POPULAR ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY
Prof. M. HIRIYANNA

KAVYALAYA PUBLISHERS
MYSORE

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By M. Hiriyanna

THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION

ART EXPERIENCE

PROF. M. HIRIYANNA

(1871–1950)

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IN
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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

We have very great pleasure in offering to the public this collection of Essays in Indian Philosophy by the late revered Prof. M. Hiriyanna of Mysore. This has been possible through the great kindness and unfailing courtesy of his daughter and near relations who have spared no pains in making available to us all papers and necessary references. Our grateful thanks are due to them in the fullest measure.

Prof. Hiriyanna contributed a large number of papers relating to Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit Literature to various journals and other publications. The present volume is but a selection from among them, except for the two studies on *Māyā* and the essay on *Indian Philosophy* which are being published now, for the first time. This last essay was contributed to the *Tamil Encyclopaedia* where it will appear rendered into Tamil. The shorter essay on *Māyā* was written in 1943, for a 'Sri Sankara Jayanti Memorial Volume' which unfortunately was not published. The longer essay seems to have been written much earlier; but no clue as to its date could be traced. *The Training of the Vedāntin* appeared also as a pamphlet issued by 'Sri Sankara Jayanti Sabha' of Bangalore with translations of the quoted Sanskrit passages added to it. Sri D. V. Gundappa who drew our attention to this fact, also kindly lent us his own copy of the pamphlet. The address *The Value of Sanskrit Learning and Culture* of which extracts alone had been published, here appears in its complete form. Certain objections raised against the essay on *Six points of View* and Prof. Hiriyanna's rejoinder may be read in the *Aryan Path* for September 1950.

We have, in reprinting these essays, made use of the corrections and to a certain extent, the marginal notes made by the author in his own copies. Nevertheless we wish to state that we are responsible for any shortcomings in this publication.

Our thanks are due to Sri N. Sivarama Sastry, Asst. Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Mysore, who has given us much editorial help; to Sri R. K. Narayan, the well-known author, who has taken a kindly interest in the publication of these essays; and to the authorities of the Wesley Press and Publishing House who have executed the work neatly and promptly.

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The late Prof. Hiriyanna's daughter desires to express her grateful thanks to the Editors of the various journals and other publications in which these essays made their first appearance.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Pr. Up.—Praśnopaniṣad.
BG.—Bhagavadgītā.
Bṛ. Up.—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Br. Sūtras—Brahmasūtras.

ERRATA

Page 64 footnote	*Read* the stanza as follows: Vāgdhenur dugdha ekaṁ hi rasaṁ yad bāla-tṛṣṇayā | Tena nāsya samaḥ sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ ||
Page 64 footnote	*Read* Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.
Page 84 line 32	*Read* 'makes us all *pashas*'.
Page 88 footnote	*Read* the quotation as follows: Ajñātaṁ Brahma viṣayaḥ; jñātaṁ Brahma prayojanam.

POPULAR ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

THE TRAINING OF THE VEDĀNTIN[1]

INTRODUCTORY

Neither the occasion which has brought us together nor the place in which we have met can fail to inspire us with the most solemn thoughts. We are here in connection with the celebration of the birthday anniversary of one whose name stands among the greatest known to history and whose message of *virakti* and *jñāna* possesses a permanent value to the human race. This message, Śaṁkara based upon the Upaniṣads whose ancient faith he restored to its original purity. The decadence of Buddhism, which had begun long before his time, had afforded an opportunity for reviving Hinduism, but the revival had resulted in a number of divergent creeds all claiming to be orthodox, but none preserving the essential traditions of the past. To have successfully overthrown these various opposing creeds in the brief space of thirty-two years signifies not merely extraordinary intellectual power, but also intense practical energy. At the same time it indicates what bitterness of feeling he must have created in those whose vested interests he affected by his bold innovations. Śaṁkara paid the penalty for the rapidity with which he revolutionised the religious thought of the land; for he was accused of heresy and was excommunicated by his own kinsmen that were too blind to see his greatness. But undaunted by reverses, Śaṁkara went on bravely with his work and stormed through the country, —refuting this doctrine and vanquishing that sect,—a spiritual Napolean in the history of Indian thought. And the hall in which we are assembled recalls to us the magic presence of one who exercised a supreme influence over all that came into contact with him. He kept the lamp of spirituality burning in an unspiritual generation. And we cannot feel sufficiently grateful to him for exemplifying to us in his simple and lofty life

[1] Paper read in Sri Sankara Mutt Hall, Bangalore City, on 6 May 1917, in connection with Sri Sankara Jayanti celebration.

the essential worth of our religion. It is to him we owe this Institute here and that other,—more modest, farther South—two homes of holiness from which, as time passes, we may hope, will radiate the light of truth illumining the path of the thinking world.

Two Classes of Patriots

It appears to me that at the present juncture in the history of our country, we require two classes of patriots to work for our amelioration,—one chiefly looking forward and bent upon reconstructing the future; the other mainly engaged in studying and interpreting the past so as to throw light on the right manner in which that reconstruction should proceed. Without a full and proper co-operation between these two classes of workers there will be no continuity in our progress. We shall be tearing ourselves away from the past and shall lose what is precious in our heritage instead of preserving and developing it. Happily we are recently having patriots of the former type; but, speaking generally, those of the latter type are as yet conspicuous by their absence. But we need have no misgiving that they will not come; and when they do come, they will, I am sure, look to these Institutions and similar ones elsewhere for much of their inspiration. Being too near their birth, we can hardly guess what greatness awaits these Institutions in the future. They are like a tiny stream trickling through the side of a mountain; but it is the self-same stream that will grow in size and volume as it flows on and carry fertilising elements to vast stretches of the country. To be connected with such a great Institution should be to you,—I do not say a source of pride, for that is the last word that should occur to any one of us now, but—a means of acquiring religious merit. And I thank you from the bottom of my heart for asking me to associate myself with you on this occasion.

Vedānta as an Art of Right Living

The Vedānta is both a philosophy and an art; and as indicated by the title of my paper, I do not deal this evening with the Vedānta as a system of philosophy, but as an art of right living. I shall not concern myself to-day with the logical validity of Vedāntic theory, but shall only try, as best I can, to point out its bearing upon practical conduct. Philosophy was

never an arm-chair study in ancient India, and what turned great minds to it was not a desire merely 'to advance knowledge,' as the phrase now goes, but an intense interest in the problems of practical life. Accordingly Indian philosophers kept their theory in closest touch with life and did not tolerate the slightest divorce of practice from precept. It is an irony of circumstance that the Indian systems—especially the Vedānta—should yet have in recent years been criticised as speculative and unpractical. By describing the pragmatic aspect of the Vedānta, I shall endeavour to show that no other system of belief can have a more wholesome influence on life and that the very centre of gravity, so to speak, of the Vedānta lies in conduct.

The Double Nature of Man

As we know, man is characterised by a double nature. On the one hand he is a member of the animal world with its instincts and desires; and, on the other, he has in him the beginnings of spirituality. It is this mixed character of human life which the *Praśnopaniṣad*, iii. 7 has in view when it says:

> Athaikayordhva udānaḥ puṇyena puṇyaṁ lokaṁ nayati pāpena pāpam ubhābhyām eva manuṣya-lokam ||[1]

The final aim of the Vedānta, in common with other higher religions, is to transform man into a wholly spiritual being by killing the animal in him. In tracing the steps by which according to the Vedānta, this goal is reached, we have to exclude from our consideration one type of men who, in the expressive phrase of the Vedāntins, are termed yatheṣṭaceṣṭā-rasikāḥ. They are mere creatures of impulse and appetite, who give free vent to their desires without a thought for the morrow. They are, indeed, not altogether oblivious of their higher self; but that only makes their self-indulgence more culpable, for they never listen to its dictates. In the other type of men, who alone come under our consideration here, the conflict between the flesh and the spirit is sharp and irrepressible and there is in them a genuine desire for self-conquest. It is only these that are qualified to enter upon a

[1] 'Then rising upwards thro' one (of the *nāḍis*) the vital air known as *udāna* leads [the self] to the good world by good work, to the bad (world) by bad work, and to the world of men by both.'

course of Vedāntic discipline, and I shall treat of that discipline in *three* progressive stages.

The First Stage—Social Morality

(i) To begin with, we have those who, in spite of their sincere desire for spiritual development, feel that this world's good has a real value for them and cannot therefore make up their mind to abandon it altogether. They have certainly an undoubted resolve to serve the higher interests of their being, but they do not see anything wrong in pursuing worldly prosperity so long as they duly subordinate it to their spiritual well-being. Such people form the majority; and to them, our *Śrutis* and *Smṛtis* prescribe *karma*, in all its variety, as a well-devised means of gradual preparation for reaching the Vedāntic goal. The performance of certain deeds—*nitya* and *naimittika karmas*—and the avoidance of others—*pratiṣiddha-karmas*,—are obligatory on every person belonging to this class; and after he has discharged that obligation—not before—he may devote his time and energy to securing his worldly interests provided he does so in some way not disadvantageous to society, but as far as possible conducive to its welfare. He does not, like a person of the first type, abandon himself to the pursuit of sensory pleasures, but rationalises them, so that whatever is base or crude in them is eliminated. In other words, the life that our *Śāstras* prescribe for a person in the first stage of Vedāntic discipline is a life of social morality. It is, as the very expression *varṇāśrama-dharma* implies, based on and intended to contribute to the upkeep of social organisation or 'civic cohesion.' This represents the first step in the progress of Vedāntic life and we must remember that it is also a *necessary* step, for that will show us how ill-founded is the common charge brought against the Vedānta that it weans away men from society and creates in them a contempt for it. No system which builds upon a general foundation like the above,—whatever view we may take of its details,—can be regarded as losing sight of the social aspect of life.

Second Stage—1. Duty

(ii) The next stage is marked by an important change, viz., the recognition of the impossibility of pursuing both the higher

and the lower ideals at the same time. There is consequently here a whole-hearted effort to suppress the lower life and develop the higher. A person who has advanced to this stage ceases to think of making the best of both worlds, and sets his face once for all towards the higher. The rule of life prescribed for him may be summarised in two words,—*niṣkāma-karma* and *upāsana*. I shall first take up the explanation of *niṣkāma-karma* and, as a preliminary to it, say a few words on the Vedāntic conception of duty.

The central idea of duty, as admitted by all, is that it should be performed; but there is a wide difference of opinion as to why it should be performed. According to the commonly current notion, a duty is that which is performed without any thought of deriving any benefit whatever from its performance. That is 'duty for duty's sake.' To the Vedāntin, on the other hand, activity not prompted by desire is inconceivable. To him desire is the basis of duty as it is the basis of the rest of our actions. Thus duty, according to the Vedānta, is not an end in itself, but a means for securing an end. What then is the object sought to be achieved by the performance of duty? The object is the cleansing of the mind or the purification of the heart—*sattva-śuddhi*—as it is called. The tendency in human nature to yield to selfish or natural impulses is termed *durita*, and it is the removal of this *durita* that is known as *sattva-śuddhi*—a result, which, we must remember, is negative in character and is the *same* in respect of *all* duties. Thus the distinction between duty and deed consists in this,—that while both are equally prompted by desire, a deed yields a specific result different in each case; but a duty gives rise to a general result—the same in all cases, viz., *durita-kṣaya* or *sattva-śuddhi*.

> Tābhyām eva rāgadveṣābhyām iṣṭaṁ me bhūyād aniṣṭaṁ mā bhūd ity aviśeṣa-kāmanābhipreritāviśeṣa-pravṛtti-yuktasya nityāni vidhīyante | svargakāmaḥ paśukāma iti viśeṣārthinaḥ kāmyāni ||[1]
>
> Ānandagiri's *Ṭīkā* on Śaṁkara: *Bṛ. Up.* I. iii. 1.

[1] '*Nityakarmas* are prescribed for one that is prompted by the very same feelings of love and hatred and acts with a *general* desire that good may befall him and not evil; *kāmyakarmas*, on the other hand, are prescribed for one that has *specific* desires such as the attainment of heaven, possession of cattle, &c.'

Moreover the performance of duty has no bearing whatever on the material welfare of the doer, but only makes for his spiritual growth by removing the evil that is in him. The appeal made here to a spiritual motive in explaining duty should not be regarded as rendering it exclusively religious. For, the duties enjoined in the *Śāstras* are of various kinds, and while there are those which are religious, there are also others, such as the duty we owe to our parents, which are of immediate practical significance. The one set of duties being quite as binding as the other, the Vedānta cannot be said to confine its attention to religious duties. Rather, it aims at raising even secular duty to the level of the religious by investing it with a spiritual meaning and laying special emphasis on it.

In the light of what I have just said, it will be easy to understand the nature as well as the object of *niṣkāma-karmas*. Every deed is designed to yield a specific result; but any deed, according to the Vedānta, can be transformed into a duty if the doer entirely shifts his thoughts from its specific result and performs it with the deliberate view of securing from it the common result of all duty, viz., *sattva-śuddhi*. The deed itself, when once performed, is bound to produce its result; only the doer's thoughts are not occupied with it, his attitude towards it being such that he would perform it even if the particular circumstances in which he is acting would lead to a result harmful to him. The immediate result, whatever it may be, is to him a consequent; never the end. Thus, motive becomes the criterion, and whether an act is a duty or no lies, not in the act itself, but in the intention of the doer. In the phraseology of the Vedānta, all *kāmya-karmas* may become *nitya-karmas*, and it is this art of doing the usual and yet deriving from it an unusual result that is extolled in the *Bhagavadgītā* (ii. 50) as yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam—'wisdom in action.'

> Svadharmākhyeṣu karmasu vartamānasya yā sidhyasidhyoḥ samatvabuddhir īsvarārpitacetastayā tat kauśalaṁ kuśala-bhāvaḥ | taddhi kauśalaṁ yad bandhasvabhāvāny api karmāṇi samatvabuddhyā svabhāvān nivartante ||[1]
>
> Śaṁkara.

[1] '*Kauśalam* means this equanimity of mind in regard to success or failure in a person that performs *karma*, proper to him, with his heart set on (fulfilling) God's (purpose). That indeed is *kauśalam* for, when performed with such equanimity, *karma*, although by nature binding, abandons its nature.'

It is engaging oneself in activity in this spirit that is termed *niṣkāma-karma.* Its aim is self-conquest by giving occasion, thro' almost incessant activity, for the play of selfish impulses, but determinedly suppressing them.

Yoginaḥ karma kurvanti saṅgaṁ tyaktvātmaśuddhaye ||[1]
BG. v. 11.

Second Stage—2. Meditation

And now as regards *upāsana.* The word *karma* is familiar to all of us; but somewhat unaccountably, the word *upāsana* has fallen into disuse, so that it signifies little to those not conversant with the technicalities of the Vedānta. But in the scheme of Vedāntic life, *upāsanas* occupy a prominent place, and any system of Vedāntic discipline which ignores them should be regarded as undoubtedly imperfect. *Upāsana* is commonly translated by the English word 'meditation'. It is of several kinds,—I shall confine my attention to the most important of them, viz., *ahaṁgrahopāsana.* This variety of *upāsana* represents a process of mentally identifying oneself with the object meditated upon,—a process not merely of thinking *about* it, but actually *becoming* it in imagination. As Śaṁkara observes in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (I. iii. 9)—

> Upāsanaṁ namopāsyārthavāde yathā devatādisvarūpaṁ jñāpyate tathā manasopagamya āsanaṁ cintanaṁ laukika-pratyayāvyavadhānena yāvat tad devatādisvarūpātmābhimānābhivyaktir iti laukikātmābhimānavat ||[2]

Such a process naturally consists of two stages,—the first one of concentration in which the mind is abstracted from everything but the object of meditation, and the second one of sympathetic imagination, in which union with that object is actually experienced. There is nothing unsound or illegitimate in this exercise, for, according to the Vedānta, what distinguishes one object from another is merely formal and nominal, reality

[1] *Karma-yogins* act without attachment for cleansing their heart.

[2] '*Upāsanam* means reaching by the mind the form of a deity or something else as delineated in scriptural passages relating to meditation and concentrating the mind on it—uninterrupted by secular thoughts, until identity with that deity or other thing is realised in the same degree in which identity is (now) realised (by us) with our body, for instance.

being equally present in all. The aim of the Vedāntin is to attain to this underlying reality by transcending the limits of this individuality; and *upāsanas* rightly serve as exercises preliminary to such attainment.

Since *upāsanas* are not matter of common knowledge, I shall give one or two illustrations of them before proceeding to consider the object which they fulfil in Vedāntic discipline. We are all familiar with the *aśvamedha*, in name,—the most celebrated and the most elaborate of sacrifices. The chief animal to be sacrificed in it is a horse, and the ceremony signifies overlordship of the world. This sacrifice is performed by a *Kṣatriya*; but the Vedāntic disciple also may perform it, only subjectively,—as a mere mental operation. In this subjective sacrifice,—this meditation on the *aśvamedha*, the sacrificer himself takes the place of the horse to be offered, and the result he attains is a feeling of unity with the whole world, corresponding to the overlordship associated with the performance of the regular sacrifice. In other words, sacrifice here becomes self-sacrifice; and the beautiful thought behind this meditation is that the devotee, by renouncing his narrow selfish attachment, experiences identity with the universe. This is an instance of the meditator identifying himself with *one* of the objects in creation, the sacrificial animal here; and we may notice the ritualistic colour which this meditation as a whole bears. That is due to the fact that *upāsanas* were chiefly elaborated in the age of the *Brāhmaṇas* which represent the oldest ritualistic literature of India. I mention this in order to point out that religious practices generally bear the impress of the age in which they originate, and that we should, in interpreting them, be on our guard not to mistake their outward form for their inner principle. There are other forms of this *upāsana* also, and this time I shall give an example of a meditation where the meditator identifies himself with the universe as a whole and not with a part thereof as in the previous case. We have such an *upāsana* alluded to in stanza nine of Śaṁkara's *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* where, on the basis of the common constituents of the microcosmic and the macrocosmic bodies, the meditator identifies himself with the universe,—or what amounts to the same thing, regards his soul as identical with *Aṣṭamūrti*, the deity presiding over the universe:

Bhūr aṁbhāṁsy anilo'nalo'ṁbaram aharnātho himāṁśuḥ
puмān
Ity ābhāti carācarātmakam idaṁ yasyaiva mūrtyaṣṭakam|
Nānyat kiṁ cana vidyate vimṛśatāṁ yasmāt parasmād vibhoḥ
Tasmai srī-gurumūrtaye nama idaṁ srī-dakṣiṇāmūrtaye ||[1]

The following is part of the commentary on this *śloka*:

Ayam arthaḥ | upāsakaḥ svadehe vartamāna-pañcabhūtāni vyaṣṭibhūtāni samaṣṭibhūtaiḥ prāṇāpānau ca sūrya-śaśāṅkābhyām ekīkṛtya pañcabhūtātmaka-śarīrābhimāninaṁ svātmānam aṣṭamūrti-parameśvareṇaikīkṛtya sakalavyāpī aṣṭamūrtyātmakas sadāśivo'smīti cintayet | tato bhāvanātiśayena tat sāyujyaṁ prāpya sarvaiśvaryasaṁpannaḥ ante tatprasādāsādita-tatvajñānena tatva-sākṣātkāreṇa vimucyate ||[2]

There is no need to multiply instances. *Upāsanas* are manifold, and the essential feature of *ahaṁgrahopāsana* is that the devotee identifies himself either with the universe as a whole, or with only a part thereof.

I must now revert to the question—what purpose do *upāsanas* serve in the scheme of Vedāntic training? The first point to note here is that unlike *karma* which is only negative in its result, *upāsanas* yield a positive result. Practice in them cultivates the intellectual habit of intense concentration and the emotional one of feeling akin to and identifying ourselves with things commonly regarded as outside us. Thus while *kārmic* discipline possesses only moral value, *upāsanas* have a moral as well as an intellectual value. Indeed, without

[1] 'All this that is moving or unmoving in the universe—earth, water, air, fire, ether, the sun, the moon and spirit—is but the eight-fold form of Him and there is nothing whatever which, on reflection, is other than the Supreme Lord. To that *Dakṣiṇāmūrti*—incarnate as our *Guru*—we make this obeisance.'

[2] 'This is the purport: The devotee should first identify the five [individual] elements in his body with the elements in the aggregate [in the universe] and the vital airs known as *prāṇa* and *apāna* with the sun and the moon. He must then look upon his own self presiding over the elemental body as the Supreme Lord manifesting in eight-fold form and meditate as follows—"I am the all-pervading *Sadāśiva* of eight-fold form." Then thro' intense meditation he will attain to union with Him, will become endowed with all supernatural power, and will finally, by the acquirement of right knowledge, realise the truth and be liberated.'

this moral value, uplifting the heart, *upāsanas* would become mere 'psychic tricks.' A person who successfully undergoes this course of training will, in the first instance, acquire the power to overcome distraction,—a power of inestimable value in all undertakings, be they material or spiritual. Secondly, he will cease to regard life from the narrow personal standpoint. He will change his angle of vision towards the universe and begin to see things in truer proportions. Or to vary the metaphor, he will shift himself to the centre of the circle from which all points on the circumference are equidistant. It is well known that our ordinary view of life is narrow; for we look upon men and things, not as they are in themselves, but as they are in relation to us. The shaking off of this narrowness will lead to the cultivation in us of a new sympathy and a new understanding which will enable us to realise the kinship of the whole world—to discover, e. g., that Kālidāsa was not merely indulging in poetry, but was also stating a fact when he spoke of 'brother' plant and 'sister' creeper. In other words, the Vedāntic disciple, by virtue of the training afforded by *upāsanas*, comes to lead a wider and a deeper life,—a life of self-sacrificing love; for what is love but unselfish attention? And love itself is here to be understood not in any narrow sense, as confined to our class or to our race, but as extending to all that breathes or is. It is the cultivation of love or *dayā* in this all-embracing sense that is the chief aim of *upāsanas*.

To sum up: While the discipline of *karma* stands for self-conquest, that of *upāsana* stands for self-sacrifice; and the life of the Vedāntic disciple in the second stage is thus a life of work and love. What more do we require to show that Vedāntism does not preach passivity or indifference? The critics who bring this charge against it mistake disinterestedness for absence of interest. The true Vedāntin is not devoid of activity, but is devoid only of anxiety which invariably accompanies interested activity. In support of this statement, I may refer to the following *śloka* from the *Bhagavadgītā*—(ix. 9.)

Na ca māṁ tāni karmāṇi nibadhnanti Dhanaṁjaya |
Udāsīnavad āsīnam asaktaṁ teṣu karmasu ||[1]

[1] 'Those deeds do not bind me, O Dhanaṁjaya, remaining as I do *like* an indifferent person unattached to them.'

Commenting upon the word *udāsīnavat* here, the *Pañcadaśī* observes:

> Audāsīnyaṁ vidheyaṁ cet vacchabda-vyarthatā tadā ‖ [1]
> vi. 270.

Karma and *upāsana* represent a very important stage in the training of the Vedāntin and it will be well for us to pause here for a moment and take stock of the progress which our imaginary disciple has made towards reaching his goal. The first condition required of him for entry upon the path of Vedāntic culture was a sincere recognition, on his part, that the demands of the spirit are more than those of the flesh, and that to give oneself up to a life of inclination is to come down to the level of the brute. Starting with this initial conviction, the disciple purged himself of all that was evil in his nature, first through a life of ordinary social morality, and then through unselfish work. In the later phase of this life he also cultivated the habits of intense application and of devoted sympathy. By reason of his selflessness, his active habits and his readiness to place himself in imagination in the position of others, he is now able to consciously live a larger life ignoring individual concerns. Such a result is the utmost that is ordinarily desired. Indeed, I know of no type of discipline which purposes to achieve more. Passive towards oneself, but actively interested in others—that is an ideal worthy of any one.

The Third Stage—Renunciation

But the Vedāntin sees a higher ideal and strives to reach it. In one sense, real Vedāntic discipline begins only here, all that has gone before being the *bahiraṅga*, the portal through which the disciple is ushered into the shrine of *jñāna*. What deficiency does the Vedāntin see in the above discipline? And what is the higher ideal that is to be reached? It is not questioned that the disciple has so far achieved much. But while he has discovered the inter-relation of part and whole, and has therefore ceased to live a self-centred life, he has not as yet risen from a notion of *appearance* to that of *reality*;

[1] 'If (actual) indifference was meant to be inculcated the suffix *vat* would be useless.'

for in truth, there are no parts at all and the whole is integral and one. Thus our disciple, however advanced morally he may be, is yet unenlightened regarding the true character of the Self. He is still an *anātmajña*,—is still under the spell of *avidyā*,—and does not know the ultimate truth, viz., the absolute unity of all reality. Until this *avidyā* is dispelled, he cannot escape from the endless whirl of transmigration. The training which he has yet to receive marks the third and the last stage in his spiritual ascent; and we may take *jñāna* as the keyword to it.

Vivekino viraktasya śamādiguṇaśālinaḥ|
Mumukṣor eva hi brahmajijñāsā-yogyatā matā || [1]
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 17.

It is here that *saṁnyāsa* or renunciation is in place.

Saṁnyāsas tu mahābāho duḥkham āptum ayogataḥ | [2]
BG. v. 6.

When we remember that the entry into this order of life is to one that has traversed the arduous path of *karma* and *upāsana*, we see how critics distort facts when they lay the charge of unmorality at the door of *saṁnyāsa*. The *saṁnyāsin*, by reason of his previous training, is characterised by a 'spontaneity of virtue' and it is inconceivable that he should ever grow indifferent towards morality. Only, he looks beyond morality to *jñāna*. Life to him is more than moral practice and he makes morality the means of reaching truth.

The natural antidote for *avidyā* is *vidyā*, and the formal study of the Upaniṣads is prescribed as the first step towards acquiring it. I call the study formal; for it has to be carried on under the direct guidance of a *guru* who has himself undergone the same course of training and has arrived at the goal. Our ancient scriptures make this step obligatory, as is clear, for example, from the affirmative particle *eva* in the following *mantra* of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (I. ii. 12).

[1] 'He alone is fit to investigate the nature of *Brahman* who can discriminate [between the eternal and the non-eternal], who is disinterested, who possesses virtues like tranquillity and who is desirous of attaining salvation.'

[2] 'O valiant sir, renunciation is hard to attain except thro' disinterested action.'

Parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo
nirvedam āyān nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena|
tadvijñānārtham sa gurum evābhigacchet
samitpāṇiḥ śrotriyam brahmaniṣṭham ||[1]

Commenting on this, Śaṁkara says:

Gurum eva ācāryam śama-dama-dayādisampannam abhigacchet | śāstrajño'pi svātantryeṇa brahmajñānānveṣaṇam na kuryād ity etad gurum evety avadhāraṇaphalam ||[2]

It is not difficult to appreciate this view; for self-effort, however valuable in itself, is not an adequate means of grasping a truth so profound and so much at variance with common experience as the unity of all reality. The living voice of a teacher who firmly believes in what he teaches has certainly a better chance of producing conviction than the written word. Not only this; orthodox opinion insists that this ultimate truth can be known for certain only through the scriptures.

Value of Revelation

This introduces the moot question of revealed authority. I know how apt a modern student of the Vedānta is to look askance at such authority. But that is a bias which, I venture to think, he owes to his Western training, and is partly due to a misapprehension of the *role* assigned to revealed testimony in our *śāstras* and partly to a fear that the recognition of revelation will lead to the dethronement of reason which is a great pet of the Western philosopher. Even in the West, latterly the adequacy of logic to measure truth has been questioned, and the authority of the intellect in ultimate matters is slowly disappearing under the double attack of the Intuitionists and the Pragmatists. But leaving alone that aspect of the subject, we may point out that recognising revelation as a mode of testimony need not prejudice reason at

[1] 'Having examined the consequences of *karma*, a *Brāhmaṇa* should become disinterested. The eternal can never [be produced] by the non-eternal. And to know that [Truth] he must of necessity go—with fuel in his hand—to a *guru* that is learned and is devoted to *Brahman*.'

[2] 'He must necessarily approach a *guru* who is characterised by composure of mind, self-control, love etc. Even one that is well-versed in the *śāstras* should not set about seeking Brahma-knowledge by himself. That is the force of the affirmative particle *eva* in *gurumeva*.'

all. The Vedānta never dispenses with reason and the Upaniṣads themselves are full of arguments. All that is questioned is the final validity of reason in matters which do not come within its purview. Śaṁkara justifies this view in his *bhāṣya* on:

> Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād apy anyathānumeyam iti ced evam apy avimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ ‖ *Brahmasūtra* (II. i. 11);

and the author of the *Brahma-vidyābharaṇa* in his note on the same says:

> Na vayaṁ sarveṣāṁ tarkāṇām apratiṣṭhitatvaṁ brūmaḥ api tu śrutitātparyaviṣayībhūtārthabādhanārtham upanyastasya ‖[1]
> Sambhāvanāmātreṇa liṅgopanyāsaḥ |
> na hi niścāyakatvena tad upanyasyate ‖[2]
>
> Ānandagiri in his *Ṭīkā* on *Bṛ. Up. Bhāṣya.*

Take for instance the survival of the self after death. Natural reason can at best show the *probability* of this conclusion, but can never *demonstrate* it; for it lies beyond experience which is its sole sphere. Surely reason cannot rise above itself.

For *certainty* in such matters, if we should have it at all, we must rely on revelation and revelation alone. Thus, according to our *Śāstras*, the authority of the Scripture is invoked only to establish certainty in matters the probability of whose truth has already been indicated by reason; and I do not think it would be a right use of language to describe this view as 'dogma' or 'un-reason.' Nor do I see why we should recoil from the word 'revelation' merely because it was in bad odour with some scientists of the last century. For what is revelation after all? Ultimately it is not an external testimony, but is reducible to intuition or religious insight. It begins, no doubt, as an external opinion inasmuch as we appropriate it from our *guru*. But we do not merely acquiesce in it. We are under an obligation to intuit it and make it our own, when it will cease to be external and become inwardly as clear to us as it is to our teacher.

[1] 'We do not say that all reasoning is indecisive; but only such as is put forth for nullifying what is intended to be taught by the *Śruti*.'

[2] 'Reason is adduced only for indicating *probability*; not for the purpose of *demonstration*.'

Taṭasthitā bodhayanti guravaś śrutayo yathā |
Prajñayaiva tared vidvān īśvarānugṛhītayā ||
Svānubhūtyā svayaṁ jñātvā svam ātmānam akhaṇḍitam |
Saṁsiddhas susukhaṁ tiṣṭhet nirvikalpātmanātmani ||[1]

Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 477-8.

Study and Reflection

I have digressed too far and must now resume my subject. The knowledge of ultimate reality or *jñāna* is of two kinds,—*parokṣa* or mediate and *aparokṣa* or immediate. The former is merely an intellectual apprehension of the truth while the latter is an actual realisation of it in one's own experience. The *parokṣa-jñāna* is attained through *mahāvākyas* or 'ultimate sentences' like *Tat tvam asi* or *Ahaṁ brahmāsmi*. A peculiarity of verbal testimony, I may state in passing, is that it must be in the form of a sentence. Single words cannot convey new ideas; they can only call up old ones which are already in our mind. But a sentence can communicate a new idea, although consisting of only known terms. This is the reason why the central truth of the Upaniṣads is stated to be communicated through *mahāvākyas*. The correct import of these *vākyas* is to be ascertained through a careful study of the whole context in which they occur. This study is known as *śravaṇa*. But *śravaṇa* by itself is not sufficient; it must be followed by *manana* which is a means of convincing oneself, through reflection, of the truth learnt by *śravaṇa*.

Śravaṇaṁ nāma vedāntānām advitīye brahmaṇi tātparyāvadhāraṇānukūlā mānasī kriyā | mananaṁ nāma śabdāvadhārite'rthe mānāntaravirodhaśaṅkāyāṁ tannirākaraṇānukūlatarkātmakajñānajanako mānaso vyāpāraḥ ||[2]

Vedānta-paribhāṣā, viii.

[1] 'Externally do teachers teach as indeed the scripture also does. Only thro' one's own understanding power—God being gracious—can one escape [*saṁsāra*]. Knowing through one's own experience that the self is integral and whole, one can remain perfected and happy—troubled by no doubt whatsoever.'

[2] '*Śravaṇam* is the name given to that mental operation by which it is known that the chief aim of the *Upaniṣads* is to teach that *Brahman* is alone without a second; *Mananam*, the name given to that mental operation by which reasons are thought out and any discord that may be found between revelation and other modes of testimony is removed.'

COMMUNION

But study and reflection lead only to a mediate or external knowledge, and it is only immediate knowledge or the inward experiencing of unity that can bring about final freedom. We may be convinced ever so well of the truth of the *mahāvākyas*, but we shall not reach the Vedāntic goal until we *see* that the finite and the infinite are one; not merely *know* they are so. To take the old example of a person mistaking a rope in the dusk for a serpent, no amount of reasoning or assurance by another will finally convince him that it is not a serpent. But a little scrutiny with the aid of a light will carry conviction at once. If we should get a first-hand experience of the reality that has only been intellectually perceived, we must practise communing with it as understood from the *mahāvākyas*. This communion is *nididhyāsana*, by constant practice in which the contemplative will be able to see the ultimate truth piercing through the veil that hides it.

> Nididhyāsanaṁ nāma anādi-durvāsanayā viṣayeṣv ākṛṣyamāṇasya cittasya viṣayebhyo'pakṛṣya ātmaviṣayakasthairyānukūlo mānaso vyāpāraḥ ||[1]
>
> *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, viii.

This vision of reality will necessarily be a fleeting one in the beginning. It must therefore be captured again and again until it begins to endure. Then the disciple becomes a *jīvanmukta*—a 'God-man'—and begins to live the life of a disembodied spirit while still in the flesh.

> Evam ātmāraṇau dhyānamathane satataṁ kṛte |
> Uditāvagatijvālā sarvājñānendhanaṁ dahet ||
> Aruṇeneva bodhena pūrvaṁ saṁtamase hṛte |
> Tata āvirbhaved ātmā svayam evāṁśumāniva ||[2]
>
> *Ātmabodha*, 42-3.

[1] '*Nididhyāsanam* is that operation by which we fix our mind on the self, drawing it away from all worldly concerns towards which it is attracted by a beginningless habit.'

[2] 'When the tinder-stick of the mind is thus incessantly churned through meditation, the flame of knowledge will flash forth and burn up all the fuel of nescience. When knowledge once dispels ignorance as the dawn does, darkness; then, like the sun, the self manifests itself without any further effort.'

That is the culmination of Vedāntic training. The final goal, however, is not yet reached; but there remains nothing to be done by the disciple. He has now only to bide his time; for, the demands of physical existence naturally continue until the cessation of life. With the cessation of life, the limits of self-hood disappear once for all and the *jīvanmukta* will for evermore be lost in the ocean of Brahman. That is *videhamukti.*

Sa yathemā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrāyaṇāḥ samudraṁ prāpyāstaṁ gacchanti bhidyete tāsāṁ nāmarūpe samudra ity evaṁ procyate | evam evāsya paridraṣṭur imāḥ ṣoḍaśa-kalāḥ puruṣāyaṇāḥ puruṣaṁ prāpyāstaṁ gacchanti bhidyete cāsāṁ nāmarūpe puruṣa ity evaṁ procyate sa eṣo 'kalo-'mṛto bhavati ||[1]

Pr. Up. vi. 5.

Fate or Free Will

I have now rapidly traversed the whole ground of practical Vedānta and shall conclude by answering an objection that might have occurred to most of you. The course of training I have described assumes the freedom of the individual will and implies that man is at liberty to regenerate himself. How is this freedom, it may be asked, consistent with the *karma*-doctrine which is the very bed-rock of the Vedānta? Are we not predestined to be what we are? Does not necessity rule our destiny? Or, as Huxley put it: Have we not been wound up like a clock to go 'right fatally'? This often-raised difficulty has been solved by Vedāntic scholars. Every deed that we do has a double result. It not only produces the particular result which it was intended to produce, but also tends to establish in us a habit favourable to the repetition of the same deed in the future. This habit is termed *saṁskāra*, and the direct result from a *karma* is known as its *phala.* Every *karma* is bound to yield its *phala*; not even the gods can prevent it from doing so. But that is *all* the necessity, we must remember, involved in the *karma* theory. As regards the *saṁskāras*, on

[1] 'As these ocean-flowing rivers, when they reach the ocean and sink into it, lose their name and form and are spoken of as only the ocean; so also do these sixteen parts of the knower that go towards the *Puruṣa*, when they reach Him and sink into Him, lose their name and form and are spoken of as only *Puruṣa.* Such a one becomes partless and deathless.'

the other hand, resulting from our deeds, we have within us the full power either to strengthen or to inhibit them. And it is the *saṁskāras* alone that really matter; for they hold in them all the possibilities of our conduct. These *saṁskāras* incessantly tend to express themselves in act, and the problem of self-discipline is how to control and regulate them. And as I have already stated, there is ample scope for our choice here. As for the fruits of the deeds we have already done, they must be reaped and there is no escape from them. This certainty, so far from unnerving us, should stimulate us to exertion. It must enable us to work for the future with confidence unmindful of what may happen in the present as the result of our past actions over which we have no longer any control. The important point about the *karma*-doctrine is that, paradoxical though it may seem, it inspires us at the same time both with hope and resignation—hope for the future and resignation towards the past. That is not fatalism, but the very reverse of it; and there is accordingly nothing incompatible between self-effort and the doctrine of *karma*.

I have done, and I once more thank you sincerely for the honour you have done me in inviting me to give this address.

Vyākhyāśatair apy atidurgraho'rthaḥ purāṇavāṇīcikureṣu gūḍhaḥ |
Yāty āparokṣyaṁ bhuvi yatprasādāt śrīmat-trayīmauligurūn numas tān||

THE AIM OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Owing to close connection between thought and will which act and react upon each other, all philosophy has necessarily both a practical and a theoretical side to its teaching; and it is not right to assume, as it is sometimes done, that any system can entirely dispense with either. No philosopher will altogether shut out from his purview either practice or theory. But this double aspect does not preclude a system from placing greater emphasis on the one or on the other. A special feature of Indian philosophy is the care it takes to lay equal emphasis on both. Individual thinkers may, no doubt, be mentioned who stressed the one more than the other; and perhaps even whole periods in the history of Indian thought which did the same; but speaking as a whole the aim of the teaching is to closely correlate the two, so that we may describe Indian Philosophy to be as much a criticism of life as a criticism of the categories or anything else of the kind. Its object is not merely to lead us to a correct way of thinking but also to introduce us into the right way of living. The fact is that Philosophy of India did not take its rise primarily in wonder, as it seems to have done in the West; rather, it originated under the presence of a practical need arising from the presence of moral and physical evil in life. It is the problem of this evil that troubled the ancient Indian most and the consideration of metaphysical evil came in as a matter of course. His interest in solving the puzzles of knowledge was chiefly to find out a remedy, if possible, for the ills of life. This is manifest from the insistence almost from the beginning on practical utility (*prayojana*) in addition to intellectual doubt (*saṁśaya*) as the justification for philosophy.[1]

This peculiarity of the Indian view-point shows itself at almost every turn; for example, the study of philosophy, known as *śravaṇa* among the Vedāntins, is carried on not in a merely academic sense but as a discipline in the closest possible touch with the student's life. The same process of correlating theory with practice is continued till the disciple becomes fitted for *mokṣa* or 'deliverance'. It is this *mokṣa* in which that

[1] Compare *e.g.*, *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 1 and Introduction to *Bhāmatī*.

correlation finds its fulfilment that is the aim of all Indian Philosophy. But it may be thought that the ideal of *mokṣa*, being eschatological, rests on mere speculation or dogma; and that, though it may be regarded as the goal of religion, it can hardly be represented as that of philosophy. Really, however, there is no ground for thinking so; for, thanks to the constant presence in the Indian intellectual atmosphere of positivistic thought, the *mokṣa* ideal was soon brought within the sphere of experience and verification as *jīvan-mukti* or 'deliverance during life'. It was, we know, already part and parcel of a very influential doctrine in the Upaniṣadic[1] period and has since been woven into the tissue of more than one classical system of thought. Even in the case of doctrines like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Viśiṣṭādvaita, which do not formally accept this ideal, there is clearly recognised a stage between enlightenment and actual liberation (*videha-mukti*) which admits of being so described because it marks the culmination of human effort in the direction of securing *mokṣa* and on reaching which the disciple has only to bide his time for attaining it.[2] Its enunciation marks the acme of Indian thought and furnishes the true basis for the remark so often heard in these days that Religion and Philosophy have been but one in India. This ideal points beyond intellectual conviction which is often mistaken for philosophy and yet, by keeping within the bounds of experience, avoids the dogma of *mokṣa* understood in the other sense. It may therefore be justly regarded as the point of union of philosophy and religion. The eschatological view has no doubt persisted in the Indian mind, but it is a relic from the old Vedic period when it was believed that the consequences of a good or a bad life led here were to be reaped elsewhere in a state beyond death. Or if its persistence signifies anything, it is that, like all other ideals we cherish, the ideal of *mokṣa* also is more than what we as human beings can attain.

The aim of *mokṣa* understood in this sense is not merely the acquisition of knowledge or mere self-discipline but a certain immediate experience resulting from both. It is this experience typified in *jīvan-mukti* or the resulting attitude

[1] See *e.g.*, *Kaṭha Up.* II. ii. 1; II. iii. 14.

[2] Compare *e.g.*, *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, IV. ii. 2 and *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 23 (Chowkhāmba Series).

of mind towards life and the world that should be understood when we say that *mokṣa* is the common end of all Indian Philosophy. Philosophic teaching, if it should serve as a true guide in life, instead of being like the blind leading the blind, as the Upaniṣads say[1] should emanate from an experienced conviction in the teacher; and it should as certainly aim at producing a similar conviction in the disciple. The *upadeśa* or precept of the one, as it is said, should evoke a corresponding *anubhava* or experience in the other. Referring to this extraordinary power of the *guru* to transform the disciple into one like himself, Śaṁkara, in a work popularly ascribed to him, says that it surpasses even the magic touch of the alchemist which can transmute a thing into gold but cannot impart to it the transmuting power itself.[2] It is true that this new attitude of the disciple will profoundly affect his conduct. But the emphasis is on the attitude itself or on the experience giving rise to it and not on the outward behaviour which is looked upon as its expression and therefore more or less secondary. Its value lies as little in inducing a person to do what otherwise he would not have done, as in informing him of what he would otherwise have not known; it consists essentially in making him what he was not before. But we should guard ourselves against thinking that the aim is on that account individualistic or self-involving. Such a narrowing influence, it will be seen, is impossible when we consider the nature of the attitude which forms the end of philosophic discipline. The attitude may be of two kinds as the result of a double mode of discipline that has been known in India almost from the beginning—one negative, which aims at cultivating absolute and unqualified detachment, and the other positive, which aims at cultivating what may be termed detachment from the mere particular and really amounts as we shall see, to equal attachment for all. This distinction is found in orthodox as well as heterodox systems and the prevalence of both ideals in ancient India is shown by their appearance now and again in Sanskrit literature outside philosophy—as, for example, in the Mahābhārata. Though thus differing essentially, the influence of both the teachings, it should be stated, is alike ascetic so far as their

[1] *Kaṭha Up.* I. ii. 8. [2] *Śata-ślokī.* 1.

bearing upon the disciple himself is concerned.[1] But the manner in which that result is brought about is somewhat different according as the views are monistic or dualistic. In the former, which eventually deny the contrast between the individual and the world, the individual is merged in the whole—a truth, the necessary consequence of realising which will be the complete effacement of separate individuality. In dualistic or pluralistic systems where the ultimacy of the individual self is maintained, its conception becomes totally transformed by the realisation of its exact place in the universe and its value in relation to it, the result being a willing self-surrender on the part of the disciple. In such of these doctrines as are also pessimistic, there is a further reason helping the same end, viz., a feeling of the vanity and nothingness of life and a conviction that the best that one can do is to bow to the inevitable. Whether it be self-effacement or self-surrender in the sense just explained, the result is the same, viz., the annihilation of *tṛṣṇā* or *ahaṁkāra*—a 'complete suppression of the will to live,' to use the words of Schopenhauer. It is clear that an ideal thus rooted in self-denial can in no sense be narrow or individualistic.

The attitude is not one of passivity either. As already observed, it does not exclude activity, but according to neither the monistic nor the dualistic view, can it be appropriately described as merely moral. Now according to the former, morality is necessarily transcended at this stage for the very idea of obligation disappears owing to the negation of all contrasts including that between the individual and society. Such a one the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* says, is not troubled by thoughts like: 'Have I not done the right? Have I done the wrong?'[2] But the disciple does not, indeed cannot, cease to act. The fact that he now comes to think cosmically signifies that he will feel equally attached to all that is, and that whatever he does will be inspired by love which knows neither preferences nor exclusions. Such an ideal may minimise the importance of society as such; but that is because it has not less regard for society but more for that wider entity which comprehends the whole of being. Social morality, however much it may widen the out-

[1] See e.g., *Br. Up. Vārttika*, p. 513. st. 406. [2] ii. 9.

look of man from the individual's standpoint, really keeps him isolated from the rest of creation and all isolation is bondage in this view. In addition to personal egotism, there is what may be called the egotism of the species which also man must get rid of to become truly free; and he will do so only when he has transcended the anthropocentric view and can look upon everything as equally holy—whether it be, in the words of the Gītā[1] 'a cow, or elephant, or dog, the cultured Brahmin or the outcaste that feeds on dogs.' In dualistic systems which recognise the ultimacy of the individual, the disciple, on account of the total transformation in the conception of his own self to which we have referred, surrenders all his rights. But unlike the previous view, the consciousness of obligation continues here, and he devotes himself to its fulfilment in the spirit of what we find so well expressed by Matthew Arnold: "The deeper I go in my consciousness and the more simply I abandon myself to it, the more it seems to me that I have no rights at all but duties." That is, though the contrast between the individual and the world or society continues to be felt, that between rights and duties disappears at this stage; and so far, the motive is lifted above that of common morality. Moreover, we should remember that here also the scope of the activity, as in the other case, is greatly extended, since the obligation felt is towards all that is and not merely towards fellowman. Only what is universal love there is here replaced by universal sympathy. According to both the views, conduct becomes spiritualised. That is, the goal of Indian philosophy is as much beyond mere morality as it is beyond mere intellectual conviction. In other words philosophy aims at achieving more than Logic and Ethics. But it must not be forgotten that though they do not themselves constitute the goal, they are the sole way of approach to it. Or to vary the metaphor, they are like the wings that help the soul in its spiritual flight.[2] The goal that is reached with their help is characterised on the one hand by illumination, (*jñāna*) which is intellectual conviction that has ripened into an immediate experience; and on the other, by self-renunciation (*vairāgya*) which is secure by reason of the discovery of the metaphysical ground for it. It is the

[1] v. 18. [2] Comp. *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi, st. 376.*

attainment of such an attitude that is the common aim of Indian philosophy and its pre-eminent characteristic is Peace—the peace that comes on the one hand from the dispelling of doubt and disbelief; and on the other, from the overcoming of all moral strife and tension.

TYPES OF INDIAN THOUGHT

It is well known that there are several schools of Indian philosophy which differ from one another in some essential respect or other. If we judge them from their attitude towards what is of fundamental importance in philosophy, viz., the relation of common experience to reality, they may all be classed under a very few heads. It is proposed to indicate this classification here, and to point out the difference in the general outlook upon reality which it brings to light in Indian thought.

I

It would be best to start with the theories that stand nearest to the common-sense notion of the world and may be grouped together as empiricism. According to current accounts of Indian philosophy the sole representative of this type of thought is the materialistic system of the Cārvāka. It acknowledges only one *Pramāṇa* or "source of knowledge", viz., sense-perception and discards all the others, including inference. Since it denies the reality of whatever is not perceivable, it may be characterised as pure sensationalism. It may seem to be too superficial a view of reality to be held by any serious thinker; but there is no reason to question its historicity, especially as parallels to it are not lacking in the evolution of thought elsewhere. The doctrine, however, in the form in which it is recounted in extant Sanskrit works, is little more than a caricature because it appears there not merely as sensationalism but also as bare unqualified sensualism. It is supposed, for example, to have held forth self-indulgence as the supreme aim of life. "One should live happily so long as he lives, and it matters not what means he adopts to that end". Its teaching besides, as pointed out long ago by Max Müller, is for the most part negative and suggests that, while its criticisms of other doctrines have survived, its constructive thought has for one reason or another all but disappeared. Though this is the only kind of empiricism now commonly recognised there is evidence, scattered here and there in old works, of the prevalence at one time of several other forms of it. The one, to which we have just referred and which refused to recognise anything other than matter,

explained what is called "soul" as not an entity by itself but only a function or property of the physical body. There was another which identified the soul with *prāṇa* or the vital principle conceived as distinct from, and higher than, matter—thus avoiding the error, into which the previous school had fallen, of reducing "all nature's facts to the dead level of a single type". Not all Cārvākas again appear to have repudiated reason, for we find references to a third school which, while denying the spiritual world like the other two, admitted inference[1] in general as a legitimate channel of valid knowledge and rejected only a certain variety of it, viz., inference by analogy which was made use of by some to establish such important points as the existence of God and the survival of the self. The exponents of this "higher materialism", as we may term it, would, in their refusal to accept—on the basis of mere analogy—that we can jump from a knowledge of the sensuous to that of the supersensuous, secure the whole-hearted support of many a modern rationalist. These and other similar schools represent the first type of Indian thought.

II

To suppose that the senses and reason are the only sources of knowledge is to restrict reality to what is ordinarily experienced by us. But such a restriction of the realm of being does not satisfy all. Though the human mind may not be definitely aware of what is beyond, we cannot say that it is altogether unconscious of it. The very statement that common experience exhausts reality implies, by placing a limit on it, that the mind has travelled beyond that limit. Our reach, as it is said, exceeds our grasp here. But it is obviously futile to postulate such a transcendental realm as merely an unknowable something. There is also need for an appropriate *pramāṇa* whereby we may know it or, at least, that part of it which is of significance to us. This *pramāṇa* is usually termed *yogi-pratyakṣa* or the intuitive vision of the *yogin*. It is conceived as fitted not merely to disclose extra-empirical facts to us, but also to make them known immediately. That is the

[1] See e.g., *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 124.

reason why it is designated *pratyakṣa*, although it does not involve the activity of the external senses and is therefore very different from common perception. This intuitive power is found in all men, but only in a latent form; and a good deal of practice in meditation is required to develop it properly. Meditative practice, however, is not the only condition for its development; a cleansing of the inner life is also needed. It means that until "the busy intellect and striving desires" are stilled, one cannot rise higher than mere reflective thought. The successful cultivation of this power is consequently not possible for ordinary men, and whatever knowledge they possess of truths attained through it is derived from others and is mediate. The association of moral purity with what is essentially a logical means of knowledge indicates, we may observe by the way, the close connection that has always subsisted in India between religion and philosophy. The schools that recognise this new source of knowledge form the second type of Indian thought. They are generally realistic; and we may take the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and Jainism as examples of it.

III

For a knowledge of the world which transcends common experience, we depend, according to the above view, entirely upon the authority of individual insight. In this appeal to the experience of an individual, others see a risk; for, in their view, nobody's private insight can carry with it the guarantee of its own validity. As Kumārila has remarked[1] in discussing a similar topic, a vision that has unfolded itself to but one single person may after all be an illusion. This is not to impugn the good faith of the *yogin*; it only means that he might be self-deluded. To avoid this possible defect of subjectivity, the opponents of the above view postulate in the place of *yogic* perception another *pramāṇa*, viz., *śruti* or "revelation"—otherwise known as the Veda—which, it is claimed, will not mislead us because it has emanated from God or is supernatural in some other sense. But belief in such a source of knowledge may appear to be mere dogmatism, and it is therefore necessary

[1] *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 90.

to find out what in reality is signified by this term. As commonly explained, the *śruti* is immemorial tradition which, because its origin cannot be traced to any mortal being, is looked upon as supernatural in its character. There is the implication here, as contrasted with the previous view, that the realm of transcendental being is not directly accessible to man, however gifted he may be. But, theological considerations apart, it must be admitted that the truths for which the Veda stands, whether or not it is now possible to ascribe them to specific seers, should eventually be traced to some human source; and the fact seems to be implied in the description of those truths as having been seen by the *ṛṣis* or inspired sages of old. If it be so, the Veda also must be reckoned as communicating to us the results of *yogic* perception. But there is a very important difference as may be gathered from a condition which is sometimes laid down as essential to all "revealed" teaching, viz., that it should have proved acceptable to the best minds of the community (*mahājana-parigraha*). That is, the truths which the Veda records have been not merely intuited by great seers but also acknowledged by the standard mind of the community. Really, then, this *pramāṇa* reduces itself to what may be characterised as "race intuition"; and its deliverances, by virtue of the objective value they thus possess, acquire an authority which cannot belong to those of anybody's private intuition. Herein lies the superiority of *śruti* to *yogic* perception. The Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta are the systems that accept "revelation" in this sense as the means to a knowledge of supersensuous truth. They constitute the last type of Indian thought.

Indian schools of thought are thus broadly divisible into two groups—one, which assumes that reality is confined to what is given in common experience and may, as we have already stated, be described as empiricism in the broad sense of the term; the other, which regards the realm of being as by no means exhausted by such experience and formulates a unique *pramāṇa* for comprehending what lies beyond. The latter group is again divisible into two classes—one, which believes that individual insight is adequate for a knowledge of the transcendental realm; and the other, which seeks the aid of revelation for it. These may together be described as

intuitionalism,[1] if we bear in mind the above interpretation of *śruti*. They differ in their estimate of the relative significance to life of the two realms of being, as also in their conception of the precise nature of the facts that may be intuited. But such details fall outside the scope of the present article. This classification indicates, by the way, the exact meaning of *śabda* or "verbal testimony" which so many schools reckon as a source of philosophical knowledge. In none of them is it to be taken as an addition to the *pramāṇas* mentioned thus far; it only stands for tradition which embodies the truths reached through intuition in the one or the other of its two senses alluded to above.[2]

[1] It is this kinship which explains the alliance between the two as seen in the later history of the systems. Thus the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya, as now known, combine a belief in the Veda with their recognition of the need for *yogic* perception.

[2] The Jaina and the Vedāntic conceptions of *śabda* may be taken as instances of the two varieties of tradition.

KARMA AND FREE WILL

The doctrine of karma is an essential part of all or nearly all the Indian creeds, and belief in it has always had a profound influence on the life of the people. It extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human conduct and signifies that, as every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is preordained. Critics conclude from this that karma stands for fatalism, and remain content with that conclusion without examining the doctrine any further. We propose to consider here one or two of its other aspects with a view to finding out whether it is really fatalistic or whether it at all leaves room for the exercise of freedom. But before we enter upon this task, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what we mean by "freedom". As it is usually pointed out in modern works on Ethics in discussing the problem of Freewill, freedom does not mean mere caprice. It is not the absence of all determination; rather it is *self*-determination. To be controlled by extraneous factors in what one does is not to be a free agent, but to be determined by oneself is the very essence of autonomy. When, therefore, we ask whether karma gives any scope for freedom of action, all that we mean is whether it does or does not preclude self-determination.

We have stated that the doctrine extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human action. It does more, for in the case of every act it traces the causes that predetermine it to the particular individual that acts. Since, however, those causes cannot all be found within the narrow limits of a single life, there arises the need for postulating the theory of *saṁsāra* or the continued existence of the self (*jīva*) in a succession of lives. Thus the theory of transmigration is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of karma. The fact of moral consciousness, according to Kant, is the guarantee of personal immortality; in a similar way, the law of karma is here our assurance of the truth of transmigration. If now we look at life in this new perspective, the *puṇya* and *pāpa* (or, to use a

single term for both, *karma*[1]) that explain the present conduct of a person and the good or evil that follows from it are eventually traceable to his own actions in the past, for destiny or karma—as observed by an old authority[2]—is only another form of deeds done in a previous birth. There being therefore no external Fate constraining man to act as he does, he is free in the sense referred to above and cannot therefore absolve himself from responsibility for his actions.

Here, no doubt, a question will be asked as to when the responsibility for what one does was *first* incurred. But such a question is really inadmissible, for it takes for granted that there was a time when the self was without karma or, to state the same otherwise, when it was without any moral disposition. Such a view of the self is an abstraction as meaningless as that of mere disposition which characterises no one. "Self" always means a self with a certain stock of dispositions; and this fact is indicated in Indian expositions by describing karma as *anādi* or "beginningless". It means that no matter how far back we trace the moral history of an individual, we shall never arrive at a stage when he was devoid of all character. Thus at all stages, it is self-determination; and the karma doctrine, so far from implying the imposition of any constraint from outside, assures us that every man constitutes his own "fate". So deep is the conviction of some as regards the adequacy of karma to account for the diversity of human conditions that they see no need to acknowledge the existence of even God, conceived as the creator of the world and as the fountain of all law.

It is clear from what has been stated that the attitude which belief in the karma doctrine engenders is not fatalistic in the sense in which that term is ordinarily understood. But it may be said that, even granting that we alone are in the long run accountable for whatever happens to us now, we are not able to help ourselves in any manner, because we cannot alter the course of our past karma which leads to those happenings. It may be that the constraint is not external; but constraint it is, and there can therefore be no freedom of action. In meeting this objection, it is necessary to draw

[1] *Adṛṣṭa* is a more appropriate word but, for the sake of simplicity, we use *karma*.

[2] See *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, I. 349.

attention to a point to which we have not so far specifically referred, viz., the idea of moral retribution underlying the karma doctrine. Whatever we knowingly do will, sooner or later, bring us the result we merit; and there is no way of escape from it. What we sow, we must reap. That is, the karma doctrine signifies not merely that the events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes, but also that there is absolute justice in the rewards and punishments that fall to our lot in life. The law of karma accordingly is not a blind mechancial law; it is essentially ethical. It is this conviction that there are in reality no iniquities in life, which explains the absence of any feeling of bitterness—so apt to follow in the wake of pain and sorrow—which is noticeable even among common people when any misfortune befalls them. They blame neither God nor their neighbour but only themselves for it. Deussen refers[1] thus to the case of a blind person whom he met during his Indian tour: "Not knowing that he had been blind from birth, I sympathised with him and asked by what unfortunate accident the loss of sight had come upon him. Immediately and without showing any sign of bitterness, the answer was ready to his lips, 'By some crime committed in a former birth'".[1]

The implication of this idea of "retributive justice" is that the karma doctrine is grounded in a moral view of the universe, and that it therefore commits man to the obligations of a true moral life. It points to the truth that there is an ideal of life which it is the first duty of man to pursue and that it can be reached only through incessant striving. In other words, the doctrine presupposes the possibility of moral growth, and the conclusion to be drawn from it is that freedom is not merely compatible with, but is actually demanded by it. If man were only a creature of his congenital impulses—altogether powerless to rise above them—it would be poor comfort for him to know that he was not the victim of any alien Fate. This does not, however, mean that he can avoid the consequences of his past karma. His life, in that respect, is characterised by the strictest necessity; and he has to submit to all the pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which it may lead. They are

[1] *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 313.

predestined results from which he can never free himself. So far, karma does imply necessity; but, as stated above, it implies freedom also, viz., in the matter of ethical advance. Only we should not suppose that life's interests will thereby become bifurcated, for ethical advance is, in this view, to be made the sole aim of *all* activities. By thus adopting the betterment of one's moral nature as the goal of all endeavour, one may grow indifferent to what happens in the present as the result of past karma, though unable to avoid it. This is the well-known teaching of the *Gītā*[1] that we should engage ourselves in the activities of life, not for the particular results which they may bring but for the purpose of self-conquest.

We have so far assumed that the necessity involved in karma is absolute; but that is not the only view held about it. Some are of opinion that karma is only *one* of the causes that explain the course of events in a man's life. There are other causes as well, of which the one significant for us here is self-effort or *puruṣa-kāra*, as it is termed. We cannot dispense with karma altogether for, as it must be within the experience of all, result is not always proportionate to effort; and the discrepancy between the two, if we should exclude chance, is necessarily to be accounted for by assuming a cause that operates in an unknown manner. It is just this unknown cause that is karma. This view is explicitly maintained, for example, in the *Law-book* of Yājñavalkya (I. 349-51), where the question is considered with particular reference to the need for initiative on the part of a king in extending his sovereignty; and the solution reached is that, although karma is certainly a factor to be reckoned with in all undertakings, it is not the only factor determining the result. "As a chariot cannot move on a single wheel, so destiny [i.e., in the sense of past karma] cannot accomplish its end until it is aided by human endeavour." It means that karma is only a co-operative element, and is powerless by itself to bring about any result. "Without present action, past destiny cannot show itself."[2] It is always open for man to help it or hinder it, so that there is scope in this view also for choice between two alternatives. The point that is important for us is

[1] The question of human freedom is discussed in this work, though all too briefly, in chapter iii. st. 33–43.

[2] See *The Aryan Path*, April 1934, p. 202.

that, whichever be the explanation we adopt, the doctrine of karma is not fatalistic, and that it neither excludes personal effort nor destroys the sense of responsibility. Only there is a limit to the exercise of freedom according to the first explanation, in that it restricts it to the pursuit of the higher life; but there is no such limit according to the second.

THE TWOFOLD WAY OF LIFE[1]

I propose to make a few observations on a familiar subject, viz., the two Indian ways of life which are commonly described as the *pravṛtti-mārga* or 'the path of active life' and *nivṛtti-mārga* or 'the path of renunciation.' A way of life necessarily implies a goal to be reached, but I do not intend to consider its nature now. The Indian conceptions of the goal are many, and some of them differ vastly from the others. But a knowledge of these differences is not required for understanding that aspect of the two ways of life with which I deal in this paper. References to these ways can be traced throughout the whole of Indian literature. Already in the Ṛgveda we have, by the side of hymns addressed to the various gods for securing from them prosperity in life here or hereafter, those that glorify asceticism; and one particular hymn, which is well known, mentions 'the mad *muni* with his long hair and coloured garments.' The same two paths are alluded to in later literature also as, for instance, in the *Mahābhārata* where, if we find some like Ajagara proclaiming the excellence of renunciation (xii. 177), we find others like Bhīmasena ridiculing that view and insisting on the need for leading a life of strenuous activity (xii. 10). These modes of life may bear different names in different periods, and a school of thought may, in the course of history, give up its adherence to one and come to adopt the other; but their twofold character persists throughout.

It is true that these ways of life are not peculiar to India, but are found wherever the human mind has reflected on the purpose of life and the means of achieving it. One of them, viz., the way of *pravṛtti*, man adopts instinctively; and it is therefore known everywhere. The other may not be so common, but even that is not special to India. We know, for instance, that it was well recognised and, with its vows of poverty and chastity, was zealously pursued by many in mediæval Europe. But in their Indian form, these paths present a rather unusual feature in that they have ceased to be mutually exclusive. In India also, they begin as antithetical,

[1] Presidential Address delivered at the Philosophy Section of the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference, held at Mysore, during December 1935.

and we find early teachers like Jaimini[1] and Āpastamba[2] contending that *saṁnyāsa* or renunciation, unlike *gārhasthya* or the state of a house-holder, is no part of the normal scheme of Aryan life. This attitude, however, has for long been changed. The negative way of *nivṛtti* still continues to be more or less the same as it was originally, but the positive one of *pravṛtti* has become profoundly tarnsformed by the incorporation in it of the essence of the other. This has removed the original opposition between them, although the paths remain distinct. But it is necessary to point out what exactly is the nature of this change, for even in its earlier sense the way of *pravṛtti* involves numerous checks on natural impulses and therefore implies the need for a great deal of self-restraint in those that follow it. What particularly marks the later conception of *pravṛtti* as distinguished from the earlier, is the *total* exclusion of self-interest from it. It does not aim at merely subordinating the interests of the individual to those of the community, or of any other greater whole to which he may be regarded as belonging, but their entire abnegation. The path of *pravṛtti* in its later form, thus lays the same degree of emphasis on self-renunciation as the path of *nivṛtti* does, and the one acquiesces as little as the other in what is sometimes described as 'reasonable self-love' or 'enlightened self-interest.' The distinction between them is that while the latter regards renunciation as the sole principle of life's discipline, the former looks upon it as only a qualifying means to the pursuit of a higher end which is positive in its character. By thus combining asceticism and activity, the discipline of *pravṛtti* elevates them both. Asceticism thereby becomes much more than self-denial, and activity is freed from all egoistic motives.

We do not know when this important change was made; but it is clear that it should have been effected quite early, for we can trace the new idea distinctly in the Upaniṣads. Their favourite way of setting it forth is by contrasting the specific organs of sense, in the matter of their functioning,[3] with Prāṇa or the vital principle as manifested chiefly in breath. The various senses operate for the sake of the whole bodily system; but over and above contributing to the general well-being of

[1] Cf. *Vedānta-sūtra*, III. iv. 17.
[2] *Dharma-sūtra*, II. ix.
[3] Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. iii.

the body, these organs act in a manner which ministers directly to their own gratification. The eye, for example, sees and thus protects the organism from possible destruction which might arise in its absence. But it also often indulges in seeing for its own sake. Similarly the sense of taste seeks its own gratification in helping the organism to make a right choice of food. It is altogether different in the case of Prāṇa, since it has no purpose of its own to serve like the senses, and functions *solely* for the organism. This is merely an allegory to show what perfect unselfishness means. It signifies that a person who chooses the path of *pravṛtti* should always keep before his mind the example of Prāṇa and that, whatever he may do, he should do it not for himself in the least but for the whole of which he forms a part. The most explicit reference to the idea of *pravṛtti* in this form is, of course, to be found in the Gītā; but while that work may be said to have given wide and permanent currency to the new idea by presenting it in a splendidly devised setting it did not initiate it. My purpose now is not merely to refer to the two paths in this their altered relation, but also to draw attention to the beautiful manner in which they have been embodied in two masterpieces of classical Sanskrit literature—the *Buddha-carita* of Aśvaghoṣa and the *Kumāra-saṁbhava* of Kālidāsa. By saying this, I do not imply that the poets have consciously aimed at propounding their views of life in them, or that the later of the two poems is a studied rejoinder to the earlier. As works of art, they give but spontaneous expression to the inmost convictions of the artists; and, if there is any truth in the saying that poets are the best spokesmen of the national mind, we may take these works as furnishing a strong support for the thesis that there has for long been in the Indian outlook on life a difference of the kind indicated just now.

We shall take up for consideration the *Buddha-carita* first. The work, as its name signifies, has for its theme the story of Buddha's life, the details of which being well known need not be recounted here. The poem opens with a description of the happy circumstances in which Buddha is born and the royal surroundings amidst which he is brought up. But the prosperity in which we find him is not to last very long. For Buddha soon comes to know of the numerous ills, like death and decrepitude, to which all living beings, without exception, are subject.

These sadden his heart intensely; and he is no less affected by the apparent callousness of men, who continue to live their routine life amidst such distressing sights (iv. 59-61). He accordingly leaves the comforts of the palace for the trials and hardships of the forest, determined to discover a remedy for these ills through rigorous self-discipline and meditation (vi. 52). But Kāma, or Māra as he is called here, 'the Satan of the Buddhist world,' is greatly perturbed by this resolve for, if the young prince should succeed in his efforts to find a remedy for the ills of *saṁsāra*, his own occupation, as he says, will be completely gone (xiii. 5). He therefore tries to tempt Buddha, but, meeting with absolute indifference from him and wondering whether his heart has been turned to stone (xiii. 16), abandons his purpose. Buddha continues his quest, and at last succeeds in gaining the knowledge which he is seeking. Such, in brief, is the way of renunciation as represented in this poem. Though entirely negative it does not, we should point out, exclude active sympathy for fellow-beings, as is shown by the fact that the very first thing which Buddha does after his success is to spread among people the saving knowledge which he has gained. It is not suffering humanity alone that evoked his sympathy; even the sorrow of the meanest living thing, says the poet, drew tears from his eyes (v. 5). But the point for us to note is that so far as his own perfection is concerned, it is attained when desire in all its varied form is overcome. His efforts to help others by pointing to them the way to that wisdom, which has brought him everlasting peace, indicate his magnanimity; but it is wholly extraneous to his reaching the goal of existence.

Let us now contrast with this the other way of life as it is represented in the *Kumāra-saṁbhava*. The story in this case may not be so generally known as in the previous one; but the broad features of it, which are all that we need recall here, are fairly familiar. Śiva has lost his beloved Satī, in the full glory of her youth and in circumstances which are extremely tragic. This has thrown him into utter despair and, renouncing everything, he retires as an ascetic into the solitudes of the Himālayas. Satī is born again in that very region as Pārvatī, daughter of the mountain-lord, and grows up to be the prettiest of damsels. When her parents are about to seek a suitable

husband for her, Nārada, the divine sage, appears and prophesies that she will become the consort of Śiva. Encouraged by this prophecy, the mountain-king approaches Śiva and, after honouring him as becomes a guest, leaves his maiden daughter there, with her two companions, to minister reverently to him in his austerities, hoping that Śiva's thoughts might thereby turn towards love again. As in the case of Buddha, Śiva also is tempted by Kāma. But as depicted here he is, unlike Buddha, once on the point of yielding to the temptation. On one occasion when Pārvatī is doing homage to Śiva, Kāma aims his dart at him, impelling him to cast a longing look on her radiant face (iii. 65-67). He, however, quickly recovers his lost self-control and burns down Kāma in a fit of fury. Finally therefore Śiva also, like Buddha, succeeds in withstanding the temptation. Up to this point, the two stories run nearly parallel. But at this stage, there is a divergence, for Kāma in Kālidāsa's story revives later and receives a treatment from Śiva which is the very opposite of the one he received before. This differential treatment is not to be ascribed to a mere caprice of the hero, for, we should remember, he is Śiva; and it is therefore clear that our poet has two kinds or types of love in view, one of which alone, according to him, merits repulsion. To determine what the distinction between them is, it is necessary to mention a few more details of the story. But before we do so, it is perhaps desirable to refer to another point. Kālidāsa has here confidently ventured upon depicting the love between the supreme God and his consort; and he has not escaped criticism at the hands of fastidious *ālaṁkārikas* for choosing such a theme.[1] It is not necessary for us to discuss this aspect of the matter, but it is clear that the topic is not one for all to write or speak about without appearing to profane it. So far as our present purpose is concerned, it will suffice to regard the love delineated here as the ideal of human love; and we shall, as far as possible, avoid alluding to Śiva in his character as the Lord of the universe.

The story is purely mythological; and Kāma, as we have seen appears in it as personified. The circumstances in which he first comes before us are briefly as follows. There is at the time

[1] Cf. *Rasa-gaṅgādhara.*

great distress among the gods, for they have been long subjugated by a wicked demon. They entreat Brahmā for help in vanquishing their foe. But seeing that no one less valiant than the son of Śiva will be equal to the task of overthrowing him, Brahmā advises them to try whether Śiva can be weaned from his asceticism and induced to think of wedded life again. Then Indra, the king of the gods, bespeaks Kāma's assistance in diverting Śiva from his austerities, and naturally flatters him in doing so. Kāma feels considerably elated at being preferred by Indra to his other lieutenants (ii. 64; iii. 10); and, in his elation, declares that he is prepared, for the sake of his sovereign, to corrupt even the most virtuous of men:

adhyāpitasyośanasāpi nītiṁ
prayuktarāgapraṇidher dviṣas te |
kasyārthadharmau vada pīḍayāmi
sindhostaṭāv ogha iva pravṛddhaḥ || iii. 6.

Pride goes before a fall, it is said; and in preparing to smite Śiva, Kāma himself, as we know, is smitten and dies. Kālidāsa foreshadows this result by means of poetic irony, when he makes Kāma say to Indra before setting out on his fateful errand, 'If only you look upon me favourably I shall, with no comrade but Spring and with no better aid than my flowery arrow, bring down the mighty Śiva himself' (iii. 10). Of the subsequent incidents in the story, we need take account of only two. The burning down of Kāma has frustrated the hopes of the gods; and they have since approached Śiva himself praying him to help their cause, which is the cause of righteousness in the world (iii. 20). He relents and agrees to seek Pārvatī as his bride for, as he declares, he has no purpose to achieve beyond the good of the world. The other incident relates to Pārvatī. The bitter disappointment caused by Kāma's destruction makes her doubly firm in her resolve to marry Śiva; and she enters upon a severe course of penance, feeling convinced that that is the only means of winning his love (v. 59, 64). When she is thus engaged Śiva meets her, disguising himself as a common celibate or *brahma-cārin*. The scene that follows is one of the most lovely in the poem. The celibate, after learning with what purpose she is subjecting herself patiently to all the pain that penance means, tries to

dissuade her from it by pointing to several 'shortcomings', as he terms them, in the person whom she is seeking for her spouse. But finding that her devotion to Śiva is unshakable and admiring her strength of mind, he reveals his identity and assures her that her penance has, indeed, won his love (iv. 42; v. 86). It is then that Kāma is revived. Śiva and Pārvatī are united in wedlock; and Kumāra—the offspring of the union—eventually conquers the demon-foe and restores the gods to their original supremacy.

Stripped of its mythological garb, this means that love, as it appears at first in Śiva, is a momentary surrender to the influence of Pārvatī's personal beauty as is suggested by the poet in two similes, used in this connection—one which likens it to the attraction of iron by a magnet (ii. 59), and the other to the flow of the tide at the rising of the moon (iii. 67). In its later phase, on the other hand, Śiva's love is not the impulse of an unguarded moment but a deliberate choice for a beneficent purpose. Pārvatī is sought not merely for her personal charms but as a help-meet in the discharge of a duty, viz., safeguarding the interests of righteousness. That is to say, love does not make light of *dharma* now as it did before, but occupies its proper place as an auxiliary to it:

dharmēṇāpi padaṁ śarve kārite Pārvatīṁ prati |
pūrvāparādhabhītasya Kāmasyochchhvasitaṁ manaḥ || vi. 14.

—a stanza which reminds one of the Gītā saying:
dharmāviruddho bhūtēṣu kāmo'smi Bharatarṣabha || vii. 11.

Secondly Pārvatī, innocent as she is, is not fully fitted to enter the kingdom of true love when she first sets her heart on Śiva, for she has not undergone the discipline of suffering. Now she has shown herself capable of the highest self-sacrifice, and is therefore worthy of such love. Mere personal beauty, however extraordinary it may be, cannot win the highest love (v. 53) whose steadfastness and intimacy, our poet symbolises by the relation that obtains between a word and its sense (vi. 79); and Śiva does not wed her until he comes to know that she has not less beauty of soul than beauty of form. Thus *kāma*, according to this view, is an evil only in its unregenerate form; but when it is pure, *i.e.*, when it is not a mere sensuous passion and when it is ready to make any sacrifice for the

sake of the object loved, it has a rightful place in the scheme of the universe. In its total absence, life would lose its meaning; and this seems to be the chief point of the fourth canto, styled *Rati-vilapana.* According to the standpoint of *nivṛtti*, on the other hand, all love alike deserves condemnation as having no value whatsoever for man. This extreme view is implied, for example, by the altered designation of 'Māra' or 'death' under which Kāma appears in the *Buddha-carita.*

There remains only one other point to mention to show that the ways of life, as represented in these two poems, are the same as the two ways of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* described above. Following the conception of *kāma* in the two poems, we have identified it with conjugal affection. But it may be taken to typify all kinds of desire. Not only does the word bear this extended sense in Sanskrit; it is also indicated in one of the poems, viz., *Buddha-carita* where Māra, when love fails to help him in his purpose, tries, though with no better result, to excite other feelings in Buddha (xiii. 18 ff.). The treatment of *kāma* in this extended sense is, on either view, the same as the treatment of it in the narrower sense of love. According to one of them, all desires without exception are to be repressed; according to the other, they are to be directed, when once they have been purged of their egoism through a proper course of ascetic discipline, to the realisation of a positive end which is not of the individual but of a wider whole with whose interests the individual identifies his own.

REINCARNATION

SOME INDIAN VIEWS

Belief in the immortality of the self is regarded as a necessary postulate of all religions. The Indians believe not only in it but also in pre-existence and reincarnation. This belief, in its triple form, has appeared to some modern scholars as a dogma that has never been questioned but is merely taken for granted. Max Müller, for instance, writes[1] that to a Hindu the idea that the souls of men migrate after death into new bodies of living beings seems so self-evident that he does not trouble to assign any reasons in support of it. That, however, is not the case, for we find the question occupying the attention of Indian thinkers from the earliest times. Thus it forms, at least in one of its main aspects, the chief theme of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*; and, in later works also, we not unoften come across attempts to prove it, whatever view we may take of the value of those attempts. Before indicating the general character of the arguments advanced in favour of this belief, we shall refer to two objections that are usually raised against it.

The first objection is based on the fact that we do not normally remember anything of our past lives. This does not mean that our failure to remember the past proves its non-existence, for that would be to confound a thing with the consciousness of it. What it means is that, even if the existence of past lives be admitted, they would, in the absence of memory, form only a disconnected series with no sense of personal continuity accompanying them. A clear awareness of the persistence of the self through them all would, no doubt, transform our life profoundly; but forgetfulness in this respect need not disprove the continuity of the soul in the form in which it is implied in the Indian theory of transmigration. This theory is essentially the outcome of an attempt to account for the observed diversity in individual character, and it explains that diversity by assuming that the state of each self in the present life is largely, if not entirely, determined by its own past. All that is required, if the past should

[1] *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 104.

exercise such influence upon the present, is that our thoughts and actions should leave behind them an impression which is sufficiently deep; and it is not necessary that we should also remember them afterwards. The experiences of our waking state, for example, influence our dreams although we do not, at the time of dreaming, realise that they do so; and the effects of the lessons learnt in boyhood (say) are seen in later life, although the lessons as such are forgotten. Similarly the experiences of an earlier existence may affect a later one, despite our being oblivious of what those experiences were.

The second objection rests on the view that the body is essential to the self. In its absence, it is contended, neither mental nor moral life is possible. There can, for instance, be no sensations, which are the foundation of so much of our experience, except through the instrumentality of the body. Now the body cannot be said to transmigrate, for it perishes at death once for all; and if the self also does not perish with it but survives, it is clear that it cannot at least remain the same. This objection overlooks the fact that the Indian schools of thought postulate, as the support and condition of all psychical life, a physical vesture for the self, which is other and subtler than the visible body and which, though its existence is not commonly realised, accompanies the self until it finds release. Release, in fact, is only release from it. Whether the self should not necessarily remain embodied even in that condition is a question which we need not discuss, for we are concerned here with the problem of reincarnation and not with that of final release. This vesture serves as a link between the real self and its fleshly envelope which alone changes with each life, giving rise to the notions of death and re-birth. It is conceived differently in different systems, but all of them acknowledge it in some form or other. Speaking generally, it is in this intermediary that the dispositions of former lives are stated to be treasured up;[1] and, since it does not change from one birth to another, there is no point in the criticism that man's soul must cease to be or, at least, change with the dissolution

[1] In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, for example, according to which the connection of the self with what is termed *manas* constitutes *saṁsāra*, the dispositions abide in the former; but they are operative only until the self is dissociated from *manas*.

of his body at death. It is true that the visible body also is intimately connected with the self, but the contention is that its loss or replacement by another will not affect the *inner* life of the individual.[1]

One of the arguments in support of transmigration, commonly met with in Indian philosophical literature[2], starts from the fact that all men are born with certain predilections, and deduces from this that, since they are not traceable to the present life, they necessarily point back to the experiences of another but forgotten existence as their source. And, as the same argument can be extended to that existence (and also to every other preceding existence), it is concluded that there must have been in the case of every one a series of lives, which has had no beginning in time. The readiness to suck the mother's milk, found in a new-born babe, is the example usually given to illustrate this argument. As another example, we may mention man's innate fear of death, which is explained as a sign of the many sufferings undergone on occasions of former death. Some of these congenital dispositions may perhaps be explained as purely physiological, but not all. The infant's sucking of the mother's milk, for instance, cannot be so explained in view of the fact, pointed out by ancient Indian writers, that it involves a psychological factor, viz., the exercise of will (*saṁkalpa*), in however rudimentry a form. Nor can it be ascribed, it seems, to heredity, for that principle leaves unexplained why a particular child should be born in a particular family. If the connection between the two is not to be a matter of sheer accident, it can be explained only by assuming a certain affinity between them and, in the very act of doing so, admitting the pre-existence of the self.

There are other arguments, like the ethical one, based on the observed inequalities of human fortunes; but these being familiar, we may pass on to mention another, which comes from a rather unexpected quarter and is more in the nature of a suggestion than an argument. Kālidāsa, in his famous play of Śākuntalam (v. 2), refers to the strange fact that sometimes, when every circumstance favours a state of peace and contentment, the sight of a beautiful thing or the hearing of sweet music makes

[1] Cf. Gītā, ii. 22.

[2] See e.g., *Nyāya-sūtra*, III. i. 19–27.

a person wistful, instead of serving as a source of pleasure to him. This apparent exception to the rule that a thing of beauty is a joy for ever, the poet explains as the consequence of the recalling, though only subconsciously, of some love or friendship of a former life which, now being past, gives rise to a feeling of melancholy. 'The sadness sometimes felt by even happy persons at the sight of beautiful things and the hearing of harmonious sounds implies, to be sure, a vague reminiscence of the affections of a former birth which are deeply rooted in the heart.' This phenomenon cannot be explained as a mere reaction to external stimulus or on any other general principle of that sort, for it does not occur in the case of all persons and may not occur again even in the case of the same person when he is in the presence of beautiful things.

So far we have concerned ourselves with the Indian view of reincarnation as explicitly stated in old works. But the best explanation, it seems, not only of the belief in reincarnation but also of that in pre-existence and immortality, is to be found in the Indian conception of *mokṣa* as the goal of life or the attainment of the highest spiritual value. The notion of *mokṣa* differs in different schools of thought, but it means in each of them 'eternal freedom' which results from the realisation in one's own experience of what it regards as the ultimate truth. Thus, of the familiar trinity of values, it is Truth that is considered supreme; and the other two, viz., Goodness and Beauty, we may state by the way, are, in all systems alike, subordinated to it in one form or another.

Now the possibility of realising eternal freedom implies that the self, which is to realise it, is immortal; and the immortality of the self can be logically maintained only by granting its eternal pre-existence. This latter point, however, cannot be properly argued without reference to the nature of the self—a topic which cannot be considered within the limits of this paper. We shall therefore content ourselves with citing in respect of it the opinion of a modern thinker, that 'any evidence which will prove immortality will also prove pre-existence.'[1] In order to show how the conception of *mokṣa*

[1] McTaggart: *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 113.

leads to the belief in a plurality of lives, we have to point out that it does not compel us to admit the existence of God in the same manner in which it does the eternity of the self. This is the reason why so many of the Indian systems, while recognising an eternal self, are atheistic although, so far as popular beliefs are concerned, theism is quite as prevalent in India as anywhere else. Jainism and Buddhism, the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṁsā—all definitely repudiate the idea of God as commonly understood; and, in all probability, some of the other systems also which now find a place for it in their world-scheme were atheistic to begin with. To admit a supreme God would, in their view, be to make the attainment of freedom in some way dependent on him and, so far, to reduce the importance of individual effort or, to state the same otherwise, to weaken the potency of *karma*. So orthodox a philosopher as Jaimini looked upon the doctrine of God as a heresy, and affirmed in its place the doctrine of the autonomy of *karma*.[1] Even systems like the Vedānta, that believe in God, take care to represent the destiny of the individual as depending virtually on himself. If the final purpose of life is to attain true freedom, and if it can be accomplished only by one's own efforts, it follows that the self should pass through many lives. For this ideal, as conceived in all the systems, is so remote from man, as he finds himself here, that a single life is absolutely inadequate to its complete attainment. It is thus the poverty of man's present spiritual equipment taken along with the greatness of his final destiny that explains the belief in a plurality of lives.

The above view satisfactorily accounts for an important difference between the Indian and other conceptions of re-incarnation. It shows why the former does not stop at postulating a series of lives but also insists that it has an end. The purpose of reincarnating is not merely to suffer pain for past sins or to enjoy the welcome fruits of past goodness but also to prepare, through a proper development of character, for the ultimate realisation of the supreme value of life. In fact, rewards and punishments, according to the doctrine of transmigration, are meant only to serve as incentives to

[1] Cf. *Vedānta-sūtra*, III. ii. 40.

aspiration and achievement. The termination of the cycle of re-births, it may be added, is not necessarily undesirable, as is sometimes assumed, for its conception is not the same in all the schools but differs according to their general outlook on life and the world. There are schools of thought, like the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya which are pessimistic and *mokṣa*, according to them, may be an unattractive consummation, for they conceive of it as isolating the self from everything else in the universe. But there are others, like the Vedānta, which are optimistic; and it is far from being undesirable in them, since their ideal is not lonely isolation but the attainment of complete and harmonious life.

'THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL'

It is well known that God, the individual soul and the world constitute the subject-matter of all philosophy and religion. In monistic systems, however, where the only reality recognised is God or the Absolute, the remaining two terms of this trinity are necessarily to be reduced to it. The manner of doing it may be the same in the case of both of them, as it seems to have been in certain forms of Advaita that were once prevalent; but in Śaṁkara's doctrine, it is not so. Though the soul and the world are alike admitted in it to be not distinct from Brahman, which is the Upaniṣadic term for the Absolute, there is a difference in the way in which they are explained to be so. The purpose of this short note is to indicate wherein this difference lies.

We shall begin by drawing attention to two types of illusion in common experience. A person may fancy that he sees a serpent at a distance, while closer scrutiny reveals to him that it is only a rope. The later or correcting knowledge here, like practically all knowledge of the kind, affirms the existence of something; but it contradicts the object *as which* that something appeared before. Again, a person looking at a white crystal through a sheet of yellow glass, of whose existence he is not aware, takes it to be yellow. But a change in his standpoint will disclose to him that the yellowness belongs to the glass and not to the crystal. Here also, as in the previous case, the later knowledge affirms the existence of some reality; unlike it, however, it does not deny the object *as which* it appeared, viz., the crystal, but only one aspect of it—yellowness. The illusion in the one case consists in mistaking a given object for something else that is not given; in the other, it consists merely in referring to an object, which is given a feature that does not really belong to it, though it also happens to be presented. But for the interposition of the object, to which the yellowness actually belongs and the percipient's ignorance, we should add, of the true colour of the crystal, there would be no illusion at all in the latter case. It is accordingly described as *sopādhika-bhrama* or an illusion involving the presence of an *upādhi*, which is the name given to such intervening factors. In the former, on the other hand, there is no such factor; and it is therefore described as *nirupādhika-bhrama*.

Now these types of illusion serve to illustrate the difference

in the manner in which, according to Śaṁkara's Advaita, one and the same Brahman comes to appear both as the world and as the individual *jīva*. It gives rise to the illusion of the world, as the rope does to that of a serpent in our first example. The ultimate truth, as realised by a *jīvanmukta*, denies the world while affirming the underlying reality of Brahman which is given in all presentations as positive being (*sat*) and with which we may therefore be said to be in constant touch. The *jīva*, on the other hand, is not illusory in this sense. It is Brahman itself appearing through media or limiting adjuncts like the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) which—we may state by the way—are elements pertaining to the physical world and, as such, are unreal. When this fact is realised in one's own experience, what is denied is not the *jīva* as a spiritual entity, but only certain aspects of it, e.g., its finitude and its plurality. Its conception may become profoundly transformed thereby, but the point for us to note is that it is not negated (*bādhita*) in the same way in which the physical world is. This difference in the explanation has a vital bearing on the Advaitic doctrine, and Śaṁkara consequently lays particular emphasis on it. It brings out clearly what is meant by the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman which is of fundamental importance to the doctrine. The *jīva* is not false as the world is, but only its limitations are so; and these limitations, which are really of its empirical adjuncts, appear transferred to it as, in our second example, the yellowness of the glass appears transferred to the crystal. It is for the purpose of elucidating this point that Śaṁkara, as explained by the commentators, gives two separate examples of illusion in the beginning of his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*: *Śuktikā hi rajatavat avabhāsate, ekaḥ candraḥ sadvitīyavat iti*—'Mother-of-pearl appears as silver; and the single moon, as double.' He refers to it elsewhere also in the same work, and we shall conclude by citing two of his statements relating to the conception of the *jīva*: 'As long as it is associated with the adjunct of *buddhi*, so long only is the *jīva* a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct'. (II. iii. 30). 'The *jīva* is not other than the Lord, but yet its intrinsic omniscience and omnipotence are hidden from it because it falsely identifies itself with its bodily organism.' (III. ii. 6).

THE SĀṄKHYA SYSTEM

The origin of this system and the logical consistency of its teaching have, for a long time, been matters of controversy; but its importance in the history of Indian thought has never been questioned. Its characteristic ideas and the terminology in which it gives expression to them are met with in the religious and philosophical literature of India almost as commonly as those of the Upaniṣads. They especially pervade the Purāṇas, including a large part of the great epic of the *Mahābhārata*. We shall not concern ourselves here with the logical or chronological controversies touching the doctrine, but shall merely give a brief sketch of it, selecting in particular such features as will help us in understanding its significance to practical life.

The Sāṅkhya is frankly dualistic. It recognizes two ultimate entities—nature and spirit—neither of which can be derived from the other. The former is termed Prakṛti, and the latter Puruṣa. Since these two conceptions are of fundamental importance to the doctrine, we shall begin our sketch with an explanation of them:

(1) *Prakṛti*: There are two commonly known ways of explaining the origin of the physical world. It may be traced to a manifold of ultimate reals which are supposed to be simple and atomic; or it may be derived from a single substance which is assumed to be complex and all-pervasive. The former is described as the theory of creation (*ārambha-vāda*), for in it the things of the world are explained as generated by the putting together of two or more atoms; and the latter, as the theory of evolution (*pariṇāma-vāda*), for in it the same are looked upon as the result of transformations within the primal substance. The Sāṅkhya adopts the second mode of explanation, and Prakṛti is the name which it gives to the principle or entity out of which is evolved the objective universe in its infinite diversity. This primal entity is not directly perceived and its existence, like that of the atoms in the other view, has only to be inferred. Here, as elsewhere generally, the Sāṅkhya prefers a rationalistic explanation and does not, like some other systems, invoke the aid of revelation in support of its

conclusions. The very name of the doctrine, derived from *saṅkhyā* which means *buddhi*, indicates that it is based on reflection rather than authority. Prakṛti, or Mūla-prakṛti as it is sometimes designated to indicate that it is the First Cause of the universe, is thus one and complex; and its complexity is the result of its being constituted of three factors, each of which is described as a *guṇa*. By the word *guṇa* here, we should not understand what it is commonly taken to mean, viz., "a quality," for the Sāṅkhya refuses to recognize the distinction between substance and attribute. There is indeed no harm in speaking for the sake of convenience of either, apart from the other; but to think of the two as really separate from, or external to, each other is, according to the present doctrine, to indulge in an illegitimate abstraction. The so-called quality and substance together form a single whole; and it is the concrete unity of both that any material thing represents. The term *guṇa* means here rather "a component factor" or "a constituent" of Prakṛti. These three constituents, though essentially distinct in their nature, are conceived as interdependent so that they can never be separated from one another. It means that they are not mechanically placed together, but reciprocally involve one another and form a unity in trinity. That is, they not only co-exist but also cohere. The three *guṇas* are named *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Each of them stands for a distinct aspect of physical reality: roughly, *sattva* signifies whatever is pure and fine; *rajas*, whatever is active; and *tamas*, what is stolid and offers resistance. From the standpoint of the experiencing mind, they are also described as being of the nature respectively of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and bewilderment (*moha*), for they give rise to those feelings. The above description shows that the *guṇas* are not merely distinct but are also, in some measure, antagonistic in their nature. The antagonism, however, is not such as to preclude their acting together; and their harmonious action is illustrated by the example of a lamp-flame—the result of co-operation between the wick, oil and fire which, in their separate nature, appear to be hardly fitted to so co-operate. In other words, the physical universe is an orderly whole which has its own laws to obey and there is no ultimate contradiction in it, though it may consist of opposing elements.

It is not only Prakṛti that consists of these *guṇas*. Everything that emerges from it is also similarly constituted, for the doctrine maintains that effects are essentially identical with their material cause. In fact, it is by a proper synthesis of the common and enduring features of the things of experience that the conception of Prakṛti has been reached as the idea of gold, for instance, is reached by a comparison of golden things like bracelets and rings. These cosmic constituents are in a state of equilibrium in Prakṛti until it begins to differentiate itself; and the diversity of the things that then spring into being from it is due to the diversity in the proportion in which the *guṇas* enter into their make-up in the complex process of Prakṛti's evolution. 'It is just as in a game of dice: they are ever the same dice, but as they fall in various ways, they mean to us different things.' Though only three in number, the *guṇas* thus really stand for a manifold of distinctions. In later Sāṅkhya, it is expressly stated that their number is infinite and that they are only arranged in three groups on the basis of their likenesses and differences. Prakṛti is not only complex and all-pervasive, it is also undergoing change perpetually. Naturally, the things that develop out of it are also conceived as sharing in its fluid character. Thus the paper on which these lines are printed may appear to be static; but it is really changing every instant, though it at the same time maintains its identity as long as it lasts. An important difference between the two is that while Prakṛti, which is by hypothesis omnipresent, can have no change of place but only change of form, the things derived from it on account of their finiteness can have both. A plant, for example, may grow or wither where it is; and it may also be shifted from one place to another. It is change of form that is meant by *pariṇāma* or evolution. The evolutionary process, in the case of Prakṛti, is supposed to be periodical. That is to say, every period of evolution or *sṛṣṭi* is followed by a period of dissolution or *pralaya* when the whole diversity of the universe becomes latent or 'goes to sleep', as it is stated, in Prakṛti. But even in *pralaya*, we must remember, Prakṛti does not cease to be dynamic; only its component parts, the *guṇas*, constantly reproduce themselves then instead of acting on one another and giving rise to a heterogeneous transformation.

As regards the things that emerge from Prakṛti, it would suffice to call attention to only one point which it is necessary to know for understanding the Sāṅkhya explanation of experience. It is the distinction between the things in which *sattva* predominates and those in which *tamas* does so. Most of the things of the material world as well as our physical frame belong to the latter class. They are objective. The former, in which *sattva* preponderates, indeed are not subjective because they also are derived from Prakṛti and are therefore physical; but on account of their finer structure, they are well adapted to assist in the revelation of external objects to spirit which, as we shall presently see, is unable by itself to apprehend anything. To state the same in another way, the activity of these *sāttvika* developments is a necessary condition of mental life, although they do not by themselves explain it. Of this group, the most important member is what is described as the *antaḥ-karaṇa* or the 'internal organ.' It is really threefold, consisting of *manas*, *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*; but it is not necessary to give a detailed description of them here. Its chief function is to receive impressions from outside and to suitably respond to them; and it is assisted in the proper discharge of this function by the various senses that belong to the same group. This whole apparatus, consisting of the internal organ and its several accessories, may be taken as roughly corresponding to the brain and the nervous mechanism associated with its functioning according to modern psychology. It is specific to each individual and, together with certain other factors, accompanies him throughout his worldly existence or *saṁsāra*. This relatively permanent 'accompaniment' is known as the *liṅga-śarīra* or 'subtle body.' It does not part one even at death, and is cast off only when freedom is fully achieved.

To sum up the conception of Prakṛti: The whole of the physical universe emanates from it and, since Prakṛti is conceived as ultimate and independent, the explanation so far may be characterised as naturalistic.

(2) *Puruṣa*: What prevents the doctrine from being a philosophy of nature, pure and simple, is its recognition of Puruṣa by the side of Prakṛti. Prakṛti does not exhaust the content of the universe; it leaves out the very element by virtue of which we become aware of the existence of the physical world. And it is

that element of awareness or sentience which Puruṣa represents. While the doctrine thus differs from naturalism, it does not identify itself with absolutistic systems like the Vedānta, because it preserves to the end the dualism of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. No satisfactory explanation of experience is possible, according to the Sāṅkhya, if we do not admit the equal and independent reality of both the material and spiritual elements. The existence of Puruṣa, like that of Prakṛti, may therefore be said to have been reached through reason. If the latter is postulated on the principle that effects presuppose a cause that is immanent in them, the former is postulated on the principle that objects point to the subject, or more strictly, that the non-sentient implies the sentient. Another argument in support of the same conclusion is based upon the design found in the physical world. The bodily organism, for example, with its many well-adapted parts suggests that it is meant to serve a definite end; and there are numerous other instances in nature with a similar teleology implicit in them. The entity, whose ends such adaptations and contrivances serve, is Puruṣa. In other words, spirit is the principle *for the sake of which* nature evolves. Both Prakṛti and Puruṣa alike are thus deduced from an investigation of the nature of common things; the only difference is that while the one is the result of arguing from those things to their source or *first* cause, the other is the result of arguing from them to their aim or *final* cause. The world is derived from a principle which is like it in its nature, but subserves the ends of another which is quite unlike. Puruṣa is manifold, in contrast to Prakṛti; and the doctrine may for that reason be described as pluralism. The conception is, in other respects also, the very opposite of Prakṛti. Puruṣa is not complex but simple; it is not dynamic but static, knowing neither change of place nor change of form. It is passive while Prakṛti is ever active, which means that it is to be identified more with feeling or the affective side of the mind than with any other. It cannot consequently either *know* or *will* anything in the ordinary sense, unless it is assisted by the internal organ and its various adjuncts. In itself, it is a mere witness or looker-on (*sākṣin*), as it is described. Like Prakṛti, however, it is supposed to be omnipresent, though its manifestation during the transmigrating state or *saṁsāra* is confined to the physical accessories like the

body and the internal organ with which it happens to be associated.

The exact manner in which these two disparate entities are brought together or *seem* to be brought together is a difficult point and remains one of the perplexities in the system. But our present purpose does not require any discussion of it. Whatever the ultimate explanation may be, Prakṛti and Puruṣa virtually act as one; and we shall therefore take it for granted that they co-operate. It is, indeed, a matter of experience that there is no spirit without a body or a body which functions as a living organism without spirit. This complex of nature and spirit is only the empirical self and is to be distinguished, according to the Sāṅkhya, from the true or transcendental self, viz., Puruṣa; but, from the practical standpoint, the distinction is of no importance. The Prakṛti element that most intimately enters into this union is the internal organ. There are other elements also, like the sensory organs; but they are all in one sense or another entirely subordinate to it. The coming together of these is the necessary presupposition of all experience, for spirit without nature is inactive and nature without spirit is blind. In the resulting union, each finds its complement and the defects of both are made good. And we may point out by the way that experience is not explained here, as in naturalism, to be a product of unconscious matter; it is, on the other hand, taken to emerge from a certain association of spirit with it—an association through which the two behave as if they were a single organism. Matter is merely the medium for spirit to manifest itself, not its source. This association of the two is found not only ordinarily but also in what is known as *jīvanmukti* or 'freedom while still alive' when a person has become fully enlightened and has transcended all the weaknesses of human flesh. Such a man, when he departs this life, must no doubt continue to *be*, Puruṣa being considered immortal. Spirit then remains in itself, wholly emancipated from nature. That condition is described as *kaivalya*—"isolation" or "aloofness"—to distinguish it from *jīvanmukti* in which the Puruṣa continues to be associated with the body, senses and so forth, though no longer in bondage to them.

The self in this sense is not a detached entity like the

Puruṣa, but exhibits the result of innumerable forces that have acted upon it in the course of its beginningless history. It is consequently not passive and does not remain a mere spectator of whatever happens to be before it, but is active and meddles with the external object as it apprehends it. It does not, however, through such meddling import any new features into the object presented; it only selects certain aspects of it and omits the rest. According to this theory of selective apprehension, all the characteristics that can ever be known of an object actually belong to it; and if any of them are not apprehended by a particular person or at a particular time, it is entirely due to subjective limitations. Hence the sensory organs and the *antaḥ-karaṇa*, though they help perception in one sense, may be said to hinder it in another. The nature of the selection made in the case of any object depends upon the past life or character of the person in question; and this is the reason why a thing that attracts one may completely repel another. The aspect under which an individual perceives the world is thus intimately personal to him; yet the doctrine does not maintain, as one school of Buddhism, for example, does, that there is no external reality at all. The different world-views are, no doubt, relative to the subject; but they, at the same time, point to an objective world which is common to all and is real in its own right. The chief argument in support of this realistic position is that, although there are differences among men in their views of things, there are as certainly points of agreement also among them. If there are occasions when each can speak only for himself, there are others when one can speak for all. Here is an important feature of the system, for it neither sides with the view that things are precisely as they are apprehended, nor with the other which holds that the mind makes its own things. It avoids either extreme and allots equal importance to the subjective and objective factors in explaining the phenomenon of experience. It is *we* who know, just as truly as it is the *world* that is known. Men obtrude their personalities into their judgments and subjective prejudices undoubtedly affect their knowledge of things; yet they never create the things they perceive. But our knowledge, though pointing to an external universe, is one-sided. This is a fundamental defect of human experience; and to it we should add

another, arising from the fact that the *whole* of the world is presented to no man at one and the same time. All knowledge, as commonly known to us, is therefore personal and fragmentary. It may not indeed amount to an error of commission (*viparīta-khyāti*); but it is partial and, so far as it is not recognized to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission (*akhyāti*). This incomplete knowledge, with the resulting over-emphasis on a part of what is given, explains the conflicts and inconsistencies of life whether they be found in the same person at different times or between different persons at the same time.

Such a view of knowledge is not without its lesson for us. The lesson is twofold: It behoves us to feel less positive than we ordinarily do about the correctness of our own views, and be more regardful of the views of others. In other words, it teaches us the need for humility and charity in our intercourse with fellow-men, and impresses upon us the need for doing our utmost to see things not only as they appear to us but also as they may appear to others. The differences between one man and another may at first sight appear unbridgeable; but it may be that they can be easily adjusted if only each tries to learn and appreciate the others' point of view. In one word, it bespeaks toleration which, as a matter of fact, is a striking feature of all Indian thought.

If all knowledge be thus imperfect in its very nature, what is truth? The Sāṅkhya holds that it is comprehensive knowledge in which one part supplements and corrects another. It is knowledge which knows no exclusions or preferences and lays appropriate emphasis on all aspects of the object known. It may be asked whether such knowledge is at all possible so long as its means continues to be the internal organ which, as a product of Prakṛti, is of a triple nature and consists not merely of *sattva* but also of *rajas* and *tamas*. In answering this question, it is necessary to remember that it is not the internal organ *as such* that limits our view of the world in the manner described above; for in its intrinsic nature, it is essentially *sāttvic* and is therefore well fitted to be the means of revealing all that is. In point of fact, however, *rajas* or *tamas* predominates in it as a result of the past history of the person to whom it belongs; and it is the relative predominance of either that accounts for

whatever limitations it may possess as an organ of knowledge. By subduing these elements through proper self-discipline and restoring the internal organ to its original purity, man may completely transform his outlook upon life and the world. *Rajas* and *tamas* cannot, of course, be entirely eliminated; but when the internal organ is purified or 'the heart is cleansed' as it is said, their presence will be harmless for all practical purposes. But it should not be imagined that this complete knowledge is merely an aggregate of all possible views of the physical world. It is rather an experience in which they have all been integrated and, according to the account given of it (see e.g., *Yoga-sūtra*, i. 49), is best described as intuitive. It overcomes the idiosyncrasies of individual attitudes; but it does so by synthesizing, not by summing, them. In this synthetic view, which represents the climax of philosophic thought, all things are seen as they actually are. So soon as this whole and disinterested truth about the world dawns upon one's mind, one sees through Prakṛti and realizes its absolute distinctness from Puruṣa. And it is a knowledge of this distinctness (*viveka-jñāna*) rather than that of the world as it is, that is stated to be the means of release. Such knowledge is attainable in the present life; and it is the attainment of it that is the final aim of life according to the Sāṅkhya. The whole realm of nature is conceived in the system as leading up to this consummation. It is designed for this end and exists solely for it. Only the approach to the ideal is through worldly life, the character and duration of which depend upon the moral and intellectual equipment of particular individuals. But all alike have to pass through the trials and troubles of common life (*bhoga*) before their mind is turned towards the final goal (*apavarga*). It means that the true ideal does not suggest itself to any one that has not seen for himself the imperfections of *saṁsāra*. The Sāṅkhya ideal of life may appear to be one that can never be actually reached; but what is important to note is the possibility of a progressive approximation to it. In the case of all ideals, we may say, it is a continual advance in the right direction that matters more than even their actual realization.

Such a view of the goal of life means a long course of discipline to reach it, and we have now briefly to consider the nature of this discipline. But before proceeding to it, we may

draw attention to what is a common feature of all the Indian systems. They are not motived by the purpose merely of discovering truth, but also by that of realizing it in life. It is such realization that marks the attainment of truth, in the proper sense of the term, and not merely arriving at a speculative notion of it. In other words, Indian philosophy regards truth as not merely a fact but also as a value. To give our intellectual assent to a doctrine, however vital that too may be, is therefore not all; we must see that it inaugurates a new life. This is the significance of the personal discipline prescribed in all the systems as the necessary accompaniment of philosophic study. The discipline in the present case is only briefly referred to in Sāṅkhya works, but it is fully described in the sister system of Yoga. If Kapila has enlarged upon the theory, Patañjali has done the same in regard to the practical side of the teaching. The discipline comprises what are described as the eight *aṅgas* of *yoga*. They are *yama* or "self-restraint", *niyama* or "observance", *āsana* or "posture", *prāṇāyāma* or "regulation of breath", *pratyāhāra* or "withdrawal of the senses", *dhāraṇā* or "steadying the mind", *dhyāna* or "contemplation" and *samādhi* or "meditative trance". The aim of this discipline is to assist man in the ascent from the narrow view congenital to him to the larger vision which brings freedom with it. A characteristic feature of it is the gradation in the training which it prescribes. It recognizes different levels of fitness in the disciples and regulates the training accordingly. It does not aim at extirpating evil propensities all at once. Another noteworthy feature of the same is that it is based upon the psychologically sound principle that vice is not overcome by attempting to repress it directly, but by sedulously practising the contrary virtue which will eventually supplant it. This eightfold discipline may be divided into two stages:

(i) The first is concerned with the right direction of the will, and represents the attainment of the good as distinguished from the true. We have already mentioned the need for charity and humility in our dealings with others. The discipline in the present stage is devised to develop this unselfish side in men's character. More particularly, it relates to the acquirement of virtues comprised in the first two *aṅgas* of *yogic* discipline, namely, *yama* and *niyama*. The former is negative and consists

of non-injury (*ahiṁsā*), truth-speaking (*satya*), abstention from stealing or misappropriation of others' property (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahma-carya*) and disowning of possessions (*aparigraha*). The latter is positive and includes purity (*śauca,*) contentment (*saṁtoṣa*), right aspiration (*tapas*), study (*svādhyāya*) and devotion to God (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*). These together may be described as the ten commandments of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. It is on this pre-eminently moral foundation that any spiritual training should rest, if it is to be fruitful and not on the mere cultivation of the intellect. Without such a foundation, there is no possibility of salvation; and he who lays that foundation firmly, even though he may stop short at that, may be taken to have achieved much. The key-word to this discipline is impersonality. Man must overcome the egoistic impulses in him which are the source of so much evil in the world. The discipline is consequently ascetic, but it is not so in the negative sense of the term, as is shown by the nature of the virtues enjoined under the second head of *niyama*. The impersonal attitude thereby attained is known as *vairāgya*, and its cultivation is recommended in order to awaken the spiritual will. It is described as *apara* or "lower" *vairāgya*, to distinguish it from the *para* or the "higher" which does not appear till full enlightenment has come. Any dabbling in *yoga*, without this preliminary purification of natural impulses, is fraught with danger; and it is such a hasty recourse to *yogic* practice that is responsible for much of the odium that has come to be attached in the popular mind to that discipline.

(ii) The next stage of the discipline, consisting of the remaining six *aṅgas*, is for the specific cultivation of the power of mental concentration. Its details being somewhat technical, we shall refer here only to its general features. Of the six *aṅgas*, the first three are devised to secure control of the physical frame with a view to facilitate the control of the mind. They refer, as already noted, to right bodily posture, regulation of breath and the withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects. Of the succeeding three, two assist in getting a direct but gradual mastery over the ever-fitful mind. The objects chosen for meditating upon may be any in this stage. The last consists essentially in direct meditation on the Sāṅkhya truth. It should be practised in two grades: The first is calculated to

transform that truth into an immediate intuition. It results in the *viveka-jñāna* alluded to above. The disciple, in this form of *samādhi*, remains conscious of having attained the discriminative knowledge which is the means of release; and it is therefore designated as *samprajñata-samādhi*. But in the next step, termed *asaṁprajñata-samādhi*, he grows oblivious of that also. When success in this final stage is achieved, all operations of the internal organ are suspended and spirit returns to itself, so to speak. The disciple then becomes a *jīvanmukta*. He may thereafter continue to live upon the earth, but he is virtually divorced from Prakṛti and therefore remains 'far from passion, pain and guilt.'

The purpose of *yogic* discipline as a whole, to put it briefly, is to secure purity and poise. Using the words of a modern moral philosopher, we may say that the *yogic* precept changes first from 'Do not' to 'Do', and from that again to 'Be.'

There is one point in the above account which requires a word of explanation. We have mentioned God in describing *niyama*; but we have not, so far, referred to his place in the doctrine at all. Of the two systems to which we have alluded, the Sāṅkhya, in its classical form, is definitely atheistic. It believes in the permanence and supremacy of spirit, but knows nothing of God. Here it shows its rationalistic bias, for no syllogistic proof, as is well known, can be given of his existence. The Sāṅkhya, no doubt, like the other Indian systems, is essentially a philosophy of values. But according to its teachers, all that is presupposed by the reality of higher values is the reality of the human spirit. This is clearly indicated by the manner in which the 'design argument', already referred to, is utilized here. It is regarded not as pointing to a designer, but to one that constitutes the end or final aim of the design. The Sāṅkhya concludes from the presence in nature of means adapted to the accomplishment of particular ends, not to God as their author, but to the self for whom it supposes them to exist. Patañjali holds a different view and postulates the existence of God or Īśvara over and above that of Puruṣa. The allusion to God appears in our account of *niyama* because the course of discipline, as we remaked before, is entirely taken over from his system. Devotion to God would consequently have no place in the discipline which is strictly in conformity with the

Sāṅkhya teaching. Here is an important difference between the two doctrines which agree in so many respects. But the Yoga conception of Īśvara is vastly different from the familiar one of the Vedānta. To begin with, Īśvara here is *one* of the Puruṣas so that, though omnipresent, he is not all-comprehensive. There are other Puruṣas as well as Prakṛti to limit his being. Secondly, he is not responsible, in the ordinary sense of the term, for the creation of the world which, as we know, is the spontaneous work of Prakṛti. But he is a perfect Puruṣa and has always been so. He is therefore unique, and even the liberated Puruṣas do not stand on the same footing. Still, on account of his perfection, he serves as a pattern to man as to what he might become. In this respect, he resembles a *guru* who should likewise be an embodiment of the ideal. Apart from serving as an ideal he, out of his abundant mercy, sympathizes with suffering men and helps them in attaining spiritual freedom if they only trust in him and meditate upon him. Accordingly, Patañjali recognizes not only the *yoga* discipline as detailed above for securing freedom but also an alternative one of *bhakti* or devotion to Īśvara and communion with him which, without all the elaborate preparation of *yoga*, qualifies one for *samādhi*—the immediate means of release.

We have so far referred to the attainment of the good and the vision of the true; and the Sāṅkhya, like the generality of Indian doctrines, subordinates the one to the other. There remains another value of life, viz., the aesthetic, and we shall refer to one or two important features of it before we conclude. An impersonal view of man and nature but devoid of enlightenment in the above sense is, according to the Sāṅkhya, the characteristic feature of aesthetic experience. The narrow view common to human life is not overcome here by the acquisition of complete knowledge; but the conditions of ordinary personal life are, all the same, transcended here, though only temporarily, as in the case of a *jīvanmukta*. The aesthetic attitude is therefore disinterested like the insight that brings freedom with it. The detachment characteristic of the attitude is the result chiefly of the *ideal* status of the objects portrayed in art which divests them of all personal reference, and thereby renders them similar to the actual things as contemplated by the perfected *yogin*. Art, indeed, may be defined as the layman's *yoga*, for

it also affords an escape from the realm of the *guṇas*. Great artists attain such detachment directly through the impulse they receive from nature—from 'woods and rills, the silence that is in the starry sky, the sleep that is among the lonely hills'. But that is not so, to any conspicuous extent, as regards ordinary men; yet even they can rise to that level with the help of the artistic creations of a genius. In either case, we must note, the stimulus comes from outside, although response to it is impossible without a certain aptitude in the individual. In other words, the act of will, as compared with the acquisition of right knowledge, plays here quite a secondary part. The impersonal attitude comes of itself; it is not sought deliberately and found. Speaking of this distinction between the artist's success and the saint's, a thinker who is known to have developed a theory of art on the basis of Sāṅkhya philosophy but with particular reference to poetry, states—somewhat exultingly—that the bliss of peace, which the *yogin* strains himself to win, is no match for that with which the poetic Muse spontaneously requites her votaries.[1] But he is really reversing the truth here, because the artistic attitude is temporary and will be followed sooner or later by what, in spite of the culture it may involve, must be regarded as a lapse into the routine of ordinary life. The saint also who has achieved true freedom may revert to common life from his state of trance; but that can, in no sense be taken as a lapse, for the knowledge and wisdom he has gained remain with him ever after inspiring all his thoughts, words and deeds.

[1] Vāgdhenur dugdhā ekaṁ hi rasaṁ yad bala-tṛṣṇayā |
Tena nāsya samaḥ sā syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ ||
Quoted from Bhatta Nāyaka in the commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 29 (Nirn.Sag.Pr.) See also *Kāvyapradīpa*, iv. 4-5.

THE IDEA OF PURUṢĀRTHA

The idea of *puruṣārtha* has played a very important part in the history of Indian thought. All the *vidyās* or branches of learning assign to it the foremost place in their inquiries, though they differ from one another in various respects in their views concerning it. We propose to consider here what this idea stands for in general without entering into details.

The term *puruṣārtha* literally signifies "what is sought by men", so that it may be taken as equivalent to a human end or purpose. The qualifying word 'human' here may suggest that the term is not applicable to ends which man seeks in common with the lower animals; but really it is not so, for we find it used with reference to several among such ends like food and rest. The qualification should therefore be explained in a different way. We know that man, like the other living beings, acts instinctively; but he can also do so deliberately. That is, he can consciously set before himself ends and work for them. It is this conscious pursuit that transforms them into *puruṣārtha*. Thus even the ends which man shares with other animals, like food and rest, may become *puruṣārtha*, provided they are sought knowingly. The significance of the first element (*puruṣa-*) in the compound is not, accordingly, the restriction of the scope of the ends sought, but only of the manner of seeking them. The implication of the other element (*-artha*) in it is that the end is non-existent at the time it is cognised as worth pursuing, and is still to be accomplished. It is a 'to be' which is 'not yet', and therefore demands for its attainment effort on the part of the person seeking it. For this reason, it is described as *sādhya* which in the terminology of modern philosophy, may be expressed as 'a value to be realized'. Fame, for instance, or what comes to the same thing, the feeling of gratification resulting from it, which cannot be attained without much toil is a value in this sense. Now the pursuit of a value presupposes a knowledge not only of what that value is but also of a suitable means to its realization. Sometimes this means or *sādhana* also is styled a *puruṣārtha*, giving rise to the distinction of "instrumental" (*gauṇa*) and "intrinsic" (*mukhya*) values, as they are called. For instance,

money, which is ordinarily acquired as a means to an end, is an instrumental value while pleasure, which is sought for its own sake, is an intrinsic one. We may thus define a *puruṣārtha* as an end which is consciously sought to be accomplished either for its own sake or for the sake of utilizing it as a means to the accomplishment of a further end.

From what has been stated so far, it appears that a *puruṣārtha* is something which does not already exist, but is to be produced anew. Indeed, according to some Indian thinkers, viz., the early Mīmāṁsakas, no existent object (*siddha*) can by itself be an intrinsic value or a *puruṣārtha* in the primary sense of the term. It can, at best, be only of instrumental interest.[1] But others allow that the achievement of a value need not always be understood in this positive sense. The end sought may be already there, and yet we may not be able to get at it owing to some obstacle or other as, for example, in the case of buried treasure. Here achievement consists merely in removing the obstacle. When that is done, the treasure, with the accompanying joy, is attained at once. This variety of value also requires the exercise of activity before it is attained, though the activity is directed solely towards the removal of hindrances which stand in the way of its attainment. Hence such values also may be described as, *sādhya*, but only in a negative or indirect sense. Nor need this hindrance be always physical as in the above example; it may be mental, being merely our failure to realize that what we seek is already in our possession. To give a trivial but typical example, a person may be so much beside himself as to set about searching for his eye-glasses while he is actually wearing them. Here 'attainment' consists in the person in question overcoming the delusion into which he has fallen, either by being appraised of the fact by some one else or by himself coming somehow to discover it. This kind of *puruṣārtha* again may be classed as *sādhya*, provided we grant that knowledge also, like action, can be the means of achieving values. Here too, as in the previous case, nothing new comes into being. But both achievements alike involve a change in the existing state of things; only while the change brought about in the one case is in the realm of being, in the other it is in the realm of thought.

[1] Cf. *Bhūtaṁ bhavyāya kalpate.*

The *puruṣārthas* that have been recognized in India from very early times are four: *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*; and the main aim of every *vidyā* is to deal with one or another of them. This shows, it may be stated by the way, that the Indian thinker was actuated by more than speculative interest in his investigations, and that he carried them on, having always in view their relation to human purposes. Not all these values, however, are of equal rank. They admit of being arranged in an ascending scale, and the determination of their relative status forms the chief problem of philosophy as conceived in India. We can refer here to only one aspect of it, viz., the distinction between secular and spiritual values. To contrast them generally, the former are what man is naturally inclined to seek, while the latter are what he ought to seek but ordinarily does not. The notion of the higher or spiritual values is suggested to him as the lower or secular ones are not finally satisfying. A lower value may, when realized, bring immediate satisfaction; but sooner or later the satisfaction terminates. Other values of the same kind will thereafter make their appeal, but the result of pursuing them will be no less transient. It is in contemplating their invariably transitory character that man comes to think of enduring values and to yearn for them. Of the four values mentioned above, the last two, viz., *dharma* and *mokṣa*, are spiritual; and the sole purpose of the Veda, as it has for long been held, is to elucidate their nature and to point out the proper way to realize them. But pursuing these higher values does not necessarily mean abandoning the lower ones of *artha* and *kāma*, for there is no necessary opposition between them—at least according to the majority of Indian thinkers. What is discountenanced by them is only their pursuit for their own sake and not as means to a higher value. When they are made to subserve the latter, they become totally transformed. There is a world of difference, for example, between wealth sought as a means to self-indulgence and as a means to some beneficent purpose.

Of the two spiritual values, there were schools of thought in India that upheld the supremacy of *dharma*; and more than one old Sanskrit work speaks only of three categories of values (*trivarga*, leaving out *mokṣa*). But gradually, *mokṣa* came to be regarded as the only ultimate or supreme value (*parama-puru-*

ṣārtha), *dharma* being subordinated to it in one way or another. Thus what was once considered good enough to be the goal of life became later but a stepping stone to the attainment of a higher end. The way of subordinating *dharma*, which has stood the test of time, is what we owe to the teaching of the Gītā, viz., that when it is pursued with no desire for what is commonly recognized as its fruit, it qualifies for *mokṣa* through purifying the affections (*sattva-śuddhi*). As regards the type of *sādhya* which *mokṣa* represents, we have pointed out that the word *sādhya* may be understood in a positive or a negative sense. *Mokṣa* being the realization of one's self in its true nature according to all schools, it is not to be effected in the former sense as *dharma* is. Its achievement can be only indirect, and we find that both the possible views here are held by Indian philosophers. While the generality of them maintain that *mokṣa* involves an actual change in the condition of the self, some hold that it means merely a change in the point of view towards it. It is in this latter way that Śaṁkara, for instance, understands it. In his view, the self has been and will ever be what it always is, viz., Brahman. This truth, however, is lost sight of by man during *saṁsāra* owing to congenital ignorance. It thus lacks realization though eternally achieved. *Mokṣa* consists merely in getting rid of this ignorance; and, simultaneously with its riddance, the self reveals itself in all its spiritual splendour. Hence *jñāna* is regarded as the sole and sufficient means to *mokṣa* in *Advaita*, while in other doctrines, generally speaking it is taken to stand in need of being associated with *karma* to serve that purpose.

In conclusion we may just refer to one more point. Is the highest value realizable by man or is it merely an idea? All Indian thinkers agree that it can be realized, some maintaining that the realization may take place even within the span of the present life. Nature, including the physical frame with which it has invested man, is not finally either hostile or indifferent to his spiritual aspirations; and he is bound to succeed in attaining them in the end, if not at once, provided only that his efforts in that direction are serious and sincere. One system, viz., Sāṅkhya goes so far as to maintain that the kingdom of Nature is not merely favourable to man's realization of the highest ideal, but that it is designed precisely to bring about that consummation.

THE UPANIṢADS[1]

During the past few years, Mr. G. A. Natesan has brought out abridged editions of the two great epics, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, and of the most popular of the Purāṇas, the *Bhāgavata*. With laudable enterprise, he is now following them up with a companion volume containing selections from the Upaniṣads. The need for this publication was, if anything, greater because the Upaniṣads are the very foundation of all Indian thought, and a knowledge of them is essential to a correct understanding of the Indian view of life. If the three previous volumes give us an insight into the ideal of practical life, the present one reveals to us its philosophic basis. But the importance of the Upaniṣads does not depend merely upon the place they occupy in the development of Indian thought; their intrinsic value also is very great. Without entering into details, it may be stated that they possess excellences, both of form and content, which have proved fascinating even to foreigners. Thus Schopenhauer, it is said, always had a version of the Upaniṣads on his table and 'was in the habit, before going to bed, of performing his devotions from its pages'. As a collection compiled from such a source, this handy volume deserves to be widely read.

The number of the Upaniṣads, as commonly reckoned, is very large; but only about a dozen of them are genuine portions of the Veda. The rest are all later and are relatively of inferior value, though even they are not without their distinctive appeal. Selections from both the groups are included here, the former being classed as 'major' and the latter as 'minor' Upaniṣads. Two or three short Upaniṣads, belonging to the first group, appear in full, while the others are represented by passages which have been selected with a good deal of care. The extracts from the second group are naturally fewer. As in the volumes already published, the passages are accompanied by English renderings which are both simple and

[1] Foreward to "*The Upanishads*": Selections from the 108 Upanishads with English Translation by T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D., *G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras.*

faithful. Prefixed to the selections from each Upaniṣad is a short note which sums up its teaching, and indicates all that is noteworthy about it. There are also brief comments to link together the selected passages where they are not continuous. The utility of an anthology provided with such aids is obvious, particularly to those who, for one reason or another, cannot make use of the original text itself.

The term *upaniṣad* literally means 'sitting down nearby'; and, at first, it signified 'secret teaching', i.e., the teaching which was jealously guarded from the unworthy and was imparted only to disciples whose fitness to receive it had been properly tested. The word has since come to be applied to the treatises which embody such teaching. The older or classical Upaniṣads, as being part of the Veda, all belong to the pre-Buddhistic period, and are therefore prior to 500 B.C. Their farther limit cannot be determined with any definiteness; but it is clear that it must be, at least, a couple of centuries earlier. Several of the doctrines, for which the Upaniṣads stand, are associated with the names of renowned sages, like Śāṇḍilya and Yājñavalkya; and it may not be wrong to look upon those early exponents as the authors of the respective doctrines. But we must not understand from this that the Upaniṣads, in their present form, are their handiwork. The doctrines, as at first taught, were in all probability epitomized in pithy formulas like *Tat tvam asi* which, when communicated to tried disciples, were accompanied by oral explanations. The explanations came, in course of time, to be more or less fixed; and out of them have developed the texts as they are now known to us. Hence, in one sense, they are not ascribable to any specific authors at all. That is evidently what should be meant by the common description of the Upaniṣads as *śruti* or 'revelation'.

There are some ideas that dominate the teaching of all the Upaniṣads. The most important of them are two: (1) that of the value of *jñāna* or knowledge of the ultimate reality, and (2) that of the need for *vairāgya* or complete detachment. The whole of the Upaniṣadic doctrine may, indeed, be said to hinge on these two conceptions of *jñāna* and *vairāgya*; and a later Vedāntic work represents them as 'the two wings that are indispensable for the soul, if it should soar unrestricted to

its eternal home of freedom and peace'.[1] To indicate the central teaching of the Upaniṣads, it will suffice to explain the significance of these conceptions. To take up the latter first:

(1) *Detachment*: No matter what Upaniṣad we take, we are sure to find that it emphasises the need for absolute detachment. But it should not be thought that the emphasis implies that social duties are ignored and that the teaching is therefore negative, for this attitude of detachment cannot, and is not intended to be, cultivated in the abstract. *Saṁnyāsa*, which symbolises it, is only the fourth and last *āśrama*; and fitness for it presupposes the strenuous discipline of the other three stages, particularly that of the house-holder with its multifarious social duties. Thus *vairāgya*, being the final outcome of such training, cannot be characterised as un-social or purely negative. The training, indeed, aims at the annihilation of desire, but only as the result of service whole-heartedly rendered to others.

It may be thought that whatever be the nature of the steps leading to it, *saṁnyāsa* in itself is negative, since it means a curtailment, if not a total abandonment, of social activities. It may appear so from some passages found in the Upaniṣads; but there are others, which enjoin the continuance of such activities throughout life. A well-known passage of the latter kind occurs in the *Īśa Upaniṣad*. In its first verse, the Upaniṣad inculcates complete renunciation but qualifies it in the very next one by adding that incessant activity also is necessary. The natural inference to be drawn from it is that man should live amidst others all his life, discharging his obligations to them, but only that he should never think of reaping any personal benefit by doing so. Thus *saṁnyāsa* stands for much more than self-denial. That is only one aspect of it; and there is another aspect, not less important, viz., devotion to the service of others. To state the same otherwise, it signifies self-renunciation and not world-renunciation. It is this teaching of absolutely disinterested work, as is now well known, that was amplified later in the *Gītā*, definitely shifting the emphasis from the form of *saṁnyāsa* to its spirit.

[1] *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, st. 376.

(2) *Knowledge*: The cultivation of detachment is recommended not as an end in itself, but as a means to the pursuit of Truth or the knowledge of ultimate reality, which, to be successful, should necessarily be disinterested. This reality is sometimes represented objectively as the all-pervading principle or Brahman and, at other times, subjectively as the inmost soul of the individual or Ātman. But the distinction is not meant to be taken as final. What the Upaniṣads signify by both is the same, viz., a spiritual reality which is in and beyond all particular facts and which explains all that is in the universe, including the individual self. It is thus neither Brahman nor Ātman, in one sense; but both, in another.

This reality is often spoken of as unknowable, but we should not conclude from it that the teaching of the Upaniṣads is agnostic. It only means that the ultimate reality cannot be made the *object* of any ordinary mode of apprehension—a view which is quite intelligible, since it is, by hypothesis, all-comprehensive and therefore not other than the apprehending *subject*. While thus denying the possibility of cognising it in the familiar way, the Upaniṣads unequivocally declare that it can be realized in one's own experience. That is, though we cannot *know* Brahman we can, as it is said, *be* it. *Yoga* or meditation is the necessary aid to this realization; and, if steadfastly practised, it will transform such indirect knowledge of the ultimate reality as may be gained by a study of the Upaniṣads, into direct experience. It is this direct or immediate experience of it that is finally meant by *jñāna*.

When knowledge in this deeper sense dawns upon a person, he attains *mokṣa* or deliverance. On the negative side, it is described as free from all sorrow and pain; and, on the positive side, it is sometimes characterised as one of joy but, at other times, as transcending it. It means that the joy of deliverance is not of the precarious kind with which we are familiar, but is transcendental, such as is meant by the saying of a much later age: *Sukhaṁ duḥkha-sukhātyayaḥ*. Rather it is not joy at all but abiding peace, or repose that ever is the same. Further, the state of *mokṣa* is conceived not as attainable elsewhere but here and now, if one so wills. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, for example, says 'When all desires dwelling in the heart vanish, then a man becomes immortal; and (even) here

reaches the goal' (vi. 14). Such a person is called a *jīvanmukta*, or 'one that is free while still alive'. This view, on account of its recognition of the possibility of perfecting oneself in the present life, marks a great advance on the earlier Vedic belief that the final ideal of man is to attain the bliss of heaven hereafter. Socrates is stated to have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth; the seers of the Upaniṣads, we may say, discovered that that heaven itself is on this earth, could one but realize it. Perfection does not mean, according to them, a change of time, place and circumstance. It is rather rising above them all, or overcoming every form of narrowness through knowledge and self-discipline.

What is the attitude towards life and the world of one that has become a *jīvanmukta*? He no longer seeks the true, for the spiritual unity of all that exists is now a matter of personal experience to him: and he is so much saturated with that experience that, under no circumstances, does he grow oblivious of it. He never loses 'the touch of the one in the play of the many'. Equally striking is the change in his devotion to the good of others. The ultimate unity of everything that exists having been realized, all desire vanishes of itself. Hence his selflessness ceases to be the result of conscious effort; and his service to others, if those terms can still be used in reference to him, becomes spontaneous—the natural and necessary expression of the universal love which complete knowledge begets. In other words, he loves others not *as such* but *as himself*, because he feels his identity with them. That the knowledge of Upaniṣadic truth connotes such perfect love is beautifully shown by what (according to Sureśvara) Yājñavalkya says to his wife, Maitreyī, in his joy at finding her eager to know that truth from him: 'Impelled by her great love for Śiva, Pārvatī has wrought herself into half of his frame, but you (with far greater love) are yearning to mingle with the whole of my being'.[1]

[1] *Atisnehāpakṛṣṭomā dehārdhaṁ śūlinaḥ śritā |*
tvaṁ tu sarvātmanātmānaṁ kṛtsnaṁ mām āptum icchasi ||
Vārttika on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. iv. 69.

THE VALUE OF SANSKRIT LEARNING AND CULTURE[1]

My first duty is to thank the authorities of this Institution for the great honour they have done me in asking me to take part in to-day's proceedings, and to deliver this address in commemoration of its illustrious founder. The service which such high-souled persons render to society never fades from the memory; yet it is only fitting that, on an occasion like this, we should give public expression to the deep affection with which their names are cherished and the profound gratitude which is felt for all the good that they have done. I had not the privilege of knowing the Hon'ble Sir Krishnaswami Iyer, and I cannot therefore speak with any personal knowledge about him; but I have heard, as so many others have done, of his rare qualities of mind and heart—especially, of his generosity which is exemplified so signally in these two Colleges. Wealth is commonly regarded as a gift of God. It would be nobler to think that God never gives but only lends it to be utilized for the good of others. Sir Krishnaswami Iyer took this view of wealth; and no worthier purpose can be thought of than the one for which he devoted it in establishing these Colleges. According to the *Gītā*, it represents the highest form of *dānam*, because it was given with absolutely no thought of personal advantage but solely for the benefit of others—a class of persons who required help and were, in every sense of the word, deserving of it. And the gift was made, I may add, in a place where and at a time when the need for it was greatest.

Dātavyam iti yad dānaṁ dīyate'nupakāriṇe |
Deśe kāle ca pātre ca tad dānaṁ sāttvikaṁ smṛtam || (xvii. 20)

This benefaction is not only an index of the founder's generosity of heart; it also shows his love and admiration for ancient Indian learning. But he did not merely add one more Institution to those which, though all too few, existed at the time for the spread and encouragement of Sanskrit. He realized that, however excellent Sanskrit learning might be in itself, instruction

[1] Commemoration Address on the Founder's Day of the *Madras Sanskrit College*, Mylapore, Madras, 26 February 1940.

in it needed, as a result of the changes which time and circumstances had brought about, to be supplemented by the teaching of modern subjects; and, as the most appropriate among them for such an institution were selected those that have a direct bearing on Sanskrit itself. By the application of what is known as the comparative method to the study of Sanskrit language and literature, modern scholarship has brought to light many valuable facts about them. It will be a serious deficiency if the pandit passes through his career as a student altogether oblivious of this new knowledge. It was with a view to remove this deficiency that subjects like Philology and History of Sanskrit Literature were added to the curriculum of the College. Besides increasing the pandit's stock of information and widening his general outlook, these subjects were well adapted to acquaint him with the methods of modern oriental scholarship. The excellences of the old pandit such for example, as the depth and definiteness of his knowledge, the clearness of his thinking and the exactness of his expression, were many. But there was a lack of historical perspective in what he knew; and he was apt to take for granted that opinions, put forward as *siddhāntas* in Sanskrit works, had all along been in precisely the same form. We may grant that there are some fundamental truths which never grow old; but as regards knowledge in general, change is the rule. The ancient Indians themselves recognized this fact, at least, in certain departments of learning as shown, for instance, by the maxim current among grammarians, *Yathottaraṁ munīnāṁ prāmāṇyam*—'The later a sage, the greater his authority'—which implies that languages change from generation to generation and that a system of grammar will become out of date, if it is not revised and re-written at frequent intervals. But this idea of development had somehow disappeared in the course of time; and the introduction of the new branches of instruction has greatly helped to familiarize the pandits with it again. This combination of the old learning with the new in Sanskrit schools and colleges is now so common that we may not realize the difficulties that confronted those that inaugurated it; and all credit is due to the pioneers who introduced this reform here and, about the same time, in His Highness the Maharaja's Sanskrit College at Mysore.

There are other commendable features of the organization such, for example, as the provision made for the residence of students and teachers within the precincts of the College. By thus preserving the old mode of simple living, alongside of devotion to the study of the most advanced subjects, the College illustrates how high thinking need not be associated, as it is now more and more coming to be associated, with high living. But it is needless to dwell at length on the merits of an Institution which has worked successfully for over 30 years, and has thus stood the supreme test of time. So I shall pass on to make one or two suggestions regarding the range of knowledge which, I think, it is desirable that the modern pandit, trained in this College and others like it, should have in view. Two or three decades ago, our pandits confined their attention only to the subject in which they specialized, and even there to a few chosen books relating to it. There was, of course, no doubt of the thoroughness with which they studied them; and it may not be an exaggeration if we say that their exposition of those works was as correct and complete as that of the earliest teachers who had taught those works. But thoroughness is no antidote against the narrowness of the mental outlook which such a limited course of study was bound to engender. Sometimes the books chosen, though well suited for the purpose of grinding the pupil, could give only a very poor idea of the wealth and value of Indian thought in the branches concerned. I may perhaps instance the *Pratāpa-rudrīya* which was the staple intellectual food offered to students in those days under general Poetics—a work which no more represents the range and richness of that subject than a sapless specimen, preserved in a botanical museum, does the living plant thriving in spring and sunshine. This drawback was all the more regrettable, as it was relatively a late feature of Sanskrit education and was unknown in older times. Happily this shortcoming has now been considerably remedied, thanks partly to the facilities created by printing; and the modern pandit has not only a wider acquaintance with the literature of his subject, but is usually also conversant with other subjects cognate with it. But there is, however, scope for further extension of such interest—especially in the direction of studying the masterpieces, which have been discovered in recent years, through the indefatigable industry of

orientalists. Many a star of the first magnitude that had once adorned the firmament of Indian learning, but was believed to have set once for all, has, in consequence, appeared again on the horizon. To mention only one such masterpiece, there is the *Brahma-siddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra which has lately been published by the distinguished scholar, Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. Kuppuswami Sastriyar, who was the first Principal of this Institution.

In this connection, I venture to suggest the desirability of our pandits extending their study to the literature of Jainism and Buddhism. In thus commending non-Vedic schools of thought to their attention, I am not proposing anything that is altogether novel. We know that Indian scholars of old learnt the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika which were, at one time, looked upon as heterodox. Śaṁkara, for instance, describes the former as pseudo-tradition and the latter as half-nihilistic.[1] Yet they came to be not only studied in earnest but also to be elevated to the coveted rank of the orthodox *darśanas*. Vācaspati, for example, a professed Vedāntin, has written a standard commentary on the Sāṅkhya as well as on the sister system of Yoga. It is such catholicity of scholarship, in addition to its range, that is wanted now. The old scholars, no doubt, studied Jainism and Buddhism also; but, when we remember certain remarks which even great thinkers like Udayana permitted themselves to make on the leaders of Jaina and Buddhistic thought,[2] we cannot say that their study was sympathetic. Obviously the reason for it was that the antagonism of Jains and Buddhists to the Vedas was of an uncompromising kind. But we, at this distance of time, can afford to be more tolerant; and I believe that our view of the Vedas also does not stand precisely where it did at that time. The literatures of those schools are vast, and have touched excellence in most branches of learning. Neither in grace nor in grandeur of style, neither in subtlety nor in profundity of thought, are they behind Hindu literature. No transition, for instance, is felt when we pass from the study of Kumārila to that of Prabhācandra, or from the study of Gauḍapāda to that of Nāgārjuna. Besides, there are several common features between the Jaina and Buddhistic

[1] Com. on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. i. 1–2; ii. 18.

[2] Cf. *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, pp. 126–7.

doctrines and ours. They believe, for instance, in the same *yoga* discipline, and in the same doctrine of *karma* together with its corollary of the theory of transmigration. More than all this, there is harmony of aim between the two sets of doctrines, although there may be no identity of conclusions. I know that some of the present-day pandits have taken to the study of these literatures. My purpose in referring to the subject is that the study must be carried on more systematically and on a larger scale, and that it should be approached in an entirely sympathetic spirit.

So far, I have assumed that there is unanimity of opinion as regards the need for the study of Sanskrit. But unfortunately that is not so, and objections are not unoften raised against it now-a-days. These objections emanate chiefly from two quarters—the protagonists of a purely modern culture and the votaries of the vernaculars. These critics generally forget that the advocates of Sanskrit education are not behind others in their recognition of the value of modern culture or of the need there is for developing the mother tongue. But only they hold that such recognition does not make it necessary to do away with Sanskrit. They believe, on the other hand, that it is not less indispensable for our future well-being. In view of the difference of opinion that exists in this respect, it may not be out of place to consider briefly what good is to be served by the study of Sanskrit. I shall not now refer to its claims for earnest study such as its antiquity, its originality, or its richness and variety. Nor shall I refer to the immense service which it has rendered by helping to bring into being such useful and interesting branches of learning as comparative philology and comparative mythology. They are considerations that apply to its study by all and not by the Indians alone. For us as Indians, its value lies first and foremost in the fact that it enshrines our ancient ideal of life. It is not the philosophic portion alone that does so, but the whole of Sanskrit literature breathes the true spirit of it. The Epics and the Purāṇas are designed to point out to us its practical application by means of concrete cases which differ from one another in numerous ways. Even poetry and the drama do the same, although in keeping with their prime character as fine arts, they do it but indirectly and

therefore perhaps also more effectively. The spirit of an ideal is, no doubt, best caught from persons that have realized it or are steadfastly pursuing it; but, owing to the many vicissitudes in the course of a nation's history, we cannot always depend upon this source of inspiration. When it fails, we have necessarily to resort to a nation's literature for our insight into the nature of its ideal. India is now more or less in that condition; and, owing to the impact of hostile forces and the growing secularization of life, there is a great risk of the true Indian ideal being obscured or even lost. This ideal has been there, as a unifying factor among the people of the land, for at least two-and-a-half millenniums—ever since the time of the Vedas. The very fact that it is so old shows how deep its influence on Indian life and Indian institutions must have been; and, if it is true that the future, to be secure, should be built upon the past, we cannot afford to be ignorant of it. The only permanent means for comprehending this ideal correctly, and appraising its worth properly is the literature to which Sanskrit furnishes the key. That is the chief reason why we should study it.

But it is not merely the accidents of history that make this ideal important for us; it has intrinsic value also, whether we consider its nature or the means to its achievement. I have stated that it has been there from the time of the Vedas. But it was not formulated till after much strenuous thought and many experiments in living, during the several centuries that covered the Vedic period. There is abundant evidence of this quest throughout Vedic literature. It will suffice to refer here to what is found in one familiar Upaniṣad.[1] It refers to teachers who, while they all upheld the necessity for preserving and passing on to the succeeding generation the learning, which even at that time was considered as handed down from the past, maintained different views regarding the best means to the achievement of life's aim—some thinking that it was uprightness of character or harmony between thought, word and deed (*karaṇa-traya-sārūpyam*), others that it was temperance and charity, and still others that it was the practice of all such virtues along with a faithful adherence to sacrificial ritual.

[1] *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, i. 9.

Broadly speaking, the result of this prolonged quest is twofold, and may be described as the teaching respectively of the earlier or *pūrva* and the later or *uttara kāṇḍas* of the Veda. It is the ideal as taught in the later *kāṇḍa* or the Upaniṣads that has come to prevail, and is the one which is the very foundation of Indian culture. But its distinguishing features will be best understood by contrasting it with the earlier one. The essential character of the later ideal and its distinction from the earlier are very well brought out in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, whose popularity among the students of Vedānta is next only to that of the Gītā; and I shall make it the basis of what I am going to say.

As stated in this Upaniṣad,[1] the highest aim of man, according to the earlier ideal, is to attain heaven, conceived as a place to be reached hereafter. Life there is regarded as one of everlasting joy, all unmixed with pain. The later ideal also is described in similar terms; but the noteworthy point about it is that it is conceived, not as attainable elsewhere, but here—within the four corners of this life. The Upaniṣad says 'When all desires dwelling in the heart vanish, then a man becomes immortal, and (even) here reaches the goal'. (vi. 14). Thus the realization of the goal is, in this case, shifted from a hypothetical hereafter to the present life. Socrates is stated to have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth; the seers of the Upaniṣads, we may say, discovered that that heaven itself is on this earth, could one but realize it. Perfection does not mean, according to them, a change of time, place and circumstance. It is rather transcending them all by cultivating an attitude of mind which is free from all forms of narrowness. It represents an inner harmony, which cannot be the result of mere outer adjustments. There is a change in the nature of the ideal also. The Upaniṣad, as I just stated, speaks of both ideals as unalloyed joy; but, if we pay attention to the details of the teaching, we find that there is a wide difference between the two. It describes the first ideal as 'leaving all grief behind';[2] but, in the case of the second, it declares that it is beyond the reach not only of grief but also of all pleasure.[3] The natural inference to be drawn from this is that the joy of the later

[1] i. 12-19. [2] i. 18. [3] ii. 12.

ideal is of a superior or transcendental kind, such as is meant by the old saying: *Sukham duḥkha-sukhātyayaḥ.* Rather it is not joy at all, in the common acceptation of the term, but peace[1] or repose that ever is the same.

Not less remarkable is the change in the mode of discipline; but I shall restrict my observations only to one or two points. The means to the accomplishment of the earlier ideal is a strict adherence to Vedic ritual. To judge from the nature of the ritualistic training prescribed, which includes the practice of virtues like charity and hospitality,[2] it is not a self-centred life that this ideal signifies as it may, at first sight, seem to do. It aims, no doubt, at bringing about one's own good; but it also requires that one should live amidst others and whole-heartedly discharge one's duties towards them. Hence the earlier ideal stands for neither pure egoism nor pure altruism, but for a combination of both. The means to the later ideal, as may be expected, is altogether different. It is *jñāna*, or the knowledge of ultimate truth, and not ritualistic life. But it must be added that ritual is not given up; it is utilized as an auxiliary to *jñāna*[3]. Here we see illustrated a characteristic feature of all advance in Indian culture, viz., that when a new stage of progress is reached, the old is not discarded but is consciously incorporated in the new. It is this critical conservatism which marks Indian civilization, as a whole, that explains its stability and constitutes its special strength. But in the process of being thus utilized, the old undergoes a vital transformation. In the present case also, ritual is adapted to its new purpose. As a means leading to the first ideal, according to what I have just stated, it serves a double purpose: It secures one's own good; it also ministers to the good of others. Of these two, the former or the egoistic aim is here totally abolished in order that ritual may satisfy the requirement of complete desirelessness, laid down in the verse already cited (vi. 14), for reaching the later ideal. But though the

[1] Indeed, the Upaniṣad itself implies as much when it repeats, in two consecutive *mantras* (v. 12-3), the same sequence of words, changing but one term, viz., *sukha* to *śānti*.

[2] See Śaṁkara on i. 17. Compare also the significance of daily rites like the five *mahāyajñas*.

[3] Cf. ii. 15 and iii. 2.

attitude of the disciple thereby becomes unselfish, we should remember, it is not unsocial for the altruistic purpose of the discipline continues as before. In other words, ritual, instead of helping to gratify one's desires, becomes here a means to their purification (*sattva-śuddhi*) through service disinterestedly rendered to others.

Thus the highest aim of life, according to the later or Upaniṣadic ideal, is abiding peace which can be attained here, if one so wills; and the means to it are knowledge of ultimate truth and disinterested altruism. Śaṁkara observes, in his commentary on the Gītā,[1] that the characteristics of one that has reached the goal (*siddha*) and those of the aspirant to it (*sādhaka*) are the same, except that while the latter are generally the result of conscious effort, the former always manifest themselves spontaneously. That is, what serve as means to the achievement of the ideal in the case of a *sādhaka* are, in the case of a *siddha*, the necessary consequences of it. If we remember that this is all the distinction between the two, we may describe the nature of the goal and of the discipline leading to it, in the same words, as a selfless devotion to the spiritual values of the good and the true. And a unique feature of this devotion is that the selflessness characterising it is absolute. Thus the Indian ideal does not, in the least, countenance what is known as 'reasonable self-love' or 'enlightened self-interest.' It is rooted in the belief that all personal desires blind the mind with delusion. This emphasis on total unselfishness alone should point to the great value to humanity of this ideal, particularly at the present time, and make its appeal universal. However that may be, there is no question of the intrinsic worth of an ideal whose watchwords are knowledge and service. Hence it is not merely the circumstances of history, as I stated before, that render the ideal important for us; it has value in itself also. Our first duty as Indians should therefore be to preserve it; and, as necessary aids to its preservation, homes of ancient learning, like those which have brought us together to-day, need to be fostered with every care.

[1] ii. 55. Compare *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, iv. 69.

THE ETHICS OF ADVAITA

The subject-matter of all religion and philosophy is reducible to three elements, viz., God, the *jīva* or the individual self and the physical world. Monistic doctrines, believing as they do in the ultimacy of only one of them, explain the other two as in some way derived from it. The Advaita of Śaṁkara goes a step farther, and teaches that all of them are but seeming derivatives from a fourth transcendental entity, called Brahman or the Absolute. The principle that accounts for this seeming diversification of what is the sole reality is Māyā; and any one who realizes this truth in his own experience attains, according to Śaṁkara, the final aim of life, viz., salvation. The conception of Māyā thus forms the pivotal point of Advaita, on its theoretical as well as on its practical side. Our purpose here is to find out the most important of its implications to practical life. We shall not accordingly refer to its place in the theory of Advaita, except in so far as it is necessary for our present purpose.

Broadly speaking, the principle of Māyā may be looked at from two standpoints: one cosmic, and the other individual. From the former point of view, it is the source as well as the sustaining ground of the whole of the physical universe. In this respect, it resembles what is termed Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya, the only difference being that while Prakṛti is conceived as real there, Māyā is not so regarded here. From the other point of view, it is the cause of the delusion under whose influence man engages himself in the various activities of life, in the hope of securing happiness or avoiding misery. As our aim is to dwell not so much upon the nature of the world as upon its meaning for man, it is with the latter or the individual aspect of Māyā that we shall be chiefly concerned here. Now a delusion is a false or wrong belief; and it always implies a failure, on the part of the person who entertains it, to realize the exact nature of a given fact. He who sees a serpent where there is only a rope should necessarily be unaware that it is a rope. But delusion is not merely a failure to realize the truth about a given fact; it also means the beholding in its place of something else as, for example, the

serpent in our illustration. Māyā too, in deluding man, similarly obscures the ultimate reality from him, and shows in its place the physical world which, as we have just stated, is derived from its cosmic side. From the standpoint of any *jīva*, this world may be divided into two parts: one that constitutes its adjuncts or 'accompaniments', such as the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), the body and the organs of sense; and the other, its objective environment in its infinite variety. But we should not forget that both these parts, being the effects of Māyā, are alike false. The *jīva*, ordinarily speaking, identifies itself with the former set of objects and, thereby losing sight of its true nature, comes to feel that it is embodied and finite. A natural outcome of this feeling of finitude is that it regards the whole of its environment, including the other *jīvas* similarly fancying themselves to be embodied, as entirely distinct from itself. It develops likes and dislikes for a small portion of it, and assumes an attitude of indifference towards the rest. The consequences of Māyā, so far as any individual is concerned, may thus be stated as threefold: First, it veils the truth about the ultimate reality from him; secondly, it gives rise to certain factors which constitute his constant accompaniments and lead him to the wrong belief that he is separate from others; and lastly, it provides him with an environment, physical as well as social, to which he reacts in diverse ways.

Let us find out which of these consequences precisely it is that subjects man to all the vicissitudes of life. It cannot be the first, viz., the obscuration of the ultimate reality for, in deep sleep, it should be assumed to persist since man does not come to know the truth about it then; but yet he transcends all the hopes and fears of life in that state, though it may be only for the time being. 'Sleep', it has been said, 'makes us all *pāśas*'. Nor can the last be their cause for in deep sleep again, though the environment continues to exist as vouched for by those that are awake,[1] it occasions none of the errors or confusions of life. The sting of Māyā must therefore lie in the second of its consequences, particularly the

[1] Occasionally a solipsistic interpretation of Advaita is given, according to which the belief in the existence of other selves is also an illusion; but we are confining our attention here to the doctrine as it is commonly understood.

antaḥ-karaṇa, which accounts for man's false belief in his finitude and which, because that belief is absent in sleep, must be supposed to have become latent then. Delusion starts only when the internal organ, with or without its several accessories like the organs of sense, re-emerges, originating the idea of *aham* or the ego. Thus the direct or immediate cause of operative delusion is not Māyā in its aspect of veiling the ultimate truth from man or of giving rise to his environment, whether social or physical, but only in its aspect of imposing on him the egoistic feeling, with its implication of the contrast of 'I' and 'You'. If thus the feeling of egoism be the source of all evil or, to state the same in different words, if selfishness be sin, it follows that he who desires to free himself from it should do his utmost to rise above that feeling by renouncing all private or personal interests. This is the first practical lesson we have to draw from the conception of Māyā.

But it represents only the ascetic ideal of self-denial. Some, no doubt, have held, both in the East and in the West, that the highest aim of life is to reach this negative ideal, and that morality therefore consists wholly in repressing one's desires and appetites. But the Advaita, though it recognizes self-conquest as a necessary stage in life's discipline, maintains that, owing to its negative character, it cannot stand for the ultimate purpose of human life. Life, according to this school, must have a positive aim; and we find it given to us in the character of the final truth which Māyā conceals from man. That truth is the *jīva's* fundamental identity with Brahman, as taught in the Upaniṣadic formula 'That thou art' (*Tat tvam asi*). Man is therefore more than the finite or narrow self which he ordinarily takes himself to be. He is really the universal self, but only hidden behind a finite guise. It is the grasping of this wider significance of the self that forms the positive aim of Advaita. But by 'grasping' here, if it should become a living influence on everyday conduct, we must understand not merely an intellectual acceptance of the truth about the self but also a ratification of it by one's own experience. Such a consummation, however, is within the reach of but a few, particularly on account of the arduous nature of the intellectual (including *yogic*) discipline necessary for it. Ethical conduct does not permit of any such restriction; and whether or

not a person feels himself fit to strive for the highest, he has to live a morally worthy life. Hence it is necessary to restate the Upaniṣadic truth in a form which shows clearly its direct bearing on such a life. If every individual self is at bottom the same as Brahman, it follows that the selves cannot, in the end, be different from one another. This way of stating the truth discloses to us at once that there is no basis whatsoever in actual fact for any discrimination in our attitude towards others and that we should therefore cherish the same kindly feeling, or bear equal love, for all. It is the cultivation of such love that constitutes the second and positive lesson which we may deduce from the conception of Māyā.

There are two features of this lesson of love, as taught in Advaita, to which attention should now be specifically drawn. The object of all higher religions alike is to develop the spirit of love in man; but in many, its scope is limited to mankind. All conscious limitation, however, implies preference which eventually rests on some egoistic consideration or other. Here, on the other hand, it extends to the whole of sentient creation, so that the moral outlook becomes greatly enlarged. To the common precept, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' is here added, to borrow Gandhiji's words, 'And every living being is thy neighbour.' This perfect catholicity of interest is the outcome of the belief that not only man but other living beings also have souls, though they may not have reached the same degree of spiritual growth. This widening of its range makes the love universal in its character; and it consequently banishes not only its opposite of hatred but also that other attitude of indifference which, as it has been rightly described, is 'farther removed from love than hatred.' But even in this extended form, the lesson of love is common to all the Indian doctrines, and not special to Advaita. The anthropocentric view which prevails in the West, that man is a privileged creation, with a soul denied to lower forms of life, and which corresponds in ethics to the long-exploded geocentric view in astronomy, was never known in India. What is peculiar to the Advaitic conception of love, and on which we like to lay special emphasis, is that it is not of the type usually understood from the term, viz., what one bears towards another. It is very much deeper, for it is based on the belief not in the mere

fellowship of all living beings, but in their fundamental oneness. In fact, it is love in its intensest form, because it signifies loving one's neighbour not as *another* but as *oneself*. And the Advaita assigns the best conceivable reason for such love by denying the ultimacy of the commonly felt distinction between one sentient creature and another. All other forms of love, according to the Upaniṣads, are but casual flashes of it. Thus the love whose cultivation the Advaita commends is deeper as well as wider than what it is ordinarily conceived to be.

To sum up: While the conception of Māyā, in one of its main aspects, implies the need for self-denial and is negative; in another, it means self-affirmation and is positive. Only we should remember that the self which is denied is the narrow or egoistic self, and that which is affirmed in its place is the universal one. Together, these two lessons of self-denial and love, in the exalted sense to which reference has just been made, constitute the sum of advaitic morality. It is, however, found described in Sanskrit works in a ritualistic terminology as consisting in the total abnegation of *kāmya-karmas*, scrupulous adherence to *nitya-karmas* and so forth. We have deduced it here directly from the metaphysics of the system, and expressed it without reference to the historical accidents amidst which it was formulated. But the conception is essentially the same. We have also detached it, we should add, from the ideal of *mokṣa* in reference to which it is commonly set out in old works, for our concern here has been not with the Advaita doctrine as a whole but only with a single, though from the standpoint of the plain man the most important, phase of it. It is hoped that this way of viewing it will help to make the ethical appeal of Advaita clearer and more direct to the modern mind.

MĀYĀ

There are several points of importance to be noticed about Māyā; but we shall confine our attention here to only one of them, viz., the support for the advaitic belief in it. Leaving out of account the authority of scripture, which is usually cited in this connection, we shall consider here two arguments, both of which appeal directly to our experience:

(1) The first of them points out that Māyā is implied in the very attempt of man to philosophise or discover the nature of ultimate reality. We seek to know it, because we are ignorant of it; and it is this ignorance of ultimate reality or *ajñāna* of Brahman, as the Advaita expresses it, that is to be understood by Māyā.[1] If we remember that the term 'ignorance', like 'knowledge', does not become fully significant until the object to which it refers and the subject or person whom it characterises are known, we shall see that the above argument not only points to Māyā as a fact of our experience but also makes its notion specific by distinguishing it from other forms of the same like one's ignorance (say) of a rope which is mistaken for a snake.

(2) The second argument is based upon the reminiscent experience of a person who wakes up from deep sleep, viz., that he slept happily, and did *not know* anything. The problem of deep or dreamless sleep is a difficult one. Without entering into a discussion of it, we may say that this experience also involves a reference to ignorance ('not knowledge'), but as obscuring the whole of reality. The point to be particularly noted here, however, is not what the ignorance in question conceals from us; it is rather the exact meaning of its description as 'not knowledge'. It may appear at first sight that it means the absence of all knowledge (*jñānābhāva*); but it cannot be understood in that sense for it would then be a mere blank, and such a state could not be recalled—much less as one of happiness. Hence the expression is taken to signify a unique type of *ajñāna* which, while it is totally removable by a right apprehension of ultimate reality, is distinct from the

[1] Cf. the advaitic saying: *Ajñātaṁ Brahma-viṣayaḥ; jñātaṁ Brahma-prayojanam.*

negation of knowledge.[1] If the first argument tells us what Māyā is, the present one tells us what it is not; and it is necessary to know a thing in both ways, if we are to know it well.

Thus the two arguments together not only support the belief in Māyā by an appeal to our experience; they also define it positively as well as negatively. May we then regard it as logically established? The answer is 'No'; for, if Māyā were thus established, it would be real. The advaitic teaching, on the contrary, is that it is *not* real (*sadbhinna*). In his commentary on the first aphorism of the *Vedānta-sūtra*, Śaṁkara says that if, as taught in it, the knowledge of Brahman should destroy our ignorance of it, that ignorance must be false. So far from establishing Māyā, the result of a logical scrutiny will be to dispel it altogether. As an old writer has facetiously put it, 'The effort to prove Māyā by *pramāṇas* is like trying to perceive darkness with the aid of a lighted lamp'. Summing up, we may say that Māyā is a datum of experience, and not a gratuitous assumption of the advaitin. Only we should remember that not all the data of experience are settled facts of philosophy.

[1] Cf. Sureśvara's *Vārttika* on *Bṛ. Up.* p. 56. st. 177 (com).

MĀYĀ

The doctrine of Māyā is chiefly associated with the name of Śaṁkara, but the popular view of it involves a serious misconception. It is commonly represented that, according to this doctrine, the entire material world is to be dismissed as a figment of the imagination. The teaching of Śaṁkara is not so antagonistic to experience. He indeed discounts the reality of the sensible world to some extent; but his position is certainly not that of pure subjectivism. The best proof of this is to be found in his refutation of the *Vijñāna* school of Buddhism which reduces the outside world to a system of ideas or states of consciousness. (*Br. Sūtras*: II. ii. 28-32.) Śaṁkara there maintains, with much force of argument, that we are bound to admit the existence of the outside world apart from its presentation as an idea. 'Even those who contest the existence of external objects', he states, 'bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal idea appears like an external thing. But, because they are anxious to refute it, they speak of it as "like something external." If they do not themselves at bottom acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they say "like something external"? If we accept the data of our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us *as* something external and not *like* something external.' More significant still is the distinction which Śaṁkara, in this connection, draws between the dreaming and waking states, for the analogy of dream-experience is a pet argument with all upholders of subjectivism. Śaṁkara characterises dreaming (although according to later commentators, he is here stating the view of another school and not that of his own) as a form of memory and therefore essentially different from perception. A revived impression may well be independent of objective stimulus; but perceptual cognition can never be so. It is therefore unsound, says Śaṁkara, to institute a parallel between the dreaming and waking states, and concludes by characterising the whole argument of the subjectivist school as giving way on all sides 'like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil.'

According to Śaṁkara, then, external things do exist. But

what is their exact character? Before answering this question, we shall analyse a simple illusion into the elements of which it is composed. Let us suppose that a rope is lying before us and we mistake it for a snake. We feel 'Here is a snake', or to translate the Sanskrit equivalent of this proposition more literally 'This is a snake'. There are two distinct elements here—one pointing *generally* to the object presented to our senses (the 'this') and the other *specifically* describing the mode or form in which we happen to cognise it ('the Snake-ness' predicated of 'this'). In other words, there is first a base or ground and then what is erroneously superposed upon it. Of these two component parts of an illusion, the former alone is true; because it is actually present before us and persists even after the disillusionment. It is the element that is common to the wrong perception of the snake and the right perception of the rope. According to Śaṁkara, the explanation of normal perception is identically the same, and every percept consists of what we may describe as a *substratum* and a *superstratum*. The substratum is pure Being which is common to all the objects of consciousness, everything that we perceive being perceived as *existent*. It is real inasmuch as it persists whatever be the nature of the superstratum. It may be likened to the gold in ornaments made of gold, which endures however much the forms impressed upon it may change.

What we have termed the superstratum is not real in the same sense, for it is a passing thing that endures not. It may be compared to the varying form given to the gold as it is turned into different ornaments. But even the superstratum, according to Śaṁkara, is not unreal. 'It is only other than real'. To explain this paradox, it is necessary to state that Śaṁkara is not content with the ordinary distinction between the real and the unreal and interposes a third category between them. Thus we have at one end the absolutely real; at the other, the absolutely unreal; and midway between the two lie a whole class of things, viz., the superstrata. They cannot be described as real for they lack the necessary permanence; nor can they be regarded as unreal (like the horns of a hare) for we actually perceive them[1]. They are, so to speak, less than real but

[1] There is no objectivity without some kind of reality. This is what Śaṁkara means by saying that the *prātibhāsika* is also real.

more than unreal. Such entities may be said to possess a temporal, empirical or relative reality. They are in time, while the ultimate reality transcends it. They have no significance beyond that of subserving the ends of practical life. That is why they are termed empirical. They are true only relatively—as among themselves, a coherent system of similar entities. With reference to the unrelated Absolute they are naught. Still it would be wrong to describe them as unreal for there can be no relation among non-entities.

Śaṁkara attributes the superstrata entirely to Māyā, or Ignorance of the perceiving agent in regard to the real character of the Absolute. This Māyā is sometimes personalized and poetically represented as wielding a mysterious power and deluding us into the belief that the empirical is the real. The power which it wields is twofold—that which conceals the Absolute (*Āvaraṇa-śakti*) and that which *misrepresents* it (*Vikṣepa-śakti*). We not only not perceive the Absolute, but apprehend something else in its place. We not only miss the basic unity which is the intrinsic character of the Absolute but conceive of it as a manifold. Perception not only hides the Absolute from us but actually draws us away from it. That is why Māyā or Ignorance is spoken of as positive and not a mere negation of knowledge.

So far we have considered only the non-self or the objective world and shown how Māyā distorts it. We must now inquire into the nature of the self or the perceiving subject. That also, according to Śaṁkara, is under the sway of Māyā and whatever was stated above regarding the objects of perception applies to it with equal force. Only while the Absolute manifests itself as Being in the outer world, it manifests itself both as Being and Sentience in the internal self. The self, like the non-self, is a blend of reality and appearance. It also consists of a nucleus of reality which through the power of Māyā appears limited or individualized. Accordingly the self, *as such*, is not an absolute reality but only a conditioned or relative reality. It is true only in so far as it is thought of in relation to the non-self which it implies. The self and the non-self—the whole 'universe of experience'—is thus the result of the Absolute being covered over with Māyā. The Absolute is thus neither the self, nor the non-self—neither the mental

nor the material—but something which is presupposed or pointed to by both.

The conception of the Absolute implied by Māyā as thus described may be more fully stated as follows: The Absolute is a unity that runs through all variations of appearance. It is, so to speak, the common denominator to which they all can be reduced —the *locus* of their substrata. It is absolutely homogeneous—undivided and indivisible. The various empirical things are, no doubt, there; but, being of a different order of reality, they can in no wise import heterogeneity into it. For there can be as little relation between the real and the empirical as between the empirical and the illusory. The serpent that is fancied in the rope cannot sting the person that fancies it. The actual policeman will not arrest an actor-thief. The Absolute, being without any attributes whatever, does not admit of either definition or description. Whatever we can think of, we can only deny of it. But we can gather that it must be of the essence of Being and Sentience—the only two ultimate notions of which it is impossible to think ourselves out. The unity of this Absolute may be compared to the unity of a Painting, say, of a landscape. Looked at as a landscape, it is a plurality of hill, valley and stream; but its ground, the substance of which it is constituted is one, viz., the canvas. It is rarely that analogies in philosophy admit of extension; but this one does, in one particular. The canvas appears not only as hill, valley and stream, but also as the garment of the shepherd that may be figured on it. Similarly the Absolute which is of the essence of sentience, manifests itself not only as insentient objects but also as the sentient subject.

There is one criticism which may be passed on such a conception of the Absolute. It first splits up the universe artificially into two elements—the persistent and the changing—and then elevates the one to the rank of the absolute, relegating the other, at the same time, to the realm of the contingent. But persistence or change taken apart from what persists or changes is a pure abstraction. Hence it may be said that this view reduces the Absolute to a mere nothing—an ultimate logical notion—not a metaphysical reality. The orthodox *Vedāntin* maintains that such a criticism begs the whole question at issue. For according to him, the Absolute is not

what has been abstracted from the concrete things of experience; but the so-called concrete things of experience are forms or modes of the Absolute. Sentience or Being is not an attribute of empirical things; but their very substance. To call such an Absolute an abstraction is only to assume the very point in dispute, viz., that the manifold things of experience are in the last instance concrete and real.

So far we have dealt only with the attributeless Absolute (*nirguṇaṁ brahma*) of Śaṁkara. But there is another side to his teaching, for he speaks also of an Absolute possessed of attributes (*saguṇaṁ brahma*). What is this Second Absolute? To understand it, we should abolish the distinction between the real and the empirical—the first two of the three categories mentioned above as peculiar to Śaṁkara's system. It is no doubt stated that this should be done not by elevating the empirical to the rank of an absolute reality but by bringing down the Absolute to the level of empirical—by associating the attributeless Absolute (*nirguṇaṁ brahma*) with Māyā, as it is said. But so long as we recognize only *two* categories instead of *three*, the result is the same, in whatever manner we may express it. The Absolute still remains a unity but being now of the same order of being as the empirical, comes into true relation with it. The Absolute thus becomes complex and heterogeneous—a cosmic unity in which all variety is harmonized. It becomes an all-inclusive conception as distinguished from the first—an all-exclusive one. Śaṁkara describes the attributeless Absolute as the 'higher' (*param*) and that possessed of attributes as the 'lower' (*aparam*). The realization of the latter is preparatory to the realization of the former, so that the Absolute possessed of attributes has no independent philosophic significance. The reasons for regarding it as inferior are mainly two: First, comprising as it does of parts, it cannot be eternal. Secondly, it cannot be the Absolute, in the full sense of the term; for, although it is not in relation with other things it admits of relations within itself.

If we suppose for a moment that the second Absolute is the ultimate one, how does it affect the conception of Māyā? Māyā ceases to be the cause of plurality, for plurality actually abides in this Absolute and is of the same order of reality. The only effect traceable to Māyā there, is the concealment from

us of the essential unity characterising the Absolute; for, in daily life, while we pay attention to its variety we totally ignore its underlying oneness. In other words, only one of the two powers mentioned above as belonging to Māyā should be ascribed to it, viz., *āvaraṇa-śakti*. We are under the influence of Māyā only in so far as we imagine that the parts of the universe have a meaning apart from the whole. So perception does not lead us away from the Absolute; only it fails to reveal it in all its fulness.

Orthodox opinion is decisive as to which of the two interpretations given of Māyā above is the right one. But in the face of criticisms that may be urged against either conception of the Absolute, it is somewhat difficult to say which of the two views regarding the nature of Māyā is the sounder one. There is, however, one point which suggests their relative significance—Śaṁkara holds before us two ideals of release (*mukti*)—*Videha-mukti* and *Jīvan-mukti*. The latter is release from worldly bonds when one is still alive; and the former is release which a *Jīvan-mukta* automatically obtains when he becomes disembodied. While both the types of *muktas* are admitted to have realized the ultimate truth, it is only the *Videha-mukta* that is represented as actually transcending plurality. To the *Jīvan-mukta*, on the other hand, it persists. In other words, the annihilation of plurality is what takes place in a supra-empirical state. Can philosophy, strictly so termed, take any cognisance of such a state? Beginning as it does in experience, should not philosophy end also in experience? If this viewpoint is correct, we might perhaps characterise the first conception of Māyā as a religious one backed by abstract logic, while the second is a philosophic one having experience as its support.

KNOWLEDGE AND DEVOTION

Broadly speaking, the course of discipline, which the Indian systems of philosophy prescribe for attaining the final goal of life is twofold: self-conquest and self-knowledge. The former is negative in its aim, although it does not imply that the means to it is necessarily so. It is usually sought by the performance of duty in a spirit of disinterestedness as taught in the Gītā (*karma-yoga*), which is far from being negative. The other item in the discipline consists in acquiring a knowledge of the true nature of the self,[1] and is obviously positive. These two aids to the goal of self-perfection, viz., *vairāgya* and *jñāna* as they are respectively termed, have been represented as 'the two wings that help the soul in its spiritual flight.' This course of discipline is common to all the philosophic systems—Vedic as well as non-Vedic. But they do not exhaust Indian thought, for there are also theistic doctrines which are not less important.[2] The course of training commended in them is somewhat different, and its distinctive feature is what is called *bhakti* or 'devotion'. The purpose of the present article is to explain the meaning of *bhakti* and to consider its relation to *jñāna*—taking that term, however, in the sense mainly of a knowledge of Deity and not in that of a knowledge of the self, which it bears in the philosophic schools.

The word *bhakti* comes from a Sanskrit root, meaning 'to serve' or 'to resort to', and signifies 'service' or 'resorting to another for assistance'. As a religious term, it connotes 'turning to God for protection, completely surrendering oneself to his will'. This conception of surrender to the divine will is very old in India. In one of the Upaniṣads,[3] for example, Pratardana, king of Kāśi, is represented as meeting Indra whom he has pleased by his uncommon valour. As a mark of his appreciation, Indra asks the king to choose any boon he likes. Instead of doing so, Pratardana says to Indra,

[1] The word 'self' in 'self-conquest' refers to the sensuous self.

[2] This distinction between theistic and non-theistic doctrines should not be regarded as rigid. They are often found to be overlapping.

[3] *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, iii. 1. The word *bhakti* itself occurs in another of the early Upaniṣads, viz., the *Śvetāśvatara* (vi. 23).

'Do you yourself choose for me the boon which you deem most beneficent to man', indicating thereby his spirit of complete resignation and his absolute trust in the deity he adores. We may also refer in this connection to the well-known words in which, according to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vi. 18), Srī Rāma gives expression to what he holds to be his life's principle: 'I will never forsake one that has sought me as the sole refuge'. It is this ancient ideal of *bhakti* that we find inculcated with increasing emphasis in the *Gītā*, the *Bhāgavata* and the various schools of theistic Vedānta.

The description of *bhakti* as self-surrender may suggest that it is to be attained simply through such passive virtues as meekness and humility, but it is not so. It also demands of man that he should faithfully discharge his duties—secular as well as religious; only, if they are to serve as a means to *bhakti*, he should give up all thought of reaping any personal advantage through them. Hence the 'path of devotion' (*bhakti-yoga*), as this system of training is called, has the same ethical implication of self-conquest as the 'path of works' (*karma-yoga*), adopted, as we stated, in the non-theistic doctrines generally. But there is an important difference, viz., that while in those doctrines, one aims at self-conquest *directly*, in fulfilling one's duties, here one does so *indirectly* through dedicating them to God.[1] There is consequently a consciousness, throughout the *bhakti* discipline, of the presence of a Being with whom personal relations are possible; and it is this consciousness that evokes in man feelings like reverence, love and fear which are peculiar to the religious attitude.

But *bhakti*, as thus conceived, or utter submission to God is not enough to secure salvation for man, according to Indian theism. It will not suffice merely to say, 'Not my will, but Thine be done.' There is need also for another aid, viz., knowledge of God. 'God can be of worth to man', it has been said, 'only in so far as he is a *known* God'. The reason for its inclusion in the discipline is commonly explained by

[1] Contrast e.g., Gītā, iii. 30, 'Throwing every deed on me, and with thy meditation fixed upon the Higher Self, resolve to fight, without expectation, devoid of egotism and free from anguish', and v. 11, 'The truly devoted, for the purification of the heart, perform actions with their bodies, their minds, their understanding, and their senses, putting away all self-interest'.

reference to the close relation that has always existed in India between philosophy and religion; and it is pointed out that, owing to the pre-eminent place which knowledge occupies in all philosophy, theistic creeds also have come to attach importance to it. But that is only to state a historical fact (or explaining from the outside). It does not reveal the significance of its inclusion in the discipline of *bhakti*. A characteristic of all religions is that they inspire in their followers an attitude of awe towards a superhuman Being who is represented as having complete control over the course of nature as well as the destiny of man. So long, however, as the idea of this Being or God is not properly understood and remains involved in mystery, the attitude of awe does not differ much from that of fear and bewilderment. Men may try to propitiate a God whom they view with dread; but they cannot worship him, for worship, in the true sense of the word, means the recognition of supreme and absolute worth in its object. The purpose of including a knowledge of God in the scheme of discipline is to enlighten us on his true nature and, by bringing home to us his infinite excellences, to render a genuine worship of him possible.

A very important consequence follows from such enlightenment. As the idea of God becomes clarified, the awe which is a fundamental feature of the religious attitude gradually passes into love mingled with veneration, for we spontaneously love and admire the highest when we know it. Thus *bhakti* in the negative sense of self-surrender is not conceived here as an end in itself, but is intended to consummate in a positive goal, viz., love of God. In fact, it is these two—self-surrender and love of God—taken together, that constitute *bhakti* in the complete meaning of the term; and of them the first, through cleansing our motives and disciplining our desires, fits us for the second. Only the pure in heart can truly love God. Indians speak of this element of love as *prīti*—a word which is philologically connected with the English *'friend'*. It is also sometimes described[5] as *anurakti* where the preposition (*anu*), it is explained, indicates that the love is such as arises *after* a knowledge of the greatness and exceeding goodness of God. It is *bhakti* in this sense of loving devotion that is a means to

[1] Cf. *Śāṇḍilya-sūtra*, i. 2 (com.).

salvation. The attitude of fear or 'religious dread', to which we referred earlier, can have little to do with it for salvation, as shown by one of its equivalents in Sanskrit (*abhaya*), is the very opposite of fear and consists in a total emancipation from it. This idea of love directed to the godhead is also very old in India and is found in the earliest portions of the Veda, where the devout believer is characterised as 'god-loving' (*deva-kāma*).

Thus it is not right to say, as it is sometimes said, that the path of devotion is meant only for the ignorant or the simple-minded, and that unqualified submission to the divine will is all that is required for attaining the final aim of life. Nor is knowledge sufficient, by itself, for the purpose. It may, no doubt, be acquired before the lesson of self-sacrifice has been fully learnt. Such knowledge may quench our speculative thirst, or it may add to our mental accomplishments; but, until the sway of natural inclinations is severely restrained, it will lead to no result that can be said to possess any moral or spiritual significance. It is because the ultimate goal of life, rightly conceived, is as much a release from ignorance as it is from selfish desire that Indian theism insists upon the need for a knowledge of God as well as for a spirit of self-denial.

We have assumed, so far, that knowledge, whether it is of the self or of God, stands for an intellectual conviction which is necessarily mediate. No Indian doctrine, however, accepts the proposition that such knowledge, essential though it be as a preliminary condition, can itself serve as a true aid to liberation. All of them lay down that, if it is to do so, it must, by appropriate means like steadfast meditation (*dhyāna*), be transformed into direct intuition. It is only when knowledge ripens into intuitive experience that it attains a certitude, which mere reason can never secure for it. It will then become self-endorsed, and nothing that may occur thereafter can shake it. The purely philosophic doctrines hold that such direct experience is the chief, if not the only, means to liberation. The theistic creeds, on the other hand, do not stop at that. They point out that such immediate experience naturally transmutes and enriches the meaning of devotion; and the resulting attitude, they term *parā-bhakti* or 'higher devotion.' It is described as 'a continuous flow of love which is infinitely more intense than any that one may bear to oneself or to those belonging to

oneself and whose promptings will not allow themselves to be thwarted by obstacles, be they never so many.' Thus devotion also, like knowledge, presents two forms, one more profound than the other; and it is devotion in the profounder sense or, more strictly, its complement of divine grace, (*prasāda*) that, according to Indian theism, is the direct cause of salvation.

Viewing now the course of training as a whole, we may say that *bhakti* in the sense of absolute self-surrender is indispensable for acquiring *jñāna* and that *jñāna* in its two phases of mediate knowledge and immediate experience is, in its turn, the condition necessary for *bhakti* to reach its fullest development in love. If we overlook the twofold distinction in both *jñāna* and *bhakti* and use for them respectively the general terms 'knowledge' and 'devotion', we see how intimately they are related, and how knowledge without devotion is as futile as devotion without knowledge.

SIX POINTS OF VIEW

We often hear of 'the *six* systems of Indian philosophy'; but, as there are actually more than six, it is necessary to specify what the 'six systems' are. There seems, once, to have been room for difference in choosing them. But, according to current usage, they are Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika.[1] These are described as orthodox systems, for they do not question the authority of the Veda as others, like Jainism and Buddhism, do. It is usual to refer to all the systems, whether orthodox or heterodox, as *darśanas*. The word *darśana* literally means 'sight' or 'vision'; but, in the present context, it is generally taken to mean 'a point of view', by which is to be understood a world-view distinctive of a particular system of philosophy. It may, for example, be monistic or pluralistic, realistic or idealistic. The purpose of the present article is to sketch the different points of view of the six orthodox systems, without entering into technical details. We shall speak generally of matter and mind or, as they may otherwise be expressed, nature and spirit; and we shall refer to categories like 'quality' and 'relation', so far only as is quite necessary. We shall begin with the Vaiśeṣika.

(1) *Vaiśeṣika*: This doctrine conceives of matter as consisting of atoms, and explains the whole of the material world as constructed out of them. The atoms are of four kinds—earth, water, fire and air; and their number, in each case, is infinite. While these atoms have some common qualities, like their infinitesimal magnitude, each has also its distinctive quality. Earth has odour; water, taste; fire, colour; and air, touch.

Thus the material universe consists finally, in this view, of independent substances characterised by attributes, like as well as unlike. These attributes themselves are conceived as independent not only of one another but also of the objects to which they belong. Thus the redness of one rose is distinct from the redness of another; and it is, in each case, quite different from the rose to which it belongs. This is an attribute which is known as 'quality' (*guṇa*).

[1] Cf. Haribhadra's *Ṣaṭ-darśana-samuccaya* (8th century A.D.), where the six systems dealt with are somewhat different.

The attributes may be of a different type also, for instance, 'universals' (*sāmānya*) or general features by virtue of which objects are classifiable. For example, 'cowness' is such a feature. Unlike 'redness' in the above example, it is regarded as common to all cows. Yet two cows are here regarded as not less distinct from each other than are a cow and a horse. That is, even things belonging to the same class are viewed as being quite as different from one another as those of different classes.

So far, we have spoken about substances and their attributes and, incidentally, have referred to the relation between them as one of absolute distinction. This relation is what is now commonly rendered in English as 'inherence' (*samavāya*). Broadly speaking, there may be another kind of relation—'conjunction' (*saṁyoga*), as, say, between a table and a rose lying on it. It will be noticed that there is a very important distinction between the two relations. While, in the latter, the two terms related are not merely distinguishable but also separable, they are only distinguishable in the former. Yet both relations are explained as external in the sense that the terms related are equally distinct. That is, the rose, in the above examples, is ontologically as distinct from its redness as it is from the table on which it lies. To put it briefly, relation, as conceived here, is not a bond of unity; it is rather a sign of difference. Another characteristic of this doctrine is that it accepts only change of place (*parispanda*) and not change of form (*pariṇāma*). That is, things may exhibit movement—as, for instance, when a ball is rolling; but they never grow. What is commonly known as 'growth' or 'development', as when a seed becomes a sprout, is explained as a new creation and not as mere transformation.

The individual souls (*jīva*) are many; and each of them is eternal. It is also pervasive, although its operative presence is limited by its physical body. That is, though theoretically the soul is present everywhere, its capacity to think, feel and act depends upon the physical aids, like the sensory organs, with which it is provided for the time being. But as knowledge, feeling and volition are explained here as attributes of the self (regarded as a 'substance'), and are therefore absolutely distinct from it, the self, *in itself*, ceases to be mental. Thus the real mental or spiritual element is here represented as a

possible and temporary feature of the self, so that the place assigned to it becomes quite minor.

As this doctrine postulates an infinite number of ultimate reals, which are absolutely different from one another, it may be described as *radical pluralism*.

(2) *Mīmāṁsā*: This doctrine appears in two forms: but we shall consider only one of them, viz., that which is associated with the name of Kumārila. It resembles the Vaiśeṣika generally in its theory of matter. But there are some important differences:

(*a*) The doctrine accepts, like the other, an external relation, 'conjunction', between different substances, for example, a table and a rose lying on it. Here the relation is external, since the table and the rose are not only distinguishable but also separable. But where an attribute is predicated of a substance, as in the case of a rose that is red, we have not an external relation, as in the Vaiśeṣika, but an internal one (*bhedābheda*) in the sense that they are not totally distinct, but distinct and, at the same time, identical. That is, the doctrine attaches due value to the distinction in the situation, viz., that the terms related are distinguishable but not separable. The outcome of such a view is that the attribute, say, 'redness', taken by itself and the 'rose', taken by itself, are pure abstractions here; and it is their concrete unity that is truly real.

(*b*) The doctrine interprets universals as actually linking up the corresponding particulars, so that it recognizes synthesized groups, instead of only wholly independent reals as the Vaiśeṣika does. Two or more cows form a unity in diversity here.[1] But it fails to extend this principle of synthesis to the whole of physical reality, making a complete distinction between one group of things and another, say, cows and horses. In thus acknowledging a synthesis, though only sectional, of the things in the universe, the doctrine gives a more satisfactory solution of the problem of the one and the many than the Vaiśeṣika does.

(*c*) This doctrine, unlike the previous one, believes that

[1] It will be seen that 'cow-ness', being a kind of attribute, the relation between it and a cow is identity-in-difference; and it is the concrete unity of both that is real, each of the two factors, taken by itself, being a pure abstraction.

matter can change its form. While, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the seed and the sprout are quite distinct, here they are regarded as distinct *as such*, but also as one as aspects of the same entity, say, the plant in question. That is, there is a continuant element when a seed becomes a sprout as well as a changing one.

The conception of the self also here resembles that in the Vaiśeṣika, except in one important respect. It is not a static entity, but can undergo change of form, knowledge being one such change in it. Knowledge is not here, therefore, an adventitious quality of the self as it is there, but an innate phase of, or a form of activity in, it. That is, the self, *in itself*, is spiritual; and, so far, the conception here is superior to that in the Vaiśeṣika. There is another aspect of the self, as conceived here, to which it is necessary to draw attention. It is known whenever any object is known at all. In fact, all consciousness is here self-consciousness. But the self is, at the same time, the agent in knowing, so that it partakes of the character of the subject and of the object.

This doctrine is *pluralistic* like the Vaiśeṣika; but, as it admits what we have described as 'sectional synthesis', it is *not radically so*.

(3) *Sāṅkhya*: The process of synthesis is carried further here and the whole realm of physical nature is brought under a single head, viz., Prakṛti. It is conceived as complex, being constituted of the three *guṇas—sattva, rajas* and *tamas*—which, though distinct, are not separable. In addition to being complex in character, Prakṛti is also dynamic as conceived here, and it is continually changing its form. All things in the physical world are evolved out of it; but, though derived from the same source, they are diverse, because of the different ways in which the three *guṇas* combine to make them. Nature here accordingly ceases to be conceived as discontinuous as it is in the above doctrines. It is a self-evolving entity which has the three *guṇas* as its enduring element, and the multifarious things of experience as its varying phases. As the whole of the physical world thus forms a unity in diversity, there is no room for any external relation in it. So far, the doctrine differs from the view of Kumārila whose synthesis of the physical element in the universe may be criticized as half-hearted.

It will be remembered that, according to Kumārila's Mīmāṁsā doctrines the self is both the subject and the object in knowing. Contrary to this, the Sāṅkhya maintains that what knows must always be other than what is known. Nothing, it is said, can be the subject as well as the object of one and the same action. The eye can see other things, but not itself. It is no doubt true that we speak of knowing ourselves; but then we mean only the not-self or the *knowable* element which happens to be included in the *jīva*. It is this not-self that Kumārila mistakes for the objective aspect of the *jīva*. That is, the present doctrine splits up the *jīva*, which the other two doctrines take to be integral, into two parts—one, the true self; and the other, the 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which, as a product of Prakṛti, is the not-self. The result of this analysis is that Puruṣa comes to be regarded as the very essence of sentience (*cit*) and therefore the very opposite of Prakṛti. These two elements being fundamentally antagonistic, their unity only *seems* to be given in self-consciousness; but it is really a delusion.

The Puruṣas are here also believed to be many; but, if we overlook that feature for the moment, the doctrine may be described as *dualism*.

(4) *Vedānta*: Here actual *monism* appears. The whole of the objective universe is shown to be Brahman, and the individual self is finally identified with it. The doctrine thus accepts not only the complete integration of physical reality which the Sāṅkhya acknowledges, but goes further and postulates the unity of all things—whether physical or mental. In other words, here self-evolving Brahman takes the place of the Sāṅkhya's self-evolving Prakṛti; Brahman constitutes the continuant element, and the *jīvas* as well as the multifarious forms of nature its changing phases. In every one of the above doctrines, nature and spirit are conceived as entirely distinct. That is, they are all realistic in their outlook. Here, on the other hand, nature is regarded as but a form of spirit—a view which makes the doctrine not only monistic but also idealistic.

Some Vedāntins stop here, and represent this all-comprehensive principle as the ultimate reality or the Absolute. But Śaṁkara, who is the most renowned exponent of Vedāntic monism, does not agree with them. For he considers that

'identity' and 'difference', being mutually contradictory, cannot be predicated of one and the same entity. It makes the nature of the thing self-discrepant; and self-discrepancy, according to him, implies that the thing in question is an appearance. The ultimate reality accordingly is not, in his view, all-comprehensive (*saguṇa*), but transcendental (*nirguṇa*)—that which lies behind and beyond both unity and diversity. This is the meaning of 'Not so, not so' (*Neti, neti*), as taught in the Upaniṣads.

But it may seem that, if we represent the Absolute as totally featureless, it ceases to be a reality for it then becomes an unknown and unknowable something. 'Pure being', it has been said, 'is pure nothing'. It might be so, if the negation of features were the final teaching about it. But that is only a part of it; the other and the more important part is the final identification of Brahman with the Ātman or the individual self. With this identification, the Absolute ceases to be an unknown something, for it thereby comes to be related to what is known to us all in some way, viz., our own self. And because nobody can deny himself or plead complete ignorance of himself, all are obliged to admit its positive and spiritual character. Our knowledge of our own self may not enable us to claim that we have realized Brahman, but it is certainly adequate to give us what may be called 'a conjectural insight' into its essence.

Strictly, these are the only *four* world-views advocated in the six systems: and the two remaining systems, of Nyāya and Yoga, have no such views. That is the reason why they are generally treated along with the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya respectively. Of these two pairs, it is possible to point to some difference in this regard between the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga. For, the Yoga doctrine finds a place for Deity, while the Sāṅkhya does not. But Deity is not conceived here as actually creating the world; it is Prakṛti, as we know, that evolves, of itself. But his mere presence, it is postulated, furnishes the initial impulse for Prakṛti to evolve; and this *does* constitute a change in the Sāṅkhya world-view.

In regard to the other pair, their world-views are identical, unless we stretch a point, when it is possible to indicate some difference between them also; but this affects their general *attitude* towards the world-view and not the world-view itself.

Every philosophic doctrine necessarily comprises ontology or a theory of being and epistemology or a theory of knowing. That is, it tells us what the nature of reality ultimately is, and how that nature has come to be discovered. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya also do so. But there is a difference of emphasis in this respect, viz., that while the Vaiśeṣika stresses the ontological side, the Nyāya does the epistemological. This is clear, for instance, from the nature of the categories which they postulate in the beginning: 'substance', 'quality', 'action', etc., in the one, and 'proof', 'doubt', 'conclusion', etc., in the other.[1]

[1] *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* , Ch. I.; *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 1.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY[1]

As several aspects of this subject have been dealt with specifically in the other portions of the work,[2] the present article will be devoted to a general consideration of it. It will be divided into two sections—one containing a rapid survey of the growth of philosophic thought in ancient India, and the other indicating what may be regarded as its most distinctive feature. As the space available is strictly limited, the treatment in both sections will necessarily be quite brief.

I

(*a*) *Vedic Period*: It is in the Veda that we have to seek for the beginnings of Indian philosophy and religion. This work represents a collection made, roughly about 600 B.C., from a great mass of literary material that was in existence at the time. It is usually stated to consist of two parts, Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. Each of them shows different levels of thought; but it will do for our present purpose to speak of the early Mantras first, and then consider the later ones and the Brāhmaṇas together:

(1) As the early Mantras are not always fully intelligible, it is difficult to determine the precise character of their teaching. The view prevalent among modern scholars is that it signifies a belief in nature worship. It means that man, realizing his complete dependence upon the various powers of nature, like wind and rain, deifies them and offers worship to them for securing their favour. These deities being many, the belief may be described as polytheism; but their conception is not, at the same time, without a suggestion of an underlying unity which considerably modifies its polytheistic character. The very use, in respect of all the gods alike, of the word *deva*, for example, which etymologically means 'shining', points to this sense of their essential oneness.

(2) In the later Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas, in general, we find this tendency to see unity of godhead fully developed;

[1] [This Paper is a contribution to The Tamil Encyclopaedia, where it appears translated into Tamil.]

[2] [The Tamil Encyclopaedia.]

but the resulting monotheism is impersonal, being but some common feature of the gods raised to the rank of a supreme God. Thus *viśva-karman* which means 'maker of all things', once used in describing certain gods, now becomes personified as the Supreme. This idea of a single God, behind all the gods, takes various shapes during the period, as if the ancient Indians were mentally experimenting and discovering one concept after another which more nearly approximated to their ideal of the divine. The most impressive of them is Prajāpati. The word literally means 'lord of creatures', and is found applied earlier to more than one god, but later this epithet is personified and installed as the Most High.

(3) Sometimes this concept of divinity undergoes a transformation and comes to represent the source of not merely the gods but of *all* being. In other words, the tendency to see unity develops in this age not only as monotheism but also as monism. To understand the exact character of this monistic teaching, it is necessary to refer to two movements of thought that are commonly met with in the literature of the period. One of them represents a search for the primary source or essence of the whole of the objective universe, and it culminates in the conception of what is termed Brahman; the other represents a search for the inmost essence of man, and it culminates in the conception of what is termed Ātman. That is, if Brahman is the fundamental principle of the world, Ātman is that of the individual. A parallel is often drawn between these two as, for example, when Brahman is figured as the self or Ātman of the whole world. All this occurs in the Upaniṣads, which are traditionally classed with the Brāhmaṇas but really form a separate stratum of thought in them. It is not, however, peculiar to them but is common to all later Vedic literature; it is rather the identification of these two principles, the cosmic and psychic (*Brahmātmaikya*), which forms the central truth of Upaniṣadic teaching. This truth that the world as well as the individual is eventually the manifestation of some Reality is enshrined in the 'great sayings' (*mahāvākya*) like *Tat tvam asi*, and it has since come to be looked upon as the crown of Vedic teaching as a whole.

(*b*) *Early Post-Vedic Period*: In the centuries immediately succeeding the Vedic period, we find, by the side of this

Upaniṣadic monism, other currents of thought which are not less important:

(1) Of them, one has its source mainly in the Veda. It also is monotheism but, unlike that referred to above, it is of the personal type which conceives of God as creating the whole universe consisting of nature, gods and men and keeping a strict moral watch over it. The conception resembles that of Varuṇa, a deity of the early Mantras, who was likewise conceived as essentially a God of righteousness. The worship of Varuṇa, to judge from the Mantra material that has been handed down to us, becomes less and less prominent and almost vanishes by the end of the Vedic period. But the spirit underlying it, we may be sure, was there all along and was revived in this monotheism of the early post-Vedic period. The gods regarded as supreme in it are Śiva and Viṣṇu, who are mentioned in the Veda. But, to speak generally, they occupy there a relatively minor place. They gradually gain in importance; and devotion to them, along with rites, like temple-worship, freely borrowed from another stream of ancient tradition known as 'Āgama', gave rise to the two creeds of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, which have profoundly influenced the life of the Indian. These creeds, based on the Veda and the Āgama, later came to be affiliated to the teaching of the Upaniṣads, as seen, for instance, in the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine of Rāmānuja, where Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa is equated with Brahman.

(2) The other currents of thought, broadly speaking, are two—one known as Svabhāva-vāda or 'naturalism' which repudiated belief in the supersensuous and the supernatural; and the other, dualistic or pluralistic in its character which gave rise to doctrines like Jainism in the course of this period. A common characteristic of these currents is their antagonism to the Vedic teaching. They must, in some form, have been already there in the earlier period for clear, though only occasional, references to them are found in the Veda and the Upaniṣads. But we possess no *direct* record of any aspect of them now. Of the many creeds that come upon the scene in this period, special mention should be made of Buddhism which, in its early form, was not altogether opposed to Vedic teaching. We shall note here but one important point about it, viz., that it has since spread over large portions of Asia, beyond

the frontiers of India, and has become a world-religion with millions of people owing allegiance to it.

(*c*) *Age of the Systems*: It was the disaccord among these various currents of thought that necessitated a critical scrutiny of them, a couple of centuries before Christ, and has resulted in what are known as the systems of Indian philosophy. They are called *darśanas*, since each of them stands for a particular 'point of view' in philosophy. There are six of them, as ordinarily enumerated: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta; and they are all described as orthodox, since they do not, in their systematized form, question the authority of the Veda. To these, we should add three more which are non-Vedic, viz., the Cārvāka (a later form of the old Svabhāva-vāda), the Jaina or Arhata and the Buddhistic systems. Confining our attention to the former and without entering into details, we may point out that they include all varieties of philosophic thought—pluralism, dualism and monism.

(1) Thus the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā are pluralistic, since they hold that the ultimate entities are many. All of them conceive of matter as atomic. The atoms which are infinite in number, are of different kinds, each having its distinctive quality; and the whole of the material world is explained as constructed out of them. The soul, which is regarded as infinite and eternal, is also manifold. In its empirical state, it is in actual relation with matter such as its physical body and the senses, whence arises its feeling of finitude; but, in its intrinsic condition, it is believed to remain altogether detached from everything else.

(2) In the Sāṅkhya and Yoga, the whole of physical nature is brought under a single head, viz., Prakṛti. It is conceived as complex, being constituted of three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which, though distinct, are not separable; and the observed diversity of things in the physical world is explained as the result of the different ways in which these *guṇas* combine to make them. The self or Puruṣa, as it is called here, is, in its empirical state, virtually in association with physical factors like the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) though, in itself, it is quite aloof from them, much as in the previous set of doctrines. The Puruṣas, no doubt, are many; but, if we overlook that feature for the moment, the doctrine may be described as dualism.

(3) The Vedānta is monistic. It elaborates the teaching of the Upaniṣads, and traces both the world and the individual self eventually to Brahman or the Absolute. But the exact relation of Brahman to the world, on the one hand, and to the self, on the other, is explained in two somewhat divergent ways. One holds that they are real, though wholly dependent upon Brahman; but the other maintains that they are only appearances of Brahman. In both alike, Brahman accounts for all that exists, and is the sole reality; only while it is all-comprehensive (*saguṇa*) in the one case, it is transcendental (*nirguṇa*) in the other. The former was the view of many early thinkers and seems once to have been very influential; but it has, for long, been superseded by the latter which is the view of Śaṁkara.

II

We have so far occupied ourselves with the problem of reality, a convincing solution of which will bring satisfaction to the speculative side of man. The question for us to ask now is whether or not the purpose of philosophy is fulfilled thereby. Many among modern thinkers in the West would answer this question in the affirmative. But the view almost universally held by ancient Indians was that philosophy must not stop at this, but should aim at satisfying the whole nature of man by meeting the practical demands of his moral life also. We shall see why the Indians took such a view of philosophy, if we turn to the several systems mentioned in the previous section and consider the exact character of their teaching. Each of them has its own conception of the self and of the physical world; but, though they differ from one another in these respects, all of them agree in laying greater emphasis on the self than on the physical world. It is for this reason that philosophy is known in India as *adhyātma-śāstra* or 'the science of the self' as we might put it. It thus becomes more a study of man than of physical nature. A person may learn that the planet Saturn has a certain number of rings encircling it, and the knowledge may have no direct relation to his everyday mode of living. But it is far different, for example, in the case of knowing a logical truth, say, the nature and sources of fallacious reasoning, because it is sure to have a direct bearing on one's thinking. The study of philosophy is, in the Indian view, like

the study of logic; and to separate theory from practice, in either, would amount to a mutilation of it.

If that is the case in regard to philosophy, as a whole, it is particularly so as regards its highest truth. Each doctrine, as we have seen, makes its own distinction between the empirical and the true selves. Thus, according to the Vedānta, the self which appears to be many and finite to us, is really but one and infinite. Of these, the empirical self is characterised by narrowness of one kind or another as a consequence of its felt limitations, while the true self is free from it altogether. The purpose of knowing this truth is much more than the gratification of theoretic curiosity; it is to act upon that truth, and to realize the higher self, repudiating the lower. It is self-realization, in this sense, that is described as *mokṣa* or 'spiritual freedom', the end for which man ought to live. And all the systems, as may be expected, prescribe a course of practical discipline for achieving it. The discipline is of two kinds: (1) one is chiefly for overcoming narrowness, or cultivating detachment (*vairāgya*) through the practice of *niṣkāma-karma*, as taught in the Gītā. But as this teaching is well-known, it is not necessary to dwell on it here. (2) The other is for transforming into direct experience the knowledge of the true self acquired by a study of philosophy, because the latter, being *mediate*, is scarcely of use in dispelling our *immediate*, though wrong, belief in the ultimacy of the empirical self. The means to it is *dhyāna* or 'meditation', which signifies constant dwelling upon the nature of the true self, until it becomes an immediate certainty.

The question that now arises is whether such an ideal can at all be realized. The Indians have never doubted that it can be. But, as originally conceived, it could be attained only in a life beyond. In the course of time, however, this view was changed, and the ideal was replaced by what is described as *jīvanmukti* or 'freedom when still alive'. This new ideal marks a great advance on the earlier one, for it represents man's aim, not as the attainment of freedom hereafter, but as a continual progress towards an end attainable, if one so wills, within the limits of the present life. Not all the systems, however, formally accept it, but only some like the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta. But even the other systems may be said to

admit it in fact, though not in name, for they postulate final release, in the case of an enlightened person, as a matter of necessity at the end of this life. The distinction between the two views reduces itself really to this: whether or not the discipline prescribed for the spiritual aspirant should, *as such* (i.e., under a sense of constraint), continue in the interval between the dawn of true knowledge and physical death. According to those, who do not formally accept the ideal of *jīvanmukti*, it should continue while, according to the rest, it need not.

We shall conclude this brief sketch by describing the kind of life which a *jivanmukta* or knower leads. We have mentioned two aids to the attainment of the goal, cultivation of detachment and realizing in one's experience the nature of the true self. Corresponding to these, the life of the knower, broadly speaking, will be characterised by two features. In the first place, it will be entirely free from the tyranny of the egoistic self, and therefore also free from the feverish activity for gratifying personal desires which can never be completely gratified. In the second place, it will be marked, to speak first of monism, by an unshakable conviction in the unity of all beings and consequently by love for others—love for them, not as equals but as essentially one with oneself. Such love will necessarily result in work, spontaneously undertaken for the good of others who, he sees, are immersed in so much ignorance and suffering. In pluralistic systems too, which believe in many selves, the same will be the case, the only difference being that the enlightened person will help others prompted by pity or compassion, rather than love in the above sense. Thus, according to all the schools, the knower, after gaining enlightenment and freedom for himself, will spread that enlightenment among others and secure for them the same freedom, so far as it lies in his power. There is in this regard the illustrious example of Buddha, who, we may remark by the way, is only one among several that have appeared in the spiritual history of India. Hence, though the final aim of life is here stated to be self-realization, it is really much more, for it also signifies doing one's utmost to secure universal good.

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