the methods which are intrinsic to democracy that when a professed democrat denies the faith he convicts himself of treachery to his profession."[9]

The final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbours on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another. Intolerance, abuse, calling of names because of differences of opinion about religion or politics or business, as well as because of differences of race, colour, wealth, or degree of culture, are treason to the democratic way of life. For everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up barriers that divide human beings into sets and cliques, into antagonistic sects and factions, and thereby undermines the democratic way of life. Merely legal guarantees of civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These things, really speaking, destroy the essential condition of the democratic way of living even more effectually than open

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[9] Quoted from the speech of Dewey given in *John Dewey* by Irwin Edman (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., New York, 1955), pp. 311-12.

coercion, which—as the example of totalitarian states proves—is effective only when it succeeds in breeding hate, suspicion, intolerance in the minds of human beings.

Given the two conditions just mentioned, democracy as a way of life is controlled by personal day-by-day working together with others. Democracy is the belief that even when needs and ends or consequences are different for each individual, the habit of amicable co-operation—which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competition—is itself a priceless addition to life. To take as far as possible every conflict which arises—and they are bound to arise—out of the atmosphere and medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement, into that of discussion and of intelligence, is to treat those who disagree—even profoundly—with us as those from whom we may learn, and in so far, as friends. A genuinely democratic faith in peace is the possibility of conducting disputes, controversies, and conflicts as co-operative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of having one party conquer by forceful suppression of the other—a suppression which is none the less one of violence when it takes place by psychological means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation, instead of by overt imprisonment or in concentration camps. To co-operate by giving differences a chance to show themselves because "of the belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of enriching one's own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic personal way of life."[10] Dewey while elaborating his stand-point regarding the functioning of democracy said that "to get rid of the habit of thinking of democracy as something institutional and external and to acquire the habit of treating it as a way of personal life is to realize that democracy is a moral ideal and so far as it becomes a fact is a moral fact. It is to realize that democracy is a reality only as it is indeed a commonplace of living."[11]

Thus, democracy as compared with other ways of life is, according to Dewey, the sole way of living which believes

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[11] *The Philosopher of the Common Man.* New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. (Refer address of John Dewey in it).

wholeheartedly in the process of experience as end and as means ; as that which is capable of generating the science which is the sole dependable authority for the direction of further experience and which releases emotions, needs and desires so as to call into being the things that have not existed in the past. For every way of life that fails in its demoracy limits the contacts, the exchanges, the communications, the interactions by which experience is steadied while it is also enlarged and enriched. The task of this release and enrichment is one that has to be carried on day by day. Since it is one that can have no end till experience itself comes to an end, the task of democracy is for ever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute. Political or economic democracy is thus the setting for experimental method in social thinking. That alone is sufficient reason for cherishing it. Given that, and all the implications about democracy making possible the realization of individuality amid social co-operation will follow. Granted that, liberalism will then assume a new and richer significance.

Perhaps no better illustration of the appropriateness of Dewey's criticism of current social and political philosophy can be found than the welter of discussion which has been rolling around the concepts of democracy and liberalism in these tragic years. It is not polite to say, "I told you so," but of any political philosopher Dewey should be granted that arid comfort. Democracy and liberalism have been so typically simple words, abstractions, functioning to inhibit investigation instead of encouraging it. They are battle-cries and shibboleths. They should be working hypotheses.

The historical fate of the liberal movement 'exemplifies the bankruptcy of political concepts. This is a very trite observation and is the theme for too many current books. But Dewey has particularly addressed himself to this problem,[12] and has undertaken so complete a reformulation of neo-liberalism—and one that anticipated by a matter of years the rather febrile

[12] See particularly his *Individualism—Old and New* (1930) ; and *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935).

exhortations of so many writers today—that at least a mention of the liberal movement is necessary.

Truly liberal programmes of any period must have, was Dewey's insistence, a similarity of purpose—a commitment to the principle that the mass of individuals should possess actual, not merely legal, liberty. Clearly, this 'liberty' does not mean being let alone : it does mean that the individual be given full opportunity to develop the potentialities and talents that alone make him an individual. But that purpose will remain empty, and indeed as abstract as any platform that has only nobility to recommend it, unless it be elaborated with great particularity. Especially must anyone who claims the name of liberal be prepared to specify. Dewey's complaint arose at this point, for the liberal is so often found either to fall back upon the most vague and vicious abstractionism dealing with individualism, *laissez-faire*, free competition, and the rest ; or to give his programme content in terms of the historical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the liberalism, that is, of the commercial, the pre-industrial, revolution. (Possibly the latter alternative is less harmful, since at least it is particularized by way of Adam Smith and the Manchester School).

Dewey's whole approach was introduced by his attack upon both of these brands of 'latter-day' liberalism. His plea was that liberalism should become again the truly radical, the subversive, reform that once upon a time evoked energies directed to fundamental social change. To accomplish this it must undergo basic readjustment. Its principle of providing a soil for the complete growth of personality must be so adopted to economic and political life that direction and relevance can be achieved. And that requires recognition of the power of organized society, which alone can insure the conditions in which individuals may function fully. Here is where Dewey broke cleanly with *laissez-faire* or individualistic liberalism—although that break was anticipated long since by liberals like Hobhouse and even John Stuart Mill in the closing years of his life when he changed his views so radically. Individualistic liberalism is bankrupt because it refuses to accept the corporate civilization which has made so many of its

premises unreal and downright ghostly. It refuses to accept the need for co-operative control and organized social planning.

The study of particular social needs and the construction of special social machinery, the planned social employment of the resources of scientific knowledge and of the forces of production—these cannot be carried through by the un-co-ordinated acts of individuals, and they must not be stopped by platitudes of an older liberalism which is anarchy of natural laws and personal liberty. Traditional liberalism has lagged far behind the shattering consequences of the industrial revolution, just as the folklore of capitalism has lagged behind the transformation of a scarcity into an abundance economy. Both have been insufficiently impressed by the realization that economic insecurity is now institutional and not 'natural', just as both have failed to appreciate that 'socialism' must come—if it is not here already. Whether the socialistic, the corporate, state be public or capitalistic—that is the specific problem that must be met. But liberalism can never meet it by closing its eyes and wishing for the salad days.

Why then was Dewey a liberal instead of a socialist—if these labels really are of interest to anyone ? Perhaps for the same reason that men like Max Lerner prefer the phrase 'democratic collectivism'. Socialism and communism are terms which are indissolubly connected with the name of Marx. Now, there is much in Marxism of which Dewey not only approved, but which, in real sense, he had actually helped put into operation. That is, the economic interpretation of history had been used by Dewey himself to explain many sections of the history of philosophy ; and, in addition through the work of his followers and students in political philosophy, history and law—the work of Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, Pound and Cardozo—the actual rewriting of much of American history and jurisprudence in terms of an economic appraisal of institutions has followed. Neither did Dewey quarrel with Marx over the very questionable intelligence and effectiveness of the capitalistic state, or over the values of a socialized society. Nor did the quarrel lie in any suspicion of the proletariate. "The world has suffered more from leaders and

authorities than from the masses."[13] Dewey was definitely suspicious of an elite class, even of experts whose investigations he cherished. Experts can discover and make known the facts, but it is only as an embodied intelligence raises the entire level of a society that fundamental social change has relevance.

Dewey's refusal to follow the philosophy of Marx was, as might easily be expected, the refusal to accept metaphysical explanation for social and political problems. The Marxian dialectic, the class struggle, the labour theory of value—these are as abstract and, for Dewey, as essentially meaningless as any of the Hegelianisms or economic classicisms from which they derive. There is no cosmic reason why capitalism must give rise to communism via socialism, why collectivism must be achieved by means of a revolutionary technique, why surplus value must arise, why any abstract sequence must appear. Marxism is as much "a logic of general notions" as the individualistic liberalism it despises. Both rely on a metaphysic of general principles. What does happen, what can happen—these are realistic and instrumental problems; not what must happen. Once a philosophic concept is made supreme, then all apparent exceptions must be explained away. And despite its violent attacks upon traditional idealism and rationalism, that is just what Marxism proposes to do.[14] It seems to operate at the same old stand: witness the feverish explanations of why fascism has arisen, why the proletariat seems so weak, why communism began in Russia instead of in Germany where it should have begun. Intelligence cannot deal with inevitables. For example, Dewey could not accept violence as an inevitable process in social change. Neither could he accept the inevitability of war or fascism or communism. This does not mean that fundamental reforms can come about painlessly. There is nothing mealy-mouthed or tepid in Dewey's challenges. But it is the *inevitability* of violence—as of anything else—

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[13] *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 208.

[14] There have been "pragmatic" interpretations of Marx by a number of Dewey's own students—Sidney Hook's work being the most brilliant; but apparently Dewey had failed to be convinced, just as Hook himself is unconvinced, that Marxist communism has been achieved in the Soviet Union (although Earl Browder—who certainly would yield to none in his Marxism—would hardly agree).

that precludes the use of reflective methods. It is only when things are not final and once-for-all that thinking can function. Indeed, as with William James, Dewey was ever captured by the creationism of conscious intelligence : it can literally make and remake worlds. That is possible only when worlds—cosmic or soical—are not yet completely made.

Thus, this approach to socialism and communism is one more example of Dewey's reliance upon techniques instead of concepts. It is perhaps the reason why he did cling to the name of liberal, for liberalism still connotes "the mediation of social transition." This does not necessarily imply that liberalism is to provide a cushion for a shifting order ; it is rather that the liberal philosophy seems elastic and tentative enough to supply the means to effect such transitions. It permits, indeed demands, an experimental method (which Dewey was very much fond of) In fact, Dewey's thinking is so adjusted to the dimensions of the present and the future that dated questions are at all in order. It would, of course, be too easy to remark that the distorted picture society presents to us is a result of the failure to accept experimentalism. George Raymond Geiger is right when he remarks in his essay *Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy* that "it would be more hopeful to suggest that when men are finally ready to apply the recognized techniques of inquiry to the solution of social riddles, the thought of John Dewey will be there, waiting to give them inspiration and guidance."[15]

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